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 THE NEED OF 
 
 AUTOMATIC TRAIN 
 
 CONTROL 
 
 With Facts 
 
 Concerning Its 'Development 
 and Present Status 
 
 By W. M. CAMP 
 Editor, Railway Review 
 
 THE RAILWAY REVIEW CO. 
 CHICAGO 
 
 1920 
 
GIFT F 
 

 Page 
 Train Accidents, in General ................... _ ...................... 7 
 
 Train Dispatching System ..... .. .................. ...... 8 
 
 Principles of Block Signaling ............. ______ ............. 10 
 
 Controlled-Manual Block ................................................ 1 1 
 
 Track-Circuit-Controlled Block ................................. 1 1 
 
 Statistics on Collision Accidents ....... .. ........................ 13 
 
 Necessity for Derails with Interlockings ............ 13 
 
 Necessity of Flagging, with Block Signals ......... 14 
 
 How Mistakes Occur ............................................................ 18 
 
 Weather Conditions ___________ ............ ~ .............. ~ ................... 18 
 
 Mental Conditions ................................ ____ ............................ 19 
 
 Enginemen Falling Dead on Duty ........................... 21 
 
 Collision Accidents .................................................................. 23 
 
 Atlantic City, on P. & R. Ry._ ................................. 14 
 
 Oakland, Cal., on S. P. Co. Ry ................................. 14 
 
 On Mobile & Ohio R. R ........................ . .................. _ 21 
 
 On Lehigh Valley R. R ................................................... 22 
 
 Terra Cotta, on B. & O. R. R ............ - ................. . 23 
 
 Fowler, on Big Four Ry ............................................... 24 
 
 Westport, on N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R ................ 25 
 
 Bridgeport, on N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R ............ 25 
 
 Wallingford, on N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R ......... 26 
 
 Amherst, on N. Y. Central R. R ____________ ........... 26 
 
 Mt. Union, on P. R. R ............. M ....................................... 29 
 
 Earlville, on C. B. & Q. R. R .................................... 30 
 
 Ivanhoe, on Mich. Cent. R. R .................... .. .............. 31 
 
 South Byron, on N. Y. Central R. R ............ ..... 32 
 
 Fort Washington, on P. & R. Ry_ ........ _____ ....... 32 
 
 Elmwood, on P. R. R ...................................................... 32 
 
 3 
 
 5^7-464 
 
Page 
 
 Inadequacy of Discipline ................................................... 35 
 
 Conditions on English Railways ........................ 36, 52 
 
 Progress with Automatic Train Control ............ 39 
 
 Government Investigations ............................................. 41 
 
 Block Signal and Train Control Board. ....... 42, 60 
 
 Automatic Train Control Committee ..................... 45 
 
 Installations 
 
 Rowell-Potter System _ ................. - .................... .. ..... 42 
 
 Kinsman System ......................................................... 50, 54 
 
 Julian-Beggs System .................... .. ............................... 52 
 
 American Train Control System ........................... 54 
 
 Miller Automatic Stop System... .......................... 52 
 
 Casale Safety Device System ................................. 56 
 
 Elementary Problems ............................................................ 46 
 
 Use of the Overlap .................................................................. 46 
 
 Speed Control .............................................................................. 47 
 
 "Permissive" Running ...................................................... 49 
 
 Lines of Development ....................... ................................. 51 
 
 Cab Signals .................................................................................... 5 1 
 
 Automatic Stops, New York Subways ......... 50, 54 
 
 Automatic Stops, Chicago & E. I. R. R ............... 52 
 
 Automatic Stops, Chesapeake & Ohio R. R ...... 54 
 
 Types of Apparatus ............................................................... 53 
 
 Requisites of Installation .................. _ ................ .. ........... 57 
 
 A General View ...................................... .................................... 58 
 
 Cost of Installation .................................................................. 62 
 
 P-4 1 
 
For more than twenty years past it has been 
 the editorial policy of the Railway Review to 
 encourage the use of the automatic train stop, 
 as a necessary supplement to the block-signal sys- 
 tem. In this way it has fallen to the writer to 
 study the possibilities of such a means of pro- 
 moting the safety of train operation, and to fol- 
 low the progress of the development of it. The 
 ideas and facts comprised in this brief treatise 
 are the result of frequent scrutiny of railroad 
 accidents and the circumstances relating there- 
 to; and essentially all of these have been ex- 
 pressed, in various connections, in the course 
 of my editorial work. As here presented they 
 are a digest of matter of my own authorship 
 which has appeared in the Railway Review, 
 but now rewritten and arranged in connected 
 form. 
 
 Even this short account should not fail to pay 
 tribute to the industry, the intelligence and the 
 perseverance with which many worthy men have 
 labored on this problem of the automatic con- 
 trol of trains. Encountering the disinterested 
 attitude of many railway officials, in the early 
 days, and not a little prejudice, they had a hard 
 row to hoe. Some of the most efficient of these 
 men of genius are now dead and gone, and the 
 
 5 
 
chapter 'of >ailroaki' History that should do justice 
 to their efforts will probably never be written, 
 adequately. They deserved better recognition, 
 for the quality of their work, at a later day, and 
 in a more sympathetic environment would no 
 doubt have achieved better success. But, as a 
 rule, one inventor builds upon the work of an- 
 other, and I am inclined to think that the labor 
 of many in this field who were destined not to 
 see the finish, has not, after all, been entirely 
 lost. Such is the story of civilization, all 
 through: the march of progress is often over 
 ground well trodden by those who have gone 
 long before. 
 
 The cause of automatic train control is no 
 longer frowned upon nor easily dismissed by 
 those charged with the responsibility of railway 
 operation. The practical utility and the availa- 
 bility of means to put this thing into being have 
 well been demonstrated. The fog is rising, and 
 the imaginary difficulties that have so long stood 
 in the way of progress have well-nigh vanished. 
 The tune has changed from "it can't be done" 
 to "wherewith shall we get the money?" That 
 is not an unanswerable argument with American 
 people if it were, this question of automatic 
 train control would never have come into exist- 
 ence, for, to begin with, we would never have 
 had railroads. 
 
 W. M. CAMP. 
 
RAILWAY ACCIDENTS. 
 
 The accident record in the operation of our 
 railroads has always been a sad reflection. And 
 while there is no other modern means of trans- 
 portation without some fateful compensations, 
 there has long been a conviction in the public 
 mind, nevertheless, that more safeguards against 
 accidents on railroads were reasonably attain- 
 able. Compared with European standards, 
 American railroads have, in some respects, been 
 cheaply constructed. Very commonly they cross 
 public highways at grade, and about 88 per cent 
 of the mileage is still single track. The former 
 condition is a prolific source of accident to people 
 on the highways, and the latter is a factor of 
 certain hazards of train operation, more re- 
 markably so with increase in traffic density. In 
 accordance with both public and corporate policy 
 grade highway crossings with railroads are being 
 gradually, but very slowly, eliminated, at much 
 expense; and the building of second track, the 
 so-called double-tracking of line, is proceeding as 
 rapidly as the resources of the railroad com- 
 panies will permit. The progress in this direc- 
 tion also has been very slow, particularly during 
 recent years. 
 
 The phase of the subject here discussed has to 
 do with train accidents, and with certain im- 
 provements or devices which can, relatively 
 speaking, be provided at moderate cost, to pro- 
 mote safety of operation on the roads as they 
 
 7 
 
stand, single, double or multiple tracks, and 
 without regard to future progress of roadbed 
 development. 
 
 Train accidents are mainly of two kinds de- 
 railments and collisions and the casualties of 
 the latter far exceed those of the former. Adop- 
 tion of the best recognized standards of con- 
 struction for track and rolling equipment, and 
 proper attention to inspection and maintenance 
 of the same, is about all that may consistently be 
 expected of railway managements as an effort to 
 reduce derailment accidents to a minimum. As 
 for collisions, however, the negligence of em- 
 ployees and their liability to error are elements 
 of uncertainty that must be guarded against. 
 
 Of the two classes of accidents, collisions are 
 the more deplorable. A derailment might be 
 caused by a broken wheel or journal, a washout, 
 a landslide or by some other casualty that no 
 amount of human foresight could anticipate ; but 
 collisions almost always occur through negli- 
 gence or error. It is just this contingency in rail- 
 road operation that mechanical experts have 
 sought to overcome by ingeniously contrived 
 checks and warnings. In view of the frequency 
 of preventable train accidents it is therefore per- 
 tinent to inquire whether precautionary means 
 have been carried far enough. 
 
 Historically speaking, train operation in this 
 country has developed on or from the time table 
 and dispatching system. In train dispatching the 
 meeting of trains on single track, and the spacing 
 of following trains, or the passing points for the 
 
 8 
 
same, on either single or double track, is con- 
 trolled by written orders. At points distant from 
 the headquarters of the dispatcher it is necessary 
 to convey the order by telegraph or telephone, 
 necessitating the participation of three or more 
 parties in the issuance and receipt of the written 
 order, namely the dispatcher, the telegraph or 
 telephone operator and the conductor and en- 
 gineman of one train or more. Upon receipt of 
 the order by the trainmen they proceed to carry 
 out the intended movement unmindful of any 
 contingencies that may arise through error or 
 mistake of any one concerned. Long experience 
 has demonstrated that this system of operation 
 is time consuming, it results in delays to trains, 
 and it has frequently led to collisions through 
 oversight or mistakes of the dispatcher, errors 
 of transmission, misunderstanding of the order 
 by the trainmen, or, finally, through failure of 
 either the engineman or the conductor to bear in 
 mind and obey the full or exact meaning of the 
 order. Furthermore, the mere issuance of run- 
 ning orders, even when correctly transmitted 
 and interpreted, does not afford protection 
 against rear-end collisions. The faulty aspect 
 of a system that is liable to so many sources of 
 error must be evident in any study of train 
 operation. 
 
