iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiPPiiiiiiiiiH^
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
:
MEMOIRS
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE HISTORY OF MY TIME.
By F. GUIZOT,
AUTHOB OF 'MEMOIES OF SIE EOBEKI PEEL,' ' HISIOEY OP OLIVEE CEOMWELL,' ETC. ETC,
TRANSift^TED BY J. W. COLE.
VOLUME IV.
t B S
LONDON:
EICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
^BuSTt^fjcr in (Bx^inar^ to |f)er i^ajoStn.
1861.
lONDON
riilNTED BY SPOTTiaWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STEEEI SQUAEE
• •• •••
CONTENTS
OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.
CHAPTER I.
EXTERNAL POLICY.
{From Oct. Uth, 1832, to Feb. 20th, 1836.)
Pag9
One of the Causes of the Policy of Conquests and Adven-
tures. — Radical Vice of this Policy. — Formation of Public
European Right. — Its essential Maxims. — Consequences
of the Violation of these Maxims. — The Government of
1830 respected them. — European Questions during 1832.
— . Errors of the three Northern Powers in their Relations
with the Government of 1830. — Prussia: King Frederic
William III., the Prince of Wittgenstein, and M. Ancillon.
— M. Bresson at Berlin. — Austria : the Emperor Francis
11. and the Prince of Metternich. — M. de Sainte-Aulaire
at Vienna. — Russia : the Emperor Nicholas. — Marshal
Maison at St. Petersbourg ; his Instructions. — Idea of a
Russian Marriage for the Duke of Orleans. — Revolutionary
Ferment in Germany. — Meeting of Miinchengr^etz. — Its
Consequences Affairs of the East. — Egyptian Question.
— Character, Situation, and Policy of Mehemet Ali. —
Situation and Policy of the great European Powers between
the Porte and Egypt. — Mission of M. de Bois-le-Comte to
the East. — His Conversatiohs with Mehemet Ali. — Peace
of Kutaieh Russia at Constantinople. — Treaty of Un-
kiar-Skelessi. — Affairs of Spain. — Death of Ferdinand
VII. — Question of the Spanish Succession. — Policy of the
French Government and its Motives. — Its Promises and
a2
IV CONTENTS.
Page
Advice to the Government of Queen Isabella. — Explosion
of Civil War in Spain. — Don Carlos in Portugal with
Don Miguel. — M. Zea Bermudez, his Character and Policy.
— Origin of the Question of the Intervention of France in
Spain. — Fall of M. Zea Bermudez. — M. Martinez de la
Rosa, his Character and Policy. — Promulgation of the
Royal Statute Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. —
Don Carlos, expelled from Portugal, takes Refuge in Eng-
land, and re-enters Spain. — Assembly of the Spanish
Cortes. — The Royal Statute and the Constitutional 1812.
— The Cabinet of Madrid demands the Intervention of
France and England. — Their Refusal and its Motives. —
Difference of Opinion in the French Cabinet. — Fall of M.
Martinez dela Rosa The Count of Toreno succeeds him.
— His sjieedy Fall. — At the moment when the Cabinet
of the 11th of Oct. 1832, breaks up in Paris, M. Mendiza-
bal and the Extreme Party enter on the Possession of
Power at Madrid . . . , . .1
CHAPTER II.
DISMEMBERMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.
(From February 22nd, to September 6th, 1836.)
My Situation and Disposition after the breaking up of the
Cal)inet of the 11th of October, 1832. — My Participation
in the Debates of the Chambers from the 22ud of Feb-
ruary to the 6th of September, 1836. — Mj Election to the
French Academy. — M. de Tracy, my Predecessor. — My
Inaugural Discourse. — The Academy of Sciences and
Belles-lettres of Stockholm, and the King of Sweden,
Charles John. — Deaths of the Abbe Sieyes and of M.
Carnot. — Death of M. Ampere ; his Character. — Death
of M. Armand Carrel ; his Character. — Acquisition and
Description of Val-Richer. — The Archbishop of Canter-
bury, Thomas a Bccket, at Val-Richer in the 12th Century.
— Situation of M. Thiers in 1836. — Attempt to assassinate
King Louis-Philippe by Alibaud. — Affairs of Spain ; M.
CONTENTS. V
Mendizabal, and his Dispositions towards France. — Tlie
English Cabinet jiroposes Intervention in Spain. — The
French Cabinet rejects the Overture. — Despatches of
M. de Rayneval on this Subject. — Revolutionary Move-
ments in Spain for the Constitution of 1812. — M. Isturitz
succeeds M. Mendizabal. — General Quesada, Governor of
Madrid ; his Energy. — Measures adopted by the French
Government towards Spain. — Mission of M. de Bois-le-
Comte to Madrid. — Military Insurrection of Saint Ilde-
fonso. — Courage and useless Resistance of Queen Chi'is-
tina. — Effects of this Insurrection at Madrid. — General
Quesada is massacred. — Proclamation of the Constitution
of 1812. — Disagreements in the French Cabinet on the
Question of Intervention in Spain. — King Louis-Philippe
and M. Thiers. — Retirement of the Cabinet of the 22nd
of February, 1836 . • • • .119
CHAPTER III.
MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE WITH M. MOLE.
(1836—1837.)
My Relations with Count Mole. — Formation of the Cabinet
of the 6th of September, 1836. — Different Sentiments of
ray Political Friends. — From what Motives and on what
Conditions I joined the Cabinet. — Its first Acts. — State
of Affairs in Algeria. — Expedition to Constantino. —
Marshal Clauzel. — The Commandant Changai-nier •
General Trezel. — 111 Success of the Expedition. — Retreat
of the Army. — Conspiracy of Strasbourg. — Prince Louis
Bonaparte. — His Failure and Embarkation at L'Orient. —
Motives of the Cabinet for not bringing him before the
Tribunals. — Opening of the Session of the Chambers. —
Attempt to assassinate King Louis-Philippe. — Debate on
the Address. — Prosecution of the Conspirators of Stras-
«bourg before the Court of Assizes at Colmar. — Acquittal
of the Accused. — Bills presented to the Chambers. — On
the Disjunction of certain Criminal Processes ; on the Place
VI CONTENTS.
Papre
•o^
of Transportation ; and on the Non-revelation of Plots
against the King's Life. — On the Dotation of the Duke de
Nemours. — Presentiments of King Louis-Philippe on the
Future of his Family. — The Bill on Disjunction rejected
by the Chamber of Deputies. — The Cabinet breaks up —
Different Attempts to form a new Ministry. — The King
sends for me. — My Propositions and Endeavours. — They
niiscax'ry. — I retire, with MM. Duchatel, Gasparin, and
Persil. — M. Mole forms the Cabinet of the 15th of April,
1837 . . . . . . .166
CHAPTER IV.
THE COALITION.
(1837—1839.)
My Disposition on leaving Office. — Family Afflictions. — The
Duchess of Orleans ; her Arrival at Fontainebleau ; her
Marriage ; her Entry into Paris. — Character of the Palace
of Fontainebleau. — Accidents at the Champ de Mai-s. —
Opening of the Museum of Versailles. — My Conversations
with the Duchess of Orleans. — The Princess Marie ; her
Marriage ; her Pursuits ; her Death. — What is due to
the Memory of the Dead. — Lady Holland and Holland
House. — Great Number of eminent Men who died be-
tween 1836 and 1839. — Their Characters. — M. Eay-
nouard and M. Flaugergues. — M. de Mai'bois and the
Abbe de Pradt. — Baron Louis. — Marshal Lobau and
General Haxo. — M. Silvestre de Sacy. — M. Laromi-
guiere. — Dr. Broussais. — Prince Talleyrand. — His last
Visit to the Institute. — His latest Acts. — Count de
Montlosier. — Difficulties of M. Mole's Position. — How
he surmounted or postponed them. — Plis internal Mea-
sures. — Favourable external Incidents. — War with Mex-
ico. — With Buenos Ayres. — Treaty with Hayti. —
Second Expedition to Constantino ; its Success. — Re-
turn of Prince Louis Bonaparte to Switzerland. — Final
Adoption of the Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles on
CONTENTS. vii
Page
the Limits of Belgium. — Evacuation of Ancona. — My
Attitude in the Chamber of Deputies. — My Speeches in
May, 1837, in the Debate on secret Supplies Dis-
pleasure of M. Mole. — Dissolution of the Chamber of
Deputies. — Character of that Measure and of the Elec-
tions. — Session of 1837-1838 Successes and Failures
of the Cabinet. — Its Position after the Session. — Session
of 1838-1839. — The Coalition. — Its general Causes.—
My personal Motives. — Was it a Mistake ? — Debate and
Vote on the Address. — Good Attitude of M. Mole. —
Dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. — Result of the
Elections. — Retirement of the Mole Cabinet — Vain At-
tempts to form a Coalition Ministry. — Provisional Ca-
binet Riot of the 12th of May, 1839. — Formation of
the Cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839 . . .227
CHAPTER V.
THE EASTERN QUESTION.
{From 12th Mmj, 1839, to 26th Feb. 1840.)
Situation of the Cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, on its
Accession. — My own Position. — How I employed my
political Leisure. — I am requested to superintend the
Translation and Publication in France of the Letters and
Writings of Washington. — I undertake the Charge. —
Great Interest with which this Work inspires me. — My
"Historical Study" on the Life and Character of Washing-
ton Its Success. — Testimonials of Gratitude received
from the Americans. — Letter from King Louis-Philippe. —
Revival of the Eastern Question. — Why that Name was
given to the Quan-el between the Sultan and the Pacha
of Egypt. — General State of the Ottoman Empire. —
Dispositions and Policy of the great European Powers. —
War breaks out between Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali. —
Good understanding between France and England. —
Death of the Sultan Mahmoud. — Battle of Nezib Dis-
agreement commences between France and England on
Yin CONTENTS.
Page
the Territorial Question between the Sultan and the Pacha.
— Vicissitudes of the Negotiations at London. — Attitude
of Russia. — She places herself at the Disposal of England.
— France persists in her Opposition, and the English Ca-
binet in its Resolutions. — General Sebastiani M. de
Brunnow in London. — Lord Palmerston. — The French
Cabinet offers me the Embassy to London. — I accept it.
— My Reasons. — King Louis -Philippe evinces Oppo-
sition. — His Motives. — The Cabinet insists. — The King
yields. — INIy Appointment. — The Chamber of Deputies
refuses the Dotation proposed for the Duke of Nemours.
— Uncertain Position of the Cabinet I leave Paris for
London . . . . . . .311
Historic Docujments ..... 373
M E M I E S
TO ILLUSTBATB
THE HISTORY OF MY TIME.
CHAPTER L
EXTERNAL POLICY.
ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE POLICY OF CONQUESTS AND ADVENTURES.
RADICAL VICE OF THIS POLICY. FORMATION OF PUBLIC EURO-
PEAN RIGHT. ITS ESSENTIAL MAXIMS. CONSEQUENCES OF THE
VIOLATION OF THESE MAXIMS. THE GOVERNMENT OF 1830 RE-
SPECTED THEM. EUROPEAN QUESTIONS DURING 1832. ERRORS OF
THE THREE NORTHERN POWERS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE
GOVERNJIENT OF 1830. PRUSSIA: KING FREDERIC WILLIAM III.,
THE PRINCE OF WITTGENSTEIN, AND M. ANCILLON. M. BRESSON AT
BERLIN. AUSTRIA : THE EMPEROR FRANCIS II. AND THE PRINCE OF
METTERNICH, M. DE SAINTE-AULAIRE AT VIENNA. RUSSIA : THE
EMPEROR NICHOLAS. MARSHAL MAISON AT ST. PETERSBURG ; HIS
INSTRUCTIONS. IDEA OF A RUSSIAN MARRIAGE FOR THE DUKE OF
ORLEANS. REVOLUTIONARY FERMENT IN GERMANY. MEETING OF
MiiNCHENGR^TZ. ITS CONSEQUENCES. AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.
EGYPTIAN QUESTION. CHARACTER, SITUATION, AND POLICY OF
MEHEMET ALL — SITUATION AND POLICY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN
POWERS BETWEEN THE PORTE AND EGYPT. — MISSION OF M. DE BOIS-
LE-COMTE TO THE EAST. HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MEHEMET ALL
PEACE OF KUTAIEH. RUSSIA AT CONSTANTINOPLE. TREATY OF
UNKIAR-SKELESSI. — AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. DEATH OF FERDINANT) VII.
QUESTION OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. POLICY OF THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT AND ITS MOTIVES. ITS PROMISES AND ADVICE TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF QUEEN ISABELLA. EXPLOSION OF CIVIL WAR IN
VOL. IV. B
2 EXTERNAL POLICY.
SPAIN. DON CARLOS IN PORTUGAL WITH DON MIGUEL, M. ZEA
BERMUDEZ, HIS CHARACTER AND POLICY. ORIGIN OF THE' QUESTION
OF THE INTERVENTION OF FRANCE IN SPAIN. FALL OF M. ZEA
BERMUDEZ. M. MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA, HIS CHARACTER AND POLICY.
PROMULGATION OF THE ROYAL STATUTE. TREATY OF THE
QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE. DON CARLOS, EXPELLED FROM PORTUGAL,
TAKES REFUGE IN ENGLAND, AND RE-ENTERS SPAIN. ASSEMBLY OF
THE SPANISH CORTES. THE ROYAL STATUTE AND THE CONSTITUTION
OF 1812. THE CABINET OF MADRID DEMANDS THE INTERVENTION
OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND. THEIR REFUSAL AND ITS MOTIVES.
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN THE FRENCH CABINET. FALL OF
M. MARTDTEZ DE LA ROSA. THE COUNT OF TORENO SUCCEEDS HIM.
HIS SPEEDY FALL. AT THE MOMENT WHEN THE CABINET OF THE
11th OF OCT. 1832, BREAKS UP IN PARIS, M. MENDIZABAL AND
THE EXTREME PARTY ENTER ON THE POSSESSION OF POWER AT
MADRID.
{From Oct. nth, 1832, to Feb. 20th, 1836.)
I HAVE retraced the internal policy and acts of the
cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, from its for-
mation to its dissolution : I shall now speak of what
it did externally, of the line of conduct it held, of
the part it played, and caused France to jpl^y? h^ the
European world.
For nations as well as for kings, for statesmen
and warriors, foreign policy is the held in which
imagination, ambition, and pride display them-
selves in their unfettered range. In domestic
legislation, present and ostensible interests, recog-
nized rights, and legal powers, imperiously re-
strain pretensions and hopes within fixed limits.
In external dealings with foreign states, and in
front of prospective views of power and glory, both
national and personal, a great temptation presents
itself to yield to passion, to appeal to force, and to
EXTERNiVL POLICY. 6
rely on success. But Avliat if we have lived in an
epoch of prodigious wars and enterprises, — if we
have seen states, great or small, adjoining or remote,
incessantly overrun, conquered, dismembered, parti-
tioned, alternately changing extent, form, name, and
master ? Such exhibitions, even when at the close of
the drama astounding reverses have decried them,
leave a vast number of minds in prey to the fever
of war or ambition, solacing themselves with military
or pohtical complications, with schemes of alliance
and plans of campaigns. Gigantic exploits excite
chimerical projects; reminiscences engender dreams.
From its birth, and through the entire course of its
life, the government of 1830 had to contend against
this posthumous passion for adventure and conquest.
The decline was great. In place of the National
Convention and the Emperor Napoleon, were substi-
tuted a sophistical advocate and a declamatory soldier,
who proclaimed themselves the patrons of ambitious
and warlike policy. But, notwithstanding their
emphatic mediocrity, M. Mauguin and General La-
marque interpreted sentiments very generally ex-
panded through the country, and on that account they
exercised actual power. They spoke in the name of
revolutionary and military traditions ; they united
and confounded, in an incoherent but brilliant amal-
gam, the promises of liberty and the illusions of
force, the Revolution and the Empire. France had
no desire to renew either of those terrible systems;
she felt in the inmost recesses of her soul, that, to
enjoy their benefits and escape their disasters, it was
B 2
4 EXTEENiVL POLICY.
necessary to repudiate openly tlieir errors and tlieir
crimes. But still dazzled and disturbed, she took
pleasure in hearing them confusedly celebrated and
under imposing names. In this, it was said, the
liberal and national spirit were combined; greatness
for France, and progress for Europe.
I recognize no idea more radically false and per-
nicious, more belied by experience, more opposed to
the true tendencies of our age, as well as to the
aggrandizement of France and the general advance
of Europe.
Europe is a society of peoples and states, at onee
similar and opposite, separated but not estranged;
not alone neighbours, but relatives; reciprocally
united by moral and material ties, which cannot be
broken up; by the intermingling of races, by com-
munity of religion, by analogy of ideas and manners ;
by numerous and continued relations, whether indus-
trial, commercial, political, or literary ; by advances of
civilization, varied and unequal it is true, but all
tending to the same ends. The multiplied European
communities know, comprehend, visit, and imitate
each other, with mutual and incessant modification.
Through all the differences and contests of the modern
world a deep and dominant unity reigns in its moral
life as in its destinies. Let us call it Christianity.
In this is comprised our original character and our
glory.
This great fact has, as a natural consequence, pro-
duced the formation of a public, European, and
Christian law, or, as we may say, the establishment
EXTEENAL TOLICY. 5
of certain principles understood and accepted as the
rule in all intercourse between states. This law,
for a long time, and even at the present day, extremely
imperfect, often disowned and violated, is not the less
real, and becomes more and more clear and imperative
in projDortion as general civilization develops itself, and
the mutual relations of peoples are more frequent and
intimate.
The essential and undisputed maxims of public
European law are few in number. Amongst the
principal we may include the following.
1. Peace is the normal condition of nations and
governments. War is an exceptional fact, Avhich
ouo^ht to have a legitimate cause.
2. The different states are entirely independent of
each other with regard to their internal affairs ; each
constitutes and regulates itself according to the most
suitable principles and forms.
3. As long as states are at peace, their respective
governments are bound to do nothing that may tend
to disturb mutually their internal order.
4. No state has a right to interfere in the internal
position and government of another state, unless its
own individual security renders such intervention in-
dispensable.
These salutary maxims have been exposed, in our
days, to the roughest trials. Sometimes they have
been outrageously trampled upon, to give free course
to the passions they are expressly framed to control ;
again, at other times, they have been scandalously
abused to promote designs they distinctly condemn.
B 3
6 EXTERNAL POLICY.
We have taken part in immense wars, entered into with-
out legitimate motive, from egotistical and inordinate
ambition, or to realize arbitrary and frivolous com-
binations under an assumption of greatness. We
have seen an encroaching propagandism carry to ex-
tremes its violence and tyranny under the name of
liberty. Great governments have oppressed the in-
dependence of small states, to maintain amongst them,
as with themselves, the principles and forms of abso-
lute power. Others have laughed at the privileges
and existence of established authorities, under the
pretext of restoring the rights of nations. Revolu-
tionary conspirators have demanded the principle of
non-intervention to cover their plots against the
security of states in general. Indignant at so many
opposite excesses, some honest and superficial minds
have wished to suppress external policy altogether,
and to place the independence of nations and the
safety of states under the guarantee of perpetual
peace and diplomatic inaction. We do not struggle
against violence and hypocrisy with chimeras ; neither
shall we attempt to annul the external activity of
governments at the very moment Avhen the foreign
relations of diiferent countries are extending and
multiplying themselves. What we require is, that
this activity should be exercised in conformity mth
justice and sound sense. Herein is comprised the
object of public European law such as it has existed
for ages. This law has not perished under its checks.
Despite the heavy and numerous blows it has re-
ceived, tliese very attacks and their injurious conse-
EXTERNAL POLICY. 7
quences have rendered its maxims, and continue daily
to render them, more defined and urgent. From
their empire alone we may hope, as far as the imper-
fection of all human affairs permits, for the habitual
maintenance of peace, and for the mutual indepen-
dence and security of states.
This is not a mere philosophical conviction. For
more than three centuries, the facts, the greatest facts
of history speak loudly to the point. Every state which
long and shamelessly violated the essential maxims
of public European law, ended by finding itself,
government and people, in a deteriorated condition.
In the sixteenth century, Charles Y. paraded his
ambition and power throughout all Europe, mthout
respect for peace, for the independence of states, or
for the traditional rights of princes and nations. He
attempted, if not actual monarchy, at least supremacy
over Europe. He became wearied and disgusted "with
the labour, and bequeathed to Spain the reign of
Philip II., who, following up in his turn, without genius
as without heart, the same pretensions, left, when
dying, his kingdom stripped externally of its noblest
provinces, and within enervated and stricken with
barrenness. In the seventeenth century, Louis XIY.,
abandoning the organized restraint of Henri lY.,
resumed with increased ostentation the European
dream of Charles Y., and arrogantly violated, as well
towards nations as sovereigns, the principles of public
justice and Christianity. After the most brilliant
successes he found himself unable to sustain the
burden they imposed on liim ; mth great difficulty he
B 4
8 EXTERNAL POLICY.
obtained from Europe a peace as humiliating as it
Avas indispensable, and died, leaving France exhausted
and almost compelled for more than half a century to
confine herself to a foreign policy of the most limited
pretensions and most inert character. We have our-
selves seen, on even a more extended scale, the same
extravagances of human ambition end in similar
ruin.
To what an extent in Europe did the power of the
French Revolution manifest itself ! — at one time anar-
chically let loose by its popular assemblies, at another
despotically mastered by the Emperor Napoleon.
Under both forms it achieved the most astounding
victories; but while triumphing, it trampled on the
2)rinciples, the traditions and establishments of public
European law, and after twenty-five years of blindly
imperious domination, it was compelled to purchase,
at an extravagant price, peace from that very Europe
the theatre and material of its conquests. In the
course of three centuries, the most illustrious in the
annals of history, the three greatest empires the world
has ever seen fell into a rapid decline, because they
insolently contemned and violated the common law
of Europe and of Christianity. Three times that
law, after enduring the most violent shocks, raised
itself again above the power and ascendency of genius
and glory.
It was the fundamental characteristic of the govern-
ment of 1830 to have adojoted the j)ublic law of
Europe as the rule of its external policy, not alone
in words and in official dii)lomacy, but in fact and in
EXTERNAL TOLICY. 9
actual conduct. We did not hypocritically maintain
and practise any special maxim of that law, which
might appear convenient to the new power we were
called upon to establish; we loyally accepted and
respected its maxims in the aggregate, the most
difficult to reconcile, as well as the simplest; those
which consecrated the order established between
different states, as also those which protected the in-
dependence and free internal development of each
state in particular. After 1830 we found ourselves
at issue with all the questions which had long ex-
cited, and still continue to excite, so much clamour in
Europe; Avith questions of nationality, of interven-
tion, of insurrection, of territorial acquisition, and
of natural frontiers. In Germany, in Poland, in Italy,
in Switzerland, in Spain, in Belgium, these questions
were at that time in play, either separately or in con-
junction. We solved them all according to the prin-
ciples of public European law : occasionally we treated
these rights with diffidence, at other times we acted
on them without hesitation ; here we interfered, there
we abstained, and in some cases we declared that we
should interpose if others did. Everywhere we placed
at the service of human and liberal policy the moral
influence we were able to exercise. In no instance
did we disavow or exceed the lunits of international
rights.
I have already named the motives, political and
moral, public and personal, by which King Louis-
Philippe and his advisers, from their first advent to
power, were induced to desire and promote the main-
10 EXTERNAL POLICY.
tenance of peace in Europe. It was not alone for the
direct benefit of peace itself, however powerful that
consideration may be, and ought to be held. Ex-
ternal inaction is not always the compelled condition
of states. Great national interests may recommend
and authorize war. It is an honest error, but still an
error to believe, that to be just, every war must of
necessity be exclusively defensive. There have been,
and there will be again, natural conflicts and legiti-
mate changes of territory between different countries.
Instincts of aggrandizement and glory are not, in all
cases, interdicted to nations and their rulers. When
Charles X., in 1830, declared hostilities against the
Dey of Algiers, that could not be called on our part a
defensive war; yet was it, nevertheless, legitimate.
In addition to the insult we had to revenge, we also
satisfied a great and lawful interest, not only French,
but European, by delivering the Mediterranean from
the pirates who had infested it for ages. The con-
quest of the Eegency was also equally lawful ^vith
the war, for it was the only method of reaUy and
permanently accomplishing that deliverance. But
the rights of ambition, if such a phrase may be per-
mitted, vary according to the times. The spirit of
war and conquest did not formerly lead to the conse-
quences^ which accompany it at present. Throughout
all Europe it met mth obstacles, counterpoises, and
limitations ; its breeze excited no universal hurricane.
The most ambitious enterprises of Charles V. and of
Louis XIV. neither imperilled every state in Europe,
nor shook the foundations of human society. They
EXTERNAL POLICY. 11
were able to pause, and did pause in fact, or rather
were compelled to pause in their successes and objects.
Europe at present is one vast body more essentially
single and susceptible. All vital questions spring
up and ferment throughout. Every evil is conta-
gious, every disturbance becomes general. When a
great enterprise commences, no one can calculate its
range, or promise that it will stop on the brink
towards which it verges. The problem is invariably
found to be more vast and complicated than was fore-
seen; a blow struck in a corner shakes the entire
edifice ; movement is ever on the point of becoming
chaos.
But at least chaos preceded creation, and ruins
were transformed into new edifices ! This avails
nothing. What remains of all the territorial over-
throws, of all the diplomatic combinations, of all the
states called into being by the external policy of the
national Convention and the Empire? Everything
has fallen and disappeared, republics and kingdoms,
foundations and conquests. So much imagination,
boldness, and power, displayed in utter contempt of
public justice, produced only the ruin of the great
performers in these ephemeral achievements, and
brought on the reaction of the Congress of Vienna,
and of the Holy Alliance.
Much is said at present of the new state of social
institutions, of the new spirit by which they are in-
fluenced, of the necessity of comprehending and satis-
fying their requirements, aspirations, and tendencies ;
while in all that applies to the relations of states with
12 EXTEKNAL POLICY.
each other, these precepts of quick-sighted innovation
are absolutely disavowed. We still crawl on in the
same beaten track so long trodden by the foreign
policy of Europe. Unbridled ambition and force
have found their favourable epochs not only for tran-
sitory successes, but for solid triumphs. In the midst
of coarse and violent manners, when the great majority
of states were still unsettled and in the throes of for-
mation, — amongst peoples who neither united closely
their daily interests, nor held regular and permanent
intercourse, in the absence of that universal and
rapid communication which in our day has trans-
formed all nations into one enormous public, ever
present and attentive at the spectacle of passing
events, — ^war, even divested of lawful or specious
motives, however unrestrained in its pretensions and
enterprises, quickly disposed of sovereignties and
territories, and terminated in durable results. As-
suredly neither Alexander nor Charlemagne was en-
dowed "svith greater genius nor wielded greater power
than Napoleon ; and their empires also fell with them,
but not as his subsided. The dominions of Alexander
were broken up into Idngdoms for his generals ; those
of Charlemagne were divided amongst his descen-
dants. At both periods the gigantic edifice gave
way, but other buildings immediately arose from its
ruins and flourished in permanence. Of the states
subdued and the thrones erected by Napoleon, none
survived him for the advantage of any; and, by a
strange phenomenon, the only one of his generals who
retained royalty held it not at his hands. The fact
EXTERNAL POLICY. 13
was, that Napoleon in his foreign policy disregarded
the true tendencies of humanity. The tune has
passed away for great territorial overthrows, accom-
plished solely by strokes of war, and regulated by the
exclusive will of the conquerors. Scarcely are their
strong hands mthdrawn when their works are ques-
tioned, and attacked by the two powers which con-
stitute the good and evil genius of our age, — the
spirit of civilization, and the spirit of revolution. The
first invokes the empire of justice in the bosom of
peace; the second appeals incessantly to force, and
endeavours to establish at all hazards, by anarchy
alternated with tyranny, what it designates the reign
of pure democracy. It is between these two powerful
excitements that the present contest which embroils
Europe, and will decide her future, is exclusively
engaged. In this state of European society, respect
for international law becomes with every well-regu-
lated government not only an imperative duty, but
a necessary precaution. In our days, the ambition
which disturbs the world in contempt of this law, and
for the gratification of its own desires, is equally
senseless and criminal.
When the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832,
assumed ofiice, the greater number of the inter-
national questions which had agitated Europe were,
if not silenced, at least lulled. Poland had sub-
mitted; Italy seemed to slumber again; Spain re-
mained motionless under her sick King ; Switzerland
deliberated patiently on the form of her federal con-
stitution. The Belgic question alone remained in
IJ: EXTERNAL TOLICY.
doubt, and excited some uneasiness as to the peace of
Europe. I have previously mentioned, and all the
world remembers, the diplomatic arrangement be-
tween France and England, which led to the siege
and capture of Antwerp. It is unnecessary to re-
peat the details. I do not write the general history
of that time ; I merely undertake to characterize its
policy and the part I took in it. It was most espe-
cially in the Belgic question that our sincere and
steady adherence to the principles of public European
law completely manifested itself. We had in that
matter to defend ourselves from all the temptations
which could assail a government on the day after
a revolution, — temptations at once revolutionary,
dynastic, and bearing on territorial aggrandizement.
We resisted them all. And at the same time we
vindicated and caused Europe to admit the interests of
security and dignity Avhich appertain to France on
that frontier. We seconded the impulse of the Bel-
gian population in favour of the national indepen-
dence and political liberty they have enjoyed for
thirty years, — a considerable segment even in the life
of a nation.
In this affair, as in all their relations with the
government of King Louis-Philippe, the three leading
powers of the North, and the secondary states who
attend them as satellites, proved themselves deficient,
not in wisdom, but in that consistent firmness which
gives to wisdom all its fruits. Austria, Prussia, and
Itussia offered no opposition to the separation of
Belgium and Holland. They sat in conference with
EXTERNAL POLICY. 15
France and England to enrol the accomplished fact
in the European system, and to settle the relations
of the two new states ; they accepted, or allowed to
pass without effective resistance, and finally sanc-
tioned, all the details so laboriously debated which
the question successively involved. But while ac-
knowledging the necessity, they yielded to it with
that hesitation and discontent which divest modera-
tion of its merit, and destroy the confidence it ought to
insjjire. It was perfectly natural that, in the negotia-
tions on the Belgian question, they should support
the interests of the King of Holland ; that they should
advocate and watch over a general respect for treaties,
while at the same time they consented to modify
them in concert : and that the intimate understandino-
of France and England should excite their warm dis-
pleasure. But in the midst of these natural con-
sequences of their position, their policy towards the
newly-established government of France might and
ought to have been uniform, and exempt from con-
tradictions and mental reservations. It was nothing-
of the kind. Absolute governments, when they have
not a great man at their head, are more controlled
by their prejudices and more uncertain in their acts
than free legislations. Despite their ostentatious
irresponsibility, the burden of power oppresses them,
and to lighten it they voluntarily take refuge in in-
consistency and inertness.
While accepting what had passed in France and
around her since 1830, the policy of the continental
powers was narrow and short-sighted, without bold-
16 EXTERNAL POLICY.
iiess or grandeur. The origin of the new French
monarchy, the confusion and struggle of" its principles,
the disorders which had beset its cradle and still pur-
sued it, the evil traditions and objectionable language
of a portion of its adherents, — all these circumstances
darkened and perplexed the eyes of the old govern-
ments of the continent. They did not foresee, and
even after years of experience they were incapable
of appreciating at its true value, what formed the
practical merit, and will constitute the historical
honour, of the government of King Louis-Philippe.
The issue of a revolution, that government at once
and distinctly renounced the revolutionary spirit,
both in its internal and foreign relations ; it refused
to take into its service the policy of disorder in con-
junction with that of order, alternately exercising both,
according to the desires of its ambition or the em-
barrassments of its position ; it perseveringly regu-
lated its acts in a conservative spirit, in accordance
with the public law of Europe. The continental
powers did not meet this difficult constancy with a
just return. On their part, their attitude towards the
monarchy differed from their conduct, and their un-
restrained expressions from their official language. Ill-
will alternately penetrated and displayed itself behind
friendly overtures and pacific declarations. On the
22nd of March, 1834, M. de Barante wrote to me
from Turin as follows : " They resign themselves to us
with a reserved hope, more or less indulged, that we
shall fall into misfortune ; " and again on the 28th of
November following : " They submitted to us at first
EXTERNAL POLICY. 17
with astonishment and fear ; afterwards they looked
on our stru2:o:le ao^ainst disorder with a malevolent
hope ; and more recently with an idea that, if we were
successful, our victory would- turn to the advantage
of absolute power. At present they are disposed to
acknowledge us as liberals rather than jacobins,
cahn but strong. Even now they are not quite de-
cided on the question."
Although the understanding between Austria,
Prussia, and Russia was general and permanent, the
characters and personal sentiments of the heads of
these states, sovereigns and ministers, differed ma-
terially, and carried into their relations with the
government of King Louis-Philippe important dis-
tinctions.
Of the three persons who at that time directed the
affairs of Prussia, — the king, Frederic William III.,
the Prince of Wittgenstein, his most confidential
adviser, and M. Ancillon, his minister for Foreign
Affairs, — not one was endowed with eminent ability,
or calculated, by natural superiority of mind, to im-
press on Europe his ideas and desires ; but all had
dispositions and qualities which worked well together,
and fitted them to exercise a salutary influence on
European politics. The King, while inclining to the
principles of absolute monarchy and the traditions
of the Holy Alliance, evinced no systematic or inve-
terate antipathy to other maxims and forms of go-
vernment. If he had not realised the political hopes,
which in the national movement from 1813 to 1815
he had allowed his subjects to entertain, it arose less
VOL. IV. c
18 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
froiri a jealous passion for power than from an anxious
sentiment of the inherent difficulties attached to free
constitutions, of the confusion they might introduce
into the state, or of the embarrassment they might
occasion to himself. He had at least, in concert with
his chancellor, the Prince of Hardenberg, carried out
extensive and liberal reforms in the civil administra-
tion of Prussia. He was a sensible, well-meaning
monarch, the trials of whose life had enlightened and
strengthened, while at the same time they had fa-
tigued him. Equally desirous of repose, \vithin and
without, simple, economical, and reserved, he imposed
respect on his people and confidence on his allies
■without requiring much from them in return. He
had learned to understand the exigencies of difficult
positions, to appreciate the full responsibility of go-
vernment, and he felt thanldul to the sovereigns, his
neighbours, who assisted him to bear the burden in
his own states by sustaining it in their own, regu-
larly, peaceably, and for the advantage of European
order. The revolution of July had caused him to feel
more angry with Charles X. than irritated against
his necessary substitute. The moderation of King
Louis- Philippe pleased him. His ability inspired
him with confidence, and he sincerely desired the
consolidation of his throne, notwithstanding the ob-
jectionable example of the revolution wliich had placed
hun there. The Prince of Wittgenstein, a courtier
and a man of the world, formed in the school of the
eighteenth centuiy, and of Frederic II., of an acute,
enlightened, and unfettered spirit, neither a liberal in
EXTERNAL POLICY. 19
avowed opinions nor a professed politician, the de-
voted friend without being the ambitious rival of the
King, his master, a true-hearted German as well as
a patriotic Prussian, and a constant correspondent of
Prince Metternich, but strongly inclined to French
manners ; — this nobleman confirmed and seconded
the King in his impartial policy, tranquil and well-
disposed towards France, and at the same time
faithful to the alliance of the three courts. No
influence can be more effectual at any given moment
than that of a man who habitually affects none, and
offers nothing beyond the advice and services re-
quired of him. Such was the influence of Prince
Wittgenstein at the court of Berlin, exercised not
only as regarded the King but over the whole royal
family, in all of whom he contributed skilfully to
maintain respect and obedience for their head.
Of much less importance, although more di-
rectly in the conduct of affairs, was M. AnciUon,
the publicist, historian, moralist, and philosopher; a
man of little originality or power in these different
careers, but ever judicious, clear-sighted, and concili-
atory, arranging and defending the King's policy with
dignity and perseverance. With a government thus
organized, the French minister at Berlin, M. Bresson,
ardently devoted to the policy of his own country and
sovereign, thirsting for success, vigilant with ardour,
and dexterous with authority, sometimes even with
enthusiasm, had acquired a commanding position and
effectual credit. The King, Frederic William III.,
listened to him with confidence and treated him with
c 2
20 EXTERNAL POLICY.
favour. He established a close intimacy with Prince
Wittgenstein, visited him almost every day Avithout
any political urgency, for the sole enjoyment of social
intercourse, and thus found himself ever in a condi-
tion to turn personal regard to the advantage of
public affairs whenever the latter j)i'esented them-
selves.
At Vienna, the position of the government of 1830
and its representative was more difficult. The prin-
ciples and passions of absolutism predominated at
that court, and seemed to encounter no opposition
from the Austrian public. The Revolution of 1830
was looked upon with an evil eye, and the society of
Vienna felt towards the agents of the government
which that movement had established, the worldly
coldness which, despite its frivolity, embarrasses and
seriously envenoms the relations of states. The Emperor
Francis II., moderate by character and experience,
and thoroughly sincere in his desire for peace, had at
the same time a profound antipathy against all free
governments issuing from revolutionary action ; and
he conceived that he did quite enough in their favour
by abstaining in his policy from all hostile practices.
Under this monarch, more influential himself in his
affairs than has generally been believed, and in the
midst of an independent and haughty aristocracy,
(dthough without constitutional or traditional liberty,
Prince Metternich had directed for more than twenty
years the foreign policy of Austria. He possessed a
lofty mind, and appeared to place his credit and
enjoyment on all occasions in a somewhat ostenta-
EXTEENAL POLICY. 21
tious display of liberalism and impartiality; but
while perfectly comprehending and admitting, when
compelled by necessity to do so, the new aspect of
states, he desired only to maintain intact the Euro-
pean edifice, such as it had been constructed by the
Congress of Vienna, the apogee of his influence and
glory. No man ever encouraged within himself so
much intellectual movement ; while devoted to the
defence of jDolitical immobility when he spoke, and
even more when he wrote, in the midst of a length-
ened prolix style, loaded with periphrases and am-
bitiously philosophical, it was easy to detect a rich,
varied, and profound intelligence, eager to seize upon
and discuss general ideas, and abstract theories ; and
at the same time singularly practical and sagacious,
skilful in unravelling what the state of facts or the
dispositions of men commanded and allowed, yet ever
confining itself strictly within the narrow limits of
the possible, while assuming the air of disporting in
the boundless regions of thought. When at leisure,
and in the fi^eedom of conversation, M. de Metternich
evinced an inquiring interest in all questions of lite-
rature, philosophy, science, and art. He possessed
and took pleasure in displaying on these topics taste,
imagination, and systematic theories; but no sooner
did he enter on politics, than he subsided at once
into the least experimental of all practitioners, the
most devoted to established facts, and the most op-
posed to all morally ambitious innovations. From
his quickness of general comprehension, combined
with prudence when action was called for and the con-
c 3
22 EXTERNAL POLICY.
tinued success resulting from this douljle endowment,
Prince IMetternicli had derived a confidence singu-
larly, and I may even say, ingenuously presumptuous
in his own views and judgment. In 1848, during
our mutual retirement in London, " a conviction of
error," said he to me one day, with a half smile Avhich
seemed to justify his words beforehand, " has never
approached my mind." " I have been more fortunate
than you, Prince," I replied; "on several occasions
I have satisfied myself that I was mistaken." His
manner told me that he approved my modesty -svith-
out wavering, at the bottom of his heart, in his own
presumption. The quality most wanting in his po-
litical talent was courage. I mean the courage of
impulse and enterprise. He had no genius for con-
test, the dangers of wliich he feared more than he
coveted the successes to which it might lead. Herein
lay his chief embarrassment in his relations with the
government of King Louis-Philippe. He rendered
it full justice, acknowledged its importance in pre-
sei^ing European order, and although extending
little favour to some of its principles, and doubtful
of its future, he abstained from all that might injure
it, and would willingly have contributed to its sup-
port; but to do so effectually, he must have dis-
pleased certain members of the Imperial family, the
society of Vienna, and the Emperor Nicholas, whose
hostility towards King Louis-Philippe, though far
from bold, was declared and haughty. M. de Met-
ternich was indisposed to enter into any of these
conflicts, or to encounter these hazards. Hence
EXTERNAL POLICY. 23
arose, in his policy towards the French government,
those hesitations, obscurities, and reserves, which fre-
quently rendered his impartiality fruitless, and his
wisdom of less avail than it ought to have proved if
he had ventured more to establish its influence.
M. de Sainte Aulaire, whom the Duke de Broglie
despatched as ambassador to Vienna a few months
after the formation of the cabinet, was eminently
adapted to that mission. Nobly liberal, dignified
and concihating, polished and brave, zealous in his
duty but not officiously meddling, and a man of the
world without unbecoming worldly complaisance,
he commanded an elevated reception in the circles of
Vienna, and established himself mth Prince Metter-
nich on the footing of easy frankness, as a man who
had nothing to conceal and required only his due.
It would have been useless to have instructed M. de
Sainte Aulaire to persuade Prince Metternich to any
important resolution or difficult effort to which he
was not spontaneously inclined; no one exercised
such influence over the Chancellor of Austria; but
M. de Sainte Aulaire maintained friendly and con-
fiding relations with hun which sufficed for the
regular course of affairs, and prevented any com-
plication or misunderstanding betwen the two go-
vernments.
But it was above all the Emperor Nicholas who
weighed like a night-mare on Prince Metternich, and
often prevented him from regulating his conduct by
his own judgment. Determined to maintain, under
any circumstances, the union of the three Northern
*
c 4
24 EXTERNAL POLICY.
Powers, M. de Metternich, with this idea, consented
in the West as m the East to more sacrifices than
were necessary, and the Emperor Nicholas took ad-
vantage, for the promotion of his own personal views
and passions, of the anxious prudence of the Austrian
Chancellor. Perhaps no sovereign has ever exercised
in his own states and in Europe such extensive in-
fluence while doing so little to acquire it and turning
it to such an unimportant account. The Emperor
Nicholas was neither a great soldier, an enlightened
politician, an expanded spirit, nor even a lofty am-
bitionist. He neither increased his territories nor ad-
vanced his people materially in prosperity, in civilisa-
tion, in knowledge, in power, and m European credit.
Nevertheless, he reigned internally with vigour, and
externally with renown. He had within himself the
instincts and before the world all the actual prestiges
of power; an imposing person, distance, the innnen-
sity of his empire, the number of his subjects, their
devoted discipline, and their silent submission. On
two or three serious occasions when his physical qua-
lities had been called into play, he showed presence of
mind, courage, and the exercise of an eftective ascend-
ency. Subsequently, he avoided rather than courted
trials, and feared to compromise more than he desired
to exhibit himself. He was a hard and haughty,
but a prudent despot, and a great royal actor, with
more taste for theatrical effects than for the events
and emotions of the drama. Fortune had miracu-
lously assisted him. On ascending the throne he
found Russia great and Europe restored to order, but
EXTERNAL POLICY. 25
still fatigued. He profited by the brilliant successes
of the Emperor Alexander his brother for the glory
and security of his empire, and neither his people nor
his allies required much from him. Within, his
labours of reform were confined to sincere efforts for
the introduction of more probity in general adminis-
tration; without, a haughty non-interference sufficed
to maintain his influence. In the West, events gave
him no opportunity for action; in the East, his first
blows against Turkey had succeeded without en-
gaging him too deeply. In the midst of this pros-
perous and easy position, the revolution of July
shocked his pride as a monarch, interfered with his
schemes for the future, and disturbed him as to his
own repose. He voAved against it an intense hatred,
but without daring to proclaim it openly, or to ac-
knowledge himself the adversary of the event that he
detested. And to gratify his passion without com-
promising his policy, he affected to separate King
Louis-Philippe from France, cajoling the French
nation after as before 1830, while nourishing enmity
against its new head. The attitude was unworthy of
such a powerfiil prince, and strangely inconsistent
in a despot; for it is the usual care as well as the
necessity of absolute power to confound closely the
sovereign and the people, and to look upon the
monarch as the representative, and in some measure
as the incarnation of the millions who live under his
rule. Of a superficial mind, notwithstanding his
pompous severity, the Emperor Nicholas forgot this
vital maxim of his own system of government, and
26 EXTERNAL POLICY.
was unconscious how puerile it was to persist in
looking upon Louis-Philippe as unlike other kings,
while at the same time bowing before the revolution
which had placed him on the throne.
His obstinacy, besides, was not always as intract-
able as it wished to appear, and when likely to pro-
duce any serious inconvenience, he knew how to
relax it. After 1830, it was his habit, when he
received the French ambassador, to treat him with
personal deference, and to discourse with him on the
affairs of the two countries without naming the
King. In January 1833, the Duke de Broglie, when
appointing Marshal Maison to the embassy at St.
Petersburg, instructed him not to acknowledge such
an attitude ; and after adding to his official orders ^,
already clearly defined, certain verbal instructions
even more precise, he requested an interview with
M. Pozzo di Borgo, and stated that he considered it
his duty to apprise him that if, while overwhelming
the new envoy with undivided attention, the Em-
peror abstained from mentioning the King, the
Marshal was commissioned to quit St. Petersburg
within eight days, at the same time assigning a pre-
text, and that the most transparent would be con-
sidered the best. The Marshal was also desired to
confirm this confidential communication made to
Count Pozzo, who failed not to write on the subject
to his Court. The Emperor Nicholas had no desire
to embroil himself with France for the pleasure of
persisting in a gross breach of politeness. At the
1 See Historic Documcuts, No. I.
EXTERNAL rOLICY. 27
first diplomatic reception, he hastened to meet the
ambassador; took him by the hand, inquired cor-
dially after the King's health, and on this point, at
least, conventional proprieties were restored between
the two courts.
About three years later, and in a private matter,
the personal feeling of the Emperor Nicholas towards
King Louis-Philippe and his family, manifested
themselves with a mixture of calculated reserve,
conceited susceptibility, indirect insinuations and
violence, which passed from the character of the man
into the policy of the sovereign. Towards the end of
the summer of 1835, M. de Barante left the Sardi-
nian embassy to succeed to that of Russia. At that
epoch, there was no particular negotiation pending
between the two governments, no special question to
arrange. The attitude and language of the new
ambassador, comprised the principal and almost the
sole object of his instructions. The future marriage
of the Duke of Orleans was then beginning to be
discussed. Before leaving Paris for his post, M. de
Barante requested the Duke de Broglie to inform
him as to what he was to do or say, in case, by any
accident, the possibility of a union between the Duke
of Orleans and one of the Grand Duchesses, daugh-
ters of the Emperor Nicholas, should be named to
him. " I know," he said, " that the Emperor is at
this moment extremely ill-disposed towards the King ;
but Russian policy is subject to sudden revulsions,
and the Emperor's character partakes of the pecu-
liarity. How am I to act under this possible con-
28 EXTERNAL POLICY.
tingency?" "The King," replied the Duke de
Broglie, " looks upon the marriage of his children as
entirely a family interest, unconnected with politics.
Ask him his intentions." The King told M. de
Barante explicitly, that he by no means desired a
Russian alliance for his son. In alluding to the
little taste he had for such a connection, some en-
couraging expressions had lately reached him, holding
out the prospect of a marriage between the Duke of
Orleans and an Archduchess of Austria. M. de
Barante received the King's answer as definitive, and
thencefoi'ward regulated his conduct on that point
accordingly.
A few days after this conversation, and on the eve
of his departure for St. Petersburg, he received in-
structions from the Duke de Broglie, to pause at
Berlin, and to ascertain, in conjunction mth M.
Bresson, whether, in the event of the Dukes of Or-
leans and Nemours paying a visit to that capital,
they would meet from the King of Prussia and his
family a cordial reception. This was not a matter
on which to found an ofiicial question. It was a
subject for guarded conversation, and not for a
written overture. M. Bresson was desired to ask a
temporary leave of absence, and to communicate the
result in Paris. An assurance speedily arrived, that
the Princes would be eagerly welcomed in Berlin,
and that the King was prepared to receive them with
paternal regard. And as the confidential under-
standing between Prussia and Austria was such,
that in similar matters the tAVo courts invariably
EXTERNAL POLICY. 29
acted in concert, the French government looked
upon it as certain that the Princes would, mtli the
exception of royal cordiality, be hailed with the same
unanimity in Vienna as in Berlin. When, some
months later, the projected journeys were carried
out with complete success, much conversation arose
on the subject in St. Petersburg. It was asked if
the Princes would also visit Russia, and some
astonishment was expressed that they had not done
so. " They would have been heartily welcomed,"
said the Emperor Nicholas ; and this observation was
carried to M. de Barante, towards whom the Emperor
had never exhibited the slightest shade of ill humour.
