GIFT OF W. H. Ivie ;ra WYCH. iflflABY • m |l- ;■ ■ .^ ^ - . .«'%•■■ -% ■*- .. ^# # I NEW AND EXTENSIYE ANALYTICAL EXAMIKATION Jlr «. tmtnts ai Mental Sthntt: CONTAIMIKO a EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ELE- MENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS OP MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION. BY REV. MOSES SMITH, A.M. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. I. "Know thyself." dtnctnnatt: PRINTED AT THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, FOR THE AUTHOR. U. P. THOMPSON, PEIKTER. 1855. ^4 !•» .O ') w EDUC. LIBRARY Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, BY MOSES SMITH, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the District of Ohio. QIFTOF PREFACE. The design of laying this work before the pub- lic, is to present the Philosophy of Mind in as clear a light as possible — adapting the sentiments and arguments to the demands of the present age, and freed from many embarrassments hitherto con- nected with the examination of the elements of mind. It is most ardently desired, that the true principles constituting the science should be cor- rectly defined, and that the entire work be auxil- iary to the investigation and knowledge of truth. Yet the best efforts are of humble pretensions and partial claims. We could not aspire to solicit recommendations favoring the circulation of these volumes, unless they can exist in the judgment and by the decisions of the student and the phi- losopher, who carefully and understandingly exam- ine each page and sentence of the work. The Author. 3 i 905112 ADVANTAGES. The advantages of this work are only partially expressed in the following order : 1. An Introduction, designed as preparatory to the science intended to be taught, commencing with man, an existent — a compound being; his primi- tive, present, and future state. 2. Psychology, established from the nature, har- mony, and distinct qualities of elements only adapted to an immaterial existence. 3. Anthropology, established from the nature and distinct qualities of elements, which are only adapted to the existence of matter. 4. The speculations of materialists examined and refuted, which closes abstract examinations of ele- ments belonging to physical science. 5. This work is divided into two volumes. The jSrst volume embraces the examination of elements of mind which lie at the foundation of mental ac- tion. The second volume embraces the examination of elements of mind which lie at the foundation of moral action. 6. Reasons naturally arise as to the necessity of such a distinction in tracing each faculty, either ab- stractly or in its combined relationship with other powers. 7. Elements which have not hitherto been ac- knowledged as having any important place in the 1* 5 b ADVANTAGES. philosophy of mind, have been inserted in this work, with reasons why they should be acknowledged. 8. Some of the primary faculties of the mind hav- ing ever been left in great obscurity, are defined, with a brief defense in favor of their position and claims. 9. The value of this work has been increased by the correct opinions and sound arguments of all the principal philosophers W'ho have written upon men- tal science ; but we have avoided referring to their various speculative opinions foreign to the true ex- amination of the elements of mind. 10. A design of this work is to present each item distinctly, and with few words. The subjects and items are all numbered in the chaptei-s and sections. Immediate reference can be had, from the Index, to any part or item of the work. 11. When any element appears to have a mental and moral position, or influence in the mind, it will be so defined. 12. As far as ability and labor could go, the effort has been to adapt this work to the science as it is, and not to adapt the science to the work. 13. A decided advantage is, that the student is under no obligations to receive the contents of this work, in whole or in part; yet the objector should be willing to render an equivalent, or give better reasons against the arguments used, than can be given in favor of them. an INTRODUCTION. SECTION I. 1. Man exists. Of non-existences we can have no satisfactory knowledge, and to define them would be utterly impossible. But man is a definite existent, occupying a point in unbounded space. The cer- tainty of his being is neither imaginary nor ideal ; but he is a certain entity, possessing a real place as truly as he does a relative position in the range and limitless extent of existences. He vies in reality and importance with all finite elements and beings around him, and the idea of his entity transcends all possibility of doubt. 2. He either exists or has no existence. If he has no existence, all arguments about that which is incapable of occupying any point in space, or of having being, either in entity or nonentity, must necessarily pause in perpetual silence. But it is impossible to conceive of nonen- tity as tangible, and having form, size, weight, and action, or that entity could be, in nature and essence, non-existence. Therefore, all existences may be de- nominated truths, or facts. 3. These/ac^ or truths^ may be made known to us by demonstration, or be received as self-evident realities. The former will produce a result worthy of full confidence, when 7 8 correctly deduced from true premises. The latter may be regarded as an axiom of knowledge, being independent of either proof or disproof. Then the certainty of our existence is not a matter of either conjecture or of doubt, but of knowledge. 4. The reasondbleness of our existence is found in the limit- less goodness of God. He is the antecedent power or cause of our being. It is impossible for us to con- ceive that any imperfect or unhappy designs were originally intended by him, but that the created should glorify the creator, and be happy in his un- ending favor. A being perfectly holy and happy could not create shame, misery, and death as an ob- ject of pleasure to exist in the midst of his absolute perfections ; if so, we can not understand the perfect purity, will, action, and infinite glory of Deity, by whose creative power man is, and holds so high a position in the range of the intellectual universe. But it is reasonable for him to live to enjoy God, and to perpetuate that blissful communion by love, service, and obedience. SECTION II. 1. He exists^ moving ^A'Ci\ freedom over the earth; has been called the noblest work of God, and lord of this world. He has been styled a compendium of creation, standing midway the kingdom of nature and that of immortal spirits. He studies to know every thing below himself — the earth, compounded of its various qualities, and all appertaining to it. He desires and labors to comprehend all unexplored laws connected with zoology, vegetation, and crys- HIS BEING IKDKSTBUCTIBLE. ^ tallization. Looking abroad upon yonder heavens, he traces the rolling orbs of the vast universe—* watches tempest and calm, rain and drouth, heat and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, should he not go still higher, and study to know himself? 2. His faculties of mind are inalienable, and have power of motion. He is rationally constituted a being who feels, reflects, thinks, judges, contrives, wills, and acts. He has power to command ideas and communicate them to others b}^ articulated sounds or speech, by the art of writing, or by sig- nonical representations of thought. 3. As a point or dot uix)n canvas, ever moving uniformly in size and direction, forms a continued and unending line, so is the existence of man ; though disconnected with the infinity of the past, yet his being will extend on through the interminable future, incapable of lim- itation. SECTION III. 1. His being is indestructible^ and can never be discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and action of all the elements of mind are averse to any thing like a return to non-existence, or to any idea that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no concej5tion that »n all-wise Being could or would create us for the purpose of causing our non-exist- ence. This conclusion can be sustained by the inde- structibility of matter. 2. Matter may be decom- posed, the elements united or consolidated, may have the laws of affinity and power of adhesion sus- pended or destroyed; but we have no evidence of 10 HIS STATES. any possible cmniJiilation of properties. Actual ex- periments will show that the existence of elements or atoms of matter can not be rendered inane by any refining or destroying process. The elements of a block of wood having been burned with fire, still exist; the fire has only separated the compound into its natural primary elements, and no property has been annihilated. JS'o evidence has ever been found that any projDcrty of either the body or of the soul can or will ever cease to be. If this be true, and we acknowledge that both matter and mind are now real existences, we are forced to the conclusion that those existences will continue to exist in some way forever. SECTION IV. 1. The existence of man has been divided into periods^ or states^ arising from important changes. (1.) His primitive state was one of innocence and happiness, and to have been perpetuated by love, service, and obedience. He was constituted with a holy nature, and capable of ever acting from pure motives. The understanding, affections, and will were obedient to, and in harmony with, the perfect law of God. The injunction requiring this law to be kept inviolate, was not the law itself, and a sub- ordinate or contingent law would have been imper- fect, and, therefore, could not exist. Hence, the injunction, suspended upon conditions, could not be properly a law, till it was signed and sealed as such by the voluntary act of our federal head. (2.) His fallen state is a departure from the primitive one. HIS STATES. 11 The change was caused by a perverted act of voli- tion. The object of his creation was to be, to have enjoyment, and to act in glorifying his Creator. "Without action in rendering obedience and praise, the design of his existence would have been de- stroyed. If action is indispensable in glorifying the Creator, then he must act, and he can not act unless he has self-power to act. For if compelled to glo- rify God, it follows that it is the compulsatory power, or law, which acts, that renders service or glory, while man was and is wholly passive. If such a power or law is operative, and is the source of all glory to the Creator, it had that power to as great a degree without as well as with the existence of man. Hence, there could not have been any object in view in our creation ; and if there was no design to be met, we have never had being, and never can exist, for all the acts of Deity exist in infinite wisdom. But if man was the actor, he must have had power to act ; and if he had power to act, that power was within himself, and was self-power, or volition. The law of God and volition in man are not one and the same thing. The latter can act without the former, otherwise the object of our creation would have been wholly destroyed by law; then our existence would have been impossible. (3.) ^^probationary state we understand man's recovery, through a Savior, from the fall. This has been called a gracious state, in which life and immortality have been brought to light through the Gospel of peace. (4.) His futnire state is that in which the soul, and, finally, the body, shall have an inseparable reunion and an intermina- ble duration of life. 12 MAN A COMPOUND BEING. SECTION Y. 1. Man is comjpounded of spirit and matter; these ■united constitute but the oie being. The ties of affection connecting the two natures seem to be so arranged, that when severed bj death the soul sus- tains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or of true knowledge. The body without the soul is life- less clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing any powder of action or item of knowledge. If the soul is possessed of powers and knowledge before death, it has them after death, unless death has anni- hilating power, wdiich is contrary to all evidence, and must be absurd, 2. The spirit contains the ani- mating _principle, or is the principle of life. The science of psychology can not be untrue; for the soul is indispensable to life and a knowledge of self. 3. The soul of man is the intelligent part of his being. Reason, judgment, and knowledge can not be matter, nor a result of material elements. 4. It is an i^nmaterial or spiritual existence, as a w^hole, one and indivisible. It can not be inert, neither is it ponderous, or capable of annihilation. 5. It is immortal — limitless in duration. Its faculties are very numerous, vivid in action, and powerful in con- ception and demonstrations. SECTION VI. 1. Matter is distinct from mind. Anthropology can furnish no material element which, in quality or essence, can be called mind in whole or in part. Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous — pos- MIND AND MATTER. 18 sessing density and extension, with gradations and dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to be inanimate when insensible and inactive within itself. Inert elements act only from impinging causes, and in conformity to the law or force oi gravitation, but tbey can not possess any self power of action. 3. It is animate when it possesses sensi- tive motion or action within itself. But the anima- ting principle is not matter; for then all matter would be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive action belongs to that which has life ; but matter may have motion or action without having sensation or life. Otherwise the vast globe might be an ani- mal or a being of life, by reason of its diurnal mo- tion and orbicular flight. But matter has no power of self-action. SECTION YII. 1. Mind is not matter. It is an internal and intellectual power. From the esseptial nature of its being, such an intellectual power, when in action, is knowledge. Mind must either act itself, or act from impinging causes. The natural tendency of matter is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and remain at rest. If gcioved by any external caus^, rest is restored so soon as the impinging agent is. wholly removed. Having no action within itself, it is im- possible for it either to act or cause action. 2. But the mind acts independent of remote, contingent, or intermingling causes. It has power to understand, conceive, judge, reason, and feel. These principles can not apply to or constitute insensible and inert 2 14 % MIND AND MATTER. matter. 3. The term mind is applied to a combina- tion of faculties, or an internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills. It is known to us by these faculties, and they are made known to us by our consciousness, the affirmations of which we can not doubt. 4. The essence of mind has been referred to something back of these faculties, or forming a still deeper foundation of their being. "We can have no clear conception or certain knowledge of such occult qualities. To advance in search of such ele- ments would only plunge us into darkness and doubt. All such speculations would be uncertain, from our ignorance of the subject; therefore, it is useless to try to decide upon uncertainties, and such a process would add nothing to true science. 5. Imagine that we remove consecutively all the facul- ties of the mind, and it would be very difficult to conceive of some remaining something called es- sence. And if we could, how could we analyze it, further than to call it the power or influence which affinitates, in common, all the functions constituting the soul ? This is stated to start the mind to think- ing, but to dwell on it would not be profitable. Though this subject has been the origin of many speculative arguments, and in a way that it is not capable of, words can not define it or make it known to us. It exists in facts or truths wholly the objects of consciousness. SECTION YIIT. 1. Knowledge^ the result of reasoning^ is not so clear, strong, and unerring as that arising from MIND AND MATTEB. 15 intuition. The latter is the only primary source of receiving facts as facts, without either proof or dis- proof. In argumentation an appeal to conscious- ness may be the last acknowledged resort, but it is the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of the external world, which strike the sense, can never vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the anterior cause of its existence. 2. We feel intui- tively a power within entirely distinct from all prop- erties of materiality. This combination of elements or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we have real knowledge of such elements only by con- sciousness. Matter combines properties which are solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are known to us as such by our senses. 3. If ih^ power constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending them together in action, be matter, how could it act within itself in recalling the past, and in contempla- ting the future — the events and occurrences of the one, and the objects and the hopes of the other? And how could it act in examining the nature and properties of tangible existences, and the design, as evidenced in the symmetry and harmony naturally adapting them to ^l^e purposes and ends of their being? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through unexplored creation and interminable duration? How could it examine the properties and laws of existences, and reason from nature up to nature's God? 4. If the principle within us which thinks and acts is matter^ we are plunged into total dark- ness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of perception or knowledge of the existence of any 16 MIND AND MATTER. j- fact; for that which thinks is known to ns only by thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and extension. The former is known by properties en- tirely different from the latter. Matter contains no principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, rejoice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair. SECTIOI^ IX. 1. Matter is not mind. The substances compos- ipg the material universe are severally ponderous, divisible, and possessing density and extension; also existing in liquids or air form. The principles of these existences are known as principles of matter and not of mind. All properties of matter are nat- urally inert. There are no elements or atoms be- longing to the science of physics which can have action within themselves, or self-action. All action or motion produced in them by operative causes, tends to inertness or rest at the suspension of the power of those causes. 2. All material elements tend naturally to rest. And rest, or that which is at rest by natural tendency or law, can not originate action, neither can it pervade with action either rest or a series of entities at rest. But mind at rest has power to act within itself, and to cause action in insensible bodies by voluntarily causing them to be impinged while at rest, and by accelerating or by counteracting their inertia. 3. Matter presents a ^phenomena distinct from mind. Its properties, or combination of substances, possesses solidity and divisibility. Our knowledge of their existence and qualities is gained by observatiooi and the test of MIND AND MATTER. 17 the senses. 4. The essence of matter is difficult to define. That properties exist is clearly demon- strable; but to go back of these in search of some occult principle or essence of being, would be attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true analysis* Yet the mind should be tested to its utmost power in trying to trace properties back to essence, or in discriminating between them by dis- tinguishing their inhesive affinity in the union of compounds, which, if dissevered and all the clus- tering properties removed, there is something re- maining as unknown or imaginary, to which the term essence may be applied. But we can have no satisfactory knowledge of any thing in physics ante- rior to, or, more correctly, primary than properties. • SECTION X. 1. If the ideas of materialists be true, that there is nothing but matter in the vast universe; and that at farthest, the soul of man is only the result of a particular organization of matter in the body, we have no reasons favoring the knowledge of any ex- istence. 2. For inert properties can have no knowl- edge of their own existence, nor of external existen- ces. But we can not conceive of an immensity of space filled with nothing. Nonentity can have no perception or knowledge of non-existence, neither can it have knowledge of entity. There can be no knowledge without existences ; and if there be enti- ties, and they exist as insensible and inert matter, they can not have knowledge of any existence. Then there must be an existence capable of thinking 2* 18 MIND AND MATTER. and knowing, and something capable of being tbe object of thought and knowledge. 3. If all bodies consist of unextended atoms, moved only by some law or influence of attraction or resistance, how could w^e account for the existence and action of that law or laws? If law can not think, reason, and act within and of itself, it is clear that there can be no power to think and act contained in inanimate and inert atoms of matter. 4. The non-existence of matter is more reasonable than that nothing exists but matter; for if nothing exists but matter, we have seen that there could be no knowledge of any reality; and if nothing could be apprehended or known, then if there could be existences, all knowl- edge of them would be lost in non-existence. Our knowledge of the existence of mind is as extensive, and more to be relied on, than is our knowledge of - the existence of matter. SECTION XI. 1. If the soul is matter, it \i2i.^ power to tliinlc and act. And as matter is matter, it follows that all matter has power to think and act, which is absurd. If some definite portion possesses this power, the dif- ference is the result of the different modifications, magnitude, figure, or motion of some parts of matter in respect to other parts, or to the mass, or the power of thinking and acting must be given to some sys- tems of it and rejected from others. What irregu- larity in the regular, onward course of nature could have being and power to make this difference, when no such power can naturally exist in the particles MIND AND MATTER. 1ft themselves? Surely no one will contend for such a position. 2. If all matter is cogitative^ it is contrary to all experience and knowledge we have of its nature. And if so, our senses and faculties are formed only to deceive us. A rock possesses no sign or evidence of either cogitation or of sense. The head is the great battery of thought, and there all the ministers of sensation make their appeal; but if all matter be cogitative, the feet would contain proportionably as much thought and understanding as the head, and there would be as much in the mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-oper- ative but inert, and is no more than a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Ma- terialism, in more recent and modified forms ^ main- tains that mind is a result of organization, or a function of the brain ; that the physical and mental faculties coinhering the same primary substances, grow, mature, decay, and cease together. If the brain is only the organ of the mind, it can not be the mind itself. It may form the center in which exists that influence on which depends sensation and motion. This organ is delicately connected, to a limited extent, with the mind's states and develop- ments. Chemical analysis will show that all nerv- ous matter in the entire system possesses precisely the same properties as that of the brain. Then if mind be matter, or the result of that kind of matter, it would be located all through the system ; and if we could live we could have knowledge, to a propor- tionable extent, as well without the head as with it, in some instances, or as well without it as without a hand or a foot. 4. The various diseases of the m 20 MIND AND MATTEE. brain often modify, impair, or destroy the manifesta- tions of mind. This sequence, if uniform, would not make mind to be the result of material elements, but would prove the brain to be the organ through which the mind acts and has access to external things. An object reflecting light to a perfect eye can be seen ; but without liglit sight would be lost — one of the bodily senses is suspended ; yet the mind has power still to retain a knowledge of the object seen. Therefore, the power of the mind to act is not limited to the senses, for it can act when they are suspended. SECTION XII. 1. Mind is independent of matter as to existence, and as to properties or essence ; but it is dependent in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them. With this knowledge attained, its manifestations are operative and independent of impressions from ex- ternal things. It possesses self-consciousness and motion. It can retain distinctly and at pleasure correct ideas of that which has ceased to exist, and can recall long-forgotten events. It can go further, and call up chains of existences, arrange them in order, symmetry, beauty, and grandeur, and present them as facts, independent of. either nonentity or of material reality. 2. Matter can exist and be matter without the power to either tJiinh or act. Mind without these ceases to be mind. If we are wholly material, and matter can think as matter, then we must continue to think always, and in proportion to the number and size of the particles contained in MIND AND MATTER. 21 each compound. Then a large body can think more and more powerfully than a smaller one; and both must continue to think on forever, or till their being, with all their elements, are annihilated. 3. If mat- ter can not be annihilated^ then materialists are im- mortal unawares and contrary to their purposes and desires, but in perfect accordance with the premises of their own assumption. At least they must have a conscious state of being as long as there are any elements of the body existing after death. There- fore, embalmed and petrified bodies must have con- sciousness, thought, and action for ages and cycles of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter thinhs through the fviure^ it must have ahoays thoiight in thepast^ and there has been no time of our actiml physical existence when the mind was not active and think- ing. But this is contrary to all experience and knowledge, and must be absurd. SECTION XIII. 1. What principle of materiality can ^oQSQsi sen- sation with'm itself or in common, or can constitute that which loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is capable of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and excited with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse and despair? These changes exist and often alternate, without any reference to changes impressed by ex- ternal things or of physical debility. In perfect health passion, anger, regret, and remorse may fill the soul; and peace, tranquillity, and hope often pos- sess the mind when the body is suffering intensely or is even dying. Whatever may be the uniformity \ 5555 MIND AND MATTER. of physical entities and laws, they can not produce a corresponding uniformity of mental states. 2. The septennial revolutions, or renewing of the system by the changes of its particles, does not change the identity of self nor the one continued being in which man lives, and which- he feels and knows to be himself. If self-action, self-consciousness, and thinking constitute the elements of matter, or are essential to them, all elements of matter, ab- stractly or combined, in every system must contain them; and then they would be impossible to any, for every system of materiality would possess self- action and a consciousness of its own existence indi- vidually in self-thought or thinking; and no self- consciousness or thought of an individual property can exist in common with other properties, or of the compound. Then no element or atom of matter in the vast universe could have knowledge of the ex- istence of any thing beside or beyond itself; and having no power of self-knowledge, it can not determ- ine its own existence. Therefore, there can be no knowledge of the existence of any thing. The near affinity and position of properties can not blend them as one, while matter is divisible and incapable of self-action. 3. If impressions made upon 7)iate- rial organs constitute the knowledge of existences, the occurrences of early life could not be commanded or recalled in old age; for the particles of the sys- tem so often changing, and being incapable of self- action, could make no transfer of their knowledge to those succeeding them. Then all knowledge of the past would cease to be, and we could know noth- ing back of the present moment. MIND AND MATTEE. 28 SECTION XIY. 1. Mind 13 dissimilar and distinct from matter, or even a result of materiality, only so far as matter may be the organ of the mind, or through which it holds intercourse with the external world. Think- ing can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of the properties which think; for this would only result in gradations of size, or as to the appearance and celerity, which would differ from thinking. The power of the senses can fully test that these changes and affections of matter are different from the prin- ciple or causes of thinking and motion. They are the effects or results of the action of other material particles in motion by some acting cause, which shows that matter within itself is inert and can not be cogitative. 2. The human body is incapable of annihilation. So far as we can analyze and under- stand, it appears that temporal death has no power to annihilate the constitutional elements of the body. The earth, air, and water consolidated in the forest oak, may be decomposed or separated by fire ; yet not one element or particle of the primary principles can be utterly destroyed. Death sunders the ties of affection connecting the soul and body, and the effect of the change in the body appears to be no more than the change of the arrangements of its essential elements. Chemical analysis will show that it is utterly impossible to annihilate any of its elements or particles of elements. 3. We have no evidence of the annihilation of any existent, and our conception of such a result is impossible. There is no evidence of such a possibility in physical analy- 24: MIND AND MATTER. sis, or taught in revelation, and onr experience and belief are against it. If any element or atom of a constitutional function of the body or of the mate- rial universe, which ever existed, has or can ever cease to be, we have no proof of the fact from any source. Decomposition can take place in fallen ele- ments, but that is no part of non-existence. SECTION XT. 1. The accumulating weakness of age and the very decay of the body indicates no annihilation of mat- ter, but a change in the affinity and position of its elements, and is an additional pi-oof of the continu- ation of the soul ; for this decay is continued exist- ence in change and under a new form or abstracted entities. AVe may prove by experiment or analysis, that all physical properties or particles of elements are indestructible, being incapable of cessation. If this be true, death has the power only to separate the constituent elements, and that they exist as fully when separated after death as they did before it. The term resurrection does not convey the idea of a new creation, but a resuscitation of the very identical body that went down to the grave, in the recalling of the primary elements to their wonted affinity and order in the new organized body; thence- forth their union will be unbroken. Should this be true of the material system, and that it is dissimilar and distinct in properties from the immaterial na- ture, who can doubt the immortality of the soul? 2. Animal life, as found in the lower orders of natu- ral existences, is not denominated an intellectual MIND AND MATTEB. 25 one, but it contains much of the ^Jienomena of mind, which is far superior to mere vegetable life or the growth of rocks. Only call it instinct, and it pos- sesses properties which differ from the properties of matter. 3. They have the power of voluntary mo- idon, and a sense of danger, and to avoid it ; also, a knowledge of causes. Some have been observed to go still further, having comparison, and, seemingly, an intuitive principle of affection or friendship, capable of being cultivated to a limited extent. The fox has been known to run through a fence with a chunk in his mouth the size of his intended prey, then to return and gather his prey from the herd and inin through the very same avenue in escaping from danger. The Newfoundland dog evinces natu- ral affection and care for the safety of children ; and often, in rescuing them from drowning, they have appeared to give evidence of judgment, as well as affection and compassion, by going to the best, and, sometimes, the only place of escaping from the water. 4. It is absurd to say that these traits of the phenomena of mind are the properties of mat- ter, possessing solidity, extension, and divisibility; for they are connected with the power of life, sensa- tion, and action. Vegetable life has no self action, and can only move in expanding or growth by the laws and influences connected with the seasons. Petrifaction, crystallization, and the growth of rocks is a still lower and more uninterrupted order of life, being independent of and almost unaffected by either the vernal ray or tropical shadow. 3 26 MIND AND MATTEK. SECTION XYI. 1. Tlioiigh we do not know matter to be eternal in duration^ yet we have no evidence to believe that its properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if matter will exist in some way forever, it follows that there is something connected with animal life and motion which is superior in nature to mere matter, and it is of a mental character and nature, clearly distinct from matter, and must be called an imma- terial or immortal principle; and we have as little or less proof of its pending annihilation as we have of the final non-existence of matter. 2. The soul is superior to matter in the Jcnowledge it has of its own existence^ and of the existence of matter^ and its power of self-action. These distinct differences show an immaterial independence, and its states and manifestations are incomprehensible — almost an in- finity of meaning within itself. To our certain knowledge we can feel something within us that acts from an internal principle; we experience liberty, the power of choosing, and we have self-government. There is an internal spiritual dominion or umpiracle principle, in which thoughts arise and are com manded, and by and from which they are sent forth through limitless creation like exploring lights, dis persed all abroad. The materialist has this power, and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts voluntarily about any business he may choose or desire. 3. Matter is natv/rally inse^isihle a/tid mo- tionless^ and unless motion is communicated to it by some other acting agency, it must remain forever stationary and dead. But the soul has power of MIND AND MATTER. 27 self action, with a design in acting, with a view of an end to be attained, while, at the same time, the means to effect it are fully considered. Such an ex- istence as this, with such energetic and vivid capaci- ties and powers within itself, can be neither material in nature nor accidental in being and results. Mat- ter, abstractly, can not be excited within itself, or moved by arguments, admiration, love, sympathy, or sufferings. But we are moved to action by reasons existing within ourselves and those imparted to us from others, and by words spoken or written. 4. To hear of or to see suffering will naturally move the feelings of the soul, and words written often cre- ate joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. The self in active characters on the paper can not mechanically or naturally move the observer in any way. If words are spoken there can be nothing in the simple pulsations of the air that can effect mat- ter creating self motion, neither to effect in any way the feelings or knowledge. That power which per- ceives and apprehends the force and sense of these things is far different from any principle of matter. Articulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse the soul in feelings or passion ; and they can pro- duce mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These results can not be the physical effects of the terms used, or else the effect would be the same and as ex- tensive if not understood as though they were. When we imagine things to have been said, the mind is affected in the same way as though they had been spoken, till such impressions are corrected by the judgment. It is wholly the sense conveyed, or sup- posed to be conveyed and received, which is imma- MIND AND MATTER. terial in itself, that excites the soul and influences physical action. SECTION XYII. 1. He who believes that matter -possessed prima- rily causation, or that it can of itself come out of nonentity into self-existence, coalesce its particles and then live, think, and act by any process of re- duction or arrangements of elements, possessing fig- ure, or is excited to motion by laws of affinity or of repulsion, should first discover and define the degree of fineness existing in a divided hair, and be able to tell all the points of intersection, angling the direc- tions of their localities respectively. Then should he proceed to define the alteration in the situation of the particles of matter in which they begin to breathe life from naught, and live, act, and cogitate. 2. The self-power of particles to change to or from each other, or in degrees of difference, is impossible ; and if they could, it would still remain, that form, figure, and magnitude are all material accidents. The substance is matter, and, in this respect, can not differ in parts one from another. Then if one part can think and act, all matter can think and act. Therefore, all particles of matter possess causation and action, and must be cogitative. And if there is such a thing as matter thinking, that influence or power must be superadded, which implies a princi- ple differing in essence or nature from matter, and can not be a result of it, but must have been con- ferred by a superior or an omnipotent cause. 3. No accident of matter can produce action or cause cogi- MIND AND MATTER. 29 tation, either regularly or irregularly; and it can not superadd that influence or power, for matter is divisible, and that which thinks must be one, or of parts united, so that the action is one. But matter is not one and indivisible. However closely the particles adhere together, they still exist as parti- cles and without self-motion, and are powerless in adhering to or in penetrating each other. If the power of thought existed in those particles, it would exist whether they were in contact or remotely loca- ted ; and if these are divisible, or are capable of being sundered and scattered abroad, there must be as many minds as there are particles in matter. Then the mountain, the globe, the sun, moon, and stars are all built of mind, or of a combination of innumerable immaterialities, which is absurd. 4. On the other hand, if it requires a union of the ele* ments of matter in order to constitute a power to think and act, there would be no power to classify these elements, and it would require all of the mate- rial elements in the vast universe to form one mind or soul. Should there be some influence or essence in which they unite or center, so their action or thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is not merely superadded, but is an existent superior to and independent of matter. SECTION XVIII. 1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas of any thing, for the particles could not reflect upon what passes within themselves, much less contemplate that which was beyond ; for within themselves they 30 MIND AND MATTER. could find nothing but limited material representa- tions or impressions, and these could not form ideas, neither could they be formed by ideas, abstracting themselves ; nor have they self-power to form them- selves into trains of thought and metaphysical argu- mentation. Mind being matter, our inward percep- tion of external things could only be in accordance to the impressions they make npon matter. For the notion or idea of that which would be conceived in the mind, could have no existence while the object was prospective or distant; but now the idea is present and exists as it is in itself, while the mind has power to instantaneously grasp the object and scan every part. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses no power capable of correcting a/ppeara/iices or irri' sessions. In seeing the topsail of a ship, far away at sea, the natural idea would be like the appear- ance, the existence of something very small ; but as it is, there is something within which forms a more correct idea, bringing into consideration the rotund- ity of the sea and the feebleness of sight. That which commands our senses and reasons correctly against appearances is not matter. Matter by and in itself is lifeless and strictly passive, and acting only when moved by some separate cause, or in conformity to laws of adhesion and gravitation. 3. Man is conscious that he lives and has liberty of motion, in thought and in changing position of place, and by an instantaneous thought change his course or purpose, and counteract, in some instances, the laws both of capillary attraction and gravitation. Inert elements can not of themselves voluntarily suspend the operations or arrest the tendency and MIND AND MATTER. 89;> action of the laws of nature. Before matter can effect this its nature must be changed; it must be brought from death to life — from incapacity of self- consciousness and thinking to feeling, breathing, and cogitation. And if its nature is changed, it ceases to be matter, for inertness or passiveness is essential to its entity. 4. No faculty or influence capable of thinking can be superadded to matter, for then by such a connection it would be rendered incapable of action. And if matter could constitute the power of cogitation, still our idea of the soul would be im- perfect; for it has many faculties, and with the thinking principle we must superadd perception, apprehending, reflection, judging, comparing, will- ing, reasoning, making deductions, and putting in motion material existences. SECTION XIX. 1. The soul is not a faculty of the body, nor a remdi of matter, but it dwells within the body, and governs it in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, eyes, and tongue. That which governs the body is not the body nor particles of it, neither is it a super- added materiality or accident, but a superior spir- itual jower or soul. 2. The soul is incapable of an- nihilation, as it is distinct and superior to matter; and matter, so far as we can understand, is imper- ishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in some way. We know nothing of the nature or the essence of either mind or matter; and to try to define them, or the nature of their mysterious union, would be fruitless. We mav reason on these sub- 32 MIND AND MATTER. jects with some degree of satisfaction, though cer- tain knowledge is not at our command. 3. We have no evidence that any existent can or will ever pass into non-existence. If the elements of matter are imperishable, so far as we can comprehend them, and the immateriality of the soul is estab- lished, which would render it more incapable of non-existence, so far as our knowledge of its ele- ments and being can extend, how can we deny an unwavering belief of its immortality? This truth is accredited and exists in the moral constitution resting upon evidences tested and known by the power of intuition. The soul has naturally an in- disposition to tarry with the present moment and circumstances ; there is ever a disposition to pass on to the future, and a desire for immortality. It can now feel an awe of the future and of God. This A^aries with its shades of conscientious rectitude or sense of wrong. We look to the future with fear or hope, according to our sense of guilt or innocence ; and without the need of argument we naturally feel that we are responsible to some being for all our acts. How can all these be attributed to inert matter? Such an assumption requires no arguments to reveal its falsehood. 4. Conscience has power of self-action^ and it is often impinged or infli^nced to action by some unseen cause, both in accordance with and contrary to our will and natural desires. He who follows its dictations, and he who repels them, are both compelled to acknowledge its quick- ening influence and its power. In contemplating the infinite future, the righteous rejoice while the wicked sink under feelings of remorse ; and in both MIND AND MATTEB. 3S cases they are conscious that their feelings can not result from impressions made by external things, or from argumentation. SECTION XX. 1. The soul has a conscicma Jcnowledge of sdf with its continued being, while in health or in the wane of life. There is no condition of helplessness or suffering, this side of death, while reason re- mains, but that the soul feels its nature and being to be immortal. The immortality of the soul is reason- able, from its vast capacities and dread of annihila- tion. It is evident from its great improvements, boundless desires, natural dissatisfaction with time and things present, a desire for the future and for 8ome kind of religion. Again: it is immortal by the consent of all nations. It is demonstrated to be such in the providence of God, and is made known by the unequal infliction of Divine justice and judgments in this life. 2. The high moral obliga- tions resting upon a rational, immaterial, and im- mortal spirit, are clear and of boundless importance; for the real existence of the human soul is beyond all possibility of doubt; and in the acknowledgment of the great government of an infinite Creator, we are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that all elements and existences should be adapted to the claims and purity of the same, and all that is im- pure must be rejected from the limitless purity of God in the future world. If the soul was constitu- ted of material properties, and could those proper- ties be dissevered and dispersed by temporal death. S^ MIND AND MATTER. he who had power to create them from naught has power to aflSnitate those elements in a reunion, and in a future organization. 3. One great object of our being is to cultivate the powers bestowed upon us for usefulness^ subjecting tJiem all to the will and service of God. There are impressions connected with the consciousness of every rational being, assuring him that the soul must live forever. We have power to deny this, but there is an internal voice ever arising from intuitive authority, thunder- ing in affirmative appeals of truth, reversing all such false assumptions ; and it can never be silenced by any confession or avowed faith to the reverse. This source of truth is unerring and irresistible. 4. If materialism or any kind of infidelity be true, adherents to such doctrines are more reasonable in rejecting them, upon the grounds assumed as the basis of their own systems and faith, than they are to adopt them in violation of revelation and its re- quirements ; for if the former be true, we shall all fare just alike in the future world. Then, if we believe them to be true, and act accordingly^, and they should finally prove to be false, our loss would be irreparable — all hope would be involved in ruin. But if we should adopt the Christian system and religion, and it should prove to be true in the final test, we would be perfectly safe forever. SECTION XXI. 1. It is more reasonable for an Atheist skeptic or a materialist naturally to believe in revelation, the immortality of the soul, and that that immortality MIND AND MATTER. 85 of being may be pure and holy, than it is for them to reject them as false. It is more reasonable for them to believe in them as true, and to live accord- ingly, even if they should prove finally to be false, than it is to reject them, from the following reasons : (1.) There is no book on earth which claims to be a revelation from God but the Bible. If it be true^ we are perfectly safe in believing it ; and as it is the only book of the kind, we could sustain no loss in receiving it as true, even if it should prove in the next world to be false; for then it would have had no power to change our condition from what it was going to be, nor to render it worse. (2.) As this is the only revelation we have claiming to bo inspired, should it be false, we will all share the same fate at last, and can lose nothing by believing it, and in living accordingly. Then, if it be true, we have gained every thing calculated to constitute us happy, and if it be false, it is as equally clear that we can lose nothing by believing it. But if we reject it, and it proves to be true at last, we are lost forever. (3.) Then, if from reason we can believe revelation to be t7'ice, who can doubt but that the soul is im- mortal? (4.) If the soul is immortal, according to revealed truth, it is capable of an immortality of purity and happiness. 2. Man is not a skeptic by nature, neither can he become one by the authority of revelation. He has an internal conviction that that principle which thinks, acts, reasons, and wills, must live forever. And if the great moral and infinite government of God is infinitely pure and holy, w^e must be prepared for it and adapted to it, in order to enter into the joys of a peaceful immor- S6 MIND AND MATTER. tality. 3. As matter belongs to 'physical science, we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer the reader to that part of this work devoted more exclusively to the philosophy of mind, where the mental powers of the student can be fully tested in examining mental elements. He should study to de- fine as clearly as possible the existence and ofiice of the various properties of mind. It will increase his confidence in the true existence of immaterial ele- ments, the self-power of the soul to act, and of its immortality. His belief will be established as to the existence and limitless power, wisdom and good- ness of the great first Cause. As standing midway the ascending and descending series in two worlds of existences, he should rejoice in trying to contem- plate all demonstrable truths, possessed of submis- sive composure amid the infinite mysteries con- nected with the government of an all- wise Creator, knowing that duty more imperatively requires him ever to wonder and adore, to love and praise. ^Itrntnts at ll^ntal Btitntt, THE ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIS AT THB POHNDATION OP MBNTAL ACTION. ,n«iiil^ ii iTA^^'s^f ««f f A au i>l giHsion Jfirst. ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. PEELIMINARY ARGUMENT. SECTION I. 1. The mind of man is truly and clearly a spir- itual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and unending in its duration. 2. In the philosophy of mind there are elements which may be called mental elements. These elements lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind, and are the source of men- tal action, and without their existence mental action is inane. 3. If moral feelings can exist in the mind, and if moral action can proceed from it as an entity, or from its states or motion, there must be elements of mind connected directly with the origin of moral influences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as appertaining to or as a part of self; neither could we ever be capable of moral action. SECTION II. 1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of moral action^ or are connected with the origin of •the moral influences of the soul, may be called moral elements of mind. 2. If there is neither mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can 39 40 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. be neither mental nor moral science^ which can be known to us as such. But mental and moral science are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, there must exist in the philosophy of mind both mental and moral powers, when we compare the nature of the actions which proceed from them; otherwise the idea of the power, or the existence of either mental or moral action, is absurd; for an effect to exist without a foundation or cause is utterly impossible. INTELLECTTJAL TOWERS. 41 Wt^tl CHAPTER II. . INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. SECTION I. 1. There are varioics orders of mind. Finite minds, from the lowest up to the highest gradation of intelligence, are justly responsible to the author- ity of the great infinite mind and sovereign Kuler over all, to whom we should ever be wholly submis- sive and obedient in adoration, service, love, and praise. 2. The inferior orc?^* of animated and self- acting beings possess something of the phenomena of mind. These properties, if they be only called instinct, are properties entirely dissimilar to and differing from those of matter. SECTION II. 1. Matter has neither conscious sensation nor sdf- motion^ but it has inertness, which is essential to its nature and existence, and without which it ceases to be matter. 2. That which is analogous to the states and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and fish, if it is perceptible at all, it may be denomina- ted or called instinct; yet instinct alone may be called imperishable, from the fact that it is distinct from and is superior to matter; and we have no evidence to believe that any properties or particles of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the intel- 4* I Mm f & INTELLECTUAL POWERS. lectual and immortal powers of the human mind are now prominently before us, and form the true objects of our inquiries. tiiiH ^«i¥^ 'ff'rT *^'^*^^?y»vp*^' ^* EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 4S CHAPTER III. OUB KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NA- TURE OF THE HUMAN MIND. SECTION I. 1. Mind is immaterial m naiv/re^ and exists in essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of matter, and has a continued being, which is inde- pendent of any essential loss or elementary destruc- tion by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not con- stituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, but it is that which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. Though we examine severally the elements or prop- erties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, but it is one in essence or nature, and the union of properties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. Our knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, independently of demonstration, falls back upon in- tuition^ and is knowledge, known to be true, in an unerring assurance received and fully tested by self- consciousness. If the power of knowing existing facts be not referred back to innate elements as truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind ; and if they be not the primary source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non- existences. In an important sense we know that we exist, because we intuitively feel our existence to be real, and the knowledge of it to be true. 4. Our 44 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. knowledge of the existence of mind may be tested by the known existence of certain facts. It has power to think and will, remember and reason. It holds intercourse w^ith external things by med-ns of the corporeal senses, and receives impressions from them. These operations and results are known to us as facts, which facts are evidences of the exist- ence of a power capable of knowing them to be such, and this primary power, which is capable of knowledge within itself, is mind. SECTION II. 1. These results^ which are of the operation or motion of the mind, are not the primary knowledge of its existence, else the whole of mind would exist in motion, and motion can not exist where there is no power of self-action, or cause capable of moving. But the power of knowing all these acts and results falls back upon self-consciousness and intuition. 2. In matter such essences as possess solidity and ex- tension, or that which is essential to its entity, are called primary properties. But contact with a smell or odor awakens a conviction in the mind that there is somewhere an unknown cause of this known sen- sation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, have been styled as Secondary properties of matter. Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of primary elements. 3. If a knowledge of mind, as an entity, is wholly and only known by its motion^ then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion or action may or may not exist; and if there be no abiding, primary elements capable of self-motion, EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 45 and intuitively the origin of all knowledge, we can not have certain knowledge of any existence. 4. Any speculations as to the cav^e of mind are far beyond philosophical inquiries. It is not the cause of its own existence, neither can entity be a result of non-existence. These things go beyond the reach of the human understanding. The true cause can only exist in the wisdom, goodness, and power of Deity, to whom we should bow in submissive awe, amid the yet unrevealed mysteries of the past, the present, and the future. 5. The nature or essence of mind is unknown to us. We know nothing of the essence of either matter or mind ; yet we are certain of the reality of that mysterious principle within us, which is a permanent existent of various phenomena or properties. If that principle or power be called the essence of mind, in whole or in part, and it be unknown to us as to its nature, yet it is not unknown to us as an existent. SECTION III. 1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, that "we are not immediately conscious of mind's existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition ; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To what extent we are immediately conscious of its ex- istence, anterior to the mind's operations, is difficult to define with words. But to say that the power of self-consciousness can extend no further back, in any way, than the consciousness of sensation, thou^it, and volition, and they admitted to be mere opera- 46 EXISTENCE AND NATTJBE OF MIND. tions of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are no more than the original power or primary ele- ments in motion. It is impossible for those opera- tions, which are only sequences or results, to derive no power from the primary cause and supporter of such operations ; otherwise the operations or acts of the mind would be the only primary principle or elements of its being. Then, whenever the mind was wholly inactive it would be annihilated, or, at least, we could have no certain knowledge of self, as the mere operations of mind may or may not exist; but if they can "imply something which feels, thinks, and wills," they imply a power which is capable of being the origin of the conscious knowl- edge of all the acts of the mind ; otherwise an eifect must be the origin of the cause of itself. 2. Axioms^ in numerical science, may, in some respects, repre- sent axioms in the philosophy of mind. The whole of mathematical demonstrations or calculations can not be known to us as certainly true or false, w^ere it not for the fact that they are based upon self evident facts or truths called axioms. "We are compelled to admit that things w^hich are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. If equals be added to equals the wholes are equal. All right-angles are equal to one another. A square block is a square block. Two added to two make four. We know all these to be truths or facts; but it is an absolute impossibility for us, by any process of reasoning or demonstration, to prove them to be either true or false. And without axioms there can be neither mathematical demonstrations or science. 3. How can we Icnow such truths to be self-evident facts? EXISTENCE AND NATUEE OF MIND. 4:7 Ko power can receive them as facts, independently of all proof, but the intuitive selfevident axioms which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. The innate principles of the soul form the final and conclusive source of appeals, and are the primary- test of the knowledge of facts to us. Tlie knowledge of self-evident facts, as such, is tested by an intui- tive satisfaction or by self-consciousness, in which it is impossible for us to doubt them. 4. Why may not these selfevident facts, or axioms of the mind, have a knowledge of their own existence ; and can not the primary power of the perception and the understanding of external facts be traced back to intuition? The origin of the power of knowledge must exist in and arise from the innate elements of mind, or otherwise an efi^ect must be the primary or antecedent cause of itself. We can believe facts to exist, and to be self-evident truths, because we have within an intuitive power to feel and know them to be true independently of either proof or disproof. 