 Owing to the aforementioned shortcomings 
 and the necessity to increase track capacity, rail- 
 roads have been working away from the dis- 
 patching method, to a large extent, by substi- 
 tuting the block system. By this means there are 
 
manually-operated or automatic wayside signals 
 at the entrance of designated sections of the 
 road, called "blocks," which serve to inform an 
 engineman whether the block ahead of him is 
 clear or occupied. At interlocked crossings the 
 block section radiates over all tracks to a safe 
 distance from their point of intersection, and 
 the signals determine on which of the routes 
 the right of way is permitted. By the block sys- 
 tem enginemen, if attentive to the signals, are 
 kept informed, step by step, as it were, as to 
 conditions a safe distance ahead, and trains fol- 
 lowing at speed may be kept at proper intervals, 
 independently of special orders. Running by 
 block signal is, therefore, a great advance over 
 the more or less haphazard movements that may 
 take place under the latitude and the chance of 
 error of the dispatching system alone. And it 
 may here be noted that some measure of the 
 train-order method is usually retained with 
 block-signal operation, to select meeting points 
 with extra trains or with delayed trains, or to 
 devise run-arounds for trains of different class 
 in the same current; but, on double or multiple 
 tracks, trains may, with timetable and block sig- 
 nals, be operated with but little, if any, direction 
 through train orders. On single track, also, train 
 dispatching may largely be dispensed with 
 through the installation of block signals, al- 
 though the services of operators are usually 
 called upon for arranging head-on meets and 
 run-arounds. 
 
 During the past thirty years block signals have 
 
 10 
 
been extensively installed on American railroads 
 and they may now be found on nearly all of the 
 heavy-traffic lines or on the densely-operated por- 
 tions of such lines. Block signals are now in 
 service on more than 100,000 miles of road, of 
 which about 37,000 miles is protected by auto- 
 matic block signals. 
 
 Controlled-Manual Block. To protect manual 
 blocking against mistakes of the signalmen the 
 levers operating the block signals are sometimes 
 electrically controlled in such manner that the 
 co-operation of the operators at both ends of the 
 block is necessary before a signal can be cleared 
 to admit a train to the block. This is commonly 
 known as controlled-manual blocking, or "lock 
 and block." As the operator at the leaving end 
 should have knowledge as to whether or not a 
 train reported in the block has passed out of it, 
 he is thus in position to check the operator at the 
 entrance end. Still, should the operator at the 
 leaving end be at fault, then the joint action of 
 the two might result in admitting two trains to 
 the block. 
 
 Track-Circuit Control. To guard against 
 errors of the men at both ends of manually- 
 operated blocks a complete and positive check 
 may be had by the use of a track circuit, making 
 it impossible for either to clear a signal govern- 
 ing entrance to the block as long as the block is 
 occupied. 
 
 As for automatic block signals it may be said 
 that they have been perfected to such a degree 
 that their operation is extremely reliable. It is 
 
 11 
 
the first principle of operation of these devices 
 that the signal will be found in the stop position 
 or will go to that position, in event of derange- 
 ment or obstruction of the apparatus by weather 
 conditions or accident of any sort. Very seldom 
 or almost never does it occur that a signal will 
 "stick to clear" or be found giving a false clear 
 indication. In other words, the failures or short- 
 comings of such devices are practically always 
 on the side of safety, and the worst thing that 
 may happen will be the stopping of a train un- 
 necessarily. 
 
 And yet, as reliable as automatic block signals 
 and controlled-manual block may be, neither is 
 of any avail unless observed and obeyed by the 
 enginemen; for some of the worst collision 
 wrecks that have occurred in this country have 
 happened because the engineman either did not 
 see or disregarded a signal set against him. 
 While there can be no question but that the 
 equipment of the busy roads with block signals 
 has greatly reduced the chances of collision acci- 
 dents, yet by no means have such installations 
 entirely prevented them. Bad collision accidents 
 do happen every year on track that is well 
 equipped with block signals, and through no fault 
 of the signals. 
 
 Statistics proving the frequency with which 
 enginemen do overrun signals are surprising. 
 The latest annual report of the Bureau of Safe- 
 ty, Interstate Commerce Commission, shows that 
 of the 53 collision accidents that were investi- 
 gated during that year (1919), no less than 
 
 12 
 
eleven were caused by disregard of fixed signals 
 by enginemen. Beginning with the year 1911, 
 the official record for five years was 31 collisions, 
 in which 166 people lost their lives, caused by 
 the failure of enginemen to observe or obey the 
 indications of fixed signals. At the end of seven 
 years the record showed SO collisions, in which 
 270 persons w r ere killed and 1405 others injured, 
 where the primary cause was the disregard of 
 signal indications; and at the end of the eighth 
 year the number of collisions from this cause 
 had increased to 61. 
 
 Seemingly such accidents fall into a class 
 which modern block signaling is unable to pre- 
 vent. The Bureau of Safety, in its reports on 
 such, has repeatedly pointed out that the best 
 system of signaling, properly installed and in 
 perfect working order, would not prevent acci- 
 dents; "that employees of the highest class, with 
 long records for faithful performance of their 
 every duty, have failed at critical times;" and 
 that "there is some weakness in our system of 
 railroad operation that has not been overcome by 
 the best engineering talent of to-day or by care- 
 ful selection and training of employees." X" 
 
 Necessity for Derails. The widespread dis- 
 trust of wayside signals alone as adequate pro- 
 tection to trains in all situations is well enough 
 attested in the general use of derails at inter- 
 locked crossings. At crossings protected by in- 
 terlocked signals without derails there have 
 been disasters, and there has been frequent de- 
 railment of trains at crossings where there were 
 
 13 
 
derails, so that either experience proves the 
 case. Near Atlantic City, N. J., on July 30, 1896, 
 at a crossing of the Philadelphia & Reading Ry. 
 and the West Jersey & Seashore R. R., two pas- 
 senger trains collided, killing 42 people outright 
 and injuring more than 50 others, several of 
 whom died afterwards. In this case the inter- 
 locked signals were properly displayed and the 
 accident occurred in daytime in clear weather. 
 As another instance (July 4, 1908), two South- 
 ern Pacific passenger trains collided on a cross- 
 ing in Oakland, Cal, killing six people and injur- 
 ing 30 others. A train from Alameda struck and 
 cut in two a train from Santa Cruz. The crossing 
 was an interlocked one, without derails, and the 
 signal stood against the Santa Cruz train, but 
 the engineman did not observe it. In almost 
 countless other instances the "moral effect" of 
 the derail has not been realized, and trains, with 
 both signals and derails against them, have been 
 derailed, often with serious consequences. When 
 enginemen will disregard an interlocking signal 
 or fail of timely action in its presence, with the 
 certain knowledge that a derail is open in front 
 of them, it obviously can not be expected that the 
 chances for proper attention to block signals in 
 all cases can be any better. 
 
 Necessity of Flagging, with Block Signals. 
 
 The universal practice in this country of requir- 
 ing flagging, as an additional protection to trains 
 in block-signal territory, also is significant of the 
 negligence of enginemen in observation of sig- 
 nals. The chance of enginemen overrunning 
 
 14 
 
block signals set to stop is too great to dispense 
 with this extra means of precaution, yet, as will 
 be seen, collisions have occurred where not only 
 were the automatic block signals working per- 
 fectly, but flagging also was properly done. 
 However, the reliability of flagmen, as a class, 
 is no better than that of enginemen, if even as 
 good, for instances where their negligence has 
 resulted in disaster are almost too numerous to 
 mention. Moreover, an engineman who would 
 disregard or overrun a stop signal would be 
 equally disposed to commit the same error in the 
 presence of a flag signal. 
 
 So, unfortunately, this means of protection, 
 also, is not to be depended upon in all cases, as 
 has been only too well proven by the results of 
 long experience. Some discussion of the contin- 
 gencies that may arise in the work of flagging, 
 and how difficult it is to realize obedience to the 
 rules, is pertinent to this question. 
 
 Flagging, or the use of hand signals, is the 
 oldest method of protecting trains while they are 
 stopped on main track, and, as stated, it is still 
 in practically universal use in this country, where 
 block signals are in service as well as on roads 
 where they do not exist. The proper method of 
 protection by rear-end flagging is a simple mat- 
 ter. The essential thing is that a flagman be far 
 enough from the train he is protecting to signal 
 an approaching train in time to make a safe stop. 
 In addition to flag or lantern he may carry tor- 
 pedoes, to make audible signals in case of bad 
 
 15 
 
weather or inattention on the part of the engine- 
 man of an approaching train, or he may carry 
 and use fusees. With proper vigilance on the part 
 of a flagman a train can hardly get past him 
 without observation of a signal, of one kind or 
 another, by its engineman. 
 
 The fact that many collisions have taken place 
 where no flagman was present or where the 
 flagman was not out far enough to protect his 
 train seems to have given rise to an impression, 
 more or less general, that flagging, after all, is 
 a loose method of train proteetion; and such, 
 indeed, it really is when not properly done. The 
 cause of trouble from improper flagging usually 
 has been that the flagman either did not go far 
 enough back, or that a train slipped up on him 
 before he had time to get back a proper distance, 
 or while he was running to catch his train after 
 being called in. In any of such circumstances the 
 fault lies with negligence of duty and not with 
 the system if the latter be guarded with proper 
 regulations. Protection while a flagman is run- 
 ning back can be had by throwing off a lighted 
 fusee while the train is slowing down, the flag- 
 man then making a run to the rear as soon as 
 his train stops. Protection while running to the 
 train, after being called in, can be had by the 
 use of either fusee or torpedoes. Torpedoes are 
 objectionable in many instances , as they may 
 stop trains unnecessarily a long time after the 
 train they were left to protect has departed, but 
 where the view is obstructed to the rear of the 
 train, or in case of a heavy wind, or whenever the 
 
 16 
 
weather conditions are bad, as in storm or fog, 
 either torpedoes or fusees should be used to pro- 
 tect trains while the flagman is running in. The 
 alternative is for the train to proceed without 
 calling in its flagman, but such practice also re- 
 sults in stopping the following train unneces- 
 sarily, in most cases, and as it leaves the train 
 short one of its flagmen it is evident that on 
 repeated stops a flagman could not be left behind 
 each time. 
 
 Unless the precautions mentioned be taken, the 
 greatest danger from following trains is while 
 flagmen are getting out or returning to their 
 trains, and right here is where negligence is most 
 liable to occur. It is just as negligent for a 
 flagman to run to his train without leaving some 
 signal at proper flagging distance to warn an 
 approaching train as it would be for an army to 
 draw in its picket lines while breaking camp and 
 getting ready to march. The question of safety 
 in flagging is not at all one as to whether the 
 train to be protected shall proceed without calling 
 in its flagman, or otherwise, but entirely a ques- 
 tion as to whether or not that flagman imme- 
 diately goes to the rear a safe distance as soon 
 as his train stops, and takes due precaution to 
 protect the train while running back to it upon 
 being called in. The only consequence of such 
 careful practice is a few minutes of additional 
 delay to the train. But the efficiency and re- 
 liability of this method of train protection, as 
 every one must appreciate, are too largely a ques- 
 tion of discipline to be entirely dependable. Un- 
 
 17 
 
less the employee does his full duty, by obeying 
 the rules practically to the letter, flagging may 
 fail utterly to protect the train. 
 