He even spoke with him in most favourable terms of
the position of France and of the King's govern-
ment, very contrary to his usual practice, although
on this subject he invariably abstained from any
expression of critical censure. A sentuuent very
opposite to dissatisfaction soon exhibited itself in-
directly. A person of high consideration at the
court of St. Petersburg, one of the ladies of honour
and an intimate friend of the Empress, the Baroness
Frederyks, spoke one day mth Madame de Barante,
with whom she was on confidential and familiar terms,
of the possibility of a marriage between the Duke of
Orleans and the Grand Duchess Maria. M. de
Barante attached little importance to the words of
Madame Frederyks ; he rather avoided than sought
any conversation with her on the subject. He knew
the views of King Louis-Philippe, and feeling con-
vinced at the same time that the Emperor Nicholas
30 EXTERNAL POLICY.
had no sincere desire for such an alliance, he cared little
to ascertain if these words were merely a woman's
fancy, or whether Madame Frederyks had been
charged to feel the ground at all hazards.
Nevertheless, it occurred to him that the Grand
Duchess Maria often spoke of the Duke of Orleans;
that she inquired as to his character, his disj^osition,
and personal endo^vments ; and had expressed a wish
to see his portrait. At a ball where M. de Barante
found himself seated at sujDper at a small table near
the Empress, the Grand Duchess being also present,
the conversation turned upon the Duke of Orleans,
and many questions were put to him with flattering
curiosity. Shortly after, M. de Barante himself gave
a ball, at which the Emperor and Empress did him
the honour of attending. He also asked permission
to invite the Grand Duchess Maria, and the invitation
had been accepted; but she did not come, and the
Emj)eror took the trouble of apologising for her
absence, by assuring the ambassador, even with some
detail, that it arose from indisposition. A few days
later, at another court assemljly, the Grand Duchess
mentioned to M. de Barante the disappointment she
had felt at not being at the Embassy; " I wept for it,"
she said, " and I walked in the morning before your
windows."
These doubtful and inconsistent demonstrations
induced M. de Barante to think that the Emperor
Nicholas had no idea of bestowing his daughter on the
Duke of Orleans, and he therefore maintained the re-
serve which King Louis-Philippe had prescribed to
EXTERNAL POLICY. 31
him. After a certain time, the marriage of the Duke
with the Princess Helena of ]\Iecklenburgh began to
be spoken of, and M. de Barante ascertained that the
Emperor Nicholas expressed himself very warmly
against this project. He wished, it was said, to em-
ploy all his influence to prevent its accomplishment,
and with that view, availed himself of his habitual
correspondence with Prince Charles of Mecklenburgh-
Strelitz, a general officer in the Prussian service, and
in some credit at the court of Berlin. When it be-
came known at St. Petersburg that the King of
Prussia strenuously advocated a plan which proceeded
from himself, the Emperor Nicholas indulged in a
strange fit of passion. He acted publicly a scene
with Baron de Boden, the envoy of the Duke of Meck-
lenburgh-Schwerin in Russia, and spoke in coarse
terms of the part the King of Prussia had taken
in forwarding the marriage. At a ball given
about this time, at which the Emperor was pre-
sent, he addressed not a single word to the Ambas-
sador of France; a marked exception to his usual
custom, and the more significant, as the ministers of
Austria and England held on that evening their
ordinary conversation with him. This fit of ill-
humour soon subsided; it produced no change in the
official relations of M. de Barante with the Count de
Nesselrode, who carefully avoided mixing himself up
with the sallies of his master ; and in a short time
nothing more was said at St. Petersburg of the mar-
riase of the Duke of Orleans.
In 1838, M. de Barante came on leave to Paris,
32 EXTERNAL POLICY.
and the Duke of Orleans, then happily married, re-
quested him to relate all that had passed at St.
Petersburg on the subject of his espousals. Being
informed of the incidents I have now related, the
Prince agreed with the ambassador in thmking that the
Emperor Nicholas never had any idea of bestowing
his daughter on him. While an attempt was making to
impress the contrary on M. de Barante, there was also
a desire to flatter the Duke himself by encouraging
such a prospect. A confidential female intmiate
repeated to hun in Paris what Madame Fredeiyks had
said to Madame de Barante in St. Petersburg, and
endeavoured to dissuade him from any other alliance.
The Prince remained equally incredulous with the
ambassador.
They were both right. The Emperor Nicholas had
never sincerely contemplated even in thought a mar-
riage so contrary to his prejudices. If the Grand
Duchess Maria had met Avith an oj^portunity of seeing
the Duke of Orleans ; if he had pleased her, and she
herself had ardently desired the union, very possibly
the Emperor might have yielded to the wishes of his
daughter. Harsh in his government, he had a ten-
derly paternal heart towards his family; and more-
over, in questions of marnage was strongly inclined to
hold it as a point of duty to allow much weight to the
personal tastes and inclinations of his children. But
no such motives pressed on him in 1836, and when the
visit of the French princes to Gennany suggested the
idea in his immediate circle, the Emperor Nicholas
had recently adopted towards King Louis-Philippe
EXTERNAL POLICY. 33
manifestations and j)roceedings calculated to estrange
him still more from such a connection.
After t]ie taking of Antwerp, and in presence of that
brilliant French solution of the Belgic question, the
discontent of the three northern cabinets, although
restrained, was profound. It was they who had to
submit successively to the most important and bit-
terest concessions, at the same time political and
domestic, — concessions equally of principle and rela-
tionship. The King of Prussia and the Emperor
had been compelled to abandon, in the King of Hol-
land, — the one his brother-in-law, the other the
brother-m-law of his sister. The Emperor Nicholas
had even gone so far as to send on an extraordinary
mission to the Hague, his chief confidant Count Orloff,
to announce to King William his secession, and to
overcome his obstinate resistance to the wishes of
Europe. Such sacrifices, even where sincerely carried
out, leave stinging wounds in the hearts of the coldest
l^oliticians. Austria, Prussia, and Kussia, beheld
moreover the perfect accordance and united action of
France and England, strengthen and extend from
day to day. This was not merely an accidental agree-
ment of the two governments upon special questions ;
it was, in fact, a general sympathy of ideas and ten-
dencies openly proclaimed between the countries
despite their ancient hostility; a sympathy which,
throughout all Europe inspired the advocates of poli'
tical reform, and the fabricators of revolutions with
the allurements and hopes of success. From self-love
and apprehension, the three northern powers felt the
VOL. IV. D
34 EXTERNAL POLICY.
desire and necessity of ostensibly opposing combined
action to action and force to force, of mutually sup-
porting each other in the face of a doubtful future,
and of taking revenge, in case the opportunity should
present itself, for the checks to which they had re-
cently submitted.
Another more immediate and pressing cause urged
them to this course. The revolutionarj'- attempts
excited in Italy, Poland, and Germany by the crisis
of 1830 had failed, but conspiracies still existed,
ardently fomented by the Italian, Polish, and German
refugees, who had found free shelter in France,
England, Belgium, and Switzerland. I have already
stated my opinion on the right of asylum, its legi-
timacy and political utility, and also of the duties
thereto appertaining, as well on the part of the pro-
tecting governments as on that of the exiles them-
selves.' The question is as simple and clear in
principle as delicate and difficult in application; but
practical obstacles have too often caused the empire of
the principle and the necessity of respecting it to be
forgotten. Political refugees, however natural and
patriotic their enterprise may have been, have evi-
dently no right to prosecute, from the bosom of the
asylum they have obtained, and to the danger of the
state that has admitted them, their war against the
government of their o"svn country ; and the power that
shelters them, whatever its sympathy may be, is
ob\^ously called on to restrain their attacks against
the authorities with which it lives in peace itself. This
* See vol. ii. chap. ii. pp. 85, 90.
EXTEKNAL TOLICY. 35
course is imperatively commanded by the public law
which constitutes the inherent morality and loyalty of
nations. This law forbids not the kind reception of
exiles, nor the relief afforded to them in misfortune ;
neither does it interdict respect for natural affection,
nor the maintenance of the private ties of which these
exiles may be the object. When Count Pozzo di
Borgo complained that the Duchess de Broglie had
received in friendly intercourse at her house Prince
Adam Czartoriski, that noble chief of the Polish
emigrants, he was in the wrong, and the Duchess
was justified in saying with animated pride, " Prince
Czartoriski has long been my mother's and my own
personal friend: I shall not exclude him from my
drawing-room because my husband has the honour to
represent France and her king." Generous senti-
ments, under such circumstances, do not justify any
defalcation from political duties, neither are they
condemned to obliterate themselves in the presence
of harsh or overweening exigencies; and the govern-
ments which exclaim against the underhand practices
of refugees, are also bound to consider the dignity as
well as the legal position of the power it calls upon to
repress them. On both sides there are many con-
siderations to be respected, many restraints to be
observed, many embarrassing points to be allowed
for. But all these being admitted, the right of re-
monstrance remains entire with the one party, and
the duty of repression with the other; a duty of
political honesty as well as of prudence, the strict ob-
servance of which is equally essential to the honour of
D 2
36 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
governments and the safety of states, and ■which can-
not be disregarded but through deplorable weakness
or inexcusable arrogance. In spite of our sincere
efforts to acquit ourselves of our duty on this point
to the different governments of Europe, from hence
arose, between 1832 and 1831), in all our dealings
with them, a source of complications incessantly re-
newing, and one of the principal causes which in-
duced the three Northern Powers to adopt combined
demonstrations and measures tending to compromise
the pacific relations they desired to maintain, and to
defeat the redress of the injuries of which they com-
plained.
At the beginning of April 1833, a revolutionary
movement exploded at Frankfort; one of those oscil-
lations so frequent in our days, serious from the ideas
and sentiments which excite them, but frivolous from
the thoughtlessness and incapacity of their authors.
At the same moment a similar conspiracy was dis-
covered at Turin. Both were j^romptly repressed.
But the Germanic Diet set on foot an extensive in-
quest to ascertain their sources, ramifications, and
objects; and, as might have been easily foreseen, the
inquiry from its first steps encountered and brought
to light the plots and aggressions of the refugees.
While pursuing its course, we learned that on the 14th
of August, the Emperor of Austria and the King of
Prussia, accompanied by their ministers, Prince Met-
ternich and M. Ancillon, had held an interview at the
castle of Theresienstadt, near Tijplitz. Three months
later, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia
EXTERNAL POLICY. 37
again met at Schwedt on the Oder, and a few days
subsequently the Emperor Nicholas and the Emperor
of Austria, also accompanied by their ministers for
Foreign AiFairs, conferred personally at MiinchengraBtz,
a small to\vn in Bohemia, whither the Prince Royal of
Prussia had previously repaired. The result of these
repeated meetings soon manifested itself. During the
first days of November, 1833, Baron de Hugel, charge
d'afikires of Austria, in the absence of Count Appony,
Baron de Werther, in the name of Prussia, and Count
Pozzo di Borgo, on the part of Russia, called succes-
sively upon the Duke de Broglie, and communicated
to him three despatches from their courts, all winding
up by declaring in the same terms, that " If France,
who had kno^wn so well how to defend herself from
the attempts of disturbers, did not henceforward
equally defeat the machinations which in her ter-
ritory they were contriving against foreign states,
in some of these latter, internal commotions might
arise which would compel them to appeal to the
assistance of their allies ; that this aid would not be
refused to them, and that every attempt to oppose it
would be considered by the three cabinets of Vienna,
St. Petersburg, and Berlin, as an act of hostility
directed against each."
In itself, this remonstrance contained nothing be-
yond what was natural and conformable to the law of
nations and the exigencies of the moment, but the
concert which had led to it, the unifonnity and per-
emptory tone of the despatches, impressed too palpably
on the act of the three courts the character of an
D 3
3 7 .i 4 Q
'i i ^ ■i .:i
38 EXTERNAL POLICY.
attempt at intimidation, not to confine us exclusively
to a consideration of its principle and motives. The
cabinets which had adopted the resolution, and the
diplomatic agents mstructed to communicate it to the
French mmistry, so thoroughly understood its bear-
ing, that while acquittmg themselves of their mission,
the most moderate endeavoured to extenuate it. The
Austrian despatch lavished encomiums on the ability
and energy of the Kmg's government. The Prussian
document, filled with expressions of personal esteem
and alFection, rendered ample justice to the efibrts the
Kmg had already made to restraia the refugees ; and
Count Pozzo di Borgo, perhaps little satisfied with the
details of the Russian missive, reframed from statmg it
at full length to the Duke de Broglie, and confined him-
self to reading the conclusion. While varying, according
to these difi'erent attitudes, his reception and language
in reply, the Duke de Broglie becomingly repulsed
the attempt at mtimidation, and resolutely mamtained,
for all cases of European complication or interven-
tion which the future might present, full liberty of
action and the free exercise of the declared policy of
France. When this answer was conveyed to Prince
Metternich, he endeavoured only to understand it in
part, and to persuade himself that Piedmont was not
one of the states in which France would suffer no
foreign intervention without interposing herself; but
M. de Sainte Aulaire, by a prompt and frank retort,
prevented him from assuming the air of decei\dng
himself on that point. M. de Metternich submitted.
At Berlin, and even at St. Petersburg, the firm reply
EXTERNAL POLICY. 39
of the Duke de Broglie entailed no remark ; and the
whole affair had no other result than that of exhibit-
ing with some display the concerted action of the
three courts, and the laborious efforts of the Emperor
Nicholas to coerce liis allies. It revealed at the same
tune their internal disagreements, and little inclination
to push their demonstrations to extremity. There
are few worse politicians than those who possess minds
more haughty than expanded, more impassioned than
reflecting ; who seek the momentary gratification of
their prejudices far more than the actual and perma-
nent accomplishment of their designs.
Independently of Western revolutions, the Emperor
Nicholas, a few months after the conferences of The-
reseinstadt, Schwedt, and Munchengrtetz, discovered in
the East a new subject of irritation agamst the
government of Kmg Louis-Philippe. The struggle
between the Ottoman Porte and the Pacha of Egypt
had commenced. Mehemet Ali subdued Syria; his
son Ibrahim, victorious at Konieh, overran Asia Minor
as a conqueror, occupied Smyrna, and menaced
Constantinople. The great problem which weighs,
and in aU probability wiU long continue to weigh
upon Europe, the Eastern question, was approaching
a most violent crisis. I shall presently describe the
conflagration which was then so near being lighted
up; at present I confine myself to its first glim-
mermgs.
There can be no doubt that Mehemet Ali aspired
to throw off the yoke of the Sultan, and to establish
an independent sovereignty for himself. It was in
D 4
40 EXTERNAL POLICl'.
vain that he multiplied his protestations of fidelity,
and declared to M. de Bois-le-Comte, who in the
spring of 1833 was charged by the Duke de Broglie
with a commission to the East, — "I am ready at
all times to proclaim, in face of the world, that I
shall never seek a quarrel with the Sultan provided
he seeks none Avith me, and that I will live in peace
and obedience. But let the great European Powers
guarantee, both for the Porte and for myself, that
we shall never mutually disturb by any aggression
the peace they may re-establish between us." M. de
Bois-le-Comte observed to the Pacha that the Sultan
was his sovereign, and that it would be difficult for
the Powers to enter into any guarantee which should
place them on an equality. " Do you know why I
am not independent?" quickly retorted Mehemet Ali.
"It is from respect for the PoAvers. Do you believe
that but for the deference I pay to their intentions,
I would continue in the position of a subject? Well;
the regard I have had for your counsels neither the
Greeks nor Belgians have entertained, and you have
rewarded them by securing their independence ; but
you punish me by refusing to guarantee my safety."
Leaving then the view of his own interest, " Within
a year," he said, with an expression full of mystery
and gravity, " within a year war will burst forth in
Europe ; I have certain information of this. United
to England, you will have to combat Russia, Austria,
and the States of the Continent, llussia predomi-
nates at Constantinople ; do you not then see the
advantage of employing Mehemet Ali, and of using
EXTERNAL POLICY. 41
liim to oppose and destroy a hostile influence ? Think
well of this ; it may suit you to let me seize the dis-
trict of Adana : this would give strength to you and
to me." M. de Bois-le-Comte then affirmed that there
would be no war; Europe had resolved to remain at
peace. Mehemet Ali seemed to understand this,
and hesitated; but some days after, speaking fami-
liarly with the French envoy, he said to him, " Mr.
Campbell, the English political agent, is going to
present to me to-morrow, Mr. Turnbull, Her Britannic
Majesty's consul. When will you also give to your
consul, M. Mimaut, a political character? Shall I
tell you what the result will be ? You not only allow
yourselves to be forestalled by England, but you will
also be so by Austria and Russia. Yes, by Russia
herself. Do not believe that I stand badly with her;
on the contrary, we are on excellent terms. The
Austrian agent, M. Prokesch, who seems so closely
united with the English and with you, has taken
upon himself to maintam friendly relations between
Russia and me." Sometimes, under an appearance
of forgetting politics altogether, the Pacha related
to M. de Bois-le-Comte with complete unreserve the
vicissitudes of his life, and the difficulties he had to
overcome before reaching his present eminence.
" One of the greatest," he said, " was the vice of my
education. I was fifty, and had governed Egypt for
ten years before I learned to read." " What motive
induced your Highness to submit to such a painful
labour? Mahomet established a religion, and laid
the foundations of one of the greatest empires in the
42 EXTERNAL POLICY.
world, without knoAving how to read." "True; but
the necessity of being able to read impressed itself on
me more and more. Until I could do so, I arranged
in my head, as in a magazine, all that I saw and
heard; sometimes the impression of objects became
weak, but in moments of danger, or when inflamed
by passion, all came back upon my mind clear and
lucid ; I found out, nevertheless, that my memory
declined. I then determined to strengthen it by
reading. Every one I saw, I desired to take a book
and read with me. By dint of this process, I learned
to read myself, and very quickly. Since then, I
have perused many books; latterly, a large volume
of geography sent to me from Constantinople. Above
all, I have studied works on military and political
science. I also read your journals. In addition, I
have looked over books of history, and I feel con-
vinced that no one "svith such weak means has
acliieved the great deeds that I have accomplished.
I have still much to do. I have already advanced
my country beyond Turkey, Greece, and particularly
beyond Persia. But I began too late. I doubt
whether I shall have time to finish. At all events
I wish to leave matters to my son in as good a state
as I possibly can." He concluded by returning to
his fixed idea, the necessity for the Porte ceding to
him the district of Adana, or that the Powers should
guarantee to him the security of his possessions. " I
consider myself," he added, " as a man placed in
presence of an enemy who holds the sword over his
head; I have a shield before me, you call upon me
EXTERNAL POLICY. 43
«
to abandon this shield; you are my friends and
I give it up to you, because I have full confidence
that you mean to provide me with another defence.
Without that, it would be to destroy me."
When he wished to ingratiate himself with the
powers whom he knew to be sincere friends of the
Porte, — and probably with sincerity on his o'svn part,
for he sometimes doubted his fortune if separated
from the general lot of the Ottoman empire, — he sjDoke
of a desii'e to end his days after the peace, at Con-
stantmople, and to devote himself heart and soul to
the raising and reanimation of that crumblmg mon-
archy. In this hypothesis, even European policy
paid homage to the superiority of his views and
character. " Assuredly," said M. Prokesch to M. de
Bois-le-Comte, " if, as by a sudden theatrical effect,
Mehemet Ali could be placed on the throne of Con-
stantinople, Austria, and all the other Powers who
suffer from the weakness of that government, would
gladly see hun there. Mehemet Ali is a reformer;
he replaces old dying mstitutions by improved new
ones. The Sultan Mahmoud is a revolutionist ; he
destroys without substitution."
Whatever turn his ambition might take, whether as
an enemy or a protector, such a man was insupport-
able to the Sultan and his advisers. One of the most
influential members of the divan, Khosrew Pacha,
hated him with an old and intense antipathy. Whe-
ther it was peace or war with Mehemet Ali, either
in concession or denial, the Porte incessantly medi-
tated his ruin; and this bitter hostility, this un-
44 EXTERNAL POLICY.
remitting eifort to destroy him, as constantly furnished
the viceroy of ^gypt with real motives and plausible
pretexts for engagmg in the struggle towards which
his ambition hnpelled him. " What would you have
had me do ? " he said, in May 1833, to M. de Bois-le-
Comte, who complamed of his attack upon the Pacha
of St. Jean d'Acre, and the war thereby excited; "I
held in my hands undeniable proofs that the Porte,
resolved on my destruction, was preparmg to fall on
me within a year. I have taken the initiative. I
was placed between two abysses, and I preferred
descendmg mto the one to bemg thrown mto the
other."
In presence of the Eastern question thus abruptly
laid doA\Ti, and surrounded by great powers all eager
to take a share in it with very opposite feelings, the
position of France was one of peculiar difficulty.
England and Austria had a simple and fixed idea;
they were anxious only to support the Ottoman
empu'e, and to defend it agamst its enemies. Russia
also held but one view, less simple, though equally
exclusive and determined. She mshed to mamtain
without strengthening the Turkish dominion, and to
control while protecting it. Prussia, little interested
in the matter, mclined habitually towards Austria
and England while humouring Russia. The policy
of France was complicated and alternative. She
wished at the same time to assist the Sultan and
the Pacha, to support the Ottoman empire, and to
strengthen Egypt. The Porte found itself engaged
EXTERNAL POLICY. 45
with two real allies, a hypocritical protector, and a
friend with a divided heart.
Arguments m some points substantial, in others
specious, were not wanting to justify this double
policy of France. The importance of Egypt in the
Mediterranean has been set forward, with the assist-
ance France might derive from that quarter in case
of a contest either with England or Russia ; and,
above all, the necessity, in the precarious state of the
East, that Egypt should neither remain in impotent
hands, nor pass into those of enemies. I shall balance
the value of these reasons when I treat of the great
debates in which they were introduced. They were
opmions formed after the blow was struck, rather
than determining causes before the event. To speak
truly, the policy of France on this question derived
its source from our brilliant expedition to Egypt in
1798; from the renown of our generals, soldiers, and
scholars; from the reminiscences and impressions of
their achievements and labours; from mipulses of
imagmation, and not from calculations of safety or
political balance. A lively interest attaches itself to
the theatre of that national and singular glory. Egypt
conquered by a French army and described by a
French mstitute, had become a popular fantasy in
France; we associated ourselves with its destmies;
and its new master, equally glorious and remarkable,
who governed with so much reputation while courting
our favour, became in our estimation a natural ally,
whom we supported from inclination and enthusiasm
rather than from reflection and motives of interest.
46 EXTERNAL POLICY.
The diflSiciilties of this position manifested them-
selves from the beginning. Three French agents inter-
posed, in 1833, in the struggle between the Porte and
Eg}^jt. At the close of 1832 General Guilleminot,
recalled in 1831, had not yet been replaced as am-
bassador at Constantinople. M. de Varemies, first
secretary to the embassy, represented France in that
quarter when the Syrian war broke out. After the
battle of Konieh, he exerted himself strenuously to
induce the Porte to consent to the concessions that
Mehemet Ali demanded. Admiral Roussin, appointed
ambassador at the commencement of January 1833,
arrived at Constantinople on the 17th of February,
and three days afterwards a Russian fleet applied for
by the Sultan on the 21st of January, entered the
Bosj^horus to protect hun against his ambitious vassal.
Admiral Roussin demanded from the Divan its im-
mediate withdrawal, pledging hunself to obtain the
consent of Mehemet Ali to the conditions which the
Porte had proposed to him in answer to his demands ;
and on the promise of the Sultan that on these terms
the Russians should effectually retire, the admiral
wrote as follows to the Pacha on the 22nd of Fe-
bruary : "To persist in the pretensions you have set
forward would be to call down disastrous consequences
on your head, which will, I have no doubt, awaken
your fears. France will keep the engagement she has
contracted ; she possesses the means, and I answer for
her inclmation. It only remains for me to hope that
you will not force us to the cruel necessity of attack-
ing a Power partly created by ourselves, and of
EXTERNAL POLICY. 47
tarnishing a glory of which I am the sincere admirer."
The Pacha haughtily refused to yield ; intrigues and
negotiations continued ; and when, six months later,
M. de Bois-le-Comte was despatched to the East
without any official authority, merely to watch the
progress of events and to give advice, he found Me-
hemet Ali still so irritated at the menacing summons
of Admiral Roussin, that he was unable to persuade
him to answer himself a second letter that the admiral
had addressed to him. " What do you wish me to
write to the ambassador?" said the Pacha; " I cannot
say my dear friend^ for I should speak falsely ; neither
can I evince my resentment, for in that case I should
offend your government. France has an accredited
agent here ; your consul is the organ of her relations
with me, and on my part he is the medium of my com-
munications with her. She herself estabhshed this
rule, to which I have faithfully conformed. When
the ambassador at Constantinople is changed, I am
not told of it, and I have nothing to do with him.
As to my relations with the Sultan, all conventiona-
lities require that I should carry them out alone and
without intermediary." Thus France, according to
the urgency of the moment, mclmed alternately to
either scale of the balance, endeavouring to act as a
counterpoise between her two friends, and to keep
her rivals at a distance.
Meanwhile Russia, on the one hand, and Mehemet
Ali on the other, pursued their work, Avhich was little
complicated and less sincere. On learning the re-
fusal of Mehemet Ali to satisfy himself with the
48 EXTERNAL POLICY.
offer of the Porte, the Emperor Nicholas once more
placed his fleet and army at the disposal of the Sul-
tan, and Mehemet Ali lavished at Constantinople his
ordinary means of persuasion, to induce the Porte
to cede to him, not only Syria, but, in addition, the
district of Adana, — in fact, the gate of Asia Minor,
the last object of dispute. After many secret con-
ferences and confused fluctuations, both parties suc-
ceeded in their efforts. On the 5th of April, a Russian
fleet, casting anchor in the Bosphorus, disembarked
five thousand soldiers on the Asiatic coast, while a
Russian division marched towards the Danube, and
on the 16th of May, a hundred discharges of artillery
announced at Alexandria that a firman of the 5th
ceded to the Pacha the district of Adana, as well as
Syria, and that the Egyptian army had recommenced
its march for the evacuation of Asia Minor. The
arrangement, considered at that time as definitive
between the Porte and the Pacha, was in effect signed
on the 5th of May at Kutaich. Ibrahim Pacha exe-
cuted his retreat, and peace might be said to be
re-established in the East.
But it was purchased at a price that sowed discord
in Europe. On the 6th of May, the day following
that which had witnessed the promulgation of the
pacific firman of the Sultan, Count Orloff entered
Constantinople in great pomp, invested with the titles
of ambassador extraordinary, and commander-in-chief
of the Russian forces in the Ottoman empire.
He arrived at the precise moment when the Porte
seemed to be free from danger, to realise substantially
EXTER'kAL POLICY. 49
the protection proffered by Russia, and to promise
that this protection should be extended under any
circumstances for the future. The apparent inutility
and unusual display of this embassy inspired the other
courts with well-founded mistrust. They required
explanations from the Porte. The Porte complained
of this demand as insulting, and affirmed that the
arrival of Count OrloiF was nothing more than an
explicit evidence of the perfect harmony then sub-
sisting between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia.
Count Orloff remained more than two months at
Constantinople, expecting, as he said, that the Egyp-
tian army would entirely evacuate the Ottoman
states. By the end of June this evacuation was
completed. Ibrahim Pacha had recrossed the
Taurus, and on the 10th of July the Russian fleet
and army retired in their turn from Turkey; but
two days previously, on the 8 th, a treaty called the
treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was signed at Constanti-
nople, expressing in Article 3, " That in consequence '
of the sincere st desire to secure the durability,
maintenance, and entire independence of the Sublime
Porte, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias,
in case any circumstances should arise to induce the
Sublime Porte to require once more the moral and
military assistance of Russia, although there is no
reason whatever to anticipate such a contingency,
yet, should God permit it, his Majesty j^i'omises to
supply, by land and sea, as many forces as the two
contracting parties may consider necessary." And
in return for this promise, a secret article, annexed
VOL. IV. E
50 EXTERN^VL POLICY.
to the treaty, added, " As his Majesty the Emperor
of all the Russias, wishmg to spare the Sublune Otto-
man Porte the expenses and embarrassments which
mioht result to her from the contribution of material
succour to Russia, will not require this succour
should circumstances impose on the Sublime Porte
the obligation of supplying it, — the Sublime Porte,
in place of the aid it is called upon to furnish
when required, and in compliance mth the principle
of reciprocity of the present treaty, is allowed to
limit its action in favour of the imperial court of
Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles;
that is to say, to the total exclusion of all foreign
ships of war, under any pretext whatever."
Thus the cabinet of St. Petersburg, converting
into a wiitten, legal right the fact of its prepon-
derance at Constantinople, reduced Turkey to the
condition of an official client, and transformed the
Black Sea into a Russian lake, the entrance to which
this client guarded agamst the possible enemies of
Russia ■without any restriction unposed on the latter
power against issuing from thence and pouring her
fleets and aiinies into the Mediterranean.
'^ Dui'ing the course of this negotiation, and when the
results began to be foreseen, Admiral Roussm, a bold
and straightforward spirit, ahvays governed by a
smgle idea, was tempted to place himself directly in
opposition to it, and to announce to the Porte, if
she thus delivered herself into the hands of Russia,
the hostility of France. He was overruled by his
colleague, the English ambassador at Constantinople,
EXTERNAL POLICY. 51
Lord Ponsonby, as intensely hostile to Russia as
himself, but who mingled more calculation with his
passion.
" I have dissuaded Admiral Roussin from opposmg
the signature of the Russian treaty," said he one day
to M. de Bois-le-Comte ; "it Avould only have pro-
voked a contest which we were not then m a con-
dition to sustam." Such was, in fact, the anger of
the Sultan and his ministers at the mere name of
Mehemet Ali, and so convmced were they that he
was already preparmg to recommence war, that very
probably nothing would have restrained them from
securmg against him the powerful protector who
offered himself. A courageous adviser attempted on
one occasion, in the name of the peace of Constanti-
nople and the dignity of the empire, to disturb the
Sultan's mind as to the designs of the Russians.
" What signifies the empu'e to me?" exclaimed
Mahmoud; " Avhat signifies Constantinople? I would
give both to the man who brought me the head of
Mehemet AH." But when the treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi, thus concluded in a paroxysm of terror,
became public in Europe, the French and English
cabinets paid little attention to the alarms of the
Porte, but inspired it in their turn with new fears, by
testifymg their resentment at its cowardly submission.
They did not confine their protests to the Porte
alone. M. de Lagrene, representative of France at
St. Petersburg in the absence of Marshal Maison,
received orders to transmit a note to Count de
Nesselrode, in which the French government, after
E 2
52 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
premising "that the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi assigned
to the iniitual relations of the Ottoman and Russian
empires a new character against which the powers
of Europe had a right to protest," declared that,
" if the stipulations of that act should subsequently
lead to an armed intervention on the part of Russia
in the internal affairs of Turkey, the French govern-
ment would hold itself entirely free to adopt such
a line of conduct as circumstances might suggest,
acting from that moment as if the treaty in question
had no existence."
The English government held shnilar language at
Constantinople and at St. Petersburg. Neither did
the two cabinets confine themselves to words. They
materially increased their naval forces in the Medi-
terranean. A part of the English squadron appeared
before Smyrna, and even more decisive demonstra-
tions were spoken of. It was asked if the time had
not arrived to force the Dardanelles, to enter the
Black Sea, and to burn that Russian fleet ever ready
to take possession of Constantuiople under pretext ot
protection. The answer of the cabmet of St. Peters-
buro' to the notifications it received from Paris and
London, tended to aggravate still more the anger and
suspicion which these menaces inspired ; for its tone
was as violent as that which it repulsed.
The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, according to M. de
Nesselrode, contained nothing which exceeded the
rights of the contracting parties, "and his Majesty
the Emperor," said he in conclusion, " is determined
to fulfil j)uiictiliously, should occasion require, the
EXTERNAL POLICY. 53
obligations which the treaty of the 8th of July imposes
on him, actmg thus as if the declaration contained in
the note of M. de Lasfrene had no existence."
So much irritation and excitement alarmed the pru-
dent guardians of the peace of Europe. The treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi had greatly displeased the Prince de
Metternich, who felt uneasy, Avitli us, at the Russian
predominance in Constantinople ; but, even more dis-
turbed at the prospect of any serious misunder-
standmg between Austria and Russia, he took care to
conceal his discontent, and his agents were instructed
to blame the explosion of ours. " Why did you carry
your protest to St. Petersburg?" said the Austrian
internuncio. Baron de Stiirmer, to M. de Bois-le-
Comte. " At Constantinople it might have passed;
but at St. Petersburg it assumes the air of a menace,
and you have drawn upon yourselves an answer
which may be injurious to you and embitter mutual
feelings."
When this acrimony led to proceedings which visi-
bly threatened the peace of Europe, the Chancellor of
Austria availed himself of the danger to act upon the
Emperor Nicholas, Avho had not in reality any desire
for war, and to impress upon him the inconvenience
of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, — a demonstration
more brilliant than useful, and which excited more
ano-er ag-ainst Russia than it conferred on her real
strength. M. de Metternich excelled in turning to
account the changes introduced by time into the state
of facts and minds, to insinuate the truths he was
unwilling to declare openly, and to diminish the dan-
E 3
54 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
gers he dared not combat at the critical moment.
The conference of Miinchengraitz furnished hun with
a favourable opportunity for exercising this sedative
influenccc He extracted words from the Emperor
Nicholas which, Avithout abolishing the treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, disavowed its consequences, and con-
tained almost an engagement not to clami its appli-
cation nnder any possible circumstances.
This was, in fact, nothing more than a pacific de-
monstration placed m balance with an ambitious one.
In reality, situations and intentions remained the
same; but none of the powers who thus looked on
each other with jealous eyes had, to say the truth, any
very urgent fears, or strong inclination to push their
menaces to extremity. The Chancellor of Austria
obtamed much credit both in Paris and m London
for the verbal concessions of the Emperor Nicholas
and his own perseverance in extorting them.
The alarm subsided; the armaments diminished,
the vessels returned to their harbours; and with the
opening of the year 1834 nothmg remamed of this
first phase of Eastern affairs except the permanent
hostility of the Porte and Mehemet Ali; the diffi-
cult situation in which France stood pledged towards
them ; the clouds Avhich her declared favour for the
Pacha had already spread between her and England ;
and the increased ill-will which this stru2:<ile had ex-
cited in the soul of the Emperor Nicholas against
lung Louis-Philippe and his government.
At the moment when this question seemed to ter-
mmate, another sprang up, destined to become, if not
EXTERNAL POLICY. bO
for all Europe, at least for us, even more important
than that of the East.
Kmg Ferduiand YII. died at Madrid, and Spam
plunged once more into the career of revolution.
Since Ferdinand VII. had fidly acknowledged King
Louis-Philippe, and no longer tolerated in Spain the
openly hostile plots of the legitimists, we lived with
the Spanish government, if not in intimate, at least
in regular and pacific relations.
The Kmg mspired us with no confidence; the
violent and senseless predominance of the absolute
party disturbed us for Spain herself, agitated by per-
petual conspiracies and severities. We acted in
concert with England to prevent the usurped tyi'anny
of Don Miguel, m Portugal, from establishing and
aggrandizing itself by the support which the court
of Madrid was inclmed to give him ; but we had not
beyond the Pyrenees any serious or pressing French
interest to defend.
We paid very little attention to what was passing
there; our leadmg afiairs turned to other quarters.
One point alone, that of the order of succession to the
crown of Spain, attracted our notice. During the last
120 years it had undergone very different solutions.
The old law of the Spanish monarchy called females
to the throne in default of direct heirs male, and
even down to the reign of Philip Y. the fact and
right had conformed.
In 1714, Philip Y. substituted in place of the
Spanish law, not the Salic law as has been said, but
a family Pragmatic which restricted the succession of
E 4
56 EXTERNAL POLICY.
females to the single contingency that there should
be no heirs male whatever, either direct or collateral ;
and the Cortes adopted the decree of the King.
In 1789, Charles IV. revoked the Pragmatic of
Philip v., restored the ancient Spanish law, and also
obtained the sanction of the Cortes for his measure,
but without publishing it. Known to many people,
but officially concealed, the royal act and the reports
of the Cortes remained in the hands of the King.
The Cortes of Cadiz, in the constitution of 1812,
maintamed, while regulating it with detail, the prin-
ciple of female succession; and on the 3rd of April
1830, Ferdinand YIL, during the first pregnancy of
Queen Christina, his mfe, after having taken the
opinion of the Council of Castille upon the validity of
the decree enacted in 1789 by his father Charles IV.,
ordered it to be suddenly and solemnly proclaimed as
the law of the kingdom. The representatives of the
courts of Naples and France at Madrid made some
efforts to oppose this act ; but when it was declared,
their courts did not reject it in any official or positive
manner. Two forms of protest, couched in letters
intended to be addressed to Ferdinand VII. by the
Kings of France and the Two Sicilies, were drawn up
in Paris in the bureaux of the ministry of Foreign
Affiiirs, when the Revolution of July exploded. The
two protests led to nothing, and after all these public
or secret oscillations, the female succession was
established in 1830 as the ancient and actually exist-
ing law of the Spanish monarchy.
In the month of July 1832, Ferdinand VII. fell
EXTERNAL POLICY. 57
ill. The absolutist and priestly party, powerful
around liiin and in his council, resolved on a great
effort to replace the crown on the head of the Infant
Don Carlos, their chief. Queen Christina took alarm,
and did not then believe herself m a condition to
sustain the struggle for the mterest of her young
daughter, now Queen Isabella 11. There was a mo-
mentary question of a marriage between the Infanta
and the son of Don Carlos, but this idea was soon
abandoned; and in September 1832, Ferdmand YII.,
still seriously ill, revoked the above-named decree of
1789, which he had lately called into vigour, and re-
established the Pragmatic of Philip Y. Exactly as
the latter had passed in 1789 as the decree of Charles
IV., the new royal act remained secret and depo-
sited, it was said, in the Chancery of Mercy and
Justice at Madrid, "with this inscription : "To be
opened in case of the King's death, or when he shall
direct."
But scarcely had the Infant Don Carlos and his party
achieved this victory, when an unexpected court
movement announced their defeat. Ferdinand YII.
appeared to recover health. Queen Christina took
courage : the moderate party and even the ardent
liberals supported her cause ; her sister Donna Luisa
Carlotta, married to the Infant Don Francis de Paule,
a princess of a bold and haughty character, repaired
directly to the King, and denounced in strong terms
the intrigue which had taken advantage of his illness
to extort from him a concession fatal to his wife and
daughter. The King yielded again. The ministers
58 EXTERNAL POLICY.
favourable to Don Carlos, M. Calomarde and the
Count de la Alcudia, were dismissed ; the ambassador
of Spain in England, M. Zea Bermudez, head of the
moderate party at the court, without siding with the
liberals in the nation, was recalled from London to
succeed them. Power changed its course; Queen
Christina was declared Regent while the King's illness
lasted; measures of political clemency and adminis-
trative reform were adopted, and at the end of
September 1832, Ferdinand VII. resumed the govern-
ment, and publicly revoked, as having been surprised
from hun durmg his indisposition, his reversal of the
decree by which, in 1830, he had declared and placed
in vigour the Pragmatic of 1789. On the 4th of April
1833, the Cortes were convoked to swear fidelity to
the Infanta Isabella. They assembled, in fact, on the
20th of June follo'vvuig, took the oath, — and the right
of female succession in default of heirs male direct
became once more, as it had been pre^dous to the reign
of Philip Y., the law of the Spanish monarchy.
In presence of these legislative and ministerial
vicissitudes m Spain, we maintained an attitude of
extreme reserve. We were anxious to avoid ofFendmg
the rights and pride of the Spaniards by interposing
in their internal afikirs; we desired not to impede
the recovering fortmie of the moderate party at
Madrid, nor to remain indiftercnt to the mterest
which rendered the demi-salic law of Philip V. moi:e
desirable for us than a system of succession which
miglit give the throne of Spain to a prince, as husband
of the Queen, unknown and perhaps hostile to the
EXTERNAL POLICY. 59
reioiiino: house in France. It is the custom of violent
governments to surrender themselves exclusively to
certain special state questions, without calculating the
different interests by which the position is complicated.
But nations, sooner or later, pay dearly for the neglects
of this imperfect policy, and rational legislation is
bound to think of everything. Six weeks after the for-
mation of the cabinet of the 22nd of November 1832,
the Duke de Broglie, when giving instructions to the
Count de Eayneval, our ambassador at Madrid, dwelt
particularly on the various combinations which the
existing order of succession in Spain might entail.
The court of Naples had renewed the suggestion of
a marriage between the eldest son of Don Carlos and
the Infanta Isabella. If it appeared that this idea
had any chance of adoption, and if the fact should
place this young prince on the Spanish throne, as
kmg in title and of his own right, M. de Rayneval
was. ordered to support liim strenuously. If, however,
the son of Don Carlos was only to reign as husband
of the Infanta Isabella, the French ambassador was
instructed neither to oppose this step nor to sanction
it by express approbation ; and even if in the terms
of the transaction the question should still remain
undecided, he was to exert himself to incline the
balance to the side of the male succession. At the
same time, on account of the inquietude occasioned
by the illness of Ferdinand YII., we increased the
number of our troops on the frontier of the Pyrenees.
But when M. Zea Bermudez, on his way through
Paris to assume office in Spain, expressed some soli-
60 EXTERNAL POLICY.
citucle as to these military movements and our diplo-
matic interference at Madrid, the Duke de Broo;lie
hastened to dispel his doubts, and to impress on him
full confidence in our respect for the independence of
Spain, and in our assurances of amicable support.
Meanwhile Ferdinand VII. again fell dangerously
ill, and, from the commencement of September 1833,
the despatches of M. de Rayneval annomiced his
death as imminent. He died, in fact, on the 29th
of September, and the event found us perfectly de-
cided on the conduct to be pursued under the ques-
tion that arose. I have already said that, in prmciple,
we should have preferred in Spain the mamtenance
of the male succession ; and while the matter was still
in doubt, M. de Rayneval was instructed to act
accordingly. In 1830, before the Revolution of July,
and at the moment when it became known in Paris
that Ferdinand VII. had revoked the Pragmatic of
Philip v., the Duke of Orleans loudly expressed, his
disapproval. He even endeavoured to persuade
Charles X. and the King of Naples to protest against
an act which compromised the future of the house of
Bourbon ; and King Louis- Philippe still entertamed
in 1833 the opinion he had so decidedly formed, as
Duke of Orleans, in 1830. The French government,
therefore, at the latter epoch, had no anterior or sys-
tematic predilection in favour of the young Queen
Isabella, but, under every title, her claim appeared to
us to be e^^dent. Charles IV. in 1789, and Fer-
dinand VI Lin 1830 and 1833, undoubtedly possessed
the same right of restoring the ancient Spanish law
EXTERNAL POLICY. 61
of regal succession which Philip V., iii 1714, had
exercised for its abolition. Their decree had been
equally sanctioned by the Cortes. After all these
fluctuations the female title prevailed. Queen Isa-
bella held the government at once de facto and de
jure. All our information led us to suppose that the
national feeling of Spain was favoural^le to her, and
that if we were to choose between the contending
claimants, she had on her side, in the nation the liberal
party, and at court the moderate section, or rather
those men who had lately and energetically defended
the mdependence of Spain, and who now aspired to
establish it by showing themselves disposed to adopt
institutions analogous to our own. We could not,
therefore, refuse to acknowledge Queen Isabella with-
out renouncing at once right and fact, without wound-
ing the mdependent sentmients of the Spanish people,
and without compromising the future prosj^ects of
Spain, and the present friendly understanding between
the two States. There was, therefore, not even a
momentary hesitation in the French council, either
on the part of the King or of his advisers. Before
we received positive intelligence of the death of Fer-
dinand YIL, the Duke de Broglie had already pre-
pared mstructions to regulate the attitude of M. de
Kayneval at Madrid, as follows : " On the decease of
King Ferdinand, you will be at first in the position
of an agent whose official character is suspended
until he receives new letters of credit from his court ;
but you will, nevertheless, immediately ofl'er to the
Queen aU the support she can desire from us. You
C2 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
will make kno^vii to her, as also to her ministers, our
most explicit disposition to accord her that support
in the manner and degree which they may consider
most advantageous for the interests of the new go-
vernment. Moreover you -will not hesitate to declare
yourself eveiy where in the same stram ; and if, as we
have reason to believe, the cabinet of London ad-
dresses analogous instructions to ]\Ir. Yilliers, you
will act in concert with that minister so that the
perfect identity of your mutual attitude may become
generally known, and impress the public mmd." As
soon as the death of Ferdmand YII. was announced
in Paris by telegraph on the 3rd of October, these
instructions were forwarded to Madrid ; and, to invest
them with additional authority, M. Mignet, at that
time keeper of the archives in the department of
Foreign AiFairs, was charged with their delivery, and
instructed to comment verbally on them, both with the
French ambassador and the Spanish government.
While traversing the Basque Provinces, he found
the insurrection in favour of Don Carlos already
commenced. From the month of March preceding,
when Ferdinand YII. renewed the abolition of
the Pragmatic of Philip Y., the Infant, after pro-
testing against the royal act, had been compelled to
quit Spain and to retire to Portugal, where he pro-
mised himself not only an asylum, but an ally. Civil
war was flagrant in that country. Don Miguel, with
the aid of the absolute party, maintained against his
niece. Donna IMaiia, whom he had detlironed, i)re-
tensions much more divested of specious foundations
EXTERNAL POLICY. C3
and legitimate sentiments than those of the Spanish
prince. The elder brother of Don Miguel, the Emperor
Don Pedro, after abdicating the crown of Brazil in
favour of his son, came over to Europe to claim,
under the title of regent, the rights of his daughter.
The struggle, prolonged for eighteen months under
varying phases, inclined at last in favour of the
young Queen. Six days before the death of Ferdi-
nand VIL, Donna Maria, having left France, where she
had been received mth friendly hospitality, disem-
barked at Lisbon ; and on the 10th of October, the
day of M. Mignet's arrival at Madrid, Don Pedro
compelled Don Miguel to raise the siege of the Por-
tuguese capital, and reduced his power in that king-
dom to a wandermg and expmng effort. But three
days earher, on the 7th of October, Don Carlos was
proclauned King of Spain at Vittoria ; a band of. his
partisans, commanded by the Biscayan Yerastegui,
arrested M. Mignet at that place, detained him for
several hours, and only allowed him to continue his
journey towards Madrid through fear of France. A
civil war, destined to be prolonged and bitter, thus
sprang up in Spain at the moment of the final defeat
of the usurpmg tyrant in Portugal, whose aid the
Spanish pretender was on his way to solicit.^
In takmg an immediate share in this contest, we
were not at first determuied by a sunple comparison
of the different royal titles of the parties engaged;
considerations of another order strongly mfluenced
our resolution. It affords a noble spectacle to see a
^ See Historic Documents, No. II.
64 EXTERNAL POLICY.
people struggling to raise themselves from a long
decline, and to resume an actiye and glorious position
in the civilized world. SjDain presented this object
to Europe, not by a sudden emotion of fancy and
national ambition, but by undergoing the severest
trials, and by disj)laying under them those heroic
qualities which authorize lofty hopes and justify diffi-
cult designs. The Spanish people had defended their
independence and the throne of their sovereign with
indomitable devotion against the conqueror of the
kings and nations of the contment. Durmg this
long and sanguinary struggle, the desire of political
regeneration had sprung up amongst them. It was a
necessity of their position as well as an impulse of
their souls. In the absence of their captive King and
of all regular power, they were compelled to govern
themselves. The exercise of political liberty became,
vnth. them, the condition of existence. In their at-
tempt to found a free government in the very
bosom of war, they formed a strange amalgam of
modern ideas and the old traditions of their country ;
ultra-radical theories mingled themselves confusedly
in the conduct of the Cortes of Cadiz, and in the
constitution they decreed in 1812, with the maxims of
the Catholic faith, and with provincial and municipal
habits ; — so that monarchical instincts acquired imper-
ceptibly, from this alliance, revolutionary princiijles.
A regular and liberal system could not emanate di-
rectly from such a chaos, and when, in 1814, Fer-
dinand \ll. reascended the throne, he had a fine
opportunity of following successfully the? exanq^le of
EXTERNAL POLICY. 65
Louis XVIIL, and of reforming without weakening
the Spanish monarchy. But instead of supplying a
remedy to the new disease of his nation, Ferdmand
restored the old complamt. Spain fell back under the
thoughtless, incapable, and narrow-minded despotism
which for more than a century had ensured her de-
cline; and on the King's death, when his daughter
Isabella and his brother Don Carlos disputed the
crown, the question included in their rivalry was that
of determining whether Spain should continue plunged
in her ordinary sterile ti'ack, or recommence, with
more experience and under better conditions, her
political regeneration. Between the contmued decay
and laborious resuscitation of this noble people,
our neighbour and natural ally, neither moral judg-
ment nor political foresight permitted us to hesitate ;
it was not alone, therefore, on account of the right of
the young Queen, but from sympathy with the cause
and future of Spam herself, that we hastened to pro-
mise our support.
