omia 
 lal 
 
 j..^iiii.^.i
 
 Univ. of California 
 Withdrawn
 
 THE PROVOCATION OF 
 FRANCE 
 
 FIFTY YEARS OF GERMAN 
 AGGRESSION 
 
 BY 
 JEAN CHARLEMAGNE BRACQ, LITT. D., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF FRENCH LITERATURE IN VASSAR COLLEGE 
 
 ' NEW YORK 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 AMERICAN BRANCH: 85 West 32Nn Street 
 LONDON. TORONTO. MELBOURNE. AND BOMBAY 
 
 1916
 
 Hl^' 
 
 iX. 1 
 
 Copyright, igtb 
 BY Oxford University Press 
 
 AMERICAN BRANCH 
 
 kistoryh
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Introduction 
 
 I. Bismarck Before the Ems Dispatch 
 
 II. The Mutilated Ems Dispatch . 
 
 III. The Conflict 
 
 IV. The Aim of the Triple Alliance 
 V. The Kaiser's Provocations . 
 
 VI. A German Quarrel .... 
 
 VII. France, Germany and Morocco . 
 
 VIII. From the Algeciras Conference to 
 Deliverance of Fez 
 
 IX. The Agadir Provocation 
 
 X. The Alsatian Question 
 
 XL German Militarism . 
 
 XII. Germany and Russia 
 
 XIII. Germany, Belgium and England 
 
 XIV. The Real Attitude of France 
 XV. Austria and the German Provocation 
 
 XVI. The Initiators of the Great War 
 
 the 
 
 PAGE 
 V 
 
 I 
 
 i8 
 29 
 
 43 
 58 
 73 
 83 
 
 95 
 108 
 120 
 
 135 
 150 
 162 
 
 173 
 
 182 
 
 193
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The pages that follow merely describe acts and events 
 which have taken place within the range of the author's 
 recollections. He heard discussions as a boy, in France, 
 upon the war of Italian liberation, and saw soldiers 
 start for that campaign in 1859. His father and one of 
 his neighbors were greatly interested in the Prusso- 
 Austrian war against Denmark, which they considered as 
 the deliverance of poor molested Germans in a virtual 
 German country. Later on, in their own way, they 
 discussed the conflict between Prussia and Austria. For 
 one of these men, a Protestant, Prussia was the repre- 
 sentative of liberalism, of humanism, of progress ; while 
 for the other, a Catholic, Austria was the custodian of 
 European order, of the best conservative traditions in a 
 tottering society, and the great Power most loyal to the 
 Church. The conversations and discussions which the 
 boy heard were, as a rule, inaccurate in substance and 
 almost always in their conclusions, but they created for 
 him an interest in the problems of central Europe that 
 has been lasting. The Franco-Prussian war taught him 
 what to think of the much vaunted liberalism and pacific 
 spirit of the land of Bismarck. Subsequent history has 
 revealed to him what German leaders, not representing 
 ethically the people, could do to harrow the soul of a 
 neighboring nation and insult her Allies by attempting 
 to discredit them. The writer is conscious of the ster- 
 ling qualities and of the attainments of the enemies of 
 his native land, but it is their unjust, their aggressive
 
 vi INTRODUCTION 
 
 and their provoking course that he has wished to bring 
 out as well as the casuistry with which German writers 
 have justified the duplicity of their leaders. He has used 
 as a guiding thread the editorial opinions of the Revue des 
 Deux Mondes, which have always been the work of mas- 
 terly minds such as Michel Chevalier, Charles de Mazade, 
 the Vicomte Georges d'Avenel and Francis Charmes. 
 These chroniqiies are, as a whole, the most reliable and 
 impartial interpretations of contemporary history, during 
 the last half century, with which the author is acquainted, 
 while the principal French books devoted to the most 
 burning international questions first appeared in this 
 review. His recent re-reading of these luminous and 
 honest statements of contentions among various peoples 
 has convinced him that they constitute a collection of 
 facts, bearing upon the question at issue, of the greatest 
 value. He has secured his evidence from varied and 
 reliable sources. Without surrendering his critical 
 independence, he confesses his readiness to accept, as 
 reliable, the statements of the noblest representatives 
 of France, of Lavisse, of Sorel, of Monod, of Taine, of 
 Renan, of Fouillee, while even the more emotional af- 
 firmations of E. Caro and of Pasteur seem to him trust- 
 worthy. He has consulted the best sources available to 
 him, and among these he cannot pass over in silence Le 
 Temps, which, for nearly a third of a century, has proven 
 to him the best instrument of information upon France 
 and Europe. This is not a book of erudition. It is the 
 simple putting together of facts which scarcely anyone 
 denies today, yet which point to an almost constant 
 aggression against France. It does not bring out the 
 acts of chance individuals, but of the rulers and govern- 
 ing classes beyond the Rhine. At the same time, it
 
 INTRODUCTION vii 
 
 attempts to show that if France has not always been 
 blameless, for she has also her militants and her mili- 
 tarists (this does not refer to her heroic soldiers), as 
 a rule her purpose has been international good-will and 
 peace. She faithfully endeavored to avert the present 
 colossal tragedy. Whatever she has accomplished during 
 the last twoscore years she has done it in the face 
 of an almost constant and exasperating provocation. 
 Her attitude, however, has been such that she can calmly 
 await the judgment of history.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE THE EMS DISPATCH 
 
 That most remarkable woman, Madame de Stael, did 
 fatal work for France when she idealized the Germans in 
 her masterpiece, De I'Allemagne. The book, rendered 
 popular among the liberals of France by the antagonism 
 of Napoleon, had a firm hold upon the national mind. 
 Her pictures of German character and life were accepted 
 as real and as worthy of imitation by her countrymen. 
 The romantic movement, to whose rise she greatly con- 
 tributed, acted in the same direction ; and the writers of 
 the Revue des Deux Mondes, in its early days, increased 
 the tendency to an extreme idealization of the trans- 
 Rhinean people. Heine in De I'Allemagne warned 
 Frenchmen not to take the pictures of the Sidtane de la 
 pensce too seriously, not to trust these good neighbors 
 too much ; but the countrymen of Voltaire, so sensitive to 
 literary influences, continued to think of the Germans as 
 disciples of the author of Eternal Peace, men athirst 
 for the invisible realities of the universe, virtual philo- 
 sophical Quakers. Towards the sixties Victor Hugo 
 speaks of " that august Germany." ^ About 1865, Miche- 
 let, Janet, Taine, Renan, About, and all the French 
 liberals looked upon them as embodying the greatest 
 amount of moral rectitude, of idealistic serenity, of sci- 
 entific calm and ethical excellence yet attained by men. 
 
 ^ Les Misirables, vol. Ill, p. 63.
 
 2 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 In their eyes the expansion of Prussia meant the spreading 
 of these idylHc virtues. 
 
 The war of 1870 was the rending of the illusory veil 
 which opened up to these Germanophiles a new view of 
 the countrymen of Kant — men of iron — led against 
 France by an indomitable hatred, prepared by years of 
 Spartan military discipline and of aggressive purpose, 
 men who waged war with a harshness and a brutality 
 that defy words. The psychological reaction was as 
 depressing as it was sudden. There was, furthermore, the 
 sense that they had been deceived by the Prussians as 
 Napoleon III had been by Bismarck. At first, under the 
 impression that the French Emperor had been the provo- 
 cator, they accepted their defeat with a certain con- 
 trition; but when it became evident to them that the 
 war had been desired, planned and carried on with a 
 remorseless intent by Bismarck, and, what was worse, 
 that the terrible man, to their dismay, represented the 
 spirit of Prussia, there was a violent revulsion of feel- 
 ing. The people east of the Rhine appeared in a new 
 light in the eyes of their western neighbors. So great 
 was the disappointment of eminent Frenchmen that their 
 attitude toward most foreigners was seriously modified 
 by the recoil of their feelings after the war. Yet the 
 philosophical minds remained fairly calm, though they 
 were deeply hurt, not only by the injustice and horror 
 of the recent Franco-German clash, but by the sense of 
 the deep deception perpetrated upon them by the coun- 
 trymen of Bismarck and by Bismarck himself. They 
 had come to loathe the heavy complimentary words which 
 they had heard from the Prussians, the honeyed talks 
 of their public men, and all the flatteries of Bismarck- 
 ian insincerity. They had ignored the depths of racial
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 3 
 
 antagonism that lay dormant in the Prussian heart, 
 ever ready to be called forth by the Chancellor and his 
 supporters. 
 
 Prussia, gradually risen from the Mark of Brandenburg 
 to her present state by sheer military effort, and by 
 the prominence given to her soldiers, endeavored to 
 deceive everyone. She maintained at this time more 
 soldiers proportionally than any other Power in Europe. 
 France, according to Renan,^ was far from aggressive. 
 She " had become the most pacific country of the 
 world. . . . The military career was abandoned. . . . 
 All activity was in the direction of the social question." 
 When she appeared militant it was because of the action 
 of Prussia creating a mighty military Power in the 
 heart of Europe. Germany, in general, and Prussia, in 
 particular, were hostile to everything French, notwith- 
 standing their unctuous attitude and their flatteries. 
 Four or five times in a century they attempted, and 
 accomplished, invasions of French territory. 
 
 The Kaiser, who, in his speeches, constantly refers to 
 Napoleon as if he had been the sole enemy of Germany, 
 and ever mentions the battle of Leipsic where Bonaparte 
 was defeated, never says that during eight years the 
 King of Prussia was the ally of the Corsican to the great 
 harm of German states. All through the early nineteenth 
 century Prussia was watching all possible chances for 
 aggressions and territorial extension. Not to speak of 
 other examples, in 1850 Prussian troops entered Hesse 
 to fight the states representing the authority of the 
 Diet. The Emperor Nicholas of Russia stopped them 
 when he said, " I shall fire on the first who fires." ^ 
 
 * La reforme intellectuellc ct morale. 1871, p. 24. 
 
 ' Lowe, Charles, Prince Bismarck, N. Y. 1886, vol. I, p. 108.
 
 4 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Then there were the wranglings of Prussia with the 
 Diet, which she used when it served her purpose, and 
 discarded in the same way. Prussia was feared and 
 hated by most of the other states of the country, while 
 at home the miUtary class was detested by those who 
 wanted political freedom. Those representing tradi- 
 tional ideas advocated the use of arms to repress the 
 spirit of independence among themselves, but found 
 in external aggressions a better way to attain their aims. 
 In 1856, they were burning to fight Switzerland, a con- 
 flict which was prevented by the kindly action of England, 
 and the hostility of Austria.^ During the Crimean war 
 Prussia remained neutral, thereby gaining the good-will 
 of Russia. During the Austro-Italian war in 1859, she 
 was watching her chances. Bismarck was not yet at the 
 helm of state, but he was already bent upon fighting 
 Austria, and driving her out of the German Confedera- 
 tion. As he said then, " if it is our aim to exclude her 
 from Germany, we can only profit by Austria first being 
 weakened by France." ^ He urges Prussia, at this 
 juncture, to take the lead of the German Confedera- 
 tion.^ This, as he cynically says, will have to be done 
 ferro et igni, by the sword and by fire, already the 
 Bismarckian method. 
 
 Neutral in pretension, Prussia called up all her troops, 
 and it looked for a while as if Napoleon III would have 
 to fight on the Rhine as well as along the Po, inasmuch 
 as the Prussians had " bound themselves by word of 
 mouth to assist Austria in any circumstances if she 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 220. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 391- 
 ' Ibid., p. 239.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 5 
 
 should be attacked by France in Italy." ^ If the ItaHan 
 war was suddenly ended and Venetia was kept by the 
 Hapsburgs it was largely due to Berlin.^ For some years 
 Bismarck, either at the Diet in Frankfurt or as ambas- 
 sador to Russia, had prepared the ground for his bellig- 
 erent policy. He had won the neutrality of Russia. 
 When, in 1863, after he had become prime-minister, 
 an insurrection took place in Warsaw, he made arrange- 
 ments with the Czar to help stamp it out.^ While there 
 were deep governmental affinities between the Russian 
 spirit and that of Bismarck he did this under the sense 
 of the value of the co-operation of St. Petersburg. For 
 years he had conquering designs upon Schleswig- 
 Holstein. This is evident from constant references to 
 it in his correspondence. 
 
 In 1859 he goes to Paris to gain the friendly attitude 
 of the French Government. The war which he desired 
 and planned against Denmark, he hypocritically repre- 
 sents as a conflict for the relief of oppressed Schles- 
 wig.* It was a " national duty of honor " . . . " to 
 protect the German subjects of the King of Denmark 
 against the oppression and constitutional wrongs " which 
 they suffered. How tender the man who later on was 
 to distinguish himself by his inhuman treatment of the 
 franc s-tireitrs, of the Poles and of the Alsatians ! He 
 had the Duchies invaded by 12,000 Saxons and 
 Hanoverians, followed by the Prussians and Austrians, 
 but once the Danes defeated, and terms of peace made 
 for the exclusive advantage of Prussia and Austria, 
 Bismarck invited both Saxons and Hanoverians to march 
 
 * Prince Bismarck's Letters, p. 147. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 259. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 304. 
 *lbid., p. 227.
 
 6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 home, whether they were wilHng or not.^ It is not 
 astonishing that he was the man most hated by Hberal 
 Prussians and by most Germans. Then Austria and 
 Prussia remained sole disposers of the Duchies ceded 
 to them by the King of Denmark. 
 
 In securing these results, there was not a country, 
 an international organization, or a ruler that the Iron 
 Minister did not mislead or deceive. England, France, 
 Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, the London Conference, 
 the Diet, Christian IX and the Duke of Augustenburg, 
 all were hoodwinked and mystified by the Prussian 
 leader.^ He practiced without scruple what in com- 
 merce and in the policies of most countries would be 
 methods of a sharper, a cutpurse, but he speaks of his 
 acts with pride. " When I was made a prince," he says, 
 " the King insisted upon putting Alsace-Lorraine into 
 my coat of arms. But I would much rather have had 
 Schleswig-Holstein ; that is the campaign, politically 
 speaking, of which I am proudest." ^ 
 
 After this he found the opportunity of carrying out 
 his purpose to oust Austria from Germany as well as 
 from the newly conquered territories. For that purpose, 
 immediately after his coming to power " the number of 
 infantry was doubled, and the cavalry regiments were 
 increased by ten." * The army was the particular object 
 of his solicitude, as he wished to make it able to cope 
 with the Empire which, as he puts it, " kept his country 
 in a state of vassalage." To that end he had already 
 courted the French Government, which was quite un-* 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 343. 
 ^ Headlam, J. W., Bismarck, pp. 192-225. 
 
 ' Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His Historyt 
 vol. II, p. 171. 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 289.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 7 
 
 friendly to Vienna, and tried to secure its neutrality in 
 the struggle ; this was granted by Napoleon.^ He then 
 turned toward Italy and began to humor her by making 
 with her a generous commercial treaty. Though he had 
 not the least sympathy with the aspirations of the 
 Venetians toward independence in 1859, and his Govern- 
 ment had prevented it, he now proposes that consumma- 
 tion as an inducement for the countrymen of Garibaldi 
 to unite with the Prussians against Austria. As his 
 advances were accepted, the Italian Government sent 
 General Gavone secretly to Bismarck and concluded a 
 treaty of aggression against Austria. Then, according 
 to the dispatch of the Italian Envoy, Bismarck said, 
 " Which of us is now going to apply fire to the pow- 
 der?" To Count Barral, the Italian Ambassador, he 
 said, " You would do us excellent service by attacking 
 first." 2 
 
 Such was the malignant and wicked design of the 
 great Prussian Mephistopheles. " Before the ' first shots 
 fell,' in 1866, he tried a last resource to obviate that 
 war, in deference to the wishes of the King, by propos- 
 ing an Austro-Prussian dualism in Germany, and an 
 Austro-Prussian alliance against France for the re- 
 conquest of Alsace." ^ The war took place nevertheless, 
 and the unspeakable stupidity of the Hapsburgs led 
 Austria to take the offensive. Thus he had first made 
 the war inevitable and then succeeded in making Austria 
 appear as the aggressor. She was signally defeated at 
 Sadowa. Bismarck allowed the Italians, defeated at 
 Custozza and at Lissa, to settle their own matters, and 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 284. 
 'Ibid., p. 376. 
 ® Ibid., p. 500.
 
 8 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 made a most profitable peace with Austria. This war 
 cost Prussia 10,000 men, and Austria 22,000.* The 
 ambition and tortuous plans of the Iron Man had cost 
 32,000 lives, not to speak of the multitudes that were 
 mutilated. 
 
 Hanover and Hesse-Cassel shared the fate of Austria. 
 This campaign ended, as almost all the wars of Prussia 
 always did, by territorial extension and indemnities. 
 Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the free city of Frank- 
 furt and Schleswig-Holstein became a part of Prussia, 
 What, perhaps, was the most important in all this was 
 the securing of Kiel as a naval base. 
 
 Having just concluded a war undertaken in the spirit 
 of buccaneers, Prussia now divided the spoils. Bismarck 
 received 400,000 thalers, Roon, the Minister of War, 
 300,000, and Moltke, the General-in-chief, 200,000.^ 
 Thus Prussia has ever rewarded her war-makers. A 
 further result was the triumph of political absolutism. 
 Since 1848, some of the noblest sons of Prussia had 
 protested against the royal tyranny and the despotic 
 spirit of ministers — mostly against the Iron Minister — 
 but, after the policy of fire and sword had been so suc- 
 cessful, public opinion changed. " Of Bismarck's 
 treachery and Straffordism, and all the rest," says Lowe, 
 " there was now no more talk ; in less than a week, 
 success had made his policy not only pardonable but 
 adorable." ^ 
 
 The aggressive brutal Prussian spirit had triumphed. 
 The intellectualists of the land began to laud the army 
 and to prepare the nation for the greater cultivation 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 391. 
 ' Ibid., p. 412. 
 • Ibid., p. 385.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH g 
 
 of the Bismarckian spirit and the wider application of 
 Bismarck's poHcy. 
 
 Up to this period, there was no obsequious comedy 
 that the celebrated Prussian Minister had not been will- 
 ing to play in order to secure the good-will and the 
 neutrality of France. He went to Paris to consult with 
 Napoleon about the possible Prussian attack on Switzer- 
 land ; ^ he was there, as a minister, attempting to pave 
 the way for the future ; he was there many a time, under 
 all kinds of pretexts, but always courting the favors of 
 Napoleon to help his future plans. He had urged his 
 Government to form an alliance with Paris.^ He went 
 so far in this direction that he was accused of being 
 an accomplice of the Tuileries. To this he replied, doubt- 
 less with a sardonic smile, " If I have sold myself to a 
 devil, it is to a Teutonic and not a French one." ^ 
 
 He succeeded in winning Napoleon completely over. 
 He had signed a treaty favorable to France and made 
 to Napoleon promises of future unmolested conquests 
 so as to maintain the balance of power in Europe and 
 satisfy the imperial vanity. Unquestionably he had 
 agreed to let him take Luxemburg; later on he tried 
 to have him turn toward Belgium, but that Bismarck 
 had made pledges and duped Napoleon is not doubted 
 now by any candid investigator. In 1866, the question 
 of Luxemburg brought the two peoples on the verge of 
 a conflict which was averted by a European Conference. 
 This did not prevent the King of Prussia from being 
 the guest of Napoleon at the time of the Exposition in 
 1867. When the King left at the end of his visit, he 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 220. 
 'Ibid., p. 235. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 260.
 
 lo THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 embraced the French Emperor, with great expression of 
 friendship, saying, " Adieu, dear brother and friend." ^ 
 
 Bismarck " went about feehng the national pulse and 
 preparing the future." ^ While he was maturing his 
 plans to attack France, he claimed to have reduced his 
 army to an absolute peace footing ^ and that he was 
 only pursuing moral conquests and the natural expansion 
 of Prussia, while at that time his country had three per 
 cent, of her population in the army. Notwithstanding 
 the fact that this population was but two-thirds that of 
 France, her army was numerically equal * and, in train- 
 ing, far superior. Lowe, often echoing the ideas of 
 Bismarck, speaks of the Exposition as '' that hollow and 
 high-sounding Carnival of Peace." ^ It would have been 
 a great Festival of Peace had not the Iron Count been 
 bent on war. For fifty years Prussia has been the great 
 obstacle in the way of translating the best feelings of 
 mankind into the sane and normal relations of peace. 
 
 Bismarck continued to work in every direction to 
 carry out his design. He controlled and managed 
 all the great forces of Prussia, and to a certain 
 extent of Germany, to arouse feelings against the 
 " hereditary enemy " France.*^ Never did a chief of 
 government have his fingers so completely upon the 
 organs of public opinion, if we are to believe Maurice 
 Busch and other German writers, and no one ever made 
 
 ^ Lowe, vol. I, p. 445. 
 ' Ibid. 
 
 * III, 7J, 51. References like this refer to the Revue des Deux 
 Mondcs. The Roman numbers indicate the series, those in italic 
 the volume and the other or others the page or pages. 
 
 * HI, 52, 8. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 445. 
 
 * in. 73, 390.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH ii 
 
 a more unscrupulous use of them. Thus the French 
 Ambassador handed him a note in reference to the 
 Treaty of Prague in which he had made a promise 
 that never was kept. The next morning all the Bis- 
 marckian papers were on fire against France. 
 
 He excelled in circulating those half-truths which are 
 the worst form of falsehoods. In 1867, the National 
 Gazette, inspired by him, alarmed the population of 
 Germany by the statement that France had concentrated 
 from 60,000 to 70,000 men in the eastern departments, 
 but kept silence upon the 75,000 Prussian soldiers who 
 were close to the French lines and who, upon a sudden 
 mobilization, would have numbered 120,000.^ " Each of 
 Bismarck's wars," says Professor Ramsay Muir of the 
 University of Manchester, " was preceded by a marvel- 
 ous ' mobilization of public opinion ' through the press." ^ 
 He thereby succeeded in isolating France. He encircled 
 her with a ring of suspicion and hostility, misrepresent- 
 ing her real aims while, by intimidation and misrepresen- 
 tation, he was making treaties with German allies, 
 many of whom were reluctant to join him now and at 
 the crucial moment. 
 
 Meanwhile, French opinion had been affected by the 
 development of Prussia, her virtual hegemony of Ger- 
 man states, and the well-nigh formation of a great 
 military German Empire at the gates of France. There 
 were Chauvinists who wanted compensations, and, at 
 times, Napoleon had been influenced by them. There 
 were those also who spoke of natural frontiers, that is 
 the Rhine as the Franco-German line, but most French- 
 men sided with the Emperor, who was forced to recognize 
 
 ' III, 74, 404. 
 
 ' Britain's Case against Germany, p. 29.
 
 12 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 that, though Bismarck had duped him, he had done so 
 by carrying out in practice the great hobby of Napoleon, 
 the principle of nationalities. In the territorial divisions 
 and ethnological redistributions which took place in dif- 
 ferent parts of the globe, looking at the peoples who were 
 absorbed by another, France did not ask, " What lan- 
 guage do you speak? " " To what race do you belong? " 
 (those have been German tests of nationality) but, " To 
 what nation do you wish to belong?"^ Annexations, 
 if any are legitimate, must be made with the consent of 
 those most concerned. The soul of national morality, the 
 will, must be the supreme determinant. The French, 
 the Italians and the Germans of the Swiss Confedera- 
 tion, representing three ethnological groups and four 
 languages, the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium, 
 must be allowed to form a nation if they so choose. All 
 new political accretions must be made after the free 
 choice of the annexed. 
 
 Led by these principles the French Emperor had en- 
 couraged and helped Italy to secure her independence, 
 thereby strengthening Prussia, helping her ultimately to 
 secure the leadership of German states. Napoleon was also 
 in favor of the gradual unification of Germany, though 
 it must be recognized that he insisted upon compensa- 
 tions to counterbalance the great Power which was just 
 created. Dishonest and dishonorable as were the bar- 
 gains between Bismarck and himself, in reference to the 
 Duchy of Luxemburg ^ he ever clung to the doctrine that 
 
 ' H. 91, 387. 
 
 " Bismarck denied that he had made this promise. Queen 
 Victoria said to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne: " Je sais ce 
 qui s'est passe. M. de Bismarck, bien qu'il le nie aujourd'hui, 
 vous a lui-mcme encourages a reclamcr le Luxemburg," Rothan, 
 G., L'Allemagne, p. 342.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 13 
 
 peoples have the right to dispose of themselves. Bis- 
 marck was bent upon using the sword to realize Ger- 
 man unity and that under the domination of Prussia. 
 Napoleon gave him a free hand, under the impression 
 that he was advancing the cause of international liberal- 
 ism in that part of the world. Duped, and ever duped, 
 by the Prussian Minister, he clung all along, with some 
 inconsistencies, to his favorite doctrine. After Sadowa, 
 when he mediated between Austria and Prussia, he se- 
 cured the insertion in the Treaty of Prague of article V, 
 which stipulates that " the people of the northern district 
 of Schleswig, if by free vote they express a wish to be 
 united to Denmark, shall be ceded to Denmark accord- 
 ingly." ^ This important article, signed by the Prussian 
 Government " In the name of the Holy and Indivisible 
 Trinity," - which contemplated fair play and justice to 
 the Danes, never was executed, although again and 
 again Napoleon endeavored to have it done. 
 
 In the great national movement of Italy the masses 
 desired unity. In some parts of the country, when the 
 people met one another they raised the forefinger of the 
 right hand for their salutation and said iina,^ thus by 
 their greetings expressing, in a symbolic way, their 
 deepest national hopes of unity. His share in the realiza- 
 tion of the Italian ideal is one of the few noble achieve- 
 ments of the Coup d'etat man. He seconded their efforts 
 in carrying out the national purpose, but with incon- 
 sistencies and contradictions at times, so that he neither 
 satisfied the Itahans nor the French. Thiers and Guizot 
 represented this as an act of signal folly, to help the 
 
 ' Treaty of Prague, Aug. 20, 1866. 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
 • Maxime du Camp, Expedition des Deux Sidles, p. 28.
 
 14 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 building up of a great state next to France in the Italic 
 Peninsula. He had also to face the opposition of the 
 national clergy, who never forgave him the sacrifice of 
 the temporal power of the Pope. He trusted the 
 Risorgimento because it was the spontaneous rising of 
 a people testifying to its sense of oneness and of a 
 common historic purpose. It asserted its desire in a 
 democratic way, by the ballot. Italian unity was built 
 upon plebisciti. 
 
 He acted similarly at an earlier date, when Savoy 
 and Nice were annexed. The Savoyards were French 
 and the Nigois mostly so. They lived on the west side 
 of the Alps, which seemed a natural boundary. Napo- 
 leon had the power to take these territories, yet there 
 was a consultation of the people, who, by an overwhelm- 
 ing majority, expressed their wish to be an intrinsic 
 part of France. Would Bismarck have dared to have 
 a plebiscitum in Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Frank- 
 furt and Schleswig when he annexed them? His princi- 
 ple of national movements was might. For Danton's 
 motto: De I'audace, encore de I'audace et toujours de 
 I'audace, he would have substituted, " The Sword, the 
 Sword again, the Sword forever." 
 
 After Sadowa Napoleon had lost many of his illusions 
 in reference to Bismarck's determination to secure Ger- 
 man unity and Prussian domination at any cost. The 
 French Emperor was not more honest than his antago- 
 nist; he was at this period a timid and idealistic dreamer. 
 At times, he was talking and acting like a pacifist, though 
 the name had not yet been invented.^ Had he not 
 
 ' The honor of coining that term belongs to a Frenchman, M. 
 Emile Arnauld, notary at Luzarches, Seine-et-Oise, who has been 
 indefatigable in the cause of the judicial settlement of interna- 
 tional difficulties.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 15 
 
 proposed the reunion of an international congress to 
 settle, in a friendly way, all the great pending questions 
 of the times ? ^ Bismarck, on the other hand, was a hard, 
 harsh, unscrupulous and realistic statesman marshaling 
 press, clergy, scientists and intellectualists, society and 
 commerce like a general. " His statesmanship," says 
 Lowe, " is of the military order." ^ His combativeness 
 is constant. The man who, as a student, fought twenty- 
 eight duels,^ remained an unscrupulous fighter all through 
 his career. He fought Prussian intellectuals, fought 
 Prussian democracy, fought the Pope, fought the Orders, 
 fought socialism. He had long since decided to fight 
 France. That seemed to him an essential part of his 
 colossal plans, and yet he wished to hide the fact that 
 he was the provocator. As Sorel puts it, " To unify 
 Germany, to dominate the Southern states, to secure the 
 vote of military credits, to obtain the help of Russia 
 he needed to be attacked. War w^as indispensable to 
 him and he could not undertake it." * 
 
 The movement of German unity was losing ground ; 
 a conflict with the " hereditary enemy " would revive it, 
 but it was essential, says again Sorel, that the war 
 should be declared by France. In his Memoirs, speak- 
 ing of the cause for which he damned his soul — if 
 man ever did that — Bismarck tells us that he had 
 reached the conviction that " the gulf which diverse dy- 
 nastic and family influences and different habits of life 
 had, in the course of history, created between the South 
 
 * Novicow, J., L' Alsace-Lorraine , obstacle a I'expansion alle- 
 tiiande, 191 3, p. 48. 
 
 ' Vol. II, p. 478. 
 
 * Vol. I, p. 17. 
 
 * Sorel, A., Histoire de la guerre Franco- AUemande , 1875, 
 vol. I, p. 49.
 
 i6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 and the North of the Fatherland, could not be more effec- 
 tually bridged over than by a joint national war, against 
 the neighbor who had been aggressive for many cen- 
 turies." ^ He wanted the unity under the control of 
 Prussia. The end justified the means. 
 
 " So, paradoxical as it may seem," says J. Novicow, 
 " the greatest obstacle to the unification of Germany 
 came from Prussia. H Prussia had been a liberal state, 
 the unity of Germany could have been secured much 
 sooner and much better. But when the Germans heard 
 a King of Prussia declare that the imperial crown offered 
 to him by the Parliament of Frankfurt had been picked 
 up in the mud, because it was offered by the delegates 
 of the German people, there were reasons to doubt the 
 possibility of realizing German unity." ^ The greatest 
 obstacle was indeed the humiliation of democratic Ger- 
 many, irritated by the contempt of a King by divine right 
 who referred to the " imperial crown," so offered, as 
 " the iron fetter whereby the descendant of four and 
 twenty Sovereigns, the ruler of 16,000,000 subjects, and 
 the Lord of the loyalest and bravest army in the 
 world, would be made the mere serf of the Revolu- 
 tion." 3 
 
 A Prussian sovereign can rarely ever be taken at his 
 word. The fact is that on that same day the news of the 
 victory of Austria at Novara reached Berlin. The fear 
 of Austria this day was the beginning of Prussian wis- 
 dom. However, the obstacle to German unity was not 
 in France, but in Prussia itself and among the German 
 states. Bismarck would unite all the recalcitrants by a 
 
 * Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, vol. II, p. 99. 
 » Op. cit., p. 87. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 89.
 
 BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 17 
 
 war with France. That he did. As Mr. James W. 
 Headlam states it, Bismarck " boasted that but for him 
 there would never have been a war with France." ^ 
 
 ' Bismarck, p. 460.
 
 II 
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 
 
 The late King of Rumania, in his autobiography, has 
 related for us how Bismarck had endeavored to direct 
 him toward the throne of Spain and how he refused to 
 move in that direction.^ When the candidacy of Prince 
 Leopold of Hohenzollem to the throne of Spain was an- 
 nounced Bismarck expressed surprise, but we know 
 now that he advocated it and did all he could to push it 
 forward.^ On this account the Governments of Paris 
 and Berlin were brought to explanations. The King 
 equivocated by saying that this was not a political but a 
 family afifair. Bismarck speaks of what he called a 
 simple family gathering to decide the matter, but we 
 know that at this meeting there were the King, his son 
 Frederick, Antony and Leopold of Hohenzollern, Bis- 
 marck himself, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and 
 Delbriick. As M. Matter says, " this resembles a council 
 of war rather than a family affair." ^ The Governments 
 of France and Prussia were then brought to the verge 
 of war, and finally to war itself. 
 
 Bismarck maneuvered to bring this about while causing 
 Prussia to appear before public opinion as on the side 
 of reason and justice, and France as the aggressor. To 
 judge of his success, one has only to open such books 
 
 Mil, 128, 684. 
 
 ' Matter, P., Bismarck et son temps, vol. Ill, p. 13. 
 
 * Op. cit., p. 23. 
 
 18
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 19 
 
 as Washburne, E. B., Recollections of a Minister to 
 France, N. Y., 1887, or the files of British and American 
 newspapers. The moral condemnation of France was 
 unanimous. He knew the political value of moral ap- 
 pearances. The King was as just as a Hohenzollern 
 could be and more pacific than his Minister, hence he 
 yielded to the complaints of France; but, unfortunately, 
 by the unreasonableness and stupidity of the Tuileries, 
 Napoleon fell into Bismarck's traps and asked for the 
 renunciation to the Spanish candidacy for all time. Even 
 then, circumstances favored the French Emperor, and 
 the last interview at Ems of the King with the French 
 Ambassador was such that Bismarck regarded the matter 
 as virtually settled. King William sent him a dispatch 
 which embodied such a conclusion and great was Bis- 
 marck's dismay. He has related with an unblushing 
 cynicism the way in which he made the Franco-German 
 war unavoidable. The three documents in which he con- 
 fessed his crime harmonize well with all the evidence 
 which we possess upon this supreme misdeed. 
 
 At the crucial moment, in the controversy between 
 Berlin and Paris, Bismarck, who was on his estate in 
 Varzin, rushed to Berlin. On his arrival he received 
 dispatches showing him that the two Governments were 
 on the way to a fair understanding. He invited to dinner 
 Count von Roon, the Minister of War, and Count von 
 Moltke, the General-in-chief, who shared his desires for 
 a war with France. At the time of the Luxemburg 
 Aflfair, Moltke was in favor of an immediate attack. 
 " Today," he said, " we would have fifty chances, in 
 one year from now we would no longer have more than 
 twenty-five." ^ 
 
 ' Rothan, G., L' Affaire du Luxembourg, 1882, p. 297.
 
 20 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 The three men had a common aggressive aim. When 
 they heard, by a dispatch, of the withdrawal of the candi- 
 dacy of Prince Leopold Hohenzollem, and of the really 
 peaceful spirit of the King and of the French Ambas- 
 sador, Benedetti, they were dismayed, and ceased to eat. 
 Bismarck took the dispatch and mutilated it in such a 
 way as to arouse the French and the Germans alike.^ 
 " It will be known," he says, " in Paris before midnight, 
 and not only an account of its contents, but also an 
 account of the manner of its distribution, will have the 
 effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull ... it is im- 
 portant that we should be attacked, and this Gallic over- 
 weening and touchiness will make us (appear) . . . 
 that we meet the public threats of France." ^ He ex- 
 pected a similar effect from the telegram in Germany, 
 and it did follow. When Bismarck had thus transformed 
 the King's dispatch his guests " recovered their pleasure 
 in eating and drinking and spoke in a more cheerful 
 vein." 3 
 
 This virtual forgery was cleverly sent to the press 
 everywhere, except to Paris. Special editions of the 
 North German Gaaette containing the inflammatory mes- 
 sage were distributed gratis in Berlin.* " The telegram 
 was published at nine o'clock and by ten the square in 
 front of the Palace was crowded with an excited multi- 
 tude cheering the King and shouting, ' To the Rhine ! 
 To the Rhine ! ' " ^ Very soon the poor mistaken crowds 
 in Paris yelled, "A Berlin! A Berlin!" The trick was 
 
 ' Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 1898, 
 vol. II, p. 174. 
 
 ' Bismarck, Autobiography, p. lOl. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 102. 
 
 * Lowe, Op. cit., vol. I, p. 514. 
 » Ibid., p. 515.
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 21 
 
 played. The people of Germany, even those that hated 
 Bismarck and Prussia, were made to believe that France 
 forced war upon them, and Frenchmen that their Am- 
 bassador had been insulted at Ems. 
 
 Nothing is more instructive than Bismarck's direct 
 statement when he wished to vindicate his claims as 
 maker of the German Empire. " The King," he says, 
 " was at Ems. I was at Varzin when, in Paris, there 
 was the outcry against the candidacy of Prince Leopold 
 Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. The French acted 
 entirely like men who had lost their head : I speak partic- 
 ularly of the Government, with Emile Ollivier at the 
 helm. Ollivier was in no way at the height of the 
 situation, and he did not dream of the harm which he 
 did in the Corps legislatif with his imprudent bravadoes. 
 The situation was then extremely favorable for us. We 
 were really challenged, and, as for a long time we had 
 been convinced that we would have to settle our quarrel 
 with France, the present moment seemed to us marked to 
 unsheathe our sword. I therefore left Varzin for Berlin 
 to consult there with ]\Ioltke and Roon upon important 
 questions. On the way I received the following telegram, 
 * Prince Charles Antony of Hohenzollern has, for the 
 sake of peace, withdrawn the candidacy of his son 
 Leopold, everything is all right.' 
 
 " I was greatly surprised at that unexpected solution, 
 for I asked myself the question : ' Will there ever be 
 such a favorable opportunity? ' (to fight.) 
 
 " As soon as I was in Berlin, I called Rolandt and said 
 to him, ' Telegraph to my house that I will return in three 
 days.' At the same time, in a dispatch addressed to His 
 Majesty at Ems, I sent my pesignation as Prime-minister 
 and as Chancellor of the Confederation. In answer, I
 
 22 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 received a reply whereby the King called me to Ems. 
 For a long time I had clear ideas upon this situation 
 and I said to myself, ' If I go to Ems everything will 
 come to nought. At most we shall reach a rotten com- 
 promise, and the only great solution (war with France) 
 will escape us. I must do everything in my power to 
 have His Majesty come to Berlin. Here better than at 
 Ems the King will feel the pulse of the nation.' I 
 therefore exposed to him in the most respectful manner 
 the motives which prevented me from going to Ems ; 
 my presence in Berlin was, at that time, absolutely in- 
 dispensable. 
 
 " Happily, the French, short-sighted and arrogant, did 
 at that time everything that they could to sink the new 
 chariot deeper into the mire. They asked to have the 
 King sign a document which would be tantamount to a 
 profound humiliation.^ The King asked my advice by 
 telegraph. I answered him with a good conscience, ' It 
 is impossible to sign.' 
 
 " I had invited Moltke and Roon to dine on the evening 
 of July 14th, and we spoke of all eventualities.. We all 
 shared the hope that the senseless course of France, that 
 the unheard-of invitation addressed to our King, would 
 set aside the danger of a weakish transaction without 
 glory. (That is, a peaceful solution.) Then — we were 
 still at the table — came a dispatch from Ems which began 
 as follows : 
 
 " ' The news of the renunciation of the Hereditary 
 
 ' Unreasonable as Benedetti's request was, he did not use the 
 brutal forms which are implied in Bismarck's words. There is 
 a gentleness in Benedetti's language which contrasts with the 
 Teutonic harshness of the Chancellor. Had the acts of the 
 French Ambassador been all that Bismarck says, that even 
 would not have justified a step which meant war.
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 23 
 
 Prince of Hohenzollern having been officially communi- 
 cated by the Spanish Government to that of France, the 
 French Ambassador, at Ems, has again addressed to His 
 Majesty a request to be authorized to telegraph to Paris 
 that His Majesty the King pledged himself forever to 
 refuse his consent in case the Hohenzollerns should 
 resume their candidacy.' 
 
