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THE AFGHAN tVAR, 1838-1842 
 
 JOURNAL AND CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 or THE LATE 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL AUGUSTUS ABBOTT 
 
 C.B., ROYAL (BENGAL) ARTILLERY. 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES RATHBONE LOW, I.N., F.R.G.S. 
 
 AUTHOK Oy "HISTOKY Or THE INDIAN NAVY," " MEMOIK OF SIR GAENET WOLSELEY," &C. 
 
 " Per damna, per coedes, ab ipso 
 Ducit opes animumque ferro." 
 
 HOR. BOOK IV., ODE 4. 
 
 LONDON: 
 RICHARD BENTLEY AND SON, 
 
 ^ublisljtrs in ©rbinarg to ^er ^ajestg t\t (S^tiMit. 
 
 1879. 
 

 MENRV MORSE SXePHENS 
 
 '•" • 
 
 
oufZ^ 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 Page 
 
 Introduction ...... 1 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR AND CABUL. 
 
 The Simla Proclamation of 1st October, 1838— Assembly of the 
 Army at Ferozepore — The March to Bukhur — Occupation of the 
 Fort of Rohree — The March into Scinde and Submission of the 
 Ameers — Crossing the Indus — The March from Shikarpore to 
 Dadur and through the Bolan Pass to Quetta — Advance on 
 Candahar — The Difficulties of the Kojuck Pass — Arrival at 
 Candahar — The March to the Helmund and Occupation of the 
 Forts of Ghirisk — Departure from Candahar — Incidents of the 
 March to Ghuznee — The Storm of Ghuznee— The March on 
 Cabul — Arrival at the Capital — Dispersion of the Army of the 
 Indus . . . , . . .57 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 
 
 March from Cabul to Jellalabad — The Khoord-Cabul, and Jugdul- 
 luck Passes — The Expedition to Pushoot — March to the Kamer 
 Valley — Repulse of the Assault — Evacuation of Pushoot — Th( 
 
 511465 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Kaffirs — Return to Jellalabad — March to Cabul — The Campaign 
 in the Kohistan — Action at Tootum Durra — Attack on Julga — 
 Eepulse of the Storming Party — Action at Purwan Durra — 
 The Cabul Cantonment — Expedition to the Zoormut Country — 
 Destruction of the Forts at Zao — Return to Cabul . Ill 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. ^ 
 
 Revolt of the Eastern Ghilzyes — Forcing the Passes of Jella- 
 labad — The Fighting at Khoord-Cabul and JugduUuck — The 
 Camp at Gundamuck — Arrival at Jellalabad — Condition of the 
 Defences — The Actions of the 14th of November and Ist of 
 December— The Council of War— The Earthquake of the 19th 
 of February — The Sorties of the 22nd of February and 11th 
 March- The Action of the 7th of April— Arrival of General 
 Pollock's Army . . . . ^ ^ £00 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 
 The Expedition to the Shinwarree Valley— Advance from Jella- 
 labad— Affair at Mammoo Khail— Action of JugduUuck— 
 Battle of Tezeen— Occupation of Cabul— Return March to India 
 — Arrival at Ferozepore- Conclusion . , , 394 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 (1838-42.) 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ■jUTAJOR-GElSrERAL AUGUSTUS ABBOTT is 
 
 -^'■^ the eldest of five brothers who have " done 
 the State some service" in India and the East. 
 The second, General Sir Frederick Abbott, C.B., 
 was educated at Addiscombe, and entered the 
 Bengal Engineers, which has been a prolific Alma 
 Mater of eminent men. When a very young officer, 
 he earned distinction by his professional skill in 
 the first Burmese war of 1824-26, and was wounded 
 whilst leading Major Gulley's column near Prome, 
 on the 2nd of December, 1825. He served as Chief- 
 Engineer of the army, which, under the late Field- 
 Marshal Sir George Pollock, retrieved our laurels 
 in Afghanistan. Captain Abbott was present at 
 
 B 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the forcing of the Khyber Pass on the 5th of 
 April, 1842, and at the actions of Mammoo Khail, 
 JugduUuck, and Tezeen, in the following September. 
 Again, when in 1845, war broke out with the 
 Sikhs, he was second in command of the Engineers 
 and gained the thanks of Lords Hardinge and 
 Gough by the rapid and skilful manner in which, 
 after the battle of Sobraon, in February, 1846, he 
 bridged the Sutlej, in a few hours, with boats, over 
 which the army, with its guns and stores, marched 
 through the Punjaubto Lahore. Lord Hardinge — 
 clarum et venerabile nomen — wrote of his services 
 on this occasion : " Two days before the battle of 
 Sobraon, I consulted with you and Colonel Henry 
 Lawrence as to the best means of overcoming 
 some difficulties which had arisen, relating to the 
 employment of the heavy artillery in the attack 
 of the Sikh entrenched camp, and I sent you to 
 the Commander-in-Chief, confidentially to communi- 
 cate with his Excellency ; the result being a ready 
 concurrence of Lord Gough, and the decision taken 
 to storm the enemy's camp after the defences 
 should have been shaken by the fire of thirty-five 
 pieces of heavy artillery. The instant that great 
 victory was achieved you returned to the ghaut, 
 and, without repose night and day, directed all your 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 energies and talents in laying down the bridge of 
 boats, by which the army, its siege train, and its 
 enormous baggage, was able in a few hours to 
 enter the Punjaub, and march to Lahore." In 
 September, 1847, Colonel Abbott relinquished the 
 office of Superintending Engineer of the !North- 
 Western Provinces, and returned to England. On 
 the retirement of Sir Ephraim Stannus, from the 
 post of Lieutenant-Governor of Addiscombe, in 1850, 
 the Court of Directors conferred upon Colonel Abbott 
 the appointment, which he held until the abolition 
 of that famous military seminary in 1861. He 
 now found a new and congenial scope for his 
 talents, as Member of the Council of Military 
 Education, where he remained until 1868. In 
 1859 he was nominated one of the Commissioners 
 for the National Defences. 
 
 The third brother. General James Abbott, C.B., 
 was educated at Blackheath, where he had among 
 his schoolfellows, no less a personage than Lord 
 Beaconsfield, whom he describes as being a leader 
 among the boys. From Blackheath he proceeded 
 to Addiscombe, whence he went to India as an 
 Artillery Cadet on the Bengal Establishment. 
 Lieutenant Abbott was engaged at the siege of 
 the great Jat fortress of Bhurtpore in 1826, and 
 
 B 2 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 in the Afghan war, but, soon after our army 
 reached Candahar, he was attached to the mission 
 of Major d'Arcy Todd, our envoy at Herat, who 
 despatched him to Khiva, to effect the release of 
 the Russian prisoners detained by the Khan of that 
 State. From Khiva he proceeded, on his own re- 
 sponsibility, to St. Petersburgh, with terms of 
 accommodation from the Khan to the Government 
 of the Czar. 
 
 How he fulfilled his mission, its dangers, hard- 
 ships, and difficulties, and how he was cut down in 
 a night attack on the shores of the Caspian, and 
 narrowly escaped with his life, are narrated in 
 his work on Khiva, of which a Times' reviewer 
 says, "that it still affords the best materials we 
 have for forming an idea of the country and 
 people." 
 
 He describes in the following terms the incidents 
 of the melee, when, amid darkness and the confusion 
 consequent upon a sudden attack, he had, with a 
 few terror-stricken native servants, to cope against 
 some fifty Kuzzauk robbers : — " My finger was upon 
 the trigger of my pistol, for I dared not fire, lest I 
 should kill my own people. Suddenly, I was struck 
 from the rear by three clubs falling together. I 
 staggered, but did not fall, until the blows were 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the next instant repeated, and I was prostrated, 
 though without losing my pistol. I sprang to my 
 feet, but the Kuzzauks who were standing over me, 
 instantly struck me to the earth, and one of their 
 clubs falling upon my arm, struck the pistol out of 
 my hand. I believe I was stunned for the moment. 
 When I recovered, having still my sabre by my side, 
 I laid hand upon it and had reached my knee and 
 right foot, when several clubs took effect, an^ 
 stretched me upon my back, and two Kuzzauks 
 threw themselves upon me, the one seizing my 
 sabre, and endeavouring to wrench it, belt and all, 
 from my body ; the .other trying to tear away a 
 dagger, bound in my girdle. A third, with a light 
 club, showered blows from behind upon my head and 
 shoulders. The struggles of the plunderers re- 
 called me to consciousness again, which previously 
 was almost lost. Their tugs at my girdle assisted 
 the strength still left me ; I suddenly sat up, and 
 drawing my own dagger, stabbed at the junction of 
 the throat and thorax the Kuzzauk in front of 
 me. He fell, and I was turning upon the other, 
 when I saw the arm of a fourth raised to strike me 
 with some weapon. I raised my dagger to guard 
 my head. The sabre fell upon my hand, severing 
 two fingers, disjointing the thumb, and shattering 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the solid ivory handle of the dagger. Other blows 
 of clubs, from the rear, stretched me again upon my 
 back, no longer able to move. My right hand was 
 numbed, but I knew not the extent of damage, and 
 tried to rise. The slightest motion of the head pro- 
 duced vertigo, and my limbs were quite powerless, 
 the flesh being, in fact, beaten to a jelly. Every 
 now and then a Kuzzauk spied me out, and cut at 
 me, in passing, with sabre, hatchet, or club. My 
 left hand Uke my right, would have been severed, 
 but that the edge of the sword was turned by a 
 ring." At length one of the Kuzzauks, whose 
 sympathy was either aroused by the gallantry of 
 the young ofiicer, or quickened by the hope of gain, 
 bestrode his body and protected him from death. 
 After a brief imprisonment, the Kuzzauks, finding 
 they had assailed, not a Russian, but a friend of 
 the Khan Huzrut of Khiva, released Captain Abbott, 
 who, embarking at Nuovo Alexandrofski, crossed 
 the Caspian and proceeded by Gorief, Orenburgh, 
 and Moscow, to St. Petersburgh, whence he made 
 his way to England. 
 
 Lord Palmerston thanked Captain Abbott for his 
 conduct of this mission, and Captain Burnaby 
 relates in his well-known book, '' that he left behind 
 him in Khiva many friends." 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 But the most important service he rendered his 
 country was during the Punjaub campaign. When 
 Chutter Singh, the Sikh Governor of Huzara, 
 declared for Moolraj, with a large force of regular 
 Khalsa troops, Captain Abbott raised some raw 
 levies among the mountaineers of that Alpine 
 province, and, though he was for several months 
 cut off from all communication with the British 
 troops, and dependent upon his own resources, 
 being the only British officer who had neither 
 retired nor been taken prisoner, he baffled the 
 superior force of the Sikh Sirdar, and occupied ^ 
 with 1500 matchlock men, the Marquella Pass, 
 which 16,000 Sikh troops, and 2,000 Afghan horse 
 were preparing to thread. When the battle of 
 Goojerat brought the campaign of 1848-49 to a 
 glorious termination. Captain Abbott was still 
 at his position at Nara, which he had held with 
 local levies while bodies of 10,000 Sikhs and 
 12,000 Afghans were encamped within sight. For 
 his services he received the thanks of both 
 Houses of Parliament; and Lord Dalhousie 
 expressed his appreciation, in a letter to the 
 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
 dated, Ferozepore, 7th of March, 1849. He said : — 
 
 " Captain Abbott has been heard of up to the 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 25tli of February, at which time he was quite safe 
 and confident in his resources, although at that time 
 he had not heard of the decisive action at Goojerat. 
 It is a gratifying spectacle to witness the intrepid 
 bearing of this officer, in the midst of difficulties of 
 no ordinary kind, not merely maintaining his posi- 
 tion, but offering a bold front at one time to the 
 Sikhs, at another to the Afghans, notwithstanding 
 that religious fanaticism has been at work to induce 
 his Mahomedan levies to desert his cause. He must 
 have secured the attachment of the wild people 
 amongst whom he has been thrown, by his mild 
 and conciliatory demeanour in times of peace, as 
 well as by his gallantry as their leader in action, 
 thus enhancing the credit of our national character, 
 and preparing the way for an easy occupation of an 
 almost impregnable country." 
 
 In 1852, Major Abbott, then Deputy- Commis- 
 sioner of the Huzara District, commanded a column 
 in an expedition against the Black Mountain, which 
 stands in the north-west corner of Huzara, on the 
 left bank of the Indus, above Umb. This Expedi- 
 tion, though little known, forms so interesting a 
 chapter in our frontier history that we will give some 
 account of it, on the accuracy of which implicit 
 reliance may be placed. 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 In the year 1852, Messrs. Carne and Tapp, 
 collector and sub-collector of tlie salt tax, were 
 murdered by a party of sixty Hussunzyes, of tbe 
 Black Mountain, in Jebandad Khan's territory, near 
 the British border. The assailants were led by 
 Meer Ali, who openly boasted of the deed, which he 
 declared he had perpetrated by order of Bostan, the 
 Minister of Jehandad. He offered to present him- 
 self before any tribunal appointed by the British, 
 on condition that, should he prove that he had only 
 obeyed the orders of Bostan,* the British Govern- 
 ment should cease to require his capture ; and fail- 
 ing such proof he offered to surrender his person. 
 This offer with which Major Abbott would gladly 
 have closed, the Government of India rejected, but 
 he was permitted to invite Hussunzye deputies to a 
 conference, which they attended, when he conjured 
 them to seize and surrender for trial Meer Ali, pro- 
 mising, on their compliance, that they should not be 
 molested, but that sixty merchants of the tribe, 
 who had been captured as hostages, would be re- 
 stored to liberty. They allowed the justice of the 
 demand, but pleaded that Meer Ali had escaped to 
 the territory of another tribe, and was quite beyond 
 
 * Bostan had no land and was but the servant of Jehandad Khan, 
 but he had complete ascendancy over his master. 
 
10 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 their reach. Such being the result of the con- 
 ference, and the reward offered for the apprehension 
 of Meer Ali having failed of effect, Major Abbott 
 urged upon the Lahore Board the necessity of 
 attacking and punishing the whole tribe. 
 
 The Hussunzyes, who occupy the western slopes 
 of the Black Mountain, are rated at 10,000 match- 
 lockmen, each soldier representing a family, a 
 number which includes those of the clan dwelling on 
 the further bank of the Indus. All attempts of the 
 Sikhs, our predecessors, to conquer the Hussunzyes 
 had been eminently disastrous, and the Black 
 Mountain still remained impregnable as it soared 
 10,000 feet above the sea's level, covered on the 
 eastern face with pine forest, while the western side 
 descends rapidly in gigantic spurs to the stream of 
 the Indus, which, though there a considerable river, 
 dwindles by contrast to a thread. The murder of 
 the British officials had been part of a plot for 
 securing the purdah* of the chiefs of Upper Huzara, 
 and Bostan, the author, had acted under their 
 assurance of support, aided by the Wahabee fanatics 
 across the Indus. The latter, invited by Bostan, 
 took possession of the principal strongholds of his 
 
 * Purdah, or ""curtain" of Asiatic privacy, here means the 
 leisure for the chiefs to perpetrate atrocities unchecked by law. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 master, Jehandad Khan, called Kotli, trans-Indus, 
 and of his castles of Chumbairi, on the ridge of the 
 Black Mountain, and of Shoongli, at its eastern roots. 
 Owing to needless delays, the Expedition was not 
 undertaken until near the end of the year, when a 
 heavy fall of snow would have rendered it impractic- 
 able. As the rebellious Syuds of Kazan were the 
 least accessible of our enemies, they were first 
 attacked. This Expedition having been successfully 
 accomplished by detailing five columns to clamber 
 over the mountain walls of that remote valley, by 
 routes debouching in rear of the Syuds' defences. 
 Major Abbott, after having destroyed one of their 
 castles, and left a strong garrison, marched with 
 the other columns to rejoin Colonel Mackeson,* 
 the Commissioner, at Shargurh, a castle near the 
 south-eastern foot of the Black Mountain. The 
 Commissioner had collected two brigades of Native 
 troopsf to keep the peace below, while the attacking 
 
 * This gallant and distinguished officer was murdered in open 
 Kutcherry at Peshawur a few years later. 
 
 ■f Viz. : 1st Brigade^ 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry, Khelat-i- 
 Ghilzi Regiment, 16th Irregular Cavalry; 2nd Brigade, 3rd Sikh 
 Regiment, two Horse-Artillery guns, two Jumboo Regiments, 
 Mountain Battery of Jumboo. Of these the Jumboo troops alone 
 ascended the mountain. 
 
12 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 force, in three columns, should be engaged in the 
 mountains above. The Castle of Shoongli, taken, 
 abandoned, and ruined by the enemy, was first re- 
 built, and then, soon after Christinas Day of 1852, 
 the assailing forces ascended the Black Mountain by 
 three several routes. 
 
 The right column, formed of the elite of the 
 force— the Guides and 1st Sikh Regiment, with two 
 mountain -guns of the Huzara Battery, and some 
 drilled Police — commanded by Major Robert Napier 
 (now Lord Napier of Magdala), had to ascend a 
 very long spur of the mountain, wooded with pine, 
 leading circuitously by the right to the enemy's rear. 
 It was defended by its inhabitants, th^ Akazyes, who 
 made an obstinate resistance. The left column, con- 
 sisting of two Jumboo Regiments, each about 500 
 strong, with mountain-guns carried by men, and 
 commanded by Colonel Mackeson, had for its object 
 to march by a detour to the left, so as to attain the 
 rear of the enemy's main force, and form a junction 
 there with the right wing. The only obstacle in 
 the path of this column was a picket of the enemy, 
 which Major Abbott drove in before they commenced 
 the ascent, so that they reached their destination at 
 one o'clock p.m. without having seen an enemy. A 
 large body of the armed peasants of Huzara formed 
 
INTRODUCTION. IS 
 
 the centre column, led by Major Abbott, and 
 opposed to the main body of the enemy, who held 
 a post unassailable by an ascending force, and 
 strengthened with ahattls. It had not been in- 
 tended that the centre column should advance 
 until the enemy's position had been turned by the 
 flank columns, as the road of their advance had been 
 rendered so dangerous, but the day previous to the 
 attack the Deputy-Commissioner suggested that, to 
 prevent succour being sent by the main force of the 
 enemy to the opponents of the right column, the 
 centre column should engage their attention, and 
 act according to circumstances. This being 
 approved, and the peasants of Huzara being best 
 controlled by their Deputy- Commissioner, it was 
 decided that he should lead the centre column. 
 
 The centre column, headed by Major Abbott, 
 threading in single files the path that climbed up 
 the huge ravine, had been advancing more than an 
 hour, when they came in sight of the high, steep 
 mound, rising like an island, in the ravine, under 
 which their path was conducting them to de- 
 struction but for the incaution of the Hussunzyes, 
 who, though invisible from beneath, were posted on 
 its summit, and now, warned by their scouts, 
 suddenly showed themselves on the summit in a 
 
14 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 dense mass, 600 strong, with a wild sliont of " II 
 lil la !" Taking lieed of tlie warning. Major Abbott 
 led his column up out of the ravine to the ridge of 
 a spur, one of several which radiated from a woody 
 summit on the left ; and, observing that the spur 
 further on descended to the ravine at a point in rear 
 of the enemy, he commenced a skirmish with the 
 Hussunzyes, under cover of which he sent on the 
 rest of his levies, as ihey arrived, to the farther 
 spur, out of reach of the enemy, with orders to de- 
 scend the spur to the rear of the enemy's position. 
 As soon, however, as the enemy discovered this pur- 
 pose, they retreated in haste up the ravine, pursued 
 by the centre column along its brink, and took post 
 at its head on the edge of a perpendicular cliff of 
 singular conformation. From this cover they kept 
 up a sharp fire upon every moving object, being 
 themselves quite invisible. Major Abbott decided 
 to wait the arrival of the left column, whose guns 
 would so greatly lessen the expenditure of life when 
 storming the position. But, to his dismay, when 
 at one o'clock that column arrived, the Commis- 
 sioner decided not to attack until the arrival of the 
 right column. This was already overdue, and 
 though its fire had been heard rattling incessantly 
 since sunrise, it seemed now more distant than ever. 
 
INTRODUCTION, 15 
 
 an effect manifestly due to its having encountered a 
 resistance wholly unexpected. As the day wore on, 
 and the firing continued, Major Abbott became 
 anxious lest other tribes from beyond the Indus 
 should have joined during the past night, or that 
 our column should be encumbered with wounded, 
 or short of ammunition. It seemed to him urgently 
 necessary to attack the enemy at once, and form a 
 junction with Major ISTapier, if only to avoid the 
 disgrace of waiting to be attacked during the night 
 on ground familiar to the enemy, who would be 
 fighting pro aris etfocis. His men, who shared his 
 anxieties and were eager for the fray, entreated to 
 be led against the enemy, but his arguments failed 
 to convince his chief, who objected on the score of 
 the heavy loss of life which an attack must have 
 cost, when, as he believed, the enemy would have no 
 road of retreat, while they must surrender on the 
 arrival of Major Napier. The sun was setting when 
 at length the head of the right column was seen 
 on the distant ridge of the mountain, and the 
 Hussunzyes below, who had some means of in- 
 formation, fled in hot haste, pursued by volleys from 
 the troops of Jumboo, and by the centre column at 
 headlong speed. 
 
 The columns were now united on the crest of 
 
16 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 that once formidable Black Mountain, which had 
 repulsed with slaughter every previous attack ; but 
 the enemy had vanished, leaving the British officers 
 the choice of retreating without having inflicted any 
 punishment for two atrocious murders, or of burn- 
 ing the wretched villages deserted by them. The 
 force spent that night on the mountain crest and on 
 a huge spur given off westward to the Indus, and 
 before daybreak next morning parties were sent to 
 burn the deserted villages, in sight of the owners, 
 who, in large numbers, looked on. The force then 
 bivouacked another night on the mountain, when 
 the first snow of the year began to fall, and at day- 
 break marched southward along the mountain ridge ; 
 Major Abbott descending to the basin of the Indus, 
 to hold the heights above its left margin, while 
 Jehandad Khan, with his horsemen, rode up the 
 basin to burn the villages, in presence of a dense 
 body of the enemy who stood gazing on either 
 brink. But no sooner did our force begin to retire 
 than they paddled their rafts of inflated hides across 
 the river, landed, and rushed up the precipitous 
 mountain, hoping to head the British columns and 
 cut off their retreat, but, being met by the fire of a 
 succession of pickets left to secure the rear, thev 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 dashed back as wildly down the headlong steep, 
 affording a singular spectacle. 
 
 A third night having been passed on the ridge of 
 the Black Mountain, the force descended to the 
 Indus basin, and Major Abbott, with the centre 
 column, the 1st Sikh Regiment, and two mountain- 
 guns, crossed the Indus to attack the Castle of 
 Kotli, occupied by the Wahabee fanatics. These 
 men, who might have given some trouble behind 
 the walls of the little fort, lost heart, and fled at his 
 approach, and some twenty or thirty of them were 
 cut up. Major Abbott would then have marched to 
 attack the cantonment of these fanatics at Sitana, 
 on the river's brink lower down, but was recalled 
 by a peremptory order from the Commissioner ; 
 and thus was lost the opportunity of scattering for 
 ever a nest of fanatics whose presence had been the 
 cause of all the disorders of that frontier, and to 
 exterminate whom two costly campaigns have since 
 been undertaken. 
 
 The small muster of the Hussunzyes on this 
 occasion, was owing to the great popularity of the 
 British officers at that time on the frontier, and none 
 but those whose villages were imperilled took arms ; 
 whereas, in the days of the Sikhs, more than 10,000 
 matchlocks from all quarters w^ere ready to defend 
 
 
 
18 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the inviolability of the Black Mountain. This en- 
 terprise, though imperfect from the causes detailed, 
 had the wholesome effect of teaching the Hussunzjes 
 and other tribes that no position was strong enough 
 to shelter them from a British attack. The Expedi- 
 tion was planned, movement by movement, by Major 
 Abbott, who made a model in sand of the mountain, 
 and all of whose suggestions as to the points of 
 attack and manner of attacking, were adopted by 
 Colonel Mackeson. 
 
 Major Abbott found the province of Huzara, a 
 hot bed of lawlessness, and left it, after a service of 
 eight years, a contented and loyal province of the 
 Punjaub, a change due in no small degree to the 
 personal regard he inspired among the chiefs and 
 all classes of the people, a large deputation from 
 whom, on the occasion of his departure, escorted 
 him to the foot of the hills with many marks of 
 regret. 
 
 A man of genius and a shrewd observer^ of 
 character, the late Sir Henry Lawrence, has placed 
 on record his opinion of Major Abbott, in the 
 following terms : — " He is one of a thousand. In 
 
 his principles like L , he has a most pleasing 
 
 manner and very superior talent. We may not 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 meet again, but I will not soon forget one wliom I 
 greatly admire."* 
 
 The fourth of the brothers is Major-General 
 Saunders A. Abbott, who proceeded from Addis- 
 combe to India in June 1828, served in the 
 Shekewattee campaign, and in the Revenue Survey 
 from 1836 to 1842, when from financial considera- 
 tions, it was broken up, and he was nominated 
 aide-de-camp to Lord EUenborough. In the 
 latter part of 1843 he was appointed Assistant to 
 the Grovernor-General's Agent on the North- West 
 Frontier, and served on the staff of Lord Hardinge 
 in the sanguinary field of Ferozeshah, where the fate 
 of India hung in the balance. Of thirteen officers of 
 the staff of " the hero of Albuera," eleven were 
 either killed or wounded, among the latter being 
 Saunders Abbott, who was dangerously wounded, 
 and was laid in a tent by the side of the late Sir 
 Herbert Edwardes, and Sir Frederick Paul Haines, 
 the present Commander-in-Chief in India. 
 
 His services at this great crisis of our Indian 
 rule were of a meritorious character. Lord 
 Hardinge having applied to the Deputy Commissary- 
 General to know how soon he could collect the 
 
 * See " Life of Sir Henry Lawrence," by the late Sir Herbert 
 Edwardes. 
 
 c 2 
 
.20 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 supplies, was informed that it could not be dene 
 under six weeks, upon which his lordship dirt cted 
 Major Broadfoot, the talented and energetic Ccm- 
 missioner on the North-West Frontier, who fell at 
 ■Ferozeshah, to undertake the task which he required 
 to be completed in four days. Major Broadfoot 
 sent by express to Captain Abbott and directed him 
 to arrange for supplies at two depots, and in the 
 morning of the fourth day Saunders Abbott, 
 ■having ridden 100 miles, reported the comple- 
 tion of the arrangements. The Governor-General 
 •despatched him express, after the battle of 
 Moodkee, to bring down from Kussowlie and 
 Subatoo, Her Majesty's 29th Regiment and the 
 Bengal Fusiliers, and to join him in the field 
 wherever he might be. By forced marches of 
 twenty-five and thirty miles, Saunders Abbott 
 conducted these two famous regiments and a 
 battery of artillery (to which he attached the drag 
 ropes and baggage elephants) and brought them up 
 in time for the battle of Ferozeshah. It was by 
 the hearty and patriotic services of such officers 
 that our Empire in India has been gained, and by 
 which alone it can be maintained. Captain Abbott 
 was mentioned in Lord Hardin ge's despatches, and 
 received promotion to the brevet rank of Major. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 2V 
 
 He served as political officer at Umballa during tlie 
 Punjaub Campaign, and by his influence assisted in 
 keeping quiet the Cis-Sutlej States. In November, 
 1854, Major Abbott proceeded on sick leave to 
 England for fifteen months, and on his return to 
 India resumed his appointment of Deputy Com- 
 missioner of Hooshiapore. 
 
 When the Mutiny broke out, his old Punjaub 
 chief, Sir Henry Lawrence, then Chief Com- 
 missioner of Oade, sent for him to officiate as 
 Commissioner in that province, but ovring to a 
 telegram for which he was waiting being intercepted 
 by the mutineers, he remained in the Punjaub. 
 Here he kept the district and station of Hooshiapore 
 in a state of tranquillity whilst the troops in almost 
 every station in the province revolted, and he 
 raised levies and furnished supplies and stores to 
 the Army before Delhi. In March, 1858, after the 
 capture of Lucknow, he was nominated Com- 
 missioner of the Division, and obtained repeated 
 acknowledgments of his services in reducing the 
 city to order and conducting difficult trials con- 
 sequent on the Mutiny. In 1863, Colonel Abbott 
 retired from the Grovernment service, when he was 
 presented with a flattering address from the 
 '' Princes, Nobles, and Citizens of Lucknow," and 
 
22 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 undertook the management of the Scinde and 
 Punjaub Railway. In 1872 he finally quitted India. 
 
 The youngest brother of this family was the late 
 Mr. Keith Abbott, wlio, for many years, filled, with 
 conspicuous success, the post of British Consul- 
 General at Tabriz, and latterly at Odessa, where lie 
 died, much lamented by the European inhabitants. 
 During his lengthened service in Persia, he 
 furnished to the Government most full and valuable 
 reports on the resources and geography of that 
 country, with every portion of which he was 
 familiar. 
 
 It is of the services of the eldest of these brothers 
 that we have to deal in the ensuing pages. 
 
 Augustus Abbott was born in London on the 7th 
 January, 1804, soon after the return from Calcutta 
 of his father, a merchant of good family and 
 position in the *' City of Palaces." He was first 
 educated under Dr. Faithfull at Warfield, in 
 Berkshire, and afterwards as gentleman-com- 
 moner at Winchester College. In his childhood 
 he was remarkable for his courage, his high 
 spirit, and his generosity. An instance of the latter 
 was told to his mother by a pastry-cook in the 
 neighbourhood of his home. When a boy of eight 
 years of age, he had gone thither with a sixpence in 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 his hand to purchase some pastry, which the woman 
 had actually handed to him on the counter, when a 
 poor woman with an infant in her arms came in 
 and asked for a halfpenny- worth of bread. Augustus 
 looked at her, then at the pastry, then at the 
 sixpence, and finally pushing back the pastry, put 
 the sixpence into the poor woman's hand and 
 vanished. This was characteristic of him through 
 life, the necessities of others always taking pre- 
 cedence of his own, in his estimation. His talents 
 were of a high order and he was gifted with a 
 remarkable memory. He was of an affectionate 
 disposition but not demonstrative ; his temper was 
 excitable but the storm was soon over, and he 
 never remembered an injury. His conscientiousness 
 was the most remarkable of his qualities — whether 
 the duty upon which he was engaged was pleasant, 
 or repugnant, he discharged it with his whole soul. 
 At the age of fourteen, Augustus Abbott entered 
 Addiscombe, and, in April, 1819, when only fifteen 
 years of age, he went out to India as an Artillery 
 Cadet, having passed through Addiscombe in one 
 year, which was partly owing to an extra demand 
 for cadets that season. There was at that time 
 great difficulty in obtaining access to books, and 
 more especially to useful and improving works in 
 
24 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the Bengal Presidency. The Artillery had a 
 military library at Dum-Dum, but every officer 
 shunned those head-quarters because they offered 
 no chance of active service, and few were there 
 longer than a year. But a reading club suyjplied a 
 few light works, and he gleaned the shops of each 
 station of all books worth attention, while his fine 
 memory retained the substance of all he read. 
 Augustus Abbott had an intense love of field sports,- 
 and was a crack shot and billiard player ; he had 
 acquired also the art of distinguishing covers con- 
 taining game, or rather their most probable habitat, 
 and when others who were accounted good 
 sportsmen, came home disappointed, he rarely 
 returned without a bag. 
 
 Augustus Abbott's first service in the field was 
 in December 1822, at the reduction of the Fort of 
 Buckhara, in Malwa, which was evacuated after a 
 practicable breach had been effected. In the latter 
 part of 1825, Lord Combermere, the Commander- 
 in-Chief in India, with an army of 20,000 men, 
 undertook the siege of Bhurtpore, .which had 
 resisted the utmost efforts of Lord Lake, '' the 
 hero of Laswarree and Delhi," in 1804. Bhurtpore 
 was a most formidable fortress of vast extent and 
 great strength, and the siege that ensued is the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 most memorable in our Indian annals, with the 
 exception, perhaps, of that of Mooltan, twenty-four 
 years later. At this time we were still engaged in 
 our struggle with Burmah, and the resources of the 
 Bengal Artillery, that noble service, declared by no 
 mean judge, the late Lord Hardinge, to be the 
 finest in the world, were taxed to the utmost. But 
 they w^ere equal to the occasion, and nearly 100 
 •guns and mortars were assembled to lay siege to 
 the virgin fortress, which was regarded as the last 
 bulwark of national independence. The eyes of all 
 India were fixed on the operations that ensued, the 
 success of which was regarded as of such importance, 
 that though a Government loan had been opened 
 for subscription in the month of August, the 
 moneyed classes in Calcutta hung back from 
 supporting it, until a decisive issue had been 
 attained. 
 
 The defences of the fort consisted of lofty and 
 thick walls of clay, hardened in the sun, supported 
 and bound by beams and logs, and rising from the 
 edge of a ditch, fifty-five feet in depth, and a 
 hundred and fifty feet broad. These defences were 
 strengthened by the outworks of nine gateways, 
 and flanked by thirty-five lofty mud bastions, one of 
 which, called the " Bastion of Victory," was built to 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 commemorate the defeat of Lord Lake, and, as the 
 Jat soldiers vauntingly said, with the skulls and 
 bones of those who had fallen in the first siege. 
 
 The artillery opened fire with thirty-six mortars 
 and forty-eight pieces of heavy ordnance, which 
 played on the ramparts for many days without 
 creating a practicable breach, as the heaviest shot 
 only caused the defences to crumble into rugged 
 masses falling down on each side of the conical 
 wall, but leaving the ascent scarcely less steep and 
 inaccessible than before. 
 
 Lieutenant Abbott held command of a battery of 
 two 18-pounder iron guns, built on the very counter- 
 scarp of the ditch, at the north angle, which he 
 held for three weeks without relief. Here Lord 
 Combermere came daily, having been delighted 
 with his practice from the battery, first erected at 
 Keedur Kundi, nearly a mile from the defences 
 of the citadel. The enemy, with their huge iron 
 guns, had by long practice got the range of this 
 battery, and being very troublesome, one day when 
 his Lordship was visiting it, he asked Lieutenant 
 Abbott whether he could silence them. Abbott 
 said he would try, and prepared some shrapnel, the 
 first of which burst in the embrasure of the trouble- 
 some gun, the next proving equally accurate. The 
 
INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 bastion was silenced for the rest of the day. This 
 had drawn Lord Combermere's notice to him, and 
 his plainness of speech amused instead of offending 
 him. His Lordship brought him his own rifle to 
 practice with when the guns were not firing ; and, 
 after the siege, gave him the Adjutancy of the 
 Sirhind Division of Artillery. 
 
 A number of sayings attributed to Augustus 
 Abbott were in circulation in the camp, having 
 more or less foundation in fact. One was to the 
 effect that an aide-de-camp brought him a message 
 one day from Lord Combermere, asking whether he 
 could not clear the ditch of the people of Bhurtpore, 
 who resorted thither in the twilight, and that he 
 had replied that " he thought it a pity to waste 
 ammunition upon old women and pigs ; but that 
 if his Lordship commanded, he was ready to fire at 
 the moon." The real occurrence was as follows : — 
 The enemy were in the habit of using huge bales 
 of raw cotton as extempore parapets, and would 
 sometimes saturate them with oil, and after setting 
 them alight, roll them down the incipient breach at 
 night, to show whether any troops were climbing 
 up it. On one occasion they had rolled several 
 bags into the ditch, and used them as a screen, 
 when Lord Combermere, observing this, and appre- 
 
28 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 liensive that tlie cover might be designed for the 
 protection of their countermines, asked Abbott, 
 " whether he could not knock the cOtton bales to 
 pieces with his shot." Abbott replied, " that as shot 
 made so little impression on bales of cotton, it 
 would cost a large expenditure of ammunition to 
 demolish these, and would probably destroy many 
 of the miserable old women who resorted thither 
 to gather shot and fragments of shells ; but, that 
 i£ his Lordship would allow him the choice, he 
 would take a dozen artillerymen with him into the 
 ditch, and rip the sacking of the bales with knives, 
 when they would fall to pieces." His Lordship would 
 not allow this, as it could not be done without 
 considerable loss of life, and so the cotton bales 
 were allowed to remain. Abbott was too thoroughly 
 the soldier ever to forget what was due to his 
 superior, the more so when he was one who had 
 treated him so kindly, but, says one qualified to 
 speak of him, " the flash of his large dark eyes, 
 when he spoke as freely and fearlessly to a 
 commander-in-chief as to a subaltern, sometimes 
 gave bystanders the idea that he was rebuking 
 his superiors." 
 
 Lord Combermere had the good taste to appreciate 
 the respectful independence of the young subaltern. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 who kept the battery alive with his wit and high 
 spirits, and whose skill as a marksman, both with 
 gun and rifle, was so pre-eminent. Abbott's posi- 
 tion on the enemy's counterscarp for so long a time 
 was one of some peril, for the enemy had skilful 
 miners, and when his brother James, who was in 
 the trenches, was one night roused out of his sleep 
 by the explosion of some of our tumbrils, his first 
 idea was that a mine had been exploded under the 
 battery on the enemy's counterscarp. 
 
 At Bhurtpore the fact was confirmed that round 
 shot from the gun of that day were not effectual in 
 breaching the mud walls of the native forts in India. 
 We had, indeed, a gun breach at the north-east angle, 
 but it was not considered practicable for the attack 
 of that point. Mining was had recourse to, and one 
 lodged under the " Long-necked Bastion" was ex- 
 ploded, but being overcharged it acted like a volcano ; 
 huge building stones were hurled into the air, whence 
 some of them fell at the distance of 500 yards 
 from the ramparts, killing several of our men. At 
 length, nearly a fortnight later, a great mine was 
 completed and charged with 10,000 pounds of 
 powder. The explosion that took place was terrific, 
 and immediately the storming column, under 
 General Reynell, rushed up the breach, and bayo- 
 
30 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 neted the defenders, who fought with desperation. 
 Thus fell on the 18th of January, 1826, after a siege 
 of thirty-six days, this great, and hitherto invincible, 
 fortress, with a loss to the British of only 1,000 
 men, that of the garrison being, it was said, 6,000. 
 The state treasure and jewels were divided among 
 the victors, the share of the Commander-in-Chief 
 being no less than £60,000. The capture of 
 Bhurtpore greatly increased British prestige, and, 
 combined with the simultaneous conclusion of the 
 long and arduous Burmese war, dissolved the hopes 
 of the disaffected, and strengthened the power of 
 the Government. 
 
 In 1833-34, we find Lieutenant Abbott — for he 
 did not obtain his captaincy until April in 
 the latter year — serving in the field with the 
 artillery of the Army, which marched through 
 and demolished the Forts of Shekewattee, a blood- 
 less campaign, but, from the nature of the country, 
 one of no ordinary difficulty. 
 
 In 1838 we entered upon the memorable Afghan 
 war, and Captain Abbott again took the field, and 
 served throughout the entire operations, entering 
 Afghanistan with the army under the command 
 of Sir John Keane, and quitting it, four years later, 
 with the victorious columns, which, under Generals 
 
INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 Pollock and Nott, retrieved the honour and prestige 
 of British arms, tarnished by the pusillanimity of 
 General Elphinstone. 
 
 Captain Abbott's batterj^ consisting of Golun- 
 dauze, or Native artillerymen, was, on the suggestion 
 of Major Penn of the Bengal Artillery, ordered to em- 
 ploy camels for draught purposes, and it was owing 
 to his established reputation as a first-rate artillery 
 ofiicer that he was selected to conduct the 
 experiment. The camels selected were those em- 
 ployed in sandy districts for the plough, and were 
 of a peculiar breed, known by a head more finely 
 formed than is usual among camels. Captain 
 Abbott's battery was perfectly equipped by the 
 care and skill of the commander, and offered a 
 novel spectacle, the camels having never before 
 been seen in harness in Upper India. Strange as 
 was their aspect it was far from unmilitary. The 
 weight which they could oppose to the vis inertice 
 of the guns, by merely leaning against the harness, 
 made the 9-pounder field-pieces mere playthings to 
 the teams, on hard, sandy, or stony ground, and 
 their speed was such, that in a race with the fleetest 
 buggy horse they could show it the muzzle of the 
 gun, as was proved at Delhi before the battery 
 marched. But they had their weak points. On 
 
32 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 slippery ground tbej proved helpless, and in cross- 
 ing those places so common in the clay soil of 
 Afghanistan, which became girth deep after the 
 passage of much cattle, where rapid scrambling 
 alone avails to carry any animals across, the camel 
 was utterly at a loss. He quietly thrust in his long 
 leg up to the elbow, and his broad splay foot 
 clinched it there for ever. It was also found that 
 the camel's constitution, when he is domesticated, is 
 far more delicate than that of the horse. The 
 battery soon after its arrival at Cabul became crip- 
 pled by deaths among the draught camels, and none 
 could be procured in Afghanistan, trained to 
 draught. So Captain Abbott got permission to 
 horse it from the Yaboos, or Galloways, of the 
 country, which proved most efl&cient. 
 
 No. 6 Light Field Battery, under Captain Abbott, 
 was the first British artillery that crossed the 
 Kojuck Pass, intervening between Quetta and 
 Candahar, and throughout the ensuing arduous 
 and protracted operations, it was always on active 
 service, and Captain Abbott frequently received the 
 thanks of the Commanding Generals for the skilful 
 and dashing manner in which he carried it into 
 action, and for the skill and resource he displayed 
 in overcoming all difficulties of transport and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 33 
 
 supply. On the bloodless capture of Candaliar, 
 and the entry of Shah Soojah on the 25th of April, 
 1839, the battery formed a portion of the column, 
 detached under Sir Robert Sale, in pursuit of the 
 Candahar Sirdars, and followed them as far as 
 Giriskh. After a delay of ten weeks, occasioned 
 by a want of food, the Army marched from the 
 capital of Western Afghanistan, and soon arrived 
 before Ghuznee, 230 miles distant.^ Ghuznee, which 
 is the most important fortress in Afghanistan, had 
 the reputation of impregnability, and as Sir John 
 Keane had brought no battering guns with him, it 
 would have defied the efforts of the British force 
 encamped before it, but for the genius of Captain 
 Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers, who hit upon 
 the happy expedient of blowing in the gate, and the 
 never-failing valour of the British rank and file, 
 who, led by their officers, stormed the fortress, and, 
 thus left open the road to Cabul, ninety miles distant. 
 No further opposition was offered to the advance of 
 the Army, which encamped before Cabul, and, on 
 the 7th of August, our puppet king. Shah Soojah, 
 resplendent in jewels, was conducted in great pomp 
 through the city, to the Bala Hissar, or citadel. 
 
 Afghanistan being subjugated, in September, 
 1839, General Willshire, returned with the Bombav 
 
34 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 column, on his way capturing by storm the city of 
 Khelat, the ruler of which, Mehrab Khan, had with- 
 held supplies from our troops. Upon the removal 
 of Shah Soojah's Court from Cabul to Jellalabad, 
 for the winter of 1839, Captain Abbott's battery 
 formed part of the brigade which escorted him to 
 that town. In January, 1840, an expedition, under- 
 taken to coerce a refractory chief, marched for 
 Pushoot, which is some fifty miles to the north-east 
 of Jellalabad. The troops, which included No. 6 
 Light Field Battery, marched on the 11th of 
 January, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Orchard, C.B., and, on their arrival before 
 the Fort, Captain Abbott opened fire with his 
 guns, and battered down the fausse-hrai. But 
 every attempt by the Engineer ofiicer to repeat 
 the G-buznee exploit of blowing in the gate, was 
 unsuccessful, and after a storming column had been 
 beaten back with much loss, the Fort was evacuated 
 by the enemy during the night. Colonel Orchard 
 expressed his high approval of the services of 
 Captain Abbott on this occasion.* 
 
 * Extract from Detachment Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Orchard, C.B., commanding the Force. 
 
 " Camp near Pushoot, 20th January, 1840. 
 "To Captain Abbott, who has successfully overcome the nuiue- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 35 
 
 In the ensuing spring Shah Soojah returned to 
 Cabul, and with him the greater portion of the 
 troops. But there was trouble in the Kohistan, as 
 the mountainous country to the north of Cabul is 
 called, and the Ameer Dost Mahomed, whom we 
 had ousted from his throne to make way for his 
 faineant rival, defeatad by Brigadier Dennie at 
 Bameean, in the Hindoo Koosh, reappeared in the 
 Kohistan. As he said, " T am like a wooden spoon, 
 you may throw me hither and thither, but I shall 
 not be hurt." On the 24th of September, 1839, 
 Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir Alexander 
 Burnes as Political Officer, marched from Cabul 
 against the Ameer, with a force including Captain 
 Abbott's battery, and, on the 29th, an attack was 
 made on a fortified village at the entrance of the 
 Ghorebund Pass, known as Tootum-Durrah. The 
 village, with a chain of detached forts, fell to the 
 fire of the guns directed by Abbott, and the advance 
 of the infantry. The success was complete, though 
 at the cost of the life of a young and very promising 
 
 rons difficulties he lias had to contend with, for the zealous and 
 indefatigable manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties 
 devolving upon him, and for the great assistance and valuable ser- 
 vice rendered by him on the morning of the 18th, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Orchard requests he will accept his warmest thanks." 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 cavalry officer, Lieutenant Edward Conolly, acting 
 aide-de-camp to Sir Robert Sale, one of three 
 brothers, all of whom perished in Afghanistan or 
 Bokhara. 
 
 After destroying the defences of Tootum-Durrah, 
 Sale marched, on the 3rd of October, upon Joolgah, 
 another fortified position held by the '* rebels," as 
 they were called. The walls of this place were too 
 thick to be breacbed by nine-pounder field guns, 
 and when an attempt was made to carry the fort by 
 storm, the scaling-ladders were found to be too sbort. 
 Many gallant men fell in the breach, and the 
 assaulting column was forced to retire. Fortunately, 
 as at Pushoot, the Kohistanees did not await a 
 renewal of the attack, but abandoned the fort. 
 
 It was known that Dost Mahomed w-as in the 
 Ghorebund Valley, within forty or fifty miles of 
 Cabul, and Sir William Macnaghten was in a state 
 of great anxiety, expecting even then " the disgrace 
 of being shut up in Cabul for a time." But a 
 gleam of unexpected good-luck fell upon our arms 
 and our Afghan policy. Dost Mahomed moved into 
 the Nijrow country, whither he was closely followed 
 by Sir Robert Sale, and on the 2nd of November, 
 an anniversary memorable in Afghan annals, the 
 Ameer was brought to bay at Purwan-Durrah. In 
 
INTRODUCTION. '.\7 
 
 the affair that ensued, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry be- 
 haved like cravens, and when Dost Mahomed, 
 followed by a small party of horsemen, advanced to 
 meet them, they turned and fled back to the pro- 
 tection of Abbott's guns, leaving their officers to 
 baar the brunt of the attack. These, like English 
 gentlemen, scorned to flee, but met their fate with 
 the heroism we applaud in the great names of 
 Greece and Rome. Dr. Lord, the Political officer, 
 Lieutenants Crispin and Broadfoot (the latter one 
 of three gallant brothers, two of whom died the 
 soldier's death in Afghanistan, and the third at 
 Ferozeshah) were cut to pieces, and Captains Fraser 
 and Ponsonby, after performing prodigies of valour, 
 retired, covered with ghastly wounds. But Dost 
 Mahomed, instead of following up his success, re- 
 cognised the futility of resistance, and rode straight 
 from the field of Purwan-Durrah to Cabul, where 
 he delivered himself up to Sir William Macnaghten, 
 and, on the 12th of December, was sent in honour- 
 able confinement to India. 
 
 The next Expedition on which Captain Abbott 
 was engaged, was into the Zoormut district, to re- 
 duce some refractory tribes, and retrieve a repulse 
 sustained by Captain Hay in an ill-judged attack on 
 the fort of Zao. The column, which included four 
 
38 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, the Moun- 
 tain Train, and some mortars, the whole under 
 Captain Abbott, marched from Cabul on the 28th of 
 September, 1841, under the command of Colonel 
 Oliver. But there was no fighting, and, after blow- 
 ing up the forts and receiving the ^submission of the 
 chiefs, the column returned to Cabul. While 
 operating in this country, Captain Abbott took his 
 guns over a pass 9,600 feet high. 
 
 As the column approached Cabul they were met 
 with the news that the Eastern Ghilzye Chiefs, who 
 held the passes between the capital and Jellalabad, 
 were in arms, in consequence of the reduction of 
 the subsidies hitherto paid them by the British 
 Government, which they regarded as a breach 
 of contract. Sir Wilham Macnaghten made light of 
 this trouble, but it was the beginning of the storm 
 that was so soon to burst on his devoted head. The 
 Indian Government, desirous of reducing the drain 
 on the Exchequer caused by supplying a large 
 army with stores from arsenals 800 miles distant 
 in a direct line, resolved on leaving a force of only 
 10,000 men, including what was known as the 
 Shah's Contingent, to garrison Afghanistan. 
 Accordingly, when in October, 1839, Sir John 
 Keane returned to India, the Army of Occupation 
 
INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 was considerably reduced, and the command de- 
 volved on Sir Willoughby Cotton, a veteran of the 
 Peninsular and Burmese wars, who, again, in 
 November, 1840, returned to India, and gave place 
 to General Elphinstone, an amiable and personally 
 gallant officer, but incapacitated for command, as 
 he himself pleaded, by reason of his feeble health, 
 and still more by an undecided and vacillating 
 temperament. Thus, with the Eastern Ghilzyes in 
 arms ; with an army reduced to a condition of 
 weakness, and led by an officer of infirm purpose, 
 the second in command at Cabul being not less 
 remarkable for a fatal obstinacy and intractability ; 
 with a Political Chief whose sanguine temperament 
 and bad judgment blinded his eyes to dangers re- 
 cognised by every one who had eyes to see ; with a 
 martial and, for the most part, hostile population ; 
 and with a province, the Punjaub, torn with con- 
 tending factions, in the rear — the situation was one 
 that demanded the vigilance, the forethought, the 
 prescience in council, and the vigour in action of 
 the best officer that the Indian Government had in 
 their pay. And such an officer they had ready to 
 hand in the country, one who was not only qualified 
 by reason of his soldierly virtues, but who was 
 familiar with Afghanistan and with the Afghan 
 
40 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 character. But, lamentable to relate, private rea- 
 sons Y^re suffered to override the paramount con- 
 sideration of the public- weal. General Nott — for 
 we need scarcely say we refer to him — was distaste- 
 ful to the Envoy by reason of his unconcealed con- 
 tempt for the Shah and his sham Court, and his 
 directness of purpose and bluntness of manner. 
 Finally, he was a Company's officer, and in those 
 days this was almost a virtual disqualification for 
 high command. 
 
 As though the troops in Afghanistan, which only 
 included three European regiments, were not already 
 too weak. Sir Robert Sale's Brigade, which included 
 Captain Abbott's battery, was under orders to re- 
 turn to India, and it was decided that they should 
 coerce, eii route, the refractory Ghilzye chiefs who 
 were in open arms, and had established themselves 
 at the Khoord-Cabul Pass, within fifteen miles of 
 the capital. On the 9th of October, Colonel Mon- 
 teith, of the 35th Native Infantry marched with a 
 small force, including two guns of Captain Abbott's 
 battery, under Lieutenant Dawes, and that night 
 his camp was attacked at Boothak, the first march 
 from Cabul. On receipt of this news, Sir Eobert 
 Sale proceeded with his regiment, Her Majesty's 
 18th Light Infantry, and having cleared the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 41 
 
 Khoord-Cabul Pass, where he left Monteith, re- 
 turned to Boothak. 
 
 On the 20th of October — Captain Abbott, without 
 whom Sale would not proceed, having returned on 
 the previous day from the Zoormut country — the 
 Brigade marched to clear the passes to Jellalabad, 
 and after a halt of one day at Khoord-Cabul, for 
 want of camels, proceeded on to Tezeen. Here 
 Captain Macgregor, the political officer of the 
 column, entered into negotiations with the Ghilzye 
 chiefs regarding the restoration of the subsidies to 
 their former footing, and, as he reported, arranged 
 the matter satisfactorily. But when, on the 26th 
 of October, the Brigade marched, Abbott being with 
 the artillery of the advanced guard, they found the 
 whole armed force of the district arranged against 
 them. The Ghilzyes attacked the rear guard on 
 the 26th at Sei Baba, on the 27th at Kutta Sung, 
 and on the 28th on approaching Jugdulluck, but the 
 enemy were repulsed on every occasion. Between 
 the Jugdulluck Pass, where Captain Abbott com- 
 manded the advance guard, and Grundamuck, the 
 fighting was specially heavy and continuous, as not 
 only had the heights to be cleared, but the immense 
 baggage train, with which all Indian armies are 
 encumbered, required protection. The column lost 
 
42 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 thirty officers and men killed and ninety wounded, 
 and at length, after eight days' harrassing warfare, 
 the troops found brief repose at Gund amuck, where 
 they found located in an open cantonment the 
 Khyber Regiment, under Captain H. P. Burn, a 
 body of Afghan Horse, and SOO ji^zailchees (match- 
 lockmen), under Captain Grerard. 
 