48 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. CHAPTER IV. EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. SECTION I. 1. OuK inquiries as to the phenomena of mind are more properly confined io properties or elements. The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There is not so much mystery connected with the examina- tion of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capa- ble of a tJireefold division. (1.) Those which are clearly mental elements. (2.) Those which may be called moral elements of mind. (3.) The mani- festations or acts of the mind. Mental elements are connected with all mental acts^ and without their existence mental motion or action can not exist. They are the foundation or origin properly of such action or character of action. Moral elements of mind are connected with the origin of all moral action, and without such for a foundation no moral action can exist. 3. The operations or acts of the mind have hitherto been regarded as involving, (1.) Our duties to God. (2.) The duties we owe to our- selves. (3.) Our duties to one another. All these have been claimed as the principal embodiment of moral philosophy. EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 49 SECTION II. 1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present order of works on mental and moral science is in- correct; for the natural character of the elements of mind, according to the books, without any suflSciently clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact that they have been called only mental elements. No separate work has been arranged exclusively upon mental action, further than is found in connec- tion with the examination of the mental elements; while, on the other hand, the action of the mind has been, by common consent, called moral action, connected with moral duties as it is contained in moral philosophy. But we should bear in mind that there are elements of mind which may be called moral elements, growing out of their relation to and influence or position in the mind. 2. This work is intended, as far as possible, to define, in the first place, mental elements, and, secondly, moral ele- ments of mind. Then there should be a work adapted to the character, power, and nature of the actions, which are the results of elementary existen- ces which are truly mental. If moral philosophy can apply to the action of mind, which arises in connection with and from moral elements of mind, and in relation to moral objects, so may action, which is wholly mental, arising only from mental elements, be defined as mental action in nature and character. 3. From the position of many writers we would be led to suppose that moral action, or that moral philosophy was hosed wholly upon men- tal elements, while the works on mental philosophy 5 50 EXISTENCE AND NATUKE OF MIND. do not contain moral elements of mind properly ac- knowledged and sufficiently defined. But they will be defined hereafter in discriminating the difference in the nature or character of mental and moral ele- ments of mind. 4. The mind, so regularly and nat- urally arranged, contains within itself immediate power to hnow and to extend knowledge by examin- ing elements, laws, and affinities of existences. This is the comparison of phenomena, and the discovery of their agreement and disagreement. Though we can not arrive at the nature of the essence of mind, yet we are certain of something existing within, exhibiting a permanent subject of certain varying phenomena, of which we are conscious, and to doubt it would be impossible. SENSATION. 51 CHAPTER V. SENSAT-ION. SECTION I. 1. Sensation is the mind's reception of an action felt and known to exist, or it is an impression made npon it. The senses form the medium through which such an effect is realized. In another point of light it may be regarded as a simple state of the mind, in a peculiar way, and connected with action. Abstractly it is incapable of self action, and must be, to a certain extent, a result of some influence or impingement, which may arise in different ways. 2. It may be connected with the change or influence of some one or more of the organs of sense, or in being closely accessory to the change of the physical pow- ers. A change in the internal state and condition of the body may awaken the sensation of fatigue, pain, or heaviness. 3. Sensation can not he sejparor ted from the mind. All sensation is in the mind, and is nothing more nor less than the mind itself in a certain state. Our sensations are diversified and are almost innumerable. The body has parts, and can exist with the loss of some of its members ; but the mind and sensation are forever indivisible. A sensation must be the mind influenced, and is the mind in a certain state. But sensation is not wholly the mind itself. By the term mind we understand an indefinable essence, of which only the elements can come under philosophical analysis; but sensa- tion can be the mind in a certain way. 4. Sensa- tion is wholly in the mind, and the cause of sensa- tion may exist in the changes or condition of the body, or it may arise from objects of the external world. Hearing, touch, and seeing are connected w^th physical organs ; but those organs have no self- power to hear, feel, and see. They may be con- nected with and may be organs of sensation; but sensation within itself is in the mind, and is the mind in a peculiar state. SECTION II. 1. In another shade of meaning sensation \& feel- ing awakened by objects of the external world. The knowledge it gives of external objects is quite imperfect. It requires a combined action of several faculties in conveying to us a general idea of real existences. The various senses, acting separately, can give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the properties of compounds. Sensation can convey to us a result of a known or of an unknown existence; but of itself it can not give us a knowledge of either the essence or of the properties of existences. 2. Sensation may be a state of internal feelings^ which is capable of being excited by spiritual influ- ences, or by sensations of humility and awe in the presence of the great God. It can be realized in the bare remembrance of startling events in the past. 3. In receiving impressions from external objects, we are to bear in mind that our sensations are not the a^jpearance or images of those entities, for the SENSATION. li true place of sensation is in the mind, l^o external property can form any part of sensation, neither can it be added to it. It is entirely different from all material properties in essence or in nature. And it is distinct in nature, so far as we can underetand, from all spiritual influences beyond the reality of self. 4. The connection between sensation and the physical organs is involved in mystery. External objects make an impression or they affect the phys- ical organs, and through the medium of the senses they awake sensations in the mind. To explain the change effected in those organs, or to define their connection with the senses, is impossible. 5. The awakening of sensation, by external objects, through the medium of tlie senses, is evidence that it is, to a great extent, consequent to tJie senses^ so far as it relates to action from these sources. In this respect only it is immediately successive to the action of some one or more of the organs of sense ; yet the power of sensation is in the mind, which power can and will act independently of the physical organs connected with the senses, in feelings of awe in the Divine presence, or in bare remembrance of past emotions of the soul, which existed either with or without a known cause. 6. As sensation is in the mind, and is the mind, in a certain way, we are compelled to acknowledge its connection witTi the jprimary elements of mental science; for sensation can not exist only in connection with the existence of mind. 5* to 54 SENSE. CHAPTER VI. SENSE. SECTION I. 1. Sense, as connected with the human mind, is that principle or faculty which has power to ajppre- liend the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities of external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway relation between the existence and change of the physical organs and the existence of real sensation, 3. In this position only it is immediately succeeded by sensation, being the medium through which im- pressions from external objects wake up the power of sensation in the mind. SECTION II. 1. Sense, at least, a^jpreJiends some of the quali- tiefe of the substances which cause sensations, such as possess hardness, extension, and weight, which comes in contact with physical organs. 2. Its sim- ple state is spontaneous^ and its action may be wholly vohmtary, as well as a result of either volun- tary or invoked causes. 3. It may be regarded as the perception of the senses, or is that influence or motion which is immediately successive to impres- sions made upon physical organs toward the reality of that which is felt ere sensation refers it to the SENSE. HP consideration of the mind. 4. It may, in another point of light, be regarded as the discernment of the senses, which takes place on contact with an object, and in relation to the real existence of such an ob- ject, almost at the same time the beginning of the impression thus made is realized. 'H lo dotooa I ^. W .£ >i 9& m e^fl' 1 THE SENSES. !>*k w- CHAPTER VII. THE SENSES. SECTION I. 1. The senses connect, in one respect, the sensa- tions of the mind with the organs of sense in the body, and have power to report to us the existence of external things when they come in contact with the physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of their properties in connection with the action of other powers of the mind. 2. The connection ex- isting between the senses and the organs of sense in the body can not be defined. 3. We are wholly dependent upon our senses as the medium through which we have knowledge of external things. While the senses apprehend external things, and are a source of knowledge to us, as to their real existence, yet we have other sources of knowledge ; otherwise the senses would be the embodiment of all the facul- ties of the mind. SECTION II. 1. We are dependent upon the senses only so far as it relates to existences in the external worlds as the primary medium of access in knowing their ex- istence to be real. Abstractly we can not call the senses the knowledge of external things. They are only the knowledge of external things in connection the; 8EN3ES. with other powers of the mind. 2. The importance of the senses as a source of knowledge in regard to external objects is indispensable. If we were de- prived of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it would be utterly impossible for us to know any thing of external physical existences. 3. Yet the loss of all these could not annihilate the mind, neither could they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are now about to enter upon the order of the Jk)e senses. In examining the senses as they occur in their order, it is not intended that we should define the power of the senses as they exist in the mind, disconnected with the physical organs of sense; but to define, as far as possible, their oflice and power as they exist in their mysterious connection with the organs of the body. ^VH^ 56 THE SENSE OF SMELL CHAPTER YIII. THE SENSE OF SMELL. SECTION I. 1. The organ of smell is said to consist in the ex- tension of nerves to every part of the delicate mu- cous membrane, with which the cavities of the nostrils are lined. These are connected to the sin- ews and extend up to the brain. So that by real physical entities the organ of smell is delicately and sensitively connected with the brain, which is re- garded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of smell is clearly connected with the nerves^ and it is impossible to separate it from them only in the de- struction of the physical organs ; then that power of the mind may remain inactive, so far as it relates to the power of apprehending external objects. 3. The substance of the nerves contains precisely the same properties as that of the brain. That part of any nerve which has been severed by disease or by vio- lence, loses all sensation, and is doomed to perish. If all the nerves of the system are sensorial, and are connected in some way with the brain, then all the physical organs of sense are connected with the brain. And the senses are inseparably connected with the nervous system. 4. The nasal nerves^ or physical organ of sense, may be affected by the odor of a rose, and simultaneously is, or exists, the sense THE SENSE OF SMELL. 0^ of smell. The nerves and the sense of smell are not one and the same ; yet to define the connection of the two is impossible. Sensation is immediately successive to the sense of smell, and conveys to the mind the impression of the external object, which was apprehended by the organ of sense. SECTION 11. 1. The sensations of smell are received by means of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the most remote test in apprehending the existence of external things. 2. The nature and elements of that which aftects the organ may elude our knowledge, as to a correct understanding of the manner of the op- eration ; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the nature and elements of that which produced the impression. This peculiar mental affection is inva- riably successive to the organic change. And the nature of the connection blending the two in one action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not classify, but to a limited extent, the sensations re- ceived by the sense of smell, for they are numerous and diversified. We may use such terms as sweet, sour, and musty; but as a general rule they are classed, being distinguished by their connection with the object which causes the sensation, as the smell of a peach or an apple. The sensations received through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully ex- hilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sen- Mi THE SENSE OF SMELL. sation of smell, through the means of the organ, has an important influence upon life and health. It aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the , harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous odors emitted from objects, or that which is destruct- ive in vapors in the air. It aids in the selection of the right kind of food, as well as to impart to us a knowledge of the thousands of sweet odors which are wafted upon the winds of heaven. 6. It is the jprojperties of external bodies which produce these sensations. Odoriferous effluvia, or small particles, are emitted from certain substances, and are diffused ^ through the atmosphere. The air which is drawn through the nostrils is impregnated with these parti- cles, and it brings them in contact with the organ ^ of the sense of smell. SECTION III. 1. The ^' jpercejptions of smeW'^ are not in distinc- tion from sensation; for perceptions of smell can not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable of perception. We can have perceptions of tJiat which is the object of the sense of smell, and we may have certain perceptions of or in relation to the condition and existence of the organ or sense within or of themselves, but not as many writers define perceptions of smell. 2. The argument must differ from former writers ; for there can be no sense of smell till that organ has been affected. The action, then, which is sensation, conveys the impression to the mind. Till that action reaches the mind there can be no perception. If we can have perception THE SENSE OF SMELL. 61 of smell, then perception must precede sensation, which is impossible. There can be no smell, known to us as such, till the organ is affected. Then if perception precedes sensation, it must act without direction to any definite object. And it will not do to say that sensation within itself is the perception of itself or of the cause of its own action. 3. We can have perceptions of the objects which are the cause of the action of the sense of smell, and these perceptions are in distinction from sensation. 6 THE SENSE OF TASTE CHAPTER IX. THE SENSE OF TASTE. SECTION I. 1. The organs of taste consist of nervous papillae, covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the mu- cous membrane, which lines the palate and the cavity of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the or- gan of taste. 2. The sense of taste is realized when the organ comes in contact with substances of differ- ent natures or qualities of properties. These effect a change in the organ, which is immediately followed b}'' a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To the sense of taste is connected tJie sensations of taste, conveying to the mind, to some extent, something of a corresponding impression arising from the qual- ities of properties, or from the nature of the external motive cause. This position has been denied ; and it has been maintained that sensation can not con- vey any thing of the nature or condition of its cause, but that it is reserved for some other power or fac- ulty to have perceptions of the qualities and nature of that which causes sensation. 4. If any faculty or faculties have power to convey to the mind any thing of the qualities or nature of objects causing sensation, why may not sense and se7isation influence THE SENSE OF TASTE. 9P the mind in regard to the cause of sensations, and favorably to the apprehending of the qualities of the same? for they are by nature adapted, as the inlet to the mind, to the reality of such existences, and are designed to be more closely connected with such objects than any other faculty or power of the mind. 5. The doctrine that sense and sensation, which are more nearly and more closely connected with the causes which affect them than any other power, can not affect the mind favorably to the qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd to require refuting arguments, and especially so, when all that has ever been said to the reverse consists wholly in assumptions. 6. The nature of the sensa- tions of taste are known, and are items of experi- ence. The mind having been impressed by sensa- tion, the affections are immediately moved in search of some external cause. Sensation, unaided by other affections and faculties of the mind, and with- out any assistance from experience, can not convey to the mind a full knowledge of the various quali- ties of external substances; yet there is a natural adaptation in external objects to produce in the mind a sensation, to some extent, corresponding to their nature, which may be called the sensation of sweet, sour, or bitter, according to the nature or qualities of the objects. SECTION II. 1. The modifications of taste consist in its power to change, or in the inclination of the organ to adapt itself, or to be adapted to the nature of the M THE SENSE OF TASTE. various qualities of sapid objects. There is hardly any quality of the objects of taste so disagreeable but that use can make them to be endured, and, per- haps, finally agreeable. And on the other hand the pleasurable may lose its agreeableness by continued use. 2. The properties of bodies which give rise to the sensations of taste are called effluvia or flavors. The nature of the essence of these flavors is un- known to us ; yet we know that such flavors exist. 3. Immediately upon the sensations of taste a state of mind ensues which refers them to the external cause, and, in part, correspondingly to the peculiar quality of some sapid object, like unto those which are acrid, sweet, or bitter. THE SENSE OF HEARING. CHAPTER X. THE SENSE OF HEABING. SECTION I. 1. The ear is the organ of sound or of hearing. Its location is convenient and wisely arranged. Its projection forms an external koilon, which is suita- ble to the gathering of every pulsation of the air as they are wafted from every direction. The internal cavity consists of circular winding passages. These are partitioned or divided by the tympanum, which is a delicate membrane, called the drum of the ear, and which has a nerve delicately and beautifully spread out upon its internal surface. This is called the auditory nerve, and is connected to the brain. 2. The sense of hearing consists in 'Cii^ power or inr fluence which is principally and mysteriously con- nected with the union of the tympanum and the auditory nerve. This is affected by the action of the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, or pulsa- tions of the air move upon or impress the tym- panum. 3. The sensations of hearing are realized when the vibrations of the agitated air are transmit- ted through the labyrinth, impressing the transpar- ent membrane or drum of the ear, and affecting the auditory nerve, which is connected with the brain. The sensation is almost simultaneously conveyed from the organ, when affected, to the mind, which is 6* 66 THE SENSE OF HEARING. followed by a new state of mind, in which we have perception, and an inquiry as to the external cause. SECTION II. 1. The varieties of the sensation of sound are almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear is capable of detecting about five hundred variations of tone, and as many variations in strength. We are informed that when these are combined they number about twenty thousand, varying in simple sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. Many human voices may sound the tone represented by three in the octave or stave, and each one will differ from all the rest, though sounding the same tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a dif- ference in all of them. A difference can be detected which may arise from light or heavy atmosphere, the good or bad repair of the same instrument, and also of the voice in sickness contrasted with the same in health, and a pleasant with an angry mode, or age with youth. 2. The cause of these sensations is remotely in the object or agent which produces the vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undu- lations, resembling the concentric encircling waves on the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be re- garded as the operative and impressing cause of the sensations of hearing. 3. The knowledge which THE SENSE OF HEARING. 69 simple sounds convey to the mind is not i/ntuitive. The power of the sensations of sound belongs to intuition; but the knowledge we receive of the ex- istence and properties of external objects, as a se- quence of the impressions made by sensations, is aided by other faculties in connection with experi- ence. The new state of mind consequent upon the action of these sensations, is that in which we have perceptions and full knowledge of the existing cause. 4. We can not tell the direction of sound, neither the distance it is from us, nor the qualities of the cause wholly unaided by other faculties and experi- ence. But in gaining a knowledge of the direction, distance, and existence of the cause, we can and must depend, to a considerable extent, upon the sense of hearing. As to direction and distance, more depends upon the sense of hearing than expe- rience. SECTION III. 1. To have knowledge of sound it is indispensable that we be in the direction and under the influence of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The nat- ural course and motion of sound is always from the cause. There can be no sound without a motion of the air, and if fhere is motion it recedes from the cause. If we depend upon experience for its direction and location, we can arrive at them amid high and strong winds as though all were calm. But this is absurd. 2. We gain our knowledge of location principally from the direction of the motion of the undulations or pulsations of air which strike the ear, producing 68 THE SENSE OF HEARING. a corresponding sensation; and also of distance by the peculiar modifications of the strength or force of such pulsations; for if there be nothing in the sensation corresponding or agreeing in any way with the properties or nature of its cause, then it follows that the mind, in trying to determine the true cause by perception, acts without a guide, and the result is wholly accidental; for no faculty is calculated by nature, or has more power to give correct direction to the perception of cause than sense or sensation, which are affected or are created by it. 3. Further proof that we are in a degree dependent upon the peculiar manner and way in which sound strikes the ear in determining the cause and its location^ is found in the fact that when we have a confused idea of the direction of sound we intuitively turn the head in different directions to get the direction of the waves of air on the tympanum, in order to know the true direction of the cause, and from the pecu- liar modulations and force of the sound thus con- veyed we judge of the distance to the cause or object. 4. The sense of hearing is of great import- ance. By it we are made acquainted with the music of nature, the melody in the concordant sounds of instruments and of the living voice. Music has charms which are exhilarating and sootjiing. Yerbal language is wholly dependent upon this sense. Ar- ticulated sounds or speech in the reciprocal expres- sion of feelings, fears, and hopes, forms one of the principal mediums and sources of human happiness. Eor such inestimable gifts praise should ever re- dound to the great Creator. THE SENSE OF TOUCH CHAPTER XI. THE SENSE OF TOUCH. SECTION I. 1. The organ of touch may be said to be blended with and exists in the muscles or papillae, extending over the whole surface of the body. The hands and fingers have been regarded as the principal organ of touch ; but it is not clear that there is naturally much more minute delicacy or acute sensations in the tendons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the hands and fingers, than exists internally and over the entire surface of the body. Yery much depends upon the frequent use of the hands and the concen- tration of the faculties to their use in realizing sen- sations of touch. 2. The sense of touch is far mare extensive than the other senses which we have just examined ; for in one sense it includes them all in itself, possessing the surface of the whole physical frame; yet a distinction can be made and does natu- rally exist in the senses. 3. The sense of touch is not the essence or j/roperties which compose the nervous system ; but it is that power or influence of the mind which is mysteriously and inseparably con- nected with the tendons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, extending its connection with them to the very apex of the papillae spread over the surface of the body. Here it comes in contact with and realizes the exist- ence of external objects. 4. The sensations of touch ^ THE SENSE OP TOUCH. constitute that which conveys to the mind impres- sions of objects which affect the physical organs. Consequent upon the action of these sensations is a new state of mind which has perceptions of the cause. But to define the mysterious union of the power of the sensations of touch with the physical organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible. SECTION II. 1. The extent and variations of the sensations of touch differ from those senses which we have no- ticed. By the sense of smell we acquire a knowl- edge of the effluvia or odors of external objects. By the tongue and palate we gain a knowledge of tastes; and by the ear we hear sounds. The knowl- edge gained by these senses is restricted to the sin- gle medium of appropriate operation peculiar to each one. But by the sense of touch we acquire knowledge of various objects and of different quali- ties, such as solidity, softness, hardness, roughness, and smoothness, and such as heat, cold, and extension and form. 2. The influence of the qualities of ex- ternal bodies upon the mind, through the medium of the sense of touch, may and does, to some extent, impart a knowledge of those properties correspond- ing to the peculiar nature of their existence. This can be tested by contact wdth hardness, extension, and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smoothness, and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of pri- mary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in part, does not prevent them from producing, when brought in contact with the sense of touch, an in- THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 71 tenial sensation or feeling corresponding, to some extent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature of the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which arises from these sources, can not be perfect, received only through the medium of any one of the senses without the aid of other faculties. All sensations are in the mind; and the idea that the}' have no power, when produced by external objects, to influ- ence the mind in any way or to any degree, as to the nature or properties of the affecting cause, is con- trary to true analysis and our conceptions of truth. SECTION III. 1. All sensation is in the mind, and can not exist either with or without external causes. Sensation is known to be true, and within itself is nothing else than what it is felt to be. 2. The nature of the sen- sations of touch is very different from the nature or qualities existing in the external causes of sensation. External causes can exist independently of the sen- sation of touch, and sensations may exist without any external cause. But when we are brought in contact with external objects, sensation reports the existence of such objects to the mind. And in con- nection with the sensation thus reporting to or im- pressing the mind, is the origin of the idea of the properties of such external cause or causes. 3. Con- nected with the sense of touch is the origin of the idea of extension, hardness, roughness, and smooth- ness, and also of edges, corners, and sharp points. The notion of such qualities must first arise in con- nection with and be conveyed to the mind through 73 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. the medium of the sense of touch. And with it is connected the origin of the idea of the form or the figure of bodies. 4. Connected with the sense and sensation of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the temperature of bodies. When heat and cold aifect the organs of the sense of touch, the sensa- tion may be capable of a corresponding action in the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within itself. And with the nature of its action upon the mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities caus- ing action ; for without the medium of the sense of touch we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. o. The sensation is not within itself the idea or the knowledge of the existence of heat or cold ; but connected with the sensation is the origin of the idea of such existences; for if the origin of such ideas be not connected with the sense of touch, then we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. This position is not affected, whether the sensations arise from internal or external causes. It is easy to determine whether the sensation arises from the remote apex of the organ of touch, or from some influence affecting the internal tendons, fibers, or nerves of a healthy system. SECTION IV. 1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold do exist^ but as to the qualities of realities which are called heat and cold we know nothing. There is a difference between a sensation and an idea. A sensation may be immediately antecedent to an idea, and we may form an idea of the cause of a THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 78 sensation after the sensation is gone ; yet the origin of the idea may be connected with sensation, though that idea or notion may be matured after the sensa- tion is gone. 2. That the origin of the idea of ex- ternal qualities which affect the sense of touch, is connected with the sensation of touch, has been ac- knowledged by all the leading philosophers of past time; but many of them contradict their assumed premises in the conclusion of their own arguments, by denying the origin of our knowledge of any ex- ternal substance as being connected in any way with the sensation of touch. They have fallen into this error by trying to keep up a logical distinction be- tween 'the elements of mind, severing the affinity of their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 3. In essence there is no similarity between the sensation and the external cause. How this dissimilar sensa- tion can carry with it the origin of the idea of the external cause we can not define, but we can not doubt the fact. Sensations are not the knowledge of external things ; but what can we know of exter- nal objects without the medium of the sense of touch? It is the basis of the mind's action in knowing their existence. 4. This sense can not, within itself, convey to us a matured hiowledge of external existences; yet the sensations may be af- fected by tjie qualities of their cause, sending them, with various modulations, to the mind, and varying in degrees of strength. How far these can impress the mind in regard to the qualities of the external causes we can not tell; but connected with the sen- sations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the cause of such sensations. ■7 n THE SENSE OF SIGHT. CHAPTER XII. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. SECTION I. 1. The eye is the organ of the sense of sight. Its location is wisely arranged for convenience and use- fulness, and where it can be most readily defended from harm or danger. It consists of transparent substances; The humors are of various refractive powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the rays of light takes place when they fall upon the convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This exterior surface receives the rays of light and trans- mits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent fluid exists between the cornea and the- crystalline humor. The jDupil is the center of the iris, and is the avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of the rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to the crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they are rerefracted and transmitted to the retina, which is surrounded by the vitreous humor. '2. The retina is a delicate membrane, which lies at the bottom of the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense of vision while passing through the eye, and are undergoing several refractions; but they produce tipon the retina or optic nerve the true image of the object which reflects the light. This sensitive organ THE SENSE OF SIGHT. ^ 75 receives the image of tlie external object impressed upon it, and this impression is the origin of vision. The primary power of vision is connected with the optic nerve, and connected with this nerve is the origin of the sensations of sight which report to the mind. 3. The importance of the sense of sight to our happiness and knowledge is self-evident. We can not fully estimate the true value of sight with- out supposing ourselves to have been always de- prived of it. Yet in that case we could depend upon others ; therefore we must try to imagine the condition of the whole world without the power of vision. One glance of vision can survey hill and valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain and rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. In an instant of time it traverses a great variety in ter- restrial existences — matches the flight of the vast globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the planetary universe. But in the absence of vision these might exist and move, yet all would be night — eternal night to us. , SECTION II. 1. The mysterious arrangement of the internal structure of the eye, in adapting it to the eftects pro- duced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom infinitely above the power of atheistic arguments ; for it is conclusive evidence of an omnipotent Crea- tor, who fashioned it according to his infinite wis- dom. The rays of light are refracted to a proper pojnt by the difierent coats and humors. The mus- cular tendons command the action of the ball in ^6 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. turning the pupil to the desired object. A circular, prominent, and strong orbit is set for its defense. It is protected by lids, lashes, and glands, secreting tears which promote its lubricity, supplying moisture, and, after washing the eye, the fluid passes through the outlet into the nose. This exquisite, mysterious, and successful arrangement can not be a result of accident or of chance. 2. The sense of sight must be connected with the retina or optic nerve. It is not the nerve within itself, neither is it the object of vision; but it is connected and has its origin with the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we consider the acute sensitiveness of the optic nerve, if rays of light reflected from objects paint or im- press the optic nerve with the images of such objects in order that they may be seen, may they not, in part, be felt by the optic nerve when seen? 4. The sensations of sight are awakened when rays of light from the object of sight afiect the retina or optic nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A state of mind ensues in which we have perception of the cause of such sensations. 5. What modern philoso- phers m6an by ^''tJie jpercej^tions of sighV we can not understand. If they mean that sight has per- ceptions of objects within and of itself, we beg leave to differ from them, as that would be utterly impos- sil)le. And if they mean that we can have percep- tion of the origin of sight, by which we see an object, then sight would be a sequence of percep- tion, and is dependent upon it for its existence, which is not true. Therefore, there can be no such thing as the perceptions of sight, but we can have perceptions of the objects of sight. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 71f . SECTION III. 1. Colors have been regarded as the principal canse of the sensations of sight. But as to how colors are produced, or as to where they have .their origin* is left in obscurity. They may ai'ise partly in the essence or qualities of the objects seen, as well as from the various refracted rays of light re- flected from those objects, and which fall on the power of vision. Some bodies, and even some prop- erties, possess power to reflect some rays more abundantly than others. That light within and of itself consists of rays of diftereut colors, unaflected by contact with other existences, is very doubtful. Light passing through a glass prism presents difler- ent colors ; why can we not have the same result when it passes through prisms of other transparent subetances? 2. We find, to some extent, that colors vary with the essence and qualities of the objects refracting and reflecting the rays of light. They may possess naturally a difference within themselves, but if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is more reasonable to believe that color arises from the nature of the objects which reflect the light to the eye, or that it results from a modification of the principles of attraction, adhesion, density, or repul- sion of such objects. 3. It is light reflected from external objects which affects the fibrous expansion of the sensitive optic nerve, and awakens sensations which extend to and impress the mind of the exist- ing action of the reflected light, together with the images of the objects which cause such sensations. The modulations or ch^ge imparted to the rays of 7* ?& THE SENSE OF SIGHT. light by the objects which reflect and refract them is carried by them to the sense of sight, and a cor- responding sensation extends to the mind. This is reasonable, unless we deny that sensations are capa- ble of change or modulations. 4. If we can not deny the degrees^ or that there is a difference in the strength of the sensations, which correspond to the variations of the action of the rays of light reflected from a bright object, compared with those from an opaque body, may we not conclude that sensations may vary with modulations of light in other re- spects? But this fact we do not know to be true: yet there is more reason in support of it than can be found on or in regard to a thousand other points assumed by philosophers when they have been una- ble to render one argument in support of them. This far we can go, that the origin of our knowledge of visual objects may be and is connected with j:he sensations of sight. SECTION IV. 1. We have power to modify or change the rays of light which come from visual objects by interven- ing transparent substances, and correspondingly our notions of those objects. Though light is the pri- mary object of sight, yet, in order to see external things, there must be objects from which light is reflected, and the change and modulations of the reflected rays carrying with them the image of such objects to the power of vision, or the eye of coats, humors, and retina, or optic nerve. To define the precise office, nature, and ppwers of any or of all THE SENSE OF SIGHT. W thesd is beyond human wisdom or philosophical analysis. 2. The knowledge we receive through the sense of sight. This sense can be affected by gradu- ated rays of light and shade coming from an innu- merable variety of objects and qualities. At once we see the relative position of bodies, with their magnitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by per- ception, suggestion, association, and experience. To say that the sense of sight, within itself, has power, to impart to us a full knowledge of visual objects is absurd. And to say that within itself it has no power to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such objects is false; for our knowledge of visual ob- jects, as such, has its origin with the sensations of sight. 3. Philosophers have erred in defining the senses so as to abstract them from their affinity to the other faculties of the mind, thereby rendering them powerless in aiding to the real knowledge of existences, whereas we should bear in mind that the elements are forever indivisible. 4. Our knowledge of color is derived from the sense of sight, and the origin of this knowledge is original with the power of vision. Ko one of the other senses can be in- volved in the primary detection of^ color. Colcy may be a property inherent in light, consisting in a difference or condition in the rays of light and shades, refracted and reflected, or are so changed, which is a result from contact with the bodies the appearance of which they present or impress upon the optic nerve. If white is not to be called a color, yet it may be regarded as the primary quality from which colors gradate, as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. These are imparted to the 80 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. mind by the sensations of sight only. And if the origin of our knowledge of color is conveyed to the mind by the sensations of ^ sight, may not the pecu- liar manner or way in which the sense of sight is affected, produce corresponding sensations in their modulations or nature in regard to the knowledge of other existences? And may not the same be true of the other senses? We know that philosophers have taught differently, and the substance of their reasons are that it is not so because it is not so, and no higher reason has been rendered by them. SECTION V. 1. The idea of extension as visual is not wholly original from Sight, but it is depentlent upon -it for self-correctness. Light is the primary object of vi- sion, but it is not the only object of vision. The modulations and inherent nature of its refracted and reflected rays present the appearance of objects to the sense of sight. If the power of vision extends no further than the retina of the eye, and that vision consists in the first contact of light with it, then when the image of an object was impressed upon the optic nerve, it would continue to be seen, though the object .should be intercepted with a cloud or darkness. May we not have power, in some way, to see the extension of the. surface of real bodies? If there was one clear reason to the reverse we would gladly adopt it, and we will do so when such reason or reasons are to be found. 2. If a solid body can present to the eye nothing but colors and light^ will that prove that there is no connection THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 81 existing in any way between those colors and light, and the object which causes them to fall on the power of vision ? We can see the effect of a strong wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it is different with a solid body; it is the cause of a peculiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; these are continuously supported there by the object; hence, the light and color either see for us the cause which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, by means of these the real objects. If the optic nerve has power to feel the action of the rays of light and the image impressed upon it, may it not have power by means of them to feel the object which causes their action upon the nerve, and continues it as long as the eye is directed to such objects? 3. The origin of our knowledge of the extension, figure, and magnitude of bodies, is prop- erly connected with the sense of touch, and is strengthened and greatly increased by the sense of sight. Beginning with the sense of touch and sight we arrive at a knowledge of the extension of bodies by association and comparison. 4. Our knowledge of objects, through the sense of sight only^ is lim- ited and confused. It has been ascertained by re- moving the cataract from the eyes of adult persons, that at first visual objects appeared to be touching the eye; and it requires the aid of some of the other senses, and of the action of the mind, to correct these appearances. But as all our senses and facul- ties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects. S£ THE SENSE OF SIGHT. SECTION YI. 1. If the sense of sight has no power, in any way, or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but very little in association and in comparing distant objects by the sense of touch only 2. In judging of the magnitude of msual objects, we are much influenced by the peculiar nature and way the mod- ulations of light strike the organ of sight, and in comparing such objects with other objects, the size of which is known. Objects, in a murky atmos- phere, often appear larger and nearer to us than they would in clear air. This may be caused by their dim appearance, and the refraction of the rays of light passing through a denser atmosphere. The sun and moon appear larger in the horizon than they do in the zenith. The principal cause of this is, that the rays of light coming from them strike the atmos- phere obliquely, and the oblique portion of the at- mosphere, which refracts the rays, occupies an en- larged space in the field of vision and subtends a greater angle at the eye. The refraction makes the appearance of the sun and moon greater than they really are, and this difference increases in proportion as the rays pass parallel with the earth's surface in the denser part of the air. 3. ^\\q purer the atmos- phere the more accurate is our estimation of the distance to objects. And an object upon a smooth plain or a ship at sea, where there are no interme- diate objects, always appear to be nearer to us than tliey really are. 4. Our perceptions of distance. THE SENSE OF BIGHT. $8 throTigli tb© medium of sight, are principally ao- quired. This is clear from the testimony of persons born blind that have been suddenly restored to sight. At first all objects appeared to touch the eye, and there was confusion in locating them ; yet experience in associating and in comparing them aided in cor- recting the false appearance. 5. Though the above position is correct, yet we find, by correct analysis, that the primary power of our perception of visual objects and of distance is original or intuitive. Take a child, before it can reason, when it first begins to notice, and place a candle near its face, and its hand will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, and intuitively the arm will be extended at full length. 84 SOUKCES OF KNOWLEDGE. CHAPTER XIII. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. SECTION I. 1. The senses may be regarded as a secondary source of knowledge, when compared with knowl- edge which is direct, or is imparted to the mind or spirit as the result of the mind's own internal action, or is received by a superhuman spiritual influence without the medium of physical organs. 2. If mat- ter has no self-power to impress or to move material entities, only when it is connected with spirit, then it follows that self-motion belongs to spirit, and that spirit can impress or move spirit or mind independ- ently of material organs. Therefore, the internal feelings, influences, and impressions, imparted by the infinite Spirit to the mind, may be regarded as knowledge direct, or that which comes to us inde- pendently of any feeble, diseased, and perishable ma- terial organs, which, from their nature and condition, are liable to deceive us. Then that which we expe- rience from imperishable sources is not only knowl- edge direct, but such sources are primary sources of knowledge to us, and are worthy of far more confi- dence and belief than any fact or knowledge we receive through the medium of the senses, which are connected with diseased, deceptions, and perish- ing physical organs. 3. According to the preceding S0UBCE8 OF KNOWLEDGE. 86 argument the senses may be regarded as a secondary source of knowledge. And the order of this world is to rely upon the senses in testing the reality and nature of external things with the highest degree of confidence or belief, while knowledge of direct evi- dence to the mind is often disregarded and rejected as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in connection or otherwise, give us a perfect knowledge of external things; otherwise each power of the senses would be a perfect mind within itself. But they are lim- ited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, which, however, is perfected when brought under the inspection of the mind. The deception exists wholly in the nature and condition of the physical organs. SECTION II. 1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of dis- ease destroying its action or of decay ; but the phys- ical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered inactive by disease, or they may be entirely de- stroyed. While under the influence of disease we can not depend upon them with much certainty. The correctness of their reports is accidental, and the mind often has great difficulty in correcting wrong impressions which have been made by them. 2. Our reliance upon the senses, and our power to believe in the correctness of their reports, does not arise in the existence and nature of the senses, but has its origin in connection with an internal convic- tion or consciousness that what they report is true. But as no one is disposed to doubt the testimony of 8 86 SOFKCES OF KNOWLEDGE. the senses when they are free from the power of disease, we will not spend time in proving the neces- sity of greater confidence in them. 3. The skeptic professes the most positive helief in the existence and nature of facts tested by the senses, while he rejects internal convictions and moral demonstra- tions. A correct knowledge of external facts re- ported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. We can have no knowledge of external facts, as such, but for the presence of intuition, to which all facts may be referred in order to be fully known and the mind satisfied. If internal afiirmations and con- victions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is utterly impossible for us to have knowledge of any existent in the external world. SECTION III. 1. It will be seen by the preceding argument that i\iQ primary source of knowledge is contained in the internal powers and nature constituting the soul or mind which possesses self-action and an immortality of being. 2. By the sense of sight I test the ap- pearance of a proposition in mathematics, and sa}'' that it is correct, because the calculation is based upon certain self-evident axioms upon which the whole science stands. He who rejects internal intu- itions and moral demonstrations, believes all this with unwavering confidence; but ask him how he knows such truths or axioms to be self evident, by which we understand that they are incapable of either proof or disproof, and he will not refer to any one or all of the senses as the source or power by SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 87 which he knows them to be self-evident truths, but he has to refer to the intuitive principle within which only has power to receive any fact as such, or any self-evident reality as such, without any possibility of proof. 3. So if we reject internal convictions, feelings, and intuitive affirmations, we are compelled to reject all knowledge. Then, to be consistent, wo must declare that we are incapable of any knowl- edge, and that our own existence is non-existence. 4. Then it follows that all knowledge of direct evi- dence to the mind^ and of which the mind is sus- ceptible, independently of the organs of the decay- ing earthly tabernacle, is less liable to deceive us than that which comes through the medium of the senses. Therefore we should watch to be directed by this internal source of knowledge, as it can not lead us to deception or disappointment, either in this life or the life to come, if we strictly adhere to the voice and dictates of conscience. CHAPTER I. PERCEPTION. SECTION I. 1. Perception is that faculty of the mind which has power of perceiving internal and external changes and existences. And in action it has power of perceiving and of receiving a knowledge of ex- ternal objects by means of the impressions they make on the senses, or it leads to the full action of the mind in arriving at a knowledge of real exist- ences. 2. Sensation and perception are regarded as the properties of mind, \>y which we arrive at a knowledge of external things. Sensation refers to the physical organs and their mysterious union with the immaterial sensibilities, and perception refers to the power and action of mental influences and ele- ments. Perception has been regarded as an asso- ciation formed between the impressions made upon the organs of the senses and the external substan- ces which are the cause of such impressions. But the acting power of this association is connected with the primary elements of mind. 3. Perception is immediately successive to the action of sensation, or it arises with the new state of mind which fol- 88 PERCEPTION. S$ lows the impressions made by sensations. Sensa- tion within itself can have no perception of its own existence, nor of the cause of such an existence; but impressions made through the medium of sensa- tion upon the mind are followed by a peculiar state of mind, in which we have immediate perception of the affecting cause. 4. Whether perception is a seqicent of impressions conveyed by sensations to the brain we know not. The inlets of the mind, for comprehending external things, appear to be myste- riously connected with the entire nervous system. The nerves are connected with the brain, and thence receive their influence. But this great medium of sensation may not require sensations to go from the extremities to the brain before there can be any action of perception. The mind may have power to perceive the affecting cause upon its action upon the- organs of senses ; but to determine the precise mode of operation is impossible. SECTION II. 1. Perception may be regarded as a voluntary act of the mind. That aggressive influence or power which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of exter- nal objects, requires an effort of the mind in order to a full degree of perception which can be retained. 2. Sensation is not necessarily followed by percep- tion. The mind may be employed in thought or in conversation, while a numerous variety of objects may pass through the field of vision and none of them be retained in the mind. This results from a want of the perception of those objects. We may 8* f^ PEECEPTION.' have experienced the sensations of them, but no effort of the mind was made in retaining the impressions of them ; for the mind must attend to what is passing in order to a real perception of external objects. 3. To a limited extent perception may be regarded as involuntary. We may open our eyes upon a beau- tiful forest ; the first tree seen may claim our atten- tion till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have faint perceptions of other trees in that forest which are still retained in the mind, and they were not voluntary objects of either sight or perception. If we cast our eyes upon a canvas of pictures and fix our mind upon one of them, so that all the rest are almost as though they did not exist, yet they are unintentionally seen, and our perception of them is involuntary. In leaving our room in eager quest of some object, we pass two men in descending the stairway, one small and the other large — the percep- tion of the difierence in their size is wholly involun- tary. 4. But voluntary perception involves an act of the mind in attending to the cause of sensations ; and connected with this act or action of the mind is our perception of external substances and qualities. SECTION III. 1. Perception makes us acquainted with external things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, in which the influence or action refers to internal afi^ections of the mind, and also to external causa- tion. It carries the mind out of or beyond the ex- istence of self, and introduces us to the external world. It has power to cause external things to pass PEECEPTION. iS in review before the inspection of the mind. Per- ception is not the only medium through which we are made acquainted with external things. Our knowledge of external things commences with sen- sation, and sensation is a sequence of the impinge- ment or of contact with external things ; and per- ception following sensation fully presents to the inspection of the mind the cause of such sensations. 2. If perception should only be regarded as an affection or influence of the mind, and as consequent upon the action of sensation in apprehending exter- nal existences, yet in reality it must be regarded as more than a secondary appendage of psychology or of the mind when we contemplate its power to act in perceiving the intenial changes, action, and pow- ers of the mind. 3. If it could be separated from the primary" elements of mind and still retain its identity and power to act in whole or in part, then we might reject its connection in every way with the original elements of mind. But its existence is either with or is dependent on its connection with the existence of the elements of mind ; for an aiFec- tion or influence of the mind is no more than an original element or elements in action; otherwise such an affection or influence would be a divisible entity, and an independent active being within itself and superadded to the mind, which is absurd. SECTION IT. 1. Out perception of primary properties of matter differs from that of sensation. Primary properties are essential to the existence of all material substan- 92 PEECEPTION. ces, and are known to be such as solidity, extension, figure, and density, with divisibility. These quali- ties belong to all real material bodies; but as to their essence we know nothing. 2. Sensation is a result of contact^ in some w^ay, with external sub- stances, and implies their existence as the cause of such sensation or sensations. Perception ref&rs or leads the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a known sensation. 3. We have perception of the difference between ^r^'ma/y and secondary ^vo'^QviiQ^ of matter. The latter are such as hardness, soft- ness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, heat, and cold, sound, and color. These may cause cer- tain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which are immediately followed by perception, bringing the affecting cause under mental inspection. FALSE PERCEPTION. 9$ .HI I . CHAPTER II. FALSE PERCEPTION. SECTION I. 1. False perceptions take place when there are no external objects corresponding with them, and which are the cause of them. When there are no external causes, as real existences, we are left to conclude that false perceptions exist within ourselves and in the mistake which the mind makes of its own perceptions. 2. False perceptions can arise Jirst in the organs of sense. The organs of sense can be affected in various ways, and the succeeding sensations are followed by perception, as to the act of the mind, when there are no external substances as cause of such sensations, or as objects of percep- tion. These organs can be changed or affected so as to produce the appearance of realities by disease or by excitement, fear, or grief. And they change within themselves, being affected by age. 3. Again : false perceptions may exist in connection with the cTumges in the states of the mind. The mind is capable of an internal error or delusion in believing in the existence of objects as real when they are not. It can be deceived in its own conceptions of real existences. 