What would the government of Queen Isabella do
to organize and strengthen itself, while satisfymg
the wishes of its partisans ? What quality and mea-
sure of support should we be called upon to lend it?
From the commencement we saw ourselves engaged
with these two questions, and both failed not to im-
press us with anxious solicitude.
Few men have inspired me with more esteem than
M. Zea Bermudez, placed, at that time, at the head
of the Spanish government. He was a Spaniard of
the old type, full of honour, loyalty, and integrity;
VOL. IV. F
66 EXTERNAL POLICY.
an equally disinterested and faithful servant of the
crown and of his country, serious, persevering, cou-
rageous, firm m his conscience, modest in his pride,
and simple in his virtue. He had ever shown him-
self moderate in the exercise of power, and had in-
variably opposed the vindictive and fanatical violence
of the party which ranged under the standard of Don
Carlos. His devotion to the cause of Queen Isabella
and of the Queen Regent confirmed him still more
in his moderation ; but, an anti-revolutionist with
more honesty than discernment, he desired the abso-
lute maintenance of the old Spanish royalty, rejected
every great political innovation, and confined his
promises of progress to admmistrative refonus. Soon
after the 3rd of December 1832, when Ferdmand VII.
recalled him from London, to confide to him the
direction of Foreign Affixirs at Madrid, M. Zea Ber-
mudez, in a circular to the Spanish diplomatic agents,
made a striking profession of the policy which re-
ceived thenceforward a name, adopted -willingly by
himself, — the name of enlightened despotism (illus-
trado). After the death of Ferdinand, on the 4th of
October 1833, he renewed his declaration, with in-
creased solemnity, in the Manifesto published under
his dictation by the Queen Regent.
In any hypothesis, he was wrong thus to pledge, not
only himself, but the future of the Queen Regent and
of the crown. Nothing at that time in the state
of Spain compelled him to announce a systematic
and permanent resolution; but his mind was more
obstinate than expansive, and he readily adopted the
EXTERNiU:. POLICY. 67
limit of his O'wn ideas for that of the wants and des-
tinies of his country. " It appears to me," M. de
Rayneval wrote, on the 7th of October 1833, " that
M. Zea will find it very difficult to maintain a long
resistance against the universal clamour. He has, if
I mistake not, committed one of those faults for which
there is no remedy. He could not surely abandon
the course he has hitherto followed ; but he ought not
to remove all hope from the men to whose counsels
the Queen listened durmg the first periods of the
King's illness, nor, above all, should he induce the
Queen to utter words seeming to rej)roach those
counsels which at the time she appeared to approve.
I believe that, m publishing his manifesto,
M. Zea's principal object has been the efi'ect it would
produce externally. He hopes that if in the Courts
of Germany and the North any difficulties should
arise to the recognition of Queen Isabella, this lan-
guage, and the opinion held of his firmness, will
suffice to remove them."
The impression produced in Paris by the Spanish
manifesto accorded with that of M. Rayneval at
Madrid. It harmonized little with our own policy,
and, as regarded Queen Isabella and her minister,
appeared to us an act of useless imprudence. The
Duke de Broglie communicated this to M. de Rayneval,
and through him to the Spanish government. " If it
be true," he wrote on the 12th of October 1833, "that'
M. Zea especially proposes to conciliate the Northern
powers, this combination convinces me that he has no
correct idea of the actual state of Europe. The first
F 2
68 EXTERNAL POLICY.
external interest of the new government of Spain is
to strengthen itself by France and England. We
understand, undoubtedly, that it attaches some value
to its recognition by the other courts ; but were they
even less desirous than they are to maintain the general
peace, they would not venture to take any step in
opposition to the cabinets of Paris and London as
regards the Peninsula. M. Zea has therefore mis-
calculated lamentably in exposing himself to oiFend
these two cabinets, whose moderation cannot be sus-
pected, by seeking support from the policy of others,
who, however disposed they may be to adopt the prin-
ciples of this minister, can only serve him by mo\T.ng
in strict accordance with France and Great Britain."
We thus evinced a friendly solicitude for the Spanish
government, whose disposition as to the support Ave
offered made us speedily foresee a serious embarrass-
ment to ourselves. I have already quoted the words
of the Duke de Broglie when communicating this offer
to the Count de Rayneval : " You A\all immediately
make known," said he, "to the Queen and to her
ministers, our formal resolution to afford her our
support, in the manner and degree which they may
consider most advantageous to the interests of the new
government." The Duke's object was to humour the
susceptibilities and to dissipate the lowering jealousy of
the Spaniards as to any foreign intervention, — a
jealousy which M. Zea, while passing through Paris
on his return to Madrid, had clearly intimated to him.
Also, when, on the 6th of October 1833, we adopted the
resolution of increasing our army by 35,000 men, and
EXTERNAL POLICY. 69
of adding to our forces on the frontier of the Pyrenees,
the Duke de Brogiie hastened to remove from this
measure all appearance of premeditated, or even of
precautionary interference in the affairs of Spain.
" We have no intention," he wrote to M. de Kayneval
on the 7th of October, " of organizing an army, pro-
perly so called, in the neighbourhood of Spain; our
object is simply to reinforce the garrisons of the south.
In this sense you must particularly explain yourself
with M. Zea. . . . We desire to think that in the mea-
sure under discussion the cabinet of Madrid will see
much more readily a motive of security than a subject
of alarm. While instructing you to declare that the
King was ready to afford his support to the govern-
ment of the young Queen, in the manner and degree
that might be judged useful and appropriate, we have,
M. le Comte, entirely laid aside all the suspicions and
fears which, under other circumstances, mio-ht be
engendered by reading the determination published
this day in the ' Moniteur.' "
But when our offers of support and M. Mignet
reached Madrid, the disposition of the Spanish govern-
ment was materially changed. The Carlist move-
ments had commenced ; the approaching entry of
Don Carlos into Spain was announced ; inquietude
rapidly possessed the partisans and ministers of the
Queen; their jealousy of all prospective intervention
on our part disappeared; and no sooner had M. Zea
received the communication of M. de Kayneval, than,
far from evincing the slightest dissatisfaction or
jealousy, he hastened to publish it officially, and in
r 3
70 EXTEKNAL POLICY.
terms which materially enlarged its bearing. " The
King of the French," said the " Madrid Gazette " of
the 12th of October, "offers to the Queen Regent, for
the maintenance of her authority and the throne of
Queen Isabella, all the support which, under any cir-
cumstances, she may consider it desirable to require."
On reading this article and the despatches acquaint-
ing him vnih the sense entertained at Madrid, and
which, "svith somewhat more of reserve, M. de
llayneval himself seemed to entertain of his first
instructions, the Duke de Broglie became seriously
uneasy. The King's ministry had never intended to
place itself thus at the absolute disposition of the
Spanish government, and to pledge itself to their
support " under any circumstances whatever, and
at their simple demand." In his correspondence mth
our ambassador at Madrid, and in his interviews with
the Count de Colombi, the Sj^tanish charge d'affaires
at Paris, and brother of M. Zea, the Duke hastened
to correct the error, and to restore to his instructions
their just interpretation. " The prior conduct of M.
Z^a," he wi'ote on the 20th of October to M. de
Rayneval, " has not prepared us for what seems to be
such a prompt and striking de^dation from his OAvn
principles We have no desire whatever to
interfere, by armed force, in the affairs of Spain;
such a proceeding would be for us, on the contraiy,
an extremity much to be dej)lored. Neither do we
pretend to support the existing government of Spain
under every step it may take, or every incident that
may occur, in every line of conduct it may adopt, and
EXTERNAL POLICY.
71
in every position in which events may place it. Our
msh was to recognise this government openly, to
give it strength arid courage by declaring that it might
depend on our friendship, and by showing ourselves
disposed to listen favourably to its demands if reduced
to prefer them; but without dispossessing ourselves
of the inherent right of every government to form its
own judgment on the opportunity, the nature, and the
extent of support accorded." The Duke de Broglie
had good reason for expressly reserving this right,
for M. Zea, before being apprized of it, and building
on his own version of the first instnictions, addressed
to the French government, on the 21st of October,
the extravagant demand that French troops should
unmediately post themselves on the frontiers, and
that the general commanding them should be placed
under the orders of the French ambassador in Spain,
their entry to depend entirely on ad\dces from Madrid.
The King's government consented to approach troops
to the frontier, but formally refused to remit thus
the right of. declaring war into the hands of their
ambassador.
Struck with the necessity of allowing no doubt to
remain, either on the minds of our own agents or of
the Spaniards themselves, as to the intentions of the
King's government, and admitting with noble frank-
ness whatever his first words might have contained of
excess or obscurity, the Duke de Broglie wrote thus
to M. de Rayneval, on the 13th of November 1833:
— " Your despatch No. 103 has particularly arrested
my attention. Equally with M. Zea you have con-
F 4
72 EXTEENAL POLICY.
eluded, from tlie explanations given by me to M. de
Colonibi, that tlic idea of the King's government had
changed since the day when I authonzed you to offer
our support to the Regent. Nothing of the kind
has taken place. When, informed of the death of Fer-
dinand VII., it became necessary for us to deliberate
on the attitude to be assumed and the course to be
followed, it was decided at once that we should mani-
fest our interest for the cause of the young Queen
Isabella by something more than a simple recognition.
" DesiiTug, moreover, that our readiness to declare
in favour of this cause should not be interpreted at
Madrid as implicating any project of controlling the
government of the Regent, or of inducing it to adopt
measures repugnant to its own views, we have deter-
mined not to act, in any case, without the express
demand of that government, and to undertake no-
thing definitively, except in the manner and degree
it may judge desirable. But, at the same time, we
have positively established that it is our intention to
hold ourselves free to examine, discuss, comply mth,
or refuse whatever may be required of us on the part
of Spain; and it is with this object that your instruc-
tions specify nothing distinctly Avith regard to the
nature of the support you are authorized to offer to
her Catholic Majesty. Such, Count, have been, from
the first moment, the system and intentions of the
King's government. I thought I had sufficiently
explained them in my despatch of the 4th of October ;
I was far from anticipating that it would from thence
be concluded at Madrid that we placed ourselves,
EXTERNAL POLICY. 73
under all contingencies, purely and simply at the
disposal of the Spanish cabinet. There has been a
mistake on my part, and I feel called upon to admit
that my despatch was very incomplete, as you have
yourself adopted a similar interpretation ^Yith that of
M. Zea. Be that as it may, as soon as this interpre-
tation became known to me by the letter which M. de
Colombi received from his brother, I have felt bound
to exjDlain myself with him, and to re-establish our rela-
tive positions such as we had understood and arranged
them. It would have been dangerous for Spain, and
painful to us, not to have acknowledged and rectified
this misunderstanding until the day when the cabinet
of Madrid might have addressed to us one of those
demands the necessary rejection of which would
have led to a most serious compromise. I have there-
fore, in my explanations with M. de Colombi, been
careful not to retract the promise of the King's
government ; I have only repeated it in its true sig-
nificance, and divested it of a commentary it by no
means admitted. Finally, I have corrected the mis-
take as soon as it came to my knowledge."
The Duke de Broglie did not stop here. In his
interviews with M.de Colombi he entered fully on the
question of the armed intervention of France, and
laid before him the leading reasons which ought to
deter Spain from such a resource. " The three
Northern powers," he said, " may delay recognizing
the new government of Sjoain, but they will avoid
declaring against it, and mil remain neutral as long
as they see it trust chiefly to itself for establishment.
74 EXTERNAL POLICY.
You may be assured it would be quite othenvise as
soon as they ascertained that a French army had en-
tered the Spanish territory. Besides, you cannot
conceal from yourselves that this very intervention,
which, regarded as a probable eventuality, already
excites so much attention in London, would give rise
to parliamentary embarrassments in the British cabi-
net, the reaction of which would inevitably be felt in
Spain to the detriment of the Queen's cause. In
line, as long as her government proceeds and acts on
its OAvn strength, it remains free to consult only the
exigencies of its position as they may present them-
selves; while we, on our part, preserve the entire
liberty of not mixing ourselves up with what are ex-
clusively the internal affairs of Spain. But you are
sufficiently acquainted with the laws and necessities
of the system under which we live, to comprehend
that, if you solicit the aid of our arms, public 02:)inion
in France would then impose on us certain obligations
which would become, in fact, so many conditions at-
tached to the despatch of that succour."
M. de Colombi and M. Zea suffered themselves, or
at least assumed the air of suffering themselves, to be
persuaded ; but we here encountered the first symp-
toms of the position preparing for us in our relations
with Spain. In the midst of this people, so haughty
and persevering in their passions, the different poli-
tical parties had no strongly established confidence in
themselves, and evinced a singular promptness in
callinoj for foreifi:n assistance. The remembrance of
the French expedition in 1823, and of its rapid
EXTERNAL POLICY. 75
success for the delivery of Ferdinand YIL, was
present to all minds; and, after 1833, the constitu-
tional Spaniards yielded at once to the temptation of
being quickly and easily saved by France, as the ab-
solutists had been ten years before. For parties as
well as for governments, it is the last trial of msdom
and courage to restrain the influence of the impres-
sions of the moment, and, in their conduct, to know
how to assign to considerations of the future the full
place they are entitled to hold.
To assist M. Zea, whose character we held in
honour, we did all that could be done without pro-
mising direct intervention, and without pledging our-
selves to the consequences of his policy. We offered
him facilities for restoring the finances of Spain by con-
tracting a foreign loan ; we gave orders that on the re-
quest of General Llassder, Captain-General of Catalonia,
6000 muskets should be delivered to him, and that
the fortress of St. Sebastian, threatened by the insur-
gent Carlists, should be provisioned. M. de Ray-
neval used all his efforts to brins: the liberals and M.
Zea together, and to win over their support for him.
But the honest servant of Ferdinand VII. attempted
an impossibility in endeavouring to satisfy a party
who in the accession of Queen Isabella saw their vic-
tory, without accepting either the principles or leaders.
Opposition sprang up on all sides; the captains-
general appointed by M. Zea set the example of
disobedience, and almost of menace. We were so
strongly impressed by the state of parties in Spain,
that the Duke de Broglie felt it necessary to write in
76 EXTERNAL POLICY.
detail on this point to M. de Rayneval, to call upon him
to point out the impending dangers to M. Zea, and to
ask him how he proposed to dissipate them.^ By the
time this despatch reached Madrid, the Queen Regent,
notwithstanding the esteem and confidence she enter-
tained for M. Zea, had ceased to support him. On
the 16th of January 1834, the leader of the mode-
rates of the court vacated office, and the chief of the
moderates of the liberal opposition, M. Martinez de
la Rosa, was called to replace him.
When I first became acquainted with M. Martinez
de la Rosa, he was far indeed removed from power,
and probably never expected to exercise it in his own
country. After five years of detention, at first in a
dungeon, and subsequently in the Presidios (fortress)
of Ceuta, from no other cause than having been a mem-
ber of the Cortes from 1812 to 1814, and also in 1820,
he had in 1823 exchanged captivity for exile, and
lived as a refugee in Paris, seeking and finding in
letters a consolation for the weight of inactivity at a
distance from his native land. He called on me one
day, to speak of an historical drama, Aben Humaya,
or the Revolt of the Moors under Philip 11.^ which he
was on the point of bringing out at one of our thea-
tres. He explained to me the plot, and read several
scenes which inspired me with much interest; but
while listening to the work, I was singularly arrested
by the author. His physiognomy, at the same time
grave, animated, and somewhat melancholy, the noble
1 See Historic Documents, No. III.
EXTERNAL TOLICY. 77
simplicity of his manners, the learned elegance of his
language, the candid elevation of his sentunents, his
perseverance, calm and without gall, in his j^olitical
opinions, the evident fruit of conviction rather than
of passion or pride, — his entire j)erson and conversa-
tion impressed me with a lofty idea of his moral cha-
racter and general acquirements. I little foresaw
that this generous and eloquent spirit would one day
be summoned to govern his country; but I felt con-
vinced that he would never fail to reflect honour
on it.
His advent to power was extremely popular. It
was the first return of the liberal party, and the
first step towards a constitutional system. A rapid
accord took place between the new cabinet and the
council of regency established by the "will of Ferdi-
nand VII. near the Queen-mother. The Marquis
de las Amarillas, president of this council, an en-
lightened and influential person, had contributed
much to the formation of the ministry, and prided
himself on having done so. Useful and approved
measures signalized its accession, and attested its
sound direction. The news from the Basque pro-
vinces assumed a better aspect. The public, for the
moment, felt satisfied, and hope appeared to dawn for
the future.
But the hopes of parties are imperative and im-
patient. The liberals expected from the cabinet the
immediate convocation of the Cortes, and the re-
establishment of the constitutional system. M.
Martinez de la Rosa also proposed this object to him-
78 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
self, but to reach it, and before gaining it, there were
many difficult questions to solve. What should be
the power and form of the Cortes? what the mode of
their election, the rules of their relations with the
Queen's goverimient and the old municipal institu-
tions of the country ? How, at this pinnacle of the
state, could a division and accordance be made between
national traditions and modern ideas? It could
neither be the mere nominal Cortes of the last
centuiy nor the sovereign Cortes of 1810 which it
was sought to restore : a new and complex political
order was to be formed. M. Martinez de la Rosa
reflected, deliberated, hesitated, and delayed. He was
much more a man of principle and meditation than
of action. A crowd of difficulties and exio-encies rose
up in his mind to which the public gave no heed.
It is the disposition of serious and devoted scholars
to live in their o^svn thoughts rather than in an in-
stinctive and habitual s^nnpathy with the ideas and
impressions of the public. They require to satisfy
themselves as much, and perhaps more than the spec-
tators who watch and wait on them. M. Martinez
de la Rosa Avas not alone under the empire of this
bias. It reigned also in the Council of Regency, his
associated and compelled support. " We must prepare
for the assembly of the Cortes," said the Marquis de
las Amarillas to M. de Rayneval, " but there is no
occasion to hurry the convocation of that body ; when
done, it must be according to the old forms, and with-
out altering too much the existing constitution : pru-
dence requires that we should be cautious in scaring
EXTERNAL POLICY. 79
the people of Spain by words to wliicli their ears
are not accustomed ; as far as possible, we must use
while rejuvenating our old institutions. England has
followed this course, and has become as free, en-
lightened, and flourishing a country as any in the
world, without having to this day a written consti-
tution." M. de RajTieval disputed not the importance
of this circumspection ; but, as an impartial and
free observer, he, and we also in Paris, felt extremely
anxious as to the dangers wliich the Spanish cabinet
might mcur from indecision and delay on the leading
point of its mission. " The sentiments which M. Mar-
tinez de la Rosa and M. de las Amarillas have mani-
fested to you," the Duke de Broglie wi'ote, on the 25th
of January 1834, to the ambassador, " cannot fail to
augment the esteem with which they have inspired us,
and the confidence we were disposed to place in their
wisdom. Nevertheless I shall not conceal from you
that, in the plan of conduct they appear to have traced
out, one point has surprised us. The idea we had
formed of the new ministry was, that we could only
see it in one of the elements of a system which ought
to be completed by the immediate convocation of the
Cortes. We are far from pretending that if the ques-
tion could be laid down in an abstract form, if it
could be isolated fi-om the general condition of minds,
there might not be a real advantage in gradually pre-
paring and ripening a determination so important in
its consequences for the future of Spain. But, at the
point which things have now reached, would not this
advantage be more than balanced by the incon-
80 EXTERNiVL TOLICY.
venicnces inseparable from a system of temporizing?
Is there not an actual danger in leaving
the different parties time to enter upon delicate dis-
cussions on the nature and form of the Cortes to be
convoked ? Are there no grounds for fearing that, by
the effect of these discussions, the government may
lose something of the absolute liberty which still
belon2:s to it as to the mode of convocation and
organization of the Cortes ; or, at least, that the resolu-
tion it may take at a later period on this important
point, — and which adopted now, whatever it might
be, would be hailed with enthusiasm and gratitude,
— may fail to obtain such unanimous approbation
when specious theories, adroitly put forward, shall
have seduced and led away inexperienced minds?
Ought it not to be expected that the regency, by the
anxiety it will evince to satisfy all reasonable desires
of public opinion, will surround itself with a popularity
which may hereafter give it the necessary strength to
resist the exaggerated pretensions of parties ? It is
in this view, Count, that you will regulate your inter-
course with M. Martinez de la Rosa and the other
members of the ministry and of the Council of
Regency."
Facts were not slow in justifying the apprehen-
sions of the Duke de Broglie, and in demonstrating
the necessity of prompt determinations and settled
cjuestions. The hopes conceived on the accession of
the ncAV cabinet soon transformed themselves into
exigencies, and exigencies into errors. Financial
discontent added itself to political misunderstanding.
EXTERNAL POLICY. 81
To restore the dilapidated and disordered revenues
of Spain, a loan was indispensable ; to accomplish a
loan, credit had to be re-established ; to obtain credit,
Spain was called upon to show that she was willing
and able to discharge her debts. The fate of the
old loans, contracted since 1814, whether royal or
revolutionary, were to be determined with equity and
without delay. We urged Spain to clear off these
questions of natural order, as well as others of
political organization ; we suggested plans and
offered aid. But on this point, as on the convocation
of the Cortes, the Spanish government demurred and
protracted, and the hesitation of the government
excited a ferment in the country. "You have fore-
seen the discredit which the new ministry has already
brought on itself," M. de Eayneval wrote to the
Duke de Brogiie, on the 1st of March 1834; "dis-
content increases every day, and appears even stronger
in the provinces than in Madrid. The most vexa-
tious symptom, in my opinion, is that M. Martinez
de la Eosa does not seem to be aware of the state of
public opinion. He sees everything on the fair side ;
a dangerous tendency in a statesman. I know posi-
tively that within the last few days he received a
very alarming report from General Dander on the
state of Catalonia. The Superintendent- General of
Police has laid before him a highly discouraging
picture of the condition of the provinces in general.
He persists in saying, and, what is worse, in believing,
that all goes on for the best. At the same time he
defers from one day to another the work relative to
VOL. IV. G
82 EXTERNAL TOLICY.
the convocation of the Cortes which he has under-
taken, and to which, he says, he wishes to put the
last hand before submitting it to the Council of
Regency. Such a state of things cannot evidently
continue ; the slightest untoward event may not
only overthrow the ministry, but plunge all Spain
into irremediable anarchy. A prompt remodelUng
of the cabinet seems to me indispensable. I say
remodelling^ and not a total change^ because I
think it important, although his popularity is no
longer intact, to retain M. ]\Iartinez de la Rosa, an
honest man of recognized integrity, and who may be
extremely useful to the government on the assembly
of the Cortes, from his ability as an orator, which, in
fact, is his brilliant side." M. de Rayneval then
named as the auxiliary indicated by general opinion
to reinforce and animate the ministry, the Count of
Toreno, a man of action, it Avas said, an able
financier, influential amongst the moderate liberals,
better suited than M. Martinez de la Rosa to treat
witli the extreme section of that party without
surrendering liimself up to them, and who, although
he had refused at first, seemed now disposed to join
the cabinet, to promote the adoption of those measures
of which he felt the urgent necessity.
A few days after the arrival of this information
from M. de Rayneval, the King's government, more
and more impressed by the afi"airs of Spain, and the
perils of the existing authority in that country,
decided on instructing our ambassador to communi-
cate without reserve to the Queen Regent herself the
EXTERNAL POLICY. 83
solicitude "we were under, and to induce her to delay-
no longer the convocation of the Cortes, the natural
consequence of the accession, and the necessary-
support of the power of the Queen her daughter.
By- two despatches of the 18th and 19th of March,
the Duke de Broglie communicated these instructions
to M. de Rayneval, in terms equally clear and kind.
There was no allusion to any particular name or
ministerial combination. M. de Rayneval was even
directed to apprize M. Martinez de la Rosa of the
step which the King prescribed to his ambassador.^
It occurred most opportunely, for the despatches
arrived at Madrid at the moment when M. Martinez
de la Rosa had just finished his work on the con-
stitutional system of Spain, and was preparing to lay
it before the Queen Regent. He presented it, in fact,
in the form of a report, dated the 4th of April, and
signed by all the ministers. As a sequel to this
report came the Royal Statute which regulated the
organization, functions, and privileges of the general
Cortes of the kingdom. Adopted and signed by the
Queen Regent on the 10th of April, the Royal Statute
was proclaimed on the 15th at Madrid; and on the
20th of May following a royal decree regulated pro-
visionally the mode of election of the chamber called
des Procuradores^ by confining the electoral ope-
rations to the 20th of June, and naming the 26th of
July for the solemn opening of the Cortes themselves.
If peoples who desire to be free would hold them-
1 See Historic Documents, No. IV.
G 2
84 EXTERNAL POLICY.
selves bound to be rational, the Spaniards might have
acknowledged that their impatience as to the tardiness
of M. Martinez de la Rosa was unreasonable, and the
merit of his work might have made them forget that
it had held them some little time in expectation.
The cabinet had not yet been formed for three months,
and he had on his hands to prepare and regulate a new
government in the midst of a civil war. The Royal
Statute manifested a rare intelligence of the conditions
of reviving liberty in the bosom of an old social system.
M. Martinez de la Rosa had not surrendered himself
to the presumptuous and chimerical mania of creation ;
he did not pretend to organize anew the entire state ;
he took the actual position of society and the Spanish
monarchy as pre-existing and incontestable facts, which
he was called upon to reform and complete according
to the necessities and lights of our own days, but, by
respecting and strengthening rather than by destroy-
ing, to reconstruct them. The Royal Statute was
neither'an abstract declaration of principles and rights,
nor a general and systematized constitution. It was the
strong resurrection of the Cortes of the kingdom, cal-
culated not only to control power, but to exercise over
the entire course of government an effective influence,
and to bring in gradually all the reforms of which
public desire, controlled as it was by free discussion
and the features of the times, might impress the neces-
sity. The decree contained neither the dogma nor
the language of the sovereignty of the people ; it was
the intervention of the country in its own government,
tempered by patriotic and loyal sincerity, equally
EXTERNAL POLICY.
85
divested of timid precautions and arrogant pretences ;
and the report addressed to the Queen Regent, which
preceded the statute, was a serious and graceful, though
a somewhat prohx, exposition of the essential conditions
of the representative system, such as they appear in
the present age to soundly thinking minds, according
to the arguments of science and the experience of
policy.
At the moment of its publication this act was re-
ceived in Spain with general approbation. The con-
stitutional royalists were really gratified. Their satis-
faction, and the general accordance of the public,
imposed silence, and even the appearance of content,
on the more ardent liberals. The journals, numerous,
and free in their opinions, were almost unanimous in
eulogium. M. Martinez de la Rosa enjoyed at that
crisis, both as a politician and an author, one of those
pure and personal gratifications which replace the
anxieties and fatigues of a difficult labour by the
conviction of a great work accomplished, and worthy
of durability. But constitutional labours in our days
experience the lot which, according to Tacitus, attended
the loves of the Romans, — their success is short and
of evil augury. The Royal Statute of M. Martinez de
la Rosa had a rival in Spain, which might keep si-
lence for a time, but waited only the propitious mo-
ment for declaring war. This was the constitution
decreed at Cadiz in 1812 by the Cortes of the struggle
for national independence, and restored at Madrid in
1820 by the Cortes of the revolution, — a work in-
spired by ideas and passions essentially opposed to
G 3
86 EXTERNAL POLICY.
those wliicli had dictated the Royal Statute. The
thorough reconstruction of the political edifice; the
absolute sovereignty of the people, — which means of
numbers; the unity of the representative assembly;
universal suffrage mthout conditions; the complete
separation of the legislative and executive power ; the
interdiction to the members of the sitting Cortes of
being excluded from the Cortes immediately follomng :
— all these radical and revolutionary theories were
proclaimed and drawn up as laws in the constitution
of 1812, with more vigour than they had been in
France, in 1791, by the National Convention itself.
It was the Rej^ublic, " one and indivisible," reducing
the old royalty under its yoke, and taking it into its
service. And to sustain this cause it had a party al-
ready formed, ripe for contest, and accustomed to rule ;
leaders known to the country, who in evil days had
defended its independence and vindicated its rights ;
full of false ideas and noble sentiments, bad publicists,
sincere patriots, and self-sufficient authors. The royal
statute shocked their political convictions and wounded
their personal vanity. Far from satisfying, M. Mar-
tinez de la Rosa by his edict had irritated and rallied
them against him. Thenceforward he found himself
placed between the Carlists and the revolutionists:
he had to sustain two civil wars, — one in full effer-
vescence, the other ready to explode.
External affairs and the success attending them
about this period somewhat distracted internal dis-
order. Although driven from Lisbon as from Oporto,
Don i\Iiguel still maintained in Portugal an obstinate
EXTERNAL POLICY. 87
struggle against his niece Donna Maria. He had
near his person the infant Don Carlos, who from the
Portuguese frontier corresponded with his partisans
in Spain, and fomented their insurrections and their
hojDes. M. Martinez de la Rosa resolved to put an
end to this anarchical hostility between the two king-
doms. He concerted with Don Pedro, still Regent
for his daughter, and on the 16th of April 1834, at
the very time when the Royal Statute was promul-
gated in Madrid, a Spanish army, under the command
of General Rodil, entered Portugal to drive out Don
Carlos and Don Miguel. The Spanish minister in
London, the Count of Florida- Blanca, received at the
same time with the envoy of Portugal, M. Moraez
Sarmento, instructions to demand from the English
government their co-operation in attaining this object.
Both designs met mth equal and prompt success.
General Rodil advanced rapidly into Portugal, driving
before him and dispersing the troops of Don Miguel,
and on the 13th of April a treaty, to which the signa-
tures alone were wanting, was concluded at London
between England, Spain, and Portugal, stipulating
that the two Queens should unite their forces to expel
both the Infants from the Peninsula, and that England
would send ships of war to the coasts of Portugal
to second them in their enterprise.
At this point of the negotiation M. de Talleyrand, —
informed, as certain evidences say, by the Count of
Florida-Blanca, and, according to others, by Lord
Palmerston himself, who, it was said, proposed to him
the accession of France to the treaty already arranged
G 4
88 EXTERNAL POLICY.
between tlie three powers, — forwarded an account to
his cabinet of what was passing, and demanded instruc-
tions. It was not ^vitlK)ut some surprise that we
received this tardy communication, and Admiral de
Rigny, our minister of Foreign Affairs after the
retirement of the Duke de Broglie, hastened to impart
it to M. de Rayneval at Madrid, saying to him :
" They intended at first to leave us simply the faculty
of acceding to this treaty by a separate act. M. de
Talleyrand ha\dng represented that we could not
accept such a secondary attitude, it is now proposed
to us to take a more direct part in appearance, by
means of stipulations inserted in the body of the
treaty, which would imply in substance that in con-
sideration of our close union with En2;land we had
been in\dted to join this alliance, that we had con-
sented, and that if it took place we should co-operate
for the expulsion of the two pretenders, according to
mutual agreement. You see that in reality the second
project differs little from the first, and bears almost
equally on the ol)jection raised by our ambassador,
since it represents us as merely interposing in
the arrangement in question under the auspices of
England. I have written to M. de Talleyrand in-
structing him to propose a counter-project, according
to which the contracting parties would be placed in a
less unequal position. In case this measure should
not be adopted, the council would then deliberate on
the course to be taken. I have no occasion to tell
you. Count, tliat in demanding this modification we
are moved by no vain susceptiljility, but we bow to
EXTEKNAL POLICY. 89
questions of general interest In the actual
situation of Spain, we believe that everything which
might tend to represent that country as not acting in
the most perfect accord with France, would teem with
dangers for the Queen's government The
partisans of Don Carlos, if they saw France co-operate
with less readiness than England, or remain entirely
unconnected with an act directed against them, would
not fail to assume that we withdraw our support
from the Queen Eegent, or that we desire at least to
remain neuter If then we regret that another
direction has not been given to the London negotia-
tion, it is, above all, in a friendly spirit towards Spain.
We are the more compelled to feel surprise that a
Spanish diplomatist, who might be supposed to be
well acquainted with the disposition of his govern-
ment, should lend himself to an arrangement as little
conformable to the true interests of his country as to
the ties that unite her to France ; and our astonish-
ment redoubles when we refer to the note by which,
on the 27th of January last, M. Martinez de la Rosa
demanded our co-operation to drive Don Carlos from
Portugal, — a note which Count Florida- Blanca must
of necessity be acquainted mth."
The apology, somewhat embarrassed, of the Spa-
nish government, was speedily offered. *' I have
hastened to see M. Martinez de la Rosa," replied M.
de Rayneval to Admiral de Rigny, on the 2nd of May.
" He was little prepared to expect such a promj^t de-
nouement of the negotiation carried on by M. de
Florida-Blanca. He has confirmed to me what you
90 EXTERNAL POLICY.
assumed, that that minister has exceeded his instruc-
tions, or, to speak more correctly, that he has acted
without instructions, and even without powers. He
was surprised himself^ at the unexpected facility of
the British cabinet ; it was, as we may express it, for
the acquittal of his conscience that he addressed to
it the note, the translation of which was appended to
your despatches.^ It appears to me certain that it
was not as a deliberate proposal, still less as the re-
sult of instructions from his government, that he has
adopted, as regards France, the step with which you
reproach him. He has obeyed, without reflection, the
impulse which the Portuguese envoy, or perhaps even
the English cabinet, has imparted to him. Your
Excellency cannot be ignorant of what I liave several
times suggested to you, — the little anxiety of England
to admit us into any transactions relative to Portugal.
But if M. de Florida-Blanca did not at first feel the
full value of our participation in the convention of
the 22nd of April, it was not so with M. Martinez de
la Rosa. At once he recognized this as the most im-
portant point for Spain, and that without it the treaty
would be an act of inferior value."
At London also, when the French cabinet, while
expressing its surprise at the silence maintained as to
this negotiation, rejected the secondary position pro-
posed in the treaty, the necessity of a change of atti-
tude was speedily felt. The counter-project presented
by M. de Talleyrand was accepted, in spite of the
' Tlwit is to say, the Count Florida-Blanca.
2 That note Avas dated the 10th of April 1834.
EXTERNAL POLICY. 91
dissatisfaction warmly expressed by Lord Palmer-
ston, and, on the 24th of April, Admiral de Kigny
was enabled to write thus to M. de Kayneval : — " The
treaty I named to you in my despatch of the 18 th
was signed yesterday, and M. de Talleyrand forwards
to you directly a copy. You will see that justice has
been done to our objections against the completion of
the arrangement at first submitted to us."
Some have traced in this proceeding of the English
cabinet a proof of the iU-feeling, and indeed, it has
been often said, of the hatred of Lord Palmerston
towards France. I believe this to be a mistake.
Lord Palmerston has neither hatred nor ill-will
towards France. He is an Englishman who serves
England, and his sentiments vary with his conduct,
according to what, in his eyes, the interest of his
country requires. It may be said, and I incline to
think, that he gives himself up too exclusively to
this patriotic egotism, and that, in his zeal for the
success and political honour of England, he estimates
too slightly the moral sentiments and necessities of
natural justice which modern civilization has deve-
loped in men's minds on the subject of international
relations. Patriotic egotism is legitimate, provided
it does not too much resemble the rude indifference
of the barbarous ages. But to this disposition Lord
Palmerston adds another, which in the exercise of
affairs embraces serious inconveniences. The special
question of the moment with which he is occupied
engages him to this extreme point, that it sets aside
every other consideration and idea. Although of a
92 EXTERNAL POLICY.
singularly active spirit, fertile, sagacious, and \igorous,
he has not Jhat permanent grandeur of imagination
and thought which never loses sight of things in
their entire scope, and which assigns to every interest
and to every separate aifair the exact place and
degree of importance which belongs to it in the
general system of the interests and affairs of the
country. He incessantly forgets the extended policy
in which he is engaged, and Avhich, in his mind,
becomes concentrated in each distinct question as it
successively presents itself, and is treated by him
"with energetic ability, but without foresight. To
preserve a good understanding with France was, in
1834, the smcere object of the cabinet to which he
belonged, as it was also his o^svn wish; but when
the active co-ojoeration of the two poAvers was de-
manded in the Peninsula, Lord Palmerston thought
only of maintaining the exclusive preponderance of
England in Portugal, as if the affairs of that kingdom
were not then closely linked to those of Spain ; and
of combating in Spain the influence of France, as if
Louis XIV. and the family compact were still in
existence. Hence arose his silence at the commence-
ment of the negotiation, his eagerness to prepare the
treaty without our concurrence, and his discontent
when it became necessary to place us in our proper
position. Without the influence of his colleagues,
and ^particularly of Lord Grey, more carefid than he
was of the general policy of England, that position
would have been more obstinately contested.
No sooner was the treaty of the quadruple alliance
EXTERNAL POLICY. 93
concluded than it became eflfective. In Europe, the
consequences surpassed the actual importance. It was
generally received as a brilliant union of two great
constitutional kingdoms in reply and as a counter-
poise to the combination of the absolute monarchies.
Neither the French nor the English cabinet intended
to give it this bearing, but mllingly accepted the
interpretation. In Portugal, the treaty decided the
defeat and retirement of the two pretenders. It
reached Lisbon on the 5th of May, and, by the 26th,
Don Miguel, beaten, pursued, and surrounded by the
Spanish army and that of Don Pedro, capitulated at
Evora, engagmg, for a pension of 375,000 francs, never
again to enter Portugal, and embarked for Italy.
The Infant Don Carlos was completely forgotten in
this capitulation; but the secretary to the English
legation, Mr. Grant, more moved by the distress of
that prince than was his royal ally, represented to the
generals of Don Pedro the indignity of such an over-
sight, and on the same day signed with them certain
articles in virtue of which the Infant, without con-
dition or engagement on his part, was conducted in
safety to the neighbouring small port of Aldea-Gal-
lega, and from thence immediately embarked for
England.
On the first rumour of this part of the arrangement,
M. Martinez de la Rosa evinced the most lively un-
easiness. " He is extremely dissatisfied," wrote M.
de Rayneval to Admiral de Rigny, " that in regu-
lating the departure and embarkation of Don Carlos,
it has not been imposed on him as a condition to con-
94 EXTERNAL POLICY.
tract an engagement similar to that required from
Don Miguel. On the eve preceding the day when
he received intelligence of the a2:)proaching departure
of Don Carlos, in a conference wliich Mr. Yilliers and
I held with him, he expressed his desire that the Infant
should not be permitted to quit Portugal until the
powers who had signed the treaty of London agreed
as to the place of his future residence." And on the
same day when M. de Rayneval penned this despatch,
M. Martinez de la Rosa addressed a long note to him
and to the English minister, in which, after laying
open all the causes of his anxiety, he formally demanded
"that Don Carlos should be called on for specific
guarantees similar to those exacted from the Infant
Don Miguel; that he should not be left at liberty
to fix the place of his residence, as he might, for
instance, make choice of some one of those states
which had not yet recognized the legitimate Queen of
Spain. Finally, that the contracting powers to the
treaty of London should declare it available and still
subsisting, although the immediate object had been
attained, so that it might not become vain and illusory
if one of the two princes, or both combined, were
again to disturb the tranquillity of these kingdoms."
" M. Martinez de la Rosa, who dreads extremely,"
wrote M. de Rajnieval, " not that the departure of
Don Carlos without guarantees for Spain can menace
this country with real dangers, but that the result may
cause the ministiy to be taxed with imjDrovidence and
incapacity, desires most ardently that some means
may be found of reparing the omission of wliich he
complains."
EXTERNAL POLICY. 95
The anxieties of M. Martinez cle la Rosa were less
personal and more soundly based than M. de Rayneval
believed. Within fifteen days after liis disembarkation
in England, Don Carlos departed again, crossed the
Channel, arrived on the 4th of July at Paris, on the
6th at Bordeaux, on the 8th at Bayonne ; and on the
10th he was beyond the Pyrenees, at Elisondo, at the
head, or, to speak more correctly, in the midst of an
insurrection raised in his name.
Loud were the outcries against the inability or
negligence of the police. It was said, to aggravate their
fault, that Don Carlos had passed several days in Paris
in one of the most frequented streets, and that he had
made visits in an open carriage. The Prefect of Police,
M. Gisquet, formally denied this assertion : " Don
Carlos," he said, " only rested twenty-four hours in
Paris ; while there he shut himself up in his lodgings,
and did not, as I believe, make known his presence to
more than two of his devoted partisans."^ Others,
to account for the success of the Infant, have attached
much value to the secret aid afforded to him, in the
name of legitimacy, by the powers who had not yet
recognized Queen Isabella, — a real aid, for we were
compelled, shortly after the arrival of the Infant in
Navarre, to withdraw the exequatur from the Prussian
consul at Bayonne, who acted as intermediary in the
correspondence of the insurgents; and the Duke de
Frias, at that time ambassador from Spain in Paris,
speaking with me one day of the pecuniary succours
' Memoirs of M. Gisquet, vol. i. pp. 511, 515.
96 EXTERNAL POLICY.
furnished to Don Carlos by the Northern courts,
assured me that he had himself intercepted a sum of
125,000 francs forwarded with that object. But neither
the connivance of remote cabinets, always cold and
parsimonious even in their favours, nor the insuf-
ficiency, faulty or inevitable, of the police, determined
this first success of Don Carlos, or encouraged the
boldness of a prince, otherwise timid and ordinary, to
encounter such perils. He had in Spain and in Europe
an actual political party, men convinced that the
right was his, and for this sole reason ardent in his
cause. It shows an incorrect knowledge of human
nature to seek in incidents purely material the ex-
planation of such enterprises and the obstinate per-
severance attendino: them: we must look for higher
causes, — faith, sound or erroneous, in a moral princi2:)le,
and the passion for heroic adventures ; the desire of
re-establishing right, and also that of animating life
by noble and stirring emotions. Here are the moving
springs which urge men to risk and sacrifice every-
thing, even the peace of their country ; and civil war,
which has proved so often the scourge of nations, is,
in this sense at least, not their dishonour.
By a fatal coincidence, at the moment when the
unexpected presence of Don Carlos in the Basque pro-
vinces redoubled the energy of the insurgents in that
quarter, and revived throughout Spain the hopes of
his partisans, the Cortes Avere on the point of assem-
bling at Madrid, bringing back upon the scene nearly
all the survivors of the Cortes of 1812 and 1820,
with their theories, passions, and the ever-cherished
EXTERNAL POLICY. 97
remembrance of their work, — of that radical consti-
tution, the place of which was now occupied by the
Eoyal Statute. And that nothing might be wanting
to the conflagration, eight days before the meeting of
the Cortes, the cholera broke out at Madrid mth ex-
cessive violence, and excited those terrors and popular
disorders of which political factions are so prompt and
skilful in availing themselves. " I have sad events
to announce to you," M. de Rayneval wrote to Ad-
miral de Rigny on the 18th and 20th of July ; "the
uneasiness occasioned by the symptoms of the epidemic
which had been observed in Madrid began to calm
down, and all was prepared for the return of the
Queen, when, suddenly, on the morning of the 16th,
the cholera manifested itself throughout the entire
city with unaccountable virulence. In a few hours it
seized nearly three hundred victims. In the evening,
a commencement of disorder became visible; those
same reports of poisoning the fountains, which in all
places have been eagerly received by the people, were
circulated with surprising activity, and propagated
more by malevolence than credulity. The priests,
and especially the Jesuits, have been denounced as
the authors of this imaginary crime. Yesterday
morning, several monks were killed in the streets.
At length the populace, excited by plotters, and ac-
companied, as is confidently asserted, by many mem-
bers of the town guard, moved against the convent of
the Jesuits, and of those of St. Thomas, and of the
Fathers of Mercy. It seems that, at the first, resist-
ance was oflfered, and that some shots were fired from
VOL. IV. H
98 EXTERNAL POLICY.
the wndows on the assailants, who having forced the
gates, laid violent hands upon all who were not able
to escape. The exact number of those who perished
is not known, — some speak of ten or twelve, others
of thirty or forty. The two other convents having
been evacuated in time by the monks, no lives were
lost there, but the buildings were forced and com-
pletely pillaged If this essay which the
agitators have just made of their strength remains
unpunished, the whole moral force of the government
is destroyed from this moment, and it is not possible
to see what rampart can be opposed to the revolu-
tionary inundation which threatens it The day
of the 17 th has clearly demonstrated that a disorgan-
ising party is formed in secret, and that it is much
stronger than the cabinet, and M. Martinez de la
Rosa in particular, had supposed. This movement,
so sudden and violent, and the atrocities by which it
has been accompanied, have deeply affected the First
Minister. He has seen in a moment the destruction
of his dearest hope, — that of arriving at a change of
political order in Spain, without sullying the period
during which he has played the leading part, with
crimes or excesses. In unison with this sentiment,
he experiences the fear that until now he has availed
nothing, in not being able to restrain the extreme
party."
In this melancholy state of public affairs and of
his own mind, M. Martinez de la Rosa, nevertheless,
was not found wanting either to his country or to
liimself Since the month of June, he had gratified
EXTERNAL POLICY. 99
a general desire, and strengthened his cabinet by-
calling the Count of Toreno to the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Two days after the disturbances which had
stained Madrid with blood, he dismissed the various
civil and military authorities who had shown them-
selves weak against the revolt. A royal decree inter-
dicted under severe penalties every description of
secret plot or seditious manifestation. " It remains
to be proved," wrote M. de Rayneval, " whether all
this will not confine itself, as too often happens here,
to mere words, and whether the government will be
strong enough to execute what it proposes." M. Mar-
tinez de la Rosa had, moreover, a pressing and deli-
cate question to resolve. The Cortes were convoked
for the 24:th of July. Should he, on account of the
cholera, which still continued to rage with violence,
adjourn their opening, or if not, should the Queen-
Regent return from Aranjuez, to impart, by her pre-
sence, that solemnity to the ceremony which the public
looked for ? Queen Christina and her Ministry, on these
points, adopted the most courageous and worthiest
course. The Cortes were not adjourned, and on the
24th of July, 1834, the Regent, seated on the left of
the empty throne of the young Queen her daughter,
inaugurated with a speech of remarkable dignity and
frankness the dawn of the constitutional system in
the Spanish monarchy.
On the eve of the same day, the attack of the
constitution of 1812 against the Royal Statute of 1834
commenced. A plot was discovered, the object of
which was to re-establish that constitution in the
H 2
100 EXTERNAL POLICY.
midst of the royal session, and before any one, either
Queen or nation, had taken oath to the Statute. The
chief conspirators were arrested, and the cabinet had
the mortification of findinf]i: amonfjst them one of the
most heroic defenders of SjDain, General Palafox, who
a few days before had been created by the Queen-
Regent, Duke of Saragossa, in commemoration of the
glorious defence of that city ; — a sad symptom of the
disease of minds, and a deplorable prognostic of the
struggle about to commence. Men whom Spain
honoured, and on just grounds, for they were of those
who had saved and wished to see her free, declared
war upon the rising constitutional monarchy; and
against other men, also sincere patriots and their
former friends, because they refused to adopt political
theories which tend to produce revolutions, but never
establish liberty.
The entire session of the Cortes in the chamber of
the Procur adores (Deputies) was taken up with the
development of this war ; and it burst forth especially
on tliree questions: the address of the chamber in
reply to the speech from the throne ; a petition, which
demanded a declaration of rights, a confused mixture
of absolute maxims and promises in favour of the
various public liberties which theEoyal Statute had
not regulated ; and the details of finance, above all
those of the different loans contracted in the name of
Spain from 1814 to 1830. The same feature pre-
vailed in all these debates. It was ever the revo-
lutionary government of Spain, from 1810 to 1814,
and from 1820 to 1823, disputing empire with the
EXTERNAL POLICY. 101
constitutional system which, in accordance with the
ancient royalty, the moderate politicians endeavoured
to establish. Neither sincerity, nor talent, nor
courao-e were wantino- on either side. I do not
hesitate to think and declare that in enlightenment,
in the true spirit of policy and in intelligence, as well
as in respect for the great moral laws which finally
decide the fate of institutions and nations, the
defenders of the Eoyal Statute had greatly the advan-
tage over their adversaries; but they were engaged
■with liberal prejudices and popular passions, and
their worthy leader, M. Martinez de la Kosa, had
neither the practical tact and promptitude of reso-
lution and action, nor the skilful management of men,
which in aU tunes, and particularly in stormy days,
form the indispensable conditions. of success in govern-
ment. He sustained the debates with eloquence, he
yielded concessions, he resigned himself to checks;
but whether through his OAvn fault, or the fatality of
his position, the violence of the attack exceeded the
power of resistance ; and in this parliamentary struggle,
where reason and power were on his side, the cabinet
rapidly exhausted, instead of strengthening itself.
It bowed at the same tune under the pressure of
civil war, becoming more obstinate from day to day.