 " There followed a long statement, the sense of w^hich 
 w^as that the King referred to what he had already said 
 to Count Benedetti, who had received his answer with 
 gratitude and that he would communicate it to his 
 Government. 
 
 " Thereupon, Benedetti asked again to be received by 
 the King, were it only to hear once more from the lips of 
 His Majesty the confirmation of what he had said in the 
 promenade. Then the dispatch added : 
 
 " ' However, His Majesty refused to receive once 
 more the French Ambassador and sent him word by 
 the aide-de-camp that " His Majesty has nothing more 
 to communicate to the Ambassador." ' 
 
 " After I had read the dispatch, Roon and Moltke in 
 a similar way dropped their knives and forks upon the 
 table, and pushed back their chairs. There was a long 
 silence. We were all profoundly depressed. We had 
 the feeling that the affair was sinking in the sands. 
 
 " I then turned to Moltke and asked him this question : 
 * The tool which we need for the war, our army, is it 
 really good enough so that we could begin war depending 
 upon the greatest probability of success?' Moltke had 
 a confidence as firm as a rock : ' We never had a better 
 tool than at the present moment,' he said. Roon, in whom 
 it is true I had less confidence, fully confirmed what 
 Moltke had said.
 
 24 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 " ' Very well, then, continue to eat undisturbed,' said I 
 to my two guests. I seated myself at a little round marble 
 table which was at the side of the one where they were 
 eating. I re-read the dispatch, took my pencil and 
 scratching out deliberately all the passage in which it was 
 said that Benedetti had asked for a new audience, etc., I 
 allowed to remain only the head and tail. Now the dis- 
 patch had an entirely different air. I read it to Moltke 
 and to Roon in the new form which I had given it. 
 
 " They both exclaimed, ' Splendid ! That will produce 
 its effect.' 
 
 " We continued to eat with the best appetite. 
 
 " I ordered immediately that the dispatch be sent as 
 rapidly as possible, by the telegraph offices, to all the 
 papers and to all the missions.^ And we were still to- 
 gether when we began to receive the desired information 
 upon the effect the dispatch had produced in Paris. It 
 had burst like a shell. After having made a most humili- 
 ating request to our King, the dispatch made the French 
 believe that their representative had been treated rudely 
 by him. All the loungers of the boulevard were of the 
 opinion that such a thing could not be endured. The 
 shout ' To Berlin ! to Berlin ' was uttered by those 
 howlers of the crowd. There was the effect in- 
 tended. 
 
 " The effect was the same here as there. The King, 
 who, yielding to my pressing representations, interrupted 
 his cure at Ems and returned to Berlin, was completely 
 surprised by the clamorous joy which the people mani- 
 fested everywhere as he passed. He did not understand 
 what had taken place. The indescribable enthusiasm 
 which burst with furor in Berlin seized and shook deeply 
 ' To all the representatives of Prussia abroad.
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 25 
 
 our old master. His eyes grew moist. He recognized 
 that this was truly a national war, a popular war which 
 the people demanded and had to have. 
 
 " Even before our arrival in Berlin we had received 
 from the King the authorization of mobilizing at least 
 a part of our army. When the Prince Royal left the 
 train, he purposely spoke very loud in the station of the 
 mobilization at hand ; the enthusiasm increased even 
 more. When we reached the Castle, His Majesty was 
 disposed to mobilize all the army. 
 
 " The sequel you know. There is a point in it con- 
 cerning which Gramont, in his Memoires, expresses his 
 sincere astonishment. He could not see the reason why, 
 after things had taken such a pacific turn, the belligerent 
 current had triumphed. ' A sinister apparition came 
 to view. Suddenly everything is changed. What had 
 happened? Here was Bismarck (arriving) in Berlin!' 
 That is just about what one reads in the Memoires of 
 de Gramont. I quote from memory. In any case, I 
 was the ' sinister apparition.' 
 
 " I add that I was authorized to make what erasures 
 seemed to me absolutely necessary. I had the freedom to 
 publish the dispatch in extenso or by extracts. I have 
 not regretted to have made extracts." ^ 
 
 The following conclusions grow out of Bismarck's 
 accounts : 
 
 1. Bismarck left Varzin because he wanted the war. 
 
 2. He was cast down when he heard of the withdrawal 
 of Prince Leopold's candidacy. 
 
 3. He, von Moltke and von Roon were dejected when 
 
 ^ The author was not able to get access to the Vienna Free 
 Press of Nov. 20, 1892. The text here given is from Le Temps 
 of Nov. 2Z.
 
 26 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 the Ems dispatch arrived, and showed that the question 
 with France was virtually settled along the lines of peace, 
 or might be. 
 
 4. He would not go to Ems because he had not worked 
 up those around the King, while in Berlin his press and 
 his followers had done the work of excitement. 
 
 5. De Gramont and Emile Ollivier, bombastic and 
 swashbuckling as they were, never used in the Corps 
 legislatif, even by exception, such language as that of 
 Bismarck in the Reichstag during the subsequent years 
 that he remained in power.^ 
 
 6. A fact which proves that Benedetti was not provok- 
 ing or arrogant is that he received the King's answer 
 " with gratitude." 
 
 7. The King not only did not insult the French Ambas- 
 sador, as the mutilated dispatch had reported it to the 
 French, but he was courteous to him, and at last did 
 really receive him in keeping with the Ambassador's 
 respectful request.^ 
 
 8. The intent in mutilating the dispatch is that it was 
 " an opportunity that never would recur again " to fight. 
 
 9. He kept only " the head and the tail " of the dis- 
 patch, leaving out what was essential to its understand- 
 
 ^ In a conversation with Lord Loftus, Ambassador of Great 
 Britain to Berlin, Bismarck gave him to understand that he was 
 about to address a challenge to France on account of the utter- 
 ances of de Gramont in the Chamber of Deputies. Letter of 
 Lord Loftus to Lord Granville. July 13, 1870. Had not the 
 Ems dispatch expedient succeeded, he would have found other 
 pretexts for a war. 
 
 ° Mr. James W. Headlam, speaking upon this, says, " Both 
 were anxious to avoid war, and the King to the last treated 
 Benedetti with marked graciousness ; he had while at Ems in- 
 vited him to the royal table, and even now, the next morning 
 before leaving Ems, granted him an audience at the station to 
 take leave." Bismarck, p. 338.
 
 THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 2-7 
 
 ing. It was a fraud and a practical forgery which he 
 did not date from Berlin but from Ems. It was sent 
 as the King's dispatch. 
 
 10. Without forgetting the stupid levity of the 
 Tuileries, as the noisy agitation of small F"rench cliques, 
 we must assert, as Bismarck has done, that he was the 
 great decisive personal factor that brought the war about. 
 "He was proud of it. As he says, " I have never regretted 
 to have made extracts." 
 
 As the war began, the would-be aggressor of Switzer- 
 land, the author of the Danish war, the manipulator of 
 the Austro-Prussian war, the mutilator of the Ems dis- 
 patch followed his sovereign to the battlefield. He " had 
 some days previously partaken of the Sacrament in his 
 own room." ^ After performing this act inaugurated by 
 Him who said, " Do this in remembrance of Me," he 
 entered the war of his own making which cost the lives 
 of 200,000 Germans and of 300,000 Frenchmen, maimed 
 multitudes for life, and tore away 2,000,000 people from 
 the land they loved. In a moment of despondency and 
 probably of remorse, October 21, 1877, he said, " There 
 is no doubt, however, that I have caused unhappiness to 
 great numbers. But for me three great wars would not 
 have taken place, 80,000 men would not have been killed 
 and would not now be mourned by parents, brothers, sis- 
 ters and widows." ^ " Eighty thousand men . . . killed ! " 
 How difficult for Bismarck to tell the truth ! Busch 
 relates that during the Franco-German war his chief 
 overtook some francs-tireiirs that were prisoners. He 
 
 ' Busch, M., Bismarck in the Franco-German War, N. Y., vol. 
 I, p. 8. 
 
 ' Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 
 vol. II, p. 164.
 
 28 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 spoke to them with great harshness. " I told them," he 
 said, " You shall all be hanged, you are not soldiers, you 
 are assassins." ^ These men patriots, though belonging 
 to free corps, defending their country against invaders, 
 and about to die, were insulted by him who had sent so 
 many thousands to an untimely death. Gladstone made 
 a signal mistake when he called Abdul-Hamid the great 
 assassin. When Vaillant, the French anarchist, ex- 
 ploded a bomb in the Chamber of Deputies the Ham- 
 burger Nachrichten reproached the socialistic organ, the 
 Vorwdrts, for the lack of indignation in its columns on 
 account of this crime. This paper answered that the 
 noted anarchist was less criminal than the forger of the 
 Ems dispatch, whose hands were stained with the blood 
 of hundreds of thousands of men. 
 
 ' Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 6i.
 
 Ill 
 
 THE CONFLICT 
 
 French victims of this act were long in realizing the 
 extent to which they had been deceived. The Affaires 
 ctrangcres made protests. Benedetti gave his own ac- 
 count of what had happened at Ems. De Gramont fur- 
 nished his version of the events that led to the fatal 
 war. Sorel, in 1875, made it morally certain that Bis- 
 marck had been the great factor in rendering the war 
 unavoidable. Liebknecht was the first in the press 
 to reveal the " nameless crime." Von Roon and von 
 Moltke, with great discretion, gave an account of the 
 night of the supreme misdeed, but the Germans con- 
 tinued their accusations against France. At last, the 
 Iron Chancellor himself made the confessions which we 
 have placed before our readers. Of course the men most 
 guilty in bringing about this catastrophe, Bismarck like 
 the Due de Gramont,^ von Moltke ^ and others, men of a 
 bygone age who had not even the excuse of belonging 
 to the fatalistic school of history, repeated the common- 
 place statement that the war was inevitable. A fact be- 
 yond question is the statement of von Sybel, repeated in 
 the Revue des Deux Mondes, that the people of France 
 did not wish the war any more than the people of 
 Germany.^ Sorel had pointed out the same fact.* The 
 
 'III, 98, 728. 
 ' V, 21, 27s. 
 
 • III, 128, 685. 
 
 * Op. cit., vol. I, p. 197. 
 
 29
 
 30 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 act of Bismarck was at once followed by a wide spread- 
 ing of legends in Germany about the insults and intended 
 humiliation of Prussia by the French Government, of 
 the discourtesy of Benedetti to the King, all springing 
 from the false impression created by the Ems dispatch. 
 The Iron Chancellor cleverly secured the same unity 
 among the public men of Germany as that which exists 
 now. There was a general recital of the horrors of the 
 old French invasions and of their new aggressive aim. 
 On July i8, four days after the horrible deed, Bismarck 
 issued a circular to be sent to the representatives of 
 North Germany which Sorel calls " injures officielles in 
 the manner of barbarian heroes " ^ who insulted each 
 other before beginning their fight. 
 
 Calumny was ever a weapon of the Chancellor against 
 those whom he wished to attack. During the eight years 
 that he represented Prussia at the Diet of Frankfurt he 
 keeps on denouncing Austrian intrigues,^ Austrian ag- 
 gressions, Austrian representatives.^ He tells how non- 
 Prussians " gambled and drank, philandered, intrigued 
 and danced." * His portrait of the Austrian Count Thun 
 is equal to some of Voltaire's satires of his enemies.^ 
 His sketch of Herr von Prokesch is the perfection of a 
 character seen through the prism of Prussian hatred 
 and drawn with sulphuric acid.^ He snubs them, slanders 
 them, and when he does not assail their morals, it is their 
 dress or their manners that he attacks.'^ The imperial 
 
 ' Op. cit., vol. I, p. 201. 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, pp. 122, 123, 125, 157. 
 
 ^ Mimroe Smith, Lowe, vol. I, p. 11. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 123. 
 
 ° Ibid., p. 122. 
 
 ° Ibid., p. 156. 
 
 ^ Ibid,, p. 142.
 
 THE CONFLICT 31 
 
 house of Austria does not fare any better. " The Haps- 
 burgs have really been great through plundering old 
 families — the Hungarians, for instance. At bottom they 
 are only a family of police spies who lived upon and 
 made their fortune by confiscations." ^ In this he was 
 imitated by other Prussians. Treitschke said, " I am 
 German and a Protestant, do not expect me ever to ap- 
 prove a single act of Catholic and despotic Austria." ^ 
 Slanders had prepared the work of needle-guns at 
 Sadowa. 
 
 In his conversations Bismarck never fails now to 
 blackmail the French whom in former days he has so 
 flattered. Here are a few Bismarckian pearls. " France 
 is a nation of ciphers." The French " are nothing more 
 than 30,000,000 of Kafifres." ^ " They have barbarians 
 for comrades, and from their wars in Algiers, China, 
 Cochin China and Mexico, they have become barbarians 
 themselves." * " Strip off the white skin of such a Gaul 
 and you will find a Turco." ^ Still speaking of the 
 French at large they are " an uncleanly people," '^ " a 
 nation full of envy and jealousy that had been mortified 
 by the success at Koniggratz, and could not forgive it, 
 though it in no wise damaged them." ^ 
 
 Frenchwomen are not spared. " I have traveled a 
 good deal through France, during peace, too, and I don't 
 recollect that I ever saw anywhere a single nice-looking 
 
 * Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 
 vol. I, p. 273. 
 
 Mil, 145, 692. 
 
 ' Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 146. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 86. 
 
 " Ibid., p. 153. 
 " Ibid., p. 586. 
 ' Ibid., p. 106.
 
 32 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 girl, but I have seen frightfully ugly creatures often. I 
 believe that there are a few, only the pretty ones go off to 
 Paris to make their market there." ^ Did he not go so 
 far as to say that he thought that when Jules Favre 
 went to discuss the conditions of peace with him, " he was 
 painted white "? ^ The countess, his wife, writes to him, 
 " I am afraid there may be no Bibles in France, so I 
 will send you a psalm-book by the first opportunity, that 
 you may read the prophecy against the French : ' I say 
 unto thee that the wicked shall be rooted out.' " ^ 
 
 The German university professors were bitter beyond 
 expression; they used their vast erudition to unearth 
 facts about the past of the French or arguments against 
 them. The celebrated men of the country acted like- 
 wise. Wagner lost all sense of truth and of justice. 
 Strauss, speaking of the successes of the German army, 
 considered them as just chastisements of the French for 
 their " thirst of rapine." According to him, it was not 
 the literature only that was corrupt, it was the very 
 nation itself. Before the war the good Germans had 
 " no idea of the rottenness of French society and of the 
 dissolution of all moral ties." * This last aspersion 
 called forth, and deserved, the most pungent sarcasms of 
 one of the gentlest of men that France ever produced, 
 Ernest Renan. Mommsen in Italy made a similar on- 
 slaught upon the hated Gauls, when speaking of " French 
 immorality," of " moral dissolution," " absence of family 
 spirit," and of " permanent frivolity." ^ The Prussian 
 
 'Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, vol II, 
 p. ii6. 
 ' Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. i86. 
 
 * Ibid., vol. I, p. 587. 
 
 * HI, 97, 548. 
 
 * III, 40, 269.
 
 THE CONFLICT 33 
 
 Machiavel crowned his infamous course by another 
 abominable performance. In his former diplomatic con- 
 ferences, seeking the neutrality of France, he had un- 
 questionably promised compensations along the Rhine, 
 then he threw over Luxemburg, and finally led the French 
 to turn their eyes toward Belgium. He and Benedetti 
 sought practical solutions. They reached conclusions 
 upon this matter; Bismarck asked the French Ambas- 
 sador to write them down. It was he that had made the 
 proposal, Benedetti had been but a scribe. On the 25th 
 of July, a few days after the declaration of war, he 
 published this document as a proposal of France to seize 
 Belgium.^ The effect of this act was prodigious in dis- 
 crediting France. These calumnies did their work among 
 neutrals. The Russians were with Bismarck at the 
 time, but when they learned the truth they w^ere greatly 
 incensed against Prussia.^ So it was later on in Eng- 
 land and in America. 
 
 The war itself was a conquering march through 
 France. The fact that France had no treaty of alliance 
 with any Power shows that this war was unexpected by 
 her and that she had not planned it.^ The French were 
 unprepared, but the Prussian campaign had been care- 
 fully contrived long before. After the Luxemburg 
 Affair, Prussian officers, in many garbs, sometimes as 
 peddlers, as tourists and at other times as commercial 
 agents, were studying the land, preparing maps that were 
 far more perfect than those of French officers. When 
 Moltke went to Paris with the King of Prussia he took 
 " strategic walks " in the neighborhood of Paris.* He 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 423 ; Headlam, Op. cit., p. 281. 
 
 * Novicow, ^p. 262. 
 
 * Ollivier, Emile, L'Empire liberal, vol. XIV, p. 106. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.
 
 34 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 had studied the year before the whole French frontier. 
 The whole plan of invasion was carried on with precision, 
 with energy and with indescribable cruelty. The shelling 
 of the Cathedral of Strasburg, the almost complete de- 
 struction of Chateaudun, the burning of Bazeilles, the 
 sending of bombs into the Latin Quarter of Paris, the 
 disregarding of the Red Cross flags over the Hospital 
 of the Val-de-Grace, the striking of the Pantheon, the 
 wholesale destruction of francs-tireurs, the systematic 
 plundering in the occupied provinces, the trains loaded 
 with booty sent to Germany, all this is still vividly re- 
 membered. Wars, cruel in themselves, have always 
 traits of cruelty that make one shudder, but the Prussian 
 war by its harshness took one back to the methods of 
 warfare of bygone days. The army which, after 
 Sadowa, had seen Bismarck share the spoils of war, 
 helped itself upon French soil most liberally. This has 
 been recorded by most reliable witnesses, among whom 
 are Lavisse as well as Gabriel Monod, men whose testi- 
 mony is above suspicion. 
 
 Bismarck could be petty in his acts. As France and 
 Germany were in the last days of the conflict, did he not 
 endeavor to substitute German instead of French as the 
 language of diplomacy? All the Governments which he 
 thus addressed answered him in their own vernacular.^ 
 Henceforth he sent his dispatches in French. This war 
 was not only deprived of sincere motives but of chivalry 
 and of all generosity. Already at Sedan he had treated 
 Napoleon with hardness. He would not allow him to 
 see the King until the military commanders had exacted 
 
 ' Busch, INT., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 
 vol. I, p. 383-
 
 THE CONFLICT 35 
 
 from him the severest possible terms.^ Similarly with 
 Jules Favre when the French })atriot appealed for easier 
 terms and stood his ground, " Too late ! " he said, " the 
 Bonapartists are before you.'' " We are resolved," said 
 he, " to make peace with the best contracting party we 
 can find ; the Emperor, the Prince Imperial with a 
 Regency, or Prince Napoleon; and if you do not agree 
 to our conditions we have in Germany about 100,000 
 excellent French troops captured at Metz, who are still 
 wholly devoted to the Imperial cause." ^ This was not 
 absolutely true. 
 
 To Thiers, who spoke of appealing to Europe, he re- 
 plied, " If you speak to me of Europe, I will speak to you 
 of Napoleon and of the 100,000 bayonets which, at a 
 wink from us, would re-seat him on his throne." ^ The 
 envoys had to yield to what the Russian sociologist, 
 Novicow, calls the " Peace of Damocles," * which he 
 characterizes as " one of the most fatal turning-points 
 of European history," '^ the Treaty of Frankfurt. Speak- 
 ing to a group of citizens of this city on his way to 
 Berlin, Bismarck said, " I bring you a peace of fifty 
 years," ^ whereby he meant that France was bled and 
 exhausted, incapable of recovering before half a century. 
 He had needlessly humiliated her, after his obsequious 
 attitude of former years, by the foundation of the Ger- 
 man Empire at Versailles. He had unnecessarily hurt her 
 feelings by the entrance of the German army into Paris. 
 
 ' Busch, M., Bismarck in the Franco-German War, pp. 108-110. 
 
 " Lowe, vol. I, p. 625. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 632. 
 
 * Op. cit., p. 5. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 14. 
 
 •Ill, J38, 102.
 
 36 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 He demanded six and obtained five billions of francs * as 
 well as Alsace and Lorraine. When the agreement had 
 been reached Bismarck asked about future commercial 
 relations; the delegates said that their instructions were 
 to keep the status quo, but, said Jules Favre, " Bismarck 
 opposed this with downright vehemence, declaring that 
 he would rather recommence the war of cannons than 
 expose himself to a war of tariffs." ' Germany secured 
 the rights of the most favored nation. Bismarck almost 
 always showed his worst side to his enemies. 
 
 At this time there was genuine mutual hatred between 
 the two peoples ; that of the Germans, was deepened by 
 traditional legends and falsehoods recently circulated by 
 their Government. . The French were still thinking and 
 talking of humaneness, of the higher laws of war, of 
 immanent justice which deepened their sense of horror 
 of a war after Treitschke's heart and which ought to have 
 pleased Bernhardi. They could only vindicate outraged 
 justice and some of them talked of revanche. The small 
 but noisy set that was temporarily to win some popularity 
 had not yet arisen. The Derouledes were exceptions. 
 The best citizens of the country, having silenced 
 every Miles Gloriosus of the last days of the Em- 
 pire, were pondering over their discovery of a new 
 Germany with its gospel of violence — they who had 
 thought her the champion of reason, of justice and the 
 friend of anti-militarism — they who had considered 
 Prussia as representing " the future and Austria the 
 past " ^ — they who, when the news of Sadowa reached 
 
 * As a matter of fact Germany received 5,567,000,000 francs in 
 three years. 
 
 ° Lowe, vol. II, p. 5. 
 
 * Napoleon quoted by Lowe, vol. I, p. 234.
 
 THE CONFLICT 37 
 
 them, made great displays of flags and of illuminations ^ 
 were now burning with violent indignation. 
 
 Bismarck, mistaken in his policy in reference to Ger- 
 many, and overexacting in reference to France, did 
 nothing to allay this wounded national sensitiveness. 
 The Treaty of Frankfurt was hard. Had it been more 
 oppressive, Europe would have protested. Deprecations 
 not a few were already heard in England and in America. 
 However, when circumstances demanded the interpreta- 
 tion of the Treaty, he ever made it harder than the text 
 warranted. He took advantage of the Commune to assert 
 that the Germans would be the judges of the time of 
 their departure from Paris, though the terms of the 
 Treaty were explicit.^ He made himself the only and 
 absolute interpreter of the text. Through General 
 Manteufifel, he drove such a sharp bargain with the 
 French Government, for the support of the army of occu- 
 pation, that millions were practically added to the colossal 
 indemnity and remitted to the Prussian and Saxon war 
 offices.^ The French soldiers who, during their cap- 
 tivity, had committed some misdemeanor and those 
 prisoners members of the free corps, not under but ap- 
 proved by the French Government, were still kept in 
 German fortresses. Bismarck showed no leniency 
 toward them.^ He wanted to exercise a sovereign fear 
 over Frenchmen. Two German soldiers had been killed 
 in a brawl, and the juries, right or wrong, rendered 
 verdicts of not guilty. 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. T, p. 392. 
 
 ' I. 9J. 555- 
 
 • Von Moltke, Speech in the Reichstag. Essays and Speeches 
 and Memoirs, vol. II, p. 68. 
 
 * De Broglie, La Mission de M. dc Gontaut-Biron d, Berlin, 
 1896, p. 14-
 
 38 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 This decision in keeping with the institution of the 
 country were vahd, but Bismarck threatened at once to 
 disregard it and to do his own poHce.^ He sent a dis- 
 patch to that effect to the French Minister and at the 
 same time gave a copy of it to his papers, in which 
 there were commentaries most galhng for France.^ On 
 June i6, 1871, the very day that Emperor WiUiam made 
 his triumphal entrance into Berhn, Bismarck learned that 
 a zone which had been reserved to the German troops 
 had, as Jules Favre stated, been entered by French 
 soldiers through a misunderstanding. Dismounting from 
 his charger, he scratched a note informing the authorities 
 that if the troops were not withdrawn they would be 
 attacked at midnight. To the Chief of the Corps of 
 occupation he also sent the following telegram, " H the 
 French outposts advance further, attack them." ^ 
 
 Owing to the habits of economy and thrift as well as 
 the earnest patriotism of the people the Government 
 under Thiers was able to pay the war indemnity before 
 the time mentioned in the Treaty. A clause of it 
 authorized this, but none referred to the immediate re- 
 moval of troops after the payment. For the great Ger- 
 man Shylock that was not in the bond. Advancing the 
 payment, it was expected by the French that, as a 
 corollary, the German soldiers would also hasten the 
 time of their departure, but he demurred. M. Thiers 
 asserted that the terms of payment and occupation were 
 inseparable, as they were extreme terms — that if France 
 could not defer the payment of her obligations she could 
 anticipate the dates fixed by the Treaty, and that Ger- 
 
 ' De Broglie, p. 16. 
 
 ' Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 354. 
 
 'Lowe, vol. II, p. 7.
 
 THE CONFLICT 39 
 
 many being paid she should remove her troops from the 
 six departments still occupied. 
 
 This situation resembled that of the Prussians in 
 France after Waterloo. They remained in France until 
 1818, and would not have left, even then, had it not been 
 for Wellington.^ Strange to say, in order to allow the 
 advanced payment followed by the German evacuation 
 of the country, a consummation which by peaceful 
 peoples would have been devoutly wished, Bismarck 
 wanted compensations.^ In the steps taken for the 
 restoration of normal relations between the two countries, 
 he ever reminded the vanquished of his might, of what 
 he could have done with it and of what he could do now. 
 For him Prussian might, then German might, was right. 
 
 After this Bismarck was rewarded with the title of 
 Prince and with the gift of the domain of Friedrichsruh, 
 officially valued at 1,000,000 thalers, but which in reality 
 was worth 3,000,000.^ His attitude toward France 
 hardly changed. He was rarely fairer or friendlier. He 
 had all along his fingers upon the Keyboard of German 
 public opinion, in the management of which he was a 
 master. It was not in vain that early in his career he 
 had been intrusted with the management of the Prussian 
 Press Bureau,* and had made it a perfect tool of govern- 
 mental purpose. By it, he so kept in touch with national 
 feelings that the people shared his aims. On reading 
 Maurice Busch's Bismarck in the Franco-German War, 
 and seeing the extent to which the Chancellor's Secretary 
 wrote articles for the press everywhere, ever seeking 
 
 ' I, 96, 308. 
 
 'I, Q5, 694. 
 
 ' Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 283. 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 153.
 
 40 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 to bring Germans to the aims of Bismarck, one realizes 
 the extent to which he had made the press a tool of his 
 policy. What most astonished Germans was that the 
 French were not discouraged, that they paid no homage 
 to their conquerors, that they did not passively accept 
 their defeat and become reconciled with their victors. 
 They were disappointed that the French did not accept 
 the final decisions of brute force, but appealed to the 
 immanent justice of the universe, the nemesis and the 
 rewarder of history. 
 
 The way in which the bruised Frenchmen reasserted 
 their energy, and offered fourteen times more money 
 than Thiers needed to pay Germany, a fact which aroused 
 the admiration of the whole world, excited rather bitter 
 feelings on the other side of the Rhine. France, de- 
 feated, mangled and crushed, healed her national wounds 
 like a healthy being. The English Teutophile, Charles 
 Lowe, who so praised Bismarck, speaks of the " truly 
 Antaeus power of her recuperation." ^ She rebuilt her 
 finances, displayed a new energy, and a new intelligence 
 in her education, reinvigorated her moral ideals, made 
 over her industrial life, extended her colonies, which, 
 later, became an object of German envy, restored her 
 army to an adequate condition in keeping with the 
 defensive duties of a great Power, and by her sterling 
 worth resumed her place in the councils of nations. 
 While the war hounds were barking on both sides of the 
 frontier, though much louder east of the Rhine, she 
 was devoted to the evolution of her national life and to 
 the framing of institutions in keeping with her present 
 needs. For the third time in her history, having found 
 the monarchical form of Government inadequate, she 
 ' Op. cit., vol. II, 51.
 
 THE CONFLICT 41 
 
 was trying republican institutions, with which Bismarck 
 had not the least sympathy. He would rather sign a 
 treaty of peace with the impossible Comte de Chambord 
 than with Thiers. When the heir to the throne of the 
 Bourbons declined to accept the tricolor flag and hence 
 could not be King, Bismarck, speaking sarcastically to 
 the monarchical French Ambassador, said, " You will 
 have to keep Adolphe I " — referring to Adolphe Thiers. 
 Gontaut-Biron replied, " Yes, provided he has no heir." ^ 
 Notwithstanding such sallies, half sarcasm, half 
 humor, he continued to annoy France. At the election 
 of Marechal MacMahon to the presidency, the great Ger- 
 man statesman demanded that the chief Magistrate of 
 France should himself notify his rise to power to the 
 Emperor of Germany. He further asked that the Am- 
 bassador of France have new credentials. He had in- 
 duced Russia and Austria to take the same stand. It is 
 customary in monarchies to renew at the death of the 
 King the credentials of ambassadors, because the sover- 
 eignty resides in the monarch, who is its representative, 
 while in a republic the sovereign is the nation, which 
 does not change.- The explanations given by the Iron 
 Chancellor showed that he was decided to meddle with 
 French internal matters. When Gontaut-Biron made 
 remonstrances Bismarck threatened to withdraw his 
 ambassador from Paris and that Russia and Austria 
 would follow the same course.' He went so far as to say 
 that he would not recognize Gambetta as president of 
 the Republic were he elected.* He demanded that the 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 69. 
 
 ' Broglie, Op. cit., p. 109. Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 375- 
 
 ' Broglie, p. in. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 142.
 
 42 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 French Government, which had already warned French 
 bishops to be moderate in their language if they spoke 
 of the Kulturkampf, should pursue and repress them,^ 
 Dr. Windthorst and his supporters rightly denounced the 
 Chancellor's silencing French bishops as " an unjustifi- 
 able interference in the internal affairs of France." ^ 
 That he should have been unfriendly to freedom of dis- 
 cussion in his own country was perfectly proper, but that 
 he should force a neighboring state to adopt the same 
 attitude is inadmissible. The episcopate of France con- 
 stituted an insignificant minority out of touch with the 
 nation. The Government was unfriendly to their 
 criticisms and to their acts, but notwithstanding that the 
 Chancellor identified them with the nation which he 
 threatened with war. " I declare," he said, " that if 
 France supports the Catholics in Germany I will not 
 wait to have her ready. That she will be in two years : I 
 will seize before that the favorable opportunity." ^ He 
 would have done it, but European sentiment and the 
 attitude of two European rulers saved her. 
 
 ' Broglie, p. 163. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. II, p. 61. 
 
 * Broglie, Op. cit., pp. 166, 188.
 
 IV 
 
 THE AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 
 As we have already seen, before attacking Austria in 
 1866, Bismarck wanted that country to join Prussia in 
 an aggression against France.^ It was on some of his 
 later proposals to \lenna that von Beust spoke of Bis- 
 marck's treaties of alliance, as des chiffons de papier. 
 After the Franco-German war, the two adversaries upon 
 the battlefield of Bohemia, Emperor William and Em- 
 peror Francis Joseph, who had not seen each other since 
 Sadowa, met at Ischl, in Austria, while Bismarck himself 
 and von Beust conferred together at Gastein, preparing 
 an understanding to be followed by concerted action. 
 Unconsciously the Chancellor was working toward what 
 seemed a great federation or federations of Europe. An 
 honest federation without any aggressive thought be- 
 hind it would have been a great boon for the world, and 
 a most gratifying step forward towards the union of 
 the civilized states which is bound to come. Such was not 
 Bismarck's aim. He brought into that combination the 
 Emperor of Russia. Thus the Hohenzollerns, the Haps- 
 burgs and the Romanofs formed what was known as the 
 " Three Kaiser League." The three rulers had met at 
 Warsaw, in i860, to discuss the European situation.^ In 
 1872 they met again in Berlin, where there were the 
 usual festivities, imperial embracings and conferences. 
 
 Mil, 73, 523- 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 265. 
 
 43
 
 44 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Whatever one may think of this trio of Powers, and 
 much good could have been said about it, one cannot 
 avoid the conclusion that its chief object, at this time, 
 was the isolation of France. One of the laudatory his- 
 torians of Bismarck sums up the character of this re- 
 union as follows : " The Meeting of the three Emperors 
 marked the first stage in the consummate policy by which 
 Bismarck sought to isolate France from the rest of 
 Europe, and thus minimize the danger of a war of 
 revenge." ^ 
 
 This policy was pursued to the bitter end, and, two- 
 score years later, it failed because of its unjust purpose 
 and its subterfuges. Some German writers said, ironi- 
 cally, that the League was for French happiness, to pre- 
 vent Frenchmen from doing foolish things ^ and to 
 preserve peace, which the French were far from disturb- 
 ing. On the morrow of the war, the attorney general 
 Renouard, in his address at the reopening of the Cour de 
 cassation of Paris, spoke upon " Justice above Force." 
 He closed with these words : " We, the vanquished of 
 yesterday, dare to assert, in the face of the world, wit- 
 ness of our recent defeats, that the resentment of our 
 wounded pride does not extinguish in us the intelligence 
 of eternal verities : peace is good, war is criminal. Our 
 beloved fatherland can give no more striking sign of her 
 renascence than by not sacrificing to her rancor the cause 
 of civilization. Let her disdain from demanding to force 
 the revenge that she hopes; it is worthy of her to seek 
 in the supremacy of justice the reparation of her ills and 
 the return to her of all her children." ^ 
 
 ' Lowe, Op. cit., vol. II, 22. 
 
 Mil, 122, 954. 
 
 ' Dreyfus, F,, L'arhitrage international, 1894, p. Z72.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 45 
 
 It would be easy to multiply passages like this showing 
 the spirit of leading French citizens. In spite of that 
 Bismarck formed his League, which was so strong that 
 its members freed themselves from the most elementary 
 rules of international courtesy. Their purpose was to 
 paralyze France, and paralyzed she would not be. She 
 so acted that she soon regained the respect and the 
 esteem of the Powers, who had begun to understand 
 Bismarck's maneuvers, and to know how he had risen 
 upon the stepping stones of others' dead selves to higher 
 things — that his international combinations were not for 
 the development of the best European life, but machines 
 subserving his ambition. France attempted none, and 
 devoted herself to the duty of building up her republican 
 institutions, for which he did not lack contempt. " A 
 republic," he said, " will, with great difficulties, find an 
 ally against us, a Monarchical Government." ^ The genius 
 which was embodied in the Iron Chancellor was capable 
 of making some mistakes. Nations cannot be indifferent 
 to the interests of their growing democracy whatever be 
 the form of their Government. France needed peace, 
 wished for peace, and worked for peace. Gambetta said 
 in 1880, " If our hearts beat it is not for an ideal of 
 bloody adventures, it is that what remains of France 
 should remain entire, and that we may depend 
 upon the future to see if there is an immanent jus- 
 tice which comes on its chosen day and at its chosen 
 hour." 2 
 
 Frenchmen were in constant fear of seeing the hel- 
 meted men reappear in the East. Menaces were fre- 
 quent, not to say constant. In 1874, von Moltke, asking 
 
 • II, 6, 92s. 
 
 ' Berard, V., La France et Guillaume II, p. 42.
 
 46 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 for more war credits in the Reichstag, said, " What we 
 have conquered in half a year by arms we must defend 
 by arms for half a century." He adds later on, " After 
 its wars Germany has caused herself to be feared and 
 to be esteemed, but she is not loved." True enough! 
 He draws pictures of the terrible armaments of France. 
 Forgetting the Bismarck dinner and the Ems dispatch, 
 he says, " What is borne to us from across the Vosges 
 is a rabid cry of revenge for the reverses which France 
 herself has courted." By a singular contradiction, he 
 recognizes that the majority of Frenchmen " is thor- 
 oughly imbued with a sense of the absolute necessity of, 
 above all, preserving peace." ^ On another occasion, in 
 the same hall of imperial legislation, discussing socialism, 
 he evokes needlessly the apparition " of the professeurs 
 des barricades and the petroleuses of the Commune of 
 1871."^ The Germans used the French as the Spartans 
 did the drunken Helotes for the education of their chil- 
 dren. The Communists suggested mistaken ideas to 
 Moltke ; some were Communalists demanding local gov- 
 ernment, some of them held doctrines of communism, 
 but the greater number had nothing to do with any new 
 social theories whatsoever. 
 
 The effect of his speech before a conservative German 
 audience was telling. As his examples of the outcome 
 of socialism were taken from Paris and the French it is 
 needless to say that it wounded the susceptibilities of 
 masses of the countrymen of Thiers who were no friends 
 of the destroyers of the Tuileries or of the murderers 
 of Archbishop Darboy. In another instance he speaks 
 with an unblushing daring of the war. " In 1870 there 
 
 ' Essays, Speeches and Memoirs, vol. II, p. iii. 
 '^ Ibid., p. 77.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 47 
 
 was as yet no united and powerful Germany in the heart 
 of Europe, and the war, with which France took us by 
 surprise, was waged principally with a view to prevent- 
 ing its establishment." ^ 
 
 There we have two positively erroneous assertions. 
 First, France did not force a war upon Prussia and, sec- 
 ond, she was not opposed to a spontaneous and peace- 
 ful unification of Germany. Every statement made by 
 German leaders, and every argument built on it, led to 
 one unfair and unfriendly conclusion. Bismarck was 
 even afraid that French finances could not long bear 
 the strain of French military burdens - and like his 
 friend, Moltke, was certain that war was forthcoming 
 and ought to be anticipated. Wilhelmstrasse discussed 
 questions of the French army as if France had been a 
 German protectorate.^ The German Ambassador in 
 Paris, von Arnim, did not hesitate to criticize the country 
 and her politics.* Bismarck accused him of having 
 " facilitated, if not directly caused, the change of govern- 
 ment by thwarting his efforts to keep M. Thiers in 
 power." ^ 
 
 The German press was most aggressive. In 1875, it 
 reached a high pitch of excitement which was far from 
 spontaneous. M. Tardieu has summed up the trend of 
 their grievances as follows : " To finish once for all with 
 France is not merely opportune. It is a duty Germany 
 owes to herself and to humanity. Europe will never 
 be tranquil as long as a struggle is possible, and there 
 will be this possibility of a struggle as long as the blunder 
 
 ^Essays, Speeches ancf Memoirs, p. 116. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 205. 
 