 While halting in this fertile spot alarming news 
 was received from Cabul, and Sale was ordered by 
 Macnaghten and Elphinstone to return with all 
 despatch, but a council of war decided against a 
 return march though the passes, encumbered as the 
 column was with 300 sick and wounded, and on 
 the 11th of November, the Brigade moved to Jella- 
 labad. A running fight with the enemy, who tried 
 to cut off the baggage, was kept up throughout the 
 following day, concluding with a brilliant charge of 
 the 5th Cavalry, and on the morning of the 13th 
 Sale entered Jellalabad. 
 
 Throughout the prolonged investment of this 
 town by the forces under Mohamed Akbar Khan 
 and other chiefs. Captain Abbott commanded the 
 artillery of the " illustrious " garrison. The works 
 of Jellalabad were very extensive, the circumference 
 of the walls being 2,300 yards, and it was impossible 
 to man them ; but the defences were strengthened 
 
INTRODUCTION. 43 
 
 under the superiutendence of Captain Broadfoot, a 
 Madras officer of Infantry, who had a real genius 
 for war, and guns were mounted m the most suit- 
 able positions by Captain Abbott, who collected 
 ammunition as he best could in the neighbourhood. 
 Sir Robert Sale was not the man to remain on the 
 defensive, and on the day after his arrival at Jella- 
 labad, sent out Colonel Monteith, with 1,100 men, 
 against the enemy. All arms were engaged, and Ab- 
 bott covered the advance with his guns. Soon after 
 the Afghans closed in menacing array on the garri- 
 son, and on the 1st of December Colonel Dennie, of 
 the 13th Light Infantry, sallied out with a column 
 and dispersed the investing force. In this affair 
 Abbott's guns worked much havoc on the dense 
 masses of the enemy. On the destruction of the 
 British force under General Elphinstone, Akbar 
 Khan, the most fiery of the sons of Dost Mahomed, 
 was enabled to bring a larger force before Jellala- 
 bad, and there was constant occasion for Abbott to 
 drive away the enemy, who took advantage of the 
 ruined buildings near the enceinte to annoy the gar- 
 rison. On the 11th of March, while thus engaged, he 
 was hit by an Afghan matchlockman, whose ball, 
 fired from a mosque 240 yards distant, struck him 
 in the breast, but fortunately only inflicted a flesh 
 
44 THE AFGHAN WAR 
 
 wound, and he refused to absent himself from duty 
 for a single day. 
 
 The last action fought by the Jellalabad garrison 
 as such, was on the 7th of April, 1842, when Akbar 
 Khan and his army of 6,000 men were finally driven 
 away in irretrievable rout. In this action Captain 
 Abbott commanded the guns, consisting of his 
 battery and that of Captain Backhouse, of Shah 
 Soojah's Artillery, and, advancing at the gallop, by 
 the precision and celerity of his fire, contributed 
 greatly to the victory. Akbar Khan on this 
 occasion himself directed the fire of his guns, but 
 they were silenced and captured. Four cannon, 
 lost by the Cabul force, and two standards were 
 captured, and, as Sale wrote, "the field of battle 
 was strewed with the bodies of men and horses." 
 Our loss was small — only ten killed and fifty-three 
 wounded, but the victory was dimmed by the death 
 of the gallant Dennie, who was shot through the 
 body. During the siege thus happily raised, when 
 their prospects were at the gloomiest, Captain 
 Abbott sought to cheer the men with his fun ; and 
 an anecdote is told of his having set up a General's 
 cocked hat at the unoccupied corner of his battery, 
 to draw thither the fire of the enemy, who marvelled 
 that the British General had so many lives to spare. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The deputation that waited upon Sale to implore 
 him to allow them to make the famous sally of the 
 7th of April, which broke up the investment, was 
 originated by him, with the aid of Captains Oldfield 
 and Backhouse. When the enemy's camp and 
 baggage fell into our hands, he found in Mohamed 
 Akbar's tent, the gold repeater watch given to that 
 treacherous chief by Sir W. Macnaghten, just pre- 
 vious to the murder of the latter. This he gave to 
 the prize agents, and purchased at their sale. It 
 was in his hands constantly on the night of his 
 death, in his restless desire to know the hour. His 
 letters from Jellalabad to an officer of the Head- 
 Quarter Staff were put into Lord EUenborough's 
 hands on his arrival in India, as affording the most 
 accurate picture of events and of the position of 
 affairs. 
 
 In the following pages will be found a narrative 
 of many episodes of the Afghan War, of which no 
 detailed account has hitherto appeared, beyond the 
 published despatches. Sir John Kaye, in his 
 admirable and comprehensive work, disclaims any 
 intention of writing a military history ; the works 
 of the military historians. Hough, Havelock, and 
 Kennedy, only deal with the operations ending with 
 the return of Sir John Keane to India in November, 
 
4C THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 1840 ; while Mr. Gleig treats more exclusively of 
 the defence of Jellalabad, and the narratives of 
 Vincent Eyre and Lady Sale record only the Cabnl 
 disasters. The following pages, on the other hand, 
 give hitherto unpublished details of the Expeditions 
 to Pushoot and to the Zoormut and Shinwarree 
 Valleys, and the campaign in the Kohistan. More- 
 over, some extracts we have made from the journals 
 and correspondence of Augustus Abbott, when com- 
 manding the Artillery at Jellalabad, shed a new 
 light on this interesting and glorious episode of our 
 military history ; more particularly we would point 
 to the affair of the 1st of December, 1841, and the 
 brilliant action of the 7th of April following, by 
 which the "illustrious garrison" broke up the in- 
 vestment. The unimpeachable veracity of Augustus 
 Abbott va sans dire, as the French say, and the 
 sober narrative of his journal and letters, jotted 
 down from day to day, and despatched to India as 
 opportunity offered, presents a strong contrast to 
 the graphic, though highly-coloured, account of 
 Mr. Gleig. 
 
 On the 15th of April, General Pollock arrived at 
 Jellalabad with the relieving army, of which 
 Frederick Abbott was Chief Engineer. The garri- 
 son were full of eagerness to avenge the disasters 
 
INTRODUCTION. 47 
 
 of the preceding January, but circumstances over 
 which General Pollock had no control, prevented 
 him from advancing on Cabul until the following 
 August, though he did not remain inactive. A 
 column proceeded, under the command of Colonel 
 Monteith, into the Shinwarree Valley, and Captain 
 Abbott went in charge of the artillery. The Afghan 
 forts and villages were destroyed, and on the 26th 
 of July, at Mazeena, where the enemy made a stand, 
 Abbott's guns were brought into requisition. On 
 the 3rd of August, the column returned to Jellala- 
 bad, and on the 20th, General Pollock began to move 
 on Cabul, with 8,000 men and 17 guns, including 
 Captain Abbott's battery. On the 24th of the 
 month, the villages of Mammoo Khail and Koochlee 
 Khail, a few miles from Gundamuck, were captured 
 after a short action, in which Abbott participated, 
 and on the 7th of September General Pollock 
 marched from Gundamuck with the first Division of 
 his Army, under the command of Sir Robert Sale. 
 On the following day took place the action of Jug- 
 dulluck, when, under cover of Abbott's and Back- 
 house's guns, the columns led by Broadfoot and 
 Wilkinson vied with each other as to who should 
 first expel the Afghan juzailchees from the 
 heights. 
 
48 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 But Akbar Khan determined to make a final 
 desperate stand at Tezeen, where, in an almost im- 
 pregnable position, he concentrated an army of 
 16,000 men. On the 13th of September the 
 strength of the opposing forces was put to the 
 test of battle, and the result was a crushing and 
 decisive defeat for the Afghan cause. Where every 
 branch of the Army covered itself with glory, it 
 need scarcely be added that No. 6 Field Battery, 
 under its gallant chief, was hotly engaged, 
 as it had been since quitting Jellalabad, and that it 
 performed its devoirs, 
 
 Akbar Khan fled from the field of Tezeen to the 
 Ghorebund Yalley, leaving Cabul at the mercy of 
 the conqueror. On the 15th of September, Greneral 
 Pollock encamped before the city, and the British 
 Standard was once more hoisted on the topmost 
 pinnacle of the Bala Hissar under a royal salute. 
 The return march to India of the combined columns 
 of Pollock and Nott was conducted without any 
 fighting of importance, and on the 17th of Decem- 
 ber, the " illustrious " garrison of Jellalabad, under 
 its gallant leader. Sir Robert Sale, defiled over the 
 bridge of boats on the Sutlej, and was welcomed 
 with especial marks of distinction by Lord Ellen- 
 borougb, who had assembled a large army at Feroze- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 49 
 
 pore. Thus Major Abbott returned to the British 
 provinces, after an absence from India of four 
 eventful years, during which he was constantly en- 
 gaged with the enemy upon as arduous service as 
 falls to the lot of few officers to undergo. 
 
 Lord Ellenborough, in an autograph letter, dated 
 the 16th of September, had already offered him the 
 appointment of Gun-Carriage Agent at Futtehgurh 
 in the following flattering terms : " Your practical 
 knowledge of the service of artillery in the field, 
 under the most difficult circumstances, renders you 
 eminently fit for this appointment, and I doubt not 
 that before you receive this letter you will, before 
 Cabul, have acquired new claims to whatever mark 
 of public approbation the Government of India can 
 bestow upon you." Previous to this communication, 
 in a letter dated the 2nd of April of the same year, 
 his Lordship also wrote : " Desirous of marking my 
 sense of your distinguished services in the field, I 
 have appointed you one of my Honorary Aides-de- 
 Camp." 
 
 This mark of distinction was repeated by Lords 
 Hardinge, Dalhousie, and Canning. Lord Ellen- 
 borough, whose instincts were military, and who 
 always lamented that a hard fate had made him the 
 wearer of a black, instead of a red, coat, showed his 
 
60 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 appreciation of the distinguished services of ISTo. 6 
 Field Battery, by directing that " Jellalabad " 
 should be engraved upon the guns, and that they 
 should be retained for use in the battery.* 
 
 In recognition of his services Her Majesty, in 
 1840, conferred on Major Abbott the Companion- 
 ship of the Bath. From 1843 to 1847 he held the 
 post of Agent for Gun Carriages, and from 1848 to 
 1855, that of Principal Commissary of Ordnance. 
 In the latter year he was appointed Inspector 
 General of Ordnance, and, in 1858, was promoted 
 to the command of the Bengal Artillery. During 
 this period his professional acquirements were often 
 called into requisition by the Government of India 
 in matters in connection with his branch of the 
 Service. Among important committees on which 
 he served, was one assembled to inquire into the 
 
 * The following is a copy of the letter, which, with others in the 
 handwriting of his Lordship, is now lying before ns : — "' January, 
 1843. I understand that your troop are anxious to have again, in 
 the event of their being called into active service, the same guns 
 with which they obtained, under your command, so much distinc- 
 tion at Jellalabad, and that these gnns will be placed in the 
 magazine at Futtehgurh. You will therefore continue to have 
 them under your care, and you will preserve them for service with 
 your troop, and I beg you will have engraven upon each gun the 
 word * Jellalabad.' " 
 
INTRODUCTION. 61 
 
 defences of Ferozepore, which, up to our annexation 
 of the Punjaub, was our extreme north-west frontier 
 station, his coadjutors being General Sir George 
 Brooke, Bengal Artillery, and Colonel (now Major- 
 General) J. T. Boileau, of the Bengal Engineers. 
 
 Shortly after attaining the command of his 
 regiment, the legitimate object of ambition of a 
 *' gunner," Colonel Abbott was compelled, by failing 
 health, to return to his native land, after an 
 interrupted absence of thirty-nine years. Besides 
 the order of the Bath, he received medals for 
 Bhurtpore, Jellalabad, Ghuznee, and Cabul, and 
 held the '' Douranee " Order, instituted by the ill- 
 fated Shah Soojah, and conferred upon him by Sir 
 W. Macnaghten, in November 1840, though he 
 never wore it. 
 
 He attained the rank of Major- General in April 
 1860, and expired at Cheltenham on the 25th of 
 February, 1867, much regretted by a large circle of 
 friends, among whom was the Earl of Ellenborough,* 
 who resided near that town. 
 
 * III 1846, Lord Ellenborough erected in the garden at Southam 
 House, a monument to commemorate the names and services of 
 those to whom he considered himself to be more especially indebted 
 for the success of his administration in India, and among tin* 
 names inscribed on the walls is that of Major Augustus Abbott. 
 
 E 2 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 It is no uncommon circumstance in India for 
 several members of one family to achieve dis- 
 tinction. Thus there are the three Lawrences, who 
 each guided a province through the perilous times 
 of the Mutiny : the three Conollys, and the three 
 Broadfoots, who all showed talents of the highest 
 order, which a cruel fate untimely nipped in the bud; 
 also the Chamberlains, the Johnsons, the Andersons, 
 the Lumsdens, the Boileaus, the Mackenzies, and 
 many other families whose names were familiar in 
 India, but whom the advent of the " competition- 
 wallah " may drive out of the field, as it would have 
 excluded those of Wellington and Nelson from the 
 services of which they are the brightest ornaments, 
 had the present rage for competitive examinations 
 animated our forefathers. However the system 
 may work — and we have no wish to depreciate the 
 importance of high mental culture, provided, so far 
 as India at least is concerned, such acquirements as 
 gentlemanly bearing, high character, and physical 
 and social gifts, are deemed indispensable — we 
 trust that our rulers will despatch from the palatial 
 seat of Government at Westminster a race of 
 statesmen and soldiers for the hour of trial which 
 appears to be impending, equally sagacious in 
 council, and bold in action, as those sent out by old 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 '' John Companj " from his modest house of 
 business in Leadenhall Street. The qualities and 
 accomplishments essential to a successful career in 
 India, either in the political or military department, 
 (and often times a soldier finds himself intrusted with 
 extended civil powers,) are not solely those of an 
 Oxford Don, or an Inspector of Schools. The 
 French staff ofl&cers, it is true, sneered at the 
 German " spectacled professors " who overran their 
 country and dictated peace at Versailles, but then 
 these representatives of a superior military culture 
 were certainly not behind their opponents in the 
 dash, hard riding, and other qualifications requisite 
 for an officer, which were found combined in the 
 person of the typical Uhlan, who was wont to ride 
 ahead of armies and achieve the surrender of 
 fortified posts. 
 
 It was by similar qualities that all our great 
 names in Indian History are distinguished. Clive 
 was a dunce at school and would have been 
 ignominiously spun by the Civil Service Com- 
 missioners, those awful judges of our incipient 
 soldiers and statesmen, and, on the other hand, the 
 ill-fated Macnaghten was a brilliant scholar who 
 carried off all the prizes at the Calcutta University. 
 But the one was the " heaven-born general " of the 
 
54 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 elder Pitt, who founded our Indian Empire, and 
 showed his surprising aptitude to lead men in a 
 crisis — while the other, though a brave gentleman, a 
 generous enemy, and an amiable friend, went nigh 
 to wreck the Empire founded by the genius of the 
 liero of Arcot and Plassey. The natives of India 
 are quick to distinguish between a parvenu and a 
 gentleman '' to the manner born," and mortal 
 offence may be given to a native Prince, or ally, by 
 the superciliousness of an ill-bred political officer, 
 who sneers at the pride and state of the descendant 
 of a thousand kings, such as the Maharana of 
 Oodeypore. 
 
 Major- General Augustus Abbott was acknow- 
 ledged in India to be one of the finest Artillerists 
 of his day, and the late Field-Marshal Sir Greorge 
 Pollock, himself a " gunner," once stated to the 
 author, that the gallant soldier in question was 
 "the finest artillery officer in India." But this 
 Memoir is not undertaken with the object of 
 elevating one who has passed away into the 
 character of a hero; such a proposal would be 
 alike contrary to the wishes of his family, and to 
 the simple, manly character of the officer of whose 
 services it treats. His modest wishes would rather 
 have preferred the epitaph dictated by his friend 
 
INTRODUCTION. 55 
 
 and brother officer, the dying hero of the Defence 
 of Lucknow : — '' Here lies Henry Lawrence who 
 tried to do his duty." Happily England can give 
 the proud answer of the mother of Brasidas to 
 the strangers who praised the memory of her 
 son : — " Sparta hath many a worthier son than 
 he." 
 
 The object of bringing the experiences of 
 Major- General Abbott before the world at 
 the present critical conjunction of affairs is, 
 rather, to show the serious nature of the task 
 upon which this country has entered in the pro- 
 jected war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, by 
 recounting the difficulties of the operations of 
 1838-42, and the manner in which an artillery 
 officer, who participated throughout these operations, 
 surmounted those difficulties and brought his 
 battery in triumph from Delhi through Afghanistan 
 to Ferozepore. At the present time, when British 
 troops are about to invade Afghanistan, the 
 observations and experiences of General Abbott 
 in his marches through the country, as jotted down 
 daily in his journal or written to friends, will be of 
 value as emanating from an officer who never 
 exaggerated difficulties; moreover, by showing 
 the difficulties against which he had to contend, 
 
56 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 measures can be taken to provide against them in 
 the forthcoming operations. It is with this object 
 that the family of General Abbott have placed in 
 my hands the preparation of this work, which to 
 me, personally, is a labour of love, for among my 
 oldest and most valued friends I am proud to 
 number more than one of this band of brothers. 
 
 C. R. LOW. 
 
 Kensington, 
 
 Noyember, 1878. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MAECH ON CANDAHAR AND CABUL. 
 
 The Simla Proclamation of 1st October, 1838— Assembly of the 
 Army at Ferozepore — The March to Bukhur — Occupation of the 
 Fort of Rohree — The March into Scinde and Submission ot the 
 Ameers — Crossing the Indus — The March from Shikarpore to 
 Dadur and through the Bolan Pass to %ietta — Advance on 
 Candahar — The Difficulties of the Kojuck Pass — Arrival at 
 Candahar — The March to the Helmund and Occupation of the 
 Forts of Ghirisk — Departure from Candahar — Incidents of the 
 March to Ghuznee — The Storm of Ghuznee — The March on 
 Cabul — Arrival at the Capital — Dispersion of the Army of the 
 Indus. 
 
 rv^ the 1st of October 1838, Lord Auckland, 
 Governor- General of India — who, two years 
 before, at the customary banquet given by the 
 Court of Directors to their departing Proconsuls, 
 spoke '' of the exultation with which he regarded 
 the prospect of doing good to his fellow-creatures, 
 of extending the blessings of good government and 
 
58 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 happiness to millions in India" — ^issued at Simla the 
 famous manifesto, directing " the assemblage of a 
 British force for service across the Indus," with 
 the object of reheving Herat, besieged by a Persian 
 Army, and of replacing on the throne of Afghanistan 
 Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. This prince, whose in- 
 competence had been frequently manifested 
 throughout his adventurous career, was described 
 in this manifesto as one " whose popularity 
 throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his 
 lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony 
 of the best authorities," though beyond Captain 
 (afterwards Sir) Claude Wade, the custodian of the 
 ex-king at Loodiana, it would be hard to discover 
 who were these " best authorities." Certainly not 
 Captain (afterwards Sir) Alexander Burnes, who, 
 in the preceding April, some time before quitting 
 Cabul, on the failure of his '' purely commercial 
 mission " as Lord Auckland styled it, addressed to 
 his lordship a communication in which he 
 declared : — " There is but one way of making 
 Afghanistan a barrier against the Russians, and 
 that is to form a strict alliance with Dost Mahomed, 
 to strengthen his authority, which has been com- 
 promised by family quarrels, and let everyone be 
 thoroughly convinced that the Government of 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 
 
 India will never allow any attempts to be made to 
 injure or subvert it."* It was only when Burnes 
 was directed by Lord Auckland to inform the 
 Ameer, that Peshawur, which had been 
 treacherously acquired by Hunjeet Singh, could 
 never be given up by the Sikhs, that Burnes 
 approved of the Shah Soojah project, and wrote on 
 the 2nd of June, that he conceived it expedient to 
 adopt " not what was best, but what was best 
 under the circumstances, which a series of blunders 
 had produced." Thus it happened that the 
 Governor- General refused the alliance proffered in 
 terms of humility by Dost Mahomed, t who had 
 been de facto ruler of Afghanistan since 1826, and, 
 concluding a tripartite treaty with Runjeet Singh, 
 the old ** Lion of the Punjaub," then tottering on 
 the brink of the grave, and our pensioner, the 
 
 * " History of the Afghans," by J. P. Ferrier. London, 1858. 
 
 •f " Let his Lordship," said he, " give me but two words of 
 encouragement, let him recognise me as Ameer of Cabul, and 1 will 
 forget the mortal feud between me and the Shah Kamran, my 
 enemy by blood, and I will rush to his support with my best troops 
 to defend him from the Shah of Persia, on the simple condition of 
 receiving a subsidy for the troops that I shall employ in the service 
 of the Company." He even added, " tliat for the present he would 
 not say another word about the restitution of Peshawur." 
 
60 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 incapable Shah Soojah, announced in his Simla 
 proclamation the invasion of Afghanistan. 
 
 Almost before the ink was dry, all semblance of 
 necessity for this step had ceased by the raising of 
 the siege of Herat on the 9th of September, but 
 the occupation of Afghanistan as a means whereby 
 the intrigues and progress of Russia might be 
 checked, was a project that commanded the 
 approval of Lord Palmerston, and of Sir John 
 Hobhouse,* then President of the Board of Control, 
 as well as of the Secretaries about Lord Auckland, 
 of whom the moving spirit was Mr. William 
 Macnaghten, who had conducted the negotiations 
 with Runjeet Singh ; and it was persevered with, 
 notwithstanding the protest of the Supreme 
 Council, and the disapproval of such men as the 
 Duke of Wellington, the Marquis Wellesley, and 
 Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who disapproved 
 even of our having an agent at Cabul. 
 
 On the 3rd of August the Regiments intended 
 for the invasion of Afghanistan and the raising of 
 the siege of Herat were warned for service, and, 
 on the 13th of September, Sir Henry Fane, the 
 Commander-in-Chief, published a General Order 
 
 * The late Lord Broughton, the friend and fellow-tiaveller of 
 Lord Byron. 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 61 
 
 brigading the force, naming the staff officers, and 
 ordering the whole to assemble at Kurnaul on the 
 31st of October. The Army, of which Sir Henry 
 Fane assumed the chief command, was to consist of 
 two divisions, under Sir Willoughby Cotton and 
 Greneral Duncan, divided into five brigades of 
 Infantry, under Colonels Sale, Dennis, Nott, 
 Roberts, and Worsley ; a brigade of Cavalry under 
 Colonel Arnold, and a brigade of Artillery under 
 Colonel Graham. In addition, a Bombay column, 
 under Sir John Keane, Commander-in-Chief in that 
 Presidency, consisting of two brigades of Infantry, 
 led by Colonels Willshire and Gordon, a brigade of 
 Cavalry under Colonel Scott, and a brigade of 
 Artillery under Colonel Stevenson, was to proceed 
 by sea to the mouth of the Indus, thence marching 
 to Sukhur. There was, in addition, the irregular 
 force, called Shah Soojah's contingent, though 
 officered and paid by the English Government, 
 under the command of Major-General Simpson, 
 consisting of two Regiments of Cavalry, a troop of 
 Horse-Artillery, and four Regiments of Infantry, 
 the whole numbering some 6,000 men. Captain 
 Augustus Abbott was, at this time, stationed at 
 Delhi, being in command of No. 6 Light Field 
 Battery, consisting of nine -pounder guns manned 
 
62 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 by native gunners, which was among those selected 
 for service beyond the Indus, and was equipped, as 
 an experiment, with camels. 
 
 On the 4th of November, he marched in company 
 with Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, and the 2nd 
 Bengal Light Cavalry, by a new route skirting the 
 desert, to join the " Grand Army of the Indus " at 
 Ferozepore, where the brigade arrived on the 21st 
 of the same month. 
 
 The officers attached to the battery were : — 
 Lieutenants R. Shakespear, M. Dawes, and R. War- 
 burton ; and Assistant- Surgeon Mackintosh. Of 
 these, the two former were officers of special promise, 
 and all three subalterns earned distinction in Af- 
 ghanistan. Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear, by his 
 successful conduct of the mission for the relief of 
 the Russian prisoners at Khiva, and, by his subse- 
 quent services on General Pollock's Staif, and Lieu- 
 tenant Michael Dawes, by the gallantry and skill 
 he displayed throughout the protracted operations, 
 until the return of the battery four years later. 
 
 The army, officers and men, tired with the 
 long peace, unbroken, save by the brief Coorg 
 campaign, since the Burmese war and siege 
 of Bhurtpore, twelve years before, hailed with 
 indescribable enthusiasm the prospect of service 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 63 
 
 with its attendant excitement and chances of 
 promotion. 
 
 History repeats itself, and the scene that was 
 presented exactly forty years ago, by the mustering 
 legions on the banks of the Sutlej and Indus, is 
 now being faithfully reproduced. Ahsit omen ! 
 Let us trust that the parallel may not be com- 
 plete, that no disaster may befall our arms, should, 
 in the future, " the Cossack and the Sepoy meet 
 upon the banks of the Oxus." In the event of the 
 issues of Central Asian politics being decided on 
 that classic stream, by the dread arbitrament of 
 battle, the Sepoy, backed by his big brother, the 
 British soldier, will doubtless, man for man, give a 
 good account of the Cossack; but there are other 
 considerations which must engage the attention 
 alike of the statesman and soldier, and these are 
 plainly stated in the opinions already referred to as 
 expressed in the crisis of 1888, by the most ex- 
 perienced and sagacious Indian politicians. The 
 Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Tucker, one of 
 the Directors of the East India Company, that the 
 consequence of crossing the Indus, to settle a 
 government in Afghanistan, will be *' a perennial 
 march into that country." Sir Charles (afterwards 
 Lord) Metcalfe expressed an opinion, that " the 
 
64 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves, 
 is for us to cross the Indus, and meddle with the 
 Countries beyond it;'' and Mr. Mountstuart Elphin- 
 stone, wrote to Burnes, " I have no doubt you will 
 take Candahar and Cabul, and set up Shah Soojah, 
 but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and 
 remote country, among a turbulent people like the 
 Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless. If 
 you succeed, I fear you will weaken the position 
 against Russia." 
 
 But the old saying, " Quos Deus vult perdere prim 
 dementat,'^ received a telling illustration within the 
 next few years. The prime mover in India in this 
 Afghan invasion. Sir William Macnaghten, titular 
 Envoy and Minister to Shah Soojah, but de facto 
 ruler of Afghanistan, and his chief assistant and 
 successor-elect. Sir Alexander Burnes, together with 
 many gallant officers and men, who were the tools 
 for carrying out the policy others initiated, paid the 
 penalty with their lives. 
 
 Though our frontier since the last Afghan War 
 has been pushed forward from Ferozepore to Pesha- 
 wur, and a distance of 800 miles no longer 
 intervenes between the seat of war and our base 
 of suppUes, and, though the Sikhs, from being a 
 source of possible danger, are now our staunchest 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 65 
 
 supports, there are, on the other hand, not less 
 weighty motives against a " spirited " policy, in the 
 financial question and in the mistrust within our 
 borders caused by the events of 1857, which showed 
 what elements of danger may arise in our rear. Qitieta 
 non movere is not a bad motto for those responsible 
 for Indian Affairs, if we can rest upon our laurels 
 without loss of honour or injury to the interests of 
 the Empire committed to our care. In the event 
 of war, though much suffering may be caused by 
 a winter campaign, our previous experience proves 
 that it is only after we have overrun the country 
 and occupied Cabul and Candahar, that our diffi- 
 culties will commence, financially because of the 
 drain on our resources, and militarily because of 
 the great distance from our base, with a hostile 
 population proficient in guerilla warfare, and the 
 outposts of Russia on the other side of the Hindoo 
 Koosh, requiring the maintenance of a large army 
 of occupation. The Umbeyla campaign of 1863 
 showed us the trouble even such petty tribes can 
 give us, and we may find it easier to conquer 
 Afghanistan than either to hold the country, or 
 evacuate it without loss of prestige, while an 
 important factor in the question, in the event of 
 a successful invasion, is that colossal power which 
 
66 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 stands bestriding the world, with one foot on the 
 Danube and the other on the Oxus, which will 
 make any rectification of frontier an euphemism 
 for annexation, a pretext for an advance on his 
 part. As we found to our cost in 1841, the diffi- 
 culties of an Afghan expedition consist not in 
 conquering the country, but in holding it, though 
 if an occupation, in whole or in part is determined 
 upon, it is not likely that the fatal blunder will 
 be repeated of reducing the army to a condition 
 of numerical weakness, or of selecting for the 
 command a general enfeebled in body and in- 
 firm of purpose. 
 
 The army assembled in November at Ferozepore, 
 where, amid surroundings of Oriental magnificence, 
 meetings took place between Runjeet Singh and Lord 
 Auckland, followed by reviews of the respective 
 armies, that of the Sikh Maharajah, consisting of 
 15,000 excellent troops, manoeuvring on the oppo- 
 site bank of the Sutlej. But intelligence was now 
 received of the raising of the siege of Herat, and 
 orders were issued for the reduction of the " Army of 
 the Indus,'' which was now to consist of one division 
 under Sir William Cotton, including three brigades 
 of Infantry, under Colonels Sale, Nott, and Eoberts, 
 the Cavalry brigade under Colonel Arnold, and the 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 67 
 
 Artillery brigade, reduced to two troops of Horse 
 Artillery, and Captain Abbott's Field Battery, under 
 Major Pew ; Sir Henry Fane, to the regret of the 
 army, which reposed confidence in him, declined to 
 command the diminished force, of which Sir John 
 Keane, by virtue of seniority, subsequently assumed 
 charge. The Bengal division now had a strength 
 of 9,500 men,* the Bombay column numbering 
 5,600, and Shah Soojah's contingent 6,000. 
 
 Captain Abbott's battery marched from Feroze- 
 pore on the 12th of December, in company with the 
 second Brigade, consisting of Native regiments, 
 which, says Abbott in his Journal, " refused to 
 pitch their tents at the first encamping ground, 
 because an order granting extra allowances for 
 service beyond the river Indus had not been issued. 
 The artillerymen, though natives, took no part in 
 this disloyal movement. The order was obtained 
 from Lord Auckland in the course of the day, and 
 
 * For this Division alone, the camp-followers, tliose necessary 
 curses of all Indian armies^ numbered no less than 38,000, and the 
 camels 30,000. Fortunately, in the present day, Indian armies 
 move with less impedimenta, and officers do not expect to have the 
 luxuries of a camp life in a campaign. Sir Charles Napier did 
 much to initiate this much needed reform, though Spartan sim- 
 plicity and self-denial are difficult of attainment in India. 
 
68 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 no further difficulties occurred." The order in 
 question was obtained by Major-General Nott, then 
 temporarily commanding the Infantry division, 
 though, as he says in a letter written in March, 
 1840, the batta was denied to the Europeans 
 *' because they had not mutinied.*' 
 
 The march from Ferozepore to Rohree, on the 
 banks of the Indus, which was reached on the 
 24th of January, 1839, was quite devoid of interest. 
 The road was excellent, supplies were abundant, 
 and the people friendly. Sir Alexander Burnes 
 had preceded the army to negotiate with the 
 ministers of Meer Roostum, the Khyrpore Ameer, 
 for the occupation of the fortress of Bukhur, which 
 though temporarily ceded to us, the Ameer was 
 desirous of retaining in his possession until the 
 treaty had been ratified by the Governor- General. 
 The fort of Bukhur, which was originally built 
 by Alexander to curb the neighbouring tribes, is 
 situated on an island in the Indus, opposite the 
 town of Rohree, and was of considerable strength. 
 
 On the night of the 26th of January, the treaty 
 arrived from the Governor-General, duly ratified, 
 and, on the following day. Sir Henry Fane, whose 
 fleet of budgerows was moored off Sir Willoughby 
 Cotton's camp, received Meer Roostum in full 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 69 
 
 durbar and produced it. Presents were made to 
 Meer Roostum, who then witnessed a review of the 
 cavalry and artillery. For a day or two longer the 
 Ameer delayed fulfilling the terms of the treaty, 
 and matters began to look threatening, when, at 
 length, on the 29th of January, the keys of the 
 fortress were delivered up to Sir A. Burnes, and 
 a detachment of troops, accompanied by Captain 
 Abbott, with a bag of gunpowder to blow open the 
 gate in case of necessity, proceeded in command of 
 Sir W. Cotton to take possession, the garrison 
 evacuating the fortress on the other side. 
 
 Intelligence was now received at Bukhur that 
 the Ameers of Scinde demurred to accepting Colonel 
 Pottinger's ultimatum, which included the payment 
 of twenty-eight lacs of rupees, and assumed a hostile 
 attitude towards the Bombay Army ; upon which 
 Sir W. Cotton, marched on the 1st of February, 
 with two Brigades of Infantry, some Cavalry, and 
 Captain Abbott's battery, to the assistance of Sir 
 J. Keane. The division arrived at Khandiyara, six 
 marches towards Hyderabad, when, on the 7th of 
 February, the Ameers came to terms and escaped 
 the fate which befell them four years later, when 
 the vast accumulated wealth of Hyderabad fell to 
 the army of Sir Charles Napier. Sir W. Cotton 
 
.70 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 now returned to Bukhur, when the array crossed 
 the Indus* by the bridge of boats, the whole force, 
 with baggage and stores, being on the Shikarpore 
 side by the 18th of February. Abbott's guns were 
 dragged across by the soldiers, while the heavy 
 ordnance was transported on a strong raft. 
 
 * The extent of river bridged by Captains G. Thomson and E. 
 Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, was 500 yards, and seventy- 
 four boats were used in the formation of the bridge, nineteen being 
 from Sukhur, on the right bank, to the island on which Bukhur 
 stands, and fifty-five from the island to Rohree on the left bank. 
 The operation of bridging occupied fourteen days and was completed 
 on the 3rd of February. Captain Abbott describes the arrange- 
 ments by which the baggage was transported across the Indus by 
 means of a flying raft. " The river was in full flow, eight feet deep, 
 and running with great velocity. The arrangement was as follows : 
 A 5J-inch shell was filled with lead^ from which an iron loop pro- 
 jected at the fuse-hole. About two yards of coir rope were attached 
 to the loop, and a long light cord of hemp was added ; three ounces 
 of powder threw the shell ninety yards well beyond the stream , and 
 thus a 4-inch rope was drawn across^ one end being fastened to 
 high rocks on the eastern side^ and the other to a picket on the low 
 ground westward of the river. A block carrying a rope about 
 100 yards in length, traversed the stream. The raft was drawn 
 up under the 4-inch rope; the block was drawn across to the 
 opposite bank and made fast there. Then the raft was loaded and 
 allowed to swing across, which it did very quickly, making the 
 passage to and fro in nine minutes." 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 71 
 
 On the 16th of February, Sir Henry Fane, who 
 had accompanied the army down the Indus from 
 Ferozepore to Bukhur, took leave of the troops in 
 a complimentary order, and, on the same day, he 
 paid the Engineers a well-deserved tribute, for the 
 skill with which they bridged the river. 
 
 The following, relating to an officer who also did 
 good service on the Indus, is from the pen of the 
 late General Havelock (then a Captain in the 13th 
 Light Infantry, and Aide-de-Camp to Sir W. Cotton) 
 whose "Narrative of the War in Afghanistan in 
 1838 — 39," is the best work extant of the early 
 portion of the war. In the latter part of 1840, 
 Captain Havelock returned to Afghanistan with the 
 ill-fated General Elphinstone, and participated in 
 the defence of Jellalabad. He says — " It would be 
 ungrateful in speaking of our means of passing the 
 great river to forget the valuable aid which vfas 
 received in the course of the undertaking from 
 Lieutenant Wood, of the Indian Navy, an officer, 
 who, not content, with discoveries immediately 
 connected with his own profession, and with 
 having carefully surveyed the Indus from its 
 several mouths to Attock, had carried his re- 
 searches into the countries on the left bank of the 
 stream near that celebrated passage, and along both 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 margins of the Cabul river. Regarding the tracts 
 thus visited, his information is said to be extensive. 
 He had accompanied the fleet of Sir Henry Fane to 
 Bukhur, and his counsel and personal efforts were 
 most useful to us, from the period of the first 
 exertions of our Engineers at Rohree, to the 
 breaking up of our bridges on the rise of the river 
 in the middle of March, when the mass of our force 
 with its cannon and baggage, was already travers- 
 ing the plains of Cutch Grundava." 
 
 A redistribution of the army now took place. The 
 Bengal and Bombay Cavalry were placed in one 
 division, under the command of General Thackwell, 
 the whole of the Artillery under Brigadier Steven- 
 son of the Bombay Army, and the Infantry was 
 divided into two divisions, placed respectively 
 under Sir W. Cotton, and General Willshire. 
 Head-quarters still under Sir W. Cotton — as Sir 
 J. Keane did not assume personal command of 
 the combined force until the 6th of April, at 
 Quetta — reached Shikarpore on the 20 th of 
 February, and marched thence on the 23rd, for 
 Jagan, the first march in the direction of Dadur 
 at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. Captain Abbott's 
 battery accompanied the first Brigade of Infantry, 
 on the 24th, and, on the following day, entered 
 
THE MARCH ON CAXDAHAR. 73 
 
 Cutch Gundava, or Cutchee, then one of tlie 
 provinces of Beloochistan. The intervening desert, 
 a distance of twenty-six miles and a half, was crossed 
 without any incident of note, the troops marching 
 by night to avoid the heat and glare. Captain 
 Abbott arrived with head-quarters at Dadur on 
 the 10th of March, and marched on the 16th into 
 the Bolan Pass,* which is nearly sixty miles in 
 length. " The road," writes Abbott, '' presented 
 no serious difficulties, but water was scarce in the 
 desert, and there was no forage in the Pass. Much 
 baggage was abandoned by the cavalry and infantry, 
 but the artillerymen lost nothing. The baggage 
 camels were generally overloaded, and this was the 
 main cause of the loss by the army. An officer of 
 the 2nd Cavalry told me that he had seen fourteen 
 maunds taken from the back of one camel, the 
 maximum load allowed by regulations being five 
 maunds only. In the case of the battery, the loads 
 
 * The daily record of the marches from Shikarpore, through 
 the Bolan Pass to Qnetta and Candahar^ are given in Major 
 Hough's valuable '* Narrative of the March and operations of the 
 Army of the Indus/' and in Havelock's equally important work ; 
 but as the road as far as Quetta is perfectly familiar since the 
 occupation of that town by British troops, it is unnecessary to give 
 any account of its features. 
 
74 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 were strictly limited to five maunds. Spare camels, 
 at the rate of one to four in use, were taken from 
 Delhi, and not an article of baggage was aban- 
 doned by the artillerymen until they reached 
 Candahar." 
 
 On the 26th of March, head-quarters, with the 
 advance and Captain Abbott's battery, arrived at 
 Quetta, which is situated 5,637 feet above sea level, 
 the losses en route being confined to the camels and 
 a few stragglers cut off by the savage hillmen. 
 Supplies now ran short, and from the 28th of 
 March, the loaf of the European soldier was 
 diminished in weight, the Sepoy received half 
 rations, and the camp-followers, quarter rations, 
 while, says Abbott, " the cavalry horses and camels 
 of the battery ceased to receive gram, and the 
 horse-artillery horses were reduced to six pounds 
 per day." On the 6th of April Sir John Keane, 
 who had advanced with the Bombay column by 
 the right bank of the Indus, through the Lukhee 
 Pass, Sehwan, and Lakhana, arrived at Quetta, 
 accompanied by Shah Soojah and Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten, and assumed command of the combined 
 army. 
 
 As there was no prospect of obtaining supplies 
 from Mehrab Khan, ruler of Khelat, and little could 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 75 
 
 be obtained at the miserable village of Quetta, the 
 armj resumed its march on the following day, 
 General Nott, notwithstanding a warm protest on 
 his part, remaining behind in charge of the station 
 with the Second Brigade, while the command of 
 the Bombay column was given to Major-General 
 Willshire, his junior in rank, and Sir W. Cotton 
 reverted to the command of the Bengal Division. 
 On the 7th of April a forward movement was made 
 in the direction of the Kojuck Pass and Candahar, 
 where, it was stated, vigorous preparations for 
 defence were in progress by the three brothers, 
 Kohun Dil Khan, Ruheem Dil Khan, and Miher 
 Dil Khan, of the Barukzye family, a powerful clan 
 of which Dost Mahomed was the head, as his rival 
 Shah Soojah was of the Suddozyes. "The effi- 
 ciency of the army," says Captain Abbott, '' had 
 been greatly reduced by the loss of camels and the 
 failure of supplies ; the cavalry horses received no 
 gram, and were forced to subsist on the green 
 crops with which the country was covered. They 
 died or were destroyed by dozens, and, by the 
 time that the force reached Candahar, our cavalry 
 were nearly unfit for service. Even the horse- 
 artillery, though their horses had received six 
 pounds of gram daily, were in little better order 
 
76 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 than the cavalry. The camel battery was still fit 
 for active service, great care having been taken by 
 the Commissariat to provide dry forage for the 
 cattle wherever it could be obtained at any price. 
 The only Bengal Cavalry corps that was fit for 
 service, on its arrival at Candahar, was the 3rd 
 Cavalry, the horses of which were of a better caste 
 than those of the 2nd, while the officers spared no 
 expense in purchasing, with their own funds, any 
 gram or forage that was obtainable." Thus with 
 camels dying by thousands, the army of the Indus 
 proceeded towards Candahar on what it was pro- 
 mised would be a " grand military promenade." 
 Fortunately no enemy appeared to contest the 
 march through the Kojuck Pass, where a handful 
 of resolute men might have given trouble to an 
 army, and Afghanistan was entered, the Shah's 
 contingent leading the way. 
 
 Captain Abbott describes in a letter to a friend 
 the march from Quetta to Candahar, which was 
 reached by the Shah on the 25th of April, when 
 the monarch made his triumphal entry into the 
 capital of Western Afghanistan. Here the army, 
 fatigued by its exertions and crippled by the loss of 
 no less than 20,000 camels, rested, and awaited the 
 arrival of the Bombay Division. '* We were," says 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 77 
 
 Abbott, ** a fortnight in the valley of Shewal, a 
 pretty place, but which afforded no forage for our 
 cattle, and we were all glad when Sir J. Keane 
 arrived and the advance was ordered. On the 7th 
 the cavalry and 1st Brigade Infantry, the troop 
 horse-artillery and my battery, marched at day- 
 light and went twelve miles, passing across a low 
 range of hills into another valley, less green, and 
 less pretty than that we had quitted. The Shah's 
 force moved at noon of the same date, leaving 
 Captain Bean's corps at Quetta to keep the post 
 on the departure of the 4th Brigade with the siege- 
 train. 
 
 " On the 8th we made a tiresome and diffi- 
 cult march, crossing deep and muddy nullahs to 
 the entrance of the valley of Pisheen. The road 
 was good on the 9th, but rather heavy in some 
 places, and the horse- artillery suffered a good 
 deal ; we encamped on a fine open plain covered 
 with hyacinths, blue lilies, and a variety of other 
 flowers. There were several large villages near us, 
 from which we obtained gram at the rate of 
 three seers (6 lbs.) per rupee. On the 10th we 
 crossed the Lora River and encamped with the 
 infantry on its banks, the cavalry going forward 
 seventeen and a-half miles for the sake of forage ; 
 
78 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the interval between our camp and theirs was 
 covered with an open thorn jungle very favourable 
 to the operations of marauders who took full 
 advantage of it, and carried off some of the cavalry 
 baggage. On this day the 2nd Cavalry lost fifty - 
 eight horses from fatigue and starvation. On the 
 11th we joined the cavalry camp, and halted for 
 the Engineers to prepare the Pass for us. On the 
 13th we moved into the broad entrance of the Pass, 
 a stage of about seven and a half miles, deep sand 
 and gentle but steady ascent. The stony bed of a 
 torrent gave ground for our camp. The Engineers, 
 guarded by the 16th Native Infantry, were six and 
 a half miles ahead, rendering the crest of the pass 
 practicable for guns. On the 14th we marched at 
 three a.m., and ascended slowly until six, when we 
 reached the difficulties. A road cut in the hill side 
 gave a tolerably easy slope to the first ascent ; 
 crossing the hill the track descended rather 
 abruptly and ran along the ledge of a pre- 
 cipice, and dropped into the bed of a clear 
 rocky nullah. Another very steep and crooked 
 ascent took us to the crest of the Pass, whence the 
 view was very fine, and very interesting to us. 
 Before us lay the plains of Candahar, about 2,500 
 feet beneath our level, and the hill immediatelv 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 79 
 
 above Candaliar was distinctly visible. Tlie descent 
 to the plain was however somewhat bad for wheel 
 carriages, ill-provided with ropes. First a short 
 steep descent terminated on the brink of nearly a 
 precipice, then a sharp turn to the right was made, 
 and the slope was easy for fifty yards, when 
 another sharp turn to the left commenced a 
 descent so steep, that forty Europeans could 
 scarcely keep a 9-pounder, with wheels locked, 
 from running wildly down the hill. After 200 
 yards of steep descent the slope became moderate. 
 Great varieties of vegetation were scattered about ; 
 wnld oats, barley, onions, rhubarb, mixed up 
 with poppies, tulips, blue lilies, blue-bells, and 
 scores of varieties of flowers whose names I 
 know not. 
 
 *' Well, the scenery was very pretty, and the 
 vegetation very pleasing, but the Pass was a 
 dreadful one for our baggage. At six p.m. our 
 last bullock waggon came into camp, and as there 
 Avas no sign of our baggage, I walked off one and 
 a half miles and dined with the Engineers. On my 
 return, at ten p.m., I found one tent in camp ; we 
 were all very tired indeed, and commending our 
 baggage to the protection of the marauders, who 
 were moving round it in the Pass, we all slept 
 
80 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 soundly and were agreeably surprised next morning 
 to find that all had safely arrived. 
 
 " The 13th Light Infantry and 48th Native 
 Infantry had not their tents up until the evening of 
 the 15th. The cavalry came up on the 15th, and 
 went on the following day about thirteen miles, in 
 the hope of water, which here is scarce, but their 
 baggage is not fairly through the Pass even now. 
 To day the siege-train comes in, and all dis- 
 posable hands have been sent to aid it. The work 
 will be severe. The Bombay people have reached 
 Quetta ; they had to fight all through the Bolan 
 Pass, but suffered very little and inflicted severe 
 chastisement on their assailants. Our people 
 managed rather badly, with the exception of one 
 company of the 36th under a Mr. Toogood. They 
 were attacked by 300 Beloochees, who fired a volley 
 and rushed on his party sword in hand. At about 
 twenty paces he gave them his fire, which killed 
 forty on the spot, and the remainder ran before the 
 bayonets reached them ; the chief was killed, and 
 they gave no further trouble. 
 
 *' The valley into which we are about to descend 
 is very little better than a desert. A few pools of 
 water shimmer in the sun here and there, and on a 
 nullah twelve or thirteen miles distant we see the 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 81 
 
 tents of the Cavalry Brigade ; a few little green 
 patches denote cultivation, and numerous little 
 eddies in the atmosphere raising those mountains 
 of sand, which are vulgarly called ' Devils,' denote 
 that sand and dust predominate. The Shah passed 
 on this morning with all his rabble. Timming's 
 troop of horse -artillery still in capital order, went 
 with him as usual, and Grant's troop of the 
 Bombay division rolled a gun (horses and all) down 
 the first ascent into the Pass ; the horses escaped 
 wonderfully, and only a wheel was smashed to 
 pieces. On the 18th only two mortar carts and 
 one 18-pounder got through the Pass; 300 
 Europeans were dragging at the gun on the first 
 ascent. Sir J. Keane went forward this morning 
 to the cavalry camp, and we hope to join him to- 
 morrow, but this whole brigade must remain here 
 until the siege-train is fairly through the Pass. I 
 dined with the Commander-in-Chief last night, we 
 had a pleasant party and he was on his good 
 behaviour. Sir John declares he will not move 
 one mile from Candahar to the westward without 
 four months' supplies, and we have not camels to 
 carry half that quantity. The Bombay Cavalry 
 are very neatly equipped, and their clothes are 
 better fitted to them than those of our men. They 
 
 G 
 
82 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 certainly look very well indeed, but both horses 
 and men are small, and quite unequal to charge 
 anything in the shape of regular cavalry. I am 
 anxious to see their artillery of which they have 
 brought twenty guns through the Bolan Pass, two 
 troops of six gfuns each, and two companies with 
 four each. 
 
 " Everyone is surprised at the mis-information 
 given us regarding the roads and the resources of 
 this country, and the disposition of its inhabitants 
 towards Shah Soojah. Until my battery was in 
 the Kojuck Pass, I had no idea that it was 
 particularly dijficult. You may have an idea of 
 what it is by learning that between daylight and 
 noon this day, two brigades of infantry have only 
 brought two 18-pounders across and a third down 
 the last slope. I will give you a detail of our force 
 and the state of each regiment. 1st. The 16th 
 Lancers have about fifty men without horses, 
 which are generally more than half starved, and 
 the regiment can scarcely be pronounced fit for 
 service. The 2nd Cavalry are much worse than the 
 Lancers and are about 180 horses short ; they lead 
 their horses on the march and ai-e quite unfit for 
 service. The 3rd Cavalry are in good order and 
 nearly complete. The Horse Artillery of the 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR. 83 
 
 Cavalry Brigade is in a bad state, but its cattle can 
 still draw the guns (the men leading) and the 
 battery is therefore able to act at a slow pace. 
 The Native Troop with Shah Soojah is still 
 efficient. The 13th Light Infantry has about 400 
 men fit for duty and about forty sick. The 
 European regiment about 400 fit for duty and 
 seventy sick. The Native Infantry 16th, 37th, 
 and 48th have about forty men each in hospital, 
 but sickness is daily increasing amongst the 
 natives. 
 
 "My battery is still on its legs, though 
 the cattle get nothing but what they can pick up 
 in the jungle. My supply of gram has long since 
 ceased, and, at this ground, I not only can get no 
 boossa, but have to send the animals five miles for 
 water. The camels live upon a singular plant, 
 about as large as a furze bush, and bearing leaves 
 exactly like those of a common thistle, with 
 sharp thorns. Our servants are allowed half-a- 
 pound of atta daily and the sepoys one pound, and 
 at this rate we have about another week's supply 
 of food. The men find the difference between the 
 bazaar price of their food and that at which the com- 
 missariat sell it, and it is calculated that a grass- 
 cutter costs Government twenty- five rupees a month. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 The whole extra expense is estimated at two lacs 
 daily. 
 
 " We came down at least 2,000 feet to-day, and 
 have the hot winds as delightfully as you can 
 imagine them to be, without 'tatties.' We find 
 Major Leech's ten mile marches to be seldom less 
 than thirteen or fourteen. The 4th Brigade will 
 have two more days' work bringing the train 
 through the Pass. On the 20th we halted, but 
 suffered sadly for want of water, and on the 
 following day, we came ten miles over an excellent 
 road, but water is salt and scarce and the scramble 
 for it is dreadful, while the heat is 102° in a good 
 tent. We have now come across the valley twenty- 
 four miles. Two most severe marches over difficult 
 ground brought us twenty-seven miles nearer to 
 Candahar. We chose the worst road that offered 
 itself. Our cavalry and horse-artillery suffered 
 terribly, and my half-starved camels got over the 
 ground but slowly. The cavalry made the two 
 marches on the same day, and lost an immense 
 number of horses." 
 
 The greatest sufferers in this promised promenade 
 militaire wore those patient beasts, the camels, of 
 which, it is said, no less than 20,000 perished from 
 hunger and being overladen, for, as Byron writes : 
 
THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR, 85 
 
 « Mute 
 The camel labours with the heaviest load.'* 
 
 There was much barbaric show in the triple camps 
 of the Shah, the Envoy, and the Commander-in- 
 Chief, gay with flags and resplendent with the 
 many-coloured dresses of the attendants, but it was 
 a pity more regard was not displayed for the life of 
 these " ships of the desert," which patiently bore 
 over the sands of Scinde and Cutch Gundava, and 
 through the rocky defiles of the Bolan and Kojuck 
 Passes, the loads which were to minister to the 
 necessities of the soldier, and the luxuries of his 
 superior. The scenes of that march would have 
 afforded a fine scope for the energies of a repre- 
 sentative of the Society for the Prevention of 
 Cruelty to Animals, and it is well that such reckless 
 and wholesale disregard for the sufferings of these 
 necessary creatures will not be permitted in these 
 more merciful and more economical days. 
 