4. False perceptions, which arise in connection with the organs of sense, are caused gen- erally by bodily disorders. These perceptions may $4: FALSE PEKCEPTION. be corrected, as we shall notice in the order of the following section. SECTION II. 1. By the concentrated action of the mind, as af- fected through the medium of the other senses. Corresponding sensations, resulting from affecting causes upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their united appeals to the mind, toward correcting false perceptions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected by comparing our perceptions of objects we suppose to exist or of objects which exist in a different way from their appearance, with the perceptions of oth- ers in regard to them. The deliberate decision of several persons, by means of the same organs of sense, while in health, and at the same time, will not mislead. 3. A correction can be made by a proper exercise of judgment in comparing with some known object. 4. If we have perception of two or rnm^e objects of the same or differing in kind, we can turn to some one that we know to be single, and if there appears to be more than one, we know our perception in that respect to be false. But in cor- recting all false perceptions we are dependent upon a correct exercise of the judgment. PEBGEPTION AND SMELL. 95 CHAPTER III. PERCEPTION AND SMELL. i SECTION I. 1. We will now turn attention to our perceptions of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of smell. The oflSce and the powers of the sense of smell have been already defined. Our perceptions of the objects of smell are successive to the sensations of smell. And these sensations are a result of the action of odors or of effluvia upon the organs of smell. Sensation reports its cause, and perception brings that cause under the inspection of the mind in order that our knowledge of it may be matured. 2. Habit, in relation to smell and in de- tecting qualities, tends to higher maturity by re- peated and continuous effort in discriminating differ- ences. If there are habits of smell, and if this sense can be cultivated, it follows that there must be something capable of being cultivated. This culti- vation is not acquired by the physical organs ab- stractly, but is conferred upon them by the action of the immaterial influence or powder connected with them, and the direction of the mind to them. 3. The origin of our knowledge of the existence and of the difference in odors commences with the sensa- tions of smell. May not the modulations and nature of the sensations of smell impress the mind favora- bly to the knowledge of the affecting cause, and the 06 PERCEPTION AND SMELL. qualities of that cause? We know that our knowl- edge of the degrees or difference in the strength of odors commences with and is conveyed to the mind by sensation. And why may not sensations affect the mind in some way, and to a limited degree, as to the qualities of the cause of such sensations? To say they do not is more absurd than to say they do. But to say and to prove either position to be clearly true is impossible. SECTION II. 1. If it is impossible for sensations to affect the mind in any way corresponding \q> the object and qualities of its cause, then there is no connection between the action of sensation and that of perception. Then when we receive sensations from the smell of a rose or jasmin, we would be as apt to have percep- tion of a rock or mountain as the cause as any other existent; and our perception as to the true cause being wholly unguided, would be accidental in its results. 2. If there is no connection between sensa- tion, and perception it would be true that when we have sensation we may or may not have perception ; and if, in any case, perception is immediately suc- cessive to sensation, it could only be regarded as an accident. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that sensation, in some way, impresses the mind to a limited degree as to the nature or properties of its cause, and that perception brings that cause under the inspection of the mind. 3. It requires all the elements of mind to constitute a sentient being, and each one contributes in its ofBce and action to our PEBOEPTION AND SMELL. W knowledge. Dr. Abercrombie mentions a blind phi- losopher who could distinguish a black dress by the smell of it. The origin of this knowledge did not commence with perception, but with sensation. And the sensation of smell, in this case, appears to have impressed the mind with a knowledge of the object and some of its qualities unaided by the other senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of James Mitch el, who was deaf, speechless, and blind, yet by smell he could detect the presence of a stranger and give the direction to him. This knowledge of the stranger and of the direction to him commenced with the sensations of smell, and that without the aid of the other senses. In this case the mind must have been influenced to correct decisions, in some way, by the peculiar nature or character of the sensations of smell. 4. Sensation reports the cause of its exist- ence to the mind, and perception hrings that cause under the full inspection of the mind, the result of which is real knowledge. 9 \ .1 XL fi PERCEPTION AND TASTE. CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTION AND TASTE. SECTION I. 1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind, through the medium of the sense of taste^ should be carefully examined. It has been said that sixteen different simple tastes exist. In the different combinations there are almost innumerable modifications, as in the degrees of strength, intens- ity, and weakness, quickness, and slowness. The properties of external substances which affect the organs of taste, awakening sensations, are called flavors. Our perceptions of these flavors or proper- ties properly follow the sensations of taste. 2. Habit^ in relation to taste, enables us to distinguish differ- ences by repeated or continuous efforts. In this way the epicurean distinguishes the flavor and qualities of the luxuries of the table to a degree which would pass unnoticed by others. And in the same way the physician can tell the difference in drugs which are similar in appearance, and also in taste, to one not accustomed to them. SECTION II. 1. Tinder the law of Tidbit some wine-dealers, by the repeated exercise of this sense, are said to have increased its strength and power of discrimination PEECEPTION AND TA8TB. 96 till they could distinguish the flavor of one wine from that of another, and tell where each or all were made. 2. The proper direction of the action of per- ception toward the true cause which affects the sense of taste, must be, to a limited extent, connected with and dependent on the nature or modulations of the sensation received ; for if there is no connection in this respect, or in any way, our perception as to being immediately successive to sensation, and in bringing the true cause of such sensation to the attention and inspection of the mind, would be wholly an accident. 100 PERCEPTION AND HEARING, CHAPTER V. PERCEPTION AND HEARING. SECTION I. 1. The perception we have of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of hearing is worthy a passing notice. The sense of hearing is more acute in some persons than in oth- ers, yet the power of discriminating sounds and the difference in tones or modulations of sound may be cultivated. 2. The sense of hearing has not within and of itself the jpower of perceimng the affecting cause, neither can we have simultaneous perception of the action of external things or of sounds upon the organs of hearing. All we can have is sensa- tion, and sensation may be strong or weak, corre- sponding to the cause. 3. The sound of a cannon pro- duces a stronger sensation than that of a rifle. Who can say that perception receives no influence as to the cause of sensations, from the peculiar way they affect the mind? If mind was divisible, then this might be impossible. But the elements of mind can not be abstracted, like blocks of marble, from the same mountain, and examined by the rules of superfices and solids and the laws governing inert elements. All the elements of mind are operative, and are connected together in constituting the living soul, and they can and do influence each other, and also each one of them the whole mind. PEECEPTION AND HEARING. 101 SECTION II. 1. The application of Ticibit to the sense of hear- ing renders the power of hearing more acnte as repeated efforts are made. There are instances of blind persons who can call the names of persons from the sound of their voices, though they may not have heard them for several years. Others can tell when they are approaching a precipice or a wall, by the peculiar sound of their feet upon the ground. 2. If there is no connection in any way between sen- sations produced by sound and our perception of the cause of such sensations, then our perception of the true cause may be accidental. 3. Our knowl- edge of the existence of sonorous bodies commences with the sensations of hearing. Sensation and per- ception hold a peculiar relationship to each other, from the fact that they may and do belong to one and the same mind. 9* \b 102 PERCEPTION AND TOUCH CHAPTER VI. PERCEPTION AND TOUCH. feci M SECTION I. 1. We eayperience perceptions of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of touch. The sense of touch is more extensive than any other one of the senses, from the fact that in one sense it includes all the other senses. 2. It in- creases in proportion to repeated efforts in appre- hending external bodies. And our perception of external existences is clear in proportion to the acuteness of touch through which such existences are reported to the mind. 3. Habit in regard to touch increases its strength as we rely on and attend to its repeated action, . And in proportion to the increase of the exquisite acuteness in detecting and rep'jrtitjg ^>;terijal substances to the mind, is the clearness and proper action of our perception in bringing such substances before the mind. SECTION II. 1. Blind persons can, with greater safety, pass all through a house in a dark night than any one who has the power of vision. Some of them can tell the distance to a burning fire by the action and degree of heat, and also of approaching contact with exter- nal bodies by the peculiar action of the air. And PERCEPTION AND TOUCH. 103 by the sense of tonch they can be taught to read by means of large raised letters, which are made by heavy type. The sense of touch can be so cultiva- ted that they can have perception of the different letters, and read correctly when as many as four thicknesses of a silk handkerchief intercepts be- tween their fingers and the letters. 2. Our knowl- edge of that which affects the sense of touch com- mences with the sensations of touch, and k more fully developed to the mind by the action and power of perception. 104: PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. CHAPTER,VII. PBKCEPTION AND SIGHT. SECTION I. 1. OvR perception of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy of attention. Expansion of surface and color have been regarded as primary objects of vision, but that of distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet it is maintained that we can judge of limited distan- ces by sight alone. If we can judge of small distan- ces by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of greater distances aided by the same power? 2. The inclination of the axis of vision^ which directs both eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in which the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, appears to give rise to an influence which affects the mind in deciding upon the true distance of such an object. To touch any object immediately before us with one eye closed is accidental, but certain with the aid of both. 3. A child, before it can reason or compare, shows an intuitive knowledge of distance ly sight^ in extending its hand no farther than the desired object when it is near, and at full length when the object is distant. Our knowledge of the distance and magnitude of visual objects commences with the sensations of sight. In some way sensations appear to be conveyed to the brain and nervous sys- tem, which are followed by perception ; but to define PEBCEPTION AND SIGHT. "405 this process, or to tell how the mind is connected with and is affected by the nervous system, is impossible. SECTION II. 1. Hdhit^ in relation to the power of vision, ren- ders it acute in detecting the existence of objects. And in proportion as we try to discriminate visual objects will we have clear perception of the objects which affect the organs of sight. By continued effort the mariner can discover a ship as it nears in the distance, when it can not be seen by a person not accustomed to maritime observations; and he can call its name when nothing more than a blur can be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface of the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a quick and vigorous action of the power of vision, and in proportion to its improvement is the clear- ness and power of our perception of visual objects. 2. A man existing without the power of hearing may supply the defect, to a limited extent, by the Tidbits of sight. We know a man who has not heard the sound of speech for al>out twenty years ; yet he can converse with us without much difficulty, by watching the expression of the countenance and the motion of the lips. 3. The keen discrimination of visual objects and qualities, which is possessed by the deaf and dumb, gives evidence that the senses can be cultivated, and that in the absence of some of them others can be so cultivated as to supply the loss sustained to a considerable extent. 4. If the mind could exist without having access to external things, through the medium of the senses, how could lOd PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. we have perception of ex.smal things f It is evi- dent that the action of perception, in one respect, has its origin in connection with the states of mind caused by sensations; and if these states of mind are not influenced in any way by the modulations and nature of the sensations received, and if these sensations do not correspond in any way with the nature and qualities of their cause, then there is no connection between sensation and perception ; hence, any action of perception in perceiving and in bring- ing under the inspection of the mind the true cause of a certain sensation, is wholly accidental. But this is not true, for a connection does exist, from the fact that they may and do belong to one and the same mind. HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. 107 CHAPTER VIII. HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. SECTION I. 1. Habit, in relation to perception, should not pass unnoticed. It has been said that men, chil- dren, idiots, and brutes acquire perceptions by habit j that they are not original with them. Our remem- brance of past events or existences may be regarded as weak or strong in proportion to the interest we had in them. 2. "We have many perceptions wliich are not remembered for the want of attention and interest in them, and by them our knowledge is not increased; yet when a necessity awakens mental exercise in attending to them, they can be called up as auxiliaries in forming correct decisions. 3. There is a law of hdbit^ in relation to perception, under which we may delineate the natural method or proc- ess of its action. Perception is connected with the existence and action of the powers of the mind ; yet its action in perceiving is at first weak and confused. That it depends upon habit for the origin of its ex- istence is impossible. SECTION II. 1. By rejpeated efforts perception is increased in power and its action is made rapid, easy, and is 108 HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. matured. Its maturity depends upon distinct and successive acts. 2. Though objects of many forms and of diflPerent elements may be simultaneously presented to the eye, yet our perception of them all can only be regarded as concentrated mto one act. And if there is naturally a distinct difference, the true order can not be clearly defined. 3. The acts of perception, in perceiving the different forms of an object, are so rapid that the effect upon us, in regard to all of them, may be said to be instantaneous. The power of perceiving is connected with the states and elements of mind. ■m giHsion CJirb CHAPTER I. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTIN- GENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. SECTION I. 1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind consists of certain thoughts and feelings^ and that the true inquiry is as to the order in wiiich they arise, and of what these elements are constituted? Though they are of great importance, yet we can not imagine that within themselves they constitute all of mind. 2. Thought exists in the mind, or it is that which is formed in the mind as an idea or con- ception. Thought may be formed by the united ac- tion of mental elements. It can arise in connection with internal spontaneous affirmations, or from the affecting influence of imagination, or from con- science. At certain states of the mind thoughts appear to arise in one connected chain, and at other times and under different circumstances, they have a more abstracted existence. 3. We can not doubt the real existence of thought in connection with the mind's states. Of the existence and action of thought we can ibrm some idea and have a satisfac- tory knowledge. The nature of elements, which have been called the original elements of thought, 10 109 110 PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. can not be clearly defined, though they must have their origin in connection with the existence and action of the primary elements of the mind. 4. Thought is that which the mind thinks, and it may be said to be tliat^ in part, which acts in thinking. And it is that which is prominent and leads in cogi- tation, reflection, contemplation, and meditation. SECTION II. 1. Thought is not only real within and of itself, but it expresses acticm,^ as in thinking. It is the act or operation of the mind when attending to any par- ticular subject or existent, and in another sense it may be regarded as the idea consequent on that ope- ration. 2. The mind may act, in pursuing any sub- ject, by a succession of thoughts. One thought introduces another thought, in accordance with a certain order which is preserved in the succession of thoughts. Some thoughts seem to be a result of other thoughts, by which some persons have sup- posed the latter could have been predicted by a strict observance of the nature of the former; but the idea of their inseparable union is only a mere sequence of their near, yet distinct relationship. Though any train of thoughts may be said to be invariably found together, yet the mind is only capa- ble of a peculiar order of divisible succession of thoughts. All that we can know of the phenomena of thought is the result of observation aided by experience. 3. Thought can not exist as a part of the mind if separated from it. Hence, our thoughts are nothing more than the mind itself in a peculiar ■>■ mpi^wi^^p^wp PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. Ill way or in different states ; yet the proper office of thought has been defined. 4. The importance of thought to our heing^ knowledge^ and happiness is forever beyond all power of description. By con- tinued thought the student ever expands the powers of his mind with useful knowledge. Think, think, always thinking, is the motto of true greatness. It will lead to the possession of that true eminence where the mind, with triumphant composure, scorns the perishable glory of earthly fame. ,^1 lis IDEAS. CHAPTER II. IDEAS. SECTION I. 1. The term idea, as that of notion, applies to that which perceives or observes in the mind ; hence the form or image of any thing in the mind pos- sessed by it for contemplation or inspection. It ex- ists in the mind, and can be a result of mental action. 2. Our ideas may be said to vary with or to correspond to their objects in regard to their nature and mode or condition of existence. 3. Our idea of physical existences may be regarded as con- tingent^ from the fact that it is natural for us to have conceptions of them as mutable, and that it is pos- sible for the power that made them to cause tliem to cease to be. 4. Our idea of physical entities may be said to be relative^ as the very notion of that which has bounds or finity will suggest the oppo- site, which is infinity or non-limitation. 5. Our idea of duration may be regarded as absolute. We know that duration is and must continue, and that its an- nihilation is impossible. SECTION II. 1. Our idea of space has been said to be necessary or absolute. To conceive of the annihilation of all physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the IDEAS. 113 annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossi- ble. Hence, the idea of space is necessary ; for we can have conception of the real existence of the object of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the non-existence of space is beyond our power. 2. Our idea of apace is absolute^ which arises from the condition of its existence. We are immediately impressed of the fact; and our belief is unwavering that space must be, and that it can not cease to be. Though we can conceive of the non-existence of all physical elements, yet to doubt the existence of space is impossible. 3. The idea of space implies the absence of limitMion. We can not conceive of it only as real and infinite. Our ideas of material elements, or of the finite, are contingent and rela- tive; and those of space, or of the infinite, are necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of space and of the infinite is necessary and absolute^ 60 may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it is reasonable for the Atheist, when looking on the works of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively infer a cause of their existence, and to believe that Buch a. cause is all-powerful and all- wise, from the vastness and skill evidenced in visual and tangible existences. SECTION III. 1. If effects or events are contingent and rdati/ve^ their very existence infers and even demonstrates the existence of a cause ; for they could not create themselves and arrange themselves with such infi- 10* 114 IDEAS. nite wisdom. 2. But though we are finite, yet the idea of personal identity, or of self, is necessary. The knowledge we have of our own existence is real, and to doubt it is utterly impossible. 3. Hence, the Atheist is compelled to acknowledge the existence of self^ and that God is necessarily the author of such existence, and to whom he is reasonably and lawfully amenable. SECTION lY. 1. Though our idea of self is necessary, yet our idea of the phenomena of mind may be regarded as contingent. We have intuitive knowledge of self; but the mind is composed of many faculties, and each faculty, in existence and action, holds a certain relation to the other faculties. 2. ^j primary ele- ments of mind, we are to understand the original elements, first in order of time. The appropriate position and action of the primary powers relatively to each other will be defined in analyzing those pow- ers. It will be seen that some faculties which have been defined as primary by some philosophers, are dependent for their existence upon other faculties. And the idea that there are only two or three pri- mary elements in mind is absurd. 3. Intuitive ele- ments, which have been denominated primary ele- ments, apprehend their objects, the action arising from intuition. Each one unites in testing and re- ceiving truths as knowledge by a simple intuitive inspection, and independently of argument or tes- timony. KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 115 CHAPTER III. POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. SECTION I. 1. The primary elements of mind may be regarded as the axioms, or self-evident truths, within them- selves, which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. Tliat they have a real existence, and that such existences are true within themselves, is knowl- edge which we have no power to doubt; and the primary elements are truths, the reality and correct- ness of which are incapable of either proof or dis- proof. 2. There is no possible way of proving the axioms or self-evident truths, which are the founda- tion of mathematical science, to be either true or false, yet we receive them as truths. The power to do this is not contained in those axioms or truths, but it lies back of all these, and can only exist in the intuitive powers of mind. Therefore, it is more reasonable for us to regard the primary elements of mind as self-evident truths; for our knowledge of them, and of all other facts or objects, turns upon their intuitive power to know them to be true, and to reject that which is false. 3. The primary ele- ments of mind are truths known to be true only from the fact that we know them to be such ; and all the power we have of knowing any thing of their existence, nature, action, or of ^ny other truth or fact in the vast universe, arises in connection with ^mmii^^F^''mmi^!^^^^^m^9^l^^^mmm'mmmmmmm^ 116 KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. and from the existence, nature, and action of these original elements. ^^ SECTION II. 1. We can not arrive at a knowledge of their ex- istence by any form of argument or from any exter- nal testimony. They are their own witnesses, testi- fying within, of, and to themselves, of their own existence, which is knowledge. 2. With them is the origin of the power to receive within and of them- selves the knowledge of their own existence. 3. With them is the origin of the power to arrive at and to know truth in regard to external things, either without or from testimony. m HP W^' KNOWLEDGE FBOM TESTIMONY. IIT ' CHAPTER IV. KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. SECTION I. 1. We have intuitive power to arrive at a knowl- edge of facts and of truth from testimony. The im- mediate self-knowledge we have of external tilings is tested by and received through the medium of the senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in regard to such existences, is obtained from other persons upon the evidence of testimony. 2. Testi- mony is a solemn declaration or attestation made for the purpose of establishing or making known some fact. Testimony is the declaration of a fact, and evidence is the eifect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree of light imparted by it. Facts are received by us from personal observation far more readily than from the declaration of others. We must first have confidence in the ability and veracity of the narrator in order to give full cre- dence to the facts revealed. If what he says comes true, we believe him more readily at another time ; but if once deceived, his future testimony is apt to be rejected. We can believe the statements of a tried friend more readily than we can those of a stranger. 3. Our intuitive power^ which is referred to in the reception and belief of external facts, is influenced by the corresponding agreement of such facts with those already known. We should look * ■■# 118 KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. well to the evidence upon which we receive facts, and to the capacity of the narrator. A weak mind is apt to have boundless credulity, and seldom ever thinks or reasons for itself. The contracted mind is generally captious, skeptical, and always inclined to reason from imperfect premises, and arrives at false conclusions. An ignorant mind or person re- jects the testimony of all philosophers. He believes the earth to be flat and its position fixed immovably. He gives only one foot diameter to the sun, and drives him through the heavens. 4. When we are limited in our views and acquirements, there is a tendency to rely on our experience, and to reject all knowledge for which we have not the evidence of our senses. A proper und'erstanding of self, and of the true method of arriving at a knowledge of ex- ternal facts, will remedy false perceptions and con- clusions. SECTION II. 1. In judging of the credibility of any fact from testimony, we are not to rely wholly upon our expe- rience of similar events, but we must proceed upon the knowledge which we have received by other means of the nature or properties of that which is presented for our inspection. 2. We can receive facts upon the authority of testimony, and the power we have to receive them must have its origin in intuition. The conclusive action of this constitu- tional power turns upon the fact that the witness is honest. 3. T\iq princijpal ground of our credence is, that the witness had a suflicient opportunity of w KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 119 knowing the facts set forth in his testimony, that he was capable of judging correctly, and that he was not improperly influenced in testifying. 4. Our confidence is increased in proportion to the number of tried witnesses who unite in the same testimony. This kind of testimony the whole world of intelli- gences are in the habit of receiving and of believ- ing. The principal foundation of incredulity is ig- norance. The enlightened mind, in forming correct conclusions, is influenced by a thousand contingen- cies, which pass wholly unnoticed by the thought, less or inactive mind. SECTION III. 1. A well-regulated mind is influenced by the recollection of facts, which appeared at first to be deceptions or even false, but subsequently they prove and are known to be true. Hence the con- clusion that there may be and that there does exist many elements and facts, though they may be de- cidedly marvelous or appalling to us at first. "We have power to know from experience alone, that facts may and do exist, both in accordance with or independent of our experience. 2. The mind is greatly influenced in deciding upon the truthfulness of that which is presented for consideration if we perceive known principles connected with it, if it contains some element of probability, or if it is in any way allied to facts or a chain of known entities, either as an antecedent or sequence. We have power to believe in the existence of realities pre- sented to the mind from the fact that other truths, P J^- 120 KNOWLEDGE FKOM TESTIMONY. at one time, were marvelous, which are now known to be true. And we can go still further and believe, by reason of facts already known, that other facts unknown to us may exist. 3. We have power to arrive at a correct knowledge of facts from testi- mony. And we have power to discriminate credi- ble testimony from that which is not, by contrasting the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the condi- tion. When a sufficient amount of the right kind of testimony has been received, we feel an internal satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 4. Infidelity assumes that we can not believe testimony which differs from our uniform experience and the uniform course of nature ; but we have seen already that this position is false. The influence or power sustaining and containing the elements of our belief in regard to testimony, has its origin in intuition. To receive proper testimony is natural, but to con- scientiously doubt it is unnatural and impossible. SECTION lY. 1. To arrive at a distinct belief of a miraculous in- terposition or act, requires something more than to give credence to facts which are in accordance with the uniform laws or course of nature. 2. Miracle we understand to be that which takes place in vio- lation to, or deviating from, the established course of nature, and that which is contrary to our uniform experience. If miracles exist in violation of or de- viating from the regular course of nature, their existence can not be a result of this uniform course of nature, nor of the laws governing the material KNOWLEDGE FKOM TESTIMONY. 121 universe. Then, if miracles exist, the cause of their -^ existence must be distinct from and superior to the course of nature. Therefore, they exist by a direct interposition or act of Divine power. Their nature and relation to the course of nature forever pre- cludes the idea of their origin with, from, or by such a uniformity of action. Miracles, as results, and considered as they are, within themselves, clearly demonstrate that their cause must be distinct from and infinitely superior to any uniform course of nature. 3. Divine revelation is regarded as a mi- raculmis gift of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly demonstrates or proves an adequate cause of its own existence. All the miracles recorded in the Bible aid in proving the existence of Deity and his power to establish laws and suspend them at pleasure. If he has power to order and arrange common events, which are called natural, he has power and does order uncommon events, which are called miracles. SECTION V. 1. Infidels assume that events Tiajppening coni/rary to the course of nature and our experience should be rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men to lie, and that several concur in propagating the same lie, than that a miracle should take place, ac- cording to their testimony, which would be a result contrary to the course of nature and experience. The rejecters of the Christian system hold and teach that the uniform course of nature is true, and that it is the unerring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume says, in regard to the res^^rrection of Christ, "I 11 122 KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. must admit one of two things — either that twelve men agreed to tell a lie, or that a man arose from the dead. It is more probable that men should lie than that one should return to life again." That is, if Christ rose it w^ould be contrary to the uniform course of nature, which course of nature he regarded as infallible truth. He then asserts that it is more reasonable for men to lie than that Christ should arise from the dead. According to his own premi- ses, arguments, and belief, such a lie could not be a part of the course of nature, which is truth, neither can it be a result of it in any possible way. Hence, such a lie being contrary to truth, is contrary to the uniform course of nature, which is truth. Then, according to his own creed and belief, this lie would be a miracle; yet he regards it as that which is the most reasonable, and adopts it as the foundation of his faith and future hope. He then tries to disprove the miracle of Christ's resurrection by assuming, in lieu thereof, the existence of another miracle, ac- cording to his own faith and teachings, which mira- cle, he says, is more reasonable, though he acknowl- edges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, all the arguments and conclusions drawn from it must be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this is the only argument which has ever been referred to, which can have any claims to be an argument against the resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, true, that Christ rose from the dead, and the truth- fulness of our holy Christianity is forever incontro- vertible, notwithstanding the great and celebrated argument of Mr. Hume. « m ^ihxBun Jf0Hrt|. CHAPTER I. CONCEPTION. SECTION I. 1. Conceptions exist in connection with peculiar states and operations of the mind, by and in which they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within itself is th^power^ and acting is the act of conceiv- ing and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the inspection of the mind. It is closely connected with our sensations and perceptions. When we have con- ceptions they are revived and followed by certain mental states, in which present or past ideas, sensa- tions, or impressions can be and are examined. 3. In a certain sense we may have conceptions of ideas, images, sentiments, and thoughts. And in another sense it may apply to re-occurring facts and to re- existing emotions and sensations, which we, at one time, had realized. The mind, in the peculiar states with which they are connected, is moved and influ- enced in reference to both external facts and internal feelings and sensations of the soul. SECTION II. 1. Conceptions in nature and action appear to differ from sensations and perceptions. Perception 123 124 CONCEPTION. is characterized by an egressive action, or by its striking out in apprehending objects, while concep- tion is more passive, with internal power to be re- vived or awakened as an inlet to the mind of exist- ing facts, and of the re-occurring of facts, feelings, and ideas which had been real in the experience of the past. 2. Conception differs from memory and from the action and objects of remembrance. The causes and objects of conceptions are absent, which is not true with sensations and perceptions. Sensa- tion and perception act from and in reference to their causes and objects; but we have conceptions of truths in the remembrance of past feelings and ideas, when the causes and objects are not taken into the account. In this way we may have conceptions of any thing within the control of memory, inde- pendently of time, condition, or place. Our con- ceptions of past occurrences take no account of the time when their causes were present; and the regu- lation of our conceptions are influenced by the power and laws of association, and can arise under the action and controlling powder of volition. 3. Con- ception is not confined to our impressions of past time, but can be connected with our feelings in re- gard to present existences. We can not only have conceptions of present and real existences, but we can have them in connection with peculiar mental states or conditions, upon which depends the pecu- liarities of illusions, dreaming, and partial insanity, though such conceptions may be misguided or be entirely false. * CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 125 CHAPTER II. CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. SECTION I. 1. Our conceptions of facts or influences con- nected with the objects of the sense and sensations of smell may be explained in few words. When any odoriferous body, as the rose or jasmin, is pre- sented to us, the effect experienced is a sensation ; this, in the course of time, may appear to be erased from memory — the power which replaces memory and perception, in recalling it, and revives in the mind any thing of the nature, kind, or qualities of that which is brought to remembrance, is concep- tion. And in this way we may have conceptions of other qualities of the objects of smell once known, which are detected and revived in memory by reason of corresponding qualities or resemblances. And when we have conceptions of any thing for- merly perceived, it becomes an object of thought. 2. Our conceptions in regard to ohjects of taste may be clear or confused, in proportion to the ratio of differ- ence as to qualities. He who has ever tasted the bituminous water of Lake Asphallities, or of the mineral water of some celebrated spring, will be at no loss in forming proper conceptions of them. And the same is true in tasting that which is sweet or sour. Our taste can be followed by vivid con- ceptions of any thing pleasant or unpleasant. The 11* 126 CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. qualities we taste in one object may affect the mind in recalling and in replacing our conceptions of sim- ilar qualities in some other object. 3. In regard to Tiearing^ we may have cor '^.eptions of sound or sounds, as to their existence, the difference of tones, degrees of strength, and of their harmony or dis- cord. Any peculiarity connected with sound or sounds that we have ever heard may be recalled and our conceptions of them be vivid, having been ex- perienced ; and we can have brilliant conceptions of the nature or character of such sounds. 4. "We can have conceptions of the objects of the sense or sen- sations of touch. Having once experienced severe heat or cold, we are at no loss in having proper con- ceptions in relation to them at any subsequent period. Some philosophers say they have knowl- edge of men having been blind through life, who had true conceptions of the forms of letters and of figures once known, and that they could even de- tect colors, and have true conceptions in relation to them. SECTION II. 1. Conceptions of objects of sigJit revive and are replaced in recalling visual objects, especially great objects, or those pervading the field of vision with that which is wild or is filled with terrific grandeur. The conceptions of visual objects are, perhaps, more easily recalled, and appear to be more vividly con- nected with the mental states, than those immedi- ately connected with that which affects the other senses. This may arise from the fact that there are CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 12Y a great variety of particles in each object of sight, which taxes the power of attention, association, and comparison. The conceptions of objects once seen are apt to be very clear ever afterward. There are examples of persons having been blind for years, yet their conceptions were strong, and, aided by them, they could give lucid and correct descriptions of that which had been seen. A descriptive writer or speaker must necessarily have vivid conceptions of truths or facts in order to present them full of inter* est. 2. The power of conception and of correctly conceiving facts is essentially important in consti- tuting a well-regulated mind. We are greatly de- pendent upon it in distinctly delineating objects and influences once experienced, their synchronizing properties, differences, and their resemblance. 3. The power of conception or of conceiving facts has its origin in connection with the original powers of the mind, and from its nature and oflice it is worthy of higher claims than to be regarded as a mere acci- dental and indefinable halo, wandering amid ele- ments called primary lights or entities constituting the soul. J09nr/J> 3d SECTION III. 1. The power of conceimng facts can be cultiva- ted by repeated efibrts to paint and repaint, dis- tinctly to the mind, the scenes and facts described by some other mind. 2. It can be cultivated by carefully and repeatedly painting to the mind the scenes of the landscape, mountain, or ocean, or by impressing the mind with the features and traces of 128 CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. beauty and grandeur as exhibited in the scenery of nature. 3. Different minds manifest different de- grees of vividness and of power in conceiving facts. A mind of vigorous and clear conception is apt to be gifted in lively descriptions. Some artists can paint the likeness of a friend from recollection, but it is necessary for them to have vivid conceptions of their features in order to give a correct expression of the countenance. It has been stated that some artists have such brilliant conceptions of paintings once seen, that in their absence they can paint a fac simile, so that when they are compared no difference can be detected. 4. When we are brought in unex- pected contact with objects which suddenly arrest our attention, we rely on our conceptions of them as true till they are corrected. Either from education or from debilitation we may be led to believe in noctur- nal apparitions or ghosts, and when involved in the gloom of night, in some lonely place, our concep- tions of the features and countenances of dead per- sons whom we have seen in time past become quick, vivid, and extravagant. Such conceptions can be corrected when tested by reason and experi- ence ; yet it can be done only with great labor and care. t SECTION IV. 1. When the attention is given to fictitious or tragical scenes, though we know them to be untrue, yet at some exciting appearance or incident, our con- ceptions are attended with a lelief that what we witness is true ; yet this is soon corrected when we CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 129 appeal to .reason, unless the mind is verging to a state of derangement. 2. If we are suddenly af- flicted by contact with some object, the cause is nat- urally the subject of revenge, from the fact that for the moment we conceive it to be capable of suffer- ing, though, in fact, it be really inanimate. And our vivid conceptions as to how much greater the injury might have been is attended with a moment- ary belief that a greater injury has been really received. Some persons in turning unexpectedly to the likeness of an absent friend, have had such vivid and strong conceptions of them as to involve a mo- mentary belief that the person was really before their eyes. 3. The influence of Tiabit on our con- ceptions aids in correcting those which are incorrect or confused, and in strengthening, with distinctive clearness, those which are true. Further we will not speak of the influence of habit upon our concep- tions of objects, and influences afiecting the mind through the medium of the senses. The influence of habit upon our conceptions of internal and moral truths and feelings will arise and be defined in the moral department of this work. IS# MEMOEY CHAPTER III. MEMORY. SECTION I. 1. Memory is that faculty of the mind by which we retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas which are past. It is the power of retaining im- pressions, facts, or events; and remembrance, or rec- ollection, is the act of recalling them, and of pre- senting them, by a voluntarj^ effort, to the mind for inspection. By conception we recall perceptions or the impressions of scenes or events without reference to time, causes, or objects, but memory retains past ideas or events with but little effort in connection with time, causes, and objects. Ideas, facts, and events seem to be spontaneous or abiding realities in the existence of memory: but remembrance, or the act of recalling past events or ideas, is controlled by an effort of the will. 2. Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind which contains and re- tains ideas or events without any special, voluntary, or involuntary action. "Within itself its capacity or power contains facts in connection with either active or inactive states of mind. It is the retentive power of events or realities which become the objects of thought and of knowledge. This power, in vigorous and voluntary action, calling up past events or truths, is remembrance, or recollection. Memory is not the origin of knowledge, but it is a source of MEMOKT. 131 knowledge, in connection with other mental powers, and it is essential in forming ideas of realities. 3. The existence, nature, and power of memory are closely connected with those of conception, percep- tion, suggestion, association, and imagination. 4. When we speak of an object of memory, we have immediate concejotions of its appearance and quali- ties. 5. In T&memhering objects which afflicted us in the past there is an immediate recalling oi percep- tions or impressions, in regard to which we have perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is common for us to say, when we think of a fact within the compass of memory, that it suggests to us another fact, perhaps from the similarity or their nearness in the order of time. Y. Memory has been called a department of association^ or, under and within the extent of its power, there is an affinity of ideas or events, forming a chain or association, in which they naturally recall each other. 8. Imagin- ation is dependent on memory in forming new com- binations of ideas from materials stored up in the memory. SECTION II. 1. There appears to be original differences in the power of memory. Some persons have remarkably strong and retentive memories, which are essential to a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge ; but when memory is very prominent or predominant, it is seldom connected with a properly-balanced and well-regulated mind. The strength of the endow- ment of such minds depends principally upon what im MEMOKT. has been seen and heard, as they are apt to be very much limited in originality, yet quick and untiring in the pursuit of an object, with but little caution or judgment. Some have been known to repeat almost any number of words which they had heard with- out any connection or meaning. One writer speaks of a man who could repeat the entire contents of a newspaper, and of another who could retain words spoken to him to the number of six thousand, w^hile their other intellectual powers were of an inferior order, though this is not universally true with per- sons of such remarkable memories. 2. Memory fo%mded upon and embracing real analogies is an element of mind more important to true mental cul- tivation and the acquisition of knowledge, than that which remembers facts only in the order in which they occurred. The former is an important auxil- iary in forming and arriving at intellectual attain- ments and character, while the latter is connected wdtli but little judgment; yet it appears to be more sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that class of facts in common demand. 3. We have em- hraced and implied^ in the nature and power of memory, in its peculiar connection with the action of the intellectual principle, (1.) A sensitive im- jpression^ or a certain mental state, resulting from contact with some previous existent, and synchro- nizing with the perception of the cause recalled. (2.) The involuntary recurring of internal impres- sions and feelings, or of those which may arise from their similarity to some existent of present knowl- edge. (3.) An involuntary recurrence in the mind of some previous existent related to the object or IIBMOSY. 133 cause apprehended in close affinity or order of time. (4.) It not only implies suggestion, but conception of past events with ihQ perceptions of epochs in past time. SECTION III. 1. Local memory, which refers to and has power over local entities or facts once known, existing either in matter or mind, is generally combined with but little caution and judgment. It merely remem- bers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, resting upon local or incidental relations, especially in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteri- ority. It is not founded upon general principles, clearly known or understood, nor upon real analo- gies, but upon facts more abstracted or disconnected in existence and relationship. 2. Memory contrib- utes to true knowledge and the belief of truth. If the power of memory to retain and remember facts be removed, our knowledge of past events is swept away. Then knowledge would principally depend upon our consciousness of present existences and our perceptions of those things which are the objects of research. Events of the past could not suggest any thing in regard to the present or future; but having knowledge of past events, through and by the power of memory, we believe in and know them to have been real existences. 3. There are degrees in the power of memory in different persons. There are some who can not retain facts in the mind for any length of time when compared with others. Some recollect that which they have seen, but soon 12 19^ MEMORY. forget that which they have heard. Others recollect that which they have read or heard, but can not remember objects of sight. Some of the greatest and most affecting orators known in history could write in two hours more than they could memorize in a week. It is true that some persons can give a long chain of facts narrated by an author, only in the author's words; while others can give all the facts, only in their own language. 4. PMlosoj)liiG memory embraces general principles and universal truths. General principles are of more importance than minor items, and also the facts appertaining to and which are explanatory of such principles. This description of memory is sustained principally by the relations of cause and effect, resemblance and contrast. Thus, our inquiries extend to the nature and origin of existences, scanning their analogies and oppositions, causes and results. 5. This species of memory is more clearly distinguishable in some minds than others. The mind naturally possessing philosophic perceptions and remembrances corre- sponding, is often more tardy in the acquisition of general knowledge than one of lively local or cir- cumstantial memory. The former is best adapted to the theoretical department, or principles of sci- ence, and the latter to the practical department, or facts of relevance and rules of proceeding. These facts and rules form mediums of rapid progress in circumstantial memory. Philosophic memory is connected with minds which look into principles, analogies, classifications, and deductions. Circum- stantial memor^^ may lose its interest and power over facts and rules, while the other, commencing MEMORY. 135 with principles, traces out the analogies and tenden- cies, bursting through or rending in sunder all op- posing diflBculties. SECTION IV. 1. A ready memory embraces qualities, resem- blances, and rules of progression with ease, and with- out any special process of exploring and of under- standing the truths or facts illustrative of general principles. Local or circumstantial memory is brill- iant and ready in common composition or hasty and desultory conversation. 2. A retentive memory is connected with that species of memory called phi- losophic. It is supported by facts and realities, con- nected with general principles, and in remembering any fact the action is apt to be prolonged by recall- ing the general principles with which it is connected. Though it may be slow, yet it is generally progress- ive and irresistible in conquest. 3. Artificial mem- ory is cultivated and attained by connecting things easily remembered with those not so readily recalled. This operation is connected with and is dependent, to some extent, upon suggestion in a modified form. The whole system of mnemonics, principally depends upon suggestion, as when in recalling two synchro nizing objects, with one and the same state of mind, the object of easiest recollection • exciting the mind in recalling the other of more difficult remembrance. This system may be useful to a limited extent ; but much effort in carrying out the system is injurious to the mind, by burdening or overloading the mem- ory with many useless and foolish items and influ- 186 MEMORY. ences, in order to the suggesting and remembrance of other things difficult to recall synchronizing with elementary agreement or disagreement. 4. An effi- cie7it memory has power to retain facts, with vivid-" ness of action in recalling them. There is an acute- ness and peculiar quickness of retentive power connected with the memory of some persons which is not exercised by others. A good memory is not only tenacious and quick in the reception of facts or existences, but it retains impressions or ideas with a great degree of freshness and vividness amid the crumbling of mutable elements and the blight of time. 5. Another feature of an efficient memory is the readiness and ease with which it recalls and pre- sents to the mind facts or impressions. 6. The ab- sence of these good qualities may arise, (1.) From weakness or incapability of the tenacious reception of facts or impressions. (2.) It may result from the inefficiency of the retentive power. 3. It may be attributed to a habit of inattention or carelessness. SECTION V. 1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not efficient as in earlier life. There is an apparent weakness in the retentive power of memory, and an inability to recall ideas and facts. The loss of the power and activity of memory can not be regarded as wholly arising within and of itself, but is princi- pally attributable to the state or condition of the medium through which it acts, though it has been accounted for in different ways. 2. This feebleness can not arise from an im'paired state of the organs MEMOSY.: liflT of perception bo much as it does from a defect of the organs or medium of its own immediate action. The organs of perception are no more liable to de- rangement than the organs or medium through which memory acts. Therefore, memory is not de- pendent upon the organs of perception further than it is dependent upon perception itself. 3. Memory is dependent upon pereejptien for facts with which it is stored, only so far as perception aids in the be- stowment of such facts. But it can not be regarded as dependent upon it for its retentive power, nor for its action in the recalling of ideas or facts. 4. Mem- ory may be weakened by defects in attention from its close connection with it; for with attention there is an emotion of interest which is not so acute and tenacious in old persons ; yet it is necessary to im- plant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remem- bered. 6. The faculty or power of memorj^, in aged persons, is not capable' of any diimnuiion or loss within and of itself. Tha defect is attributable to- the change and enfeebledness of the organs or me-' dium through which its manifestations are realized. Otherwise the mind of an aged person would be an- nihilated in proportion as it ceases to be developed. But this is contrary to experience and knowledge. The memory of the aged can retain the events of early life so that they can be correctly rehearsed, while present events or truths are forgotten by them in an hour. This shows that the original power within itself has suffered no elementary loss, and that it is free from any annihilating power. 12* . 138 MEMOET. SECTION VI. 1. The im^ovement of memory depends upon the tenacious manner which attends it in the perception of facts. Many facts or truths may come within the compass of a careless or inattentive memory and not become the objects of its retentive power. By strict attention we may cultivate acuteness in the manner of receiving facts, which are to be the objects of the retentive power of memory. 2. The retentive power of memory can be cultivated by repeated efforts to impress upon it the facts we wish to recollect: and by often pausing in order to impress that which is to be remembered upon the mind by associating it with objects known, easily retained, and readily recalled. 3. In order to imjprove memory^ the effort should be to deeply and distinctly impress the mind with those things which are to be the objects of memory. Hence, our attention should be turned to the distinct differences of objects, and we should form distinct conceptions of all facts and objects which we wish to remember. In this way memory can be cultivated. SECTION YII. 1. Memory may be aided by carefully considering the condition and relationship of that which is to be remembered, together with the time and circum- stances of, and in connection with, the objects of memory. 2. The memory will often retain facts better by writing them down^ and also by classify- ing them, or by tracing them back to first principles. MEMORY. 13fl 3. He who fears to tniat memory will always feel embarrassed in delivering what he knows on any subject. In order to conquer and to feel at home on any or all subjects, we must make memory responsi- ble, and freely throw ourselves upon it. 4. Memory should be constantly exercised and burdened only with the most important facts. 5. We should receive the impressions of things to be remembered in their nat'fcral order — from premises to relations and re- sults, from elements to manifestations and from causes to effects. liCt. DURATION OF MEMOKT CHAPTER IV. EEMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURA- TION OF MEMORY. SECTION I. 1. Remembrance is the retainina or the continu- ing in the mind ideas or facts which have been pres- ent at previous mental states, or it is an idea or impression previously received from some object recurring to the mind at a subsequent period without the presence of its cause. 2. Remembrance implies the occurring of ideas or facts to the mind spontane- ously, or with but little mental effort. 3. The ease, distinctness, and readiness with which we remember an impression or fact, is proportionably to the tenac- ity with which they are received. Deep impressions are lasting, and are continued as property of the mind without any special voluntary mental effort. SECTION II. 1. Recollection is the act of recalling impressions or facts which have been the objects of memory at some former time. 2. Remembrance differs from recollection. The former implies that an idea or impression occurs to the mind spontaneously or with but little voluntary exertion. The latter implies not only the power, but it is the act of recalling ideas or facts which do not spontaneously recur to the mind, DURATION OF MEMORY. 141 and with seemiDgly voluntary efforts. 