In vain the Cortes ardently denounced the Carlists ;
in vain the Cabinet despatched against Don Carlos in
the Basque Provinces the conqueror of Don Miguel
in Portugal, — General Rodil, with his army. The
insurrection had found in Zumalacarreguy one of those
improvised leaders, who at once display the qualities
H 3
102 EXTERNAL POLICY.
of a great soldier, a partisan, and a popular hero.
After some successes at the outset, Rodil and his
lieutenants met "vvith nothing but repeated defeats.
The Cabinet recalled him, and gave the command of
the Queen's troops to Mina, flattering itself that the
renown and skill of the veteran chief would triumph
over his younger rival; but Mina, though always
ardent and in favour with the enthusiastic party, was
worn out and ill; some well-directed strokes, which
marked his arrival, produced no decisive result, and
the passions as well as the habits of the two opposing
commanders rendered the war cruel even to ferocity.
Mina threatened capital punishment to all who
should be found on the high-road without sufficient
reason, between the setting and the rising of the sun.
Zumalacarreguy added to the order of the day issued
to his troops, victory or death. On both sides no
quarter was given on the field of battle, and when the
fighting ended, prisoners were shot without mercy.
Bands, at first suppressed, re-appeared in Arragon
and Catalonia; others threatened to organise them-
selves in the provinces of the centre, the west, and the
south. The more the acts and exhibitions of war
became odious, the more its end appeared uncertain
and perhaps impossible.
Then commenced with tliis people, so proud and
independent, a strange phenomenon : on all sides they
began to talk of the necessity of foreign interference.
Not only in the provinces desolated by the war, but
in Madrid ; not only amongst the politicians, but with
the soldiers ; in the Cortes, in the Council of Regency,
EXTERNAL rOHCY. 103
in the bosom of the cabinet, it was declared that
foreign intervention alone could put an end to this
struggle. Deputies arrived from Biscay and from
Navarre, to declare to the government that such was
their advice and desire. The moderate members of
the Cortes waited upon M. Martinez de la Rosa to ex-
press the same conviction. General Llassder, now
Minister of War, held similar language to M. de Ray-
neval. General Cordova, returning from the army,
explained himself in the same sense. The Marquis de
las Amarillas said frankly in the Council of Regency :
" The forces at the disposal of government for the
reduction of the insurgent provinces are insufficient.
There are only three methods of obtaining this result :
the first is a convention with these provinces — a means
indicated at a period already remote by the Council
of Regency, and which to-day presents many difficul-
ties and few chances of success ; the second, the media-
tion of the French government, which, with this object,
should receive full powers from the Spanish authorities,
and would become guarantee for the stipulations agreed
upon; the third, the armed intervention of France."
Before the question thus laid down, the Count of To-
reno maintained an attitude of reserve, for the moment
more opposed than favourable to intervention. M.
Martinez de la Rosa loudly rejected the idea. " Even
though all Spain should call for French interference,"
he had said, at the time of signing the treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, " there was at least one Spaniard
who would oppose it, and that Spaniard was himself."
Without holding, at the close of the year 1834, a lan-
H 4
104 EXTERNAL POLICY.
guage so absolute, lie persisted in his opposition against
all appeal to foreign arms to settle the quarrels of the
Sj)aniards amongst themselves. Two small printed
circulars, which announced the entry of a French army
into Spain, had been hawked about the streets of
Madrid, authorised, it was said, by the police them-
selves. M. Martinez de la Rosa formally interdicted
to the blind men, the professional public criers of the
capital, any distribution of printed or wi'itten bills not
sanctioned by the approbation of the censorsliip. It
was the First Minister, standing almost alone, who
maintained the dignity of the country against public
disquietude and impatience.
When transmitting this intelligence to us, M. de
Rayneval added his own idea, and showed that he also
felt convinced that the armed intervention of France
alone could stifle the civil war in Spain, and rescue the
throne of Queen Isabella from the dangers mth which
it was menaced.
We were equally grieved and surprised at the state
of events beyond the Pyrenees. Not that we enter-
tained the slightest doubt of our right to judge freely
of them, and to act only in accordance with the in-
terests of France. I have already said 'svitli what
care, immediately after the accession of Queen Isabella,
the Duke de Broglie had explained and established
our notion on this point. We had neglected nothing
since then to maintain the liberty of our resolutions,
and to impress them thoroughly upon the Spanish
irovcrnment.
On learning the arrival of Don Carlos in the
EXTERNAL POLICY. 105
Basque Provinces, Admiral de Rigny wrote as follows
to M. de Rayneval : " You cannot be too careful, not
only in declining any request that may be proposed
to you for effectual intervention, but also in pre-
venting, if possible, the occurrence of such an idea
to the Spanish ministry; and if it should decide on
asking that description of aid from us, you must sedu-
lously avoid any ground for anticipating our decision.
The revolt of three or four small provinces,
which collectively do not exceed in population and
extent one of our ordinary departments, and in which
the towns have remained faithful to the government,
seems to me utterly insufficient to justify an appeal
to foreign force. La Vendee, on several repetitions,
has presented very different obstacles to a govern-
ment surrounded by external enemies. We have
triumphed over them nevertheless, still less by force
than by the action of time, by the lassitude of the
people themselves, and by substituting a mixture of
prudence to the measures of terror which had been
employed in the first instance. Nay, it was also said
that it would be found impossible to subdue by
regular means an insurrection which lasted not a few
months, but several years. The event has proved
the contrary. It is in this sense that you must
express yourself, should you have reason to believe
that our interference is likely to be called for." ^
While holding this language, we were warmly dis-
posed to hasten to the aid of the Spanish government,
' Despatches of the 16th and 22iid of July, and of the 12th of
December, 1834.
lUC) EXTERNAL TOLICY.
and to give it moral strength, as the indirect means
which it required to be enabled to avail itself
effectually of its own resources. M. Martinez de la
Rosa had expressed a desire that, by an official act,
the contracting powers to the treaty of the Quad-
ruple Alliance should declare it applicable to the new
circumstances in which the return of Don Carlos had
placed Spain. We hastened to satisfy this ^vish, and
on the 18th of August, 1834, additional articles were
signed in London, to the folloAving effect: 1. His Ma-
jesty the King of the French pledges himself to adopt
in that portion of his States which borders on Spain the
measures best calculated to prevent the despatch of any
kind of succour, whether in men, arms, or ammunition,
from the French territory to the Spanish insurgents.
2. His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland engages to supply to Her
Catholic Majesty all the succour in arms and
ammunition that Her Catholic Majesty may require,
and in addition, to assist her with naval forces should
such become necessary." In fact, we redoubled our
vigilance on the frontier of the Pyrenees, to prevent
the Carlist insurrection from receiving any aid in
France. We reinforced the ser\ace of the customs,
and established posts of circulating gendarmerie.
It Avas then that we withdrew the exequatur from
the Prussian Consul, through whom the corres-
pondence of the insurgents had passed: and on
the 22nd of July, 1834, Admiral de Rigny wrote
thus to M. de Rayneval : — "It might possibly suit
the Spanish government to take into its pay some
EXTERNAL POLICY. 107
portion of the foreign legion we have at present in
Africa. Should it be so, we might perhaps furnish
four or five thousand armed men, to be disembarked
at Carthagena." We offered and rendered to the
Spanish monarchy all the good offices it could expect
from sincere allies, who only rejected the perspective
of having to answer for its destinies by placing their
forces at its unrestrained disposal.
But Spain and the Spanish government were in
prey to other dangers than those of the civil war in
the Basque Provinces. At one time, by taking ad-
vantage of those dangers and the anxious irritation
they excited in the country, at another by their own
direct and personal impulse, the radical party waged
from day to day a more determined and formidable
war against the Ministry and the Royal Statute.
Within the Chambers, M. Martinez de la Rosa, and
M. de Toreno, resisted with courage and ability
sometimes effectual; — the Chamber of the Proceres
(Nobles) supported them firmly; and in the Chamber
of the Procuradores (Deputies) they alternately lost
and regained a majority, always uncertain : but
externally, power was absolutely deficient in unity
and means of action. The remains of the old local li-
berties, and the inexperienced attempts of new liberties
equally supplied causes of anarchy. Attacks against
the moderate cabinet blazed forth on all sides ; now
to demand the constitution of 1812, and now for
the sole gratification of revolutionary passions. The
spirit of revolt reached the army itself. On the
18th of January, 1835, at Madrid, eight hundred
108 EXTEKNAL POLICY.
men of the 2nd regiment of the light infantry of
Arragon broke out, crying, " Liberty for ever, doAvn
with the ministers ! " The Captain-General of Old
Castille, General Comterac, ran to call them to order,
and fell under several musket shots. They seized
the Post Office, defended themselves there against the
loyal troops, and escaped with no other punishment
than that of joining, in the Basque Provinces, the
army fighting against the Carlists. In February,
March, and April, at Malaga, Saragossa, and in Murcia ;
in one place against an order of discipline issued by
the Minister of War; in another against an inter-
diction of the Archbishop, who was unwilling that the
choristers of the cathedral should sing patriotic airs
in the theatre, violent popular seditions disturbed the
public peace, ending always with the ciy, " Long live
the constitution of 1812," and in the massacre of
several monks. The mutual barbarities of the civil
war in the Basque Pro\dnces had excited a \ivid
sentiment of reprobation in Europe. The English
cabinet had despatched to Biscay a special commis-
sioner. Lord Elliot, to endeavour to put a stop to
them, and we had formally concurred in the object of
his mission. A convention was, in consequence,
concluded on the 28th of April 1835, between General
Yaldez, who had succeeded Mina, and Zumala-
carreguy, to this effect : " That the lives of prisoners
should be respected, that they should be exchanged
two or three times per month, and that no one should
be put to death for his political opinions without
being tried and condemned according to the existing
EXTERNAL POLICY. 109
laws of Spain." This act of strict justice and simple
humanity excited in the Chamber of the Procuradores
a violent storm. It was, they said, the fruit of
foreign influence. Why had the ministers sanctioned
any treaty with Zumalacarreguy, a leader of rebels?
It was demanded, and the motion was adopted, that
the treaty should be communicated to the Chambers,
who would examine its motives; and on the 11th of
May, at the conclusion of a sitting in which M.
Martinez de la Rosa had courageously defended the
treaty, a popular assembly intercepted his passage,
and pursued him to his residence \n\h insults, and
the cry of " Long live the Constitution ! "
So many contests and perils, and so much helpless-
ness in the presence of two opposing enemies, ex-
hausted the confidence and wearied the patience of
M. Martinez de la Rosa himself. The Council of
Regency combined with the Council of Ministers, and
on the 17th of May, 1835, a resolution was there
unanimously adopted; " to demand the armed co-
operation of the powers who had signed the treaty of
the 22nd of April, 1834," especially of France, the
only one whose action in favour of Spain could be
decisive."
The demand was not unlooked-for. M. de
Rayneval had announced it to us, supported by all
the arguments his own personal convictions could
suggest; and before we received it, the Duke de
Broglie, in a despatch of the 23rd of May 1835, had
forewarned the King's ambassador of our answer, by
explaining to him the motives which opposed the
110 EXTERNAL POLICY.
intervention. ^ Called upon for a positive resolution,
we had not only to debate the question ourselves, but
to concert on the point with England ; for the treaty of
the Quadruple Alliance, in the same article appealed to
by Spain, expressly declared that, " In case the co-
02:>eration of France should be judged necessary by
the high contracting parties, to obtain completely the
object of this treaty, His Majesty the King of the
French engages to act in this respect as may be
decided in common accord between him and his three
august allies."
Thus explicitly laid down, the question was scrupu-
lously debated, both in the assembled council and in
our private interviews. M. Thiers explained with
his characteristic eloquence, at once natural and in-
genious, the reasons which decided him in favour of
intervention. I remarked to him, on one occasion,
" Your reasons are strong ; I comprehend that either
line of conduct might be adopted." Subsequently, in
one of the great debates m the Chamber of Deputies
on this subject, M. Thiers asked me from the tribune
if I permitted him to repeat these words? "Un-
doubtedly," I replied; and he then repeated them.
I have nothing to add to-day to the explanation I
then gave. " I m no sense withdraw those expres-
sions," I said ; " the Chamber wiU readily under-
stand that, dreading at that epoch, in the interior
of the cabmet, a separation I never sought, and
shall always regret, I have never used in my private
conversations or elsewhere, any language but such as
' See Historic Documents, No. V.
EXTERNAL POLICY. Ill
seemed to me calculated to prevent it. I shall add that
my opinion on this question has not been from the
first day complete and absolute, like that of others ;
it has formed and strengthened itself progressively
and in presence of passing events. But the honour-
able member, M. Thiers, knows, as well as any one, or
as I do myself, that whenever it has become necessary
to adopt a resolution, to pronounce either for or
against intervention, I have declared against it.
This is the only fact that I desire to establish at
this moment."
It is agreeable to me to recall this to-day. The
leading argument set forward in 1835 and 1836, by
the partisans of intervention was, that without that
aid the crown of Queen Isabella, and of the con-
stitutional system in Spain would be lost. Twenty-
five years have since rolled on, twenty-five years of
severe trials for Spain; no intervention has taken
place, and Spain has not required it; she has saved
herself. A great security for her future, as well as
a subject for legitimate pride. Amongst her friends,
these who hoped the most from her are not those
who knew her the least.
From the first day. King Louis-Philippe was, in
his Council, one of the most decided against inter-
vention ; and to speak the truth, it was his solicitude
for France, rather than his hopes for Spain, by which
he was influenced. " Let us assist the Spaniards
externally," he said to me; "but let us not embark
in their vessel. If we ever do so, we must take the
helm, and God knows what will then happen to us !
112 EXTERNAL POLICY.
Napoleon failed to conquer Spain, and Louis XYIII.
to win the people back from their disorders. I know
them ; they are not to be subdued or governed by
foreigners. They call for us to-day; we shall scarcely
arrive amongst them when they will abhor and im-
pede us by every means in their power. Do you
remember Rajnievars despatch, in which, while
preaching intervention to us, he pointed out the in-
e\itable accompaniments. It would be necessary, he
said, tliat the French army, to consolidate its work,
should occupy for more or less time the country it had
pacified, without which the flame would indubitably
burst forth anew.* And have you not told me that the
Duke de Frias informed you himself, Avithin the last
few days, that the intervention of France in Spain
would avail nothing, if not followed by an occupa-
tion of four or five years at least? Trust me, my
dear minister, let us not employ our army in this
interminable work, or open this gulf for our finances ;
let us not set this cannon-ball on foot in Europe. If
the Spaniards are to be saved, it must be their own
work; they alone can do it. If we encumber our.
selves \\dth the burden, they will place it exclusively
on our shoulders, and then render it impossible to be
borne."
The reply of the English cabinet to the Spanish
government furnished an additional argument to the
opponents of intervention. I find the text in a
despatch from M. de Rayneval of the 13th of June,
1835 : — "A courier arrived here from London yester-
1 Despatch of the 22ud of May, 1835.
EXTERNAI. POLICY. 113
day evening ■vvith despatches from the Spanish Le-
gation. Their import is, that the English cabinet
declines the request of co-operation made by the
Queen's government to her allies; that it does not,
however, oj^pose the assistance which France, in her
own name, might wish to afford to Spam ; but that it
has no desire to hold itself responsible m any manner
for such a measure, which might compromise the
general repose of Europe."
I do not believe that the last consideration was
sincere, or the true reason for the refusal of the
Enghsh cabinet. If France and England had con-
curred in supporting Queen Isabella with their armies
against the insurgents, the Northern Powers would
assuredly not have despatched theirs to the aid of
Don Carlos. But be the motive what it might, the
course adopted by England of leaving the weight of
the responsibility of intervention exclusively on
France, could not fail to influence our decision. The
Duke de Broglie transmitted it to M. de Rayneval on
the 8th of June, adding to his official despatch a
private letter in these terms : " Our answer to the
demand of Spain is precisely what I have announced
to you. We have laid the question before the
English government in the sunplest terms, and in
perfect good faith, and without making any effort to
bias its determination. The refusal is positive. We
have allowed time here for the expression of public
opmion. Through a concurrence of particular cir-
cumstances we are willing to excite rather than abate
it : of this, the articles in the ' Journal des Debats,'
VOL. IV. I
114 EXTERNAL POLICY.
bear testimony. ^ The entire press, mth this excep-
tion, declared openly against intervention, and on this
occasion found itself the organ of the public in
general. We finally sounded individual opinions in
the Chambers. There were not twenty members who
"wished to hear the measure spoken of. As soon then
as the cabinet became decided and unanunous (and
this was not easily accomplished), any attempt of this
nature without the concurrence of England, and in
opposition to the feeling of the country, would have
been a senseless enterprise, which the ascendency of
opinion would soon have compelled us to abandon.
" You will feel no surprise that, in their official
conununications, the cabinets of London and Paris
have only considered mtervention with regard to the
progress of the Carlist rebellion, leaving entirely aside
the eventual dangers which may result from revolu-
tionary insurrections. We appreciate these dangers
at their just value; we are aware that the fears they
inspire in the Spanish government are the true cause
of the demand addressed to France and England, and
that if it had only to deal with Don Carlos, it would
endeavour to resist with the forces still at its disposal.
But however well grounded such apj^rehensions may
be, we could not debate them as the basis of eventual
intervention in documents which, according to all
appearance, will some day become known to the
public. Constitutional governments, governments
built on free discussion, could not, on any contin-
gency, engage in an intervention, the sole or at least
1 On the 29th and 31st of May, and 4th and 7th of June, 1835.
EXTERNAL POLICY. 115
the principal object of which wouki be to maintain
one ministry in power in preference to another, and
to set aside certain shades of opinion. It would be
with great difficulty, the treaty of the 2nd of August,
1834, in our hand, that we could justify an inter-
vention between the Queen Regent and Don Carlos ;
but on no pretext whatever could we justify an inter-
vention between M. Martinez de la Kosa and M. Ar-
guelles, or M. Galiano."
The Duke de Broglie was right in dealing with the
question thus. Besides the civil war between the
party of Queen Isabella and that of the infant Don
Carlos, there was an active struggle in progress be-
tween M. Martinez de la Rosa and M. ArgueUes;
between the Royal statute, and the constitution of
1812; or, as we may say, in the very bosom of the
adherents and ministry of Queen Isabella herself.
We had the means of obtaining, and did obtain, a
firmly established opinion of the political merits of
the parties who were then struggling for power under
the same sceptre. We recognized in the ideas and
practices of the radical sections, the deplorable empire
of the revolutionary spirit, of its theories and passions ;
we desired the success of the moderates, we wished
to support them with our influence. While refusing
the direct and official intervention they called for, we
offered them all the indirect service we could think
of; the introduction into Spain of the foreign legion,
permission to recruit a free corj)S in France, with sup-
plies of arms and ammunition. But neither did the
treaty of the Quadruple Alliance command, nor the
I 2
116 EXTERNAL POLICY.
principles of public European law and the interests of
France permit us to go farther, or to place at the
service of that particular party in Spain the soldiers
and treasures of our country. After the refusal of
intervention, the internal struggle of the Sj^anish
ministry eventuated as it was easy to foresee. M.
Martinez de la Rosa fell, and for three months his
colleague, M. de Toreno, his successor, endeavoured
to govern still in the name of the moderate party;
but his concessions and attempts at resistance were
equally vain; popular outbreaks, revolutionary tu-
mults, massacres of monks, and insurrections to the
cry of " Long live the constitution of 1812," redoubled
in violence. M. de Toreno fell in his turn, and in
the month of February 1836, when in France the
cabinet of the 11th of October broke up, on the
conversion of the funds, — in Spain, the radicals, then
represented by M. Mendizabal and his friends, ob-
tained possession of power.
I comprehend the temptations of the policy of fixed
ideas and great enterprises, and the impassioned en-
joyment which generous spirits may feel in pursuing,
at any cost, the success of a design mingled with
doubt and evil, but bold and perhaps promising for
the future. It is sweet thus to surrender ourselves to
our own idea, to strike the imagination of men, and
to believe, that in violently changing the face of the
world we are ministers of Providence. But this is
not the policy of healthy governments, of free people,
or of honest men. This latter has for its law, respect
for rights, for all rights, the care of the regular
EXTEKNAL POLICY. 117
and permanent interests of nations, and some degree
of scruple as well as of patience in the employment of
means. When, after 1830, we were called to act in
the affairs of Europe, we were not indifferent to the
condition or Avishes of the European states. We
knew that there were many wounds to heal, many
lawful wants to satisfy. We ourselves had in the
question of European reforms our particular ambitions
and s}mipathies; and many powerful reminiscences,
ma y seductive appearances urged us to give them
play. But we could not plunge into these attempts
without having at first for ally, and speedily for
master, the spirit of revolution, — that poisoner of the
fairest of human hopes. Moreover, we felt convinced,
that an appeal to force was not the eligible method
of accomplishing the really salutary reforms and ad-
vances which Europe sighed to obtain. It was our
determination to exercise a policy entirely new in the
relations of states, — the policy of rational minds and
honest people. Masters of great and commanding
genius have not been wanting to the world. They
have displayed, in governing it, superior faculties, and
have changed -with brilliancy the form and aspect of
nations. But in this undertaking there have been so
many superficial and disproportionate conceptions, so
many arbitrary combinations, so much ignorance of
social facts and of their natural laws, such a multipli-
cation of egotistical and capricious desires, that just
doubts have arisen, after these leaders have departed,
on the definitive merit of what they have thought and
done; and then the question has been reasonably asked,
I 3
118 EXTERNAL POLICY.
wlictlier tlioy served or led astray the nations whose
destinies they controlled. Charles Y., Richelieu, and
Peter the Great, have conquered and deserved the ad-
miration of history ; yet, nevertheless, when the great
light of time and experience is brought to bear on them,
the real value of their intentions and deeds appears
more and more doubtful, and is more disputed fi'om
day to day. How many objections and reproaches are
cast up to them in these times ! How many errors,
omissions, and fatal consequences do we not discover
in their works ! How much mischief mingled with the
success which forms their glory ! We were sincerely
anxious to avoid such a combination. We desired to
infuse more discretion into our enterprises, to judge
them ourselves with more severity, and to attempt
nothing that would not bear a rigid scrutiny and a
lengthened trial. I admit that in the estimation of
spectators as well as of actors, this policy is less seduc-
tive than that of the ordinary class of distinguished
men; and that by interdicting improvident abstrac-
tions and popular empiricisms, it aggravates for the
moment the difficulties, already so formidable, attached
to the government of states. But to achieve in this
world a certain and lasting good, avc must take into
the account, justice, Hberty, and time. This confi-
dence, both internally and externally, formed the
basis of our conduct. I see nothing to regret in it,
even after our reverses.
119
CHAPTER 11.
DISMEMBERMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.
MY SITUATION AND DISPOSITION AFTER THE BREAKING UP OF THE
CABINET OF THE IItH OF OCTOBER, 1832. MY PARTICIPATION IN
THE DEBATES OF THE CHAMBERS FROM THE 22nD OF FEBRUARY TO
THE 6tH of SEPTEMBER, 1836. MY ELECTION TO THE FRENCH
ACADEMY. M. DE TRACY, MY PREDECESSOR. MY INAUGURAL
DISCOURSE. THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND BELLES-LETTRES OP
STOCKHOLM, AND THE KING OF SWEDEN, CHARLES JOHN. DEATHS
OF THE ABBE SIEYES AND OF M. CARNOT. DEATH OF M. A3IPERE ; HIS
CHARACTER. DEATH OF M. ARMAND CARREL ; HIS CHARACTER.
ACQUISITION AND DESCRIPTION OF VAL-RICHER. THE ARCHBISHOP
OF CANTERBURY, THOMAS A BECKET, AT VAL-RICHER IN THE 12tH
CENTURY. SITUATION OF M. THIERS IN 1836. ATTEMPT TO
ASSASSINATE KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE BY ALIBAUD. AFFAIRS OP
SPAIN ; M. MENDIZABAL, AND HIS DISPOSITIONS TOWARDS FRANCE.
THE ENGLISH CABINET PROPOSES INTERVENTION IN SPAIN. THE
FRENCH CABINET REJECTS THE OVERTURE. DESPATCHES OF M. DE
RAYNEVAL ON THIS SUBJECT. REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN SPAIN
FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF 1812. M. ISTURITZ SUCCEEDS M. MEN-
DIZABAL. GENERAL QUESADA, GOVERNOR OF MADRID; HIS ENERGY.
MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOWARDS SPAIN.
MISSION OF M. DE BOIS-LE-COMTE TO MADRID. MILITARY INSUR-
RECTION OF SAINT ILDEFONSO. COURAGE AND USELESS RESISTANCE
OF QUEEN CHRISTINA. EFFECTS OF THIS INSURRECTION AT MADRID.
GENERAL QUESADA IS MASSACRED. PR0CLA3IATI0N OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF 1812. DISAGREEMENTS IN THE FRENCH CABINET ON
THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION IN SPAIN. KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE
AND M. THIERS. RETIREMENT OF THE CABINET OF THE 22nD OP
FEBRUARY, 1836.
{Fro7)i February '^'ind, to September Gth, 1836.)
I HAVE been attached to power, yet I never escaped
from it without a sentiment of satisfaction, and almost
I 4
120 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
of joy; like a laborious student who enters on his
vacation, or a man who breathes freely when de-
livering himself from a heavy burthen. A profound
melancholy seized me when, on the 22nd of February,
1836, I again entered that small house no longer
accompanied by her who had recently filled it with
happiness ; but it was our own, replete with cherished
remembrances, and I there recovered repose and
liberty, — powerful charms after years of labour and
combat. It is the privilege of the human heart to
admit at the same moment the most opposing feelings,
without regard to disagreement or inconsistency.
I experienced another satisfaction, more superficial
but not indifferent. The public applauded my friends
and myself for ha\ang resigned office rather than
submit to a check and an embarrassed position.
The reduction of the funds was extremely unpopular
in Paris. It was the opposition and the third party
who had carried the motion in the Chamber of Depu-
ties. Behind the debates, an intrigue was suspected.
The appearances of intrigue follow rapidly in the
wake of success, even Avhen success has not been
thereby decided, and it is dangerous to rise by a
defeat in Avhich you have participated. General
tokens of esteem and sympatliy attended us in our
retirement. I remained at home on the Thursday
evenings. The English ambassadress, Lady Grenville
and her niece the Duchess of Sutherland, found it
difficult, on one occasion, to penetrate into the small
saloon whei:e my mother received visitors with a
simple and earnest gravity, which inspired interest
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 121
while commanding respect. Even those amongst our
friends who regretted our determination, admitted the
good effect of it for ourselves. From as far off as St.
Petersburg, M. de Barante wrote to me : " I hesitate
to affirm that this step was not necessary, but I grieve
for the result. Serious, steady, and consistent men, of
great talent and exalted fame, are to be regretted at
aU times, and it does not appear to me that we have
reached the point of losing them without damage
or danger. The danger you diminish by a con-
duct I foresaw; you render possible the ministry
which succeeds you, and you do not leave it the
temptation of departing from your policy, although
exposed by its position to that course. M. Thiers is
a man of sound sense, talent, and courage, but I fear
he cannot long maintam his equilibrium, and that,
whether he will or no, he may find it difficult to
make a movement. His reason, I imagine, has had a
strong combat with his dream of ambition. He has
said this freely, and in truth I beheve him. Exter-
nally, as yet, I perceive no effect, and I feel no
anxiety. The position is excellent, devoid of actual
dano;er: and even without the earnest assurances of
M. Thiers, I felt convinced that I should receive no
different instructions from hun. Every body writes
to me of the part you take in the Chamber, of the
influence you hold there, of a consideration still in-
creasing. I congratulate myself on this, and my
friendship is proud of it. I know not what unforeseen
events and the fluctuations of coteries in the Chamber
may reserve for you, but I am sure you will neither
122 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
be impatient nor ardent. Many opinions and even
some passions are exhausted ; let us hope that envy-
may become as much depreciated and weary. It is
the venom of the worst days of the revolution ; the
beast is dead, but not the poison."
I quote these friendly words without hesitation. I
should cease to write these Memoirs if I felt any
difficulty in saying what appears to me true, and
fitted to convey a just idea of the times and situa-
tions.
I held the same opinion with M. de Barante before
he communicated his to me ; feeling persuaded that
M. Thiers would exert himself to maintain the policy
we had carried on together, and resolving to do
nothing that might perplex him. During the course
of the session, from the month of February to July
1836, I took part in only three debates, and on occa-
sions when I could not abstain ; but it is not in the
power of man to suppress the consequences of facts,
and in free governments there is no skill or prudence
which can prevent truth from coming to light. It
soon became evident that the cabinet of the 11th of
October, 1832, was necessary to the maintenance of
its policy, and that its dismemberment entrained that
of the party in government which had rallied under
its flag.
It was on the question of the secret supplies called
for by the new cabinet that the first unportant debate
arose. My friends and myself were fully resolved to
vote them without objection, as in fact we did ; but
the new supporters of M. Thiers, the men of the old
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 123
opposition, wlietlier from the left or third party, stren-
uously maintained, some that they would not vote
these supplies until the policy they had disputed
should be effectually modified, — others, that if they
did vote them, they reckoned on that modification,
which they considered natural and inevitable; some
evinced their fears that the new cabmet would merely
perpetuate the old one; others, their hope, that being
differently constructed, it would act in another spirit ;
and all indulged in doubts, commentaries, and com-
parisons with reference to the past, while demanding
explanations as to the future. The debate, in truth,
was merely an attack somewhat restrained on the
policy of resistance, with cajolmg advances towards
that of concession. In the midst of these uncertain
glunmermgs I spoke, not to discuss the secret sup-
plies, not to add my own doubts to all these contra-
dictory objections, but to replace in full light the
policy which my friends and I had sustained since
1830, and to extract, not from any personal polemic,
but from a true picture of facts, the demonstration of
its practical necessity as of its moral legitimacy, in
the actual condition of our country. " Progress is
talked of," I said; "progress does not consist in
marching blindly in the same sense, in the same
track ; true progress for society is to obtain what it
requires when society has fallen into licence. Pro-
gress is to return towards order, when certain ideas
have been abused. Progress is to retreat from the
abuse which has thus been indulged in. I do not
slander our past: yes, we have had revolutions, in-
124 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
evitable, necessary, and glorious; but after forty
years of revolutions, after so many and such notable
explosions of revolutionary principles, habits, and
practices, our France requires to establish, to secure
herself on the ground she has conquered, to enlighten
and organize herself, to revive the principles of order
and preservation she has so long lost. Such is the
true progress to Avliich she aspires. I do not conceive
it to be any wrong to our illustrious predecessors, to
our fathers of 1789 and 1791, not to pursue to-day
the path in which they trod. I go even farther ; I
doubt not, but that in their unknown abode, those
noble souls who desired so much good to humanity,
experience a profound joy in seeuig us avoid the
rocks on which they shattered so many of their
brightest hopes."
The chamber was moved by these words. M.
Odilon Barrot answered me with moderation and
dignity, but not Avithout suffering the embarrassment
of recent alliances to mingle with his speech ; for he
decidedly announced his opposition to the line of
policy which the new cabinet he seemed inclined to
support, declared itself resolved to maintain. M. de
Montalivet and M. Sauzet alone took part in the
debate. M. Thiers preserved silence. He had too
much political tact not to feel the necessity of simple
positions, and he had little inclination to exhibit him-
self in the complicated part he had so recently ac-
cepted. Free governments introduce amongst parties
and persons many manoeuvres and metamorj^hoses :
but they render them difficult and burdensome, at
GOVEENMENT PAETY. 125
the very moment of introduction, even for the actors
who may succeed in their accomplishment.
Some time after this debate, I had, beyond the
Chambers, a new and natural opportunity of bringing
into light, at a moment when it seemed a little veiled,
the policy which, since 1830, I had ever practised
myself, and maintained while supporting the ministers.
My friends of the departmental division which I re-
presented were anxious to give me, while I no longer
held office, a public testunony of their unflinching
approbation. On the 10th of April, 1836, they met
together at Lisieux, at a banquet to which the Duke
de Broglie was also invited. In thanking them for
their faithful support, I enjoyed the satisfaction of
laying before them what for six years had been and
ought to continue for the future, that policy of mode-
ration and resistance, in the bosom of liberty, which
in the time of Henry IV., as in our own days, had
received and merited the name of the policy of the
just medium {juste milieu). It is in this speech, and
in that which I have just referred to on the demand
for secret supplies, that, if I do not deceive myself, I
gave the most complete and animated summary of the
conduct, which in my idea, was most suitable to our
government, of its rational and incidental motives,
of its moral and practical merit. I was at that
time unconnected with the cabinet ; I had no parti-
cular act to defend, no pressing polemic to sustain ; I
spoke with unfettered freedom, with no other care
than that of my own thought, and the desire of
making it thoroughly understood, almost Avith the
126 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
same sentiment which I bring to-day into my remi-
niscences.
I was in favour with the Chamber ; my attitude
and language pleased the majority. I faithfully ad-
vocated what it had thought and done without sug-
gesting any new effort, any new struggle. Occasions
were readily embraced to evince its sympathy with
me. The committee of the budget had proposed in
the monetary department of the ministry of public
instruction, several amendments ; it wished to multi[)ly
the number of chapters, to impose on the minister ties
of more rigorous specialit}^. It demanded that the
copies of the works to. which this minister subsci'ibed^
for their encouragement, should only be distributed
to libraries, or other public establishments, never to
simple individuals. The gifts which I had made of
these were charged with favour and abuse. I opposed
both amendments. I urged the inconvenience of
shackling the administration within rules too tightly
dra'wii, which at a later period unforeseen facts might
often place it under the necessity of infringing ; unless
to the detriment of the public interest, these facts
were ignored and held of no account. I entered into
precise details on the individual distribution I had
made of works acquired by subscription, and I vehe-
mently protested, in the name of science and literature,
against the interdiction sought to be pronounced. De-
spite the efforts of the reporters of the budget and their
friends, the Chamber sided with me, and rejected the two
amendments ; my arguments weighed with the house,
and it had confidence in me in such matters. More-
GOVERNMENT PAETY. 127
over, it felt satisfaction in an expression of good will
towards one of the most faithful representatives of
its policy, and in an act of independence as re-
garded the new cabinet, which it supported more
from conviction than inclination. If I had continued
a minister, I should perhaps not have obtained the
same success.
The debate on the aifairs of Algeria was the third
and last occasion on which I spoke during this session,
and I availed myself of it to support the demand for
men and money originating with the cabinet. From
the beginning I had taken a lively interest in this
question. When doubts had been raised as to the
retention of our conquest, I had repulsed them
with my utmost power; and in 1836, on the approach
of a new discussion, the colonists already settled in
Algeria wrote to me in token of confidence, and re-
quested me once more to take their cause in hand. ^
I needed not this incentive to demand, in the interest
of our establishment, all the troops and resources
necessary for its security and prosperity. But what
had happened at several repetitions, in Algeria, since
1830, with the opinion I had formed of the arrange-
ments of the governor-general in 1836, Marshal
Clauzel, a distinguished soldier rather than a fore-
casting politician and administrator, inspired me with
some anxiety, and I felt called upon to explaui my-
self before the Chamber. " There is," said I, " a line
of conduct which I must permit myself to call restless,
warlike, anxious to advance too quickly or too far, and
^ See Historic Documents, No. VI.
128 DISJIEMBERMENT OF THE
to extend abruptly, by force or stratagem, the French
rule, the official French rule, over all the districts and
tribes of the old Kegency. There is another line, less
restless and warlike, slower and more pacific, the object
of which should be to establish the authority of France
firmly over certain portions of the territory, over
those which were the most closely appropriated in the
first days of our occupation ; and for that reason, being
desirous of entertaining friendly relations with the
natives, would not immediately disturb them on the
question of their independence, and would make no war
on them except through compulsion, in case of absolute
necessity. I believe that the state of Africa, the state
of France, and the state of Europe, every imaginable
reason, reject the first mode of proceeding, the rest-
less and aggressive line; and recommend deliberate,
pacific, and moderate measures." I know not whether
M. Thiers saw anything in my words which touched
him personally, or if he felt himself compelled to
shield Marshal Clauzel, to whom alone my doubts ap-
plied. Be that as it may, he replied to me at once,
not without some impatience, calling upon me to ex-
plain, with more precision, the substance of my coun-
sels, which he called lessons. I defended myself thus :
" I have never pretended," I said, " and never shall
pretend to give lessons here to any one ; the words
which fall from this tribune are not lessons. We
deliver our opinions with perfect freedom, our opinions,
and nothing more." I remembered that while I was
in the cabinet, and at the very moment when the
governor-general of Algeria received its instructions.
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 129
I had spoken in the same strain. Marshal Clauzel
delivered a few guarded words on the course he
intended to adopt, and the debate proceeded no
farther.
The session closed ; no other opportunity of discord
between the various elements of the opposition pre-
sented itself; but it was evident that there was no
longer union amongst them; mistrusts, discontents,
and mutual skirmishes developed themselves from day
to day, and the mischief, though checked, Avas felt by
the public as in the Chambers, externally as well as
in the heart of the country. " Your position is noble
and great," M. de Barante wrote to me from St.
Petersburg; " your speeches have never been more
weighty, or more seriously attended to ; not only in
the Chamber, but from one end of Europe to the
other; and even here, where little attention is be-
stowed on our internal policy: and yet, how will
all this end? How will a combination re-adjust itself
which was still necessary? A combination not alone
confined to particular persons and names." M. de
Barante had reason for his anxiety. The great
government party, which had been formed in the
cabinets of the 13th of March 1831, and of the 11th of
October 1832, and which constituted their strength,
floated in doubt and dislocation.
A happy literary incident at this epoch diverted my
mind and thoughts from political j)re-occupation. A
seat became vacant in the French Academy: M. de
Tracy died on the 9th of March 1836, and I was
elected to replace him on the 18th of April. No
VOL. IV. K
130 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
competitor offered himself to contest this honour.
Out of twenty-nine academicians present at the sit-
ting, twenty-seven gave me their voices : there were
two blank votes.
The duty which this success imposed on me was
almost as agreeable as the success itself. Without
any intimate acquaintance Avith M. de Tracy, I had
often met him in the world, at the house of Madame
de Rumford amongst others, and I had said to myself
more than once, that it would gratify me to succeed
him in the Academy, and on that ground to be called
on to speak of him and his time. This noble old man,
the sincere and consistent friend of universal justice,
of political liberty, of all the rights and hopes of his
fellow-creatures, invariably faithful to his ideas and
his friends, had become, at the close of his life, melan-
choly, morose, retired Avithin himself, cold, and ap-
parently indifferent to that future of the humanity
which had so constantly engaged his thoughts.' " I
am no longer of this world," he said, with some bit-
terness ; " what passes there concerns me no more."
I saw in him a worthy representative and a striking
image of the age in Avhich he had lived, and had seen
teraiinate in the midst of such cruel trials and lament-
able errors. Lately, when I had the honour of pre-
siding at the French Academy for the reception of my
learned friend, M. Biot, I endeavoured to characterise the
eighteenth century by calling it "an age of spnpathy,
and of young and presumptuous confidence, but sin-
cere and human, whose sentiments were more valuable
than its principles and manners; which failed greatly,
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 131
because it had too much faith in itself, and mistrusted
everything else ; but for which it may be permitted
to hope, that when its faults shall seem to be suffi-
ciently expiated, much may be pardoned, because it
has so intensely loved." In 1836, I bore towards that
distinguished epoch, the last survivors of which had
received me in social life with such generous good will,
the same sentiments which I subsequently expressed in
1857; and the memory of M. de Tracy appeared to
me the most favourable opportunity that could occur
of judging it with independence, or of depicting it
with grateful respect.
This was the object and character of the discourse
I delivered on the 22nd of December, 1836, before
the Academy, when I had the honour of being ad-
mitted a member. On reading it to-day, I find it
true and just in the estimate of the eighteenth
century, of its philosophical doctrines and social in-
fluence, of what it was in itself, and of what it has done
for its successors. But this discourse did not receive,
either in the Academy or on publication, the full
sympathy I had expected. The philosophic school of
the eighteenth century was still numerous and power-
ful, and had for representatives, as usually happens
when schools become old, no longer its great leaders,
but some of their most intractable disciples. These
parties were opposed to the rising spiritualistic and
religious philosophy ; and to philosophical controver-
sies were united political and literary dissensions which
greatly aggravated their bitterness. Minds thus dis-
posed found my discourse dry, and even harsh, as
K 2
132 DISMEMBEmiENT OF THE
regarded the eighteenth century, its principles and
masters. It was, they said, a discourse purely doctri-
narian. It was, in fact, too much so for the moment
and the place where it was delivered ; perhaps, also,
in the physiognomy of the ideas and the fornis of the
language. Emancipated from the arena of politics, I
felt a secret pleasure in no longer living ^vithin it, in
caiing for no adversaries, and in giving myself up
entirely to my own train of thought, as if I spoke
for myself alone. On that day I forgot too entirely
the struggles I had to maintain elsewhere, and the cau-
tion necessary to be observed when speaking, in respect
to the prejudices and tastes of those who listen.
On the same day I met, in requital, with a piece of
good fortune, far su2:)erior to the somewhat common-
place gratification of the academic compliments. The
Academy was presided over by one of the most ex-
cellent spirits and generous hearts it had ever enume-
rated in its ranks, Count Philip de S^gur, devoted
like myself to historical studies, and in political life
one of my staunchest friends. He spoke of me in
terms which I cannot re-peruse to-day without feeling
intensely the value and charm of the friendship which
inspired them.
Two years after my introduction into the French
Academy, the Academy of Historical Sciences, Anti-
quities, and Belles-Lettres of Stockholm did me the
honour of electing me a member ; and I received, on
that occasion, a letter from a man who, in our days
of strange destinies, has accomplished one of the
most singular as well as of the most illustrious ; — from
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 133
Charles John, King of Sweden, with whom I had
never held the slightest communication. I insert
the letter here as a curious specimen of the original
and emphatically conciliating turn of mind of this
regal soldier of fortune, who, while occasionally yield-
ing to the most chunerical ambition, still contrived
to maintain himself and establish his dynasty on the
throne to which popular election had called him. He
wrote to me thus, on the 8th of June 1838 : —
"Monsieur Guizot,
" When I sanctioned your nomination as a
member of the Academy of Historical Sciences, Anti-
quities, and Belles-Letters of Stockholm, I yielded to
the natural desire of my soul in expressing the satis-
faction I felt at the choice. Those who read your
works will applaud the words I uttered ; and I,
Monsieur Guizot, congratulate myself that chance and
my own conviction have furnished me with the oppor-
tunity of making known to those who were near me at
that moment, the tribute of esteem with which you
have inspired me, and to which you have so many titles.
" Yours very affectionate,
" Charles John."
The year 1836 saw expire with M. de Tracy,
several men whose names, on different grounds, have
acquired and will retain a celebrity equal to his own :
two of his contemporaries, the Abbe Sieyes and
M. Carnot; and belonging to our ovni generation, the
great philosophic physician M. Ampere, and M. Ar-
K 3
134 DISMEMBERIMENT OF THE
mand Carrel. I liad no personal knowledge of the
first two, and I shall abstain from expressing, as re-
gards them, my full opinion. It might perhaps be
considered too severe, both on their genius and on the
acts of their lives. Times of revolution are times of
idolatry as well as of hatred; many men enjoy, we
know, much more reputation than they deserve, and
commit deeds worse than they are themselves; and
when they are only judged by public report and ap-
pearances, there is great risk of running into puerile
admiration or of condemning with excessive rigour.
But I was well acquainted with M. Amj^ere and
M. Armand Carrel, and in referring to them I am sure
to speak without borrowed prejudice and according to
my own judgment. I have no intention of painting
and estimating them here at full length ; but I am
anxious to name of each what particularly struck me
in them, and what, in my idea, were the essential fea-
tures of their superiority. M. Ampere possessed one,
which has ever been rare, and seems to become more
so; he bore to science an unaffected and unlimited
love, purified from all personal prepossession, from
vanity, as from the desire of wealth. He was an im-
passioned scholar and scrutinizer of nature, of her
laws and secrets ; and nature, to him, was not entirely
confined to what he could see with his eyes and touch
■with his hands, nor even to the abstract labours of
his mind. This perfect geometrician, this inventive
physician, believed in the moral as well as in the
material world, and studied the human soul with as
much ardour nnd faith as he did the combinations
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 135
of molecules or figures. I once found myself in com-
pany with him and an illustrious rival, Sir Humphrey
Davy, who was making a short stay in Paris. M. Cu-
vier and M. Royer-Collard were of the party. After
talking on various sul)jects, the conversation turned
to philosophical questions, especially to the founda-
tions of psychology and morality. Sir Humphrey
Davy and M. Ampere joined in it with warm in-
terest; but Sir Humphrey was evidently animated
with the desire of showing himself, in presence of his
learned friends, as profound a metaphysician as he
was an able chemist ; vanity seemed to have a very
considerable share in the taste he exhibited for philo-
sophic inquiry. M. Amjjcre, on the contrary, gave
himself up to it in conversation, as in his cabinet,
with the most disinterested passion, solely desirous of
discovering truth ; and when he believed he had dis-
covered it, of making it understood and acknowledged,
without the slightest idea of aiming at personal ad-
miration. A truly simple mind and a fertile genius,
which sought light everywhere, — in the celestial as in
the terrestrial regions, — for the sole pleasure of con-
templating and expanding it.
The orio-inal and remarkable character of M.
Armand Carrel had this peculiar feature, that he was
capable of being quite different from what he really
was, and of doing the opposite of what he really did.
Not that I hold slightly the powers he loved and
served, — the republic, the democracy, and the press.
Apart from the strength they possess in our days,
there is, in the ideas and sentiments which those
K 4
136 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
names awaken, a large measure of truth and grandeur.
But M. Armand Carrel embodied in himself more than
a republican, a democrat, and a journalist. I was in
relation Avith him at two periods, and on very different
occasions. I had given little attention to his early
writings, and his History of the Counter-revolution
in England under Charles II. and James II. was
not calculated to give me an exalted idea of his
historical lights. In 1828, when I commenced pub-
lishing the Revue Franqaise (French Review), he
called to see me, and brought me two articles on the
state of Spain and the French expedition to that
country in 1823, which were inserted in the miscellany.
I and the public were equally struck by the for-
cible justice and impartial freedom of mind, as also
by the clear and resolute ability therein displayed by
the author, — recently a conspiring emigrant and
actor in that brief episode. His frank and dignified
demeanour pleased me, moreover, as much as his
ability. In 1830, during the very days of July, I
saw M. Carrel several times, and after the revolution
was accomplished, as Minister of the Interior, I sent
him to the departments of the west, with a com-
mission to observe their condition, and to carry to
them words of equity and peace. His reports during
his journey were replete with sagacity and mode-
ration. When he returned to Paris, I offered him a
prefecture, to which I had already appointed him.
He refused, from two motives ; one, of personal
position, which he avowed to me ; the other, of
wounded pride, which he withheld. He was dis-
GOVEENMENT PARTY. 137
gusted at not being placed in the career of politics,
in the same rank with his two eminent companions,
M. Thiers and M. Mignet, in the contests which Le
National had sustained. I was wrong in not perceiv-
ing on the instant the secret wound, which no one
amongst the men then in power, and in spite of our
momentary embarrassment, would I think have refused
to heal. I should regret it still to this day, if I thought
that a different situation would have given to the inward
dispositions and life of M. Carrel an opposite course :
but I cannot believe this. There were in him cleli-
ciencies and passions which would ever have prevailed
over the influences of his external position, and have
thrown him back into the path in which he pre-
ferred to tread. This keen observer, who carried
into his appreciation of particular facts and the
practical views they suggested to him, so much jus-
tice and freedom of thought, had no unity of prin-
ciple, and extracted not from his constitutional good
sense the general ideas which might have been
its legitunate produce. This unshackled and sagacious
censor of the errors and faults of the party he had
embraced from his first steps in life, submitted not
the less, and under diverse circumstances, to bear
the entire yoke of that party. This character, filled
with elevated and generous instincts, but also with
impetuous and personal excitements, found neither
the rule nor measure of which he stood in need, in
wholesome moral conductions. This submissive ad-
mirer of military discipline had in his political life
a rude taste for independence, and repulsed, with
138 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
haughty impatience, superiority, rivahy, obstacles
and dekiys. He was an ambitious spirit, who woukl
have wished to be carried at once to the top of the
ladder, and perhaps might have well sustained his
place there, but who could not endure to mount the
steps by progressive labour. His resolute spirit failed
to preserve him from ebullitions of passion and sallies
of temper. Neither could his antipathy to disorder and
plebeian rule restrain him from submitting to disor-
derly and popular influences. Such were the incidents
of position and natural tendencies which determined
the lot of M. Carrel ; stifled in him some of his most pre-
cious gifts, and made him the noblest and most judi-
cious, but also the most powerless and least satisfied of
republicans, democrats, and writers in the opposition.
A melancholy example of the mischief that may befal
an uncommon man, from his time, his party, and his
own defects accepted by himself without struggle.