 On the 4th of May, the Bombay Division, under 
 the command of General Willshire, arrived at 
 Candahar, before the walls of which the Army lay 
 inactive for a lengthened period owing to a scarcity 
 of supplies. 
 
 The halt at Candahar was broken by an Ex- 
 pedition against the Barukzye Sirdars, who held 
 
86 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 Candahar under feudal tenure of their brother Dost 
 Mahomed, and had fled to Grhirisk, a place seventy- 
 five miles in a westerly direction from Candahar. 
 Captain Abbott, who commanded the artillery of 
 the column, describes the road to the Helmund and 
 the proceedings of this force, in a letter addressed 
 to Colonel Chambers, commanding the 5tli Light 
 Cavalry, an officer who fell in the disastrous retreat 
 from Cabul in the winter of 1841 : 
 
 " Ghirisk is held by a son of Kohun Dil Khan, 
 and is a strong little place, with an artificial mound 
 and a deep ditch. The Sirdar himself is encamped 
 about four miles from the fort, with a few followers 
 and two guns ; he brought three from Candahar 
 when he left on the Shah's approach, but lost one 
 of them in the Helmund. The second fort is rather 
 stronger than Ghirisk, and was built by Futteh 
 Khan, the famous minister whose influence drove 
 Soojah from the throne thirty years ago. Both 
 these places are on the direct road to Herat, and it 
 is requisite that the Shah's influence should prevail 
 in their garrisons. The Sirdar having refused all 
 terms offered him, it was decided to send out a force 
 to take possession of these strongholds. 
 
 " Accordingly, the following troops were ordered : 
 13th Light Infantry, 120 men; 16th Native In- 
 
EXPEDITION TO GHIRISK. 87 
 
 fantry; 2nd and 3rd Cavalry, one troop each; 
 Shah's Cavalry, 300 ; Shah's Infantry, 450 ; Sappers, 
 160. The whole of my battery, two 18-pounder 
 guns, and two S^-inch mortars, manned by Garbett's 
 Company. 
 
 " Our first march, the 12th of May, was a difficult 
 one, owing to the numerous canals, some of which 
 had bridges so narrow that great nicety was required 
 in crossing, while others had no bridges at all. The 
 cavalry and infantry marched thirteen miles and a 
 half, crossing the Urgundaub River on the 12th, but 
 I encamped on the high ground on its left bank, in 
 order to make a day of the crossing. The stream 
 was three feet deep, and running with such force, 
 the men could scarcely wade through, and beyond 
 the river there were six deep canals without bridges, 
 so that it was requisite to cut ghauts for the guns. 
 Our encampment was the prettiest we have enjoyed 
 during the whole of this service. The river, pour- 
 ing its rapid waters immediately beneath our feet ; 
 the broad valley beyond it, studded with villages, 
 and shaded by innumerable trees, the crops green, 
 but varying in shade, extended as far as the eye 
 could reach; and beyond them, rose the rugged, 
 barren hills, in marked contrast to the fertility of 
 the valley beneath them. 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 " Our baggage was detained by tbe heavy train 
 at tbe narrow bridges, and some of our camels did 
 not arrive till niglit. Next morning we prepared 
 for the passage across tbe river and its canals. 
 Tbe water rushed against the broad naves of the 
 wheels, rose a little, and poured over the naves 
 without reaching the bores. The soil being gravelly, 
 the canals did not stop my camels, and we had an 
 easy morning's work. On our march out, we passed 
 the ancient city of Candahar, which Nadir took 
 about a century since. The buildings, though 
 nearly all * pucka,' are still in good preservation, a 
 proof of the dryness of this climate. The old city 
 was built so as to include a steep rock within the 
 line of fortificatioDs. At present there are 
 numerous inhabitants of the suburban villages, 
 and the whole country is green with mulberry and 
 other fruit trees, which are cultivated with some care. 
 
 " The march this morning (the 14th of May) was 
 made in the dark, but we lost nothing, as, though 
 the road was excellent, the country was not worth 
 seeing. The mornings are quite cold, and the troops 
 get under canvas before the sun becomes very 
 powerful. A hot wind rises about 10 a.m. and 
 lasts until sunset ; the heat as great as 109*" in our 
 tents." 
 
EXPEDITION TO GHIRISK, 
 
 Writing from Khak-i-Clioupaii, on the 16tli of 
 May, he says : "Oar last two marches have brought 
 us into something like a desert. The first of them 
 to Khooshk-i-Nakhood was along an excellent road 
 for twelve miles, when it quite cleared the valley of 
 the TJrgundaub, and enters upon rough ground 
 and deep sand-hills. We found the distance to be 
 sixteen miles. Coming here, we encamped near an 
 ancient city, built, according to the native account, 
 by the Kaffirs long before the Mahomedans had 
 power in the land. The fortifications and houses 
 are still standing, the dry climate having preserved 
 them in a remarkable manner. The waters of a 
 small river, which used to run past this town, have 
 been diverted from their natural channel, and now 
 run through six or seven canals, which considerably 
 impeded the troops this morning. We soon, how- 
 ever, got upon dry, stony soil, and at the end of 
 nine miles came amongst sand-hills, which we 
 threaded for another mile to camp. The little grove 
 and its stream at which we are encamped are quite 
 worthy to confer upon the spot the title of ' the 
 diamond of the desert.' This is the first water the 
 traveller from Ghirisk sees after crossing the 
 Helmund, when twenty-four miles of arid sand 
 intervene. 
 
90 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 " On the night of the 16th, we marched at 10.30 
 p.m., and came at an easy pace twenty-one miles 
 and a half. We descended considerably, and have 
 reached a precious hot place. Our camp was about 
 two miles short of the road, as it is called. On the 
 18th, we commenced the passage at eight o'clock, 
 with two rafts, extemporised from casks, as the 
 Sirdar had destroyed the ferryboat. Each raft was 
 capable of transporting fourteen soldiers, and 
 took an hour and half to cross and return, so 
 that at one p.m. there were about eighty men across, 
 when an order came from head-quarters to halt on 
 the left bank, and send a portion of Shah Soojah's 
 troops to occupy the fort of Grhirisk and other 
 places abandoned by the Sirdar. We were glad of 
 the order, as we should have drowned half the 
 cavalry horses, the current being most rapid and 
 the river eight feet deep." 
 
 The troops commenced their return march on the 
 24th of May, and arrived at Candahar on the 29th. 
 The people of the country showed their hostility to 
 the British Army and its protege, Shah Soojah, 
 by attacking convoys, stealing camels, and murder- 
 ing stragglers. Early in June, all the camels of 
 Captain Abbott's battery were stolen from their 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 91 
 
 grazing-ground by some thieves, but the greater 
 portion were recovered after some difficulty. 
 
 On the 21st of June, he notes in his Journal the 
 departure to Herat of his brother James, who 
 accompanied Major d'Arcy Todd, the newly- 
 appointed Envoy to Shah Kamran, of that city, in 
 the capacity of Political Assistant. The other 
 officers of this mission were : Lieutenant Richmond 
 Shakespear, of Captain Abbott's battery, Political 
 Assistant ; Captain Sanders, of the Bengal En- 
 gineers, and Lieutenant North, of the Bombay 
 Engineers, who went to place Herat in a proper 
 state of defence, and Dr. Logan. 
 
 Every officer and man of the army was eager to 
 leave Candahar, the monotony and heat of which 
 were insupportable, and corn being now more 
 abundant, the army marched in three columns from 
 Candahar towards Grhuznee and Cabul, on the 27th 
 of June, the day on which Runjeet Singh breathed 
 his last at Lahore. Captain Abbott's battery 
 accompanied head-quarters, with which also 
 marched the horse- artillery and cavalry of both 
 Presidencies, and the 1st Bengal Brigade of In- 
 fantry. He writes, on the 26th of June, to a corre- 
 spondent in India : ''At present the heat is fearful, 
 being 111° and upwards in our tents. The long- 
 
92 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 looked-for caravan came in on tlie 23rd, with 2,700 
 camel-loads of rice and atta. The people, however, 
 refused to proceed any further, and our Commissariat, 
 having no camels to carry the supplies, were obliged 
 to bribe the surwans by an offer of twenty rupees 
 per month for each camel to go on as far as Cabul ; 
 1,700 of them have agreed to this, and thus we are 
 able to move. Had the caravan failed, we should 
 have been detained here three months, for we had 
 neither camels nor cash wherewith to purchase 
 them. The issue of pay this month was a great 
 uncertainty, and we are not to have any next month 
 we hear. The safety of the caravan was very 
 questionable at one time; no escort had been 
 attached, and a report came that 700 Ghilzyes had 
 gone out to attack it. The 3rd Cavalry, 48th 
 Native Infantry, and two guns went out, and missed 
 the caravan ; then the 35th Native Infantry and a 
 squadron of the 2nd Cavalry went out, and missed 
 it also. Finally, Colonel Wheeler caught it up on 
 his return to camp, about five miles short of Canda- 
 har. It seems that a party amongst its guard of 
 chokedars had agreed to give it up in case of the 
 Grhilzyes attacking it, but that a guard of Skinner's 
 Horse, who went out with spare camels to assist 
 the Kafila, disconcerted the arrangement. The 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 93 
 
 chief of the Kafila was faithful, and aided by the 
 Hindostanee troopers, kept the rogues in proper 
 order. Brigadier Sale is looking forward to service 
 in Nepaul, which is talked of very confidently. He 
 is quite of the bull-dog genus, and loves fighting for 
 its own sake, I believe. His regiment, however, is 
 sadly cut up by sickness. I don't think it can 
 muster above 350 men fit for service, and it has 
 120 in hospital, with many dangerous cases. In- 
 flammation of the brain quickly follows a fever here, 
 and few recover. Our long stay at Candahar has 
 raised all the thieves in the country against us, 
 and nearly every corps has had its camels taken off. 
 I lost forty-four and got back only twenty-six. 
 The 13th lost all their's, and recovered none. They 
 had two Europeans killed in the affair; the poor 
 fellows were acting as surwans (drivers), and had 
 no arms, and the guard of eighteen men was asleep 
 in a village, and gave no assistance. These annoy- 
 ances we must expect until we get clear of this land 
 of thieves, who sneak after our baggage in the dark, 
 and murder any unlucky man that falls in the rear." 
 Writing, on the 10th of July, he says : ''On the 
 27th of June, we quitted Candahar, and made two 
 short marches of six and ten miles over a level 
 plain to Killa Azeem, Thence to the Turnuk 
 
94 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Eiver was a severe stage of fifteen miles and a half 
 over undulating ground. The Turnuk is a small 
 stream running down a narrow valley of rich and 
 well-cultivated soil, on either side of which are hills 
 and barren downs. The river runs generally under 
 its southern boundary of hills, rarely crossing the 
 valley to the north, on which side our road lies. 
 "We have found the marches most trying to our 
 cattle, as sometimes a score of little canals cross 
 our path, and at other times we traverse the un- 
 dulating ground, which is still worse. The crowd 
 of baggage is quite suffocating, and all orders to 
 keep it in the rear are quite unavailing. Fortunately, 
 we have no enemy to attack it, and the crowd is too 
 numerous to be assaulted by common plunderers. 
 When near Khelat-i-Grhilzye, we were told we should 
 find the forts occupied by 30,000 men. We there- 
 fore approached in battle array, and found that the 
 only fort worthy to be so called, had been destroyed 
 by Sultan Mahomed, and the two that remain are 
 about eighty yards square, with their mud walls, 
 and no ditch. The old fort stood on a remarkable 
 hill ; a spi'ing of fine water issues from the hill-side, 
 just below the citadel, giving nourishment to some 
 fine mulberry trees, and offering an abundant supply 
 for the garrison ; but the place is quite deserted. 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 65 
 
 its bastions are nearly washed down, and tlie re- 
 mains of fortification are barely perceptible. We 
 encamped on some fine undulating high ground 
 about two miles on this side of Khelat-i-Grhilzye. 
 The barometer gave 5,500 feet as the elevation of 
 our camp above sea-level, but the stony ground 
 accumulated so much heat from the sun's rays that 
 we did not enjoy the fine climate to be expected at 
 such an elevation. After our halt we came on by 
 easy stages, if any can be so called in this country, 
 and we are now, after four days' marching, only 
 fifty-seven miles beyond Ghilzye, and still ninety 
 from Grhuznee. Our elevation above the sea is about 
 6,500 feet, and the climate is very pleasant. Our 
 army has greatly improved in efficiency since it 
 reached Candahar; the horses get five seers* of 
 barley and plenty of forage ; the men are on half- 
 rations, but can buy as much atta as they please at 
 the villages, and compensation is given for the 
 difference in price. Our cavalry have recovered 
 condition in a great measure, and only Grant's 
 troop of horse-artillery remain in such a weak 
 state as to halt the whole column when an obstacle 
 occurs. The Bombay Horse-Artillery has an odd 
 appearance, with its clumsy carriages and its small 
 * A seer is two pounds. 
 
96 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Cabul horses enclosed between enormous shafts, 
 but it answers admirably. Its horses, though small, 
 beat our's completely in working; their system, 
 too, is better, and their discipline much stricter. 
 Not only I, but all the Bengal Artillery officers with 
 me, are quite converted from our dislike of the 
 Bombay system, having witnessed its superiority 
 over our own. My poor camels are quite overtasked 
 by these perpetual ascents, and the want of more 
 cattle in draught is evident, otherwise I have got on 
 pretty well, and even with my insufficient means, 
 have not delayed the column as the troop has 
 delayed it." 
 
 " The 11th of July. — We came nine miles and a 
 half this morning to Chusma-i-Shadee, which we ex- 
 pected to have passed four miles short of our camp. 
 We have entered into a well-cultivated country ; 
 one clear spring issues from under a high rock close 
 to our camp, and there are numerous hahreez 
 (wells)." 
 
 Writing from Mookloor, on the 14th of July, he 
 says : *' We have arrived at the half-way house 
 between Candahar and Cabul, a nice spot ; villages 
 abundant, and shaded by large groves of trees, with 
 fine lawn of ' dhoop * grass for camp ; a sweet spring, 
 one of the sources of the Turnuk, gushes from a 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 97 
 
 liard rock, and passes our camp in the form of a 
 clear stream, with water-cresses on both banks. 
 The country is quite open on our right, and the 
 last marches have been apparently level, the real 
 ascent of about 1 foot in 200, not being perceptible. 
 We are 7,300 feet above sea-level, and enjoy a 
 delightful climate. The country is open and level 
 for nine miles, with villages and forts in great 
 number. The road, also, quitting the bed of the 
 Turnuk River and its undulating banks has been 
 far more easy for our cattle. We get plenty of 
 supplies, grain, boossa, sheep, cows, horses, 
 tattoos, fowls, and all sorts of odd things are 
 brought into camp. The Doomba sheep are fine, 
 fat, good-looking animals, and no gram-fed mutton 
 could be more promising than the meat, but I can- 
 not endure it except in the shape of a steak ; it is 
 so highly-flavoured and rather tough. The ' Ducks * 
 (as the Bombay troops are called) enjoy it much, 
 and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in 
 particular, is loud in his praise of the abomina- 
 tion. The lambs are tolerable, and we get them at 
 a rupee each. 
 
 '' The next marches — to Oba, fourteen miles, 
 Jumrood, twelve and a half miles, and Musheekee, 
 eight and a half miles — were over open country, road 
 
 H 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 pretty level, but crossed by several dry nullahs, 
 which gave the Pioneers some work ; soil coarse, 
 sandy, and heavy for our wheels. Gram is cheaper 
 than we have hitherto found it; we get fourteen 
 seers either of wheat or barley and eight seers of 
 gram for a rupee, but the latter is scarce. The 
 ghee is all composed of fat from doomba's tails and 
 kidneys. The fine water of this country is the 
 greatest luxury we enjoy. All liquors have long 
 since vanished from our table, and the pure element 
 is a very good substitute. A great storm on the 
 night of the 17th laid the sand for us, or the march 
 of the 18th, though but eight miles and a half, would 
 have proved a severe one. As it was, we crossed 
 numerous nullahs and about fifty water-courses in 
 heavy, coarse sand mixed with stones." 
 
 Writing on the 20th of July, he says : " Two 
 short stages of nine miles to Ahmed Khail, and eight 
 miles to Nannee, through heavy sand, have placed 
 us near Ghuznee. As soon as we reached the camp, 
 my battery was sent a mile in advance to fire a 
 royal salute on the Shah's arrival. On the 19th, 
 the Shah, with the 4th Brigade and the Park, joined 
 us, and to-day the ' Duck ' Brigade is to come up. 
 It consists of two Queen's regiments of infantry and 
 the ' Duck' Howitzer battery of four 24-pounders, 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL, 99 
 
 ■with the Poonah Horse ; altogether we form a 
 marvellous large camp, and the natives wonder 
 where all the troops are. A Cabul man told 
 Lawrence, of the 2nd Cavalry, yesterday, that we 
 were an army of tents and camels, that our horses 
 were weak, and our men sickly, and ' as for your 
 artillery, wait till you see the Dost's guns !' I 
 suspect we shall wait long enough. We certainly 
 are, as the man says, an army of tents and camels, 
 and were a night attack made, there would be few 
 troops in the lines to meet it, as almost two-thirds 
 are on picquets and guards in various places, and 
 few men could stand on parade when the assembly 
 sounded. We are now about 7,500 feet above sea- 
 level, in a very broad valley, well cultivated and 
 studded with villages. The village of Nannee is a 
 little in our rear, and Ghuznee about ten miles 
 ahead." 
 
 On the 21st of July the army arrived before 
 Ghuznee, 230 miles distant from Candahar, and 
 90 from Cabul. Relying upon reports furnished to 
 them that the place was of no great strength, and 
 that the Afghans would not defend it. Sir John 
 Keane had left behind him at Candahar the siege 
 train, brought with such difficulty all the way from 
 Ferozepore and through the Bolan and Kojuck 
 
 H 2 
 
100 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Passes, and wlien he arrived before the fortress of 
 Ghuznee — reported, and not without reason, to be 
 one of the strongest in Asia, and called in tlie days 
 of the conqueror Mahmood, " Dav-oos-Sultanut-i- 
 Ghuznee," ( the seat of the Sultan's power) — he 
 found himself compelled to undertake its reduction 
 with 9 and 6-pounder field-pieces. But a Deus ex 
 machind arose in the person of Captain Thomson, of 
 the Bengal Engineers. 
 
 Witli a view of making the Afghan commandant, 
 Mahomed Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, 
 unmask his force, the guns of the Horse- 
 Artillery and Captain Abbott's battery began a 
 smart bombardment, to which the enemy repHed 
 with vigour, while an infantry fire was kept up 
 between the 1st brigade, which was moved up 
 towards the walls, and the juzailcheea of 
 the enemy.* Having obtained the object of the 
 reconnaissance. Sir J. Keane withdrew the troops 
 and guns. 
 
 The remainder of the day was passed in 
 changing ground to the south-east side of 
 
 * Captain Abbott writes :— " I picked up a five pound shot and 
 a six ounce jinjall both of hannnered iron. These jinjalls were 
 fired pretty correctly, and I saw a horse killed at 600 yards by a 
 matchlock." 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 101 
 
 the fortress, thus cutting off the commuuLca- 
 tion with the Cabul road, by which it was 
 understood that Ufzul Khan, another son of 
 the Ameer, and the forces of the Grhilzye 
 chiefs were marchinof to the succour of the be- 
 leaguered fortress. On the followi"ng morning. Sir 
 John Keane, accompanied by Sir W. Cotton and 
 the Engineer officers, made a reconnaissance of 
 Grhuznee from the heights, and acting upon informa- 
 tion supplied by Abdool Reshed Khan, Barukzye, a 
 deserter from the fortress, it was decided that an 
 attempt should be made to storm the place by the 
 Cabul gate, the only one that was not walled up, 
 after Captain Thomson had blown it in with bags 
 of gunpowder. 
 
 That night the troops and batteries took up their 
 appointed positions, and everything was ready for 
 the assault at three a.m., the storming column being 
 placed under the command of Brigadier Sale, with 
 Colonel Dennie leading the advance. Captain 
 Thomson directed the movements of the explosion 
 party, which was led by Captain Peat and Lieu- 
 tenants Darand and Macleod. 
 
 Amid the roaring of the elements, at three a.m., the 
 guns opened fire upon the fortress, and, while the 
 attention of the enemy was thus distracted, the 
 
102 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 explosion party boldly advanced with twelve bags, 
 containing 300 pounds of powder, wbich were laid 
 and fired with complete success. The Cabul gate 
 was forced in, and Colonel Dennie rushing in with 
 bis stormers, the British soldier carried all before 
 him with the bayonet. Brigadier Sale followed 
 with the main column, and in less than a quarter 
 of an hour the colours of the 13th Light Infantry 
 were planted on the ramparts of the citadel. Thus, 
 on the 23rd of July, Grhuznee was lost and won, 
 with a loss to the victors of 17 killed and 165 
 wounded, including Brigadier Sale and 17 other 
 officers. Of the Afghans, 514 were slain in the 
 assault, exclusive of about 100 killed by the cavalry, 
 and 1,600 prisoners were taken, including Mahomed 
 Hyder Khan, together with 1,000 horses, 300 camels, 
 and vast stores of provisions. There was an auction 
 of the booty captured at Ghuznee, and, says Captain 
 Abbott, "so anxious were the officers to carry away 
 some reminiscence of the fortress, that an Afghan 
 knife, which when new cost five rupees, sold for 
 seventy." 
 
 He writes of the attack to an Indian corres- 
 pondent : — " We are all quite astonished at the 
 quiet way in which the garrison allowed our 
 batteries to move along a road which they com- 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 103 
 
 pletely enfiladed, and they must have kept a very- 
 bad look out indeed. I was nearly three-quarters of 
 an hour with the head of my column standing only 
 300 yards from the wall, so great was the difficulty 
 of getting my carriages down into the ravine under 
 cover. The two guns in the ravine were beautifully 
 placed, but we were working in the dark, and had 
 not the garrison shown blue lights we should have 
 had no mark to fire at. The moon went down at 
 half-past ten o'clock and the darkness was great 
 until daybreak, when our troops had possession of 
 the place. We all thought the people had evacuated 
 the fort, as only a few matchlock balls were fired, 
 previously to the advance of the Engineers. The 
 prisoners say we took them quite by surprise, and 
 do not seem to understand such energetic proceed- 
 ings. Ghuznee, though by no means calculated to 
 stand a siege, has walls too lofty for escalade, and 
 presents a serious obstacle to a force unprovided 
 with siege ordnance. The gate was barricaded 
 with timber eight inches in diameter, and had an 
 ordinary charge of powder been used, it would 
 probably have failed. The amount used, however, 
 shook down much of the gateway, and large stones 
 fell on our men as they fought under the broken 
 arch. I saw one poor fellow retiring quite be- 
 
104 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 wildered, and complaining of an injury to his head. 
 On examination, I found a stone weighing about 
 two pounds in his cap, having smashed the 
 patent leather top. A thick chupattie he had put 
 there to eat at a favourable opportunity, saved his 
 life." 
 
 On the 24th, he writes, " I have just been into 
 the town and citadel. The gateway is a narrow 
 place and, well defended, must have indeed been 
 difficult to take. Beyond it, however, is a good 
 open space where a corps might form up, and a 
 right-half turn commences the ascent to the citadel, 
 which has both upper and lower works, the latter 
 containing the guns, and the former appearing 
 rather calculated for a dwelling than for any mili- 
 tary purpose, being a square, or rectangle, with a 
 dead wall outwards and dwelling openings to the 
 centre. The ditch in some places is wet, in other 
 places dry, but deep. There is an enormous brass 
 68-pounder (cast by Nadir Shah) which seems to 
 have been cut down, as the ' trunnions ' are far 
 forward, and there is a copper swell to the muzzle, 
 evidently put on by the hammer. Great quantities 
 of grain and forage were found in the place, and 
 evident preparations had been made to stand a 
 protracted siege. A note on the Bank of Russia 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 105 
 
 for 2,000 ducats was also found, I believe, in tlie 
 citadel." 
 
 On the 30tli of July the army resumed its march 
 towards Cabul, a small garrison being left at 
 Ghuznee, in command of Major Maclaren. Captain 
 Abbott says in his Journal : — " We marched at 
 half-past four a.m., on the 30th of July, first ascend- 
 ing the Gundi Sheni Pass, and then descending to 
 Shushgao, where we encamped at an elevation of 
 about 9,000 feet, after a tedious march of fourteen 
 miles. On the following day we marched to Hufto- 
 saya, an easy descent, and, on the 1st of August, to 
 Hyder Khail, a continued descent, the road stony, 
 and crossing many streams. The march of the 2nd 
 of August took us to Sheikabad, nine miles and a 
 half, crossing the Logur river. The road was bad, 
 broken up by canals and ravines, two rivers, and 
 some mud ; a bridge crosses the Logur river, but 
 is two narrow for guns. We halted on the 3rd of 
 August, and, on receipt of intelligence that Dost 
 Mahomed had fled from Urghundee, a party was 
 sent in pursuit, and another detachment went on 
 to secure the guns at Urghundee. On the 4th we 
 arrived at Beni Budaum, a march of ten miles and 
 a half, and camp was pitched 8,010 feet above the 
 level of the sea. My battery encamped with the 
 
106 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 party at Beni Budaum, the main force going about 
 seven miles and a half further on the road to Cabul. 
 On the following day we marched to Mydan, nine 
 miles, crossing the Cabul river, two miles beyond 
 which we encamped. A march of eight miles 
 brought us to Urghundee, where we found all Dost 
 Mahomed's guns.* On the 7th of August we 
 entered and encamped in the valley of Cabul, after 
 a short march of six miles." 
 
 On the 7th of August Shah Soojah, in magnificent 
 state, accompanied by Mr. Macnaghten and Sir A. 
 Burnes, Sir John Keane, Sir W. Cotton, and other 
 officers of rank, with their staffs, made his public 
 entry into Cabul, and established his residence at 
 the Bala Hissar. The restored monarch was re- 
 ceived with respect by a vast crowd, who were 
 glad to be rid of the exactions of the Barukzyes, 
 but there was no enthusiasm. On the 14th of 
 August, the mail route was opened from India, 
 via Jellalabad and Peshawur, instead of by the 
 circuitous route by Candahar and the Bolan Pass, 
 owing to the successful operations of Colonel (after- 
 wards Sir Claude) Wade, who, at the head of an 
 
 * ''' These mustered^" says Havelock, " twenty-two pieces of 
 various calibre, on field carriages, and two more in battery at the 
 village of Urghundee." 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 107 
 
 army of Sikbs, Afghans, and Hindoos, escorting 
 Timour Shall, the Shahzada, forced the Khyber 
 Pass, as far as AH Musjid, with the loss of 150 killed 
 and wounded, and the hasty recall of Akbar Khan 
 by his father on the fall of Grhuznee, enabled him 
 to thread the passes leading to Cabul without 
 opposition. 
 
 Of the two chief cities of Afghanistan, now in 
 the possession of a British Army, Abu-1-Fazil, 
 secretary to Akbar the Great, Mogul Emperor of 
 India in the sixteenth century, writes in the Ayeen 
 AJchari/y " Cabul is the gate of Hindoostan towards 
 Tartary, as Candahar is towards Persia, and if both 
 places be properly guarded, that extensive empire 
 is safe from the irruption of foreigners." And the 
 same writer remarks (page 7) " that according to 
 the Indians no man can be called the ruler of India 
 who has not taken possession of Cabul." 
 
 On the 3rd of September, Colonel Herring, C.B., 
 commanding the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, was 
 killed at Hyder Khail, four marches from Cabul, 
 whence he was proceeding to Candahar on escort 
 duty, an event which afforded an indication of the 
 hostile feeling of the Afghan nation. His death 
 was avenged by Outram, who attacked and almost 
 exterminated the tribe of Kwajucks, his murderers. 
 
108 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 On the 22nd and 23rd of August, the army again 
 changed ground, and Captain Abbott's battery 
 encamped on the heights beyond Sia Sung. He 
 now received orders to exchange his camels, which 
 were unequal to the work of dragging guns in a 
 hilly country, for horses, and to have his battery 
 ready for immediate service.* 
 
 Early in September, Lieutenant Dawes was des- 
 patched with three of the newly equipped nine- 
 pounder guns in company with the 48 th Native 
 Infantry, to Ghuznee, to escort to Cabul Hyder 
 Khan and the other prisoners. Captain Abbott 
 says in his Journal : " I was obliged to advance 
 cash for the food of the horses. The Shah's 
 commissariat gave gram for sixteen days only, but 
 could not provide cash to purchase more, so 1 paid 
 300 rupees from my own purse." 
 
 On the 17th of September Shah Soojah held his 
 first investiture of the newly instituted Order of the 
 Dooraneet Empire, and on the following day, the 
 
 * Hough (p. 2G0), in quoting this order in his work, adds : — 
 " The camel battery worked well during the campaign. The camels, 
 were in better condition than the horses in going through the Bolan 
 Pass. They had marched 1600 miles in ten months." 
 
 I This word is a corruption oi Duor daw ran, " pearl of the age," 
 
THE MARCH ON CABUL. 109 
 
 Bombay column, under General Willshire, com- 
 menced its march for India via the Bolan Pass, 
 on the way capturing by storm the fortress of 
 Khelat, where Mehrab Khan and many of his chiefs 
 fell sword in hand in the breach. By orders of 
 the 9th of October,* the "Army of the Indus" 
 
 the title taken by Ahmed Shah Abdiilee, founder of the dynasty in 
 1747, and grandfather of Shah Soojah and Zemaun Shah. 
 
 * '' General Orders, October the 9th. Her Majesty's 13th Light 
 Infantry, three gnns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the 35th 
 Native Infantry to remain at Cabul, and to be accommodated in 
 the Bala Hissar. Colonel Dennie, C.B., to command. Three guns 
 of No. 6 Light Field Batteiy, the 48th Native Infantry, the 4th 
 Brigade and detachment of Sappers and Miners, and 2nd Cavalry, 
 with a Rissalah of Skinner's Horse, to be cantoned at Jellalabad. 
 Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th Native Infantry, a Rissalah 
 of Skinner's Horse, and such details of His Majesty Shah Soojah's 
 force as are available. The whole to be under the command of 
 Major Maclaren. Candahar will have for its garrison the 42nd, 
 and 43rd Native Infantry, 4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery, 
 a Rissalah of the 4th Local Horse, and such details of His Majesty's 
 Shah Soojah's troops as may be available. Major-General Nott 
 will command." Besides the Shah's contingent, under command of 
 Major-General Roberts, who succeeded Major-General Simpson, 
 which was divided between the garrisons, there were raised a little 
 later some Reginjents of Afghan horse and foot, who proved 
 themselves totally unreliable, and went over to the standard of the 
 enemy when called into the field, though in some instances, as 
 
110 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 was broken up, and, accompanied by Sir John 
 Keane, the greater portion commenced its return 
 march to India on the 15th, leaving three brigades 
 at Cabul, Jellalabad, and Candahar respectively, 
 with a garrison at Grhuznee, the whole under Sir 
 Willoughby Cotton, with General Nott in command 
 in Western Afghanistan. 
 
 during the advance of Sir Robert Sale's Brigade from Gundamuck 
 to Jellalabad, in November, 1841^ they did good service. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 
 
 March from Cabul to Jellalabad — The Khoord-Cabul, and Jugdul- 
 hick Passes — The Expedition to Pushoot — March to the Kamer 
 Valley — Repulse of the Assault — Evacuation of Pushoot — The 
 Kaffirs — Return to Jellalabad — March to Cabul — The Campaign 
 in the Kohistan — Action at Tootum Durra — Attack on Julga — 
 Repulse of the Storming Party — Action at Purwan Durra — 
 The Cabul Cantonment — Expedition to the Zoormut Country — 
 Destruction of the Forts at Zao — Return to Cabul. 
 
 /\N tlie 30tli of October Lieutenant Dawes 
 ^returned from detached duty, with three guns 
 of No. 6 Light Field Battery, having marched 400 
 miles ; and, on the 2nd of November, a portion of 
 the Cabul Brigade, including Captain Abbott's 
 battery, accompanied Shah Soojah to Jellalabad, 
 which, from its being 3,000 feet lower than Cabul, 
 was the winter residence of the Afghan sovereigns. 
 In his Journal he describes in detail the difficulties of 
 
112 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 a marcli made in the depth of winter, through 
 passes which have since acquired a sad interest 
 for all Englishmen. The first day's march was 
 to Boodhak,* about eight miles along the valley, 
 where they encamped near the entrance of the 
 Khoord-Cabul Pass, a tremendous defile about 
 three miles and a half in length, which is, in fact, 
 the bed of a rivulet passing through a range of 
 high, steep, and rugged hills. On the 8rd of 
 November they entered the Pass at seven a.m., 
 and during the day crossed twenty-eight times 
 the stream that runs down the defile. " The cold 
 was so intense," says Abbott, " that everything was 
 glazed with ice, and the horses' tails became masses 
 of hair and ice, and icicles hung from their bellies, 
 traces, and equipments. At three and a half or 
 four miles the hills again open out, and we saw 
 the sun. My carts, drawn by bullocks, gave great 
 trouble on this march, the animals frequently falling 
 and fracturing the poles." 
 
 The march upon the following day, to Tezeen, was 
 over a broken and stony road, and the descent 
 of the Huft-Kothul was very steep. Abbott 
 
 '^ The name of this place signifies the " dust of the Idols," 
 Mahniood of Ghuznee having here destroyed many that he had 
 seized in India. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 113 
 
 says: — "Broke all but one of my locking chains, 
 bullock waggons had two poles broken, and the 
 cattle were quite knocked up at five miles from 
 camp. Sent back spare poles and eight horses to 
 help them on, and all reached camp at sunset." 
 On the 5th of November the march was resumed 
 down the bed of the river, and the force encamped 
 at the Fakir's Tomb, a little short of Bareekaub, 
 and near to the entrance of the Pass, where there 
 is a direct but difficult route to Cabul. On the 
 following day they made a short but arduous 
 march to Kuttur Sung, commencing with a long 
 but easy ascent, and ending with a steep descent, 
 which made Captain Abbott lock his wheels. The 
 march of the 7th, brought them to Peri-Bagh 
 ("fairy-gardens") in the middle of the Jugdulluck 
 Pass. The battery went up the narrow bed of the 
 stream at a good pace, and reached camp long 
 before the infantry, who marched over the hills. 
 This Pass, Captain Abbott notes in his Journal, 
 a^ *' a very formidable one when held by an enemy, 
 the road being extremely narrow, with a steep wall 
 on either side ; its length is about three miles." 
 The march of November the 8th, a severe one for 
 artillery, brought them to Soorkaub. " First," 
 says Abbott, " we ascended for three miles and 
 
 I 
 
114 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 a half the crest of the Pass, and then dropped 
 down to the stony bed of a torrent, which we 
 followed for four miles when the road emerged to 
 the left upon undulating ground. At one mile 
 from camp a very steep descent of the valley of 
 the Soorkaub occurred. One of my locking chains 
 broke, and the team of eight horses rushed down at 
 full speed, but luckily none of them fell. The bridge 
 across the Soorkaub was broken, and we forded the 
 river to our camp." 
 
 On the 9th, the march was to Gundamuck. 
 " The road was about half a mile of ascent, then a 
 mile of sandy but level road; about a mile of 
 descent over gravel into broken ground and water ; 
 another ascent and a mile or two of good road ; a 
 very steep descent, after which the road was easy 
 as far as the eighth mile, when a steep, crooked 
 ascent occurred." After this they reached the 
 table-land of Gundamuck, crossing two rocky 
 nullahs to their camp. The day was stormy and 
 the hills, southward of thera, were covered with 
 snow. The march of the lOth was to Futtehabad. 
 " It commenced by an easy descent of about five 
 miles, followed by a steep descent of half-a-mile to 
 the valley of Neemlah, crossed a stream and 
 traversed high, rough, stony ground and encamped 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 115 
 
 at the entrance of the valley of Jellalabad." Much 
 rain fell during the march in the day, and great 
 annoyance was caused during the night by robbers, 
 two of whom were shot by the sentries. The next 
 march was to Sultanpore, or Shahabad, about seven 
 miles, and, on the 12th of November, they arrived 
 at Jellalabad, eight miles distant. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to an Indian corres- 
 pondent : — " The 2nd Cavalry and the European 
 regiments move to-morrow to the ground for our 
 permanent camp, of which the left flank rests on 
 the Cabul river, the right consequently being a 
 good mile from water. Jellalabad is a poor place, 
 the Shah has a small wretched residence in it, and 
 the walls are in ruins. There are ten brass guns, 
 but, as usual, they have unserviceable carriages. 
 The valley is fertile along the river, and there are 
 plenty of canals, but there seems to be a scarcity 
 of springs. My horses work admirably during the 
 march, and have arrived in the highest condition. 
 My bullock-carts all broke down. Bullocks are 
 utterly useless for draught here." 
 
 The 37th and 48th Native Infantry marched 
 towards Peshawur, to relieve AH Musjid, which 
 was assailed by the Khyberrees, and support the 
 negotiations set on foot with these tribes by 
 
 I 2 
 
116 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur; 
 and, on tlie 1st of December, Captain Abbott 
 followed with his battery. He describes as follows 
 this arduous march made in the depth of winter : — 
 " On the 1st of December we marched to Ali 
 Boghan, seven miles, over a good road. We 
 heard last night of the capture of Khelat. On the 
 following day we marched to Buttee Kote, a 
 distance of fourteen miles ; four miles of steady 
 ascent, after which you enter a Pass, about one and 
 a half miles in length, and emerge upon a stony 
 plain, which you cross to Buttee Kote, a cluster of 
 walled villages with a little cultivation. The plain 
 is barren, and can scarcely be crossed in summer 
 owing to the extreme heat. A 13 -inch shell of oval 
 form lay at the gate of one of the villages. The 
 battery made this march in four hours, the cavalry 
 in three hours and three-quarters, and the infantry 
 in five hours. The large round stones distressed 
 man and beast, and injured the wheels of my 
 carriages. The march of the 3rd to Hazar-Nao 
 was by a long road, which descends gradually for 
 ten miles. My battery made the march in two 
 hours fifty minutes, and the infantry in three 
 hours twenty minutes. On the following day the 
 battery reached Dakka, nine miles distant, by a 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 117 
 
 good road which threads a very narrow pass, and 
 which must cause great delay to a large force. At 
 six and a half miles there is a narrow pass which 
 terminates opposite to Lalpoora, a large village on 
 the left bank of the Cabul river. We encamped on 
 the right bank of the river, which could with 
 difficulty be forded by camels." 
 
 The troops halted at Dakka between the 5th 
 and 9th, when an urgent request for their return 
 arrived from Captain Macgregor, as Jellalabad 
 was menaced. Accordingly, at half-past six a.m. 
 on the 10th, the column marched for Buttee Kote 
 (nineteen miles distant) which was reached at 
 twelve; Colonel Salter, commanding the troops, 
 was about to push on to Jellalabad before night, 
 when a second message was received from the 
 Political Resident, which induced him to march 
 easily to Jellalabad, where the column encamped on 
 the 12th of December. No. 6 Light Field Battery 
 remained encamped at Jellalabad for a month, 
 but on the 12th of January, 1840, their ser- 
 vices were called into requisition to accompany 
 a force despatched to Pushoot, about fifty 
 miles in an E. N. E. direction from Jellalabad, to 
 displace Syud Hashim, the Padshah, or ruler, of 
 Kooner, in the valley of the Kama river, and 
 
118 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 restore his brother Bawadeen,* who had been 
 displaced by Dost Mahoned. 
 
 The Kooner, or Kama, river, mentioned by Arrian 
 in his narrative of Alexander's march, after 
 traversing the country of the Kaffirs, enters the 
 Kooner valley at Chaga Serai, continues its course 
 W. S. W. to Pushoot, Kooner, and Kash-Kote, 
 where it enters the Jellalabad district, and flows 
 
 * The father of Bawadeen rebelled against Zemann Shah, King 
 of Cabiil, whose threatened invasion of India in 1798 disturbed the 
 equanimity of the Marquis Wellesley at Government House, in 
 Calcutta, and the King's brother, Shah Soojah, punished him by 
 invading the valley. On the death of the Padshah, his son, Bawa- 
 deen, held the country undisturbed by the Barukzyes until the 
 year 1838, when he commenced intriguing with a view to the 
 restoration of Shah Soojah. Dost Mahomed, becoming aware of 
 the correspondence, sent his son, Akbar, with an army and guns 
 to reduce the fort of Pushoot, the stronghold of the Padshah, and 
 a partial breach having been effected, the garrison suriendered. 
 Akbar had with him the " Cazi," a 16-pounder, which was 
 afterwards used by the British in the defence of Jellalabad, and 
 was eventually destroyed by General Pollock's army on the return 
 march to India. Bawadeen was deposed, and his brother Syud 
 Hashim was placed on the throne. When Shah Soojah was res- 
 tored to power in 1839, the ex-Padshah appeared at Court, and 
 begged to be reinstated in his dominions. Hashim refused to ab- 
 dicate, and a detachment was ordered to .displace and, if possible, 
 to capture him. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 119 
 
 into the Cabul river, three or four miles to the east 
 of that town. The country between Chaga Serai 
 and Kash-Kote, a narrow valley about fifty miles 
 in length, is watered by canals led from the Kama 
 river. The inhabitants are an unwarlike race of 
 agriculturists, and the defence of the country is 
 entrusted to a wild race of mountaineers, called 
 Saffees, who perform military service in con- 
 sideration of an annual allowance of grain. Of 
 the country to be invaded, nothing was known 
 beyond what the Ex-Padshah chose to tell the 
 British Envoy. Bawadeen declared that the road 
 was excellent for guns, and that the forts were 
 not more formidable than sheep-pens. A detach- 
 ment, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, one 
 of infantry, and three guns, was ordered to make 
 a night march of fifty miles, and surprise Hashim 
 in his Fort at Pushoot; but the order was 
 cancelled in consequence of a report that Saadut 
 Khan was about to attack the depot of supplies at 
 Dakka, and the detachment intended for Pushoot, 
 was sent off hastily towards the Khyber. Hashim, 
 a bold and clever schemer, made the most of the 
 respite thus allowed him. He came into Jellalabad 
 and commenced negotiating the terms of his 
 abdication, while his nephew, Ay-ood-deen, was 
 
120 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 engaged repairing the forts, collecting revenue, and 
 purchasing ammunition. These objects completed, 
 Hashim suddenly disappeared. The expedition 
 could no longer be delayed, and the march of a 
 force was ordered. 
 
 On the J 2th of January, 1840, Colonel Orchard, 
 C.B., of the 1st European Regiment, marched from 
 Jellalabad with a column, consisting of eighty men 
 of his own regiment; a wing of the 37th Native 
 Infantry; the Shah's 3rd Infantry; and two 
 9-pounders, and one 24-pounder howitzer, under 
 Captain Abbott. Two days before, a regiment of 
 the Shah's cavalry, under Captain Christie, had 
 been sent forward with orders to invest the fort 
 of Pushoot, and prevent the escape of the 
 Padshah, and a detachment of twenty sappers had 
 proceeded to improve the road. Colonel Orchard's 
 column commenced its march by crossing the 
 Cabul river, a rapid stream which the guns forded 
 while the infantry were ferried across on rafts. 
 The baggage cattle forded with dijSiculty, and 
 many of them were drowned. Three miles of 
 canal country were crossed without accident ; the 
 road through the Tung-i-Topchi (Artillery pass) 
 was wide and good, and the troops reached Shewa, 
 sixteen miles distant from Jellalabad before sunset. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 121 
 
 where tlie camp was formed on the right bank 
 of tlie Kama river. On the 13th of January 
 the march Avas continued. The rocky nature of 
 the mountains, which close upon the river a little 
 to the north-east of Shewa, render the road that 
 side quite impracticable for guns, and it was 
 necessary to cross the Kama, a wider, deeper, and 
 more rapid river than the Cabul. The passage of 
 the infantry upon rafts occupied nearly the whole 
 day. The guns and baggage forded with great 
 difficulty, and many camels and much baggage 
 were lost. The large round pebbles, which ren- 
 dered the fords of the Kama so dangerous to the 
 army of Alexander the Great, were as numerous 
 as ever, and an animal falling into this rapid 
 current was very seldom saved. The fort of Kash- 
 Kote, a strong little place, for the capture of 
 which neither time nor ammunition could be 
 spared, fired a few shots at the column as it 
 passed on to form its camp on the left bank of the 
 river. On the 1 4th the river was again forded by 
 the detachment, but the bed was wide, and the 
 ford was better than that at Shewa. No accident 
 occurred, and the camp was formed near the 
 village and fort of Moorgul on the right bank of 
 the Kama. On the loth the river was again 
 
122 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 crossed by a dangerous ford, and a tolerably good 
 ferry, and tbe column encamped under the walls 
 of the town of Kooner, the little fort on the 
 opposite side of the town being held by Hashim's 
 adherents. 
 
 On the 16tli the force continued its march amid 
 much rain, and arrived without difficulty at the 
 camp formed near the town of Pushoot, by Captain 
 Christie, who reported that he had moved without 
 a halt from Jellalabad to Pushoot, a distance of 
 fifty miles. Pushoot was a fortified town about a 
 mile in circumference, with a strong fort about 
 400 yards north-east of it. Both the town and 
 fort were held by Ay-ood-deen, and Hashim himself 
 was in the fort of Kotekee on the opposite side of 
 the river. 
 
 During the night of the 16th, Ay-ood-deen 
 evacuated the town, his numbers being insufficient 
 to defend both that and the fort. On the 
 following day the town was occupied by Colonel 
 Orchard, and the fort was reconnoitred by 
 Captain Abbott, Lieutenant Pigou, the Engineer 
 officer, and Captain Macgregor,* the officer in 
 
 * Now General Sir G. H. Macgregor, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., an 
 officer of great ability and distinguished services, of whom the 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 123 
 
 political charge of the Expedition. Both town and 
 fort are on the left bank of the Kama, and about 400 
 yards distant from the stream, and the same dis- 
 tance from each other. The fort is upon high stony- 
 ground, but, at twenty paces from the river face, 
 there is an abrupt descent, and the ground between 
 this steep bank and the river is cultivated in 
 terraces. The fort measured 150 by 140 yards, 
 with a rampart eighteen feet high, ten feet thick 
 at base, and seven at summit, and a thin loopholed 
 parapet. The outer wall ran parallel to, and at an 
 interval of ten feet from the rampart, and beyond 
 the outer wall was a deep dry ditch. The gate was 
 between two bastions nearly in the centre of the 
 river face, and included between the outer wall and 
 the gate there was a traverse which completely 
 screened the gate. The only passage across the 
 ditch was by a very narrow wooden bridge leading 
 to the gate in the outer wall at the north-east end 
 of the traverse, and this bridge was easily remov- 
 able in less than ten minutes. 
 
 The means at Colonel Orchard's disposal for 
 the reduction of this fort were altogether 
 insufficient. Any attempt to breach such a wall 
 
 writer published a Meiiioir in Colburii's United Service Magazine 
 ill 1869. 
 
124 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 with two light O-pounders would have been absurd, 
 and an attack on the gateway alone offered a 
 reasonable chance of success. Colonel Orchard 
 had no hesitation in deciding upon this mode of 
 attack and the following arrangements were 
 ordered. On the morning of the 18th of January, 
 about an hour before daylight, Captain Christie 
 was to cross the river by a ford at some distance 
 below camp, and to proceed up the right bank to 
 invest Kotekee as closely as the range of the 
 enemy's matchlocks would allow. The infantry 
 and guns were to make a wide circuit to the south 
 and east, passing round the fort of Pushoot to a 
 spot on the low cultivated ground from which the 
 outer gate could be seen, and the guns were to open 
 their fire on the gate as soon as there was light 
 enough for effective practice. It was correctly 
 calculated that this fire would have the double 
 effect of demolishing the gate, and of preventing 
 the enemy from removing the little bridge, by 
 which alone the storming party could cross the ditch- 
 On the outer gate being destroyed, the Engineer 
 officer was to advance with bags of powder to blow 
 open the main gate, which was quite safe from the 
 fire of the guns. 
 
 At half -past four a.m. on the morning of the 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 125 
 
 18th of January, the troops proceeded to carry out 
 the above detailed orders, and all of them reached 
 their appointed posts. At seven a.m. the first shot 
 was fired. The cannonade was at first very slow, as 
 owing to there not being the slightest motion in 
 the air, and a light drizzling rain falling, the smoke 
 lay so heavily on the ground in front of the guns, 
 that after each round the gate for some minutes 
 could not be seen. At eight o'clock, however, a breeze 
 arose, and drove the smoke away. The firing now 
 became rapid, and at nine o'clock the gate of the 
 fausse-hrai was demolished and nearly separated 
 from the wall, though it did not actually fall. 
 Lieutenant Pigou now advanced with his powder, 
 and a covering party, consisting of fifteen European 
 soldiers and twenty-five Sepoys of the 37th, lined 
 the canal that passed close in front of the river 
 face and opened a smart fire on the loop-holes to 
 distract the attention of the garrison. A bugler, 
 seeing the covering party move forward, imagined 
 that the river gate was open, and sounded the 
 *' advance." The storming party rushed on, 
 pushed down the gate of the fausse-hrai, and 
 crowded the intervals between the outer and inner 
 walls. The main gate, however, effectually 
 arrested their progress. It was composed of 
 
126 THE AFGHAN WAR 
 
 planks sev^en inches thick, and was fitted into a 
 very massive frame. In vain did the men fire 
 volleys into the gate with the points of their 
 bayonets touching the wood ; it defied all their 
 efforts to force it. The stormers were with 
 difl&culty persuaded to withdraw and take shelter 
 in the canal, while the Engineer officer laid his 
 powder at the main gate. This dangerous and 
 difficult task was accomplished by Lieutenant 
 Pigou, assisted by Lieutenant Tytler.* The powder 
 was laid, the fuse was fixed and success appeared to 
 be certain. But, unhappily, the powder, which had 
 been supplied from the Shah's magazine at Jella- 
 labad, was of a loose spongy nature, and had 
 absorbed so much moisture that it would not 
 explode ; the bag into which the fuse was intro- 
 duced, burnt like a squib, and the other bags 
 remained entire, so that the gate was uninjured. 
 Lieutenant Pigou now obtained a barrel of 
 9-pounder cartridges from Captain Abbott, who 
 urgently advised him to carry it up entire to the 
 gate, and to insert the fuse at the bung-hole, 
 as the heavy rain that was falling would 
 wet uncovered powder. He, however, con- 
 
 * The late General Fraser-Tytler^ who only died during the 
 present year. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 127 
 
 sidered the weight* too great to be moved by one 
 man, and, taking out all the cartridges, placed them 
 in two open baskets, each of which he gave to a 
 sapper. One of these men was killed, and fell with 
 his load between the canal and the gate, while the 
 other arrived there with the contents of his basket 
 thoroughly wetted. Lieutenant Pigou inserted the 
 fuse into one of the cartridges, some of which he 
 piled against the gate. The train was fired, but 
 only the cartridge into which the fuse was inserted 
 exploded, the others were not ignited, and a second 
 failure occurred. 
 
 Lieutenant Pigou, in despair, now begged that 
 
 * One hundred and thirty-three pounds as he placed the amount 
 in a letter to his brother Frederick. On this point Captain Abbott 
 says, " As the men were under cover only twenty yards from the 
 gate, the carriage of a load of one hundred and thirty-three pounds 
 that short distance, might, I think^ have been easily effected.'* 
 Of Lieutenant Pigou he writes, " Lieutenant Pigou, who failed to 
 blow open the gate of Piishoot^ was more successful against a fort 
 in the Shinwarree country in 1841^ but he destroyed not only the 
 gate but himself also by the explosion. Tlie same dislike to be 
 advised, which caused him to take the 9-pounder cartridges out of 
 the barrel at Pushoot^ induced him to shorten his fuse on the sub- 
 sequent occasion, because Captaiu Bellew told him that it was 
 already dangerously short. Ihe powder exploded before Pigou 
 cou.d make his escape, and he was killed in an instant." 
 