3. Recollec- tion, in one sense, is voluntary^ and in another sense it is not. We can not remember because we merely choose to remember. To will to remember any fact or facts, implies that such facts were once the objects of memory, and that they are still in the reach and subject to the power and the act which recalls them. 4. Memory may be said to be the power which receives and retains ideas or facts. Remembrance appears to preserve facts once known from passing away from the mind so as to be utterly beyond recovery. Recollection is the act of recalling facts, once the objects of memory, for the inspection and use of the mind. SECTION III. 1. The duration of memory is clearly evidenced in its power to recall and present to the mind the events of its past experience. Memory, within it- self, is absolutely imperishable, and thoughts which are the objects of memory are indestructible. If the impression is revived with which any thought in time past was connected, the thought itself can be reproduced. The reviving of any impression once realized necessarily involves the presence and the action of a power which can affect the recalling of thoughts coexisting with it. 2. Thoughts and feel- ings, which have been forgotten for years, often re(mr unexpectedly. It is believed by some that the mind possesses within itself power in its different states, and while affected alternately by innumerable exist- ences and influences, to recall, at different periods, 142 DURATION OF MEMORY. all the events and feelings which have ever been the objects of memory. 3. The different conditions and states of the physical system exert an influence over the power of memory. But no influence of this kind has absolute control over memory itself, or any object of memory, so as to annihilate any thing which is essential to them. 4. If all that is essential to memory can not be in whole or in part annihila- ted by physical elements, what must be the power of memory when freed from all entanglements in the future world? This is no more than memory as an abstract entity. Its present indestructible exist- ence is only the beginning of its immortality. The memory is said to become weak and to lose its re- tentive power, and also its vividness of action in recalling past events; yet we have no proof that memory within itself has sufiered any elementary loss. So that this defect in the memory of aged persons must be attributed to the change, enfeebled- ness, and inactivity of the physical organs or me- dium through which it acts. SECTION lY. 1. Memory can be and is affected by the physical organs, when those organs are under the power and influence of disease. There is a connection between the mind and the physical organs, in which each exercises a reciprocal influence. The action of the mind may be increased or diminished in proportion to the manner and intensity of the influence of dis- ease upon the body. Accordingly as the body is affected the mind may be retarded or quickened in DURATION OF MEMORY. 143 action. 2. Memory may be impaired from inguries of the head or affections of the brain. An English- man has been mentioned who was in a state of stu- pt)r, the result of an injury of the head, who, when reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He had been thirty years from his native country, and previous to the injury he had forgotten his native language, and when restored to health he recovered the English language again and could not recollect the Welsh. This was evidence that the power of memory had not been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recall- ing facts can not be attributed to any defect within and of itself. A Frenchman on going to England when quite young, finally lost the power of speak- ing French ; but while suffering from an injury of the head he spoke only French. 3. When the body is affected in different ways the effect upon memory differs. A boy has been mentioned who seemed to be insensible under the operation of trepan for a fracture of the skull, and when he was restored to health he had no recollection of it ; but during the delirium of a fever eleven years after he gave a cor- rect description of the operation, and of the persons present. An Italian gentleman, when fi[rst attacked with disease of the brain, spoke English ; as the dis- ease progressed he spoke French, and for some time before his death he spoke only Italian. These facts, with many others, show that diseased organs have an influence over memory, and also that memory must be imperishable. 144 DURATION OF MEMORY. SECTION y. 1. Often when the mind appears to be in an inact- ive state of coma^ the result of violent fever, the powers and action of memory are not wholly sus- pended. There are instances of persons thus af- fected, and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, who, on recovery, have had a perfect recollection of the events and conversation which took place. And on the other hand, an attack of disease often sus- pends the action of memory, so that all anterior knowledge, for some length of time, is lost. Some recover correctly the ideas of things, but can not recollect their names. These facts go to show that the most intense disease can not destroy the element- ary 230wer of memory. Hence, we can but come to the conclusion that temporal death has no power to annihilate the elements of mind. 2. States of stupor or coma are often the result of intemperance, or other habits of dissipation. In the case of some memory is suspended, but with others there is a brilliant recollection of impressions and facts. 3. When the subject of intemi^erance is under the injhoence of delirium tremens^ it would appear im- possible for him to retain any thing of what was passing; yet there is a vivid and horrible recollec- tion of real feelings and of facts which are regarded as true. When the drunkard revives from this state of mental torture, he can recall and give appalling descriptions of snakes, hooks, pincers, and devils. With tremors of horror he can describe the wailings of the lost and the undying flames of an intermina- ble hell. That which was true to him, and that DTTBATION OF MEMORY. 145 which appeared to be true, were of tenacious recol- lection, showing the power of memory. Though he may try to drown his sorrows and forget his sins in the lethean poison of earth, yet faithful memory, in the future world, will gather them all around him with more than scorpion sting of unrelenting re- morse. If this be the real condition of the mind, what will be the future hope Of the soul while de- scending amid the melting bowlders of the flame- encircled walls of woe, as though it were seeking a deeper electricity of more fervent wrath eternal ! SECTION VI. 1. Truths, which are the first objects of memory in the minds of the young, are those which are of most importance. Though they are the first re- ceived, yet they are the last to be forgotten. Those things which we learn first are generally closely con- nected with our education, and they greatly influence our couree in life, and aid in forming our characters for eternity. Therefore, there can not be too much care in selecting proper truths for the mind in the beginning of its education. 2. In view of the judg- ment of the great day, what manner of persons ought we to be? Memory will then and there pre- sent to the mind all the impressions, ideas, feelings, and acts of our whole lives. All, all will be remem- bered. From the very nature and duration of memory we should be guilty of no act that we will dread remembering in that day, or to have revealed before the countless millions of the vast universe. 13 146 ATTENTION, CHAPTER V. ATTENTION. SECTION I. 1. Attention is that faculty of the mind which has power to attend to or Jieed any object or fact. 2. By general consent it has been defined to be the action in, or the act of attending to, objects or facts. 3. If it has power to act, or if it can be axited wpon^ then it is a real entity. And if it is a real entity, it must be capable of being called an element of the mind. 4. If it is an element of mind, it can not be a result of any other element or elements. 5. The strong efforts made by some to prove that it is not an original power of mind, has convinced us that the reverse is true, from the fact that their conclu- sions failed for the want of correct arguments. 6. Attention expresses not only the state of mind, but the act by which it is directed to any object or fact, to the exclusion, for the time, of all other considera- tions. Though it is closely connected with percep- tion, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to some extent, before the attention is directed to them. The musician can perceive the order of the bass of a piece of music which he is playing on an instru- ment, while his attention is at the same time upon the air he is singing. When our attention is stead- ily fixed upon an object, other objects may pass within the field of vision unheeded till our attention is withdrawn ; then, without difficulty, the mind can ATTENTION. 147 be directed to the object which had received no pre- vious attention. While the attention is intensely fixed upon some object, a friend may ask a question which may seem, for some time, to be lost; but when the attention is diverted and turned to the question, it can be answered with ease. SECTION II. 1. Attention is said to be voluntary when it is under the power and action of the will. An object may have our attention so as to lead us to a general examination of its appearance ; but we can detenn- ine to attend to the nature or elements of such object or objects, upon which a penetrating investigation takes place. 2. Attention is said to be involuntary when it is suddenly attested and turned to an unex- pected object before the consent of the will is ob- tained to forsake an object of previous pursuit or investigation. 3. The degrees of attention differ from small to great. The mind may be but slightly and momentarily arrested by an object, and the attention may not be quickened by any voluntary action or powerful emotion; therefore its action is feeble. But attention is tenacious and intense when it acts under the continuous earnestness and power of volition. 4. Intense and successful attention de- pends upon our determination to tJvoroughly investi- gate and understand the objects or facts to which the mind is directed. This determined persever- ance is, or soon will be, accompanied with a desire to conquer, and a love for the investigation of truth. 148 ATTENTION. SECTION III. 1. Much depends upon 2, jproper exercise of atten- tion in listening to the truths and arguments of a discourse. K we listen with seemingly an involun- tary indifference or carelessness, that which is learned, cogent, and beautiful is to us almost if not entirely lost. And if we give attention in a hurried and confused manner, our remembrance of that which was heard will be confused and defective. 2. In attending to truths we read in the perusal of books, the mind should be concentrated upon that which we read with earnestness of thought and with calm and mature deliberation. If we are apt to become weary and inattentive, it is better to read less at any one time; and we should read but few books, and they should be of the best selection. 3. Memory is dependent upon attention. In proportion as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief and imperfect. That which receives our undivided attention becomes the object of remembrance. If the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove receives our undivided attention, it will be remem- bered, while all those which surround it, with equal peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remem- bered at all they will be remembered as almost indistinct entities. Any object of which we can have knowledge through the medium of the senses, if it does not become the object of attention, our remembrance of it will be imperfect, if not entirely lost. ATTENTION. 14» SECTION IV. 1. Attention is easily influenced by disease. Many persons under only a slight inflnence of febrile aftec- tion, are often discovered to be incapable of fixing their attention upon any thing with any degree of certainty. 2. Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem to affect this faculty of the mind first. And as dis- ease advances its victim becomes so far incapable of exercising attention that present occuiTences, with him, can not be remembered. When the mind is so much affected by disease that we are incapable of receiving correct impressions from external objects, and we begin to regard the objects of our thoughts as real existences, we are ia the first degree or state of delirium. 3. Fever, intemperance, and old age 80 affect the body, that in the majority of cases the attention can not be concentrated upon a long chain of arguments, neither can it be fixed for a long time upon any one object. Though diseased physical organs may exert a great influence over attention, yet the power of attending to facts is in the mind, and is incapable of any essential destruction or an- nihilation within and of itself. 13* 150 ASSOCIATION. CHAPTER VI. ASSOCIATION. SECTION I. 1. Tub power of association is in the mind. This power has its origin in connection with conscious- ness, original and relative suggestion, and by it the objects of thfeir action seem to be blended for the inspection and use of the mind. Its action is the associating of ideas where two or more ideas con- stantly or naturally follow each other in the mind, so that one almost infallibly produces the other. 2. The act of associating is sustained by a remarkable tendency, in which facts or conceptions, having been contemplated together or in immediate succession, become so connected in the different mental states, that one of them, at a subsequent period, recalls the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which suc- ceed each other in the order of their original asso- ciation. 3. Association may be regarded as volun- tary^ to a certain extent. There can be a mental effort made in calling up ideas or facts which have been associated with those which are clearly the objects of volitive action. 4. But we are led to regard association principally as involuntary. It is spontaneous when any fact present to the mind sug- gests another resembling or having some kind of affinity to itself; this may suggest a third and so on till many arise. This may take place with but little or no mental effort, and without attention, so that ASSOCIATION. 161 the facts can not be remembered till something oc- curs to arouse the attention; then, by a mental effort, we are confident that facts have intervened since the attention was withdrawn from some fact far back, which is the object of remembrance. SECTION II. 1. If association consists only in the adhering, natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued cogently and effectually. But if "resemblance, con- trast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and effect" are primary laws of association, we can not understand their undefined definition of the primary power of association. If there is a power in the mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies back of the act of associating them; and if the act is acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to and is in the mind. It is impossible for the original power of association to be a result of the action of one or more of the elements of mind. No primary element of mind has power to form itself, and conse- quently it can not, by mere action, form a power which fills the office of a mental faculty. 2. It is not contended that the associating of ideas or facts, as a result, is an original element of mind, nor that it is any thing more than an ultimate existent in mental phenomena, but that the power which acts is in the mind. 3. Association is fumisTied with materials in the occurrences and facts which are connected with the laws of cause and effect, resem- blance, contrast, and contiguity in time and place. 153 ASSOCIATION. %{f^m, EJECTION III. 1. Objects which are connected, or those which sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of canse and effect, do suggest each other as objects of the power of association. 2. Resemhlance^ in the form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest each other to the mind, and the objects or facts thus presented are the property of the power of associa- tion. 3. Contrast appears to contribute to associa- tion. A very large man seems to suggest to the mind of the beholder the idea of a dwarf, the rivu- let a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Association is aided by facts connected with the law of contiguity of time and place. The nearness of time in which" facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close con- nection of localities or places aids the power of sug- gestion and contributes to association. Some par- ents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' children by recalling to the mind the birthdays of their own children, which correspond to or are near, in time, to the birthdays of their neighbors' chil- dren. When we think of the cities of London and Paris, we immediately think of the countries where they are located. SECTION IV. 1. Natural association takes place when any fact, which is the object of attention, is by the mind as- sociated with some fact of previous knowledge to which it has a resemblance or a relation. In this way associations may be formed. The referring of ASSOCIATION. 153 facts to some principle or subject, which they are calculated to illustrate, fixes them iu the mind, and the association is easy and natural. If a question arises which we can not at the time decide, any sub- sequent information deciding the question will be referred by tlie mind to such question; whereas, such information might have passed unnoticed or have been forgotten but for the original question. 2. Association can arise out of thQ'natural and real relations of facts to each other, or to objects of thought which have long existed in the mind. The remembrance of facts or truths does not wholly de- pend upon the acuteness of attention, but it depends, in some degree, upon the previous existence of truths or facts in the mind, with which new ones can be and are readily associated. And to these subse- quent facts or truths which may arise can be added, extending the power and increasing the energy and activity of the mind. Thus, every new thought or truths received by the mind are valuable within themselves, and each one forms a new basis for a new and extended association of facts by which we progress in knowledge. The same facts, associated in the minds of different persons, may vary with their intellectual habits and be associated in various ways. Many truths thus associated in the mind are so related to each other in their aflSnitating tendency as to readily recall each other in the various mental states. SECTION V. 1. The calling up of facts is voluntary when we direct the mind to a particular train of truths or 164: ASSOCIATION. thoughts best calculated to lead to those we wish to command. We may have an impression of some item of knowledge which we have been in the pos- session of, and from the present knowledge of a por- tion of facts belonging to a certain class or associa- tion be enabled to recall all others of the same association. We can turn the mind to the examina- tion of the known truths till they lead to the recall- ing of those we desire to have at our command. In remembering a part of associated facts we can com- mand and direct our attention to them till all of the same connection are revived and recalled. 2. Asso- ciations recur involuntarily when the mind is turned to some subject which is calculated, in its nature, or by its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to them. The mind can pursue trains of thought with- out any volitive effort, and often without any con- sciousness of its action, till some object arrests the attention. The process which leads to such an object of thought appears to be lost till we trace the asso- ciations of thought back to some existent of previous and intentional examination. In this way ideas, truths, and occurrences which had not been the sub- jects of thought for years are revived and recalled. Thus they may recur spontaneously, being associated, according to their natural and real relation, to each other. 3. Casual associations are formed only in connection with persons, incidents, or place. An idea or thought is associated with the source it was received from — the person, the book, or the place, of whom, or of which, or where we came in pos- session of any truth or fact. Such truths or facts are recalled in the mind whenever the source is ASSOCIATION. 165 thought of, seen, or mentioned. If we think of a certain city where we have been, the mind is imme- diately presented with direct facts, incidents, or occurrences in connection with it to almost an innu- merable extent. SECTION VI. ,,. 1. Facts or occuiTences associated with places or localities are revived vihen we think of or visit them. The Christian loves to revisit the place where his manner of life was changed, and to think of and review the associations connected with it. And even on the othel* hand, the murderer dreads to think of or to revisit the places of his dark criminal deeds, and he shudders in dwelling upon the asso- ciations which there arise as portentous of wretch- edness and woe. 2. Associations formed in connec- tion with localities seem to impress the mind with fiictB' almost independent of memory. In some in- stances occurrences, which have been experienced in connection with certain locations, have been en- tirely forgotten till the place or places were revisited, when the facts associated with them were revived and recalled. 3. If we meet with a person or per- sons who know us, but of whom we have no recol- lection, and being unwilling to ask their names, we continue to converse with them till we learn the location of their homes, or the places where we met with them, from some fact connected with the former associations, and even their names revive and are at our command. If we wish to call the attention of a friend to any item or truth he has forgotten, we 156 ASSOCIATION. speak of the circumstances which were associated with it till some one which he remembers recalls the fact, and probably all that was connected with it. SECTION VII. 1. Intentional association involves a volitive men- tal action. The truths associated are not connected so much by the external relation they sustain to each other as that existing in the states and action of the mind. We can establish a connection between the thing we wish to remember and some other known object, which may have no relation to that which is to be remembered. 2, Often, when persons go in the pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that some one wdll be forgotten, they will select some familiar phrase, carry something in their hand or in their pocket, only as realities, to prevent them from forgetting the object desired. 3. We can associate any thing we wish to remember with some hiown existent, which does not resemble that which we wish to remember, so that it can be recalled. Mer- chants can tell the prices of their goods from marks, which can have no resemblance to prices in any way. The order of successive periods, or the observ- ance of the commemorative rites in the Christian system, must be regarded as intentional. 4. Differ- ent objects can produce impressions which excite similar feelings in the mind, and they mutually sug- gest or recall each other. This arises from the natu- ral resemblance in their mutual relation. Thus ob- jects of natural resemblance can not but excite similar feelings. Similar feelings are the result of ASSOCIATION. 157 entities, which have any thing in common assimila- ted to the original principles or nature of our being. And any thing of sucli resemblances or relationship may suggest or recall another object which will pro- duce a similar result upon the mind. SECTION VIII. 1. The principle of intentional association is fur- ther illustrated by the way in which the mind is affected in regard to the real existence of the Chris- tian system and the truths connected with it. Infi- dels who have urged that the common course of nature is the only truth that is universal and infalli- ble, have, on the other hand, denied that human testimony is sufficient to establish the events con- nected with our lioly religion. Though this is a sophism, yet it should be met. If we had no means or way of judging of the lapse of time, or of the remote ages of the world, than the testimony of inert elements as contained on the face of the globe, or those which are now regarded as being contained in the stratified archives of its own periods and ages, we would as readily infer that the existence of the earth was an accident of recent occurrence as to have any other supposition. 2. A proper belief in the arrangements and occurrences of such facts de- pends upon human testimony and experience in rela- tion to the chain of associated truths in the past. By means of traditional and written testimony we are led to the belief that the earth is more than five thousand years old; but without this testimony it would all be in the confusion of uncertainty, and in 14 158 ASSOCIATION. darkness. 3. The commemorative rites or periodical observances, can be transmitted from age to age by traditional testimony^ or that which has been written by many individuals, and at different times, during the lapse of thousands of years; yet there is the regular return of the fact, the occasion and the day associated with them, the unbroken series which carry us back to the time of the original events, and the persons who witnessed them. Hence, we have as much faith or belief in the real existence of such facts as we have in the series of years which have marked the course of time and the existence of the globe. 4. By the association of the events and facts connected with these observances we are freed from every impression of false testimony, from the fact that we are conducted back by regular steps and periods to the time of the original events. An im- postor can not fabricate a system of theology which can be even the object of investigation till it is marked with rites, periods, and events; then the harmony and regular occurrence of them would be of the utmost importance. Bat such a system as this, bearing a sufficient resemblance to the Bible to be believed, has never been known ; while the Bible has them in the series of facts extending through the past and described as pending in the unbounded future to a degree and extent infinitely beyond all other books, systems, or facts ever known. ASSOCIATION. 159 CHAPTER YII. ASSOCIATION CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. The true analysis of language will not allow the terms law or laws to be applied to the principle of association, nor to those principles or existences closely connected with it, only as such connected entities are clearly contingent in nature or relation- ship. 2. Truths may sustain such relations to one another as to mutually suggest each other; this rela- tionship can not reveal the law or laws of the prin- ciple of association ; but it is that by which objects suggest each other upon the ground of a common influence or impression made by them upon the mind. Objects which have no known relation to each other are often associated from the fact that the effect of them upon the mind is similar. 3. A variation of the associating principle may be fouiid in, and in connection with, the original difference in mental powers. It may arise from the difference in primary elements and their action, all of which may affect the associating principle. One mind may differ from another by possessing one or more facul- ties of a higher order than those corresponding to them in the other mind ; yet when all the faculties of both minds are examined they are found to con- stitute them equal in strength, yet the associating principle varies, being affected by them. The ac- 160 ASSOCIATION. tion of many minds differ, and these differences influence the associating principle. Three men of equal minds in strength journey together; one of them is naturally inclined to notice the face of the country, a second the road and internal improve- ments, and a third the manners and customs of the people. All these different objects give rise to cor- responding associations. 4. The associating princi- ple varies with the energy and strength of the emo- tions. Objects vrhich cause or have in connection with them realities, giving rise to intense feelings of sorrow, are readily recalled ; as permanent columns, amid ruins, they stand out, the enduring objects of memory, while facts connected with slight emotions are soon numbered with things that were. And in like manner those things which excite feelings of joy, becoming the objects, not only of feeling, but of attention and thought, will be readily at our com- mand, together with all the associated facts. SECTION II. 1. The influence of the lapse of time affects the existence and action of the associating principle. Facts occurring last evening can, at the present time, be recalled with clearness and far more readily than those of many years' standing, from the fact that there is no perceptible loss in the strength of the connection by which the facts thus associated revive and restore each other. This view of the subject is in accordance with the common experi- ence of mankind. But however far the associating principle can or may be affected by the lapse of ASSOCIATION. Wk time, its original power must be imperishable, and all facts thus becoming a part of knowledge will live and be known beyond the bounds of change. 2. The lapse of five years may erase many truths from the memory of aged persons, while the associated facts of early life readily recall each other. This shows that the original power is not lost, but that it still lives; and when death is shaking down this clay tenement, the interaal animating flame, long compressed, will burst forth from amid the ruins with imperishable powers, and with all its resources of knowledge. 3. The associating principle is influ- enced by the original differences in the natural incli- nations or disposition. Some persons naturally love that which is grave or solemn, and associations of facts are formed corresponding to their natural dis- position or feelings; others have only lively feelings; and a difi*erent class are attracted with the romantic, or that which possesses natural sublimity or beauty. So that facts become prominently associated corre- sponding to all the different inclinations or disposi- tions, together with even the times and circumstances. SECTION III. 1. Associations can be revived and recalled when present objects are reported to the mind, through the medium of the senses, being the immediate ob- jects of perception. There "^may be something in or connected with such objects which causes the recall- ing of truths and trains of facts which had not been thought of for many years. Often there is some- thing in the sound, the taste, the odor, the appear- 14* 1^'' ASSOCIATION. ance, or touch, which revives some occurrence or fact of early life. 2. The vividness and duration in the reception and retention of realities which have been the objects of the senses and of percep- tion, depends upon the strength or force and charac- ter of the action thus received. When an object aifects directly and forcibly the organs of the senses, and is fully the object of perception and thought, accompanied with appropriate emotions, it can not be readily classed with fleeting objects of memory. It appears to have been impressed upon the mind in a durable way. 3. Mental associations may be under a direct volitive power and action. By vol- untary action we can not create associations nor the facts entering into such combinations. And we can not will the existence of truths to be associated with- out first having some idea or perception of those things we wish to have exist; but we can will that facts or trains of thought may be present with and under the full inspection of the mind ; and we have volitive power to retain them as objects of such in- spection. And on the sudden perception of some unpleasant reality we can instantly divert the atten- tion and refuse to contemplate it, or the facts which may be associated with it. 4. Associations can be and often are under indirect voluntary power. A volitive power may be regarded as incapable of cre- ating, by direct action, either mental associations or the facts thus connected. But when we have per- ception of some truths, which appear to be of an association or chain of events, we can will to use them and contingent facts in arriving at, and in being able finally to contemplate and comprehend ASSOCIATION. 16S other existences which are at the time unknown. When we stop such succession of mental states or action, or check the regular tendency or course of our thoughts, there will arise associations under the control of indirect voluntary action. In pursuing a train of thought or events we often arrive at some- thing rema'rkable within itself; here the regular ac- tion of the mind is arrested, when, from the peculiar qualities or resemblance of such an existent, remote facts arise and new associations are formed. 5. In noticing the skill and design interwoven and con- nected with the works of nature they lead us to think of the great first Cause. Here we pause as though we would wish to comprehend the infinity of such a power or Being; yet the regular course of such thought is no sooner checked than the silvery trains of innumerable rolling worlds or orbs, which he has made, fly through the field of mental action and contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imper- ishable light. SECTION lY. 1. The influence of association upon our ideas of correct taste is worthy of notice. Great care should be observed in receiving truths according to the rules of correct taste. Oratoi-s famed for wisdom, a ready and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, which would be regarded as revolting and disgust- ing but for the influence associated with the speaker. Though such defects are noticed at first without pleasure upon the part of admirers, yet in the course 164 ASSOCIATION. of time such defects, being associated wi'li the man and his zeal, are regarded as marks of great dis- tinction. Hence, such defects are copied and imita- ted, while traits of true excellence pass unnoticed. 2. Our ideas oi. fashion vary with the influence of association. The odd insignia or the peculiarity of the escutcheon upon which is emblazoned the glory of some great warrior, however ludicrous they may appear within themselves, yet they are soon regarded as tasteful and glorious from their connection with such a personage. This is true, to some extent, in regard to almost every extravagance in dress. 3. That which would be abhorred^ if introduced by common persons, can be introduced by others, and be extolled by almost universal consent, only from its association with such persons. When the multi- tude lay aside any extravagance, should any one perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of refinement. It would appear that any person ever conforming to the niles of a correct taste and fash- ion, independently of the varying influence of asso- ciation, would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, being unworthy of imitation. 4. Habit gives effi- ciency to the power we have over our associations. It is constituted by the repetition of efibrts in at- tending to associating operations, till we gain a facility and readiness in them and in regard to them. Trains of thought or associations, which have been long familiar to us, are attended to with ease and precision. The mind has a natural tendency to re- turn or recur to the states of previous experience, in T'hich associated truths or events receive and re- call each other. The formation of habit is volun- ASSOCIATION. IW tary when we determine to repeat the efforts of at- tending to such mental operations. And it may be the result of indirect volitive power. SECTION Y. 1. The tendency and the effects of irriproper^ slsso- ciations are worthy of notice. Associations may descend in degrees from those of simple error to those of vicious and malicious tendencies and re- sults. Many descriptive writers associate with wicked tendencies, deeds, and events language full of imagery, exciting the feelings with sublimity, beauty, grandeur, and delight, till that which is sin- ful can be contemplated without any feelings of ab- horrence, and the mind becomes inclined to crime. This course once entered, without almost a miracu- lous interposition of Divine power, the immortal soul is soon entangled and black with crimes, at- tracting the electricity of unending wrath under the just claims of infinite law. 2. We here close with the tendency and results of correct associations. That which is pure within itself becomes the object of pure mental action. A pure mind appears to be naturally so corelated to objects that if some of them were not of a high order of purity, yet the associations, if permitted to be formed, would be pure and harmless. 3. He who wishes to succeed in any branch of science must know that he has first correctly fixed the primary principles, and then asso- ciate with them those truths which are naturally adapted to and are connected with their existence, in order to arrive at, and to clearly comprehend cor- 166 ASSOCIATION. rect results. We can not speak of all the endlessly- diversified applications of the associating principle, yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition of knowledge. giHsion Jfiftfe- CHAPTER I. MENTAL STATES. SECTION I. 1. A SIMPLE mental state may be regarded as only expressing the presence of one thought or object, which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. Such a state of mind seems to be natural ; for a sim- ple notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they can be the object or objects of mental states. 2. If two or more elements or existences, collected or con- nected together, enter into mental states, such states are not simple, but complex. 3. Though simple mental states can not be defined, yet, like axioms, they may be regarded as self-evident truths, always to be known as real entities within themselves. 4. Our helief in and reliance upon simple mental states as real may be with boundless confidence; for there can be no imaginary existent in a single idea, feel- ing, or fact abstracted and indivisible. Here is nat- ural truth, in which we can trust without the fear of deception. 6. Simple mental states may be re- garded as preceding those which are complex. A simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter into mental states and be known, in order to the knowl- edge of the relationship of many truths in the ex- istence of complex states. If compounds are made 167 ^« 168 MENTAL STATES. up of simple elements or facts, so many complex states of mind exist, being affected with the presence of a plurality of realities capable of being discon- nected or reduced to simple indivisible entities. SECTION II. 1. The existence of complex mental states may be regarded as being affected with the presence of a collection, assemblage, or a complication of ideas, feelings, or realities. If we think of any external existence, as a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there are properties and qualities embraced in the action of the mind in relation to each or all of them. But inert elements have no self-power of uniting by pen- etration, and remain only in juxtaposition. There is a higher degree of blending and in the union of the elements and the inclinations or influences of the mind. 2. Our thoughts and feelings may arise from many objects or causes, but all unite in the soul under the immediate inspection of the mind, which can take into the account the oneness severally in their origin. 3. Our mental states are complex in contemplating external objects. We form an idea of the existence of ice from its properties, and we describe it only by giving those properties, w^eight, friability, color, and hardness. Similar complexness exists in regard to any other combination of pro23er- ties. 4. Complex mental states may exist in rela- tion to tJiat which is connected with external objects, differing from abstract elements. In connection with qualities there may be presented to the mind tend- encies, appearances, and influences. And we may MENTAL STATES. 169 be ready to acknowledge an essence or foundation without being able to define it. The only way that we can study the existence and nature or essence of material compounds, is by their elements and inert- ness. And the only way that we can study the nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and ac- tion. From the peculiar impression existing ele- ments often make upon the mind, it is natural for us to receive the idea of the existence of something, though its nature can not be defined. 5. Complex states of mind are often the result of internal influ- ences or realities. As a lake receives from tributary streams, on every hand, so the mind may be re- garded as the receptacle of knowledge, being affected by almost innumerable influences and impressions. We can judge of these as correctly as we can of those arising from external existences. 15 ItO ABSTBAOTION, CHAPTER II. ABSTRACTION. SECTION I. 1. Abstkaction is the act or operation by which elements are separated from each other and are ex- amined individually. The original power of such action, and by which it is known to exist, is in the mind. It may take place when the mind is occupied with separated facts, or when we contemplate some particular part or property of a compound, or of a complex object, as disconnected from other existen- ces of such combinations. 2. By the mental exercise or the acting power of abstraction, we can examine many objects, selecting definite properties in which they agree and can be classified. And it can be still more comprehensive in selecting a property or fact which is common to an extensive collection of adhering or complex entities. 3. An abstract notion or thought may arise upon the ground of detected resemblance and difference in objects or properties, and in the special notice or attention given to them individually. In the presence of compounds we can have conceptions of density, form, or friability with- out the introduction of other properties. Proper- ties may be so separated from the combination as to be the objects of abstract thought, and any element may be so contemplated in its separation as to be the object of special observation. If I say this ABSTKACTION . iTl apple is red, the color only may be the object of abstract thought. SECTION II. 1. Mental operations in separating facts, or in ab- stracting certain ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. The power of abstraction is in the mind. If the mind has the power of motion, and if it does act, we must admit that notions or ideas arise in connec- tion with or in such action. In the origin of our ideas they may be simple, or may exist separated from each other. Tliere appears to be a natural tendency uniting them, giving rise to complex men- tal states. If this union is formed of many simple ideas or truths, the power in the mind, or that is connected with mental operations, which is capable of separating these united facts, in whole or in part, may be called abstraction. The union of ideas forming complex mental states may be either inten- tional or involuntary ; but the separating or abstract- ing of them appears to be voluntary. There must be an intentional action in the examination of any individual thought or idea in the mind by which it is separated or abstracted. 2. Abstraction can not be implied in the examination of simple elements or ideas unless tliey could be capable, in some way, of being decomposed, or are divisible within and of themselves. But abstraction will apply in the sepa- rating of the oneness of their existence from all other facts or realities existing in the mind. 3. Ab- straction is implied in the examination of complex notions or ideas, when every simple element or idea involved in the compound or collection are analyzed m. 172 ABSTRACTION. individually or separately. The act of distinctly separating the elementary parts of a compound or certain entities of a collection from each other is called abstraction, and this work caYi only be effected by abstraction. 4. 'We msij he said to have particu- lar abstract ideas on the presentation of an object to us having color, fragrance, form, density, and exten- sion, when the mind is so entirely occupied with some one of these qualities as to be almost insensi- ble to the existence of the others. The particular abstraction takes place when the action of the mind is limited to one quality. When any object or qual- ity existing in a state of combination is separated by a mental process for inspection, the idea we form of it may be said to be of particular abstraction. This may take place in the mind either with or with- out a real separation of the combined entities. SECTION III. 1. The power of abstraction and the right exercise of it is of essential importance in the acquisition of true knowledge. It is indispensable to a correct knowledge of material existences in analyzing the constituent elements or component parts, bringing them separately and consecutively under the test of the senses and the power of perception. It enters into the process of correct deductive and demonstra- tive argumentation or reasoning. It is involved in the mental operations of the exciting orator, the descriptive writer, and the efficient architectnralist in abstracting each form of beauty, elements of taste, and superior excellence, contributing to that ABSTRACTION. lit which is to be accomplislied in true interest, sublim- ity, or grandeur. 2. Abstract notions or ideas may be said to be simple, complex, or general. Onr ideas of objects which have many elements, parts, or qualities may be said to be complex; bat general abstract ideas may exist in relation to classes of ob- jects when they are contemplated separately — dis- tinct from, or are abstractedly from those of other classes. The term man may be used to convey the idea of the existence of our race, while the term iish may apply to the existence of all in that department of creation. These classes can be contemplated by separating them from each other, or from any other class of existences, under the law of general abstrac- tion. 3. Primary truths or principles may be classi- fied and examined under the law of general abstrac- tion. Such truths or facts may be combined in classes entering into trains of thought or reasoning in arriving at permanent conclusions or results in the general divisions or departments of knowledge. 4. General abstraction may apply to numerical sci- ence. General abstract propositions, though brief, may involve almost a world of meaning or reality. Though a series may arise, extending to innumerable powers, yet it can be represented by a general no- tion or term, which, in reality and effect, is the work of abstraction. General reasoning depends upon classification as a result of abstraction. SECTION lY. 1. General abstraction may apply to classification when we examine one class of objects separate and 16* w^ . m m If4 ABSTRACTION. apart from other classes. Objects classified under the terms of genera and species, may be contempla- ted or examined under the law of general abstrac- tion. When a variety of objects are before us, it is easy and almost natural for the properties or qualities of agreement and disagreement to be pre- sented to the mind, giving rise to associations or classes. These classes of many objects may be represented by a single term, and any one of them become the object of mental action separate or ab- stracted from the others. 2. General abstract ideas will apply to almost innumerable classes of objects — the different orders or classes in zoology, ornithol- ogy, vegetation, and crystallization. 3. The process of abstraction is essential to a well-regulated mind. Without it we can not proceed correctly in analyzing the qualities or elements of objects; and we could not control the attention, concentrating the action of the mental powers in the examination of any one object separated from the thousands bestudding the field of vision, or that are present with and are con- tained in the mind. 4. It is influenced and affected by the power of disease, and can be so impaired or weakened, as disease increases, that all objects are in a state of confusion to the mind, and it naturally varies as to degrees of acuteness and power in dif- ferent minds. « IMAGINATION. 175 CHAPTER in. IMAGINATION. SECTION I. 1. Imagination is that power or faculty of the mind by the action or exercise of which we form new combinations within the mind, gathered from real elements, scenes, or facts. It is that which forms new associations of ideas from the truths which are the property of memory, being subject to its power. From the materials stored up in the mem- ory it produces new combinations, on the one hand, more pleasing, more brilliant, or more sublime, or, on the other, more awful, more terrible, or more hor- rible. 2. Imagination has been regarded as an idte- rior element of mind, or that it is a result of certain primary elements when in action. If its origin and existence wholly depends upon the action of certain primary elements, then when those elements are inactive the power and action of imagination would be annihilated ; and if ever its being and action are recalled they would exist by the creative action of those primary elements. That any primary ele- ments of mind have such creative power is absurd. The power and the action of imagination is wholly in the mind. Though it may be called an ulterior fac- ulty, yet to define it to be an imaginary nothing is incorrect; if it is a real existence it is capable of being so defined. 3. Imagination is closely con- I IW IMAGINATION. nected with the power of the understanding and our conceptions and perceiDtions of objects and facts. Under its influence and action we are enabled to combine objects and qualities of which we have conceptions, and extend our thoughts to the contem- plation of similar ones, or of other facts as real, though unknown to us before, and w^e can imagine such existences as being more pleasing or awful than tkiiy fact of real existence in nature. In some in- stances we can pursue and describe them to a greater degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur than is contained in any similar fact or object of material- ity. 4. Imagination may extend to the operations of apprehending and contemplating the arrange- ments, qualities, resemblances, or influences con- nected with objects of mental action, and the exten- sion of our thoughts in the formation of new ideas beyond those which may be regarded as primary ones, together with the relative position and influ- ence of the same to and upon each other, and to the original ideas. It recombines our ideas of the rela- tive condition of things, and influences mental states in relation to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, which transcends the original ideas as our thoughts pass beyond them and ascend higher. SECTION II. 1. Imagination influences mental states, in and by which the mind conceives and forms ideas within itself, and of real and imaginary external objects. It assembles images and paints them upon our minds and on the minds of othei-s. By it we can go be- I IMAGINATION. ITT yond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those already in the mind, and in adding any image or reality necessary to fill or complete the scene or proc- ess of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or there is a suspension of further action. Thus tfcere is a pleasure realized as we advance to new facts and in the reception of every new idea. 2. Imag- ination is incapable of being resolved into any other element or combination of mental faculties, from the fact that no element of mind has self power to cre- ate or aid in creating any other faculty, the ofiicc and action of which can be defined, and upon which other faculties are dependent. The origin, power, and action of imagination belongs to and is in the mind. Therefore, it is a power or faculty of the mind, though the ulterior process of its action may be regarded as of secondary relationship. The idea that this faculty is wholly created by some other fac- ulty or faculties is absurd. 3. Imagination leads in Mending elements of diverse existences. Those which belong to widely diversified scenes can be combined into one beautiful conception. It blends the ideas or the elements of thought in harmony, either with some real conception or the elements of it. And it blends diversified elements, presenting to the mind that which is beautiful, grand, or par- takes of true sublimity. SECTION III. 1. The operations or exercise of imagination may be said to be involuntary^ when there is action with- out any volitive effort of the mind. And such t ^ 178 IMAGINATION. action can take place when we are not immediately conscions of the fact till some object oi fact arrests our attention, and we recall beautiful combinations which have been the work of imagination. 2. In- tentional imagination involves artificial combina- tions, by means of which the mind acting passes on, while extended thoughts and facts arise, forming new objects of contemplation. 3. Fictitious deline- ations are dependent upon imagination for transac- tions, scenes, and imaginary facts. Aided by this faculty the narrator or actor paints images and char- acters with any appropriate qualities or influences. 4. Productions of the imagination are chaste and of a high moral character in proportion to the moral principles, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The comhinations of images, elements, or facts which are produced by the imagination being vile, demoraliz- ing, and destructive in their nature and tendency, correspond with the bad motives, the corrupt princi- ples, and the perverted habit of the author. SECTION IV. 1. Imagination differs from fancy in forming new combinations from the materials stored up in the memory, graduating them from the beautiful to the sublime, or from the awful to the more terrible. Fancy is that by which the mind forms images or representations of facts or existences, while imagina- tion is the power of combining and increasing, or oi diminishing the interest of mental states. 2. Im- agination differs from admiration; for the latter is no more than wonder mingled with emotions of love IMAGINATION. 1T9 or veneration, or of that which is novel or great. 3. It differs from fictions in the results of its action. Fictions can only be regarded as fictions; but im- agination blends elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity into one grand conception, the elements of which can not be abstracted from true existences. The creations of the imagination are true to thought, and are objects of mental action. 4. There is a dif- ference between the imagination and bombast. The former may command, combine, and blend elements into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, while the latter consists in high-sounding words in an in- flated style. In this way persons often use high- sounding terms, but without any connection of ideas or cogency of thought, and without a proper concep- tion of that which they wish to express. A speaker, while enforcing the truthfulness and claims of his theme, had moved his audience with a general feel- ing of excitement under his thrilling eloquence, and closed with great applause and triumph in the fol- lowing manner: '^Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains; thrusting my tongue into the thunder's mouth, I would proclaim these truths to the ends of the world." Subsequently a young speaker attempted to use the same while delivering a discourse in a loud tone of voice and with great confidence: "Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Eocky Mountains, and I would thrust my tongue into the thunder's mouth, and Pd, I'd, I'd howl like a wolf." Here is evidence that the action of the imagination was imperfect, i> 180 IMAGINATION. and that at first he had but a meager conception of what he wished to say. Bombast is without a cor- rect blending of the beautiful, and without the proper presence and arrangement of ideas and of thoughts, jM-'m ^^^ ^^ ^^ without a maturity of conception, all of -^^^"'^^ which belong to or are connected with a vigorous and active imagination. SECTION V. 1. Imagination differs very much in nature and action from that of hurlesque. The solemn thought- fulness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by ludicrous images or representations. It is the pecu- liar influence manifested in a contrast between the subject and the way in which it is treated, tending to excite laughter or ridicule, while the active im- agination carries with it real interests, thrilling the soul with the liveliest emotions of the beautiful and sublime. 2. Imagination differs from sarcasm. The latter may abound with imagery or beautiful lan- guage, but at the same time there is an ironical sig- nification or expression. Though there is a granting of the claims of any person or people, yet there may be a keen, reproachful expression or satirical re- mark, with an influence, expression, or feeling of scorn, while imagination must be regarded as free from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings of syTnjpatliy are not wholly dependent upon imagination, though they may be aided by it. Though sympathy can and does not originate with or from imagination, yet a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and IMAGINATION. ^Sl does combine images of suffering, gloom, and de- spair. A man whose moral sensibilities are still alive to action always has sympathy intuitively on the presentation of any object of suffering, if his attention is arrested by it. But his feelings are much increased when he begins to imagine himself in like condition. 4. The imagination can be exer- cised in works of fiction without injury ordy when such fiction is immediately connected with truths or facts in nature^ and possessing the high moral char- acter which infinite Wisdom has connected with all that he has made. 6. Tlie influence of fictitious writings upon an active imagination and upon the mind is decidedly injui-ious. It weakens mental ac- tion in the examination of real and important truths, tends to fickleness and whimsicalnxiss of mind, insta- bility of character, and often leads to certain min. The divine Being has filled an infinite space with an eternal range of existences or facts, so that the im- moi-tal mind of man can dwell on real facts or truths without number, and to endless ages increasing in majesty and glory. When all these truths have been scanned till they have become dim with age and their glory exhausted, then, and only then, has an undying spirit time to breathe its energies out upon puffs of empty air, or excite its restless powers over the dreams of some drunken lord which were kindled by the exhalations of rum ; or they may be the result of a perverted and vicious purpose of heart. 6. The imjproveraent of the imagination, or the injury it receives from popular works of fiction, depends principally upon the purity of the author's motives and the manner in which the elements of 16 183 IMAGINATIOif, thought are combined. A chaste and spirited nar- ration of facts, as they are mapped or arranged in the universe around us, tends to enliven the imagination in advancing and combining or blending of new forms of beauty or grandeur. A chain of real enti- ties present tliat which can give rise to the creation^ of imagination and its rapid improvements SECTION YI. 1. The utility and importance of the imagination must be regarded as of no ordinarj^ character. In neglecting the cultivation of this noble and import- ant faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and action of the whole mind. 2. A vigorous and active imagination, in conveying our thoughts or in de- scribing facts in writing, is of great importance. To present imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, facts, or transactions, or to paint them in their com- binations and qualities, is effected principally under the control and action of the imagination. 3. An active imagination is essential to true oratory. To conceive of a speaker's power to excite, move, and thrill an audience without the aid of imagination to assist him is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and exciting eloquence can never exist in connection with that mind which is destitute of an active im- agination. Under its combinations and blendings, derived from the language of trope and metaphor, the orator may launch thunder-peals, startling the feelings or emotions of all around him. The elec- trifying power, drawn from imagery, illustrations, atid resemblances, will ever stir with life and thrill IMAGINATION ISI with joy or awe. 4. The combinations, blendings, descriptions, and painting of the poet are without 2J\y pleasing interest unless the action of the mind is pervaded by an active imagination. 5. The sculp- tor's chisel can not trace upon the marble the living and desired expression or features of a friend if he is destitute of the power or influence of imagination. It is this which enables him to render every form graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty which causes others to admire the work when it is com- pleted. 