M. Armand Carrel wasted in an incoherent, imperfect,
sterile, and gloomy life, qualities of character and mind
formed to reach and suffice to a destiny more illus-
trious for himself and more profitable to his coun-
try. According to his friends, he experienced in his
lattei" days, and a short time before the lamentable
encounter in which he fell, attacks of low spirits, over-
flo^\^ng with ennui and sinister presentiments ; — a
state of lassitude natural to a man engaged in the
course he had followed \\nth sincere passion, but
wherein he found, and from day to day hoped less to
find, the gratification of liis more wholesome thoughts
and nobler inclinations.
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 139
At this period I took advantage of my political
leisure to accomplish a desire I had long formed of
acquiring in Normandy, in the midst of a population
who for seven years had treated me with so much con-
fidence and sympathy, a residence which might become
my vacational refuge while I continued in the arena
of public life, and my haven of retirement when I
finally seceded from it. One of my friends at liisieux
took me to see, at a distance of three leagues from
the town, the abbey and farm of Val-Richer, then
for sale. There remained of the ancient monastery
only the abbot's house, not old in itself, for it had
been rebuilt towards the middle of the last century.
The church adjoining the abbey, and the claustral
buildings dependent on it, had been destroyed during
the Eevolution. The mansion, solid and spacious,
was very imperfectly finished within, and already
much dilapidated. Walls, the remnants of earlier
constructions, old apple-trees, planted here and there,
kitchen gardens, and small washhouses for domestic
purposes surrounded it on every side, and even close
to the wuidows ; everything had a coarsely rustic and
somewhat abandoned air. There was no road by
which to reach the place ; it could only be approached
on horseback, or by obtaining, through the complai-
sance of the neighbours, a passage across their fields.
But the locality pleased me. The house, situated
half way up a hiU, commanded a narrow, solitary,
and silent valley. There was no viUage, not even a
roof in sight, but some extremely verdant meadows,
bushy thickets sprinkled with lofty trees, a running
140 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
stream serpentining through the plain, and a spring
of pure and living water close to the house itself. It
was a picturesque Avithout being an uncommon land-
scape, at once rural and smiling. I promised to
myself to furnish the house commodiously, to remove
the walls, to form plantations, lawns, slopes, allies,
and groves ; to induce the government to open
roads, of which the country stood much in need ; —
and finally I purchased Val-Richer.
It was not alone the aspect of the place that
attracted me. There was a history attached to it,
and great names were mixed up with the traditions
of the abbey. It had been originally founded towards
the middle of the twelfth century, at first near Vire,
from donations given to St. Bernard and to Nivard
his brother. Some years later, the monks found this
first residence confined and unhealthy ; the monastery,
by the aid of new gifts, was removed to the valley
called Richer, near Cambremer, a fief dependent on
the bishopric of Bayeux; and a disciple of St. Ber-
nard, Thomas, monk of Clairvaux, became the first
abbot. When, seven hundred years after, I became
proprietor of this land and house, which had no longer
lord of the soil or monks, an old resident, assistant to
the mayor of St. Ouen-le-Paing, the chief place of
my township, said to me one day, " Sir, if you ^vish,
I ^vill take you to a spot in the woods of Val-Richer
where the Saint retired to pray." "What saint?"
replied I. " Ah ! I do not know his name, but there
was a saint who once dwelt at Yal- Richer, and was
accustomed to perform his devotions in the wood, at
GOVEKNIMENT PARTY. 141
a place still remembered." I questioned some per-
sons better informed than the substitute of St. Ouen-
le-Paing, and soon discovered, through the most
learned Norman archaeologists, that the celebrated
Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas a Becket, during
his exile in France, from 1165 to 1170, had visited
Lisieux, and from thence proceeded to Val-Kicher,
the abbot of which, Robert I., was a friend of his;
that he had sojourned there for several months, lead-
ing the life of the monks, participating in the same
labours and pious exercises ; and that the remains of
the ecclesiastical ornaments he used in celebrating
the mass had been for a long time preserved.^ Such
reminiscences could not be indifferent to a historian
who had become a land-owner in Normandy, and they
added, in my eyes, an additional charm to my estab-
lishment at Yal- Richer.
In 1836 it was still far fi'om being an establish-
ment. Not only would the condition of the house
alone prevent this, but the state of public aifairs, and
the impending future, glimpses of which revealed
themselves, rendered it little probable that I should
be able to live beyond the circle of politics, or indulge
in a lengthened residence in the country. At the
precise moment when I busied myself in the acqui-
sition of Val-Richer, the ministry of M. Thiers tot-
tered, and observers with but little experience already
foretold its fall and successors.
M. Thiers had attained power with the King's
1 See Historic Documents, No. VII.
142 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
favour, and was accepted with a good grace, I might
ahnost say with good-will, by the foreign cabinets
and their representatives in Paris. His brilliant,
fertile, and flexible mind, the facility of his character,
the animation and unreserved freedom of his con-
versation, rendered communication with him equally
agreeable and accommodating; and nearly all the
diplomatists, more especially the ambassadors of
Austria and Russia, and the Prussian minister,
yielded themselves to it with the eagerness and com-
plaisance which resemble seriously premeditated par-
tiality. The English ambassador, Lord Granville,
was more reserved. He entertained a sincere friend-
ship for the Duke de Broglie, and regretted his
retirement. I do not think M. Thiers deceived him-
self as to the value of these appearances, but they
gratified him, nevertheless, and what pleases ever
exercises a certain influence. It soon became a
generally received notion that the Anglo-French
alliance was beginning to cool, and that the govern-
ment of King Louis-Philippe inclined towards the
great powers of the Continent. The conjecture was
superfcial, and grossly exaggerated. M. Thiers, as
I think, always continued to attach the same im-
portance to the intimacy of France and England;
only, in 1836, he believed he had found in the other
European cabinets, particularly at Vienna, disposi-
tions more favourable than usual ; and he met them
graciously in his turn, promising to extract advantage
therefrom for the Prince he served, and for his o^vn
personal credit.
GOVERNJtIENT PARTY. 143
But whatever pains were taken, on either side, to
prolong and display it, the diplomatic honey-moon
endured but for a short space, and led to nothing.
Its course was disturbed and curtailed by sundry
incidents. In France, in Belgium, and in Switzer-
land, the secret revolutionary practices of the political
refuo^ees atjainst their old orovernments still continued.
This led to the temporary occupation of the republic
of Cracow by the three northern powers, and to
strong European remonstrances with the federal go-
vernment of Switzerland to obtain the expulsion of
the conspirators. In both matters, M. Thiers asso-
ciated himself with the Prince Metternich, either by
manifest concurrence or positive action. In this he
only acted in strict conformity with the rules of public
law, and the legitimate interests of European order.
But this policy, of wliich the English cabinet had
no knowledge, excited noisy anger in the French
opposition, created unpleasant embarrassments in
Switzerland, and failed in producing the expected
advantage to the government of King Louis-Phi-
lippe. At this period, the Dukes of Orleans and
Nemours carried out the visit to Germany projected
and prepared under the preceding cabinet. Every-
where, in Vienna as in Berlin, from the people and
the authorities, their reception was most flattering;
but the negotiations officiously entered into for the
marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the arch-
duchess Maria-Teresa, daughter of the arch-duke
Charles, were unsuccessful. The arch-duke exhi-
bited no unwillingness; the French ambassador at
144 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
Vienna, M. de Ste. Aulaire, who had dissuaded the
attempt, exerted himself mth equal tact and zeal
for its accomplishment; but the prejudices of the
Emperor of Austria, his family, and court, against a
government born of the revolution of 1830 proved
too strong ; and, despite the guarded reserve on both
sides, this diplomatic enterprise, from which M. Thiers
had probably expected to derive reputation and future
stability for himself and his party, furnished him with
nothing but the occasion for a false step at the Tuile-
ries and a check in Europe.
At home, and while the Princes were still absent on
their travels, a sinister incident — the attempt of the
assassin Alibaud — threw the cabinet into great dis-
quietude. On the 25th of June, as the King, accom-
panied by the Queen and Madame Adelaide, was pass-
ing under the mcket of the Tuileries to return to
Neuilly, the end of a cane was placed upon the door of
the carriage; a shot was fired; the carriage became
filled with smoke ; the ball lodged above the opposite
door, and the wadding remained in the King's hair.
He was bowing at the moment, to salute the National
Guard, who presented arms: tliis accidental motion
saved him. The excitement was general and profound.
Of what use, then, were all the attempts at conciliating
parties — the proclamations of amnesty — the prospec-
tive hopes of the policy of concession ? Had new
paths been entered on only to encounter in them the
same crimes and perils, in addition to the mistake?
It was said, that in consequence of this abortive
crime, a desire was evinced to raise once more the flag
GOVERNJklENT PARTY. 145
of the policy of resistance ; that overtures were made
to call back to the cabinet its most decided represen-
tatives; that on this subject I had held an interview
with M. Thiers; that the Ministry of Finance had
been offered to M. Duchatel; that we had rejected
these propositions ; and that I had even left Paris to
avoid any further discussion. There was no truth
whatever in these assertions, beyond the report of
them, which spread abroad, and revealed the trouble
by which minds were then possessed. By turns, people
promise themselves, from various lines of policy, more
than can possibly be accomplished. The policy of
resistance had not restrained Fieschi; the policy of
concession had no effect on Alibaud. There are blows
which no human hand can calculate on warding, and it
is not by such incidents that the merits of the maxims
and conduct of a o-overnment can be measured. What
justly impressed the public in this circumstance was, —
the utter emptiness of the confidences and promises of
the third party. The cabinet was sensibly weakened,
but it was destined to give way before other events,
and from different causes.
At the moment of its formation it found the Spanish
government in a most unfavourable vein, both as re-
garded Spain herself and her relations with France.
In the month of September 1835, the last representa-
tive of the moderate party, the Count of Toreno, had
fallen, and was succeeded by one of the most unsteady,
as well as the boldest, amongst the chiefs of the radicals
— M. Mendizabal. Spain then entered on a path which
of necessity could only end in the revolutionary re-
VOL. IV. L
14G DISaiEMBERMENT OF THE
establishment of the constitution of 1812, and in the
diplomatic preponderance of England, formerly the
ally and supporter of the authors of that work, essen-
tially anarchical, whether ruling over a monarchy or
a republic. " The King's government ought not to
remain ignorant," the Count de Rayneval wrote to
the Duke de Broglie, on the 15tli of September 1835,
" that Mr. Villiers has taken a most active part in all
the manoeuvi'es which have for their object the removal
of M. de Toreno and the triumph of M. de Mendizabal.
.... This public support given by the minister of
England to a man Avho, in spite of his protestations of
moderation and attachment to the Queen and the form
of government Spain has received from her, the extreme
liberals continue to regard as their leader, has inspired
them with the most lively satisfaction. They believe
themselves sure of the protection of the British cabinet
under any excesses in which they may indulge."
Scarcely in possession of power, M. Mendizabal, in fact,
assumed openly the attitude of the particular friend
1 -wall not say exactly of the- jyrotege, of England.
Not only did he reject all idea of French intervention,
declaring that he was able to suppress the Carlist in-
surrection with the Spanish forces alone, but he went
so far as to express an indiscreet malevolence towards
France. " Some days since," M. de Rayneval wrote
to the Duke de Broglie on the 22nd of September,
" two persons who formerly held posts in the adminis-
tration, called on him to demand passports for France.
He told them that he could have wished not to see
them leave Spain at this moment, their departure
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 147
evincing little confidence in the existing government,
but that nevertheless he should not oppose it ; yet as
a friend he advised them to go anywhere but to France,
for it was possible that -within a very short time the
relations of Spain with that country would entirely
change their character." This anti-French ostentation
did not last long. M. Mendizabal discovered that it
injured him materially in Spain, with the nation as with
the Cortes ; and, equally fickle and presumptuous, he
abruptly changed his attitude and language. " Now,"
M. de Kayneval wrote on the 15th of November, " this
minister, who seemed disposed to do without France
altogether, repeats to all the world that it is upon
France alone that the firm establishment of the throne
of Queen Isabella depends ; that whatever eftbrts the
Spanish government may make, it will never bring the
civil war entirely to a close unless the French cabinet,
while still confining itself within the limits of the
stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance, lends it a sin-
cere and effectual aid." But this clamorous conver-
sion, imposed by necessity, was more apparent than
real ; after all, it was upon England that M. Mendizabal
relied, being ready to assure her aid by conceding
everything that the English cabinet might require.
On the 4th of December 1835, M. de Rayneval wrote
to the Duke de Broglie : "I have just ascertained
with certainty, but under the seal of the most pro-
found secresy, that the difiiculty of introducing into,
and passing through the Chambers a custom-house
bill, has determined M. Mendizabal to conclude a treaty
of commerce with England, taking advantage, on this
I. 2
148 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
point, of the latitude wliicli the Eoyal Statute has left
to the crown ; that this negotiation is carried on be-
tween M. IMendizabal and Mr. Yilliers alone, without
letting any of the officials of the Secretary of State's
department into the secret; that for the necessary
writings they employ a private secretary, whom M.
Mendizabal has brought from England ; in fine, that
the greater part of the articles are already drawn up,
and that M. Mendizabal has ordered the necessary
powers to be prepared for signing the act which he
has clandestinely arranged. I pray the King's govern-
ment to forward to me its instructions on this subject
as speedily as possible, and I await your answer with
impatience." The answer anticipated the request.
Aware, on his part, of the negotiation in progress at
Madrid, the Duke de Broglie had, on the 28th of
November, instructed M. de Rayneval to remhid M.
de Mendizabal that all existing treaties assured to
France, in Spain, the treatment of the most favoured
nation. The ambassador was called upon to explain
to the Spanish minister that it was not merely nominal,
but actual equality that we claimed, by equivalents
calculated to satisfy French commerce. Finally, he
was ordered to announce to him that if commercial
arrangements were concluded between England and
Spain from which France was excluded, the treaty of
the Quadruple AlHance would thereby receive a blow
which perhaps Spain would speedily repent. This
announcement, solemnly repeated on the 12th and
19th of December \ arrested the pending negotiation;
> See Historic Documents, No. VIII.
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 149
but the general position was, in consequence, rather
aggravated than alleviated. M. Mendizabal more
than ever regarded England as his support, while the
English cabinet looked upon M. Mendizabal and his
party as those from whom their Spanish policy had
the most to expect.
M. Thiers had scarcely entered on power, when a
proposition came from London which occasioned him
some surprise. The English cabinet, which had re-
jDudiated intervention when the moderate party and
M. Martinez de la Rosa governed Spain, now took
the initiative in that movement when M. Mendizabal
had become minister. It proj)osed to the French
government to march a corps d'armee into Spain, and
to occupy certain valleys in the Basque Provinces,
amongst others that of Bastan, while English forces
should take possession of St. Sebastian and the har-
bour of Passages ; an arrangement which would en-
able the Spanish army, then commanded by General
Cordova, to pursue the insurgent Carlists to extre-
mity, without caring for the points occupied by its
allies. I have not before me the actual text of the
English proposition, nor of the answer returned by
M. Thiers, on the 18th of March 1836. He formally
rejected it, not without regret, as he admitted himself
some months later in a debate of which this question
became the object, but with ample reason according
to my opinion. I find in a desjoatch addressed by
M. de Rayneval to M. Thiers, on the 31st of March,
details which prevent any misconception as to the
true motive and character of the English proposal. " I
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150 DISMEMBER]MENT OF THE
had been informed," he says, " by Mr. Villiers of the
new part which England was preparing herself to play
in the affairs of Spain, and of the part she proposed
to you. He has not concealed from me that the first
idea of this project proceeded from hmiself; but he
refrained from saying that M. Mendizabal was aware
of, and approved of it, which nevertheless appears to
me beyond all doubt. I foresaw the negative reply
of the King's government ; and as it was natural to
suppose that before acting, the cabinet of London
would assure itself of the consent of Spain, which
the language of M. Mendizabal in no way implied, I
persuaded myself for a moment that this project
would not be followed up. But I was soon unde-
ceived. Scarcely had I received your despatch, than
we ascertained here, at once by an English courier
and by an express from General Cordova, that the
British government had not only taken the resolu-
tion of interfering directly in the war against the
Pretender, but had already adopted measures, and
issued the necessary orders on this subject. The
astonishment of the public was great at seeing the
English cabinet, without any pre\aous indication, thus
suddenly change its system, and M. Mendizabal act
in the same manner, by the accejotance, not to say the
den;and of those foreign succours, which only a short
time since he so disdainfully rejected. Queen Chris-
tina had some slight intimation of this affair two daj^s
before the opening of the Cortes. She said to M.
Mendizabal that she would not accept the direct aid
of England, unless France consented to contribute
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 151
liers. As soon as she was informed that all was ar-
ranged, and even, as it may be said, carried into
execution, without her consent, and in some degree
without her knowledge, she evinced the most violent
irritation, to such an extent, that for two da^^s she
refused to see M. Mendizabal She accused
him of having failed in his duty towards her and the
state by a clandestine negotiation, and of ha\dng ren-
dered himself guilty of treason by furnishing the
English with the opportunity, which they had long
sought, of taking possession of some of the ports of
Biscay I have been enabled to judge myself
of the dissatisfaction of this princess I have
had, on the same subject, two conversations with M.
Mendizabal. He has anxiously endeavoured to per-
suade me, that the project in question was settled in
London without his knowledge. At the same time
he endeavoured to exculpate himself from the re-
proach of inconsistency by accepting foreign inter-
vention. He assumed that the name could not be
given to the present proceeding of England, and that
we were to blame in persisting to see intervention in
the military operation proposed to us by the British
cabinet. After listening to the explanations I thought
it my duty to give him as to what had passed in Paris
on this topic, he again took up the question of inter-
vention properly so called, and this time with the air
of a man who had only weak scruples against such a
measure."
In this state of minds at Madrid, London, and
Paris, the refusal of intervention, pronounced in the
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152 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
terms and ^vith the reserve employed by M. Thiers,
amounted merely to an adjournment of the question ;
clear and positive for the present, it did not confine
itself to the freedom of action which a judicious govern-
ment should always preserve ; it distinctly allowed
glimpses of its anticipations, and of the chances of a
contrary resolution. " With whatever name it may
be covered," he wrote to M. de Eayneval, on the 30th
of A^^ril, " within whatever limit it may be proposed
to restrain it, even to the occupation of the Bastan,
armed intervention is still repulsed, at this moment,
by the same considerations which \x]) to this point
have prevented us from consenting to it. Without
any prejudgment on the changes which diiFerent cir-
cumstances might sooner or later produce in our
determination, we feel bound to declare, that as long-
as things remain in their present state, any attempt
to obtain from us an armed co-operation would prove
fruitless. Such steps, which, like those already taken,
could not fail to become public, would amount to gra-
tuitous imprudence, since, while bringing into new
light the distress of the Queen's government, and
exposing it to a mortifying refusal, they could only
produce the effect of weakening still more its remains
of moral strength. Its friends, therefore, cannot too
strongly advise abstention from this course."
The permanence and progress of the two scourges
which desolated Spain, civil war and the spirit of re-
volution, rendered this forbearance in Madrid, and
this expectant reserve in Paris, more and more diffi-
cult. In the Basque Provinces, the Carlist bands and
GOVERNMENT rAllTY. 153
the royal troops, while combating with ineffectual
animosity, gave themselves up mutually to revolt-
ing cruelties, nearly always tolerated, and sometmies
commanded by their chiefs. Fresh partisans of the
rebellion, even more audacious than the first insur-
gents, overran Spain in every sense, spread terror
even to the gates of Madrid, and seemed to be pro-
tected in their erratic courses, alternately by the weak-
ness of the authorities and the favour of the populace.
At the same time, plots of secret societies and demo-
cratic passions burst forth in the provinces of the
south, at Barcelona, Valencia, Malaga, Seville, Cor-
dova, and Cadiz; raising in all quarters the cry of
'■''Long live the Constitutmi 0/ 1812 !" and leading on
every side to scenes of bloodshed. Impotent to re-
press these excesses, the Spanish government at one
moment endeavoured to palliate, at another to appease
them, by adopting measures agreeable to the liberal
and systematic reformers, — such as the suppression
of all the religious corporations, the closing of the
convents, the sale of their property, the repeated dis-
solution of the Cortes, in which the moderates predo-
minated, and their convocation according to more
democratic laws, which nevertheless brought back the
same party in a majority, or in a close condition to
re-establish one. Men soon exhaust themselves in
exercising the double trade of daring innovators, or
rulers without strength. M. Mendizabal fell. M.
Isturitz succeeded him ; more moderate and delibera-
tive, and more mdependent of English influence ; but,
despite his good intentions, nearly as ineffective in
15 4 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
putting an end to the civil war, in re-establishing
order in the state, in the finances, in the streets, and
in securing the future of the constitutional monarchy,
by rendering real and practical for all Spaniards the
rights and guarantees which it had promised them.
Even in Madiid, on the 17 th of July and the 3rd of
August, revolutionary anarchy exhibited itself, and
would have triumphed there from that time, but for
the energy of a man, destined to be for a moment its
conqueror, and speedily its ^dctim. Being informed
that an assembly of national guards, horse and foot,
had met on the Prado to proclaim the constitution of
1812, General Quesada, Captain-General of Castille, a
rigid disciplinarian, an excellent soldier, and a staunch
Spaniard, repaired thither about ten o'clock in the
evening, with an escort of only twenty carabineers,
and exulting in the opportunity of displaying his
authority and courage in the presence of rebels,
apostrophised them instantly thus : — " You are pol-
troons and assassins; you are not men. I am tired
of these games of women and children. I want
battle and blood. Let those who desire the constitu-
tion select from all these houses that which suits
them best; let them occupy it, and I undertake to
dislodge them vnth these twenty soldiers. You have
hii-ed men to kill me, but I defy you aU." " All were
silent," wrote M. de Bois le Comte, who had just
arrived at Madidd, whither he had been despatched
by M. Thiers, and who gathered these details from eye-
witnesses. '" Well,' added General Quesada, 'what
are you doing there ? Why have you come?' Some
GOVERNMENT TARTY. 155
officers replied, ' We heard the generale beaten, and
we assembled in consequence: are we to disperse?'
' No, keep together, on the contrary, for I am deter-
mined to exterminate you once for all.' The national
guards were divided amongst themselves : some had
revealed the plot to the authorities, and promised
their assistance for the maintenance of order. When
Quesada summoned them to keep their word, they
excused themselves timidly. ' Go, go,' he said,
' you mean well, but you are cowards ; go your ways,
for you impede me.' All the national guards retired
gradually, and the Prado was evacuated. Towards
one in the morning, Quesada went to the ' Plaza
major.' He found the national guards there, accom-
panied by some grumblers. ' I require your quarter,'
he said to the guards ; ' which will you prefer, to
surrender or defend it ? Take your choice, it is the
same to me. If you mean to keep it, fight at once.'
The national guards yielded up the quarter, which
was immediately occupied by the Queen Regent's
regiment.' " '
Few generals were so energetic or fortunate in the
suppression of revolts as General Quesada, who evi-
dently could not always expect the same success.
Arriving one upon the other at Paris, these new evi-
dences of the lamentable state of Spain excited in
the government the most contrary impressions and
intentions. The adversaries and partisans of inter-
vention. King Louis-Philippe and M. Thiers, found
1 M. de Bois le Comte to M. Thiers ; despatch of the 22ik1
of April, 1836.
156 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
in them decisive reasons in support of their respective
policy. According to M. Thiers, civil war was the cause
of all the evils of Spain ; the Carlist insurrection alone
fomented revolutionary terrors and passions. Let the
civil war be extinguished, and Spain would become
governable; since the authority of Queen Isabella
was not in a condition to stifle the contest, it belonged
to France to accomplish that work. By the treaty of
the Quadruple Alliance, she was pledged to do so.
Moreover, the interest of France commanded it as
much as that of Spain. The France of 1830 could
not suffer the triumph of Don Carlos in the latter
country. In the opinion of King Louis-Philippe, on
the contrary, the more the civil war and anarchy con-
tinued to display themselves obstinately in Spain, the
less ought France to take upon herself to bring it to
an end. Whatever might be her successes at first,
she would undertake an impracticable work; neither
the Carlist insurrection nor the anarchy in Spain were
superficial accidents, momentary and easy to be sub-
dued. Both found in the traditions, manners, and
2:)assions of the Spaniards, deeply-seated roots, and for
a long time they would spring up again incessantly,
and with increased vigour, when foreigners attempted
to repress them. It would therefore not be in a hasty
expedition of war, but in a long occupation, and in a
close association with the Spanish government, that
France would find herself involved. Far from pre-
scribing such a line of conduct, French interests abso-
lutely interdicted it. France had enough to do to
establish order and liberty at home. On her own
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 157
account she had nothing to fear from the Carlist insur-
rection in Spain, which, in any case, would be in no
condition to attempt aught against us. Besides,
despite its momentary triumph, it was very probable
that this insurrection would not ultimately succeed,
and that in the midst of varying chances, gloomy
trials, and protracted efforts, the constitutional govern-
ment of Queen Isabella might triumph in the long
run. But that it was for Spain herself to reach this
end, for she alone could accomplish it. In this France
ought to assist, but not to take the lead. The treaty
of the Quadruple Alliance imposed no such necessity
on us. We had already fulfilled and exceeded the
obligations contracted, by the indirect aid we had
already given, and were still giving, to the Queen of
Spain. We were not called upon, as was the Kesto-
ration in 1823, to exhibit beyond the Pyrenees proofs
of political boldness and of the fidelity of our army.
If we embarked in a direct and extended interven-
tion, similar to that of the former epoch, we should
doom ourselves either to retire speedily, leaving Spain
a prey to incalculable disorders, or to assume for an
indefinite period the responsibility of her government
and of her future destiny. The King neither ought,
nor would he consent to impose such a burden on
France.
An attempt was made to reconcile the two lines of
policy. The King agreed that the indirect succour
aiforded to Spain should receive new extension.
Arms and munitions of war were forwarded. The
foreign legion, already in the service of Queen Isa-
158 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
bella, had been reduced by its campaigns to 2500
men ; it was arranged that it should be augmented to
6000, by recruiting in France, in the name of the
Spanish government and its agents. A French
general of reputation (General Bugeaud, and even
Marshal Clauzel were spoken of) was to be appointed
to the command of this corps, with which some
Spanish regiments were to be associated, but it was
to remain officially under the orders of the general in
chief of the Spanish army. M. Thiers, on his side,
appeared to content himself with this development of
indirect co-operation, and M. de Bois le Comte, who
at this precise epoch was despatched to Madrid where
M. de Rayneval had fallen seriously ill, was instructed
to announce to the Spanish cabinet that the French
government would go no farther. In rendering
account to M. Thiers, on the 9th of August 1836,
of his arrival at Madrid and of his first interview
with M. Isturitz, " I began," he wrote, " by telling him
in the most decided and unqualified manner that he
must renounce all idea of direct intervention; that
the King's government saw with regret that, in spite
of all we had represented on the impossibility of our
adopting that course, the Spanish cabinet had never
abandoned the hope of one day persuading us to
it; that I must destroy that illusion, which had
exercised a flital influence, for by always recurring to
that perspective as a last resource, he and his ministry
had prevented the royal cause from developing its
full energy and from employing all its means."
But the most determined words suffice not to settle
GOVERNMENT TAHTY. 159
questions and to dissipate hopes which have been
lono; broodino- in the minds of nations. On the 12th
of August 1836, three days after he had commu-
nicated Avith M. Isturitz, in the terms I have just
quoted, M. de Bois le Comte again wrote to M. Thiers :
" The Spaniards are so accustomed to see us interfere
in their affairs, and reguLate their disputes of succes-
sion, from the days of Henry of Transtamare to those
of Philip v., Ferdinand YIL, his father, and Queen
Isabella, that the idea of our finally adopting the
same course now is so profoundly received, that it
can with the greatest difiiculty be eradicated from
their minds. They believe that they should let us
say what we please, and that we shall inevitably 'vvind
up by direct intervention, not being able to tolerate
in Spain either revolutionary anarchy or the restora-
tion of Don Carlos. I have found this conviction in
M. Isturitz and the Queen Regent, and in her whole
court ; to combat it, I have employed the full force of
the expressions which your Excellency used to con-
vince me of the firm resolve of the government to
refuse, at all tmies, direct intervention. I believe I
have at last persuaded Queen Christina and M.
Isturitz, and have made them comprehend that they
must seek their safety in their own energy, and con-
sider us henceforward as their most powerful prop,
but no longer as the vital principle of their cause.
But this impression which I have been enabled to
produce on the Queen and her cabinet, is not received
by the public. The coincidence of my arrival with the
success of the Carlists, and with the proclamation in
IGO DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
Arragon and in Andalusia, of the constitution of 1812,
has inspired all minds with a confidence that I was at
last the herald of the intervention so anxiously de-
sired. Some even say that I announced it positively;
others, that I proclaimed a measure which would
inevitably lead to it."
It was necessary to emerge from this position, which
held minds in uncertainty — at Paris in action, and at
Madrid in expectation; to choose, in fine, between
indirect assistance and direct and complete interven-
tion. The discussion was renewed in the council,
and became daily more animated and clear. The
King thought he had a right to complain that in the
execution of the measures of indirect aid to which he
had recently consented, the stipulated limits had been
exceeded; the recruiting for the foreign legion, fixed
at 6000 men, already, he said, amounted to 8000, and
was still actively going on, not through the medium of
General Alava, as had been arranged, but by the aides
de camp of the Minister for War himself. Marshal
Maison. Questions, explanations, and retorts, suc-
ceeded each other incessantly in the council, in
which six of the ministers coincided with M. Thiers,
and one only, the Count de Montalivet, with the King.
The two lines of policy were in presence and ap-
proached a crisis, both supported by a sincere con<
viction, and relying, one on the urgency of existing
circumstances, and the desire of Spain evidently pro-
nounced in favour of intervention ; the other, on
prospective considerations and the feeling of France,
which clearly showed itself opposed to the measure.
GOVERNMENT TARTY. 161
" Nothing can incline the King to intervention," said
M. Thiers one day to his Majesty, " and nothing can
lead me to renounce it."
In the meanwhile news reached Paris that, on the
12th of August, at St. Ildefonso, where the Regent and
the young Queen then resided, the two regiments on
duty — one of provincial militia, the other of the Guards
— suddenly broke out into insurrection, marched uj^on
the palace of La Granja, and clamorously proclaimed
the constitution of 1812. Queen Christina, with re-
markable courage and self-possession, vainly opposed
to this sedition her personal influence and resistance.
In the absence of all effective force, she was compelled
to give way, and finally authorized these troops " to
swear the constitution until the assembly of the
Cortes." On the 13th of August, in the square of
St. Ildefonso, officers and soldiers took the oath. On
the 14th, a similar insurrection broke out in Madrid.
General Quesada suppressed it for the moment ; but
on the 15th, when what had taken place at St. Ildefonso
transj^ired in the capital, the movement became irresis-
tible ; the Isturitz cabinet broke up, and a new ministry
composed of old partisans of the constitution of 1812,
was forced on the Queen Regent, under the presidency
of M. Calatrava. On the 17th of August, the two
Queens re-entered Madrid, the Cortes, which had been
on the point of assembling, were dissolved, and on
the 21st of August a royal decree convoked new ones
for the 24th of October, according to the system
prescribed by the constitution of 1812, and to bring
it into operation.
VOL. IV. M
162 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
As I have spoken of General Qaesada, and liis
attitude in presence of sedition, I shall here repeat
textually what M. de Bois le Comte communicated on
the 30th of August with reference to his death and
character. It is the lawful right of great hearts
sacrificed to savage violence, that the remembrance of
their last moments should be preserved with respect,
for the glory of their names, as well as for the instruc-
tion of the living. The stoic Thrasea, condemned to
death by Nero, said to his son-in-law, Helvidius Pris-
ons, when ordering his veins to be opened: " Behold,
young man ! you are born in times when the soul re-
quires to be fortified by firm examples." ^ We have seen
days when such examples were as necessary in France
as in Kome under Nero. Those days are far removed
from us; but even now, and sheltered from mortal
dangers, it is well to know how to preserve our honour.
" The first idea of the revolutionists on becoming
masters of the capital," says M. de Bois le Comte,
" was to prevent the escape of Quesada. Warned too
late, he took the road to Burgos, and had scarcely
entered on it, when he was followed by a crowd of
the militia. He soon discovered that he could not
escape their pursuit. Having reached Hortaleza, one
league from Madrid, he took refuge in a house. The
soldiers had already arrived. A little girl saw him,
and asked if he wished to speak with the parish priest.
" Undoubtedly," replied he, "I require the priest, for
I am about to die." Resigned to his fate, he traversed
* "Spectejuvenis; in ea tetnporanatus,et quibusfirmare animum
cxpediat constantibus exemplis." — Tacit. Annul, lib. xvi. cap. 35.
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 163
the chamber with rapid steps, without seeking to con-
ceal himself, and passing his hand through his hair,
according to his habitual gesture. The militia-men
dared not to attack him hand to hand ; they fired on
him through the bars of the mndow ; the baU entered
his body. He looked on them, saying, ' If you wish
to kill me you must fire a second time ; once is not
sufiicient." Several shots then followed; they broke
open the door, and pierced him with swords. Tlie
fury of the murderers glutted itself in a thousand
atrocities perpetrated on his still breathing body and
continued on his corpse. Thus fell a true Spaniard,
extreme in his good qualities as in his faults ; a fiery
soldier of the faith in 1823 ; an anarchical promoter of
the overthrow of M. Zea Bermudez in 1833; having,
under all conflicting circumstances, avowedly attacked
and repressed, with unswerving energy, the same
boasters and bravado, — the Carlists, the men of the
clubs, and the men of the revolution. He saw his fate,
and marched to it without illusion, hope, or anxiety.
Singly he restrained the revolutionary movement at
Madrid and disarmed it, when the Queen's cause
encountered shipwreck on another point and swept
him away in its fall."
The murder of Quesada, the flight of the principal
leaders of the moderate party, the sanguinary clamours
which were raised agaiust them, the intelligence from
the provinces, which announced almost every where
the same excitement, threw the honest and peaceable
population into consternation filled with alarm. " I
do not believe in a reign of terror in Spain," M. de Bois
M 2
164 DISMEMBERMENT OF THE
le Comte wrote to M. Thiers, " but minds are power-
fully stirred up. Not a newspaper has yet condemned
the murder of Quesada, committed six days ago. Not
one has dared to raise a doubt on the perfect spon-
taneity with which the Queen has accepted the con-
stitution. The editorship of all the moderate journals
has been changed; there is not at this moment in
Madrid a single opposition paper. As to a Carlist
journal, nobody has ever thought it possible to esta-
blish one. With such popular habits, it is difficult
to exercise a government here, based upon publicity
and free discussion As to us, the intelli-
gent section of the revolutionists would like to con-
ciliate France, and entreat her support. The savage,
ignorant portion, which predominates in the streets
and barracks, and unfortunately also in the secret
societies, from whence this movement springs, affects
to brave us ; and for the last few days you hear per-
petually repeated in the coffee-houses of Madrid this
sentence, which has become proverbial : — ' Ea ver
aJiora, lo que haran esos picaros de Franceses.^ ^ We
shall see now what these French rogues will do.' " ^
Perplexity increased in the council, already so dis-
turbed, when all these particulars successively reached
Paris. To whose advantage would intervention hence-
forth tend, supposing it should be adopted? What
government were we going to support in Spain?
Would Queen Christina remain Regent? What atti-
tude would the Eno-lish cabinet assume towards the men
'to'
1 Despatches of M. de Bois le Comte, of tlie 17th and 21st of
August, 1836.
GOVERNMENT PARTY. 165
who brought back the constitution of 1812 by violence ?
M. Mendizabal, to whom it had seemed so partial, was,
according to all accounts, the principal fomenter of
the insurrection of St. Ildefonso and of Madrid. The
future of Spain was charged vnth dark clouds and
storms in the darkness. More determined than ever
not to involve in them France and her government,
the King demanded that the troops assembled on the
Pyrenees should be removed, to render it quite clear
that they could not enter Spain in aid of revolu-
tionary power, and of the obscure contingencies it
seemed to develop. The cabinet formally refused
this measure, declaring that it would be a decided
and open disavowal of intervention. " We must
break the ice," said M. Thiers; the King will not
consent to intervention; we wish it; I retire." His
colleagues, with the exception of M. de Montalivet,
seconded his resignation. " Gentlemen," said the King,
"it is then understood that the cabinet is dissolved.
I request you not to speak of it, and to remain at
your posts while I look for your successors." No
doubt or complaint could be raised. The King and
his advisers separated in consequence of a profound
disagreement on a serious question, which would
be carried before the Chambers and the country.
Each exercised an indisputable privilege, guaranteed
by their mutual influence and dignity in the govern-
ment of the state.
M 3
1G6 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
CHAPTER III.
MY ALLIANCE AND EUPTUEE WITH M. MOLE.
MY RELATIONS WITH COUNT MOLE. FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE
6th OF SEPTEMBER, 1836. DIFFERENT SENTIMENTS OF MY POLITICAL
FRIENDS. FROM WHAT MOTIVES AND ON WHAT CONDITIONS I JOINED
THE CABINET, ITS FIRST ACTS. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ALGERIA. —
EXPEDITION TO CONSTANTINE. MARSHAL CLAUZEL. THE COM-
MANDANT CHANGARNIER. GENERAL TREZEL. ILL SUCCESS OF THE
EXPEDITION. RETREAT OF THE ARMY. CONSPIRACY OF STRASBOURG.
PRINCE LOUIS BONAPARTE. HIS FAILURE AND EMBARKATION AT
l' ORIENT. MOTIVES OF THE CABINET FOR NOT BRINGING HIM BEFORE
THE TRIBLTTALS. OPENING OF THE SESSION OF THE CHAMBERS.
ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE. DEBATE ON THE
ADDRESS. PROSECUTION OF THE CONSPIRATORS OF STRASBOURG BEFORE
THE COURT OF ASSIZES AT COLMAR. ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED.
BILLS PRESENTED TO THE CHAMBERS. ON THE DISJUNCTION OF
CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCESSES ; ON THE PLACE OF TRANSPORTATION ;
AND ON THE NON-REVELATION OF PLOTS AGAINST THE KING'S LIFE,
ON THE DOTATION OF THE DUKE DE NEMOURS, — PRESENTIMENTS OF
KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE ON THE FUTURE OF HIS FAMILY. THE BILL ON
DISJUNCTION REJECTED BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, THE CABINET
BREAKS UP. DIFFERENT ATTEMPTS TO FORM A NEW MINISTRY. THE
KING SENDS FOR ME. MY PROPOSITIONS AND ENDEAVOURS, THEY
MISCARRY. — I RETIRE, WITH MM. DUCHAtEL, GASPARIN AND PERSIL,
M. MOLE FORMS THE CABINET OF THE 15tH OF APRIL, 1837.
(1836—1837.)
Long before the crisis exploded, I had left Paris
with my mother and children to pass some weeks in
Normandy, at first at Lisieux, and subsequently at
the seat of the Duke de Broglie. I wished, even in
WITH M. MOLE. 167
the eyes of the idle gossips, to remain a stranger to
the fall of the cabinet, and to avoid finding myself
engaged in any of the combinations connected Avith
the selection of its successors. I was bent on pre-
serving, in this future, my entire liberty. The public,
who had been surprised by the fall of the cabinet of
the 11th of October 1832, felt, ^vithout regretting it,
the retirement of that of the 22nd of February 1836
to be sudden, and seemed weary of ministerial crises.
From this conviction, and my o^vn choice, I found it
convenient to keep aloof.
An attempt was made to change my plan. I re-
ceived from Count Mole an invitation to visit and
converse with him. I declined the overture, and he
understood me, for he wrote thus from Acosta on
the 18th of August : " On my arrival I found your
answer. I should be grieved to cause you the
slightest disturbance, and I hasten to tell you so. I
shaU myself be moving about in the neighbourhood
of Paris until the session recals me there. You
know without doubt that all the resignations have
been tendered and accepted. The telegraphic des-
patch announcing the events at St. Ildefonso has
changed or adjourned ever3rthing."
There were many reasons and chances why M.
Mole should succeed M. Thiers. In 1830 he had
held, with favour from the King and the public, the
post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since the
Spanish pohtics began to agitate people's minds, he
had openly declared against intervention. His name,
his social position, his experience of the great
M 4
168 MY ALLIANCE AND EUrTUKE
functions of government under the Empire and the
Restoration, his personal merit, the prudent tone and
charm of his conversation, his dignified and polished
manners, gave him high consideration with the party
of order, and seemed to point him out expressly for
the conduct of foreign affairs . He was ambitious,
and he had a right to be so. M. Bertin de Veaux,
who knew him well, and was a competent judge, often
said to me, " No one surj^asses M. Mole in the great
intrigue of politics. There he is full of activity, long
foresight, skilful solicitude, discreet regard for indi-
viduals, arid of becoming ingenuity without display.
There is pleasure in being connected with him." He
then added, with a smile, " more pleasure than safety."
In truth, M. Mole was reproached with being exclu-
sively occupied with himself and his personal success,
and of forgetting too easily his associates and what
they had a right to expect from him.
I had no old intimacy with M. Mole. Before the
Restoration, when he was grand judge, minister of
justice, and in favour with the Emperor Napoleon, I
had sometimes met him in society; amongst other
places, at the house of Madame de la Briche, his
mother-in-law, and also at that of Madame de Re-
musat, but he was then cold and silent. I was
young, and of the liberal opposition; we saw each
other without becoming acquainted. Under the
Restoration, and Avhen he joined the cabinet of the
Duke of Richelieu as Minister of Marine, we had
more frequent communication, but without attaining
habits of familiarity. I was connected Avith M.
WITH M. MOLE. 169
Decazes, who thought he had reason to complain of
M. Mole, and this misunderstanding extended to
their friends. The Revolution of 1830 brought us
more closely together, and both in the first cabinet
of the government of July, and during the admin-
istration of M. Casimir Perier, we thought and acted
nearly always in unison, but still without close and
personal attachment. While the cabinet of the 11th
October 1832 lasted, M. Mole was habitually, and in
accordance mth his position and character, in the ranks
of the advocates of order. Nevertheless, he separated
himself from the ministry in some circumstances
which were considered decisive, and which seemed
to us to require immoveable resolution ; amongst
others in the course of the great trial instituted
in the Chamber of Peers against the insurgents of
April 1834. He entertained, also, in respect to our
foreign relations, if not a distinct policy, at least a
political tendency opposed to that of the cabinet, and
particularly of the Duke de Broglie. He held less
closely to the English alliance, and seemed more
disposed to seek the friendship of the Continental
courts. From these various causes a certain cold-
ness sprang up between us.
But in 1835, after the attem2:)t of Fieschi, and
especially in 183G, on the fall of the cabinet of the
11th of October 1832, the most friendly and
habitual relations were formed between M. Mole
and me. He was sedulous to cultivate them. We
often met at the house of the Countess de Castellane,
one of those persons the most admirably adapted to
170 MY ALLIiVNCE AND KUPTUKE
bring together men she wished to unite, as she could
equally have succeeded in embroiling them, had
such been her object. Animated, but attractive and
gentle, of an original turn of mind, easy and fertile,
without displaying any pretension beyond the desire
of pleasing and amusing, full of art, yet apparently
natural, seductive, while seeming to be interested
and charmed, comprehending and enjoying every-
thing, — literature, the fine arts, and politics, — and
with the habitual air of caring for nothing beyond
the pleasure of indulging in the conversation, or of
promoting the enjoyments or interests of those she
sought to attract to her drawing-rooms, or win over
to her views. Her circle was limited; comprising
some men of the world, some distinguished by genius,
with a few foreigners, diplomatists and travellers.
Conversation was unrestricted at her parties. To-
wards those she had reasons for wishing to please, she
knew how to practise graceful, affectionate, and re-
fined distinctions. I was included in these, with the
avowed and not inconvenient object of establishing
habits of friendly intelligence and agreement between
M. Mole and myself In this she succeeded without
difficulty, for at that period, and on the questions in
the order of the day, there was no discord between us.
We mutually aided in the duration and transactions
of M. Thiers' s cabinet, estimating them nearly always
in the same spirit, and mth similar conjectures as to
the future.
I was at Broglie when the resignation of M. Thiers
became a public fact, and was announced in the
WITH M. MOLE. 171
Moniteur of the 26tli of August. I immediately re-
ceived two letters, dated on the same day, one from
M. Bertin de Veaux, the other from M. Mole. " My
dear friend," M. Bertin de Yeaux began, " I have
told you several times through your son, and once
through the Duke de Broglie, not to appear in Paris.
The fate of M. Thiers was then uncertain, and I did
not wish that he, or any one else, should be able to say
that you had come to precipitate his fall. To-day,
the Moniteur has spoken, and the course must be
changed. Your presence now will surely be useful ;
it is even necessary, for in such critical circumstances
minutes are precious. Hasten, then, to return. Be
assured that I consider your interest as my own, and
that I would not advise you to what I should abstain
from myself." M. Mole said to me: " You will now
comprehend the reasons which made me wish to see
you. I received this evening, at Acosta, a letter
from the King, urging me to repair to him. I have
just left him, having stated my desire to come to an
understanding with you before proceeding farther.
Moments are valuable. I hope you will think so
with me."
Looking upon things as they actually stood, my
position was simple. It was on the Spanish question,
and to evade intervention that the new cabinet was
forming, and I was opposed to intervention. The
question was to return, internally and externally,
towards the policy, principles, and persons, of the
cabinet of the 11th of October 1832. The King de-
manded my co-operation in an important conjuncture,
172 MY ALLIANCE AND RUrTURE
both as regarded himself and the country, and in
which I approved of his resistance to the preceding
cabinet. He required, he said, in the Chamber of
Deputies, either M. Thiers or me, and on this point
the public, as well as the Chambers, were of the same
ojDinion. No concession was required from me, no
obstacle was raised Avhich might have furnished me
with a pretext for refusal.
Amongst my political friends, sentiments were
divided. Some regretted that I should resume office
so soon ; I had too recently left it ; experience of the
mischief accruing from a deviation from the policy of
resistance had neither been sufficiently long nor com-
plete; the reaction which called us back towards that
system was only commencing ; during my retirement,
my position had increased with repose; it would
advance and consolidate itself still more if I remained
for an interval unconnected with power, and I could
resume it at a future period with all the authority
I might require. This, amongst others, was the
opinion of M. Duvergier de Hauranne, who displayed
at that time towards me tokens of sagacity, fidelity,
and, I may add, of moderation, which nothing that
has since passed between us either can or ought to
prevent me from acknowledging. Others, and I may
say the greater part, considered my return as natural
and necessary. I had not sought it; I was entirely
a stranger to the fall of M. Thiers ; I had not even
opened my mouth on the question before which he
succumbed. They would not admit that I could deny
myself to the King's desire when my opinion accorded
WITH M. MOLE. 173
with his, or to the opportunity of adding his rank
and influence to the political party I espoused. To
this opinion, some added, that on resuming office I
should explicitly demand the lead. " I do not think
I deceive myself;" thus wrote to me from Nismes the
president of the royal court, M. de Daunant, one of
my oldest and most judicious friends, " in telling you
that you are generally expected to be at the head of
the new cabinet. The serious difficulties that pre-
viously existed have, without doubt, been augmented
by the wavering policy adopted during the last six
months. A longer trial would in all probability have
completed its discredit ; but I hope that this unhappy
essay, and the confidence you inspire, -will rally round
you honest and courageous men." The Duke de
Broglie, with his unaffected and magnanimous gene-
rosity, expressed the same idea to me with increased
energy : " The new ministry," he wrote, " ought to re-
ceive you as leader, not only in fact, but in name ; at
all events, you will have the responsibility, and should
possess the command. A ministry with two presidents,
— one nominal, the other actual, — has in reality none;
therein is comprised an inevitable and rapid dissolvent."
In fine, nearly all accorded in thinking and saying, —
that to restore the policy for a moment laid aside, the
new cabinet ought to present it under a new aspect.
M. Duchatel wrote to me, on the 23rd of August, from
La Rochelle, where he was presiding over the General
Council : " If a crisis comes on unexpectedly, you
should use your freedom. I cannot write to you in
detail ; but my opinion is, that two things are neces-
174 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
sary: first, not to revive the past, but to create anew;
secondly, to be most careful in all that is substituted."
The Duke de Broglie was even more exj^licit : " The
new ministry ought to be truly new, and it should be
the fruit of new combinations which may surprise the
public. If it were to present itself as a resurrection,
as a weakened and faded counter-trial of the ministry
which displaced itself six months ago — as that same
ministry, in fact, less such important members as
Thiers and liumann, — such an attempt would be
mortal; it would not last for a month."