 HOW MISTAKES OCCUR. 
 
 Weather Conditions. Any person who has 
 driven an automobile in bad weather has been in 
 position to appreciate the difficulties which en- 
 ginemen encounter who are charged with the 
 safe operation of a railway train under like con- 
 ditions. Perhaps the most trying test of eye and 
 nerve in driving a fast train is to proceed cau- 
 tiously, making time as best one can, in thick 
 fog or in a blinding snow storm. In such a sit- 
 uation much vigilance must be exercised to avoid 
 passing signals unnoticed. At a speed of 50 miles 
 an hour a train travels about 73 feet per second, 
 and, at this rate, it might happen that while one 
 was merely turning his head the train would 
 run farther than the maximum distance at which 
 he could see a. signal in a thick fog. This fact 
 makes it almost obligatory upon an engineman 
 when running at high speed in heavy fog to keep 
 his eyes constantly to the front, for should he 
 glance across the cab to speak to the fireman, or 
 turn to test his water gage he might easily pass 
 a signal without seeing it. 
 
 It is evident from the recorded testimony of 
 enginemen that they often take chances when 
 running under these conditions. The truth of 
 this situation was no doubt well expressed by one 
 who said, at a public hearing, that he did not 
 allow fog to interfere with his business as long 
 
 18 
 
as he was "sure of his signal indications;" but 
 the uncertainty of always being "sure" may be 
 inferred from his further remark to the effect 
 that if he missed one of the signals he would 
 know that he had done so and would then get 
 ready to stop at the next signal. He meant, of 
 course, that his knowledge of the route was so 
 intimate that he could not miss a signal without 
 being almost immediately aware of the fact. 
 Such frank testimony of running practice in 
 foggy weather raises questions which operating 
 officials might reflect upon soberly. 
 
 Mental Conditions. The uncertainties with 
 which train operation is sometimes involved 
 through stress of weather are, perhaps, no 
 greater than another class of contingencies 
 that arise in the mental state of even the most 
 reliable of men, at times. The man who could 
 be constantly alert on every occasion, under 
 the routine of handling a train over the same 
 route repeatedly, would be exceptional, to say 
 the least. Periods of indisposition, absent- 
 mindedness or momentary lapses of con- 
 sciousness are only ordinary experiences. To 
 concentrate the mind on what is before the 
 eyes, for hours at a time, without distraction, 
 is something of a tax, yet on a fast run an 
 engineman may be passing block signals oftener 
 than one each minute; and to him observa- 
 tion of signals becomes a commonplace thing. 
 To pull one's watch without noting the time 
 of day, or to straightway forget what time it 
 was, is familiar to the experience of every 
 
 19 
 
normal person, yet an act of no greater inat- 
 tention in the observation of signals might, 
 in less than a minute of time, bring an engine- 
 man into trouble. Many railway accidents 
 have been chargeable to the failure of men 
 who have ranked high in ability and record. 
 Momentary lapses of consciousness are com- 
 mon with the best of men, and may happen 
 to any one at the most critical time. There 
 can therefore be no absolute security, as long 
 as the human ejement must be depended upon. 
 Such mental deficiencies may befall any 
 person, through fatigue or loss of sleep, but 
 there are other causations in the every-day 
 experience of people which might render the 
 mind unfit for concentration on exacting 
 duties. A hard cold, constipation, bereave- 
 ment, or agitation of the mind over trouble 
 might exert fully as much influence to dis- 
 tract the mind of the employee as would loss 
 of sleep or overwork. The indiscretion of 
 eating a heavy meal, with resulting stupor 
 or drowsiness, especially with people in seden- 
 tary occupations, is not a rare occurrence; 
 and as the occupation of enginemen is not 
 one of continuous physical activity, it is no 
 unheard-of thing that one will occasionally 
 fall asleep at his post. In this connection it 
 need only be mentioned, without dwelling upon 
 it, that many of the conditions on a locomo- 
 tive in operation induce sleep the heat, wind 
 blowing in the face, the monotony of rocking 
 motion, vibration, etc. 
 
 20 
 
Enginemen Falling Dead on Duty. It is 
 
 rather remarkable that so few accidents have 
 happened to trains running without control 
 through the sudden illness or sudden death 
 of enginemen at their posts. Occasionally an 
 instance of this kind has occurred, and it has 
 always suggested to the mind of the thinking 
 person the grave possibilities of accident from 
 such a cause. How many of the accidents 
 from unexplainable causes might have hap- 
 pened in this way is at least an interesting 
 question to reflect upon, as the facts of ex- 
 perience are sufficiently numerous to uphold 
 a view of the reasonableness of such an ex- 
 planation, a few of the known instances may 
 here be cited. 
 
 During July, 1907, a collision occurred on 
 the Mobile & Ohio R. R. caused by the engine- 
 man of a passenger train falling unconscious, 
 the train running past a station where a stop 
 should have been made, and the fireman not 
 discovering what was wrong in time to stop 
 the train before it collided with a switch 
 engine. A week or two later the engineman 
 of a passenger train of the Lake Shore & 
 Michigan Southern Ry., approaching Cleve- 
 land, was overcome by heat and fell uncon- 
 scious at the throttle. Fortunately the fire- 
 man observed the engineman's condition in 
 time to prevent accident to the train. Dur- 
 ing the same week the engineman of a freight 
 train on the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
 Ry. became suddenly insane and ran his train 
 
 21 
 
a considerable distance at extraordinary speed, 
 in fear of an imaginary enemy in pursuit, in 
 spite of the vigorous efforts of his fireman to 
 prevent him. Eventually the head brakeman 
 returned from a trip to the rear and he and 
 the fireman overpowered the unfortunate man 
 and assumed control of the train. This 
 engineman had just recovered from a spell 
 of sickness and had gone out on his regular 
 run without displaying any evidence of his 
 mental condition. 
 
 In December of the same year the engine- 
 man of a Lehigh Valley R. R. freight train 
 died in his cab, suddenly, the fireman not 
 aware of it, and the train collided with 
 another freight train, causing a bad wreck 
 in which the engineman was found with no 
 apparent injury to the body and not pinned 
 fast, so that he could have extricated himself 
 without difficulty had he been alive. Just be- 
 fore the collision the train was flagged by the 
 rear brakeman of the train ahead, who, fail- 
 ing to get attention, threw stones against the 
 cab, but there was no response, so that it 
 is reasonably certain that the engineman had 
 died before the collision occurred. Soon after 
 this the engineman of a Pennsylvania R. R. 
 express train running from Jersey City to 
 Philadelphia was stricken with paralysis in his 
 cab, near Torresdale, and was found entirely 
 helpless by his fireman in time to prevent 
 accident. Six weeks later the engineman of 
 a freight train of the Erie R. R., west of 
 
 22 
 
Marion, Ohio, became suddenly ill and un- 
 conscious, and his fireman had reason to think 
 that the train had run a considerable distance 
 before his condition was discovered. 
 
 These two collisions and four instances 
 where collision or other accident might have 
 occurred but for great good fortune, all hap- 
 pened within a period of eight months. It is 
 needless to remark that they afford good 
 ground for argument for automatic control 
 of trains. In this connection, the Central 
 London Tube Ry. at one time employed an 
 assistant motorman at the side of the motor- 
 man in control of the train, for such emer- 
 gencies. 
 
 COLLISIONS THAT BLOCK SIGNALS 
 DID NOT PREVENT 
 
 Having outlined the manner in which en- 
 ginemen and other trainmen may and do com- 
 mit errors and bring trains into collision, it 
 will be impressive as well as instructive to 
 narrate the circumstances and the particulars 
 of a few of the serious collision wrecks that 
 have occurred in recent time on railroads 
 that were well equipped with block signals. 
 
 The Terra Cotta Collision, B. & O. R. R. 
 On Dec. 30, 1906, there was a rear collision 
 of passenger trains at Terra Cotta, D. C, on 
 the Baltimore & Ohio R. R., in which 43 
 people were killed and about 100 others were 
 injured. A train had stopped at the station 
 and was just pulling out, when a following 
 
 23 
 
train, running at high speed, on a down grade, 
 collided with it, smashing up three coaches. 
 The track was under block signal protection 
 and the signals were properly displayed, 
 but there was a thick fog and the engineman 
 of the following train said that he failed to 
 see any signal. 
 
 The 'Fowler Collision, Big Four Ry. On 
 Jan. 19, 1907, at Fowler, Ind., a passenger 
 train of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & 
 St. Louis, Ry. collided, head on, with a freight 
 train. In a fog the passenger train, running 
 50 miles an hour, overran a block signal set 
 at stop. Sixteen people were either killed 
 outright or burned to death, and ten others 
 were injured. 
 
 The engineman who, in this instance, ran 
 by a red light signal at high speed when the 
 weather conditions called for unusual caution, 
 was an employee with a good record, which 
 would have entitled him to confidence in any 
 situation. It was then the custom of that 
 road to test the observance of signals. On his 
 last previous eastbound trip this engineman 
 had been checked up by what is considered 
 the strongest test of an engineman's caution 
 and strict observance of rules. The rule re- 
 quired that he should stop if a signal light 
 was out, even though the signal itself might 
 show the line to be clear. At a certain sta- 
 tion the light was purposely extinguished, 
 with the signal remaining at safety, but the 
 engineman distinctly saw that the signal was 
 
 24 
 
at clear. He knew therefore that he would 
 be safe in running by, and that the technical 
 violation of the rule would not cause serious 
 results; yet he stopped his train with the 
 emergency application and reported in the 
 station that the light was out. The fact that 
 the same man on his next trip caused a ter- 
 rible disaster, simply shows that reliance upon 
 good men and thorough discipline is not the 
 final solution of the problem of safety. 
 Accidents on the N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. 
 A bad derailment accident at Westport, 
 Conn., on the New York, New Haven & Hart- 
 ford R. R., Oct. 3, 1912, was caused by too 
 fast speed through a crossover. The investi- 
 gation showed that the train struck the cross- 
 over at a speed of 50 to 60 miles per hour. 
 The engineman disregarded not only the 
 company's rule that train speed should not be 
 higher than 15 miles per hour passing through 
 the crossover, but he also disregarded an in- 
 terlocking distant signal at "caution," and a 
 home signal in stop position, properly located 
 to govern train movements through the cross- 
 over. The train entered the crossover at 
 high speed, in spite of the attempts of a work- 
 train conductor and a section foreman (the 
 latter standing in the track, ahead of the 
 train) to flag the reckless engineman down. 
 The wreck at Bridgeport, Conn., July 11, 
 the year previously, happened in the same 
 way, in all essential particulars. The Fed- 
 eral Express train, running 60 miles an hour, 
 
 25 
 
passed both distant and home signals, 2,200 
 feet apart, displayed at caution and stop, re- 
 spectively, without slackening speed, and took 
 a crossover lined up for the train. Twelve 
 people were killed outright and 40 others 
 were injured. 
 