6. The simple tones or rounds in music, if abstracted, are monotonotis if they do not cause con- fusion; but the relation of those sounds, when prop- erly blended or harmonized, thrills the soul with the most pleasing emotions. SECTION VII. 1. The development or improvement of the imag- ination can be secured by attending to the manner of its exercise or action, by continued or repeated efforts to extend its power and influence. It should not be exercised out of its proper sphere, but in the most natural way and upon its appropriate objects. 2. The influence of disease may aftect the imagina- tion ; its action may be directed to an improper ob- ject or in a wrong channel. 3. It can lead us to m^isconceptions and improper action unless it is con- trolled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are apt to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who have left the world, have died happy and are gone to heaven, when they have not, at any time, given one clear and conclusive evidence of such a result, as 184 IMAGINATION. is required by the Gospel law. 4. Imagination will lead to deception^ if it is allowed to wander nncon- trolled amid myriads of imaginary beings, or scenes of wealth and pleasure. It soon tends to abstract the mind from real existences, and causes it to dwell on the beautiful forms of imagination, which are false, and upon the most whimsical speculations. It ceases to contemplate real existences at hand as worthy attention. It soon withdraws from all ob- jects of worth and dwells in a world of imagination. When the mind advances to this point it is midway from a rational state to that of insanity. 5. A con- tinued love of and an untiring pursuit oi fiction often diseases and sends out the entire desires of the mind upon the wing of imagination — feasting such desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable glory. Finally, the mind becomes wearied with the staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions ap- pear as realities. The sympathies and affections of the heart become cold and die for the want of real accessible objects upon which they can act. Often false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eter- nal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if pos- sible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the im- mortal soul to perish with invoked madness, l^ever let the mind dwell too long upon only one and the same idea if you would be sane on all points. 9fi' .lit-^mmm '. CHAPTEB I. Intellectual states of exteenal obigin AND intellectual STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. SECTION I. 1. The powers of mind arranged under the pre- ceding divisions of this work, or the greater number of them, have, by the common consent of many writers in time past, been arranged under the gen- eral heading of intellectual states of external origin, and the faculties, the defining of which we are now commencing, have been arranged under the heading of intellectual states of internal origin. In this ar- rangement there appears to be a distinction without a philosophical difference. There is a difference, but it is contrary to the meaning conveyed by the first heading referred to. 2. We object to the doc- trine of intellectual states of external origin. Intel- lectual'states may exist as results of external causes; but for intellectual states to arise iu the external world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is impossible for intellectical ^states to have external origin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties 16* 185 186 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. or powers of tlie mind couched under such a head- ing, as having their origin externally or in the exter- nal world. There are external causes of mental states; but mental states and faculties can not have external origin till they arise out of the mind, which is impossible. 4. It is utterly impossible for us to conceive that mind is matter^ or that matter can be mind. All the faculties of the mind belong to and exist in the mind. All the mental states of which "we are capable have their origin and existence in the mind. Therefore, no state or faculty of the mind can have an external existence or origin unless such existence or origin takes place beyond the self- limits of mind, and, consequently, in the external world. SECTION II. 1. If we should say that any element or power of mind was of external origin^ as to either its exist- ence or action, would it not convey the idea that the origin, or that the commencement of its being was in connection with some inert element or existences of the external world ? But if we refer to the origin of its action, would it not imply that such action might commence with distant objects of matter, thence advance to the mind in order to be known ? 2. If we say that any mental state is of external ori- gin, would it not convey the idea that external phys- ical elements have self-action, which action must first ta*ke place in order to affect the mind, which is at rest, creating new mental states? This would seem to indicate, that while the mind was at rest mental OEIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 187 action of the same mind could take place in connec- tion with inert, distant objects, which finally afiects the mind in creating new mental states. If such conclusions be true, we are not capable of so under- standing them. 3. The action of some faculties of the mind may be regarded as more closely related to and connected with external objects than that of others, and their position and claims must be de- fined accordingly, which can not be done to any great extent by any general heading. SECTION III. 1. There can be no impropriety in saying that there are intellectual states of internal oAgin; io\\ although external objects may afiect the mind through the medium of the senses, yet the mental state which follows must be wholly of and within the mind. And this state, though it follows an ex- ternal cause, can not of itself be said to be of exter- nal origin. While the cause may be external, yet the origin of the mental state, as such, is not the inert cause, nor the sensation received by contact with it, but is wholly of and within the mind. 2. The origin of all knowledge known to us, as such, is in the mind. The true study of psychology is of boundless importance. The undying soul may be said to contain within itself an eternity of meaning, being, and destiny. Through the medium of the senses we become acquainted with the realities, beauty, and grandeur of the external world ; but by means of internal powers we can and do have knowl- edge independent of material entities, or of the 188 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. power and action of the senses. 3. The most ulte- rior origin of knowledge, in regard to external things, must begin with sensation. This knowledge can only embrace the fact that a sensation has been received, and that we have the presence of such an existent. This sensation in and of itself can never generate or impart to the mind thoughts and ideas, which are the true beginning of intellectual or rational knowledge. 4. The action of sensation af- fecting the mind is immediately followed by a new mental state, which is the result of a reviving influ- ence or action of the internal power of the soul. By and in the action of this internal power, modi- fied into certain mental states, arises the formation and existence of thought; and with the formation of thought commences intellectual or rational knowl- edge. 5. The existence of simple thoughts and ideas must arise by and within the action of the internal power of the soul. The advancing of these from simple to complex, and the blending of them into combinations, is real knowledge. Thinking, believ- ing, hoping, and doubting have their origin wholly and only in the active internal power of the soul. They are not objects of the senses, nor of sensa- tions, caused by external things. So we are forced to the conclusion that knowledge is of internal ori- gin, and the power we have in knowing all truths or facts, whether they exist in the external world or within the imperishable soul, is an internal power, the test of all facts. SUGGESTION. 189 CHAPTER II. SUGGESTION. SECTION I. 1 . Suggestion appears to be the jpresentation of an idea to the iniud without the immediate aid of the senses. It has power within and bj its own ac- tion to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and arise from the internal action of the immaterial con- stitution, without the aid of combining and compar- ing ideas or facts. There are certain thoughts and ideas which arise and can be called natural sugges- tions. 2. Simple suggestions may be regarded as primary and natural. They have been regarded as a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. The action of these may suggest the idea of real existences which may become the objects of mental action. 3. The internal action of the mind, in and by which suggestions arise, may be regarded as the real or clearly-deiinable origin of their knowledge or known existence. In connection with these we have power to believe in their real existence. 4. From this internal action or states of the mind is suggested the notion of self^ or of the mind as real, and the cause and reality of change. That which suggests the idea of our being, or the notion of du- ration, is independent of the power and action of f#0 SUGGESTION. the senses or of sensation as to its origin. Such suggestions appear to arise from intuitive power and become the objects of consciousness, and such inti- mations appear to be essential to the nature of mind, and its power of primary action, which is the origin of all knowledge to us, capable of demonstration. SECTION II. 1. The idea of self-existence can not be tested by the senses. We can not see, hear, taste, or smell such an idea or fact, neither can we feel to originate the same, but it arises from the mind itself. It is suggested spontaneously, from the very nature of the mind, as it is constituted by its sovereign Crea- tor. It is so closely connected with the nature and existence of mind that it is impossible for us to define the time or the beginning of its origin. 2. The origin of the idea of mind, as an existent, can not commence with the senses; for the senses are properly affected by external things, and no idea of mind can result abstractly from the existence of ma- teriality. The origin of the notion is suggested by and from the nature of the mind within itself The beginning of our ideas of the primary elements of mind is suggested by the mind, though they may be matured by the feelings and action of the mind in various ways. 3. The origin of the notion or idea of personal identity is with the internal power of the mind. It can not arise from inert elements of the external world, neither can it arise from the same- ness in qualities or nature of any mental existence beyond and distinct from self; but the beginning of SUGGESTION* §0^ its being is suggested by the interDal and intuitive power and nature of the mind. 4. The idea of our 7'eal existence must arise from the natural existence of the mind. We can not exist without having an idea of our existence. The beginning of such an idea is connected with the power of suggestion, and may be regarded as a simple idea, forever undefina- ble. But an idea or thought implies and is action; therefore, the self-acting power is of and within the mind itself. SECTION III. 1. Simple suggestion may embrace certain states of mind which arise out of states previously experi- enced, when the relationship is not an object of memory or of present mental action. 2. Simple ideas arise from the internal power of the soul, and from the nature and origin of some of them we may come to the conclusion that there is such a thing as natural suggestion. Connected with such ideas is a belief that their existence is true. 3. Simple sug- gestion can apply to pctst thmigJit 07' events. If we visit a natural curiosity, which we have formerly visited, in company with a friend, the different ob- jects of former attraction and conversation will revive the thoughts and even the words used by i>s on that occasion. In passing the different objects of former conversation they often cause the former language and words to be revived by the power of suggestion. 4. This kind of suggestion extends not only to the action of the mind in regard to past tlwuglits or facts ^ but will apply to mental action in » 192 SUGGESTION. regard to that which may become the object of men- tal action, though it may have never before been the object of any mental action. One idea often introduces another into the mind. The sight of a peculiar object may suggest others of the same class, but differing in certain facts or features, or may, and often does, give rise to certain trains of thought never before experienced. SECTION lY. 1. Suggestion is involuntary when thoughts arise in connection with other thoughts which are not at the time the special objects of the attention or of mental action. And it is clearly involuntary when the thought or idea appears to arise in connection with or from the intuitive power of mental and moral action. 2. This power may be said to be vol- vmtary when we, by intentional cogitation, use cer- tain thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order to trace out other or similar things of which we have had no clear perception before. The discovery of each new fact suggests the idea of something as real still beyond. 3. The importance of this faculty is incalculable. It is a revealer to us of the past; it enables us to contemplate the future, and upon it memory is dependent for much of its power in call- ing up past thoughts or facts. It is an original tend- ency of the mind to exist in certain states after certain other states. 4. In suggestion there is a tendency to relative conceptions: All ideas or ob- jects so affinitated as to sustain a relation to each other may and often do suggest one another. These SUGGESTION. 193 relations are experienced, or are so perceived by the mental faculties, that in trying to comprehend them the power and majesty of the mind augments our conceptions of its limitless reality. 5. In suggestion there is also a tendency to relative perceptions, in which all facts or truths, sustaining a relation to each other, suggest similar facts or truths, which, without their presence with the mind, would have never been the objects of perception. SECTION V. 1. The origin of the idea of material existences may be imparted to us through the medium of the senses, but we could not, from sight or touch alone, judge of the qualities or properties of a compound beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But that which is tested by contact with the senses can and does suggest an idea of those properties which exist within or beyond the outer surface. 2. Suggestion involves our experience in noticing successive mental states. This chain of successive events suggest other chains, and all the individual facts serve to suggest corresponding facts or truths. 3. We are princi- pally dependent upon suggestion as to the origin of our idea of motion. We can test the abstract ex- istence and qualities of objects which are in motion, but there is a difference between that which moves and motion itself Our idea of that which changes the relative position or order of things must be sug- gested; for motion can not be regarded as a real object of the sense; hence the idea or notion of it can not arise from the power of the senses, but is 17 ^ Id^ SUGGESTION. suggested in the change and relative position of things. 4. "We are dependent, in an important sense, upon suggestive ^ower for our notion or idea of the relation of effect to its cause. The character of an effect may suggest the cause, guided in part by the presence and action of the senses : but the origin of the idea of the cause is wholly of sugges- tion. If it requires strength to raise a small stone from the earth, the thought of lifting a larger one naturally suggests the idea of additional power; hence, the presence of the vast globe naturally sug- gests a first Cause, or the omnipotent power which caused the being or real existence of the globe or of the vast universe. SECTION VI. 1. The origin of the idea of time is connected with the suggestive power. Time is duration meas- ured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We can not have clear conceptions of duration existing in succession, though we can have of duration which can be measured. The events which take place in time, and the relative positions in the flight of the orbs which measure it, can not give us a satisfactoi*y idea of time; hence, such an idea arises from an internal suggestive power. 2. If duration measured can be called time, then it would appear that dura- tion without being measured, or being unfinished, may be called eternity. The succession of events, lander the law of measurement, has a natural tend- ency to the suggestion of the idea of the permanency of duration unchecked by a succession of periods or SUGGESTION. 195 the flying returns of revolving worlds. 3. We can not recall the time when we first received an idea of space. It appears to have arisen spontaneously, or that it is a result of an intuitive suggestive power. There is no way to represent space to the senses; it is without form, figure, or bounds. It is not depend- ent upon the existence of any thing else, so far as we are capable of judging, and when we have con- ceptions of any existent, it is impossible for us to think of it out of or beyond the bounds of space. 4. Resemblance may be regarded as an ulterior law of suggestion. The primary power of sugges- tion is connected with the intuitive powers of the mind, as the previous argument will show. The mutual or ■ reciprocal resemblance of objects often suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling past existences by means of the suggestive power and its action. The house of a stranger may replace in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or the banks of that rolling river instantly revives the place of my childhood sports, and where my little brother and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound of the last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger may recall to my mind, as from the grave, that of my father. The peculiar state of mind aflfected by one object has a tendency to suggest other states or objects. SECTION YII. 1. The internal action of the suggestive power is aided by the contrast involved in the nature and 196 SUGGESTION. existence of objects. The presence of the dead body of a celebrated warrior, statesman, or divine is almost instantly followed by their appearance when living and in their glory. 2. The extremes of conditions^ in existences, suggest their opposites. In connection with the idea of a suffering beggar by the wayside is suggested the thought of prosperity and happiness. The prairie which has smiled under the rays of a thousand summer's suns only affects the mind by the introduction of the thought or idea of dark, silent groves, or of majestic forests waving in the living emerald of beauty and grandeur. The action of the mind in passing from one object to an- other is a wise arrangement of Deity, else all of earth would become monotonous and uninteresting. 3. In thinking of some one of cotemjporaneous ex- istences often others of the same epoch are suggested to us. If objects distinct from each other, yet united by an invariable connection, as the batteries at the extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of the one often suggests the other. 4. Without lively sug- gestive powers mental action would be confused. It appears to be indispensable in furnishing new materi- als, amplifying the thoughts of the writer or of the speaker; and in proportion to the activity of the suggestive power will be the readiness of language, cogency of thought and sentiment, and the force of appeal. 5. Beat entities are the objects of sugges- tion, and when thus presented to the mind they be- come the objects of notice and reason. The great truths which lie at the foundation of that process of reasoning by which we are compelled to acknowl- edge the existence of God, together with our own SUGGESTION. 19f being and our obligations to him as the Father and donor of all good — thej are the direct intimations and objects of the suggestive power of the mind. SECTION YIII. 1. The suggestive intellect is capable of being strengthened and rendered lively and efficient by attentively directing the mind to those thoughts and feelings of our choice, and which will be most likely to suggest each other and in trying to retain them as distinctly and as long as we possibly can. Facts thus collected become as encamped or collected materials for the egressive action of the mind. 2. Thm power can be rendered more vigorous by attend- ing to those truths which are most naturally affinita- ted, or are blended in a state of union. 3. It can he aided in attending to those facts which differ most abstractly from others, and produce sensations and feelings peculiar, or that differ in kind and nature so as to attract the greater attention. 4. This power can he increased by attending to that temperance, care, and economy necessary to secure the health of the bodily powers, contributing thereby to the natu- ral capability and readiness of mental development, BO far as mind is dependent upon physical organs. The mind can not be perfectly developed through either a diseased skull or brain. 5. The activity of the suggestive power of the mind depends much upon the hdhit or manner in which it is exercised. It should be tested and exerted with care and with repeated egressive efforts in presenting the mind with new and delightful truths or facts. In the con- 17* 198 SUGGESTION. templating of these natural truths the mind rises, admiring the power and goodness of Him who reared the forest, commands the storm, rolls the ocean, and eliminated, as from the uncreated light of Lights, the planetary lamps which ever move in boundless space around us, outnumbering, if possi- ble, an infinite flight of years. BELATIVB SUGGESTION. CHAPTER III. RELATIVE SUGGESTION. SECTION I. 1. In contemplating objects the mind is capable of receiving impressions, or of being influenced in re- gard to certain relations which such objects mutually sustain to each other. Thai which awakens a feel- ing or a mental state in regard to the natural rela- tionship of objects is called relative suggestion. Without doubt the mind is capable of such an influ- ence, but it is difficult to clearly define its office, as it appears to be midway between the nature or char- acter of simple suggestion and that of the judg- ment. Yet a suggestive power, in any way or to any degree of strength, is clearly distinct from that of the judgment. 2. The mind is capable of expe- riencing certain influences^ which are aff*ected by a peculiar relationship of objects of similar or dissim- ilar co-ordinate properties or qualities, which give rise to a new class of feelings and mental states. The presence of such objects appears to affect in the mind the process of comparing, so as to give rise to the cognizance of the first intimations or ideas in relation to them, in which we realize their relation in a certain way or respects. This is an original susceptibility of the mind, and is connected with the action of intuitive principles. The mind is not only capable of realizing or experiencing the pres- 200 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. ence and relations of objects, but of being affected by the condition or character of those things which are like or unlike, agreeing or disagreeing as to equality, time, or place. 3. Influences of relation may arise and be suggested, or experienced by the mind, in the notice or contemplation of a great va- riety of realities or facts. The degrees of difference which glow in the emerald hues of a summer forest, are the occasions of giving rise to the first appre- hensions, or perceptions, of the different kinds of trees composing that forest and other relative facts. In the sound of the national band, one instrument is loud, and another soft; in the touching of frozen mercury and cotton, or in the tasting different kinds of fruit, there are natural differences, the relations of which affect or influence the mind in regard to them. The relation of any class of objects is dif- ferent from the objects of, and within themselves. That w^hich is involved in such relationship affects the mind in regard to the objects themselves, and also in respect to the degrees of the mutual contrast in the properties related. 4. Terms of correlative character may involve and express that which is intended to be explained. The mere mention of them involves the relation they sustain to other objects, which relation is the immediate occasion giving rise to mental influences, or states ; while the object expressed by the use of the term was lost sight of. In the use of the terms father, mother, governor, or commander, the relations are the more direct causes of a full mental action * , .j . .... :.'. ..■ -f J .1.. .. RELATIVE SUGGESTION. SECTION II. 1. Relative auggestion does not depend upon the power of the senses for its existence, else brutes and birds would have it as fully developed as man; for they can see and hear as well as we can ; but as to their power of suggestion, or their perception of relations being well developed is very doubtful. The idea of the tallness of a tree could not be con- veyed to us by sight only; for if no tree of any kind existed save that one, it would, doubtless, ap- pear to us neither tall nor short; but if we know that tall and short trees are before us, it is evidence that their relation has been suggested to the mind, and has been an object of mental action. 2. Wo are not dependent upon the action of the senses in recognizing, and in realizing the mutual relation- ship of hope and expectation, love and jo}^, or that joy and grief are opposites ; yet these relations give rise to mental influences and new states of mind. The number of relations which affect or cause the action of the suggestive power, in consequence of which new mental states are experienced, or take place, are almost as the stars of heaven for number. "What a limitless variety of objects and facts con- tribute to the action and resources of the mind ! What must mind be contemplated in the perfection of its powers I What an eternity of duration, and infinity of feeling, memory, knowledge, action, and being within and of itself! Imperishable gem, as- sert the power of thy immortal faculties ; for living thou shalt never cease to be. 3. The extent of this power, and the number of objects and facts involved 202 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. in its action, can not readily be defined. Its action is connected with relations of coexistence, resem- blance, diversity, degree, and position. It may extend to the relation of cause and eflfect. But it is useless to dwell longer upon this subject^ We will pass to the examination of the next topic, with increased humility, gratitude, and awe in contemplating the powers and the being of mind, and the goodness of that Creator who con- stituted it progressive to endless ages. With more than lightning speed it sends forth its pioneer thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, without ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its dominion. 4. Who can define and contemplate the soul ^perfected in its departure from earth? Progressive flight! when millions of rising series in knowledge have been numbered, comprehended, and passed, still onward in its towering flight, know- ing more, and still more, of the incomprehensible fullness, love, and goodness of that Being to whom it owes its existence I THE JUDGMENT. -fidS CHAPTER IV. THB JUDGMENT. SECTION I. 1. The faculty of the human mind that is called judgment has often been acknowledged, while some- thing else has been defined in lieu of it. Its exist- ence can not but be acknowledged, for it is a real faculty, and as such it should be defined. 2. It is that faculty of the mind by which we are enabled to compare ideas or thoughts, and to determine upon the evidences as to preferences, or that which is right or wrong. By it we not only compare ideas and thoughts, but we advance to compare the rela- tions of terms, of propositions, and of arguments ; also to determine upon that which is correct. 3. It is that which may be called the determination of the mind, in which we become satisfied from the evidence and influence received in comparing the relations of ideas, thoughts, propositions, and argu- ments. 4. It is not only the act of judging, but it is the power by which such a process or action is concluded. And if it has power to examine the agreement or disagreement of things in order to arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or to decide upon that truth after it is found or defined. It not only has power to examine and to determine upon relations, and the correct stages of argumenta- tion, but it is the concluding action of the mind in 204: THE jtjdgmj:nt. regard to the determining of the truthfulness of ob- jects or entities, and of determining the mind favor- ably to truths, whether casual or substantial, 5. The faculty of judgment is a particular jpower within itself 'y it is not to be taught in order to have being, and the power of its origin is connected with the existence and action of the primary ele- ments of mind. It is not originated by education, but exists only to be exercised. If it is naturally deficient — and this appears to be true in some minds — there is no process of instruction that can supply the defect. The understanding may be nat- urally^ perfect, and the same may be true of sugges- tion, or other powers ; but if the judgment is defi- cient, the mind generally acts hastily, and at the first intention. 6. The judgment has not only power to determine an action, or of concluding, or of finishing that which may be called a mental process satisfactorily, but it can analyze^ abstract^ classify^ and generalize. By it we can class an individual existent under a general notion in the afiirmation, as that is an animal of a certain kind, or that is a tree of a special kind, or from a certain mountain. The powers^' of the mind are in motion, uneasy, or rest- less till the object of its action is decided by the judgment. This decision once made, rest generally pervades the whole of the mental faculties. SECTION II. 1. A naturally-defective faculty of judgment — • and many there are who appear to be almost totally wanting in regard to a well-developed power of THE JUDGMENT. 205 judgment — is attended with great uncertainty, and much confusion, as to a proper discrimination and action in regard to what is right or wrong. Such minds may desire to do right, and to act conscien- tiously in all things, but there is plainly a want of proper and safe decisions. They should share of the charity of others rather than suffer severe pen- alties in case of wrong acts. An allowance should be made for their imprudence, while the purity or impurity of their motive, at the time of their error, should be the object of the judgment of others in acquitting or in condemning them. 2. The judg- ment jpresujpposes the understanding. The latter may exist without the former, but the judgment can not exist with any special manifestation without the understanding. The latter furnishes the materials, or facts, upon which the former acts. It furnishes to the judgment that which is capable of being an- alyzed, abstracted, classified, or generalzied. With a well-developed understanding, we may have dis- tinct and vivid conceptions of objects presented to the mind; but if the judgment is deficient, we can not properly discriminate between them in marking the features of difference, and in bringing such dif- ference, or differences, into the decision, each one contributing to the final decision or conclusion. 3. The understanding only knows objects as they really exist, and as they are presented to the mind ; but the judgment must discriminate by arranging them together, and by evolving those things which agree or disagree; and it depends upon this power to give a decision accordingly and correctly. 4. The judg- ment, then, must be that which has power to determ- 18 #S# ^ THE JUDGMENT. ine, or of decision ; but, in another point of light, its action, in connection with a mental apparition, is the recognition of facts, feelings, and differences in the relations of things presented to the mind, which are the objects of conception, or are made known to the understanding. Bj its action we are impressed with the relations of resemblance, and of dissimi- larities which may, or does, exist between two ob- jects, and can arrive at a conclusion in regard to them. 5. Judgment, properly exercised, is con- nected with the various mental operations guiding them to the discovery and knowledge of truth. It enables us to compare facts with facts, feelings with feelings, and truths with truths, weighing their bear- ings, relations, tendencies, and differences, and to give to each its proper importance, or influence, in the final conclusion : hence the importance of a fully-developed and well-regulated judgment. By it we can be rendered safe in life, can judge prop- erly of men and things, and pass above and beyond the sorrow which so often rafters the moral condition of earth with prison environs, and vails the spiritual sky with augmenting darkness, closing out true hap- piness from perishing thousands. - -^^^ SECTION III. 1. The action of the faculty of judgment is so closely connected with reason, that a reference to the one may aid in explaining the other. Reason embraces the ground of an opinion, or the premises of an argument npon, and from which the argument is based, and carefully carried through to the con- THE JUDGMENT. 207 elusion. The judgment appears to inspect this proc- ess, and weighs the facts presented in the different objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon all the facts involved in the argument, even to the correctness of the premises, unless such premises be free from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment must approve of the same. That the judgment is really and only reason is absurd. Keason, unaided by judgment, does not appear to know any thing but the premises and conclusion, with the regular argument, or successive steps in going from the one to the other, while the judgment appears to decide upon the truthfulness and the amount of weight that should be attached to all the facts, together with the justness of the conclusion. 2. Under the active power of the judgment may be comprehended the relations of properties or qualities of entities by which they are distinguished and recognized. The geologist marks the differences of the earth's strata, containing the archives of its own periods and ages. In this way the lapidarian detects the agreement or disagreement of the properties and particles which are consolidated in the mountain cliffs and crags, which defy the wastings of time or the violence of storms. This is also true of the zoologist and orni- thologist, in regard to certain characteristics of the different tribes, or divisions of those vast families of existences. 3. A correct development of the rela- lations of resemblances, and a satisfactory knowl- edge of the same, depends very much on a vivid judgment. Here is the power of arranging the relations of resemblances, and of classifying prop- SO^ THE JUDGMENT. erlj, by discriminating the certain number of sub- Btances or properties necessary to class them to- gether as one species. The correctness of all such arrangements, of individuals forming the genus or properties of the compound, or existences of classes, with the elements of differences, relations of resem- blances, and analogy, embracing the points or de- grees in which there is a difference, depends upon a well-developed and active judgment. SECTION IV. 1. We may readily decompose a compound, but it requires the presence of the judgment in attend- ing to the agreement or disagreement of the proper- ties and the relations of resemblances — the natural adaptation and agreement of the parts to each other and to the whole. It is the work of the judg- ment to clearly discriminate these facts, and to so satisfy the mind in regard to them. Keason may connect or follow a chain of truths in arriving at conclusions, but it requires the exercise of judg- ment in satisfying the mind in relation to them, so as to produce uniformity of our belief, purpose, and action. 2. The character and relations involved in regard to cause and effect can only fully be recog- nized through the medium of the judgment. If the nature or qualities of a cause are known, then it requires the exercise, or an act of judgment in form- ing an opinion of the nature or character of the approaching effect or pending result. The exercise of this faculty is especially necessary to prevent confusion, in case of joint causes, followed by a THE JUDGMENT. 000 common effect, or, if there be joint effects, of a com- mon cause. There may be sequences introduced to our notice, wliich will require us, from their charac- ter, or nature, or relations, to look for, and judge of, the true antecedents or causes, as well as the form- ing of an opinion of the character of the results. 3, The truthfulness of axioms, and the relations of angles and propositions, are objects of the judgment. If we say that all axioms which lie at the founda- tion of mathematical science are self evident truths, and are incapable of either proof or disproof, it requires the exercise of the judgment in order to receive them as such free from doubt. Otherwise, doubt and confusion would pervade all our efforts in acquiring knowledge, and in relying on them as true. 4. The skill and success of a physician greatly depends upon this faculty^ or mental power. He must be able to judge of the symptoms by which a disease may be known, though they may resemble those of other diseases, as well as the effect of cer- tain remedies upon disease, and upon different phys- ical constitutions. Without judgment we can not foretell the probable result of an action under par- ticular circumstances, and on different kinds of objects ; but in this way we are enabled to arrive at truth, and know it to be such from a careful discrim- ination of the facts which are evolved, and the ap- proval of conscience. SECTION V. 1. The action of the judgment is essential in regard to our knowledge of intellectual science. It 18* 210 THE JUDGMENT. is the process or method of judging correctly of the facts evolved in argumentation, or events and rela- tions, giving due weight to each one in the final result. The power of memory may call up an ex- tensive array of facts, but judgment must form tliem into classes, genus, or combinations, or it must ab- stract them according to the various elements or points of difference connected with each or all of them. 2. Decisions may be true or false, in propor- tion to the clearness and distinctness jwith which we judge in weighing all the facts and influences con- nected with the premises, argument, and conclusion. He who arrives at conclusions upon slight, partial, or imperfect evidence, and is unwilling to admit of corrective facts, will be almost invariably wrong in his decisions. If, with pure motive, he attempts to regulate his own conduct, and is not guided by a proper judgment, he is liable to be led by the most hasty impressions or feelings, which will lead him to quick and rash conclusions, too often only to la- ment the want of proper and timely consideration; or, having formed his opinions, he is more tenacious and arbitrary in regard to them than the man of sound judgment; therefore, we should be careful to form our opinions with care, properly judging of all the facts which would naturally lead to sound re- sults. 3. This jprincijple^ or power ^ appears to be of universal adaptation, whether it be applied to the investigation of scientific truths, or the afi'airs con- nected with every day's occurrences or events. It pre-eminently aids in deriving from all sources of facts that which is essential to correct motives, acts, and conclusions connected with our belief, and the THE JUDGMENT. 211 rule of right. When our conclusions are thus formed with care and deliberation, we should al- ways be free to be influenced by new facts as cor- rectives, yet we should first know them to be true within themselves. SECTION VI. 1. A great natural defect in the judging power is incurable. There are some minds which are want- ing in the power of reason, and are unskilled in the strict exercise of attention. Such minds are easily shaken in their conclusions; whenever new facts are urged, whether they are legitimately connected with the subject or not, they are ever changing. But by care and repeated efforts the want of attention may, in a great measure, be corrected, and the power of judging become more perfect. There are others whose judgment is so deficient that they hastily form an opinion from the first evidence, however imperfect or deceptious it may be, with a stubborn firmness: and then, with such, all arguments or facts, which may be brought as correctives, are to them not only worthless, but aggravating. If their motive be pure, they may escape, while their work is lost; but if their motive be uniformly impure, there is but little or no hope ; for it is impossible to remedy a radical defect of judgment by any kind of training or education. 2. In order to judge cor- rectly^ all selfish motives and feelings should be buried a million of feet under ground ; then all the facts connected with the case should be carefully and impartially considered, and due weight of each 212 THE JUDGMENT. and all should contribute to the final decision. De- cisions made in this way are worthy of confidence. 3. Connected with the power of judging is the^/'c>6'- ess of classification^ which embodies an idea not only of the power, but of the act of forming into classes, or of distributing into sets of classes. 4. This may take place in the mind, to some extent, involuntarily. When no special mental effort is put forth, the qualities of some contingent existent, under the law of resemblances, may give rise to a state of mind embracing realities as such. SECTION VII. 1. In certain respects classification may be re- garded as necessary, when it arises in connection with our conceptions of primary facts or self-evident truths ; and if our attention is attracted by a tree, it exists in common with all trees : hence it requires the exercise of a special power to discriminate the differences, and to classify so that it may be dis- tinctly an object of clear perception and thought, and that power is the judgment. Then qualities or properties may be the immediate work of classifica- tion, which can not be correctly arranged without the special discriminating action of the judgment. 2. In certain respects the work of abstraction is connected with the power of judging. The mind takes cognizance of the character of the qualities or elements of objects through the medium of the judgment, by which the properties are abstracted and arranged under the clear conceptions of their natural differences. Henceforth an abstract ele- THE JUDGMENT. M0 ment can be a special object of thought without involving the obscurity of the compound, or mass, whence it was evolved or eliminated. 3. General- ization is, in part, connected with the power and action of the judgment; for the power of correctly reducing particulars to generals, or to their genera, must be exercised with a due reference to those features, or qualities, which would designate them as naturally belonging- to a certain class or combi- nation. Such properties of differences, or of agree- ment, must be determined by the judgment. In this way we determine that a fact is general by finding it in each member of a certain class of existences, and we determine, in a similar way, that facts are not general when they are found only in certain members of different classes. 4. The act of judging may be preceded by perception. We may have perception of a variety or a mass of objects which, at first, are apprehended in a con- fused way, but by comparing the appearance, or qualities of properties, we are enabled to decide upon them without doubt : hence we arrive at gen- eral conclusions from their applicability to each and all of the entities of any one, or of each particular class, which are the immediate objects of mental action. SECTION VIII. 1. The faculty or power of judging differs from tJiat of the understanding. The understanding seems to know notions or objects as they appear, but it requires the exercise of judgment to abstract 214 THE JUDGMENT. or classify according to natural principles and dif- ferences, so we can have a clear and real knowledge of their existence. That which is the object of the understanding is that which is decided upon by a well-developed judgment. If the power of the un- derstanding be vigorous and well developed, and that of the judgment radically deficient, the mind will have experienced the presence of many facts without the power of combining them, so as to have distinct and decisive use of them : hence the knowl- edge of many things, but the control of almost none of them to advantage. 2. The jpower of judging is closely connected with that of suggestion. The lat- ter consists in the first intimation, or presentation, of a fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has decisive power in regard to them, which proceeds upon the notice of, and the influence or weight of all the differences compared and balanced. The action of the powder of judging is clearly different and distinct from that of suggestion. 3. The power and action of relative suggestion is not one and the same with tTiat of judgment. The former takes place when the mind experiences the first effects, or influences, which arise out of the certain relations that different objects mutually sustain to each other. The making known to the mind, merely, the first intimations of mutual relationship may be called relative suggestion, but it requires an act of judgment to decide upon the causes of these rela- tions, and the importance that should be attached to each, or all the facts connected with them ; and we can not have clear conceptions of them, and a distinctive command over them, only as it is given THE JUDGMENT. 215 by the correct exercise of judgment. That the judgment only acts under the controlling influence of suggestion, or that of relative suggestion, is ab- surd ; but it has the natural right, and does act upon and in regard to all the facts or influences which are the objects of mental action, being em- braced in the power of suggestion, or of relative suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestionably true that it difiers from them both as to its nature and oflice in the mind. 4. The importance of a well-developed and active judgment is incalculable. The acquisition of knowledge, and a right use of it, in adding to our own happiness and to the happi- ness of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient in regard to the power of this faculty, we never can act with that degree of prudence and discretion that the laws of propriety and right require ; but with a mature and well-regulated judgment we are fur- nished with facts from all sources, together with an unshaken belief in, and command of them, upon which we can depend with the utmost confidence, and can arrange either to hide from the dangers and storms of earth, or to triumph over and beyond their power. • §xhhxan Bthtni\. CHAPTER I. REASON. SECTION I. 1. Reason is a faculty of the mind, having power to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected with the intuitive elements of our being, and can be cultivated so as to increase its power of vividness in action, but it is impossible for its origin to be the result of education. It is that principle of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from error, and good from evil. In the exercise of this function of the mind other faculties appear to harmonize, and can be called into action as auxiliaries in the investiga- tion of truth, and in distinguishing between that which is correct and that which is false. With the power, and the correct exercise of reason, the mind is capable of deducing inferences or results from facts or from propositions. 2. This principle ena- bles us to allege or assert, with confidence, the ground or cause of opinion upon which is to be built the elements of argumentation, or facts lead- ing from the cause to the conclusion. It aids in the selection and use of that kind of facts and positions in the argument which naturally support and jus- tify the final conclusion or result. 3. Hatiocination 216 REASON. '217 can not exist without a power competent to be the foundation of such action, or exercise of reason. It is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowl- edge of the process of demonstration, both as to the facts involved and the correctness of the process. The reception of, and our confidence in the facts as ti-ue within themselves, together with the results, de- pends upon the power and correct action of reason. 4. Reason appears to be the foundation upon, or in the power of which rests ideas or facta for the purpose of correct arrangements, and the right use of thoughts and arguments. It leads to the devel- opment of primary principles in nature, and the exploring of hidden fields of truth. It invests the mind with power to define, to some extent, the pow- ers of our being, and rises by and through con- nected chains of facts, from nature up to a real belief in the existence and power of a sovereign Creator and Ruler of the universe. L , SECTION II. 1. Reason is not only a power existing in the mind, but it is a power capable of action. It is a faculty capable of acting, and such action is reason- ing when appropriate facts are involved as materials of argumentation, and influences and results are correctly deducted from the premises. Eeason, as to its natural and real existence in the mind, is correct, and so we may regard it when in action ; for we can not have conceptions of incorrect reason- ing. The judgment will admit of degrees, but the moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason. 19 218 EEASON. The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect to cause, or of cause to efffect, is unjointed, and the action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be either reason or reasonable. 2. Reason, in another sense, is to exa'iuine^ discuss^ or suj^ort hy facts ^ connected in argumentation. E'othing can be re- ceived by us as true which opposes the dictates of reason. It is utterly impossible for us, at one and the same time, to receive truth and error, or that of correct and false propositions ; but certain truths and correct propositions, at first, may appear decep- tions or false ; yet often, when they are traced out in their proper connection, or chain of facts, in argu- mentative form, we become satisfied that they are correct. 3. Reason differs from the understanding. The latter is that which apprehends and embraces things presented to it, but reason proceeds, in the investigation, to the certain knowledge of their real existence and character. Notions may arise with, or be given by the understanding, but reason ena- bles the mind to investigate the truthfulness of them, or to know that which is true and that which is false. The understanding can not blend those things which are presented, involving such things, or truths, in a certain connected train, in order to give a knowledge of the real results, as well as the correctness of the steps taken in arriving at such a conclusion ; but reason can bring all into the ac- count, and arrive at certain conclusions and a knowledge of them. 4. Our ideas of riglit and wrong are tested by reason, with the exception of ax- ioms or self-evident truths, both in matter and mind. They are received by us as truths without reasons REASON. 21^ either for or against them ; for we are incapable of reasoning in regard to them ; yet the intuitive, self- evident truths, which are the foundation of mind, receive self-evident truths as such, independent of proof in any way. All our ideas of other facts, or existences, are, or can be, tested by reason, and, by the same process, our knowledge of them be matured. SECTION III. 1. The power of reason exists in the mind^ and is connected with its intuitive faculties. Its origin is neither the result of habit nor of education, and the objects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There are certain intuitive facts ^ and self-evident truths, which can not be tested by reason. Such self-evi- dent existences are in the mind, and lie at the foundation of reason; but their truthfulness can not be tested by reason. Reason in action advances from one fact, or degree, to another, founding the one upon the other, till we reach the conclusion. And in tracing the chain of connected facts from the conclusion backward, we will arrive at primary facts, or self-evident truths, both in the existence of mind and matter. All such truths can not be made known to us by any kind of reasoning or proof, for they are incapable of either. 3. Self-evident truths may be divided into two classes: (1.) Those truths which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind; and, (2.) Those truths which belong to, and are connected with, the science which appertains to external things. The axioms, or self-evident truths, 230 KEASON. upon which the whole of mathematical science stands, or is based, are incapable of either proof or disproof; yet we are compelled to receive them, and to receive them as facts, independently of any power of reason; therefore, what power is capable of receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie at the foundation of all external science or knowl- edge, but the intuitive, self-evident elements which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind? 4. These. intuitive principles are the foundation and origin of all knowledge to us : hence intuitive internal facts, or elements, with our feelings and experience, are to be depended upon as true with more absolute certainty than the knowledge of all external things ; for the latter are tested by and through the medium of the senses, which may deceive us by reason of their connection, often, with diseased physical nerves, while internal feel- ings, or facts, are objects of direct knowledge, with- out the interception of physical elements, which may be imperfect or diseased so as to deceive us. 6. All self-evident facts are not, and they are inca- pable of being, the results of reason in any way. They are received by us with a conviction of infal- lible certainty. Though incapable of either proof or disproof, yet they are received by us, and are known to be true. It is utterly impossible for an}^ one to doubt their existence, or their truthfulness, and all men are guided by them in the acts of life. Such facts, or truths, are received as such by the intuitive powers of our existence, independently of all proof. REASON. 221 SECTION IV. 1. A knowledge of our own existence arises in connection with the power and action of the pri- mary elements of the mind. Self evident truths, which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind, have power to affirm and know our own existence; and in their existence and power we have knowl- edge of all other facts within the bounds of mental action. With them arises the conviction of our own existence ; and being identified with their being and nature, it is utterly impossible for us to avoid the knowledge of our real entity. With the same pow- ei*s arises the conviction as to the distinct nature of the mind from the body, and that the mind is capa- ble of thinking and acting without the aid of the material organs. Knowledge implies a power capa- ble of knowing, and objects capable of being known. Those elements which are capable of ex- periencing a conviction of their own existence, and that of other existences, may be regarded as pri- mary, self-evident principles. 2. These truths are unchanging in their essence and nature of action within themselves. Our physical powers are con- tinually changing, and the same may be said to be true, to some extent, of elements tested by the senses ; but a knowledge of all these changes is realized by the unchanging intuitive powers of the mind. Facts tested in this way are of direct knowl- edge, and can not admit of either sophistry or doubt ; therefore our knowledge of the existence of our own minds as certain, is more absolute in nature than the knowledge we can have of our material 19* 222 KEASON. being, or of any thing beyond that of self. 3. In these self evident, primary elements of the mind is contained the power of receiving and of 'knowing self evident truths, or axioms, in external things, or that lie at the foundation of all scientiiic demonstra- tions and knowledge beyond that of self. If we can not depend upon the internal being, convictions, feelings, and processes of the mind, it is utterly im- possible for us to have real knowledge of any fact or existent beyond the self-bounds of the mind. 4. In the intuitive being and power of the mind arises the conviction and belief of our personal identity. Present mental states, or internal affections and feelings, are the occasion of the calling up of past mental states, or feelings, each or all existing in the same mind, and at the same time, imparting the idea of duration to the same sentient being, and the certainty of the sameness of that which was pres- ent, or was capable of commanding and retaining such knowledge. Change belongs to all physical entities, and the various acts of the mind ; but amid every and all possible abbreviations, or changes, the sentient being experiences and retains a certain conviction that spiritual self does not, and can not change, but must ever be the same in essence ; and, with this conviction and knowledge, all our notions of external things are regulated. 5. Connected with the power of reason arises the notion tJiat every result must liave a cause. It is natural for us to ex- perience a conviction of cause from effect, and to have an idea of the character of the cause from the magnitude or nature of the result. The uniform and natural tendency is, that the same cause under BBASON. 223 the same laws will have a similar or the same effect. If there were no uniformity in these things, we could have no confidence in the laws regulating ex- ternal things ; therefore, accident would be the only law regulating all objects of external knowledge. We have intuitively a conviction, confidence, and belief in the uniformity existing as to degrees, na- ture, and character involved in the relations of ante- cedents and sequences, of causes and effects ; and to doubt these is contrary to nature and all experi- ence, and is utterly impossible. 224 REASON. CHAPTER II. f REASON, CONTINUED. SECTION I. ' 1. In connection with the power of reason is our confidence in the uniformity of the laws of nature. The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner in the succession of phenomena, evolving the rela- tions of sequences and antecedents, of effect and cause, gives rise to a conviction and notion of their order and obedience to law, all of which enters into our experience and knowledge. The origin of such a conviction is connected with intuitive power. Ex- perience, guided by reason, enables us to apply it to the proper objects, or process, in successive events. 2. Our immediate confidence in the uniformity of phenomena gives origin to the notion of causation. The regular tendency of one event to follow another, becoming or affecting an abiding experience, gives rise to the conviction that the former is that of cause, and the latter is the result or effect. We then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. The next item is, to notice the character or nature of both cause and effect, and if these uniformly har- monize, we come to the conclusion that the same cause, under the same laws, will invariably produce the same effect. This uniformity must be thor- oughly tested by experience, so as to prevent decep- tion in regard to the various phenomena. 3. Redson JBEASON. miist he present in forming correct conclusions in re- gard to complicated, or complex and extensive natu- ral tendencies, or operations. The first effort to contemplate such a mass of realities may be at- tended with confusion; but by extending the effort so as to embrace the entire mass, we are impressed with a uniform tendency. Yonder waves a beau- tiful forest. The different kinds and sizes of the trees, at first sight, present a confused scene of grandeur. Some individual trees will soon be taken away ; but the idea of the forest growing contina- ally, and that it can continue to exist in the future, can not be doubted, for this accords with reason and experience. The seasons, for some length of time, may vary, but our observation in relation to these changes, for several years, gives rise to the belief that, in the lapse of a still greater number of years, there will be conformity to a general law and a re- markable uniformity. It has been observed, with some degree of certainty, that from two to three cold wintei*s succeed each other, then there will be about as many of milder temperature. The same has been thought to be true in regard to y^ry hot or cool sum- mers. Another opinion has been partially settled in regard to wet and dry years, that the weather graduates to the two extremes about every four years. Amid all these changes, there appears to be a conformity to something like general laws, a knowledge of which seems to have been based upon experience, and guided by reason. 