This was the j^recise source of my discontent. To
construct a new cabinet would be to separate myself
from the Duke de Broglie. I had recently resigned
office vdth him, M. Duchatel, and M. Persil. To re-
turn with two only of my associates, without the most
intunate of the three, and to take upon myself liis post
as President of the Council, no matter what might
be the weight of political motives, and of the advice
of the Duke himself, would convey an appearance of
desertion and infidelity, which grieved and deeply
wounded me.
King Louis-Philippe, in this emergency, committed
an error, too common on the part of princes, who,
to spare themselves a momentary embarrassment of
conversation, frequently assume airs of lightness, in-
difference and oblivion. If, after the resignation of
M. Thiers, the King had invited the Duke de Broglie,
not to resume office, but to converse "with liun, in
honest sincerity, on the position, and to discuss its com-
patibilities and exigencies, with the necessity of new
WITH M. MOL^. 175
combinations of persons in maintaining the old policy,
he would have found him perfectly disinterested in
mind and heart, and without any desire to return to
power, much more disposed to decline the offer if made
to him, and ready to give the new cabinet his loyal
support. The King did not thoroughly know the
Duke de Broglie : on this occasion he neither sent for
nor wrote to him, nor bestowed on him any token of
confiding and affectionate remembrance. The Duke de
Broglie felt himself wounded, as did his friends around
him ; nobly wounded, as becomes such lofty souls ; the
sentiment had no influence on his conduct. Neither
his devotion to the King, nor our mutual friendship,
nor the sincerity of his concurrence in our common
policy, wavered for a single moment. But nevertheless
the cabinet about to be formed found in this an un-
pleasant incident, and I myself a source of regret,
which prejudicially influenced my resolutions.
I started for Paris, and on my arrival received this
note from the King : — " My dear former Minister, I
understand you are at last in Paris. I have im-
patiently expected you, and I pray you to let me see you
as soon as you can. I wish it could be this evening,
should my note reach you in time. If you find it too
late to come to Neuilly to-night, I propose to you to-
morrow morning at ten o'clock, or the Tuileries at
twelve. You know the sentiments I entertain for
you," I saw the King; I had interviews with M.
Mole and M. Duchatel. I collected the impressions
and opinions of those of my friends who were then in
Paris, and I confined myself to demanding that my two
176 MY ALLIANCE AND RUrTURE
colleagues in the cabinet of the 11th of October 1832,
M. Duchatel and M. Persil, should re-enter into the
new ministry, the one as Minister of Finance, the
other as Chancellor; that M. de Gasparin should be
called to the Ministry of the Interior, in which he
already discharged the functions of Under Secretary
of State; and that M. de Remusat should replace him
in the latter post, I thus secured to my political
friends half of the seats, and two of the most important
departments in the cabinet. For myself, I only
desired to resume the ministry of Public Instruction ;
and on these terms I accepted the alliance ^Yith
M. Mole, as minister for Foreign Affairs and President
of the Council.
These arrangements were dictated by my personal
feelings rather than by political utility and foresight.
In consenting to return to office without the Duke de
Broglie, I was bent on not procuring for myself any
advance of position, any gratification of ambition or
self-love ; and I flattered myself that in a council thus
formed, having in the Ministry of the Interior two
of my staunchest friends, I should exercise upon the
general government of the country, although confined
within my own modest department, all the influence
which the policy I represented could require. I de-
ceived myself. There is no such thing as ruling
effectually by factitious combinations and indirect
means. Setting aside my affections, and consulting
policy alone, I had to choose between two lines of
conduct. I might refuse to enter a cabinet which I
had not formed myself, and which, moreover, wanted
WITH M. MOLE. 177
several of the principal elements which had given to
the ministry of the 11th of October 1832 its strength
and authority. Or I might propose for my object to
reconstruct that cabinet at some future day, or an-
other equivalent to it; and I might have remained
until then in that position of watchfulness and expec-
tancy which affords to personal difficulties time for
obliteration, and to reconciliations the opportunity
of being brought about under the pressure of necessity.
This would have been, perhaps, the most effectual
and prudent course. When I decided to enter the
cabinet of M. Mole, I ought to have surmounted my
own internal feelings and embarrassments; I should
have taken the ministry of the Interior, therel^y
directly assuring to myself the power, the responsibility
of which would evidently weigh upon me, and should,
have transferred my two friends, M. de Remusat and
M. Gasparin, one to the ministry of Public Instruction,
and the other to that of Agriculture, Commerce, and
Public Works; two departments for which they were
respectively well qualified. This would have been a
more natural and powerful combination than that to
which I had given my concurrence. But I yielded to
my personal mipressions, to the strong instances of
the King, to the urgency of the position, and also to
a tendency in my nature to accept too readily whatever
cuts short the difficulties of the moment, — to exact
too little as to means, and to have too much confidence
in success.
After my adhesion, and the official appointment of
the principal ministers, the cabinet still remained in-
VOL. IV. N
178 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
complete for several days. The departments of War
and Trade were not disposed of, which led to some
difficulty. Marshal Soult declined to resume the port-
folio of War under the presidency of Count Mole.
Several persons desired, not without reason, that the
Count de Montalivet should continue, as minister of
Commerce, a member of the cabinet. In the preceding
ministry, he alone had opposed intervention in Spain.
He possessed courage, activity, tact, and considerable
influence in the Chambers. But it suited him not to
accept a department inferior to that which he had
quitted, and in which his under-secretary of State,
M. de Gasparin, had just replaced him. The King,
moreover, preferred keeping M. de Montalivet near his
own person, and holding liim in reserve, that he might
► at need join any ministry whose tendencies he doubted.
General Bernard and M. Martin du Nord were named
for War and Trade ; both men of merit, able and use-
ful, but not called for by the public, who were weary
of being kept in suspense for fifteen days.
The first measures of the cabinet were well received.
The appointment of M. Gabriel Delessert as Prefect of
Police obtained general approbation in Paris. He had
exhibited rare courage in the outbreaks, and an inde-
fatigable devotion to order. His family and himself
decided with great reluctance, and from pure zeal for
the public good, to accept these delicate functions. He
was favourably regarded both for his comphance and
hesitation. Soon after the formation of the cabinet,
and at its recommendation, the King pardoned sixty-
two criminals under sentence for political offences.
WITH M. MOL^. 179
The ministers of Charles X., confined at Ham, MM.
de Chantelouze and de Peyronnet, in the first instance,
and a few days later, the Prince de Polignac and M.
Guernon de Ranville, were set at liberty, mthout any
of those restrictions which give to party passions a
useless and vulgar gratification, and under the single
condition, as regarded three of them, of remaining,
on parole, in residences selected by themselves. The
Prince de Polignac was banished from France for
twenty jz-ears. The relations of M. Mole with the
foreign cabinets and their representatives in Paris
commenced under auspices of good- will and reciprocal
confidence. I resumed my labours in the expansion
and improvement of public instruction in all its de-
grees. The elementary schools received many en-
couragements. A chair of general j)athology and
therapeutics was instituted in the faculty of medicine
at Montpellier. In presiding at the re-opening of the
lectures of the great normal school in Paris, I applied
myself to a clear definition of the character of public
teaching as settled by the State, by affirming that in
all its degrees, as already practised in the elementary
department, it ought to, and could, reconcile itself
with the privileges of liberty.^ I used strenuous en-
deavours, in the question of publishing, for the sup-
pression of spurious editions, both by legislative enact-
ments and negotiations with foreign powers. My
colleagues promoted with equal anxiety the legal and
liberal ameliorations which their departments required
' See Historic Documents, No. IX.
N 2
180 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
or admitted. The public, and the Chambers, then on
the point of re-assembling, followed with favouring ex-
pectation these first steps of a regular and enlightened
ministry. But two events, both unexpected, — the ill
success of the expedition against Constantine, and the
conspiracy of Strasbourg, — quickly and seriously al-
tered a position scarcely yet assured, and abruptly in-
volved the new cabinet in great struggles and dangers.
The preceding ministry had determined on and
prepared the expedition against Constantine. Marshal
Clauzel has affirmed that M. Thiers adopted his plans
of operation and conquest on all the important points
of Algeria, and promised him the full means of execu-
tion that they required. Authentic documents indicate
that the minister of War, Marshal Maison, had as-
sociated himself with this approbation and these pro-
mises, lea\ing, however, with regard to the expedition
against Constantine, something undefined " as to the
epoch when it would be convenient to undertake it,
and the fresh orders Marshal Clauzel might expect
before he entered upon action." When the cabinet of
the 22nd of Februar}^ 183 G fell, after its resignation,
officially announced on the 30th of August, Marshal
Maison wrote to Marshal Clauzel, " that the arrange-
ments settled were, on the whole, confirmed by inter-
views and verbal communications between several of
the King's ministers ; but that they had not yet been
made the subject of any deliberation in council, or re-
ceived the definitive sanction of the government ; that
it rested with the new cabinet to accord or withhold
that sanction, and, until then, nothing could be at-
WITH M. MOLE. 181
tempted, no compromise risked; that he must confine
himself within the limits of actual occupation, within
those of the eifective force at his command, and of
the legislative credits, or at least of the expenditure
prescribed and sanctioned." The retiring minister
of War thought only of relie\dng himself from the
responsibility of the projected enterprise, and of trans-
ferring it to his successors.
Marshal Clauzel was — and not without reason —
surprised, offended, and embarrassed. Anxiously
wishing to believe, and belie\dng himself authorized,
he had already commenced operations. From the
2nd of August 1836, he had given to General Eapatel,
his substitute ad interim in Algeria, full instructions,
which he also communicated to the minister of War,
for the execution of what he called " the system of ab-
solute rule in the ex-regency, definitively adopted, on
my proposition, by the government." He had deter-
mined the distribution of troops throughout the whole
territory of Algeria ; put m motion those destined to
occupy the province of Constantine ; prescribed, both
as regarded the means and persons, the measures to
be adopted on the scene of action itself, and announced
those which had already been transmitted, or were
about to be forwarded, from Paris by the minister of
War. All these preparatives and orders were kno^vn
throughout the Kegency, to the Arabs as well as to
our own soldiers, at Constantine and in the city of
Algiers ; and Marshal Clauzel wound up his instruc-
tions to General Rapatel in these words : " By the
9th of October, at the latest, I shall repaii' to Bona to
N 3
182 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
assume direction of the military operations against
Constantine." Disturbed, but not arrested in his de-
signs, by the evasive and dubious letter addressed to
him on the 20th of August by Marshal Maison, he
replied thus on the instant : " Will you and the Pre-
sident of the Council be so kind as to recollect that
you pressed me to set out for Algiers, that I took
leave of you eight days before my departure, and that
you said nothing to me of the council, in which the
plan of operations to be carried out in Africa was to
be discussed? You will find, when you recall that
circumstance, that I deserve no reproaches." As soon
as Marshal Clauzel was made acquainted with the
formation of the cabinet of the 6th of September,
he addressed to it despatches upon despatches, en-
treaties upon entreaties, demanding authority to enter
on the campaign. " Constantine," he wi'ote on the
24th of September, " is an admirable field for colo-
nization ... it is there that we should strike
and establish ourselves. All is ready. ' Shall we
alone delay ? Shall we not act when time and cir-
cumstances call upon us?"
Inheriting thus a position already defined and press-
ing, the cabinet at once adopted two resolutions:
the one, to withdraw the general government of
Algeria from the paths in which Marshal Clauzel had
entangled it, and to remove the Marshal himself as
soon as convenience allowed; the other, to sanction
his prosecution of the enterprise against Constantine,
and to furnish him with the means promised by the
antecedent ministry. One of these resolutions was
WITH M. MOLE. 183
clearly indicated to him, the other officially announced
on the 27th of September by the new minister of War,
General Bernard, in these terms ; "It has appeared
to the King's government that a plan so vast as that
laid down in your letter of the 2nd of August to
General Rapatel, could not be realized without an
increase of expenditure which it does not feel justified
in incurring, at least for the present. It is also felt
that the exalted conceptions you have submitted re-
quire the most serious attention and call for the ma-
turest reflection. For these reasons it would have been
desired that the expedition against Constantine should
have been suspended for the present; but his Ma-
jesty's government is impressed with the consequences
that might ensue, in such a country as Africa, and in
the present spirit of the native population, from the
postponement of an expedition publicly announced,
and when the prospect of that undertaking has already
rallied several tribes to our cause .... It is there-
fore because the ex23edition to Constantine has been
proclaimed, and for this reason alone, that the King's
government now permits it ; but merely as an operation
necessitated by events exclusively special, and not
intended to lead as a consequence to the execution
of the general plan of occupation which you recom-
mended ... It must be well understood, Monsieur le
Mar^chal, that this expedition is to be carried out with
the means (in numbers and material) now actually at
your disposal. But you mil observe that these means
are superior to the allotment projected in your general
plan of occupation, and at least equal to those named
n' 4
184 IklY ALLIANCE AND KUPTURE
in your instructions to General Rapatel of the 2nd of
August last."
Even before the receipt of this letter, Marshal
Clauzel had ceased to mistake his position. He was
well aware that the new cabinet was opposed to the
line of conduct in Algeria which, under the old
ministry, he had caused to be adopted. Neither had
he met on the ground itself all the facilities he anti-
cij)ated. For six months pre\dously, and in the
prospect of a conquest which he held for certain, he
had appointed, as Bey of Constantine, the lieutenant-
colonel of Spahis, Youssouf, who pledged himself, by
his secret understanding in that province, to secure
the fall of the Turkish Bey Achmet, and the almost
spontaneous surrender of the place. While waiting
for the expedition, the Marshal had despatched Yous-
souf to Bona to prepare local arrangements, but the
success of his envoy was very incomplete ; with re-
gard to the le\y of native auxiliaries, the collecting
of baggage mules, and the probability of capitu-
lation, the results fell far below his promises. The
Marshal sent his aide-de-camp, M..de Ranc^, to de-
mand reinforcements; General Bernard replied that
the expedition against Constantine was aU that the
cabinet authorized, and as the provinces of Algeria and
Gran were to remain on the defensive, it was from
them that the reinforcements, if required, should be
forwarded to Bona. Then commenced a controversy
between the minister of War and the Marshal, governed
on both sides by a tacit reference to the general plan
of conquest and occupation, which the one refused to
WITH M. MOL^. 185
adopt, and the other persisted in following. According
to M. de Ranee, not 30,000, but 45,000 men were re-
quired for the operations against Constantino and the
other provinces of Algeria. After a month of some-
what confused correspondence. General Bernard ob-
served to the Marshal that he had 11,478 effective
men at Bona, which gave 10,602 present under
arms ; that is to say, the force he had at first demanded
for the expedition. He sent him in addition the
necessary funds to pay 4000 native auxiliaries for six
weeks, and finished by saying : " Now, Monsieur le
Marechal, either the means at your disposal are those
which you yourself pronounced sufficient, and as your
instructions to General Rapatel have induced the
King's government to believe, or in your real judg-
ment they are not so. In the first case, you have no
reason to demand reinforcements; in the second, as
you are merely permitted, not commanded, to under-
take the expedition, you can, if you please, abandon
it. It depends therefore solely on yourself to decide
on this point according as you find the means you
possess sufficient or insufficient."
To bestow on Marshal Clauzel a distino-uished mark
of confidence at the same time, and when he was left
free to settle the question he had provoked himself,
the Duke of Nemours embarked at Toulon to take
part in the expedition to Constantine, as in the pre-
ceding year the Duke of Orleans had accompanied
that to Mascara. And, to combine foresight with
confidence. General Damremont, an officer of acknow-
ledged merit, who commanded at Marseilles, received
186 MY ALLIANCE AND KUPTUEE
confidential orders to proceed to Algiers, and to hold
himself in readiness to assume the government of the
province if, as a rumour prevailed, Marshal Clauzel
should tender his resignation.
The Marshal, who I believe had never hesitated,
formed his resolution at once. Having reached Bona
during the last days of October, he wrote on the 1st
of November to General Rapatel, left in command at
Algiers : " Send me, by the return of the steam frigate,
the battalion of the 2nd light infantry commanded
by Changarnier, the officer I have remarked, and who
I promoted to be a lieutenant-colonel some months
since." General Rapatel obeyed his orders; the Com-
mandant Changarnier arrived at Bona with his bat-
talion, and on the 13th of November 1836, Marshal
Clauzel, taking mth him 7000 men of all arms, with
2000 native auxiliaries, and leaving at Bona a gar-
rison of 2000, already stricken by the autumnal
fevers, began his march towards Constantine.
For several days before his departure, the weather
was dreadful ; the rain fell in a deluge, the plains were
inundated, the snow covered the mountains. " These
are not the long rains of winter, but only fertilizing
showers which soon pass over," exclaimed those who
were enthusiastic in hope. " I have confidence in the
troops," wrote the Marshal; "I hope to inspire them
with the same sentiment, and I depart for Constantine,
Avhere I shall soon arrive." A few less sanguine
spirits, particularly in the military administration,
participated not in this feeling, and betrayed many
doubts as to the facility of the enterprise, the aj^tness
WITH M. MOLE. 187
of the moment, and the extent of our resources. But
the greater part of those present persuaded themselves
that they were entering on an expedition of assured
success, and ahnost on a party of pleasure. Much
reliance was placed on the assertions and promises of
Youssouf ; he was already looked upon and treated as
a powerful Bey ; some officers only complained of the
prospect that not a shot would be exchanged. The
sun had reappeared, and seemed to confirm by its
brilliancy these flattering expectations. The troops
marched, the advanced guard on the 9th of November,
Marshal Clauzel on the 13th. They had scarcely
been in movement for twenty-four hours when the
rain recommenced ; the rivulets became torrents ; the
soldiers advanced laboriously; many fell behind;
already some of the Arab auxiliaries deserted, carry-
ing away a small but precious portion of the very
limited supplies of the expedition. But the fine
weather returned ; for five days the army proceeded
without suffering and without resistance ; but on the
19th of November, when it reached the high table-
lands in the vicinity of Constantine, rain, snow, hail,
and cold once more came on with violence ; the
soldiers were unable to find on that fertile but denuded
soil a morsel of wood to cook their rations or dry
their clothes. At each passage of a torrent, at every
bivouac, numbers of men were left behind, perishing
of cold and fatigue, with spoiled or abandoned provi-
sions. " We were there exposed," said Marshal
Clauzel in his report, " to all the rigours of a winter
in St. Petersburg, while the ground, entirely broken
188 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
ujD, recalled to the old officers the mud of Warsaw."
On the 21st of November, the army at length ar-
rived before Constantine. The strength of the place
was instantly perceived, and how little it thought of
surrendermg. The red flag of the Arabs floated
upon the principal battery. As soon as our troops
were within range, a lively cannonade issued from the
ramparts. Achmet Bey, at the head of a numerous
cavalry, held the open country, and advanced to
attack the brigade of our advanced guard, which,
under the orders of General de Rigny, had occupied
the eminences {mamelons) of Koudiat-Aly, in sight
of the gate of Bab-el-Ouad. A bold and renowned
Kabyle chief, Ben-Aissa, commanded in the to'wn, as
the Bey's lieutenant. He executed a sortie with the
Turkish garrison, and joined in the attack on the
same brigade. The Arab horsemen and Turkish in-
fantry were valiantly repulsed, but mthout any other
result. Our forces were too weak to invest the place ;
no symptom of capitulation appeared; our ammuni-
tion and provisions were rapidly diminishing. Mar-
shal Clauzel resolved to attempt a vigorous assault
against the gates before which the two divisions of
his small army were encamped, — the only chance, if
there existed one at all, of carrying the place. The
Rummel, and the ravine at the bottom of wliich it
runs, separated the div^sions. On the 23rd, at three
in the afternoon, a soldier swam across the river,
carrying, in a small piece of oilcloth wrapped round
his head, the following note from the Marshal: —
" General de Bigny, at midnight I shall attack the
WITH M. MOLE. 189
gate of El-Kantara ; you mil assail that of Koudiat-
Aly." The two attacks, one led by the Marshal in
person and General Trezel, the other by General de
Rigny and Lieutenant- Colonel Duvivier, were made
with determined vigour, but without success. In the
first, General Trezel, " who exposed himself," said the
Marshal's report, " to the hottest fire, to regulate and
encourage the troops," fell by a ball which passed
through his neck. In the second. Lieutenant- Colon el
Duvivier was for a moment on the point of gaining
the place, but all who surrounded him, officers and
soldiers, were struck down and compelled to retire.
" By three in the morning the struggle had ceased,"
said one of the brave men present ; " the ordinary
silence was resumed, when the usual signal for the
last nocturnal prayer issued from the mmaret of the
principal mosque of Constantine. Verses of the
Koran, borne through the air, were repeated on the
ramparts by thousands of calm, resolute, and con-
fident voices. Our soldiers felt themselves compelled
to esteem their enemies."
At the same moment, under the Marshal's direction,
and in the obscurity of the night, the separated divi-
sions of the army placed themselves in motion to
unite in a single column, and to commence a retreat,
now evidently inevitable. The two corps formed pre-
cipitately; the ambulances were hastily loaded -with
wounded men, picked up on the very instant from
the ground on which they had fought, and with their
hurts scarcely bandaged. The assembly of all the
troops on the point fixed by the Marshal was not yet
190 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
completed wlien the sun rose. The garrison of Con-
stantine, apprised by the sentinels on the ramparts,
issued forth in detachments continually increasing in
strength, and eager to push forward their attacks. In
the midst of this disciplined agitation, the Commandant
Changarnier, who covered with his battalion the march
of the division conducted by General de Rigny to-
wards the point of concentration indicated by the
Marshal, perceived thirty or forty soldiers running
across the front of the Arabs in an attempt to rejoin
the French column. It was an outpost that had been
forgotten. Facing instantly about, Colonel Chan-
garnier led on his battalion to the charge, for the
rescue of these lost men, and recovered nearly all, but
not without losing a few of his own. Then haltuig
at intervals, as the ground favoured him, he re-
peatedly checked the Arabs, obstinate in pursuit,
and thus gained for the different corps sufficient
tune to unite and reorganize, according to the ]\Iar-
shal's orders, in a column of retreat. Towards eleven
the combined march began ; the battalion of the 2nd
light infantry continued to cover it ; the entire cavalry
of Achmet Bey appeared to be prej^aring for a general
charge. As soon as he saw their approach. Colonel
Chano-arnier threw his battalion into a square, ex-
claiming, " Soldiers, look on those men ; they are
6000 and you are 300 ; you see readily that the game
is unequal." Then, when the cloud of Arab pur-
suers approached within twenty paces, he ordered a
close, point-blank fire from two ranks, with loud
shouts of " Long live the King ! " His small force
WITH M. MOLE. 191
strewed the soil mtli men and horses. The Arabs
wheeled rapidly round. The Turkish garrison, which
had issued from Constantine without proAdsions, re-
turned to take their first meal. The French column
continued its march in good order; on the close of
that day, the 24th of jSTovember, when the battalion
of the 2nd light infantry took its place in the bivouac,
it was received with prolonged acclamations by the
whole army, and Marshal Clauzel himself addressed
the most cordial congratulations to Colonel Chan-
garnier. On the following morning, the 25th of
November, the march was resumed, and for five days
the retreat went on, incessantly harassed by the Ka-
byles, distressed by the scarcity of provisions, and
saddened by fatal incidents and deplorable losses;
but directed by Marshal Clauzel "svith the resolute
activity and firmness of soul which inspire troops
with confidence in their leader, resignation under
sufi*erings, and ardour . in peril. On the 1st of De-
cember the little force reached Bona. Marshal
Clauzel and the Duke of Nemours left that place on
the 6tli for Algiers, and on the 22nd the young
Prince re-entered Paris, esteemed by the whole army
for the calm courage he had evinced in his unassuming
character of volunteer, and prepared to lay before
the Kmg his father, with scrupulous reserve, a recital
of the mistakes, misfortunes, and heroic deeds of
which he had been a witness.
I cannot here deny myself the satisfaction of paying
a particular homage to one of the chiefs of that
expedition. General Trezel, my friend, and, in 1847,
192 MY ALLIANCE AND KUPTURE
my colleague as minister of War. This brave man,
as virtuous as he was valiant, had long served in
Algeria, and there, as elsewhere, had won a dis-
tinguished reputation for both qualities. But after
the check he sustained, on the 28th of June 1835, at
La Macta, against Abd-el-Kader, he himself requested
Marshal Maison to recall him; "for," said he, with
rare candour, " I can no longer promise myself the
confidence of the troops, and I shall submit without
a murmur to the full censure and severity which the
King's government may think I have deserved, hoping
that it will not refuse to reward the brave men who
have distinguished themselves in these two combats."
Nevertheless, this reverse, so nobly avowed, weighed
cruelly on him, and his heart was fixed on finding,
by still serving in Algeria, a chance of repairing it.
Being called in 1836 to the command of Bona, he
naturally took part in the expedition to Constantine,
and directed, under Marshal. Clauzel, the second
division of that small army. Arrived before Con-
stantine, he saw at once that with such scanty means
of attack there was no probability of success against
serious resistance. An assault was however spoken
of, and while it was preparing, he said to his young-
orderly ofiicer, to whom he bore confidence and
friendship, " My dear Morny, there are no human
means of entering into that town; many of us -wnll
be killed under its walls ; should I be amongst the
numljcr, which is probable, try to convey to my ^vife
what may yet remain of me. You will find in
my pocket a note for 500 francs; it is nearly all the
WITH M. MOLE. 193
money I now have." During the night of the 23rd
or 24th of November, when Marshal Clauzel endea-
voured to force the gates of El-Kantara and Bab-el-
Oued, General Trezel, entrusted with the attack on
the first, approached close to the rampart, vnth M. de
Morny by his side. The moon shone brightly ; they
were fired on. " My dear General," said the young
officer, "if we remain here we shall both infallibly
be killed ; as for me, I should be no great loss, but
if, as I scarcely think, an assault will be attemj^ted,
it would be a sad pity if you were not there." At
this moment, some men of the engineers passed close
to them, leading a mule loaded with shovels and pick-
axes ; a soldier and the mule were killed. Turning
towards M. de Morny, General Trezel said to hun,
" I believe really you are in the right ; but where
can we place ourselves while waiting the assault?"
At the very instant he fell with his face on the
ground. On turning towards him, M. de Morny per-
ceived a stain of mud on, his temple, and thinking
him dead, exclaimed with some impatience, " There,
I told him so ; he is killed because he would not
listen to me ; what absurd courage ! " As he was
endeavouring, with the aid of some soldiers, to place
him in a blanket to carry oiF his body, the general
came to himself and said, " Well ! what has hap-
pened ?" "How, General, you are not dead ? what
happiness ! " "I only fainted, and was unable to
speak ; but I heard you grumble and say I was dead :
I had only one anxiety ; the fear of being left there."
He was taken to the ambulance. A ball had gone
VOL. IV. o
194 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
through his neck, but being very small, it passed be-
tween the vertebra}, throat, and the carotid artery.
A musket ball would have killed him. He made the
retreat in Marshal Clauzel's calash, as calm and
thinking as little of himself as he had been under the
ramparts of Constantine. I take pleasure in record-
ing these reminiscences of that modest and incor-
ruptible servant of France. He had an indomitable
heart in a mean and insignificant body. To the
manly and, at the same time, diffident sunplicity of a
soldier more practised in obedience and command
than in discussion, he joined the respectful patriotism
of a citizen devoted to order and to the laws. He
had some of the prejudices but none of the weak-
nesses of his time. His firmness was not always
exempt from obstinacy, but when he deceived him-
self, no personal view, no sentiment of doubtful
purity mingled with his error. Duty was his law and
devotedness his passion. Wliether it were necessary
to compromise or to reserve himself, to mount to the
assault, or to retire from the world, neither emer-
gency found him hesitating, and he was equally pre-
pared for the efi'ort or the sacrifice. He has not
won the reno^vn of the Catinats and Faberts, and
he had neither their fortune nor genius in war ;
but in soul he was of their race, and I only render
him justice when I place him by their side. I return
to Marshal Clauzel, and to the consequences of this
unfortunate canapaign.
In the Chambers it became the subject of long
debates. The Marshal himself took part in them,
WITH M. MOLE. 195
without skill and with no just comprehension of his
own or of the general position. He was a warrior
eminent on the field of battle, but he continued what
the revolution and the empire had made him, a
patriot with habitual notions of Adolence and des-
potism, loving the greatness of France, and ever
ready to serve her with his sword ; but a stranger to
all other political views, and to every sentiment of
resj)onsibility in the bosom of liberty. He had been
obviously unprovident, presumptuous, light, too little
occupied with the fate of the men he commanded,
seeking pre-eminently his personal success, no matter
how weak were the chances, or how costly the price
at which it might be purchased. When he arrived
at Bona, under the shock of his repulse, and anxious
to soften the displeasure of the cabinet, he wrote con-
fidentially to General Bernard, while forwarding his
official report : "I shall declare to the government,
when it will and how it will, that the troops under my
command were sufficient for the expedition, and I
should either have taken or forced Constantine to
surrender, with a portion of those who were reduced
to a state of annihilation by the bad weather, if that
portion could have been united with the rest." When
the day of public debate came on, he could only
defend himself by accusing the government of with-
holding from him the necessary forces, and of pre-
paring to abandon Algeria; an absurd accusation, for
the cabinet comprised none of the men who had suf-
fered such an inclination to escape them; and I,
on the contrary, was one of those who, on every
o 2
196 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
occasion, had most strenuously advocated the main-
tenance and future of our possessions in Africa.
But the charge of indifference to the national great-
ness was the popular theme of attack, and to that
Marshal Clauzel looked for his point of support.
While this debate was in progress, he had ceased for
two months to be governor-general of Algeria. Fully
determined to repair the check received by France
before Constantine, and not to incur again the risk
of the mistakes that had led to it, we had, on the 12th
of February, 1837, recalled Marshal Clauzel, appoint-
ing as his successor General de Damremont, whose
high military reputation and sound understandmg
promised us for the general administration of Al-
geria, as well as for the sj^ecial conduct of the new
expedition, the double guarantee of which we stood
in need.^
The news of the disaster produced a lively emotion
in France, which would have been even more painful,
had it not been preceded and diverted by another
excitement, arising from an incident of a different
character. At the precise moment when Marshal
Clauzel reached Bona, and was preparing to set out
for Constantine, Prince Louis Bonaparte entered
Strasbourg, and endeavoured by a military insurrec-
tion to overthrow the King and the Charter of 1830.
On the evening of the 31st of October, the Minister
1 I insert amongst the "Historic Documents" (No. X.), a letter
■which General Damremont transmitted to me from Marseilles, on
the lOtli of December, 1836, before the failure of the expedi-
tion against Constantine was known, and in which, from that date,
he explained his views as to Algeria.
WITH M. MOLE. 197
of the Interior, M. de Gasparin, brought to me a
telegraphic disptatch which he had just received from
Strasbourg, dated on the preceding eve the 30th, and
which ran thus : —
" This morning, about six o'clock, Louis Napoleon,
son of the Duchess of St. Leu, icho had in his co7i-
Jidence the Colonel of Artillery Yaudrey, traversed the
streets of Strasbourg with a party of . . ."
The despatch stopped there, and the director of
the telegraphic lines, M. Alphonse Foy, had added
to it this note : " The words underlined are doubtful.
The mist which has enveloped the line neither allows
us to receive the end of the dispatch nor to clear up
the dubious passage."
We repaired instantly to the Tuileries, where,
a few moments later, the entire cabinet assembled.
We conversed, we conjectured, we weighed chances,
we drew up eventual instructions, we discussed the
measures to be adopted under various hypotheses.
The Duke of Orleans prepared to leave us. We re-
mained there by the King nearly the whole night,
expecting news which arrived not. The- Queen,
Madame Adelaide, the Princes, went and came, de-
manding whether anything further had transpired.
We slept from lassitude, and woke from impatience.
I was struck by the sadness of the King, not that he
seemed uneasy or subdued, but uncertainty as to
the seriousness of the event occupied his thoughts;
and these reiterated conspiracies, these attemj^ts at
civil war, republican, legitimist, and Bonapartist,
this continual necessity of contending, repressing, and
o 3
198 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
punishing, weighed on him as a hateful burden.
Despite his long experience and all that it had taught
him of man's passions and the vicissitudes of life,
he was and continued to be naturally easy, confiding,
benevolent, and hopeful. He grew tired of ha^dng
incessantly to watch, to defend himself, and of find-
ing so many enemies on his steps.
On the following morning, the 1st of November,
an aide-de-camp of General Voirol, commandant at
Strasbourg, brought us the end of the event, as also of
the telegraphic dispatch, and a detailed account of
the abortive attempt. From Switzerland where he
resided, and fi^om the waters of Baden to which he
often resorted. Prince Louis maintained in France, and
especially at Strasbourg, constant communications.
Neither amongst his adherents nor in himself did
anything promise encouraging chances of success.
A few old ofiicers, enthusiastic women without po-
sition in the world, retired functionaries out of em-
ployment, and scattered malcontents were not the
most elfective agents against a power which had
already lasted for six years; and which, in open day,
had conquered all its enemies, republicans, and legi-
timists, conspirators and insurgents. Prince Louis
was young, unknown in France by the army and by
the people. Nobody had seen him; he had done
nothing ; some essays on the military art, " Political
Reveries," a " Project for a Constitution ; " and the
praises of two or three democratic jom^nals were not
very powerful titles to the public favour and to the
government of France. He had his name, though
WITH M. MOLE. 199
even his name had remamed barren under a concealed
and entirely personal force ; but he had faith in him-
self and in his destiny. While performmg his duties
as a captain of artillery in the Canton of Berne, and
while publishing his pamphlets on which France be-
stowed little thought, he looked upon himself as the
heir and representative, not only of a dynasty, but of
the two ideas which had constituted the strength of
that djmasty, — revolution without anarchy and mili-
tary fame. Under calm, gentle, and unassuming
manners, he combined, a little confusedly, an active
sympathy for revolutionary enterprises and inno-
vations, with the tastes and traditions of absolute
power; and the pride of an exalted race, united in
his mind with the ambitious instinct of a lofty future.
He felt himself a prince, and he believed, with in-
vincible confidence, that he was predestined to be an
emperor. It was with this sentiment and m this
faith that, on the 30th of October, 1836, at six in the
mornmg, without any other support than a colonel
and commandant of a battalion, pre^dously won
over to his cause, he traversed the streets of Stras-
bourg, and presented himself at the barracks of the
4tli Kegiment of Artillery, where, after two short
addresses by Colonel Yaudrey and himself, he was
received with shouts of Long live the Emperor ! At
the same moment some of his partisans repaired to
the residences of the general commanding and the
prefect, and, failing to persuade them, left them in-
sufficiently guarded in their hotels. On arriving at
the second barrack, which he proposed to carry, the
o 4
200 MY ALLIANCE AND KUPTUKE
barrack Finckmall, occupied by the 4:6tli Regiment
of Infantry of the Line, Prince Louis encountered a
different reception. Forewarned in time, Lieutenant-
Colonel Talendier resolutely repulsed all efforts to
seduce the fidelity of the soldiers. Colonel Paillot
and the other officers of the regiment arrived, equally
loyal and determined. On the spot itself, the Prince
and those who accompanied him were arrested. The
report spread rapidly, and the insurrectionary move-
ments attempted in several corps, and on various
points of the city, ceased on the instant. The
General and Prefect had recovered their liberty, and
took the necessary measures. Of the known ad-
herents of Prince Louis in this enterprise of a few
hours, one alone, M. de Persigny, his confidant and
most intimate friend, effected his escape. The au-
thorities of Strasbourg, when sending their reports
to the King's government, demanded instructions as
to the fate of the prisoners.
We learnt, at the same time, that on the same day,
the 30th of October, at Vendome, a corporal of the
1st Regiment of Hussars, in garrison at that town,
had assembled at a public-house some of his com-
rades, and that they there resolved to sound " boot
and saddle " the following night, to seize the officers,
the civil functionaries, and to proclaim the republic.
Being apprised while their meeting was still going on,
the Lieutenant-Colonel instantly arrested the corporal
and his accomplices. The corporal, after killing Avith
a pistol-shot a quarter-master who was guarding him,
escaped, wandered about during the Avhole day in the
WITH M. MOLi. 201
environs of the town, and with a humbled spirit and
subdued heart returned at night to Yendome, to
surrender liimself. It has been frequently said, that
there was no connection whatever between this miser-
able bungle and the attempt of Strasbourg. The
coincidence unplies, and I have reason to believe, that
this conclusion is erroneous.
Our deliberation was short as to the conduct to be
adopted in regard to the prisoners. On ascertaining
the issue of the enterprise and the captivity of her
son, Queen Hortense hurried to France under an
assumed name, and pausing near Paris, at Viry, in
the house of the Duchess of Ragusa, from thence
addressed her maternal supplications to the King and
M. Mole. She might have spared them. The re-
solution of not bringing Prince Louis to trial, and of
sendino: him to the United States of America, was
already taken. This was the decided inclination of
the Kino;, and the unanimous advice of the Cabinet.
For myself, I had never served or lauded the Em-
jDcror Napoleon the First; but I respect greatness
and genius, even when I deplore their application,
and I cannot think that the claims of such a man to
the respect of the world descend with him into the
tomb. The heir to the name, and according to the
imperial system, to the throne of the Emperor Na-
poleon, had a right to be treated as of royal race, and
to be subjected only to the exigencies of pohcy. On
the 10th of November he was removed from the
citadel of Strasbourg, and taken by post to Paris,
where he passed several hours in the apartments of
202 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
the Prefect of Police, being visited only by M. Ga-
briel Delessert. Departing immediately for L'Orient,
he arrived there on the night of the 13th or 14tli,
and was embarked on board the frigate. Andromede,
about to sail for Brazil, touching at New York.
"When the frigate was on the point of getting under
way, the sub-prefect of L'Orient, M. Villemain, while
pajdng his respects to Prince Louis, and before taking
leave of him, inquired if, on arriving in the United
States, he should find, at first, the resources he
might require. " None," replied the Prince. " Well
then, my Prince, the King has ordered me to place
in your hands fifteen thousand francs in gold, which
you will find in this little casket." The Prince took
the casket, the sub-prefect went ashore, and the frigate
sailed.
Twenty-five years (and what years!) have rolled
on since that epoch. Their instruction is clear.
Twice — in 1836 and in 1840, — mth the perseverance
of faith and enthusiasm. Prince Louis Napoleon en-
deavoured to overthrow the constitutional monarchy ;
both times he failed, and at the outset. Li 1851, he
destroyed the Republic at a blow, and since that
day has reigned over France. The constitutional
monarchy was a regular and free government, which
gave guarantees for the true and complete interests of
France. The France which desired this in 1789, in
1814, and in 1830, has never concurred frankly with
its destroyers, and submitted to its fall in 1848 with
astonishment and alarm. The Republic commenced
in 1848 by anarchy, and led to nothing else. France
WITH M. MOLE. 203
accepted and supported the empire as a haven of
refuge against this anarchy. There are times when
nations are swayed pre-eminently by their ^vishes,
and others when they crouch signally under their
fears. As these dispositions prevail, they seek in
preference liberty or security. The first secret in
the art of government is, not to mistake the ruUng
desire of the people governed.
With respect to the accomplices of Prince Louis,
doubts arose as to the tribunal to which they were to
be committed. We decided for that which was not
the object of any popular objection, — the trial by
jury. This, I think, was a weakness and an error.
If ever enterprise bore the character of an attempt
against the safety of the state, it was assuredly this
of Strasbourg. It fell also, according to the Charter
and our constitutional traditions, under the privi-
leges of the House of Peers. The preceding cabinet
had recently sent before that court the assassin Ali-
baud, a matter in which there was no political com-
plication, and which involved no difficult question
either of principle or circumstance. That of the con-
spiracy of Strasbourg belonged much more naturally
to the same tribunal, and the step we had lately taken
with reference to Prince Louis furnished an ad-
ditional reason for sending his accomj^lices before the
Chamber of Peers ; for that court alone was capable
of appreciating the propriety of the step, and not
the less so of exercising equitable firmness in a ge-
neral judgment on the affair and its actors. As to
the inferior plot of Vendome, the course was clear.
204 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTUEE
Soldiers only were implicated in it, and they were
consigned to a court martial at Tours.
The session of the Chambers approached, and
seemed likely to open under varied auspices, mixed
with serene and cloudy prospects. Externally, the
general aspect of affairs presented nothing but what
was satisfactory. Peace was no longer endangered
from any quarter. The preceding dispute between
France and Switzerland on the subject of the re-
fugees, had led to a suspension of diplomatic relations
between the two countries ; but owing to the mode-
ration of both governments this alienation of good
neighbourship had ceased, the question was smoothed
down, intercourse was renewed, and the subordinate
incidents which had contributed to interrupt it no
longer retamed importance, except as supplying food
for the polemics of the opposition. While declming
intervention in Spain, we continued to fulfil, not only
scrupulously but zealously, the treaty of the Qua-
druple Alliance, and afforded to the government of
Queen Isabella all the indirect support we could
supply without engaging the French flag in her ser-
vice. This policy produced its fruits. The Carlists
protracted the civil war beyond the Pyrenees without
decisive success. In spite of their local victories and
their irruptions through Spain, the constitutional
monarchy held its ground, obstinately and effectually
defended. The Spanish radical party, possessed of
power, felt the responsibility which weighed heavily
and exclusively on their shoulders, and gradually
became enlightened and moderate in their rule.
WITH M. MOLi. 205
The new Cortes confirmed the regency of Queen
Christina, and were preparing modifications in the
constitution of 1812, calculated to render it less
dangerous to order and monarchy. By recognising
the independence of the American republics, the
Spanish government escaped from a weighty burden,
and placed itself in a condition to use all its energies
for the pacification of Spain herself. The confi-
dential negociations carrying on at Berlin and
Schwerin for the marriage of the Duke of Orleans
mth the Princess Helena of Mecklenburg promised
a successful issue. Taking all things together,
M. Mole after some months of administration, pre-
sented himself to the Chambers, having faithfully and
prudently put in practice the maxuns in the name
of which the cabinet had been formed, and having
already gathered from them flattering results. But
internally, the position was more complicated and less
promising. The expedition to Constantine and the
attempt at Strasbourg weighed on us, leaving serious
questions to be settled and difiicult duties to be dis-
charged, which could not fail to excite animated
debates.
On the 27th of December the King repaired to
the Palais Bourbon, along the quay of the Tuileries,
to open the session. The second legion of the Na-
tional Guard, which lined the road, lowered their
colours before him: he moved forward beyond the
door of the carriage to return the salute ; a shot was
fired; the ball grazed the King's chest, passed be-
tween his two sons, the Duke of Nemours and the
206 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
Prince of Joinville, who, with the Duke of Orleans,
were seated with him, and smashed a window on the
opposite side, the fragments of which slightly wounded
the two princes. The assassin was instantly seized,
mth great difficulty extricated from the indignation
of the populace, and carried, in the first instance, to
the guard-house of the Tuileries. The train con-
tinued its course, the King showed himself again at
the carriage window, replying with his hand to the
acclamations which greeted his passage. He arrived
at the Palais Bourbon, where the Queen, Madame
Adelaide, the Princess Marie, the Princess Clemen-
tine, the Duke of Aumale, and the Duke of Mont-
pensier, awaited his coming in the gallery of the
royal family. The report of the attempted assassina-
tion had already spread through the hall; anxious
and hesitating looks were turned towards the Queen;
all sat motionless and silent, as if anxious not to
excite her first alarm by visible emotion. The Com-
mandant Dumas, despatched on the instant by the
King, appeared in the tribune, and said to the Queen,
" Madame, the King is well, he is on the point of
arriving; the Princes are unwounded." They fol-
lowed without delay. The King ascended the estrade
and sat down. His three sons remained standing by
his side : some drops of blood stained their clothes.
For several minutes the cheers were enthusiastically
renewed, the whole assembly on theu' feet, members
of the Chambers and spectators crying " Long live the
King ! " and turning alternately from his Majesty to
the Queen. I never witnessed a disj)lay of public
ATITH M. MOLE. 207
emotion more animated and sympathetic. The King,
with unaffected self-possession, delivered a calm ad-
dress, filled with confidence for the future of France,
and only slightly alluding, in a few words, to the
recent attempt to which he had been exposed. " Sup-
ported by your loyal co-operation," he said, in con-
clusion, "I have been enabled to preserve our country
from new revolutions, and to save the sacred depo-
sitory of our institutions. Let us continue to in-
crease our united efforts; with every successive day
we shall witness the augmentation and firm esta-
blishment of order, confidence, and prosperity; and
we shall obtain all the advantages a free country has
a right to look for, which lives in peace under the
aegis of a national government."
I saw and interrogated the assassin. He was a
young man of coarse and vulgar appearance, rude
and embarrassed, dogged rather than excited, an-
swering questions curtly, with as little intelligence
as emotion, as if desirous of hearing nothing more
said on what he had done, and rejecting with stupid
pride every appeal to repentance. It was soon found
that his name was Meunier, that he led an idle and
unsettled life, sometimes as an inferior clerk, at others
as a workman, and that he was nephew to an honest
merchant of Paris, who, recognising him with bitter
mortification, spoke of him to the investigating ma-
gistrates as of a weak, unsettled character, addicted
to bad habits, vicious reading, engaged in secret so-
cieties, and incapable of resisting the influence of his
associates. The ofiicial examination and report fully
208 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
confirmed these statements. From routine, rather
than from a just estimate of the circumstances, Meu-
nier was sent before the Court of Peers. A few days
after his attempt, the police discovered and seized, in
the house of a mechanician named Champion, an
infernal machine, fully prepared. Being instantly
arrested, with three others compromised by the first
interrogatories, the mechanician strangled himself in
prison.
It was under the imj^ression of these sinister inci-
dents that the first acts of the Chambers, the prepa-
ration and discussion of their addresses, were carried
out. There are salutary alarms and vexations ; these
latter were not, as I think, without their influence on
the character of the ensuing debate, which was un-
usually grave and restrained. Parties still found
therein an opportunity of repeating their ordinary
assertions and accusations. Some again told us,
with regard to Spain, that we attempted an impos-
sibility in seeking to establish order with liberty by
the hands of a power the offspring of revolution:
others, — that since 1830, there had been no essential
difference between the various cabinets and their
policy; that a single will governed, in a single and
uniform system, and that, from this will and this
system, neither France nor Spain could expect any
good result. These worn out and monotonous attacks
had little effect on the Chamber of Deputies, which
bestowed scanty attention on them; and the debate,
laying aside revolutionaiy themes, concentrated itself
in the question essentially political, — namely, in the
WITH M. MOLE. 209
controversy between the two cabinets of the 2ncl of
February and the 6th of September, which had
formed opposite opinions on the interests and duties
of France in her relations with Spain, and one of
which advocated direct intervention, while the other
limited itself to indirect assistance. M. Thiers,
M. Passy, M. Sauzet, and M. Odilon Barrot, on the
one side, — M. Mole, M. Hebert, M. de Remusat, and
myself, on the other, discussed, for four days, these
opposite lines of policy, seriously, energetically, and
sometimes even with a degree of acrimony, but with-
out violence or subterfuge, with convictions and fore-
thought equally sincere though essentially diiferent,
like men who can bear the weight of power under the
eyes of their adversaries, free in spirit, and expect-
ing the judgment of their country. No unforeseen
deviation, no intemperate incident disturbed the de-
bate; the Chamber was enabled to determine the
points at issue in perfect freedom ajid tranquillity of
argument. It pronounced a verdict in favour of the
opponents of direct intervention, and events confirmed
the decision. France abstained from interfering in
Spain; nevertheless, Don Carlos was driven out, the
constitutional government and Queen Isabella re-
mained erect, and when France, to substantiate the
policy she had always proclaimed, had occasion to
appeal to the confidence and friendship of Spain, of
her Queen, her Cortes, and her ministers, that confi-
dence and friendship were not withheld.
A trifling fact in this debate, scarcely noticed by
the public, nevertheless deserves to be recalled, as,
VOL. IV. p
210 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
for some time, it was not without influence on our
external position. During the sitting of the 14th of
January 1837, in the Chamber of Deputies, while
speaking of the danger on account of which our in-
tervention in Spain was specially demanded, namely,
the probability that absolutism would triumph Avith
Don Carlos, M. j\Iole uttered this sentence, Avhich,
being in a Avritten speech, was textually copied in
the " Moniteur : " " We detest absolutism, and pity the
nations who are so little aware of their own strength
as to submit to it." If M. Mole had spoken to
France alone, his words would have been received,
at that time, mth almost unqualified approbation ;
but all Europe heard him, and diplomatists are as
susceptible as they outwardly appear indifferent; and
there was something of forgetfulness in a minister of
Foreign Aifairs speaking thus openly before the sub-
jects of absolute governments with whom we were
living, and -wished to live, on friendly terms. The
ambassadors of Austria and Russia vehemently re-
sented this language. They interchanged sentiments
bitterly in their private conversations, and Avrote to
their courts saying that the words implied " an
appeal to rebellion addressed to all nations." Nothing
could be more remote from M. Mole's idea; but his
usually clear and well-governed mind had not always,
when he spoke in public, an exact appreciation of the
bearing of his words, and he was sometimes uncon-
scious of their full effect. Those we have alluded
to infused for several months a degree of suspicion
and coldness into his relations Avith more than one
WITH M. MOLE.