 On the same road, Sept. 2, 1913, a collision 
 wreck occurred, between North Haven and 
 Wallingford, Conn., in which 21 people were 
 killed outright, five more were fatally injured 
 and about 50 others were injured more or less 
 seriously. A passenger train had stopped at 
 a signal on a piece of straight track where, 
 ordinarily, there is a clear view for two miles, 
 but at the time of the accident a dense fog 
 was on. The road was properly block-sig- 
 naled, the signals were in working order, and 
 in addition to this a flagman had gone back to 
 protect the rear of his train, but to an insuf- 
 ficient distance. 
 
 The Amherst Wreck, New York Central 
 R. R. On March 29, 1916, there was a double 
 collision wreck of three passenger trains, near 
 Amherst, Ohio, on the New York Central 
 R. R., which resulted in the death of 27 people 
 and injury to 47 others. The accident is of 
 peculiar interest, owing to the failure of an 
 engineman to observe a block signal that was 
 properly displayed and the neglect of a flag- 
 man to do his plain duty. 
 
 The first section of an east-bound passenger 
 train had been stopped at the home signal of 
 an interlocking station. When the signal was 
 
 26 
 
cleared the train started, but slipped and 
 stalled and then got started again, but before 
 it had proceeded more than six or seven car 
 lengths it was struck by the second section, 
 running about SO miles per hour. The result 
 of the collision was that the locomotive lifted 
 the rear end of the rear car, a steel coach, 
 which, in turn, threw the car ahead, a wooden 
 club car, across the adjoining west-bound 
 track. This collision took place at 3:18 a. m., 
 and before any movement could be made to 
 stop approaching trains the club car was struck 
 and cut in two by a west-bound train, known 
 as the "Twentieth Century Limited," running 
 at a speed of something between 50 and 60 
 miles per hour. At the instant the first col- 
 lision occurred this train was passing the in- 
 terlocking tower, only 1,200 feet distant, and 
 all three trains were in collision within the 
 short period of 30 seconds. 
 
 The road at this point was protected by 
 modern automatic block signals, but there 
 was a heavy fog, so that signals were dis- 
 tinguishable only at close range one to three 
 car lengths, according to the varying testimony 
 of trainmen who were on the ground at the 
 time. The engineman saw neither the home 
 nor distant signal, or misread them if he did 
 see them. The fireman testified that he did 
 not see any signals for six miles approaching 
 the point of collision, and was lost in the fog 
 so completely that he did not know where 
 he was within a mile or two. Aside from 
 
 27 
 
this, the engineman had a bad record for ob- 
 servance of signals, having been disciplined 
 five times in the preceding sixteen years for 
 over-running block signals or points desig- 
 nated by orders. 
 
 Let us now consider how protection by 
 flagging failed. When the first train began 
 to slow down in making the stop the rear 
 brakeman lighted and threw off a five-minute 
 red fusee. This was not seen by the engine- 
 man of the second section and, in all likeli- 
 hood, had burned out before the second sec- 
 tion came along, as sufficient time had elapsed 
 for it to do so. When the first section started, 
 the flagman got aboard, but when the train 
 stalled he got off again and then, for the 
 first time, heard the second section approach- 
 ing, and that under steam. He then lighted 
 a fusee and ran west, but got out only three or 
 four car lengths by the time the second sec- 
 tion had arrived. This seems to have been 
 the first signal indicating a train in the block 
 that either the following engineman or his 
 fireman recognized. This fusee w 4 as so near 
 the train it was intended to protect that, prac- 
 tically speaking, there was no flagman out; or, 
 in other words, protection by flagging did not 
 exist. 
 
 The flagman of the first section started out 
 right by throwing off a lighted fusee when his 
 train slowed down. Where he failed was in not 
 getting back a safe distance as soon as the 
 stop was made and planting another fusee 
 
 28 
 
or torpedoes when called in. Instead of doing 
 this he hung around the rear of his train until 
 after the fusee had burned out, so that, in 
 reality, and in short, that indispensable ad- 
 junct of block signaling, the flagman, was 
 absent. 
 
 Mt. Union Collision, Pennsylvania R. R. 
 On Feb. 27, 1917, a passenger train of the 
 Pennsylvania R. R. had stopped at Mt. Union, 
 Pa., at the station, and, when attempting to 
 start, the brakes on some of the cars failed 
 to release, as a result of which the train was 
 detained at the station longer than the usual 
 time of making a stop, and a freight train fol- 
 lowing came into collision, killing 19 pas- 
 sengers, and a porter and injuring five others. 
 
 The wreck occurred about midnight and in 
 a heavy fog. The block signals at this point 
 were about 4,000 feet apart, and as the freight 
 train, running at a speed of more than 40 
 miles an hour, passed the second signal 
 bridge in advance of Mt. Union, on which were 
 located the signals for four tracks, the engine- 
 man called out a white signal. The fireman 
 and head brakeman, however, who were look- 
 ing ahead at the time, both called "green" 
 and, noticing their disagreement with the 
 engineman, the fireman crossed over and in- 
 quired of the engineman if he did not make 
 out a green signal. But the engineman still 
 insisted that the signal was white, and pro- 
 ceeded under steam until the home signal for 
 the next block was reached, when he found a 
 
 29 
 
red signal against him and immediately ap- 
 plied the emergency brakes, shut off steam and 
 pulled the sand; but as the passenger train 
 was standing only 276 feet beyond the signal, 
 the speed of the freight train could not be 
 appreciably reduced, and the collision was 
 inevitable. As has happened so freqently, the 
 flagman of the passenger train was dilatory 
 and had gotten to the rear no further than 
 300 feet when the collision occurred. 
 
 All of the employees concerned in this ac- 
 cident were experienced in train operation 
 and had excellent records, and the signals 
 were in good working order, so that human 
 liability to error must be set down as the 
 cause. As a matter of official record, this 
 was the fourth accident of the same kind that 
 had happened on this one railroad within a 
 four-year period, all of the collisions being 
 due to non-observance of signals or mistaking 
 the indications thereof, by enginemen of long 
 experience and good records. 
 
 The Earlville Collision, C. B. & Q. R. R. 
 On Sept. 17, 1917, a freight train of the Chi- 
 cago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., near Earl- 
 ville, 111., collided with the rear of a stock train, 
 smashing four cars and killing seven men in 
 a passenger coach at the end of the stock 
 train. The operation of these trains was 
 under the block system, and the cause of the 
 collision was that the engineman on the fol- 
 lowing train was asleep, and had unconscious- 
 ly run past several signals, the last one he 
 
 30 
 
could recall before meeting with the accident 
 being the signal at Meridian, ten miles from 
 where the accident occurred. At the coroner's 
 inquest the engineman testified that he had 
 been ill with a cold, not having worked for 
 three days previous to the accident. The only 
 way in which he could account for his failure 
 was that he was not feeling well at the time 
 and had been taking medicine for his illness 
 which he thought might have caused him to 
 go to sleep at his post. 
 
 The Ivanhoe Collision, Michigan Central 
 R. R. On June 22, 1918, before daylight, an 
 empty troop train of 20 sleeping cars, follow- 
 ing a circus train, on the Michigan Central 
 R. R., near Ivanhoe, Ind., ran into the rear 
 of the circus train, killing more than 60 people. 
 Fire broke out and many injured passengers 
 were burned alive. 
 
 This acident occurred on track completely 
 block-signaled, with modern automatic ap- 
 pliances which were working perfectly. The 
 responsibility for this disaster was wholly 
 with the engineman who, at the moment of 
 the collision, was fast asleep; and so soundly 
 had he slept that he had not only failed to see 
 the cautionary distant signal, and a stop sig- 
 nal at the entrance of the block, nor the tail 
 lights of the circus train, visible a long distance 
 down the track, but in addition to these he 
 had passed a fusee burning in the track and 
 another lighted fusee thrown at the cab 
 window by the rear brakeman of the circus 
 
 31 
 
train when he saw that no effort was being 
 made to stop the following train, which was 
 coming right on at good speed. The man 
 who failed in this instance was an engineman 
 of 28 years' experience with a good previous 
 record. 
 
 South Byron Collision, N. Y. C. R. R. On 
 Jan. 12, 1919, there was a rear-end collision 
 of passenger trains on the New York Central 
 R. R., at South Byron, N. Y., while the train 
 in front was at a standstill. The engineman 
 of the following train failed to observe the 
 block signal indications, and the flagman of 
 the first train had not gone back a sufficient 
 distance to protect his train, nor did he dis- 
 play a lighted fusee, as required by the rule. 
 This engineman had a faulty record, having 
 once been dismissed for using main track 
 without flag protection. 
 
 Fort Washington Collision, P. & R. Ry. On 
 Jan. 13, 1919, a through passenger train of the 
 Philadelphia & Reading Ry. collided with the 
 rear of a local passenger train while the latter 
 was standing one-quarter mile from Fort 
 Washington station, Pa., killing 14 people and 
 injuring more than 20 others. Failure of the 
 engineman to observe and obey a block signal 
 was the primary cause. The flagman of the 
 local train had not gone out far enough to 
 prevent the collision. 
 