 * Broglie, Op. cit., p. 224. 
 *V, 14, 19- 
 
 'Lowe, vol. II, pp. 39, 50,
 
 48 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 made by the Treaty of Frankfurt remains unrepaired. 
 For it leaves France in a position to survive and re- 
 commence the duel. Germany is troubled by the con- 
 sciousness of having only half-crushed her enemy and 
 of being able to defend herself only by sleeping with 
 one eye open." ^ 
 
 It is well known that Bismarck had been for some time 
 bent upon a new invasion of France. The old Emperor, 
 listening to a speech of the Prince prepared for the 
 opening of the Reichstag in 1874, declared that that 
 speech was a " menace " to France. He insisted that it 
 should be modified in a pacific sense. He said, later on, 
 to Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe : " I do not want war 
 with France, I am too old to undertake anything like that, 
 but I fear lest Bismarck may lead me to it little by 
 little." 2 
 
 "^ In 1875, he intended to attack France and to " bleed 
 her white," but was prevented by Queen Victoria, through 
 the energetic action of Lord Derby,^ and by the Czar. 
 In 1887, he wished again to provoke her and had even 
 attempted to secure the neutrality of St. Petersburg in 
 advance,* but the Czar was bent upon a pacific policy. 
 He realized all along that the great German's purpose 
 was to strike France. By a strange coincidence, the 
 two Powers which were bound ultimately to be her 
 friends stood by her then. Bismarck's hostility changed 
 in form, but remained unabated. As the French Ambas- 
 sador opposed many of his anti-Gallican designs, he 
 ceased to be persona grata, and was attacked by the 
 
 "^ ^France and the Alliances, 1908, p. 124. 
 ' Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 380. 
 
 * Journal dcs Dcbats, Nov. 27, 1893. 
 
 * Mevil, A., De la paix dc Francfort a la Conference d'Al' 
 gesiras, 1909, p. 5.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 49 
 
 Bismarckian papers. According to them, he conspired 
 against the Empire, he had become a center of intrigues, 
 he had endeavored to secure the favor of the Emperor 
 over and above the head of the Chancellor, who wanted 
 his recall.^ In a letter to M. Decazes, the Ambassador 
 exclaims, " That man does not forgive me the service 
 which, with honor, thank God, I have rendered my 
 country." ^ The Prussian Richelieu could hardly bear 
 the wise and judicious policy advocated by the Ambas- 
 sador and practiced by France which foiled his bel- 
 ligerent purpose.^ 
 
 He ever finds occasions to show his unfriendliness. 
 In 1894, as he received a deputation of German teachers, 
 he speaks of the teaching of history in the German 
 schools and at once proceeds to criticize bitterly the 
 French methods — that the Gallican teachers are in- 
 capable of imparting to their pupils anything like im- 
 partial and objective history — that they are very de- 
 ficient in their knowledge of geography, etc. France 
 under the Republic never had a blind interpretation of 
 national history like that of Treitschke, nor has Ger- 
 many any popular text-books of history superior to those 
 of Gabriel Monod and Lavisse, while the geographical 
 text-books of Vidal de la Blache and Foncin — to men- 
 tion only these — are equal to the best elsewhere. He ac- 
 cuses the French of waging a systematic war upon 
 German securities. It is true that French financiers were 
 unfriendly to national investments among the countries 
 of the TripUce. They were unwilling to have their 
 savings used against them by their ayowed enemies. 
 
 * Broglie, Op. cit.^ p. 259. 
 ' Ibid., p. 266. 
 ' Ibid., p. 293.
 
 ^> 
 
 50 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Right or wrong in so doing they were only following the 
 object-lessons of Bismarck, who, when temporarily op- 
 posed to Russia, did the very thing with which he re- 
 proached the French. He repeated ad nauseam that 
 France would attack Germany. In order to meet this 
 fictitious danger the peaceful German taxpayer, trusting 
 his leaders, consents to pay the taxes, but hates the French 
 whom he makes responsible for this burden, and the 
 Chancellor attains his twofold purpose, the credits and 
 he culture of antagonism to France. 
 
 The red rag of the revanche is constantly held before 
 their eyes. At times his accusations, made in public or 
 made in print, are exhibited in posters ; one of them was 
 placed on the walls of Metz.^ When the Government 
 publishes alarming news one may be certain that a mili- 
 tary project is in the air, and when negotiations are going 
 on in Paris the press may be furious, but as soon as the 
 arrangements are concluded it is almost silent. If the 
 Reichstag refuses to vote the seven-year army bill, he 
 conjures the members with the pictures of the Red- 
 breeches about to cross the Vosges.- He speaks of 
 " her hatred against all her neighbors " and of her 
 being " the most turbulent nation that exists." He 
 wanted to secure his vote. He knew that a mighty army 
 is not only efficient for the purpose of obtaining a terri- 
 tory from a neighbor in time of war, but also to gain con- 
 cessions in time of peace. In other words he wished to 
 make it an instrument of intimidation. He was so 
 provoking that Boulanger owed some of his popularity 
 to the fact that while every public man in France was 
 pacific, he dared, after one of Bismarck's bellicose 
 
 Mil, 59, 237. 
 ' III, 88, 210.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 51 
 
 speeches, to answer him with energy.^ However, as 
 soon as Boulanger saw the popular effect of his chal- 
 lenge, he put his musket on his other shoulder and 
 proclaimed that Boulangism meant peace. Like all 
 demagogues he knew what the French people desired 
 most and that he promised to them. " The fall of 
 Boulanger," said Bebel in the Reichstag, "proves that 
 France is not disposed to allow herself to be stirred to 
 war and to go into it led by an adventurer." 
 
 The Germans have often expressed the regret that 
 they are not loved by their western neighbors, without 
 ever imagining that they themselves may be at fault, 
 or that the French are a peaceful people. We are 
 not here speaking of a group of individuals, of ir- 
 responsible cliques such as exist in every country, but 
 of the men who were at the helm of things. They were 
 proper and correct with their trans-Rhinean peers. On 
 the other hand, Bismarck was haughty, arrogant. Dur- 
 ing the palmiest days of the Drei-Kaiser-Bund, his atti- 
 v^tude was exasperating. He practically demanded that 
 France should not help the Carlists of Spain and recog- 
 nize the government of Marshal Serrano.^ His stand 
 toward Belgium in 1875 was menacing and the brave 
 little state had her Bismarckian scare. ^ He remonstrated 
 with Italy because of the protection which the Ouirinal, 
 by the Papal Guarantee Law, gave to the Vatican.* 
 Spain, after the great consideration shown her to draw 
 her people into the alliance, had her turn when the con- 
 troversy about the Caroline Islands arose. For awhile 
 
 ' Barclay, Sir Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Remi- 
 niscences, p. 91. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. II, p. 59. 
 
 * II, 9, 222. 
 MI, p. i:i2.
 
 52 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 he was hard and unyielding,^ but at last the question was 
 referred to the arbitration of the Pope. It was in the 
 same spirit that he annoyed the Americans at Samoa.'' 
 In 1889, he showed his dictatorial spirit against Switzer- 
 land, because she gave shelter to German Socialists. 
 With the support of Russia and Austria, at the time, he 
 demanded from the Swiss the suppression of the right 
 of asylum for socialistic fugitives and practically the 
 limitation of Swiss sovereignty, though this was sanc- 
 tioned and guaranteed by Europe.^ 
 
 f Again, he annoyed France by the use he made of the 
 ' acts of the French Catholic Clergy. It has ever been 
 repugnant to the Catholic Church to bend, or bow, before 
 any political Power, and at times it has been her glory 
 to face the mighty courageously, and, as in Belgium, to 
 have a Cardinal Mercier stand for justice and humanity. 
 What was contemptible in the Iron Chancellor was his 
 cunning use of the rantings of some French bishops to 
 alarm Italy, as if France intended to restore the temporal 
 power of the Pope, a step which no French Government, 
 not even that of President MacMahon, would have dared 
 to take. Bismarck used French clericalism to fight Ger- 
 man Catholicism at home, and to gain his ends in Italy. 
 He took advantage of the erratic action of the Clergy 
 to arouse Italian anger. He made the bishops representa- 
 tives of the people of France, and then caused French- 
 men, many of whom at Magenta and Solferino had shed 
 their blood for the independence of Italy — men still the 
 best friends of the land of Cavour and Garibaldi — to 
 appear as foes. This maneuver brought Italy into the 
 
 • III, 71, 235. 
 =* III, 9^, 477, 950. 
 *III, 9^, 236.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 53 
 
 Triple Alliance with its crushing military burdens, a step 
 which many Italians regretted then and regret even more 
 now. By this time Russia had virtually slipped out of 
 it, and was gravitating toward the French rapprochement 
 which ultimately was to ripen into an alliance. 
 
 By his international combinations — less reliable than 
 he thought — he created periods of continental anxiety/ 
 that were detrimental to Europe and harmful to France.^ 
 Ever resourceful he worked, at times, in two ways to 
 attain one result. Thus he and a representative of the 
 Dual Monarchy offered Italy to take possession of 
 Tunis.- The purpose was to arouse France and thereby 
 send Italy toward Berlin and Vienna. Later on he en- 
 couraged the French to take it and they did, but his 
 gift of Tunis served the same purpose. It embittered the 
 Italians, though, among them, there remained those who 
 could show their gratitude to France for her past services 
 by approving her protectorate over Tunis. He intended, 
 according to M. Tardieu, to use his new allies for the 
 purpose of irritating and provoking France.^ He adds 
 later on, " Italy was a puppet in the hands of Berlin." * 
 He followed the same course in Egypt. At times he 
 sided with France and encouraged her to hold her 
 ground and at other times he urged England to " take 
 Egypt." ^ He hoped that the Land of the Pharaohs would 
 prove a bone of contention between the French and the 
 English nation. Fie tried to draw Spain into his combi- 
 nations. The German Crown Prince went to Madrid, 
 where he worked for the German cause. King Al- 
 
 ' III, 89, 235. 
 Mil, 103, 889. 
 
 * France and the Alliances, p. 91. 
 
 ♦ Ibid., p. 134. 
 
 • Lowe, vol. II, p. 244.
 
 54 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 phonso XII returned the visit in Berlin. William I 
 appointed him colonel of a Prussian regiment, but it was 
 stationed at Strasburg in the conquered country. The 
 festivities on that occasion were such that a few days 
 later the new Prussian colonel was greeted in Paris 
 with hisses and groans, though, before, the Parisians 
 were very friendly to him. Was this feast in Strasburg 
 accidental or was it the purpose of the Chancellor to 
 exasperate his neighbors again? It is impossible to tell. 
 
 In 1881, Rumania was apparently drawn into the same 
 movement.^ Inviting M. Bratiano to join the Triplice, 
 he said, " We want peace, we are a league of peace ; and 
 if you desire peace, you may find support with us; but 
 if war is your object, then you must go to others." ^ An 
 alliance was reached, but the Rumanians demurred and 
 the project had to be abandoned.^ King Milan, who 
 was practically driven ofif his throne, and his reckless 
 son who was murdered, disloyal to their people, also 
 entered into the movement,* but the Servians soon 
 realized who their real friends were. Mr. Lowe, who, 
 all along, has characterized the Bismarckian efiforts as 
 meant to isolate — he might have said, strike — France, 
 speaks as follows : " The German Chancellor . . . had 
 thus gradually imposed his pacific will on all European 
 diplomacy, and gathered the nations of the Continent 
 into a Peace League to which it was discreditable, and 
 even dangerous, not to belong." ^ The Bismarckian iron 
 net was thus woven about France with a patience worthy 
 of a better cause. Charles de Mazade, in 1883, wrote, 
 
 * Lowe, vol. II, p. 149. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 151. 
 
 * III, 109, 477. 
 
 * Muir, Ramsay, Britain's Case Against Germany, 1914, p. 141. 
 •Vol. II, p. 155.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 55 
 
 " France is at present surrounded by a sort of circle 
 created with as much cleverness as power in such a way 
 as to compress her." ^ Indeed the Triplice ever pro- 
 tested that it loved peace, but it caused to rest over 
 France menaces of a conflict that were more alarming 
 because of their indefiniteness. Prince von Bismarck 
 could indeed have created a large instrument of peace, 
 but that which he evolved ultimately crumbled because^ 
 of its unquestionably belligerent purpose. 
 
 One of Bismarck's successors, von Biilow, hints that 
 the people who had joined this great alliance were drawn 
 together by a sense of " common dangers," ^ and there 
 is the implication that they arose from France, but what 
 could she have done had she wished, to Servia, to 
 Rumania, to Spain, to Italy, to Austria or to Germany 
 herself, bristling with armaments? The new Chancellor 
 could not mention the least evidence of a French pur- 
 pose to attack a single one of these peoples. France 
 needed all her strength to cope with her overwhelming/ 
 home problems. These " dangers " were simply fanciful 
 creations of a German political leader who used them to 
 help or justify an aggressive course. This gentleman 
 has boundless faith in the Dreibund even when reduced 
 by the secession of Russia, Spain, Servia and Rumania. 
 He views it " as the resumption and the prolongation of 
 the Holy Alliance of bygone days " ^ and as " a mighty 
 fortification dividing the continent into two." * " Rarely, 
 if ever, has the history of Europe witnessed so solid an 
 alliance." ^ In 1902, dealing with the same subject, he 
 
 • III, 60, 707. 
 
 ' Imperial Germany, p. 69. 
 » V, 7. 477- 
 
 • Imperial Germany, p. 67. 
 
 • VI, 23, 273-
 
 56 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 says, " We will continue to maintain Germany so strong 
 that our friendship shall be precious to each and that 
 it may not be indifferent to anyone to incur our enmity." ^ 
 In all his utterances there is a threat. " So solid an 
 alliance," " the masterpiece of statecraft " ^ of Bismarck, 
 received a strong blow, first by the Franco-Russian 
 Alliance, then a second one by the Franco-Italian En- 
 tente and a third one from the Anglo-French Agreement. 
 The remaining partner, Austria, is the prisoner of Ger- 
 many, which now commands at the Ballplatz. 
 
 With the extension and apparent progress of the 
 Triplice Bismarck did not fail to keep the French 
 national nerves unstrung. In 1884, someone spoke 
 to him of the possible drawbacks arising from the fact 
 that Germany had no navy. He replied that if Germany 
 had grievances there should be no need of going so far, 
 and that the gates of Metz opened into France.^ Later 
 on came the Schnoebele incident. This man, an agent 
 of the French Government, had been made liable for 
 some of his acts. He was living in France. While there, 
 however, German officials drew him, by deceit, into their 
 territory and there arrested him.* Frenchmen had no 
 sympathy with the victim of this police system, but 
 resented strongly the methods employed to seize him y 
 and, not without misgivings, demanded his release. The 
 country was for a few days in a terrible suspense. The 
 year was scarcely over, when along the frontier of the 
 Vosges Mountains a German guard fired upon French- 
 men, killing one and wounding another on French soil.^ 
 
 ' V, 7, AT7- 
 
 * Lowe, II, p. 116. 
 
 • HI, 64, 235. 
 
 * III, 81, 222. Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 551. 
 
 • III, 85, 950.
 
 AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 57 
 
 French protestations probably contributed to the char- 
 acter of his next great speech. On February 8, 1888,^ 
 in the Reichstag he treats France with insuhing con- 
 tempt. " One does not always wage war through 
 hatred," he said, " for were it so, France ought to be 
 ceaselessly at war, not only with us, but also with Eng- 
 land and Italy ; she hates all her neighbors." ^ These 
 were the senile rantings of a great man whose successors 
 were to find France surrounded by " un cercle d' alliances 
 et d'amities, toufes faites de coiirtoisie et de cordi- 
 alite." 2 
 
 * Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 539. 
 
 * Pichon, S., Discours, Paris, Feb. 24, 1907.
 
 V 
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 
 
 When Bismarck resigned, in 1890, Frenchmen could 
 not but rejoice that their great enemy had ceased to be 
 the Chancellor of Germany, and also that, later on, he 
 and the Kaiser were no longer on friendly terms. They 
 were far from the time when the Crown Prince, after 
 his grandfather's death and when his own noble father 
 was dying, spoke at a banquet of " Germany, with its 
 chief killed, its lieutenant-colonel deeply wounded, gather- 
 ing round its standard bearer, Bismarck." ^ Now the 
 Prince, having come to power as King of Prussia and 
 Emperor of Germany, soon indicated his purpose of 
 being absolute. On March 5, 1890, at the banquet of 
 the provincial Diet of Brandenburg he said, " I will 
 break as a piece of glass those who will oppose me." 
 Soon after he inscribed on his portrait Sic volo, sic juheo. 
 At the Rhinean Diet on ]\Iay 4, 1891, he said, " There 
 is only one master in the country and that master it is I." 
 Later on, in Munich, he inscribed the following preten- 
 tious sentence, Siiprema lex regis voluntas.^ These as- 
 sertions were a greater expression of absolute personal 
 power than when Louis XIV said, L'Etat, c'est mot. 
 These were uttered in France while Louis XIV was 
 young, in an age of ignorance, but the Kaiser was speak- 
 
 ' III, 86, 950. 
 
 * Le Temps, Nov. 17, 1891. 
 58
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 59 
 
 ing at the end of the nineteenth century, in enlightened 
 Germany. What was worse than his formulae of divine 
 rights, or what Le Temps called ccsaropopism, he as- 
 sumed the position of " standard bearer " and he dis- 
 missed Bismarck " like a lackey." ^ 
 
 There followed a painful period when the young Kaiser, 
 who had displayed a certain harsh attitude toward his 
 parents, been ungrateful toward the Chancellor, draping 
 himself in the splendor of his authority, defiantly looked 
 at the recluse of Friedrichsruh and practically wished to 
 seal his lips. The latter had held the imperial helm for 
 twenty-eight years and had not only made Germany 
 but made her to his likeness. He had infused his ideas, 
 good and bad alike, into the life of the Empire. Humanly 
 speaking he was . . . " aussi grand qit'un front pent I'ctre 
 sous le del." In spite of his w^rongs, of his crimes, 
 even, no one in the Hohenzollera House had a right to 
 depreciate his work, which, from many points of view, 
 was great. He was sensitive in this direction and re- 
 mained fearless in his criticisms of those who attacked 
 him. The warnings which he received from Berlin 
 moved him but little. When the Imperial Government 
 resorted to persecutions such as its attitude at the time 
 of the marriage of his son, he remained stoically in- 
 flexible. The moment the Kaiser endeavored to lessen 
 his fame as the builder of the unity of Germany, and the 
 statement was made that it was the work of Emperor 
 Friedrich III, Bismarck made the confession which was 
 published by the \^ienna Free Press and which we have 
 reproduced.- This confession ought to have done away 
 with heaps of German literature, mountain high, which 
 
 * These are Bismarck's own words. 
 
 * P. 21.
 
 6o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 repeat the falsehoods about the aggression of France in 
 1870. 
 
 With the elevation of Wilhelm II to the supreme im- 
 perial rank matters changed but little. Frenchmen did 
 not modify their attitude, nor did the Emperor and his 
 military caste. After the death of his father he wrote 
 to a friend, " The way is the same, and now, full speed ! 
 Go ahead ! " ^ At times he seemed to be disposed to win 
 over the French, but some of his attempts were all but 
 happy. The visit of his mother to Paris is a case in 
 point. She had gone to urge French artists to take part 
 in an exhibition in Germany. Her going was like the 
 arrival of the Kaiser in Copenhagen, at the death of 
 King Christian IX, when he was not wanted by anyone. 
 Had German artists made a proposal like the one re- 
 ferred to above, it would have been eminently proper, 
 but for the mother of the reigning sovereign to do it was 
 construed as an undue attempt to break through a digni- 
 fied moral reserve which was legitimate. " She deeply 
 wounded French feelings," said Victor Berard, " when 
 she visited the Galerie des glaces of Versailles, where 
 the German Empire had been proclaimed, as well as the 
 ruins of St. Cloud." - Her good heart ought to have 
 saved her from committing such a blunder. The Pari- 
 sians made her feel this lack of kindness or at least of 
 tact. The Kaiser was irritated. Like Bismarck, he soon 
 took up the harping at the " hereditary enemy." 
 
 Nothing can help one better to understand the spirit of 
 the German Ruler than his addresses published in a book, 
 The German Emperor,^ by Professor Christian Gauss 
 
 ' III, 98, 714. 
 
 * La France ct Guillaume II j p. 16. 
 
 • N. Y. 1915.
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 6i 
 
 of Princeton University, a book of modest pretensions 
 but of signal worth, as it exhibits in their fair historical 
 framework some of the typical utterances of the Kaiser. 
 There are some 700 or 800 of these oratorical produc- 
 tions.^ These outbursts of feeling — few of them are 
 anything else — tell us that the army is dominant, the 
 army is the rocher de bronze upon which the nation must 
 stand. The judgment of the reader will recoil at the 
 incense burned before the Hohenzollerns, his constant 
 praise — praise that comes only from him — for " my im- 
 mortal grandfather, His Majesty Emperor William the 
 Great." ^ There is much also about the expansion and 
 power of the German people, their destiny shaped by the 
 law of the " Old God," and a theology not far distant 
 from that of Constantine, of Clovis and, at best, of 
 Saint-Louis, six or seven centuries ago. One constant 
 note is that of the danger from without and principally 
 from France. At first, he endeavored to react against 
 the opinion credited to him that he was militant and 
 warlike, by asserting his determination to keep peace, 
 but war and hatred of France are in the Hohenzollern 
 blood. In 1889, at Aldershot, in England, in a speech 
 of one hundred and eleven words, considerably less than 
 twice the length of the Lord's Prayer, there are two 
 references to Waterloo and one to Malplaquet.^ Anti- 
 Gallicanism with him, as with iMoltke and Bismarck, is 
 an obsession. He cannot keep it at home. It even be- 
 comes an article of exportation. On May 6, 1890, plead- 
 
 ^ Tardieu, A., Op. cit., p. 162. Professor Gauss has given us 
 only the most important ones. 
 
 " Von Arnim addresses William I as follows : " Most illustrious, 
 very powerful Emperor and King, gracious Emperor, King and 
 Sovereign." Document from von Arnim' s Trial. 
 
 • Gauss, p. so.
 
 62 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 ing before the Reichstag for more armaments, he lays 
 stress upon " the military organization of our neighbors, 
 (which) has been broadened and perfected to an unfore- 
 seen degree."^ In 1891, on the occasion of the maneu- 
 vers of the Fourth Saxon corps, he referred to Jena and 
 again urged the Germans to prepare against the " com- 
 mon enemy." ^ In the latter part of 1892, there was 
 another proposal made by him for further armaments.^ 
 No one needed to be told the reason of it. Not to speak 
 of other acts, on July 4, 1893, the rapprochement be- 
 tween France and Russia became the basis of his plea — 
 the Germans can ever find a rational pretext for what 
 they want — for an increase of war resources.* Before 
 his access to the supreme honor of the Empire there had 
 been in Germany celebrations of the anniversaries of the 
 war of 1870, during which there were the threadbare 
 accusations against France — accusations that have been 
 so often repeated that their falsehoods have become like 
 infusible crystals in the national consciousness, as if they 
 were indisputable verities. Germany could not have been 
 held to the Prussian and Bismarckian ideals of militarism 
 unless the war spirit was kept up to a white heat by 
 misrepresentations of the neighboring state and culti- 
 vated by these war celebrations. In this, confederate 
 states were scarcely behind Prussia. The King of 
 Saxony, at about this time, speaking before some vet- 
 erans, lets his imagination run loose, and talks as if war 
 were actually on.^ 
 
 The Kaiser, however, is not to be surpassed. In 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 59. 
 ' III, /07, 713. 
 » III, 114, 234. 
 
 * III, 10^, 713. 
 
 • III, 95, 472.
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 63 
 
 September, 1894, he went to Metz on the date of the anni- 
 versary of the battle of Sedan. There, standing in front 
 of the bronze statue of his grandfather, he reviewed his 
 troops. It is to this city, wrested from France, and 
 close to the country which the Lorrainers love, that he 
 comes with the Prince of Naples, the grandson of 
 Victor Emmanuel, for his theatrical displays, his peace- 
 ful speeches ever spiced with indirect menaces. He 
 thus associates the House of Savoy, for which France 
 had done so much, with his irritating acts. On October 
 18, the anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, he says: 
 " This inspiring day is one whose memories move the 
 world and which marks an epoch in our German his- 
 tory." ^ This was a reference to France, though she was 
 not mentioned. At times his seconds come in. Von 
 Caprivi, before the Army Commission, the previous year, 
 also held up the imaginary specter of French aggression. 
 He points out the great peril resulting from the move- 
 ment of Russia toward France. He even saw possible 
 dangers in the direction of peaceful Denmark. Ger- 
 many ought not only to be able to defend herself, he 
 maintained, but to take the offensive from the beginning 
 of the war, to protect her '' brethren from Alsace," new- 
 comers into the Empire, who should not be abandoned 
 to the rigors of the French armies.- \'on Caprivi, speak- 
 ing of the rigors of the French armies against " the 
 brethren from Alsace," gives the measure of his sincerity. 
 Rigors of the French armies against the loved Alsatians, 
 that is splendid! The orators, speaking on behalf of the 
 project, did not fail to recall the siege of Dantzig, the 
 Napoleonic campaign of Eylau, as well as the burning 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 83. 
 Mil, //;, 472.
 
 64 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 of the Palatinate under Louis XIV.^ This shows the 
 spirit, the methods of the men who, having no legitimate 
 wrongs to complain of, must have recourse to such 
 arguments as those of von Caprivi, or evoke such distant 
 occurrences and distort them so as to pose as victims. 
 Never do they refer to the services rendered by France 
 which weakened the hold that the House of Hapsburg 
 had upon them, helped German states oppressed by other 
 German states ; nor to the alliance of the King of Prussia, 
 who, during eight years, benefited, at the expense of other 
 German states, by Napoleonic conquests. There is also 
 perfect silence upon the fact that most of the invasions 
 of France proceeded from the East, and that Prussia 
 was foremost in them. In their conversations France is 
 the great disturber. On the occasion of the marriage 
 of the Grand Duke of Flesse-Darmstadt and the daughter 
 of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, the Kaiser and Queen Vic- 
 toria of England were present as well as the Crown 
 Prince of Russia. Everyone talked of peace, but France 
 was spoken of as the only one to arm, when her arma- 
 ments were not one-half those of her antagonist.^ Such 
 was the talk of royalty and militaries, but the best in- 
 formed people must have been aware that France could 
 not be so dangerous even had she the designs ascribed 
 to her. In 1895, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary 
 of the victories of 1870, Germany resounded with uni- 
 versal displays of mustered patriotism keeping up the 
 animosity against the Byzantine and decadent Republic 
 beyond the Vosges. France, though not without re- 
 minders of her own victories but having no such celebra- 
 tions, was not infrequently wounded by these uncon- 
 
 MII, 117, 473. 
 =■ III, 123, 235-
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 65 
 
 trolled effusions of a patriotism raised to a white heat — 
 a patriotism that has two defects, one rests upon error 
 of facts, and the other leads astray by the cumulative 
 repetitions of the same fictitious and exaggerated 
 complaints, getting further and further away from 
 truth. 
 
 In 1895, as Bismarck reached his eightieth birthday, 
 the people of Germany organized a great celebration. 
 They wished to honor the man who, in their eyes, had so 
 splendidly served and enlarged the fatherland. They 
 resorted in large numbers to the great Recluse's place 
 of exile, Friedrichsruh. The Kaiser, perhaps conscious 
 of his former unkindness, or anxious to be forgiven 
 by the masses for his injustice towards the former 
 " standard bearer " of Germany, attended the celebration, 
 and presented him with a sword with " Alsace-Lorraine " 
 inscribed on it.^ The Emperor could find no better way 
 to honor this old broken-down servant of the Empire 
 than to bring him a sword on which was an inscription 
 equally harrowing to the feelings of Alsatians and of 
 Frenchmen. He sought to have his unkind treatment of 
 the old servant forgotten by referring to the bloodshed 
 at Mars-la-Tour.- This did not soothe the wounded 
 feelings of the old Dictator. Henceforth to the end he 
 fought the New Order, attacked the policy of von Capri vi, 
 maligned some of the men who in the past had been his 
 docile tools, revealed his dishonest treaties with Austria 
 and Russia, and showed the depth of his rancor against 
 those who deposed him from what he had considered his 
 omnipotent and eternal seat of Power. Even then he 
 never ceased to show his resentment against the 
 
 ' III, 128, 714. 
 » III, 128, 715.
 
 66 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 land upon which he seemed to have concentrated his 
 hatred.^ 
 
 The Kaiser continued in the same course. In 1897, as 
 he addresses his brother Henry, at Kiel, before his 
 departure for China, he cannot refrain from reminding 
 him that the step which he is taking is a consequence of 
 the great victories of 1870 and the establishment of the 
 Empire which followed.^ In the autumn of that year, 
 on another anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, his 
 monotonous speech again recalled the conflict with the 
 western enemies of the fatherland. At the following 
 anniversary, he once more reminds his hearers of the 
 work which his father and grandfather accomplished in 
 building the German Empire — for him and for his sub- 
 jects to do this was to crush France. On April 2'], 1903, 
 while President Loubet was expressing pacific senti- 
 ments — and they were heartfelt — at a banquet in Naples, 
 the Kaiser was making a most belligerent speech in 
 Karlsruhe. " The recollection of the grand period when 
 the German people has accomplished its unity, the 
 memory of the battles of Woerth, of Wissembourg, of 
 Sedan, the remembrance of the outburst of joy with 
 which the Grand Duke of Baden greeted the first Em- 
 peror of Germany will deepen the conviction that God 
 will help us." ^ Four days later at Mayence and two 
 weeks later at Saarbriicken, his orations deserve the 
 famous saying of Alphonse Karr, Plus ga change plus 
 c'est toujours la mcme chose. The battle of Leipsic, 
 not those in which the King of Prussia, betraying other 
 German states, was on the side of Napoleon, stands fore- 
 
 ' Le Temps, April 10, 1896. 
 ' Gauss, p. 1 18. 
 *Mevil, p. 152.
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 6y 
 
 most. In 1913, it was to be celebrated with signal eclat, 
 as the centennial of the great event which was also the 
 twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign. An accident to a 
 Zeppelin prevented the carrying out of his plans. The 
 destruction of this aircraft, entailing the loss of the 
 lives of twenty-seven ofificers and men, hindered him from 
 attending the proposed historic celebration. It is prob- 
 able that this distressing casualty saved France from 
 being reminded once more of what Louis XIV and 
 Napoleon T, the French Kaisers of old, had done. Again 
 and again, he utters what was, in his eyes, an incentive 
 to German patriotism, and a challenge to France, as when 
 he speaks of his grandfather, " the great Emperor Wil- 
 liam." " Let us not forget that he lived through and 
 remembered Jena and Tilsit, and that, nevertheless, he 
 never despaired of the future of the Fatherland. From 
 Tilsit we traveled to Versailles." ^ Yes, but that was 
 not the first time. This idee fixe of the Kaiser is so 
 deeply rooted in him, that, in sending a message of apol- 
 ogy to Sir Edward Goschen for the insults to which the 
 English Ambassador had been subjected when war was 
 declared, he could not avoid making a reference to 
 Waterloo. 
 
 All along, the German Government had been increasing 
 the power of its army to vast proportions, frightening 
 the people into consent by the process that we have 
 mentioned. Now it was the turn of the navy. Everyone 
 knows that no armada was threatening Germany, that 
 her great commercial fleet was plowing the oceans, in 
 every direction, with complete liberty and increasing suc- 
 cess. After the Franco-German war her ambition was 
 in Europe, but now the field of her aspirations is the 
 ' Gauss, p. 230.
 
 68 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 world. Then she justified her armaments on the basis of 
 French danger ; later on, of Russian and Danish danger ; 
 now the enemy is also England, " the great robber-state." 
 She cultivates hatred of Britons. She had long ex- 
 pressed contempt and indifference for colonies. Bis- 
 marck went so far as to oppose colonists. This Dr. Carl 
 Peters knew by a painful experience.^ About the time 
 of the foundation of the Empire, Bismarck said, " For 
 us in Germany, this colonial business would be just like 
 the silken sables in the noble families of Poland, who 
 have no shirt to their backs." ^ Then the Germans 
 wished merely to develop their military, their industrial 
 life at home, their commerce abroad, and that they did 
 with a felicity applauded everywhere by all men who 
 admire success. Other Powers turned their eyes toward 
 unoccupied fields and made stupendous sacrifices for 
 distant territorial expansion. They had not attained the 
 goal reached by their German competitors in military, 
 industrial and commercial matters, but had legitimately 
 entered into possession of colonies. Towards 1880 the 
 attitude of Germany changed. In 1884, the Cameroon 
 country was seized. In 1885, German Southwest Africa 
 and German East Africa were annexed. The Caro- 
 line Islands shared the same fate. Longing for more 
 she cast her eyes upon the possessions of others. 
 According to German cant, she would not attack any- 
 one, she dreamed of no conquests, of no increase 
 of territory, if we heed von Billow. However, he un- 
 covers the pot aux roses when he says, " Between 
 the Greater Britain and the New France we have a 
 
 ' Saunders, George, Builder and Blunderer, p. 16. 
 ' Lowe, vol. II, p. 209.
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 69 
 
 right to a Greater Germany," ^ and that is doubtless 
 what the Kaiser calls " a place in the sun." ^ This simply 
 means that as there are no more unclaimed territories, 
 Germany is entitled to those of others. 
 
 In 1898, the Kaiser visited Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the 
 cruel murderer of the Armenians and of some peoples 
 of the Balkans. The imperial visitor kissed him and 
 called him " brother." Indeed " a kind of political and 
 personal brotherhood was sworn between the two mon- 
 archs, and lasted through the later horrors of the 
 Sultan's reign until he was deposed by the revolution." ^ 
 There is no need of saying that this comedy on the 
 part of the Christian Kaiser was royally paid for. It 
 was then that were negotiated the proposals of the 
 Bagdad railroad and were secured privileges which have 
 developed into a stupendous mortgage over the whole 
 Turkish Empire. French prerogatives and concessions 
 were arbitrarily revoked. British and French influences 
 in Constantinople were reduced to nought. His visit to 
 Jerusalem marked a new departure. He virtually as- 
 serted a religious protectorate over the Moslem world 
 and announced his determination to disregard that which 
 France had carried on for centuries in connection with 
 the Catholic Church. For a long time she w^ent beyond 
 the religious world and protected Christian travelers in 
 the Levant and the Far East as well as the members 
 of the Orthodox Church now shielded by Russia. She 
 has the right, recognized and defended by the Holy See, 
 to look after all the Catholic institutions as well as after 
 groups of Eastern Catholics, the Maronites, the Melchites, 
 
 • III, 157, 234. 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 181. 
 
 • Saunders, G., Builder and Blunderer, p. 74.
 
 70 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 the Chaldean and Armenian Catholics.^ The fact that, 
 until recently, she furnished as many missionaries as 
 all the Catholics of the world put together, gave promi- 
 nence to them. It was thought that the national pro- 
 tectorate was the cause of the influence exerted, while it 
 was due much more to the fact that France has ever been 
 fertile in men of genuine apostleship. Also the Govern- 
 ment gave subsidies to missions when most of their 
 work was educational and philanthropic. This protec- 
 torate was approved by the Pope and to some extent 
 was under his authority, but the institution itself rests, 
 with most states, upon international agreements.^ This 
 protective function doubtless increased French prestige 
 among the Orientals and did much good, though Free- 
 Thinkers are generally opposed to it. They do not ques- 
 tion the gains accruing thereby to general civilization, 
 but the whole system seems to them an anachronism. 
 
 The Kaiser while in the Holy City announced not only 
 a similar protectorate over Pan-Islamism, but that he had 
 rejected, as far as German priests were concerned, this 
 French Catholic protectorate. The Berlin Congress had 
 recognized in all Powers the right to protect their own 
 subjects, but the same article states " that the rights 
 acquired by France are continued, and that it is well 
 understood that no breach could be made in the status quo 
 of the holy places " ^ in Jerusalem. It was doubtless the 
 right of the Kaiser to act as he did, but it may be doubted 
 if he would have done so had not the protecting state 
 
 ' Le Temps, Nov. 22, 191 2. 
 
 ' De Lancssan, J. L., Les missions et leur protcctorat, Paris, 
 1907, p. 6. In this work the author has treated the subject with 
 great fairness and rare competence though not with much sym- 
 pathy. 
 
 ' Article 62.
 
 THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 71 
 
 been France. Be that as it may, a first fruit of this new 
 pohcy, January, 1897, was the taking of Kiao-Chou in 
 China, under the pretext that two German missionaries 
 had been massacred by the Celestials. The first act of 
 this protectorate was the taking of Chinese lands. This 
 new departure, unimportant in itself, was a part of the 
 unfriendly and aggressive course pursued against Paris 
 by his Government. It did not stop there. France was 
 anxious that Cardinal Rampolla, the liberal Secretary 
 of State under Leo XIII, should be elevated to the visible 
 headship of the Church. This aim had no international 
 bearing. It was thought by the Government that he alone 
 could have kept the French Clergy within proper bounds, 
 and he most probably would have averted the separation 
 of Church and State which Pius X unquestionably pre- 
 cipitated.^ Austria had given France the assurance that 
 she would not raise any opposition to the election of the 
 Cardinal, but at the last hour she sent in her veto.^ This 
 was done at the request of the German Government. 
 
 The constant nettling and ruffling of French feelings 
 was exasperating. The Kaiser's speech of the " mailed 
 fist," his hypocritical plea for " a place in the sun," the 
 clamor for a greater Germany, the assertion that, with- 
 out the German Emperor, no great decision dare hence- 
 forth be taken, his intoxication of power and his out- 
 spoken desire of domination made the French feel that 
 they had on their eastern frontier a great personal source 
 of danger. In 1900, he declared that the troops which 
 had gone to China were destined to " show that the arm 
 of the German Emperor reached to the farthest ends 
 
 ' See Bracq, J. C, France Under the Republic, 1910, pp. 290 
 iand 312. 
 
 ' Mevil, A., Op. cit., p. 114.
 
 ^2 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 of the earth." ^ Similarly the book of Prince von Biilow, 
 Imperial Germany, which reflects the national aspirations, 
 is the work of a man overwrought with the sense of 
 German might and who can scarcely conceal the determi- 
 nation to use it against someone. " Bismarck," says 
 Novicow, " had to do a stupendous work to bring the 
 Prussian people to the policy of violence which rendered 
 possible the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870." ^ Since then 
 the German leaders, thoroughly Prussianized, have even 
 intensified this policy of " Blood and Iron," but they can 
 no longer pose as men of peace. Books like, Usher, R. 
 G., Pan-Germanism; Fouillee, A., Psychologie des 
 peuples enropeens; Cramb, J. A., Germany and England 
 or Villard, O. G., Germany Embattled have made such a 
 comedy impossible. 
 
 * Saunders, Op. cit., p. 100. 
 
 * Op. cit., p. 369.
 
 VI 
 
 A GERMAN QUARREL ^ 
 
 Meanwhile, France, after the period of just indigna- 
 tion, and hatred of her soulless conquerors, witnessed a 
 most remarkable movement making for international 
 comity which would have ultimately worked out a recon- 
 ciliation between her and Germany had not the latter 
 so acted as to deprive it of its potential efficiency. The 
 old idealistic traditions of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, the 
 teachings of Saint-Simonians, the new education fostered 
 and expanded by the Republic, the scientific movement, 
 as well as the tendencies of philosophy, travel and the 
 wide dissemination of intelligence, had profoundly af- 
 fected French democracy. The movement was inter- 
 national to some extent, but nowhere was it more earnest 
 than in the land of Voltaire and Hugo. The moral sense 
 of the nation recoiled from the ideals of militarists, and 
 from the thought of the international murders that we 
 call war. Fashoda, which at other times might have left 
 a century of bitter memories, because the nation had 
 reached a higher conception of international comity, ulti- 
 mately led France and England to deal with each other 
 in the new spirit moving men everywhere toward saner 
 international relations. The doctrine of pacifism had 
 now sunk deeply into the national consciousness. Social- 
 ists and Radicals, led by what the writer calls a Christian 
 
 ' Popular French saying in speaking of a quarrel without 
 cause. 
 