211
of the great powers and their representatives in
Paris.
In ^vinding up this great debate we touched on
the quarrel with Switzerland as to the refugees ; and
the expedition to Constantine was also introduced,
but in a secondary light. The Swiss question was
settled. The opposition expatiated with complaisance
on a police incident connected with it ; but the pre-
ceding minister of the Interior, the Count de IMonta-
livet, with loyal courage, assumed the responsibility,
and deprived the attack of its direct object and
interest. On the expedition to Constantine all dis-
cussion was postponed for the present, it being de-
stined to form the subject of a special inquiry and
report in connection with the bill for supplementary
credits. Two matters alone, the Spanish intervention
and the conspiracy of Strasbourg, materially occupied
the Chambers and the public. Precisely as the Cham-
ber of Deputies pronounced on the first by voting
its address, we were informed that in the court of
assizes at Colmar the jury had decided the second
by a full acquittal of all the accused. The absence
of the principal author of the attempt, and the step
which had liberated him from prosecution, had sup-
plied the defenders of his accomplices ^vith the argu-
ment, and party passions with the pretext, which
led to such a defeat of truth and law. The two
leadino; advocates, M. Ferdinand Barrot and M. Pas-
quier, summed up their whole pleading in this unique
and specious manner of acting upon minds, some
of which were weak and intimidated, others sanguine
212 MY ALLIANCE AND rxUPTURE
and determined beforehand. " Gentlemen," said
M. Ferdinand Barrot, " there was a prince amongst
the accused, and, to use the terms of the indictment,
royal clemency has set him at liberty, thus adding a
noble action to your history. As I arrived here, this
prince was approaching the soil of America, for him
the land of hope and happiness. Already his spirit
is more calm and peaceable ; he breathes in tran-
quillity ; already a mother can console him and dry
the tears her child has shed. But behold, on this side,
the sorrows and anguish of captivity, the accumula-
tion of misfortunes ! You, citizens, the organs of law
and not the supporters of force, you will prove your-
selves worthy of the mission confided to you. You
will acquit, and your sentence will inscribe itself in
the fairest ^^ages of our judicial annals, for there is a
principle established in our habits ; it is this, ' equal
justice to all.' " Under the shadow of this strange
oblivion of facts, and of a confusion of ideas and duties
not less extraordinar}^, the Bonapartist and revolu-
tionary opposition, which had many adherents in
Alsace, displayed itself mth passionate boldness. It
filled the hall of trial, crying out to the jiny from all
sides as they retired to deliberate, " Acquit them !
acquit them ! " and when the verdict of acquittal was
declared, the transports which burst forth, and the
rejoicings that followed, far exceeded the expression
of sympathetic pity ; they amounted to an explosion
of the triumph and hopes of a party.
It would have been the height of blindness and
imbecility to have mistaken the grave importance of
WITH M. MOLE. 213
this position, and the duties *it imposed on us. In
the prosecution and repression of political conspiracies
and outrages, the King's government had, from the
beginning, practised a degree of persevering mo-
deration and gentleness, to which, I do not hesitate
to say, no parallel can be found in history. In no
instance had any offence of this exclusive character,
and untainted by any other crime, been followed by
the infliction of capital punishment. On the pre-
ceding eve, when we learned that the court-martial
at Tours had condemned Corporal Bruyant, the author
of the insurrection of Vendome, to death, the King
commuted his sentence to deportation. By simply
banishing Prince Louis Napoleon to the United States,
he had performed an act of noble and intelligent
equity. And this very act was taken advantage" of
to weaken his government, by withholding from it, in
spite of the evidence of facts, the commonest protection
of the laws, while, even in the bosom of the army, in-
subordination and defection were encourao;ed. We
should have blushed for ourselves if we had accepted,
in scandalous sloth, these victories of party passions
over public duties ; these legal falsehoods, this weak-
ness of moral habits, from which hostile factions could
not fail to extract increased confidence and audacity.
After mature deliberation, and with one accord, we
presented three distinct bills to the Chambers, to mo-
dify or complete the penal code, and to prevent, as far
as the power of the laws could extend, a repetition of
similar disorders. The object of the first was to
render the penalty of transportation efficacious, by
p 3
214 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
making it real. A pla<fe was fixed on, in a particular
district of the Isle of Bourbon, where the punishment
was to be undergone, and the necessary funds were
allocated for that establishment. The second enume-
rated certain crimes and offences named in the penal
code and subsequent laws, and provided that, in case
of i^articipation and complicity between soldiers and
civilians, the prosecutions should be distinct, and the
soldiers handed over to courts-martial, while the
civilians were delivered to the ordinary tribunals.
The third restored three articles of the penal code of
1810, and punished, with certain legal exceptions, the
non-revelation of j^lots formed and crimes projected
against the life or person of the King. The first two
of these biUs were presented to the Chamber of De-
puties, and the third to the Chamber of Peers.
We did not confine ourselves to these directly re-
pressive measures. We resolved to deal with a
question which had remained in suspense since 1830,
and one of great, though indirect im2:>ortance, as re-
garded the monarchy, — the question of dotation to
the different branches of the royal family, an element
of monarchical stability, and consequently of strength.
This subject had hitherto been considered so delicate,
so many attacks had already been launched against
it by the opposition, and so many prejudices spread
amongst the public, that, since 1832, no succeeding
cabinet had ventured to ask from the Chambers the
allocation of one million, which, according to the terms
of the treaty concluded between France and Belgium
on the 28th of Jul}- in that year, should have been pro-
WITH M. MOLE. 215
posed in the following session, as a dowiy for the Prin-
cess Louisa, who had become Queen of the Belgians.
On the 26th of January 1837, we presented two bills to
the Chamber of Deputies, one to fulfil the engagement
contracted with the King of the Belgians, the other
assigning to the Duke of Nemours, who had reached
his majority in the preceding year, the domain of
Rambouillet, with certain portions of the state forests.
On these two bills, particularly the last, we did
not in the slightest degree deceive ourselves as to the
obstacles they would encounter and the contests they
would excite. The most inveterate enemies of King
Louis-Philippe would hesitate to repeat to-day, with
regard to his personal fortune, and his avidity in mat-
ters of private interest, the inconceivable errors and
odious calumnies of which that prince has been the
object. The facts, accounts, papers, all the details
and documents of his private life, have been exposed
to the most complete and unlooked-for publicity, and
submitted to the most rigorous investigation. This
trial has redounded to his honour, and the falsehoods
which were heaped round his throne have vanished
before his tomb. But in 1837 these lies were uni-
versally spread abroad, hawked about, and credited.
Many who retailed, believed them. Those who taxed
them with exaggeration and hostility were scarcely
certain of their own thoughts, and amongst the rejec-
ters some were not without a measure of uneasiness.
King Louis-Philippe was himself one of the chief
causes of this state of feeling. No prince, I would
even say voluntarily, no man has more frequently con-
p 4
216 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
veyed the semblance of faults he possessed not, and of
errors he never committed. He had been a partici-
pator in so many unforeseen disasters, had lived in
the midst of so many ruins, and had himself suiFered
so many privations, that he ever retained an extreme
mistrust of the future, and a lively apprehension of
the fatal chances which might still reach him and
his family. At one time he recalled, with just
pride, the days of his wandering and impoverished
life ; at another he spoke of it with a bitter reminis-
cence, and a presentiment filled Avith alarm. In
September 1843, during the first visit of Queen Vic-
toria to the Chateau d'Eu, while walking one day in
the garden of the castle, in front of some wall-trees
covered ^vith fine peaches, the King gathered one and
ofi^ered it to the Queen, who wished to eat it, but was
at a loss how to peel ofi* the skin. The King took
a small knife from his* pocket, saying, "One who has
been a poor devil like me, living on forty sous a day,
always carries a knife ! " And he joined in the
general smile at this allusion to his poverty. On an-
other occasion I happened to be alone Avith the King.
He spoke to me of his domestic position, of the future
of his family, of the chances that still weighed upon
them ; and he grew warm while entering into the de-
tail of his expenses, his debts, and the absurdities in
which people indulged as to his property. He took
me suddenly by both hands, and said with extreme
emotion, " I tell you, my dear mhiister, that my
children Avill want bread." When under the empire of
this feeling, lie anxiously souglit, for himself and for
WITH M. MOLE. 217
those belono-mo; to him, some 2:uarantees for the future,
and at the same time expressed his solicitudes and
complaints mth a freedom and intemperance of lan-
guage which sometimes astonished his friendly audi-
tors, supplied his enemies "with suspicions in support
of their credulity or inventions, and inspired the public
"svith that mistrustful bias against whicli we had to
contend when, in the name of justice and sound policy,
we asked for the dotations which the King seemed to
solicit as a greedy and anxious plaintiff.
We did not therefore feel, on the introduction of
these bills, particularly easy as to the result; but the
coldness mth which they were received, in the
Chamber of Deputies, and "without, exceeded our ex-
.pectation; ^nd this coldness extended itself to the
three penal enactments we proposed at the same time.
Our adversaries congratulated themselves on the
ground of attack we offered ; our friends appeared em-
barrassed by the position in which we placed them,
and saddened by the effowfc we demanded. We recog-
nized all the omens of a difficult and dangerous combat.
It was on the bill relating to prosecutions in case of
crimes committed conjunctively by soldiers and ci"vi-
lians that the struggle began in earnest. This bill had
nothing in it contrary to the essential principles of law,
either in a moral or an equitable sense ; it established
no exceptional tribunal, it removed no one from his
ordinary judges, while its political seasonableness was
evident. But it was in disaccord with the maxims
and traditions of French jurisprudence ; it presented
certain difficulties of execution, mostly specious, with
218 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
a few that were real though not insurmountable. The
lawyers fastened on this discussion, and protracted it
for seven days. Out of thirty-one speakers who took
part in it, twenty were magistrates or advocates. They
were much divided amongst themselves; eleven at-
tacked the bill, and nine defended it. But the opposers
had with them the instincts and hal^its of the greater
portion of their auditors. They raised difficulties in
profusion which the defenders of the bill could not
so readily resolve. MM. Dupin and Nicod displayed
in this attack as much ardour as ability and address.
M. de Lamartine and M. de Salvandy supported the
bill A\dth resolute independence of spirit and the in-
spiration of eloquence, but without much effect. Some
of the principal political orators of th§ Chamber, ,
M, Thiers and M. Odilon Barrot amongst others, took
no part in the debate. I intended to speak : I had
studied the question, taken notes, and pre2:)ared the
plan of my discourse ^, but, at the convenient mo-
ment, some of my steadiest friends urged me to remain
silent. I should excite, they said, more animated
passions; I should draw into the arena adversaries
who had hitherto held aloof, and should probably
augment the dangers of the question. I yielded to
this advice. It was an error. I know not whether
I could in any way have altered the result of the dis-
cussion, and I incline to think not; the opposition had
united its entire strength, and had also on its side, in
' I insert amongst the Historic Documents No. XI. tliis i)lau
and these notes, which, altliough the question and position are
alike extinct, may still retain some interest.
WITH M. MOLE. 219
this instance, all the weaknesses of the government
party. But for the position of the cabinet, and more
particularly for my own, it would have been better to
have taken my part in this great debate. Be that as
it may, its issue was against us ; the bill for the dis-
junction of tribunals was rejected by a majority of
two voices.
All the other bills we presented were stricken
by this check as a single gust of wind overthi'ows
the most varied and divided trees. The selection of
the Isle of Bourbon, and of the district of Salasie in
that island, as the locality for transportation, em-
braced difficulties and inconveniences. The bill on
the non-revelation of plots formed and crimes pro-
jected against the life or person of the King, gave
rise to strong moral objections and evil reminiscences.
M. Royer-Collard announced that he should oppose
it strenuously. On the dotation proposed for the
Duke of Nemours, all the controversies were re-
opened to which the assessment of the civil list had
given rise in 1831 and 1832. Why should the
princes have hereditary appanages ? why landed
property ? Would it not be better to give them pen-
sions on the state, or simply dotations for life? In
1837, as in 1831, all political and monarchical fore-
sio:ht was banished from these discussions. Re-
searches were made into the revenues of the private
estate, and the value of the portions of forest land
which the bill added to the domain of Rambouillet ;
and the opposition press raised doubts and suspicions
on this subject which could not be immediately re-
220 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
futccl, and which, while waiting the refutation, chilled
and embarrassed the most friendly minds. Political
bodies have their impressions of alarm and panics
like armies. The cabinet was looked upon, in the
Chambers and by the public, as in a state of defeat,
and consequently approaching a crisis.
Its composition and internal state rendered it little
suited to an energetic and long defence. M. Mole
could live better A\^th superiors than with equals.
He had well served the Emperor Napoleon, and
submitted with a good grace to the presidency of the
Duke of Richelieu; but when the hierarchy of rela-
tive positions was not so clearly determined, when
men found themselves by the side of each other, with
their advantages and objections, their personal merits
and defects, and in a condition to be either associates
or rivals, M. Mole became mistrustful, suspicious,
susceptible, jealous, and alternately given over to un-
certainty and to ill-founded and misplaced preten-
sions. On the part of his colleagues, every unex-
pected step, the slightest negligence, appeared then
to him an act of secret malevolence and premeditated
hostility. The most trivial offence to his self-love
operated as a rankling Avound. His political educa-
tion had not been in the bosom of free institutions ;
he had formed and developed himself under a system
ignorant of the conditions and struggles of represen-
tative government; thus he was better adapted to
hold an insulated and entirely personal line of conduct
tlian to enter into the combinations and movements
of a great assembly. He was of excellent judgment
WITH M. MOLE. 221
ill a council, skilful in management and agreeable in
manner in his intercourse with individuals, but party
en2:ao:ements and ties were unsuited to him. He
found them embarrassing in general policy, com-
promising rather than profitable to himself, and he
felt justified in disregarding them according to the
exigencies of public afikirs or of his own position.
No serious misunderstanding or visible quarrel oc-
curred between him and me during our short alliance ;
on the main point of the leading questions we were
habitually agreed, but the difference of our characters
and political habits soon manifested itself and rendered
our relations less cordial in reality than in appear-
ance. We acted together with mutual watchfulness,
and without a reciprocal feeling of perfect confidence.
M. Mole, moreover, persuaded himself, and quite
erroneously, that M. de Gasparin, more my friend
than his, sought to injure him to serve me ; and mis-
trust of all that emanated from the minister of the
Interior became one of his most uneasy preposses-
sions. Nothing was more foreign to the intentions
and conduct of M. de Gasparin, a man ever true and
loyal in public as in private life. He devoted himself
to the duties of his department with no other object
or care than that of discharging them faithfully.
Unfortunately, being more practised in administra-
tion than in policy, he wanted, in the Chambers and
in the Tribune, the ease and authority which the
many, important, and delicate affairs he had to handle
required. Modest even to timidity, though firm to
the extreme, in danger, he did not always combat
222 MY ALLIANCE AND RUPTURE
with promptitude and success. When the hour of
reverse arrived, when the refusal of the bill for dis-
junction threw confusion into our ranks, these internal
weaknesses and discrepancies in the cabinet became
evident. In the Chambers and with the public, a
general impression went abroad that it would infallibly
fall unless it modified, according to its enemies, its
policy, and to its friends, its composition.
At first, partial changes only were spoken of, which
should leave intact the basis on which the ministry had
been formed, — the alliance between M. Mole and me.
The retirement alone of M. de Gasparin seemed to be
insisted on, and, with his accustomed disinterestedness,
he hastened to resign. I declared that if M. de Gas-
parin left the cabinet, I should only remain myself on
the condition of occupying the post of minister of the
Interior, and of being succeeded in that of Public
Instruction by one of my own friends, M. de Remusat,
in preference to any other. I had felt the insufficiency
of indirect influences, and was resolved to submit to
no combination in the government which did not
strengthen the policy I maintained, and my own posi-
tion in its support. M. Mole formally rejected this
modification. From that moment, my own position
became perfectly clear, and, to speak truly, I required
not this symptom to enlighten it. The question was
not simply personal or partial ; it involved an entire
change of politics. The check which the policy of
resistance had so recently met ^vith in the Chamber of
])eputies had senously compromised it in the eyes of
the pul)lic and in the opinion of some of its defenders.
WITH M. MOLE. 223
The majority which, until then, had firmly su2:)ported
it, appeared weary and wavering. Was it possible to
advance further, or even to persevere in the path in
which we encountered so many adversaries and such
doubtful allies ? Had the time arrived to loosen the
reins and try other modes of government ? As if on
the day succeeding a great and decisive victory, an
amnesty was again proposed; it was asked whether
such a proceeding would not finally disarm conspirators
and assassins. The King himself, Avithout being shaken
in his convictions, began to be moved and perplexed
in his resolves. It was under the pressure of this
general hesitation that the ministerial crisis developed
itself. I remained the representative of the policy of
resistance; M. Mole was preparing to become leader
of the policy of concession. Our rupture, and the
total dissolution of the cabinet, became, within a few
days, accomplished facts. Nothing then remained
but to ascertain under what maxims and standard
the new administration should be formed.
On the 5th of April, the King sent for me, told
me that M. Mole had tendered his resignation, and
required me to lay before him the elements of a cabinet.
I expected this trial : I had already spoken of it with
my friends, especially with the Duke de Broglie and
M. Duchatel, and I knew their dispositions. As far
back as the 29th of March, the Duke de Broglie, who
had absented himself with scrupulous reserve, wrote to
me as follows : " If, which God forbid, the King should
send for me spontaneously and entirely at liis own
suggestion, I could only, in my soul and conscience,
224 MY ALLIANCE AND IIUPTURE
give him one advice, namely, to try a ministry founded
on a reconciliation between the men who for six years
have co-operated in defending the actual government ;
reserving for debate the conditions of the reconcilia-
tion and the various applications of the principle."
I instantly decided on my course. After first seeing
M. MoM, and receiving from hun a confirmation of
his retirement, I sought M. Thiers, who did not ex-
pect me, and proposed to him to reconstruct the cabi-
net of the 11th of October 1832. In that case lie
would have resumed the ministry of the Interior ; the
Duke de Broglie, Foreign Aff'airs Avith the Presidency
of the Council; M. Duchatel, the Finances; and I
should have continued in the ministry of Public In-
struction. Our conversation was long, unreserved,
^Ndthout embittering allusions or subterfuges. M.
Thiers declined my proposal. He felt that what had
passed within a year, the question of Spanish interven-
tion, ever in controversy between the King and him-
self, and his position in the Chamber of Deputies,
prevented him from accepting it. I retui-ned to the
Tuileries; I related to the King my fruitless \dsit,
and prayed him to think of other means and other
persons than myself to form a cabinet.
During eight days the King sent for, sometimes
singly, at other times together. Marshal Soult, M.
Thiers, General Sebastiani, and M. Dupin. He dis-
cussed with them llie various pending questions and
every possible form of combination, pressing them to
lay some one before him that could meet the exigencies
of the position. They tried several, but witliout success ;
WITH M. MOLE. 225
they were unable to agree either as to the persons or
measures. M. Mole had no share in these efforts,
complaining merely of the prolongation of the crisis,
and betraying symptoms that, at need, he could ter-
minate it. On the 12th of April, a report was spread
that, in concert with M. de Montalivet, he had applied
himself to the work. On the same day the King sent
for me again, and demanded if, with my o^vn parti-
cular friends, I could form a cabinet. Without exte-
nuating in the slightest degree either the peril or
difficulty of the enterprise, I asked him, in my turn,
if I might rely on two men of courage as colleagues,
who enjoyed his confidence, — M. de Montalivet and
the Duke of Montebello. In addition to M. Duchatel,
I selected amongst my friends M. de Remusat and
M. Dumon. I mentioned the name of General Bu-
geaud. "It is too dangerous," observed the King,
"svith a feeling of kind hesitation ; "I cannot, I dare
not." " I understand, sire," I replied; "the King-
mil find less compromising means," and, so saying,
I retired. Two days later M. Mole's cabinet was
formed, and the "Moniteur" of the 15th of April
announced that, under his presidency, M. Barthe,
M. de Montalivet, M. Lacave-Laplagne, and M. de
Salvandy had replaced, in the departments of Justice,
the Interior, Finance, and Public Instruction, M. Per-
sil, M. de Gasparin, M. Duchatel, and myself.
I was not mistaken as to the sense and bearing of
this change. The measures which M. Mole and I had
adopted and presented in concert were immediately
renounced. The bill for the dotation to the Duke of
VOL. IV. Q
226 MY ALLIANCE AND IIUPTURE WITH M. MOLE.
Nemours was Avitlidrawn. Those on transportation
and the non-revealment of conspiracies fell to the
ground. A general amnesty was publicly announced.
In place of the policy of resistance, a new course
w^as proclaimed, which received the name, not of con-
cession, but of conciliation.
227
CHAPTER IV.
THE COALITION.
MY DISPOSITION ON LEAVING OFFICE. FAMILY AFFLICTIONS. THE
DUCHESS OF ORLEANS ; HER ARRIVAL AT FONTAINEBLEAU ; HER
MARRIAGE ; HER ENTRY INTO PARIS. CHARACTER OF THE PALACE
OF FONTAINEBLEAU. ACCIDENTS AT THE CHAMP DE MARS.
OPENING OF THE MUSEUM OF VERSAILLES. MY CONVERSATIONS
AVITH THE DUCHESS OF ORLEANS. THE PRINCESS MARIE ; HER
MARRIAGE ; HER PURSUITS ; HER DEATH. WHAT IS DUE TO THE
MEMORY OF THE DEAD. LADY HOLLAND AND HOLLAND HOUSE.
GREAT NUMBER OF EMINENT MEN WHO DIED BETWEEN 1836 AND
1839. THEIR CHARACTERS. M. RAYNOUARD AND M. FLAUGERGUES.
M. DE MARBOIS AND THE ABBE DE PRADT. BARON LOUIS.
MARSHAL LOBAU AND GENERAL HAXO. M. SILVESTRE DE SACY.
M. LAROMIGUIERE. DR. BROUSSAIS. PRINCE TALLEYRAND. HIS
LAST VISIT TO THE INSTITUTE. HIS LATEST ACTS. COUNT DE
MONTLOSIER. DIFFICULTIES OF M. MOLi;'s POSITION. HOW HE SUR-
MOUNTED OR POSTPONED THEM. HIS INTERNAL MEASURES. —
FAVOURABLE EXTERNAL INCIDENTS. WAR WITH MEXICO. WITH
BUENOS AYRES. TREATY WITH HAYTI. — SECOND EXPEDITION TO CON-
ST ANTINE ; ITS SUCCESS. RETURN OF PRINCE LOUIS BONAPARTE TO
SWITZERLAND. FINAL ADOPTION OF THE TREATY OF THE TWENTY-
FOUR ARTICLES ON THE LIMITS OF BELGIUM. EVACUATION OF
ANCONA. MY ATTITUDE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. MY
SPEECHES IN MAY 1837, IN THE DEBATE ON SECRET SUPPLIES.
DISPLEASURE OF M. MOLE. DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF
DEPUTIES. CHARACTER OF THAT MEASURE AND OF THE ELECTIONS.
SESSION OP 1837-1838. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE
CABINET. ITS POSITION AFTER THE SESSION. SESSION OF 1838-1839.
THE COALITION. ITS GENERAL CAUSES. MY PERSONAL MOTIVES.
WAS IT A MISTAKE ? DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE ADDRESS.
GOOD ATTITUDE OF M. MOLE. — DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER OF
DEPUTIES. RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS. RETIREMENT OF THE MOLE
Q 2
228 THE COALITION.
CABINET. VAIN ATTEMPTS TO lOUM A COALITION JtlNISTRY.
PROVISIONAL CABINET. RIOT OF THE 12T1I OF MAY 1839. — FORMA-
TION OF THE CABINET OF THE 12TH OF MAY 1839.
(1837—1839.)
Having left the ministry on the 15th of April 1837,
I passed nearly three years without returning to
public emplopiient. This was my longest vacation
between 1830 and 1848. Much has been said of my
ambition and the ardour of my struggles to maintain
or resume ofS.ce. I have been represented as a man
possessed by a single passion and obstinate in the
pursuit of a single object. These inferior moralists
know little of human nature, of the infinite variety
of its inclinations, and of the vicissitudes of the soul
in connection with the incidents of life. Ambition
has its days; so also has indifference. Great contests
animate and please, the resources of mind and cha-
racter are thereby developed; but there is no power
that does not become weary and call for repose.
Neither does destiny reside exclusively in the arena
of politics, and he who escapes from it will, perhaps,
encounter under his domestic roof, more piercing
wounds than the blows of his fiercest adversaries.
Such was my position in April 1837. Two months
before, on the 15th of February, I lost my eldest
son, an excellent and engaging youth who had
already reached manhood. He was almost twenty-
two, and promised me a companion equally amiable
and sure. It was not that he evinced much inclina-
tion for the career of politics. Endowed with dis-
THE COALITION. 229
tinguislied intellect, lie had completed his literary
and scientific classes with unusual success; follow-
ing the lectures of the Normal School, and being
admitted after a strict examination into the Poly-
technic, although without the intention of becom-
ing a student there. His disposition was modest,
independent, and refined; somewhat concentrated
within himself, more anxious for confidential in-
timacy than for celebrity, and inclined to enjoy the
exalted pleasures of life rather than to court its
triumphs. I know not whether he would have taken
an important part in the public afi'airs of his country,
but he would assuredly have proved one of those
chosen spirits who embellish domestic life and re-
flect honour on human nature. A pleurisy snatched
him from me, and left the bitter conviction that the
malady had existed long before it was observed.
This is one of the saddest and most enduring im-
pressions left by the trials which have stricken me
in my dearest aifections. We seldom apprehend evil
sufiiciently or in time.
I never felt more disposed to bend under the
weight of affliction. Within a month after this
shock, the great debates in the Chambers commenced.
Besides the general policy, I had to support, on my
own account, the long discussion on the bill pre-
sented by me a year before, on the subject of se-
condary instruction. Then followed the ministerial
crisis. I was aided in my heavy task by the univer-
sal sympathy evinced towards me at this severe
moment ; a sympathy the more consoling as I recog-
Q 3
230 THE COALITION.
nized in it, beyond personal consideration for myself,
a general sentiment of the dawning merits of my son,
and of the tender justice which men voluntarily accord
to a young life, suddenly extinguished in the midst
of brilliant hopes, without having yet engaged in
combat or experienced disapj^ointment. M. Dupin,
at that time President of the Chamber of Deputies,
overwhelmed me, amongst others, with friendly at-
tention. This man, sometimes so harsh, and so con-
stantly occupied with himself, has a heart open to
natural feelings, to family afflictions, and knows how
to treat them with respect, even beyond his own
domestic circle, and without any tie of personal
attachment. In the midst of these tokens of a sym-
pathy which I have some right to call public, it
happened nevertheless one day that in the Chamber
of Deputies an adversary of mine, more from routine,
as I believe, than through premeditated intention,
spoke of my determined attempts to retain power.
I could not listen silently to this unseasonable attack.
" Several times already in the course of my life," I
said, " I have accepted and resigned office, and, on
my own personal account, I am profoundly indif-
ferent to these variations of political fortune. I
associate with them no interest beyond that of the
public, and of the cause to which I belong, and
which I honour myself by supporting. You may
believe me, gentlemen, when I tell you, it has pleased
God to make me well acquainted with the joys and
sorroAvs which leave the soul inaccessible and cold to
all other pleasures and evils." This was indeed the
THE COALITION. 231
sentiment I carried back to my unpretending home,
when I re-entered it with my aged mother and my
three young children.
It was not public business, but political festivals
which brought the first occasions for my again leav-
ing it. Two days after the completion of his mi-
nistry, M. Mole announced to the Chambers the
marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the Princess
Helena of Mecklenbourg-Schwerin. The Duke de
Broglie had left Paris as minister extraordinary to
make official demand of the princess's hand, and to
conduct her to France. I was invited to Fontainebleau,
where the nuptials were to be celebrated. I arrived
there on the 29th of May. The court was brilliant,
and the public satisfied. The future, they said, was
secure. It was well known that other alliances had
been attempted without success ; a good feeling was
entertained towards the young princess for her con-
fidence in the destiny, perhaps a stormy one, which
opened before her. It was related that before leav-
ing Schwerin, she replied to the expressed uneasiness
of her family, " I had rather be Duchess of Orleans
for a single year, than pass my life in looking from
these windows to see who enters the court of the
castle." High opinions were expressed of her mind,
her ideas, and her tastes. Amongst the French
liberals, her being a Protestant was far from unac-
ceptable; this was recognized as a consecration and
pledge of religious liberty. When she presented
herself, the first impressions confirmed anticipated
hopes. On the 29th of May, at five in the afternoon,
Q 4
232 THE CO^SXITION.
all the invited guests assembled in tlie gallery of
Franeis I., wliich opens on the vestibule of the grand
staircase of the court of the White Horse, through
which the princess was to enter. At half-past six,
the King, the Queen, the princes and princesses, also
arrived to receive her. Her approach was announced.
At seven o'clock, under a flourish of drums and
trumpets, accompanied by the acclamations of the
crowd and the soldiers, she arrived, and found the
Duke of Orleans with the Duke of Nemours, at the foot
of the staircase, and the King himself at the top. On
approaching him, and in this first meeting with the
royal family, the expression of her features, her
manners, and her words, were perfectly noble and
simple, affectionately dignified, modest, and unem-
barrassed, as of one already at ease in her new
position, and naturally born for distinction and hap-
piness. On the following day, the 30th of May, a little
before nine in the evening, the solemn celebration of
the marriage commenced. There were three succes-
sive ceremonies ; the civil contract, in the gallery of
Henry II., performed by M. Pasquier, who two days
before had received from the King the title of chan-
cellor. He was the hundred and forty-sixth chan-
cellor of France, since Saint Boniface, who was
invested with that dignity in 752, on the accession of
Pepin the Short. After the civil marriage, the
Catholic form was celebrated in the chapel of Henri
Quatre, by the Bishop of Meaux, the Abbe Gallard;
and the Lutheran in the hall named after Louis-
Philippe, by M. Cuvier, President of the Consistory
THE COALITION. 23
9t
of the Confession of Augsbourg at Paris. In the
midst of these ceremonies and amongst spectators so
mingled, the impression was as varied as the situa-
tions and creeds. Some congratulated themselves,
others evinced regret ; and a portion took part in the
complicated scene with indifferent curiosity and a
slight degree of surprise, more struck, as I believe, by
its novelty than by its imposing grandeur. But the
success of the event, and the person who occupied in
it the leading place, effaced or restrained these dif-
ferences of opinion ; and during the four days passed
by the court at Fontainebleau in promenades in the
park, in spectacles and fetes of every kind, the pre-
vailing sentiment was that of sympathy and satis-
faction.
I know no palace to be compared to Fontainebleau
for such solemnities. It stamps on them from the
first moment a lofty character.' So many kings and
so many ages have left their impress on the walls,
that when history is now acted there, it is in presence
of past records, and new events link themselves with
old ones, as with their own ancestors. From the
narrow winding staircase, which in a corner of the
oldest buildings leads to the small chamber of Louis
the Young, to the grand apartments constructed or
restored in recent days, we traverse the abodes of
Francis L, Henry II., Henry IV., Louis XIIL,
Louis XIV., Louis XV., Napoleon, Louis XVIIL,
and Louis-Philippe. We assist in their labours, we
contemplate their magnificence. Within two centuries
alone, and without speaking of other great trans-
234 THE COALITION.
actions, five royal marriages or their accompanying
fetes have taken place within that residence. It was
at Fontainebleau that the natural son of Henry TV.
and Gabrielle d'Estrees, Caesar, Duke of Vendome,
espoused Gabrielle of Lorraine. Louis XIV., after
his marriage at Saint-Jean-de-Luz with the Infanta
Maria Teresa, conducted the young queen to Fon-
tainebleau, and passed nine months in the palace, in
the midst of the most brilliant festivals. Tlie King
of Spain, Charles II., who bequeathed his dominions
to Philip v., was united at Fontainebleau to Maria
Louisa of Orleans, niece of Louis XIV. The
marriage of Louis XV. with Maria Leczlnsky was
celebrated there. At a later period, that of Prince
Jerome Bonaparte with the daughter of the King of
AYurtemberg; and more recently, it was there that
Louis XVIII. received the Duchess of Berry. You
cannot move a step without encountering the most
striking reminiscences. While we were attending
the marriage of the Duke of Orleans, the Duchess de
Broglie occupied the apartments of Madame de
Maintenon. One mornino- when I was dressins; in a
cabinet which had formerly been a portion of the
Gallery of Stags, I perceived, at the bottom of the
wall, a marble plate on which I read : " In this win-
dow Queen Christina of Sweden, in 1657, ordered
the death of her equerry, Monaldeschi." Everywhere
throughout this palace, the walls speak, the dead
appear, and seem to re-assemble to greet the living
who arrive in their turn.
Towards four o'clock on the 4:tli of June I beheld
THE COALITION. 235
that royal family, which I had seen at Fontainebleau
in all the pomp of a court, re-enter Paris, surrounded
by an entire nation. The King and the princes were
on horseback; the Queen, the Duchess of Orleans,
and the princesses, in an open carriage. From the
Arch of the Star to the Pavilion of the Clock, the
national guard and the regular troops lined the road.
An immense crowd, ' curious and joyful, filled the
Elysian Fields and the garden of the Tuileries. The
cortege advanced slowly along those vast alleys of
chestnuts and lilacs in flower. The sky was clear,
the sun brilliant, and the air balmy. The young
princess raised herself from time to time in her car-
riage to obtain a more perfect view of the grandeur
and effect of the spectacle, with which she was de-
lighted. Never, perhaps, did so tragical a destiny
open with such a flattering dawn.
I cannot say that even from that period sorrows
were not speedily mixed with joys, and hostile ma-
noeuvres with acclamations of attachment. Dur-
ing one of the popular fetes, at the egress from
the Champ de Mars, the obstruction of the crowd
and the narrowness of the passage led to deplorable
accidents. In the world and in the press many
hostile voices dwelt on these with secret complaisance,
comparing them to the misfortunes which, sixty-
seven years before, in the square of Louis XY.,
had accompanied the nuptials of Louis XVI. with
Marie Antoinette; — a melancholy presage of a cruel
future.
The very effect of the festivals, the splendours of
236 THE COALITION.
the court, the magnificence of royalty, the presents
offered to the Duchess of Orleans, her trousseau^ her
toilet-table, the descriptions which such subjects
furnish to flattery and curiosity, served as a text to
democratic enemies for remarks and commentaries
addressed to envious and hateful passions. Nothing
is so easy as to place in painful contrast good and
evil fortune, riches and want, — all that unequal dis-
tribution of property and poverty, of enjoyment and
suffering, which varies according to times, institu-
tions, and manners, but which still continues, in
different degrees, the permanent condition of hu-
manity. In presence of this formidable fact, Chris-
tian faith has its dogmas and promises ; philosophy, its
explanations and precepts ; policy, its duties and effec-
tual means, — if not of making it disappear altogether,
at least of restraint and palliation. But these are
little heeded by anarchical factions, who are mucli
more intent on turning the wound to advantage than
desirous of curing it ; and the very amusements of
the people furnish them with an opportunity for
irritation. These efforts were not spared at the
marriage of the Duke of Orleans, but they obtained
little success at the moment. The instincts of the
people are simple and upright ; they take their por-
tion of enjoyment in great events, without seeking in
them subjects of complaint or anger. The satisfac-
tion and good feeling of the public, in the days to
which I here refer, were animated and sincere; but
factions at war with a government have no occasion
for prompt success ; they feed themselves on their
THE COALITION. 237
passion, their labour, and their hopes; and if the
moral and political forces, whose mission it is to
combat them, are not incessantly vigilant and active,
the venom penetrates and diiFuses itself, and sooner
or later the social body becomes infected. A woman
of spirit said of ghosts, " I do not believe in, but I fear
them." We are bound to believe in the demons of
anarchy, and to watch them with the wise apprehen-
sion which speaks of intelligence and foresight, but
has no taste of fear.
The fete which followed that of the marriage was
neither a courtly nor a popular festival. I do not
remember any exhibition more imposing than that of
the inauo;uration of the museum of Versailles, nor
any assembly which brought more vividly into con-
tact and contrast the France of the seventeenth and
the France of the nineteenth century; those two con-
ditions of society, the one truly and naturally the
daughter of the other, and at the same time so totally
distinct, and separated by the profound abyss of the
Revolution. Even in the mind of King Louis-
Philippe himself, the first idea of this museum was
only an expedient to save from barbarous destruction
and vulgar appropriation a palace and gardens, the
magnificent work and residence of the most powerful
and brilliant of his ancestors. This idea, grand and
beautiful in itself, expanded, rose, and carried with it
the attachment, I should say rather, the passionate
enthusiasm of the King, and the approbation of the
public. The entire history and glory of France,
as is said in the official inscription on the monument.
238 THE COALITION.
— revived in canvas and marble, and replaced under
the eyes of present and future generations ; events
and persons, great deeds of war and civil life ; the
association of all French names, ages, and destinies
in these galleries of the dead called back to the con-
templation of the living ; — here is abundant matter to
engage reflecting thought and popular imagination.
The undertaking, when scarcely commenced by the
King, was hailed with delight, and he devoted him-
self to it with the pride of a descendant of Louis
XIV., the self-respect of an inventor, and the
assiduity of an architect. He took pleasure in dis-
cussing, directing, and closely watching the different
labourers as he traversed those extensive halls, the
greater part of which still empty, he saw in anticipa-
tion adorned and peopled according to his desire.
And on the ari'ival of the day when the work was
sufficiently advanced to be presented to the public, —
on that 10th of June 1837, when he summoned and
himself conducted a nation of guests through the
palace restored in honour of old France, and trans-
formed for the convenience of France of the present
time, — that day was undoubtedly one of the most
animated and agreeable of his busy and chequered
life. Was he personally much impressed by the
novelty of the spectacle of which he was the director ?
Did he on the instant fathom its great and original
character ? I suspect not. Very probably King
Louis-Philippe on that day was absorbed in the
pleasure and success of his enterprise. But I still
retain the idea which impressed me as I looked
THE COALITION. 239
on that eager, anxious crowd which hurried in
some confusion from chamber to chamber in the
suite of the King. It was new France — mixed,
democratic, citizen — France, invading the palace of
Louis XIY. : peers, deputies, warriors, magistrates,
public functionaries, scholars, authors, and artists.
A pacific but a sovereign invasion ; conquerors some-
what astonished in the midst of their victory, but
ill constituted to enjoy it, although determined
to keep what they had won. The representatives of
the ancient French society, the inheritors of its great
names and brilliant recollections were not absent;
they circulated familiarly through all the windings
of the old abode of royalty, but they exhibited more
of familiar ease than they preserved of importance.
A people who had achieved their o^vn greatness and
for their own profit, and were endeavouring to be
free, evidently ruled in the palace of the great King,
and replaced his court. '
The dramatic fete which wound up the day had
also its contrasts. The old theatre, recently restored,
was resplendent in colour and light. The King in-
tended that the master-piece of Moliere, the Misan-
thrope^ should be represented there without alteration
or omission ; not aline was to be expunged. The fur-
niture of the scene was exactly that of the seventeenth
century ; the costumes, faithfully copied from the
same date, were distributed to the performers ; all the
adjuncts of representation on the stage and in front,
were excellent, and probably far superior to what
had ever been exhibited to the eyes of Louis XIY.
240 THE COALITION.
under the superintendence of Moliere. But the
effect was common-place and cold, more in default of
truth than from deficiency of talent. The actors
had no feeling of the general manners of the seven-
teenth century, nor of the simply aristocratic cha-
racter of the personages, nor of their frank wit
and natural language in the midst of the refinements
and subtle frivolities of their every-day life. The
style was inconsistent with the dresses, and the
accent with the words. Mademoiselle Mars played
Celimcne as a coquette of Marivaux', not as a con-
temporary of Madame de Sable and Madame de
Montespan. The incongruity was more glaring at
Versailles and in the palace of Louis XIV., than at
Paris and in the theatre of the Rue de Richelieu.
From Fontainebleau and Versailles I ];)roceeded to
Compiegne, where, towards the beginning of Septem-
ber in the same year, 1837, the Duke of Orleans,
who commanded a camp of twenty thousand men,
invited me to pass several days. The castle of Com-
piegne, notwithstanding its extent and splendour,
has nothing to engross and satisfy the imagination.
The ancient origin and important historical remi-
niscences of the place have disappeared in the recent
and massive buildings of Louis XIV. We must
look for them in books, for we forget them in
courts, pavilions, apartments, and staircases where
they are not recalled. But this visit to Compiegne,
at that time, had for me an exclusive charm. It
was there that I began to know the Duchess of
Orleans, whom the Duke her husband took pleasure
THE COALITION. 241
in introducing to tlie army and to his guests, and who
did the honours, of the castle with admirable grace.
Being often seated near her at table, we conversed
much on many topics, for she had reflected, and took
an interest in everything with the ardour and fascina-
tion of an exalted, rich, and cultivated mind ; ready,
perhaps too much so, to admit impressions which
conveyed noble enjoyment, and more generous in her
susceptibilities than fastidious in taste or judgment.
We did not always agree, and she listened graciously
to my objections ; a little astonished at times, and
scarcely allowing me to think that she was much
touched by my remarks. I left her charmed with
the superiority of her understanding and the eleva-
tion of her sentiments, and convinced that she pos-
sessed a truly royal soul, not always perhaps to be en-
lightened by the trials of life, but of which they would
never subdue the courage nor impair the dignity.
On the 17th of October 1837, four months after the
marriage of the Duke of Orleans, his second sister,
the Princess Marie, espoused, at the Trianon, Duke
Alexander of Wurtemberg, and Avithin less than
fifteen months afterwards she died at Pisa, far from
her family, leaving behind her works and a name
singularly celebrated for a princess whose life was
circumscribed to twenty-five years. She had received
from heaven those gifts of invention and sentiment
in the domain of the arts which astonish and move,
at a distance as in close observation and in all ranks,
the imagination of men. She and the Duke of Orleans
were undoubtedly the most brilliant and popular of
VOL. IV. R
242 THE COALITION.
the royal family, and both were cut off in the flower of
their popularity and youth, before prospects of the most
flattering future. Although the strongly original bent
of the Princess Marie's genius and character appeared
pre-eminently in the region of art, it was not confined
to that sphere alone. The same ardent and expansive
nature developed itself in every object of her occupa-
tion, and her taste included all great conceptions.
One day, in the park at Neuilly, at the commencement
of the sunnner of 1838, we were discoursing of the
most agreeable employments of life. She indulged
herself by imagining the position of a lady of eminent
station, escaping from the yoke of her rank, from the
etiquette and monotony of the court, and, without
descending from her refined habits, surrounding
herself with a diversified, accomplished, and animated
circle. The portrait drawn by Bossuet of. the
Princess Palatine, Anne of Gonzaga, in a funeral
oration, and some of his beautiful expressions, re-
curred to my memory. I repeated tliem to the
Princess Marie : " The genius of the Princess Pala-
tine found itself equally adapted to business and
recreation. The court never beheld any one more
engaging; and, without speaking of the acutenessof her
mind or the infinite fertility of her resources, every-
thing yielded to the sweet charm of her conversation
... to such an extent did she attract confidence, and
so natural was it for her to win over hearts ! She
declared to the leaders of parties the extent to which
she would pledge herself, and they believed her in-
capable of deceiving or of being deceived. Her par*
THE COALITION. 243
ticular disposition was to conciliate opposing in-
terests, and, while raising herself above them, to hnd
the secret place, and, as it were, the tie by which
they might be bound together . . . immoveable in,
her friendships and incapable of failure in any human
duty." The Princess Marie was pleased by the image
of such a character and life. " Yes," she said to me,
" to belong to all, to see all, to take part in all,
without becoming the slave of anything; delightful
conversations, sometimes a participation in great
affairs, liberty, friends, and the house of my aunt
Adelaide in the street of Varennes, to receive them ; —
here would indeed be perfect happiness." She was
not permitted this enjoyment, but the sight of the
misfortunes and afflictions of her family was spared
to her. God distributes his severities and favours
without reference to the foresight of men.
I have always entertained, even before reaching
old ag-e, an endurino- affection for the dead. The
infinite and unforeseen variety of the blows of the
destroyer incessantly recurs to me in thought at the
aspect of the healthiest and happiest lives. Enduring
sorrows inspire me with a profound and sympathetic
respect for the souls who feel them. Readiness of
oblivion impresses me with regret for those who
have passed so rapidly from the hearts where they
thought they possessed such strong hold; and it
gratifies me to cherish reminiscences which I per-
ceive so easily effaced. During my residence in
London, in 1840, I went one evening to pay a visit
at Holland House. Lord Holland v/as dining out,
r2
244 THE COALITION.
I do not recollect where. I found Lady Holland
alone in that long library where, above the books,
portraits are placed of the celebrated politicians,
philosophers, and writers who had been the friends
and habitual visitants of the family. I asked Lody
Holland if it often happened that she found herself
thus alone. "No," she replied, "very seldom; but
when it occurs I am not without resources;" and
pointing to the portraits, she observed, " I entreat
the friends you see there to descend from above;
I know the place that each preferred, the arm-chair
in which he was accustomed to sit: tliey come: I
find myself again with Fox, Romilly, Mackintosh,
Sheridan, and Horner; they speak to me, and I
am no longer by myself." And this haughty, im-
perious, and capricious woman, who, in the midst
of the triumphs she had won by her beauty and
talents, retained the reputation of coldness and
egotism, appeared, as she thus spoke, to be visibly
and sincerely affected. From this incident I have
preserved a favourable impression of her. Those
who forget not have loved sincerely, and the fidelity
of the memory is one of the surest pledges of the
value of the heart.
I do not wish to incur the reproach of forgetfulness
towards the men with whom I have lived, and who
nearly all received me, while yet young and unknown,
with signal indulgence. At the precise epoch of which
I am now treating, within the short space of three
years, from 1836 to 1839, I saw a great number of
them disappear in succession, my immediate predeces-
sors or contemporaries ; some were my friends, and all
THE COALITION. 245
truly distinguished ; men who, in extremely unequal
degrees as under very opposite pretensions, obtained
sufllicient mark to preserve a little place in the world's
remembrance, and to give me a right of saying some-
thing of them as to my own.
The two first, by the date of their deaths in 1836,
M. Raynouard and M. Flaugergues, were the last
survivors of that committee of the Legislative Body
who, in 1813, attempted the first essay, I will not
say of resistance, but of sincere warning, to the Em-
peror Napoleon, who, after a long succession of
triumphs, had reached the most fatal reverses and
stood on the brink of ruin. M. Raynouard was a
native of Provence, honest and acute, quick in manner
and speech, but moderate in spirit, sincerely liberal,
and capable of firmness in a moment of crisis, while
at the same time anxious to avoid difiicult positions
and the necessity of exercising the courage which
would never have failed him. After the Hundred
Days he retired from political life, and gave himself
up entirely, not, as he had done at an earlier period,
to poetry and the drama, but to learned letters, — to
the history of the French language and literature,
especially in the provinces of the south, and to the
labours of the two academies to which he belonged
in the Institute. He enjoyed without disturbance, to
his latest day, independence and respect in his labours,
repose, and the intimacy of some select friends. M.
Flaugergues, born in Rouergue, was a man of simple
manners and harsh exterior, upright in heart, and
firm in temper, even to obstinacy ; without originality,
B 3
240 THE COALITION.
but not destitute of pretension in his political ideas,
and a subtle though a heavy reasoner. Not having,
like M. Raynouard, the tastes of literary life for a
refuge, he continued to occupy modest public func-
tions up to the day when, under the ministry of M. de
Villele, his conscientious independence led to his dis-
missal. From that period he lived in retirement, as
did his colleague of the committee of the five, but
much more obscure and forgotten. Both were honour-
able types of upright men, faithful to their liberal
convictions, but discouraged rather than enlightened
by experience, and resolved, from wisdom and probity,
to repel the iniquitous and absurd consequences of the
revolutionary spirit, without having learnt to dis-
cover its vices clearly, and to oppose them resolutely.