128 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 the howitzer might be advanced to a spot behind 
 the embankment of the canal, for the purpose of 
 battering down the outer wall and the traverse, and 
 eventually the main gate. The piece was accord- 
 ingly dragged forward over ploughed fields, by the 
 battery guard, and Captain Abbott ran on to 
 examine the spot selected for it, but he instantly 
 perceived that it would be impossible to touch 
 either the traverse or the gate from that position, 
 and that the only spot from which they could be 
 seen, was within twelve paces of the edge of the 
 ditch. Captain Abbott's endeavours to drag on the 
 howitzer entirely failed. Of four men who accom- 
 panied him, three were immediately struck by 
 matchlock balls, and a bullet was only prevented 
 from passing through Captain Abbott's body by 
 the buckle of his sword belt, off which it glanced. 
 It was evident that to persevere in the attempt 
 would only cause a severe loss of men, without any 
 chance of success, as the operations to be 
 performed, would have required two hours firing, 
 and a gun's crew could not have lived five minutes 
 within twenty yards of the wall. That Captain 
 Abbott escaped under this murderous fire, exposed 
 as he was to it for a considerable time, w^as not a 
 little remarkable. Lieutenant Collin son, of the 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 129 
 
 37tli, a very gallant young officer, and two Sepoys 
 of the same Regiment, were wounded, the 
 former mortally. Seeing the futility of persevering, 
 Captain Abbott went to Colonel Orchard, who, 
 agreeing that any further attempt would involve a 
 useless sacrifice of lives, decided on calling off his 
 men. The troops had now been seven hours under 
 arms, and during five hours of that time had been 
 exposed to the rain. Their limbs were benumbed, 
 their muskets were useless, and all the 9-pounder 
 shot had been expended. The bugles sounded the 
 "recall" and the detachment withdrew, leaving 
 nineteen of their number dead within a few paces 
 of the fort, and carrying off forty-eight wounded, 
 many of whom died in camp. 
 
 That the loss of the assailants was not much 
 greater, must be attributed to a mistake committed 
 by the garrison, who, when they saw the storming 
 party advance, imagined that the gate had been 
 forced, and in that belief descended from the wall 
 to meet our men in the narrow entrance. Before 
 they had resumed their posts in the towers, our 
 party had found shelter in the deep double canal. 
 " I fired away,'' says Captain Abbott, " all my 
 round shot, excepting five, and have only shells and 
 grape left. Had my whole battery been present, I 
 
 K 
 
130 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 would have breached the wall, but two 9-pounders 
 had no chance. The guns weigh only 8f cwt., 
 and can be used either for foot or horse battery. 
 The conveyance of the wounded men was a matter 
 of some difficulty, owing to the want of doolies, and 
 the return to the camp was made amid a storm of 
 rain and sleet, which continued to fall throughout 
 the night, so that the tents stood in from two to 
 three inches of water." 
 
 The enemy, dreading another attack, abandoned 
 the fort during the night of the 18th, and Syud 
 Hashim fled from Kotekee, and the whole of the 
 forts of Kash-Kote, Noorgul, and Kooner were 
 evacuated by his adherents. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes from Pushoot on the 9th 
 of February : — " Several of our wounded have died, 
 and we have altogether lost about twenty -seven 
 lives. The ball struck poor CoUinson with as 
 much force as if it had gone into a tree ; it went 
 through an arm, through a rib, wounded the liver, 
 and made a deep groove in the backbone. It has 
 rained almost incessantly for three weeks, and now 
 we have a very cold wind blowing over the snow. 
 Exercise is out of the question without running a 
 risk of being shot or stabbed. Eraser, of the 2nd 
 Cavalry, came out with a troop and a company of the 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 131 
 
 43tli Native Infantry escorting supplies. Ponsonbj 
 brouglit a second convoy, escorted by another 
 troop and some Sepoys. They were each about 
 ten days on the road and were attacked almost 
 daily. The whole party returned on the 30th, but 
 were, together with one of Christie's E-issalahs, 
 brought up at Kooner, eleven miles from this, by 
 about 250 Soofees who lined the bank of the river 
 opposite the ford. Fraser wrote for reinforcements 
 of infantry, and Macgregor bought a free passage 
 for the detachment. I am sure we might have 
 caught Syud Hashim had a party made a night 
 march into the valley, as he was known to be only 
 ten miles from us in an open village. The Soofees 
 can muster 1,500 men, but of these, not 500 have 
 muskets. The people hesitate to give him up, being 
 a Syud, but lots of them have offered to murder 
 him." 
 
 The camp was moved to higher ground, and 
 Colonel Orchard remained at Pushoot until the 
 16th of February, during which the weather 
 was so inclement that nearly all the camels 
 died. The remains of Lieutenant CoUinson — 
 whose sword Captain Abbott purchased at the sale 
 of his effects for transmission to his family — and 
 some European soldiers, were interred in the fort, 
 
 K 2 
 
132 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 and the rose, thistle, and shamrock, planted by 
 their countrymen over their grave, had taken root 
 before the detachment marched for Jellalabad. 
 
 During the halt at Pushoot, some information 
 was obtained of the strange tribe known as Kafl&rs, 
 whose frontier is about sixteen miles north-east of 
 Pushoot. Captain Abbott has the following 
 remarks concerning them in a letter to his brother 
 Frederick. " At Chaga-Serai, there is a class of 
 men who carry on the little traffic that exists 
 between the Kaffirs and the Mahomedans. The 
 Kaffirs are very hostile to the Mussulmen, who 
 drove them out of Afghanistan ; indeed, no 
 Kaffir is allowed to marry until he has killed a 
 Mahomedan. There are two classes of Kaffirs ; one, 
 fair and having blue or grey eyes ; and the other 
 ^lass, black as Indians. The fair Kaffirs are the 
 aristocracy of the country, and the others do all the 
 hard work. Doubtless they are respectively the 
 descendants of the Greeks and aboriginal inhabit- 
 ants. Some of the female names, as Amy, Camille, 
 Miriam are familiar to us. The fair Kaffirs sit 
 upon benches, instead of squatting on the ground, 
 as other Asiatics do. They walk with small canes 
 in their hands, drink wine from goblets, and are 
 extremely hospitable." 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 133 
 
 Tho Fort of Kooner and the best of tlie Kash- 
 Kote forts were destroyed, the gates being blown 
 in by small quantities of the country powder 
 which had failed on the 18th of January. Colonel 
 Orchard was blamed by some persons for having 
 repeated the experiment which succeeded so well at 
 Ghuznee, but Captain Abbott was of opinion that 
 no other mode of attack, of which the assailants had 
 a choice, could possibly have succeeded. The re- 
 sult of the attack on Julgah, in the Kohiatan, a 
 comparatively weak place without any ditches, 
 afforded convincing proof of the difficulty of breach- 
 ing mud walls with light field-gnns. Mining was 
 out of the question at Pushoot, and a coup-de-mam 
 alone offered a fair chance of success. 
 
 In crossing the river at Kooner, on the return 
 march to Jellalabad, Captain Abbott dismantled his 
 carriages and dismounted the guns, which were 
 ferried across the deep stream on rafts made of in- 
 flated skins, with a little brushwood thrown over 
 them, similar to those described by Herodotus, and 
 employed by Alexander in crossing the rivers of the 
 Punjaub. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to a correspondent : — " At 
 Kooner I had a raft of fifty ' mussucks,' very badly 
 put together, and with scarcely any timber on it. 
 
134 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 This carried a gun, with the wheels and boxes of 
 its limber, and twenty or thirty men. At the Cabul 
 river I had only twenty-four ' mussucks,' with a 
 pretty good framework over them. This carried 
 the gun alone, with the boxes of the limber, and 
 a few men besides; the operation is not very 
 troublesome when the men are well taught to 
 mount and dismount the guns and carriages. The 
 rafts are very buoyant, and are the best contrivance 
 imaginable for crossing these streams. They are 
 pulled to pieces in a few minutes, and reconstructed 
 in an hour or two, if you have plenty of people to 
 blow air into them. The natives use bellows for 
 this purpose. A camel can carry enough skins for 
 a good raft."* 
 
 * To the same correspondent he writes of a n>port that appeared 
 in the papers as to his having been wounded : — " I must not for- 
 get to say that I was not wounded at Pushoot. I wish people would 
 not write such stuff in the papers. The truth was, that a ball 
 hit the ring of my sword-belt^ and glanced from it into a tree. It 
 gave me a smart blow, and I asked Tytler to look whether I was 
 scratched, as I could not see the place myself. This was the origin 
 of the story. I received only a bruise of no consequence whatever, 
 and it was a useful admonition not to stand still another time 
 within so short a distance of a loopholed wall. A pei-son moving 
 quickly has little chance of being hit, as we all found on the fol- 
 lowing day." 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 135 
 
 The fords of these rivers from the left to 
 the right banks, being up stream, the water deep 
 and very rapid, and the footing on round shingle 
 very insecure. Captain Abbott preferred losing a 
 little time to running any risk of drowning his 
 horses. Although there are no hills to be crossed 
 between Jellalabad and Pushoot, yet the march is 
 a most difficult one; the Cabul river is crossed 
 once, and the Kama river thrice, and close to Jella- 
 labad there are five miles of sloppy ground, with 
 scores of canals of all sizes. Colonel Orchard's 
 column arrived at Jellalabad on the 22nd of 
 February, and remained there until the roads to 
 Cabul became passable. 
 
 The following extracts from his letters give 
 further accounts of this Expedition. He writes to 
 his friend. Colonel Chambers, on the 13th of 
 January, from Shewa : 
 
 " Yesterday at eight a.m., we quitted Jellalabad 
 for a dour (expedition) upon Pushoot, the En- 
 gineers and Pioneers having preceded us on the 
 10th. The ford of the Cabul river is most danger- 
 ous and difficult. My guns got through it safely, 
 as I had made two men examine the place well, but 
 I was nearly washed away myself, and got a precious 
 ducking. Two camp followers were drowned, and 
 
136 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 some camels, with tlieir loads, were swept away and 
 lost. On this side, we found canals and watercourses 
 innumerable, and we came sixteen miles over the 
 heaviest ground I ever encountered out of Sheka- 
 wattee. Our course lay through fields, some of 
 them swamped previously to ploughing, and some 
 (the greater part) already ploughed. My guns 
 were sometimes up to their axles in stiff mud, from 
 which the horses, unaided, could not extricate them. 
 We were detained at the Cabul River an hour and a 
 half, waiting for the infantry, which was ferried 
 over on rafts, a tedious operation, and altogether 
 were eight hours and a half on the road. We 
 reached Shewa a little before sunset. Christie is 
 before Pushoot (we ho'pe) with his own corps, and 
 about 1,500 Afghans, who were to join at Kooner. 
 He must have made a severe march. Forty-five 
 miles in twenty-four hours over such roads is a good 
 performance, and will, I think, raise the credit of 
 his corps, which is undeservedly at a discount just 
 now- 
 
 " Now, having detailed some of the inconveniences 
 of the road, I must say that the valley is a very fine 
 one, and must be very pretty when the trees are in 
 leaf, and the numberless vines of gigantic size hang 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 137 
 
 their blue and amber-coloured clusters from the 
 branches of the trees to which they are trained. 
 
 " At about six miles from Jellalabad, we quitted 
 the valley of the Cabul river, and entered that of 
 the Kama or Kooner river. I have not seen so 
 fine a valley as this anywhere. The Kama is a 
 large rapid stream, with about a mile of rich soil on 
 either side, sometimes considerably more. The 
 villages are large and well peopled. We have come 
 with the Pioneers, who had just completed the road 
 thus far. Our progress hence must be slow, and 
 the absurdity of attempting a dour with artillery 
 over this country is pretty clearly proved. Had we 
 started without sending on the Pioneers, we should 
 have been three days on the road as far as this 
 place only. Not a single atta or barley load has 
 arrived, and my horses stand the chance of being 
 starved. It is, no doubt, a device of the enemy, 
 who has great influence with the Governor of 
 Jellalabad.*' 
 
 " 13th of January. — ^We made a short and dis- 
 astrous march yesterday. The ford of the Kama is 
 very difficult. The river runs in four streams, in- 
 tersecting a bed about a mile and a half in breadth. 
 Three fords are tolerable, but after the third, there 
 occurs a quicksand, over which my guns, with ten 
 
\ 
 
 138 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 horses to each, were obliged to pass at .full speed, 
 and even there narrowly escaped destruction. The 
 ford is about two feet and three-quarters deep, but 
 if you diverge from it af all to the right, you get 
 into deeper water. Here about twenty or thirty 
 camels were lost, as well as 100 lbs. of powder 
 and 4,000 rounds of ammunition. I lost three of 
 my own camels, with their loads ; a fourth fell, but 
 got up again, and only one came safely through. Just 
 as I thought all was safe, down went a waggon, 
 team and all, in a diiUdul. I dug out the horses, 
 dismantled the waggons, and got all safely out in 
 about three-quarters of an hour. I had four miles 
 to go to meet the infantry, who were at the ferry 
 (much above the ford). On reaching their vicinity, 
 I found the sappers and pioneers halted, and the 
 small fort of Kash-Kote firing upon them. A party 
 came from the ford to protect the guns, and we 
 moved on, passing about 800 yards from the place. 
 The fellows came out and fired, at about 600 yards, 
 with their juzails, but hit no one. We halted at 
 1,000 yards from the fort, and remained till near 
 four p.m., when the troops were all over, and now 
 we are about a mile and a half in advance of Chota 
 Kash-Kote, and about as far short of the principal 
 fort of that name. The rascals in the small fort 
 
/ 
 
 CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 139 
 
 gave us great applause as we came on. They have 
 since murdered a surwan, and one Sepoy got a 
 slight wound in the leg, the only mischief done 
 by about two hours' firing,* which we, of course, did 
 not return. 
 
 " 13th, four p.m. — The advantages of leaving 
 enemies in our rear are beginning to be seen and 
 felt. We found the ford this morning rather a good 
 one. It was very rapid and two feet and three- 
 quarters deep, but there were no holes or rapids to 
 be avoided. I crossed without a check and waited 
 about an hour and a half for the infantry, who, 
 after vainly looking for rafts, were obliged to ford 
 also. Everything that remained far in rear has 
 been attacked by marauders. 
 
 " We are now close to Noorgul, a fortified village, 
 with a fort at a little distance from it and the road 
 passing between. But I believe we are to sneak 
 round this place also, and thus maintain our cha- 
 racter for consistency. A Cossid, passing through 
 to Macnaughten, brought a verbal message from 
 Macgregor, saying that he had cooped up the 
 heathen nicely in Pushoot, but we are still a great 
 distance from that place. I have a difficult ford to 
 cross about two miles and a half from this camp. 
 Our camels have now been three days without food. 
 
140 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 and are quite done up. I have now only one camel 
 able to carry. I started with, twenty-five excellent 
 animals ; of these, three were drowned yesterday, 
 the fourth is scarcely able to move. Immediately 
 below our ford this morning is a very remarkable 
 rock, an island in the middle of the river. It rises 
 about 100 feet above the water, and is steep and 
 rugged. The remains of an ancient fort are on its 
 summit, and it seems to be a favourite station for 
 thieves, of whom we can see fourteen or fifteen now 
 watching the ford. They have done very little 
 business, however, being arrant cowards. The 
 Padshah of Kooner is with us in camp, and a pre- 
 cious rabble he has with him. The country here is 
 resuming its wild character. The valley is narrow, 
 and there is but little land under cultivation. 
 We are encamped on high, level ground, just above 
 the river, barren, rocky hills rising north-west and 
 south-east, the valley open south-west, and making 
 a turn northwards beyond Noorgul. 
 
 " Kooner, 16th. — Yesterday, we forded the Kama 
 river a third time. The ford difficult and danger- 
 ous as usual; some of the Europeans, with the 
 ammunition camels, had narrow escapes, and one 
 native and a few camels were drowned. We en- 
 camped here at four p.m. Macgregor is here to 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. Ul 
 
 meet us and conduct us to Pushoot, twelve miles 
 distant. Kooner is a poor village, about 200 yards 
 square. It has a fort on the side opposite to us, 
 held by a few of Has him' s people. We leave this 
 also in our rear. Hashim himself is in a little fort 
 on the right bank of the Kama river. This is our 
 relative position. If Hashim fights, we shall have 
 sharp work, for I have not the means of breaching. 
 " Half -past three, p.m. — We made a march of 
 about twelve miles between half -past nine and one 
 o'clock, and joined Christie's camp here. Pigou is 
 reconnoitring the place, and the fellows are popping 
 away long shots at his escort, one of whom came in 
 just now with a scratch on the head. Eain com- 
 menced as we moved from our last ground, and 
 it continues heavily. Snow is falling on the hills 
 on each side of the valley. We can do nothing 
 until the weather clears, and we fear Hashim may 
 bolt. A letter to his family was intercepted to-day ; 
 in it he tells them that the Ferringhees have been 
 such fools as to send only 200 sowars, who ex- 
 pected to find the fort empty ; but that his men had 
 proved themselves heroes, and that the party was 
 encamped, doing nothing. He will probably write 
 a different account to-morrow, after seeing the red 
 coats of our infantry and the white tents rising on 
 
142 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 this ground. The nearest bastion of Hashim's 
 fort is crowded with people staring at us. 
 
 " 17th, eight p.m. — Will close this for despatch, 
 in case of accidents. We (Macgregor, Pigou, 
 Tytler, and self) went through the town to-day, and 
 i)loselj reconnoitred the fort. The enemy fired at 
 as smartly, and will no doubt fight. We attack to- 
 norrow morning at daylight. My guns open on a 
 yicket by which the faiisf^e hrai is entered. This 
 •^hould be demolished by a few rounds. Then I 
 jlear away the parapets and amuse the enemy with 
 hells. After this the storming party rush forward 
 '.vith ladders to cross the ditch, which has neither 
 oridge nor crossing. My guns during the advance 
 will turn on the parapets of the flanking bastions, 
 which are not shot-proof, and I shall shell away 
 from the howitzer as fast as possible, until the 
 troops are in advance of my battery, after which 
 shot only will be the order of the day. We are all 
 disappointed in Colonel Orchard, who has done 
 nothing, and who now acts solely on Pigou' s and 
 my report, without having reconnoitred the place 
 himself. The enemy fired to-day very accurately at 
 our party, and are much better shots than any 
 natives I have as yet seen." 
 
 To his brother Frederick, he writes from Pushoot, 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 143 
 
 on the 28th of January, particulars of the attack 
 on the fort : 
 
 " My two 9-pounders opened on the barrier gate 
 of the fausse braie at seven o'clock, and at nine it 
 was fairly cut out of the wall, and knocked about 
 so that a man might walk through it and on each 
 side. Pigou, of the Engineers, ran on and found a 
 narrow foot-bridge across the ditch, but the main 
 gate was closed. The advance was sounded by 
 mistake, and the troops became exposed to a severe 
 fire of rifles from the loop-holes of the parapet. 
 They retired while Pigou laid 200 lbs. of Cabul or 
 Jellalabad powder, which went off like a wet squib, 
 md did no harm to the gate. I gave him all my 
 )-pounder Shrapnel cartridges (about 90 lbs.) in a 
 barrel, advising him to insert a fuze, and thus make 
 sure of the explosion. He, however, thought the 
 affair too heavy, so he took out and divided the 
 cartridges, taking half himself, and giving the 
 remainder to be carried by a sapper, who was shot 
 dead ere he reached the gate. The few cartridges 
 he had with him became wet, and again the explosion 
 failed. He now came and pressed so urgently for 
 a gun to be taken up that I got a number of Sepoys 
 •and advanced the howitzer, but on running forward 
 to look for a place whence it might fire on the gate, 
 
144 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 I could find none ; the higli embankment was an 
 insuperable obstacle, and there was no bridge by 
 which the gun might have been taken across the 
 ditch. Colonel Orchard, who commanded, was 
 quite at his wits' ends, and as both he and Pigou 
 insisted on the possibility of battering with the 
 howitzer, I asked for men to bring it forward, as 
 Ijie party that had originally advanced it to within 
 sixty yards of the place, had retired, after several 
 had been wounded. I went back and collected a 
 few men, and Collinson, of the 37th, came to help 
 me, but was shot close to the howitzer, and I could 
 not get it forward. After making three trips 
 forward and the same back again, crossing the fire 
 of eighty rifles at fifty or sixty paces each time, 
 I succeeded in dissuading Colonel Orchard from an 
 idle exposure of his men; and the troops having now 
 been five hoars under very heavy rain and sleet, 
 with all their fire-arms totally useless, the recall 
 was sounded, and the men were taken back to camp. 
 Nineteen fell dead on the spot within fifty yards of 
 the place, and forty-eight, wounded by rifle-balls, 
 were carried off. Collinson's wound is a very 
 dangerous one, and a young lad named Hicks, of 
 the European regiment, was also severely wounded. 
 After the first explosion had failed, I wished to 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 145 
 
 batter the gate from my right gun, which commanded 
 about one-half of it after the barrier-gate was re- 
 moved and a portion of the traverse destroyed by 
 my shot ; but Colonel Orchard said I should bring 
 down too much rubbish. I fired five rounds before 
 he interfered, and the effect of these convinces me 
 that twenty more shot would have opened a way to 
 our troops. The five shots took eifect, and one,t 
 which struck the door, drove it off its hinge, for it 
 was of six-inch mulberry plank, and presented 
 great resistance to the shot. The enemy were afraid 
 to stand a second. 
 
 " 1st of Februarv. — Collinson died of his wounds 
 on the 30th ; several men also have died. This 
 dirty little Expedition has cost us thirty lives of 
 fighting men, about a dozen camp-followers drowned 
 or frozen to death, and about 120 camels. Two 
 troopers of the 2nd Cavalry were smashed by pieces 
 of rock rolled down upon them at one of the passes. 
 They were part of an escort of a troop and company 
 under Captain Fraser, with supplies for our force. 
 The Soofees are a miserable race of mortals, who 
 subsist by selling wood and by plunder. They in- 
 habit a narrow valley about sixteen miles in length, 
 the northern extremity of which is about four miles 
 west of this place. The valley is but 600 yards in 
 
 L 
 
146 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 breadth, and of course the fire of rifles can cross its 
 centre easily.'* 
 
 On the 27th of April, Shah Soojah left Jellalabad, 
 escorted by the troops under Sir E. Sale, on the 
 return to Cabul. The march was without any in- 
 cident of note, except an attack, on the fifth march, 
 on the baggage by a body of 150 Ghilzyes, as it 
 emerged from the Purwan-Durra Pass, the bed of a 
 narrow rivulet, with perpendicular rocks on either 
 side — the very place for a robber raid. The infantry 
 took the mountain road, sending two companies to 
 escort the guns, which had cleared the Pass and 
 reached the open bed of a river, when a fire of 
 matchlocks was opened from a hill in the rear upon 
 the spare horses and some remounts. The drivers 
 mounted on the spare horses trotted up to the 
 battery, but the syces in charge of the remounts 
 allowed them to run loose. Captain Abbott, who 
 looked in vain for the infantry, unlimbered the 24- 
 pounder howitzer and fired three shells, which 
 killed several of the assailants, who dispersed before 
 the escort made its appearance. The infantry, on 
 hearing the sound of artillery and matchlocks, re- 
 turned across the hills and assisted in securing the 
 loose horses. Sir Eobert Sale, who had shortly be- 
 fore passed the spot without escort, accompanied 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 147 
 
 bj his wife and daughter (wife of Captaia Start, of 
 the Engineers), rode back on hearing the firing, 
 and all arrangements were made for securing the 
 bao^orao^e. It was afterwards ascertained that their 
 assailant was a Grhilzye chief, named Azeez Khan, 
 a son-in-law of Dost Mahomed, who, with 150 men, 
 had stationed himself at the Cabul end of the Pass, 
 for the purpose of capturing baggage, and mistook 
 the remount horses for baggage cattle. Had he 
 allowed the guns which escorted them to pass on, 
 he would have secured a large amount of plunder, 
 as most of the camels were led through the narrow 
 Pass. 
 
 On the 10th of May, the troops encamped at Sia 
 Sung ("black rock") under a low range of hills, 
 rendered memorable eighteen months later as the 
 place whence the Afghans attacked the Cabul can- 
 tonments with such fatal persistency. 
 
 Captain Abbott gives an account of his march to 
 Colonel Chambers, jotted down from day to day. 
 It is headed, " Commenced in camp near Baree- 
 kaub, 6th of May: — We quitted Jellalabad on the 
 27th, and marched eight miles to Sultanpore, 
 halted there a day, and on the 29th came on eight 
 miles more to Futtehabad, where we found a 
 decided improvement in the cUmate, although the 
 
 L 2 
 
148 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 ascent had been very trifling. On the 30th we 
 made Neemla, seven miles, and next day ascended 
 the steep hill to Gundamuck. There was a very 
 severe fall for three-quarters of a mile, and then 
 a gradual ascent for a mile more, after which two 
 rocky nullahs were crossed and we encamped in a 
 fine cool climate at Grundamuck. The march to 
 Soorkaub was a very severe one of only eight and 
 a half miles ; we found the river unfordable, and my 
 guns were handed over tlie broken bridge. The 
 next march to Jugdulluck was a very trying one 
 indeed ; a steep ascent I pulled up, but could not 
 get round a sharp turn at the top, and was obliged 
 to obtain the aid of the infantry. After this 
 there was a steady ascent up shingle for eight 
 miles, then a severe ascent for two miles, and a 
 descent of three miles to camp. We halted to 
 mend my howitzer, whose axletree had given way, 
 and yesterday came on through the Purwan-Durra 
 Pass. Two companies of infantry followed the guns 
 down the bed of the nullah, the remainder going 
 over the hills. I came safely through all the worst 
 part of the Pass, and was about 600 yards clear of 
 it, when a sharp fire was opened from a hill (in my 
 rear) about 700 feet high, upon my spare horses 
 and Grarbett's remounts, which were passing under 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 149 
 
 it. I looked in vain for the infantry, and ob- 
 serving that about 100 men had occupied the 
 height whence they might have played mischief 
 with our baggage, I just gave them a couple of 
 shrapnels. The first shell had rather a long fuse 
 and burst over the men, throwing all its contents 
 forward. The fellows did not seem at all alarmed 
 and remained on tlie spot, so I sent a second which 
 took effect exactly, covering the ground about the 
 people with bricks and splinters. They scuttled 
 off as fast as they could, carrying five of their 
 number pick-a-back. Racing over the hill, they 
 came in contact with the infantry, exchanged shots 
 with them, and one Sepoy was shot there through 
 both legs. Sale had ridden through with his wife 
 and daughter, about half a mile ahead of me, with- 
 out any sort of escort, and was not molested. He 
 came back when he heard my guns, and the 
 column struck across to join me; we made all need- 
 ful arrangements to secure our baggage, and lost 
 nothing but one of the remount horses, thirteen of 
 which were running loose the moment the fire 
 commenced. The syces were so alarmed that 
 some fell off the horses from sheer frio^ht, some 
 were thrown, some jumped off and ran ; but one of 
 them was touched by the assailant's fire, and two 
 
150 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 were half killed and are now quite useless, owing to 
 their own cowardice. This day we came only four 
 and a half miles, but the road was most awful. 
 Ten horses required thirty men to aid them on the 
 ascent, and afterwards we had a steep descent 
 with locked wheels — a job I detest, particularly 
 because it takes so much time, and our chains are 
 continually snapping. Last night an old Afghan 
 came to warn me that 500 men were collected near 
 this to attack our baggage on the march, and that 
 if they failed in this attempt, they were determined 
 to make a chafpow on our camp at Tezeen. 
 
 " The route to Khiva which my brother took is 
 quite impracticable for troops, owing to the want of 
 water between Merv and Khiva. James followed the 
 Moorgaub to Merv and found it a rapid stream 
 flowing between deep banks of clay. The jungle 
 on the banks is filled with pheasants and chuckores 
 (whence its name I suppose.) The country on 
 either hand is a desert. Merv is a poor place, and 
 the Governor is decidedly our enemy. From Merv 
 the party took on twelve days' food, and five days' 
 water, and proceeded by a footpath, crossing wave 
 after wave of sand, at the rate of thirty miles a 
 day. The cold was so intense that they were 
 obliged to dismount every hour during the night 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 151 
 
 to light fires, which the low scrubby bushes on 
 which camels subsist, afforded them the means of 
 doing. One night snow fell heavily and the path 
 was completely covered ; the camels were then 
 used as guides and led the way with the greatest 
 certainty. The traveller emerges at once from 
 these sandhills upon the fertile country around 
 Khiva, a respectable town in appearance, sur- 
 rounded by a wall, but having no ditch. The 
 houses are mean and gloomy as to the interior, 
 being unprovided with windows. The Khan is a 
 man of prepossessing appearance and address, but 
 very ignorant and rather timid. Both lie and the 
 Wazeer asked James to prescribe medicine for 
 them, and the Wazeer wanted him to mend 
 three old watches and to convert some brass into 
 gold. The vehicles of the country are small carts 
 drawn by one horse (between shafts), witb an 
 oddly shaped collar. The women are almost as 
 fair as French women, and have generally a high 
 colour and fine eyes. The people have nothing of 
 the bull-dog appearance of the Chinese and 
 southern Tartars, and are mostly good looking. 
 This is all I can tell you of the new country. 
 James avoids all politics, of course, but his letter 
 leads me to suppose him to be well on his way to 
 
152 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Orenburg as the bearer of proposals from the Khan 
 to the Emperor of Russia. The Khan seems in- 
 dined to make any required concession, and to sub- 
 mit to any terms however humiliating. In this case 
 the Russians will be deprived of their pretence for 
 the invasion of Khiva, and the mask will be torn 
 from their faces. Their i-eal nature, a desire to ap- 
 proach our Indian dominions, will stand undis- 
 guised. I have no idea that any terms will be 
 granted. The Russians will have Khiva this season, 
 and Bokhara next. They then will be almost in 
 contact with us, and a large force must always 
 occupy Afghanistan, unless we crush the power of 
 the Sikhs and obtain entire possession of the 
 Punjaub. It would never answer to have a small 
 force here, with all the Sikh army interposed be- 
 tween them and India, and the Russian advance of 
 8,000 or 10,000 troops at Bokhara. 
 
 " 7th, Tezeen. — Last night some Afghans attacked 
 our picquet stationed at the entrance of the 
 Lutabund Pass which was just in rear of camp. 
 They were easily driven off, and no one was 
 touched ; three balls came amongst my horses, but 
 hit none of them. This morning we marched nine 
 miles, ascending very considerably all the way, our 
 course was up a stony nullah, but the large stones 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 153 
 
 had been removed, and the march proved easier than 
 any since we had quitted the valley of Jellalabad. 
 I had looked forward to it with dread, remember- 
 ing the huge stones with which it was formerly 
 covered. The valley here opens out, and we have 
 a good camp near the wretched village of Tezeen. 
 If Saadut Khan and Azeez Khan did intend 
 to attack us, they have allowed the opportunity to 
 pass. At least the attempt would be absurd on 
 our present camp. The Pass near Boodkak indeed 
 remains, but it is within ten miles of Cabul, 
 and these vagabonds never like going to any dis- 
 tance from their own homes. Broadfoot of the 
 Engineers destroyed Azeez Khan's fort the other 
 day, and this is the cause of the present bad feel- 
 ing towards us. That Salter's detachment will be 
 molested I have little doubt ; they have the treasure 
 and only one regiment with it, for the cavalry 
 could do nothing in these parts, and cannot be con- 
 sidered as a sufficient guard of the escort. The 
 37th is a capital corps, and will give a very good 
 account of their charge. 
 
 *' Koord-Cabul, 8th of May : — All my troubles are 
 over. This morning my guns came up that long 
 hill with aid only at one awkward turning where 
 three of the five carriages stuck and required to be 
 
Ibi THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 started again. The other two galloped round it 
 and completed the two mile ascent without any as- 
 sistance. All are in excellent condition, and only 
 one horse has been injured on the march from 
 Jellalabad. The road now is down hill, or on level, 
 until we reach Cabul. 
 
 " Cabul 10th. — Arrived this morning all well. 
 Sir W. Cotton crows not a little at the condition of 
 my horses, and at the howitzer having been used. 
 He is welcome to his victory as it has put him into 
 high good humour with me." 
 
 The summer and autumn of 1840 was a time of 
 anxiety for Sir William Macnaghten, and of action 
 for the troops under Sale and Dennie. Dost 
 Mahomed, who, with his sons Afzul Khan and 
 Akbar Khan, had sought protection at the court of 
 the Khan of Bokhara, had been imprisoned by that 
 capricious tyrant ; but in August escaped and sought 
 refuge with the Wullee of Kholoom, who placed all 
 his resources at the disposal of his old ally. The 
 Dost soon found himself at the head of a consider- 
 able force, and in September advanced with 6,000 
 men upon Bameean, in the Hindoo Khoosh, where 
 a British column had wintered. In the latter part 
 of June, the 4th Goorkha Kegiment of the Shah's 
 contingent, under Captain Hay, forming a portion 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 155 
 
 of this force, had occupied the advanced fort of 
 Bajgah, near to which a disaster took place in- 
 volving the lives of some thirty or forty of the 
 Goorkhas. Bajgah and Syghan were abandoned, 
 and the garrisons retreated upon Bameean, while 
 the 35th Native Infantry were hastily despatched 
 from Cabul, under Brigadier Dennie. The Kohistan, 
 or hilly country to the north of Cabul, was now re- 
 ported to be ready to rise in favour of the Dost, 
 and on the 12th of September we find the Envoy 
 writing to the Governor- General, endorsing the 
 opinion expressed to him by Sir W. Cotton, '' that 
 unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengthened, 
 we cannot hold the country," and urging the 
 dispatch of another brigade. Dennie arrived at 
 Bameean on the 14th of September, and after dis- 
 arming Captain Hopkins' regiment of Afghans, who 
 had shown disaffection, he advanced against Dost 
 Mahomed and his ally, the Wullee, with 900 men, 
 and defeated them with heavy loss on the 18th of 
 September. On the 24th, the Brigadier entered 
 the Syghan valley, and destroyed the fort, and 
 four days later. Dr. Lord, the Political Agent, con- 
 cluded a treaty with the WuUee of Kholoom, when 
 Brigadier Dennie returned with his force to Cabul. 
 But Dost Mahomed, who only escaped with hi^ 
 
156 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 sons from the disastrous field of Bamsean bj the 
 swiftness of their horses, reappeared in the Kohistan, 
 and on the 24th of September, Sir Robert Sale, 
 accompanied by Sir A. Burnes, quitted the camp at 
 Sia Sung with a brigade, consisting of the 13th 
 Light Infantry, one squadron 2nd Cavalry, two 
 companies 37th Native Infantry, and three guns 
 and the 24-pounder howitzer of No. 6 Field Battery, 
 under Captain Abbott. 
 
 The troops skirted a lake, and turning the range 
 of hills which were impracticable for artillery, by an 
 easterly pass, proceeded by a steep rocky descent, 
 where three locking-chains of Abbott's guns snapped, 
 and at length emerged upon open cultivated ground. 
 At a distance of ten miles they passed Killa Hadji, 
 and then went through a pass between hills, and 
 turning to the north-west, made a long and steep 
 descent to the bed of a stream, where having aorain 
 broken his locking-chains. Captain Abbott was 
 obliged to take the guns down by hand. Ascending 
 the opposite side, the encamping ground was 
 reached after a march of fourteen miles. The next 
 march was over a road, rough and stony, wdth an 
 easy descent for about four miles, when it enters 
 the bed of a dry nullah. Marching over uneven 
 ground, they reached by a very narrow path the 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 157 
 
 river under Ak Serai, crossing whicli, the march 
 was resumed along a rocky and dangerous descent 
 down the hill side, and another awkward descent 
 down a narrow lane, when level country was reached, 
 and a distance of three miles and a half brought 
 the troops to Karabagh, where camp was formed 
 for the day. " From the hill above the Serai," writes 
 Abbott, *' we looked down upon a beautiful valley 
 covered witli orchards, vineyards, and trees of 
 various kinds. The silver poplar holds a conspicu- 
 ous place in the landscape, and under the hills that 
 bound the valley to the north are extensive groves 
 and orchards giving shelter to considerable villages, 
 the property of Kohistanee chiefs, of which the 
 largest is Istalif, above which is a small castle." 
 On the 28th, Sir R. Sale marched to Rohat, and on 
 the following day proceeded thence to Chareekar, 
 where he was joined by a detachment* that had 
 preceded him from Cabul, under Captain Eraser, 
 of the 2nd Cavalry, to watch the passes." 
 
 At eight a.m., the Brigadier marched from 
 Chareekar, with the object of attacking the forts at 
 the entrance of the Ghorebund valley, belonging to 
 Ali Khan, and known as Tootum-Durra. On reach- 
 
 * A squadron of 2nd Cavalry, two 6-poiinders under Lieutenant 
 Warburton, one Kohistanee Regiment, and some Afghan Horse. 
 
158 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 iag the ground in front of the village, which was 
 strongly fortified, the guns went to the front, and 
 cannonaded the village. A strong party of infantry, 
 with two guns, under Lieutenant Warburton, pro- 
 ceeded to clear the hill to the left, and then to take 
 the position of the enemy in flank, while three 
 companies of the 13bh Light Infantry, supported 
 by Captain Abbott's 9-pounders, advanced to the 
 attack of two detached forts on the right, the guns 
 also directing their fire on the towers and other de- 
 fences of the village. " These operations," says 
 the Brigadier, in his dispatch, '' were crowned with 
 complete success." The main column of attack 
 now moved on the village at a rapid pace, and the 
 enemy fled on their approach. Captain Abbott 
 then brought his guns and howitzer to the right, 
 and formed them for action within sixty yards of 
 the gate of the large fort, upon which the enemy 
 evacuated it from the rear. The whole chain 
 of forts was in possession of the British by 
 eleven a.m., with but small loss, " a fact which," 
 says Sir Robert Sale, ''I, in a great measure, 
 attribute to the dread inspired by the excellent 
 practice of artillery under the able direction of 
 Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and 
 Warburton." In this affair Captain Edward 
 
/ 
 
 CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 159 
 
 Conolly was shot througli the heart. This gallant 
 young officer was a learned antiquarian, a classical 
 scholar familiar with the literature of Greece 
 and Rome, and a traveller who could express 
 his observations and experiences with precision and f 
 
 in polished language. His body was taken into 
 Cabul for interment, and his relative, the Envoy, 
 bitterly mourned over his untimely end. He was 
 one of three brothers, who all died in this war, 
 and the eldest of whom, Arthur, is well known as 
 the companion of Colonel Stoddart in his cruel im- 
 prisonment and death at Bokhara. The Engineers 
 were occupied until the 2nd of October blowing up 
 the forts with mines of 100 lbs. of powder. 
 Captain Abbott experimented with his guns on the 
 penetration of shot into the mud walls, when he 
 found that at a range of 240 yards, with a charge 
 of 2 1 lbs. of powder, a shot penetrated 2 feet into 
 the solid part of the bastion, and from 2^ feet to 2f 
 feet into the hollow part. 
 
 Sir Eobert Sale was not equally successful in his 
 next affair. On the 2nd of October, the column 
 marched from Tootum-Durra for Chareekar, when 
 a council of war was held, at which it was decided 
 to attack the fort of Julgah, sixteen miles north- 
 east of Chareekar, in which Sir A. Burnes had 
 
160 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 ascertained the *' rebels," (nioofsids) as they were 
 called, had taken refuge. At five a.m., on the 3rd, 
 the Brigade marched. " The road,'* writes Abbott, 
 " was abominable, crossing canals, water-courses, 
 and flooded fields for five miles, which broke much 
 harness." At about half-past ten, the battery 
 reached Julgah, and was immediately ordered to 
 open fire on the fort, which, like other Afghan forts, 
 was constructed as follows : The tower was solid to 
 a height of twelve feet, above which were two 
 chambers, loop-holed all round, with a thin parapet 
 above all. The curtain consisted of a wall about 
 thirty feet high, with a thickness of six feet at its 
 base and three feet at its summit. Against the 
 interior, houses, about twelve feet high, are built, 
 and their roofs serve as a rampart, from which the 
 garrison fire through loopholes in the thick walls. 
 Such was the place that Sir Robert Sale set himself 
 to breach with three light 9-pounder guns drawn up 
 on the open plain, without shelter of any sort. 
 
 *' There would have been no difficulty," says 
 Captain Abbott, in his Journal, "in breaching a 
 curtain at eight feet, or more than that, above the 
 ground, but the objections were : (1) If the breach 
 were made above the roofs of the houses, the rubbish 
 would not suffice to form an ascent for the storm- 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 161 
 
 ing party ; (2) if below tlie roofs, the roofs would 
 fall in, and effectually check the advance of the 
 stormers." He adds : ''I therefore decided on 
 breaching the hollow chamber of a bastion at a 
 height of twelve feet from the ground, the breach 
 being easily accessible by means of ladders, while 
 no opposition could be offered by the enemy, as our 
 guns would keep them out of the bastion." The 
 guns, accordingly, opened upon a bastion at 300 
 yards' range, and at noon had effectually breached 
 the lower chamber, " but," says Abbott, " the En- 
 gineer officer now insisted on the curtain being 
 breached, and much time and ammunition were thus 
 wasted." 
 
 At three p.m., the curtain breach was re- 
 ported practicable, and the storming party, led by 
 Colonel Tronson, of the 13th, advanced to the 
 assault. They took ladders also for the assault of 
 the tower, but no instructions seem to have been 
 given as to their use. The ladders, instead of being 
 placed against the tower, were placed on the rubbish 
 of the curtain breach, where they were worse than 
 useless, as the rubbish being soft, the men sunk 
 knee-deep in it. The attack failed, and the party 
 retired, leaving many men dead on the ground. 
 Although the battery reached Julgah at ten a.m., 
 
162 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 tlie 6-pounder guns of the Shah's horse-artillery 
 did not arrive until an hour later, and the 8-inch 
 mortars only made their appearance at three p.m. 
 
 Captain Abbott immediately set one of them on 
 loose planks, knocked out the head of a barrel of 
 powder, and managed to put thirty- three shells into 
 the fort before the firing ceased, by order of the 
 General. Soon after dusk, the enemy evacuated 
 the fort, and escaped through the lines of the 
 Afghan horsemen, who formed part of the force. 
 In this disastrous affair, the British loss was thirteen 
 soldiers of the 13th Lio^ht Infantrv killed, besides 
 many wounded. 
 
 During the 4th of October, Captain Abbott busied 
 himself recovering his shot* from the breach, and 
 thus replenished his stock, which the previous day's 
 work had reduced to fifty rounds per gun, no supply 
 being available within 700 miles of Cabul. On this 
 point, he says : " My urgent application for 200 
 rounds per gun had been rejected with contempt by 
 the Military Board, with some wise remarks on the 
 extravagance of such a demand." 
 
 * The following was the ammunition expended at Julgah : — 
 9-pounder, 452 round shot and nine shrapnel ; 24-pounder howit- 
 zer, 8 shrapnel and 1 shell ; 8-inch mortars, 33 shell ; and 
 6-pounders, 114 round shot. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 163 
 
 The brigade marclied at four p.m. on the same day, 
 and encamped in the valley of the Grhorebund 
 river, about three miles below Beghrami {Alexandria 
 ad Caucasiim), of which celebrated city no remains 
 exist, excepting mounds of clay, much broken 
 pottery, and many coins bearing Grreek inscriptions. 
 Here the force halted till the 8th, and Captain 
 Abbott and other officers examined some forts which 
 the rebel chiefs had abandoned. '' That of Meer 
 Musjidi," he says, " is the most formidable, but 
 none could have resisted 18-pounders, though all 
 would have been troublesome to a force having only 
 9-pounder field guns of less than 9 cwt. metal." 
 
 Sir R. Sale marched early on the 8th of October 
 for Chareekar, expecting to meet Dost Mahomed. 
 '' I had prepared," says Abbott, " an excellent road 
 for the guns, but was not allowed to use it, General 
 Sale insisting that I should follow a path which I 
 knew and reported to be impracticable for my 
 cattle. After much injury had been done to 
 carriages and harness, the horses were untraced, 
 and all the guns were taken up by the hand. 
 Beyond this, the road selected by the General was 
 desperately bad, and we were nearly five hours on 
 a march of six miles, and my horses were often 
 thrown down. The mortar carts drawn by 
 
 M 2 
 
164 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 bullocks,* had their poles and most of their 
 yokes broken, and were dragged into camp at 
 Chareekar by Maule's Regiment of Kohistan In- 
 fantry." Here the column halted until the 15th. 
 
 "On the 10th of October,'' he continues, "I 
 looked at Meer-dad Khan's fort, about two miles 
 and a half from camp, also the remains of an old 
 building, probably a tope;t breakfasted with Sir 
 A. Burnes, and while with him, heard that Dost 
 Mahomed had arrived in the Ghorebund Valley, 
 
 * He says in his Journal, " The utter worthlessness of bullocks 
 on such ground was on this occasion proved. The three mortars 
 and their beds were carried on four carts, each drawn by eight 
 gun bullocks. Tlie poles and yokes were nearly all smashed, and 
 the carts were dragged into camp by the Kohistan Regiment." 
 
 j- In India the word tope is applied to a clump of trees, but in 
 Afghanistan the term is applied to the numerous mounds scattered 
 about the country, which are supposed to be the monuments of 
 kings. Captain Abbott, who was a keen numismatist, and had an 
 excellent collection of coins which cost him 600 rupees, says of 
 these topes in a letter to a friend, from Jellalabad : — " On opening 
 them we find numerous coins, both of copper and silver^ bearing in 
 clear Greek characters the names and epithets of the Sovereigns 
 who once ruled over the land. Of Menander the coins are very 
 abundant, and some are very beautifully executed. Those of 
 Antimachus are less numerous, and of Appollodotus the coins are 
 more scarce. Copper coins are more abundant. The city of Nysa 
 is supposed to have existed close to Jellalabad." 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 165 
 
 which was later confirmed by people who had seen 
 him." 
 
 He says in his Journal : — " While we were thus 
 encamped at Chareekar a remarkable execution took 
 place close to the piquets. When Dost Mahomed 
 was in power, a landowner of the Kohistan was 
 murdered by his man-servant, and left two widows, 
 one of whom was childless while the other had a 
 large family. The murderer married the childless 
 woman and shared the property with her. On the 
 appearance of Prince Timour in the Kohistan the 
 other woman complained to him, and insisted on 
 having revenge. There was no evidence to convict 
 the murderer, who however pleaded guilty, and the 
 Prince was obliged to pass sentence of death upon 
 him. He was led to execution close to the British 
 camp, when his hands were tied behind him, and he 
 was ordered to kneel on the ground. The widow, 
 who was furnished with an Afghan knife, rushed at 
 the kneeling man, drove the weapon into his bowels, 
 and then tried to turn it round. The man was 
 writhing in agony for a few moments, but was soon 
 put out of pain by a blow from a sword which 
 struck off his head. The woman then called her 
 children, who dipped their hands in the blood. The 
 body remained on the spot on which it fell, and a 
 
166 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 crowd of cliildren covered it with a heap of large 
 stones." 
 
 On the 15th the force marched to Karabagh, 
 and Captain Abbott sent to Cabul for his two 
 remaining guns. Two days later Sir R. Sale 
 marched on the fort of Baboo Koosh-gurh, the 
 chief of which, on being ordered to submit to the 
 government of Shah Soojah, had sent an insolent 
 message, that as the British were all day long 
 battering the fort of Julgah and did not get in, 
 he had made every preparation for resistance 
 and would " fight to the last." However, he was. 
 not as good as his word, and when the column 
 approached the fort, which was a very strong one, 
 the chief thought discretion the better part of 
 valour, and, swallowing his '' prave orts," as 
 Fluellyn would have said, incontinently bolted with 
 his garrison, and the troops took peaceable possession 
 when the fort was destroyed. 
 
 While halting here, the camp was attacked at 
 nine p.m., on the 18th of October, by about 1,000 
 men hidden in the gardens around, but after much 
 expenditure of ammunition, the enemy ceased firing 
 at midnight and retired, having only killed two men 
 and wounded a few, and some horses. During all 
 this fusillade the soldiers were ordered to lie flat 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 167 
 
 on the ground without returning a shot, as the 
 night was so dark that no object was visible. ^^ 
 " This, attack," writes Captain Abbott, " called by 
 the Afghans, ' Shub-Koon,' was the only good 
 instance of the kind that I witnessed. The firing 
 was well maintained for two hours and a half, but 
 the soldiers were ordered to lie down, and the 
 ofiicers only remained on their legs. The assailants 
 had flint locks to their juzails, and, as they had 
 damped their priming and caked it in the pans, it 
 went off like a squib, illuminating their visages at 
 each discharge. The effect was very picturesque 
 on that pitch dark night. A ravine, forty yards in 
 front of the battery, was filled with the enemy, but 
 one round of case gave them a hint to keep down 
 their heads, and they fired too high to do any 
 harm. The Afghans highly prize flint locks, 
 
 * Sir W. Macnaghten at Cabul chafed at this delay, and wrote 
 despatches and letters complaining of the dilatoriness of Sir R. 
 Sale, and magnifying every check. He says in a letter to a col- 
 league : — " Burnes and Sale, with nearly 2000 good Infantry are 
 setting down before a fortified position about twenty miles distant, 
 and are afraid to attack it. The enemy made an attack upon 
 them the night before last, killed and wounded some of our people, 
 and got off unscathed. All this is very bad." 
 
168 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 because they save slow-match and do not betray 
 the movements of troops in the night." 
 
 On the following day, six companies of the 37th 
 Native Infantry and Captain Abbott's two nine- 
 pounders reached camp from Cabul, and, early next 
 morning, he and Captain Sanders,* of the Engineers, 
 escorted by two squadrons of cavalry, 200 infantry, 
 and two 6-pounders, reconnoitred Kardurrah, the 
 people of which had attacked the camp on the night 
 of the 18th. They selected a position for a camp 
 with the right resting on a small fort, while the left 
 extended towards Kardurrah. The camp was moved 
 to this position, and on the 21st, the brigade 
 advanced in battle array at daylight to attack 
 Kardurrah, which, however, the enemy evacuated. 
 The remainder of the day was employed in destroy- 
 ing the place, which was found to be of considerable 
 strength, and on the following morning Sir R. Sale 
 marched southwards. Early on the 29th, an ex- 
 press was received from Lieutenant Maule that his 
 Kohistanees were deserting to Dost Mahomed, 
 and, at noon of the same day, when near Karabagh, 
 intelligence arrived that the Dost had descended 
 from the valley of Nijrow, forty miles north-east 
 
 * This very distinguished officer was killed at Alaharajpore in 
 1844. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 169 
 
 of Chareekar, and had entered Kohistan at the head 
 of a large force of infantry. The column immediately 
 moved northwards from Meer Musjidi's* fort, over a 
 difficult country, full of ravines, canals, and deep 
 water ruts, to Purwan-Durra, a small valley, 
 through which runs a rapid stream, with several 
 forts scattered on the plain. 
 
 Dost Mahomed, whose object was to make a dash 
 on Cabul, without encountering the British force, 
 pursued a course under the hills, and had reached 
 Purwan-Durra, when Sale, crossing the Ghorebund 
 river, headed him back and he retired over the brow 
 of a bluff mountain towards the Punj sheer river. 
 The path, however, was very difficult, and as his 
 cavalry were forced to lead their horses, two 
 squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry, numbering 240 
 sabres, led by Captains Eraser and Ponsonby, 
 moving at a trot along the base of the hill, appeared 
 certain to intercept him. Seeing the state of affairs, 
 
 * Meer Musjidi disappeared in a suspicious manner in the follow- 
 ing November, during the investment of the Cabul cantonment by 
 the Afghans, and it was said that he was made away with, a 
 reward having been oifered for his head by Captain John Conolly, 
 then representing the Envoy with Shah Soojah in the Bala Hissar ; 
 but the charge was never proved, and for the credit of the British 
 name, and the honour of a very distinguished and high-minded 
 young officer, we are glad to discredit the statement. 
 