4. When the miiformity of natural entities exist and conform to general laws, and a conviction of such facts enters into our experience, we are then enabled to detect 226 KEASON. results which are contrary to regular laws. Such deviations can easily be made the objects of mental action, and such incidental or contingent causes, diminishing or interrupting the results, can be as- certained, and a reoccurrence prevented. In this way dangers can be detected, and even foreseen, reasoning from natural relations and tendencies ; and often life, safety, and happiness are preserved in lieu of such dangers, or even temporal death. 5. There are laws regulating mind, but our knowledge of its conformity and uniformity thereto is attended with greater uncertainty than is our knowledge of the conformity and uniformity of matter to the laws by .which it is regulated. Physical elements, existing without self-motive and self action, can not evade or deprecate the force and authority of the laws by which they are governed; and, under all circum- stances, such elements are subject to the investiga- ting action of the mind. But sentient beings can evade and deceive, so as to render the true analysis of mental phenomena more obscure ; yet mind and the laws under which it acts, are as true within themselves, and can be depended upon as such with as much certainty as any thing that appertains to the material world. SECTION II. 1. Self-evident truths^ either in mind or matter, which are the objects of belief and confidence, with- out being capable of either proof or disproof, are necessarily involved in all mental processes in guid- ing to correct conclusions; for it is impossible not to SEASON. fi9f believe them ; and an appeal to consciousness is all that is necessary in order to know that they are re- ceived by us as true. 2. The power of reason within itself can contain and command a certain number of truths, and as to their truthfulness no reason or evidence can be given, and none is re- quired. And unless we admit that the intuitive elements of the mind contain power to receive self- evident truths as such, without proof, either in regard to mind or matter, it is utterly impossible for there to be any such thing as reason, reasoning, or knowledge in an^^ or all created intelligences ; for if all truths could only be known, or made known to D8 by proof, then all knowledge would begin with proof; and then proof would have to extend to infinity, which is impossible, as they are numerous, and, therefore, can not be infinities within them- selves ; and the mind, being finite, could not use them in proof of ulterior facts. 3. The conduct of all persons shows their helief in the existence of primary truths, whether they acknowledge or deny such existences. No skeptical philosopher can pro- ceed in the investigation of any fact without involv- ing a reference, and clear evidence of his belief in their existence, though he may deny the same at every step or degree of his argument. If he is in quest of some primary truth, the absence of which would soon involve him in sufierings or death, it would be revolting to all his feelings to be informed that there was no such thing in existence ; and his dismay would be augmented if he should be re- minded that to prove such an existent, is that he own his own existence to be utterly impossible. ^ S9t EEASON. How can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the beginning in which he knows his own existence to be real ? "Without confidence in such settled facts, how could he contemplate that which, from the regular chain of such truths, will affect his interest or happiness in the future, or be certain that the pain he had received, in time past, was experienced by the same person, called by his name, and which he now thinks to be himself? 4. If he looks upon a beautifully-finished tower, it is natural for the mind to run back to the 'beginning^ at the founda- tion, and to inquire as to the process of building, and also as to who the builder was. IS^otwithstand- ing he is assured by thousands that it exists without a cause, builder, or beginning, which would accord with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive con- viction would appeal to his understanding, and thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the very truths which are the foundation of all the knowledge their minds are capable of. SECTION III. 1. There is a difference between the process of argumentation and the mere action of the reasoning power, in arriving at primary truths. The mind, which is capable of correct argumentation, has power to evolve facts by basing one upon another, or by connecting them in a correct chain from the first to the final result. This requires natural ac- I REASON. tivity and cogent habits of mental discipline. These gifts and acquirements are possessed only by few persons ; but the action of reason, in connection with our reception and belief of first truths, is nat- uraj, and common to all rational minds ; and it is impossible for them to doubt their intuitive convic- tions in regard to them. It is natural and easy for us to believe that an effect must have an adequate cause. When we look on the trembling fires of yonder heavens, we believe in a great First Cause, and see the power and design of Deity as written in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning sun, or flying orbs. 2. Reason differs from conscicnisness^ the latter being the knowledge of mental opera- tions and of sensations, or that act of the mind which makes known internal objects or feelings. The former evolves and connects facts in arriving at results, and apprehends truths necessary, abso- lute, and univei'sal. 3. Its power differs from that of the senses. The latter may be regarded as the medium through which sensations make their appeal to the mind ; but the former commands the energies of the mind in amplifying its research, and in ex- tending its knowledge. 4. It differs from the judg- ment. It appertains to the latter to discriminate, combine, and decide upon the truthfulness of that which is used in argumentation, and also the rela- tions of facts and the correctness of that state, and each position of the argument; but it requires the presence and action of reason to properly connect this chain, and in forming a correct process and conclusion. The origin of such action is found in intuition. 5. Reason diff'ers^ also, from the under- 20 k. 230 REASON. standing. The latter apprehends the real state of that which is presented to it, or is the power of believing; while the former leads to a satisfactory result, or a certain knowledge. SECTION IV. 1. In connection with the power of reason arises convictions in relation to right and wrong. Tlie mind is capable of being influenced, and has intu- itive power to act in reference to, and in distinguish- ing between good or bad, right or wrong. An intu- itive influence affects the mind favorably in regard to right, and deters it in relation to evil. It has power, also, not only to be influenced, but to act in exploring or in demonstrating that which is right or wrong. This introduces us into the process of rea- soning. 2. We soon know, from experiences that when we perform certain acts, we have the approval of conscience, and are entitled to a peaceful reward ; and in the performance of other acts, our con- sciences are disturbed, and we can only expect pun- ishment. When that which is good is involved in the action of reason, there will be a corresponding result ; and when that which is bad or impure fills the steps or degrees of argumentation, there will be a corresponding bad result. 3. This intuitive con- viction, influence, and self-afiirming power of the mind, in regard to right and wrong, is universal. All rational intelligences are endowed with it, whether they are under the light of Christianity, or are under the cloud of heathenism. In every soul conscience exists, and intuitions arise and act in REASON. im^ reference to that which is good and evil. Such is our nature as ordered and wisely arranged by the great First Cause. All men are endowed with power to adhere to this light, and, through the assistance of Divine grace, to be saved in heaven; and none are under an absolute necessity of being doomed to irresistible and irretrievable sorrow. 4. In connection with the power of reason, we may experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that which is heautifid or svhlime. Many objects of the same -class may differ in degree of beauty: that in each one which approaches nearest the most perfect one, or to our conceptions of a perfect model, re- quires the presence and action of reason, in arriving to a correct equilibrium, or balancing of them, and to just conclusions. The descriptions of an orator may surpass the perfections of that which forms the object of his descriptions. The painter may surpass the natural beauties of the landscape, or the graphic sublimity of some occurrence or reality. The arrangement and regularity of these must re- quire the presence and action of reason. When defects exist with the beautiful in any object, or that which agrees or disagrees with a perfect model, we must be aided with the power of reason in giving each its legitimate place and weight, or the whole would be contemplated with confusion. 282 REASONING. CHAPTER III. REASONING. SECTION I. 1. Keasoning is the power of reason in action. It is, then, the act or process of exercising the faculty of reason, in and by which new or unknown propo- sitions or facts are deduced from previous ones, and previous facts are established from the relation and character of their results or effects. 2. The correct exercise of reason is destructive to atheism^ or the foundation of infidelity. We know that an effect can not exist without a cause, and we can not be- lieve in a cause that is inadequate to the effect which follows it. Universal existences all around us confirm our belief in the existence of a great First Cause; and the idea of such a cause, or Being, is a first truth of reason. 3. Two modes of argumenta- tion will settle and confirm our belief. The first evidence or proofs are drawn from the necessity that such a being must exist independently of the evi- dences which are every-where written upon his works. The second embraces proofs or evidences of his being and perfections as given in his works. We now proceed to examine these two modes of argumentation. REASONING. SECTION II. 1. If there be no oiie being in infinite space but such as might possibly not have had a being, it would follow that there might possibly have never been any existent: hence the possibility that such an entity might have arisen from nonentity. Thiq is impossible. Then it is impossible that there might have been no existence in any way ; there- fore, an impossibility of not existing must be true, and there must have been a being whose non-exist- ence is impossible, otherwise the truthfulness of all reason and knowledge would be reversed. 2, All the essence and attributes of an unoriginated being must be unoriginated, and necessarily self-existent. Such an essence, or being, can not give origin to its own attributes, unless it had power to act before it existed, which would be impossible. Such a being must be real, absolute, self-existing, and eternal ; for any thing finite, or contingent, must have a cause which would be anterior, and show that such a finity, or contingent, could not be causation nor eternal. 3. The attributes of an unoriginated be- ing must be absolute and limitless, otherwise they would be imperfect or limited, and that would in- volve a modifying cause; but no such cause can be acknowledged, as such a cause would be imperfect. But the cause of which we speak, being perfect, lies back of all things, and may be styled the cause of causes, being infinite or eternal. No modifying cause can be allowed, as such a one could not be absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal;'' and all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which 20* 234 REASONING. is not infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some degree, and must be capable of greater perfection by improvement, exercise, and experience. This would prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, and that he was perfecting his attributes and exist- ence by self-action, experience, and a farther ac- quaintance with his own works. His being, and each attribute, must be perfect and unoriginated. 4. Such an unoriginated and infinite being must exist every-wTiere^ in the same way and manner he does any where, otherwise there must be a cause by which his existence and presence is limited. But there is and can be no cause limiting the existence, action, or presence of Deity; for there can not be but one first cause, which cause, from necessity, must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have con- ception of more than one infinite space, and beyond this thought can not travel ; neither can we have any idea of any out border, or limitation to the innu- merable worlds which are the result of a cause lying still back of their origin and motion. Then if there is only one infinite space, it can contain only one infinite series of points in that limitless space; therefore, that reality which is capable of filling each point in infinite space must be indivisi- ble, one, and infinite. As two or more infinite be- ings can not occupy one and the same infinite space, filled with only one series of infinite points, without being one and the same being, therefore there is one, and only one unoriginated, self-existent, infi- nite, and eternal cause and Governor of the universe. REASONING. 235 SECTION III. 1. This tmorigmated being must be a reality, precisely the same in every place, not consisting of parts, as they would naturally exist independ- ently ; nor of whole, for that would imply a com- bination of parts; nor of degree, as that would signify imperfection and quantity with comparison ; therefore, this being is one and omnipresent, with- out any thing like degrees, comparison, or limita- tion. He exists, and can be, and is to every one an object of belief and knowledge, naturally resulting from an intuitive conviction within us so effectually, and ever making it^ internal appeals to conscience, reason, and judgment, that it is naturally impossi- ble to indulge a conscientious doubt. 2. Such a being can not be ?riaieriality, for this would come under the laws which govern it, and would have density, divisibility, form with limitation. !N^on- entity can not give origin to matter; and matter which is limited can not give origin to matter, for it contains no power of self-action; much less could it produce an existent with self-cogitative power, being within and of itself unthinking. That which is naturally inert, and utterly incapable of self- action, can not produce itself or any other inert ele- ment; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it could not originate other inert elements, much less give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 3. If matter and motion were both eternal, and could be connected together, yet they never could produce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, though changed or varied in any possible way, yet 236 REASONING. the particles could only meet, impel, and resist each other ; and they have no power to do more. It is impossible for matter to originate any thing, being inert. Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could never have had origin, as it could not result from nothing. If matter without motion were eternal, then motion could never have a beginning ; for mat- ter has no self-motion, and inertness is essential to its nature and being. If only matter and motion are eternal, then thought or intellectual action could never have a being ; for matter, either at rest or in motion, can not originate, within and of itself, self- action, cogitation, and knowledge ; neither is it capa- ble, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel joy, pleasure, or grief. These differ from any prop- erties or qualities of matter, and are superior to them. Then the first being must be infinite, and must have self-power to act, think, foresee, and ar- range the beginning and real existence of all finite things; and that which is first of all things must really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, as nothing which is essential to such an existent could ever be added ; for that which was added would t)e finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be created. 4. Such a being must possess wisdom and power without limitation, and all other attributes must be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. Real or natural attributes are considered as belong- ing to the essence or nature of a being, and are essential to the nature of such an existent. There are no attributes of Deity ideal, casual, or contin- gent. All his attributes are unlimited and eternal: hence nothing can exist without his knowledge, or REASONING. 281F be sustained without his omnipotent power. For an atheist to have ever lived without conscious misgiv- ings as to the soundness of his doctrine, is utterly impossible. SECTION ly. 1. The existence of more them one uuoriginated being in the universe, or the same infinite space, is utterly impossible. Such a being is possessed of in finite attributes, and must, of necessity, be present in every point in infinity. A second unoriginated being must be equal to the first in every respect, as both must, necessarily, be eternal, from the fact that they are unoriginated ; therefore, as there can be only one infinity to be occupied or filled by them, that infinity can be no more than perfectly filled ; and those two unoriginated and infinite beings must, necessarily, be the same in essence or nature, every- where present, incapable of any distinction or dis- similarity, and, of absolute necessity, they would have to be one and the same. To suppose the ex- istence of any but one such infinite and eternal Being is absurd, and to try to contemplate a second or third, is only contemplating, as far as is possible for us, the existence and attributes of one and the same being. 2. AU inferior or subordinate exist- ences^ in any respect, or degree, have their existence curtailed by finity, and their origin must, necessa- rily, take place within the compass of duration ; and, as such, they are all wholly dependent upon the great First Cause for their existence. There can only be one unoriginated essence or being in 238 REASONING. the universe, or in infinite space. 3. All finite ex- isf'ejioes, becoming entities within the bounds of duration, or aside and apart from that which is eter- nal, implies a cause of their existence. It is impos- sible for them to originate themselves, not being self-existent ; and that which is self-existent is eter- nal, and that which is eternal is unoriginated, one and the same. All finite existences owe their being to the great First Cause, which Cause, so far as we can understand, was under no possible obligations to constitute them real entities. 4. The absolute, or omnipotent power of Deity, does not make his acts either arhitrary or of necessity. They are free in their nature and power, and are with efibrt, other- wise such acts would be of necessity, which neces- sity w^ould be the cause, and not the free power of absolute perfections in unison. What he willeth he can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which is right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be unkind. SECTION V. 1. His omnipotence does not necessitate his knowl- edge ; yet he knows all things, and there is nothing hid from him. Necessity would imply something that was, or is yet to be explored by him ; whereas, if there is any thing which he would not choose to know, as contingent or otherwise, it would imply that he must first know what that is before he would choose not to know it. 2. He has power to act, and Buch action must be according to liberty or ^perfect freedom. As all his perfections are infinite, none BBA&ONING. of his acts can be originated by contingent or out- ward causes : hence, the oneness in the harmony of his limitless attributes, and the infinity of his good- ness and absolute holiness, can not be connected with action contrary to his infinite power, wisdom, purity, and truth. 3. He has infinite wisdom in the exercise of his knowledge and power, and infi- nite goodness in the perfection of all his acts. 4. From reason we may infer that the object of man's existence was to share of the endless goodness of God; his duty was to glorify his Creator; and that the performance of this duty wholly depends upon volition ; therefore, he must be created free to serve and glorify God. If such service was of necessity, or by requisition, then such requisition would be the agent in rendering glory, while man would be passive : hence, the object of our being would have been cut off by law, and, of course, our existence would have been impossible. Then, if we are at liberty to hold a merciful relation to our Creator, a perversion of the same liberty will deprive us of happiness. 24:0 KEASONINO. CHAPTER IV. REASONING, CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. We now proceed to the second mode of rea- soning^ which is to establish or to prove the exist- ence of Deity, by arguing from effect to cause. This process exemplifies the power and action of reason, and tends to strengthen our confidence in the cor- rectness of argumentation, and also leads us to a confirmed belief in the conclusions made, and in the facts established, from incontestable evidences or proof. 2. Our conceptions of a being of infinite ^ower, and wisdom would naturally lead us to sup- pose such power and wisdom would be evidenced in the variety, multiplicity, agreement, dependence, mystery, and design which exist in, and in connec- tion with all his works. That which we can com- prehend, and those things which we can not compre- hend, are alike characteristic of his power and wisdom, and are evidences of his being. 3. If the divine Being is an unoriginated and infinite Spirit^ he can not be made known to us as such through the medium of the senses only, and that abstractly, or without any aid or evidence from material exist- ences. Spirit may be manifested to spirit, but spirit can not be manifested to spirit through the medium of our senses, and without any aid or evidence con- tained in materiality. The great unoriginated Sj^irit BEAB0NIKO1. manifests himself to us through the medium of our senses by material existences. Spirit and matter might exist independently of each other, so far as we can determine ; but material elements, or exist- ences, the objects of our senses, may be used as evidences proving the existence of spirit. The ex- istence of inert matter as a result is evidence of a competent self-acting cause. 4. There is evidence of the wisdom and power of Deity in the different systems of innumerable orbs which glow in the heavens. The order, distances, velocity, gravitation, and centripetal forces; the diurnal and orbicular motions, all of these are conclusive evidences of the wisdom, power, and existence of God ; for these things are neither of self-origin nor accidental. 6. Ths earth contains, in its own structure, evidences of the presence and power of an infinite Creator. Its internal structure contains the archives of its own periods and ages. Vegetation upon its surface is mysteriously promoted by the circulation of nutri- tious properties elevated by capillary influences, forming ligenous fibers, or is consolidated in trunks, boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and glow- ing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, can only be regarded as so many evidences of the wis- dom and goodness of the great Creator. 6. The laws of inert matter^ or elements, could never ar- range and preserve the orders of genera and spe- cies, without which the world would be confusion. All these are so many marks of infinite skill, wis- dom, and goodness. 21 242 REASONING. SECTION II. 1. There is evidence of the existence of Deity in the order of providence^ which meets the demands of all animated or self-moving beings — the regular return of the seasons, the descending rain, and warming sun, each year yielding a sufficiency, and not too much. These things are out of the common onward course of nature, and, to a certain extent, they are miraculous, as there is no law contained in matter that can originate them or govern them with- out settled uniformity. 2. Life^ sleep^ vision^ and muscular action are evidences, and furnish positive proof of the existence of Deity. It is utterly impos- sible for any finite existence or influence to originate, and keep in regular action, the expansion and con- traction of the intercostal nerves, by which, in part, the lungs are enabled to inhale the atmospheric air, receive the oxygen, and throw off the carbon from the blood. We have no self-power to keep up this process, yet it goejs on whether we sleep or wake. Reason, together with the facts in the case, teaches us to know this truth, that this process is arranged and continued by the wisdom and constant presence of a merciful Creator, and the very moment the influ- ence of his presence is withdrawn from these nerves our breath is paused forever. 3. Another source of evidence may be found in connection with the circu- lation of the hlood. It is stated that in health the heart, in one minute of time, makes eighty pulsa- tions, and a little over two ounces of blood are ex- pelled into the aorta at each pulsation — about nine thousand six hundred ounces every hour, and about m! SEASONING. one thousand four hundred and forty pounds per day ! It is also stated, by those who have exper- imented in, and have tested these things, that each pulsation of the heart propels the blood eight inches, making fifty feet in one minute I The average quan- tity of blood in each human body is about thirty pounds, and it is said to pass through the heart twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating the velocity, and the force necessary to effect action to the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins to the heart again, would require the heart, in its legitimate office and action, to possess the astonish- ing power of four hundred pounds. Who is pre- pared to acknowledge that these realities and proc- esses of action are the result of inert materiality, or of chance or accident ? They are conclusive evi- dence that the cause by which they are arranged is possessed of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. ■ SECTION III. 1. But how are we to account for the irregular, yet continuous, eoiypansion and contraction of the muscles and cords of the heart, which gives motion to the blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of life ? These muscles and cords, being matter, have no self-power to move or act, and the suspension of such action is death. Human knowledge has never attempted to solve the mystery, and account for it, but in one way that had the least appearance of reason ; that is, that the pulsations of the heart are 9M BEASONIKG. caused by the stimulating nature of the blood. 2. This has been disproved by the following experi- ments: (1.) If we apply a stimulus to the muscles of the heart of an animal after it is emptied, it will dilate and contract as if it were full. (2.) If all the large vessels of the heart be entirely emptied, the dilations and contractions will continue for some time, in the entire absence of the blood, and it will be discovered that the dilations are as forcible as are the contractions. 3, The continued and un- wearied action of the heart is evidence of the infi- nite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That which exhausts all the other muscles of the body increases the power and action of the heart. This action is wholly involuntary, and the muscles and delicate cords of the heart, unlike any other phys- ical powers, may act incessantly^, and without weari- ness^ for a hundred years. Natural laws can never explain this. 4. The existence and action of the heart is created and arranged by an all-wise Being, and its action is given, sustained, and perpetuated by the power and continued presence of the same. Matter has no self-power to either originate or con- tinue action ; but the heart continues its motion in our waking hours, and in the deep slumbers of the night. Having no self-power in either state to con- tinue its motion, should we lie down in slumber with enmity toward God, how easily, in our uncon- scious state, could he withdraw from those tender muscles and cords of the heart, and their action would be suspended, the wheels of life paused, and the spirit fled forever ! As such action is irregular, and contradictory to the nature and principles of all REASONING. 245 self-power of action and material laws, it is only sustained by an abiding presence of the great Cre- ator. SECTION IV. 1. Keason may be regarded, in a certain sense, to be the jpower^ and reasoning the action^ or process^ of deducing conclusions from premises. This proc- ess adds a second step to that which has been used, and a third to the second, and so on to the last, or the conclusion. In other words, it may be regarded as that process of action which connects a chain of facts, or a train of reasoning, involving them as a whole, and, in their legitimate order, or appropriate fitness, as parts most naturally adapted to the nature of the premises or proposition. Keasoning is the continued exercise of reason, in the demonstration or investigation of subjects, or series of facts, trac- ing their relations, arriving at and establishing legit- imate conclusions. 2. Reasoning applies to the investigation of propositions in science, or existing wholly in the mind. We reason in regard to ex- ternal things through the medium qf the senses, but mental or moral reasoning may take place in the mind. 3. The valioe of the reasoning power is all-important in the investigation of truth, and in selecting it as that which is to us of inestimable value. The various objects of our knowledge, how- ever diversified, can be the immediate objects of reason. It tends to prevent a too hasty action or belief, till the whole matter is examined and tested with proper caution and deliberation. That which 21* 246 EEASONING. is mysterious in nature, science, or art, must be un- raveled by reason, if it becomes to us knowledge known to be true. The strength of mental action, in the investigation and the proper understanding of truths, is matured by a constant exercise of rea- soning, first in relation to simple ideas or truths, till strength is acquired to command and to comprehend complicated propositions and events. 4. Reasoning is a source of specific and certain Icnowledge^ giving the mind a controlling power over the different steps, degrees, or relations of things, or realities, which would be too complicated and obscure to be known to us in any other way. Those things which require intermediate steps, or propositions, in order to be directly understood, can be controlled only by the reasoning power. It enables the mind to pene- trate the unexplored mysteries of nature, and its action is the occasion of the origin of new ideas and new series of interwoven facts, or chains of propositions. 5. The jproper exercise of this power is the occasion, or is attended with such vivid dis- crimination, that we can select those truths, propo- sitions, events, or arrangements which are best adapted to our views and feelings. This involves a reference to consciousness ; as reasoning progresses those facts or propositions which are most natu- rally adapted to the desired issue, or exploration of that which is presented to the mind, will claim our feelings or preference ; and we will love to reason on and in relation to those things which are con- genial to intuitive influences. Perception, sugges- tion, and judgment can not do the work of reason. It is the latter that mujal; build with facts the argu- w REASONING. 34T ment, conoecting the process, and exploring the way to the final result, revealing all the contingent truths. .V :\d 248 REASONING. CHAPTER V. REASONING, CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. When effect is the object of a reasoning process, its cause is implied ; for such an object, first known to us as a result, or efi'ect, would involve reasons as to why it is thus characterized, and an investigation would employ the power of reason in tracing back- ward each step to a cause, and such a cause as would be adequate to the efiect, and corresponding in nature or qualities. 2. The cause of an efiect may be assumed^ and upon a correct process of reasoning, we may and can proceed to bring to light the proper cause. 3. The final conclusion of prop- ositions may be assumed^ and a process of reasoning be brought to action, involving the relations of in- termediate facts and propositions, till we arrive at the legitimate conclusion; yet propositions which are known to us need not the aid of reasoning to secure the same knowledge. 4. If a process of reasoning takes place in connection with or from intuitive articles of belief, revealing facts or truths to our knowledge, various combinations of facts, or objects, involving a diversity of mental processes, a strict adherence to reason and reasoning is our only guide in using that which is naturally adapted to the origin, process, and conclusion. 5. The power and action of reason is involved in selecting appro- ppp-i I III I- 1 II SEASONING. 249 priate facts relating to that which is to be tested by reasoning, and to employ nothing in the deduction which is not properly added to each position or step that has preceded it. All the series in this process must be connected by a correct adaptation. If the premises be incorrect the conclusion will be absurd ; if the premises be correct, and the process of rea- soning false, the conclusion will b^ wrong ; but if the premises be correct, and the process of reason- ing is also correct, the conclusion will certainly be correct. SECTION II. 1. Reasoning a priori deduces consequences or results from definitions formed, or facts assumed, or infers effects from causes previously known ; and it is that process, or kind of reasoning, by which an effect or result is proved from a cause. From the nature and relation of combined facts, or proposi- tions, we can readily assume results corresponding to the legitimate tendency of such antecedents or causes. That general adaptation or fitness, blending and harmonizing existences, naturally leads us to infer or believe in other corresponding realities. This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external things through the medium of the senses. The cor- rectness of both turns upon the testing power of intuition in regard to the reception of self evident; truths as such, without which argument could not be relied on as true. The statement of terms, defi- nitions, and propositions, which are known, or are S#0 REASONING. given, involves the idea of other corresponding ex- istences, and such known definitions or propositions evolving other truths or existences by comparisons and inductions. Mathematical calculations are based upon primary axioms or definitions ; and dem- onstrations commence with these; and, if correctly pursued, the result is inevitable, and invariably cor- rect. 2. Reasoning a posteriori is drawn or pro- ceeds from effect, facts, or results. We might say that reasoning a priori is from cause to effect ; but reasofting a posteriori is from effect to cause ; yet both methods can be varied in accordance with dif- ferent varieties of facts or propositions. A process of reasoning may commence with an effect or result, and extend back to a cause, or to something of ante- rior existence. 3. Processes of reasoning must be found upon truths or facts, and proceed from them. It involves the natural adaptation of facts and prop- ositions, with such correlative qualities as will render the progressive steps of the argument true in forcing a correct result. 4. "We proceed, in reasoning or argumentation, by using or involving a sufficient amount of facts or combinations in the argument. This process brings to our knowledge new truths ; but, to a great extent, it requires the presence and action of the judgment in clearly discriminating and in deciding upon that which should be used in arriving at a correct result; otherwise, unadapted facts might be involved and used in haste, render- ing the conclusion uncertain in regard to truth. BEA80NINO. 251 SECTION III. 1. Reasoning requires that the attention be di- rected to the truths of each step in the argument. We must know that these facts correctly corre- spond to the premises. We must know that the premises can not but be true, and arranged accord- ingly, so that the process of argumentation may be conducted correctly in the truthfulness of the pro- gressive degrees or steps, and that these are con- nected to the conclusion, or force a conclusion cor- responding to the argument. 2. We must also know that such a series of facts are so related and arranged as to bring out a new fact, or an intelli- gent result; otherwise, they may lead to confusion. But in this way the mind may become capable of bringing to light, or of disclosing new truths, and of forcing new and important conclusions. 3. In every correct process of reasoning there are three things^ as will be given in the following section, which must claim our attention. SECTION IV. 1. We must know the premises to be correct or true. If not, we can not proceed correctly ; and if there is any doubt in regard to this, we should prove the premises true, if susceptible of proof. 2. The truthfulness of the premises being established, the chain of reasoning, it may be, consisting of numer- ous distinct facts, arguments, propositions, or steps, must all he true within themselves^ and correspond in respect to the same premises, and so connected f6d REASONING. that one step in the argument becomes an essential part of the premises of the subsequent one, till the entire argument is completed. All the interme- diate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, must be carefully examined and known to be cor- rect. 3. With caution in the preceding steps, the conclusion or result will be easy and natural ; but we must know that such conclusion is a legitimate result of the preceding argument, corresponding to the correct force, natural existence, condition, or in- fluence of the truths which have compelled such a result or conclusion. 4. The reasoning power dif- fers or varies in the minds of different persons. Some have great difficulty in connecting their thoughts, and more trouble in connecting realities in a process of reasoning, or in argumentation. We will now notice the origin or manner in which some of these differences or variations arise. SECTION V. 1. TTiey may arise from the pressure or inactivity of the physical organs, in connection with which the mind holds intercourse with the things of the external world. The mind, with all its faculties, is affected by the pressure or imperfect organization of the corporeal powers. Doubtless there is not so much difference in the natural power of different minds, as there is in the physical mediums through which they are developed, or are manifested ; but we will speak of this in another place. 2. Much defends 'ujpon tJie manner of information stored away in the mind. Knowledge is not only power, SEASONING. 258 but the acquisition of it implies, first, mental strength or ability to receive it; and, secondly, that there has been much exercise and discipline of the intellectual powers in order to acquire knowledge; therefore, the mind is capable of greater cogency and correctness in argumentation. 3. The power of correct reasoning depends very tnuch wpon atten- tion and the judginerU. Progressive reasoning evolves new facts, attention places them under the inspection of the mind. The judgment discrimi- nates and decides upon their appropriateness and truthfulness. SECTION VI. 1. Mathematical reasoning has been regarded as being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact that there are fewer intermingling or connected con- tingencies, and we have not so many things to as- sume. This, in part, is true; but we are not pre- pared to admit that mathematical propositions, or demonstrations, are worthy of as much confidence or belief as those which are mental or moral. 2. If^ in numerical reasoning^ nothing is assumed or taken for granted, in regard to the truthfulness and existence of premises, upon which the reasoning is founded ; and if all necessary assumptions are few, contingent, and easily freed from intricacy, yet the power of knowing and of receiving these as true realities, is found connected with and in the intui- tive power of the mind. We know nothing of math- ematical facts, or reasoning, only as the power con- nected with, and existing in the intuitive elements fiSlft REASONING. of the mind receives, or introduces us to them, and thereby they are known to us as realities. 3. No fact^ tested by the power, or received through the medium of the senses, can be known as real and true ordy as tJie internal^ intuitive power of the primary elements of the mind enables us to receive and to know them to be such. It is this power alone which enables us to know that the axioms which are the foundation of all mathematical calcu- lations and demonstrations, are self evident truths; for no reason can be offered proving them to be either true or false; yet the superior, intuitive power can receive them as true independently of all proof. 4. Internal mental or moral reasoning can not be said to be of remote origin, and received, in whole or in part, through intercepting mediums ; but our knowledge of such is direct, present, and experimental. We may be deceived in testing ex- ternal truths through the medium of the senses ; for the correctness of the sensations thus experienced by the mind depends upon the health and activity of the physical nerves, or organs, which come in contact with such external things. Diseased nerves often are the means of deception in regard to cor- rect mental states. A diseased optic nerve often gives origin to the perception of something which is only a spectral illusion. He who depends with more confidence upon the truthfulness of that which is made known to him through the medium of the senses, than he does upon intuitive power and ac- tion, by which the senses are made eflScient, and are regulated and corrected, should either study to know himself more perfectly, or be consistent, and REASONING. SW deny the existence of all things. It is far more reasonable to deny the existence of all external things, the knowledge of which we receive through the medium of the senses, the physical organs of which, being diseased, often deceive us, than it is to doubt the action or operations of the internal, intu- itive power of the mind, forming a part of con- scious experience and present knowledge. SECTION VII. 1. Our confidence in the power and accuracy of mental reasoning will be increased by our confi- dence in mathematical reasoning, knowing the supe- riority of the former over the latter. In mathemat- ical arguments, or reasoning, if we have any doubt as to the process, or conclusion, we have only to turn back to the premises, and build the argument again, guarding against any improper step, and divesting the same of all obscurity and doubt ; and if there is any doubt of a proposition which is as- sumed as the result of preceding steps, a review of those steps, in the demonstration, or argument, will enable us to detect any thing that is wrong, and to approve of it when corrected. 2. When we see that all the terms used are clearly defined^ and all doubt being removed from them, we regard the conclusion as inevitably correct. 3. If the true objects of nu- merical argumentation or demonstration be quantity and its relations^ it is certain that an acute atten- tion and precision, in regard to the correctness of each step in the whole process, will render doubt in regard to its correctness impossible. In defining, or 256 KEASONING. in determining the correctness of the various steps or facts used, or to be involved in any process of reasoning, requires the presence and action of the judgment. We are guided and progress by the power of reason, under the inspection and decisions of the judgment, in regard to that which is adapted in nature or qualities. SECTION VIII. 1. Demonstrative reasoning is that kind of rea- soning which is used to probably a greater extent among the masses of intellectual beings than any other, progressing from cause to effect, or from premises to the conclusion, showing, or proving, by clear and certain evidence, the result. It is a power demonstrating or connecting the truths of a process, rendering or forcing a correct conclusion with clearness and certainty. 2. Investigative rea- soning is that kind of disquisition which involves the idea of vivid, keen, and penetrating mental powers and action ; and it is that kind of progress- ive mental action which forces its way into hidden fields of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to light new facts, which may evolve others connecting, or adding them into appropriate inciirsive chains, rendering such dormant treasures the conquest of research and imperishable knowledge. 3. False investigative reasoning may take place or exist when the acknowledged primary facts are untrue, either in whole or in part, or in their conditioned combina- tion or relation. The inductions, or processes of arguments, may be incorrect in some way, and the BEASONINQr- 259^ conclusions may not be legitimate or natural results. False reasoning may take place as noted in the order of the following section. '^K\^^ .1 SECTION II. -ifi-MT^ 1. J^alse reasoning may take place by assuming premises or propositions which are incorrect within ithemselves, or which are not naturally adapted to the conclusion desired. 2. J8y assuming a prop- osition asserted to be a conclusion of some previous process of reasoning, without examining such former process, or knowing it to have existed, and to b^ true or correct. 3. £y confusing the distinctiveness of each step in the connected links or chain of rea- soning, thoroughly rendering a change in position possible, and without detection. 4. ^y commencing the argument at some point far removed from the premises. 5. By petiiio principii, or begging the question in assuming a principle which amounts to the same thing to be proved, or which may vary slightly in some almost imperceptible way. 6. By assuming a principle, and then wandering qff^ rea- soning on many contingent things, till they can be combined together, from which the reasoning com- mences, without any connection with the first as- sumed principle; or by reasoning in a circle, in assuming a principle, and employing it to establish some other reality or facts, which fact or facts are used to prove; tlje first; assumed principle. ; , . 22* , - 1'- -' -'-^ ^a#4' vk; ^iiiLaA&»fc,i> i*w a»iA^ liaa ;©oi».>ik* ««aobif S5^ BEASONING. SECTION!. 1. False reasoning may arise by means of the sophistical use of terms and analogies in principles assumed, all of which can be corrected by careful examination. 2. Reasoning may be rendered more efficient and more capable of performing its work with increased exactness, by attending to the re- peated efforts in pursuing arguments, and guarding against all contingencies which should not be con- nected with the chain, or process of its immediate action. 3. Reasoning may be influenced improp- erly by an impure motive. This will so bias the efforts of the mind as to cause more than a due pro- portion of attention to be bestowed upon those things most intimately connected with some conclu- sion designed or desired, while real facts, naturally adapted to the argument, receive such a slight pro- portion of attention as to be finally lost from the argument, or have no special influence. 4. Preju- dice will affect reasoning so as to distract or destroy its accuracy ; for in this way opinions are formed before the subject has been investigated or exam- ined. Such previously-formed opinions will often bias the process of our reasoning when we are un- conscious of the fact. Before we are fully aware of what is passing in the mind, our reasoning power may be in search of facts to establish the truthful- ness of those previously-formed opinions, and the correct process of argumentation lost sight of, or that has been departed from ; but the principal ground of departure is that of a willing and ma- licious choice; and when we determine to pursue BEASOKINO. 259 a wrong course, though our consciences may revolt at it for a long time, yet perseverance will finally lead to uncertainty, and a bewildered stupor and inactivity, from ; which a return and recovery is almost imposaiWe.' Reader, if you would start right, and remain or continue in a right course, never pre- judge the subject of your inquiries, and never dare to act according to or with an improper or vitiated motive! Let motive be pure forever. giHsion €ig|t|. CHAPTER I. D R E A M I K G. SECTION I. 1. Dreaming is having thoughts, notions, or ideas in or during sleep. They may arise in connection with only one subject, or we may experience a series of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above heading we shall define that which may be called mental dreaming; and, in another place, we will define moral dreaming, as there are two kinds clearly distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded as wholly involu7itary j for we often experience im- pressions, or ideas, which arise in the mind, of an unpleasant nature, or those which are revolting to us, but have no power to divert our notice of them, though we experience an efibrt to efiect such a change. At times the efibrt made in resisting un- pleasant impressions, and the apprehensions of ap- proaching fear, are such that we are aroused from slumber; but the mind retains a vivid knowledge of what was passing, or had been the object or objects of its anxiety and action. 3. We not only experience the presence of impressions and ideas or thoughts, but they associate^ or are combined^ to a certain degree, and often they succeed each other in 260 DBEAMINO. 261 regular trains of thought, and we have seemingly no control over them. 4. That the mind is im- pressed or affected by dreams, or visions, in this way, and that it experiences the presence of real thoughts, and ideas of real entities and events, is beyond the possibility of doubt. A great variety of different trains of impressions or ideas occur, and some of them are so indelibly impressed on the mind as to be remembered for years. 5. Dreaming is common to all persons; yet some dream much more frequently than others. But very few have ever asserted that they have never experienced any thing of the kind. Those who think they have never dreamed may have dreamed, and the mind be unable to recall them in their waking hours. The natural inclination of the mental powers to be in motion always, and independently of the co-opera- tion of the physical system, shows the superiority of mind over matter, and strongly argues its imper- ishability. SECTION II. 1. Mental dreaming^ as a general rule, arises in the mind, or is one of those states which take place in sleep, immediately following and corresponding with those facts, or subjects, which were the objects of mental action previous to the slumber in which such ideas arise; but the manner in which trains of ideas arise is mysterious. Kecent occurrences and recent mental states may be connected, or have some relation to that which is passing through the mind, or is impressed upon it in the hours of sleep. 1,'iil'' ■'"'W*f'-»p DREAMING. The hearing of some sad news, or the witnessing of some horrible event, are often followed by dreams, in which the different items, as they were made known, or were witnessed by us, reappear to the mind ; but not often without some change, or the absence of some thing, and the addition of others. 2. They are not always immediately successive to preceding events or facts. Under the influence of dreams we may be impressed with realities, or have ideas revived, which took place years before, and even of things which had been forgotten ; and, in our waking hours, we can often recall the percep- tions which the mind had in dreams of facts or events which are to come, of which we have never had knowledge before ; yet the real occurrence of such things can not be regarded as certainly coming to pass, from the fact that we had such dreams ; they may or may not occur. 3. Mental states of mind, which take place under the influence of dreams, are not to be depended upon as true pre- ludes of things to come. They are mere circum- stantial or casual states, which can not be regarded as positive evidence that those things made known in dreams will ever occur, or that their opposites will come true. They are w^orthy, perhaps, of no more confidence than the notions which arise in a flighty mind, under the influence of delirium, caused by an intense or high fever; but impressions of moral dreaming, or visions, are worthy of confi- dence, and are to be depended upon as being in- tended for our instruction in some way. 4. Perhaps the principal or most important truth we derive from the existence or occurrence of mental dream- DREAMING. 263 ing is, that the mind is active within itself a/ad in- dependently of the body; and if it can act while the body is inactive under the power of sleep, which is typical of temporal death, we are left to infer that, as it thus acts, and is ever acting, it can act on or continue to act when the body is silent in death. SECTION III. 1 . Dreaming may, in some degree, be caused by physical debilitation. On careful observation it has been ascertained that dreams are pleasant or revolt- ing in proportion to the strength and health of the body. In good health, the occurrences which are experienced in the mind, while under the influence of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or pleas- ant character ; and if we are verging to an attack, or the influence and power of disease, we are apt to rest imperfectly in sleep, and our dreams are oppress- ive and generally of a disagreeable character. 2. The character of dreams often vary with the laws of anatomical departments, or localities, which are aftected by disease; and they may vary with the kind of disease. The difierent ways in which the nervous system is afiected has some corresponding influence upon the mind, and this may be connected to those mental states which occur in sleep. When the physical system is reduced by dyspepsia, the mind is apt to be filled with gloom, so that its ac- tion, whether we are awake or sleeping, is of a mel- ancholy character. If the nerves are excited by fever, the action, whether in dreams or in waking hours, will be quick, with an uneasy influence, or 2M DREAMING. unpleasant sensations. 3. Bodily sensations^ which have been once experienced in such a way as to make a lasting impression upon the mind, may be recalled, in part, if an object of similar qualities, or properties, be brought in contact with the physical nerves, during slumber, that affect them in giving rise to the first sensations experienced. If the body in slumber becomes chilled with cold, we often dream of winter, or of the sufferings of others, or of self with cold. If burning with fever, the mind is apt to dream of sufferings from a hot sun or room. If we experience an acute pain while sleeping, we are apt to dream of similar sufferings as endured by others or ourselves. 4. When realities or events are presented to the mind under the influence of dream- ing, they appear directly opposite to what they are, in fact, but corresponding with the natural inclina- tions or desires of the soul in waking hours. The poor man dreams of receiving a vast amount of wealth ; he who can not compose, dreams of writing poetry or a book ; the man who can not express his thoughts, dreams of speaking with great fluency; but an orator seldom ever dreams of delivering a discourse with freedom. The eloquent extempora- neous speaker generally dreams of being embarrassed in addressing an assembly ; so there is no general rule or uniformity in the order or character of dreams. SECTION IV. 1. There is no fixed law of conformity or of agreement in relation to dreams ; for there is great DREAMING. 265 disasrreement and contradiction in dreams. Such thoughts are often disconnected and desnltory. These irregularities are not corrected by reason, judgment, and the exercise of the senses, in regard to definite truths and settled laws in external things ; and those mental powers which have a correcting control over the mind, are partially suspended. 2. Though the power of the senses is suspended^ and the principal faculties of the mind appear to be in- active^ in many respects, yet our conception of reali- ties, or events, while under the influence of sleep, appears to be vivid and strong. The power of sug- gestion and comparison appears to be also in lively exercise. No sensations affect the mind through the medium of the senses : hence, the mind attends to the objects of conception. This may account for the tenacity of the mind in recalling that which ap- peal's to be real in our dreams. 3. Old associations and facts that have been forgotten, are often called up or revived in dreams, so that they become the objects of thought again in our waking hours. It is utterly impossible to account for their origin, or re- occurring upon any fixed principle or definite law. That such things have and do take place is experi- mental knowledge, but to assign any certain cause is impossible. 4. We are now prepared to go still further, and say that we may have facts revealed to us in dreams of which we have never had am,y con- clusive knowledge. Students have been known to work till late at night at propositions in mathemat- ics, and have retired to rest without solving tlie dif- ficulties in regard to them ; but when under the power of sleep the wliole difiiculty, or difficulties, 23 -'^l^tW^i m!m^ 26Q DREAMING. have been clearly solved in a dream, and, on wak- ing, with joy they have placed all the work down on paper correctly, and without any trouble. SECTION V. 1. Our conceptions of the length of time occupied in dreaming appears to be of very long duration, when, in fact, it can only extend to but a few min- utes. A chain of events may pass through the mind in one dream which would require many days in reviewing them, but on waking we discover that it has been the work of a few minutes ; yet our dreaming conception of it would appear to have continued months. Such conceptions appear to be present as real ; and our successive thoughts, ac- tions, or that which is noticed or experienced in our dreams, appear to employ very much time and de- liberation, when, on being suddenly wakened, we ascertain that we have been slumbering only a few minutes. This is evidence that the mind can and does act in sleep, and that such action is, in reality, far more rapid than it is in our waking hours ; for that which is experienced, or passes through the mind, at certain times, within ten minutes, would require a whole day to review in our waking hours, or state. If the action of the mind, without the immediate use of the senses, is increased, v^q may infer that its capacity and power of action, when freed from the inertness connected with the nature of the physical system, will far transcend all com- prehension and thought in regard to such action. 2. Mere mental dreaming is often regarded as true DBEAMIN6. 267 when some feature or fact thus experienced happens to come to pass by casual, or even by natural causes. When we dream of events taking place, of great variety, and for a long continuance of time, it is not unlikely for something to occur corresponding to some event, or fact, of which we had conceptions in a dream. The mere occurrence of such a fact, or facts, will recall that part of our dream, the remem- brance of which tends to strengthen our confidence in the truthfulness of them. These mental states may be affected, or may be the result of disease or of some kind of physical debilitation ; but that which occurs corresponding to something realized in dreaming, becomes the object of special mental ac- tion, while perhaps a thousand other facts, or events, contained in dreams, pass unnoticed in our waking hours, not being recalled by facts corresponding to them. 3. Dreams vary with different individu- als. Some persons never dream of objects they have never seen, while the reverse is true with others. There is another class who never dream of tastes, smells, or sounds, only as the presence of these to the slumberer are the occasion, or are, in part, the cause of such corresponding dreams ; but there are others again whose experience differs. Some persons, after the loss of their sight, never dream of seeing objects; so that there appears to be retained in the mind, while under the influence of sleep, at least a partial sense of defects which may exist in connection with the senses, in apprehending or in knowing realities or facts of the external world. 