 73
 
 74 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 humanism, made these principles central in their political 
 propaganda. The Liberals were equally earnest. The 
 Government was — and had to be — the expression of 
 national ideals and feelings and, as such, was forced to a 
 friendlier attitude toward all Powers — even Germany. 
 Jaures, assassinated by a fanatic of the old form of 
 narrow patriotism, would have died a happier man had 
 he seen progress made toward reconciliation with the 
 trans-Rhinean Power. 
 
 It was not the fear of Germany but the growth of a 
 more reasonable spirit among various states that led the 
 French Government to sign numerous treaties of arbi- 
 tration. King Edward, ever a friend of France, fos- 
 tered better feelings in his own country and paid a visit to 
 President Loubet which was returned by the latter. This 
 was followed by reciprocal courtesies of the fleets, of 
 municipalities and of the members of the two Parlia- 
 ments. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, the great friend 
 of peace with honor, or rather of peace with justice, 
 the man who had persuaded President Roosevelt to stop 
 the boycott against the court at The Hague by referring a 
 case to it, organized a group of members of Parliament in 
 view of giving unity and support to the peace ideals of the 
 nation. Meanwhile the two Governments were discuss- 
 ing the imperative Anglo-French difficulties that urgently 
 demanded a solution. Old and diverse were these inter- 
 national problems. M. Delcasse, one of the most dis- 
 tinguished statesmen that France has produced, was 
 the embodiment of conciliation. He laid stress upon the 
 fact that it was easier to solve twenty difficulties 
 than one, because in most problems it is a question 
 of give and take. He and Lord Lansdowne started with 
 the new and advanced point of view that, in their at-
 
 A GERMAN QUARREL 75 
 
 tempts to reach an understanding, each would leave to 
 her competitor what meant most to her. Thus, in New- 
 foundland, the French Shore was far more important 
 for England than for France. In Egypt, freedom of 
 action was of more value to Great Britain than to her 
 neighbor. In these countries, and at other points, France 
 yielded to her. Similarly, Morocco meant more for 
 France than for England, and so, with definite restric- 
 tions, France secured a free hand there. As a whole 
 this adjustment was not only equitable but mutually con- 
 siderate. When on April 8, 1904, it was made public, it 
 failed to satisfy the jingoes of both countries, but peace- 
 ful men everywhere breathed more freely, and felt that 
 a great step forward had been taken by the two Govern- 
 ments for their own peace and that of the world. If the 
 most difficult Anglo-French contentions could thus be 
 settled calmly and peacefully by the new diplomacy, then 
 any international entanglement might be. A great moral 
 victory had been won on the side of reason and 
 conscience. 
 
 The German authorities were hostile to the method and 
 to its results. In fact they were skeptical in reference to 
 the possibility of an Anglo-French Agreement. Many 
 of them would have been happy to see the two nations on 
 opposite sides of the Strait of Dover cross swords. The 
 hostility of the two countries was a fundamental postulate 
 of German diplomacy. The Egyptian stick, that Bis- 
 marck prided himself to use sometimes in striking Eng- 
 land and sometimes in annoying France, was no more.^ 
 A conversation of M. Delcasse with Prince Radolin, 
 telling him of the nature of the transaction, had failed to 
 
 ' Mevil, A., De la paix de Francfort a la Conference d'Alge- 
 siras, p. 146.
 
 76 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 bring conviction. France and England waited seventeen 
 days, during which Germany made no objection, before 
 signing the celebrated treaty. It was only then that Wil- 
 helmstrasse saw that this Anglo-French Agreement was 
 a reality.^ The attitude of the German Government had 
 two phases. First, Chancellor von Biilow made no oppo- 
 sition to it. On April 12, he said, and rightly too : " We 
 have no reason to suppose that that agreement is directed 
 against any Power whatsoever. It seems to be an at- 
 tempt to cause to disappear a series of dissents existing 
 between France and England by a friendly understand- 
 ing. From the point of view of German interests, we 
 have nothing to object." ^ " We have before all," he 
 states again, " commercial interests there, and so it is of 
 much moment for us that calm and order should pre- 
 vail in Morocco. We must protect our mercantile 
 interests there and we shall protect them. We have 
 no cause to fear that they could be disregarded by any 
 Power." 
 
 Let it be noticed that to introduce " calm and order " 
 was the task assumed by France. Furthermore, by her 
 position and experience, she was better prepared than 
 any other people to do that work. When Count 
 Reventlow criticizes the Anglo-French Agreement, from 
 a Pan-Germanistic point of view, the Chancellor heaps 
 cutting sarcasms upon him and defends the stand which 
 he has taken.^ Six months later the German Secretary 
 of State assures the French representative, M. Bihourd, 
 that Germany has only economic interests in Morocco.* 
 
 ^ Mevil, pp. 145-148. 
 ' Ibid., p. 153. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 158. 
 
 * Yellow Book, document 192, p. 167.
 
 A GERMAN QUARREL yy 
 
 On the 29th of the following March, the Chancellor has 
 become the Jupiter Tonans of German politics. Herr 
 Bebel, opposed to an aggressive policy, accuses him of 
 having changed his position. He answers, " I must re- 
 mind him that the language and attitude of diplomatists 
 and politicians are regulated by circumstances." In 
 1914, the Great Statesman, speaking of the Anglo-French 
 Agreement retrospectively, says, " Just at this time 
 France was preparing to injure us in Morocco." ^ " In 
 certain French circles the original object was to ignore 
 Germany." ^ It was " the high-handed policy of France 
 in Morocco which threatened to ignore German industrial 
 and commercial interests as well as our national credit." ^ 
 Ever thinking more of Germany than of the facts of 
 the case, he continues, " The treaty was indirectly aim- 
 ing at injuring the latter country." * " French Moroccan 
 policy was an attempt to set Germany aside in an im- 
 portant decision on foreign affairs, an attempt to adjust 
 the balance of power in favor of France." ^ The first 
 utterances of the Chancellor were the calm answer of a 
 statesman who, though disappointed by the fact that 
 France and England had become reconciled, and that 
 France and Italy had become friends again, spoke cheer- 
 fully of the Agreement. 
 
 Again the new relations with Italy w^ere due largely 
 to the broad and noble spirit of M. Delcasse as well as 
 that of Marquis de Visconti-Venosta, who had recognized 
 the artificiality and burdensome character of the Triplice. 
 The renewal of the Triple Alliance, in 1902, had been 
 
 * Imperial Germany, p. 44. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 102. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 93. 
 
 * P. 95. 
 » P. 98.
 
 78 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 freed from clauses which were threatening for France.'^ 
 Sig. Prinetti, in the Itahan Parliament, and M. Delcasse, 
 in the Chamber of Deputies, asserted that the unfriendly 
 Bismarcko-Crispinian elements of the Treaty had dis- 
 appeared. France, previously hurt by the former Italian 
 ungratefulness, could have said, " He that is not with 
 me is against me," but now, satisfied with the Franco- 
 Italian treaty, settling the Mediterranean questions, and 
 with the modification of the Triplice, she could say, " He 
 that is not against me is on our part." The speech of 
 the Kaiser at Karlsruhe showed not only his ill-feeling 
 toward the Franco-Italian rapprochement but seemed to 
 imply that he did not admit of a policy for other peoples 
 not sanctioned by Germany. Von Biilow was aware of 
 the cooling of the Triplician zeal of Italy, but he did not 
 think that she was flirting with France. He referred to 
 it in a witty form : this was merely " un simple tour de 
 valse." 
 
 The evolution of English mind and feelings could not 
 be disposed of with a joke. England, walking hand in 
 hand with France, was a fact contrary to all German 
 anticipations, and, ascribing motives like their own to 
 the two participants, there was opened before them the 
 vision of contingencies that were not absolutely pleasant. 
 Italy's partial escape from the Dreihund was bad enough, 
 and the change that had come over England was most 
 serious, but both, taken together, justified a certain 
 anxiety that the Chancellor would not admit. Further- 
 more, public opinion, favorable to a rapid policy of ex- 
 pansion, was annoyed by what seemed a failure. The 
 resolutions voted on March 20, 1904, at Esslingen, by 
 * Mevil, Op. cit., p. 123.
 
 A GERMAN QUARREL 79 
 
 the Pan-Germanists of Wurtemberg/ the address voted 
 on May 2^, at Stettin, by the Colonial Society ^ and the 
 unanimous resolutions of the Pan-Germanist Union, 
 June 3, at Lubeck,^ urged the Government to take an 
 aggressive stand in Morocco. The opponents of the 
 Chancellor taunted him in the Reichstag for what 
 seemed a diplomatic defeat. All this doubtless contrib- 
 uted to his right-about-face and his new pugnacious 
 stand. 
 
 The attitude of mind and soul which had led the 
 French to work for the Anglo-French Agreement also 
 practically led them to what was a virtual disarmament. 
 Russia had been defeated in September, 1904, and by 
 March, 1905, she was crushed at the hands of the 
 Japanese without any hope of recovery. England was 
 but loosely pledged to stand by France, which was in the 
 throes of the separation of Church and State. This was 
 the time when, at the request of von Bulow,* the Kaiser 
 went to Tangier and made the speech which was meant 
 to exasperate France and England, and possibly to bring 
 on a fearful war. 
 
 The writer loves the sincerely religious of all creeds, 
 and the earnest worshipers at all shrines, but he dreads 
 the pious effusions of German political leaders. Bis- 
 marck, notwithstanding the mutilation of the Ems dis- 
 patch and many other villainous performances, said, 
 " We Germans fear God and nothing else in the 
 world." ^ Von Bulow naturally turns to religious gush. 
 
 ' Yellow Book, doc. 141, p. 121. 
 ' Ibid., doc. 162, p. 136. 
 
 * Ibid., doc. 166, p. 138. 
 
 * V, 26, 269; von Billow, Op. cit., p. 98; Tardieu, A., France 
 and the Alliances, p. 24. 
 
 Mil, 103, 885.
 
 8o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 He speaks of the " happy dispensation of Providence " * 
 and of what " Providence has granted us." ^ In a speech 
 at Bremen, on March 22, 1905, the Kaiser urged his 
 hearers " to hold fast to the conviction that our God 
 would never have taken such pains with our German 
 Fatherland and its people, if he had not been preparing 
 us for something greater." Then, with characteristic 
 German contradiction of pride and humility, he adds, 
 " We are the salt of the earth, but we must also be 
 worthy to be so." ^ Nine days later, the Kaiser reached 
 Tangier, in great pomp, to perform the task laid upon 
 him by his Chancellor. There are evidences that he hesi- 
 tated long, and that even after he had reached Tangier 
 he dreaded the fatal words that might bring about the 
 irretrievable. At last he made his speech. " 1 am 
 pleased," he said, " to make the acquaintance of the 
 pioneers of Germany to Morocco and to be able to tell 
 them that they have done their duty. 
 
 " Germany has great commercial interests here. I 
 shall advance and protect our commerce, which shows a 
 satisfying increase, and for that reason shall insist upon 
 equal rights with all Powers, which is only possible 
 through the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independ- 
 ence of the country. For Germany both of these must 
 be unquestioned, and I am, therefore, ready to intervene 
 for them at all times. 
 
 " I hope that my visit to Tangier declares this 
 plainly and emphatically and that it will call forth the 
 conviction that what Germany undertakes in Morocco 
 
 ^ Op. cit., p. 12. 
 ' Ibid., p. 297. 
 • Gauss, p. 239.
 
 A GERMAN QUARREL 8i 
 
 will be negotiated exclusively with the sovereign Sul- 
 tan." ^ 
 
 In all, the Kaiser was two hours in Morocco,^ but, 
 had nothing else happened, his speech would have put 
 back the potential reconciliation of France and Germany 
 for half a century. The speech was interpreted every- 
 where as a menace both to France and to England.^ 
 What made his statements unpardonable is that he did 
 not frankly state the deep underlying motive of his 
 course, and that what he said was largely untrue. The 
 " great commercial interests " of Germany amounted to 
 9,500,000 of francs a year on the basis of the returns 
 of the four preceding years. France and Algeria had a 
 trade of 33,000,000 and England 31,000,000.* Professor 
 Gauss neatly stated the case when he said that German 
 " trade there did not amount to as much as that of an 
 ordinary department store or to that of a fairly successful 
 merchant." ° 
 
 At first the Germans claimed to have none but ex- 
 clusively economic interests in that country, but if that 
 had been true' the Tangier Speech was the greatest pos- 
 sible blunder. " The German Government," says Novi- 
 cow, " has caused a stagnation of affairs which has made 
 its subjects lose ten times more money than the trade 
 with Morocco would have brought them in a century." ^ 
 The twaddle about the " sovereign Sultan " does not bear 
 examination. As to the absolute disregard of Germany 
 in the Anglo-French Settlement, it is true that the Quai 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 242. 
 ' v., 2(5, 946. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 9SO. 
 
 * Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, p. 499. 
 
 • Op. cit., p. 241. 
 
 • Op. cit., p. 228.
 
 82 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 d'Orsay had made no formal notification to Germany, 
 but M. Delcasse, with perfect correctness of manner 
 and frankness, had communicated the substance of the 
 Agreement to Prince RadoHn, the German Ambassador 
 in Paris, a fortnight before it was signed.^ In the French 
 Yellow Book one is obhged to recognize that the great 
 Prime-minister had not forwarded an official communica- 
 tion of the document to the German Ambassador, though 
 he had made an informal one." It is certain that Wil- 
 helmstrasse knew all about it. Berlin waited a whole 
 year, made no remonstrances, friendly or otherwise, 
 showed not even those cant courtesies upon which states 
 and individuals are so punctilious in the case of strained 
 relations. In June, 1905, " the Germans," says M. 
 Tardieu, " knew that M. Rouvier was willing to do more 
 than pay the price of their good- will in Morocco." ^ If 
 Germany's intentions were peaceful why did she not 
 speak? Why did she not ask explanations? Why did 
 she choose the moment when Russia was overpowered 
 by Japan, and when France was torn asunder by what 
 looked like a possible revolution, to spring forth like one 
 in ambush for a chance? Were there in the act of 
 France any valid reasons for a people bent upon peace 
 to abandon diplomatic action, and to resort to a theatrical, 
 discourteous threat like that of Tangier? None, none 
 whatsoever. The Tangier Speech was une querelle 
 d'Allemand. Professor Gauss puts this conclusion into a 
 neat English form : " Germany was evidently picking a 
 quarrel with France." * 
 
 ' v., 27, 948. 
 
 * Doc. 142, p. 122. 
 
 * France and the Alliances, p. 187. 
 
 * Op. cit., p. 240.
 
 VII 
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 
 
 Almost all the German references to French colonies, 
 since the beginning of the present war, have been greatly 
 misleading. The colonial expansion of France has been 
 determined both by her history and by her environments. 
 For over three centuries, she has done colonial work 
 more and more appreciated by all. The countries which 
 have come under her sway during the last eighty years 
 have, in part at least, been forced upon her, and that is 
 particularly true of North Africa. She purged the Medi- 
 terranean Sea of Algerian pirates who seized her vessels, 
 as well as those of other countries, and even descended 
 upon her coast, carrying ofif men and women as slaves to 
 Algiers. The first action of France was no more of a 
 conquering nature than that of Commodore Decatur at 
 Tripoli. However, she felt compelled to push her action 
 further. The Algerian conquest was long, ever to be 
 renewed, and when it was considered ended it had to be 
 begun again. She, at times, contemplated giving up the 
 task. In the last days of the Orleanists, P. Christian 
 published his Afrique franQoise, in which he eloquently 
 protested against such a fatal consummation. Today 
 Algeria is one of the finest colonies of the world. This 
 led, perhaps not by straight roads but led, to the pro- 
 tectorate over Tunis. The depredations of its inhabitants 
 upon the Algerian frontier and the movements which led 
 
 83
 
 84 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Austria to Bosnia, England to Cyprus, doubtless con- 
 tributed to accelerate this action. 
 
 The expansion of the North African and of the West 
 African colonies in their hinterland brought about the 
 creation of a colonial dominion extending from the Medi- 
 terranean to the Congo. Not to speak of her other 
 colonial possessions, some of which date from the seven- 
 teenth century, France has, there at her very door, an 
 extensive colonial empire,^ though some of these terri- 
 tories seem to have but a trifling value. This shows the 
 unreliable character of the statements of learned 
 Germans, American university professors, when they 
 tabulated colonial reports and said that since 1870 she 
 had increased her colonies by so many square miles and 
 Germany by only so many. What is the value of 
 thousands of square miles of Saharan sands? Nations, 
 like individuals, have their course determined by their 
 aptitudes and uses of opportunities. Germany chose 
 military, industrial and commercial power, and when she 
 has attained a goal far in advance of others in these 
 domains she comes and asks those who have toiled in 
 other directions to give up the fruits of their efforts. 
 She asks it in a brutal way, as by the Tangier Speech. 
 Again, nations may have an especial policy like that of 
 England of old in Newfoundland, where her fisheries 
 were reserved for English fishermen from home, and 
 thereby increasing the number of her seamen, and 
 through that developing the greatest navy that the world 
 has ever seen. However, when Britain no longer found 
 it profitable to follow her former course she could not 
 ask the French, in Newfoundland, except by special 
 
 ' See Bracq, J. C, The Colonial Expansion of France, National 
 Geographic Magazine, vol. XI, no. 6, June, 1900.
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 85 
 
 agreement, as was done, to surrender prerogatives shaped 
 by the first pohcy. Similarly, Germany was signally in- 
 different to colonies for a long time, and now she is 
 bitter because she has not done what others did. 
 
 Unquestionably, Morocco looked to her like a desirable 
 field for a colony and to the French it seemed, at first, 
 like a most enviable morsel to be added to the French 
 colonial empire. There were, however, such dangers 
 associated with it that the most thoughtful Frenchmen 
 were averse to such an acquisition. On other grounds, 
 Socialists and Radicals clamored against the idea of 
 having either a protectorate over it, or of proceeding to 
 its annexation. Its general condition was forlorn. 
 Anarchy reigned supreme. In the eyes of all, govern- 
 ment meant violence and plunder. The Sultan had lost 
 almost all his power. To reconquer it for him, or to 
 win it for France, looked like a gigantic task. Generally, 
 Frenchmen were opposed to any form of action which 
 would lead even to a partial control. They found a great 
 danger in the very extension of this French Mediter- 
 ranean colonial Power. North Africa is peopled by a 
 very capable militant population ever ready to resort to 
 arms. Formerly, these North Africans, divided among 
 themselves, were in a continual state of civil war, and 
 security to the outside world came from their intense 
 particularism. With French rule, they have, willy-nilly, 
 lived under the pax Gallicana and some of their sons 
 have acquired considerable French culture through the 
 lycecs and the Medersas for the Islamic Clergy. These 
 natives, formerly at variance with each other, have, in 
 later times, shown signs of a growing common moral and 
 religious consciousness. There is among the most intel- 
 ligent a sense of oneness which has never existed before.
 
 86 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Their belligerent spirit, which has been weakened by the 
 new life introduced by France, is frequently reawakened 
 by appeals from Mohammedan communities outside or 
 by local fanatics, A secret Moslem society, the Maghre- 
 binian Union, with headquarters at Alexandria, has long 
 worked to unite the Pan-Islamic forces in North Africa 
 under the auspices of Germany.^ 
 
 The annexation of Morocco would have accentuated 
 the evil. Before long, according to an eminent authority, 
 M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, there would be 14,000,000 
 Arabs and Kabyls against, at most, 1,150,000 to 1,200,000 
 Europeans, and thirty Moslems for one Frenchman.^ 
 This increase might imperil French colonies. Further- 
 more, Jaures and his followers made the most violent 
 opposition to the taking of Morocco in any way whatso- 
 ever.^ There was no national desire to possess that 
 territory, but when it became evident that the Germans 
 were aiming at a foothold there, the sense of a greater 
 danger loomed up. The aggressive spirit of the Ger- 
 mans, so dangerous in Europe, would be even more so 
 in Africa. The French army in Algeria, and Tunisia, 
 would have to be increased, and the chances of German- 
 French friction would be multiplied. To quote the words 
 of Sir Thomas Barclay, a man very friendly to Germany, 
 writing before the present war, " Beyond the latent feel- 
 ing about the lost provinces, there was at the time no 
 hostility on the part of Frenchmen to Germany." * Look- 
 ing at the matter calmly — for the population of France 
 exhibited a great deal of self-control at this time — it was 
 
 * Le Temps, Nov. 2, 1912. 
 ' V, 43, 22. 
 
 * V, 43, 709- 
 
 * Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 267.,
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 87 
 
 better to take chances with the Arabs and the Kabyls than 
 with the men who were clamoring for the " Greater Ger- 
 many," and complained that their territories were insuf- 
 ficient for all their needs; as if all progressive nations did 
 not depend upon other countries to supply some of the 
 increased wants created by our civilization. 
 
 England was compelled to take the same attitude as 
 France, and for many similar reasons. She had more 
 than four times greater economic interests there ^ than 
 the Germans. She had and could have kept her ascend- 
 ency over the Sultan. Englishmen had done much for 
 the introduction of Western civilization in that country. 
 There was also the question of Gibraltar. England could 
 hardly have countenanced the establishment of the hel- 
 meted men on the opposite shore. As someone has said, 
 " Morocco was mortgaged with the question of the 
 Strait " ^ guarded by the impregnable English fortress. 
 Spain, somewhat cramped between two strong neighbors, 
 did not wish to see the advent of a third one, Germany. 
 An entente with the Castilian Government was recorded 
 on October 6, 1904. Italy had already approved the 
 Anglo-French Agreement as a compensation for a free 
 hand in Tripoli. The unanimity of these Powers grew 
 out of the fact that this was the culminating point of a 
 great historic status, during which the nations had made 
 great sacrifices and through which the world had been 
 greatly benefited. They were all at one about the es- 
 sential work to be done in Morocco, to put an end to an 
 impossible life there and to open the land to all. These 
 Powers recognized that France, on account of her posi- 
 tion and experience, was better equipped and better quali- 
 
 ' Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, p. 499. 
 ' Menil, Op. cit., p. 137.
 
 88 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 fied than any other Power for this work. Again Germany 
 had in former years showed a singular indifference to 
 the land of the Sultan. In 1880, Bismarck, in a report 
 to the Kaiser, said that Germany should encourage 
 France to go to Morocco.^ When the Count de Saint- 
 Vallier went to see him about the protectorate over 
 Tunis, he expressed the hope that France would also 
 annex Morocco. " We can but rejoice at that," ^ said 
 he. The land of the Kaiser, as we have seen, had but 
 scanty interests there, created by the recent emissaries 
 sent to prepare the way for the future action of her 
 Weltpolitik. 
 
 We have already said that Morocco was not really a 
 country with a regular government. There were only 
 sections of the territories that accepted fully the authority 
 of the Sultan, who at times seemed more like a mediaeval 
 baron robber than like a modern ruler. His sway was 
 at best nominal over the greater part of the land. His 
 subordinates did what they had seen their Prince prac- 
 tice and that in cruel ways. Absence of government and 
 lawlessness reigned supreme. Neither the property nor 
 the persons of the natives, nor the belongings nor the 
 persons of foreigners were in security. No one has 
 summed up the situation better than M. Andre Tardieu 
 when he says, " For the last ten centuries it has been the 
 lot of Moroccan vSultans to have continually to conquer 
 their subjects, and the special occupation of the subjects 
 has been that of disobeying their sovereigns. To tell the 
 truth, the notion of sovereignty does not exist. Where 
 there is no hierarchy, it is impossible that there should 
 be any moral notion attaching to revolt. Morocco is a 
 
 ' VI, 6, 718. 
 
 "* Matter, Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 512.
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 89 
 
 country of feudal and theocratic anarchy; and the dis- 
 turbances that have occurred there in recent times are 
 merely a fresh manifestation of tendencies that have 
 long existed. It is Europe alone which, first through 
 mental assimilation, and subsequently through political 
 interests, has created the unity of Morocco. In such 
 unity there has never been either reality or totality. 
 What does exist is a Moorish empire with which other 
 Powers treat ; but inside the empire one finds merely 
 tribes who, in battles or else in incessant negotiations, 
 seek their personal profit only." ^ To carry out his ag- 
 gressive purpose, the Kaiser maintained this fiction of a 
 government as if it had been real. 
 
 The Yellow Book published in December, 1905, is an elo- 
 quent defense of the friendly attitude of France toward 
 Morocco. A long list of grievances, plunders, murders 
 speaks well for the patience of the stronger Power.^ To 
 remedy this, France did not assail the Sultan, but en- 
 deavored to help him. On that long frontier of nearly a 
 thousand miles, after so many incursions of Moroccan 
 tribes and marauders into Algeria, she could have found 
 many pretexts for invasion. She had by the treaty of 
 1845 the " right of pursuit " whereby she could track 
 Moroccan intruders into the country. She had made 
 several punitive expeditions into the Sultan's territories,' 
 but as a whole she acted as a friend ready to help him to 
 solve his own difficulties. Several treaties show a mutual 
 understanding between the two Governments. The 
 amicable disposition of France is shown by the fact that 
 
 ' France and the Alliances, p. 108. 
 
 * See documents i, 3, 4, 25, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54, 67, 68, 79, 80, 83, 
 84, 114, 115, 118, 125, 128, 136, 144, 148, 221, 225, 240, 264. 
 •Tardieu, Op. cit., p. 115.
 
 90 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 several times she allowed the Sultan's troops to cross 
 her territory on the way to restore order ^ or Moroccan 
 subjects pursued by enemies to find refuge in Algeria.^ 
 She rendered many other services. 
 
 The French policy of peaceful penetration was already 
 being carried out at the beginning of this century. Some 
 French ofificers were endeavoring to put some order in 
 the Sherifian army at Fez. French customs ofificers were 
 organizing the fiscal service in the various parts. The 
 chief of police of Tangier was a Frenchman, his two 
 helpers were Algerian Moslems but appointed by the 
 Sultan. He was to decide upon who would be their 
 successors. This work was done quietly without hurt or 
 shock; it was to be an evolution and not a revolution.^ 
 The Anglo-French Agreement was really the continua- 
 tion of this which was already opposed at Fez by 
 German agents. The Sultan had borrowed some 
 money from French banks for important public works. 
 French officials had displayed much energy for the re- 
 lease of the American subject, Perdicaris, captured by 
 the brigand Raisuli. The most imperative and reason- 
 able reforms contemplated by the Agreement had re- 
 ceived at least a partial application. The French aim, 
 according to M. Tardieu, was directed by three guiding 
 principles, " Morocco's integrity, the Sultan's authority, 
 commercial liberty." ^ As M. Delcasse said, " Far from 
 lessening the Sultan's authority we were particularly 
 anxious to enhance his prestige." " We are endeavor- 
 ing to give the country (Morocco) security to assure 
 
 ' Yellow Book, docs. 26, 29, 69, 86, 92, 95, 97, 188. 
 " Ibid., docs. 59, 69, 124, 193, 201, 218, 250, 354. 
 ' Le Temps, Aug. 17, 1904. 
 * Op, cit., p. 120.
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 91 
 
 ours," hoping that it " would know our presence by the 
 benefits that would accompany it. France seeks her 
 advantages only in the harmony of interests and for the 
 benefit of all." ^ M. Delcasse has all along endeavored to 
 introduce a real idealism into international relations. No 
 French statesman, more than he, has shown the danger 
 from a narrow patriotism and a national selfishness. No 
 one ever was more opposed to the spirit of conquest and 
 domination according to the Bismarckian method. M. 
 Delcasse has been at one with modern sociologists who 
 have proclaimed the evil of national greed and the 
 beneficence of general good-will. In dealing with inter- 
 national problems, he always saw the reasonableness of 
 conflicting claims. In the spirit of conciliation he pro- 
 ceeded to just concessions. A Hay or a Root, only even 
 gentler, he wished to have French action permeated with 
 a lofty form of humanitarianism good for the Moroccans 
 as well as for the world at large. The Tangier Speech 
 put an end to all this. 
 
 On its own side, the German Government sent at once 
 Count von Tattenbach to Fez to work upon the feelings 
 of the Sultan." Agents in different parts of the country 
 tended to keep up national anarchy.^ As a matter of 
 fact Germany has generally been indifferent to the 
 wrongs endured by small and backward nations. She 
 did not side with the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Servians 
 or with any of the peoples so outrageously treated by 
 the Turks. She has ever been against the oppressed, 
 hand in hand with the massacrers. She never took an 
 important part in opposing indescribable wrongs in the 
 
 * Mevil, A., Op. cit., p. 174. 
 
 * V, 27, 236, 474. 
 
 * Ibid., 480.
 
 92 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Congo, or in the Turkish possessions, as the United 
 States, England and France have done. Philanthropic 
 considerations of the well-being of the natives in Morocco 
 never entered the mind of the Germans. Their repre- 
 sentatives posed as the defenders of Islamism. In his 
 address in Damascus the Kaiser spoke as the protector 
 of the Moslems. " May the Sultan," ^ he said, " and may 
 the 300,000,000 of Mohammedans throughout the world 
 who reverence him as their Caliph, be assured that at all 
 times the German Emperor will be their friend." ^ He 
 has been popularly presented to the Turks as " Hadji 
 Mohammed Guillioun." ^ It was therefore easy for Count 
 von Tattenbach, imitating his chief, to get close to the 
 Sultan of Morocco, to convince him that his country was 
 in the hands of the French, that the German Turcophiles 
 were his friends — he sadly learned the contrary later on 
 — ^and that they would be the deliverers of his empire. 
 He worked with him, and finally succeeded in convinc- 
 ing him of the importance of a European conference to 
 settle North African matters.^ 
 
 Meanwhile the German Government was seeking in 
 Paris to undermine and overthrow the great minister 
 who had made friends for France, and had introduced a 
 new spirit into international relations. All kinds of 
 falsehoods were circulated to show that France at Fez 
 had claimed to act by virtue of a mandate from Europe 
 — that she was about to send an ultimatum to the Sultan 
 demanding that he should accept French terms, — that 
 M. Delcasse had tried to form combinations against 
 
 * Abdul Hamid. 
 '^ Gauss, p. 129. 
 
 * Le Temps, Jan. 19, 1915. 
 
 * V, 2/, 951.
 
 FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 93 
 
 Germany, that he had done his work with England in an 
 underhanded way — charges which do not bear exami- 
 nation. There were threats softened by the suggestions 
 that if M. Delcasse were thrown overboard, Germany 
 would be more conciliatory. There were even hints of 
 war. Dernburgs were sent to Paris to conciliate the 
 Radicals and to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 removed. The official diplomacy of Prince Radolin was 
 supplemented by an officious one headed by Prince 
 Henckel von Donnersmark, who worked in every way to 
 win his point.^ The pacifists headed by M. Rouvier, 
 thinking that Germany was in earnest, sacrificed the 
 great minister.^ European opinion interpreted this act 
 as a victory of von Bulow. The great English dailies 
 expressed their regrets, and the Daily Chronicle had a 
 heading, " A Victory of the Kaiser." As soon as the 
 latter received the news of M. Delcasse's downfall he 
 drove in great haste to the residence of the aggressive 
 Chancellor, and announced to him his elevation to the 
 rank of Prince.^ 
 
 Before this there were two possible courses open to 
 the French Government. One was, with the help of 
 England, help that had been offered, to resist Germany. 
 This was the Delcasse policy which was rejected. The 
 other was to yield as much as possible to Wilhelmstrasse, 
 showing a spirit of peace at any price. This was the 
 course taken by M. Rouvier. France in her concessions 
 went to the borderland of cowardice, but that did not 
 modify the attitude of Prince von Biilow. As a matter 
 of fact Morocco was a mere pretext. What astonished 
 
 * Mevil, Op. cit., p. 273. 
 
 * Ihid., Chap. V. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 301.
 
 94 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 the yielders was that the Chancellor, having won his 
 point in the matter of the great Minister, was more than 
 ever pressing the Moroccan question, and demanding a 
 conference. Five days after the resignation of M. 
 Delcasse, Prince von Radolin had an interview with M. 
 Rouvier urging the question and concluding with these 
 threatening words, " You must know that we stand 
 behind Morocco." ^ 
 
 Von Biilow, appealing to various countries, had but 
 little encouragement. The Government in Washington, 
 after looking into the matter, asserted its disinterested- 
 ness in the question. President Roosevelt and Secretary 
 Taft gauged at once the true purpose of von Biilow.^ 
 Had the advice of M. Delcasse been followed a con- 
 ference would have been impossible. The Powers at 
 large, while perhaps not absolutely satisfied with every 
 part of the Agreement, approved it. The Quai d'Orsay 
 could not accept at once the idea of a conference. Its 
 inquiries from the defenders of the proposal as to the 
 specific aims and methods and the particular questions to 
 be discussed were met by a cold mutism and a suggestion 
 that France should inquire at Fez. This way of doing 
 was in perfect keeping with the previous action of Prince 
 von Biilow and in fact it was a new manner of waging 
 war. Before the Algeciras Conference, he had another 
 thrust at France, made another menacing speech in the 
 Reichstag, and asked more money for armaments upon 
 land and sea.^ The substance of the speech was a repeti- 
 tion of that of the Kaiser at Tangier. After all this, the 
 Kaiser, his Chancellor and the German provocators had 
 yet the monumental boldness to pose as friends of peace. 
 
 * Yellow Book, document 269, p. 232. 
 ' Mevil, p. 230. 
 
 ' V, 30, 954.
 
 VIII 
 
 FROM THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE TO THE 
 DELIVERANCE OF FEZ 
 
 M. RouviER had thought that Germany would yield 
 after the resignation of M. Delcasse, but she did not. 
 On the contrary she became more exacting, and finally 
 France accepted the principle of a conference which in 
 reality was nothing but a German intervention. This 
 conference convened at Algeciras on January i6, 1906. 
 The delegates of von Biilow had explicit instructions to 
 leave to France only the frontier, to give Spain the 
 Mediterranean coasts, to secure for Berlin or for Ger- 
 man allies or for some neutral Power the police of the 
 ocean. ^ For officers, they had Austria propose repre- 
 sentatives of neutral Powers that could easily be in- 
 fluenced, such as Switzerland or Holland.^ With the 
 beginning of the session the language of the German 
 Government was hard, imperious and menacing. Ger- 
 many wanted to dictate what should be done. She tried 
 hard to faire la pliiie et le beau temps. She rejected with 
 haughtiness ofifers of arbitration made by Italy, Russia, 
 America and Austria.^ Before the Conference the Ger- 
 mans endeavored to place their claims upon the basis 
 of the Conference of Madrid in 1880, but German jurists 
 were the first to discover that the Conference which 
 
 ' Berard, Op. cit., p. 212. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 213. 
 
 ' Tardieu, Op. cit., p. 202. 
 
 95
 
 96 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 dealt then with a special issue had no bearing upon the 
 present difficulty. 
 
 A striking change in the attitude of Germany is that 
 from the first she attempted to internationalize a problem 
 which really concerned three Powers, and this was done 
 by the most nationalistic nation of Europe. Novicow 
 has shown that " since 1871, the Germans have not, 
 with the exception of the postal-union, taken a single 
 step for the organization of Europe." ^ All at once, in 
 Algeciras, they were seized with zeal for the interests 
 of all. They began to talk of equal treatment as if 
 France had had no more rights in the land of Abd-el- 
 Aziz than Belgium, Holland and Sweden. Did not 
 England, with her peculiar position at Gibraltar, the key 
 to the avenue of her Eastern Empire, have more claims 
 than Germany in deciding what should be done with the 
 bankrupt and collapsed Moroccan state ? Was not Spain, 
 with her establishments on the coast of the country, more 
 concerned than the United States? Was the combined 
 work of France, England and Spain of no moment and 
 were the services which they had rendered to civilization 
 to give them no special recognition? Was Germany, so 
 long indifferent to colonies and never having done any- 
 thing on behalf of the Moroccans, entitled to the same 
 treatment as France, who had so long been annoyed by 
 her Moslem neighbors, and who, by treaty, enjoyed in 
 Morocco all the prerogatives of England as well as her 
 own? 
 
 After much useless opposition the agents of von 
 
 Billow were forced by the spirit of the Conference to 
 
 admit France's special rights. Italy, England, Russia, 
 
 the United States, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 243.
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 97 
 
 Holland, were thoroughly won over to the side 
 of Rouvier's representatives, while Morocco and 
 Austria were with Germany.^ This last statement must 
 be modified. M. Tardieu says that " although devoted 
 to Germany, she (Austria) could not go against plain 
 evidence, and had exercised a conciliatory action, which 
 now and again inclined distinctly in favor of France." ^ 
 Morocco was representing mere nominality and nullity 
 as a state. In spite of all, the representatives of the 
 Powers were under the impression that French claims 
 were as fair as they were moderate.^ Germany was at 
 times inconsistent. She recognized some special rights 
 to her antagonist in Morocco and at the same time 
 wished to secure the internationalization of everything. 
 She wanted to have a " general inspector " chosen from 
 the diplomatic corps of Tangier to look after Moroccan 
 matters and at the same time stood for the independence 
 of the Sultan.* Finally the Conference voted that France 
 and Spain should be intrusted with the work of pacifica- 
 tion and organization. 
 
 Most of the Powers realized that behind German 
 action there was a bold, aggressive and pugnacious pur- 
 pose, and so they decided on behalf of the two Powers 
 who had really the greatest interests at stake there. 
 Germany gained no prestige, but, rather, emerged crest- 
 fallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations. 
 There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Ger- 
 many could not have her " place in the sun." There was 
 intense bitterness against Russia,^ while Italy was 
 
 ' V, J-', 77. 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 203. 
 
 • V, 3^, 717. 
 
 * V, 3^, 718. 
 
 • V, 32, 957.
 
 98 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 greatly censured.^ What was more painful for Ger- 
 many than the fiasco of Algeciras was that she be- 
 gan to have misgivings about the Triplice. Italy was 
 in favor of an aUiance of peace, while Germany, by 
 her methods and action, was for a Triplice of 
 war. 
 