170 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the Dost descended to tlie plain, resolved to 
 stake his crown and life on the hazard of the die. 
 Taking off his white ' loonghie ' (turban) from his 
 head, he called to his followers : — " In the name of 
 God and the Prophet fight, drive those Feringhee 
 Kaffirs from the country, or I am a lost man." 
 Accompanied by only eighty troopers, the infantry 
 remaining on the hill, the Dost, with a chivalrous 
 courage worthy his gallant race, rode down to 
 encounter the cavalry, which, having crossed the 
 Purwan river, together with the guns and infantry, 
 was now a mile in advance of them. To the 
 astonishment and horror of all eye-witnesses, 
 when Captains Eraser and Ponsonby led on their 
 squadrons to the charge, the troopers first hung 
 back and then finally fled back to Abbott's guns, 
 leaving the officers to bear the brunt of the charge 
 of Afghan Horse. Dr. Lord, the Political Officer 
 with the force, a man of ability, Lieutenat Broad- 
 foot, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant and Adjutant 
 Crispin, were killed ; and Captains Fraser and 
 Ponsonby were severely wounded, while the 
 cowardly troopers suffered more severely than 
 they would have done had they faced the handful 
 of Afghan horse ; two Native officers and two men 
 being killed and twenty wounded. Captain Fraser 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 171 
 
 received a deep cut down Lis back and his right 
 hand was severed ; Captain Ponsonby had a ball 
 through his left arm, the top of his left thumb 
 was cut off, and he received a very severe 
 sabre wound across his face, cutting his right cheek 
 bone, dividing his nose and extending across the 
 left cheek. His sword was nearly cut in two, his 
 reins were severed, his jacket and the cantle of his 
 saddle were cut. His charger, a fine powerful 
 animal, to which he owed his life, as it lashed out 
 fiercely knocking over three Afghans, was shot 
 through the neck, and had both ears severed. The 
 bodies of the three officers were recovered, but 
 they were naked and headless. The tAvo squadrons 
 of the 2nd Cavalry which had disgraced themselves 
 were sent to India and disbanded. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes of this disgraceful affair : — 
 '' As soon as Sale saw the cavalry advance in pur- 
 suit, he asked me whether my horses w^ere fresh, as 
 those of the 6-pounders, which formed part of the 
 advance, were quite done up, and unable to move. 
 I said, ' certainly they were,' when he directed me 
 to send on two guns to support the cavalry who 
 were nearly a mile ahead. I took two guns, and 
 moved forward at a hand gallop, until a deep water- 
 course stopped me. While looking for a place at 
 
172 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 whicli the stream could be crossed, I saw a great 
 many horses rushing back from the front, and soon 
 afterwards, the remains of the two squadrons 
 arrived. They were ordered to the rear, and the 
 guns opened on the enemy, who, however, were so 
 few in number, and in such loose order, that it 
 was useless to j&re many shots at them. 
 
 " A wing of the 37th Native Infantry advanced? 
 covered by two of my 9-pounders, and carried the 
 key of Dost Mahomed's positio;i, which he abandoned 
 during the night." 
 
 Sir Eobert Sale says in his despatch — ''The 
 flank companies of the 37th Native Infantry and 
 one company of the 29th Native Infantry, supported 
 by two guns from Captain Abbott's battery, and 
 followed by some of the Jaun Bazes, now ascended 
 the hill overlooking the pass and valley of Pur wan, 
 which was crowded by the enemy's infantry, and 
 cleared it in brilliant style, the enemy deserting 
 their positions one after the other, and flying in 
 the direction of the Puhjshere valley, where they 
 still cover the hill sides in great numbers." But 
 Dost Mahomed had done all that honour required, 
 and he rode straight to Oabul and surrendered his 
 sword to the Envoy, Sir W. Macnaghten, who 
 treated him with generosity, and, on the 12th of 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 173 
 
 December, sent him, with his family, to India, 
 where he was pensioned until his return to his 
 own country two years later. On the following 
 day (the 3rd of November,) Sir R. Sale moved 
 again to Chareekar, and as, owing to the surrender 
 of Dost Mahomed, all danger for the present at 
 least was over, the column returned to Cabul for 
 the winter. 
 
 The following succinct account of the campaign 
 in the Kohistan, by Captain Abbott, would appear 
 to have been written for publication, as he omits 
 all reference to himself. 
 
 " On the 24th of September, 1840, a force which 
 included three 9-pounder guns, and the 24-pounder 
 howitzer of No. 6 Field Battery, was sent under 
 Brigadier Sale, to the Kohistan of Cabul. The 
 march was easy, and the troops reached Chareekar 
 on the 29th. The Brigadier made no halt there, 
 but moved on at once to attack Ali Khan, a rebel 
 chief, who held a fort and a village at Tootum- 
 Durra, close to the Ghorebund Pass. The enemy 
 were now driven from all their positions, and the 
 fort, a pretty and quite new one, was destroyed by 
 mines, after which the Brigadier moved back and 
 encamped at Chareekar. Our loss in the attack 
 was numerically speaking very small, but a most 
 
174 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 amiable member of our Society, Lieutenant E. 
 Conolly, was amongst tbe slain. A ball passed 
 tbrough his heart. 
 
 " It was reported to Sir A. Burnes, the Political 
 Officer with the force, that a meeting of the rebel 
 chiefs had occurred at Julgah, a fort about sixteen 
 miles north-east of Chareekar, and it was resolved 
 to surprise and capture them if possible. On the 
 3rd of October, the infantry started early, and were 
 followed at daylight by the artillery and regular 
 cavalry. There was no road at all, and the guns 
 had to cross fields watered by canals and water- 
 courses, which caused great delay and numberless 
 accidents to horses and harness. These difficulties 
 ceased at the end of five miles, after which the pace 
 was rapid, and the guns reached Julgah immediately 
 after the infantry, who, with some Afghan horse- 
 men, had quite surrounded the place. Julgah was 
 a very small fort, immediately above the high bank 
 of the Ghorebund river. A wall, six feet thick at 
 base, and three feet at crest, enclosed an area sixty 
 yards square. The wall was thirty feet high, but 
 had no ditch ; it was flanked by a round tower at 
 each corner, and houses twelve feet high, built 
 against the interior, answered the purpose of a 
 rampart. It was loopholed at a height of three 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 175 
 
 feet above the roofs of the houses. The towers 
 were soHd to the height of twelve feet, above which 
 they were hollow. The gate opened towards the 
 river, and could not be touched by artillery. The 
 plan of attack was to breach a bastion on its 
 eastern side, and to occupy the chambers within it 
 by the aid of ladders, for which the poles of our 
 doolies supplied material. At half-past ten a.m. 
 the guns opened fire, and at twelve had completely 
 opened the bastion at the south-east angle; the 
 Engineer officer, however, wished a portion of 
 curtain adjoining the bastion to be also breached, 
 a mistake which caused the attack to fail. At 
 three p.m., the breach of the curtain appeared to 
 be practicable, and the storming party moved to the 
 assault. They planted the ladders, intending to 
 escalade the bastion on the rubbish of the other 
 breach, where they were worse than useless. No 
 attempt was made to enter the bastion where the 
 men would have been screened from the fire of the 
 enemy within the walls; the storming party was 
 repulsed with loss, and retired. The mortars, which 
 had been sadly delayed by the canals and water- 
 courses, now arrived on the ground, and were used 
 without platforms ; a few shells were thrown into 
 the fort, which the enemy abandoned as soon as it 
 
176 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 was dark, escaping tlirougli the treacherous Afghan 
 horsemen, who allowed them to pass unmolested. 
 
 " On the 4th we recovered nearly all the shot that 
 had been used in breaching, and moved to Suh Hadji, 
 in the valley of the Ghorebund river, about three 
 miles below Beghram. 
 
 " On the 8th we made an extremely difficult march 
 across the country to Chareekar, damaging all the 
 harness, and breaking nearly all the yokes of the 
 mortar carts, which were drawn by bullocks. Two 
 days later we heard, but did not believe, that 
 Dost Mahomed had entered the Kohistan. On the 
 11th and 12th these reports were fully confirmed ; 
 it appeared, however, that he had scarcely any men 
 with him, and was moving towards Mjrow, a 
 valley north-east of the Kohistan, the chiefs of 
 which were favou/^ble to him. 
 
 " On the 15th the force marched to Karabagh, 
 and on the 17th took possession of Baboo-Koosh- 
 Ghur, and encamped amongst gardens and ravines 
 near it. 
 
 " On the night of the 18th, at nine o'clock, 
 about 1,000 men occupied the ravines and other 
 cover, and fired into camp until half-past eleven 
 p.m., when having expended their ammunition they 
 retired. Our pickets at first returned the fire, but 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 177 
 
 were ordered to keep quiet, after which not a sound 
 was heard in camp, save the ghurries striking the 
 hours, the time being given by the quarter-guard of 
 the 13th Light Infantry, and repeated in succession 
 by every corps from the right to the left of the hne. 
 The enemy wasted much powder and lead, and 
 killed only two men, a few beasts of various kinds, 
 completely riddling the tents with their balls. 
 
 *'0n the 19th of October, the 37th Native 
 Infantry, and two 9-pounder guns joined from 
 Cabul, and on the 20th, the whole force advanced 
 about four miles and encamped near Kardurrah, 
 a village surrounded by vineyards and enclosures 
 of different kinds. On the 21st we attacked the 
 position, which was abandoned by the enemy. The 
 grapes were quite ripe, and the soldiers carried off 
 as much as they could of that beautiful fruit. The 
 camp now removed to Karabagh, where the Briga- 
 dier awaited intelligence of the movements of Dost 
 Mahomed. A portion of the Kohistan Regiment 
 declared for the Dost, who had descended from 
 Nijrow, and appeared to be endeavouring to reach 
 Cabul by a circuitous route, avoiding Sale's force 
 altogether. On the 1st of November, Sale advanced 
 in the direction of Nijrow, and there ascertained 
 that Dost Mahomed was at Purwan-Durra. On 
 
 N 
 
178 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the 2nd of November, the force moved on Purwan- 
 Durra. The whole of the cavalry with the two 
 6-pounder guns of Shah Soojah's artillery, were in 
 advance, the field battery and the rest of the 
 force followed. The route was difficult, and the 
 6-pounders caused great delay ; at length they 
 fairly stuck on the ascent from the Purwan river, 
 and the cavalry went on without them. Dost 
 Mahomed was seen retreating along the rugged 
 face of a mountain that reached from the Purwan 
 to the Punj sheer river. He had about eighty ill- 
 mounted troopers, who were leading their horses, 
 and 3,000 or 3,500 riflemen on foot. The two 
 squadrons of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry went forward 
 at a good pace over the undulating, but not difficult, 
 ground at the base of the mountain, and it was 
 evident they would reach the Punjsheer river in 
 time to intercept the fugitives. Seeing this. Dost 
 Mahomed descended with his handful of cavalry, 
 who confronted boldly our regular troopers, and 
 made them run. In vain did the English officers 
 set the most gallant example by charging the 
 enemy ; they did so almost alone, and the men fled 
 shamefully from the field. As soon as the cavalry 
 advanced, leaving their 6-pounders to be dragged 
 up the steep bank of the Purwan river by working 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 179 
 
 parties of infantry, the General desired the officer 
 commanding the 9-pounder battery to send on two 
 9-pounders to replace the sixes. The 9-pounder 
 horses were quite fresh, and the two teams started 
 at a gallop, but the cavalry were a mile ahead, and 
 ere the guns had been five minutes in motion, they 
 met the Native troopers running from the field. 
 The whole battery went to the front, and formed 
 for action, allowing the fugitives to pass to the 
 rear, but the enemy would not face the guns, two 
 of which only were employed, to drive them from 
 the lower spurs of the mountain. Had the force 
 then pushed on, the enemy would have fled like 
 sheep ; the cavalry would have followed valiantly, 
 and nothing would have been said of the repulse. 
 As it was, we halted and formed camp, allowing 
 the enemy to hold the heights until night, after 
 which they retired at leisure. Dost Mahomed 
 went straight to Cabul, and gave himself up to 
 the Envoy. The two squadrons of cavalry were 
 afterwards sent to India and disbanded. 
 
 "Thus ended the Kohistan campaign of 1840. 
 The troops went into quarters for the winter. The 
 guns, with two teams only of horses, remained at 
 Cabul, the remainder of the cattle being sent to 
 Jellalabad. The new cantonment had been rendered 
 
 N 2 
 
180 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 habitable at Cabul, Her Majesty's 13th Light 
 Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, and the battery 
 were quartered in it, and were very comfortable. 
 The season, which was not a very severe one, passed 
 quietly away. Two 8-inch iron mortars, on 
 carriages drawn by teams of good horses, were 
 permanently attached to the battery, and a batter- 
 ing train of six iron 9 -pounders was sent from 
 India for the attack of the small forts with which 
 the countrv abounded." 
 
 Captain Abbott passed the winter of 1840-1, in 
 company with the 13th Light Infantry, and 35th 
 Native Infantry, in the new cantonments, where 
 barracks had been built for officers and men. 
 
 This cantonment was constructed as a place of 
 residence during peace for the garrison of the 
 citadel of Cabul. Lord Keane intended the upper 
 citadel, or Bala Hissar, to hold his magazines, 
 and the lower citadel to be garrisoned by the troops 
 in case of an insurrection. It was necessary to 
 surround the cantonments by a wall, as scarcely 
 a night passed without some Afghan assassin firing 
 into the camp, but the parapet was a mere mound 
 of earth, with a ditch in front of it. The Shah 
 objected to the occupation of the upper citadel by 
 our troops, because his palace was overlooked from 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 181 
 
 that position, and the Envoy, acceding to his 
 request in a weak moment, caused all the stores 
 to be turned out in the spring of 1841. The 
 powder was stored in a bastion at an angle of the 
 cantonment, where any mischievous person might 
 have exploded it ; the other stores were piled in an 
 orchard within the wall, and the commissariat stores 
 were placed in a fort, outside the cantonment, and 
 to their loss was largely attributable the disasters 
 that befell the British force at Cabul in the winter 
 of 1841. 
 
 Captain Abbott gives in a memorandum the 
 following account of the origin of the cantonment 
 and magazine fort at Cabul, which form such 
 prominent features in the tragedy of 1841-42 : — 
 " The proper post for the troops raised for the 
 protection of Shah Soojah's person, in case of a 
 general insurrection, and of their being unable to 
 face them in the field, was the Bala Hissar or 
 Citadel of Cabul. 
 
 " The Bala Hissar was an extensive fortress easily 
 defensible against any irregular force. The lower 
 fort contained the palace of the Shah, and the 
 humbler dwellings of many other persons. The 
 upper fort, which was not inhabited, was selected 
 as the site of our magaziine, and a better position 
 
182 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 could not have been chosen. But the Bala Hissar, 
 though an excellent position for troops standing on 
 the defensive, would have been a most inconvenient 
 abode for them under ordinary circumstances, and 
 it was determined that they should reside in an 
 open cantonment built on the nearest available 
 spot ; a strong guard being kept in the Upper 
 Bala Hissar, to secure the magazine against any 
 sudden attack. Shah Soojah offered one of his 
 gardens for the accommodation of the troops, and 
 no objections, on the shore of health, being made 
 to the spot, the barracks were built upon it in the 
 course of the year 1840. It was not originally 
 intended that the barracks should be enclosed by 
 even a common wall, but the annoyance sustained 
 by our men from small parties of Afghans, who 
 prowled around the camp, night after night, 
 occasionally shooting a soldier on his post, or in 
 his bed, obliged the General to order that the 
 troops in barracks should be protected against 
 such petty hostilities. The Engineer proposed to 
 surround the barracks by a slight field-work, which 
 was accordingly thrown up. That no other purpose 
 than the above could have been intended by Sir W. 
 Cotton or his Engineer, will be belived when I add, 
 that several Afghans were, at different times, 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 183 
 
 punished for walking over the parapet, and that 
 in 1841, Captain Younghusband of the 35th Native 
 Infantry, a heavy man, won a bet of two gold 
 mohurs, by riding his pony across the ditch over 
 the parapet, and fairly into the place, without much 
 difficulty. ISTo Engineer officer would have con- 
 structed such a work with any view to permanent 
 defence, and no man in his senses would have 
 placed, in such a position, a cantonment intended 
 to be defensible ; for, even if all the forts and other 
 buildings around it had been destroyed, there would 
 still have remained two deep canals running parallel 
 and very close to the north-west and south-east 
 faces of the place. These canals could not have 
 been filled up, without ruin to many miles of 
 cultivation which they watered. The heights of 
 Bey-Maroo also, 1,000 yards to the north-west, 
 afforded a position from which the lightest guns 
 could throw their shot into the cantonment. The 
 forts, and the heights, and the numerous gardens, 
 however, afforded most grateful shelter from the 
 cold blasts of a Cabul winter, and the canals were 
 very convenient to our men and cattle. 
 
 " It is extremely improbable that General Elphin- 
 stone would have defended the cantonment, had all 
 his supplies of ammunition remained in the Bala 
 
184 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Hissar, where Sir W. Cotton left them. They were 
 however ejected in the spring of 1841 by Shah 
 Soojah, in spite of every remonstrance that could 
 be offered by the military authorities. The Shah 
 would not even allow them to remain in the citadel 
 until accommodation could be provided elsewhere, 
 and the whole of the stores left by Lord Keane, 
 together with a large supply taken up by Lieu- 
 tenant Eyre, in 1841, were thrown down in an 
 orchard in the cantonment. The erection of a 
 magazine thus became absolutely necessary, and 
 the foundation of a small fortified square was laid 
 at a distance of 100 yards from the south-western 
 face of the field-work. The magazine fort was 
 never quite completed, but it became a very useful 
 post during the siege, and the delivery of it into 
 the hands of the Afghans, under the terms of the 
 treaty, placed our troops entirely at their mercy, 
 for it had been purposely built so as to command 
 the whole cantonment. 
 
 " The above is a faithful account of the 
 origin of the Cabul cantonment, and of the 
 magazine fort, which figure so conspicuously in 
 Captain Eyre's narrative, an excellent work, which 
 describes in unexaggerated language all that the 
 author intended, or had the means of knowing. 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 185 
 
 " The particulars whicli I now offer, are not verj 
 generally known, even by persons who were at 
 Cabul in 1840-41, and some undeserved blame has 
 been thrown upon Sir "W. Cotton, and the excellent 
 members of his staff. Captains Douglas, Paton, and 
 Sturt, who fell in j\fghanistan. The cantonment 
 was not originally intended to be anything more 
 than a large barrack-yard, the residence, during 
 peace, of the garrison allowed to defend the city of 
 Cabul, in case of an insurrection. That it ever 
 became a more important post was owing to a 
 combination of circumstances, for which neither 
 Sir W. Cotton, nor any of his staff, can justly be 
 considered responsible." 
 
 The winter of 1840-41 passed without any 
 incident of importance. Sir W. Cotton gave place 
 to Major- General El phin stone, an amiable officer, 
 but disqualified by physical infirmity, and, still 
 more, by a fatal weakness and indecision of 
 character, for the difficult task of keeping in check 
 the turbulent and warlike people of Afghanistan, 
 who chafed at the restraints imposed on them by 
 British officers, and looked with contempt on the 
 poor tool. Shah Soojah, whom they were told to 
 consider their king. While proceeding up from 
 Peshawur to Cabul, General Elphinstone detached, 
 
186 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 on the 21st of February, a column under Brigadier 
 Shelton, of the 44th Regiment, to chastise a 
 refractory tribe in the Nazian valley, called the 
 Sungho Khail, and the task was successfully 
 effected, though with the loss of nine killed and 
 twenty-four wounded, including Lieutenant Pigou, 
 of the Engineers, and Captain Douglas, Assistant- 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 In the spring of 1841, Shah Soojah, accompanied 
 by the Envoy and escorted by troops, returned to 
 Cabul from his winter quarters in Jellalabad. But 
 the quiet and order upon which Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten congratulated himself, was that of a 
 volcano before it bursts into fresh activity, and 
 there were not wanting signs to those who had eyes 
 to see, and ears to hear, that denoted a deep 
 feeling of restlessness and hatred of British rule. 
 Major Pottinger, the political agent in the 
 Kohistan, was the only one of Macnaghten's sub- 
 ordinates, who correctly measured the situation; 
 and, in May 1841, he sent warnings to his chief of 
 the state of feeling in his district. But, notwith- 
 standing his great reputation for courage and 
 sagacity, he was regarded in the light of an 
 alarmist, and the optimist view was taken both by 
 Macnaghten, who w^as in expectation of soon 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 187 
 
 returning to the provinces, and by his successor- 
 elect, Sir A. Burnes, who had established his 
 residence in the city of Cabul itself. 
 
 From motives of economy, the European portion 
 of the troops in Afghanistan had been reduced to a 
 point of dangerous weakness. General Nott's 
 division at Candahar only included one British 
 regiment, the 40th, and the division, whose head- 
 quarters were at Cabul, had but. two regiments, the 
 13th and 44th, of which the former was actually 
 under orders to return to India. There was no 
 European regiment of cavalry, in which arm both 
 divisions were equally deficient, and only one troop 
 of European horse-artillery in each division, though 
 'No. 6 Field Battery had proved itself not unworthy 
 by its lengthened and gallant services to rank in 
 efficiency with any battery of European gunners. 
 The Native Infantry of the Cabul division, consisted 
 of the 27th, 35th, 37th, and 54th Regiments, who 
 were to be divided between Cabul, Ghuznee, and 
 Jellalabad; and General Nott, who had the vast 
 country lying to the south and west of the Suffeid 
 Koh, including the garrison towns of Candahar, 
 Quetta, and Khelat-i-Ghilzye, had under his 
 command five regiments, the 2nd, 16th, 38tli, 40th, 
 and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry. 
 
188 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Besides these troops, there was the Shah's con- 
 tingent, under General Roberts, which included 
 horse, foot, and artillery, fairly serviceable troops. 
 Such was the military situation, immeasurably 
 weakened by the characters of the leaders at Cabul, 
 in the autumn of 1841, when Sale's brigade was 
 under orders to return to India, and Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten was about to take up the high office of 
 Governor of Bombay, to which he had been 
 nominated as a reward for his labours and anxieties 
 during the past three years. The disaffection, 
 caused by dislike for Shah Soojah, who treated the 
 native chiefs with hauteur, and openly manifested 
 his dependence on British bayonets, together with 
 the ill-judged reduction by one-half of the sub- 
 sidy paid to the Eastern Ghilzye chiefs, since 
 1839, for keeping the Passes open between Jella- 
 labad and Cabul, brought matters to a crisis, and 
 the year 1841 closed in such disgrace and 
 disaster as had never yet befallen British arms. 
 
 In September, 1841, intelligence arrived at Cabul, 
 that Captain Hay, of the Shah's force, had been 
 beaten off when attacking a fort at Zao, in the 
 Zoormut country, and, accordingly, a column was 
 detailed to proceed thither to chastise the 
 refractory chiefs. It was the first time a force of 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 189 
 
 regular troops had been sent to this part of the 
 country, which was known to be difficult, and 
 Captain Abbott proceeded in command of the 
 artillery detailed for the service, which included 
 four guns of his battery. He writes in his 
 Journal : — " By this time No. 6 Field Battery was 
 in excellent condition. Each gun had twelve good 
 horses for its draught, and six ponies for the 
 carriage of its waggon ammunition. Two 8-inch 
 mortars also, on double platform carts, with teams 
 of twelv^e horses, had been added to the armament." 
 Captain Abbott had repeatedly written for 18- 
 pounders to be sent from India, for reducing the 
 forts with which the country abounds, but the 
 authorities only sent, besides two 8-inch iron 
 mortars, six iron 9-pounders. 
 
 On the 28th of September, 1841, the force,* 
 commanded by Colonel Oliver of the 5th Native 
 Infantry, marched from Cabul, the infantry taking 
 the direct road from Sia Sung, through the Pass 
 by which the Logur river enters the valley of Cabul, 
 and the guns pursuing the more circuitous road by 
 
 * Two hundred of Her Majesty's 44th Foot, 5th Native Infan- 
 try, Anderson's Horse, 6th Shah's Infantry, Captain Backhouse's 
 mountain-train, four guns of No. 6 Battery, two 8-inch mortars, 
 two iron 9-pounders, three companies of Shah's Sappers. 
 
190 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the city of Cabul and the village of Indikee. At 
 the city of Cabul there is a steep ascent, and the 
 road through the village of Indikee was impractic- 
 able, so that the guns had to pass over the steep 
 rocky spur of the hill above the village. The view 
 from this eminence was beautiful. " Orchards, vine- 
 yards, and groves covered the whole face of the 
 valley, while innumerable canals and water-courses, 
 which gave life to the vegetation, glittered like 
 veins of silver amid the varied foliage of the trees." 
 The remainder of the march was easy, and camp 
 was pitched beyond the village of Char-Asya, a 
 distance of twelve and a half miles from Sia Sung, 
 but the 9-pounders did not arrive until sunset, 
 having been long delayed by the difficult ascent at 
 Indikee. On the following day the march was to 
 Gomoran, by a good road for a distance of ten 
 miles, with barren hills on the right, and cultivation 
 on the left. The guns then crossed with difficulty 
 the deep canals with muddy bottoms, and forded 
 the Logur river, on the right bank of which were 
 canals, where one of the mortar carts was broken. 
 On the 30th they encamped at Dadhoo Khail. The 
 change of climate now became very sensible, as 
 they had been gradually ascending towards the 
 source of the. Logur river. On the 1st of October, 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 191 
 
 they quitted the valley of the Logur, and proceeded 
 in a south-east direction over dreadful roads, " such 
 as I could not have imagined to exist in 
 Afghanistan," says Abbott, "to the village of 
 Budkao, under a low range of hills." 
 
 This day's march covered about ten and a half 
 miles, and that of the following day to Al-timour, 
 thirteen and a quarter miles, for ten of which the 
 road was excellent, crossing stony plains and one 
 stream of water. Then the troops entered the 
 Pass, which was easy as far as the encamping 
 ground. After breakfast. Colonel Oliver and 
 Captain Abbott rode on to examine the Pass, which 
 becomes more difficult at every step, and imme- 
 diately below its crest, for a distance of 600 yards, 
 is quite impracticable for horses in draught. The 
 road was the bed of a very steep torrent, and 
 ran between rocks some three or four feet in 
 height, over which the wheels of the carriages had 
 to be alternately lifted. Captain Sturt, the 
 Engineer officer — s.on-in-law of Sir R. Sale, who 
 fell in the retreat from Cabul a few months later — 
 set up his barometer, and found the crest of the 
 Pass to be 9,600 feet in height. 
 
 During the 3rd and 4th of October, the guns 
 were dragged over the Pass by 600 Afghans, when 
 
192 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the carriages were much shaken, and some were 
 seriouslj damaged. He says : — " You may imagine 
 the nature of the road when 100 Afghans were 
 three and a half hours employed in taking each 
 gun over 600 yards. I was out from five a.m. to 
 four p.m." The descent beyond the Pass was 
 easy, and on the evening of the 4th, the brigade 
 encamped in a very bad position, with high rugged 
 hills all around them. 
 
 On the 6th of October, they descended the bed 
 of a rivulet to Soork Killa, about eight miles, 
 where the country opens out, and the road enters 
 the Zoormut Yalley. Three more miles brought 
 them to the village of Bala Deh, which stands on 
 high ground, and six miles to the south rose the 
 hill on which stood the ancient fort, Ghur-Duz, 
 now a ruin, but having a deep wet ditch, which 
 must have made it almost impregnable to any 
 Afghan force. Captain Abbott, with other officers, 
 rode out eight miles to see the forts of Zao, which 
 had been abandoned by the enemy. The road 
 would have been difficult for guns, owing to a river 
 and some ravines, though the country is open, and 
 the distance from Soork Killa on one side, to Zao 
 on the other side of the valley, is about twelve miles. 
 The soil is fertile and well watered, but imperfectly 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN, 193 
 
 cultivated ; the villages are few in number and very 
 small, and every field had a round tower for the 
 defence of its owner. Zao itself, the most consider- 
 able of them, had a thick wall, and was defended 
 by five small forts. The people had all fled to 
 the hills, which, covered with pine trees, rise 
 immediately behind the village, and as they 
 
 obstinatelv refused to submit and acknow- 
 
 «/ 
 
 ledge Shah Soojah, their property was doomed 
 to destruction. 
 
 On the 7th, Colonel Oliver marched about eight 
 miles northward, to Gurruck, the residence of 
 robbers, who of course were " not at home." 
 Their forts and smaller towers, intended to protect 
 them, were destroyed, and, on the following day, 
 the column marched five miles to the fort of Khoja 
 Meer, a notorious freebooter, which was also 
 destroyed. 
 
 On the 9th, they turned their faces towards 
 Cabul, and, marching eleven and a half miles over 
 very difficult ground encamped at Soork Killa. The 
 next day they crossed the Pass amid a snow storm, 
 with hail and rain, and encamped at Al-Timour. 
 Abbott says, *' only one tent was standing, and the 
 ploughed land, in which the camp was pitched, was 
 like a hasty pudding." After a halt of one day 
 
 
 
194 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 they marched on the 12th, and the Cabul cantonment 
 was reached on the 17th. 
 
 Captain Abbott gives the following account of 
 this expedition to Zoormut, in letters to his brother 
 Frederick. The first is dated, " twenty miles south 
 of Cabul, Logur river, the 29th of September, 
 1841." He says:— 
 
 " Yesterday's march of twelve miles brought us 
 to the pretty village of Char Asya. The road was 
 difficult round Cabul, and, at a village half way, 
 so perfectly impracticable, that we were obliged to 
 drag our guns over a high, steep, rocky hill, which 
 caused great delay, and we did not reach camp 
 until half -past twelve o'clock. The heavy rains 
 were out from five a.m. until sunset. The said 
 hill, however, affords the most lovely view I have 
 ever enjoyed. A valley of immense extent is com- 
 pletely covered with orchards and vineyards ; 
 numerous forts enlivened the landscape, and the 
 hundreds of streams that give life to the vegetation, 
 reflect the rays of the sun from every spot that is 
 not hidden by the foliage of the trees. Char Asya 
 is a pretty village watered by five ' kahreezes ;' but 
 nothing in Afghanistan can equal the valley of the 
 Cabul river as viewed from the village of Indikee, 
 a name of fear to horses and bullocks attached to 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 195 
 
 guns. This morning we came for six miles over as 
 fine a road as ever I saw in India, and agam, after 
 slopping through a few scores of canals near the 
 Logur, have got upon capital ground. The Logur 
 is a nice little stream about forty yards broad and 
 three feet deep, with large shingle for its bed. 
 Captain Hay has been reconnoitring the forts and 
 reports them to be newly repaired, and that their 
 garrisons, which have been increased, all fired on 
 his party. They will probably give us a good deal 
 of trouble as we have no battering guns. I am 
 glad that my repeated applications for 18-pounders 
 are on record — with two such guns I should be 
 certain of success — with 9-pounders I have twice 
 failed, and of course am rather nervous. There is 
 no shelter near the forts, which protect each other, 
 and we shall require regular batteries for the guns, 
 and a trench for the guard. Had we not come on 
 this trip, I should have most likely been sent into 
 Nijrow. There is such misrule here, that the 
 country never can be quiet ; people are sent out for 
 the express purpose of getting up rows, and ren- 
 dering the employment of our troops necessary. 
 
 October 1st., Budkao. — Yesterday and-to day's 
 marches of twelve and a half and ten and a half 
 miles, have been over such roads as I could not 
 
 2 
 
196 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 have imagined to exist in Afghanistan. Plains of 
 great extent, bounded east and west by rugged hills, 
 are generally barren, but there is abundance of 
 water and in some places the cultivation is con- 
 siderable. We have just heard of Sir William 
 Macnaghten's nomination to the Government of 
 Bombay. Yesterday storms were raging all round 
 us and the hills were covered with snow, which, 
 however, will not lie at this season. To-day is mild 
 again. The only late news from our front is, that 
 the enemy have sent in petitions to the Shah ex- 
 plaining their conduct and begging pardon. 
 Macnaghten will now be anxious to be off, and to 
 leave all matters here in a quiet state, so I suspect 
 there will be no fighting, and may add that I hope 
 so, for there is no pleasure in seeing people killed, 
 w^hile one runs infinitely greater risk in attack- 
 ing these paltry places, than would be incurred 
 before an ' Antwerp.' No credit is ever obtained, 
 and the most distinguished service is acknowledged 
 by a few common place words in an ** Order," and 
 then forgotten altogether. If Sanders had been 
 wounded at Ghuznee, instead of in an infinitely more 
 dashing affair (as far as his conduct was concerned), 
 he would be a major and C.B. now to a certainty ; 
 whereas he has only the scars of his wounds and 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 197 
 
 periodical pains in consequence of them, to remind 
 Lim that his most gallant behaviour averted dis- 
 credit from tlie British na're. Yesterday we 
 reached the entrance of a hill pass, and came two 
 miles up it. A party rode on at two p.m. to in- 
 spect the crest, three and a half miles distant. 
 Two and a half miles w^ere tolerable, the ascent 
 gradual and not very stony ; but after that, a rocky 
 nullah, very narrow, very steep, and with stones 
 two or three feet high in the middle, conducted us 
 to the crest, up which the road is made, but is so 
 excessively steep that three out of five horses were 
 floored and brought to a standstill, while mine, a 
 very powerful beast, was much distressed. This 
 ascent is about 400 yards long. The heavy guns 
 have gone on this morning, preceded by the sap- 
 pers, and attended by 800 Afghans to man the 
 drag ropes. The enemy have bolted, and why we 
 should incur all this trouble and damage, I cannot 
 conceive, but the Envoy delights in giving trouble 
 to the troops, and will keep us at this w^ork another 
 month if Elphin stone will allow him. It is horribly 
 cold here at night the altitude being 8,500 
 feet." 
 
 On the 7th of October he continues his letter 
 from Bala-Deh : 
 
1P8 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 •*' I wrote to jou from the other side of the Pass, 
 as soon as we heard that our friends in the forts 
 had bolted. We were two days employed in drag- 
 ging the guns over the Kothul. The four guns and 
 their two platform waggons were on the road all 
 the first day, and enjoyed a snow storm. Sturt set 
 up his thermometer on the pass and made the 
 altitude 9,600 feet. We are here about thirteen 
 miles from the Kothul and shall have a heavy fall 
 on the way up, though it is nowhere steep. 
 Ghurduz is a remarkable object in tMs valley, being 
 built on an isolated table-hill, about forty feet 
 above the plain, and having a sort of citadel, or 
 rather the ruins of one, on a natural mound rising 
 twenty or thirty feet higher. This valley is well 
 watered and susceptible of great fertility ; but the 
 inhabitants are few in number, and not above half 
 the available land is cultivated annually, the other 
 half remains fallow. The hills are sprinkled with 
 stunted firs, resembling the juniper in foliage. 
 Yesterday I rode to see the forts eight miles 
 distant. The road is much broken and flooded, 
 and we should have had trouble in taking on the 
 guns. The forts are most contemptible ; all their 
 gates completely exposed, their towers mere nut- 
 shells, and none of them shot proof. In fact resis- 
 
CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN. 199 
 
 tance would have been madness. The village has a 
 thick wall, but much dilapidated. A few rounds 
 from the 9-pounders would make a nice mess of such 
 pepper-pots. The General will be angry, and with 
 reason, at our having brought the guns over the 
 Pass, after hearing that they were not required. 
 I was not consulted in the matter." 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 
 
 Revolt of the Eastern Ghilzyes — Forcing the Passes of Jella- 
 labad — The Fighting at Khoord-Cabul and JngduUuck — The 
 Camp at Gundamuck — Arrival at Jellalabad — Condition of the 
 Defences — The Actions of the 14th of November and Ist of 
 December — The Council of War — The Earthquake of the 19th 
 of February — The Sorties of the 22nd of February and 11th 
 March— The Action of the 7th of April — Arrival of General 
 Pollock's Army. 
 
 "pvUMNGr his absence on tliis dour through 
 ^^ the Zoormut Yallej, important events had 
 occurred, and still more momentous incidents were 
 on the eve of accomplishment. The storm that so 
 soon was to overtake the devoted Cabul brigade 
 with disaster and death, was already gathering, but 
 Sir William Macnaghten affected to regard it with 
 unconcern, and wrote flippant letters in which, 
 speaking of the revolt of the Eastern Ghilzyes, and 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 201 
 
 their occupation of the Khoord-Cabul Pass, he 
 talked of " the impudence of the rascals," and 
 anticipating a speedy end to the insurrection, when 
 "the country will be quieter than ever it was," 
 described the name of Shah Soojah as " a tower of 
 strength." Thus his official blindness remained to 
 the last, and he turned a deaf ear to the warnings 
 of Pottinger, who was of opinion that the 
 Kohistanees, headed by Meer Musjidi, had 
 formed a league with the Grhilzyes and Douranees 
 against us. 
 
 On the 9th of October, General Elphinstone sent 
 Colonel Monteith to clear the Khoord-Cabul Pass 
 with his regiment, the 35th JNTative Infantry, a 
 squadron of the 5th Cavalry, a rissalah of Irregular 
 horse, the two guns of Captain Abbott's battery 
 remaining at Cabul, under Lieutenant Dawes, and 
 half of Broadfoot's Sappers. On reaching Boodhak, 
 the first march from the city, Monteith found that 
 the Khoord-Cabul Pass was occupied in force, upon 
 which he halted and sent for reinforcements. 
 
 On the night of the 10th, his camp was attacked 
 by the Ghilzyes from the Pass and volunteers from 
 Cabul, and he sustained some loss. Upon receipt 
 of this intelligence. Sir Robert Sale marched on the 
 11th with the 13th Light Infantry, which, in 
 
202 THE AFGHAN WAR 
 
 company witli Monteitli's small brigade, cleared tlie 
 Khoord-Cabul Pass in gallant style, wlien Sir R. 
 Sale, who, with four other officers, had been 
 wounded, returned with the 13th Light Infantry 
 and Captain Oldfield's squadron of the 5th Cavalry 
 to Boodhak. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to a friend of this 
 affair : — " As the advance guard, consisting of four 
 companies of the 13th and 35th, and my two guns, 
 approached the narrow gorge of the Pass, where a 
 breastwork and turret had been erected, a heavy 
 fire was opened. Greneral Sale was shot in the 
 ankle, and Colonel Dennie, who got command, 
 actually ordered the guns in advance with some 
 sappers. Dawes galloped over the breastwork 
 which had been breached by the stream during the 
 heavy rain of the preceding night. Here three of 
 his horses were shot, and one man got a ball 
 through the leg, and had not the sappers, laying 
 aside their tools, ascended and drove off the 
 enemy, the guns would have been entirely crippled. 
 Meanwhile our infantry ascended the heights, and 
 drove the enemy off. The column now went 
 through, established the 35th and my guns beyond 
 it, and then the 13th returned to Cabul." 
 
 Colonel Monteith remained encamped in the 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 203 
 
 small valley beyond the Khoord-Cabul Pass, with 
 the 35th, Dawes' two guns, and a rissalah of 
 Anderson's horse, our ally, Jan Fishan Khan, re- 
 maining on the heights wdth his force of 200 
 juzallchees. Captain Macgregor, the Political 
 officer, who had accompanied Colonel Oliver's 
 column to Zao, had hastened his return on the 
 requisition of Sir W. Macnaghten, who placed the 
 highest confidence in his ability and discretion, and 
 started to join Monteith's camp, in order to 
 negotiate with Humza Khan and the other Ghilzye 
 chiefs for the restoration of tranquillity. 
 
 As some days elapsed without Captain Mac- 
 gregor making any progress in his negotiations 
 with the insurgents, the Envoy saw that a consider- 
 able force, with more guns, would be required to 
 bring them to terms, and only awaited the arrival 
 of Oliver's column to send a strong brigade under 
 Sir E.. Sale, with Captain Abbott's battery and 
 Captain Backhouse's mountain -train. Meanwhile 
 the plot was thickening. 
 
 The 18th was attacked every night by parties 
 w^lio went out from Cabul, but the 35th Native 
 Infantry, at Khoord-Cabul, were unmolested until 
 the 17th, when, at sunset, a messenger arrived from 
 a Ghilzye chief at Kubber-i-Jubber, giving warnino- 
 
204 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 of his intention to attack the camp in the course of 
 two hours. The promised attack was made at 
 eight p.m., and lasted for about three hours, during 
 which Lieutenant Jenkins and thirteen men were 
 killed, or mortally w^ounded, and owing to the 
 treachery of some Afghans, supposed to be friendly 
 to Shah Soojah, who were permitted to encamp 
 near the 35th, eighty commissariat camels and much 
 baggage were driven off. 
 
 On the 18th of October, Captain Backhouse's 
 mountain -train and the Zoormut detachment of 
 sappers joined Colonel Monteith, and, at noon of 
 the 19th, within twenty-four hours of his return, 
 Captain Abbott, having repaired the damages to 
 his carriages caused by the recent march to Zao, 
 and changed some of his armament, marched in 
 company with the 37th Native Infantry to join 
 Sir R. Sale, with the following guns : — Three 
 brass 9-pounders, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 
 8-inch and two 5^-inch mortars. At Boodhak, 
 besides the 13th Light Infantry, was one 5|-inch 
 mortar, and on proceeding to Khoord-Cabul with 
 Sir R. Sale on the following day. Captain Abbott's 
 command was increased by his two guns, under 
 Lieulenant Dawes, and Captain Backhouse's 
 mountain-train battery. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 205 
 
 The brigade halted at Khoord-Cabul on the 21st, 
 to await the arrival of camels from Cabul, and, 
 next morning, marched to Tezeen in the following 
 order : — Advance guard, under Colonel Monteith : 
 two companies Light Infantry leading, two com- 
 panies each of the 35th Native Infantry and 37th 
 Native Infantry, two guns, the mountain- 
 train, three companies of the sappers. Main 
 column, under Colonel Dennie : 13th Light 
 Infantry, 35th Native Infantry, 37th Native 
 Infantry, one troop of 5th Cavalry, one rissalah of 
 Anderson's Irregular cavalry, two guns. Rear 
 guard, under Captain Old field, 5th Cavalry : one 
 company each of 35th Native Infantry and 37th 
 Native Infantry, two companies sappers, two 
 guns, and one troop of 5th Cavalry. 
 
 The march before the column was a long one of 
 no less than sixteen miles, through the tremendous 
 passes of the Huft Kotul, which could be defended 
 by a few resolute men against an army; but, 
 fortunately, no enemy barred their progress until 
 late in the day, when, on entering the valley of 
 Tezeen, the heights in every quarter were found to 
 be occupied by jvzailchees, while a body of men 
 issued from the gardens and fort of Mohamed 
 Afzul, a large work, and crowned a hill 
 
206 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 immediately in rear of the fort. Colonel Monteith 
 halted the advance guard, and the two guns 
 cleared the hill in the course of a few minutes, 
 when the infantry advanced ; and, as they ascended, 
 the enemy fell back, endeavouring to lead our men 
 up the heights, but they were held back, and 
 occupied the fort and the lower spurs of the moun- 
 tains until half-past three p.m., when the advanced 
 parties were recalled. 
 
 A little later, as the enemy occupied a position 
 which commanded the ground on which Sir R. 
 Sale had decided to encamp, some companies of 
 the 13th, aided by the guns, advanced to disperse 
 them, but ammunition failing the infantry, some 
 little confusion ensued, and Lieutenant E. King of 
 the 13th, described by Abbott, as " one of the 
 finest young soldiers I ever knew," was killed. 
 " The guns of No. 6 Field Battery, and three of 
 Captain Backhouse's," he adds in his Journal, 
 " were engaged throughout the day in supporting 
 the attacks of the infantry. At sunset I placed my 
 guns with the right flank picquet." 
 
 The rear guard, under Captain Oldfield, owing 
 to want of carriage did not reach camp until ten 
 p.m. The enemy withdrew during the night, and 
 occupied positions covering another fort in the 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, 207 
 
 hills. In Mohamed Alzul's fort was found forage 
 enough for two days, but the country around was 
 bare, and the 3,000 cattle of the brigade must have 
 been without any fodder had the enemy destroyed 
 this supply. 
 
 On the 23rd of October, Sir E. Sale warned a 
 detachment for service, under Colonel Dennie, 
 against the fort of Khoda Bux Khan, but messages 
 of submission were sent by that chief and his 
 confederates, and Captain Macgregor concluded a 
 treaty whereby the Ghilzyes agreed to supply 
 forage and keep open the road on condition of their 
 former subsidy being restored to them. 
 
 On the 24th, the chiefs supplied forage to the 
 starving cattle, and, on the following day. Sir 
 Robert Sale, finding the carriage insufficient for 
 the entire brigade, sent back a column lightly 
 equipped, consisting of the 37th Native Infantry, 
 half of Broadfoot's sappers, and half of Backhouse's 
 mountain-train 3 -pounder guns, to Kubber-i- 
 Jubber, where they Avere directed to await the 
 arrival of the Shah and Envoy on their way to 
 Jellalabad, whence the 37th would accompany him 
 to India. The Assistant Quartermaster-General, 
 Captain J. Baton, accompanied this column in 
 order to select a position from which they could, if 
 
208 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 necessary, move on Cabul in one day, the Khoord- 
 Cabnl Pass being kept open by our ally, Jan Fishan 
 Khan. 
 
 On the 26th, the brigade marched to Seh Baba, 
 Captain Abbott, with four of his guns, being on the 
 advanced guard. The column was followed by the 
 Ghilzyes who made attacks on the baggage and 
 on the rear guard, but the Pass, being wide, they 
 effected little mischief ; and the hostages informed 
 the Political Agent that the collision was unavoid- 
 able in consequence of the breaking up of the 
 Ghilzye force, the chiefs of which had little 
 control over their followers. The camp was well 
 protected during the night, the enemy firing 
 occasionally; and, on the 27th, the brigade 
 moved on to Kuttur Sung, through a narrow 
 Pass. 
 
 On this day. Captain Abbott commanded the 
 advanced guard, but saw no enemy until he nearly 
 reached the summit of the Pass, above Bareek-Aub, 
 when the vedettes were fired on by Grhilzyes, who 
 immediately decamped. He' left a company of the 
 18th, under Captain Wilkinson, at the crest of the 
 Pass, to aid the rear guard, which had to fight 
 throughout the march, inflicting severe loss on the 
 enemy. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 209 
 
 While encamped at Kuttur Sung, the General was 
 warned to avoid the gun road through the Peri 
 Durra Pass, as it was occupied by large bodies of 
 the enemy, and to take the route over the hills. 
 The march of the 28th from Kuttur Sung to the 
 Peribagh (in the middle of the JugduUuck Pass) 
 was very diflB.cult, but, although the Ghilzyes, dis- 
 appointed of their anticipated booty, crossed the 
 hills and attacked the rear guard, the camping 
 ground was reached with little loss. But hot work 
 was anticipated for the morrow, as throughout the 
 day, the vedettes saw large parties of the enemy 
 going forward to occupy the JugduUuck Pass, about 
 three miles in length, through which the force would 
 have to march. The camp was pitched in and about a 
 grove of mulberries, and, occasionally, two guns, 
 posted on the steep hill above, fired at parties pass- 
 ing ahead to occupy the narrowest part of the defile. 
 During the day, eighty camels, while foraging, were 
 captured by the enemy, who, however, restored them 
 on receiving 1,300 rupees. 
 
 At daylight on the 29th, the Brigade marched. 
 Captain Abbott, with four of his guns, being placed 
 in command of the advanced guard, which moved 
 with strong flanking parties on the heights on either 
 side. They proceeded about three miles before 
 
 k 
 
210 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 meeting with serious resistance, and, at length, 
 reached the point selected by the enemy for their 
 stand — being the spot where the Afghans raised the 
 barrier at which the Cabul troops were so remorse- 
 lessly slaughtered on the succeeding 12th of 
 January, when Brigadier Anquetil, commanding 
 the Shah's troops, Colonel Chambers, of the 5th 
 Cavalry, (Abbott's friend and correspondent), and 
 many brave officers, died sword in hand. At this 
 point, on the right, a stone breast-work, or sungha, 
 with a steep ravine in front of it, obstructed the 
 flankers, while large bodies of Ghilzyes held a high 
 and steep hill on the left. This hill our soldiers 
 could not climb, but they took post on the lower 
 spurs of it, and prevented the Afghans from de- 
 scending to the road. Captain Abbott sent Captain 
 Wilkinson, of the 13th, a very fine officer, through 
 the defile itself, to ascertain whether any barrier 
 existed in advance ; but as he found none. Captain 
 Abbott moved on with the remainder of the 
 advanced guard and his guns, and took the rebel 
 defences in reverse, after which he posted parties to 
 protect the baggage. The rear guard was attacked 
 throughout the march, and at one time so furious 
 was the assault by a large body of Afghans, who 
 returned to the rear over the hills, that the column 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 211 
 
 was thrown into some confusion ; the camel drivers 
 abandoned their charges and fled to the front, and 
 the camels, with their loads, were captured by the 
 enemy. The small guard were heavily engaged on 
 the heights, and it was not until Captain Backhouse, 
 with his artillerymen, and Captain Fen wick, with a 
 company of the 13th, showed a steady front that 
 order was restored. 
 
 The Brigade reached Soorkhaub (''red river") 
 late in the day, and passed a quiet night ; but the 
 losses had been very heavy during the day, thirty- 
 one officers and men being killed, and ninety-one 
 wounded. Captain Abbott says : " The officer 
 killed was Captain Wyndham, 85th ISTative Infantry. 
 He was lame, and having dismounted to assist a 
 wounded soldier, was cut down by the enemy 
 Lieutenants Holcombe and Rattray, of the 13th 
 Light Infantry, were wounded ; the former was one 
 of the best skirmishers of the force. He used a 
 rifle of very large bore, and made wonderfully 
 correct practice with it. Amidst all the confusion 
 that occurred in the Pass, Holcombe was standing, 
 with one sergeant by his side, on the spur of a bill, 
 loading and firing deliberately upon the masses of 
 the enemy, who were scrambling for the abandoned 
 
 p 2 
 
212 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 baggage. The sergeant was equally cool, and they 
 had killed a great many Afghans, when Holcombe 
 received a ball through his leg, and was obliged to 
 retire, which he did unmolested, the enemy being 
 too active in plunder to take any notice of him or 
 his comrade." 
 
 On the 30tb, the Brigade marched, with little 
 opposition, from Soorkhaub to Gundamuck, a village 
 situated upon table-land some thirty miles west of 
 Jellalabad. Here they found cantoned the Khyber 
 regiment, under Captain Burn; 250 Eusofzye 
 juzailchees, under Captain Gerard ; 300 Douranee 
 horsemen (jaunhazes), under Captain Dawson ; and 
 two 6-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks. The Brigade 
 remained in camp at Gundamuck until the 11th 
 of November. Meanwhile terrible events had 
 happened at Cabul, but so blind was Sir W. Mac- 
 naghten to the crisis that, on the 1st of November, 
 the day before the outbreak of the insurrection, 
 when Sir A. Burnes and other officers were 
 murdered, we find him writing to Macgregor that 
 he ** hoped the business last reported was the ex- 
 piring effort of the rebels," alluding to the severe 
 fighting at Jugdulluck. To Major Rawlinson, the 
 Political Agent with General Nott, he also wrote on 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 213 
 
 the same day, which was that fixed for his departure 
 from Cabul, congratulating him on the tranquil 
 aspect of affairs at Candahar. 
 
 Sir R. Sale wrote from Gundamuck on the 30th 
 of October, regarding the gallantry displayed by his 
 troops during the arduous march from Cabul: 
 " Since leaving Cabul, they have been kept constantly 
 on the alert by attacks night and day ; from the time 
 of their arrival at Tezeen they have invariably 
 bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has 
 only been secured by unremitting labour and throw- 
 ing up entrenchments, and very severe outpost duty, 
 whilst each succeeding morning has brought its 
 affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently 
 skilful in the species of warfare to which their 
 attempts have been confined, and armed w\\hjuzails^ 
 which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at 
 which they could only be reached by our artillery. 
 I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the 
 gallantry of officers and men on every occasion, and 
 especially in scaling the tremendous heights above 
 Jugdulluck. I beg to express my sense of the 
 highly able assistance which I have received in all 
 our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the 
 operations, from Colonels Dennie and Monteith, 
 C.B. I have been much pleased with the address 
 
214 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 and able arrangements of Captain Abbott, of the 
 Artillery, who has twice commanded the advanced 
 guard ; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my 
 brigade- major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian 
 interpreter to Greneral Elphinstone (temporarily 
 attached to me), deserve my warmest commenda- 
 tions." 
 
 On the day after Sale's arrival at Gund amuck, 
 Burkut Khan, an influential Ghilzye chief, paid 
 Macgregor a visit, and brought with him two 
 others, Saadad Meer and Sur Boland Khan, who 
 offered their submission. Supplies were abundant, 
 and thannahs (posts) for the protection of the road 
 to Cabul were re-established, and matters began to 
 look brighter. But there was one powerful chief 
 who held aloof, and, on the 4th of November, the 
 grass-cutters of Sale's force were attacked by men 
 from Mammoo Khail, a fort situated in a difficult 
 country, some three or four miles from camp, be- 
 longing to Afzul Khan Urzebegi, who had arrived 
 from Cabul with orders from the insurgent chiefs to 
 raise all the country against the Feringhees. 
 Captain Macgregor sent a letter to this chief, re- 
 quiring his presence in camp, but as he did not 
 make his appearance, on the following day a column, 
 including some artillery, under Captain Abbott, 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 215 
 
 marched against the fort, which was abandoned "by 
 the enemy and occupied by the British. A body of 
 Irregular troops was ordered to garrison the fort, 
 and the force returned to camp on the 6th. 
 
 After the hard marching and still harder fighting 
 of the past few days, when the men had to be on 
 the qui vive, day and night, the troops found the 
 respite, for it was too brief to be called rest, most 
 welcome. The valley of Gundamuck is one of the 
 most beautiful in Afghanistan, and is remarkable 
 for the profusion of the vegetables and fruit with 
 which it abounds. The cantonment in which the 
 Irregular troops, forming part of Shah Soojah's 
 contingent, 'were quartered, was placed on a table- 
 land, and the brigade pitched its tents close at hand. 
 The utmost care was taken to guard against a sur- 
 prise in which description of warfare the Afghans 
 are such adepts, but after the recent severe lesson 
 read them in the Passes they were not likely to try 
 the effects of a " shub khoon." 
 