4. Dreaming conceptions are not confined to old conceptions. Under the influence of slumber, poets 26$ DKEAMING. have composed parts of poems, and, in their waking hours, have written out the same. The logician has unraveled mysterious things, and concluded his ar- gument correctly; the mathematician has concluded his demonstration ; and the linguist has seen how to translate a difficult passage. SECTION VI. 1. Dreams may have existed in the mind, of which there is no recollection in our waking hours. Persons often talk in sleep without being conscious of any thing of the kind in their waking hours. It is clearly evident that such conversation is the re- sult of dreaming, yet it can not be recalled. This may account for the opinion of many persons, who think they never dream. They may dream, but not be able to recall them in their waking hours. 2. The loss of power ^ in dreaming over the succession of our thoughts, is probably the most striking pecu- liarity connected with the phenomena of such men- tal influences or states. We may dream of trying to rehearse some facts, or chain of facts, connected with some general principle or subject, and lose the connection, or wander away from the desired course. While the chain of facts, or ideas, are passing through the mind, it is not unlikely that the general subject, or some important truth came up, when the thoughts wandered, in the absence of power to con- trol them, and that, too, while tliere is an internal conviction or impression that the regular process of investigation, or of examination, proceeds undis- turbed; yet we can discover that we have some mw* ' •* m DREAMING. 269 power at times, and by an effort, to check our thoughts to some extent, and to direct them again to the desired object, though this power is not apt to be of long duration. 3. It is useless to try to define the causes of dreams. The best we can do is to regard them as varying with the many and myste- rious influences connected with the phenomena of mind. Each person can best determine the cause of such mental influences, or states, by carefully attending to his own experience in regard to them. All the facts connected witl; the phenomena of dreaming are evidences that mind is ever active and imperishable. STO^ CLAIRVOYANCE. CHAPTER II. CLAIRVOYANCE. SECTION I. 1. Clairvoyance does not properly belong to this work, and should not receive this brief notice, were it not for the fact that it has been regarded, by many, as being an essential part of the phenomena of mind. 2. It is the clear-sigJitedness of the mind in perceiving, or in apprehending facts or events, without the aid of the senses, as a medium, in whole or in part, in arriving at a knowledge of such facts, or events. This is, in reality, closely connected with dreaming, though it appears to take place further removed from any internal controlling power gov- erning it. This ulterior process appears to occur when we are under the deepest influence of Somnus, and when the senses are entirely inactive to external affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It is a power attributed to persons in a mesmeric state, of perceiving, or of discriminating objects or reali- ties not present with, nor objects of the action of the senses. To define such a power and its action, or to give bounds to it, we regard as a work more properly belonging to beings more perfect in knowl- edge, and cogent in thought, than we are, or ever expect to be in this world. 4. Such a powder does not appear to be comnnon or naturally connected CLAIRVOYANCE. 271 with earthly intelligences, in the proper existence and relationship which characterizes thefn. How- ever natural it may be to the action of spirit within itself, or abstracted from the inertness of bodily organs, yet such action is not common to the masses of intelligences, or, if so, we are unable to recall such action in our waking hours. SECTION II. . 1, If such a power does really exist in connection with some minds when it is unknown to others, or to the great majority of persons, we can not account for its existence as an essential element of spirit, or any thing superadded to one that is withheld frorii another; therefore, the only rational way we have of meeting the subject is, that such difterences depend upon some peculiarity in the physical or nervous constitution, which is connected with the mind's developments and action. The nerves are connected with the brain, and are so inseparably connected with the sensations experienced in and by the mind, that mental states may be affected by- them ; and we know not how far such states may vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. Sow far or to what extent the doctrine of clairvoy- ance is true, we shall not determine ; but we shall claim the privilege to say that too much faith or belief in such things is deceptions and dangerous, and it adds no essential truths to knowledge. For the mind, with confidence, to dwell long in such a field, and to become all absorbed in exploring what 272 CLAIRVOYANCE. seems, in its imagination, to be therein contained, is to advance midway from a world of reason to that of insanity. 3. That a simple state of clairvoyance may be experienced by some minds connected with a peculiar nervous constitution, or system, is neither unnatural, nor a new reality or truth, in the exist- ence and bounds of scientific research. Such per- sons are so naturally constituted that they can be affected by mesmerism, anxiety of mind, fatigue, or disease, so as to have some kind of stupor over the action of the senses, and, at the same time, they experience some kind of perception of things which can be the objects of mental action. This is no new theory, either in reality or the investigations of science. It is as old as this kind of peculiar nerv- ous constitutions. It is natural with the nervous sensitiveness of some persons, though the perverted use that is often made of it, in the necromancy and feats performed in the world, is deceptions, tending to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person has a natural disposition and tendency to such men- tal states as may be included under the meaning of clairvoyance, it is innocent j but when an inten- tional perversion takes place, it becomes wickedly absui-d or sinful. No one can be so operated on by another as to reveal facts of the spirit-world beyond the limits of its personal identity, or mental re- sources and action. SOMNAMBULISM. 273 CHAPTER III. SOMNAMBULISM. SECTION I. 1. This is the act or jpractice of walkiDg in sleep. In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move from place to place while under the influence of sleep. This singular affection differs from dream- ing. Simple dreaming involves only the action of the mind, while somnambulism includes the affec- tion and action of the physical powers in connection with mental inclinations and action. 2. It differs from dreaming as to the exercise of the mind. The mind may be fixed upon its own impressions, or ideas, which are passing under its inspection, but there appears to be less power in recalling such an exercise in our waking hours than there is to recall the substance of dreams. There are but few if any somnambulists who can ever recall the fact of walk- ing in sleep. As a general thing they never have the slightest knowledge, in their waking hours, that ever such an occurrence took place, or was the result of their own action. 3. The same appears to be true in regard to talking in sleep. There is, per- haps, not one case out of a thousand where persons who are in the habit of talking in sleep, ever have the slightest knowledge of such a fact from any VPIt SOMNAMBULISM. action of their own minds, though it is highly probable they are dreaming, or the mind is acting in some way all the time. 4. The first degree of somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination to talk in sleep, though others are not known to talk. The former often rehearse what is passing in the mind, and frequently that which was not in- tended to be known. If this propensity increases, we may expect them to walk during sleep. A friend of mine intentionally lodged in the same room with a man who was in the habit of walking during sleep, intending to follow him. About mid- night the somnambulist arose, walked down stairs, passed out at the door, took a path across the field, crossed a water course on a high log, not touching the hand-pole, and without either stooping or paus- ing. In this way he could not pass over in his wak- ing hours by daylight, yet he passed on without any difiiculty ; then turning into a dark valley, he ascended and seated himself upon drift wood. In a few moments he returned, by the same way, to his Toom and bed, and knew nothing of the occurrence on the next morning. SECTION II. 1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the ^ower which the action of the mind has over the muscles and the nervous system, whether such men- tal, action or volitions can, in any way, be recalled in our waking hours or not. Dreams appear to be real in the mind of any one, and the same appears to be true in regard to that which is passing in the IIPII.IIIPIIII I J ill II ip> I ip i^ SOMNAMBULISM* 276 mind of the somnainbulist. The additional power 18 added in, and by which he can and does put his physical powers in motion. A servant in the south, during sleep at night, often responds to his master's call, on his return home, takes his horse, waters him, puts him in the stable, feeds him, and fastens the door, returns to bed, and knows nothing of the trans- action on the next morning. He has often, under the influence of sleep, gone to mill, then returned to his bed, and had no knowledge of it in his waking hours. 2. Another peculiarity is, that in sleep the senses and mitscles appear to be powerless and inact- ive; but in somnambulism the latter is active, while the former is inactive. This can not be defined unless it exists in connection with that peculiar sen- sitive class of nerves connected with the muscles, and not with the senses, being affected in some way, and in such a manner as to invoke or induce an effort of the muscular powers under the influence of mental volitions. In this way the senses may be powerless, while muscular action is a natural result; and persons often perform hard labor, or travel a long distance, without having experienced percep- tions of any thing which they can afterward recall. 3. The absence of fear is another peculiarity con- nected w^ith somnambulism. The somnambulist can go where he could not in his waking state without fear or loss of life. They have been known to pass out of windows and climb up on the tops of houses, and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or beams of timber from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 4. The strength of the investigative power seems to be more vigorous under the influence of somnambn- 2fd SOMNAMBULISM. iism than in waking hours. While under its influ- ence students have finished tasks which they had given up in despair on going to sleep. Some have composed poetry which they failed to accomplish before ; others have solved propositions which they could not do in their waking state. SECTION III. 1. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes wit- nessed in the presence oi paroxysms^ which come on in the daytime as well as at night. At times they are preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the head, but frequently they are xperienced without any warning. The mind seems to be abstracted from external impressions, yet there is no apparent difficulty in conversing about that which is passing through the mind at the time of such conversation, so that they could narrate correctly events which they could give but an imperfect account of when freed from such paroxysms. 2. Some persons are totally unconscious of any external thing; others can hear and answer questions. There have been instances given where persons have, while under the paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, which they could not do at other times. 3. A contingent fea- ture of this affection has been referred to as being produced by an attack of somnolency. In recover- ing from one attack, persons have lost all literary knowledge ; but in recovering from the second at- tack, all the lost attainments have been restored, and thus alternating for years. 4. It would almost appear that, under such paroxysms, the mind or SOMNAMBULISM. 2Y7 spirit has some kind of sight and perception inde- pendently of the senses. Philosophers have given instances of persons who have had their eyes closed while under the paroxysm, and bandaged with many thicknesses of black silk; yet they could read and answer questions in regard to distinct objects cor- rectly, and in regard to some things which they had never seen before. We know of no way to explain this, unless in proportion as the soul is abstracted from the bodily organs, the more perfectly its powers are developed, and the more correctly is its action. 5. Whatever there may be that is strange or novel in the preceding part of this chapter, yet it should be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that mind cam, act without the body, from which it is reasonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer its imperishable nature or its eternal duration. 24 278 MESMERISM. 'Hfffi CHAPTER IV. MESMERISM. SECTION I. 1. By mesmerism we understand animal magnet- ism, or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in which the mind is active, though the mesmerized person appears to be unconscious of external objects. The mind is active within itself, or in regard to something specially passing within itself, while all external things are lost sight of or are precluded. 2. The act of mesmerizing is that of affecting the hody in different ways, so as to produce a species or kind of sleep, while the mind retains its activity and power. This is no new discovery in scientific research and knowledge. Long has it been known, and it has and does exist, in reality, in the very nat- ural constitution of some persons. 3. A constitu- tion which is capable of being mesmerized is almost the same as those which come under the influence of somnambulism. It is natural to some constitu- tions, and all such may be mesmerized ; but a dif- ferently-constituted person can not be mesmerized. The mesmeric susceptibility is connected with a pe- culiar condition or nature of the nervous system, and never can be imparted to one who has it not; yet the influence or power of disease might effect such a change, or condition of the nerves, aa to MESMERISM. STt render a person capable of being mesmerized who had no natural disposition to it. This constitutional or natural affinity to mesmeric affection, or influ- ence, can be affected or produced by external agen- cies or causes, which are neither marvelous nor un- common ; but there is a mystery in the nature of such a constitution, which, like many other things, can only be fully comprehended in the future world. 4. There are hut very few persons^ if any, who are in the habit of talking or walking in sleep, while in health, but what can be mesmerized ; yet this can not be done contrary to the will or permission of the subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence of mesmerism, are wholly unconscious of external things, while others are not, but have not immediate power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim that the former class can be operated upon by will, in commanding them to do as they please, while the latter class can resist only in part. It may be that persons, being mesmerized, go into that state with the mind almost entirely directed to the operator, and when a stupor comes over the power of the senses, the mind still having liberty to act, and the operator being the object of the mind, he may have more controlling power over it than any other per- son, and more than would seem natural ; but there is far more contained in the assertions of such agents than there is in the facts as they are. SECTION II. 1. In this way it has been maintained that the truthfulness of phrenology has been established by S8$ MESMERISM. the action of the mesmerized person, corresponding to the nature of the organ touched bj the operator ; but this is no proof, if what the mesmerizer claims is true, that subjects can be operated upon by will ; for he knows what organ he intends touching, and what kind of action he expects. This being fixed in his mind would be that which he would will : hence, the action of the subject would correspond to the will of the operator. With all the obscurity and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of the head can possess within itself spiritual rational- ity sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why may it not act without involving the inert existence and medium of the skull. The truthfulness of phre- nology can not be established by mesmerism while mind and matter are dissimilar and divisible. 2. If the somnambulist becomes lost to every thing but that upon which his mind is intently fixed, and if he has power to walk abroad in obedience to any internal inclination, may not a person, on being mesmerized, become unconscious of every thing in regard to the action of the senses, yet be controlled by the thoughts of the mind, which still cluster around the existence and will of the operator, so as to be thus influenced in some way ? But deceptions in regard to these things are far more probable than conjectures in favor of such mysteries. We men- tion them only to induce investigative thought, while the student is left to form his own conclusions. 3. There are persons who, under mesmeric influ- ences, are partially sensible of what is passing, but MESMEBISM. 281 are unable to move from any position they may be placed in, though they may try to do so. By a well-tried effort, some of them have succeeded in breaking the influence, as they have testified. 4. There is another class which appears to be uncon- scious of every thing, yet they will respond to ques- tions, or walk, if ordered to do so. This ma}'^ be accounted for upon the same principle that a person continues to converse with another in sleep. When some individuals begin to talk in sleep, they will answer almost any question asked. In this way confidential truths have been revealed. But to fully explain such phenomena must be the work of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. Though this constitutional or natural tendency to, or susceptibility of mesmeric states, can not be defined, yet we can but believe, to some extent, in its mysterious existence ; but, when properly viewed, it contains no more mystery than dreaming or som- i nambulism. This far we may go in safety; but the idea that men may send the spirits of others to distant worlds, or have the facts of the spirit-world revealed by them, is not only absurd, but tends to ruin. Finity has no such power. 24* 38S PHKENOLOGY. CHAPTER V. PHRENOLOGY. SECTION I. 1. Phkenologt proceeds upon the supposition that the brain is the organ of thought and passion ; that the science of the human mind is inseparably connected with this supposed organ; and that the different powers of the mind may be determined principally by the size and shape of the head, to- gether with the undulations of the skull, embracing the position and condition of such undulations. As to the general features, or outline of phrenology, we would file no very special objections ; but when we come to define and settle the divisions of the organ, w^e are plunged into darkness and confusion. 2. The size and the general appearance of the head, together with the expression of the eye and the countenance, are important in forming a correct judgment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more is indicated by physiognomy than is by phrenology. The expression of the countenance, as a general thing, is more important in deciding upon the strength and character of the mind, than all that can be gathered from the different sections in crani- ology. 3. There are several important points to he settled^ and to be acknowledged as true, before the philosophy of mind, with its well-tried chain of \ PHRENOLOGY. 283 truths, can be supplanted by it. We do not regard the doctrine of phrenology as being sufficiently in- terwoven with mental science to require an exten- sive analysis : hence, we shall refer briefly to only a few facts in connection with it. SECTION II. 1. The trutTis which support the doctrine of phre- nology must be sufficiently clear and strong to show that it is, in fact, a science ; but no two writers have entirely agreed, in every respect, in regard to the localities of the different organs, as indicated by the peculiar shape of the skull, which, according to phrenology, is essential to the existence of such a theory or doctrine. 2. It must be demonstrated vyithout a doxibt^ that the brain is, and is wholly, the organ of the mind, otherwise the cranium might deceive us ; and as all the nervous matter in the entire system is of the very same properties as that of the brain, and is, to some extent, and in some way, connected with it, there might be some diffi- culty involved in locating the organ of the mind. 3. Phrenologists should first prove that the hrain is the organ of the mind, and then they must agree in locating the different powers or faculties of the mind according to the exterior surface of the skull, and especially those locations should be made and be defined without doubt, which have so long been the objects of doubt and contention among different writers. An intelligent world will expect these questions of doubt to be settled before they will consent to regard such a system, as a whole, conr iw^ippw^wpj -I* ^^'iwippip im PHRENOLOGY. sistent with reason, or that it is true science. 4. It must be clearly shown how the skull bone, which is inert within itself, is better adapted to the develop- ment of the various influences and powers of an immaterial nature, than such a nature would be to develop its own powers and action. 5. If we ad- here to the exactness of phrenological claims, it must be demonstrated^ according to general uniform- ity, that each undulation on the external surface of the skull has a concavity corresponding to it on the inner surface of the skull, answering to the different lobes of the brain, which lobes have been assumed as being the basis respectively from which the ac- tion of the various powers of the mind are elimi- nated; but this is impossible. 6. There should be ^ clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really contain lohes^ or ^protuberances^ as has been assumed, and just a sufficient number to correspond with the different powers and affections of the mind ; but the almost imperceptible waves of the brain can not be called lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phre- nology. SECTION III. 1. Should such lobes exist as organs of the differ- ent powers of the mind, it would appear that they would have to exist in immediate contact with the skull, so that the external surface would indicate the size and strength of such organs thus manifested ; therefore, no vacuum, or space, could exist between the brain and the skull without confusing the defi- nite location and action of the various mental pow- I PHKENOLOGY. 285 ere. But there is a vacuum, or space, between the brain and skull which severs the connection between the two, and renders it impossible to trace the con- nection between the external surface of the skull and the brain at any time, without taking into the account the changes under different circumstances. 2. Philosophers agree that the hrain may be re- garded as the organ of the mind by reason of the wise order in the arrangement of infinite wisdom, and not that it is or can be the organ of the mind from its peculiar essence, or natural qualities ; for in this case the whole nervous system would be the organ of the mind, as it is connected with the brain, and contains precisely the same essence, or proper- ties, when analyzed. 3. The idea that the mind is whoUy dependent upon the nature and condition of the physical organs, in order to be manifested, or for the character of its action, is absurd; for we have already seen that the mind can act without the bodily organs, and when the senses are locked up, or their power is suspended by sleep. 4. The doo- trine of phrenology, when not sufficiently guarded, often misleads the mind. In some instances it has given origin to tendencies which have resulted in the worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has been assumed that all the sufferings of both body and mind are the results of imperfect physical or- ganization, and that the fall of man affects only the physical powers, by and through which the mind acts. If this be true, and it is possible for us to have any consciousness of guilt or sin, then tJiat which tests this fact must be matter, and when the body dies all our consciousness of guilt must perish 286 PHRENOLOGY. with it. This would result in the doctrine or idea of annihilation, which is false. SECTION ly. ,^4, 1. The physical organs, being inert within and of themselves, they have no power to comprehend the knowledge of suffering, and report the same to the mind, in order that it msij be known. Matter can never originate intuitive mental convictions and feelings of our lost estate ; for it is by the existence, presence, and self-action of innate mental elements that we can have any knowledge of the capability of the body to suffer, or that it ever has experienced pain. 2. While the reasonableness and truthfulness of the outlines of phrenology are acknowledged, yet we are unable to admit the more peculiar specific doctrines connected with it, and all we can do is to receive that which is correct, and reject the incor- rect, or that which is false. The same cause will not affect every person in the same way. 3. Inju- ries received upon the head often affect some power of the mind, and an injury received upon a certain organ affects one mind very differently from the re- sult the same cause would produce upon another mind. The same organ in kind may be affected on different heads, and the results are not similar; but, in most instances, they are very different. The same organ in the same head may be affected by a blow, at different times, without producing similar effects upon the mind ; therefore, it is impossible to locate the different organs from the similarity in the effects realized. 4. Different portions of the brain PHBENOLOGY. 28T» may be diseased without affecting the mind corre- sponding to the office, nature, and action of the organs thus affected. A lady has been mentioned, one half of whose brain was completely paralyzed by disease, yet the faculties of her mind were per- fect, notwithstanding the destruction of one half of the cerebral organs. A man has been mentioned, who retained the right use of all his faculties up to the moment of his sudden death, and on opening his head it was discovered that suppuration had destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. Though one half of his cerebral organs were de- stroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, when the mind did not appear to have been affected up to the time of death. SECTION V. 1. We learn, from different experiments^ that large portions of the brain have been often removed with- out destroying the exercise of the mental faculties. A man has been mentioned, whose head had been so injured that a large portion of the right wing of the OS frontis was removed, suppuration had taken place, while at each dressing, for over two months, the matter discharged brought with it large quanti- ties of the brain ; yet he retained the right use of all his faculties to the time of his death. 2. Instan- ces have been given, in cases of fracture of the skull, when large portions of the brain have been removed without the slightest injury to the minds ^288 PHRENOLOGY. of the persons thus suffering. These facts are con- clusive evidences that different organs in the brain can be entirely destroyed without marring the cor- rect action of the mind. 3. How can this be ac- counted for upon the principles of phrenology f There is only one way of escape, so far as can be determined at present ; that is, when the organs on one side of the head are destroyed, we have to as- sume that there are double organs, and those on the other side correspond to those lost. But this is only assumption, as it can not be based upon any pri- mary principle of phrenology. 4. While the gen- eral principles of phrenology may be regarded as true, yet we are unprepared to adopt it in lieu of mental philosophy, as the latter has been long es- tablished upon true principles, attested by almost any amount of experiments and facts known to be true. ^mii^ \i^-w^^ MP I'll I being opposed to any thing like an unchanging ne- cessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the lawa over matter and natural causation, and even t)ie laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has volitive power to choose, in which alternatives are disposed of without respect to any natural relationship, ele- ments, or of cause and effect. The mind of man is free to act in accordance with the course of nat- ural laws and tendencies, or contrary to them ; and this same liberty exists in relation to imma- terial elements and laws. Mind is free in its natural existence, or liberty of action, amid all relations and laws of realities around him. 4. Yolition is possessed either of self-freedom^ or it is under the law of fatal necessity. If it is governed 406 VOLITION. by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitu- tional organization, then the whole mind is under the law of necessity, whether it be regarded in a primary or a secondary point of light. It has been asserted that we are free, or are at liberty to act ac- cording to choice ; but we have seen that volition is anterior to choice, and that choice is dependent on it for existence. Sentient beings have self-power to act as opposed to natural tendencies and physical laws. The wheels of an extensive manufactory tend to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion by the great water-wheel, which yields to the weight of water, according to the law of gravitation. Tiie force of this law is the cause or necessity of action. If man acts only under the law of necessity, then it is the law which is accountable for either good or bad deeds, as it is wholly the cause of every act of every order or kind. The idea and the possibility of choice, without the possibility of a different or a contrary choice, is utterly impossible ; and this lib- erty to choose is anterior to choice, and is only found in connection with intuitive power. SECTION IT. 1. Another y^Z^^ proposition is, that "motives are causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again asserted that " every volition has a motive, and if the motive be single, which operates upon the will, such motive will determine it ; but if there are sev- eral operating upon it at the same time, the strong- est one will determine the will-action." It would appear that no proposition, or propositions, could b€ V^OLITION. 40(| much more unreasonable or absurd. 2. Motive may be regarded as tJiai which has power to invoke will-action; and when wo speak of it, in connection with volition, we do not saj motive is action, but it is that which invokes action of the volitive power; otherwise, motive and volitive action would be on^ and the same. If motive is not volition, then it can only influence the mind to action in a secondary wa}^; for it is clear that, as it is not volition, it can not act either as or for volition, but it is rather a contingent object or influence inducing volitions. Then, in all cases, volitive power must exist anterior to motive, and motive can not and does not have any authoritative power over it. All that it can do is to invoke volitive action, which may be granted or refused at the pleasure of the will. 3. The origin and arrangement of motive, or motives, presujpposes and proves the pre-existence and action of the voli- tive power. If we can pre arrange motives to pro- duce in the mind certain volitions, then the determ- ining to make such pre-arrangements is a volition, which volition must exist previous to motive, as its being is a prelude to the origin and arrangement of motive. Motive can exist, in the order of time, after volition; but motive, in the human mind, can never precede and give origin to the power of voli- tion. 4. Volitions are spontaneous^ and can exist independent of motive, and, in many instances, without being influenced by it in the slightest de- gree. Like intuitions, they can exist and become connected with the action of other powers of the mind ; so there is nothing like chance or irrational- ity in regard to them while connected with sentient 40§ VOLITION. beings. We know, from the preceding argument, that motive can only have a secondary or an ulterior influence upon volition. The same principle applies to mind in general. The relation of cause and ef- fect, when referred to the acts of the divine Being, destroys all law of motive- control. Such a law, then, could not exist unless by Divine volition. Then, if he could act once without motive-infl.uence, he could continue doing so forever: hence, motive /rced by any law or infiueuce VOLITION. 417 in the range of thought, then free will and all ac- countability ceases together, and our ideas of obli- gation, right and wrong tend to fatal deception. 7. Man naturally possesses volition, and he is capable of volitive action, or oi jpuUing forth volitions. If he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is need- less to exhort him to action in order to do right ; for he has no power to act. If we could ascertain, by some process, what the sovereign motive-power was, then it would be reasonable to appeal to that; for man is passive, while the motive power is the whole action and cause of action. Indeed, it would be useless to let man know any thing about duty, as motive must do all and is accountable for all ; there- fore, if he should not act he is clear, and the whole blame is with the motive-power, which governs him. But we have pursued this topic far enough. The human mind exists in perpetual or unending freedom. By its self-power of action, under its present rela- tions to its Author, it either rises to happiness and heaven, or forces its way into gloomy despair. i..Wi^ SECTION yi. 1. Mr. Stewart says that " will properly expresses that power of the mind of which volition is the act." If volition is only the act of the will, why call it volition ? for the act of the will is the act of the will, and it is no more or less. If will has real action, it would be foolish presumption to say that volition was the same action, and only the same, in essence and action ; yet this would be the case if volition is the action of the will; but this is false. 418 VOLITION. Then, if volition be only the action of the will, and is dependent upon such action for its origin, and can not be the action of the will, as the will is acknowledged to have its own action, it must be an accidental and superadded action, which may have a casual being, and then sink into annihila- tion ; but this is absurd. 2. Then we must come to a more rational conclusion that volition can not exist only as action, unless there is something capable of moving or acting. The very idea of action implies a power capable of acting ; therefore, volition is a power of the mind capable of motion or action. 3. Mr. Upham says the will is " the mental power, or susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." This amounts to about the same thing as that given by Mr. Stewart. But it would stand thus : that vo- lition, or the act of the will, is that which puts forth the act of the will. Who can understand such logic? Here comes again the same old hackneyed argumentative circle, the last resort of every philos- opher who attempts to chain or fatalize the free and imperishable human mind ! 4. Yolition and the will are not distinct powers of the mind, neither are they co-ordinate branches of any mental power. One can not give rise to the other, nor are they de- pendent upon each other for existence. The two terms refer the mind to the different conditions and degrees of strength naturally connected with and contained in the one intellectual power. 5. The term volition refers the mind to the natural liberty- power, essentially free to act in any way or manner corresponding to the nature of such freedom. 6. The term will refers the mind to the same mental VOLITION. 41^ power of action, embracing not only its primary spontaneity, bnt involves an idea of its higher de- grees of strength, and authoritative and mandatory power, not only in giving origin to action, but in continuing, contracting, and in compelling action. All the difference that need be referred to in this place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced in the nature of the condition of the one power in its varied manifestations. We now enter upon the analysis of the wiU in its more extensive manifesta- tions, and will define, in brief form, its relation to other faculties of the mind. »iS# ^u- liHsion CfodftJ. CHAPTER I. THE WILL. SECTION I. 1. The will is that faculty of the mind by which we determine either to do or forbear an action. It is an inherent power or faculty which we exercise in deciding among two or more objects, as to which we shall choose or pursue. Its very nature precludes the necessity of an extensive analysis ; therefore, we do not feel called upon to amplify by following the example of previous writers, taxing the time and toils of the student in examining a general variety of subjects, having only a very remote and common relevancy to the important doctrine of the will ; yet we desire to involve in the argument more facts intimately connected with the doctrine of the will than can be found in any one work now extant. 2. The will, in its very nature^ is the liberty-power of the mind. The peculiar condition of its essential being is the nature, which is self-freedom and self- power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very nature, but it has determining power, deciding in the mind that something shall be done or forborne ; and it possesses mandatory power, leading to such mental action as will be effectual, or will secure cer- 420 THE WILL. 421 tain results. 4. The mind is coni/r oiled by the will in a sense superior to the nature, office, or capability of any other faculty or power of the mind. This will more fully appear when the nature, office, and power of the will are examined in connection with other faculties which are closely connected with it. SECTION II. 1. The will is closely connected with the judg- ment^ and can be and is often influenced by it ; yet, while the latter can discriminate and decide upon realities or facts, it requires the presence of the will in determining or in compelling action. The judg- ment can only act in relation to truths ; and when it decides, such decision is knowledge ; but the mind is wholly free to act or to forbear action. But when we will to secure that which is the object of decis- ion, the powers of the mind are directed to the work necessary to be accomplished. 2. The under- standing cam, not control the will. It has power to contain or embrace all that is necessary to be brought under the inspection of the mind, and, in this way, it can go no further than to invoke volitive action. 3. Reason may connect the different steps, or a chain of facts, from the premises to the result, but it has no authority over the will in causing ac- tion. Its power is under the control of the will, by which its action can be continued or suspended at pleasure. Its process may aid in inducing volitive action, but never can command such action. 4. We understand by the term will a commanding power^ or a power which can direct. The under^anding 86 THE WILL. appears to contain or embrace all that is necessary to be furnished for immediate mental action ; the judgment determines which is preferable, while it is the province of the will to decide on which to pursue, and to act in relation to that which is the object of such decision. SECTION III. 1. We object to the order of the "classification of the mental powers," according to the arrange- ment of some writers, upon the nature of the will. A fine specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though intentional, design may be detected in the assump- tion, that " a knowledge of the will implies a pre- liminary knowledge of the intellect;" and that such " knowledge implies a preliminary knowledge of the sensibilities." This arrangement will claim that we have knowledge of the existence and action of several faculties as anterior to our knowledge of the will, thereby fixing a previous basis containing laws governing the will. The absurdity of this arrangement will be clearly defined hereafter. 2. To define the relation of the will to other faculties, or to all of them combined, in order to find some one or a combined influence as a law or laws of the will, by which it may be and is governed, is wholly unnecessary, as the very nature and relation of the will to all the other powers of the mind will forever preclude any idea of the correctness of such con- fused positions and argumentation. 3. Feeling^ ihiriking^ and willing are three faculties distinct from each other. They have been known as the THE WILL. 423 sensibility, intellect, and the will. All sensitive states and feelings are referred to the first; all ip- tellectual operations are referred to the second ; all mental determinations are referred to the tliird. These three powers of the mind are clearly distinct, and all that is embraced under each one. The will is distinct from all other powers. It is improper to call an act of the will either a thought or feeling. It is a determination or act peculiar to itself or its nature. 4. " Laws of the wiU " constitute a heading for lengthy arguments, according to some writers. The term law implies not only the power to rule, but a power which does control or direct. If phi- losophers, in using "laws of the will," intend to convey the idea that the will is governed by any law, or laws, beyond its own nature and being, it will be necessary for us to call on them for more light. SECTION lY. 1. No material element, or elements, anterior to the existence of will in the human mind, can, of or within themselves, contain any law or laws possess- ing action y and if inertness would be essential to the nature of such existences, they could have no power over the will. 2. If they intend, by the " laws of the will," to say that the IoajOs which Deity has fixed over the material universe have power to control the will, then mind is matter, and the will within itself is inert; but this is false. 3. It can not be possible that they refer to the existence and controlling power of the divine Being ; for they 4M THE WILL. could not call such an existence the "laws of tlie will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the action of our wills, and we are both passive and not accountable. 4. It can not be that they refer to any other faculty of the same finite mind ; for it would be just as improper for any faculty to have volitive power to act in the place of and for the will, as it would be for the will to act for itself. The will has power of action, and does act, in its own capacity, without calling any other faculty or faculties to act for it. NATURE OF THE WILL. 125 CHAPTER II. . NATURE OF THE WILL. SECTION I. 1. We have already seen that '•''laws cf the voiU^'^ as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can not exist, or, if it is possible for such to be real exist- ences, the human mind is incapable of having any satisfactory knowledge of them. 2, The will is gov- erned hy its own law^ and from its nature it is im- possible that any other faculty or faculties should control it; and if the other powers of the mind have no authoritative power to control it, then it is absurd to say that any object selected, by the mind can con- tain power to govern the will. 3. " Contingent ac- tion of the will^^ implies the continued being and power of action as possessed by other faculties of the mind, and that volitive action is accidental. If the action of the will is wholly accidental, then there is no abiding or real principle capable of being called the will. Then, if the will is contin- gent, or only exists in action, it follows that, when such action is suspended, the will is annihilated ; but contingent volitive action, as taught by many, is false, and is resorted to only for the purpose of destroying the liberty-power of the will. 4. If the mind has power to act within and of itself, the con- dition of such power is freedom, or liberty ; other- wise, no action could take place without an impingi 86* 426 NATTJKE OF THE WILL. ing cause. And if action is compelled, in any way, or by any power, beyond the identity of self, then action is caused by such an influence or power. Then that which causes mental action is that which acts while the mind is passive or wholly inactive; but if the mind has self-power to act, it is reasonable to suppose that it possesses some faculty capable of acting, or of determining action. It is just as rea- sonable to suppose that the will possesses such voli- tive power as to refer such power to any other fac- ulty or influence. SECTION II. 1. The doctrine that the ''''will lias its laws prelim- inary to that of its freedom^'' as taught by Mr. Up- ham, and others, is clearly incorrect. Under this proposition, it is assumed that "the will is subject to laws." An argument to prove this is drawn from the fact that all things in the universe are subject to law, and that the mind of man can not be regarded as an exception. This general blending is very ob- jectionable. Why was there not a distinction made between the laws governing the inert part of the universe, and the laws governing the intellectual and immortal soul ? If an uplifted rock is ponder- ous, and will naturally gravitate to the earth, is that conclusive proof that the soul is ponderous, and that it must naturally and always obey the same law of gravitation? If so we are undone forever. 2. The decision having been made, by Mr. Upham, and others, that " the will is subject to laws^^ then they io,ake this deduction : ''Hhe freedom of the will^ NATURE OF THE WILL. 431" wTiatever may he its nature^ rmbst accommodate itself to this preliminary fact?'^ Here we have at least the will fatal ized under the infinite law of necessity. But for this desired result, the "immortal" work of Mr. Edwards, Upham, and others, would probably not have been so amplified in the order of careful argumentation. While it is our happy privilege to profit by all that has gone before, we would humbly beg leave to give reasons for our belief and views of the doctrine of the will. 3. The argument seems to stand thus: The will is subject to and is governed by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the "liberty of acting" under and according to the na- ture and requirements of such laws. These laws are regarded as being infinite, and all they require is of infinite necessity. This system of philosophy teaches and enforces the doctrine of free will, which is our "freedom or liberty " to act according to neces- sity. This view of free will is absurd, as correct arguments will show. 4. We have already seen that the will is not subject to such laws ; and it will be remembered that " laws of the will " have been assumed, without any attempt to define them, of any one of them. The first position assumed was, that a knowledge of the will implied a previous knowledge of other powers of the mind. If that be true, it does not follow that those previously-known powei-8 were laws governing the will ; for the very nature of those powers, as specified by them, would forever refute such a position. The next general position is, that " the will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom." Here "laws" are assumed without telling us what they are. We will now pro- 428 NATURE OF THE WILL. ceed to notice those things which have been specif- icallj mentioned and pointed out by them as gov- erning the will. SECTION III. 1. The will may he influenced hy desire^ but it can never be controlled by desire, or desires, only in a subordinate way. The doctrine that the will is authoritatively controlled by desire, is too absurd to require any thing more than a passing notice. De- sire is no more than a mere emotion or excitement of the mind, directed to the attainment of an ob- ject. It is an inclination or wish for something to be enjoyed. That which we wish for or desire may become the object of the determining power of the will, or we may determine to pay no attention to the object of our desires, though the strength of such desires may remain unchanged. In traveling from home and friends, we may often desire to return ; yet we have volitive power to continue our onward course to some far-off and perhaps uninteresting part of the world. 2. Desire, being only an emotion, can never, within and of itself, exercise any manda- tory influence and power over the will. 3. Desires may arise voluntarily and involuntarily. We have volitive power to turn our attention to an object, or class of objects, till such object, or something con- nected with the class of objects, becomes the object of desire; and, in connection with some peculiar condition or fitness in some object, which claims our voluntary attention, may arise a desire to have the same in our possession. In tlajs way desire may b© NATUBE OF THE WILL. 42^ successive to volition, if not a result of volitive ac- tion. Desires may be involuntary, though the will has power to cross or counteract the strength of such desires; and, by repeated efibrts, it has power to diminish and to destroy them. 4. Desire can invoke volitive action^ but can never command such action, and control its determinations. Our desires can exert an invoked subordinate influence upon the will, and, in this way, induce volitive action; but they can do no more. SECTION IV. 1. Another position assumed by many writers, to enslave the will, is, that it is directed and positively controlled by choice. The liberty of the will con- sists in the power of acting according to choice; therefore, choice controls the will, and our liberty ia wholly embraced in obeying clwice^ our sovereign ruler. If choice has mandatory control of the will, it would follow that, when choice is exercised by any inert object, and as the power of choice could not act without such an object, the object would cause the exercise of choice ; therefore, the inert ob- ject governs choice, and choice controls the will : hence, an inert object may be the sovereign ruler of the soul, with power to determine its fate forever ; but this is false. 2. The very nature of choice im- plies the possibility of a different selection to that which is made. We intuitively feel that there ie always an alternative to that which we choose or decide on ; and as we compare different objects to- gether, we have an abiding consciousness that we 430 NATURE OF THE WILL. are at liberty to choose any one under our inspec- tion. We know t^at we have volitive power to choose or not to choose, and it is utterly impossible for us to complete the act of choosing unless we de- termine to do so. When two or more objects are presented to the mind, we feel that we have power to choose any one of them, or to refuse making any choice. If choice can not be controlled in any way by the will, and is the result of some anterior con- stitutional determination, then it would follow that choice is inevitable, and that it can only take place as effect follows its cause. Then, choice could never take place only in an involuntary way. 3. We know that choice does exist; then its origin must be caused by the laws of natural necessity, or the mind has natural and volitive power to decide between alternatives. Choice can never be free if it be j^i^o- duced by the laws of necessity. Our freedom to act according to such necessity is bondage, but choice can be voluntary. When we have made choice, we feel and know that we were at perfect liberty to have abstained from such choice, or to have made a different one. If choice is produced by laws of natural necessity, it can never be free; but choice, in its very nature, implies liberty or free- dom, and without this it ceases to be choice ; there- fore, volitive action is essential to the existence of choice. 4. The position of some writers is, that choice controls the will, and that choice is the effect of the laws of natural necessity. Then, for the effect of a natural cause to govern the manner, qualities, or condition of itself is impossible: hence the perfect impossibility of such an effect causing NATURE OF THE WILL. 48!f volitive action, for that would be an effect causing an effect. Choice may and does have a subordinate influence upon the will, but has no mandatory power over it. The will can control, determine, or confirm our choice, and it has pK)wer to act contrary to our choice. It is very common for us to feel and say, in regard to some act of ours, that it was not our choice. SECTION V. 1. Another assumption is, that the will is governed by- motive. Mr. Upham says that " the will acts in view of the strongest motive, and necessarily so acts.^^ If such action is necessitated^ of course it could not be otherwise; therefore, tlie will is gov- erned by motive, which is clearly and forever incor- rect, as arguments will show. 2. Motive is that which incites to action^ having only subordinate in- fluence upon the will in inducing volitive action.^ The very nature of motive implies no mandatory power over its own origin and action ; and if it pos- sesses no self-power of government, it would be im- possible for it to govern the will or any other faculty in a positive way. The highest power of motive consists only in action toward an object, and this is granting more than its nature strictly demands. It is acknowledged, on all hands, that the will, in. its lowest signification, has power to act. As the latter, in its very nature, has higher claims to liberty than the former, why should it be regarded as subordi- nate to motive? 3. The only way for motive to govern the will is, that its action be anterior, in the 1st NATURE OF THE WILL order of time, to the origin of the action of the will. It is utterly impossible to prove that the action of motive in the mind is anterior to the origin of the action of the will ; and if it could be done, it would be no evidence that motive-action could control the action of the will; and the very nature of the former, compared with that of the latter, precludes the possibility of such a conclusion. 4. If motive has power to act^ and such action can only be in- duced by the presence of an object, then the object controls the motive, and the motive controls the will. Then it would follow, that when the object was inert it would control the mind. We are not prepared for such a conclusion. Motive may have power to induce volitive action, but it has no author- itative power over such action. SECTION yi. 1. It has been maintained, by many writers, that motive governs mind in general; that it governs volitions in the human mind ; and that, in the same way, it applies to the Divine mind. Mr. Upham says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same with that of the supreme Being himself. He is inevitably governed, in all his do- ings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best;" therefore, the divine Being is '-'' inevita- hly^^ governed by a superior. We understand Dr. Edwards, and others, to teach that the ^''energy of Tnotives'^'^ existed, in the nature of things, anterior to the will of God. In this way, many writers take the ground that motive governs the will of man, NATUEE OF THE WILL. 433 and that motive governs the will of Deity, being anterior to it : hence, we are driven to the conclu- sion that motive governs all beings, and that it must be, of necessity, the supreme ruler of the universe, with power to fatalize all things. Notwithstanding the opinions of such writers, we can not and never will acknowledge motive as the great ruler of the universe. 2. Motive, in the Divine mind, is subor- dinate to volitions. If "mo^'ve," or any ^^ certain fixed and irresistible infiAiences^'' control the acts of Deity, such controlling power could not have been originated and arranged by the supreme Being; for, in that case, he must have willed the existence and arrangement of such pre-existing and controlling power. Then it follows, that such a controlling power must either be anterior to any act of Deity, and thereby superior to him, or such an assumed controlling power could not have existed till the Divine volition willed it into real being; an^ if it could only exist by the will of Deity, he had power to act independent of such supposed influence. If he had power to act once independently of this mo- tive, or natural irresistible influence, he had and has power to act on independently of such supposed in- fluences forever: so, farewell to the eternal sover- eignty of motive! Sleep peaceably on forever! 3. "We have already seen that motive has no power to control the volitive power in the human mind. It may have subordinate influence in inducing volitive action, but nothing more ; for, in order to control the will, it must be proved, without a doubt, that motive exists anterior to the action of the will, and that it has volitive power to act in causing the will 37 434: NATURE OF THE WILL. to act. Without this liberty-power of action, it can not move the will and determine such motion ; but, from its very nature, it can not have such volitive power of action; and if it could, it would be just as fatal to the law of necessity as to refer such power to the will, where it belongs. From the very nature of things, there is no possible way to control the will by any law of motive. 4. Another position as- sumed and strongly argued by Mr. Edwards, is, that " the will always is as the greatest apparent good ;" but he explains this by admitting that the " will is determined by the greatest apparent good." Both methods amount to the same meaning. To blend the will with the intellect is absurd ; for we can not say that it is a thought : and it is equally as incor- rect to blend it with the sensibilities, for it is not a feeling. If any other faculty, power, or influence of the mind has authority to control the will, such faculty, power, or influence must have not only lib- erty of self action, but volitive power to cause the will to act ; otherwise, the will can not be controlled in this way. And if the will can only be governed by such volitive power, why not refer such power to the will itself, where it naturally belongs, and not labor against all plain reasoning to give the power of the will to some other power, where it does not natu- rally belong? And if motive can induce volitive action, under the law of necessity, then it would follow that when an inert existence was the object of motive ; that as the object controlled the motive which controlled the will, so would such an object control the will : hence, we would be compelled to serve material elements and laws in common with NATURE OF THE WILL. m every thing else possessed with power to influence motive; but this is false. 5. That the will is un- trammeled is in perfect accordance with the con- sciousness of mankind. Of nothing are we more positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge re- ceived through the senses, connected with diseased and perishing physical organs, may deceive us ; but consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is knowledge, without demanding an increase of testi- mony from the senses. It is of 'and within its own existence and nature the end of all controversy or doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality of all things. Our consciousness of self-action, as to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or is free, equals our consciousness of existence itself; and we can no more doubt this than we can doubt the existence of self and that of every thing else. When we contemplate future action in regard to many objects, we feel and know that we have natu- ral volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or to determine on any course we please in relation to one or all of them ; and we are perfectly confident that we have power to refuse action contrary to either motive or the power of choice. When we reflect upon a wrong act in the past, we feel an internal conviction that we were free to have done difierently: hence our deep regret or sense of sin; for without this conscious liberty, we could never regret the imperfections of the past, or feel that we had ever sinned or done wrong. As long as we feel that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a con- sciousness of liberty in acting. If a consciousness 4:36 NATURE OF THE WILL. of liberty could be removed from the mind, just as long as such a sense was gone, we would be incapa- ble of any regret or remorse. However much we may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intu- itive liberty, we never can experience any thing like regret or remorse in regard to any past act. Just as long as we could feel that we had no con- scious liberty, we would be compelled to feel our acts were not our own. t.A LIBERTY OF THE WILL 4# CHAPTER III. LIBERTY OF THE WILL. SECTION I. 1. The expression "/ree 'M7^7Z," is, to some extent, objectionable, as it would seem to imply the oppo- site, or that there conld be such a thing as the will enslaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we have seen to be incorrect. Will, in its very essence, or nature, ift a free principle. Liberty is its essen- tial condition or law, I^ree will is as incorrect as hound will. Liberty is essential to its nature, and it is Hot will if it be not free ; and if it be hound^ it ceases to be will. Yolitive power of action is essential to the being of the soul, and to all rational, intellectual, and accountable beings. Action and self-action are essential differences lietween matter and spirit. Spirit has self-power of choice; matter lias not. Ratiocination is essential to intellect, and it can not take place without action. Connected with these, volition is forever inseparable ; thereforel, mind can not exist without self liberty of action. S."