 The great German nation began to feel, what she had 
 so long imposed vipon France, a sense of isolation that 
 was positively depressing. Von Biilow, who kept up a 
 brave countenance, was obliged to recognize in a speech 
 in the Reichstag a certain entente cordiale of the Western 
 Powers unsympathetic to Germany and on that account 
 dangerous.^ A similar movement, inaugurated by Bis- 
 marck, the purpose of which was to isolate France, 
 was praised by Prince von Biilow, but this one which 
 menaced no one was characterized by him as follows : 
 " A policy which would have for its purpose to create 
 a ring of Powers to isolate and paralyze us would be a 
 very dangerous policy. The foundation of such a ring 
 is not possible unless there is exerted a certain pression ; 
 a pression creates a counter-pression ; pression and 
 counter-pression may easily produce explosions." ^ The 
 Entente was the child of the Dreihund, of the Triplice, 
 and above all of the violent and aggressive course of 
 Prince von Biilow. In his mind, the German coalitions 
 were legitimate, but a coalition of the other Powers was 
 wrong. For him the only international morals must be 
 German ethics. What is right for Deutschland is 
 wrong for some other country. Instead of recogniz- 
 ing that the cause of this international friction was 
 
 ^ V, 33, 218. 
 ' V, 36, 7^7- 
 * Quoted from Berard, Op. cit., p. 243.
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 99 
 
 himself, he concluded with the great expression of 
 Prussian faith in force, " Let us keep our sword 
 sharp." 1 
 
 The task intrusted to France was specially difficult, 
 as her government was censured alike by Jaures and his 
 supporters as well as by the Germans. She was doomed 
 to be blamed either for overdoing or for failing to do. 
 One fact, however, which we must notice is that the 
 privileges granted to France by the Powers at Algeciras 
 were not essentially different from the previous ones 
 assumed after the Agreement. If we examine the in- 
 structions given by M. Delcasse to M. Saint-Rene Tail- 
 landier when he went to Fez to announce to the Sultan 
 the great historic Anglo-French understanding, and if 
 we look at the Franco-Spanish Agreement of the same 
 year, both contain a pledge to respect " the integrity of 
 the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sul- 
 tan." 2 The mission of pacifying Morocco was rendered 
 harder by the Germans, who had excited the natives — 
 they who needed so little incentive to rise against any- 
 one — against the French. The German war-machine to 
 create public opinion in their favor, or against their 
 antagonists, the machine that sent Dernburg to the United 
 States, Baron von Schenk to Athens, Prince von Biilow 
 to Italy, that has secured members of the German Em- 
 bassy to help Dr. Dumba to disorganize American in- 
 dustries, that has sent emissaries to India, to Egypt, to 
 Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and especially to the colonies of 
 France and Great Britain,^ was at work and carried 
 on efforts to make the French task impossible. 
 
 ' V, 36, 718. 
 
 * Tardieu, A., Op. cit., p. 102. 
 
 * Le Temps J March 7, 27, and July 3, 191 5.
 
 loo THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 The natives were furious against these Frenchmen 
 whose aims were represented to them in sinister colors. 
 At all points in the Sultan's country, they were annoyed, 
 insulted, ill-treated and several lost their lives. Dr. 
 Mauchamp, who practiced medicine, was assassinated by 
 Moslem fanatics.^ At Casablanca, on the west coast, 
 Frenchmen were outrageously treated, and their work — 
 they were building a breakwater — was destroyed so that 
 French soldiers were landed to protect Europeans and 
 the French consulate. As these mariners came in sight 
 of the city gates, though there was a pre-arrangement 
 with the authorities, Moroccan soldiers began to fire 
 upon them, and a reckless mass of native fighters, from 
 the country, came in not only to attack the French, but 
 also to give vent to their deepest instinct, plunder. The 
 French defended themselves and then protected the city.^ 
 They did what the Americans were compelled to do in 
 Vera Cruz, but did not do what the Germans have done 
 in Louvain.^ 
 
 This incident, common enough in the history of colonies 
 and protectorates — the French could not honorably have 
 acted otherwise — at once aroused the German military 
 element and the German press.^ Did they ever imagine 
 that in such a country and with such a people, the French 
 could do their work and not meet " bloody points with 
 bloody points " ? Again France and Spain were intrusted 
 with restoring order, but Germany kept on interfering. 
 Thus when the two brothers, Abd-el-Aziz, who was in 
 power, and Moulai-Hafid, who was a pretender, were 
 
 ' V, 38, 709. 
 * V, 39, 947. 
 
 ' Supposing that the Belgians attacked them, which is most 
 improbable. 
 ' V, 41. 235-
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE.' ;,; if ioj: 
 
 fighting, Germany received the delegates of the latter.^ 
 Again, when the former was defeated Germany sent her 
 Consul, Herr Vassel, to Fez to work upon the new Sul- 
 tan's mind. At the same time she sent a note to the 
 Powers urging them to recognize Moulai-Hafid. She 
 acted as if there had been no Conference at all. She had 
 given Abd-el-Aziz the greatest assurances of friendship, 
 proclaimed his independence urbi et orhi, asserted in 
 the Tangier Speech that he was the only ruler that she 
 would recognize, persuaded him to resist France, but 
 now when fortune betrayed the hapless ruler, Germany 
 not only dropped him but she urged other nations to 
 support his brother. 
 
 This resembles the treatment of President Kruger. 
 When, in 1884, a Boer delegation, anti-English in char- 
 acter, was received in Berlin, it was entertained with 
 lavish hospitality at the Emperor's expense. Kriiger 
 " sat at the Emperor's table next to Bismarck, and talked 
 about the glorious future of the Dutch and German races 
 in South Africa." " On January 6, 1896, the Kaiser 
 telegraphed to him, " I beg to express to you my sincere 
 congratulations that, without help from foreign Powers, 
 you have succeeded with your own people and by your 
 own strength in driving out the armed bands which 
 attempted to disturb the peace of your country and in 
 re-establishing order and in defending the independence 
 of your people from attacks from outside." When, later 
 on, at the hour of great bitterness and sorrow, the van- 
 quished President of the South African Republic wished 
 to see him, Wilhelm II declined. He has related in the 
 Daily Telegraph interview how he made plans for the 
 
 ' V, 45, 474- 
 
 * Lowe, vol. II, p. 235.
 
 sq-?. THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 defeat of the Boers. These plans were sent to London, 
 It was in following them that Lord Roberts achieved 
 victory.^ 
 
 Similarly the poor Sultan was thus betrayed by those 
 who had pledged themselves to stand by him, and who 
 now attempted to help his brother against him. France 
 was indifferent as to who the Sultan was in the first 
 place, but she was loyal to him until it was demon- 
 strated that the Moroccans had transferred their 
 allegiance to his brother. Even then Paris insisted 
 that the defeated ruler should have his life spared, 
 and be treated with kindness and becoming dignity.^ 
 She even provided him with means to lead a decent 
 existence. 
 
 Berlin kept up its policy of irritation. In 1908, the 
 Kaiser, in his interview with a reporter of the Daily 
 Telegraph, stirred up his own people by references to the 
 Boer war and by his moral color-blindness in his boast 
 of what he had done for England; but he managed to 
 say things about France that would damage her in 
 British eyes — things which, according to Mevil, were 
 most erroneous.^ During the year his Government re- 
 curred to the Moroccan Question. After the decision 
 of the Conference, Germany again objected that one 
 Power should have a more favored position in the Moor- 
 ish Empire than any other.* She really tried again to 
 take Morocco out of French and Spanish hands. Accord- 
 ing to the Conference, all Powers were to be upon the 
 same economic basis, but not upon the same basis of 
 
 * Gauss, p. 272. 
 ' V, 47, A7^. 
 
 * Op. cit., chap. I. 
 
 * V, 47, 712.
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 103 
 
 influence. The Chancellor asked for more. In Novem- 
 ber of the same year an incident occurred that intensified 
 the bitterness of feeUng created by the action of Berhn. 
 The French were at Casablanca, having restored order 
 in the city and in the Chaoui'a. The occupied country 
 was under martial law. As is shown further on, the 
 Germans had long been hostile to the Foreign Legion, 
 a French corps of foreign volunteers. Now it happened ^ 
 that six of these men, in order to desert their regiment, 
 had placed themselves under the protection of the Ger- 
 man Vice-consul. On September 25, 1908, when he at- 
 tempted to smuggle them on board of a German steamer, 
 the men were recognized by the French authorities, who 
 endeavored to arrest them. There was a serious scuffle 
 of both parties. The German Vice-Consul raised his 
 cane to strike a French officer, and the officer, in the 
 legitimate performance of his functions, took up his 
 revolver. At the time when Vera Cruz was under 
 martial law, let us suppose that the German Consul of 
 that city had tried to help American soldiers to desert 
 from the American army, and had attempted to smuggle 
 them on board of a German steamer, what would 
 Americans have thought of such acts? Would not the 
 consular immunities have appeared slight as compared 
 with the wrong of helping to disorganize the American 
 army? So it was at Casablanca. The deserters, what- 
 ever their nationality, were French soldiers. They had 
 become so by a free regular engagement. Of their own 
 free will they had entered the French army. What made 
 the matter more delicate, the deserters were not all 
 
 ' L' Illustration says that there was in Casablanca " a real 
 agency of desertion " under the protection of the German Con- 
 sul. Nov. 28, 1908, p. 355.
 
 104 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Germans. There were an Austrian, a Swiss and a non- 
 German Pole. One of them was a French subject recently 
 naturalized German. In reality there were only two 
 Germans. Another report speaks of three Ger- 
 mans.^ 
 
 The trans-Rhinean press and Government took up a 
 very menacing attitude. It demanded the immediate 
 release of the men as well as an apology. It was inti- 
 mated that in the case of refusal Prince Radolin, the 
 German Ambassador, would be immediately recalled. 
 The Quai d'Orsay asked that, as several contradictory 
 principles were involved in the question, the whole 
 matter be referred to The Hague Court, with the under- 
 standing that if France was blamed she would apologize 
 and vice versa. This was finally accepted. The award of 
 the Court, which was favorable to France, deeply 
 wounded her opponents beyond the Rhine. The rela- 
 tions of the two countries were far from improved 
 thereby. 
 
 The persistent aggressive ill-will of Germany against 
 France continued with the exception of a period of 
 nearly two years during which Berlin would have been 
 happy to array her against England. There came a time 
 when it was realized that all the initiatives of Berlin 
 had been checked and its hostile combinations against 
 France had largely failed. Prince von Biilow put on a 
 brave countenance, but he was painfully reminded by 
 his opponents in the Reichstag that his maladroit and 
 hostile moves had been far from improving Germany's 
 international situation, and that the opposite was true. 
 The alliance of France with Russia had been strength- 
 ened. Among important treaties signed there was one 
 ^ Oppenheim, L. F. L,, International Law, 1912, p. 503.
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 105 
 
 of arbitration between Paris and Tokio, June 13, 1907. 
 On August 31 an agreement, most earnestly seconded 
 by France, was made between England and Russia.^ 
 The hostility of these two Powers had hitherto been 
 considered as a permanent statical force in European 
 affairs. 
 
 Nothing at present proves that the Germans were 
 concerned in the unfortunate occurrence between Ad- 
 miral Roszdestvensky's fleet and British fishermen off 
 the Dogger Bank, but it is strange that the rumors that 
 led to it emanated from Germany.^ France not only 
 helped the pacific settlement of this deplorable incident, 
 but contributed to an understanding between London 
 and St. Petersburg. 
 
 A fact of the greatest importance for the two nations 
 dwelling on either side of the Pyrenees was the marriage 
 of the King of Spain with an English princess. The 
 Entente with England greatly facilitated that with Spain. 
 It was not pleasant for Wilhelmstrasse to hear, in 1907, 
 of the treaty between Japan and Russia, a treaty complet- 
 ing that of 1905 and sealing the reconciliation of the 
 two peoples. This not only freed the land of the 
 Romanofs from any anxiety in the East, but, during the 
 present war, Japan has proven an inexhaustible source 
 of supplies. Wilhelm II had doubtless hoped great 
 things from the Russo-Japanese rivalry, but at this point 
 his hopes were baffled.^ 
 
 All along, the restless and aggressive spirit of Ger- 
 many forced upon the Entente Powers the conviction of 
 a common danger, and that, sooner or later, one or all 
 
 • V, 5^. 84. 
 
 ' Saunders, G., Op. cit., p. 104. 
 
 "Ibid.
 
 io6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 of them would be attacked. This consciousness strength- 
 ened the Entente itself. The Germans on the other 
 hand had the feeling that they were encompassed by 
 unsympathetic nations. They made others responsible 
 for a situation which they themselves had created. 
 
 In 1909, an agreement indicating good-will on both 
 sides was signed in which Germany pledged herself no 
 longer to oppose France in Morocco. The two Govern- 
 ments and their representatives had not found practical 
 formulae for carrying out the understanding, but that was 
 no proof that it could not be done. Early in 191 1, while 
 French officers were doing a work agreed upon between 
 Paris and Fez for the training of the Moroccan army so 
 as to render her capable of establishing order in the 
 country, a small colony of Europeans had been gathered 
 at the capital. Suddenly it was learned that masses of 
 natives from several points threatened the lives of all 
 Europeans in this city as well as those of the authorities. 
 To allow fanatics to massacre these peoples would have 
 been a crime. It would have given the lawless hordes a 
 free hand in one of the few spots of the country where 
 there was yet what, with charity, we may call Govern- 
 ment. Something had to be done. As soon as prepara- 
 tions were made to relieve the Europeans in Fez the 
 official German newspapers began their menaces.^ The 
 troops started for their work of deliverance and reached 
 the city when it was no longer tenable. Both Europeans 
 and loyal Moroccans had fallen, cut off from their base 
 of supply and from the possibility of national relief. 
 French troops did not enter the city, but remained out- 
 side to do their work of pacification. Again it must be 
 reasserted that France did not wish to go to Fez. It 
 ' VI, 3, 476.
 
 THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE lo^ 
 
 is a characteristic of such enterprises that they compel, 
 by unexpected accidents, nations to do what was abso- 
 lutely contrary to their desires at the outset. This is 
 what the Radicals and Socialists of the French Parliament 
 had feared all along.
 
 IX 
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 
 
 Germans have peculiar ways of their own. They 
 often dispense with diplomatic courtesies which, in time 
 of strained relations, make the continuance of interna- 
 tional life possible. They who are so sensitive have done 
 things which, with people of a similar spirit, would have 
 meant war at once. The sudden sending of the Panther 
 to Agadir on the coast of Morocco early in July, 191 1, 
 was a most warlike challenge. The Government in Ber- 
 lin informed the French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 of the fact after the vessel had been sent. There was 
 no disturbance on the coast,^ so that this was without 
 excuse. It was the repetition of the Tangier Comedy. 
 What France and England in answer to this ought to 
 have done would have been to send their own men-of- 
 war and have done everything which the German ag- 
 gressors did, but such a course would have been fraught 
 with momentous possibilities. It was said that this move 
 on the part of Wilhelmstrasse was intended to please 
 Pan-Germanists, and that the Government at their sug- 
 gestion had already chosen Agadir as a future German 
 port. This step was considered by many of them as a 
 virtual seizure of that part of the disputed Moorish 
 Empire. Other apologists of Germany said that the 
 Panther incident was a means of compelling the French 
 to negotiate, but the Quai d'Orsay had been ready at all 
 
 » ^ Le Temps, July 3, 191 1. 
 
 108
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 109 
 
 times so to do. M. Jules Cambon, whom many will re- 
 member for his splendid services in Washington, had 
 long endeavored to discuss the question, and, as a matter 
 of fact, he had actually had conferences on the subject 
 with von Kinderlen-Waechter,^ so that this explanation 
 is inadequate. The Agadir coup was the obvious dis- 
 regard of the Cambon Agreement of 1909 and an un- 
 friendly challenge to the Entente. By this agreement 
 Germany had pledged herself not to interfere " with the 
 consolidation of order and peace in the Sherifian Em- 
 pire " ^ towards which France was working. According 
 to this, had the Germans had any special interest to de- 
 fend in Agadir they ought to have referred the task to 
 France. It was understood that if difficulties arose the 
 two Powers would consider them and settle them in the 
 spirit of mutual concession, nay, in the spirit that had 
 made the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility. 
 The most elementary international courtesy demanded 
 that Germany should have announced her intentions and 
 have acted, in keeping with the Cambon Agreement, for 
 the carrying out of the decisions of Algeciras. 
 
 There were Germans who justified the Agadir coup 
 by the fact that there were French soldiers at Fez.^ 
 Agadir in their eyes was the counterpart of Fez. These 
 vindicators of this unfriendly course seem to have for- 
 gotten that when the Cambon Agreement was signed, 
 in 1909, there were French troops at Oudjda, and that 
 thousands of French soldiers held the Chaouia. This 
 was not an unusual fact. Furthermore, General Moinier 
 went to Fez to save human lives and France had prom- 
 
 ' VI. 4, 472. 
 
 * Accord dii 8 fevrier 1909. 
 
 • See p. 331-
 
 no THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 ised to withdraw these Fez men as soon as possible. She 
 intended to do there what she had performed in Syria 
 in 1860.^ Even then this attempt to whitewash the op- 
 probrium of Agadir ignored the fact that the Sultan of 
 Morocco was sovereign. Germany had been loud in her 
 assertions of his independence. Now this sultan, exer- 
 cising the fullness of his rights, called France to his aid 
 and she went, saving thereby the lives of the authori- 
 ties as well as those of Europeans doomed to be crushed 
 by a Moroccan Boxer Movement. She was ready to re- 
 call her forces from there, but had it been otherwise, so 
 long as the Sultan and the Makhzen ^ approved the Ger- 
 mans could not find in that situation any excuse for the 
 Agadir coup. It was a violent reopening of the Moroccan 
 Question which confirmed absolutely in the French heart 
 the sense of the aggressive intentions of the Teutons. 
 
 In the eyes of Europe, at large, it was unmistakably 
 an act of provocation from a Power that deemed itself 
 capable of whipping the whole world. For Russia it 
 seemed a casus foederis. England, though less out- 
 spoken, was deeply alive to the great European danger. 
 France was willing to talk, to negotiate and to com- 
 promise for the sake of peace. Her statesmen, calm and 
 resolute, were the very opposite of the de Gramonts and 
 the Emile OUiviers of the last days of the Second Em- 
 pire. They were even then reasonably conciliatory. The 
 two Governments took up the whole Moroccan Question. 
 By this time Germany had given up all talk of the sover- 
 eignty of the Sultan, the integrity and independence of 
 Morocco and the internationalization of the Question. 
 She had ceased to pose as the defender of the rights of 
 
 * Le Temps, July 3, 191 1. 
 
 * Practically the ministers of the Sultan.
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION in 
 
 all. Now it was merely a matter of bartering for her 
 own advantage. The Cambon Agreement was forgotten, 
 the decisions of Algeciras were set at naught. Her 
 former contentions had practically been set aside, now 
 she was after a bargain. France ought to have refused 
 to consider the proposals and to have appealed to a new 
 conference. She could have shown the unreasonable 
 demands of Berlin and made the Powers the judges of 
 her use of the trust placed in her hands in 1906. Von 
 Kinderlen asked, at first, one half of the French Congo 
 next to the ocean ^ as well as the right of pre-emption 
 which France had over the Belgian Congo in order to 
 cease all opposition to France in the land of the Sultan. 
 Everyone acquainted with Morocco knew that the pre- 
 requisite of all reforms was peace in the country and 
 that peace, according to the decisions of Algeciras and 
 the Cambon Agreement, was to be established by France. 
 It was impossible to open the economic life of Morocco 
 to European trade until a political order of some kind 
 was established ; but as soon as France tried to face the 
 imperative issues in that direction Germany intervened. 
 Again, in order to have the French bring about the 
 pacification from which the whole world would benefit, 
 she asked the compensations stated above. INIoreover, 
 what right had she, in that respect, that did not belong to 
 other Powers? Why should not the United States or 
 Sweden have made similar claims? It is true that 
 France was having a virtual extension of territory, but 
 did Germany say a single word when England annexed 
 the Transvaal in 1902, or when Japan took Corea? Did 
 she protest against the British protectorate over Egypt 
 by virtue of this selfsame Anglo-French Agreement? 
 ' V, 4, 716.
 
 112 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Did she offer any objection when Spain really took pos- 
 session of the northern coast of Morocco from Ceuta to 
 Melilla? No. No. No. The reason for her action 
 was her national aggressive spirit against the " hereditary 
 enemy " and her burning desire for new territories. Her 
 hard harsh attitude can only be explained on the ground 
 that she expected that the British would abandon France 
 to her own fate. She was sorely disappointed. 
 
 England saw clearly where the Franco-German wrang- 
 ling would lead. The British press sounded a strikingly 
 united warning to the Goths. On July 4, Sir Edward 
 Grey had a conference with Count Wolff Metternich in 
 which he did not conceal his displeasure over the Agadir 
 provocation. The British political leaders uttered no 
 uncertain sound.^ On July 6, Asquith called the atten- 
 tion of the Parliament to the seriousness of the German 
 pretensions in Morocco.^ On July 21, Lloyd George 
 gave the threatening Teutons to understand that their 
 course was shocking the deepest sense of fair-play of the 
 Britons. Balfour spoke for the Unionists in the same 
 strain. Ramsay Macdonald voiced the feelings of the 
 labor-party — all were most outspoken, and gave Ger- 
 many to understand what the course of England would 
 be. There was a united front against the aggressiveness 
 of Berlin. The Germans, who had thought the British 
 hopelessly divided upon everything, found them intensely 
 of one mind upon this issue. The helmet men who had 
 so long delighted in showing their swords, their German 
 swords, as a menace resented like exhibitions on the part 
 of others. The furor of Pan-Germanists was great. 
 In 1908, they had used with Russia the bluff of force 
 
 ' VI, 4, 949. 
 
 'VI, 4, 953.
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 113 
 
 successfully on the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia ; 
 they attempted a similar arrogant act with Morocco, and 
 wished to dictate their will, as law. The French with- 
 stood their opponent, and the British Lion gave an un- 
 mistakable growl which practically meant, " Hands off 
 from France ! " The Kaiser and his subjects understood. 
 They realized that they must give up all territorial ambi- 
 tion in the Sherifian Empire. 
 
 In that interesting book, Imperial Germany, a book to 
 which the writer has so frequently referred, Prince von 
 Billow makes a most eloquent plea pro domo sua, and 
 that with no excessive modesty. He offers a brilliant 
 defense of his administration, not as an historian, but as 
 a Prussian politician. No book, not even Bernhardi's 
 The Next War, gives such an insight into the psychologi- 
 cal and ethical conceptions of Prussians. We say Prus- 
 sians, because we repudiate the idea that all Germans 
 are Bernhardians and Biilowans. He recalls the state- 
 ment made by someone that after M. Delcasse's over- 
 throw, which brought to the imperial chancellor princely 
 honors, Germany ought to have come to an understand- 
 ing. " It is a question," he replied, " whether France 
 was at all inclined to pay an acceptable price." ^ There 
 lies the explanation of the rattling of the German saber 
 in Tangier, at Algeciras and at Agadir. 
 
 Von Kinderlen asked one-half of the French Congo 
 and French reversionary rights over the Congo Free 
 State. These rights, to which, in case that country 
 should pass into other hands than those of the Belgians, 
 France would have a first claim, Germany coveted. For 
 a long time Pan-Germanists had spoken of Belgium as 
 an essential part of Germany. In addition to one-half 
 
 ' P. 100.
 
 114 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 of the French Congo, Wilhelmstrasse wished to secure 
 these potential claims of France in the heart of Africa. 
 In the case that brave little state were annexed, having 
 secured the French reversionary rights, the Congo Free 
 State would become a German possession, while the 
 conquest of Belgium would not entail the transfer of 
 these colonies. Unquestionably the Teutons had already 
 some plans to seize that country, and were stretching 
 their hands forward so as to have at the same time the 
 Congolese possessions. This was not all. " The open 
 door " was promised again. They wanted much more. 
 Before Algeciras and even after they worked to reserve 
 all concessions exclusively for the Sultan, but now, they 
 wanted to have from the French some of these conces- 
 sions, such as railroads built by Germans and operated 
 by Germans — not to speak of other privileges among 
 which was that of having proteges — natives enjoying 
 German citizenship, protection and exemption from fiscal 
 burdens. 
 
 France was willing to abide by the terms of the Al- 
 geciras Conference, liberally interpreted, that is, bearing 
 in mind the contingencies arising in different parts of the 
 country and meeting them squarely. She was willing to 
 open the country to civilization. She was ready to help 
 the natives to do the work for themselves, and to evolve 
 toward a modern state, if a Mohammedan community has 
 ever attained such an end. She was willing to do the 
 work which would increase the possibilities of German 
 trade in Morocco as she had done in Algeria and Tunisia, 
 where things " Made in Germany " had a great sale. 
 She hesitated long to dispose of territories that had been 
 won by her noble explorers and kept by men who, as a 
 whole, have done heroic service. Her rights of pre-
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 115 
 
 emption to the Congo Free State were for her intangible. 
 Furthermore, the German claims were ever followed by 
 new requests from Germany. 
 
 At last the threats of British leaders seriously modified 
 the attitude of Berlin, though matters had become so 
 serious that a financial panic ensued.^ The Germans be- 
 came more conciliatory and at last the two Governments 
 came to an understanding.^ The delay in reaching this 
 goal weighed heavily upon Europe. To put an end to 
 German claims, France reluctantly established a pro- 
 tectorate over Morocco, but this involved the sacrifice 
 of over 100,000 square miles of the Congo colony. This 
 settlement was not the result of fear. The great barome- 
 ter of French feelings, the Bourse, had scarcely any ups 
 or downs. It was not, either, an act imposed by the sense 
 of the justice of German claims, but by French love of 
 peace. The Germans secured territories in which they 
 had never performed any service, had never spent a 
 dollar or lost a man.^ A fact which shows their quarrel- 
 some spirit is that hardly had the treaty been signed 
 when they claimed islands in the Congo River, though 
 the text carefully stipulated " jusqu'a la rive." *^ 
 
 This treaty excited the most bitter dissatisfaction of 
 Pan-Germanists. They naturally blamed everyone but 
 themselves, though Chauvinists are the same the world 
 over. When it was presented in the Reichstag it ex- 
 cited the hilarity of Socialists as well as of numerous 
 malcontents, among whom the Crown Prince was con- 
 spicuous. The Minister of Colonies, von Lindequist, 
 
 • VI. 5, 475. 
 
 ' VI, 5, 710. 
 •VI, 5, 471. 
 
 * VI, 6, 239.
 
 ii6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 was so disappointed that he resigned.^ The impression 
 left by these proceedings was painful for their admirers 
 abroad. Public opinion in Russia and in Great Britain 
 had crystallized into a profound conviction that Germany 
 courted war. In France, the Tangier Speech and the 
 long silence that followed, the German tactics for the 
 overthrow of M. Delcasse, the maneuvers at the Al- 
 geciras Conference, the Agadir incident bold and bad, 
 the surrender of a large part of the territories acquired 
 mostly by the heroic labors of Savorgnan de Brazza, the 
 brutal ways of dealing with a land in which the suaviter 
 in modo ever takes precedence over the fortiter in re 
 struck deeper than the Teutons thought or perhaps 
 meant. Shortly after this, however, the Kaiser posed 
 as a pacifist when he said, " We have given a new proof 
 of our willingness to settle international points of dispute 
 amicably wherever this can be done in accordance with 
 the dignity and the interests of Germany, through the con- 
 clusion of our agreement with France."^ How clever! 
 The great miracle of our day is that there are still people 
 who believe what the Kriegsherr of Germany says. 
 
 From this time on to the present war, Germany armed 
 even more than in the past. In three years, three laws 
 for the increase of armaments and men were passed. 
 Von Bethmann-Hollweg repeated the old Prussian 
 Comedy before the Reichstag. He made the statement 
 that he had discovered beyond the Vosges " a revival of 
 Chauvinism." ^ Indeed there was something' new in 
 France, a new consciousness of danger uniting parties 
 and creeds, leading men to reject pacifistic tenets at the 
 
 ' VI, 6, 472. 
 * Gauss, p. 306. 
 •VI, 7^,948.
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 117 
 
 sight of the German danger. There was indeed a new 
 spirit awakened by the long German provocation. Inci- 
 dents of an irritating nature deepened these feelings. 
 In May, 1913, the descent at Luneville of a Zeppelin 
 with a party of German officers who, before coming there, 
 had flown over many of the fortified cities along the 
 frontier did not seem accidental. These men asserted 
 that, owing to a fog, they had lost their way. That may 
 have been true, the Government accepted it as such, but 
 it is not unreasonable to doubt it. The Nancy incident, 
 when a few Frenchmen annoyed some Germans on a 
 Sunday evening — a rare occurrence in view of the situa- 
 tion — made the German press furious, though absolutely 
 silent concerning the Luneville Affair. The French 
 authorities punished the prefect of Nancy, and the con- 
 temptible policeman who had failed to do his duty in pro- 
 tecting the young insulted German underwent a severe 
 penalty. The new German Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 denounced violently this insignificant brawl, which re- 
 sembled all such quarrels that take place constantly on 
 the frontier of all civilized peoples, and viewed it as a 
 manifestation of " French Chauvinism," repeating the 
 very terms which von Bethmann-Hollweg had used a few 
 days before. The French Government took efficient 
 measures so that nothing should be done in France which 
 would irritate the Germans. This applied to theaters, to 
 comic papers and to military life. At an earlier date a 
 French general who had spoken freely about Germany 
 was punished by being sent from Eastern France to 
 Algeria.^ 
 
 Among other provocations of the Germans during this 
 period, they carried on a campaign of unpardonable 
 ' V, 46, 239.
 
 ii8 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 slanders against the Foreign Legion to which reference 
 has already been made. It is a body of foreign volunteers 
 who have generally served in the colonies and especially 
 in North Africa. All that is asked from them is good 
 service, good behavior and no question is raised in ref- 
 erence to their antecedents or to their nationality. As 
 many of the men have a past which it is better to forget, 
 the rules of this corps are severer than in others, but 
 not inhumane. If it is discovered that a man enlists 
 before he is of age, he is dismissed at once. The same 
 thing is true with what pertains to their health. A great 
 sense of fairness tempers the severity of their life with 
 justice and humaneness. What kindled this German 
 antipathy is that a large number of Alsatians joined the 
 Legion. In spite of great exertions in Germany and in 
 Alsace against this military institution, more Alsatians 
 entered the Foreign Legion in 1912 than in any single 
 year since 1870.^ Misrepresentations availed nothing. 
 The people in whose army there has been such cruel 
 treatment of soldiers that when Red Rosa called for 
 witnesses to defend her statements 1,100 came forth 
 — the people that made no protest against the massacres 
 of Armenians by Kurds, or those of the Balkan popula- 
 tions by the Turks, were seized with a most holy zeal 
 for the poor victims of this organization. In April, 191 3, 
 there was a play in Berlin against the Foreign Legion 
 patronized by representatives of the army and navy, to 
 arouse popular feelings. Some Germans who had taken 
 service in this corps came forward to protest against 
 these slanders. The alleged statements that France had 
 recruiting agents in Germany were baseless. These men 
 could never be found and what was a most perfect refuta- 
 ^ Gauss, p. 100.
 
 THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 119 
 
 tion was that France had more volunteers for the Legion 
 than she needed. Herr Zimmermann, a state official 
 who had thoroughly looked up the matter, said that every 
 time that the German administration had made inquiries, 
 the conclusions had always been that these assertions 
 were groundless.^ It is easy to see the purpose of this 
 campaign in which, by the side of the irritating challenges 
 of Germany, there was a pin-prick policy calculated to 
 exasperate France. 
 
 ' VI. 21, 475.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 
 
 A GREAT source of irritation to France was Alsace. 
 The Treaty of Frankfurt has, ever since 1871, cast its 
 fatal shadows upon central Europe. The country taken 
 by the might of the conquerors has remained in the 
 German organism like an infusible substance which their 
 mighty genius cannot assimilate. The survival of na- 
 tional loyalty is sometimes extraordinary. "If an igno- 
 rant nation like Bulgaria," says Novicow, " did not 
 abandon her national aspirations after five centuries it 
 is easy to see what those of the Alsatians will be." ^ It 
 is not only the Poles, the Schleswigians, the Holsteinians 
 but also the Hanoverians, the Nassovians, the Hessians 
 and the Frank furtians that were incorporated in spite of 
 themselves into Prussia. Many there were, and there are 
 still, in the Empire who hate Prussian domination. 
 Alsatians likewise hated the Prussian character and the 
 Prussian method of holding men as if they were pos- 
 sessions. Nothing is more pathetic than the noble stand 
 of the deputies of the annexed provinces at Bordeaux 
 and their eloquent protestations. " Before any delibera-" 
 tion of the National Assembly, we, Alsatians and Lor- 
 rainers, gathered together in Bordeaux, wish to pro- 
 test vehemently against even the very idea of a cession 
 whatsoever of the least part of our territory, we are 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 355. 
 120
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 121 
 
 French and we want to remain French. . . , " ^ Eleven 
 days later, another protestation, " Abandoned in spite of 
 all justice and by a hateful abuse of force to foreign 
 domination we have a last duty to perform. We declare 
 again null and void a pact which disposes of us without 
 our consent. 
 
 " The vindication of our rights remains forever open 
 to all and to each in the form and in the measure which 
 our conscience shall dictate to us." - In ten years 100,000 
 Alsatians — chiefly young people — left the country,^ a 
 few of the rest were won by favors, but the greater 
 number became more and more unreconcilable. The 
 efforts to win them have been colossal failures. This 
 was particularly visible at the polls. At the elections in 
 1881, the German candidates had 13,000 votes, the Cleri- 
 cals 20,000, but the protestators had 133,000. In 1887, 
 18,000 were given to the Germans while the protestators 
 elected all their candidates and had 630,000 votes.^ The 
 Prussian mind cannot understand that force, brutal 
 force, is a poor instrument of conquest. " It is the 
 Prussian Government," says again Novicow, " which by 
 its oppressive laws prevents Posen from being Ger- 
 manized." ° The same thing might be said of Alsace. 
 
 France has rapidly drawn to her new peoples. This 
 an English writer has luminously set forth in an admir- 
 able passage which we quote. " This power of attracting 
 loyalty from neighbouring conquered states is one of 
 which France may fairly boast, for she is almost alone 
 in Europe in its possession. The Germans cannot con- 
 
 ' Feb. 18, 1871. 
 
 ^ Florent-Matter, L' Alsace-Lorraine de nos jours, 1908, p. 84. 
 
 * Matter, P., Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 489. 
 
 * Florent-IMatter, Op. cit., pp. 87, 90. 
 ' Op. cit., p. 131.
 
 122 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 ciliate the Poles even as much as the Russians can, and 
 have been resisted by the Magyars for centuries, with 
 ultimate success. They are hated by the Bohemians, and 
 have never succeeded in making themselves endurable to 
 any section of the population of Italy. The Russians 
 cannot absorb the Poles, and are not liked by the Finns ; 
 while the Spaniards have never been able fully to digest 
 the Basques, and could not keep the Portuguese after 
 sixty years of union, and this though Lisbon is the natural 
 capital of the entire Peninsula. The Danes never re- 
 moved the deep distaste felt for them by the Holsteiners, 
 while the Norwegians to this day, after seventy-three 
 years of alliance, regard the Swedes, their own Norse 
 kinsfolk, with the deepest suspicion and dislike. Our 
 own failure in Ireland is at this moment the governing 
 factor in English politics; and though Scotland is more 
 than friendly, the fusion of the two Kingdoms, such as 
 France has always insisted on in all absorbed States, 
 would be next to an impossible revolution. France only 
 has secured a loyalty at once complete and obedient, and 
 the fact is the more remarkable because France has the 
 power of exciting bitter national enmities. If all her 
 neighbours regarded her with liking or even with toler- 
 ance, there would be nothing wonderful in the success of 
 her annexations. ... It is when annexation is com- 
 plete, and bitterness should grow rancorous, that in all 
 white subjects of France it begins to die away. . . . 
 Government by France after annexation is always 
 honorific. It is insolent during an occupation, but 
 absorption once decreed, logic secures that there shall 
 be no inequality, that laws shall be the same, that votes 
 shall be equal in force, that even the mob of Paris shall 
 respect the new citizens of France, the fresh children of
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 123 
 
 the Republic. That attitude is carried straight through 
 in the smallest as in the highest detail, so that a Savoyard 
 who succeeded as Deputy or Senator would have just 
 as good a chance of the Presidential chair as if he were 
 a Parisian, as he would also, if successful in a little way, 
 have just the same chance of gaining permission to open 
 a tobacco shop ; and it removes much, if not all, the 
 bitterness of conquests. No Frenchman is looked down 
 on in France, the status of Frenchmen being, for any 
 one who accepts it, a kind of civil consecration. . . . 
 France can, in a very special degree, assimilate absorbed 
 peoples, and this is one of her greatest political re- 
 sources, and one of which she has the greatest reason 
 to be proud." ^ 
 
 The peoples in France, drawn within the national 
 orbit, have been assimilated and nationalized through 
 kind and generous treatment. The authorities never 
 dreamed of robbing these populations of their essential 
 liberties, such as that of language, for instance. The 
 inhabitants of Provence, still using their vernacular with 
 the French, have become almost bilingual. Some of 
 them, though loyal to the old Langue d'oc, have become 
 incomparable prose writers in French like Daudet and 
 Aicard, not to mention others. The Basques still use 
 their very ancient tongue. The Bretons enjoy the 
 language and the poetry of the French Welsh, and in 
 the northernmost part of French Flanders the people 
 hammer away at their Germanic Flemish, while the 
 French language penetrates slowly, very slowly but 
 surely, among all. A broad-minded Government would 
 have favored a bilingual culture which is so potent in 
 the life of a nation, but in Alsace French was ostracized 
 ' The SpectatoTj Sept. 10, 1892, p. 343.
 
 124 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 everywhere. Some local newspapers have had a perma- 
 nent ironical heading. " French Inscriptions Hunting." ^ 
 It was prohibited in all postal documents for Alsace and 
 Lorraine. It was interdicted upon all public signs. A 
 hairdresser was prevented from having his sign, Coiffeur, 
 he had to put Friseur. Milliners could no longer have 
 the sign, Modiste, which was replaced by Modistin. 
 Restaurant had to be transformed into Restauration. 
 The Cafe du Griffon was obliged to drop the du and 
 became Cafe Griffon and Cafe italien was compelled to 
 have its adjective begin with a capital because it gave 
 the name a German appearance. Cafe imperial was inter- 
 dicted by the police, it was too French. A restaurant 
 posted its bill of fare, the Menu du jour, which had the 
 advantage of being artistic. It was tabooed. Cigarettes 
 frangaises en vente ici, posted upon a cigar store in 
 Savern, had the same fate.^ The police of Strasburg 
 allowed eight French plays a year, each one approved by 
 the chief of police. This privilege was revoked.^ The 
 singing of the Marseillaise was prohibited even in the 
 city of Strasburg where it was composed. The tricolor 
 bows, which young Alsatian women wore on their hair, 
 were violently snatched by the police. 
 
 The Eden-Theater of Strasburg wishing to play 
 La Vivandicre, an operetta representing the life of the 
 French Revolution, the police objected to the French 
 flag in it. After awhile a compromise was reached and 
 the Dutch flag was used instead.* There was also the 
 disbanding of all kinds of societies with French sympa- 
 
 ' Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. i88. 
 
 "^ Op. cit., pp. 188-192; Lcs Annates, March 7, 1915. 
 
 ' Ibid., May 30, 191 5. 
 
 " Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. 235.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 125 
 
 thies, such as choral unions, literary circles, dramatic 
 associations, botanical and zoological societies and even 
 those harmless organizations, societies of mutual help.^ 
 The Club of Alsatian and Lorrainer Students was closed.^ 
 
 The teaching of French was suppressed in the^schools, 
 its use in the courts, and everywhere the language was 
 pursued with a relentless spirit. The names of citizens 
 in public records had to be Germanized; Guillaume be- 
 came Wilhelm, Jean was written as Johann and Albert 
 assumed the form of Albrecht.^ Even the inscriptions 
 upon the clothes or the caps of employees and porters 
 in private establishments had to be in German. This did 
 not accomplish its purpose. In 1895, I59'532 Alsatians 
 reported that their mother tongue was French; in 1900, 
 it had become 198,173. Several newspapers, either 
 published in German or in two languages, during the 
 Second Empire have now become French.* 
 
 The Alsatians were made to feel that everything which 
 they cherished was to be eradicated from their hearts, 
 and above all their great national hope. No wonder that 
 they did not love their conquerors. Already in 1871, 
 Busch speaks of " the inexplicable attachment of the 
 Alsatians for France ; of their voluntary Helotism, and 
 their infatuation which prevents their seeing and feeling 
 that a Gaul regards them only as Frenchmen of the 
 second class, and treats them in many respects accord- 
 ingly." ° As far as common, uneducated Frenchmen were 
 concerned, there may be a little truth in Busch's state- 
 ment in reference to Alsatians, but the elite of France 
 
 ' III, 96, 692. 
 
 ' IJ Illustration, June 24, 191 r. 
 
 ' Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. 191. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 195. 
 
 ° Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 130.
 
 126 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 had the greatest admiration for them. They were given 
 important positions in the educational, the scientific and 
 the historical world. They have had such popular 
 literary men as About, Erckmann-Chatrian and eminent 
 artists. Some of them have succeeded in every high 
 domain that demands intelligence and character. This 
 is particularly true of the army. Five years ago Jules 
 Claretie made the following statement : " At the present 
 hour there are 76 generals of divisions or of brigades 
 coming from Alsace-Lorraine whose names stand on the 
 books of the French army." ^ The fact which is evident 
 from Busch's statement is the attachment of the Alsatians 
 to France. That " inexplicable attachment " already 
 existed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 
 1709, a Prussian Minister, Schmettau, wrote to Prince 
 Eugene and to the Duke of Marlborough, " It is evident 
 that the inhabitants of Alsace are more French than the 
 Parisians, and that the King of France is so sure of their 
 affection in his service and for his glory that he has 
 ordered them to provide themselves with rifles, pistols, 
 halberds, swords, powder and lead every time that he 
 hears that the Germans intend to cross the Rhine, and 
 that they rush in masses toward the bank of the river 
 to prevent or at least to dispute the passage to the Ger- 
 man nation, at the evident peril of their own lives, as if 
 they were going to a triumph." ^ 
 
 Miss Ruth Putnam has pointed out the inconsistency 
 of a German historian who speaks of Alsace brought 
 " back to the newly founded German Empire. That a 
 newly founded institution could receive back territory it 
 
 * Quarante ans aprcs, p. 194. 
 
 * Quoted from Matter, P., Bismarck et son temps, vol. III. 
 p. 227.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 127 
 
 was too young to have lost, sounds a trifle illogical." ^ 
 Yes, it is more than illogical, the statements of German 
 writers do not correspond to reality. " There never 
 was," says Dr. Matter, " any Reichsland under the name 
 of Elsass-Lothringen : that geographical expression has 
 existed only since 1871 ; up to their assimilation by France 
 the territories of this region were partitioned and varied. 
 Belfort and the Sundgau, objects of contention by 
 princes in the course of centuries, were united to France 
 in 1648 ; Mulhausen, a Swiss city, gave herself freely in 
 1798; Colmar and the cities about were in reality annexed 
 in 1673; Strasburg became French in 1681 ; Metz entered 
 into its new fatherland with Toul and Verdun in 1552. 
 Until the time of their annexation, these territories were 
 distinct, rival, and such a city as Saint-Marie aux Mines 
 was divided by a frontier which made two hostile parts 
 of its population. It was the work of France to ag- 
 glomerate these divers parts, to assimilate them into one 
 same nation, and to breathe into them the same patriot- 
 ism : there were no longer Alsatians or Lorrainers, 
 peoples of the plains or of the mountains, but French- 
 men." ^ Their treatment by the Germans, so different 
 from that of their fathers, closed their hearts to their 
 conquerors. Their open, frank nature did not conceal 
 the fact. At the time of the discussion of the septen- 
 nate of Bismarck, some one of his supporters said that 
 if the bill was not passed the enemy would invade the 
 Reichsland. An Alsatian member of the Reichstag 
 sprang up and exclaimed, " The enemy has been among 
 us for more than sixteen years." ^ 
 
 "^Alsace and Lorraine, 1915, p. 177. 
 
 ^ Matter, P., Bismarck ct son temps, vol. Ill, p. 227. 
 
 » III, 88, 210.
 
 128 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 One of the harshest measures was the closing of the 
 Alsatian frontier to those who had made their option 
 for France. Again and again, when aged parents were 
 passing away, asking to see once more their loved sons, 
 the latter were held at the frontier by a stern order re- 
 quiring the imperative passport, and not infrequently if 
 the required permit came at all it would be after the 
 old father or mother would be under the sod.^ In the 
 Treaty of Frankfurt there is a clause stating that sub- 
 jects born in the ceded territories are free to keep their 
 property there. The right to own property ought to 
 include the right to visit it, and to use it, but such was 
 not the interpretation of German officials.^ One of the 
 outcomes of the Franco-Russian Alliance is that as soon 
 as it had become a reality the hard regime of passports 
 was ended.^ 
 
 There were periods of calm as there were spasms of 
 violence. The furious treatment of the caricaturists, 
 Zislin and Hansi, who had sketched so skillfully the 
 foibles and ridicules of the conquerors, excited protests 
 everywhere. What the authorities called treason, and 
 wished to punish like treason, should have called forth tlie 
 heartiest laughter of healthy men. Who were ever more 
 often exposed to the sarcasms of satirists in every part 
 of the world, and deservedly so, than the French ? They 
 have never thought of bringing the clever artists before 
 the courts and condemning them to a long imprison- 
 ment because they had exaggerated in a very clever way 
 French weaknesses. Hansi was referred to the Court 
 of Leipsic. He was charged to have, in My Village, 
 
 ' III, 20, 475. 
 
 Mil, 96, 682. 
 
 ^Journal des Debats, Oct. 6, 1915.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 129 
 
 excited the Alsatians against the German regime and 
 prosecuted for high treason.^ Then comes the Savern 
 incident ^ which called forth the horror of men with a 
 large heart in every country. To assail men as Col. von 
 Reutter and Lieutenant Forstner did, " sabring and 
 persecuting the civilians, who were driven almost to 
 revolt by the overbearing arrogance of ,the military,^ 
 carries one back to the regime of the brutal violence of 
 olden times. Yet these men were exonerated by their 
 military judges.* At an earlier period Marshal von 
 Manteuffel did not see the sad irony contained in his 
 statement, when he spoke of the Alsatians as " the re- 
 conquered brethren." ^ " The reconquered brethren " 
 subjected to this regime ! 
 
 The spirit of the victors in Alsace in dealing with the 
 vanquished is shown by a few facts taken at random. One 
 of their most ungenerous and tactless acts was the erec- 
 tion of the statue of William I upon the finest square of 
 Strasburg. The Alsatians were thereby challenged in 
 their sentiments toward the Hohenzollerns. Kindness 
 of heart would have prevented such a step. When Herr 
 Herzog, Director of Affairs for the Reichsland, visited 
 Mulhausen, someone asked him to be considerate for the 
 people. He answered, " The wishes of the people are 
 absolutely indifferent to me." " One recalls the Prus- 
 sians crossing Hanover, and Manteuffel's telegram to 
 Bismarck asking how the Hanoverians should be treated, 
 " As friends if one can, if not in a deadly way " was the 
 
 • L' Illustration, May 23, 1914. 
 'in. 18, 954. 
 
 ' Villard, Oswald Garrison, Germany Embattled, 1915, p. 55. 
 
 * VI, 19, 479. 
 
 ' Larousse, Grand dictionnaire, vol. XVII, p. 206. 
 » III, 88, 205.
 
 I30 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 reply. ^ Giving instructions to the chiefs of adminis- 
 tration in Schleswig-Holstein, he advises them to 
 deal severely with those undisciplined peoples after the 
 principle, " If thou canst not be loved thou must be 
 feared." ^ In parts of Germany conquered by Prussia, 
 King William met a cool reception. He reproached his 
 Minister for it. Bismarck answered, " We have no 
 time to make ourselves loved." ^ " In annexing Alsace- 
 Lorraine, his primary object," he said, " was not to make 
 the inhabitants happy and contented, but to secure Ger- 
 many against future aggression." * " Alsace must for- 
 ever be and remain the glacis of the Empire." ^ Apart 
 from the heartlessness contained in these statements, they 
 were rendered much more hateful by revealing the stiff, 
 hard and harsh ways of the conquerors. The French 
 treatment was different. When, at various times, most 
 of the sections of Alsace-Lorraine came under the French 
 flag, they were won over by considerateness. An Alsa- 
 tian member of the Reichstag eloquently voiced the recol- 
 lection of French rule in his appeal for a fairer treat- 
 ment of his people, " Make," he said, " for the Alsatians 
 and Lorrainers a home in which they will be at ease and 
 can forget a happy past. The German Empire could only 
 gain by following the example of France. You possess 
 the language, you have force, but there is something 
 that is not in you, it is generosity. What we ask is not 
 generosity but equity." ^ 
 
 " V, 14, 753. 
 ' V, 21, 245. 
 
 * HI, T3, 541. 
 
 * Lowe, Op. cit., vol. II, p. 382. 
 " Ibid., p. 390. 
 
 * VI, I, 957.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 131 
 
 The regime of German harshness, alike in every one 
 of the conquered territories, equally severe with the 
 Danes, the Poles and the Alsatians, did but little to ad- 
 vance the conquerors' cause. One is astonished to hear 
 the Kaiser say, in a speech at Strasburg, July 30, 1908, 
 " The people of Alsace-Lorraine have given me such an 
 expression of their love and loyalty." In this he must 
 have mistaken German emigrants for genuine Alsatians. 
 Unquestionably, German leaders believe in this policy 
 when dealing with the vanquished who remain refractory 
 to German expectations. Prince von Billow would say 
 of Alsace what he has uttered about Poland, " This policy 
 must ultimately reconcile our Polish fellow-countrymen 
 to the fact that they belong to the Prussian State and 
 to the German Empire." ^ The Prince might have added 
 that virtual expulsion and real expropriation of Poles 
 from the home and land of their fathers, will, if con- 
 tinued, be more efficient, but the terrible mistake of 
 Prince von Biilow and of Germans at large is that in 
 their opinion the Poles and the Alsatians belong, that 
 they are the property of German states and that behind 
 this conception there is the German first principle that 
 " Might makes Right." That which Germany cannot 
 forgive the Alsatians, any more than the Poles or the 
 Danes, is the survival of their national hopes. They do 
 not forget the iniquity which has denationalized them, 
 and they continue to appeal to the immanent justice which 
 dominates history. 
 
 The question of Alsace remains to be settled. Ger- 
 man misrepresentations of the question have been signal 
 provocations west of the Rhine. Prince von Biilow says, 
 " France moves in a circle round the thought of x\lsace- 
 * Op. cit., p. 309.
 
 132 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Lorraine." ^ Anyone acquainted with the variety and 
 richness of French thought during the last forty years 
 will smile at the statement that France has been hypno- 
 tized by such an idea, however noble. Again, " France 
 will not look upon her great colonial empire as a suffi- 
 cient compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine." ^ 
 It is not land, but justice to a people that France wishes. 
 The German Emperor is reported to have said to some- 
 one, referring to the Alsatian Question, " It is impossible 
 that all the progress of the civilized nations should depend 
 upon knowing if 1,800,000 individuals shall be Ger- 
 man or French." ^ The question is not whether or no 
 " 1,800,000 individuals shall be German or French," but 
 whether or no they can be what they choose ; whether 
 they can have political freedom or no. Prof. Miinster- 
 berg speaks as if France had no other feelings than those 
 of revenge, and again and again repeats his calumnies * 
 as if Alsace were an all-absorbing question, and the only 
 possible solution of which would be war upon Germany. 
 Yes, for over twoscore years France has thought and has 
 thought much of Alsace. There were French militants 
 — not a large number — who would have been willing to 
 attack Germany to redress the Alsace wrong, but the 
 nation at large was not. " Here is the fact," says 
 Novicow. " Since 1871 France has performed no act 
 showing that she wished to take back the lost provinces 
 by arms. There have been many German bluffs since 
 1871, there has not been a single French one." ^ The 
 spirit of revanche 'has existed if that meant the vindica- 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. no. 
 '^ Ibid., p. 93. 
 
 * Novicow, Op. cit., p. 6. 
 
 * America and the War, pp. 43, 76, 95, 139, etc. 
 " Op. cit., p. 199.
 
 THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 133 
 
 tion of Alsace, " but," says the same author, " if the 
 Germans think that it has been heroic for them to main- 
 tain their claims during 223 years, it would be the op- 
 posite for Frenchmen to do the same for 44 years." ^ 
 
 Everywhere the spirit of revanche had died out, when 
 it was revived by the aggressive course of Germany in 
 Morocco, by the ill-treatment of Alsatians and by the 
 colossal armaments beyond the Rhine. The thought of 
 revanche had so subsided that, in 1904, Francis de Pres- 
 sense challenged the conservatives in Parliament, daring 
 them to put upon their program a war for the recovery 
 of Alsace.^ In 1909, Le Temps, examining French text- 
 books used in the schools, draws the following conclusion, 
 " France has lost the hope and even the desire of re- 
 venge." ^ The great Parisian paper was right, the 
 pacifistic movement had largely swept away the revanche 
 aspect of the Alsatian Question, and this would have 
 continued had it not been for the late indignities to 
 which France has been subjected by Germany. 
 
 The mass of Frenchmen would not have dreamed of 
 attacking Germany — they had too keen a sense of the im- 
 morality and irrationality of war — but they hoped that, 
 with the international readjustments which the Teutons 
 would force upon the world, thp lost provinces would 
 recover, as they may do, their freedom. On the other 
 hand the Germans are only too ready to see but one 
 solution for questions of this kind, and that is war. 
 They tried to settle the question of Alsace that way in 
 1870, and since then they have ascribed like motives to 
 the French. Some of the most civilized nations point 
 
 ^ Novicow, p. 192. 
 * V, 19, 916. 
 ' V, 54, 477.
 
 134 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 with pride to other solutions of international issues either 
 by arbitration or by conciliation. There have been more 
 than 75 cases in which the United States and Great 
 Britain have deemed such solutions the only ones be- 
 coming highly civilized states. The arbitration of the 
 Alabama Case between the two countries was a higher 
 index of civilization than the great scientific institutions 
 which are the boast of Teutonic peoples. It is because 
 of the signal German difficulty of rising to such a fair 
 judicial point of view that they cannot reconcile French 
 feelings for Alsace with a French love of peace. Even 
 when they recognize the nobleness of the French attitude 
 they seldom fail to give a suggestion which is far from 
 flattering for their opponents. Prince von Biilow, speak- 
 ing of England and France, says, " The mainspring of 
 English policy toward us is national egoism; that of 
 French policy is national idealism. He who follows his 
 interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he 
 who pursues an idea." ^ Let us overlook the " national 
 egoism " of England, and perhaps also the suggestion 
 of the absence of national selfishness among Germans, 
 but after the irritation in reference to Alsace, the Tangier 
 Speech, Agadir and other provocations, France was 
 calmer than her Teutonic opponent. It must be added 
 that all along the sufiferings and trials of the Alsatians 
 were sympathetically those of Frenchmen ever ready to 
 listen to " L'Hernelle plainte des vaincus," ^ that is, to 
 protest against the unrighteous decisions of war. 
 
 ^Imperial Germany, p. 109. 
 2 Jules Ferry.
 
 XI 
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 
 
 One fact which makes Frenchmen indignant is the 
 naive way in which German apologists endeavor to de- 
 ceive the pubUc, acting and talking as if the thought 
 of war was not an obsession of the national mind. Von 
 Billow asserts that the German Empire " is and must 
 remain a military state." ^ Prussia has risen to the 
 supreme leadership among other states by war. The 
 French historian, Lavisse, who has written with so much 
 competence and impartiality upon Prussia, truly says, 
 with a point of irony, " The Hohenzollern is someone 
 who ever wishes to have more money to pay more sol- 
 diers. He has the habit of acquiring new territories; 
 this habit is so old and so strong that he cannot give it 
 up. Today, he dreams of governing the world." - That 
 the Hohenzollern has been a territory, and largely a 
 German territory, grabber is not an invention of Teuto- 
 phobists. Bismarck relates how he spoke to his royal 
 master. " I pointed out to the King, for instance, that 
 all his predecessors, with the exception of his late 
 brother, had added to their territories, and asked him 
 whether he wished to follow that brother's example." ^ 
 Thanks to Bismarck, he did not. 
 
 ' Op. cit, p. 338. 
 ' Le Temps, Feb. 15, 1915. 
 
 * Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 
 vol. II, p. 172. 
 
 135
 
 136 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 With the Prussians war purpose and territorial ex- 
 tension go hand in hand. The highest distinctions of 
 the Empire are for mihtaries. The Kriegherr, the War- 
 Lord, is the supreme soldier and thereby the supreme 
 magistrate. " God's will placed him at the head of the 
 army." Wherever his sons are, and at whatever age, 
 they appear in their military dress. At great national 
 functions the army officers come before the representa- 
 tives of the nation. At the opening of the imperial 
 House of Parliament, its members were not the hosts; 
 on the contrary, there was a rope stretched separating 
 them from the dignitaries of the Court, and from the 
 representatives of the army. Everywhere the man with 
 a helmet comes before the philosopher and thfe scientist. 
 The commonest lieutenant assumes a certain superiority 
 over the rector of a university. The scholar subordinates 
 his work to, and harmonizes his conclusions with, the 
 aims and purposes of the military clique. The historian, 
 betraying his mission of telling the objective truth, ever 
 celebrates the perfections of his race and its military 
 attainments. Even the clergymen have lost all inde- 
 pendence in their international judgments. The Reichs- 
 tag is ten times more military and more responsive to 
 military appeals than any other parliamentary institu- 
 tion in Europe. The late Professor J. A. Cramb speaks 
 of " the annual appearance of very nearly seven hundred 
 books dealing with war as a science," while in England 
 there is published barely a score of books on the same 
 subject.^ The German army, the military organization, is 
 the central axis of national efforts, the greatest instru- 
 ment of the will to power, and preparation to fight the 
 supreme end of the nation's life. For Bismarck the army 
 
 * Germany and England, p. 71.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 137 
 
 was " Prussia's life-nerve." ^ For Treitschke, it was 
 " the expression of a nation's will to life and must ad- 
 vance with that life." " A nation's military efficiency is 
 the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism," Bethmann- 
 Hollweg says, " The vital strength of a nation is only 
 the measure of that nation's armaments." ^ 
 
 For the Germans at large war itself has been spiritual- 
 ized, made divine and paramount, and for some of them a 
 state of things resting upon peace would be immoral. 
 The doctrine of evolution of Darwin explaining zoologi- 
 cal relations has been extended to nations who develop 
 through the natural selection of war which brings about 
 the survival of the fittest, the German, " the most perfect 
 creation that history has produced up to now." ^ That 
 German wants to be the strongest and that for him means 
 the greatest. He has thrown himself without restraint 
 into a mad industrialism and mercantilism which have 
 dwarfed his spiritual life. He is not so foolish as to 
 dream of liberty, equality and fraternity for all. He 
 does not try to harmonize his patriotism with humanity, 
 as the French have done. He has but little interest in 
 mankind. Germany is the exclusive center of his pre- 
 occupations, Deutschland iiber Alles. It is true that 
 German Socialists have platonically reproved all wars, 
 and held to the principle that peoples have a right to dis- 
 pose of themselves, but they voted for the increase of 
 armaments, and when the war came, they acted like the 
 other Germans. To the prevalence of these ethics must 
 be ascribed the relative failure of pacificism in that 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 81. 
 
 ' Cramb, J. A., Germany and England, p. 51. 
 
 • Letter of Dr. Adolf Lassen.
 
 138 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 country, and its attitude toward the judicial settlement of 
 international difficulties. 
 
 Dr. Andrew D. White, ever an admirer of Germany, 
 has shown us, in a masterly way, her attitude at the 
 first Hague Conference. He speaks as follows of the 
 chief of the German delegation : " Count von Munster 
 insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; 
 that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is 
 or can be ; that she can mobilize her army in ten days ; 
 and that neither France, Russia, nor any other power 
 can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give 
 rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and 
 would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany." ^ 
 Again, " He was out of humor with all the proceedings 
 of the conference. He is more than ever opposed to 
 arbitration.^ . . . He came out, as he did the day 
 before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, 
 declaring it ' humbug.' " ^ At the closing of the Con- 
 ference, after speeches by M. de Staal and others, Count 
 von Munster, as the presiding delegate from Germany, 
 had to make a closing address. " It must have been pain 
 and grief to him," says again the renowned American 
 educator, " for he was obliged to speak respectfully, in 
 the first place, of the Conference, which for some weeks 
 he had affected to despise; and secondly, of arbitration 
 and the other measures proposed, which, at least during 
 all the first part of the Conference, he had denounced as 
 a trick and a humbug." * Another member of the Ger- 
 
 ^ Autobiography, N. Y. 1905, vol. II, p. 265. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 296. 
 'Ibid., p. 297. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 346.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 139 
 
 man delegation, Professor Baron von Stengel of Munich, 
 was especially known for a book which he had written 
 against arbitration.^ With them was Colonel Schwartz- 
 hoff, a man strongly " prejudiced against the Conference." 
 Herr Zom von Bulach, another German delegate, main- 
 tained that an international tribunal is incompatible with 
 the sovereignty of a monarch. These delegates accord- 
 ing to Novicow blocked every attempt to solve inter- 
 national difficulties by judiciary processes.^ So much 
 for the attitude of the German delegation at The Hague 
 in 1899. 
 
 The American diplomatist, already quoted, throws 
 further light upon the position of the German authorities 
 at this time. " It now appears," he says again, " that the 
 German Emperor is determined to oppose the whole 
 scheme of arbitration." ^ " There are also signs that the 
 German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies 
 — the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Roumania 
 — leading them to oppose it." * " There is no longer any 
 doubt that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration, 
 and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference." . . . 
 " I had learned from a high official, before I left Berlin, 
 that the Emperor considered arbitration as derogatory 
 to his sovereignty." ° At times, on account of Teuton 
 opposition, the American delegates seem discouraged, but 
 they go on. " Those of us who are faithful to arbitra- 
 tion plans," says the chief of the American delegation, 
 " will go on and do the best we can ; but there is no 
 telling what stumbling-blocks Germany and her allies 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 259. 
 ' Op. cit., p. 77. 
 ' Op. cit., p. 293. 
 
 * J bid., p. 294. 
 
 • Ibid., p. 29i8.
 
 I40 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 may put in our way." ^ The American Ambassador 
 makes earnest appeals to Count von Miinster, as if he 
 were more concerned for German moral interests than 
 for those of his own countrymen, but he was struggling 
 for a great ethical issue, and his conspicuous services 
 will be remembered. He wrote a most impressive letter 
 to von Billow in view of modifying the stand of the 
 German Government. At last he went so far as to send 
 Judge Frederick Holls to Berlin, as a special delegate, 
 imploring the Germans to cease their hostility to arbitra- 
 tion and assuring them that, unless they yielded, the 
 Emperor would be the most hated man in the world.^ 
 He did not fail to act in other directions. He urged 
 Baroness von Suttener " to write with all her might to 
 influence public prints in Austria, Italy and Germany in 
 behalf of arbitration." ^ At last the Emperor relented 
 and ceased his opposition, but the attitude of Germany 
 at this time leaves room for no uncertainty. She showed 
 there how fundamentally hostile she is to the rational 
 and equitable settlement of international difficulties, and 
 how, in her mind, the sword is almost the sole ultima 
 ratio. 
 
 We are told repeatedly that the Kaiser is a man of 
 peace. Hardly a defender of Germany has failed to 
 mention the quarter of a century of peace during his 
 reign, but as Mohere puts it, Le temps ne fait rien a 
 I'affaire. If it takes two to marry, it takes two to fight. 
 Indeed the Ruler of Germany has said, " It is incom- 
 patible with my Christian faith and with the duties which, 
 as Emperor, I have assumed toward the people need- 
 
 * Ibid., p. 299. 
 
 " Ibid., pp. 299, 302, 311. 
 
 • Ibid., p. 309.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 141 
 
 lessly to bring upon Germany the sorrows of war, even 
 of a victorious one." ^ Notwithstanding that, his utter- 
 ances are those of a man hypnotized by the army and 
 ever rolling the word, sword, upon his tongue like a 
 sweet morsel. When he wishes to honor Bismarck, 
 who was on the border of the grave, he presents him with 
 " the noblest weapon of the Germans." His military 
 metaphor of " the sharpened sword " recurs as by a 
 fixed idea. " We Germans," he says in 1909, " are a 
 people who rejoice in weapons and who lightly and joy- 
 fully wear our uniforms, because we know that it pre- 
 serves peace for us." ^ 
 
 On July 31, 1914, speaking of the AlHes, he says, 
 " they are forcing the sword into my hand," and on 
 August I, " We hope and pray that our good German 
 sword will come out of the struggle victorious." The 
 threats of " the mailed fist," the demand that his soldiers 
 shall use their " weapons in such a way that for 1,000 
 years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German 
 askance," and the supreme behest to his men that they 
 " give no pardon " and take " no prisoner " are not the 
 ways of speaking of a man of peace. To this " mailed 
 fist " speech Prince Henry replied, " One thing alone 
 draws me on. It is to publish in foreign lands to every- 
 one who will listen and also to those who will not listen 
 the gospel of your Majesty's hallowed person. This 
 gospel I mean to have inscribed upon my banner, and I 
 will inscribe it wherever I go. ... I call upon those 
 who are so fortunate as to be my comrades in this 
 voyage to keep this day in their recollections, to imprint 
 the person of the Emperor upon their minds, and to send 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 45. 
 ' Ibid., p. 278.
 
 142 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 forth into the world afar the cry : ' Our most illustrious, 
 our most high and mighty, our beloved Kaiser, King and 
 Lord for ever and ever ! Hurrah ! Hurrah ! Hur- 
 rah ! '" 1 What a valuable document of mental pathol- 
 ogy! The categories of the Kaiser's mind deny at every 
 step his pretensions in this direction. His telegram to 
 President Kriiger and his speech at Tangier do not sug- 
 gest the spirit of " peace on earth, good-will toward men." 
 At the time of the Morocco Affair he was bold, pushing, 
 conscious of being backed by the mightiest army on earth, 
 resolved to use it. 
 
 Militarism and thirst for power are two dominant 
 characteristics of German activity. Every human dis- 
 covery and every form of progress is at once mortgaged 
 for war purpose. " The constant increase of German 
 armaments by land and sea," says Professor Muir, " has 
 turned all Europe into an armed camp." ^ Dr. David 
 Starr Jordan speaks of Germany which had acquired " a 
 monstrous and menacing military equipment before 
 breaking the world's peace." Never has the world seen 
 such an amazing amount of war provisions, the Spandau 
 Treasury, the Kiel Canal, deepened and enlarged for war 
 purposes, the numerous strategic railroads that make it 
 so easy, in time of conflict, to transport ammunitions and 
 soldiers from one frontier to another.^ There were also 
 great exertions to prepare foodstuffs. From 191 1 on, 
 the Germans bought large quantities of meats even in 
 France which they gathered in their cold storage.* There 
 
 ' Saunders, G., Op. cit., p. 88. 
 
 * Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 132. 
 
 ° Prof. E. Doumergue of Montauban speaks of eleven lines of 
 strategic railroads transporting troops to the front. Foi et Vie, 
 May 16, 1915. 
 
 * Houlaigue, L., Le Temps, Nov. 15, 1914.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 143 
 
 is an almost encyclopedic world of war preparations from 
 the control of the press, the spying system, the organized 
 agitation in hostile and neutral countries to stupendous 
 strategic activities, secret to an extent that would be 
 impossible in any other country. Had Germany made 
 the same efforts for peace the so-called Utopias of paci- 
 fists would have become world-wide realities ! 
 
 After 1870, the imperial rule imposed military service 
 upon all, while France adopted that measure, with in- 
 numerable exceptions, only later. The German tendency 
 to larger armaments increased with time. Every inter- 
 national event was turned into a pretext for increased 
 war appropriations. In 191 1, 1912 and 1913, legislative 
 acts continued this unreasonable accumulation of means 
 of human destruction, though when the last law was 
 passed the Chancellor said that no one threatened his 
 country. Nevertheless, the army at one vote and by a 
 war levy of $250,000,000 was increased by 200,000 units 
 and presented, in 1913, an aggregate of 850,000 men 
 in time of peace, while France, with a very much smaller 
 army, had to discount the men of various services, and 
 60,000 men immobilized in North Africa. Germany's 
 figures represent fighters, the different services were 
 provided with men to be added to the effective fighting 
 numbers. According to various French authorities the 
 relative strength of German and French contingents 
 was something like three to two or at least four to 
 three.^ If we are to accept the statements of Le Temps, 
 Germany increased her war expenses 22y per cent, from 
 1883 to 1913, that is in thirty years, and France only 
 70 per cent. 
 
 The German hallucination, or perhaps mere pretext, 
 
 ' VI, 14, 211.
 
 144 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 of the French revenge has caused them not only to see 
 enemies in the West, but the Russo-French alliance led 
 them to see them in the East also, and the same spirit 
 has revealed to them foes on the sea. The creation of 
 one of the most powerful navies of the world cannot be 
 put upon the score of French aggression, or that a 
 foreign fleet menaced its merchantmen. The colossal 
 growth of her navy cannot be explained on the basis of 
 love of peace. The imperial naval formulae, " The 
 trident ought to be in our fist," " Bitterly we need a 
 powerful German fleet," " Nothing can now be done in 
 the world without Germany and the German Emperor," 
 were the outbursts of an unsated ambition and of an 
 aggressive purpose. We know that Germany showed a 
 conspicuous unfriendliness to the work of The Hague 
 and also that she refused to accept every proposal — 
 there were many — of England for the limitation of naval 
 increase.^ We know that during the Greek-Turkish 
 war in 1897, when the Powers were doing their utmost 
 to limit the conflict, Germany lent her officers and fur- 
 nished implements of war to the Turks. We know that 
 in 1912, when Russia, France and England made noble 
 attempts to prevent and stop the Balkan war, Germany 
 showed a signal indifference, and her officers took a 
 very important place in the Turkish army, while the 
 great Powers of Europe remained neutral. We know 
 that she stood by Austria — perhaps pushed her in 1908, 
 and supported her in the annexation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina. Germany encouraged her, or at least 
 backed her, in the present war. In viewing the facts 
 that we have pointed out and many others besides, there 
 loomed before Frenchmen the sense of a great potential 
 ^ Muir, Ramsay, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 16.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 145 
 
 and unavoidable danger. The disingenuous utterances 
 of the Kaiser irritated them still further. In the Reichs- 
 tag on August 14, 1914, he said, " Too often have our 
 attempts to come to friendlier relations with the French 
 Republic failed because of her old resentments." ^ Yes, 
 the " attempts to come to friendlier relations " in French- 
 men's eyes were the alliances to isolate them, the Bis- 
 marck designs to fight them again, his misrepresen- 
 tations and those of the Kaiser, colossal menacing 
 armaments, the Morocco challenges, Agadir, and the 
 harrowing treatment of the Alsatians. 
 
 There is a German psychological trait, almost exas- 
 perating for the French, which throws considerable light 
 upon their provoking acts. This was brought out many 
 years ago by A. Fouillee, in his Esquisse psychologique 
 des peuples europcens,^ and has been put in striking 
 relief — Horresco referens — in a conversation of Chan- 
 cellor von Billow with Sir Thomas Barclay. " We Ger- 
 mans," he said, " at least the Gehildeter Stand (the 
 educated middle class), have history on the brain. It is 
 an intellectual disease which makes Germans see cur- 
 rent events out of focus. Far-off happenings stand out 
 in their mind as large as the nearer ones. We see them 
 without the sense of perspective that fixes their true 
 value. The professor and his pupils are as indignant at 
 wrongs inflicted on Germany a century or even cen- 
 turies ago as they are at what happens today, and 
 publicists seriously write historical books to show up the 
 evil ways of their neighbors, as if they might be prece- 
 dent for action today." ^ This is very true, so true 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 326. 
 
 ' P- 256. 
 
 • Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 270.
 
 146 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 that the Chancellor, having become a Prince, is uncon- 
 sciously to give us many proofs of it. In his book, 
 Imperial Germany, he says, " We wish to prevent the 
 return of such times as those of Louis XIV and of 
 Napoleon I and for our greater security have therefore 
 strengthened our frontiers against France." ^ Speaking 
 of the treatment of the Poles, whom the Germans with 
 great cruelty have endeavored to drive away from their 
 ancestral homes, he says, " In the seventh century we 
 Germans abandoned all lands east of the Elbe." ^ " West 
 Prussia was regarded not as a newly acquired land, 
 but as German land that had been recovered and rightly 
 so." ^ Notice, lands abandoned " in the seventh cen- 
 tury," the Germans endeavor now to recover by methods 
 unworthy of a civilized people. Decidedly they have 
 good memories. During the Franco-Prussian war and 
 after Sedan, M. Thiers met Ranke in Vienna. He asked 
 the Prussian historian, " Now that you have Napoleon,* 
 against whom are you fighting?" "Against whom?" 
 answered Ranke, " Against Louis XIV." ^ Von Moltke, 
 in the Reichstag, evokes the specter of Napoleon and his 
 generals as if they were about to cross the Rhine.® He 
 speaks of the milliard squeezed by Bonaparte and the 
 robbery of the Hamburg bank by a French General as 
 if they were a matter of yesterday.' One would think 
 from these German ways of viewing things that Turenne 
 
 ' P. 87. 
 ' P. 297. 
 
 • P. 302. 
 
 * In a manifesto one German General had said: "We do not 
 fight the French but Napoleon." 
 
 ' Le Temps, March 31, 1915. 
 
 "Essays, Speeches and Memoirs, vol. II, p. 112. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 138.
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 147 
 
 and Villars are with General Joffre, that the Palatinate, 
 not Louvain, not Dinant, not Ypres, not Reims, not 
 Arras, not Senlis, is still burning — that President Poin- 
 care, the first servant of France, is still Louis XIV, the 
 former War-Lord, the Kaiser of France — and that 
 French soldiers, the earnest sons of French democracy 
 — not the hirelings and mercenaries of Louis XIV — are 
 ready to renew the awful tragedies of attacking Germany 
 " thirty times in two hundred years," as the humane von 
 Tirpitz who torpedoed the Lusitania puts it.^ These 
 men who seek in history only pretexts for their aggres- 
 sive purpose never say that many of the wars were 
 undertaken for the protection and liberation of German 
 peoples, and never have anything to say about their own 
 invasions of the land west of them.^ 
 
 They do not refer to the unpardonable invasion of 
 France by Prussia and Austria, in 1792, to defeat the 
 men who were endeavoring to free their country from 
 the despotism of the Ancien regime. Both were de- 
 feated at Valmy by French soldiers fighting for the 
 first time under the inspiring strains of the Marseillaise. 
 Prussia and Austria were fighting, not only against those 
 who stood for the rights of France, but for those of 
 man. Two years later they joined the whole of Europe 
 against France. After having been for nearly eight 
 years the allies of Napoleon, and having secured through 
 this compact all possible benefits, they turned against 
 their ally, invaded France after Waterloo, and once 
 
 * New York Sun, Dec. 22, 1915. 
 
 * We commend particularly on this subject an essay of that 
 able and courageous member of the French Parliament, Joseph 
 Reinach, De I'iniluence historique de la France sur I'Allemagne, 
 in his Histoire et litterature, 1889.
 
 148 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 more in 1870 when they worked out the scheme of 
 conquest of Bismarck. In their statement of grievances, 
 they never formulate them objectively or stand defi- 
 nitely by an issue. Finally, they do France a great in- 
 justice not only by the misstatement of their case, but 
 by overlooking the generous, broad, human and humani- 
 tarian evolution of the last century. One feels that 
 behind German acts and German historiography there 
 is a strong, unreasoning, hostile passion against France. 
 The writer does not maintain that the latter has always 
 been as amiable as she might have been. Amicability 
 is less a right than a favor. France has had a correct 
 attitude, at times frigidly correct, but correct even when 
 Germany was exasperating. 
 
 The subjects of the Kaiser do not seem to be aware 
 of the fact that uncultured foreigners know something 
 of the work of the Naval League, of the German Colonial 
 Society, of the Pan-Germanistic Association as well as 
 other organizations which may differ in character, but 
 have the common purpose of territorial expansion and of 
 ethnological accretions at any cost. In broad daylight, 
 publicly, some of these organizations have advocated the 
 annexation of Belgium and of large parts of France. 
 Almost all demanded dominant positions in the North 
 Sea, all the land along the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the 
 Rhine, the mining basin of Belgium for coal and that 
 of Lorraine for iron. Such pretensions among French- 
 men, in reference to other countries, would have met 
 with popular reproof. In the country in which a large 
 party had for its motto at a time when the matter was 
 discussed, " Tonkin for the Tonkinese ! " and when re- 
 cently the same party in Parliament fought with the 
 rallying cry of " Morocco for the Moroccans ! " the aims
 
 GERMAN MILITARISM 149 
 
 of Pan-Germanists seemed to belong to another age. 
 In fact they were in keeping with those of jurists, of 
 economists, of sociologists and philosophers pointed out 
 by M. Fouillee, men among whom there is a perfect 
 worship of brute force, the ethical justification of na- 
 tional aggressiveness and a complete acceptance of the 
 doctrine that might makes right.
 
 XII 
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 
 
 The Franco-Russian Alliance was peculiarly annoy- 
 ing to the Germans and the characterization of their 
 Eastern neighbors was greatly resented in France. The 
 Kaiser is said to have spoken of them as " Asiatic Bar- 
 barians." In the recent apologetic literature of German 
 origin, one meets constantly expressions like the follow- 
 ing, " barbaric Pan-Slavism," " the Cossacks ready to 
 crush the culture of Germany," " the uncultured hordes 
 of the East," " the onrush of barbaric masses " who 
 have " the force of blind barbarity " ; in the present 
 war, the Germans defend " the cause of civilization as 
 opposed to Muscovite barbarism." Dr. Andrew D. 
 White has done justice to the often quoted epigram, 
 " Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar," which 
 is no more correct than to say, " Scratch an American 
 and you will find an Indian." ^ Those who are so severe 
 with the subjects of the Czar do not tell us that again 
 and again Russia had rendered conspicuous services to 
 Prussia and that she saved her at the time of Napoleon. 
 " Did the Prussians and Austrians," says Professor Paul 
 VinogradofT of Oxford, " reflect on the humiliation of an 
 alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of 
 the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kuhn stood 
 like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Van- 
 damme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin 
 
 ' Autobiography, vol. II, p. 26. 
 150
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 151 
 
 have obliterated the bas-relief in the ' Alley of Victories * 
 which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future 
 victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the 
 Kaluga regiment ! " ^ 
 
 During his ambassadorship, Bismarck did all he could 
 to secure the friendship of the Czar, while later on he 
 avoided irritating him and furthermore helped him to 
 subdue the Poles. In 1866, his neutrality enabled Prus- 
 sia to crush Austria. When, during the next year, 
 France asked Prussia to carry out Article V of the 
 Treaty of Prague, again Russia gave her moral support 
 to Berlin.^ In 1870, she influenced Denmark and 
 Austria, preventing them from joining France. Emperor 
 William, after the war, wrote to the Czar : " Never will 
 Prussia forget that it is thanks to you that the war has 
 not assumed extreme proportions. God bless you. ..." 
 " Your eternally grateful friend." ^ During the Franco- 
 German war, there is no favor that Bismarck is not 
 ready to confer upon St. Petersburg. He " proposed 
 the opening of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea to 
 all nations. It would probably be agreeable to Russia." * 
 Later on, referring to the same subject, he says, " In 
 the London Conference on the Black Sea Question we 
 are to support the Russian claims with all our strength." ^ 
 Two or three years later the Germans were profuse in 
 their flatteries to Russia.'' " Never place us in the 
 alternative of choosing between you (Austria) and Rus- 
 sia," said he to Count von Andrassy, the Hungarian 
 
 ' Paul Vinogradoff, The Times, Sept. 14, 1914. 
 ' III, 73, 391- 
 
 • Mevil, Op. cit., p. iv. 
 
 • Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, vol. II, p. 109. 
 
 • Ibid., p. 185. 
 
 • III, 2, 222.
 
 152 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 statesman.^ In 1878, when the Russians were excessive 
 in their demands from Turkey, someone urged him to 
 do something for peace. He answered that he did not 
 know what he could do, but he exclaimed Beati possi- 
 denfes,- which practically meant, leave them alone, so far 
 so good. During the war he made representations to the 
 Porte at the request of the Russian Government on ac- 
 count of the barbarity of the Turks against the soldiers 
 of the Czar, but had previously declined to comply with 
 a similar request from the Sultan.^ 
 
 The German press changed its tone completely with 
 the Franco-Russian Alliance. It began to speak of Rus- 
 sia as a Barbarian nation, but, except for a little while, 
 the Iron Chancellor did not modify his attitude. Again 
 and again, he expresses his gratitude to the Russians * 
 and in 1892 he censures von Capri vi because he has pre- 
 pared a rupture between the two empires.^ At times 
 he went to a great length in his courtesies toward St. 
 Petersburg. When Alexander of Battenberg, the hand- 
 some Prince of Bulgaria, the victor at the battle of 
 Slivnitze, wished to marry Princess Victoria of Prussia, 
 a project highly favored by the Queen of England, ap- 
 proved by the Emperor and by the royal family, Bis- 
 marck opposed this step and carried the day because he 
 did not wish to displease the Czar.^ While there were 
 brief periods when his w^armth for Russia lost some of 
 its intensity, as at the time of the Berlin Congress and 
 
 ^ III, j8, 70s. 
 
 * III, 26, 228. 
 
 ' Lowe, Op. cit., p. 93. 
 
 * III, 103, 884. 
 ' III, 112, 473. 
 
 * Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Papers of His History, vol. II, 
 p. 414.
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 153 
 
 even later, he was, to the last, a partisan of an alliance 
 with her and that to prevent a Russo-French rapproche- 
 ment and above all to keep France at his mercy. This 
 attitude he did not modify even during his last days at 
 Friedrichsruh.^ He knew that had it not been for 
 Russia, he could not have accomplished what he did.^ 
 Again and again the German Government endeavored to 
 detach the Czar from France, but all in vain. The Kaiser 
 did his utmost with Russia, embraced the Czar again and 
 'again, but the embraces, so potent with the Turkish 
 Sultan, were of no avail. The German detractors of 
 Russia do not realize how justly irritating to Frenchmen 
 were German calumnies of the subjects of the Czar. 
 
 Granted that Russia has but lately emerged from 
 political absolutism, have the Germans, with all their 
 assumptions of superiority, reached anything like free- 
 dom from personal government? Do they ever give 
 Russians credit for what they have done? The mass of 
 Russians are backward, but where is there a country that 
 like theirs has, without a revolution, transformed 20,000,- 
 000 slaves into free landowners like the Empire of the 
 Czar?^ Where is the people that would have given up 
 all at once the use of Vodka, a kind of Russian absinthe, 
 that yielded the treasury 2.000,000,000 francs a year? 
 This indicates a self-control not possessed by nations 
 boasting of their enlightenment. Russia is making 
 progress in many ways. Her education is spreading 
 rapidly. A. Rambaud says that she had 250 lycees and 
 colleges for women when France scarcely possessed any.* 
 
 * III, i2g, 237. 
 " III, 143, 233- 
 
 ' Rambaud, A., Journal des Debals, Oct. 6, 1893. 
 
 * Ibid.
 
 154 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 She has philosophers and scientists of considerable 
 eminence. Her economist, Novicow, has treated in a 
 masterly way some of the most difficult European prob- 
 lems. Russia has her artists, and Germany never had 
 one more humane than Vereshtchagin, the painter, who 
 attempted the impossible task of making war seem as 
 horrible as it really is. She has her musicians, never 
 more appreciated than now, and the world — very igno- 
 rant of the Empire of the Czar — was astonished when, 
 through Melchior de Vogiie, came a revelation of the 
 noteworthy literature of the country. It is impossible 
 not to agree with Professor Vinogradoff of the Oxford 
 University when he says, " A nation represented by 
 Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, in literature, 
 by Kramskoy, Vereshtchagin, Repin, Glinka, Monssorg- 
 sky, Tchaikovsky in art, by Mendeleeff, Metchnikoflf, 
 Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in his- 
 tory, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an enter- 
 national competition for prizes of culture." ^ One fact 
 which is evident is that in 1866, Austria was not slan- 
 dered one whit less by the Prussians, while in 1870, 
 France was represented as the incarnation of ignorance 
 and depravity. 
 
 The work of Russia in the cause of civilization and 
 humanity cannot be overlooked. The great Russian 
 Jurist, F. de Martens, one of the most conspicuous 
 figures at the First Conference of The Hague, has told 
 us of the services rendered by Catharine II of Russia to 
 the cause of international progress. In 1780, she made 
 the celebrated " declaration of the rights of nations and 
 of neutral commerce which served as a basis to armed 
 neutrality." Sir J. Harris of England, later Lord 
 ^ The Times, Sept. 11, 1914.
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 155 
 
 Malmesbury, made fun of it. The Empress answered, 
 " Laugh at my declaration, call it if you like my armed 
 neutrality, my armed nullity. It is a fact which will 
 remain." This principle of Catharine has entered into 
 the body of international law recognized by the world.^ 
 At the time of the invasion of Hesse, in 1850, by the 
 Austro-Bavarian army on the one hand and by that 
 of Prussia on the other the Czar Nicholas said to them, 
 " I shall fire on the first who fires." - In 1864, Alexander 
 II was prominent among those interested in the Con- 
 ference of Geneva for the humanization of war. In 
 1868, he summoned the Conference of St. Petersburg 
 to limit war excesses and to prevent the use of certain 
 projectiles and arms ^ and especially of explosive bullets.* 
 In 1875, after the war scare created by Bismarck, the 
 Duke of Cambridge speaking with Gavard of the French 
 Embassy said, " What a week we have just passed ! The 
 opinion, however, is that it is all over and that it is 
 Russia that has saved the peace of Europe." ^ 
 
 The Czar rendered then signal service to France. He 
 came to hold to the principle of national rights. The 
 Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878, reads, " The 
 final frontiers of the Bulgarian principality shall be 
 traced by a commission which shall bear in mind the 
 nationality of the majority of the inhabitants of the 
 frontiers." The great basis of decision here is not strat- 
 egy or territories, but respect for the inherent rights of 
 men. "If Bismarck," says again Novicow, " had sup- 
 
 ' V, 18, 318. 
 
 * Lowe, vol. I, p. 108. 
 
 * Higgins, A. P., The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 6. 
 
 * Larousse, Grand dictionnaire, ist supplement, p. 87. 
 ' Journal des Debats, Nov. 27, 1893.
 
 156 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 ported Russia at the Berlin Congress the whole of Bul- 
 garia, the whole of Servia, Greece and Albania would 
 have been delivered from the fatal Ottoman yoke." ^ 
 In 1888, at the time of the visit of the Kaiser to Russia, 
 it is said that the Czar already talked with him of dis- 
 armament.^ It was not Kaiser Wilhelm II, but the 
 Czar Nicholas II, who took the leadership in the calling 
 of the Conference at The Hague in 1899. The sovereign 
 of a great and powerful nation proclaimed there, before 
 the whole world, " the necessity for Governments to 
 bear in mind the aspirations and wishes of peoples, and 
 to try to discover the basis of a lasting peace among 
 them by a decrease of military forces." ^ In his rescript, 
 the Czar, speaking most wisely of armaments, said, " It 
 seems evident that if this situation continues, it will lead 
 fatally to that very cataclysm which one attempts to 
 avoid, the horrors of which cause all human thought to 
 shudder beforehand." * There were not two opinions 
 among the delegates, except those of Germany, concern- 
 ing the earnestness of the Czar whom a German-Ameri- 
 can delegate called, " The August Initiator of the Peace 
 Conference." ^ There is no doubt as to the value of the 
 co-operation of Baron de Staal, whom Andrew D. White 
 calls " the foremost diplomatist of this epoch," or of 
 that of the most renowned authority on international law 
 in the Empire, Fedor de Martens. It would be unjust 
 not to mention the presence there of Jean de Bloch, whose 
 works are said to have converted the Czar to peace 
 
 '■ Novicow, Op. cit., p. 245. 
 ' III, 88, 714. 
 •V, 18, us. 
 
 * V, 18, 333. 
 
 ' Holls, F. W., The Peace Conference at The Hague, N. Y., 
 1910.
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 157 
 
 ideas while he left his fortune to establish the Peace 
 Museum of Lucerne. 
 
 Russia espoused with singular devotion the peace and 
 humanitarian ideas discussed at the first conference. 
 She took a scarcely less important place at the second 
 conference in the same city. At all times, she earnestly 
 sustained every move that made for international comity, 
 for the humanization of war, and the permanent estab- 
 lishment of peace by reasonable and rational methods. 
 Dr. Andrew D. White twice suggests, in his Auto- 
 biography, that the Czar would have shown better his 
 earnestness at the time of The Hague Conference " by 
 dismissing from 200,000 to 250,000 troops " from his 
 army,^ but this would have been an unwise step, as the 
 Russo-Japanese war has demonstrated. France took 
 such a step, but that only made the Germans more ag- 
 gressive. Why did not the American Ambassador rec- 
 ommend that course to the Germans? Russia, unfortu- 
 nately like all other Powers, had moments when she 
 failed to show in practice her pacifistic principles, but her 
 efforts have not been inglorious. " The Franco-Russian 
 Alliance was not an alliance made for revenge," says 
 Andre Tardieu.- At the banquet given to the Czar, at 
 the time of his visit to Paris, in September, 1901, he said, 
 " No doubt can exist as to the fact that the alliance has 
 its origin in the desire for peace, and no one can deny 
 that the alliance has contributed to the preservation of 
 the balance of European Power — the necessary condi- 
 tion of peace." This peaceful aspect of Russian aims 
 appealed very much to Frenchmen, while the alliance 
 delivered them from the dread of German aggression. 
 
 ' Vol. II, p. 28. 
 
 "France and the Alliances, p. 12.
 
 158 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 This pacifistic tendency gave rise to statements in the 
 German press that Russia was willing to take French 
 money, but would not fight for her ally. Von Biilow 
 asserts almost triumphantly that " England, like Russia, 
 has refused to serve the cause of French revenge." ^ 
 This, meant as a slur upon France, is by ricochet a com- 
 pliment to the peaceful spirit of England and Russia. 
 
 The record of the Czar's Government in the direction 
 of practical pacific action is not insignificant. In 1815, 
 Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, defended the 
 neutrality of Switzerland with energy and success.^ The 
 Due de Richelieu received a map from Alexander I 
 showing what the Prussians wanted to secure from 
 France — " a line including a part of Franche-Comte, the 
 whole of Alsace, a great part of Lorraine, the Trois- 
 Eveches, Stenay, Sedan, Mezieres, Givet, all of Hainaut, 
 and of French Flanders to the sea." ^ This thirst for 
 territories was not quenched by Russia. Even Nicholas I 
 did much to protect Christians under Turkish rule, and 
 joined France and England on behalf of the Greeks. 
 When Bismarck wished to fight France again in 1875, 
 the French Ambassador, Gontaut-Biron, told the Czar 
 what the situation was. The master of All the Russias 
 answered, " Peace is necessary to the world, and each 
 nation has enough to do at home. Depend upon me and 
 have no fear." ^ He did what was essential to cause 
 Prince Bismarck to desist from his purpose. 
 
 The Treaty of San Stefano, stiff as it was, stipulated 
 valuable advantages for all Christian peoples in Turkey, 
 
 • Op. cit., p. 108. 
 ' V, 18, 319- 
 
 • Nouvelle Revue, Oct. 15, 1895. 
 
 • Broglie, Op. cit., 240.
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA 159 
 
 independence for some of them, and virtual autonomy 
 for others.^ Russia, in the flush of victory, heeded 
 Europe after San Stefano, and never was a menace to 
 her western German friends. She continued to work 
 for the protection of the Balkan peoples, standing regu- 
 larly for the principle of nationalities and the respect of 
 sovereignties.^ When the Greeks provoked war with 
 Turkey in 1897 they received no encouragement and no 
 support from Russia. In 1899 ^"^ 1900 the Cabinet of 
 St. Petersburg was endeavoring to put a stop to the 
 South African war by friendly mediation.^ It was 
 agreed by France and Germany that the ofifer of good 
 cfifices should be extended by " Russia alone." 
 
 After the Russo-Japanese war, which was largely 
 brought about by the impatience of Japan and the slow- 
 ness of Russian diplomatic action — a war which would 
 not have taken place had Russia's reply, having already 
 granted Japan's demands, arrived one day earlier,* she 
 not only came to terms with the Japanese, but in 1907 
 she signed a treaty with Japan which established a per- 
 fect understanding between the two countries. Then 
 came the remarkable agreement with England which not 
 only put an end to the historic antagonism in the East, 
 but prepared the ultimate evolution of the Entente. In 
 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina — 
 when Europe was threatened with the war that has now 
 come, Russia yielded, and in 191 1 she reasserted her 
 desire not to interfere with Bosnia and Herzegovina.^ 
 
 ' III, 103, 876. 
 
 ' III, los, 411. 
 
 ' Mevil, Op. cit., pp. 55-59. 
 
 * Mevil, Op. cit., pp. 73-117. 
 
 ' VI, /. 476.
 
 i6o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 When Austria mobilized armies on the Servian frontier, 
 she mobiHzed none. During the first Balkan war " the 
 policy of disinterestedness," presented to all the great 
 Powers, was the proposition of Russia.^ She yielded 
 also during the London Conference to the unreasonable 
 claims of Austria in the matter of Scutari.^ When it 
 seemed necessary to coerce Montenegro to take away 
 all pretexts of interference on the part of Vienna, she 
 asked France and England to join her in a demonstra- 
 tion against the brave little kingdom. When the Servians 
 seemed aggressive against the Dual Monarchy, Russia 
 issued a communique to the press which led the Servians 
 to recall their troops. In July, 191 3, she sent an earnest 
 appeal to Servia and to . Bulgaria, urging them not to 
 fight,^ an appeal from a friendly country which ought 
 to have been heeded. 
 
 In Southern Europe she has exerted a kind of Russian 
 Monroe Doctrine, protecting Greek Catholics against the 
 Turks, and against the Roman Catholic inhabitants of 
 Austria-Hungary. One fact is evident. The peoples 
 protected by the Czar have their autonomy and fullest 
 independence — an independence which is far from bow- 
 ing before everything Russian — while Bosnia and Her- 
 zegovina are under the yoke of Austria. In the days of 
 the war crisis, Russia showed a reasonable spirit. She 
 offered to refer the contention to the Court of The 
 Hague, baffled only by the determination of the Dual 
 Alliance to move southward. A fact of great signifi- 
 cance is that while Prussia was small and weak, Russia 
 never attacked her. She may become aggressive and 
 
 ^ VI, 12, 470. 
 ^ V, 15, 234. 
 'VI, j6, 233.
 
 GERMANY AND RUSSIA i6i 
 
 military, through the examples and inspiration of her 
 western neighbors. The threats of Pan-Germanists 
 have compelled the Swiss to arm more and more, the 
 Russians may be affected in a similar way. They may 
 follow the example of Japan, which has so completely 
 assimilated Teutonic Kulttir.
 
 XIII 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 
 
 For some years the scholars of Deutschland have laid 
 stress upon the common ethnological traits of the British 
 and themselves as the strongest assets on the side of 
 peace. On November i6, 1907, the Kaiser, addressing 
 English journalists, said to them, " We belong to the 
 same race and religion. These are bonds which should 
 be strong enough to preserve harmony and friendship 
 between us." ^ In this the Emperor of Germany was, 
 and should have been, disappointed. Race and religion 
 have seldom prevented peoples from fighting ; on the con- 
 trary they have often brought about the bitterest con- 
 flicts. The ethnocrates who give prominence to physical 
 kinship ought to remember that, according to their the- 
 ories, it is the peoples who are most alike who are most 
 opposed to each other. In the struggle for existence the 
 species that are most similar have the same wants, com- 
 pete for the same food, and therefore are the most 
 destructive of each other. 
 
 Germany, as usual, makes others responsible for the 
 war. England, according to the Germans, is the great 
 transgressor. They lay stress upon what they call a 
 " race treason." ^ Their violent and prejudiced diatribes 
 have revealed the decadence of objective thinking in 
 Germany and the fact that they have been misled by 
 
 ' Gauss, p. 264. 
 
 ' Miinsterberg, H., America and the War, p. 73. 
 162
 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 163 
 
 the teachings of Gobineau. This man, a mediocre diplo- 
 mat, advanced theories of races that gave the highest 
 place among the peoples of the world to the Germans. 
 Most serious thinkers in our day have given up the use 
 of the word " race " as ambiguous and deluding, but the 
 Gobinists spoke of what they called by that name as 
 permanent and almost unchangeable. These theories, 
 inadequate from the point of view of facts, ethically bad, 
 and in their application, often ridiculous, have been ac- 
 cepted by almost everyone in Germany, and have fully 
 entered into all the philosophical and literary productions 
 of the country. Anyone with anything like independence 
 of mind knows that the nations of the world are the 
 result of a mixing process which has gone on for several 
 hundred thousand years, and that, as a consequence, 
 almost all of them are the resultants of ages of physical 
 and moral crossings. According to Virchow the fair- 
 haired dolichocephalous type, generally identified with the 
 Germans, is observed only from 33 to 43 per cent, in 
 northern Germany, 25 to 32 per cent, in the center and 
 18 to 24 per cent, in the south. ^ There is no country 
 absolutely Germanic, or nearly so, in the Gobinian sense 
 of the term, and no ethical judgment can rest merely 
 upon an ethnological basis. Professor Miinsterberg and 
 Professor Bergson, both of them Hebrews, have become 
 so permeated with the spirit of the peoples among whom 
 they have lived that at times they outdo them in their 
 national characteristics. Almost all the ethnological 
 twaddle of English and German Gobinists is bad philos- 
 ophy and worse morals. 
 
 The charges of the Teuton allies against England are 
 gratuitous and fanciful. The people really dominated by 
 * Fouillee, Op. cit., p. 247.
 
 i64 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 jealous and aggressive ends have been the Germans. 
 That is the only way to explain their hostility to England 
 and their arraignments of her past. They ascribe the 
 present war to English " jealousy " and to " economic 
 rivalry." We are not ready to say that these feelings 
 did not exist in England and that in some minds they 
 have not determined a hostile attitude, but had they 
 been potent, they would have manifested themselves by 
 means of parties, by some Pan-British or anti-German 
 association, with a program akin to that of Pan-German- 
 ists. No such party or even group existed in Great 
 Britain, where every " ism" from the upholders of the 
 theory of the " Lost Tribes " ^ to every form of theo- 
 logical and social Utopias have their organizations. Had 
 there been such a spirit the British would have taken 
 measures in Parliament to check German commercial 
 progress, but where is there a single fact which points 
 to the least truly national attempt to limit or hinder the 
 progressive German exportations ? Had there been an 
 aggressive British spirit, the English, who are a practical 
 people, would have prepared for war, would have mus- 
 tered large armies, their arsenals would have been ade- 
 quate to war possibilities, their military stores would 
 have been filled with limitless munitions, provision 
 would have been made for the landing of vast military 
 corps on the Continent, preparations would have been 
 in readiness for the use of French, Belgian and German 
 railroads, millions of men would have been trained ready 
 to be rushed for continental service. All this, and much 
 more, was wanting. There can be no better refutation of 
 
 ' Some years ago an organization in Great Britain not only 
 gathered data to identify the British people with the " Lost 
 iTribes " of Israel, but propagated the belief in such an identity.
 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 165 
 
 German accusations. They who of recent years had 
 provided belligerent Japanese, Boers, Tripolitans, Turks 
 and others with all possible implements of war pro- 
 tested against American commercial liberty, and charged 
 the people of this land with a violation of neutrality. 
 The very fact that a country like England lacked mu- 
 nitions of war, when her industrial capacities along that 
 line were so great, is an evident proof that her people 
 could not have planned an aggression against Germany. 
 In any case such a proof is unnecessary since we have 
 conclusive evidence as to who were those desiring the 
 war. 
 
 Again, in the Empire of the Kaiser, there were no 
 great protests, similar to those of British scholars, of 
 what the Tory journals called the " Cocoa Press," of 
 the peace societies, and of the Socialists to avert the 
 war as in Great Britain. The general attitude of Ger- 
 many and her roughshod way of dealing with France 
 inspired great national distrust. The British, whose 
 confidence in German peaceful intentions had been so 
 weakened by the course followed by Wilhelmstrasse, felt 
 that the interests of peace were best safeguarded by 
 France and her ally, Russia. Their attitude was very 
 much assaulted by cosmopolitan financiers of German 
 origin who exerted their efforts in every direction, but 
 especially upon the Cabinet and most of all upon Sir 
 Edward Grey. The Kaiser sent a letter to The Times 
 in which were his usual protestations of his love of 
 peace — a letter which was not published.^ There were 
 the frantic efforts of the good Quakers, of English paci- 
 fists and of labor organizations who failed to realize that 
 they were working to hand over France and Russia to 
 
 * Wickharn Steed, Lecture in Paris, May 2, 1915.
 
 i66 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 the greatest militarists of the world. American peace 
 workers, then in England, were far from neutral. Some 
 of them would have allowed the French, who had taken 
 them at their word, and attempted to introduce their 
 principles into national politics, to be crushed by the 
 mighty Teutons. The British Government did nobly 
 for peace. It had given Berlin the assurance that she 
 would never support any aggression of her allies against 
 the Kaiser's people, and similarly Great Britain, unwill- 
 ing to encourage a possible " bellicose spirit of the 
 French " or the martial activities of the Russians, de- 
 clined to promise British co-operation with France. At 
 the same time. Sir Edward had warned the German 
 Ambassador that in case of a conflict in which France 
 would be a participant, England would not remain neu- 
 tral. No one could have done more to discourage 
 militants on all sides and to avoid the terrible con- 
 flict. 
 
 It was only on August 2 that M. Paul Cambon secured 
 the pledge from Downing Street that Great Britain, in 
 case of a German attack on the sea, would defend 
 French coasts. For some Gallican critics the apparent 
 hesitation of the Foreign Office was unexplainable ; the 
 Germans feel that Britain ought to have been more out- 
 spoken, but the friends of peace and humanity are obliged 
 to note that Sir Edward kept to the end his faith in the 
 possibility of avoiding the great international collision. 
 It was only when he saw the evidence of the brutal pur- 
 pose of Germany to do violence to Belgium that he felt 
 that his country was bound to have her share in opposing 
 this aggression. Sir Edward had earned the gratitude 
 of all peace lovers of the world by his practical tact, his 
 earnestness and his fairness at the London-Balkan Con-
 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 167 
 
 ference.^ The German Chancellor, speaking of his 
 leadership, at that time, said, " Europe will be grateful to 
 Sir Edward Grey for the exceptional zeal and spirit 
 of conciliation with which he directed the discussions 
 of London." ^ The same judgment must be passed upon 
 the noble bearing and the remarkable fairness of pur- 
 pose which he displayed at this time. It is not astonish- 
 ing that he should have had such support from the Brit- 
 ish Parliament, nay from the whole British Empire. 
 However, this is the man and his is the people that have 
 been spoken of by German writers in terms that are at 
 once contemptuous and insulting. The Comedy of 1870 
 was renewed and England was treated with the same de- 
 tracting spirit wherewith Germany then treated France. 
 Misrepresentations and the sword have ever been two 
 favorite Prussian weapons. 
 
 Belgium has not fared any better. The Germans were, 
 and still are, supremely incensed against her people. 
 The writer, acquainted with them for over half a cen- 
 tury, has seen them rise from great poverty to an unusual 
 prosperity by hard work, by education and by a strong 
 sense of conduct. No group of men drawn together has 
 had a deeper consciousness of the importance of its 
 unity. L'union fait la force is its motto. The national 
 cohesion, overcoming ethnic and linguistic dissent, is 
 paramount with them. They are conscious of their 
 rights as neutrals and also of their obligations. Again 
 and again they have reminded their neighbors of this by 
 the zeal with which they were safeguarding the trust 
 laid upon them by the Powers of Europe. Whenever 
 a Frenchman suggested to Belgians the possible union of 
 
 ' VI, 13, 477. 
 
 'y 1, 13,956.
 
 i68 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 their countiy with France — the writer has tried it — he 
 would receive an answer that would lead him not to 
 renew the experience. They would not tolerate such 
 suggestions, either, from Englishmen, Dutchmen or Ger- 
 mans. With the exception of a few Socialists, they love 
 their country with a strong, deep and unflinching patriot- 
 ism, capable of the greatest sacrifices. They were aware 
 that the French and the English were friendly. They 
 trusted the Dutch, whose loyalty is evident. Not so Ger- 
 many. They remembered the way in which Bismarck 
 threatened them in 1875.^ The program and the agita- 
 tion of Pan-Germanists, who, again and again, advocated 
 the annexation of Belgium, the large number of teachers, 
 merchants and laborers settling there, the strategic rail- 
 roads started after the defeat of the Russians in Man- 
 churia and, about 191 2, so completed as to be able to 
 throw an enormous army into this little Kingdom in no 
 time ; the doubling of lines having no economic interests, 
 the establishment of enormous military sidings, 600, 700 
 and 1,000 feet long, the massing of five army corps near 
 the frontier of the neutral country ^ greatly alarmed the 
 elite of Belgium. No doubt the Government asked Eng- 
 land and France what each would do in the event of a 
 German invasion. They began especial works of de- 
 fense in view of what seemed an impending danger. It 
 would have been almost criminal for them to do less. 
 Led by similar considerations the French General StaflF 
 urged France to fortify the north of their country, but 
 the pacifists opposed such a course most violently. They 
 found in the Parliament a majority to prevent this most 
 elementary precaution against the dangerous and 
 
 ^ II, 9, 222; Broglie, Op. cit., p. 192, 
 '^ Le Temps, Dec. 22, 1911.
 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 169 
 
 threatening foe. The pacifists — the writer is one of 
 them — ever pleaded extenuating circumstances on behalf 
 of Germany, and even when she was obviously working 
 at her scheme of invasion of northern France, a fact 
 which most German writers now admit. The arguments 
 of the friends of Jaures were that the people east of the 
 Rhine would never dare to incur the moral opprobrium 
 that would fall upon them were they to carry out the 
 purpose ascribed to them. 
 
 Prussian leaders have never been very considerate 
 for the rights of neutrals. When, in 1856, the Prussians 
 sought a pretext to fight Switzerland they wished very 
 much to go through Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. 
 Bismarck was incensed because Austria supported these 
 states in opposing the transit of Prussian troops through 
 their territories.^ Then he went upon what he called " a 
 simple holiday trip of pleasure " to France, but what 
 in reality was intended to secure from Napoleon III 
 " the permission to allow Prussian troops to cross Alsace 
 and Lorraine, but the French Emperor declined, as that 
 would arouse too much feeling in France." " The cam- 
 paign contemplated toward the Canton of Neuchatel was 
 as outrageous as that against the Duchies. 
 
 In a similar way the Germans planned to reach France 
 by first invading Belgium. We know now how they have 
 dared to do it, how they have burned Louvain, Dinant, 
 Ypres, committed nameless atrocities, shot innocent men 
 in presence of wife and children, executed priests with- 
 out any form of judgment, laid waste a country culti- 
 vated like a garden, destroyed most means of livelihood, 
 requisitioned foodstuffs, subjected the population to 
 
 ' Lowe, vol. I, p. 217. 
 
 * Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, vol. II, p. 43.
 
 I70 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 war exactions worthy of a barbaric age and destroyed 
 venerable institutions of a region historically as interest- 
 ing as classic lands. Some of the worst insults to the 
 good sense of the civilized world are statements like 
 the following, from a Harvard professor, " Belgium chose 
 to put itself on the side of France." ^ According to this 
 writer there were only two sides, the German and the 
 French. He did not think of a third alternative, the 
 pledged duty of remaining neutral. Again, " Germany 
 did not come to Belgium as an enemy." What would 
 Germany have done that she did not do, had she come 
 as an enemy ? " Germany could do this with a clear 
 conscience ; it did not violate the higher laws of honor." ^ 
 Not satisfied with statements which betray an ineradi- 
 cable moral color blindness, the author hints at the 
 duplicity of the Allies, suggests that the Belgians were 
 in league with them prior to the invasion. What could 
 have been their motives for so doing? What gains 
 could they have made? We are not told. His proofs 
 are like the celebrated rocher de bronze of King Fred- 
 erick William and of the Kaiser. A rocher de bronze 
 is something like " German Silver," like " Hamburg 
 steak," like " German Delft " something ungenuine. " It 
 was reported," he says, " that fifty automobiles," etc. 
 Reported, by whom? Reported when ? Reported where ? 
 Again, "Everything suggested that." ^ What thing? 
 To people of singular historic misfortunes we should 
 not offer German Tartufe-casuistry. We owe them re- 
 spect and truth. 
 
 Similarly they invaded Luxemburg early in the mom- 
 
 ' Miinsterberg, Op. cit., p. 182. 
 "Ibid., p. 185. 
 •P. 181.
 
 GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 171 
 
 ing of August 2, that is, more than thirty-six hours 
 before the declaration of war by Germany upon France. 
 The pretext here, as in Belgium, was that France had 
 previously invaded the Duchy. The French Premier 
 showed the untenableness of such an assertion in his 
 protestation to Berlin. France, far from moving forward 
 into others' territories, was keeping her troops at a 
 distance of ten kilometers from the frontier. She had 
 so well shown her intention of respecting the neutrality 
 and the integrity of Luxemburg that she tore up the 
 railroad on her side leading there.^ With Belgium 
 similar German acts and similar German pretexts. Even 
 before reaching Brussels, the Germans reiterated that 
 they had proofs of Belgium's agreement to have England 
 and France invade the country, but why did they not 
 give those proofs to the public? They ransacked the 
 archives in Brussels and found some correspondence 
 which they considered as incriminating Belgium, but it 
 merely served to show that their evidence is a good deal 
 like that of the Harvard professor. This gentleman has 
 also taxed our credulity by telling us that the atrocities 
 of German soldiers in Belgium — those in France had not 
 taken place as yet — were only " hallucinatory phenom- 
 ena." ^ The destruction of Tirlemont, Termonde and 
 Louvain, according to him, were delusions of the Allies. 
 It is remarkable what a great German psychologist can 
 see ! It is no wonder that the healthy, honest and ener- 
 getic Belgians dreaded to see such things and to be 
 compelled by German science to see them like that. 
 
 Their manly courage has excited the admiration of 
 the world. What will be the future of that noble land? 
 
 ' Lc Temps, April 7, 1915. 
 = Ibid., p. 177-
 
 172 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Will she be allowed to restore her crumbled homes and 
 to resume her normal life so brutally wrecked by her 
 soulless conqueror? That will depend upon the success 
 or failure of the friends of that state. In the case of 
 their success, will the boundaries remain where they 
 have been since Leopold I ? It is well known that there 
 is a part of the country east of the province of Liege 
 which is Walloon and given to Prussia by the Treaty of 
 Vienna. Many foreigners have suggested that this terri- 
 tory might be restored to her former owner, but the 
 Belgians are far from wishing to increase the German 
 elements among them, and doubtless would oppose such 
 an annexation. It is to be hoped that Belgium, formerly 
 able to take care of 255 inhabitants to the square kilo- 
 meter when the Germans complain with their 120 per 
 square kilometer, will soon be able to resume her former 
 life, restore her ruined institutions, live again her strenu- 
 ous and progressive history and call forth in a greater 
 degree still the admiration of mankind.
 
 XIV 
 
 THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 
 
 We have endeavored to reduce German calumnies 
 against French alHes to nought. It is time to show that 
 France also has been treated in a similar manner. 
 As far as the German charges of belligerency on her 
 part during the last forty-four years are concerned, it 
 must be remembered that she was absorbed to the ut- 
 most by her burning political and social problems when 
 the people were asking themselves anxiously, Shall we 
 have a republic or a monarchy ? — a liberal or a socialistic 
 Republic? — absorbed by colonial expeditions, those of 
 Madagascar, of Indo-China and by the effects of the 
 Panic of Langson ; — absorbed by the reform of her educa- 
 tion, having to decide whether it should be free, broad, 
 lay and republican or otherwise ; — absorbed by the Drey- 
 fus question, when the nation seemed hopelessly divided 
 over a question of practical justice; — absorbed when 
 she attempted to free herself from monastic forces that 
 were tending to stifle her freedom; — absorbed by the 
 gigantic task of the separation of Church and State, 
 when the relations that had so long existed between these 
 two institutions were torn by their very roots ; — absorbed 
 by all these issues and reforms which evoked the deepest 
 passions and most dangerous enthusiasms. How, under 
 these circumstances, could the French have thought of 
 waging war upon their mighty neighbor? Would a 
 sensible people have dared so to do, even if that had been 
 
 173
 
 174 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 their aim? Again, their economic interests were on the 
 side of peace. " We produce on a small scale," says 
 V. Berard, " but handsomely, not for the human beast, 
 but for the civilized man; the progress of our wealth 
 is bound up with that of civiHzation." ^ 
 
 Their industrial products are mostly for the better 
 classes, so that their fine goods and their financial in- 
 vestments demand peace for their best returns. France 
 was therefore held to a pacific policy by all her most 
 vital interests. All possible evidences of national tend- 
 encies point in a similar direction. When, in 1907, the 
 Petit Parisien had a plebiscite which called forth 15,000,- 
 000 votes upon the greatest Frenchman, the highest place 
 was not given to a warrior but to a scientist who ever 
 preached peace — Pasteur. The second was awarded to 
 Victor Hugo — the poet who, in his best days, exalted 
 peace — while Napoleon came only fourth. Another 
 paper by the same process asked, " Who are the great 
 men not yet in the Pantheon ? " The men designated 
 were Pasteur, Gambetta, Thiers, Parmentier, Curie, 
 Denfert-Rochereau, Savorgnan de Brazza, Alexandre 
 Dumas and Lamartine. The only soldier in this list 
 was Denfert-Rochereau, the heroic defender of Belfort. 
 The writer does not produce these names as represent- 
 ing " the greatest Frenchmen " or those worthy to have 
 above them the beautiful inscription, " Aux grands 
 hommes la patrie reconnaissante," but as indicating the 
 peace ideals of the voters. 
 
 There were many causes at work for peace. Those, 
 
 even, who are least favorable to pacifism must admit that 
 
 idealistic sympathies for judicial ways of settling fhe 
 
 difficulties of nations indicate unfriendliness to war. 
 
 * La France et Guillaume II, p. 89.
 
 THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 175 
 
 Temperance people do not open saloons to promote the 
 non-alcoholic regime. Orthodox religious people do not 
 encourage radical religious teachings to promote con- 
 servative religion and traditional faith. A people that 
 outwardly has risen above aggressive militant feelings 
 to rational ethics that proclaim the bankruptcy of war 
 is more likely to be peace-loving than one that protests 
 that war is " moral," that it is an agent of justice and an 
 historic necessity. That is the case with France as com- 
 pared with Germany. France, following Enfantin, said, 
 "If you want peace prepare for peace," while Germany 
 has clung to the old Latin irrational motto. Si vis pacem, 
 para bellum — in other words, if you want a railroad build 
 a canal. The attitude of Enfantin's country is in keeping 
 with her ancient traditions. It is needless to lay much 
 stress upon the great scheme of peace of Sully ^ and 
 of Henry IV, of the teachings of the Abbe de Saint- 
 Pierre, of the utterances of Voltaire and of Madame de 
 Stael, or the eloquent protestations against war of En- 
 fantin and its sublime condemnations by Victor Hugo. 
 France has been led by her idealism to enter into every 
 movement that made men just and on that account 
 lessened the frequency of war. She has been largely 
 represented at every international gathering that made 
 for peace. Judge Holls has praised the great services 
 rendered at The Hague by ]\I. Leon Bourgeois, by Pro- 
 fessor Louis Renault of the Paris Law School, and by 
 Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. 
 
 At the two conferences French delegates joined with 
 everyone who endeavored to stem the tide of inter- 
 national wranglings. They were as earnest and as active 
 
 ' The Great Design of Henry IV, with an introduction by 
 Edwin D. Mead.
 
 176 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 at the international peace congresses in different parts 
 of the world as in their national congresses at home. 
 They honored at the Academy of Moral and Political 
 Sciences as well as at the Sorbonne Frederic Passy, the 
 most distinguished pacifist of France, the courageous 
 prophet of better relations among men, the economist 
 who insisted that by the play of economic and ideal 
 forces the reign of international peace would come, 
 that the Utopia of the ideal would be realized. " L'utopie 
 est le rcve d'aiijourd'hui et la realite de dcmain." They 
 honored one of the noblest sons of France because he 
 voiced her highest aims and her hopes. The strength of 
 the pacifist movement may be measured by the violent 
 utterances of the militarists. The reading of the address 
 of the eminent Catholic educator, Pere Didon, on July 20, 
 1898, shows the power of the ideas which he combated.^ 
 All the great national organizations were pledged to 
 peace by judicial and not by martial methods. The ideal 
 of most of them was : la paix par le droit. All the men 
 who joined Waldeck-Rousseau, Briand and Jaures as 
 the mouthpiece and leaders of Socialism were equally 
 decided against militarism, armaments and war. This 
 was an essential part of their programme. Can the Ger- 
 mans point to a movement in France similar to that of 
 Bismarck, his alliances and his Berlin Congress that were 
 war machines? Can they show in France anything like 
 the Navy League of Germany with its millions of mem- 
 bers and with a paper. Die Flotte, having a circulation 
 of over one-third of a million ? ^ Can they suggest any- 
 thing which corresponds to the push of the Colonial 
 Society or to the Pan-Germanists? The Ligue des 
 
 * Le Temps. 
 
 * Barker, J. Ellis, Modern Germany, p. 235.
 
 THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 177 
 
 pairiotes was never more than a loud-talking and parad- 
 ing society. In a dozen of the best books, written by 
 Americans and by Englishmen, discussing contemporary 
 France there is not a single reference to it. The leading 
 societies of France, whatever else they were, were paci- 
 fistic. Hence the policy of a virtual disarmament. 
 
 The term of military service was reduced, after 1870, 
 from seven years to three, arid in 1900 from three to 
 two. General Gallieni told the writer shortly before 
 the war that he had been consulted by the Government 
 about the possibility of reducing their service further to 
 one year. Within a brief period, the military drill of 
 reservists was shortened from sixty-nine days to forty- 
 nine. The Minister of War, a pacifist like the rest of the 
 Cabinet, managed for some time to keep the contingent 
 of men in service to 65 per cent, of legal requirements. 
 Classes of men that should normally have been held in 
 the barracks were allowed to go home. France not only 
 decreased her army, but it was permeated by the most 
 positive and extreme spirit of pacifism and on that ac- 
 count hostile to any bellicose end. Colonel Bonysson 
 reports that one of Lis lieutenants, addressing soldiers, 
 began by saying : " I am an anti-militarist." ^ A large 
 number of the troops were not only sociaHsts but positive 
 internationalists.^ 
 
 In 1913, there were military uprisings in Toul and 
 Belfort.^ The Germans then denounced France as a 
 unit of aggressiveness and as a hotbed of anarchy. 
 Whatever she was, she could hardly have been both. 
 She was not in the race for armaments; for while, in 
 
 'V, 41, 9SO. 
 
 • VI, 15, 710. 
 
 • Ibid., p. 712.
 
 178 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 1870, her navy came only second, now it stands fourth 
 or fifth.^ This was not because she lacked money. 
 Under the Combes Cabinet, Camille Pelletan, Minister of 
 the Navy, had the audacity to postpone indefinitely the 
 building of warships voted by the Parliament.^ Thus 
 while France was considering war as an anachronism, 
 as a relic of barbarism, was having the principle of arbi- 
 tration and conciliation accepted by the majority of her 
 people, Germany was idealizing war, defending its utility 
 as a force of justice and was arming to an extent only 
 now — it never was before — revealed to the world by her 
 limitless resources on the battlefield. 
 
 At last, but too late, France woke up, and began to 
 restore the three years' military service, which was ac- 
 cepted as a natural necessity by the people. The Parlia- 
 ment voted $100,000,000 for armaments and for war 
 credits. It recognized that while pacifism is right, that 
 it is the only compass whereby a nation may steer its 
 ethical life, it is a signal folly for a neighbor of a 
 mighty warlike and belligerent Power to be alone in dis- 
 arming. Thanks to the intelligence and patriotism of 
 the nation much was done to regain lost time. The 
 world at large may not have given France credit for 
 heeding absolutely principles that seemed premature, but 
 recognized her pacific and reasonable spirit. 
 
 The leading nations of Europe, aware of the danger 
 that threatened that land, became more sympathetic. 
 This was especially true of English-speaking peoples and 
 particularly of Great Britain. Von Biilow recognizes this 
 .evolution. " For many reasons," he says, " English 
 public opinion is more favorable to France than to us, 
 
 ' V, 56, 953- 
 * V, 24, 7I£K
 
 THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 179 
 
 for England no longer looks upon her as a rival, and 
 certainly not as a competitor at sea." ^ Again we have 
 the German monochord idea, ever ascribing one motive 
 for an action that may have one hundred, but never giv- 
 ing the most evident one. In the same way he deals 
 with France. The armaments are made because of her 
 " hypersensitive national pride " or upon national resent- 
 ment against Germany, " the soul of French policy." ^ 
 " So far as man can tell, the ultimate aim of French 
 policy for many years to come will be to create the neces- 
 sary conditions, which today are still wanting, for a 
 settlement with Germany with good prospects of suc- 
 cess." ^ Another interested calumny, " France would 
 attack us if she thought she were strong enough." * She 
 is a nation that for " a whole generation has cherished 
 one hope and one ideal," the revanche.^ He expresses the 
 charitable thought that she will ruin herself in her com- 
 petition for armaments. " It is just possible," he says, 
 " that the effect of convulsively straining her mihtary 
 resources to the utmost may, by reacting on the economic 
 and social conditions of France, hasten the return of 
 pacific feelings, and that once again the French 
 proverb may prove true, Que I'exces du mal amene la 
 gucrison." ® When " pacific feelings " were absent it was 
 because German Chancellors, and foremost among them 
 Prince von Biilow, had done their best to drive them 
 away. A most certain fact is that her armaments did 
 not precede but succeeded those of Germany. It was 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 39. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 84. 
 
 • Ibid., p. 103. 
 
 * P. 108. 
 ' P. 106. 
 
 • P. 103.
 
 i8o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 impossible for her to do aught that could compare with 
 the results of a country that had centered its national 
 energies upon the production and accumulation of war 
 implements. Her people remained pacific and, as a 
 whole, pacifistic, but the course of Germany united 
 Frenchmen under the sense of danger as they never 
 had been. Their feelings were not unlike those of forty 
 years ago. The old spirit of revanche which had died 
 away was revived. The Alsatian Question, considerably 
 in the background, came again to the front. A sense of a 
 deep German ill-will prevailed and there was the con- 
 viction that the mighty and remorseless Goth was about 
 to strike, and so he did. 
 
 France had not only professed sound principles of 
 international relations at home but had practiced them 
 abroad. In the splendid movement of international 
 understandings which led the most civilized nations be- 
 tween 1904 and 1910 to sign over one hundred treaties 
 of arbitration, Germany signed none,^ but France was 
 foremost. She did much to reconcile Russia and Japan. 
 She herself drew nearer to the land of the Mikado and 
 contributed to the rapprochement and entente between 
 England and Russia after having done great things to 
 help the settlement of the Dogger Bank Anglo-Russian 
 incident. " There can be no doubt," said two English 
 writers, " that French influence was largely responsible 
 for the gradual reconciliation of England and Russia in 
 those years, for the growth of a feeling in both countries 
 that their Asiatic interests, hitherto the main cause of dis- 
 putes, were by no means irreconcilable." - She has dealt 
 with Italy and Spain so as to win their respect and their 
 
 ' Muir, R., Op. cit., p. 177. 
 
 * French Policy Since 1870, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 22.
 
 THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE i8i 
 
 friendship. She had no great success in the Balkans — 
 no one of the great Powers had — but she did all she could 
 to prevent the first war, and when it was on, to prevent 
 it from bringing the whole of Europe into a gigantic 
 conflict. M. Poincare, then Prime-minister, on the first 
 report of a silent compact for a war against Turkey by 
 the Balkan states, summoned the leading bankers of 
 Paris to him and urged them not to lend the sinews for 
 an aggressive war even against the Turks. As presi- 
 dent, he centered all his efiforts upon a policy of peace. 
 The Quai d'Orsay sided with every proposal, even those 
 of Count Berchtold,^ that tended to restore normal re- 
 lations. At the London Conference, in conjunction with 
 other Powers, she moved in line with the peacemakers, 
 humoring the Austrians so as to keep them from the 
 Balkan fray. When Europe was menaced with the 
 greatest catastrophe of history, she was one with Eng- 
 land, Russia and Italy to try to avert the nameless crime 
 which has soiled the escutcheon of the two Teutonic 
 Powers. In the conflict which was forced upon her, she 
 deserved fully the judgement passed by the editor of the 
 New York Evening Post, " The onlookers abroad know 
 that France has borne herself with rare dignity and re- 
 straint ; that her moral position is clearer and more shin- 
 ing than that of any other of the combatants ; that she 
 has revealed a fortitude in defeat and a resoluteness to 
 succeed in the end which, together with unexpected 
 qualities of self-control, command the admiration of all 
 who behold with unprejudiced eyes. The nation of 
 Lafayette, of De Grasse, of Rochambeau, has lived up 
 to its best." 2 
 
 • VT. //, 237. 
 
 * Villard, Oswald Garrison, Germany Embattled, p. loi.
 
 XV 
 
 AUSTRIA AND THE GERMAN PROVOCATION 
 
 Were the Austrians to hate France they would not be 
 without good reasons from some points of view. One 
 of the great services rendered by her to Germany was 
 the weakening of the power of the Hapsburgs. The 
 deliverance of Italy from its cruel rule was accomplished 
 by the co-operation of Napoleon Ill's soldiers, who helped 
 to drive the Austrians from that fair land. The work 
 done so well and so long by France was continued by 
 Prussia, practically driving out Austria from Germany. 
 After Sadowa, Austria was collecting her thoughts. Bis- 
 marck made efforts to attract her and to prevent an 
 alliance with Napoleon III. With his usual far-sighted- 
 ness after the Austrian defeat, Bismarck realized the im- 
 portance of Austria as an ally, and pleaded for gentle 
 treatment. After the Franco-Prussian war, he drew the 
 Emperor of Austria as well as the Emperor of Russia into 
 the Three Kaiser League. Austria, doomed to ultimate 
 disruption on account of the many conflicting ethnic 
 elements within her borders and feeling her insecurity, 
 yielded. The Iron Chancellor had a twofold policy with 
 these strong neighbors. He wished to change the course 
 of their interests. He urged Russia to move eastward, to 
 extend her sway as far as possible in Asia, to establish 
 herself there so as to weaken her hold in the West. 
 This Bismarckian policy was also that of the Kaiser, who 
 encouraged the Czar in the same direction. Four months 
 
 183
 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 183 
 
 after the occupation of Kiao-Chou, the Russians were 
 entering Port Arthur, where they were bound to meet 
 Japanese opposition. The French Government warned 
 St. Petersburg of the grave danger of a colHsion with 
 the Empire of the East. In a conversation with Presi- 
 dent Loubet, the Czar recognized the seriousness of the 
 situation, and said that never would Russia declare 
 war upon Japan.^ He was sincere in his purpose, but 
 the force of events was stronger than he. The disaster 
 of Port Arthur followed, and the policy of Germany 
 bore its intended fruits. With this came the elevation 
 of Japan to the rank of a great Power. 
 
 As to Austria, now that she had given up her aspira- 
 tions to the hegemony of German states, Bismarck 
 wanted to prevent the return of her former ambition and 
 also to have her forget Sadowa. Accordingly he led her 
 to give a complete reversal to her traditional policy and 
 to try to expand in the direction of Slavdom. This 
 policy, if successful, would increase the importance 
 of the Slav element in the Dual Monarchy, and ulti- 
 mately might release the German populations of Austria 
 and incorporate them into the Empire. For him the true 
 goal for Austria was the ^gean Sea, and the ideal sea- 
 port for her was Salonica. At the Berlin Congress von 
 Moltke urged Count Karoly to advise his Government to 
 go to Salonica. The tempter added, " We will approve 
 you ; better still, we will sustain you." ^ As a matter 
 of fact the Ballplatz did not need these counsels. It had 
 long coveted Bosnia and Herzegovina. As early as 1867, 
 von Beust had his eyes turned toward those provinces, 
 and this had long been known not only in Berlin but 
 
 ' Mevil, Op. cit., p. 79, 
 » Ibid^., p. 8.
 
 i84 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 also in Saint Petersburg.^ The Iron Chancellor had 
 prepared everything before so that the two Teutonic 
 Powers should be gratified at the Berlin Congress. The 
 population of the provinces was practically handed over 
 to Emperor Francis Joseph. Having been oppressed so 
 long by the Turks they deserved a better fate. They 
 were denied the right to live their own national ideals. 
 They unquestionably gained in the transfer by coming 
 under a Christian Power, but the consoHng prospects of 
 former days that there were independence and freedom 
 ahead for them had vanished. Bismarck, on the other 
 hand, demanded his pay for his services in the form of 
 an alliance by which Austria was compelled to defend 
 Germany in case she were attacked, but the terms were 
 far from reciprocal.^ Many Austrians, but chiefly the 
 Young Czechs, were eloquent in their denunciation of 
 this agreement.^ 
 
 In November 1896, Bismarck, with his usual cynicism, 
 revealed to the world that, while he had made a treaty 
 with Austria involving her support of the new German 
 Empire against the possible attacks of the Czar, he had 
 at the same time a secret treaty with Russia, against 
 Austria, covering the same period. Why the unscrupu- 
 lous statesman made this other startling revelation no one 
 can absolutely tell. It is thought by many that he wished 
 to show the Germans that in losing him they had been 
 deprived of a valuable ally. He furthermore may have 
 wished to have France doubt the sincerity of Russia.'* 
 Austria, however, knew nothing of this double-dealing.^ 
 
 ' in, 74, 413. 
 ' III, 103, 883. 
 ' III, 87, 233. 
 * III, 138, 470. 
 
 • III, 138, 715.
 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 185 
 
 Professor Miinsterberg accuses Russia of " playing a 
 double game " of late.^ That would be natural, as the 
 Czar had so long learned practical lessons from Berlin. 
 
 Then there was the abrogation of Article V of the 
 Treaty of Prague. France, who in 1866 had mediated 
 between Prussia and Austria, succeeded in having in- 
 serted in this treaty a clause whereby the inhabitants of 
 Schleswig should have a vote to decide to what country 
 the province would belong. During twelve years, the 
 Iron Chancellor had held that population in subjection 
 without ever keeping his promise. By a preliminary 
 treaty, October 1878, published in February 1879, the 
 two Powers abrogated that part of the Treaty of Prague - 
 and doomed the Danes of the province to become Ger- 
 man subjects. 
 
 Meanwhile, Austria unquestionably made improve- 
 ments in the Balkan provinces, but left no stone unturned 
 to assimilate and Germanize them. The promises of 
 virtual autonomy and of a liberal administration were 
 never kept. The Germanic elements of the Dual 
 Monarchy, ever seeking preponderance over other races, 
 continued after the virtual protectorate over Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina. In 1908, the Austrian Government pro- 
 ceeded to annex the two provinces. Turkey and Russia 
 protested. England practically did the same thing. Prince 
 von Billow sums up the reasons for his militant attitude 
 at this time as follows : " The antagonistic policy of Eng- 
 land seemed aimed less against Austria than against 
 Germany, Austria's ally. For the first time, the Austro- 
 German Alliance was to prove its durability and strength 
 in a grievous conflict. 
 
 ■ Op. cit., p. 72. 
 =■ III, 31, 953.
 
 i86 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 " In my speeches in the Reichstag, I made it clear that 
 Germany was resolved to preserve her alliance with 
 Austria at any cost. The German sword had been 
 thrown into the scale of European decision, directly in 
 support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the 
 preservation of European peace, and above all for the 
 sake of German credit and the maintenance of our posi- 
 tion in the world." ^ Of the right and wrong of the case, 
 not a word, but, to test the Alliance and for national 
 credit, he was willing to plunge Europe into a war. No 
 one will be deceived by his German cant about " the 
 preservation of European peace," which no one disturbed 
 except Austria and Germany. Furthermore Wilhelm- 
 strasse and the Ballplatz declined every proposal of a con- 
 ference to deal with this matter.- As we have seen, 
 Russia yielded. 
 
 The Government of the Hapsburgs laid its hands upon 
 the Serbs of the annexed provinces. It had previously 
 endeavored to have Servia gravitate within the Austrian 
 orbit. The wretched King Milan and his ill-fated son 
 had been used to keep Belgrade under Austrian influence, 
 but all in vain. The people on both sides of the frontier 
 knew full well that the Dual Monarchy would not respect 
 them nor their ideals and traditions. After the annexa- 
 tion Servia, feeling that she had been wrongly dealt with, 
 assumed that she was entitled to some compensations, 
 toward the Adriatic, and had Austria been generous she 
 might have humored her, but she did the opposite.^ The 
 Ballplatz did not object to having Servia reach the ^'gean 
 Sea, for, in attempting so to do, she would have been 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 63. 
 ' V, 49, 234. 
 • VI, 12, 479.
 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 187 
 
 crushed by the Turks, and then Austria would have had 
 her opportunity. It was the Adriatic that Servia needed ^ 
 to escape from her economic dependence on Austria. 
 The Dual Monarchy never tried, we do not say gentle- 
 ness, but fairness, with Servia, and was bitterly opposed 
 to two essentially modern principles that govern the 
 political life of the most progressive countries, first, the 
 rights of democracy, and second, the building of a Govern- 
 ment either upon the consensus of wills or upon ethno- 
 logical affinities. When, in 1859, Prince Napoleon had an 
 interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph to settle peace 
 conditions, he presented the French memorandum in the 
 following words, " The Emperor of Austria surrenders 
 his rights upon Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, 
 who, according to the wishes of the populations, trans- 
 mits them to the King of Sardinia." The Austrian Em- 
 peror protested against the clause which we have itali- 
 cized and said, " What you call ' the wishes of the 
 populations,' I call revolutionary rights w^hich I can- 
 not admit. I only recognize the rights inserted in 
 treaties. From them, I possess Lombardy. I am 
 willing, as a consequence of the fate of arms, to sur- 
 render my rights to Napoleon, but I cannot recog- 
 nize the wishes of populations nor anything like 
 that." ' According to him, then, peoples are perfectly 
 helpless in presence of the decisions of their supreme 
 owner. As a consequence the Dual Monarchy holds, by 
 force, " seventeen nationalities." ^ On the other hand, 
 Servia, notwithstanding her limitations, stands for a 
 
 ' VI, 12, 473. 
 
 ' Journal dc ma viission aupres dc I'Empcreur d'Autriche. 
 Revue dcs Deux Maudes, Aug. i, 1909, p. 489. 
 * Le Temps, March 3, 1915.
 
 i88 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 modern principle, the rights of those that are governed. 
 As a rule she modestly asserted her claims to existence 
 and her wishes to open the door wide to her kinsmen. 
 At the London-Balkan Conference she showed an ad- 
 mirable spirit, placing her case in the hands of the 
 Powers,^ while her opponent was the only aggressive 
 nation. 
 
 Austria, in the south of Europe, land-locked on all 
 sides, without a seaport except Trieste, which remains a 
 part of Italia Irredenta and an object of Italian de- 
 sires, was unsatisfied. That she should by loyal means 
 have sought a way south either by Avlona to the Adri- 
 atic, or by Salonica to the ^gean Sea, would have had 
 the approval of all liberal-minded men. The difficulty 
 with Avlona was that the Italians desired it also, and that 
 at best any seaport in the Adriatic was practically bottled 
 up by Italy. By an act of able and frank diplomacy, 
 Austria years ago could have worked her way to Salonica. 
 The Murzsteg Agreement between Russia and Austria, 
 in 1903, might by its condominium have paved the way 
 for such a consummation. Mutual concessions of the two 
 Powers involved might have secured that end. A nation 
 of 50,000,000 of inhabitants should have its own free 
 broad access to the waterways of the world. Her efforts 
 to realize this desideratum came too late, and the methods 
 employed were arrogant and dishonest. After the occu- 
 pation of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Montenegro and 
 Servia, the accepted time had passed. The way to 
 Salonica was blocked. Hence the greater earnestness not 
 to let Avlona escape — Avlona, one of the finest natural 
 harbors of the Mediterranean. 
 
 For years, Austria had, by her missionaries and by 
 " VI, 12, 955.
 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 189 
 
 other agencies, attempted to penetrate Albania. Every- 
 thing that could be done was tried to secure a great in- 
 fluence there, but Italy was watching and made it a 
 matter of important parleys with Vienna. The agree- 
 ment reached by the two Powers was that neither of them 
 would lay their hands upon Albania and that both of 
 them would exclude others from the coveted land.^ 
 Austria and Italy, sustained by Germany, considered that 
 if their scheme as to Albania succeeded, it was important 
 that that kingdom should be as large as possible as a 
 field of Austro-Italian influence. If the program 
 failed, both countries would claim the fragments — the 
 larger the better.^ In either case Austria wished to keep 
 her own way clear along the Adriatic while still clinging 
 to the forlorn hope of the -^Egean Sea through Servia. 
 During the Balkan war she assembled an enormous army 
 on her southern frontier and showed her impatience to 
 move ahead. When the Powers were asked by Russia 
 for a pledge that they would keep the peace in this cam- 
 paign, Austria refused to give hers.^ Count Berchtold 
 again and again stated that she " reserved to herself 
 the defense of her interests." * He maintained the liberty 
 of fighting if it was for his advantage, or of sharing the 
 Balkan spoils, and above all he was not wilHng to commit 
 himself to the policy accepted by all the great Powers 
 when they promised to make no territorial extension, 
 to live up to what they called " the pohcy of territorial 
 disinterestedness." He was satisfied with the prolonga- 
 tion of the war, because it would weaken the Balkan 
 
 ' VI, 12, 474. 
 
 *vi. 77,475. 
 
 • VI, //, 958. 
 
 * VI, 12, 240, 471.
 
 I90 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 peoples that stood in Austria's path.^ He encouraged 
 Bulgaria to resist the legitimate claims of Servia, bring- 
 ing about the war against Greece and her ally. He 
 similarly acted at Bucharest to conciliate Rumania. He 
 wished to break the Balkan alliance, he did break it, but 
 in it Rumania took the place of Bulgaria, and the alliance 
 continued. Then there was the miserable affair of 
 Prochaska, the Austrian Consul in Servia, and his scan- 
 dalous attempts to blackmail the Servians so as to create 
 a casus helli.^ Independent judges found in such acts an 
 explanation of the gigantic army which Emperor Joseph 
 kept along the Servian frontier, and of his purpose.^ 
 Austria was ready at any instant to fall upon the Servians 
 or the Montenegrins if they dared to cross her pros- 
 pective designs. She was, as already said, the cause of 
 the second Balkan war. In the compact of the Balkan 
 allies, they had agreed to a partition of conquered terri- 
 tories on the assumption that no European Power would 
 interfere; but, now, as Austria had prevented Servia 
 from having her hypothetical share, she demanded — and 
 rightly too, if we admit these principles of territorial par- 
 tition — to have a revision of the agreement. At the 
 moment of hesitation Count Berchtold advised Bulgaria 
 not to yield, and she did not. War followed, an Austrian- 
 Balkan war by proxy. When King Ferdinand was de- 
 feated Vienna and Rome threatened to interfere to pro- 
 tect the treacherous aggressors.* 
 
 During the London Conference Austria did not become 
 more pacific. Her belligerent purpose seemed firmer. 
 
 ' VI, 12, 713. 
 
 * VI, 13, 237. 
 »VI, 13, 22,7. 
 
 * VI, 16, 718.
 
 AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 191 
 
 That she wanted a clash with Servia seemed more and 
 more evident. Sig. GioHtti at a very important sitting in 
 the ItaHan Chamber, early in December, 1914, created a 
 violent commotion by an important communication. The 
 disclosure which he made was that during the second 
 Balkan war Austria intended to crush Servia. During this 
 period, on August 9, 1913, the Marquis di San Giuliano 
 had sent a dispatch to his colleague reading as follows : 
 " Austria informs us, as well as Germany, of her in- 
 tention to act against Servia, and declares that such a 
 step on her side could only be considered as defensive. 
 She hopes to make the casus faderis of the Triple Al- 
 liance work, but I think this cannot be made applicable 
 under present circumstances." No reasonable doubt can 
 be entertained now that at the same time Rumania was 
 informed of the aggressive purpose of Austria against 
 Servia.^ The Government of Bucharest took the same 
 stand as that of Rome." Austria's mobilization seemed 
 plausible so long as the Serbians had not given up their 
 purpose to have a foothold upon the Adriatic, but after- 
 ward she did not dismiss one man. How can that be 
 explained on the basis of a peaceful purpose? At the 
 London Conference, the Powers made concessions, even 
 against their better judgment, to prevent her from ag- 
 gressive action. She asked that the Servian territory 
 should not reach the Adriatic, it was granted. She de- 
 manded the independence of Albania, an independence 
 which its people did not desire, it was granted. She made 
 gigantic exertions to have Ipek, Prizrend and Diakova 
 included in this fictitious state, but while she failed in 
 that she succeeded in maintaining Scutari in it. She 
 
 ' Le Temps, Jan. 10, 191 5. 
 ^ Ibid., Jan. 27, 1915.
 
 192 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 took the initiative of a naval demonstration.^ Its pur- 
 pose was not doubtful, but its obviously dangerous char- 
 acter was eliminated by having other Powers take part 
 in it. In the matter of Scutari, she wanted to use force 
 against King Nicholas, demanding that he relinquish it, 
 but the Powers settled it by diplomatic action.^ She 
 antagonized the Servians at every point. Their legitimate 
 ambition to reach the sea was foiled, while her pet scheme 
 to create an Albanian state was carried out, to prove a 
 most humiliating failure. 
 
 ' VI, 13, 235. 
 ''Ibid., 473.
 
 XVI 
 THE INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 
 
 The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
 Austria had the benefit of a government that could not but 
 be an improvement upon that of the Porte, but they did 
 not enjoy self-government. They were treated as the 
 Italians had been, in an oppressive way and as conquered 
 peoples. The national attainments of Servia in various 
 ways and her recent victories made the Serbs of these 
 provinces proud. They naturally enough wished to be 
 united with the Serb family politically represented by 
 Servia. It would be impossible to prevent a certain 
 agitation among such a population and to banish proselyt- 
 ing. A people like this, largely kept by themselves, de- 
 spised by haughty masters indifferent to their interests 
 and their aims, could not but be hostile to their oppress- 
 ors. There, as in all countries under similar circum- 
 stances, the Tugendhund in Germany in 1808, and the 
 Carbonari in Italy, secret societies were working in con- 
 cealment to secure justice refused to them openly, and 
 which could not be obtained in any other manner. It 
 would have been impossible to cut off Servia from sym- 
 pathetic touch, and from social co-operation, with these 
 peoples. Fear could not be a permanent barrier. One 
 can no more crush these deep national desires and long- 
 ings by force of arms than eradicate, by the same means, 
 their language and their religion. 
 
 Austria was bitterly disappointed with the Bulgaro- 
 
 193
 
 194 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Turkish Treaty ^ and perhaps even more so with the 
 Treaty of Bucharest. She displayed her insincerity to 
 the extent of objecting to it on the ground that it was a 
 violation of the terms of the Berlin Congress. Her 
 friends disregarded them in 1886 - and she herself had 
 been the flagrant delinquent in that respect by annexing 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina.^ She blamed Servia for most 
 of her own failures, for only a war that would have 
 shattered the Belgrade Government and opened the way 
 to Salonica would have satisfied the belligerent clique 
 of Vienna. She was hostile to her nominal Serb sub- 
 jects, who generously retaliated. The contempt for these 
 jnen, voiced in many ways, expressed itself in most of 
 the schools. In some of them the language against the 
 Servians exceeded all measure. Feelings ran high, es- 
 pecially among the young. Borne onward by the sense 
 of injustice and outrage, thousands of young people 
 were ready to give their lives to avenge the wrongs done 
 to Servia and to themselves. The Austrians were not 
 calmer. Having been baffled all along, they had ex- 
 pected to secure a footing in Servia during the two 
 wars. Then they had some hope of penetrating by 
 means of a Roman Catholic protectorate over Servia, that 
 is, to be made the custodians of Catholics in that Ortho- 
 dox country. Here again the Ballplatz men missed their 
 mark. The Vatican signed a Concordat with Servia 
 regulating the affairs of the Church in that country. This 
 added to the Austrian anger. The Archduke Ferdinand 
 was known as an anti-Serb. He was going south to 
 direct Austrian maneuvers close to the country to which 
 
 • VI, 17, 716. 
 ' III, 72, 234. 
 
 ' VI, 16, 955.
 
 INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 195 
 
 he was hostile. This was enough to make him the butt 
 of the murderous aims of Bosnian avengers. The prince 
 and his wife lost their lives in the city of Serajevo, June 
 2^, 1914. The violence of the Serbs was more than 
 matched by that of the Austrians.^ 
 
 Notwithstanding the inquiries and explanations of Bel- 
 grade, the repeated assertions of its Government that it 
 had nothing to do with the events of the Bosnian capital 
 and that it was ready to punish any of its subjects, a 
 party to the crime, the Ballplatz remained mute as death. 
 What could Servia have gained by such a monstrous 
 act? It was cruel to let this painful period of suspension 
 oppress those who had so many reasons to fear. The 
 pretext so long sought for the invasion of Servia had 
 come at last. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, in his re- 
 markable book, Germany Embattled, says, " It is beyond 
 all question that the Austrian military party sought war 
 with Servia not once, but three times, and finally brought 
 it about, thanks to the Archduke's assassination." - We 
 would say that for a long time the ravenous wolves 
 of Vienna were constantly watching for an opportunity. 
 Now circumstances seemed favorable. The representa- 
 tives of most Governments were away. The nations of 
 the Entente were harassed by vexatious problems, 
 finances in Russia, thz Irish question in Great Britain, the 
 Caillaux excitement in France, and the labor difficulties 
 in all of them. This seemed for her the time to strike. 
 Therefore, she sent the famous, or infamous, ultimatum 
 so much in keeping with her ways. After the settlement 
 of the Balkan conflicts, the Albanians attacked the 
 Servians in their territories. They were defeated, and 
 
 ' VI, 2^, 470. 
 = P. 164.
 
 196 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 in their retreat they were pursued by the Servians, who 
 then occupied insignificant parts of the fictitious Albania, 
 and made the statement that this was temporary. 
 Austria, without consulting the Powers, sent Servia an 
 ultimatum to leave the occupied points within eight days.^ 
 She acted in the same way with Greece in reference to 
 Epirus.^ When Prince von Wied went to Albania he 
 seemed the agent of the Dual Monarchy rather than that 
 of the Powers.^ 
 
 The fatal ultimatum of July 2^, 1914, was the cul- 
 minating point in the unreasonable course of Austria, and 
 was calculated to bring war, and war it did bring.^ It 
 had been prepared by Count Tisza, the Hungarian states- 
 man, more Austrian in his foreign politics than the most 
 Chauvinistic Austrian, by Count Forgach, the former 
 Minister to Servia, celebrated for the Fried jung for- 
 geries, and by Tchirschky, the German Ambassador,^ 
 but it was a virtual repetition of a similar message sent 
 to the King of Sardinia in 1859. This also accused Sar- 
 dinia of being the home of conspirators and assassins.* 
 In this document, probably sketched before the tragedy 
 of Serajevo, Austria boldly asserted the guilt of Servia 
 without giving any fair and adequate evidence. She con- 
 demned Servia's anti-Austrian tendencies, but this little 
 country could have turned the tables upon Austria on 
 reciprocal grounds. The charges were in themselves acts 
 of international discourtesy. The acts of the Serbs 
 under Austria and of the Servians were manifestations 
 
 ' VI, 18, 237. 
 ' VI, 18, 473. 
 
 * VI, 22, 240. 
 
 * VI, 22, 711. 
 
 " Le Tevips, Jan. 29, 1915. 
 
 * The Thnes, July 30, 1914.
 
 INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 197 
 
 of public opinion that no country, except Austria, would 
 have attempted to stop. The accusations against Servian 
 officials were merely the assertions of Austrian agents 
 that had nothing judicial in them. Among other things 
 she demanded the suppression in Servia of anything 
 hostile to her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 This would have been like the Germans demanding in 
 France the suppression of papers hostile to their pos- 
 session of Alsace. She enjoined the dissolution of the 
 Narodna Odhrana, the removal from the army of anyone 
 implicated in the Bosnian agitation of the Serajevo 
 murder, and the acceptance of " agents of the Imperial 
 and Royal Government in the suppression of the sub- 
 versive movement directed against " Austria, etc. The 
 Ballplatz gave Belgrade just forty-eight hours to answer 
 this humiliating order. The difficulties for the friends of 
 peace were increased by the fact that the ultimatum 
 was communicated to the Powers only twenty-four hours 
 after it was sent to the Servian Government. When the 
 document was received, one of the ambassadors asked 
 that the time be extended, but the Austrian official 
 answered that the note to the Powers was only for their 
 information, and that the question was exclusively a 
 matter between the Dual ^Monarchy and Servia. Con- 
 scious of the strength of the Triplice, he practically said 
 to the Powers, " Hands off ! " There was in Vienna the 
 usual diplomatic cant about having sufficient territory 
 and coveting none — the usual formula of all land grabbers 
 in all countries. We know what that means. There has 
 not been, in recent times, such an unscrupulous and 
 arrogant proceeding. 
 
 The poor Servians, poor at the outset, impoverished by 
 two wars, were in a most trying position. The ultimatum
 
 198 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 would tolerate no delay, and their answer must be yes 
 or no. In either case their independence seemed in 
 hopeless danger. They were conciliatory to the utmost. 
 They granted all demands except those involving sover- 
 eign rights. These they were ready to discuss in a 
 friendly way or refer them to The Hague. Never did a 
 little people humble itself more to placate a great Power. 
 It was the old story of the Wolf and the Lamb. The 
 Austrians, like the Germans, repeated that it was a ques- 
 tion of life and death, a most absurd assertion. A great, 
 rich people of 50,000,000 of inhabitants having enjoyed 
 half a century of peace and prosperity could not resist 
 the action of 4,500,000 Servians exhausted by two ter- 
 rible wars ! It was as if the old whale had said, " I must 
 swallow Jonah, otherwise Jonah will swallow me." In 
 all her steps Austria was supported, and possibly inspired, 
 by Germany from the Conference of Berlin to this time. 
 There was the same concerted purpose among these 
 Teuton allies to put down Servia, to reach the ^'gean 
 Sea, and some think, Constantinople. 
 
 A study of all the diplomatic documents will convince 
 one that the Teutonic Alliance was unfriendly to inter- 
 national action for peace. Germany maintained that the 
 Austro-Servian quarrel was eminently Austria's concern, 
 while modern opinion more and more claims that war is 
 everybody's business. The whole human society suffers 
 from it, and hence has a right to protect itself. Four 
 of the Great Powers, Italy, France, England and Russia, 
 did their utmost to avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey 
 proposed many ways out of the situation which would 
 have succeeded with Governments really desiring peace. 
 After great efforts for an honorable and just solution, 
 the English statesman asked Germany to propose some
 
 INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 199 
 
 means whereby the situations might be saved, but she 
 showed a faint-heartedness which cannot be explained 
 except on the assumption that she was bellicose. One is 
 forced to agree with M. Rene Viviani, who said, "If 
 Germany really loved peace she might have had it simply 
 by accepting pourparlers at London on July 29, or two 
 days later by accepting the Czar's call for an appeal to The 
 Hague Tribunal, or on July 31, Great Britain's call to 
 suspend military operations in view of negotiations at 
 London." ^ 
 
 In her diplomatic papers Germany claimed to have 
 exerted all possible influence for peace in Vienna, but 
 none of her dispatches to that effect has been published 
 in her White Papers. Would it not be remarkable that in 
 such a publication, to justify her pacific attitude, to ex- 
 hibit her work in avoiding the present war, there should 
 not be a document showing that she even tried to influence 
 the war clique of Vienna? She became menacing when 
 the Powers were only taking the most elementary precau- 
 tions in view of all possible war eventualities. On July 
 2y, Francis Joseph published a manifesto addressed " To 
 my peoples " which also resembles that of 1859 to Sar- 
 dinia. The documents are almost identical in spirit, 
 in the statement of grievances and in their abusive lan- 
 guage.^ On the next day, he declared war on Servia. 
 On July 29, the Kaiser demanded that Russia should 
 suspend her mobilization and on August i he declared 
 war. Three days after, he attacked France, whose troops, 
 notwithstanding German concentration of forces, had 
 remained at a distance of ten kilometers from the 
 frontier. On August 2, the imperial troops entered 
 
 ' Statement in Paris, Feb. 25, 1915. 
 " The Times, July 30, i9iS-
 
 20O THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 Luxemburg and then Belgium. Then followed the un- 
 speakable horrors of the present war. 
 
 Germany had hoped that the land of Cavour would 
 join the Teuton allies, but in this they were disap- 
 pointed. The Quirinal was perfectly av/are of the ag- 
 gressive move of the two Powers. The withdrawal of 
 Italy from the Alliance was a virtual proclamation that 
 the act of Germany and of Austria was criminal. With 
 this there was a growing national consciousness that the 
 Germans had already made the economic conquest of 
 their country, had secured the control of their banking 
 institutions and of their navigation companies, had done 
 there what they had already accomplished in Belgium 
 and in Turkey. They remembered how, in former days, 
 Austria had treated them as now she wished to do with 
 Servia — they remembered the inhuman torments of 
 many victims such as Maroncelli and Silvio Pellico, con- 
 demned to death, and when this was commuted, subject- 
 ing them to moral tortures a hundred times worse than 
 death — they remembered that the Dual Monarchy still 
 holds under her sway their kindred who long to be 
 under the green, red and white flag of Italy — they re- 
 membered that France had helped them to secure their 
 independence, and that both lands were among the best 
 supports of liberal civilization. National feelings were 
 deepened by appeals of leading literary men, among whom 
 was Gabriele d'Annunzio. The movement became hostile 
 to neutrality and demanded action to such an extent that 
 the Government had to heed it and to head it. 
 
 To oppose this really national movement, Germany 
 sent to Rome her ablest Dernburg, Prince von Biilow. 
 Ever ready for concessions at the expense of the Dual 
 Monarchy, he attempted to bring back the Italians, by
 
 INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 201 
 
 making promises to them which were far from agreeable 
 to Vienna. He did not ask them to join the hosts of 
 the Kaiser, but attempted to make their neutraHty a 
 virtual adherence of Italy to a fictitious Triplice. The 
 end of this was not only to stem the movement of practi- 
 cal sympathy with the Allies, but it looked beyond also to 
 the conclusion of the war. In the international congress 
 which will unquestionably modify the map of Europe, 
 Italy would support Germany. Austria was equally 
 desirous of securing this peculiar kind of Italian neutral- 
 ity, but in the diplomatic conferences which took place 
 she asked for " freedom of action in the Balkans," show- 
 ing that whatever was her attitude toward Italia irredenta, 
 she had not given up her purpose of a move southward 
 to the -^gean Sea. The aged Austrian Emperor made a 
 positive refusal as to the concessions proposed by the 
 German Envoy on behalf of the Italians, who were not 
 asking favors, but the restitution of their own kindred, 
 not lands so much as men. They demanded for these the 
 right to live under institutions of their choice — a conten- 
 tion similar to that of France for Alsace. They asked 
 military frontiers taking the place of those imposed upon 
 them in 1866, and their preponderance in the Adriatic. 
 They were true to their old vindications against Austria 
 and perhaps to their old hatred. At last, they broke ofif 
 all relations and took their stand by the Allies. 
 
 The spirit of hatred and aggressive purpose so strenu- 
 ously cultivated first in Prussia, and then in Germany, 
 has borne its fruits. The long and systematic provoca- 
 tion of France has brought allies to her side. The 
 German abuses against them have been as painful to 
 Frenchmen as those against themselves. The awful 
 crash so desired by the enemies of the land of Poincare
 
 202 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE 
 
 has come. The civihzed world has expressed its judg- 
 ment upon those responsible for the Great War. The 
 manner of waging it has met with a similar condemnation. 
 Denials of atrocities were to be expected. These abomi- 
 nations have been established by evidence which no 
 philosophical-minded man will refuse to accept. The 
 countrymen of Bismarck will discover now — if not 
 now, some day — that there is a sovereign justice which 
 has its supreme hour of reckoning. Has that hour come ? 
 Events will soon tell. General Jofifre, avaricious of 
 words, has said that it would be long, dur, sur.
 
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