 Of the gardens at Mammoo Khail, Captain 
 Abbott writes to a relative in England : — " The 
 gardens and vineyards are of great beauty and 
 extent, and so abundantly do the grapes grow, that 
 during the month of August, while I have been 
 here, they were given to the bullocks to eat. The 
 
216 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 trees are most luxuriant and so numerous at tlie 
 village, that some vines, which are allowed to wan- 
 der over their branches, form a complete canopy 
 protecting the whole of the force from the rays of 
 the sun. These vines produce but poor grapes, the 
 fine fruit growing in the vineyards, where the vine 
 is cut down to the height of a small gooseberry 
 bush." 
 
 He writes from Gundamuck, on the 7th of 
 November : " I took one day only to repair my 
 shattered carriages, and pay my men, and on the 
 19th, the guns came out toBoodhak at the northern 
 extremity of the Khoord-Cabul Pass. On the 20th, 
 all assembled at the camp of the 35th, and, on the 
 22nd, we advanced against Tezeen. The march oE 
 fifteen miles was clear of an enemy, but we found 
 the heights around the Tezeen valley strongly 
 occupied by jiizailckees, while a small fort and a 
 large orchard poured forth a host who would not 
 face the troops on the plain, but took post on a 
 steep hill close above the fort. Two shells, which 
 killed seven men on the spot and wounded many 
 others, cleared the brow of the hill, and the troops 
 got up easily, but they had some fighting on the 
 top. By the night, we had the orchard and fort, 
 and as many of the heights as we required to secure 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 217 
 
 our position. Next day we were about to advance 
 against the superior fort of Tezeen when the enemy 
 sent in a civil message, and as our cattle were 
 starving, we were glad to patch up a peace, when 
 they supplied us with forage, and enabled us to 
 move forward on the 26th. From that day until 
 the 30th, when we reached Gundamuck, we had to 
 fight our way. At the Jugdulluck Pass was the 
 severest affair, and I will give you some account of 
 it. Jugdulluck is an open space in the middle of a 
 long pass. There are two roads by which you may 
 reach it from Cabul, one through the Peri-Durra 
 Pass, where a few children might destroy an army 
 with stones ; the other across the mountains, leaving 
 the Peri-Durra about a mile to the left. The latter 
 road, difficult as it was, we preferred, and we saw 
 the inner Pass lined with Ghilzyes, who sat like 
 foul vultures on the heights waiting for their prey. 
 Not a camel of our's, however, entered that Pass, 
 and the enemy then crossed our road and fought 
 the rear guard. Foiled in this attempt, the Ghilzyes 
 went forward and occupied the Pass ahead of us ; 
 they were about 1,000 strong, and added to the 
 natural strength of the mountain, by building stone 
 breastworks in commanding positions. At half- 
 past seven of the 29th, we advanced to force the 
 
218 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Pass. I commanded the advanced guard, and my 
 orders were to proceed steadily, securing tlie lieiglits 
 on either side as I advanced. All went well for 
 two miles, our skirmishers driving the enemy before 
 them, but at half a mile from the crest of the Pass, 
 our people were checked on both sides at the same 
 moment. On the left, a lofty mountain threw down 
 three steep and rugged spurs into the Pass, while 
 above the spurs it rose like a wall, and was fortified 
 by three breastworks, one commanding the other. 
 On the right, a deep chasm presented itself, with a 
 breastwork beyond. After securing the spurs of 
 the hill, the whole column pushed through the Pass, 
 leaving the enemy on the heights checked by our 
 skirmishers, who maintained their position on the 
 lower part of the hill. Thus far, all went on well, 
 but on the too early withdrawal of the people I had 
 sent up, the enemy rushed down in force upon the 
 rear guard. The whole affair cost us 126 men 
 killed and wounded, including four officers, and the 
 rear guard was so much shaken that the column 
 was obliged to countermarch to their succour. We 
 reached Gundamuck on the 30th, and remained 
 there quiet until the 4th, when an attack was made 
 on our grass-cutters by the men of Afzul Khan, one 
 of the Shah's most trusted and indulged officers. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 219 
 
 I^ext day, at two p.m., we marched on his fort, 
 about four miles from camp, by a dreadful road, 
 which was evidently reckoned as an obstacle to 
 delay us all day. The horses, however, worked so 
 well, and the men of the 13th gave such willing 
 assistance, that we reached the fort at four o'clock. 
 The enemy retreated, firing a few shots, and, when 
 two of us went on, we found the fort quite empty. 
 Cauldrons of broth were boiling on the fire, and 
 troughs of dough about to be converted into bread, 
 showing we had been rather sharp on our friends. 
 The fort is a pretty, clean place, about 100 yards 
 square, and surrounded by gardens and vineyards, 
 with streams of clear water running from the hills 
 in its rear, forming as nice a property as I have 
 seen in the country. As rain had been falling for 
 two hours, the men got under shelter, the cavalry 
 a ad artillery, with an infantry guard, remaining 
 outside. We returned to camp yesterday." 
 
 Of the superiority of the enemy's matchlocks, he 
 says : " The long rifles of the Afghans kill at 800 yards, 
 while our musket has not half that range, and we 
 wage a most unequal war with the mountaineers, 
 who never allow us to approach them within musket 
 shot." 
 
 On the 6th of November, the day the column re- 
 
220 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 turned from Mammoo Khail, rumours first became 
 current that an insurrection had taken place in 
 Cabul; that Sir A. Burnes and other officers had 
 been murdered, and that our troops were besieged 
 in their cantonment. Sir R. Sale immediately 
 moved his camp to the cantonment occupied by the 
 local levies, and precautionary measures were taken 
 to meet the coming storm, anticipations of which 
 not all the soft words of the Ghilzye chiefs could 
 remove. During the night of the 10th of November, 
 a messenger, who had travelled in company with a 
 man who bore a missive for Noureddin Khan, the 
 leader of the jaunhazps, from one of the rebel chiefs 
 at the capital, arrived in camp bringing letters for 
 Captain Macgregor from Sir "W. Macnaghten, 
 and for Sir R. Sale, from General Elphinstone, 
 dated the 9th inst., peremptorily requiring the im- 
 mediate return, " at all risks," of the brigade to 
 Cabul. 
 
 But Sir Robert Sale declined to adopt a course 
 which, he considered, would involve the destruction 
 of his brigade, and resolved to continue his march 
 on Jellalabad. His determination was bitterly 
 resented by the officers of the Cabul force, who 
 accused him of disobeying orders and abandoning 
 them to their fate. But though, writing after the 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 221 
 
 pvent, it is manifest that the combined division 
 could have easily maintained itself at Cabul 
 against any number of Afghans ; and that had such 
 officers as Sale, Dennie, Monteith, Abbott, Have- 
 lock, and Broadfoot, been at Cabul, Elphin stone 
 and Shelton would never have been permitted to 
 surrender — yet on the whole, the reasons advanced 
 by Sale for not obeying orders appear most cogent. 
 In his reply, written within three days after hi^ 
 arrival at Jellalabad, he represents that, owing to 
 the destruction of his camp equipage, he would have 
 been compelled to abandon his sick and wounded, 
 who now numbered over 300, that there were no 
 depots of provisions on the route, that his force 
 was too weak to enable him to force the Passes 
 leading to Cabul, which, he was given to under- 
 stand, were held by hostile tribes, amounting to 
 30,000 or 40,000 men, and that his ammunition* 
 was insufficient for protracted operations, while by 
 holding Jellalabad he would establish a point on 
 which the Cabul force could retreat. 
 
 * Captain Abbott notes in his Journal the following as his 
 stock of ammunition on arriving at Jellalabad : 9 -pounder shot 
 832 ; case, 76 ; segment shell, 98 ; howitzer segment shell, 40 ; 
 common shell, 40 ; case, 16 ; carcasses, 4 ; 8-inch mortars, 300 shell 
 and 8 light balls ; 5^ inch mortars, 385 shell and 18 light balls. 
 
222 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 y Captain Abbott, speaking of Sale's decision, says 
 in his Journal : " I have no doubt whatever that 
 this decision was a wise one, though persons 
 hostile to the good general have expressed a 
 different opinion. Lady Sale, his daughter, and 
 his son-in-law were at Cabul, and Sir Robert would 
 have gladly joined them, could he have done so 
 without sacrificing his men. There were not two 
 opinions at Cabul as to the sufficiency of the force 
 there to suppress the emeute of the 2nd of 
 November, had the General commanding adopted 
 active and vigorous measures, instead of placing 
 himself behind walls and thus encouraging the 
 rebels while he damped the spirits of his own 
 men." 
 
 As a further inducement to march on Jellalabad, 
 Abdool Eahman, the governor in the interest of 
 Shah Soojah, wrote urging the advance of the 
 British to occupy the town which the rebels were 
 about to seize. All the owners of hired cattle 
 also carried off their beasts, and the camp- 
 followers were ready to fly towards Peshawur 
 rather than again enter the dreadful Passes. 
 
 In pursuance of his resolution, Sale moved on 
 the 11th of November from Gundamuck, towards 
 Jellalabad. The arrangements for the march 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 225 
 
 were not very good. Orders were sent to the 
 garrison at Mammoo Khail, to retire from Afzool 
 Khan's fort, after destroying it, but the juzailcheps 
 and jaunbazes were directed to stand fast at 
 Gundamuck, and all the tents, baggage, and heavy 
 stores, which could not be moved, owing to the 
 desertion of the Afghan camel-drivers with their 
 cattle, were left under their charge. The garrison, 
 after firing the fort, took post in the orchard, upon 
 which the enemy, assembled on the hills behind 
 Mammoo Khail, descended and attacked the small 
 party, who retired fighting and suffered severe 
 loss. 
 
 The jaunbazes at Gundamuck were no sooner 
 left to their own devices than they raised the 
 Afghan standard, declared in favour of the 
 Burukzye Sirdars and fired the cantonment, after 
 plundering it of the baggage left under their 
 charge. The Khyberrees, under Captain Burn, 
 remained faithful, and effected their retreat with 
 the loss of both the 6-pounder guns, (which, being 
 drawn by bullocks, could not move quickly), and all 
 their stores, and joined Sir R. Sale at Futtehabad, 
 nearly fourteen miles from Gundamuck, at the 
 entrance of the Jellalabad valley; arriving at 
 midnight, they were mistaken for the enemy, and 
 
224 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 were fired on by the sentries, but no harm was 
 done. 
 
 The night passed without incident, but at nine 
 a.m., when the brigade was preparing for the 
 march, the enemy were seen crowding the sur- 
 rounding hills in great masses, conspicuous among 
 them being the jaunbazes. The advance guard 
 and main body of the force, moved off quietly and 
 were unmolested, but the rear guard, under Colonel 
 Dennie, were furiously attacked by the villagers of 
 the Jellalabad valley, who all took up arms against 
 the retiring column, mistaking their orderly retreat 
 for panic. 
 
 At length, when the rear guard gained the open 
 plain, the cavalry, led by Captain Oldfield and 
 Lieutenant Mayne, two very gallant officers, turned 
 and charged in brilliant style, cutting down great 
 numbers and driving the remainder under shelter, 
 whence the infantry dislodged them. The check 
 was not less severe than unexpected, and no further 
 attack was made, though the inhabitants of all the 
 villages mustered with the intention of cutting off 
 baggage and stragglers. 
 
 On the 12th of November, the brigade arrived 
 at Jellalabad and encamped under the walls, sur- 
 rounded by the enemy, who, during the night. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 225 
 
 burned tlie cantonment, consisting of grass huts, 
 lying about a mile eastward of the town, which 
 were erected, in 1840, for the winter quarters of the 
 troops. On the following morning, the artillery 
 and infantry, to the dismay and astonishment of 
 the inhabitants, who expected that the brigade 
 would continue its retreat on Peshawur, entered 
 the town, leaving the cavalry for the present in an 
 enclosed garden close to the walls. 
 
 " Our prospects," says Captain Abbott in his Jour- 
 nal, " are rather dismal. The defences of Jellalabad 
 are in a miserable state, and there is cover for an 
 enemy within pistol-shot of the walls in every 
 direction. We have no supplies of food excepting 
 a small store of barley, intended for the horses ; 
 we have about 2,060 men to hold a mile and a-half 
 of dilapidated rampart, and the number of sick and 
 wounded are so great, as to render any movement 
 of retreat through the Khyber impossible. This 
 force of 2,060 men is made up as follows : — Her 
 Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, about 700 strong, 
 who are armed with unserviceable flint muskets, 
 which have been condemned by a committee, but 
 were not exchanged because the regiment was on 
 its way to India. More than half the men are 
 recruits who have joined from England during the 
 
 Q 
 
 / 
 
226 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 summer. The 35th Native Infantry, 750 bayonets, 
 a very efficient regiment, armed with serviceable 
 flint muskets. Broadfoot's sappers, a corps of 150 
 bold, active men, Afghans, Huzaras, and Hindos- 
 tanees, armed with fusils, rather loose in discipline, 
 but always foremost in action. Also about 40 
 men of the Shah's infantry. The cavalry consist 
 of one squadron of 5th Bengal Eegulars, 130 
 men, under Captain Oldfield, and one rissalah 
 of Shah Soojah's contingent, (Irregulars) 90 
 sabres. The artillery comprises my battery, 
 120 men, and Captain Backhouse's mountain-train, 
 60 men. The ordnance are five 9-pounders, one 
 24-pounder howitzer, three 3-pounders, two 8-inch 
 and three 5J-inch mortars. We have about 200 
 rounds per gun, and 100 for the howitzer, and the 
 infantry, about 130 rounds per man." 
 
 Sir Robert Sale expected to find large supplies 
 of food collected at Jellalabad for the use of the 
 troops waiting there, but there was none, and only 
 a little barley for the horses. As he had no 
 supplies with him, and the enemy, consisting of 
 about 5,000 infantry with 300 cavalry (the jaun 
 hazes) surrounded the place, immediate action was 
 necessary. Accordingly, a sortie in force was 
 determined on, and, on the morning of the 14th of 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 227 
 
 November, Colonel Monteith made a sally with a 
 force of lj,100 men,* supported by two of Abbott's 
 guns, the remainder of the artillery covering the 
 advance from the walls. The sortie was 
 completely successful. Under cover of the guns 
 from the walls, the infantry, issuing from the 
 Cabul gate, advanced upon the enemy, whom 
 they quickly drove back, when the cavalry 
 fell upon them, and the treacherous jaun hazes 
 who attempted to cross sabres with Oldfield's and 
 Anderson's troopers, were severely handled ; mean- 
 while the guns kept well to the front, and by the 
 accuracy of their fire, contributed greatly to the 
 success of the day. On the following morning not 
 an Afghan soldier was to be seen. 
 
 The important question now arose whether they 
 should hold the town, or only the citadel, which, 
 being of much smaller extent, was more easily 
 defensible. A council of war was convened, which 
 Captain Abbott attended as commandant of 
 artillery, and it was decided to adopt the former 
 course. Of the condition of the defences of Jella- 
 labad at this time, Sir Robert Sale writes in his 
 
 * Three hundred of the 13th Light Infantry ; 300 of the 35th 
 Native Infantry ; 100 Sappers ; the whole of the cavalry ; and 
 200 juzailchees belonging to the Regiment of Khyberrees. 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 ofl&cial report : — " T found the walls in a state 
 wliich might have justified despair as to the 
 possibility of defending them. The enceinte was 
 far too extensive for my small force, embracing a 
 circumference of upwards of 2,300 yards. Its 
 tracing was vicious in the extreme ; it had no 
 parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, while 
 there was not more than two or three feet high 
 earth, and rubbish had accumulated to such an 
 extent about the ramparts, that there were roads 
 in various directions across and over them into the 
 country. There was a space of 400 yards together 
 on which none of the garrison could show them- 
 jselves excepting at one spot ; the population 
 within was disaffected, and the whole enceinte was 
 surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, 
 and gardens, from which a fire could be opened on 
 the defenders at twenty and thirty yards." 
 
 To place the town in a proper condition of 
 defence, a committee of officers was constituted, of 
 which Captains Abbott and Broadfoot were the 
 leading spirits. The former was appointed com- 
 missary of ordnance, and superintended the 
 mounting, in suitable places, of the guns, including 
 some few Afghan pieces, for which he made 
 carriages, and made up ammunition as best he 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 229 
 
 could from the materials procurable in the neigh- 
 bourhood. 
 
 , In his duties as commandant of artillery, Captain 
 Abbott received cheerful and able assistance from 
 Captain Backhouse, of the Shah's artillery, and 
 from his subaltern, Lieutenant Michael Dawes, 
 who proved themselves throughout the siege 
 admirable artillery officers. Both have long since 
 paid the debt of nature, and the Journal of the 
 latter officer, kindly placed at my disposal by a 
 relative, one of the survivors of the retreat from 
 Cabul, breathes throughout the true spirit of a 
 Christian soldier, and is a simple and unaffected 
 record of the events of the defence of Jellalabad. 
 
 There being no Engineer officer with the brigade, 
 the duties were undertaken by Captain George 
 Broadfoot, of the Madras Infantry, attached to the 
 Shah's artillery, an officer of rare acquirements, of 
 whom Havelock said that he possessed an un- 
 common genius for war. It is not too much to 
 say that no professional engineer could have better 
 conducted the duties than this indefatigable and 
 most capable officer. 
 
 On the day after the sortie, Sir Eobert Sale 
 received cheering accounts from his wife at Cabul, 
 to the effect that they had beaten the enemy and 
 
230 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 captured some guns, upon which tidings the 
 General fired a royal salute, but as the event 
 proved, it was an ill-timed act of jubilation. 
 Captain Abbott says in his Journal : — '' On this 
 day we commenced work on the defences, and I was 
 able to mount three 9-pounder guns on the left 
 bastion at the Cabul gate, and on the 16th, the 
 right bastion was ready to receive guns. On the 
 17th, I jfiixed the armament of the right bastion 
 Cabul gate, at one 9-pounder gun and one howitzer, 
 and that of the left bastion at two 9 -pounders. I 
 placed the " Cazi," a brass 16-pounder gun, on a 
 bastion to the south, near the Gosein's garden. 
 Captain Backhouse mounted a 3-pounder mountain- 
 gun on the east face." 
 
 Supplies now came in from the surrounding 
 villages, owing greatly to the exertions and 
 influence of Captain Macgregor, who, having no 
 political duties to perform, undertook the post of 
 commissariat officer. On the 19th, the Khyber 
 regiment was disbanded, many of the men 
 having previously deserted, and food being- too 
 valuable to maintain any who were not trust- 
 worthy. 
 
 Again, on the 18th, letters were received from 
 Lady Sale and Captain John Conolly, the former 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 231 
 
 giving a good account, and tlie other, a very 
 gloomy one of affairs at Cabul. On this day, 
 Captain Abbott mounted a 9-pounder and two 
 5^-inch mortars on the north-east bastion, and an 
 8-inch mortar on the " Cazi's " bastion. He writer 
 in his Journal on the 19th, that orders were again 
 received from Cabul, insisting on the return of the 
 brigade. On this day he placed an 8-inch mortar 
 on the right bastion, and a 5^ -inch mortar on the 
 left bastion Cabul gate. On the 20th, they 
 received information that Azeez Khan and Gool 
 Mahomed were about to attack, and a letter came 
 from Mr. P. Mackeson (cousin of the famous 
 Political officer, then British agent at Peshawur) 
 that he was besieged by the Khyberrees in Ali 
 Musjid, and that one of his bastions was blown up. 
 On the 21st, Captain Abbott mounted a 9-pounder 
 gun on the left centre battery on the river face. 
 
 Though the enemy had received a severe lesson 
 and made no immediate attack on Jellalabad, the 
 position of its gallant defenders daily became more 
 serious. No news of an advance in force from the 
 British provinces reached to cheer their spirits, 
 while daily fearful rumours of reverses to the Cabul 
 brigade, and scarcely more cheering scraps of 
 authentic information from other parts heralded 
 
232 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the terrible disasters which so soon overtook our 
 ill-fated countrymen. 
 
 General Nott could be trusted, with his force and 
 his British tenacity of purpose, to hold his own at 
 Candahar until relief could be despatched through 
 Scinde and the Bolan Pass, but the position of the 
 isolated garrisons at Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Ghuznee 
 w^as one of extreme anxiety. On the 21st of Novem- 
 ber they learnt of the destruction of the Chareekar 
 garrison, consisting of the Shah's 4th, or Ghoorka, 
 regiment, and some artillery, when only Major Pot- 
 tinger. Lieutenant (now Colonel) Houghton,* both 
 severely wounded, and one Ghoorka escaped to the 
 Cabul cantonment. 
 
 Next day came news of the evacuation of the 
 post of Pesh Bolak, situated to the east of the 
 Khyber Pass, about twenty-five miles from Jellala- 
 bad, and held by a small garrison, consisting of 250 
 juzailchees, under Captain Ferris, and 24 troopers of 
 the 5th Cavalry, under Captain Ponsonby. On the 
 13th of November they were attacked by 5,000 
 Shinwarrees and other clansmen, and after spend- 
 ing all their ammunition, on the 16th cut their 
 
 * The writer of this work published in a Magazine an account of 
 this memorable siege, and the extraordinary escape of these two 
 officers, from the papers of Colonel Houghton. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 233 
 
 way through the enemy and retreated to Lalpoora, 
 the chief of which, Tora Baz Khan, who was friendly 
 to the British, sent them under escort to Peshawur, 
 where they arrived having lost twenty- two killed and 
 twenty-six wounded. 
 
 The enemy now began to muster in force again. 
 Supplies had continued to come in freely from 
 the neighbouring villages since the victory of the 
 14th ; but, on the 22nd of November, some of the 
 camels, bringing in grain from the valley beyond the 
 Cabul river, were captured by the Ghilzyes, who, 
 however, were repulsed with loss on the following 
 day, when trying to capture a convoy escorted by 
 Captain (the late General Sir Thomas) Seaton of the 
 35th Native Infantry. 
 
 On the 25th the enemy cut off the canal which 
 supplied the town, and on the following day began to 
 collect in considerable force under Azeez Khan who 
 took up a position two miles west of Jellalabad. A re- 
 connaissance was made on the 28th, which caused 
 the enemy to show themselves, and on the following 
 day, Azeez Khan advanced in force and commenced 
 an attack, firing all day from the ravines and disused 
 buildings around the town, to which, however, no 
 response was made by the English garrison, as Sir 
 Robert Sale was anxious to husband his ammunition. 
 
234 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 On the 30tli of November the enemy occupied 
 the buildings and broken ground near the north- 
 west angle, and on the 1st of December, emboldened 
 by the inaction of the garrison, the entire Afghan 
 force, about 6,000 strong, advanced and occupied 
 the low ground near the river, whence they 
 kept up a heavy fire at short ranges. To this the 
 General could not submit, and, accordingly, a sally 
 was made at noon, by a column of 800 infantry, 
 200 cavalry, and two 9-pounder guns, the whole 
 under the command of Colonel Dennie. 
 
 Captain Abbott gives the following account of 
 the action of the 1st of December, in a letter to 
 his brother Frederick, written three days later. 
 '* Oq the 23rd of November, the enemy came for- 
 ward in great force, and their advanced parties 
 were within 350 yards of our walls, when they 
 were recalled and went into quarters two miles 
 distant. On the 1st all moved down as if for a 
 general attack, about 4,000 men, confining them- 
 selves to the low broken ground chiefly, near the 
 river. Their skirmishers closed to within twenty 
 yards of the wall, and no one could show his head 
 over the parapet in that part. They even fired 
 through our loopholes, abused us and dared us to 
 come out, so at noon the Cabul gate was thrown 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 235 
 
 open, and out dashed 800 infantry followed by 200 
 cavalry and two guns. Tlie enemy were seized 
 with a panic and ran. The cavalry killed almost 
 100 on the plain to the left ; on the right the 
 infantry could not catch the fugitives, but the 
 ground being good I took on my guns at a gallop, 
 and crossed the enemy's columns with a fire that 
 drove them all down to the river. Had the in- 
 fantry now pushed on, the greater part of Azeez 
 Khan's force would have been destroyed, but Sale 
 halted them. I went on, however, with my guns 
 as far as the head- quarters fort of Azeez Khan, and 
 to the brink of the steep bank that falls into the 
 river's bed, and made some good practice upon the 
 dense masses that crowded the fords. Many were 
 killed, and more drowned by missing the fords in 
 their haste. A peremptory order now came to 
 withdraw, and we returned towards Jellalabad, 
 where the enemy showed some signs of rallying. 
 A small body of horse hovered on our rear at a 
 great distance, but the guns moving back got 
 within 1,400 yards of them, and at that distance 
 a round shot emptied two saddles and forced the 
 whole to retire. Two or three more shot dispersed 
 another party, and Azeez Khan's whole force de- 
 camped. Shah Newaz Khan, of Lughman, and 
 
236 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 another chief were killed in the cannonade, and 
 over 200 men shared their fate. Supplies are 
 pouring in, and we are quite safe if the authorities 
 in India have done their duty." 
 
 On the day after this affair not an enemy was 
 visible, and as usual after a marked success, the 
 country people brought in supplies. 
 
 On the 10th of December a letter was received 
 from Captain John Conolly, reporting the severe 
 defeat of the 23rd of N'ovember, which practically 
 sealed the fate of the garrison, already reduced to 
 great straits by the loss, early in the siege, of the 
 commissariat fort. 
 
 On the 18th of December a letter arrived from 
 Sir W. Macnaghten, saying that the troops had 
 behaved ill and that the military authorities were 
 urging him to come to terms with the Afghan 
 chiefs. This intelligence leaked out and created 
 a feeling of indignation among the garrison, who 
 refused to give it credit. But it was too true, and, 
 on the 2Brd of December, the Envoy, who, whatever 
 had been his faults and his mistakes, had protested 
 against negotiations, and urged the military chiefs 
 to renewed action, fell a victim to the treachery of 
 Mahomed Akbar Khan, who, at an interview for 
 the settlement of terms, shot him with his own 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 237 
 
 hand. Thus fell Sir William Macnaghten, who, 
 notwithstanding a singular want of political fore- 
 sight, was gifted in no ordinary degree; and as 
 Marshman said of him, '' though he was the only 
 civilian at Oabul, he was one of the truest-hearted 
 soldiers in the garrison." 
 
 The first authentic intelligence of the crime 
 reached Jellalabad on the 2nd of January, in a 
 letter from Major Pottinger, who had been called 
 to the head of political affairs in this hour of 
 disgrace and disaster. It created a feeling of 
 horror, which deepened into one of consterna- 
 tion, when, at 10 a.m. on the 9th, three sowars 
 arrived from Cabul bearing a sealed letter, dated 
 29th of December, and signed by Major Pottinger 
 and General Elphinstone, requiring the immediate 
 evacuation of Jellalabad as they had agreed to a 
 convention with Akbar Khan by which the British 
 were to leave the country. 
 
 Sir Robert Sale immediately convened a council 
 of war, which was attended by the Political Agent 
 and commandants of corps, and, after full con- 
 sideration, it was resolved that a reply should be 
 despatched, signed by the PoUtical and Military 
 Chiefs, in which occurs the following passage: — 
 " We have positive information that Mahomed 
 
238 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the 
 chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise 
 their followers for the purpose of intercepting and 
 destroying the force at Jellalabad ; under these 
 circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await 
 a further communication from you, which we desire 
 may point out the security which may be given for 
 our safe march to Peshawur." 
 
 For a short period the Khyber Pass was opened 
 for the passage of the dawk, and, on the 26th of 
 December, a party of twenty-five troopers, in the 
 pay of Tora Baz Khan, arrived, each man 
 carrying at his saddle 1,000 rupees, a wel- 
 come addition to the garrison money-chest, which 
 had run very low. But now again every day 
 brought some fresh news of disaster. 
 
 On the 12th of January, they heard that the 
 Cabul garrison had marched from the cantonment, 
 and, on the following day, a solitary horseman 
 arrived, who revealed in all its horrors the details 
 of the retreat. It was Dr Brydon, who, wounded 
 and exhausted, and carrying in his hand a broken 
 sword, thrilled the hearts of his hearers with the 
 fearful tale, announcing that the Cabul force of 
 4,500 fighting men and 10,000 camp-followers, 
 had been annihilated, with the exception of some 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, . 239 
 
 few officers and soldiers. The army had marched on 
 the 6th of January, their path ht by the conflagra- 
 tion of the cantonment, and, instead of pushing on at 
 all hazards, as the only chance of safety, halted in 
 the snow at Boodhak, thus giving time to the 
 Ghilzyes to occupy the passes and effect their 
 destruction. 
 
 On the 8th, the British force commenced to thread 
 the Khoord-Cabul defile where a great slaughter 
 ensued, the 44th and the troop of horse-artillery 
 displaying a courage in facing fearful odds that 
 merited a better fate. But all was in vain, and the 
 remainder of the force, crippled by cold and hunger, 
 and the vain attempt to guard an enormous baggage 
 train and a vast herd of camp-followers, gradually 
 became a disorganised mob. The carnage was 
 fearful at Tezeen and at Jugdulluck, where General 
 Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton, the two senior 
 officers of the force, were retained as hostages by 
 Akbar Khan. Here the European officers and sol- 
 diers made a gallant but ineffectual stand. On the 
 evening of the 12th, the remainder pushed on, and at 
 the Jugdulluck Pass found a barrier across their 
 path, where Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the 
 Shah's troops. Colonel Chambers, of the 5th Cavalry, 
 the friend and correspondent of Captain Abbott, and 
 
240 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 many other gallant officers and men, fell beneath 
 the knives or juzails of the Ghilzyes. Some 
 mounted officers and a party of Europeans managed 
 to get as far as Grund amuck, when they took up a 
 station on a hill ; but the end soon came, and they 
 were remorselessly shot down or hacked to pieces 
 by the Afghan butchers. A few officers gained the 
 valley of Jellalabad, but were killed in sight of the 
 walls, and only Dr. Brydon, eluding bis pursuers, 
 managed to urge his wretched pony as far as the 
 haven of rest. This officer, who was severely 
 wounded on the head and in other places, fainted 
 directly after his arrival, and on recovering his 
 senses, his first words were, "feed my pony." 
 But the poor animal was too far gone with wounds 
 and fatigue, and it had died. Dr. Brydon told the 
 author's brother (of whose regiment he was Medical 
 officer) that this pony was the property of his Native 
 assistant, who, being wounded. and feeling his end 
 near, entreated him to mount the animal and push 
 on for Jellalabad. Brydon did so, and reached the 
 plain in company with a small party of officers, who 
 being all better mounted than he was, pushed on, 
 leaving him in the rear. Seeing the horsemen, a 
 party of villagers killed them, but Brydon, being 
 alone, escaped observation. He was then attacked 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 241 
 
 by an Afghan horseman who wounded him in the 
 head, the tulwar cutting away a bit of his skull, and 
 he owed his life to a copy of Frazer's Magazine, 
 which he had placed in his cap. 
 
 Beacons were kept burning all that night, and 
 bugles were sounded three times every half -hour to 
 attract stragglers, but there was no response, for 
 like Sennacherib's Army in Holy Writ, " They were 
 all dead men.'* The following morning, in tht^ 
 hope of rescuing some of their countrymen, a party 
 of cavalry, accompanied by some officers, anxious 
 for the fate of relatives and friends, patrolled four 
 miles on the Cabul road, when they found three 
 bodies, but no survivors were met with. 
 
 On the 23rd of January their worst fears as to 
 relief were confirmed, by the receipt of information 
 of the defeat of Colonel Wild's attempt, made four 
 days before, to force the Khyber — not a surprising 
 result considering that 'he had no European troops 
 and only four guns, the ricketty carriages of which 
 soon broke down. On this failure, the two Native 
 regiments that held Ali Musjid, being short of 
 provisions, abandoned the fort and cut their way 
 back to Jumrood, with some loss. By this disaster 
 the difficulties of a successful advance were vastly 
 increased, the moral effect produced on the 
 
 B 
 
242 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 Sepoys being very depressing. Events seemed to 
 be hastening on the final catastrophe which was to 
 overwhelm the garrison of Jellalabad. 
 
 Abbott notes in his Journal on the 14th of 
 January: — "Burkut Khan informs us that he 
 must join the enemy in order to save himself. 
 Abdool Guffoor and the governor of Jellalabad 
 retire for the same reason by Macgregor's desire." 
 
 The British garrison at Jellalabad were now 
 thrown on their own resources without hope of 
 relief. The Cabul force had ceased to exist, no 
 help could be looked for from Candahar, the 
 Peshawur relieving column was beaten, and there 
 was no immediate prospect of succour from India, 
 as General Pollock, who was marching through the 
 Punjaub with reinforcements, could not move for- 
 ward without cavalry and guns. Meanwhile Akbar 
 Khan and the whole armed might of Afghanistan 
 were free to make an onslaught upon them. Like 
 the Thane of Cawdor, the Commandant of Jellala- 
 bad might have said : — 
 
 '^ They have tied me to a stake ; I cannot fly 
 Bat bear-like, I must fight the course." 
 
 Every precaution was taken for the coming storm. 
 All Afghans, including Captain Ferris's juzailcheeSy 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, 243 
 
 were turned out of the town, and Sir Robert Sale 
 commenced arming the camp-followers with pikes, 
 which Captain Abbott set about making,* and for- 
 aging parties were sent out to collect a store of 
 wood and grass for the cattle. 
 
 Captain Abbott suggested, in an official letter to 
 the General, that a breach should be made in the 
 curtains of the forts near the town, to prevent their 
 being occupied by the enemy in the approaching 
 investment, and that the bulrushes should be burnt 
 to prevent their finding means to hut themselves 
 during the winter, and also that a store of wood 
 should be laid in from the topes near the town — 
 all of which proposals were carried into effect. 
 
 On the 26th of January, an important dispatch 
 was received from Shah Soojah, requiring the 
 immediate abandonment of Jellalabad, according to 
 the terms of the treaty. 
 
 Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor immedi- 
 ately convened a council of war, consisting of the 
 commandants of corps, to consider the nature and 
 terms of the reply. The meeting was attended by 
 Colonel Dennie, 13th Light Infantry; Colonel 
 
 * He writes in his Journal that, by the 20th, he had completed 
 100 pikes for his own camp-followers, and was busy making 
 " pebble-grape" for close action. 
 
 E 2 
 
244 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Monteitli, SStli Native Infantry ; Captain Oldfield, 
 commanding tlie cavalry; Captain Abbott, com- 
 manding the artillery; Captain Backhouse, com- 
 manding the Shah's artillery ; and Captain Broad- 
 foot, commanding the sappers and miners. The 
 military and political chiefs laid their proposals 
 before the council, which were to the following 
 effect. That as the Shah, for whom they held 
 Afghanistan, required them to abandon the country, 
 and their remaining was of no service either to the 
 Government, or to the Candahar force, who would 
 retire on Scinde, or to the prisoners in Akbar's hands, 
 they should be consulting the best interests of all 
 parties by treating with the Shah for the evacuation 
 of Jellalabad. There was much heated discussion 
 on this proposal, and eventually, the council, on the 
 motion of Captain Broadfoot, a man of fiery courage 
 jind iron will, adjourned to the following day. 
 Again the question was argued Tvith much warmth, 
 and at length the terms of the capitulation, as set 
 forth in the letter drafted by Sale and Macgregor, 
 with the exception of a clause giving hostages, 
 were carried, only Captains Broadfoot, Oldfield, 
 and Backhouse, voting in the minority. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes in his Journal : — " The 
 council met at ten a.m. and decided on replying 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 245 
 
 that as His Majesty no longer required the services 
 of the British Army, he had only to give them a 
 formal discharge as well as certain security that 
 they should not be molested on the march. Sale 
 and Macgregor were forced to reply thus, because a 
 flat refusal would have caused the immediate 
 execution of the hostages ; but they required terms 
 which Shah Soojah could not possibly grant, their 
 object being merely to gain time and avoid doing 
 anything decisive until the orders of Government 
 might be received. Amongst other securities 
 insisted on, was the surrender of Akbar Khan, to 
 be held as an hostage by us until we arrived at 
 Peshawur. This alone was sure to make the 
 negotiations ineffectual, as there was no chance 
 that Akbar, after having so foully murdered the 
 Envoy, would place himself in the hands of the 
 British."* 
 
 The letter was despatched to Shah Soojah, and 
 on the 8th of February, a cossid arrived from 
 
 * On the 16th February, Captain Abbott makes an entry in his 
 Journal : " Heard to-day that the despatch from Cabul stated 
 regret at their inability to give us the securities demanded, 
 owing to the disobedience of Akbar. The Shah wrote asking us to 
 express honajide our intentions^ and offering to send Futteh Jung 
 to ebcort us to Peshawur if we were desirous of going thither." 
 
246 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Cabul bringing the Shah's reply, which was not 
 an actual acceptance of the terms, and calling npon 
 the chief ofl&cers to affix their seals. The council 
 was, accordingly, again convened on the 12th of 
 February, when Captain Broadfoot, profiting by the 
 tenour of the Shah's letter, moved a reply to the 
 effect, that as their proposed terms had neither 
 been rejected nor accepted, they were liberated 
 from their objections, and that the Shah should be 
 referred for a reply to the Govern or- General. This 
 letter, as also another, couched in more temperate 
 terms, was rejected by the council. Sir Robert Sale 
 vehemently denouncing the tactics of the opposition, 
 and the council adjourned. An hour later the 
 members reassembled, but a change had come over 
 the opinions of some of those who had formed the 
 majority. Colonel Dennie and Captain Abbott 
 determined to oppose any evacuation, and Colonel 
 Monteith brought forward a draft letter, express- 
 ing disinclination to negotiate, which, after some 
 discussion, was adopted by the council. 
 
 A sense of relief was felt by the members of 
 the council on the settlement of this matter. On 
 the following day, the wisdom no less than the 
 patriotism of the course they had adopted, became 
 manifest, by the receipt of a letter from Mackeson, 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 247 
 
 stating that Pollock liad arrived at Pesliawur on 
 the 5th of February, and that large reinforcements, 
 including British cavalry and artillery, were making 
 forced marches through the Punjaub, but, he added, 
 that if desired, he could "purchase their safe retreat 
 from Jellalabad. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to his brother Frederick, 
 under date of the 23rd of December, 1841, of the 
 state of affairs at Oabul, and there can be no doubt 
 that had the troops not been mismanaged, and 
 ^11 enterprise departed from the councils of the 
 military leaders, the brief gleam of success that 
 shone on our arms in the affair of the 13th of 
 November, if followed up, might have been the 
 precursor of their deliverance : " We are all under 
 extreme anxiety regarding the troops at Cabul. 
 Our last letter thence was dated the 9th, when the 
 cantonment people had only three days' supply re- 
 maining. The troops were completely paralysed, 
 and some of them had misbehaved. This news 
 came from the Envoy and Lady Sale on the 10th. 
 Next day, we received a letter from our doubtful 
 friend, Burkut Khan, saying that on the 13th we 
 had gained a victory, and that ihe Douranees had 
 gone over to the King, while Mahomed Akbar Khan 
 had sought the protection of the Envoy. The 
 
248 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Urzebegi's son liad certainly (on the receipt of a 
 letter from his father) broken up a force of 1,500 
 men collected at Futtehabad, and had gone off, and 
 this gave us some hope that there was truth in the 
 report. After this, various people brought in re- 
 ports of peace at Cabul, but none seemed to know 
 on what terms. Yesterday the old story of a capi- 
 tulation, or convention (or whatever the disgraceful 
 act may be called), was revived. A chief at Bala 
 Bagh received from his father at Oabul (Osman 
 Khan, one of the most active of the rebels there) a 
 letter, saying he had acceded to the terms of the 
 enemy, and that hostages had been given on both 
 sides, Mahomed Akbar Khan himself being made 
 over to us to see our troops safe to Jumrood. This 
 letter is said to be of the 17th or 18th, eight or nine 
 days later than the Envoy's last received. It enters 
 into various details as to the commissioners appointed 
 to proceed to Grhuznee and Candahar to settle 
 matters there. But all the names given are 
 Barukzyes, which is very suspicious, and I suspect 
 that the writer is premature in saying the terms had 
 been accepted. The reinforcements from India are 
 taking their time, I think. With one more regiment 
 and a little more ammunition, Jellalabad would defy 
 an Afghan force for two months. But the Cabul 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 249 
 
 arrangements would place our heavy artillery in the 
 enemy's hands. We have some croakers amongst 
 us also, who do much mischief in the lines. Old 
 Dennie's face is enough to alarm a whole regiment. 
 If the men do their duty, we cannot be touched 
 here ; the troops that dare not storm the miserable 
 cantonment at Cabul will never attempt the walls 
 of Jellalabad. With regard to the convention, I 
 do not think the Envoy has power to make it, and 
 I doubt whether the Government would ratify it. 
 Whatever may be the result of this war, it is evident 
 that we must retire eventually from the country, 
 after the unmistakable display of popular feeling 
 towards us. It were injustice to our troops to 
 allow less than double the present force to remain, 
 and even that would require strong fortresses at all 
 its stations. The expense cannot be borne, and I 
 really think by restoring Dost Mahomed, and afford- 
 ing him a small pecuniary assistance, we should 
 more effectually establish a barrier against Russia 
 than our own eminently expensive armament could 
 afford. But if we get out of this scrape, we must 
 punish all offenders, before any new line of policy 
 can be adopted. Amongst the troops ordered to 
 reinforce us, we hear nothing of cavalry, probably 
 because a prejudice exists on account of a regiment 
 
250 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 requiring so mucli commissariat carriage. Now we 
 are much in need of good cavalry to face tliat of 
 the Afghans. Khan Kureem Khan, chief of the 
 Kuzzilbashes, has 200 most splendid sowars, and 
 the retainers of other chiefs are nearly as good. 
 Altogether they bring 6,000 into the field, and thus 
 have had a superiority over our people in all their 
 contests of late. Our handful of troopers have 
 been of vital service to us here, and the people 
 stand in great need of them and of the guns. Two 
 o'clock having passed without any news whatever, I 
 will close this for the post. 
 
 "P.S. — A Cossid from Cabul says provisions 
 were very scarce in cantonments, and atta four 
 seers per rupee in the Bala Hissar. That the 
 Cabulees withdrew at night, and only invested the 
 place by day — in fact, that there was little fighting. 
 If common precautions had been observed as to 
 supplies, all would have been right ; nothing could 
 have been more disgraceful than the inattention of 
 the military authorities to these points. There was 
 not a seer of atta in cantonments, save in regi- 
 mental bazaars, last year, and I suppose the case 
 was the same this season. The commissariat 
 store-rooms were in a little fort half a mile from 
 cantonments, and garrisoned by twenty Sepoys, but 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 251 
 
 Mainwaring says little grain was collected there. 
 This fort, of course, fell into the enemy's hands the 
 moment the insurrection broke out." 
 
 " Christmas Day. — Some Hindoos arrived last 
 night from Cabul in eleven days, and say they left 
 the people in statu quo — not much fighting, and all 
 at long shots. Another Hindoo got a letter from 
 Cabul, saying that all the chiefs had made peace 
 with the Envoy, who was on his way down to Jella- 
 labad. I give you these as specimens of the rumours 
 that reach us — we believe none of them. This is 
 the eighth day since I wrote, and my letter must 
 go to dawk at three p.m. We are all holding 
 up our hands at hearing that more horse-artillery 
 are being sent here. Nothing short of the breaking 
 down of all the troops will convince our commander- 
 in-chief that the arm is unfit for service in this 
 country. We hear also of three 9-pounders from 
 Ferozepore ; these we shall, however, be able to 
 horse and turn to good account. Ponsonby writes 
 (19th) from Peshawur, that the leading corps of 
 the reinforcements were supposed to be near the 
 Attock, but that Gholab Singh had broken up the 
 bridge of boats. If matters are really settled at 
 Cabul, we ought to employ our force in subduing 
 the Punjaub, and we might take as many Afghans 
 
252 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 as we pleased against the scoundrel Sikhs. They 
 refused us the contingent they are bound to 
 supply, and peace really is at an end whenever we 
 find it convenient." 
 
 To a relative in England he writes on the 1st of 
 January : — '' The reports from Cabul are of the most 
 dismal nature ; our troops seem to have given up 
 fighting, and now there is nothing but negotiation, 
 which will never answer with such villains as they 
 have to deal with. Our latest letter is dated 
 the 9th, and we received it on the 18th. The 
 country is so covered with snow, that the travellers 
 are obliged to follow the beaten track which is 
 easily watched by the enemy. I will not give you 
 all the horrible reports we have from the Afghans, 
 all we are sure of is, that on the 9th of December 
 our men had only three days' food remaining, and 
 must have obtained supplies on some terms, or else 
 have been starved. That there was some con- 
 vention is certain, for our enemies here all 
 vanished on the 18th. However, we did not miss 
 them, for they had not ventured within twelve 
 miles since the sortie of the 1st of December. Our 
 reinforcements were at Peshawur on the 28th, and 
 ought to be here in three or four days more. We 
 shall then be near 7,000 strong, with a good fort, 
 
b 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 253 
 
 and plenty of cash and supplies. If the Cabul 
 force should be annihilated before the season may 
 arrive at which the road will be passable by an 
 army, we shall have a great deal of work to do ; 
 but our means will be considerable, and we may 
 fairly calculate on being able to move hence with 
 10,000 men, while an equally strong division will 
 advance from Candahar. There seems to be no 
 doubt that Sir William Macnaghten has been mur- 
 dered at a conference to which Mahomed Akbar 
 had invited him, and if the Afghan tale be true, 
 our troops must have agreed to leave the country. 
 But they must not calculate upon assistance from 
 this quarter, for the road is covered by snow, and 
 troops cannot traverse the 100 miles that intervene. 
 The three regiments that marched from Candahar 
 in the middle of November, by order of General 
 Elphinstone, could not advance beyond Ghuznee, 
 and the other two returned to Khelat-i-Ghilzye 
 and Candahar. This is a vile place for politicals ; 
 they are the only people who never hear the truth. 
 Every private in the service knew that the whole 
 country was hostile to us. Many of our men 
 received notice that our departure from Cabul 
 would be the signal for an insurrection. But no 
 one ever told the Envoy this, nor would he have 
 
254 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 given credit to sucli a piece of information. It 
 seems in this country to be a rule " never to tell a 
 great man anything but good news." I lose about 
 4,000 rupees worth of property at Cabul, if all goes 
 wrong there. My house, tent, guns, books, &c., 
 and my coins,* (which alone cost 600 rupees) are 
 all there ; here I have just a few things absolutely 
 necessary for service in camp.*' 
 
 " January 3rd. All doubt of the Envoy's 
 murder was yesterday removed by a letter from 
 Major Pottinger announcing the fact. He gives no 
 particulars save that Captain Trever was killed at 
 the same time, and Captains Lawrence and 
 Mackenzie seized and carried off. Notwithstanding 
 this treachery, the General still insisted on negotia- 
 tion. A letter from Mahomed Akbar to the chiefs 
 of this valley, urging them to rise, was also inter- 
 cepted, and we may perhaps have another affair 
 similar to those of the 14th of November and 1st 
 of December, which will do us all the good 
 possible. The regiments from India are moving at 
 a snail's pace, and will suffer for their backward- 
 ness. Had they done their best to succour us, 
 they would have found the whole country quiet 
 from the effect of our victory, and the supposed 
 
 * These were sayed by a friend at the sack of the cantonment. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 255 
 
 peace at Cabul. Now they will certainly be much 
 annoyed, for in this country any number of armed 
 men may be collected at a day's notice, and though 
 contemptible individually, and indeed collectively, 
 will be able to annoy greatly a convoy of some 
 thousands of camels. You may all be easy about 
 my present safety. Jellalabad cannot be touched by 
 an Afghan army even garrisoned as it now is, and 
 when we do advance, we shall, I think, do so in 
 irresistible force, for our whole Indian Empire 
 would be shaken were this army to meet with a 
 reverse." 
 
 On the 30th of January, a foraging party suc- 
 ceeded in capturing 175 bullocks, and, on the 
 following day, the cavalry made a raid on the 
 enemy's flocks and drove off 734 sheep, forming a 
 welcome addition to the stock of provisions. 
 
 On the 1st of February, Captain Abbott notes 
 that on counting the stock of ammunition in depot, 
 he found it to consist of 18,000 rounds of musket 
 and 4,000 rounds of fusil cartridges. The reserve 
 ammunition was served out, 7,000 rounds of 
 musket and 2,175 rounds of fusil cartridges, to each 
 of the two infantry regiments, and 4,980 rounds to 
 the artillery, who were armed with muskets, 
 borrowed from the 35th Native Infantry. Mean- 
 
256 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 time, Abbott was busily engaged making carriages 
 for tlie Afghan guns found in the town, increasing 
 the defensive power of the works, and manufactur- 
 ing " pebble grape." 
 
 On the 15th of February, Akbar Khan's camp 
 could be seen bearing a little north of west, and 
 distant about ten miles, and some of his horsemen 
 approached within two miles of the walls. 
 
 On the 18th, a letter was received from Ma- 
 jor Leach at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, saying that the 
 Candahar force was ready to march on Cabul as 
 soon as the weather permitted, and that the 
 garrisons of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, under Craigie, and 
 Ghuznee, under Colonel Palmer, still held out. Sir 
 Eobert Sale also heard from General Pollock, who 
 begged him to hold out for a month or six weeks, 
 as a large force was marching from Ferozepore, and 
 on the following day, a letter arrived from Govern- 
 ment expressing approval of the retention of 
 Jellalabad, the first intimation Sale had received 
 that his conduct was approved of. On this day, 
 Abbott notes that 300 of the camp-followers were 
 armed with pikes, the remaining 700 being 
 unarmed. 
 
 Writing from Jellalabad to a relative in England, 
 under date of the 18th of January, Captain Abbott 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 257 
 
 gives a grapHc account of the destruction of the 
 Cabul force, and of their position, which is of 
 special interest as giving an accurate and sober 
 record of these events as they were regarded at the 
 time by the Jellalabad garrison : — " This will be a 
 Journal carried on from date to date until an oppor- 
 tunity may offer for its despatch, and perhaps it 
 may prove more interesting than any former 
 letters, for the events to be recorded already exceed 
 in horror anything that the history of British India 
 can exhibit. 
 
 "On the 9th instant, three horsemen arrived 
 
 bearing a mandate, signed by General Elphinstone 
 
 and Major Pottinger, for this garrison to retire to 
 
 Peshawur. The date, however, showed that the 
 
 document had been kept back for some purpose or 
 
 other, and we knew that Mahomed Akbar had 
 
 been issuing circulars calling on all the country to 
 
 rise and destroy us. General Sale refused to 
 
 ]*etire, and sent one of the proclamations in 
 
 question to the General at Cabul. We were in 
 
 hopes this would have stopped the Cabul force, 
 
 because the general order to march said that ' they 
 
 would not march from Cabul until Sale's reply 
 
 should arrive,' but we were soon undeceived by the 
 
 arrival of letters saying that they were positively to 
 
 s 
 
258 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 march on the 5th. Start, Sale's son-in-law, a very 
 fine young fellow, (a son of the Blackheath family) 
 wrote to this effect : — ' Dissensions run high 
 amongst the rebels. The Shah's party gains 
 ground, and must succeed, and yet we march to- 
 morrow ! ! ! We shall have a fight — but courage ! 
 Man will not help us — God only can !' 
 
 '' On the 6th instant. General Elphinstone moved 
 out of cantonments, and guided by Akbar, en- 
 camped only three miles distant in six inches of 
 snow. The populace entered and burned canton- 
 ments immediately ; they fired on the rear guard, 
 and took away string after string of camels, 
 unresisted. Such was the commencement of the 
 march ! The second march of four miles brought 
 the column to the entrance of the Khoord-Cabul 
 Pass, where they were stopped, and again encamped 
 in the snow. The third march was through the 
 Khoord-Cabul Pass. The enemy disputed the* 
 passage, but the troops crowned the heights and 
 freed the Pass, though with great loss. Sturt was 
 killed, with some others, and many were left behind 
 to be murdered. At a little Pass, further on, where 
 the troops neglected to secure the heights, there 
 was a check, and Mahomed Akbar persuaded 
 General Elphinstone to surrender the ladies. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 259 
 
 The Sepoys were quite helpless, and, after 
 five nights' exposure to cold could not fight. 
 