 The Elwood Collision, Pennsylvania R. R. 
 On August 24, 1919, there was a rear-end 
 collision between two passenger trains on the 
 
 32 
 
West Jersey & Seashore division of the Penn- 
 sylvania R. R., near Elwood, N. J., resulting 
 in the death of one passenger and the injury 
 of 25 passengers and one employee. This col- 
 lision occurred on straight track, well pro- 
 tected by automatic block signals. A con- 
 tributing factor was the foggy condition of 
 the weather, though the testimony shows that 
 signals could be discerned for a distance of 
 ten or twelve car lengths. In addition to 
 passing both caution and stop indications of 
 automatic block signals without regarding 
 them, the engineman also overran a burning- 
 fusee. 
 
 WHAT IS THE REMEDY? 
 
 The foregoing recital of facts shows that 
 the best systems of block signals known to 
 engineers and operating officials, assisted by 
 flagging, frequently have failed to protect 
 trains from collision. After all, block signals 
 are nothing more than a means of conveying 
 information, and they afford no protection 
 whatever when overrun by a sleepy or negli- 
 gent engineman, or by one who fails to see 
 the signal in a fog or snow storm, or when it 
 is obscured by a cloud of smoke or steam or 
 in the glare of a powerful electric headlight. 
 
 The most perfect signaling appliances in 
 extensive service on American railways to- 
 day fall just one step short of accomplishing 
 all that is necessary to put train operation 
 beyond the fortuity of human error or neglect. 
 
 33 
 
It is certain, therefore, that some automatic 
 device or mechanism that would take the 
 control out of the engineman's hands in event 
 he failed to observe or regard a signal indica- 
 tion that restricts the movement of his train 
 is indispensable to safety of operation. The 
 need of automatic train control has been 
 established beyond any question, and the de- 
 mand for it is real and urgent. Automatic 
 brake setting, or some other, as yet unknown, 
 scheme providing an equivalent check, when 
 signals are disregarded, is bound to come 
 into general use. 
 
 A fundamental conception of the present 
 situation was expressed as long ago as 1879, 
 by Charles Francis Adams, Jr., in his book 
 "Notes on Railroad Accidents." The accuracy 
 with which he foresaw the danger points of 
 present operating conditions is well recorded 
 in the remarks here quoted: 
 
 "The American block system of the future 
 will be essentially different from the present 
 English system. While the operator is every- 
 where in the English block, his place will be 
 supplied to the utmost possible degree by 
 
 automatic action in the American The 
 
 effort in America, somewhat in advance of that 
 crowded condition of the lines which makes 
 the adoption of something a measure of pres- 
 ent necessity, has been directed towards the 
 invention of an automatic system which at 
 one and the same time should cover all the 
 dangers and provide for all the needs which 
 
 34 
 
have been referred to, eliminating the risk 
 incident to human forgetfulness, drowsiness 
 and weakness of nerves. Can reliable auto- 
 matic provision thus be made? The com- 
 plicated and unceasing train movement de- 
 pends upon many thousand employees, all of 
 whom make mistakes or assume risks some- 
 times; and did they not do so they would be 
 either more or less than men. Being, however, 
 neither angels nor machines, but ordinary 
 mortals whose services are bought for money 
 at the average market rate of wages, it would 
 certainly seem no small point gained if an 
 automatic machine could be placed on guard 
 over those whom it is the great effort of rail- 
 road discipline to reduce to automatons." 
 
 Considering the time when these observa- 
 tions were made, they show that Mr. Adams 
 was somewhat in advance of his day in grasp- 
 ing the needs of American railways in the 
 way of block signals. The extensive use of 
 automatic block signals predicted by Mr. 
 Adams has come to pass, and his suggestion 
 of the automatic control of trains points to 
 that essential feature of operation in which 
 our railroads are now found deficient. 
 
 The Inadequacy of Discipline. The argu- 
 ments that were once used to discourage the 
 idea of automatic train control might have 
 led some to believe that a gradual improve- 
 ment in the discipline of trainmen in this 
 country was to be expected. Whoever may 
 have entertained such a view has certainly 
 
 35 
 
been disappointed, for neither generally ob- 
 served conditions nor results have confirmed 
 it. Neither is the situation in other countries 
 satisfactory in this respect. 
 
 Some of those who have been opposed to the 
 idea of automatic train stops, on the ground 
 that a good system of block signals with en- 
 ginemen trained to a high standard of dis- 
 cipline, should afford adequate protection, 
 have often referred to the accident records of 
 English railways to substantiate their con- 
 tention. It is known, however, that the En- 
 glish railways, obviously for some good rea- 
 son, have for years been experimenting with 
 cab signals as an additional precaution for 
 safety, nothwithstanding the prevailing block 
 system of train operation and the good repu- 
 tation of their enginemen for discipline. Ac- 
 cording to official accident records, however, 
 the reliability of block signal equipment and 
 of enginemen to observe signal indications do 
 not come as near perfection as is generally sup- 
 posed to be the case. 
 
 In one ten-year period there were 137 rail- 
 way accidents in Great Britain, due to over- 
 running signals and to imperfections in the 
 signaling system itself. Of these, 47 accidents 
 were caused by the overrunning of signals by 
 fault of the enginemen, either through non- 
 observance or disregard; 61 accidents were 
 due to irregularities of the block system (man- 
 ual block), including 8 failures of signals; and 
 21 more accidents were caused by faults of 
 
 36 
 
the signalmen. Subsequent records have 
 shown that improvement of the signal instal- 
 lations, including the use of the track circuit, 
 had reduced the number of accidents caused 
 by irregularities in the operation of the block 
 system by fifty per cent, but there was no re- 
 duction in the number of accidents caused by 
 overrunning signals. 
 
 Train operation in Great Britain having al- 
 ways been held up as the criterion for safety, 
 such an exhibit ought to be convincing testi- 
 mony to the fact that human error, even in the 
 presence of the most reliable of block signal 
 arrangements, is a cause of railway accidents 
 the world over; and comparisons of the acci- 
 dent records of the United States, England and 
 other European countries, while they may in- 
 dicate some differences in degree, really show 
 no differences in kind. In England the liability 
 to error with block signals .in the hands of 
 highly-trained men is recognized, and in addi- 
 tion to this they have more fog to contend 
 with than we have. For this reason the use 
 of detonators (torpedoes) as an auxiliary to 
 fixed signals, to call the attention of engine- 
 men to the signal indications in times of 
 heavy fog, is in very general practice. The 
 expense of stationing "fogmen" at the side of 
 the track to repeat the signal indications by 
 means of audible signals is considerable, and 
 this has led to the development of a device 
 known as the torpedo placer, which has been 
 used to some extent. This automatically places 
 
 37 
 
a torpedo upon the rail simultaneously with 
 the setting of the signal. The explosion of 
 the torpedo warns the engineman of the posi- 
 tion of the signal. The use of safeguards as 
 auxiliary to the wayside signals is therefore 
 in considerable and regular service, so that the 
 proposition of placing an auxiliary system on 
 the locomotives in the form of cab signals is 
 not at all inconsistent with English ideas. 
 
 Thus it has been shown that our own 
 country is by no means the only one where 
 carefully-operated ,block signal systems and 
 studiously prepared and strictly enforced rules 
 for the use of the same fail to safeguard trains as 
 well as could be desired. To some extent, 
 however, a false standard of ethics with block 
 signal experts has stood opposed to the pur- 
 suit of further means of protection. Signal 
 engineers, with both railroads and manufac- 
 turers, have labored industriously and ingeni- 
 ously, and have produced apparatus re- 
 markable for its high order of perfection, yet 
 the practical efficiency of the whole system is 
 still dependent upon human reliability as much 
 as upon perfection of mechanism. This fact 
 might be expected to strike signalmen in an 
 unwelcome manner, but the further considera- 
 tion that the responsibility for lapse of dis- 
 cipline is not theirs does not change the 
 situation. Pride over the high efficiency of 
 existing equipment is commendable, but it 
 should not stand in the way of possibility of 
 further progress toward safety. In the light 
 
 38 
 
of every-day railroad experience, one cannot 
 dismiss from his mind that the idea of placing 
 both men and machines under automatic con- 
 trol is a "consummation devoutly to be 
 wished." 
 
 PROGRESS WITH AUTOMATIC TRAIN 
 CONTROL 
 
 As clearly as the necessity for automatic 
 control of train operation has been seen in the 
 past three decades, the progress, nevertheless, 
 has been very slow, especially so when one 
 takes account of the great advance that has 
 been made in th/. ^OOStruction of track, rolling 
 stock, station buiU'^o's ^fld terminals, as well 
 as in the refinement of passenger equipment, 
 increase in speed, train tonnage, etc. Auto- 
 matic train stops are now in use on a few 
 rjailroads in this country, covering a small 
 mileage, and they have been used or experi- 
 mented with in a spasmodic sort of way for 
 upwards of 25 years, about the first notable 
 experiments being those installed on elevated 
 railways in Chicago during, and immediately 
 following, the World's Fair. On the Boston 
 Elevated Ry. and in the tunnels and subways 
 of New York and Philadelphia there is an 
 aggregate length of 105^ miles of road 
 equipped with automatic train stop devices. 
 
 It must be said that but little effort has 
 been made by the railroads in this country to 
 develop automatic train control. Very few 
 railroad managements have encouraged it by 
 
 39 
 
either moral or financial co-operation, and 
 various pleas, of more or less plausibility, 
 have been made to put the matter off. 
 Among these have been the insistence that 
 proper discipline on the part of the trainmen, 
 in obedience to the indications of approved 
 installations of block signals, should afford 
 adequate protection to trains; and another 
 has been the claim that no system of automatic 
 control sufficiently developed to meet all the 
 requirements was available. As hereinbefore 
 shown, experience has abundantly proven 
 that the excellence of discipline in con- 
 templation has never fceen realized; and as 
 for the state of the art of designing automatic 
 train control devices, it is the opinion of the 
 writer, supported by the views of men of 
 long experience in signaling and train oper- 
 ation, that if anything has been wanting in 
 this direction it has been because whole- 
 hearted efforts have not been made to follow 
 up excellent and promising beginnings. 
 
 The prospect of the expense of installation 
 and maintenance has undoubtedly been the 
 chief reason for the hesitancy to undertake 
 experiments in automatic train control; and 
 about the only consistent line of defense 
 which has been made was that trial of con- 
 trol systems in earnest would result in a 
 popular demand for the general equipment of 
 railroads with such devices in advance of the 
 financial ability of the roads to install the 
 same. The Government has been interested 
 
 40 
 
in this question for some years, and the 
 Safety Bureau of the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission has repeatedly recommended 
 that railroads generally should undertake ex- 
 periments with automatic train stops, with a 
 view of developing something which could be 
 adopted in standard practice. 
 