* The will, in its acts and determinations., is subject to the law of self-liberty in opposition to the law of necessity. We have seen already that the will can not fall under the law of infinite necessity; there- fore, it must fall under that of liberty, as opposed to necessity. If we know that we are under the law of' necessity, then we have the same power of know- 37* 488 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. mg that we are not accountable. To suppose and believe that our actions are necessary, and that we are accountable for such actions, is to suppose and believe an absurdity ; for we never can experience remorse for any act, or acts, which are not wholly voluntary, either by intention or permission. 3. The doctrine of liberty is clearly established by con- sciousness, in which there is a universal conviction that our past acts, even under the same circum- stances, might have been very different. Such a conviction could not exist only in spontaneous origin or liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of many objects of choice, we have a positive con- sciousness that two or more acts of the will may be put forth, or that we may will to refuse them all, and that contrary to motive, desire, or choice. This truth can be tested by any one, at this moment, in regard to the very next act of the mind. The con- sciousness of liberty we now have, can no more be doubted than we can doubt our own existence. SECTION 11. 1. We objected wholly to "laws of the will," as used by different writers. The will knows no law only that of liberty^ which liberty may be regarded as absolute, being entirely and forever opposed to any law or laws of necessity. 2. I may determine to go to London, and while this determination re- mains unchanged, all the other powers of the mind must be subject to the controlling power of the will. This determination may be continued or suspended only by the power of the will. The ab&ence of voli- LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 439 tive action does not imply that, during such inactiv- ity, the other powers of the mind are unemployed; but the oflBce of the will is to preside over the men- tal operations. 3. The effort to sustain the law of necessity has involved reasoning in a circle, Ne- cessitarians have assumed that "the action of the will is always in the direction of the strongest mo- tive." In defining the strongest motive, they say it is the motive in the direction of which the will does act. They have no way to define the strongest mo- tive at first sight, but wait till the will acts, and then assume that the motive, in the direction of its action, is the strongest. They have to assume that motive determines the will, without accounting for its authority. If we ask them what determines the will, they will answer. The strongest motive. Then, what is the strongest motive? That which determ- ines the will. Here is the same old circle; but this generation seeketh after evidence. 4. Mr. Edwards says " that every act of will whatsoever, is excited by some motive." Then, motive causes the action of the will; therefore, all volitions are effects of mo- tives. If an effect can not be greater than its cause, we are forced to the conclusion that no action can exist, or take place, either in the mind or body, un- less it be caused by motive. Then, motive is the only being having right to command and to control our entire existence ; but we have already seen that this is false. C# "iua *A'julOut we have seen, by previous arguments, that the will is not svhject to law^ as taught by necessitarians. The will is independent in its very nature and relation to the other powere of the mind. 3. The power and freedom of the will is clearly evidenced in self- preservation. If I were in a boat, peacefully float- ing on the silvery waters of Niagara, above the Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends upon the ef- forts of myself, and only upon myself. I feel as conscious as I can of any thing, that I have power either to determine to row to the shore, or to determ- ine to go over the Falls without any effort. .4. Con- nected with the remembrance of past errors^ we experience a consciousness^ which is clear and posi- tive, that, under the same circumstances, we might have done differently; and connected with such re- called determinations, there is a vivid consciousness of the power we had to have determined differently. If the affirmations of conscience are uniformly or are always wrong, then we may have some gi*ound for distrusting the liberty-power of the mind; but if such affirmations are true, then the doctrine of the liberty of the will is true and irresistible. SECTION II. 1. The will has self-determining power. It is not a matter of astonishment that necessitarians should doubt the self-determining power of the will ; but they acknowledge that the mind, as a whole, has self-determining power. So do we; and we hold that the will, in its nature and office, presides over 444 POWER OF THE WILL. all the other faculties, and determines all the proc- esses and acts of the mind. No event, object, or fact can be made the subject of knowledge only by the self-determining power of the mind; for noth- ing can be brought under the inspection of the mind without mental action, and such action is in the mind, and is a result of its self-determining power, as no self action can arise without such a power. 2. Mr. Upham says, " If by the phrase self determin- ing power of the will be merely meant that the will itself, that distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus denominate, has power of action^ we grant that it is so ;" that is, the will can act, but not au- thoritatively — it can only act under the control of law or the strongest motive. The freedom of such action is in conforming to necessity. But hear him again : " The will acts, and with such freedom and such power as to lay the basis of accountability." With how much freedom does it act ? Let him an- swer, "It is free to act according to the law of neces- sity." This is the substance, and amounts to the fact that such action is coerced by the law of fate. Wonderful freedom of volitive action ! Yet, he bases our accountability upon the liberty of the will, and the will, at the same time, incapable of acting only in obedience to the law of eternal fate. How is it possible for students to ever gain a correct knowledge of self, the powers of mind, and their accountabilit}'^ from such logic? 3. Mr. Edwards says, " If the will determines the will^ then choice orders and determines the choice P This might, in part, be correct, if we were to acknowledge his pre- vious positions on this subject to be correct; but we POWEE OF THE WILL. 445 do not acknowledge such positions as true. Then, that which would destroy his argument would be clear and true with others. First. Why did he make the proposition unfair, by lugging in the term ''^orders'''* in the latter part? This is sophistical, wliether so intended or not. If the will can determ- ine the mind, it certainly can determine the will ; for the will is a faculty of the mind, and the self- determining power of the mind has been acknowl- edged to be true. We have already seen that no faculty or faculties of the mind can determine the mind except the will ; then the will has power to determine both the wiU and choice: so we have no difficulty on the subject. 4. Volitions are spontane- ous^ and are independent of any law of necessity; therefore, the very nature of the volitive power is freedom with self-liberty to act in any way. SECTieN III. 1.. The superior power of the will is that peculiar power it possesses by which it is not only distin- guished from the other powers of the mind, but determines the action of the mental powers as a whole, or as united in the acts of the mind. 2. The ground of offense in the sight of God, is not only our power to perceive the difference between right and wrong, and an chiding conviction as to what we should do, but it is embraced in the fact that we possess the power to do that. which is right, and to refuse to do that which is contrary to the Divine will. 3. Connected with voluntariness is the ground of all accountability. Take this away, and it is ut- 38 446 POWER OF THE WILL. terly impossible for us ever to be called to an account for any thought or act. We can neither be ap- plauded nor blamed. 4. The doctrine of the will, as taught by many writers, has been confused un- necessarily. Too many topics have entered into the argument; and as we contemplate defining its con- nection with and relation to the elements of mind, which lie at the foundation of moral action, in the second volume, we will close this volume with one more general proposition. SECTION IV. 1. The will possesses mandatory jpower. The mind certainly has self-determining power, by the consent of philosophers, and in the very nature of its being and operations. By general consent, and true analysis, this power has not been defined as being diffused through the nature and power of all the faculties, separately or combined ; but the determ- ining power has been referred to some one faculty of the mind. No faculty, from its essential nature, can possess mandatory power but the will. 2. The will appears to preside over the combined action of the other faculties, and has power to control mental action. 3. Some necessitarians have erred in try- ing to confound the will With the 5€^s^5^7^^^€5, and refused to appeal to special and universal conscious- ness. 4. Another evidence of the independence and controlling power of the will, is contained in the fact that we can will to jperform imjpossibilities ; that is, we can will the reality of an impossibility. The Atheist may finally be possessed of such a hor- POWEB OF THE WILL. 447 rible dread of the truths of the Bible, that, with all his soul, he may will its annihilation ; yet he knows, at the same time, that this is impossible. 5. Such is the wiU^ the free liberty power of the imperishable mind. Under its vivid power and mandatory con- trol, the minds of the high and the lowly, enkin- dling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, may assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, or the requirements of their laws ; but mind, intel- lectual and immortal, may determine upon the ad- vance of infinite happiness, and the interminable progression of imperishable knowledge. How can we define the true character of the soul, when per- fected in its separation from the imperfection and decay of the physical organs which trammeled its manifestations in time? Possessed of all the facts and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range all through the boundless future ; but infinitely higher, to our conceptions, must be the cfiaracter of that soul perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love of God! Witli holy triumph and increasing joy, burn ,on, thou spirit of endless day ! As tlie accel- erated travel of a star, range the progressive series of heavenly knowledge; and when thy flight has surpassed the utmost bounds of unwearied contem- plation, still thou art in heaven 1 ^ INDEX INTRODUCTION. 8X0TI0K I. _ _, PAaa. L Man an existent — • 7 2. His existence certain. '. 7 8. How existing facts are made known to us 7 4. Reasonableness of our existence — how traced • 8 SECTION II. * »" 1» His relative existence and liberty of action .• 8 2. His inalienable faculties — peculiar natural endowment — self-powei: of action 9 8. His existence unending .9 SKCTION- III. ifc-. , ' .,.f >■ 1. His being -indestructible 9 2. Matter oan change without annihilation - 9 8ECTI0K IV. 1. The existence of man divided into jeriods or states 10 (1.) His primitive state- • •- 10 (2.) His fallen state 10 (3.) His probationary state .'11 (4.) His future state 11 SECTION V. 1. Man compounded of spirit and matter , . 12 2. Spirit the principle of life 12 8. The soul the intelligent part of our existence 12 4 Its nature immaterial 12 6. It is immortal • 12 SECTION VI. 1. Matter is distinct from mind 12 2. Matter when inanimate 18 8. When is it said to be animate?.. : - 18 38* 449 460 INDEX SECTION VH. 1. Mind is not matter ^^q 2. Independence and power of mental action 13 3. Application of the term mind 14 4. The essence of mind 14- 5. Process by imagination 14 SECTION VIII. 1. Knowledge the result of reasoning and intuition 14 2. Intuitive sense of difference between mind and matter 15 3. The power constituting mental action not matter 15 4. The thinking principle not matter 15 SECTION IX. 1. Matter is bot mind 16 2. Material elements have a natural tendency to rest 16 8. Matter presents phenomena distinct from mind 16 4. Difficulty in defining the essence of matter 17 SECTION X. 1. Doctrine of materialists absurd 17 2. Impossibility of inert elements acting or knowing 17 3. The law of attraction or of resistance can not originate action 18 4. Non-existence of matter more reasonable than that nothing exists but matter 18 SECTION XI. 1. The power of the soul is superior to that of matter 18 2. Matter not cogitative 19 8. Mind not a result of a function of the brain 19 4. Effect of disease upon the brain 19 SECTION X'll. 1. Existence of mind independent of matter, but dependent on it in knowing materialities 20 2. Matter can exist without either thought or action 20 3. If matter is incapable of annihilation, then materialists are immor- tal 21 4. Matter can not always think 21 SECTION XIII. 1. Matter incapable of sensations or emotions 21 2. Septennial changes of the system can not change the identity 22 3. If mind is matter we can not recall past events 22 SECTION XIV. 1. Mind distinct and dissimilar from matter 23 2. The body incapable of annihilation 23 8. No evidence of the annihilation of any things 23 INDEX. ** 4:51 ■■OTIOV XT. Pa«b. 1. Age and the decay of the body can not be annihilation 24 2. Phenomena of mind connected with animal life 24 3. Instinct differs from matter 25 4. Such traits of the phenomena of mind can not be matter 25 SECTION XVI. 1. If matter is immortal, so is the spirit of animals • ► 26 2. The soul superior to matter in its power of self-knowledge 26 8. Matter is insensible and motionless 26 4. Power of action from what we see or hear 27 SECTION XVII. 1. Matter can not possess causation 28 2. Particles of matter have no self-power tb change in size or recipro- cally 28 3. No accident of matter can produce action or cogitation 28 4. If matter consolidated is mind, then there is but one mind in the vast universe. 29 gKCTION XYIII. 1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas 29 2. Matter possesses no power to correct appearances and impressions • • SO 3. Our consciousness of being and liberty ". 30 4. No faculty or thinking power could be superadded in constituting material elements 31 SECTION XIX. 1 The soul is neither a faculty of the body nor a result of matter •• •• 31 2. The soul incapable of annihilation 31 5. No evidence that any thing will pass into nonentity 32 4. Conscience power of self-action 32 SECTION XX. 1. The soul has a conscious knowledge of self and its continued being 33 2. The high moral obligations resting upon the soul 33 8. We should cultivate our powers for usefulness 34 4. It is reasonable for materialists and infidels to believe in the soul's immortality. , 34 SECTION X XI. 1. Atheists and skeptics should adopt the Christian system 34 (1.) Reason. (2.) Reason. (3.) Reason. (4.) Reason 35 2. Man a skeptic, impossible ! .35 3. Matter belongs to physical science--. 36 48* 9 INDEX. EIEMENTS OP MIND VHIOH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION. ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. • PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. i ,. •. SKCTIONI. Pag«. 1. Mind immaterial in essence or nature 39 2. Elements which are strictly mental 89 8. Elements connected with the origin of moral influences 39 SECTION II. 1. Powers which lie at the foundation of moral action - 39 2. Elements of mental and moral influence 39 CHAPTER II. INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. SECTION I. 1. Various orders of mind 41 2. That which resembles mind in inferior orders of beings 41 SECTION 11. 1. Matter is without either conscious sensation or self-motion 41 2. That which resembles mind in inferior orders of self-moving beings 41 CHAPTER III. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OP THE HUMAN MIND. SECTION I. 1. Mind immaterial in nature 43 2. Mind not constituted by thought and feeling 43 3. Knowledge of the real existence of mind confirmed by intuition- •• 43 4. Knowledge of mind tested by the known existence of certain facts • 43 SECTIONII. 1. Mental operations or motion are not the mind itself 44 2. Relation of primary properties in matter 44 8. If mind be only action, its existence is only an accident 44 4. The cause of mind .*• 45 6 Essence of mind unknown to us 45 INDEX. 4S9^ SBCTION III. Pa«s. 1. Mr. Stewart's definition of mind incorrect 46 2. Axioms in science and mind 46 3. Power of knowing axioms to be self-evident facts 46 4. Intuition faculties may have power to know their own existence • • • 47 CHAPTER IV. EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. SECTIOX I. 1. Our inquiries as to mental phenomena are more properly confined to properties - V 4|J 2. Three-fold division of mind 48 (1.) Mental elements .' •— 48 (2.) Moral elements of mind 48 (3.) The action of mind 48 3. That which the operations of mind involyes 48 jl.) Our duties to God * 48 (2.) Duties to ourselves 48 (8.) Duties to one another 48 8XGTZ0H II. 1. Present order of mental and moral science— objections 49 2. Mental and moral elements 49 3. Moral action — on what based 49 4. Power of mind to know and to extend knowledge 60 CHAPTER V. SENSATION. SECTIOK I. 1. Sensation defined 61 2. Its connection with physical organs 61 3. Sensation can not be separated from the mind 61 4. Sensation is wholly in the mind 62 SECTIOK II. 1. Sensation may be awakened by external objects 62 2. It is a state of internal feeling 52 3. Sensations from external things are not the images of such things • 62 4. Connection between sensations and physical organs 53 6. In what respect sensation is dependent upon the senses 53 6. Sensation and primary mental powers 63 CHAPTER VI. SENSE. BKCTIOIT I. 1. Sense defined 64 2i Its relation to physical organs and to sensation 64 8. Sense is succeeded by sensation 64 454: INDEX. SECTION II. Pask. 1. Sense — apprehension 54 2. It is spontaneous 54 3. It is the perception of the senses 64 4. It is the discernment of the senses 65 CHAPTER VII. THESENSES. SECTION I. 1. The senses connect sensations 56 2. The connection between the senses and physical organs of sense undefinable 56 3. Our dependence upon the senses for our knowledge of external things 56 SECTION II. 1. Our dependence upon the senses for knowledge limited to external things - 56 2. The importance of the senses ^ • . • ........ .... . . 57 3. The loss of the senses can not annihilate the mind ♦ 67 4. Five senses— how defined 67 CHAPTER VIII. ( '. . THE SENSE OF SMELL. SECTION I. 1. The organ of smell defined 58 2. Sense of smell connected with the nerves 68 5. Substance and extent of the nerves 58 4. Union of the nerves and the sense of smell indefinable 58 SECTION n. 1. The sensations of smell 59 2. The nature of the manner in which the organs are aflfected 59 3. Limited extent of sensations i-eceived by the sense of smell 59 4. Influence of the sensations of smell upon life 59 6. Sensations caused by external bodies 60 SECTIONIII. 1. Perceptions of smell impossible • 60 2. Argument differs from former writers 60 3. Perception of the objects of the sense of smell 61 CHAPTER IX. THE SENSE OF TASTE.' SECTION I. 1. Organs of taste defined 62 2. The sense of taste — how affected 62 INDEX. 45ft Pagk. 3. Sensations of tagte 62 4. Sensations aflfect the mind in relation to a CMrect apprehending of the qualities of the cause 62 5. The reverse doctrine absurd 63 6. Nature of the sensations of taste 63 8ECTI0V II. 1. Modifications of taste — ^how changed 63 2. Properties of bodies giving rise to sensations of taste 64 3. Mental stat^ following sensations of taste 64 CHAPTER X. THE SENSE OF HEARING. SECTION I. 1. The organ of hearing 65 2. That which continues the power of hearing ^ 65 3. Sensations of hearing* ••% 65 SECTION II. \ Varieties of the sensation of sound 66 2. Cause of the sensations of healing 66 .S. Knowledge from hearing not intuitive 66 4. Our knowledge of the direction and cause of sounds 67 SECTION Hi. 1. Knowledge of the correct direction of sound — ^how gained 67 2. Sensation corresponds to its cause 67 3. Further proof of the same fact 68 4. Importance of the sense of hearing 68 CHAPTER XI. THE SENSE OF TOUCH. SECTION I. 1. The organ of touch 69 2. lU extent 69 3. Difference between this power and the physical nerves 69 4. Office of the sensation of touch 69 SECTION II. 1. Extent and variation of the sensations of touch 70 2. Influence of the qualities of external bodies • • • • 70 3. Primary and secondary properties 70 4. Knowledge imperfect from only onte of the senses 71 SECTION HI. 1. Sensation without any external cause • • • » 71 2. Nature of the sensation of touch differs from that of its cause 71 3. Origin of the idea of qualities connects with this sense 71 ^^6 INDEX Page. 4. With this sense is the origin of our knowledge of the temperature of bodies • • • • , 72 5. Sensation abstractly is not the idea of heat or cold 72 SECTION IV. 1. Our knowledge of the real existence of heat and cold 72 2. Origin of the idea of external qualities 73 3. No similarity between sensation and its external caflse 73 4. This sense can not convey to us a matured idea or knowledge of ex- ternal entities 73 CHAPTER XII. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. SECTION I. 1. The organ of the sense of sight 74 2. The retina 74 8. Importance of the sense of sight 75 SECTION n. 1. Mysterious structure of the eye 75 2. Sense of sight connected with the retina 76, 3. Acute sensitiveness of the optic nerve 76 4. Sensations of sight — when awakened 76 6. Perceptions of sight incorrect 76 SECTION III. 1 • Sensations of sight produced by colors 77 2. Color of light influenced by objects 77 3. Sensation caused by light reflected from objects upon the optic nerve 77 4. Degrees of strength in sensations : 78 SECTION IV. 1. Sight may be modified or changed 78 2. Knowledge received through the sense of sight 79 3. Error of philosophers • 79 4. Knowledge of color from sight 79 SECTION V. 1. Idea of extension as visual is not wholly original with sight • ■ 80 2. Connection between colors, light, and the objects which reflect them 80 3. Origin of our knowledge of extension 81 4. Our knowledge of objects from sight only is confused 81 SECTION VI. 1. The power of the sense of sight 82 2. Its power in judging the magnitude of objects 82 3. Apparent distances of objects 82 4. Perceptions of the distances to objects of sight principally acquired 82 5. Perceptions of visual objects and distance original • 83 INDEX. itt m CHAPTER XIII. PRIMARY JlTHJ> SECONDARY SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. SKCTIOK I. 1. In -what respect the senses are a secondary source of knowledge • • • 84 2. Matter has no self-power to impress or cause motion in matter 84 3. The senses secondary sources of knowledge 84 4. The senses limited and deceptions 84 SECTION II. 1. Effect of disease upon the senses •• 85 2. Belief in the report of the senses 85 3. The skeptic's belief false 86 SBOTIOH III. 1. Primary source of knowledge 86 2. To reject a reliance on internal intuitions h to reject all knowledge 86 3. Result of such rejection * 87 4. Knowledge directly evidenced to the mind 87 CHAPTER I. PERCEPTION. SKOTION I. 1. Perception defined 88 2. Use of perception in arriving at a knowledge of existences 88 3. It is immediately successive to sensation 88 4. Perception a sequent of impressions unknown 89 SECTION II. 1. Perception a voluntary mental act 89 2. Sensation not always followed by perception • 89 3. Perception involuntary 90 4. That which is inrolved by voluntary perception 90 SECTION III. 1. Perception makes us acquainted with facts 90 2. If perception is only an affection or influence of the mind, it is more than secondary in its power 91 3. From its nature it is connected with primary elements 91 SECTION IV. 1. Perceptions of primary properties of matter differ from sensations- 91 2. Difference of sensation and perception 92 3. Perception of the difference between primary and secondary proper- ties of matter 92 458 INDEX. CHAPTER II. FALSE PERCEPTIONS. SECTION I. 1. When false perception takes place •-•••• »;.ii-.f • • 93 2. They can arise in connection with the organs of sense • •• 93 3. They can arise in connection with the change in the mental states • 93 4. They can be caused by disease 93 SECTION II. 1. False perceptions— how corrected M 2. Corrected by comparing our perceptions of objects with other ob- jects- • 94 3. By the exercise of the judgment 94 4. Perception of two or more objects — ^how corrected 94 CHAPTER III. PERCEPTION AND SMELL. SECTION I. 1. Perception of objects by means of the sense of smell 95 2. Habit in relation to smell • 95 3. Origin of our knowledge of odor , 95 SECTION II. 1. The mind affected in a way corresponding to the object or cause- • • 96 2. If there be no connection between sensation and perception, then perception is an accident 96 3. Constitutional elements of a sentient being 96 4. Office of sensation and perception 97 CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTION AND TASTE. SECTION I. 1. The perception of objects reported to the mind by the sense of taste 98 2. Habit in relation to taste • 98 SECTION II. 1. The law of habit 98 2. Direction of perception — how guided 99 CHAPTER V. PERCEPTION AND HEARING. SECTION I. 1. Perception of objects which aflFect the mind by means of hearing- -100 2. Sensation has no self-perception 100 3. The eflfect of degrees in sounds - • -100 INDEX. 459 SKOTION II. Pass. 1. Habit in relation to the sense of hearing 101 2. Connection of sensation and perception in regard to sound 101 3. Our knowledge of sonorous bodies commences with the sensations of hearing 101 CHAPTER VI. PBRCEPUION AND TOUCH. SECTIOS I. 1. Perception of objects made known by the sense of touch 102 2. Perception increases in power with repeated efforts 102 8. Habit in regard to the sense of touch 102 SECTIOK II. 1. Perceptions as manifested in the case of some blind persons 102 2. Origin of our knowledge of external things 103 CHAPTER VII. PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. 8S0TI0N I. 1. Perception of objects of sight 104 2. Inclination of the axis of vision important in determining dis- tances 104 3. Intuitive knowledge of distance ^.•.•. 104 gSCTION II. 1. Habit in relation to vision 106 2. Power of hearing partially supplied by sight 105 3. Discrimination of the deaf and dumb evidence of Improvement • • • ^lOS 4. Perception of external things — how dependent and affected * . • • - • • • 105 CHAPTER VIII. HABIT IN RBIATION TO PERCEPTIONS. SECTIOK I. 1. Perceptions by habit in men, children, idiots, and brutes 107 2. Perceptions dependent upon attention in order to be remembered • • 107 3. A law of habit - ^-... 107 ^, \ ' SECTIONII. 1. Power of perception increased by repeated efforts 107 2. Oneness of perceptive acts 108 3. Vividness of perceptive action 108 460 INDEX. ^ihision ^I^tirlr. CHAPTER I. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTINGENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. SECTION I. * Pagk 1. Thoughts and feelings can not constitute the whole of mental phe- nomena 109 2. Oi-iginof thought 109 3. Real existence of thought 109 4. Nature of thought 110 SECTION II. 1. Thought expre'feses action or thinking 110 2. Succession of thoughts 110 3. Thought separated from the mind can not exist 110 4. The importance of thought Ill CHAPTER II. -;; . - IDEAS. SECTION I. 1. Definition of idea 112 2. Ideas may vary with the nature of the object 112 3. Ideas of physical entities contingent 112 4. Ideas of material objects relative 112 5. Idea of duration absolute 112 SECTION 11. ^ 1. Idea of space necessary or absolute • • 112 2. Idea of space absolute, arising from its nature or condition 113 3. Idea of space implies the absence of limitation 113 4t Idea of space and infinity necessary and absolute 113 SECTION- 111. 1. Effects and events contingent and relative • 113 2. Idea of personal identity or self necessary 114 3. The Atheist compelled to acknowledge the existence of self and the existence of God 114: SECTION IV. 1. Idea of the phenomena of mind contingent 114 2. Primary elements of mind 114 8. Intuitive elements — power of apprehending facts 114 CHAPTEE III. POWER OE KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. tBOVtOT I. Pass. 1. Primary elements of mind ^15 2. Primary elements of materiality compared with those of mind 3. Prinuury elements of mind — how known 116 SECTION II. 1. Knowledge of primary elements of mind can not arise from argument nor external testimony 116 2. With them is the origin of the knowledge of their entity 116 3. Origin of the knowledge of external things 116 CHAPTER IV. KNOWLBDOB THOM TESTIMONY. SECTION 1. 1. Intuitive power to arrive at a knowledge of facts from testimony- • -117 2. Testimony and evidence 117 3. Intuitive power to receive facts 117 4. Knowledge — when uncertain » 118 SEOTIOK II. 1. Judging facts from testimony 118 2. Power to receive facts from testimony • • • 118 3. The principal ground of oUr confidence 118 4. Confidence increased in proportion to the number of witnesses 119 SECTION III. 1. A well-regulated mind — how influenced 119 2. Decisions of thelnind — how influenced by known principles 119 3. Power of correct knowledge from testimony 120 4. Assumptions of infidels 120 SECTION IV., 1. Belief in miracles • 120 2. Miracles defined ._..*^,^j, 120 3. Results connected with the existence of revelation. *f* •!^>W^>«r»».. 121 SECTION v. , 1. Arguments assumed by infidels ; 121 2. Mr. Hume's celebrated argiunent against the resurrection of Christ. 121 3. Christianity true 121 39* ' •• Pass. .116 II 4^ INDEX. CHAPTER I. CONCEPTION. SECTIOK I. PilGg. 1. Conceptions arise in connection with peculiar mental states 123 2. Conception defined 123 3. Conceptions of ideas and reoccurring events ; • • • • 123 SECTIOK II. 1. Conceptions diflfer from sensations and perceptions 123 2. Conception differs from memory 124 3. Conceptions can refer to both past and present impressions 124 CHAPTER II. ''^ CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. SECTION I. 1. Conceptions of objects of sense and sensations 125 2. Conceptions of objects of taste — when clear 125 3. Conceptions of sound • ....126 4. Conceptions of the objects «f the sense of touch 126 SECTION II. 1. Conception of objects of sight 126 2. Importance of correctly receiving facts 127 3. Origin of the power of conceiving facts 127 SECTION III. 1. The power of conceiving facts is capable of cultivation 127 2. The manner of cultivating • • 127 3. Different minds manifest degrees of vividness 128 4. Our conceptions of objects when brought in sudden contact with them .-128 SECTION IV. 1. Our belief— how affected by excited conceptions 128 2. Such conceptions give rise to improper feelings 12& 3. Influence of habit on conceptions 129 CHAPTER III. .MEMORY. SECTION I. 1. Memory defined 130 2. The power of memory to contain and retain ideas and events 130 8. The connection or relation of memory to other faculties 131 INDEX. 'Ml- •Pxr.n. 4. Connection of memory and conception 131 5. Connection of memory and perception 131 G. Connection of memory and suggestion 131 7. Connection of memory and association 131 8. Imagination dependent upon memory 131 8KCTION II. 1. Original differences in the power of memory ^ 131 2. Memory founded upon analogies 132 3. That which is embraced and implied in the nature of memory 132 (1.) Sensitive impressions 132 (2.) Involuntary recurring of impressions *> 132 (3.) Recurring of previous existences • • 133 (4.) It implies suggestiou, conception, and perception 133 SKCTIOK m. 1. Local memory .»... ...^ 133 2. Memory contributes to true knowledge* 133 3. Degrees in the power of memory 133 4. Philosophic memory •• *-• 134 5. Different degrees 134 8XCTI0N IT. 1. A ready memory • ^ 136 2. A retentive memory 135 8. Artificial memory •••• 135 4. An efficient memory •••• -. 136 5. It acts with readiness and ease 136 6. Absence of these qualities — how may they take place? 136 (1.) Weakness ,.,.,^..,^,^^. 136 (2.) Insufficiency of the retentive power... • ............> 136 (8.) Habit in relation to attention •"•136 BBOTION T. 1. Memory of the aged 136 2. Defects in memory not from perception 136 3. Memory dependent upon perception 137 4. Weakened by defects in attention 137 6. Memory of the aged incapable of destruction ..*....*. ..> ..137 SECTION VI. 1. The improvement of memory ^ 138 2. Its retentive power — how cultivated 138 3. Manner of improvement 138 SECTIOK VII. 1, Memory — how aided '. 138 2. Retentive power increased by writing our thoughts 138 8. A want of confidence in memory tends to confusion 139 4. Constant exercise of memory ..139 5. We should remember things in their natural order 139 4:64: INDEX. CHAPTER IV. REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURA- _ TION OF MEMORY. SECTION I. Pagk. 1. Remembrance tiefined 140 2. That which is implied by remembrance 140 3. Memory is aided by the tenacity with which facts are received • • • • 140 SECTION II. 1. Recollection defined 140 2. It differs from remembrance 140 3. Recollection — when voluntary 141 4. Memory, remembrance, and recollection 141 SECTION III. 1. Duration of memory 141 2. Power of memory to recall all past events 141 8. Influence of the physical system upon memory 142 4. Memory can not be annihilated • 142 SECTION IV. 1. Influence of disease upon memory 142 2. Effect of injuries upon the head 143 3. It can be affected by a diseased body 143 SECTION V. 1. Memory not suspended in all cases of mental inactivity or states of coma • 144 2. States of stupor or coma often results of intemperance 144 3. Power of memory to recall that which transpired during delirium tremens 144 SECTION VI. 1. Importance of the first objects of memory as they are the last 145 2. From the nature and duration of memory we infer its power in the future world 145 CHAPTER V. ATTENTION. SECTION I. 1. Attention defined 146 2. Attention, or the act of attending to facts 146 3. If it acts or can be acted upon, it is a real entity 146 4. It can. not be a result of mind 146 6. It is not wholly an ulterior principle 146 6. Attention is direction to an object exclusively 146 INDEX. 465 BBCTIOK II. Pxec. 1. Attention — when voluntary 147 2. "When involuntary 147 8. Degrees in attention 147 4. Dependence on thorough investigation 147 sECTioar III. 1. That kind of attention necessary to understand arg^uments 148 2. The manner of attending to truths or facts 148 3. Memory dependent upon attention 148 SXCTION IV. 1. Attention influenced by disease 149 2. This faculty first affected by bodily disease • i 149 3. Influence of fever, intemperance, and old age 149 CHAPTER VI. ASSOCIATION. SSGTIOir I. 1. The power of association 2. Act of associating — how influenced l '.' .i *,'?i?I J} 3. When voluntary 250 4. When involuntar — .........100 8KCTI0K II. 1. False views of philosophers » 151 2. The work of associating not the power or cause of such work 151 3. How association is furnished 151 SECTIOK III. 1. Objects furnishing association — how related 152 2. Fiurnished from resemblance • 152 3. Contrast contributes to association 152 4. It is aided from the law of contiguity » 152 SECTION IV. 1. Natural association 152 2. It may arise from the natural relationship of facts or existences •• -153 SECTIOK V. 1. When the recalling of a fact is voluntary 153 2. When facts recur involuntary 154 3. Casual associations 154 SECTION VI. 1. Facts associated with places — how revived • "• . .155 2. Associations formed in connection with localities 155 3. Memory dependent upon association • • 155 4:66 INDEX SECTION VII. Pack. 1 . Intentional association involves volitive action 156 2. Method of associating in order to retain facts 156 3. Associating with known facts 156 4. Different objects excite similar feelings 156 SECTION VIII. 1. Intentional association further illustrated • 157 2. Dependence on human testimony 157 8. Traditional or written testimony 158 4. Universal belief in the associated events and facts connected with revelation 158 CHAPTER VII. ASSOCIATION, CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. The term law, as applied to association, incorrect 159 2. The relationship of truths may suggest each other 159 3. Variation of the associating principle 159 4. It varies with the strength of the emotions 160 SECTION II. 1. Associating principle — how affected by the lapse of time 160 2. Associated facts of early life — how affected by time 161 3. How affected by differences in inclinations 161 ;.Ti*lW lazMj*. KJ «st. SECTION III. 1. Associations — ^how revived and recalled 161 2. Vividness and force of impressions — on what dependent 162 8. Mental associations under a direct volitive power 162 4. Associations under indirect volitive power • • 162 5. Evidences of skill and design in nature lead us to seek for an ad- equate cause 163 SECTION IV. 1. Influence of association upon taste 163 2. Ideas of fashion vary with the influence of association 164 3. Influence of association in connection with persons 164 4. Effect of habit on association 164 SECTION V. 1. Effects of improper associations 185 2. Results of correct associations 165 8. Success depends upon forming associations in connection with cor- rect principles 165 INDEX. ^^ MlilMion 0iitl. CHAPTER I. MENTAL STATES. 8KCTI0K I. 1. A simple mental state •....' i...l
267 SECTION VI. 1. Dreams which are not remembered 268 2. When loss of power over our succession of thoughts 268 3. Causes of dreams — how far definable 269 CHAPTER II. CLAIRVOYANCE. SECTION I. 1. Clairvoyance — why introduced in this work 270 2. Clairvoyance defined 270 8. Attributed to persons in a mesmeric state 270 4. It is not common to all persons ^ 270 INDEX. 4W 8BCXIOK II. 1. This power not essential to the existence of mind 271 2. Clairvoyance true — to what extent 271 3. True in connection with some minds 272 4. This natural gift innocent 272 CHAPTER III. SOMNAMBULISM. SECTION I. 1. Somnambulism' defined 273 2. It differs from dreaming 273 3. Talking in sleep not recollected 273 4. It is the first degree of somnambulism • • •• 274 SKCTION II. 1. It difil>rs from dreaming 274 2. Muscidar action in somnambulism, but not in gleep 275 8. Absence of fear in somnambulism 276 4. Investigative mental action — how increased 276 8KCTI0K III. 1. Singular phenomena in paroxysms 276 2. How unconscious of external things 276 8. Contingent feature by somnolency • • 276 4. Some kind of perception without the senses 276 5. Byidence of the character of the soul 277 CHAPTER IV. MESMERISM. * 8KOTXOV I. 1. Mesmerism defined 278 2. Mesmerizing — how effected 278 3. Constitutions capable of being mesmerized 278 4. Somnambulists capable of being mesmerized 279 6. Degrees of consciousness in such a state 279 SECTION II. 1. It does not prove phrenology true 279 2. How far can we be controlled by the spirit of others 280 3. Partial consciousness under mesmerism 280 4. Mesmeric state similar to that of talking in sleep ^. .. .281 6. Belief in it — how far true 281 CHAPTER V. PHRENOLOGY. SECTION I. 1. Phrenol(^ defined 282 2. Dependent on the size and shape of the head 282 3. What points to be settled in regard to its truthfulness 282 478 INDEX. SECTIOir II. Pagk. 1. Truths supporting phrenology should be clear and conclusive 283 2. Main position slioald be without doubt 283 3. We should know the brain to be the organ of the mind 283 4. Can the skull develop mind 284 6. Difficulty in its formation • • 284 6. Difficulty in regard to the lobes of the brain 284 SECTION III. 1. Lobes can not answer to the different powers of the mind- 284 2. The brain — how the organ of the mind 285 3. Mental action — how dependent on matter 285 4. This doctrine— when tendency to infidelity 285 SECTION IV. 1. Physical organs powerless •• -286 2. Outlines of phrenology true 286 3. Effect of injuries 286 4. Effect of injuries of the brain • • • • • 286 ;>».. SECTIONV. ih'iRemoval of portions of the brain — how the mind affected • •287 2. iFractureof the skull— effect of 287 3. Such effects contrary to phrenology • -288 4. General principle true 288 tJttt- M ih is ion NCutj^. •• i .CHAPTER I. REFLECTION. SECTION I. 1. Reflection defined - 289 2. Action of this power » 289 3. When it is involuntary • • • • • 289 4. When it is voluntary-- •• 289 5. Connection with memory 290 SECTION II. 1. Powers acting with reflection 290 2. Origin of our belief in external things 290 8. Belief in the existence of self 290 4. Convictions as to the report of the senses 290 6. Importance of reflection 291 INDEX. , 4f8i CHAPTER II. CONNECTION AND INFLUENCE OP THE BODY UPON THE MIND. SKCTIOI X, ^ 1. The mysterioag union ••« ^•m>292 2. Power of temporal death ;■......'.'. . : ..... ;-. ..'. ;'^ . . . . 292 3. Final result of death 292 4. Its power over the soul 292 5. Its power over knowledge 292 SECTION II. 1. Intellectual action — when imperfect 203 2. Conceptions of the correctness of such actions 293 3. Future condition of an idiot 293 4. Irregularity of mental action when caused by disease 294 SECTION III. 1. Internal operations — how affected-... • 294 2. Extent of the effect caused by disease 294 8. Nervous system — how affected 295 4. Mental excitement — effect on the body .". 295 SECTION IV. 1. Effects of excited imagination and conceptions .295 2. Results of such influences 296 3. Effects of excited imagination caused by disease 296 CHAPTER III. APPARITI 0*N S , SECTION I. 1. Apparitions defined 298 2. Effect of disease upon the eye 298 3. Effect of disease upon the nerves 299 SECTION II. 1. Affection of the retina or optic nerve 299 2. Change of the optic nerve by disease • * * 299 3. Changed by internal excitement 299 CHAPTER IV. SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. SECTION I. 1. Spectral illusions — how to be regarded 801 2. An instance recorded 301 8. They often originate in dreams 802 4. Impressions in solitude often t^pear real 302 J 4:80 INDEX. SECTION II. 1. Spectral images — how accounted for 304 2. Origin in connection with mental excitement 304: 3. Majority of them can be accounted for 304 4. Effect of anodynes and opiates 305 * SECTION III. 1. Nyctalopia — power or extent of such influence 305 2. Brain affected by wrong impressions 306 3. Influence of epileptic tits 306 4. Influence of febrile diseases 306 5. Influence of excited imagination 307 6. The senses — how influenced 307 7. Evidence furnished by the preceding facts 307 CHAPTER V. SPIRIT-RAPPINGS. SECTION I. 1. Connection of necromancy with mental science 308 2. Spirit-rapping delusive 308 3. Mystery of involuntary writing solved 308 4. Why have spirits delayed their work so long? 309 SECTION II. 1. Can spirits reveal facts to us ? • 310 2. Object and character of such messages 310 3. Ideas of purity — the result 310 4. Character of such messages 310 SECTION III. 1 . The result when such tidings are contrary to truth 311 2. False if from Satan 311 3. Demonology — how a result 311 4. Such facts contrary to spirit-rappings -311 CHAPTER VI. EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. SECTION I. 1. Excited conceptions defined 313 2. Connection of vigorous minds with weak nerves 313 3. Influence of physical defects 314 4. Effect of general debility ' 314 SECTION II. 1 . Such conceptions impossible to mind abstractly 314 2. Such conceptions from sense of sight 314 3. They may arise with some emotion of spirit 315 4. They may arise from great joy 315 5. When caused by grief 315 INDEX. 4lf SBOTIOK III. Paok. 1. How caused by the effect of disease 315 2. Origin of excited conceptions of sound 316 3. Such conceptions — instances given 316 4. Acute hearing in affliction 317 SECTION IV. 1. Excited conceptions and sense of touch 317 2. Similar facts in regard to other senses 318 8. Caused by the nervous system 818 4. Caused by affections of the brain 319 5. Caused by febrile influence 319 CHAPTER VII. PARTIAL INSANITY. BECTIOK I. 1« Influence of partial insanity ...320 2. The mind — when partially insane 320 8. Its relation to recent facts and those of early life 321 4. Defective action 821 SECTION II. 1. Insanity caused by the judgment 321 2. Its origin with suggestion 322 3. Caused by imperfect association 322 4. Caused by imperfect reasoning 323 5. Evidenced by hasty reasoning 323 SECTION III. 1. Physical organs of sense — how influenced 324 2. Insanity not natural to spirit : 824 8. Its connection with belief 324 4. It exists in loss of confidence .325 5. Caused by indolent habits 326 SECTION lY. 1. Caused by too great physical efforts 326 2. Caused by too intense study 326 3. Caused by unnatural excitement 327 4. Effect of repeated mental excitement 327 CHAPTER VIII. TOTAL INSANITY. SECTION I. 1. Total insanity defined 829 2. Its influence over mental states 329 3. Restriction of mental action 329 4. Influence of only one impression 330 5. Mental abstraction— how effected 33Q 41 4:82 INDEX SECTION II. Page. 1. Mania — how varied 330 2. Hallucination — when incurable 331 8, A characteristic of maniacs 331 4. Total insanity — results 332 SECTION III. 1. Degrees of insanity — ^how connected 332 2. Unnatural vividness of thought 333 8. Greatest peculiarity of insanity 333 4. Indisposition to change belief 334 SECTION IV. 1. Power of mental hallucinations 334 2. Extremes and modulations of insanity 335 8. Insanity in the case of the maniac 336 4. General character of derangement 336 6. Malicious insanity 335 CHAPTER IX. INSANITY— MELANCHOLIA. SECTION I. 1. Melancholia defined 837 2. DiflFerence between melancholia and mania 338 3. Tendency of melancholia to suicide 338 4. Maniacs do not commit suicide 338 SECTION II. 1. Melancholia leads to suicide 339 2. Suicide a voluntary act 339 8. He who commits suicide has the use of reason • • • '. -339 4. Proof that they are not insane • • 339 5. Such persons know what they are going to do 340 SECTION III. 1. Melancholia hallucination -^ 341 2. Intended suicide—when abandoned • 341 8. The mind totally insane can not commit suicide 341 4. Impression of the criminality of suicide 342 CHAPTER X. INSANITY. ^. SECTION I. joSM 1. Degrees of insanity • 344 2. Slight alienation— how judged •• • 344 3. Cause of insanity 844 4. Ambition a cause of insanity • * ■ 845 INDEX. iSi BBOTIOH II. 1. Influence of the mind on the body ••.•••••••■ 345 2. Constitutional tendency to insanity 345 3. Influence of high fevers 346 4. Effect of injuries of the skull * 34^ SECTIOW III. 1. Hereditary insanity — how conditioned 847 2. Intense action of the mind — when of insane tendency 848 8. Tendency to insanity by dwelling on only one idea 848 4. Influence of sudden events 848 SECTION IV. 1. Too intense habit of study 349 2. Healthy influence of plain facta. •^. 349 8. Highest number of insane are the lovers of flctioii 849 4. Caution in punishing the insane 850 CHAPTEB XI. IDIOCY. 8BOT10KI. 1. Idiocy defined 351 2. Fatuity — that which it includes 35I 3. Cretinism — what its meanings 851 4. Another class with evidences of intellectual action 851 5. That which characterizes an idiot 353 SEOTIOK II. 1. Condition of an idiot's mind 353 2. Insanity differs from idiocy 353 8. Idiocy incurable in this life 353 4. Extent of physical influence 353 SECTIOK III. 1. Cause of delirium not wholly in the mind 354 2. The mind not naturally insane 355 3. Cause of idiocy not in the essence of mind 35g 4. There can be no essential loss of mental elements 856 SECTIOK IV. 1. Evidence of destructive bodily influence 357 2. Its effect on the power of hearing 357, 8. Its effect on the organ of sight .i35jt 4. Cause of idiocy connected with the physical powers 853 4:84 INDEX CHAPTER I. INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. SECTION I. 1. The soul has knowledge in itself 360 2. It has power of knowledge within itself 360 3. Primary power of knowledge 361 4. Knowledge from the senses 361 5. Apprehending of facts internal in origin 361 SECTION II. 1. Knowledge is of internal origin 362 2. Origin of knowledge 362 3. Ideas of internal origin 362 4. They may arise in connection with the power of intuition 363 6. Primary origin of knowledge 863 6. Complex ideas of internal knowledge 363 CHAPTER II. THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT WHICH RESEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES. SEOTIO N I. 1. Extent of our inquiry 364 2. Connection of mind and matter — ^how conditioned 364 8. Matter without mental power 365 4. Life connected with vegetation 366 SECTION II. 1. Animated existence or life 36 2. Brutes either wholly matter or they have minds 36 3. Inertness essential to matter 36/ 4. Brutes possess animation different from matter 367 SECTION III. 1. Brutes diflfer from inert entities • ? 867 2. Their power of self-action— how diflferent from matter 368 8. Power of the senses in brutes - 368 4. Internal superior power of brutes 368 SECTION IV. 1. Volition in reference to animals 369 2. Their power of self-preservation 369 8. Their knowledge of courses ■> 369 4. Knowledge of a horse or dog 370 6. Their power of judging and comparing 370 IKDEX. 4)S5lf 8BCT10N V. Pa»b. 1. Brutes have some kind of spiritaal natures •••• '• mni»»»^i(m*itu>i:kK*Sll 2. Character of brute intelligence. k»i. ...i'.» ..*. -871 3. PoAver to select food 372 4. Instinctive intelligence of bees 372 8B0TIOX' VI. 1. DiflFerence bet^reen the powers of man and that of brutes 873 2. Natural inclination to look for the cause of an effect 373 8. Human mind scientific • ....373 4. It is capable of progressive improvement-. 374 SECTIOir VII. 1. That which is essential to the human jpind 374 2. That which is not possessed by brutes 376 8. Man subject to moral feelings.. ••..••'•'•'•• ••••••,♦ •B75 4. Contrast of mind in man with that of the brute. ••• • ^.375 5. The brute has a spirit and a body 376 SECTION VIII. 1. The brute — how capable of being taught 876 2. The dog can be taught 376 3. Animals have been learned to dance 376 4. Memory in man differs from brute memory 377 SECTION IX. 1. Memory of the horse • •....• '^T^ 2. I^he active power of brutes can not be mattejf '•••.••••'■'••• • .'•.••. •'^878^ ' 8. Further evidence of brute mind • 378 SECTION X. 1. The Hebrew term ruach, in Scripture, proves that bmtes have spir- its or souls _• ."..... 378 2. The brute has a soul ♦.r.ji ..^,.jr«j|^; 879 3. Beasts, before the fall of man, had purity and fireedom from death • • 379 4. They could not have been created only to be annihilated 380 CHAPTER III. INTUITIONS. SECTION I. 1. Mental intuition defined -381 2. Intuition faculties give origiu to original action 881 8. Powers of the mind can be intuition faculties 381 4. The reciprocal relations of intuitions 381 SECTION II. 1. Ideas — relation to original elements 382 2. Simple ideas — how arise-. * 382 8. General ideas — how arise 382 41* 486 INDEX. SECTION III. Page. 1. Spontaneous action anterior to attention 383 2. When such action is voluntary 383 3. Intuitive conviction of self 383 4. Origin of self-apprehension 383 SECTION IV. 1. Instinct defined 384 2. Mind with instinctive power 384 3. Instinct can not be separated from mind 384 CHAPTER IV. COMMON SENSE. SECTION I. 1. Common sense defined 385 2. The immediate decision of correct reason 385 3. This process — how modulated 385 4. Mental affirmations common to all minds 385 SECTION II. 1. Importance of this mental power 386 2. Common sense is of the real affirmations of the mind 386 3. It is dependent upon reason and judgment 387 4. It involves a general understanding of facts 387 SECTION III. 1. This power is common to all minds 388 2. Its use in arriving at facts 388 8. It can be cultivated • 388 ^ihisian Mlzhtnt^. CHAPTEE I. VOLITION. SECTION I. 1. Volition defined • 890 2. The act of willing or of determining choice 390 3. Criticism on volition 890 4. Its nature is freedom 891 SECTION II. 1. Certainty of such a power 891 2. Doctrine of necessitarians absurd 891 3. Volition not simple action only 892 4. It is an internal power 39:3 INDEX. ,. 487 SECTION m. Paob. 1. Volitions diflFer from volition — in what respects 393 2. Nature of volition can not be defined 393 3. Volition can exist either with or without an object 393 4. If it can only exist with an object, then it may become non-exist- ence 394 5. It can not exist wholly in action 394 SECTION iv. 1. It exists of its essential nature 395 2. It exists either with or without what we believe to be in our power 395 8. Volition differs from volitivc action 396 SECTIOK V. 1. Volition differs from desires 396 2. This power exists in the mind 397 3. Desire defined 897 4. Desire differs from volition 397 SECTION ▼!. 1. Volition differs from desires in sudden changes 898 2. It is not governed by the strongest desire 398 8. Character of motive — how varied 399 4. Influence of pure motive ^899 CHAPTER II. VOLITION, CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. Volitive power — degrees of strength — ^how varied 401 2. Degrees in force of action 401 3. It can vary with our feelings 402 4. It differs from feeling 402 SECTION II. 1. Relation of volition to self-action 402 2. Volition implies more than mere action 403 3. It differs from choice 403 4. It has power to act or to refuse action 404 SECTION III. 1. Volition anterior to choice 404 2. Antecedent volitive power 405 3. The act of choosing free • --405 4. Volition has either self-freedom or it is of necessity 406 488 INDEX. SECTION IV. Paok. 1. Criticism on a false proposition used by necessitaxians 406 2. Influence of motive on the volitive power 407 8. The origin of motive-action presupposes volitive action 407 4. Volitions spontaneous and independent 407 CHAPTER III. ' VOLITION, CONTINUED. SECTION I. 1. Motive can not control the Divine mind 409 2. Motive-law leads to materialism as taught by fatalism 409 3. It can not govern volition 410 SECTION II. 1. Motive and choice control contrary to consciousness 410 2. We feel that our action in choice and in relation to motive is free- -411 3. Evidence in the impossibility of doubting our accountability 411 SECTION III. 1. Voluntary choosing-motive r 412 2. Resolving to act with the strongest motive 412 3. Motive-control, impossible ! 413 4. Evidence in the law "of self-preservation 413 SECTION IV 1. The law of motive-necessity contrary to conscious feeling 414 2. Volitions spontaneous and free ..-.. 414 3. Convictions of liberty in relation to past events 415 4. Consciousness of liberty in deciding upon the acts of others 415 SECTION V. 1. Conscious liberty in relation to acts of present time 415 2. Criticism on an incorrect proposition 416 3. Volition is spontaneous liberty-power • 416 4. It is the power of inotion 416 5. Power of determining and enforcing action 416 6. It is the ground of accountability • • •• 416 '.. It is natural to mind 417 SECTION VI. 1. Opinion of Mr. Stewart incorrect 417 2. Volition is not action only 418 8. Objections to the opinion of Mr. Upham-. ••• 418 4. Volition and the will — how the same 418 6. That which is implied in the use of the term volition - 418 6. That to which the term will refers - 418 INDEX. 48ft CHAPTER I. • THE WILL. SECTION I. Paok. 1. The will defined 420 2. It is in its nature the liberty-power of the mind 420 3. It is free with determining power 420 4. The mind is controlled by the will 421 SECTION II. 1. Connection of the will and the judgment 421 2, The understanding can not control the will 421 8. Reason can not control the will 421 4. The will is a commanding power 421 SECTION III. 1. Objection to the classification of the mental powers as used by others 422 2. Relation of the will to other faculties 422 3. Feeling, thinking, and willing distinct powers 422 4. Laws of the will incorrect 423 SECTION IV. 1. There is nothing in matter that can control the will 423 2. Laws of the material universe can not control it 423 3. Such teachers can not refer this controlling power to Deity 423 4. It can not be governed by other faculties 424 CHAPTER II. NATURE OF THE WILL. ' SECTION I. 1. Laws of the will absurd 425 2. It is governed by its own law 425 3. Contingent action of the will — ^how incorrect 425 4. Freedom the condition of mental action 425 SECTION II. 1. Laws of the will preliminary to that of its freedom, as taught by Mr. Upham — how incorrect 426 2. Mr. Upham says the will is subject to laws — ^how incorrect 426 3. Statement of the condition of such arguments 427 4. The will is not subject to laws 427 4:90 INDEX. SECTION III. 1. The will — ^how influenced by desire 428 2. What is desire, and its influence 428 8. Desires may arise voluntarily and involuntarily 428 4. Desire can only invoke volitive action 429 SECTION IV. 1. The will governed by choice— how incorrect 429 2. The very nature of choice implies volition 429 3. Choice is either of natural necessity or the mind has natural volitive power 430 4. Choice can not control the will 430 SECTION V. 1. Mr. Upham's view of motive governing the will— how incorrect-- ••431 2. Motive defined and limited from its very nature 431 8. If motive could govern the will, how it would be done 431 4. An inert object can not control the will 432 SECTION VI. 1. Incorrect conclusions of Mr. Upham and Mr. Edwards 432 2. Motive in the Divine mind subordinate to volitions 433 3. Motive has no power to control the will 433 4. The will is as the greatest apparent good, according to Mr. Ed- wards — how incorrect 434 6. That the will is free is established by the consciousness of man- kind 435 CHAPTEK III. k; liberty of the will. SECTION I. 1. The will is strictly neither free nor bound ♦ 437 2. The will subject to the law of self-liberty 437 8. Doctrine of liberty clearly established by consciousness 438 4. Volitive power to choose 488 SECTION II. 1. The will knows no law only that of liberty 438 2. Further proof ' 438 8. The effort to sustain the law of necessity involves reasoning in a circle 439 4. The position of Mr. Edwards that every act of the will is excited by some motive — how incorrect 439 SECTION III. 1. The spirit of dependence can not exist under the law of necessity. 440 2. This doctrine can not mellow our feelings 440 8. A dreadful sentiment of Dr. Chalmers 440 4. A design of man's creation, that he might voluntarily serve God. • -441 INDEX. 4W. CHAPTER IV. POWER OF THE WILL. BECTION I. 1. Difference between liberty and power 442 2. Mr. Upham'g view of the will not independent — how incorrect 442 3. Power and freedom of the will evidenced in self-preservation 443 4. Liberty of the will in the remembrance of past facts 443 SECTION II. 1. The will has self-determining power 443 2. Criticism on a position of Mr. Upham 444 8. Mr. Edwards's objection to the idea of the will determining the will 444: 4. Volitions are spontaneous 445 BEOTIOK III. 1. The superior power of the will 445 2. That which is the ground of offense before God 445 3. It is connected with voluntariness 445 4. The doctrine of the will— how confused 446 8«CTI0K IT. 1. Mandatory power of the will 446 2. Office of the will 446 3. Error of necessitarians in confounding the will with the sensibili- ties 446 4. We can will to perform impossibilities, which is evidence of liberty -446 5. Such is the will, the free liberty -power of the mind 447 END OF VOL. I. m •'». L ^rff^ ■#■ #1? -%■ *^Br ^W^' ^ '*fii i 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DjESK JRQM^WmCIjLBQBJ^ LIBRARY This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 7 DAY USF <^ni^M£R DURING SESSIONS f^k 2 1963 ^/iv ifiRrna MAR 18 1965 MARS RCCD 2P MAR 3 1965 W- :D-2 QSl JUN18 1965 LD 21-50m-12,'61 (04796sl0)476 General Library University of California Berkeley U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES I!|||||il!ll I'll! -"I '^ liii" ilili III llllllllllii II ii II III li I CDETM7flDTb