 " On the Huft-Kothul, only twenty-eight miles 
 from Cabul, nearly all the Native Infantry was 
 destroyed unresistingly. After this the column 
 pushed on more rapidly, and reached JugduUuck, 
 where the men halted for a day under the fire of 
 the surrounding hills. Here Mahomed Akbar 
 received notice of our refusal to quit Jellalabad, 
 and here he found himself strono^ enouo^h to avow 
 his treachery. He detained General Elphinstone 
 and Brigadier Shelton. The former, however, was 
 able to send a note, saying, ' March to-night at al] 
 risks for there is treachery.' 
 
 *' At about seven p.m. of the 12th of January 
 the column started ; they found the road barri- 
 caded with felled trees, but met no enemy until 
 they were near the summit, when the rear of the 
 44th was furiously attacked. The men got into 
 confusion and fired in the air, scrambling forward 
 as fast as they could to clear the Pass. All was 
 here lost. Many officers reached the Jellalabad 
 valley, but the ride of fifty miles had exhausted 
 their horses, and they were all but one destroyed. 
 The one fugitive, a Dr. Brydon, arrived about noon 
 
 s 2 
 
260 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 on the 13th, on a wretched pony, wounded, and 
 with his sword broken. 
 
 " Next morning, the cavalry patrolled four miles 
 on the Cabul road, and brought in three bodies, 
 believed to be those of Dr. Harpur, Captain 
 Hopkins, and Lieutenant Collyer, but the features 
 could not be distinguished. General Elphinstone 
 and Brigadier Shelton, with all the ladies, and 
 three European women, have been taken to 
 Lughman, to the strong fort of Mahomed Shah 
 Khan, Ghilzye. The above is a detail of the 
 greatest calamity that has ever befallen a British 
 force in India, where the catastrophe will cause a 
 greater sensation than it has amongst us, as the 
 men, accustomed as we have been to horrors of all 
 sorts, are not easilv excited. 
 
 '' We shall have hard work to defend our 
 position with so few troops, and have sent out all 
 our Afghans, even including the jnzailchpes, who 
 have hitherto fought well, but of whom some have 
 been tampered with by the enemy. Our strength 
 is about 2,060 soldiers, and about 500 camp- 
 followers. Of the Cabul calamity, it may be said 
 that it has been occasioned entirely by the in- 
 efficiency of the General who mismanaged the 
 troops from the first, and ended by allowing 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 261 
 
 himself to be led from one trap to another until his 
 force was destroyed. 
 
 " Mahomed Akbar, you will observe, (1) kept 
 our people close to Cabul for two days, because he 
 knew that until the populace had plundered can- 
 tonments they would not come out to annoy the 
 retreating. (2) By making short marches he kept 
 the men five nights, at altitudes 6,500 to 8,000 
 feet, where the cold completely crippled them. (3) 
 He arranged so as to have a fresh enemy ready in 
 each Pass to annoy the troops, and until he had 
 destroyed all but 300 men, his wretched victim did 
 not become sensible of the treachery that was 
 practised. The surrender of the ladies in the 
 Khoord-Cabul Pass, early in the retreat, was the 
 immediate cause of the disorganization of the 
 troops. A note has just been received from 
 Lieutenant Souter, of the 44th, from Grundamuck, 
 saying that the remains of his regiment were 
 destroyed in a sanguinary fight about six days ago, 
 and that he fears no other officer has survived it. 
 That he himself is wounded and stripped, and will 
 be murdered unless 1,000 rupees be sent as his 
 ransom. Another letter, signed C. Griffiths, Major 
 37th Native Infantry, has come to hand asking 
 the same sum. A letter from the Khyberrees to 
 
262 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Mahomed Akbar complains of liis not assisting 
 them, and sajs that the Feringhees are in great 
 force, and that Greneral Avitabile is sending all the 
 Sikhs to assist them !" 
 
 Gradually, the horrible details of the sanguinary 
 events of the second week in January came to light 
 by the statements of the few survivors, or the 
 letters of the captives confined in a fort near a 
 neighbouring valley. Nothing could exceed the 
 impressions of horror and indignation that filled 
 the minds and nerved the hearts of the Jellalabad 
 garrison as the direful story was revea.led to them, 
 of the relentless massacre of their countrymen on 
 the bleak hill-sides and sunless gorges of the 
 Passes between Cabul and Gundamuck. It 
 was felt tbat no terms could be expected and no 
 conditions be accepted at the hands of a foe who 
 violated all the principles of good faith with an 
 audacity exceeding even the bounds of Afghan 
 treachery. 
 
 Continuing his letter on the 20th of January, 
 Captain Abbott says : — " A letter from a Lughman 
 chief received this morning says that the ladies 
 are all there in a fort of Mahomed Shah Khan, 
 Ghilzye, and are well treated ; that eleven officers, 
 five or six Europeans, and three women, are also 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 263 
 
 there, and that Mahomed Akbar is intending to 
 attack us after the ' Ead ' (to-morrow), but has no 
 great force as yet, and only three guns taken from 
 the Cabul force. 
 
 " January 20th. Yesterday two natives, escaped 
 from the massacre of the Cabul force, arrived here, 
 one a risseldar of Anderson's horse, and the other 
 an officer's servant. They only add to our former 
 store of information, by detailing the names of 
 officers and men whom they saw killed. Burkut 
 Khan, a friendly Ghilzye, writes, begging us not to 
 put any faith in Mahomed Akbar, and on no 
 account to quit the fortress. He cautions us 
 against the juzailchees, whom we, however, had 
 turned out the evening before his advice reached 
 us. We are endeavouring to form a corps of armed 
 camp-followers, but the difficulty lies in finding 
 arms. I have 100 good stout men whom I am 
 arming with pikes, a really formidable weapon any- 
 where, having a staff six feet long, with eight inches 
 of iron head, as sharp as a needle. My forge and 
 carpenters make up twenty per diem. The arrival 
 of the risseldar has done good. He tells the men 
 that the enemy at Cabul were very contemptible, 
 and never dared approach the cantonment unless 
 under cover. He says that nothing but cruel mis- 
 
2§4 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 management caused any difficulty at all, but that 
 at Cabul, all was terror on the part of tlie Envoy 
 and G-eneral from the very first, and the men lost 
 confidence when they saw the inefficiency of their 
 superiors. 
 
 " January 25th. We are now in a nice dilemma. 
 Colonel Wild, after delaying at Peshawur, and 
 losing the opportunity of coming on unopposed, 
 took a sudden freak of dividing his force. Two 
 regiments came on one night to Ali Musjid without 
 meeting an enemy, but the remainder of the force, 
 on attempting to follow, was repulsed, with 120 
 killed and wounded. The repulse was owing partly 
 to the vile Sikh guns which broke down at the first 
 round, partly to the viler Sikh regiments which ran 
 away without firing at all, and partly to the want 
 of spirit in our own troops. The moral effect of 
 this will be so bad for us, both as encouraging our 
 enemies and alarming our own troops, that I do 
 not think General Pollock ought to advance with 
 less than 10,000 men to force the Khyber. Those 
 who have seen the Pass, declare it is not worse 
 than many parts of the road between this and 
 Cabul, all of which we forced in October last, I 
 have an interesting letter in French, from War- 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 265 
 
 burton, one of my old subs of the camel battery, 
 who is a hostage at Cabul." 
 
 The following is a copy of the letter, dated 16th 
 of January, which is so interesting that we give it 
 almost in extenso, merely premising that the 
 gallant writer, the late Colonel Warburton, only 
 died a few months ago : — 
 
 " I have been very anxious to know how all goes 
 on with you, and how and where your force is 
 quartered. You have no doubt heard of the sad 
 events which have taken place here, how the Envoy 
 was brutally assassinated by Mahomed Akbar, on 
 the 23rd ultimo, at an interview near the river. 
 After that, the General and Pottinger made a 
 treaty with the chiefs, by the terms of which 
 our troops were to march to Jellalabad without 
 opposition. They were, however, delayed from day 
 to day until the 6th, when the troops quitted can- 
 tonments, (which were immediately pillaged) and 
 reached with ease their first camp at Boodhak, 
 though their rear-guard had to fight the whole 
 way. Mahomed Akbar while at Cabul, swore that 
 he would not allow a single officer or lady to escape 
 from his hands. We did all in our power to let 
 the General know this, but were unable to do so. 
 On the next day, we heard that Pottinger, 
 
266 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Lawrence, and Mackenzie had been given to 
 Mahomed Akbar as security for the Jellalabad 
 force having marched before the Cabul force should 
 reach Jellalabad. Akbar said that, for this reason, 
 he vrished the Cabul force to halt at Tezeen. It 
 was a mere pretence to give him time for the 
 assembly of people in the Passes to attack the 
 retreating force. These attacks were made all the 
 way from Cabul to Jugdulluck, at which place the 
 force was finally destroyed. A letter was received 
 at Boodhak, by Pottinger, informing him that 
 Mahomed Akbar had sworn to destroy the Ferin- 
 ghees, and to gain possession of their ladies. I 
 told poor Sturt that he would probably act thus, 
 but had no idea that he would so fully succeed. I 
 hope that the authorities at Jellalabad will not be 
 deceived by him. I forewarn yoa that nothing is 
 too villainous for him. No oath can bind him. 
 He will stick at nothing. Macgregor is not a man 
 to be readily deceived, and I hope that he or who- 
 ever is your head, will not trust to such a scoundrel 
 as he is. Our Sepoys return to Cabul in great 
 numbers, in a sad state from cold. The camp- 
 followers are sold in the bazaar for one rupee each. 
 The daughter of an officer (I believe Anderson's) 
 has been brought into the city. We are trying to 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 267 
 
 obtain the child, and hope to succeed, as the 
 Nawaub has sworn to get her for us.* I believe 
 him because he is a good man, and although made 
 King, has done all in his power to give matters a 
 turn in our favour. He is a weak man, and was 
 forced to become King, and at present he is our 
 friend, but I believe he has no head-piece. Amee- 
 noolah Khan is a scoundrel, whom I hope to see 
 hanged. The politics of this place are extra- 
 ordinary. The Nawaub and principal men hero 
 have made terms with Shah Soojah, to the effect 
 that he shall be king, with the Nawaub as prime 
 minister, and Ameenoolah Khan, chief of affairs. 
 It was proposed at one of the councils that the 
 King should kill two of us, in order to establish 
 a feud between him and our Government. The 
 terms on which he was to be king were : — The 
 payment of 300,000 rupees, to give up all his 
 partisans and all his guns, and to take no share 
 in the management of the State or of the Army. 
 The King is playing a good game. He gains 
 power daily, and has sent to-day to assure us that 
 he will soon entrap them all. There is no govern- 
 
 * This cliild^ aged four, whicli was carried off by the Ghilzyes 
 at Khoord-Cabul, was afterwards rescued by Zeniaun Khan, 
 generally known as " the Good Nawaub." ^ 
 
268 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 ment, every man is king in his own house. The 
 cantonment was pillaged and totally destroyed, 
 your house among the rest. I have saved your 
 books, gun, juzail, and one table. I hope one day 
 to see Cabul like the cantonments, not one brick 
 upon another. A letter has been received from 
 the Khyber from AUa-dad Khan, (son of Khan 
 Bahadoor Khan) by the Nawaub, saying that four 
 regiments have arrived at Peshawur, and 4,000 
 Sikhs at Jumrood, and begging him to send 
 against you an army headed by some chief of 
 note. I hope that no terms will be granted to 
 these rascals. T do not think that an army can 
 arrive at Cabul without fighting, for the Afghans 
 have gained courage since our soldiers have been 
 defeated, and they have secured pillage. One of my 
 friends has promised to send this letter as far as 
 Jellalabad. His name is Taj Mahomed Khan, a 
 man in whom I can place confidence, and he tells 
 me that he will send letters for us to any quarter. 
 The Nawaub has gone to-day to pay his respects to 
 the King, together with the other notables. If you 
 write, do so in French, or in the Greek character. 
 If you write in French, write the proper names 
 in Greek. There are people stationed to intercept 
 letters." 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALADAD. 269 
 
 Captain Abbott continues his letter, under date 
 26th of January : — " Yesterday letters came from 
 ladies and officers at Lughman, asking for clothes 
 and all sorts of things which the wardrobe of a 
 bachelor is rather deficient in. Our people are 
 beginning to be discouraged here, I mean the 
 officers, and there are not wanting those who 
 advise a retreat to Lalpoora. I, however, trust 
 that until Government avow their intention of not 
 assisting us, we shall not quit the very important 
 position we now hold. We could, I think, 
 hold out for a long time against a large Afghan 
 force. 
 
 " January 29th. A council of war was held 
 yesterday to consider the reply to be given to a 
 letter from Shah Soojah, inquiring whether we 
 intend to quit the country. We were, of course, 
 indulged with a siglit of all documents bearing on 
 the subject, and to my utter astonishment, a letter 
 from the Governor- General was produced, desiring 
 that in the event of Cabul falling, all the other 
 stations should be immediately evacuated by our 
 troops. Pollock's and Wild's brigades, it seems, 
 are merely intended to show a front to assist our 
 retreat, if they can do so without risk to them- 
 selves. We have, therefore, nothing to expect 
 
270 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 from India, and although we have four months' 
 supplies, we must fall back on Peshawur, provided 
 our safe conduct thither can be guaranteed, which 
 I scarcely think probable. Letters were also read 
 from Mackeson and Henry Lawrence, reporting the 
 defeat of Wild's regiments, and the panic created 
 thereby. Also an intercepted report from the 
 Khyberrees stating that Mackeson had retired from 
 Ali Musjid, and that Tor Abbaz Khan had bolted, 
 burning all the tents and destroying all the ammu- 
 nition sent on by Mackeson. The messenger, who 
 brought the Shah's letters, told us that a large 
 force was preparing to come down with twelve 
 guns to besiege us, under the Shah's son, Futteh 
 Jung. We should laugh at the Shahzada and his 
 army, were there any chance of eventual relief, but 
 this seems to have been decided against by Grovern- 
 ment, and what the end will be no one can tell. 
 We have demanded hostages who will not be 
 given. 
 
 " February 1st. Nothing seems to improve our 
 position, we see people daily going up to Lughman 
 to salaam to Mahomed Akbar ; yesterday and to- 
 day they have fired long shots across the river at 
 our grass-cutters. We have commenced laying 
 violent hands on cattle for the use of the garrison ; 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 271 
 
 175 bullocks, and 734 sheep have already been 
 seized. Yesterday, the serjeant-major of the 37th 
 Native Infantry, arrived from the Urzebegi's fort, 
 where he had been a prisoner ; he describes dread- 
 ful mismanagement on the part of the General at 
 Cabul. Small parties, it seems, were sent out to 
 fight the whole army at Cabul ; the result was 
 inevitable, and the men were at length completely 
 discouraged. The Urzebegi's son continually 
 taunted his captives with the folly of General 
 Elphinstone in halting at the entrance of the 
 Passes, and allowing Mahomed Akbar time to 
 secure them with his troops. He declared that 
 had the troops marched straight from Cabul by 
 the usual stages, they would have met with no 
 opposition. 
 
 "February 3rd. The Peshawur route seems to 
 be completely closed against English letters, but 
 notes in Persian have arrived and give us hope 
 that we may yet be relieved, as Captain Mackeson 
 was on the 29th negotiating with the Khyberrees, 
 and Ali Musjid had not been given up to Mahomed 
 Akbar's people. Our ally, Meer Guffoor Khan, 
 came back from Lughman yesterday, and brought 
 letters mentioning in high terms the kind treat- 
 ment our captive friends there experienced. 
 
272 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 The jvzailchees went over to the enemy some days 
 ago, with all their fine rifles furnished by our 
 Govern ment. 
 
 *' 12th February. Our communication is im- 
 proving, and we have two notes from Peshawur, 
 smuggled in walking sticks. The birth of the heir 
 to the throne, H.R.H. Prince of Wales, was 
 announced last night ; and we fire a Royal Salute 
 to-day. The Afghans will think we are destroying 
 our powder preparatory to a run. Another council 
 of war is to meet to-day. Our political and mihtary 
 chiefs have been in what the Americans would call 
 a * fix,' since the arrival of a messenger from Cabul, 
 assenting to all the terms on which we agreed to 
 retreat. Shah Soojah has sent orders to his son 
 Tim our, at Candahar, to take that force out of the 
 country as soon as possible. If General Nott goes, 
 we shall thus be in a fair way of losing Afghanistan, 
 just at the moment when Government, by using very 
 slight exertion, might redeem their lost honour, and 
 have the option of retaining the country or quitting 
 it with credit." 
 
 A great calamity, and one against which no 
 human precautions could provide, befell Jellalabad 
 garrison on the 19th of February, and in a minute 
 levelled the defences that had taken three months of 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 273 
 
 unremitting labour to construct. At this time the 
 following were the works completed as appears by 
 Sale's official report : — " Generally, they consisted 
 in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover 
 for the enemy, extending to the demolition of 
 forts and old walls, filling up ravines and destroy- 
 ing gardens, and cutting down groves, raising the 
 parapets to 6 or 7 feet high, repairing and widening 
 the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching 
 three of the gates, covering the fourth with an out- 
 work, and excavating a ditch 10 feet in depth and 
 12 feet in width round the whole of the walls." 
 
 In the course of a minute an earthquake nearly 
 destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of 
 the parapets, the Cabul gate with two adjoining 
 bastions, and a part of the new bastion that flanked 
 it ; nearly destroyed three other bastions, made 
 several large breaches in the curtain, that on the 
 Peshawur side being 80 feet long, and filled the 
 ditch, thus ^making an ascent quite easy. Fortu- 
 nately Akbar Khan and his army, who had removed 
 to Amukhail, within seven miles of the towu, were 
 too much horror-struck at the calamity, which 
 levelled their forts and dwellings, to take advan- 
 tage of the helpless state to which the Jellalabad 
 garrison was reduced. 
 
 T 
 
274 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Not an hour was lost in repairing the damages. 
 The whole garrison were told off into working 
 parties, and, says Captain Broadfoot, the Acting- 
 Engineer, "before night the breaches were scarped, 
 the rubbish cleared away, and the ditches before 
 them dug out, whilst the front one on the 
 Peshawur side was surrounded by a good gabion 
 parapet. A parapet was erected on the remains 
 of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure 
 allowing the guns to flank the approach of the 
 ruined Cabul gate ; the parapet of the new bastion 
 was restored so as to give a flanking fire to the 
 north-west bastion, whilst the ruined gate was 
 rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, 
 and in every bastion round the place a temporary 
 parapet was raised." This was not a bad day's 
 work, and it was an earnest of many such that 
 were to follow. All the troops off duty were em- 
 ployed unremittingly all day, and such was the 
 energy and perseverance of officers and men, that 
 by the end of the month the parapets were entirely 
 restored, and the curtain filled in where this was im- 
 practicable. The breaches were also built up, with 
 the ramparts doubled in thickness, the whole of the 
 gates were retrenched and every battery was 
 re-established. In this duty the chief responsi- 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, 275 
 
 bility devolved on Captains Abbott and Backhouse 
 as Commandant of Artillery and Chief Engineer. 
 
 Captain Abbott gives the following account of 
 this visitation in a letter dated 20th of February : — 
 " The last week has been an eventful one. We 
 have been gratified by intelligence of strong rein- 
 forcements marching to our aid, but the very day 
 which brought us the news, witnessed a most 
 extraordinary calamity. I was walking round the 
 place yesterday, about noon, when the ground 
 trembled under my feet, and I was sensible of 
 the shock of an earthquake. The oscillation 
 increased, and as the ground actually undulated, 
 I sat down to avoid falling. Before me was a lofty 
 bastion three stories high, on which stood a Sepoy 
 sentry. This high building began nodding in a 
 strange manner, and I fully expected it to fall at 
 full length outwards, but only the thin parapet was 
 shaken off, and the sentry remained unhurt at his 
 post. All the parapets along the face commenced 
 falling in like manner, and several large breaches 
 were made in the bastions and the curtains. Within 
 the works a confusion of cries arose, and a dense 
 cloud of dust denoted that great injury had been 
 sustained. The whole of the town was more or less 
 injured, and two-thirds of the houses were totally 
 
 T 2 
 
276 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 destroyed. Our house had not escaped ; my room 
 is the only one now habitable, and that has its walls 
 and roof in such a state, that last night I was more 
 than once about to desert it, for we had eight or 
 ten shocks between nine a.m. and daylight this 
 morning. The aspect of the town is now most 
 wretched, but fortunately few lives were lost. 
 The working parties were all out, and only four 
 men were killed of all our force. Colonel Monteith, 
 of the 35th Native Infantry, was buried in the 
 debris of a curtain, which fell under him, but the 
 men speedily dug him out, and he is doing well. 
 The whole country has suffered dreadfully. The 
 bastions and curtains of many forts have been 
 thrown down, and the clouds of dust that arose 
 from every fort and village denoted that we were 
 by no means the only sufferers. The market people 
 tell us that women and children have been killed by 
 dozens, the waters of the river were twice thrown 
 from their bed during the shock, and I had no idea 
 that such mischief could be done in a minute and a 
 half. To see the solid bastions of this fort, on 
 which my guDS looked like toys, split and thrown 
 down by invisible agency, to see a mile and a half 
 of parapet, the work of all hands during three 
 months, in the same short time shaken down in 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 277 
 
 their whole circuit, was equally awful and vexatious. 
 The first great shock lasted only a minute and a 
 half, but at short intervals we have ever since 
 had slight shocks, which invariably sends all hands 
 scampering into the open air. All night our men 
 slept at their posts for fear of an attack, and to- 
 day they are working away at a capital rate on the 
 repairs." 
 
 On the 21st of February, a body of the enemy's 
 cavalry attacked the foraging party, when the small 
 escort retired slowly until the former came within 
 gun-shot, when one of Abbott's 9-pounders made 
 them draw off. On the following day the escort was 
 increased to ninety sabres, under Lieutenant Mayne 
 of the 5th Cavalry, a particularly gallant officer. 
 At eleven a.m. a large body of the enemy's horse- 
 men moved unobserved down the bed of the Cabul 
 river and made a dash on the grass-cutters. Mayne 
 charged twice, but being overpowered, was com- 
 pelled to retire, when Captain Oldfield moved out 
 to his support, and Captain Abbott, taking down 
 two of his guns from the bastion, proceeded at a 
 gallop, and, opening fire on the enemy with great 
 effect, drove them beyond the brow of a hill. The 
 Afghan horsemen refused to take up the gauge of 
 battle offered by the small British force, which was 
 
278 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 about to follow tliem up, when the General sent 
 peremptory orders to them to return. 
 
 Captain Abbott notes in his Journal, " That after 
 the action of the 22nd February, the sowars of the 
 5th Cavalry begged to be allowed to use their own 
 tulwars, as they can do nothing with their English 
 cavalry swords." 
 
 On the following day the foraging parties were 
 again driven in by Afghan horsemen, and, on the 
 25th, Akbar Khan quitted Amukhail, and established 
 his camp two miles to the westward of Jellalabad. 
 Next morning he reconnoitred with all his cavalry, 
 and Captain Abbott commanded a party of the 
 three arms sent out to protect the grass-cutters.* 
 
 * He says in his Journal : — '* Their cavalry took post on the 
 heights beyond the range of our guns ; and their infantry occupied 
 the broken ground around us, and fired incessantly, but to no 
 purpose. They had four standards, two red, one white with blue 
 stripes, and another white. An old Moollah of their party, as if 
 in derision of such vanities^ displayed a dirty turban at the end of 
 a bamboo. Towards evening the whole drew off, having lost some 
 six or seven by the fire of amateur riflemen, who alone were allowed 
 to fire. Thus ended the first day of the siege, in which the enemy 
 expended much ammunition. We collected their balls and thus 
 obtained a welcome supply of ammunition." On the 28th he notes 
 the arrival of a cossid who had his hands and ears cut off by the 
 enemy. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 27D 
 
 On the first day of March, Akbar established a 
 second camp to the westward, within one mile of 
 the town, beyond Meer Aga Jauns' fort, with his 
 left on the Cabul river ; and a party of his men 
 ascended the rocks, 800 yards south-west of the 
 place, and fired into the cavalry lines. Again, on 
 the following day, he made another attack which 
 lasted from eleven a.m. till sunset, but the result 
 was only a profuse expenditure of ammunition, 
 and, in the evening, a party sallied out from the 
 town and drove his skirmishers away. On the 4th 
 Akbar posted a strong detachment two miles east of 
 Jellalabad, and it became evident that the Afghan 
 Chief, fearful of trying an assault, determined to 
 invest the place, and starve the garrison out. But 
 Abbott opened fire with his battery on this detach- 
 ment, and so accurate was his practice that he 
 speedily forced the enemy to retire. Two days 
 later there was a skirmish between the British 
 foraging party and the detachment posted on 
 the east side of the town, and again, on the 
 8th, when Akbar received considerable reinforce- 
 ments. 
 
 "Our spies," writes Abbott in his Journal, 
 " estimated the Afghan army at 3,500 cavalry, and 
 
280 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 14,000 infantry, the latter number much exagger- 
 ated."* 
 
 Early on the 9th March, about 2,000 of the 
 enemy approached the walls, and planted standards 
 in all the ravines near the north-west angle. There 
 was heavy firing throughout the day, and Captain 
 Abbott mentions that a blind for the protection of 
 an embrasure, in the north-west bastion, composed 
 of 2-inch planks, was riddled with balls, and they 
 had to double its thickness, proving that the 
 penetration, no less than the range of the Afghan 
 juzail, was far greater than that of the antiquated 
 flint musket, forming the arm of the British 
 infantry. 
 
 He writes in his Journal : — " The enemy having 
 come down in force brought with them a gun for 
 which they commenced a battery on Piper's Hill, but 
 
 * Abbott notes in his Journal : — " An official letter received 
 from Shah Soojah asking whether we intend to evacuate Jellalabad, 
 and threatening that a large array will be sent against us if we 
 refuse to go. The Shah also sent a private note saying that he 
 cannot much longer delay the despatch of an army against us, and 
 inquiring what our intentions really are ? The General replies 
 officially by referring the Shah to General Pollock, under whose 
 orders we are now serving." On the 9th a cossid arrived from 
 Colonel Palmer, commanding at Ghuznee, with a message that his 
 water being cut off, he is forced to capitulate. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 281 
 
 a 9-pounder shell killed ten of the working party 
 and the gun was taken back to camp. Our loss 
 was small, but we heard that the enemy had 120 
 killed and wounded.'* 
 
 On the 10th of March, when the Afghans con- 
 tinued firing all day, the investment was so close that 
 the foraging parties could not go out, and, as the 
 spies reported that Akbar was busy mining, a sortie 
 was resolved upon. Accordingly, on the morning 
 of the 11th, Colonel Dennie sallied out with 600 
 men drawn equally from the 13th and 35th, and 
 200 of Broadfoot's sappers, while the cavalry formed 
 in the plain, and the artillery manned the ramparts. 
 The guns first opened a destructive fire, and, says 
 Abbott, "compelled the enemy, who were about 
 8,000 strong and crowded the ground behind 
 Piper's Hill, to fall back, when the infantry pushed 
 forward and carried the breastwork." 
 
 Having ascertained that there were no mines, 
 Colonel Dennie retired without loss, the enemy 
 having suffered considerably. 
 
 On the following day the Afghans returned to 
 their breastworks, and, nothing daunted by their 
 reverse, made an attack that lasted from noon till 
 sunset. Whilst standing in the banquette of the 
 south-west bastion to observe the flight of shells 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 he was pitching among the enemy behind Piper's 
 Hill, Captain Abbott was wounded by a musket 
 ball in the breast. Fortunately the force of the 
 ball, which was fired from a mosque 240 yards 
 distant, was somewhat spent, but it penetrated 
 deep enough to cause a troublesome wound, which 
 required the attention of the doctor for some 
 weeks, though he refused to absent himself from 
 duty for a day.* 
 
 * To a correspondent in India he writes on the 12th of March : — 
 " You will no doubt have attributed my long silence to its true 
 cause^ the cessation of all intercourse by dawk between Jellalabad and 
 Peshawur. The Political Agent continues to smuggle a few lines 
 in a quill or some other disguise, but the cossidsj when taken, are so 
 <?ruelly treated, that they are afraid to undertake the conveyance of 
 private letters. Macgregor sent one note for me enclosed in a quill 
 addressed to my brother Frederick. We are now in a state of 
 siege ; our works are strong enough to resist any Afghan force, 
 but there is cover within eighty yards of the walls, and the enemy 
 hem us in daily. Akbar Khan at length finding that he had no 
 chance of deceiving us to surrender Jellalabad, and that his force of 
 cavalry was sufficiently large to enable him to act, came down to 
 the village of Amukhail, twelve miles north-west, and sent out 
 large parties of horse to cut off our forage. On the 22nd of 
 February, Lieutenant Mayne was in command of the forage party, 
 and had with him forty-five troopers of the 5th and forty-five of the 
 Shah's cavalry, when 700 sowars appeared so suddenly, that the 
 grass-cutters could not reach the walls in time to avoid them. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 283 
 
 On the 18th, the working parties were driven in 
 by the enemy. On the following day the Afghans 
 established a fortified post 1,100 yards north-west 
 of the Cabul gate, and there was skirmishing in 
 front of the position, and, on the 17th, they made 
 
 Mayne drew up his men about 500 yards from the fort, and charged 
 the head of the column, which recoiled and halted. He then 
 resumed his course towards the gate, but being again pursued, he 
 charged again with the same success, and got all the grass-cutters in. 
 His men were now overpowered, and Sale now thought of sending 
 him support, which he had withheld in defiance of the opinion of 
 everyone ; Oldfield moved out with the rest of the cavalry, and 
 made up the whole party to 220, who offered battle to the enemy. 
 1 feared he would be overpowered, and taking down two guns from 
 the bastion^ went off at a gallop to his aid. The guns drove in 
 the skirmishers that covered the front of the main body^ and then 
 advancing, opened upon the dense ^ gole ' with considerable effect. 
 They were about to retire^ when we were recalled by repeated 
 orders from Sale, and left the affair undecided. Mayne got no 
 thanks for his gallantry, but was blamed for fighting, when he 
 could not have avoided doing so unless by abandoning his charge. 
 After this the General obliged our foragers to run in on the 
 slightest attack, and our cattle were in danger of being starved, 
 when our urgent remonstrances induced him to force his forage, 
 and strong parties went out with orders not to retire unless the 
 enemy should come upon them in force. Akbar now came nearer, 
 and on the 26th again attacked, placing all his 1,500 cavalry on 
 the heights, one and a quarter miles distant, and sending his infantry 
 to fire at us from some rocks at the south-west angle, and from 
 
284 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 another attack with the usual result. At three p.m, 
 they fired a salute, and Abbott records a grim joke 
 On the part of Akbar Khan, who, when Saadut 
 Khan sent to him for aid against General Pollock, 
 sent him a Koran and told him to rely on that. 
 
 On the 18th the Afghans seized the rocks called 
 Piper's Hill, (from an Afghan piper having been 
 seen in the first action of the 14tb of November, 
 
 the ravines at the north-west. Our reply was merely a shell now 
 and then, and a few shots fired by amateurs. On the 2nd of March 
 another attack was attended by similar results. Akbar now began 
 to gather strength, and on the 9th he came down again. His 
 people planted their standards in all the hollows near the place. 
 On the 10th our foraging was entirely stopped. At daylight the 
 enemy were around us, and there was much firing all day. It was 
 reported they had commenced mines^ and Sale ordered out a party 
 on the morning of the 11th to examine the ground, which was 
 done without loss on our side, though the enemy suffered a good 
 deal, for their skirmishers were overpowered, and when their 
 reinforcements come down from camp, the guns killed a great 
 many. At 10 o'clock a.m. we saw a gun moving down from camp 
 towards two hills at our south-west angle, and soon perceived a 
 rascally soobadar, who had deserted from the Shah's artillery, 
 directing a working party to make a battery on the top of the hill. 
 One shell from a 9 -pounder however changed the soobadar's 
 opinion as to the eligibility of the spot, and the gun was soon 
 seen toddling back to camp without having fired a shot.'* 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 285 
 
 playing his bagpipe thereon amid a storm of bullets) 
 but were soon dislodged. 
 
 Ever since the catastrophe of the 19th of 
 February, slight shocks of earthquake continued 
 almost daily, and on the 20th of March, there was 
 so severe a shock that the left centre battery, on 
 the river face, was cracked, and the parapets were 
 damaged. Letters were received from General 
 Pollock discouraging any idea of an immediate 
 advance from Peshawur, owing to the non-arrival 
 of reinforcements, and, on the 23rd, at Abbott's 
 suggestion, orders were issued to destroy the 
 camels which had been consuming forage, required 
 for the half starved horses of the cavalry and 
 artillery, whose allowance was reduced on the 
 27th, from two to three seers (four pounds) of 
 gram, and five seers (ten pounds) of grass, Abbott 
 remonstrated against this, stating in his letter 
 that, to be effective, an artillery horse required 
 twenty-five seers of grass. The rations of the 
 ammunition ponies was four seers of grass and 
 one of gram daily. 
 
 The enemy drove in the grass-cutters on the 
 19th and two following days, but, on the 24th, 
 when they were followmg the guard too closely, 
 Broadfoot, who was in command, suddenly turned 
 
286 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 upon them and charged with the bayonet, driving 
 them back with much loss. In the hand-to-hand 
 melee that ensued, this gallant officer was severely 
 wounded,* and four of his men were killed. But 
 the Afghans were very persistent, and a party 
 of horse attacked the grass-cutters on the 4th, 
 when some dismounted troopers, armed with car- 
 bines, drove them off. Provisions and forage now 
 began to run short, but, by a well-timed sortie, the 
 garrison were put in possession of a supply of 
 animal food for ten days. 
 
 Akbar, in order to diminish the supply of grass 
 near the walls, which was already very small, or to 
 entice Sir R. Sale to despatch a weak detachment 
 to secure them, had, during the past few days, 
 sent several flocks of sheep to graze within half-a- 
 mile of the town, a guard being placed in conceal- 
 ment. Watching his opportunity. Sale ordered a 
 
 ;;(* K^ye> borrowing from Gleig's work, " Sale's Brigade in 
 Afghanistan," places the date of the wound by which Broadfoot 
 was incapacitated from further fighting during the siege, as the 
 1 1th of March, when Captain Abbott was wounded, but we have 
 adopted the date given by this officer in his Journal for this and 
 many other incidents of the siege, though at variance with those 
 narratives. The 24th March is also the date of Broadfoot's wound 
 given in Sir R. Sale's Official Report of the 1 6th of April. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 287 
 
 sudden sally of all the cavalry, supported by a 
 strong detachment of 650 infantry. Issuing out of 
 the south gate, and being concealed by the walls 
 until they reached the south-west bastion, they 
 were able to make a dash before Akbar could bring 
 forward his main body, and, in a short time, three 
 flocks, numbering 520 sheep, were driven witbin 
 the gates, Captain Abbott playing upon the heavy 
 masses of the enemy, who now hurried up, with his 
 guns from the ramparts. The garrison were jubi- 
 lant at this great success, and the good feeling 
 that existed between the component parts of the 
 force, was intensified by the generosity of the 35th 
 Native Infantry, in giving up their share of the 
 sheep to their European comrades of the 13th, 
 and this though they had been upon half rations 
 throughout the siege. 
 
 Abbott gives the credit of this coup to a young 
 officer of the 5th Cavalry. He says in his Journal : — 
 " Lieutenant Plowden, a very bold and good officer, 
 persuaded Sir Robert Sale to seize the flocks of sheep 
 grazing near the town, and volunteered to lead a 
 small party of cavalry to make the attempt, although 
 he knew that 300 or 400 of the enemy's horsemen 
 were in ambush behind an old fort which he must 
 pass. The General assented and ordered the 
 
288 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 remainder of the cavalry and 650 infantry to follow 
 in support. Plowden, with twenty troopers, dashed 
 forward at full speed, cut down the shepherds and 
 began to drive the sheep and goats, above 500 in 
 number, towards the town. The enemy turned out 
 so slowly that the sheep were close to the walls and 
 were guarded by the whole detachment before any 
 attempt was made to recover them. Akbar's whole 
 force came forward and suffered severely from the 
 fire of the guns." 
 
 On the 4th of April the enemy attacked the 
 grass-cutters but were driven off. *'It seems,'* 
 says Abbott, "that Kyroola Khan, who com- 
 manded the party, was much quizzed for his 
 failure." 
 
 But the jubilations of the garrison were short- 
 lived, for on the 6th of April, two spies reported 
 that General Pollock had been defeated in the 
 Khyber Pass, the fact being that he had forced 
 that defile on the previous day, by a masterly series 
 of operations. Akbar had been strengthening his 
 investing lines during the past few days, and the 
 question that arose for consideration on the receipt of 
 this disastrous intelligence, was as to the course that 
 should now be pursued when succour appeared to be 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, 289 
 
 indefinitely postponed by the defeat of the relieving 
 force. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to a correspondent of the 
 events since the earthquake : — 
 
 " On the 22nd of February we had a skirmish 
 with 750 of Akbar's cavalry, who fairly declined 
 the combat when offered them by our 220 troopers. 
 The grass-cutters were at work on some heights 
 one mile and a half to the south, when a cloud of 
 horsemen approached and they all began to run in. 
 The escort of ninety troopers, under Lieutenant 
 Mayne, covered the retreat, and made two or three 
 charges on the enemy's column, which recoiled each 
 time, but pursued again when our men continued 
 their route, until at length our troopers were in 
 some confusion. The remainder of the cavalry 
 moved out, and the enemy drew off to the heights, 
 when I took out two guns to dislodge them. They 
 were evidently about to run when the General 
 called us all in, so that nothing was decided as it 
 should have been. We found four bodies on the 
 ground where the enemy stood the few rounds I 
 fired, and there were large pools of blood in several 
 places. The General was annoyed at our going out 
 at all, as he had positively forbidden it ; but in fact, 
 he behaved ill in allowing Mayne to be overpowered, 
 
 u 
 
290 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 when he might so easily have aided him, for our 
 working parties always have their arms and 
 accoutrements piled beside them, and all were 
 most anxious for a fight. Akbar's cavalry com- 
 mander, Mahomed Shah Khan, Grhilzye, was 
 wounded in the hand ; he is a first cousin and 
 a great friend of Akbar's. The chief himself 
 viewed the battle from a distant hill, and was 
 much disgusted at seeing his men take to the hill. 
 They took him two heads of the troopers they 
 killed, and showing him bloody swords, declared 
 they had done wonders, but he was not to be 
 imposed upon, and rated them soundly for their 
 cowardice. Akbar has to-day advanced his camp 
 four or five miles, and has taken up a position 
 about three miles from us, and will be able to 
 annoy our forage parties very much. 
 
 " February 26th. Our forage parties were out 
 early this morning, and I held 200 infantry, all the 
 cavalry, and two guns ready at the rocks, near the 
 south-west angle of the place to cover their retreat. 
 At eight a.m., the enemy began to form their 
 ' goles ' of horse, and I recalled the foragers, and 
 got all safe in before they advanced in force. At 
 near noon they came on, about 1,400 cavalry, 
 taking post on the hills, while another detachment, 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 291 
 
 about 1,200 or 1,500, sent forward parties to all 
 the old walls and hollows around, as well as to the 
 rocks at the south-west angle. The guns and 
 mortars fired twelve or fifteen rounds. 
 
 " March 13th. From the 26th of February to 
 the 1st instant, all was quiet ; but, on the 2nd, 
 Akbar made another attack. 
 
 "On the 4th, he divided his force, placing a 
 portion of it two miles east of us, and on the 6tli, 
 they attacked in force from this point. The guns 
 upset a few horsemen and all the rest were dis- 
 persed by a great storm from the west. 
 
 " On the 9th, all Akbar' s force came down again 
 at 11 a.m., and planted standards in the ravines 
 close to the north-west angle. There were plenty 
 of volunteers to capture them, but the General 
 refused them leave to go out. 
 
 " On the 11th, a sally was made to examine the 
 ground by our people, who drove off the enemy's 
 posts and effected their object, destroying all the 
 works commenced by the Afghans. The whole 
 mass of the enemy then came forward, when our 
 troops were called in, and the artillery played upon 
 the masses with good effect, killing and wounding 
 120. At 10 a.m., they brought up a gun, and 
 
 u 2 
 
292 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 were making a battery on the heights at our south- 
 west angle, when a shell killed ten of the working 
 party, and we now saw the gun moving quietly 
 back to camp. 
 
 ** On this day, the enemy received a strong rein- 
 forcement, at least 2,000 men. Heavy rain fell on 
 the night of the 11th, and the enemy did not attack 
 us till noon yesterday, when they came forward 
 about 8,000 strong, but were very cautious. The 
 men had crowded the heights south-west of us, 
 and I was pitching shells amongst them, when one 
 of their riflemen put his ball into my right breast ; 
 it rebounded from the bones and made only a 
 trifling wound about an inch deep. The doctor 
 says it will take some time to heal, but it does not 
 take me from my duty. One shutter of an em- 
 brasure at the north-west angle, which is always 
 the point of attack, had thirty -four balls put into 
 it during the 11th instant, and though it was 
 originally made of two-inch planks, I was obliged to 
 add two more planks, making it near five inches 
 thick 'ere it resisted the balls. 
 
 " April 4th. Little has occurred since my last 
 entiy. The enemy for some time drove in our 
 foragers regularly. General Sale having ordered the 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 293 
 
 covering parties not to fight. At length, our cattle 
 began to starve, and the General ventured to send 
 out some men and allow them to stand until 
 threatened by a large force. 
 
 " On the 24th of March, the enemy attacked as 
 usual, and the party of about 150 men remained 
 out until the collection of the Ghilzyes amounted 
 to 1,000, and were closely pressed as they retired. In 
 this position they turned and charged with the 
 bayonet, a manoeuvre which confounded the 
 Ghilzyes, who were driven down a steep bank, 
 and suffered afterwards from the musketry. They 
 had several killed and wounded ; we lost four 
 killed and a like number wounded, amongst the 
 latter. Captain Broadfoot, of the Shah's sappers, 
 who led the charge, and cut down two men him- 
 self. This check somewhat dispirited the enemy, 
 and we foraged with better success afterwards. 
 Rain fell, and gave life to great quantities of 
 grass which thrives in sandy soil, and spreads 
 like a strawberry plant over a great extent of 
 surface. 
 
 " On the 1st of April we made a fool of Akbar. 
 He had ordered the shepherds to pasture their 
 sheep round the fort, and three flocks came within 
 a thousand yards, but well within Akbar*s advanced 
 
294 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 posts. A few cavalry and skirmisliers dashed at 
 the slieep and seized them, when the enemy 
 rushed to the rescue, but were met by all the rest 
 of the cavalry, supported by 550 bayonets. These 
 easily drove off all the advanced parties, and before 
 Akbar's whole force could turn out, all the sheep 
 were safely lodged within our walls, so that when 
 the horsemen came pouring down, they were too 
 late to do any good, and merely exposed themselves 
 to a fire from my guns. Akbar is furious at the 
 loss, and vows vengeance against us ; however, we 
 have 500 sheep and can afford to laugh at him. 
 His camp is rather too distant for a surprise, and 
 it is strongly situated, with a dry nullah in front, 
 a very deep one in rear, a fort and gardens on the 
 right, and an unfordable stream on the left. We 
 could force the position, and the affair would, if 
 well conducted, be a very glorious one. I had 
 been urging it warmly until I heard that Pollock 
 had actually marched, which altered the case very 
 much, as failure on our part would involve his force 
 in great difficulties. We have no confidence in 
 Sale, who is a very good fellow, but a very in- 
 efficient General, as our affairs at Julgah and Pur- 
 wan-Durra clearly demonstrated. 
 
 "April 6th. We have just heard of Pollock's 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 295 
 
 defeat in the Kliyber, and it is decided that we 
 attack Akbar's camp to-morrow, as our only chance 
 of deliverance. We shall have rough work, and I 
 may not survive the affair, so this letter shall, for 
 the present, be closed." 
 
 The false news as to Pollock's defeat appeared 
 confirmed by a royal salute, which Akbar Khan 
 fired in honour of the event, and it seemed to some 
 of the officers of the garrison that the only course 
 to pursue in this desperate state of affairs, was to 
 sally forth and break the investment by a general 
 attack on Akbar's position and camp. Sir R. Sale 
 was averse to this measure, but Abbott, Oldfield, 
 and other fiery spirits in the camp, insisted upon it 
 with so much urgency, that at length, the gallant 
 old chief, who, though he loved fighting for fight- 
 ing's sake, was fearful of incurring responsibility, 
 (as Sir Greorge Pollock himself told the author,) 
 consented to make a sally in force and gave the 
 necessary orders. 
 
 Thus, in fact, it was by something very like a 
 mutiny — Abbott going the length of proposing to 
 the heads of corps that they should act without 
 him — that Sir R. Sale was induced to make the famous 
 sortie which constituted the chief claim of the gar- 
 rison to the historic title of " illustrious." 
 
296 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 The enemy, during the past month, had been 
 busily engaged entrenching his position and 
 strengthening his works, and starvation for them- 
 selves and the horses stared the garrison in the 
 face, unless they broke through the lines. The 
 entire brigade, with the exception of the ordinary 
 guards at each of the city gates, and the camp- 
 followers who manned the walls, was formed into 
 three columns. The centre, 500 strong, consisted 
 of 'the 13th, under Colonel Dennie ; the left, of the 
 35th, under Colonel Monteith, 500 men ; and the 
 right, 360 bayonets, of the sappers, with one com- 
 pany from each of the two regiments, under Captain 
 Havelock, Broadfoot not being sufficiently recovered 
 from his wound to take the field. These columns 
 were to be supported by Captain Abbott with the 
 guns of his battery, and by the handful of 
 cavalry, under the command of Captain Oldfield 
 and Lieutenant Mayne. 
 
 The troops issued from the Cabul and Peshawur 
 gates at daylight on the 7th of April, and found 
 Akbar Khan with his army of 6,000 men, supported 
 by four guns, drawn up in battle array. The 
 columns advanced on the enemy, Havelock along 
 the river's bank, and Monteith on the left of 
 Dennie, when the Gleneral deviated from his plan 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 297 
 
 of attack, by ordering Colonel Dennie to attack a 
 fort, the inner keep of which had not been breached, 
 while the only means of ingress was through a 
 doorway half way up the wall. In making a futile 
 attempt to carry this work, (which was evacuated 
 at the conclusion of the action) the gallant Dennie 
 and some men were killed and several wounded. 
 At this time the other columns were in a critical 
 position, owing to the overwhelming force of the 
 enemy, and a disaster was only averted by the 
 centre column abandoning the attempt on the fort, 
 and rapidly pushing on to the support of Mon- 
 teith's and Havelock's columns, when the combined 
 force made a determined attack, which Captain 
 Abbott supported by bringing up his guns at the 
 gallop, and opening fire in his usual brilliant and 
 effective style. 
 
 The Afghans made a gallant attempt to check 
 the British advance, by throwing forward large 
 bodies of horse, and a masked- battery of three guns 
 opened fire under the personal command of the 
 Sirdar. But the British infantry would not be 
 denied, and the fire of the guns was overwhelming. 
 The advance was uninterrupted, and soon the 
 enemy were dislodged from their position, their 
 cannon and standards captured, and their camp 
 
298 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 stormed and involved in a general conflagration. 
 By seven a,m.j all was over, and Akbar Khan in 
 full retreat in the direction of Lughman. 
 
 Everj officer and man of the brigade well per- 
 formed their duty on this glorious day, including 
 the artillery, which fired with their usual precision, 
 a shot directed by Abbott killing the horses of 
 one of the enemy's guns, which the Afghans were 
 endeavouring to carry off. Besides his own 
 subaltern, Lieutenant Dawes, Captain Abbott had 
 the services of Captain Macgregor, the Political 
 Agent, himself an artillery officer, who volunteered 
 for the occasion. Not the least satisfactory 
 feature in the results of the victory was the cap- 
 ture of four gnns, lost by the Cabul division during 
 their retreat. 
 
 The following is a brief account of the action 
 from Abbott's Journal : — 
 
 " Officers commanding corps waited on the 
 General and entreated him to attack Akbar at once. 
 The 13th Light Infantry and the Battery were 
 ready for action. The General was very angry and 
 drove the officers from his presence, but, in the 
 course of the day he changed his mind, and gave 
 orders for an attack at daylight. On the 7th, 1,3.j0 
 infantry, 210 cavalry, and the 9-pounder battery 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 299 
 
 advanced to tlie attack at a quarter to five a.m. 
 The infantry were divided into three bodies, com- 
 manded by Havelock, Dennie, and Monteith. The 
 two latter commanded their own regiments, but 
 Havelock had a mixed detachment of one company 
 each of the 13th Light Infantry and 35th Native 
 Infantry and the sappers, in all about 350 men. 
 He pushed forward along the river's bank, while 
 Monteith advanced on his left. The 13th and the 
 battery were detained by a small fort which the 
 enemy held within half a mile of the town. Thus 
 the force was separated, and while the guns were 
 wasting shot and losing time, Monteith and Have- 
 lock were hard pressed by the whole of the enemy's 
 cavalry, and were forced to send for assistance. 
 The General then allowed the battery to go forward 
 and followed at a quick pace with the i3th. The 
 enemy, unable to face the fire of the guns, retreated 
 from the battery, leaving the camp to the mercy of 
 the assailants, who recovered some ordnance and 
 ammunition that had been taken from the Cabul 
 force." 
 
 The total loss in achieving this great success, 
 was only thirteen killed and seventy-one wounded. 
 Of these, Captain Abbott's battery had one man 
 killed and eleven wounded; five horses were 
 
300 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 wounded, and the expenditure of ammunition had 
 been thirty -three rounds per gun. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes to a relative in England, 
 o^ the 26th of April, an animated account of the 
 action of the 7th of April, which raised the siege : — 
 " On the 5th of April, our spies brought us news 
 that General Pollock had been repulsed in the 
 Khyber Pass with great loss, and a royal salute in 
 Akbar's camp confirmed the sad intelligence. It 
 was now necessary to attack Akbar and beat him 
 in order to obtain supplies for a further siege. 
 Oldfield and I went round to all the heads of corps, 
 and we all determined to go in a body to the 
 General and beg to be allowed to fight. We talked 
 for an hour, using every argument in vain, but he 
 dismissed us with a positive refusal. I proposed 
 that we should quietly parade our men at four 
 a.m. on the 7th, and go out before he was out of 
 his bed, but of all the party only three supported 
 me, and the plan was abandoned. After two hours' 
 consideration, Sale sent for Oldfield and me, and 
 agreed to go out. The plan of attack was fixed. 
 The gates were closed to prevent the exit of every 
 spy, and all was prepared for the next morning's 
 work. At ten p.m. we received the cheering intelli- 
 gence that our troops bad forced the Khyber, and 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD, 301 
 
 that the salute in Akbar's camp had been fired in 
 celebration of Shah Soojah's murder at Cabul. 
 Sale, however, happily did not change his mind, 
 and, at daylight, all the troops advanced against 
 the force by which we had so long been besieged. 
 The infantry were formed in three columns, two of 
 500, and one of 350 men. The cavalry numbered 
 210, and I had all my six guns in the field. Our 
 plan was to advance directly upon Akbar's camp, 
 avoiding any fortified posts that might intervene, 
 and directing all our efforts to the capture of the 
 main position, in which were all his guns, ammu- 
 nition, and stores. The camp was two miles and a 
 half west of Jellalabad. Its rear was upon the 
 Cabul river, which by a sudden bend secured its 
 left also. The right was secured by a fort and 
 gardens. In front was a deep sandy nullah. The 
 river did not extend beyond his right, but a nullah, 
 with high steep banks flowing from south to north, 
 was a serious obstacle to a retreat, and the position, 
 though strong, was very dangerous. Sale, how- 
 ever, had not moved 800 yards before he made a 
 blunder that might have caused a defeat. The 
 enemy had prepared an old fort, and had placed in 
 it an advanced picket of 150 men, while behind it 
 were concealed about 200 sowars. A few shots 
 
302 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 made the sowars run, but instead of our advancing, 
 Sale took away the 13th Light Infantry, and all my 
 guns to attack the fort, allowing the other columns 
 to go on unsupported. Before I had fired thirty 
 shots. Colonel Monteith, commanding the left 
 column, sent word that all Akbar's cavalry were 
 upon him. I was then allowed to gallop on, and 
 opened fire upon several dense ' goles ' of horse, 
 who suffered severely and were soon broken, so that 
 when the 13th came up we were all ready to advance 
 again. We now went all right. The guns kept 
 well ahead and cleared the way, supported by the 
 compact masses of infantry. At 800 yards from 
 camp, Akbar's guns opened, but were soon silenced, 
 and then we rushed upon his camp which the enemy 
 abandoned. 
 