 Government Investigations. The urgent 
 public demand for some means to promote 
 the safety of railway travel led to congres- 
 sional enactment, in 1906, directing the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission to investigate and 
 report upon the use of and necessity for block 
 -signal systems, and appliances for the auto- 
 matic control of trains. The first report of 
 the Commission, after investigation, was 
 made to Congress, Feb. 23, 1907, and was 
 published as Senate Document No. 342, 2nd 
 Session, 59th Congress. 
 
 This report gave quite full information on 
 the use of and necessity for block signal sys- 
 tems in train operation, but, because of the 
 limited extent to which automatic train con- 
 trol appliances had been installed on the rail- 
 roads, had but little, other than merely theo- 
 retical, information to give concerning them. 
 Accordingly the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission recommended to Congress that an 
 appropriation be made sufficient to secure the 
 services of men competent to supervise and 
 conduct experimental tests of any automatic 
 train-control devices that appeared to be 
 worthy of trial. By an act of March 4, 1907, 
 
 41 
 
an appropriation of $50,000 was made avail- 
 able for this purpose, but restricted to si^ch 
 signal systems and appliances as might be 
 furnished in connection with the investigation 
 "free of cost to the Government/' 
 
 In order to carry out the terms of this Act 
 the Commission organized and established 
 the Block Signal and Train Control Board, 
 which was appointed July 10, 1907. Under 
 the auspices of this board two experimental 
 installations of a system of automatic train 
 control designed by the Rowell-Potter Safety 
 Stop Co., of Chicago, was made on the Chi- 
 cago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., and put in 
 service in October, 1908. One of these in- 
 stallations was on 5*/2 miles of single track, 
 between Sugar Grove and Big Rock, 111., and 
 the other on 3 miles of double track, between 
 Aurora and Eola, 111. These trials were in 
 every way practical, as the signals governed 
 the operation of all trains passing over the 
 road, in each case. 
 
 The same system had previously been in- 
 stalled, experimentally, at an interlocking 
 plant of the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville and 
 the St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Roads, at 
 Hawley, III, in 1899; and again on four blocks 
 of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 
 between Pacific Junction and Edgebrook, 111., 
 on the Milwaukee division, in 1902. This 
 system was of the mechanical trip type, auto- 
 matic train control being effected by means 
 of track instruments interlocked with the sig- 
 
 42 
 
nals, so that should an engineman ignore or 
 fail to observe a stop signal against him his 
 brakes were automatically applied by con- 
 tact of the brake-setting device on the loco- 
 motive with the track instrument in the "up" 
 position. A unique feature of this system 
 was that the power for moving the signals 
 and train stop trip was stored in a series of 
 twelve heavy coiled springs that were wound 
 up, like a w T atch, by a lever and ratchet oper- 
 ated by the undulations of the track rails 
 under passing trains. The mechanism*, all 
 told, was the most elaborate design for the 
 purpose that has been installed anywhere, 
 even to this day. 
 
 The operation of these two installations 
 was put under the observation of an inspector 
 appointed by the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission, who made daily record of the be- 
 havior of them. After these trials had been 
 under way for six months the Block Signal 
 and Train Control Board reported that if cer- 
 tain minor faults in the details of the design 
 of the mechanism were remedied, and the 
 board saw "no reason why they should not 
 be substantially overcome, the system would 
 be safe and reliable and its use would tend 
 materially to promote safety of operation on 
 a railroad using it." 
 
 In its report of Dec. 26, 1.911, the Board, 
 
 "Completely described and illustrated in the Railway (and 
 Engineering) Review of Jan. 6, 1900; March 15, 1902; and 
 Dec. 26. 1908. 
 
 43 
 
with further information obtained from tests 
 of two automatic stops of the intermittent 
 electrical contact type, and another of the me- 
 chanical trip type, concluded that there were 
 "several types of apparatus and methods of 
 application which, if put into use by the rail- 
 roads, would quickly develop to a degree of 
 efficiency adequate to meet all reasonable de- 
 mands. Such devices properly installed and 
 maintained would add materially to safety in 
 the operation of trains. In many situations, 
 under conditions existing in this country, the 
 Board is convinced that the use of automatic 
 train stops is necessary to the safe operation 
 of trains." 
 
 This board was in existence four years, 
 and made annual reports, but general interest 
 on the subject was lacking to such an extent 
 that the board was finally abolished for dearth 
 of experience to report upon in the way of 
 actual practice with automatic train control. 
 In its discussion of progress in this direction 
 the railroads were charged with being "decid- 
 edly lax in developing the automatic stop." 
 It was urged that the roads should be "ex- 
 pected to develop the art of automatic train 
 control so as to provide devices which will 
 meet their operating conditions. This ap- 
 pears to the Board to be entirely practicable, 
 and should it not be done with a reasonable 
 degree of expedition, steps should be taken 
 by the Government to stimulate such action." 
 
 44 
 
In its final report of June 29, 1912, besides 
 recommending the compulsory adoption of 
 the block system by all interstate passenger 
 railroads, the conclusion of the board was that 
 "The development of the automatic train stop 
 has proceeded far enough to warrant the ex- 
 pectation that by its use greater safety can be 
 secured in the operation of trains. Railroads 
 should be given to understand that the auto- 
 matic train stop must be developed by them 
 as rapidly as possible/' 
 
 The commendable work accomplished by 
 this Board, in its investigations and recom- 
 mendations, seems to have been forgotten or 
 ignored by railroad managements, in general, 
 for in the eight years intervening they have 
 sat by and awaited "developments." An au- 
 tomatic train control committee appointed by 
 the United States Railroad Administration, 
 in January, 1919, after some investigation, re- 
 ported, at the end of the year, without, how- 
 ever, having made any considerable study of 
 automatic train control systems "undergoing 
 test upon various lines of railroad," as they 
 had been instructed to do, although there was 
 opportunity to have done so with systems in 
 regular operation on the Chicago & Eastern 
 Illinois R. R. and on the Chesapeake & Ohio 
 R. R. The report of this committee, which 
 is mainly descriptive, and but mildly recom- 
 mendatory, might mislead the younger gener- 
 ation to suppose that experiments in auto- 
 matic train control are a new thing; whereas 
 
 45 
 
the need of the improvement, the practica- 
 bility of it, and the adaptability of available 
 devices had all been settled by the Block Sig- 
 nal and Train Control Board eight years 
 before. 
 
 ELEMENTARY PROBLEMS 
 Early ideas on automatic train control con- 
 templated nothing further than stop devices 
 operating in unison with the wayside signals. 
 However, it soon became a question whether, 
 if such were applied to the usual arrangement 
 of home and distant signals, either at inter- 
 lockings or with block signals, it would not 
 operate to delay trains unnecessarily in some 
 situations, and to reduce the capacity of 
 tracks this for the reason that the stop 
 device would have to be placed maximum 
 braking distance from the home signal; for 
 to place it at the home signal would not allow 
 sufficient stopping distance to protect a train 
 near the entrance to the block unless overlap 
 were provided. The overlap is an arrange- 
 ment of circuits which allows braking dis- 
 tance beyond the home signal. One of the 
 utilities of it is to dispense with distant sig- 
 nals, although it has sometimes been used 
 with both home and distant signals, as on the 
 electrified lines of the New York Central 
 R. R. 
 
 Having in view these possibilities, some 
 systems of train control have been designed 
 for adaptation with the overlap arrangement. 
 
 46 
 
The installations of the Rowell-Potter system 
 of automatic train control, heretofore referred 
 to, were with signals operating on the over- 
 lap principle. 
 
 Speed Control. As the use of distant and 
 home signals is the prevailing arrangement in 
 this country, there arises the problem of com- 
 pelling obedience to the indications of the 
 distant signal without unnecessary delay and 
 still retain the protective feature. This can 
 be done only through some means of speed 
 control, whereby, if a train passes the distant 
 signal under proper control, "prepared to 
 stop at the home signal," the automatic brake- 
 setting mechanism is rendered inoperative; 
 or, should the train pass the distant signal at 
 too high speed the brakes will be applied to 
 bring the train under control. 
 
 One way of accomplishing this purpose is 
 through the use of a centrifugal governor 
 connected with an axle of the engine, the 
 adjustment of the device being such that con- 
 trol of the brakes is not brought into action 
 so long as a designated speed is not exceeded. 
 Several systems of automatic train control 
 employ such a mechanism to effect speed 
 control, but there are other contrivances to 
 accomplish the same purpose. Some of the 
 objects for which speed control may be used, 
 including the aforesaid, are the following: 
 
 I. To permit a train to pass a brake appli- 
 cation point at designated speed, or slower, 
 without receiving an automatic application. 
 
 47 
 
2. To permit a train to proceed at low 
 speed after having been stopped by an auto- 
 matic application of the brakes. 
 
 3. After automatic application of the 
 brakes to permit release of the same when 
 the speed has been reduced to a designated 
 rate. 
 
 4. To permit a train to pass an approach 
 indication point without an automatic appli- 
 cation of the brakes, providing the engineman 
 properly observes the approach indication. 
 
 5. To permit a train to proceed without an 
 automatic application of the brakes as long 
 as the speed is controlled in accordance with 
 the signal indications. 
 
 6. To prevent a designated speed being ex- 
 ceeded regardless of block conditions. 
 
 7. To prevent a designated speed being 
 exceeded between certain points, as on a 
 sharp curve. This result may be arranged 
 for by proper location of ramps or equivalent 
 control appliances. 
 
 In itself, the train-stopping feature is sim- 
 ple, but it has been commonly supposed that 
 the requirements of speed control would in- 
 troduce complications. Some have seized 
 upon this as an excuse for hesitating to under- 
 take experimental installations of train con- 
 trol. In defense of their tardiness in this 
 respect speed control has been a convenient 
 scarecrow. 
 
 One feature of block signal operation in 
 this country which has stood in opposition 
 
 48 
 
to the principle of automatic train control, is 
 the quite prevalent, but more or less danger- 
 ous, practice of "permissive" use of blocks. 
 By this readers understand the permission 
 given to an engineman, in a following move- 
 ment on double track, to pass a home signal 
 in the stop position and proceed into an oc- 
 cupied block, providing he does so at slow 
 speed, with his train at all times under ready 
 control. The regulations usually require that 
 the train must first be brought to a stop be- 
 fore passing the signal, and sometimes the 
 rule requires that the engineman must wait 
 one or two minutes before proceeding. The 
 dangerous tendency in such practice is that 
 of enginemen to fall into the habit of pro- 
 ceeding in the block at too high speed, with- 
 out first stopping at the signal, thus disobeying 
 the rule and often causing a collision, espe- 
 cially in foggy weather. With automatic 
 block signals there is no telltale to serve as a 
 restraint on enginemen against taking such 
 chances. The too prevalent use of "permissive" 
 running has had most to do in bringing about 
 the existing widespread prejudice against the 
 idea of putting a complete check on engine- 
 men, which the most highly developed sys- 
 tems of roadside signals fail to do. 
 
 As illustrating the importance of speed 
 control on safe carrying capacity of tracks 
 the experience of a certain elevated railway 
 in the early days of automatic train control 
 on such roads may be mentioned. After the 
 
 49 
 
automatic stops had been installed it was 
 found that the schedules could not be main- 
 tained by absolute blocking, thus making it 
 necessary to resort to permissive running, 
 but still the automatic stopping of the trains 
 caused exasperating delays, and the system 
 was finally taken out of service. 
 
 As another illustration the experience of 
 the Interborough Rapid Transit Ry. in one of 
 the subways of New York City, will be cited. 
 That road was equipped, many years ago, 
 with the Kinsman system of automatic train 
 control, which uses automatic stops of the 
 electrically - controlled mechanical trip type. 
 As first arranged, a train, at whatever speed, 
 could not pass a stop signal without being 
 "tripped" and brought to a stop. Under these 
 conditions the shortest practicable headway 
 between trains was 2 minutes; and, with sta- 
 tion stops of 46 seconds, the maximum move- 
 ment over one track was 30 trains per hour. 
 Owing to congestion of traffic it was highly 
 desirable to increase the track capacity, and 
 this was accomplished by means of speed con- 
 trol,* which resulted in decreasing the head- 
 way between trains to 1 minute, 39 seconds, 
 and increasing the track capacity to 36.4 trains 
 per hour, or a gain in carrying capacity of 
 21.3 per cent on each track. 
 
 By means of the speed-control signals there 
 installed a train may, if under proper control, 
 
 *The details of the change are described in the Railway 
 (and Engineering) Review of July 2, 1910, page 645. 
 
 50 
 
approach a station at which a preceding train 
 on the same track is discharging passengers, 
 without being stopped, where, formerly, a train 
 in like circumstances was stopped and held 
 at a signal until the preceding train had 
 cleared the station. The automatic train 
 stop is the "control" feature of this system 
 and, so far as this road is concerned, the au- 
 tomatic stop is a highly dependable device, 
 and no experiment. 
 
 It is not to be inferred, of course, that the 
 identical system of signals which is working 
 so satisfactorily on this road of very heavy 
 traffic would be adaptable to general condi- 
 tions of the heavy'-traffic railroads on the 
 surface, yet the principles of installation and 
 operation there followed may undoubtedly be 
 studied with profit. 
 
 LINES OF DEVELOPMENT 
 Cab Signals In a general way signal 
 engineers have sought to improve upon block 
 signaling as a means of train protection in 
 two ways. One of these, as already shown, 
 is by the use of automatic devices to apply the 
 brakes should the engineman fail to observe 
 a stop signal or disregard it. The other is 
 by the use of signals in the locomotive cab, 
 to repeat the indications of the wayside sig- 
 nals, in order that the engineman might be 
 warned should he, for any reason, pass a 
 caution or stop signal unawares. Such are gen- 
 erally know^n as cab signals, and they may 
 
 51 
 
consist of miniature semaphore or position 
 signals, colored lights, or audible signals, 
 (bells or whistles) ; or a combination of two 
 or more of these. 
 
 The desirability of cab signals, as an auxil- 
 iary of wayside signals, was seen in England 
 long ago, owing to the trouble and uncer- 
 tainty of running in fogs. They have, there- 
 fore, been more extensively used or experi- 
 mented with in England and other European 
 countries than in this. Some experimenting 
 with cab signals has been done in this coun- 
 try, however, and particularly with installa- 
 tions combining both cab signal and auto- 
 matic stop functions. The Julian-Beggs* 
 experimental installation on 20 miles of the 
 Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry., 
 in 1916, combined cab signal, automatic stop 
 and speed control appliances. The Miller 
 automatic stop system, which has been in reg- 
 ular operation, with automatic block signals, 
 on 106 miles of double track of the Chicago 
 & Eastern Illinois R. R., between Chicago 
 and Danville, 111., for more than four years 
 past, is designed to include cab signals, but is 
 being operated without them. 
 
 The use of cab signals as a means of block 
 operation, with or without the automatic 
 train-stop feature, and without wayside sig- 
 nals, is possible, but the idea has not gained 
 
 ^Described in detail in the Railway Review of May 27, 
 1916, and May 26, 1917. 
 
 52 
 
footing in this country, as yet. Perhaps the 
 best argument against such a proposition 
 would be that, with the double system that 
 is with wayside signals in addition to cab 
 signals or automatic train stops as an auxil- 
 iary, there would still be an independent sys- 
 tem of signals for protection in case the de- 
 vices on the train were, by any chance or ac- 
 cident, put out of service. Moreover, unless 
 fixed, or wayside, signals were used there 
 would be no signal protection to foreign or 
 unequipped locomotives passing over the 
 road. 
 
 Types of Apparatus. The variety in designs 
 of automatic train control devices that have 
 been experimented with, or are now available 
 for trial, is large. The Automatic Train Con- 
 trol Committee has found sixteen different 
 devices or systems sufficiently developed to 
 be worthy of test. These comprise electric- 
 ally-controlled mechanical trip, intermittent 
 electrical contact, inert roadside element, in- 
 duction, and continuous induction types. 
 Excluding the, as yet, experimental instal- 
 lations, those that are now operating in regu- 
 lar service employ, for transmitting the indi- 
 cation to the train, either electrically-con- 
 trolled mechanical trips, or intermittent elec- 
 trical contact by means of ramps, at the road- 
 side. A ramp is a long metal bar or length 
 of rail, with down-sloping ends, in a fixed 
 position on or near the ends of the ties, to 
 engage a shoe or brush on the train, to make 
 the desired contact. 
 
 53 
 
The Kinsman automatic train control ap- 
 paratus is in regular service on the New York 
 Municipal (569 stops), the Interborough Rap- 
 id Transit (1813 stops), the Hudson & Man- 
 hattan (290 stops), and the Pennsylvania 
 Tunnel & Terminal (52 stops) subway lines 
 in New York City; in the Philadelphia Rapid 
 Transit subway (136 stops) in Philadelphia; 
 and on the Boston Elevated Ry. (207 stops). 
 All of these installations have electrically- 
 controlled mechanical trips, in most cases at 
 the roadside, the trip arm being operated 
 electrically or pneumatically. In addition to 
 the Interborough, as already stated, the Mu- 
 nicipal and the Hudson & Manhattan roads 
 have speed control, time-limit relays being 
 used to define the time allowed for a train 
 to run a definite distance. In these instal- 
 lations the roadside trip arm may be moved 
 from the stop to the proceed position, by the 
 trainmen standing on the ground, when nec- 
 essary to pass a signal in the stop position; 
 but the trip assumes the stop position as soon 
 as it is released. 
 
 The American Train Control system, which 
 has been in regular operation on the Chesa- 
 peake & Ohio R. R. for three years past, is 
 now installed on a busy section of 21 miles of 
 single track, between Charlottesville and Gor- 
 donsville, Va. It combines automatic stop, 
 cab signal (both visible and audible), and 
 approach indication features, but no speed 
 control. 
 
 54 
 
It works in connection with automatic block 
 which has color light signals, but is designed to 
 be used without wayside signals; and the first 
 installation, on 7 miles of track, was so installed 
 and operated for a time. The installation of this 
 system of automatic train control displaced the 
 existing system of manual block, and the saving 
 effected in wages of block operators dispensed 
 with has paid interest on the new investment for 
 train control. 
 
 This system has ramps located in pairs, in 
 advance of the signal, the right-hand ramp being 
 used for the stop, and the left-hand for the 
 approach indication for the next block. For 
 back-up movements there is a circuit reverser, 
 which transposes the normal functions of the 
 contact shoes, in order to receive the proper 
 sequence of signals. This arrangement provides 
 the engineman with a second shoe for automatic 
 stopping in case either shoe should be lost, dam- 
 aged or otherwise be put out of commission; the 
 stop shoe, in that case, being made to work the 
 caution signal, or the caution shoe to work the 
 stop valve. The usual accidental conditions on 
 track, such as open switches, cars fouling main 
 line, and broken rails, cause the system to operate . 
 -on train control with full effect, and automatic 
 stopping for such reasons has been among the 
 experiences of this installation. 
 
 The visible type of cab signal first installed is 
 a standard two-position tower indicator, with 
 
 55 
 
miniature semaphore, but, on the locomotives 
 later equipped, lights are used. The clear indica- 
 tion is by a white light and the caution by a green 
 light, and when the automatic stop valve drops 
 the lights go out ; although the design is such that 
 a red light can be added for the stop indication 
 if desired; but it is considered against good prac- 
 tice to use it. A vibrating bell, operated by the 
 engine battery, gives a signal every time either 
 shoe goes over a ramp. This audible signal has 
 been found to be a desirable auxiliary for service 
 in fogs and other unfavorable weather condi- 
 tions. The system is described, in all its details, 
 in the Railway Review of April 12, 1919. 
 
 The Casale system of automatic train control 
 has been installed, for regular service, on 21 
 miles of double track of the Chicago, Rock Island 
 & Pacific Ry., between Blue Island and Joliet, 111. 
 It is of the intermittent electrical contact type, 
 with automatic stop and speed control features. 
 The centrifugal type governor for the latter is 
 rigidly bolted to the outside of an engine truck 
 wheel, and securely enclosed, so the operation of 
 it is not dependent upon belt or gearing. The 
 method of operation prevents exceeding a desig- 
 nated speed after receiving an automatic brake 
 application at the approach signal. A three-posi- 
 tion relay, in accordance with the polarity of 
 current on the ramp, controls the train apparatus 
 to provide proceed, caution or stop indications. 
 
 56 
 
REQUISITES OF INSTALLATION. 
 