 " We took four guns, great numbers of tents and 
 much valuable property, and I cannonaded the re- 
 treating column until it was a mile distant. Sale 
 burned the tents, which was a great pity. I pur- 
 chased for 600 rupees, a beautiful MacCabe's gold 
 repeater, found in Akbar's tent, and shall keep it 
 as a memento of the 7th of April, 1842. Akbar 
 fled to Tezeen, taking all his prisoners. He has 
 sent in Captain Mackenzie* (one of them) to nego- 
 
 * Now General Colin Mackenzie, C B., who was assibtant to 
 
THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD. 303 
 
 tiate with us. Mackenzie says that Akbar never 
 ceases to talk of the gallant manner in which our 
 troops behaved on the 7th." 
 
 On the 16th of April, General Pollock arrived 
 with his victorious army at Jellalabad. Since 
 leaving Cabul in the preceding October, Sale's 
 brigade had lost 4 officers and 110 men killed, 
 and 16 officers and 384 men wounded. 
 
 Sir W. Macnaghten, and accompanied him on the occasion of his 
 murder, when he owed his safety to Akbar Khan, who carried him 
 off on his horse. Captain Mackenzie was prominent during the 
 disastrous retreat from Cabal, for his gallantry, and his juzailchee» 
 were almost all killed before he was surrendered as a hostage ou 
 the 8th of January with Pottinger and Lawrence. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 
 
 The Expedition to the Shinwarree Valley — Advance from Jella- 
 labad — Affair at Mamrnoo Khail — Action of JugduUuck — 
 Battle of Tezeen — Occupation of Cabul — Return March to India 
 — Arrival at Ferozepore — Conclusion. 
 
 p ENERAL POLLOCK was condemned to remain 
 at Jellalabad for some months, until he had 
 collected sufficient cattle and supplies for the ad- 
 vance on Cabul, and Lord Ellenborough had made 
 up his mind whether there should be an advance at 
 all, or whether, the relief of the Jellalabad garrison 
 being accomplished, the army should return to 
 India, alike leaving unredeemed the captives in the 
 hands of Akbar Khan, and British honour, sullied 
 by our recent reverses. But his lordship was not 
 slow in recognising the services of the defenders 
 of Jellalabad, and, on learning the famous victory 
 they had achieved on the 7th of April, issued the 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 305 
 
 following Proclamation, in which he applied a term 
 to the garrison which has become historic. 
 
 '* Secret department, Benares, 21st of April. 
 
 " The Govenor- General feels assured that every 
 subject of the British Government will peruse with 
 the deepest interest and satisfaction the report he 
 now communicates of the entire defeat of the 
 Afghan troops, under Mahomed Akbar Khan, by 
 the garrison of Jellalabad. That illustrious garrison, 
 which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and 
 by its valour in action, has already obtained for 
 itself the sympathy and respect of every true sol- 
 dier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under 
 the command of its gallant leader, Major- General 
 Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field 
 an enemy of more than three times its numbers, 
 taken the standards of their boasted cavalry, des- 
 troyed their camp, and recaptured four guns, which, 
 under circumstances which can never again occur, 
 had during the last winter fallen into their hands. 
 The Govern or- General cordially congratulates the 
 Army upon the return of victory to its ranks. He 
 is convinced that there, as in all former times, it 
 will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European 
 and Native troops, mutually supporting each other, 
 
 X 
 
306 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led 
 into action by officers in whom they justly confide. 
 The Governor- General directs that the substance 
 of this notification and of Major- General Sir 
 Robert Sale's report be carefully made known to 
 all troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be 
 fired at every principal station of the army." 
 
 Lord EUenborough also issued an order directing 
 that Captain Abbott's battery, the 5th Cavalry 
 and 35th Native Infantry should bear upon their 
 colours and appointments " a mural crown, super- 
 scribed Jellalabad, as a memorial of the fortitude, 
 perseverance and enterprise evinced by these several 
 corps during the blockade of Jellalabad." In this 
 order, he also directed the issue of a medal to every 
 officer and man engaged, bearing, " on one side, a 
 mural crown, superscribed Jellalabad, and on the 
 other side, 7th April, 1842 ;" and ordered a donation 
 of six months' batta, and directed that " the several 
 corps composing the garrison, should be received, 
 on their return to India, at all stations on the 
 route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such 
 cantonments in review order with presented arms." 
 
 On the 18th of May, Captain Abbott writes to a 
 friend : — " We cannot advance, because 9,000 camels 
 are wanting, and far from getting any addition to 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 307 
 
 our present stock, we are daily losing from ten to 
 twelve by death. We could not even retire without 
 leaving much property on the ground. Akbar is a 
 strange character; a singular mixture of savage 
 cruelty and almost chivalrous generosity. Instead 
 of being enraged by the beating we gave him on 
 the 7th of April, he went to Lughman and told the 
 ladies the story with great good-humour, praising 
 the gallantry of our soldiers." 
 
 On the 5th of May, Captain Abbott had the hap- 
 piness of meeting his brother Frederick, who had 
 been appointed Chief Engineer of General Pollock's 
 army, and proceeded up from Peshawur with a 
 column under Colonel Bolton, of the 31st Regiment. 
 
 Writing from Jellalabad on the 19th of May, 
 Frederick gives some details of the decisive action 
 of the 7th of April, and of his brother's conduct 
 during the siege, gathered from officers of the gar- 
 rison. He says : — " On the 6th of April, Augustus 
 and one or two others, collecting the heads of corps 
 and departments, went to Sale, and stated the neces- 
 sity of sallying upon the enemy, either relieving 
 themselves of the investment or dying like soldiers 
 with arms in their hands. Sale was obstinately 
 resolved not to go out, declaring the enemy to be 
 too strong. The debate was strong and some took 
 
 X 2 
 
308 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Sale's view. Augustus declared that he would 
 have his battery ready at the gate the next morn- 
 ing, and beat up for recruits ; Colonel Dennie said 
 Her Majesty's 13th should be there likewise, and 
 all the rest followed in the same strain. Sale dis- 
 missed the assembly, but soon after sent for a few 
 of them, and declared his intention of making a 
 sally on the following morning. The enemy were 
 encamped about two and a half miles west of Jel- 
 lalabad in one line, with their right on a mud-fort, 
 and their left on the river ; a small party also occu- 
 pied a mud-fort within a few hundred yards of Jel- 
 lalabad. The garrison, about 1,400 strong, were 
 divided into three columns, and it had been fully 
 agreed to advance directly upon Akbar Khan's 
 camp, without taking the least notice of the inter- 
 vening fort, which must fall afterwards. Out they 
 sallied, but no sooner did Sale come within fire of 
 the fort than, forgetting all his lesson, he ordered 
 Dennie' s column at it." 
 
 " Augustus was directed to make a breach, which 
 was impossible. After some firing, Dennie assaulted 
 the place, was shot dead, and his party beaten back. 
 In the meantime, the two other columns advanced 
 without a check, and soon found themselves about 
 to be surrounded by heavy bodies of the enemy's 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 309 
 
 horse. They sent back for the guns. Augustus 
 limbered up and went off at a gallop, and joining 
 one of the columns, opened fire on the three masses 
 at once, and kept it up so smartly and precisely, 
 each shot rolling over a heap of cavaliers, that be- 
 fore his ammunition was expended, the enemy's 
 three masses dissolved, and each individual sought 
 safety in flight. The infantry and guns were ad- 
 vanced, and burned the encampment. The enemy 
 were in numbers as four to one, and by Sale's 
 blunder they had an opportunity of uniting their 
 forces against two weak columns. 
 
 " We joined Pollock on the 5th instant, when 
 Augustus rode out to meet me. I would have 
 passed him by, not recognising him. He is in ex- 
 cellent spirits, and appears to have been the life of 
 the garrison in their worst times, when most were 
 desponding and giving up all for lost. I was much 
 gratified by the honest testimony of the Sepoys of 
 the 35th Native Infantry, who were shut up all the 
 time in Jellalabad. Pollock sent them to meet us 
 in the Khyber and assist in bringing on the stores. 
 Some of these men found out that I was Augustus's 
 brother, and they launched out forthwith in 
 praises of their hero. Sale, they said, was their 
 General, but Abbott Sahib was their Preserver. If 
 
310 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 it had not been for his guns, they would all have 
 been lost. He walked about the ramparts all day 
 in the sun, and all night in the cold. Whenever 
 the enemy came in force, he used to say, * Don't be 
 afraid ; see what I will give them,' then bang went 
 a gun, and over rolled the enemy, horse and men. 
 One man said, ' He is such a shot that if you set up 
 a needle, Abbott Sahib will send a ball through its 
 eye.' ' In the fight of the 7th,' said another, ' his 
 guns seemed to be everywhere, and whenever he 
 came, the enemy's horsemen disappeared.' All this 
 was genuine effervescence of love and admiration. 
 The men as they marched would take up his praises, 
 and it was amusing to see some fat soobadar getting 
 angry at a nimble-tongued Sepoy taking the story 
 out of his very mouth. Augustus is living in an 
 old native house, in which he has a small cabin and 
 a nook for his bed. He messes with a small party 
 of cavalry, the remains of the ill-fated 5th. 
 
 " Jellalabad is one of the least defensible places 
 I could have imagined, and when the little band of 
 gallant hearts first reached it, followed by a numer- 
 ous enemy, it must have been a most hopeless-look- 
 ing resting-place. The town is about 600 yards 
 long by 400 broad, a collection of mud huts with 
 a few houses and gateways. Around it was the 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 311 
 
 ruin of a mud wall, over which the enemy could run 
 cr ride. North was the broken bank of the river, 
 affording cover for an enemy within pistol shot ; 
 east was the British cantonment, close under the 
 walls ; south and west was broken ground, with 
 walls and mud forts, all affording cover, and within 
 430 yards of the south-west angle stands a rock 
 called Piper's Hill, which commands a view of a 
 good portion of the interior. The hard work the 
 men had to undergo, combined with the fine cold 
 climate of Jellalabad in winter and the abstinence 
 from spirituous liquors, has been the means, under 
 Providence, of making the garrison wonderfully 
 healthy ; the soldiers look as if fresh from Europe." 
 Of the position of affairs at Jellalabad, and the 
 prospect of a march on Cabul, Frederick Abbott 
 writes, under date of the 19th of May, to a relative 
 in England: — ''When Pollock forced the Khyber, 
 his sole instructions were to relieve Sale and bring 
 him back to Peshawur, the attack of Cabul by this 
 side being deemed impracticable. The news of 
 Shah Soojah's murder, arriving at the same time 
 with the defeat of Akbar Khan, raised in General 
 Pollock's breast a hope of being able to strike a 
 blow upon Cabul during the confusion and panic of 
 the Afghans, and had Lord Auckland's Government 
 
Bt2 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 behaved like men at the first outbreak of the insur- 
 rection at Cabul, our Army might have been pre- 
 pared to take advantage of the opportunity thug 
 presented. But we are entirely destitute of three 
 essentials, money, siege-guns, and carriage ; of coin 
 we are in want, but that may be rectified, thougk 
 to acquire the rest will be a matter of much time, 
 and the opportunity will slip by. To marcli 
 effectually against Cabul, we should act in concert 
 with the Candahar force under General Nott. To 
 move even with one month's provisions we w^ant 
 10,000 camels, and Nott wants about the same 
 number. I see little hope of either army being 
 supplied, yet Pollock is sanguine, and trusts to 
 Mr. Clerk's exertions and interest with the Lahore 
 Government to provide our army. In the mean- 
 time we are exposed in tents in a very hot valley. 
 It is proposed to move up by degrees to Gunda- 
 muck, where the climate is more temperate. The 
 distance is forty miles on the road to Cabul, and 
 this can only be done by moving one brigade at a 
 time, sending back its camels for the second and 
 so on. This I think a false military step, for 
 should we be recalled or obliged to retire by force 
 of circumstances, we should have to leave our 
 stores and tents on the ground, and make a dis- 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 313 
 
 graceful retreat. Grovernment gives Pollock no 
 instructions. Akbar Khan, on his defeat, fled to 
 Lughman, and told his prisoners, very good 
 humouredly, that their friends at Jellalabad had 
 given him a great beating, and left him neither 
 clothes nor money. He then took them on to 
 Tezeen, half, or more than half-way to Cabul, and 
 seeing Lady Sale and Lady Macnaghten on horse- 
 back, the day being rainy, he gave them his litter, 
 and gallantly mounted a horse, although suffering 
 severely from his wound. From Tezeen he sent in 
 one of the prisoners. Captain Mackenzie of the 
 Madras Army, to treat with General Pollock, but 
 the terms were too vague to lead to anything but 
 an opening. Mackenzie had parole to remain two 
 days in Jellalabad, and set out again with wonder- 
 ful firmness for his prison-house. In the meantime, 
 Akbar's clan, the Barukzyes, had met a severe 
 defeat from the Douranees at Cabul. Mackenzie 
 was allowed a rest of only three hours, when the 
 chief sent him off again with a letter to Pollock, 
 saying, his (Akbar's) star was in the ascendant, 
 that he had beaten his opponents, and was the 
 dictator of the Empire, and he proposed to become 
 a friend of the British upon a large annuity ; the 
 other terms are not divulged, but they are said to 
 
314. THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 be quite preposterous. Pollock has offered him 
 two lacs of rupees, or £20,000, for the prisoners, 
 but I much fear he will not give them up. Being 
 now in fear of his rivals, the Douranee tribe, he has 
 placed his captives in a strong fort about twelve 
 miles from Tezeen. Whilst Sale was relieving him- 
 self, Pollock forcing the Khyber, and General Nott 
 gaining a victory, two adverse circumstances oc- 
 curred to throw a cloud upon our military renown. 
 Ghuznee, the fortress over whose capture all 
 England went mad with rejoicing, garrisoned by a 
 single regiment of Sepoys, the 27th, left to its fate 
 amidst snow and enemies, was forced to capitulate, 
 and Brigadier England, advancing from Quetta 
 with treasure and stores to the relief of Candahar, 
 was beaten by a rabble enemy in the Passes, leaving 
 a heavy number of Europeans and Natives on the 
 field. He has fallen back upon Quetta, and it is 
 feared his ill success will raise the whole of Scinde.'* 
 During his enforced idleness General Pollock 
 despatched a column into the Shinwarree valley, 
 to punish the inhabitants who held a gun and 
 some property belonging to the Cabul force. The 
 column, which was placed under the command of 
 Brigadier Monteith, numbered 2,300 men, exclusively 
 drawn from the newly-arrived troops, with the ex- 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 315 
 
 ception of Captain Abbott's battery, which the 
 Brigadier, as a Jellalabad officer, appeared to 
 think indispensable to the completeness of a 
 column. 
 
 At Ali Boghan, our troops, infuriated by the 
 sight of some plundered property, began to set fire 
 to the village, but were restrained by their officers. 
 
 The plundered property was restored, and the 
 money that had been taken, was returned to the 
 inhabitants. As explained by General Pollock in 
 a letter to the address of the Grovernor-Greneral, 
 dated the 2nd of April, 1843, refuting the charge 
 of excesses having been committed by his troops 
 during the advance upon Cabul, though it was to 
 be regretted that the village of Ali Boghan was 
 burnt, there were extenuating circumstances, owing 
 to the discovery of some portions of the dress of 
 our soldiers massacred in the previous January. 
 "The destruction of All Boghan," he says, ''was 
 caused by one of those sudden bursts of feeling 
 which being wholly unexpected, no precautions were 
 considered necessary;" and he adds, "the Brigadier 
 immediately took steps to prevent the occurrence of 
 such scenes, and subsequently, during the whole 
 time the Brigadier was detached, I heard of no 
 more excesses. 
 
 5J 
 
316 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 The report of tlie violence that had been com- 
 mitted at Ali Boghan spread through the valley. 
 The people believed that the British troops were 
 about to fire all the villages, so they began at once 
 to remove their property, and to fly in every direc- 
 tion from their houses. Captain Macgregor, the 
 Political Officer, exerted himself to restore con- 
 fidence among them, by explaining the real designs 
 of his Government, and the people began to return 
 to their dwellings. But, although indiscriminate 
 plunder and destruction were not the objects of 
 the Expedition, the brigade had been sent out to 
 do certain work, and it soon became evident that 
 it could not be accomplished without inflicting 
 some injury upon the people. The captured gun 
 and the plundered property were to be recovered. 
 It was known that two of the principal chiefs of a 
 place called Goolai were in possession of a portion 
 of the treasure that had fallen into the hands of our 
 enemies. It was known, too, that the captured gun 
 was at Deh-Surruk ; so it was determined that the 
 brigade should march against the two places. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th June, Monteith 
 moved upon Goolai. In his report, Macgregor, 
 writing of this place, said : — '' It presented all the 
 appearance of a flourishing little settlement. Several 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 317 
 
 of the forts were extensive and in good repair. 
 They were shaded by clusters of mulberry and 
 willow trees. Flowing water passed close to the 
 forts, and served to irrigate the neighbouring fields 
 of cotton, rice, and jewarree. The summer harvest 
 had just been collected, and was stocked outside 
 the forts in its unwinnowed state. The inhabitants 
 had evidently only time to escape with their port- 
 able property before the troops reached Groolai. In 
 fact, our visit was most timely. Three or four days' 
 delay would have enabled them to carry off their 
 grain." Monteith pitched his camp on some rising 
 ground near the village, and demanded the restitu- 
 tion of the plundered treasure. 
 
 On the following day evasive answers were 
 received ; there was no prospect of obtaining, by 
 peaceful negotiation, the concession that was de- 
 manded from the chiefs — so the work of destruc- 
 tion commenced. Their forts and houses were 
 destroyed ; their walls were blown up ; and their 
 beautiful trees were injured and left to perish. The 
 retribution was thorough and enduring in its 
 effects. 
 
 Regarding the extreme measure of the destruction 
 of the trees, which, in Eastern countries, are 
 essential to render habitable the villages, built 
 
318 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 beneath their grateful shade, Macgregor says in 
 his report : — " All the injury we could do their 
 forts and houses, could, with facility, in a short 
 time be repaired by them. From their proximity 
 to the hills they could always obtain timber in 
 abundance ; and where water is plentiful they could 
 rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up, and 
 therefore a greater degree of punishment than this 
 seemed to be necessary, and was completely within 
 our power if we destroyed their trees — a measure 
 which seems barbarous to a^ civilized mind ; but in 
 no other way can the Afghans be made to feel 
 equally the weight of our power, for they delight 
 in the shade of their trees. They are to be seen 
 under them in groups during the summer, all day 
 long, talking, reading, weaving, and sleeping. 
 Even women and children seek the shade of their 
 trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to 
 us in any other way. He removes his herds, flocks, 
 and property to the hills on the shortest notice, and 
 flies before our troops to places where he is in- 
 accessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, 
 were deserving of no mercy. The amounfc of 
 treasure they had plundered (viz. 18,000 or 20,000 
 rupees) was considerable. They had been very 
 pertinacious in attacking Captain Ferris's canton- 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 319 
 
 ment ; and equally so, subsequently, our troops at 
 Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at 
 once to commence the work of destruction, desired 
 that neither fort, house, tree, grain, nor boosa 
 should be spared them. This assuredly was the 
 best plan for preventing the necessities of harsh 
 measures in future. Working parties from the 
 brigade were accordingly appointed for this 
 purpose." 
 
 The work of destruction went on for some days. 
 In the meantime the captured gun had been given 
 up, and the people of Deh-Surruk were willing to 
 restore the treasure they had taken ; but could not 
 easily recover it from the real possessors. How- 
 ever, after some difficulty, upwards of 10,000 rupees, 
 besides other property, were recovered from the 
 Shinwarrees. A large quantity of grain, timber, 
 boosa, and other requisites, was appropriated at 
 Goolai; and it was supposed that the declared 
 objects of the Expedition had now been fully 
 accomplished. But the Shinwarrees had not been 
 thoroughly coerced. They had always been a 
 refractory people — unwiUing to pay revenue either 
 to the Barukzye Chief or Suddozye Prince. It was 
 thought advisable, therefore, to read them a 
 lesson. 
 
320 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 " On the 8tli of July," writes Captain Abbott, 
 '' having completed the work of demolition, we 
 marched south-west to a very pretty village 
 amongst the spurs of the Suffeid Koh, inhabited 
 by Tajiks, a poor class of people whom we did not 
 molest. 
 
 " On the 10th we came on to the valley of Kote, 
 said to contain much of the property taken at Pesh 
 Bolak. We have commenced unroofing a few 
 villages. The valley is some miles in length from 
 north to south, but is very narrow, though highly 
 cultivated." 
 
 On the 20th of July he notes : — " We have only 
 moved five miles since I last wrote, but the course 
 being uphill, we have got into a fine climate. Yester- 
 day we took a small party and reconnoitred the 
 Shinwarree valley which we are to attack. We 
 went six miles from camp. The road is per- 
 fectly impracticable for guns, and I have proposed 
 carrying them on elephants along a low ridge that 
 bounds the valley to the south-east. The ride led 
 us through fine groves of trees and over much 
 cultivation for four miles, when the narrow valley 
 commenced, down which a fine river pours its 
 waters, rendering it impassable for camels. We 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 321 
 
 found all tlie forts deserted, as far as we went up 
 tlie valley." 
 
 On the 22nd of July, tlie Brigadier, with one or 
 two other officers, including Captain Abbott, made 
 a wide reconnaissance, and found a practicable path 
 to the entrance of the Shinwarree Yalley, by which it 
 was decided an immediate advance should be made, 
 twenty-foar elephants having been received from 
 Jellalabad to help in case of need. Brigadier 
 Monteith entered the valley on the 23rd of July, 
 and, at daylight of the 26th, he left his camp with 
 a strong force, including Captain Abbott's battery, 
 and seven companies each from Her Majesty's 31st 
 Eegiment, and the 33rd and 53rd Native Infantry. 
 On arriving in the valley he detached the sappers 
 and miners, under Lieutenant John Becher,* to set 
 fire to all the forts, which was done in succession, 
 thirty-five being ablaze at one time, while the troops 
 moved parallel along the left ridge for the protection 
 of the party. The Brigadier now advanced to 
 attack the enemy, who were drawn up on the 
 heights, and, as the infantry drove them from their 
 position. Captain Abbott, he says in his report, 
 *' opened a fire of shrapnel upon them which did 
 considerable execution, and so disconcerted them 
 
 * Now Lieutenant- General Bechcr, C.B. 
 
 Y 
 
322 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 that parties left the field altogether, and never 
 returned." Having completed the work of destruc- 
 tion, the column retired, the Brigadier's arrange- 
 ments, as detailed in his despatch, being most 
 judicious, and the return march of seven miles and 
 a half was made, as he says, " over as bad a road 
 as can well be supposed without loss or injury of 
 any kind." The casualties during the day were 
 only one ofl&cer and two men killed and twenty- 
 three wounded. 
 
 The expedition into the Shin war ree country was 
 a complete success, and Captain Macgregor states 
 in his report, " that from the 17th of June to the 
 3rd of August, both men and cattle had entirely 
 subsisted on the resources of the country; the cattle 
 especially," he added in conclusion, " will be found 
 to have greatly improved in condition while em- 
 ployed on this service. Indeed, in whatever way 
 it may be viewed, it will be found that the 
 expedition has been highly beneficial to British 
 interests." 
 
 On the 3rd of August, the brigade arrived at 
 Jellalabad. Captain Abbott writes of this Expedi- 
 tion to a correspondent in England from Jellalabad 
 on the 17th of August : — ** I told you that T was 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 323 
 
 about to march on the 17th cf June for Pesh 
 Bolak. We had a precious Lot trip, destroyed 
 twenty-five forts there, and then turned towards 
 the Suffeid Koh, and crossed valley after valley, 
 bounded by the low spurs of the mountains. Some 
 of these spots were very pretty, and our course 
 was not marked by any warlike operation until we 
 arrived at the Hissaruck country, about twenty- 
 five miles south of Jellalabad. The approach to 
 the valley was dilB&cult, and all the ground was 
 completely flooded, this being the season for the 
 cultivation of rice. We arrived at the entrance of 
 the Shinwarree valley on the 23rd, and in the 
 evening, I proceeded with 200 juzailchees, and made 
 a reconnaissance of the road up the ridge of hills 
 which bound the valley to the south-east. The 
 enemy's picquets fell back, and after proceeding as . 
 far as prudent, I returned to camp. 
 
 " Next morning, the Engineer officer, Captain 
 Robertson, made his reconnaissance with an escort 
 of 700, including two companies of Europeans, 
 but having advanced a mile beyond the point where 
 I turned back, had an affair with the enemy, who 
 killed and wounded thirty of our men. As the 
 reconnoitring party of course came back to camp, 
 the Shinwarrees claimed a victory, and said they 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 THE AFGHAN WAR, 
 
 had repulsed our whole brigade. We therefore 
 determiiied to give them a lesson, and on the 6th 
 of July, leaving 1,000 men to guard our camp, the 
 main body advanced to the attack. 
 
 " The valley of this tribe of Shinwarrees is 
 bounded on either side by a low ridge of rocky 
 heights, whose summits are 1,000 yards apart. A 
 fine clear river runs down the centre of the valley, 
 w^atering the rice fields, and giving life to numerous 
 orchards and gardens and fine chenar* trees which 
 shade the level space between the hills. The forts 
 and villages stand on high ground above the culti- 
 vation. I had ascertained that guns placed on the 
 crest of the ridge on our left of the valley, could, 
 without much difficulty, move along it, commanding 
 all the low ground, and the heights on the opposite 
 side. The ascent was, however, impracticable for 
 draught cattle, and the soldiers took up my six 
 guns by the hand. Once established on the ridge, 
 we moved slowly along, sending parties to burn all 
 the forts and villages below, which they accom- 
 plished for three miles without meeting opposition, 
 but on approaching the forts of Secunder Khan, 
 the chief whom we particularly wished to punish, 
 we found all the force of the enemy assembled to 
 
 * The Oriental plane. 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 325 
 
 oppose US. The forts of Secunder Khan stand just 
 where two valleys branch off right and left from 
 that of the river. The ridge of course terminates 
 here, and my guns were at a stand, but the position 
 was excellent, and a few shells soon sent all the 
 rabble to the right about. 
 
 " The advanced guard took up positions to pro- 
 tect our incendiaries, who burned everything com- 
 bustible in the forts and then we thought we had 
 done enough. We collected our men and returned 
 slowly to camp, which we reached at a quarter past 
 three p.m., having been out eleven hours on a 
 terribly hot day. The thermometer rose to 145'' on 
 the heights, and we were all much scorched as you 
 may suppose. Next day, submissive messages came 
 in from the Shinwarrees, and we retraced our steps 
 one march to relieve them of their fears. Thence, 
 by a short cut across a dreadful country for guns, 
 we returned to Jellalabad on the 3rd of August. 
 
 " All my wheels were sadly shaken, and I have 
 not yet completed their repairs. The horse- 
 artillery have their cattle in bad condition, and are 
 obliged to send back one third of their guns, keeping 
 all the horses for the remainder. My cattle are 
 still in good order, and the battery is in great favour 
 as it seldom gives the infantry any trouble. Two 
 
326 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 days ago, General Pollock proclaimed his intention 
 to advance to Cabul, General Nott having marched 
 with 7,000 men from Candahar on the 7th instant ; 
 we are badly off for carriage, but anything is better 
 than being excluded from the honour of revisiting 
 the capital. General Pollock's orders are positive 
 to be here again before the 15th of October." 
 
 No one at Jellalabad knew till the last moment 
 what the intentions of the Government were. 
 On the 29th of April, Sir Jasper Nicolls, the 
 commander-in-chief, instructed General Pollock 
 that he was " to withdraw every British soldier 
 .from Afghanistan ;'* but Pollock was averse from 
 this pusillanimous course so long as the prisoners 
 and hostages were still in Akbar Khan's hands, 
 and made the want of cattle a pretext for delaying 
 his return. 
 
 On the 4th of July, the Governor- General wrote 
 to General Nott, giving him the option to '' retire 
 by way of Ghuznee, Cabul, and Jellalabad," and 
 directed General Pollock to " combine bis move- 
 ments " with Nott, should he desire to retire by a 
 route which was, in effect, an advance through the 
 country. Pollock sent five messengers to the Can- 
 dahar General, asking him what course he intended 
 to pursue, and Nott, not less eager for an advance, 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL, 327 
 
 despatched a letter on the 27th of July, ex- 
 pressing his determination to take the route by 
 Cabul, for which he commenced his march on the 
 7th of August. 
 
 Sir Robert Sale had been encamped for some 
 little time at Futtehabad, two marches on the 
 Cabul road, and, on the 20th of August, General 
 Pollock left Jellalabad with head-quarters and the 
 2nd Brigade, including Captain Abbott's battery, 
 and, halting the first day at Sultanpore, passed Sale 
 at Futtehabad, and encamped in the valley of 
 Neemlah on the 22nd of August, near the cele- 
 brated garden planted by the Emperor Baber. 
 On the following day, the column pushed up 
 the hill to G-undamuck, and formed the camp on 
 the table-land. 
 
 Hearing that the enemy were in force at the fort 
 and village of Mammoo Khail, three miles in 
 advance. General Pollock, at four a.m. on the 24tli 
 of September, moved to attack them. He divided 
 his force into two columns, with a wing of Her 
 Majesty's 9th in front of each, and directed Captain 
 Broadfoot to proceed with a third to the right of 
 Colonel Taylor's* column, where, as usual, he did 
 
 * Colonel Taylor, of the 9ili Regiment, a very gallant officer, 
 who fell in the Punjaub. 
 
328' THE AFGHAN WAR 
 
 good service. Captain Abbott accompanied the 
 main column, and opened the ball with his guns, 
 when the enemy retired and the village was 
 occupied. 
 
 The left column, under Brigadier Tulloch, then 
 advanced against the fort of Mammoo Khail, which 
 was evacuated, and the right, or Taylor's, column, 
 which was accompanied by Generals Pollock and 
 McCaskill, drove the Ooloos from the peaks of the 
 Suffeid Koh, and proceeded to Koochlee Khail, 
 two miles in advance. Here some sharp skirmishing 
 took place, and after the village had been destroyed 
 by fire, the columns retired to Mammoo Khail, to 
 which the camp was brought up from Gundamuck 
 on the following day. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes on the 28th, from Mammoo 
 Khail, of this affair : — " While in the act of dis- 
 missing our men on encamping at Gundamuck, we 
 observed that a considerable body of Afghans 
 occupied the village of Mammoo Khail, some four 
 miles to the south. Some sowars came down to re- 
 connoitre us, and our cavalry gave them a chase, but 
 without overtaking them. The enemy proved to be 
 a body of some 1,200 men, commanded by Kliy- 
 roolla Khan (brother to Zemaun Khan, whom the 
 rebels made King), Golam Jaun, son of the Chief 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 829 
 
 of Mammoo Khail, and a rascal named Hadji Khan. 
 In my letters of November last, T must liave 
 described this place which we occupied on tlie 5th 
 of ISTovember, the enemy flying before us. It stands 
 about five miles south of the Cabul road, and about 
 two miles from the foot of a lofty range of hills. 
 There is a very considerable ascent the whole way, 
 and the road is rugged and stony until it reaches 
 the cultivated land where it becomes a huge flight 
 of steps, the narrow fields rising one above the 
 other with banks from two to four feet high between 
 them. At daylight on the 24th, we advanced and 
 soon came in contact with the enemy's outposts, 
 whom I drove in easily at the expense of a few 
 shells, and then advancing, again commenced a can- 
 nonade on the main body, when they decamped into 
 the dense groves of the village. The guns could 
 not move beyond the fort of Mammoo Khail, but 
 our Light Infantry and Cavalry pursued, though 
 the latter were stopped by flooded rice fields, which 
 covered all the ground ahead of us, and the infantry 
 had the skirmish all to themselves." 
 
 This first success on the march to Cabul, was: 
 achieved with the loss of only seven killed and 
 forty-five wounded, including four officers. The 
 division returned to Gundamuck on the 30th of 
 
THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 August, having first inflicted punishment on the 
 treacherous villagers. 
 
 Abbott says : — " We destroyed all the vineyards, 
 and cut deep rings round trees of two centuries' 
 growth. It is lamentable to see the mischief done, 
 but the example was quite necessary. We treated 
 them well in November, and they attacked our rear 
 the moment we moved from Grundamuck." 
 
 Having obtained a sufficiency of supplies. General 
 Pollock marched on the 7th of September for Cabul, 
 with the first division of his army, including Captain 
 Abbott's battery, under the command of Sir Robert 
 Sale. The second division, under General Mc 
 \ Caskill and Brigadier Tulloch, marched on the 
 following day from Gundamuck, where a strong 
 detachment was left behind in an entrenched 
 camp.* 
 
 * The first Division consisted of two guns horse-artillery; 
 Captain Abbott's battery; three guns of Captain Backhouse's 
 mountain-train; Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons; one squadron 1st 
 Cavalry ; three Rissalahs (Tait's) Irregular Cavalry ; Her Majesty's 
 9th and 13th Foot ; 26th and 35th Native Infantry ; five companies 
 Sappers; Captain Broadfoot's Sappers; and Mr. Mackeson's 
 Pioneers. The second Division consisted of four guns horse-artil- 
 lery ; two squadrons 1st Cavalry; three Rissalahs 3rd Irregulars; 
 Her Majesty's 31st Foot ; right wings of 33rd and 60th Native 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CADUL. 331 
 
 On the 8th of September, as he approached the 
 Jugdulluck Pass, General Pollock found the enemy 
 occupying in great force the hills guarding the 
 Pass, and the sungos, or breastworks, they had 
 thrown up to defend them. Captain Abbott's 
 battery was in advance, and opened a heavy fire, 
 scattering the stones of the breastwork among the 
 defenders, when the infantry advanced in three 
 columns, under Colonel Taylor, Captain Broadfoot, 
 and Major Wilkinson. The latter column, which 
 was headed by the 13th Light Infantry, was led in 
 person by the gallant chief of the Jellalabad 
 garrison, ever foremost where fighting was on 
 the tapis, and his usual fortune did not desert him 
 on this occasion, for he was wounded, being the 
 third time since the storm of Ghuznee. After a severe 
 struggle, the Ghilzyes fled to the precipitous heights 
 above the Pass, whither they were pursued by two 
 columns, under Broadfoot and Wilkinson, which, 
 advancing under cover of Abbott's and Backhouse's 
 guns, drove them thence in ignominious flight. 
 ^^ Seldom," wrote General Pollock, " have soldiers 
 had a more arduous task to perform, and never 
 w^as an undertaking of the kind surpassed in 
 
 Infantry ; and a portion of the Sikli Contingent, under Captain 
 H. Lawrence. 
 
•332 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 execution." This great success, which was 
 achieved with one division of the army, only cost 
 the loss of six killed and fifty-eight wounded. 
 
 G-eneral Pollock followed up his victory, and 
 pushing on, encamped that night at Kuttur Sung, 
 but the labour was severe in dragging the guns over 
 such a road. 
 
 On the 10th he reached Seh Baba, and on the 
 llth arrived at Tezeen, where he was joined by 
 General McCaskill's division. Here a halt was 
 necessary to rest the draught cattle. Captain 
 Abbott dated a letter from here on the followinss: 
 day, giving interesting details of the march from 
 Gundamuck, and the action at Jugdulluck. 
 
 He writes to a relative in England from the 
 camp at Tezeen, under date of the 12th of 
 September : — 
 
 "We left Gundamuck at daylight on the 7th, 
 and at three miles reached a conical hill, where our 
 unfortunate Cabul force made its last hopeless and 
 desperate stand. The hill is literally covered with 
 skeletons, most of them blanched by exposure to 
 the rain and the sun, but many having hair of a 
 colour which enabled us to recognise the remains 
 of our own countrymen. From thence to the 
 Soorkaub, we saw but few bones, but at the ford of 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL 333 
 
 tlie river there was a considerable heap, and some 
 caves contained the bodies of Hindoostani people 
 recently murdered. The whole road from Soorkaub 
 to Jugdulluck was similarly marked, and it is useless 
 to attempt any account of the horrible sight. 
 Suffice it to say, we passed skeletons thrown into 
 heaps of eighty and a hundred. 
 
 "At the crest of the Jugdulluck Pass, the whole 
 of the Ghilzye chiefs drew up their forces to oppose 
 us, about 4,000 men, who held admirable positions 
 covering the Pass. Our course lay up the spur of 
 a mountain, and was completely enfiladed by a stone 
 breastwork, on which the road led directly. On 
 parallel spurs of the mountain, the enemy held 
 positions flanking us on either side, and their main 
 force was on the crest of the range of hills over 
 which we wished to pass. It was really a pretty 
 sight ; numerous standards, amongst which we re- 
 cognised some Jellalabad friends, were displayed, 
 and the enemy seemed conscious of their strength, 
 and confident in their ability to repulse our force. 
 Our column consisted of two regiments of infantry, 
 some sappers, and nine guns, four of my battery 
 being in advance ; we had also a good many cavalry, 
 who could be of no use on such ground. After a 
 good deal of delay. General Pollock allowed my guns 
 
334 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 to advance and drive the enemy out of the stone 
 breastwork, which was easily done, as the shot 
 went right through the work, sending the stones 
 right and left amongst the party that held it. Our 
 sappers attacked the principal flanking column of 
 the enemy, and our infantry rushed on with cheers, 
 which were too much for the nerves of the Ghilzyes. 
 Gool Mahomed, who was on the right of the enemy, 
 was the first to fly, and the remainder abandoned 
 the defence of the Pass, and took post on a very 
 steep and lofty mountain, which they thought our 
 men would never be able to ascend. On the height 
 they again raised their standards, and again set up 
 their yell of defiance. General Pollock now ordered 
 Sale's brigade to ascend the hill and complete the 
 victory by dislodging the enemy, and this work was 
 beautifully done by the old garrison of Jellalabad, 
 who ascended with little loss, supported by the fire 
 of my battery and the mountain -train. The victory 
 T^as now complete, and the Ghilzye chief s dispersed. 
 " Yesterday we arrived here, having had a slight 
 skirmish on the road, and the rear division having 
 joined us at the expense of much labour and of 
 much baggage, a halt became necessary. We are 
 surrounded by marauders awaiting our movement 
 to attack our baggage, and the firing at our picquets 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL, 335 
 
 is almost incessant. We got a little forage from 
 the lower fort of Tezeen, which was evacuated on 
 our approach, but my horses have none to-day. 
 However, I hope they will still go on well to 
 Cabul." 
 
 Before night fell on the 12th September, it be- 
 came evident that Akbar Khan intended to make 
 his final stand at Tezeen. He had sent away the 
 greater portion of the ladies and officers he held as 
 prisoners to the Hindoo Khoosh, and taking with 
 him Captains Troup and Bygrave, proceeded to 
 Khoord-Cabul, where he proposed to fight. Bat 
 mistaking the halt of the British army at Tezeen 
 for indecision on the part of its leaders, he hastily 
 moved on that position, and, on the evening of the 
 12th, attacked the picquets on the left flank, which 
 brought on a sharp skirmish with a detachment of 
 the 9th Eegiment, sent by Pollock, under Colonel 
 Taylor, to drive the Afghans back. The enemy 
 now attacked on the right flank, and the attempts on 
 the picquets continued throughout the night, giving 
 an earnest of what might be expected on the morrow, 
 when the General had resolved to force the Pass, a 
 formidable defile about four miles in length, de- 
 fended by an army of not less than 16,000 men> 
 under Akbar Khan and other redoubtable leaders. 
 
336 THE AFGHAN WAR 
 
 including Mahomed Shall Khan, and Ameenoollah 
 Khan. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th of September, 
 General Pollock advanced to force the Tezeen Pass. 
 He divided his army into three columns. The 
 advance, which he accompanied, was under Sir 
 V Robert Sale ; the main column, which included four 
 of Abbott's guns, was commanded by General 
 McCaskill ; and the rear guard, with the two re- 
 maining guns of No. 6 Field Battery, was placed 
 under Colonel Richmond, of the 33rd Native 
 Infantry. The British troops at once commenced 
 to scale the heights, three companies from each of 
 the three European regiments (the 9th, 13th, and 
 olst), leading the two columns, under the protection 
 of the fire of the guns. After a conflict, in which 
 the Afghans, almost for the first time, waited for 
 the bayonet, the British infantry, closely followed 
 by the Goorkhas and Sepoys, drove them from crag 
 to crag until they took refuge on the summits of 
 the Huft Kothul, nearly 8,000 feet above the level of 
 the sea. But even these almost inaccessible peaks 
 did not shelter them, and at length the Huft Kothul 
 itself was crowned, and a 24-pounder howitzer 
 captured. A second gun was captured by a 
 squadron of 3rd Dragoons, led by Captain Tritton, 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 337 
 
 and two horse-artillery guns of Major Delafosse's 
 troop, and the former cut up the fugitives hand- 
 somely. Major Skinner, of the 31st, who had been 
 detached with a column, operated on the right 
 flank with considerable success, and Colonel Rich- 
 mond, in command of the rear guard, was equally 
 successful in guarding the baggage, owing to his 
 admirable arrangements. Having dispersed the 
 enemy with great slaughter, his own loss beins^ 
 23 killed and 140 wounded, General Pollock 
 advanced through the Pass, and encamped at 
 Khoord-Cabul. In passing through that terrible 
 defile, 3,000 soldiers and camp-followers had been 
 slaughtered during the retreat in the preceding 
 January, and the skeletons still lay so thick that 
 the artillerymen had to move them on one side^ 
 to prevent the guns passing over them. 
 
 Of the action at Tezeen, Captain Abbott writes : 
 *' On the afternoon of the 12th of September, 
 we saw large bodies of the enemy closing around 
 us. A party of the 9th Foot attacked one of 
 these bodies and handled it severely, but during 
 the night a picquet of the 60th Native Infantry was 
 driven from its position with great loss. Next 
 morning, a strong advanced guard entered the 
 narrow Pass, and a strong rear guard remained in 
 
 z 
 
338 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 the valley until all the camels had filed into the 
 Pass. The enemy allowed us to proceed two miles 
 unmolested, and then we came upon their force, so 
 posted as to bring us for a short time to a halt. 
 Our men ascended the heights gallantly. The 
 enemy resisted desperately, so that the conflict was 
 often hand to hand. The bayonet, however, aided 
 by the guns, prevailed, and we drove the Ghilzyes 
 from one position to another until at length they 
 were all in full flight. We captured two howitzers 
 on the road above the Huft Kothul, and the dragoons 
 cut up some of the fugitive horsemen of the enemy. 
 Meanwhile the rear guard was furiously attacked, 
 but a charge of cavalry drove the assailants before 
 it, and the Afghan horse, though amounting to 
 near 4,000, would never again venture within reach 
 of the guns of the guard. Akbar's whole force of 
 16,000 men dispersed in all directions, and he 
 himself next day fled to the Kohistan, and thence 
 to Ghorebund." 
 
 Taking his usual precaution to crown the heights 
 on either flank, General Pollock marched on the 
 14th from Khoord-Cabul to Boodhak, without meet- 
 ing with any opposition, and on the following day 
 encamped on the race-course before Cabul. On 
 the 16th of September, he proceeded into the city, 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CADUL. 339 
 
 accompauied by a strong escort of troops, and the 
 British flag, from which all stains of dishonour had 
 been washed out by this brilliant campaign, was 
 once more hoisted on the Bala Hissar, amid the 
 cheers of the troops and under a royal salute. 
 
 On the same day, the few captives who had been 
 left at Cabul by Akbar Khan, arrived in the camp, 
 and the remainder on the 21st. These latter, in- 
 cluding Ladies Sale and Macnaghten, had proceeded 
 as far as Bamian, in the Hindoo Khoosh, and all hope 
 of escape seemed at an end, when they succeeded in 
 effecting their own liberation by bribing their 
 custodian, Saleh Mohamed, formerly of Captain 
 Hopkins's Afghan Regiment. While on their re- 
 turn march, they were met by a body of 700 Kuzzil- 
 bash* Horse, led by Sir Hichmond Shakespear, ^ 
 (one of Captain Abbott's subalterns up to the time 
 of his accompanying Major D'Arcy Todd's mission 
 to Herat in 1839, and now Military Secretary to 
 General Pollock,) who had volunteered to proceed to 
 their rescue. 
 
 While at Jellalabad, Captain Abbott had received 
 a letter from Lord Ellenborough, nominating him 
 
 '^ Kuzzilbash, which means " red head," was the name by 
 which the Persian colony, established by Nadir Shah in Cabul, 
 was known. They were always friendly to the English. 
 
 z 2 
 
340 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Honorary; AMe-de-eamp,* and he was further 
 promised the command of a troop of horse-artillery. 
 On the 4th of October, he received a second very 
 handsome letter from his Lordship, conferring on 
 him the post of Gun-Carriage Agent at Futtehgurh, 
 the emoluments being 1,350 rupees per mensem, 
 and quarters. 
 
 General Nott arrived at Cabul on the 17th of 
 September, and, on the J 2th of October— after 
 summary punishment had been inflicted by a 
 column, under General McCaskill, on Istaliff, in 
 the Kohistan, the residence of that arch-traitor 
 and assassin, Ameenoollah Khan, and the great 
 bazaar of Cabul had been destroyed by gunpowder, 
 under Frederick Abbott's direction, as a mark of 
 vengeance for the treachery of its inhabitants — the 
 British army commenced its return march to India. 
 
 Captain Abbott's battery formed part of the main 
 column, under General Pollock's immediate com- 
 mand, which, owing to the General's admirable 
 arrangements, threaded the Passes with its baggage, 
 and reached Jellalabad, without sustaining any loss. 
 As the Sikhs had previously declined to accept of 
 the town, the defences were demolished, and on the 
 
 \ * The only other officer of the Jellalabad garrison on whom this 
 
 lioiiour was conferred, was Captain Oldfield, of the 5th Cavalry. 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL, 341 
 
 27tli of October, Generals Pollock and McCaskill 
 moved towards the Khyber with two divisions, 
 while Nott brought up the rear. On his arrival at 
 Dakka, fortj-two miles east of Jellalabad, General 
 Pollock led the advance column, consisting of the 
 1st and 4bh Brigades, including Abbott's battery, 
 and General McCaskill followed with the 2nd and 
 3rd Brigades. On the 1st of November, Pollock's 
 Division arrived at Ali Musjid, and, at length, 
 emerging from the gloomy portals of the Khyber 
 Pass — famiUarly known to the Army of Afghanistan 
 as the " Good Old Trap " — encamped at Jumrood. 
 
 General McCaskill cleared the Pass on the 4th 
 of November, and General Nott, who destroyed Ali 
 Musjid, on the 6th, both divisions having been 
 furiously attacked by the Afreedees, and suffered 
 considerable loss in men and baggage. 
 
 The march through the Passes between Cabul 
 and Jumrood was very harassing to the troops, 
 owing to the enormous convoy of baggage, camp- 
 followers, guns, fugitive Hindoos (from Ghuznee 
 and Cabul, some 2,000 in number, who attached 
 themselves to Pollock's column), warlike stores, 
 and lastly, the gates of Somnauth,* which Lord 
 
 * It has since been conclusively shown that these gates never 
 were in the temple of Somnauth. 
 
342 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Ellenborough, in a childish freak, directed GeneraJ 
 Nott to bring with him from Grhuznee. 
 
 Captain Abbott writes from Ali Musjid on the 1st 
 of November : — " On one march of eight miles our 
 rear-guard did not arrive till daylight the following 
 morning, and I was once out on a lofty ridge with 
 all my guns until nine p.m., waiting while the whole 
 infantry of the rear-guard dragged a number of 
 useless carriages up a difficult Pass. We made a 
 week's halt at Jellalabad, and I was sorry to see 
 the old walls destroyed, and our quarters burnt. 
 The great length of the Khyber would call for a 
 vast body of troops to keep up communications, if 
 menaced by a determined enemy. Yesterday even- 
 ing we came up a tremendous ascent of three miles 
 (the Lundikhana), and the artillery remained all 
 night on its crest, awaiting the advance this morn- 
 ing of the army, which came twelve and a half miles 
 farther to this camp. We found Ali Musjid two 
 miles short of our caiDp, and have before us another 
 difficult hill, which will terminate our troubles. Ali 
 Musjid is a very paltry fort, commanding the most 
 difficult part of the Khyber, and its possession is 
 essential to an army forcing the Pass. A fine spring 
 of water gushes from the hill side, 800 yards above 
 the fort, and another wells from the ground im- 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 343 
 
 mediately under it, but the garrison cannot 
 command a supply of water, and Mr. Mackeson, 
 when defending the place, used to make the 
 Afreedees ransom the bodies of those killed near 
 the walls, by the payment of so many skins of 
 water." 
 
 On the 12th of November, General Pollock 
 marched from the camp, four miles from Peshawur, 
 (where he, Nott, Sale, and their officers had been 
 handsomely entertained by General Avitabile) 
 across the Punjaub, to Ferozepore, where the 
 Governor-General had assembled an army of 25,000 
 men, under the command of Sir Jasper Nicolls, 
 and made grand preparations for the reception of 
 the successful warriors. 
 
 The first to cross the Sutlej by the bridge of 
 boats, on the 17th of December, was the Jellalabad 
 Brigade, headed by their gallant chief, and Lord 
 Ellenborough, desirous of showing them especial 
 honour, met the " illustrious " garrison at the foot 
 of the bridge, while the army of reserve, formed in 
 one line extending two miles and a half, received 
 them in review order with presented arms, 'and the 
 artillery saluted with nineteen guns, and the bands 
 played. 
 
 It was a brilliant and suggestive spectacle, and 
 
SU THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 every pulse beat high as the small band of heroes — 
 who had rendered the memory of Jellalabad one 
 which every Englishman must regard with pride — 
 swept past the regiments of the noble army as- 
 sembled to do them honour. General Pollock 
 crossed the Sutlej with his army on the 19th of 
 December, and General Nott, dragging the 
 Somnauth gates, on the 23rd, but they were not 
 received with presented arms and salutes, an in- 
 vidious distinction, due to the orders of Lord 
 EUenborough, which was in bad taste, to say the 
 least of it. 
 
 Now succeeded a saturnalia of banquets and 
 balls, varied by military reviews and receptions, and 
 the war-worn heroes of Jellalabad, Candahar, and 
 Tezeen might have said : — 
 
 " Now are onr brows bound with victorious wreaths ; 
 Our bruised arms hung up for monuments ; 
 Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings, 
 Our dreadful marches to delightful measures." 
 
 But Captain Abbott had no relish for such 
 gaieties, and his only anxiety was to reach Calcutta 
 before the 20th of January, when his children, who 
 had lost their mother during his absence in Afghan- 
 istan, sailed for England. He writes to a relative : — 
 
 i 
 
THE ADVANCE ON CABUL. 3t5 
 
 " I have no fancy for such vanities, and would 
 rather avoid the call for full-dress coats, &c." 
 
 And so, amid a scene of revelry and military dis- 
 play, the great Afghan war was brought to a 
 conclusion. 
 
 That eminent critic and literary authority. Dr. 
 Johnson, inspired by his veneration for the classic 
 " unities," closes his commentary of Shakespeare's 
 play of Othello, by the expression of his opinion 
 that had the scene opened, as it closed, at Cyprus, 
 there had been little wanting to a drama " of 
 the most exact and scrupulous regularity." 
 This criticism cannot be applied to the great 
 Afghan tragedy. In 1838, amid a scene of festivity 
 and martial display, the curtain rose on the vast 
 plain of Ferozepore — a scene fitted for historic 
 events, for here, as some suppose, Alexander, 
 twenty-one centuries before, had erected altars to 
 commemorate the limits of his conquest; and here, 
 only three years after the close of the Afghan 
 imbroglio y the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej for the 
 
 invasion of British territory and again, in 1842, 
 
 the curtain fell on a repetition of balls, banquets, 
 and reviews. Thus the "unities" of the drama 
 were preserved in their integrity. 
 
 But what a change these four short years had 
 
316 THE AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 wrouglit among the dramatis personce of the mighty 
 tragedy in which the destinies of nations .ancj the 
 lives of armies had formed the stakes. Eunjeet 
 Singh was dead. Shah Soojah, the teterrinia causa 
 belli, Macnaghten, and Biirnes, lay in unknown 
 graves in that land whither ambition had led them ; 
 while a holocaust of officers and men had been 
 sacrificed at the shrine of the insane policy for 
 which the sponsors, Lord Auckland and Sir John 
 Hobhouse, were rewarded, the one with an earldom, 
 and the other with a barony ! But the memory of 
 the brave men whose bones lay bleaching in Afghan 
 Passes, was not suffered to detract from the gaiety 
 of the show at Ferozepore, where all, once more, 
 " went merry as a marriage bell." 
 
 Thus it was acknowledged by the world, which 
 formed the audience before whom the curtain was 
 quickly descending at that Christmas of 1842, that 
 the last act of this tremendous drama, like the first, 
 and the interlude of Jellalabad, was a decided 
 success. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 London: Printed by A. Schulze, 13, Poland Street. (S. & H. 
 
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