 Some of those opposed to the idea of auto- 
 matic train control early sought to obstruct the 
 practical development of it by demanding, at the 
 beginning, a system that would fulfill every con- 
 ceivable exigency, no matter how complicated or 
 unusual the situation might be. The realm of 
 imagination was ransacked to the extent of quite 
 overreaching practical requirements, and no dis- 
 tinction was drawn between essentials and pos- 
 sible adjuncts. In time, however, the various 
 questions and differences were threshed out in 
 the Railway Signal Association, with the result 
 that a set of requisites, stripped of superfluous 
 exactions, was evolved and adopted. 
 
 The requisites of installation of automatic 
 train control, formulated by the Railway Signal 
 Association, after careful study and several revi- 
 sions, were adopted by the American Railway 
 Association, and later by the United States Rail- 
 road Administration. They are now the recog- 
 nized standard of practice in this country, and 
 are as follows: 
 
 1. The apparatus so constructed as to operate in 
 connection with a system of fixed block or interlock- 
 ing signals, and so interconnected with the fixed sig- 
 nal system as to perform its intended functions : 
 
 (a) In event of failure of the engineman to obey the 
 fixed signal indications; and, 
 
 (b) So far as possible when the fixed signal fails 
 to indicate a condition requiring an application 
 of the brakes. 
 
 2. The apparatus so constructed that it will per- 
 form its intended function if an essential part fails or 
 
 57 
 
is removed; or a break, cross, ground or failure of 
 energy occurs in electric circuits, when used. 
 
 3. The apparatus so constructed as to make indica- 
 tions of the fixed signal depend upon the operation of 
 the track element of the train control device. 
 
 4. The apparatus so constructed that proper opera- 
 tive relation between those parts along the roadway 
 and those on the train will be assured under all condi- 
 tions of speed, weather, wear, oscillation and shock. 
 
 5. The apparatus so constructed as to prevent the 
 release of the brakes after automatic application, until 
 the train has been brought to a stop, or its speed has 
 been reduced to a predetermined rate or the obstruc- 
 tion or other condition that caused the brake applica- 
 tion has been removed. 
 
 6. The train apparatus so constructed that, when 
 operated, it will make an application of the brakes 
 sufficient to stop the train or control its speed. 
 
 7. The apparatus so constructed as not to interfere 
 with the application of the brakes by the engineman's 
 brake valve or to impair the efficiency of the air brake. 
 
 8. The apparatus so constructed that it may, be 
 applied so as to be operative when the engine is run-, 
 ning forward or backward. 
 
 9. The apparatus so constructed that when two or 
 more engines are coupled together or a pusher is used 
 it can be made operative only on the engine from 
 which the brakes are controlled. 
 
 10. The apparatus so constructed that it will 
 operate under all weather conditions which permit 
 train movements. 
 
 11. The apparatus so constructed as to conform to 
 established clearances for equipment and structures. 
 
 12. The apparatus so constructed and installed that 
 it will not constitute a source of danger to trainmen, 
 other employees, or passengers. 
 
 58 
 
A GENERAL VIEW. 
 
 The most approved systems of block signals 
 alone do not adequately protect trains against 
 collision. I am not aware that any will presume 
 to dispute this, but if some one should the facts 
 are against him; and facts can not be argued 
 away, or even changed. The facts in this case 
 are so well established and so open to public 
 knowledge as to have been the occasion for force- 
 ful appeals to Congress for remedial legislation. 
 While the foregoing review of the progress of 
 experiments with automatic train control has 
 shown that these experiments have been few, 
 relatively speaking, in view of the railway mile- 
 age and traffic volume of the country, yet these 
 trials, under service conditions, let it be under- 
 stood, date back nearly thirty years for elevated 
 railways and full twenty years with surface 
 steam railroads. So little encouragement has 
 been given to the promotion of automatic train 
 control by railway managements, even when 
 prompted by the Government, that most of the 
 studies on the question have been initiated and 
 carried on by men outside of railway service. 
 Likewise, by far the larger part of the expense 
 of installation and tests has been borne by private 
 enterprise. As a result of this, practically all of 
 the score or more of systems or devices that are 
 now available for practical tests are, at least par- 
 tially, covered by patents; but that situation is 
 not exceptional in the railway equipment field. 
 
 Although, to repeat, the service trials of auto- 
 matic train control have not been numerous, in 
 
 59 
 
one way of thinking, yet in the past two decades 
 there have been enough of them, and the degree 
 of success attained has been sufficient, to demon- 
 strate that such means of protection to train 
 operation is both practicable and feasible; and 
 now, in spite of all the contentions, is actually at 
 hand. The much-studied requisites have all been 
 met, so the last prop that has held this question 
 on debatable ground for many years has been 
 knocked from under. 
 
 If it is really necessary to refer to the achieve- 
 ments of the past few years to support the fore- 
 going conclusion, then an implication falls upon 
 the obstinate influences that have stood in the 
 way of an earlier solution of any of the problems 
 involved. As long as eight years ago the Block 
 Signal and Train Control Board, after four 
 years of investigation and service trials, summed 
 up its conclusions in the following language : 
 
 "Few, if any, of the mechanical or electrical 
 elements entering into the construction of auto- 
 matic train-control systems involve any new 
 principles, nor are they materially different from 
 the elements used by the railroads in the every- 
 day operation of their interlocking and block 
 signals, train brakes, and other devices. The 
 ingenuity and initiative which have been mani- 
 fested by railroad engineers in the development 
 of much of the apparatus used in the conduct of 
 railroad business greatly exceeds, in the opinion 
 of the Board, that required to produce apparatus 
 which can be super-imposed upon existing signal 
 
 60 
 
systems adequately to compel obedience to the 
 signal indications. 
 
 "Further, the Board has no hesitancy in say- 
 ing that had the railroads directed the same 
 effort toward the development of automatic 
 train-control apparatus that has been devoted to 
 the development of interlocking and block-signal- 
 ing apparatus, we should now have adequate 
 installations of automatic train-control devices 
 which would permit an engineman to handle his 
 train without interference as long as he did it 
 properly, but would intervene to stop his train if 
 he disregarded a stop signal or ran at excessive 
 speed where speed restriction was prescribed." 
 
 The old line of defense that a practical sys- 
 tem of automatic train control has not been de- 
 veloped no longer holds true, nor is it, at this 
 day, even plausible. A few far-seeing manage- 
 ments, largely with the assistance of ingenuity 
 from outside of railroad employees or officials, 
 having gone ahead and done something, it is 
 now timely that more initiative should proceed 
 from within the railroad corporations. The 
 present status of the art will amply justify lay- 
 ing out programs for beginning installation in 
 all general situations, for circuit layouts and de- 
 signs of apparatus can now be followed that are 
 practical and safe. 
 
 It hardly need be added that appliances de- 
 veloped fully to the point of meeting every essen- 
 tial condition of operation await installation 
 under service conditions, and the more numer- 
 ous and extensive the installations the more 
 
 61 
 
rapid will be the progress. The elaborations of 
 modern automatic block signaling have come 
 from small beginnings, and automatic train con- 
 trol devices fall so nearly into the same class, 
 and the solution of the problem has progressed 
 so near to a satisfactory state that no such rec- 
 ord of "trial and error" as has been true of the 
 history of automatic block signaling need follow 
 from further progress with train control. 
 
 It is unreasonable to expect that a system of 
 train control, or any other railroad equipment 
 that is equally intricate, could be thought out 
 full-fledged and designed to a finality in ad- 
 vance of service experience. No great improve- 
 ment in railroad operation or railroad engineer- 
 ing has come about in that way, but, rather, as 
 the outgrowth of trial and modification under 
 operating conditions. Any broad-minded con- 
 ception of the problem must concede this truth 
 to be equally applicable to automatic train con- 
 trol; and it is now the decided feeling of many 
 railroad officials who have looked into the subject 
 that such automatic control is bound to come. 
 
 It remains to be said that the expense of in- 
 stallation and maintenance is the only real ques- 
 tion which confronts the railroads in this mat- 
 ter of automatic control of trains. What the 
 first cost of installation would be in typical cases, 
 not to consider special situations, has not, for 
 lack of experience, been worked out to close esti- 
 mation, as yet; but it seems likely that it might 
 
 62 
 
reach a figure somewhere between $800 and 
 $2,000 per mile of road, according to local con- 
 ditions, in addition to the cost of the wayside 
 signals. At any rate it is certain that the cost 
 would not be prohibitive. 
 
 In some installations that have been made, 
 with ramps, and with signals already installed, 
 the cost (war-price basis) has been as low as 
 $200 per ramp, or $200 per mile for the track 
 appliances. In certain installations now in serv- 
 ice the cost of installing the appliances on the 
 locomotives has been around $600 per set. 
 
 The halt in railroad extensions, and the dimin- 
 ishing rate of improvement of existing lines, for 
 some years past, have brought the transporta- 
 tion business of the country into a spell which 
 must soon be broken if our industrial life is to 
 prosper. Much new capital will be necessary to 
 provide for sorely needed second track, yard and 
 terminal additions, new buildings and other 
 facilities. What would be needed to equip the 
 heavy traffic lines for automatic train control 
 is only a trifle compared with capital that will 
 have to be raised for the construction of new 
 roadbed and track. Now is the time to decide 
 the question, while the country, railroads and 
 all, is in a state of flux. In the years of high 
 prices that seem bound to follow the present 
 period of unrest the cost of installing train con- 
 trol, which must, in the end, fall upon the "ulti- 
 mate consumer," will seem less of a burden than 
 to try to add it on after rates shall once more 
 become stabilized. 
 
 63 
 
What is now needed in the automatic train 
 control situation is to make some kind of a start, 
 with the most promising types or systems, be- 
 ginning with train-stopping devices as the foun- 
 dation, aim at gradual development, adding speed 
 control features and such other refinements, 
 step by step, as may be studied out. By the time 
 that experience with the ordinary situations shall 
 have become general the more difficult of the 
 problems relating to terminal conditions will 
 doubtless have been worked out. The fact is 
 that the majority of serious train collisions have 
 not occurred where the track conditions were 
 complicated with interlocking, or with switches 
 and crossings and crossovers, but out on the 
 straight-away line, at a distance from terminals, 
 where high speed is usually made, and where 
 enginemen, as a rule, are not as alert as when 
 passing through terminals. It is therefore en- 
 tirely logical and fitting to take the simplest sit- 
 uations first. 
 
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