Some months later, two persons died whose lives
had been more actively and constantly political, —
M. de Marbois, at the age of ninety -two, who reckoned
seventy-one years of public service ; and the Abbe de
Pradt, Archbishop of Malines, who for more than
twenty years had exchanged his episcopal seat, whence
the Catholics ejected him, for a pension of twelve
thousand francs, and lived on his estate at Breuil in
Auvergne, incessantly occupied in sending forth
pamphlets and newspaper articles, and in making
excursions to Paris. I have already mentioned what
were, in 1815 and 1816, my relations with M. de
Marbois. They continued, up to his death, frequent
and affectionate. I often met the Abbo de Pradt in
society, where he was the most inexhaustible and
wearisome of talkers, determined to consider his
THE COALITION. 247
auditors as untiring as himself. A comparison of
the lives of these two men, and of the position each
made for himself, would form a curious study and
supply a highly moral conclusion. Both were mixed
up, from their youth and almost to their decease,
with the events and affairs of their time ; in public
duties, in assemblies, at the court, abroad, and in
exile. Both served and even adulated nearly all the
authorities which have succeeded each other with us,
and authorities of the most opposite character. Both
acted, wrote, and spoke much; but in these vicissi-
tudes of their lives they were stamped, or rather they
stamped themselves, with extremely different seals.
The radical defect of repeated revolutions is to for-
get and kill respect. The Abbe de Pradt ran full tilt
into this vice of his age. M. de Marbois continued
always a stranger to it. Whatever might be his situa-
tion, M. de Marbois, honest and serious, sincerely
respected his ideas, his cause, his country, his party,
and himself. The Abbe de Pradt, vain and thought-
less, respected nothing, neither persons, ideas, cause,
party, nor master : he alternately praised and abused
all, extolled them to the clouds or turned them into
ridicule. Thus, the one lived and died honoured by
his superiors, his equals, even by his adversaries and
indifferent persons who disagreed with him ; the other
was universally treated without the least considera-
tion by those even whom he served or amused ; and
despite his rare intelligence, and without being abso-
lutely corrupt, he ended his life in equal disrepute
with the State and the Church, as a politician and as
R 4
248 THE COALITION.
a priest. The world takes men at their word, and
holds them in no higher estimation than they appear
to hold themselves.
A statesman who had been thrice charged to
restore the finances of France, exhausted by war, or
utterly deranged by revolutions, and who as often
floated them again by credit, while founding credit
on order and probity, — Baron Louis, — died also in
the course of this same year, 1837. He was endowed
with an expanded, steady, and unsophisticated mind,
which proposed to itself but one end, never losing
sight of it, and resolutely exacting, from everyone
all its conditions. Independently of the signal ser-
vices he rendered in the direct exercise of power,
no one more essentially contributed to infuse and
establish solidly, in all branches of our financial ad-
ministration, those wholesome maxims, those strong
habits and traditions which until now have protected,
and will, I trust, ever protect it against ignorant
chimeras, thouglitless innovations, and the greedy
pretensions which disorder alone can satiate.
Another valiant defender of a diffisrent species of
order, still more urgent, if not more essential, —
Marshal Count de Lobau, — terminated at the same
epoch his life, so often hazarded and spared on
fields of battle. Under manners of little refinement,
he possessed a mind judicious and sensible to shrewd-
ness, with as much devotion to the duties of the
citizen as to those of tlie soldier. For seven years
he commanded the national guard of Paris with
tranquil resolution, and a blunt but intelligent and
THE COALITION. 249
prudent authority in his brief mode of speech. A
few months before his death the army also lost one
of its eminent chiefs — the General of Engineers,
Haxo — recently celebrated at the siege of Antwerp;
an officer and a man of mark, of highly- cultivated
faculties beyond his special vocation, and of the most
honourable character. His rare capacity and the
just confidence he inspired would have fitted him for
a more exalted career, had he not been possessed by
a mania, which, sometimes vitiating his judgment,
rendered him always troublesome and occasionally
impracticable, — the mania of criticizing, objecting,
and contradicting, as if indispensably required to
prove the originality and independence of his thought.
One of his friends said, " Haxo never agrees with
anybody; thus no one ever agrees with him."
Death seems to have its days for seeking, in all
careers, select victims for immolation. While striking
so many distinguished men devoted to the service of the
State, it reached also, in their retirement and in the
midst of scientific labours, an academician, a metaphy-
sician, and a physician, all three eminent and famous ;
M. Silvestre de Sacy, M. Laromiguiere, and Doctor
Broussais. I have nothing to say here of their special
merits in their respective sciences, but I preserve a
clear remembrance of their characters and physio-
gnomy. M. Silvestre de Sacy joined the knowledge of
his own time to the manners of bygone ages. Active,
with calmness and gravity, he was found equal to nu-
merous and diversified functions without ceasing to
take his learned studies for the central object of life.
250 THE COALITION.
When called to a situation which connected him with
politics, he performed its duties scrupulously, rather
than in the light of his appropriate and selected
mission ; and while engaged in worldly aiFairs, retained
his attachment to his austere home. His vast erudition,
far from unsettling, had confirmed his Christian faith,
and all the overthrows he had witnessed and partici-
pated in, had neither aiFected his domestic habits nor
the regularity of his piety. The revolution which as-
sailed and altered everything around him, seemed
never to have reached himself; and if it had not taken
place, I believe he would still have remained the same
moral individual. I never knew a man on whom
external circumstances and agencies obtained such
slender hold, and who, for the regulation of his life,
listened more exclusively to the voice of his o^\ti
judgment and conscience in solitary communion with
the soul. A rare and admirable example of moral
health, for it is even more difficult for minds than
bodies to escape contagion.
In opposition to M. de Sacy, M. Laromiguiere fol-
lowed the current of modern influences and ideas.
In intellectual order and with the refined discipline
of his spirit, he was a disciple of the eighteenth cen-
tury, and the steady friend of the most faithful
pliilosophic representatives of that great epoch — Con-
dorcet, Tracy, Cabaris, Yolney, and Garat. But
Avhile habitually partaking their opinions and society,
M. Laromiguiere held himself absolutely aloof from
politics, a stranger to all worldly ambition, to all
appearance of self-aggrandizement, solely addicted to
THE COALITION. 251
the study and teaching of philosophy, and practising
its tenets with as much wisdom as he took delight in
imparting them to others. I know not whether, in
the history of metaphysics, there remains any impor-
tant trace of his labours, amongst others of his at-
tempt to enlarge and elevate the sensualistic doctrine
of liis master, Condillac, by leading him a step towards
spiritualism. His idea on this subject was ingenious
and well stated rather than original and profound.
But what will survive M. Laromiguiere in the me-
mories of the present age, will be the charm of his
person and instruction. His disposition was gentle
and accessible with dignity, his mind clear and
elegant ; always animated and never aggressive, he
delighted in conversation and argument, but disliked
contest and carefully avoided it, even within the range
of philosophy, while maintaining his opinions with
becoming firmness. He was sincere, without passion ;
defending himself well and never accepting defeat, but
little bent on pursuing victory; more solicitous for
his independence and repose than jealous of propa-
gating his doctrines, and leaving them without much
solicitude to their fate, provided they disturbed not
his own.
In this particular, no one less resembled M. La-
romiguiere than Doctor Broussais ; in proportion as
one loved tolerant and pacific science, the other pre-
ferred it warlike and predominating. I have formed
no opinion, and I have no right to adopt one, on the
physiological and medical theories of Doctor Broussais,
and no one is more opposed than I am to the general
252 THE COALITION.
philosophical ideas he sought to deduce from them;
but it was impossible to know him without l^eing
struck, I will even say moved, by the energy of his
convictions, and his devotion to obtain their triumph.
He was one of those natures, intellectually powerful
and vehemently personal, in wdiom the love of truth
and self-esteem mingle and unite so closely that it is
difficult to discern the respective portions of either in
the transports and infatuations of passion. Doctor
Broussais experienced in his scientific life the fate of
more than one eminent politician. He won and lost
great conquests ; he saw his reputation increase and
decline, he enjoyed in the young learned world popular
favour, and experienced the bitterness of being aban-
doned. I am convinced that neither errors nor
reverses weakened his faith in his own ideas and his
hopes for their future. He was of those who even
in falling impart a step in advance to their fol-
lowers, and w^ho have more claims to respect in their
decline than to enthusiasm during their triumph.
Amongst the many deaths of these three years, I
have not yet named the most celebrated of all ;
of him who occupied the greatest share of public
attention during his life, and who attracted equal
notice at the moment of his decease, — Prince Talley-
rand. After his resignation of the English embassy,
lie lived alternately in Paris and at his seat of
Valen9ay; always well received by King Louis-
Pliilippe, but not invariably finding in this passive
favour the means of escaping from vacuum and
ennui. He had been from its origin a member of the
THE COALITION. 253
class of moral and political sciences in the Institute,
and lie re-entered it of right in 1832, when I caused
its re-establishment. A fancy seized him in 1838 to
deliver a lecture there, and, in effect, on the 3rd
of March, at a private sitting, he read to us a notice
of Count Reinhard, a learned and honest diplomatist,
who had long served under his orders, either in the
bureaux or in various foreign posts, and who had
even been for a moment, in 1799, minister for Foreign
Affairs. The lecturer was greater than his subject.
He had too much taste to exaggerate it ; a just sen-
timent of proportion and accordance formed one of
the intellectual qualities of M. de Talleyrand, and his
empiricism, when he chose to practise it, was perfectly
delicate and concealed. While praising M. Reinhard,
he left him his true position and stature; but he
scattered through his notice, on the subject of study
and diplomacy, a multitude of reflections ingeniously
acute, and brilliant passages without appearing to
study novelty or effect. It was written with that
natural elegance, which in a modest topic and in a
short composition, supplies the place of talent, with-
out its pretension. This reading, at which several
members of other academies of the Institute were
present, including M. Royer Collard and M. Ville-
main, met with general success. Particular attention
was excited by an extremely just eulogium, but one
little expected, of high theological studies, of their in-
fluence on the vigour as well as on the refinement of
the mind, and of the able ecclesiastical politicians they
had formed, especially the Cardinal Chancellor Du-
254 THE COALITION.
prat, the Cardinal d'Ossat, and the Cardmal de
Polignac. M. de Talleyrand evidently experienced
a bold satisfaction in recalling that he also had studied
in the Seminary, and in proving that if, since, he had
bestowed little thought on the duties of that position,
he, at least, had not forgotten the advantages he
derived from it. His listeners felt obliged to him for
having offered a work to the Institute, destined,
probably, to be his last, and the least devout readily
forgave the great philosophic dignitary, who treated
them with this act of deference, for his compliments
to the theologians.
Their good feeling towards him was speedily sub-
jected to a more difficult trial. A few weeks after
his lecture at the academy, M. de Talleyrand fell
seriously ill. Death approached him. How would
he receive it ? What would be his own final judg-
ment on his past life ? At the moment of appearing
before the Sovereign Judge, by what acts or denials,
by what words or silence would he manifest the
state of his soul ? On the mere report of his illness,
the heads and zealous believers of the Catholic Church
busied themselves vehemently with these questions.
Around his bed, affectionate solicitudes and pious
entreaties were not wanting. On the other hand,
amongst those of his contemporaries who had, like
himself, professed and practised the philosophic ideas
of the eighteenth century and the revolution, several
dreaded, on his part, a contradiction of his life, a
desertion of his cause, a symptom of weakness and
hypocrisy. To speak only of the external and known
THE COALITION. 255
acts of liis last days, what M. de Talleyrand did, he
was consistent in doing, and his death merited no
reproach either of falsehood or vacillation. Inde-
pendently of all inward faith in his relations with
the church to which he belonged, he had been
deficient in imperative duties, and had committed
great scandals. In submitting to an acknowledg-
ment of these errors, and in avowing his penitence,
he performed an act honest in itself and in accord-
ance with the opinion of the world. It was neither
an abjuration of his general ideas, nor an abandon-
ment of his political cause, but a solemn apology
after notorious irregularities. He might have done
this without hypocrisy, for he was one of those
who, even in the licence of their lives, maintain,
through natural elevation of mind, the instinct of
moral order, and willingly render to that feeling
the respect which is its due, when no longer called
upon to sacrifice to it their interests or their passions.
I know not what may have been the religious
disposition of M. de Talleyrand at the last hour,
and under the solitary trembling of the soul on the
point of separation from this world. Death has
authoritative influences, equally unexpected and
secret, which no one here below can penetrate. But
a characteristic fact deserves to be recorded. When,
on his death-bed, a letter was handed to him for
signature which he had addressed to the Pope, he
desired that it might be dated on the day when he
read his notice of Count Rein hard to the Institute.
He was anxious to prove he had written that letter
256 THE COALITION.
with unimpaired mental faculties, and to associate
his deed of submission to the Church with his last
act of fidelity to his friends and the recollections of
his life.
In the same year, 1838, some months after the
death of M. de Talleyrand, an aged man of eighty-
four, like himself, one of his colleagues and adver-
saries in the Constituent Assembly of 1789, the
Count of Montlosier, was called to the same tribunal.
He possessed one of the strongest and most original
minds I have ever met with; his character, his
understanding and ability, whether as orator or
author, even his person and manners, all were marked
by the double physiognomy of solitude and combat.
He seemed to have passed his life far from the world,
in his mountains of Auvergne, meditating on its
volcanoes or their congenial studies, and to have
descended amongst men for the single purpose of
dispute. Liberal and aristocratic, monarchical and
independent, his opinions on religion, pohtics, history,
and literature were all profoundly personal, — the fruit
of his solitary reflections and researches, — and he
maintained them as men defend their houses or
their lives. He was at once filled with pride, capable
of devotion, and passionately obstinate in disconnected
and incoherent ideas and sentiments. There were in
him the elements of superiority, but method and
harmony were utterly deficient, and he consumed in
imperfect labours, in generous but almost uniformly
futile efforts, in extreme contests, a rare energy of
mind and spirit, and a life of unusual duration.
THE COALITION. 257
When he beheld its term at hand, he called faith and
the Christian Church to his aid in that formidable
transition. He had always respected and frequently
defended them. They had neither defection nor
scandal to reproach him with. He declared himself
ready to disavow, in a general sense, all that either
in his conduct or writings might have appeared
contrary to their dogmas or precepts. But he was
asked to retract expressly the ideas he had sometimes
maintained on the relation of the Church with the
State, on the part of the clergy in our Christian
societies, and on religious congregations. He hesi-
tated, sorrow-stricken and undecided. Explanations
and amendments were spoken of and proposed to
him, and while the question was still in argument,
he died in a medley of submission and resistance,
neither a deserter nor a rebel, but ever an inde-
pendent.
I have acquitted myself, if such a discharge is
possible, towards the dead of the age in which I
have lived, and who occupied such different and
unequal positions. It only remains for me here to
notify the date of the decease of a lady, whose
friendship during nearly twenty years afforded me
unqualified delight in days of happiness, and was
even more consolatory in those of sorrow. The
Duchess de Broglie died of a brain fever, on the
22nd of September, 1838. She was one of the most
noble, rare, and charming creatures I have ever seen,
and of whom I shall only say, in the words of Saint
Simon, when deploring the loss of the Duke of
VOL. IV. . s
258 THE COALITION.
Burgundy : " May the mercy of God permit me to
behold her eternally, where, beyond all doubt, his
goodness has placed her!" I return to the living,
to their agitations and struggles.
In forming the cabinet of the 15th of April, M«
MoM undertook a difficult task. He abandoned the
policy of resistance, which, in general thesis, he
wished to maintain. He adopted the policy of the
third party without belonging to it, and without
ranging himself in the ranks of that section as one
of its own natural adherents. By his ideas, habits,
and tastes, he was a man of order and authority ;
the maxims and tendencies of the democratic oppo-
sition inspired him with much more disquietude than
sympathy, and yet it was to the desires of this very
democratic opposition that he yielded, and towards
which he inclined when he Avithdrew the repressive
and monarchical bills he had himself presented, and
proclaimed an amnesty in the midst of the combat,
not on the morrow of a victory, but of a defeat. A
single power which acts without discussion, can, on
a given day, and for several days, change thus
abruptly, attitude, direction, and language; but it
was in presence of great free assemblies, and when it
was impossible to escape from their debates, that M.
Mole accomplished this sudden manoeuvre. His new
policy might be good or bad, but his parliamentary
position was weak and false. He had to govern with
and by the Chambers, and in the Chambers he was
Avithout a friendly and tried party, without a steady
and defined standard, floating between two leading
THE COALITION. 259
opinions of the house, and momentarily inclined
towards that from which he could promise himself no
certain support, and the least in accordance with his
own dispositions.
He diminished or adjourned with much sagacity
and tact the difficulties of this position. The gravity
of his appearance and demeanour relieved him from
all semblance of versatility or weakness. The charm
of his intercourse and conversation drew towards
him the men of no previously decided party, and
conciliated good -will even in the ranks where he
reckoned on no political adhesion. He knew how
to arrange and recommend measures calculated to
give to opposing opinions the required satisfaction
or suitable compensation. Four days after having
pardoned the abettors of revolutionary plots, he re-
opened and restored to public worshija the church of
Saint Germain I'Auxerrois, which had remained
closed since the riot of the 13th of February, 1831,
finally delivering the Catholics from that revolutionary
outrage; then followed the restoration of the cru-
cifix in the hall of the Royal Court at Paris. While
serving the house of Bourbon, he failed not to re-
member his debut in public life, and when occasion
offered, he rendered honourable and friendly offices
to the family or ancient adherents of the Emperor
Napoleon. He proposed and carried the vote for
a pension of 100,000 francs to the Countess of
Lipano, ex-Queen of Naples. While watchful over
religious and moral observances, he took equal care
of material interests, and presented many bills to the
s 2
260 THE COALITION.
Chamber of Deputies for the establishment of rail-
roads to be completed by the co-operation of private
speculation with the state. Several important laws,
the greater part of which had been proposed by pre-
ceding cabinets, and amongst others, those on the
duties of municipal authorities and general depart-
mental councils, were definitively debated, adopted,
and promulgated in the course of his ministry. To
him belonged the honour of effectually shutting up
the gaming-houses of Paris, a measure voted during
the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, on the pro-
position of M. Humann. By the care of his col-
leagues, MM. Barthe, Montalivet, Salvandy, and
Lacave-Laplagne, the internal administration at this
epoch was both enlightened and active; and the
name of M. Mole, his imperious character, blended
with frigid politeness, his position near King Louis-
Philippe, Avith whom he was at the same time de-
ferential and exacting, respectful and susceptible,
imparted a unity to his cabinet, Avhich, although not
predominantly powerful, was far from being deficient
in dignity.
In the conduct of foreign affairs, he had this good
fortune, — that no profound disagreement, no compro-
mising question sprang up during his administration
between the great European powers. The English
cabinet was less confidential and colder with him
than it had been with M. Cashnir Perier and the
Duke de Broglie. The cabinets of Vienna, Berlin,
and Saint Pctcrsbourg, well pleased at a relaxation
of ties between the two great constitutional states,
THE COALITION. 261
reciprocated friendly relations witli M. Mole, praising
his principles and regulations, but showing them-
selves more disposed to profit by than to meet them
with a substantial return. The attitude altogether
was more agreeable than secure; not strong enough
to surmount grave difficulties, should they present
themselves, but which offered no provocation, and
sufficed for the necessities of the moment.
Moreover, incidents occurred, in the secondary re-
gions of external policy, which marked the cabinet
of M. Mole with good fortune, which he readily seized
and turned to account. In America, amongst the
greater portion of the new states formed from the
ruins of the Spanish supremacy, violent and pre-
carious governments outraged at every moment the
principles of public right, invaded the interests of
the resident or foreign merchants, and rejected with
ignorant and improvident arrogance the remon-
strances of the European governments. In March
1838, facts of this nature led to a rupture with
Mexico; at first the suspension of diplomatic re-
lations, then the blockade of the Mexican ports, and
finally war. A French squadron, commanded by
Admiral Baudin, which the Prince de Joinville
hastened to join, commenced vigorous hostilities,
carried by assault the fortress of Saint Jean d' Ulloa,
said to be impregnable, subsequently Vera Cruz, and
compelled the Mexican government, despite its bra-
vadoes and revolutionary fluctuations to sign a treaty
of peace on the 9th of March, 1839, which satisfied
the demands of France. In Southern America, at
s 3
262 THE COALITION.
the mouth of the La Plata, between Monte Video and
Buenos Ayres, analogous causes, complicated by the
internal discords of the two republics, produced the
explosion of similar events, and led to the commence-
ment, in June 1838, of that series of negotiations,
combats, and ineffectual attempts at peace, destined
for ten years to occupy French diplomacy, naval in-
terference, and parliamentary debates. The black
republic of Hayti failed to keep the engagements con-
tracted in 1825, under the ministry of M. de Villele,
in return for the acknowledgment of its indepen-
dence. M. Mole reminded it of these contracts;
first, by negotiation, secondly, by the presence of a
squadron ; and on the 12th of February, 1838, a
fresh treaty was concluded, which confirmed the inde-
pendence of the new state, fixed the indemnity to the
colonists at sixty millions, and stipulated for an
immediate instalment. These distant enterprises,
bravely executed and carried to a successful issue,
excited the interest of the public, and animated with-
out compromising the foreign policy of the cabinet.
A more important and durable success was sought
for and found in Algeria. It had been decided,
under the preceding ministry, before my rupture
with M. Mole, that a second expedition should be
undertaken against Constantine to revenge the check
we had received there. It took place between the
2nd of October and the 3rd of November, 1837, under
the command of General Damremont, who prej^ared
it with provident activity, conducted it under heavy
difficulties to the walls of the place ; and while visiting
THE COALITION. 263
the works in the trenches with the Duke of Nemours,
was struck doAvn by a cannon shot, which, without
allowing him to feel death, gloriously terminated his
honourable life. This mournful accident, far from
abating, redoubled the ardour of the attack; the
senior officer present, the general of artillery Yalee,
already possessing the confidence and esteem of the
army, to which he had added new titles since the
commencement of the expedition, at once assumed
the command ; and on the day following the death
of General Damremont, the 13th of October, the as-
sault was given with a vigour worthy of the best era
of our best soldiers. The Duke of Nemours com-
manded, with intrepid coolness, the column of attack ;
several of our bravest officers, amongst others
Colonels Combes and Lamoriciere, found there, the
first his death, the second a dangerous wound. But
the place was carried; its fall determined the sub-
mission of the surrounding tribes, and the expedition
resulted in a conquest which definitively added the
province of Constantine to the number of French
possessions in Africa.
Four months previously, General Bugeaud, de-
spatched into the province of Oran to arrest the pro-
gress of Abd-el-Kader, had concluded with that able
leader a treaty known by the name of the treaty
of the Tafna: a precarious peace, since severely
criticised, and which supplied important objections
to minds preoccupied with our future prospects in
Algeria, but which, at the moment of its conclusion,
was opportune and advantageous. Spectators are
s 4
264 THE COALITION.
prone to judge political transactions by their own
fixed and general views, not according to the exist-
ing circumstances and special objects which have
determined the actors. A fertile source of error and
injustice. By the taking of Constantine, the tem-
porary pacification of the province of Oran, and the
administration, little popular, but able and honest,
of ^Marshal Yalee, who succeeded General Damremont
as governor-general, the ministry of i\I. Mole was, for
Algeria, a period of prudent extension and effectual
consolidation
Three great questions, the return of Prince Louis
Bonaparte from America to Switzerland, on the
death of his mother Queen Hortense, — the execution
of the treaty denominated, of the twenty-four articles
which definitively settled the territorial limits of
Belgium, — and the evacuation of Ancona by the
French troops, were, externally, the leading affairs
of the ministry of M. Mole, and were settled in a
manner which excited the most vehement attacks.
The events, passions, and contests of that time are
already so far removed from us, and the repose of
my present life throws so much light on my percep-
tions of the past, that I may say, without embarrass-
ment or reserve, what I think to-day of the policy
of M. Mole on those three points, and of the objections
to which it gave rise.
In demanding from Switzerland the removal of
Prince Louis Bonaparte, M. Mole was fully justified.
It was tiie only method, if not of stifling, at least
of rendering more diflioult and perilous, the designs
THE COALITION. 265
publicly avowed and pursued by the prince against
the government of France. Public right authorized
this requisition, and the simplest political foresight
commanded it. Perhaps M. Mole did not adopt the
most eligible diplomatic proceedings; perhaps, in
form, he may have neglected the circumspection best
calculated to attain his object. His ability was
sometimes rather superficial ; but, after all, his step
was as legitimate as necessary, and it succeeded
without the employment of other means than a few
momentary demonstrations, and without more incon-
venience than the clamour of the violent democrats
in Switzerland, and the ill humour, more apparent
than real, of the federal government of the Republic,
sufficiently moderate to practise, but too timid or too
weak to avow openly the principles of public right
and sound sense.
I must say the same of the attitude of M. Mole
in relation to the treaty of the twenty-four articles
on the territorial limits of Belgium. In 1834 the
Belgians were eager to accept this treaty as the
pledge of their independence acknowledged by Eu-
rope. In the subsequent negotiations to which the
prolonged refusal of the King of Holland gave rise,
the French government had vainly endeavoured to
obtain for Belgium the entire possession of the
duchies of Luxembourg and Limbourg. On the 11th
of December, 1838, the conference of London main-
tained the treaty of the twenty-four articles which
the King of Holland at last appeared disposed to
accept. We had evidently reached the term of the
266 THE COALITION.
concessions of the great European powers to the new
state. The English cabinet, on this point, was in
perfect accordance w^ith the three cabinets of the
north, and more decided than any other not to ex-
ceed the limits which the treaty of the twenty-four
articles had assigned. The conclusive and unani-
mous adoption of this treaty was equally impor-
tant to the formation of the Belgic state and to the
consolidation of European peace. M. Mole acted
wisely in adhering to it, and in not allowing France,
when the essential points were obtained, to remain
isolated in Europe, and Belgium still in suspense.
The evacuation of Ancona was a more complex
question. The Pope demanded it. Austria, at the
same time, engaged to abandon the Legations. The
law of nations was not doubtful, but events have
taken upon themselves to show how much, from that
period, the great European cabinets have wanted
resolute and persevering foresight in the aiFairs of
Italy. In 1831, in presence of insurrection, they
had recommended and obtained in the Roman States
reforms insufficient to satisfy popular passions, but
which would have become salutary had they been
real. Nothing lowers or compromises power more
than submission without renouncement, and a belief
that it is justified in neglecting its promises as soon
as it finds them difficult to accomplish or capable of
being avoided. Sustained, in fact, by the court of
Vienna, the Papal government readily seized every
opportunity and motive for nullifying the reforms it
had decreed, and which the European cabinets, care-
THE COALITION. 267
less or ill-disposed, took no pains to maintain by
rendering them serious and effective. After all that
has passed since that epoch, and in face of what is
passing now, I persist in thinking that the Roman
question, — that is to say, the reform of the internal
government of the Roman States, might be effected
without the temporal spoliation of the Papacy. The
work is difficult, but not impossible, and it was then,
as now, a work of necessity. They deceive them-
selves strangely who believe that, in presence of the
events in which we are all participators, the Roman
question is on the point of being determined. It is
not the solution which approaches, it is the chaos
that begins. No one can estimate the perturbation
which would be, I do not wish to say will be, thrown
into the social and moral condition of Europe by the
disorganization of the Catholic Church, and the
prostration of the base on which it reposes. The
honour and safety of the Christian world require that
the government of the Ronian States should be re-
formed, but not that the Papacy should be over-
thrown. From 1831 to 1838 a decided action exer-
cised upon the court of Rome by the great European
powers would have attained this double end. By the
occupation of Ancona, that military and diplomatic
coup de main of M. Casimir Perier, France was in a
position to place herself at the head of the important
work. She could, from that point, at once press
upon the courts of Rome and Vienna, encourage and
equally restrain the hopes of the Roman populations,
and infuse into the government of the Papal States a
268 THE COALITION.
profound reform without subverting Italy and de-
naturalizing the Papacy. By giving up Ancona,
M. Mole deprived France of all means of action and
chance of success. The court of Rome fell back into
its habitual inertness ; Austria reassumed in Italy her
inmiovable preponderance; and the Roman question
found itself still more loaded with embarrassments
and perils.
In the midst of all these foreiG:n and domestic
incidents, and throughout the whole duration of
M. Mole's cabinet, I preserved a tranquil attitude,
free in my language, but a stranger to all active or
disguised hostility. On several occasions, including
the intervention in Spain, the affairs of Algeria, the
treaty of the Tafna, and the Greek loan, I spoke in
support of the policy and demands of the cabinet,
either because they linked themselves to the acts of
the preceding administration, or because I found
them conformable to public right and the interests of
the country. Twice only I was led, in the debates
in the Chamber of Deputies, to mark distinctly my
opinion and personal position; not attacking the
cabinet, but caring little for the displeasure it might
feel, or the result that might ensue.
During the first days of May 1837, a fortnight
after my rupture with M. Mole, the Chamber of De-
puties discussed the demand for extraordinary secret
funds presented by the cabinet. In the course of
this debate, I was called upon to name the causes of
my retirement. I explained myself with reserve,
avoiding all personal controversy, but insisting on
THE COiVLITION. 269
the necessity of a strong and homogeneous organiza-
tion of the different parties and the ministry, for the
mutual interest of liberty and power. On this oc-
casion I spoke of the democracy and the middle class,
of their relations and mission in our social state, and
in the bosom of free institutions. M. Odilon-Barrot,
in reply, repeated the reproach he had already ad-
dressed to me more than once. " You wish," he
said, " to establish an exclusive system which would
tend to no less than a division of France into hostile
castes. The middle class rejects this ill-omened
present, this monopoly of victory. You forget then
that all the triumphs of our revolution were gained
by the world at large; you forget that the blood
which has flowed, at home and abroad, for the inde-
pendence or liberty of France, is the blood of the
whole world."
" No," I exclaimed, " I do not forget this. It is
true, our Charter contains rights which have been
conquered for all the world, which are the price of
the blood of all the world. These rights are, equality
in public charges, equal admission to all public em-
ployment, liberty of labour, liberty of worship, the
liberty of the press, and individual liberty ! These
rights, amongst us, are those of the whole world;
they belong to all classes of Frenchmen ; they are
well worthy of having been conquered by the battles
we have fought, and the victories we have won.
" There is yet another reward of these battles and
victories; yourselves, gentlemen, the government of
which you form a part, this Chamber, our consti-
270 THE COALITION.
tutional royalty, this is what the blood of all France
has conquered; this is what the entire nation has
received from victory as the price of its efforts and
its courage. Do you find this insufficient for noble
ambition and generous sentiments? Will it be ne-
cessary, after this, to establish that absurd political
equality, that blind universality of political rights
which hides itself at the bottom of every theory
lately enunciated from this tribune ? Do not say that
I refuse to, or dispute with, the French nation, the
price of its victories, the price of its blood poured
forth in our fifty years of revolutions. But, appa-
rently, France has not intended to live always in
revolution ; she has assuredly reckoned that at the
close of these combats, and for the security of all the
privileges she has conquered, a regular, fixed order
would be established, a free and reasonable govern-
ment, capable of guaranteeing the rights of all by
the direct and active interposition of that part of the
nation truly capable of exercising political power.
This is what I meant to say wlien I spoke of the
necessity of instituting and organizing the middle
class. Have I assigned the limits of that class?
Have you heard me say where it was to commence
or end? I have carefully abstained from doing so.
I have neither distinguished it from any superior
section, nor from the inferior orders. I have simj^ly
stated this general fact, that in a great country such
as France there exists a class not devoted to manual
labour, not living by wages, able to dedicate a con-
siderable portion of its time and faculties to public
THE COALITION. 271
business ; possessing not only the necessary fortune
for such an undertaking, but also the lights and in-
dependence without which a similar work could never
be accompUshed. When, by the course of time, this
natural limit of political capacity shall be removed,
when knowledge, the progress of wealth, and all the
causes which change the state of society shall have
rendered a greater number of men capable of exer-
cising political power with sound judgment and inde-
pendence, then the legal boundary will also change.
It is the perfection of our government that political
rights, limited to those who are capable of exercising
them, may extend as capacity extends ; and such is
at the same time the admirable virtue of this govern-
ment, that it excites incessantly the extension of
that capacity ; that it scatters on all sides learning,
intelligence, and independence; so that, while as-
signing a limit to political rights, at the same moment
it labours to displace that limit, to extend it, and
thus to elevate the nation at large.
" How can you believe, how could any one believe,
that it ever entered my mind to constitute the middle
class in a narrow privileged form, to remould it into
somethino; reserablino; our ancient aristocracies ?
Allow me to say, that in so doing I should have re-
nounced the opinions I have maintained through life ;
I should have abandoned the cause I have ever
defended, the work in which I have had the honour
to assist under your eyes and by your hands. When
I applied myself to spread education throughout the
country, when I sought to elevate in intellectual
272 THE COALITION.
order the classes who live by labour, to give them
the knowledge they require for their position, — this
was on my part, and on the part of the entire govern-
ment, a continued incitement to acquire universal
information, to rise to a higher sphere. It was the
beginning of that work of civilization, of that gene-
rally ascending movement, the desire of which is
implanted in human nature, and which it is the duty
of all administrations to encourage. I repel, there-
fore, I repel utterly these accusations of a narrow
system, foreign to the general interests and senti-
ments of the nation, and solely applicable to the
individual advantage of a special class of citizens. I
repel them most emphatically, and at the same time
I assert that the moment has arrived for shaking off
those worn-out revolutionary ideas, those absurd
prepossessions of absolute equality in political rights,
which, wherever they have prevailed, have extin-
guished real justice and liberty.
" Much is said of democracy. I am accused of
disowning its rights and interests. Ah ! gentlemen,
what has so often injured democracy is, that it has
not acquired a true feeling of human dignity ; it has
neither understood nor chosen to admit that variety,
that hierarchy of positions which naturally develop
themselves in the social state, and which allow with-
out reserve the ascendant tendency in individuals,
and mutual competition according to relative merit.
Neither liberty nor the advancement of the working
classes have satisfied democracy ; it demands level-
ling; and this is the reason why it has so often and
THE COALITION. 273
SO rapidly ruined the societies in which it has pre-
dominated.
" For myself, I am one of those determined to
oppose the levelling principle, no matter under what
form it may present itself. I am resolved to call
u]3on the whole nation to advance, but at the same
time reminding it, that advancement has its special
and imperative conditions ; that it requires capacity,
intelligence, virtue, industry, and a host of inciting
ao-encies which all men are not able to command.
" I desire that wherever these agencies are found,
wherever there is capacity, virtue and industry, the
democratic class may elevate itself to the highest
positions of the state ; that it may ascend this tri-
bune, raise its voice here, and exercise its influence
over all the affairs of the country. But you possess
this privilege already, gentlemen ; you have no occa-
sion to demand it. You live in the midst of a society
more completely thrown open to progress and the
expectation of equality, than any that has ever yet
appeared. Never has there been seen such a con-
course of individuals raised to the highest rank in
every career : we have nearly all won our positions
by the sweat of our brows and on the field of battle."
M. Odilon-Barrot : "If this were to begin again.
M. Guizot : " M. Odilon-Barrot is right ; it is to
begin again, to-day and for ever."
M. Odilon-Barrot: " You have mistaken my idea.
These illustrative cases occurred in a time of equality,
and if that were to be repeated "
VOL. IV. T
274 THE COALITION.
M. Guizot : " It seems to me that tlie honourable
M. Barrot is indulging here in a strange illusion. I
spoke just now of every kind of illustration
The honourable M. Barrot himself supplies a faithful
instance ; he has won his position in our own days,
under our eyes, in the midst of us, under the system
of which I speak, and not at any other epoch. There
are many men who in opposite careers have raised
and are raising themselves as he has done. I should
repudiate absolutely an advantage applicable to a
single generation, even though it were my own case.
I do not understand that after all the political vic-
tories of the French nation, we have conquered for
ourselves alone the rights that we possess. No, we
have won them for our children, for our grand-
children, and for our descendants throughout all
ages. This is what I understand, this is what I am
proud of ; this is true liberty, generous and productive
liberty, in the midst of that envious, jealous, uneasy,
and shuffling democracy which seeks to reduce every-
thing to its own level, and is discontented if it sees
one head raise itself above another.
" God forbid that our country should continue in-
fected by such a deplorable disease ! • I explain it to
myself in the times it has passed through, in the
struggles it has sustained ; when it laboured to over-
throw absolute power and privilege, it called to its
aid, indiscriminately, every variety of force, dan-
gerous or useful, lawful or unlawful, good and evil
passions. All these appeared upon the fields of
action, and all looked for their share in the plunder.
THE COALITION. 275
But to-day the contest is over, peace is made, the
treaty concluded : that treaty is the Charter and free
government. I do not desire that my country should
repeat anew what it has accomplished. I accept
1791, 1792, even the following years; while con-
demning them I accept them in history ; but I do not
desire them for the future, and I hold it is a duty of
conscience to warn my country as often as I see it
inclining in that direction.
" Such is my policy, gentlemen, my only policy.
Such is the sense in which I understand the words
middle class and democracy, liberty and equality, so
often repeated, and a moment since in this tribune.
Nothing, gentlemen, will induce me to deviate from
the meaning I attach to them. I have risked for it all
that man can hold most dear in public life,- — I have
risked popularity. I have not been unacquainted with
popularity. You may remember, gentlemen, M.
Barrot may remember, a time when we served toge-
ther, when we fought under the same flag. At that
time he may recollect that I was popular; I have
beheld popular applause frequently present itself
before me; I enjoyed it much, very much; it was a
beautiful and delightful emotion. I have renounced
it, — yes, I have renounced it. I know that such
popularity does not attach itself to the ideas I am
now defending, to the policy I maintain at present ;
but I know also there is another kind of popularity,
the confidence we inspire in the social interests of a
great country, the confidence of those regular and
conservative interests which I regard as the founda-
276 THE COALITION.
tion on which society is based. This is the confidence
I have sought for in place of that seductive and
dehghtful popularity with which I was formerly
acquainted. I aspire to the esteem and confidence of
the friends of order, of lawful and liberal order ; to
the confidence of men who believe that France is in
possession of the rights and institutions she has been
seeking since 1789, and that her most important
occupation at present should be to preserve and
strengthen them.
" This is the cause to which I have devoted myself;
this is the popularity I covet. This will console me
for the rest, and I shall envy no one the possession of
any other kind of popularity, however genial it may
be."
The Chamber was profoundly moved and satisfied.
Nothing gratifies men more than to see their own
ideas clearly elucidated, and to recognize themselves
in an image which raises them in their own eyes.
From that time people began to adopt what has since
become the favourite common-place expression in the
policy of the extreme parties. They imputed to the
general body of the citizens the design of becoming,
and the accusation of having already become, a new
privileged class, the inheritors of the old nobility, to
the exclusion of and at the expense of the people.
They taxed them with thinking of nothing but their
own interests, with coldness, egotism, sordid views,
and mean-spirited propensities. I have some right
to speak of the weaknesses of the middle class, for
perhaps, more than any one else, I have suffered from
THE COALITION. 277
their inconveniences and borne their weight. It is
true, that called abruptly, although by the natural
course of things, to take a preponderating part in
the government of France, this class has not always
proved equal to its novel and arduous task. The
grandeur of thought and the resolution of experience
were sometimes deficient. It has been occasionally
too much alarmed at the political fermentation, to
which it yielded too readily ; it has not always known
how alternately to undertake and how to persevere
enough. It w^s not itself exempt from the errors
and mischievous tendencies against which it con-
tended ; but, in spite of its improvidences and mis-
takes, it was not less the true, honest, and faithful
representative of the general interests of French
society, such as that society had been made by the
Revolution. No desire of exclusive privilege or
oppressive system entered into its calculation ; no evil
of that character could result from the institutions
it loved and supported. These were truly free and
open institutions, unmingled with any species of
tyranny, accessible to all rights and to unrestricted
progress. The declared partisans of universal and
immediate equality alone had any pretence for taxing
the citizen class with usurpation and injustice. With
the exception of this radical section all shades of
opinion, interests, and parties enjoyed the perspective
of an unfettered career. All could advance accord-
ing to their true merit and actual strength. A day
will come when the storm which then began to raise
itself against the middle class will be pronounced one
T 3
278 THE COALITION.
of the most senseless aberrations of popular cre-
dulity ever engendered by revolutionary passion ; and
I merely anticipated that day when, in May 1837, I
defended that class and the institutions in which it
predominated against the gathering tempest. Its
gratitude was testified with unusual ardour. Two
hundred and six deputies joined in requesting per-
mission to reprint a portion of my two speeches, and
to circulate them in their departments. More than
thirty thousand copies were speedily distributed. The
opposition itself, while maintaining its attitude, took
pleasure in this grand parliamentary scene ; and the
effect produced in the Chamber spread itself through-
out the country, as much as such effects can extend
beyond the place and the day where the presence of
the individual speakers and the power of words have
impressed the spectators.
The cabinet was injured by the echo of this de-
bate in which it had taken so small a share. The
opposition, by whom it was received favourably as
long as the question involved the overthrow of the
preceding government, took pleasure in fomenting
the discontent of the new ministers by proclaiming
the importance of the men they had separated from.
M. Thiers came to their aid, as he had promised the
King ; but extraneous support cannot restore the
power it tries to uphold. M. Mole, of a delicate
and susceptible nature, felt these wounds keenly; the
more so that beyond the Chambers the marriage of
the Duke of Orleans, the amnesty, and the second
expedition to Constantine inspired him with satisfac-
THE COALITION. 279
tion and the confidence of success. Irritated by this
contrast, he considered the moment propitious for
giving himself a parliamentary position in harmony
with his external strength. He proposed to the King
the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. No
political or general necessity called for this step. The
Chamber had adopted all the propositions of the
ministry, who still held a majority, while the oppo-
sition was more ironical than aggressive. It was
evidently to gratify his self-love and ease that M.
Mole desired the dissolution. The King consented to
it with some reluctance. The elections took place,
not as a public struggle between the great opinions
and parties of the country, but as a mingled conflict
of candidates, supported or rejected by the Ad-
ministration as they were presumed to be friendly or
hostile. Out of 459 deputies, 152, springing from
very opposite ranks, were replaced by new-comers ;
and amongst those who lost their seats were several
of my own particular friends, staunch defenders of
the policy of resistance, who looked upon it as ener-
vated and compromised by the attitude of M. Mole.
The number included MM. D'Haubersaert, Giraud,
Renouard, &c., who were especially opposed and ex-
pelled by the cabinet. These elections, thus con-
ducted, without defined principles and any de-
clared standard, produced a disorganised Chamber,
with no steady, public engagements, governed by
individual interests and feelings, in the bosom of
which M. Mole might possibly find the scattered
elements of a favourable majority, but wherein the
T 4
280 THE COALITION.
great governing party, commenced under M. Casimir
Perier, and already disunited by the fall of the
cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, underwent a
new crisis of disruption and enfeeblement.
When the session opened, the consequences of this
state of parties and minds speedily manifested itself.
In both Chambers the addresses were all that the
cabinet could desire. Amongst the bills presented,
those of minor importance, or such as had already
been the object of long debates in preceding Cham-
bers, were readily passed. But when great and
difficult questions arose, where the cabinet had to
adopt and carry its resolutions on the conversion of
the funds, and on constructing the general net-work
of railroads, then its weakness appeared. Political
authority was found wanting. It rested on no party
strongly knit together, bound to it by fixed convic-
tions, and determined to support it in the interest of
their common cause. Its definitive intentions were
vacillating. It carried into the debates little power
and brilliancy. The two propositions I have alluded
to were thrown out, and the elections looked upon
as victorious eventuated in a cold and barren session.
The only debate essentially political, the demand
for a new and extraordinary credit on account of the
secret funds, was marked by the same character, and
I took part in it myself with indifference and embar-
rassment. I neither wished to refuse the secret sup-
plies, nor to assume towards the ministry an attitude
of general and permanent opposition. I confined
myself to noting with regret the instability of power,
THE COALITION. 281
the decline of the Chamber itself, and the weakness
it imparted to the entire government. I was coldly
listened to as I spoke. My old adversaries of the
Left asked, with a smile, if I was not myself tainted
with weakness and decay. I saw the coming storm,
I warned others of its approach ; but I was not de-
sirous of being accused of raising it.
After the session of 1838, and in the interval
which separated it from that of 1839, the flaw in
M. Mole's position developed itself rapidly. He had
exhausted the influence which his accession to office
gave him, the adhesion of the Third Party, and even
of the Left, These transient allies abandoned him,
and he failed to acquire, in the course of his adminis-
tration, new and personal force. His prudence, his
favourable attitude, his well-timed and agreeable lan-
guage preserved for him, in the Chamber and with
the country, a degree of favour unaccompanied by
real power. Europe esteemed him, and congratulated
herself on his policy, but without relying on his
strength. He still enjoyed a tranquil and easy present,
but his future in perspective was menaced and weak.
No sooner had the session of 1839 commenced
than the mischief burst forth ; all causes of discontent
expressed themselves loudly ; animated by the same
humour the diflerent shades of opposition drew to-
wards each other. It was asked if they should
accept indefinitely a decaying and wavering adminis-
tration, seeking support alternately from opposing
ranks, passing from resistance to concession, from
concession to resistance, and which, under the guise
282 THE COALITION.
of conciliation, placed the government beyond the
influence of all clear, steady, and consistent opinions,
and drove from its side their most approved repre-
sentatives? Wliy did not this conciliation so much
vaunted penetrate the bosom of the opposition itself?
Why did not M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and M.
Guizot, endeavour to understand each other and act
in concert, even for a moment, and with a special
and decided object? When M. Mole separated from
M. Guizot, had not M. Mole arranged with M. Thiers
and M. Odilon-Barrot to change policy, and substi-
tute concession for resistance? This bad example
became contagious at the very moment when its
mischievous results were making themselves felt.
The coalition worked its effects on minds and in con-
versation before passing into speeches and votes.
I embarked in it openly and actively. Before
estimating the fact and its consequences I shall state
the motives by which I was determined.
I was earnestly bent on recalling the government
to a more decided and consistent policy. For nine
years I had alternately defended and carried the
standard of resolute authority in presence of auda-
cious freedom. I suffered in my inmost soul when I
saw this flag, not abandoned, but half wound up and
shrouded. It is the natural and admirable effect of
free government, that the great parties of which it is
formed attach themselves to principles, and desire to
proclaim while practising them. It is essential that
minds should be satisfied and elevated at the same
time that interests are guaranteed and confided. I
THE COALITION. 283
do not think I go too far wlien I affirm that, during
the administration of M. Casimir Perier, and that
of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, the
Chamber and the public participated in this double
satisfaction. M. Mole gave it not to them ; he suf-
ficed from day to day for the necessities of order
under a free system, but without exercising or
securing liberty and order in durability by his per-
sonal influence. It was a regular and rational govern-
ment ; but vigour and intellectual riches were want-
ing to it ; the drama was greater and more animated
than the actors.
Amongst the causes of this unproductive languor
was the inadequate share taken by the Chamber of
Deputies. It neither held the place nor played the
part to which it was called by the nature of our
institutions, and the state of parties. Five political
groups constituted and gave life to this assembly.
At the extremities the Republicans and the Legiti-
mists were expressed, I will not say led, by M.
Garnier-Pages and M. Berryer ; between these two
factions, important by ideas and talent if not by
number, stood the Right Centre, the Left Centre, and
the Left, represented by M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers,
and myself. None of these groups, not more those
who accepted than the others who rejected the new sys-
tem had, by their avowed chiefs, a direct and effective
action in the government. The principal and habi-
tual agents were in the rank of spectators divested
of responsibility, and tempted to give themselves up
to the pleasures of criticism. From conviction as
284 THE COALITION.
much as from position, I felt strongly what I shall
permit m^^self to call this parliamentary disorder,
and I considered it urgent in the interest of power
and of liberty, of the crown and of the country, that
the Chamber of Deputies, and its public interpreters,
should resume in public affairs their natural share of
influence and personal responsibility.
Another consideration moved me. Since the fall
of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, and my
separation from M. Thiers, the basis of the govern-
ment had become closely contracted ; rivalries, jea-
lousies, internal and unforeseen difficulties, tended to
restrict it still more from day to day. An oppor-
tunity occurred of escaping from this narrow track,
and of widening the circle of future cabinets by the
introduction of men who, despite the difference of
their positions and habits, adopted in reality the
same ideas, inclined towards the same end, and were
not of necessity, as they had not always been, incom-
patible. Between M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers, and
myself, when our hearts were sounded, there were no
insurmountable barriers, no irrevocable engagements ;
we had for eighteen months made many material
advances. Had not the moment arrived for a more
decisive step ? All three unconnected with the
administration of M. MoM, we had ceased to oppose
each other. Was it not possible to come to an under-
standing, and reconstruct together a great consti-
tutional party capable of establishing on enlarged
foundations the free and monarcliical government we
mutually desired to establish, and the destinies of
THE COALITION. 285
wliicli our dissensions, under the fire of its enemies,
were capable of compromising? The importance of
such a work was evident, and however slight might
be the chance of success, it was assuredly worth the
attempt.
I was too well acquainted ^vith human weaknesses,
including my own, to doubt that personal feelings
might mingle with these views of public interest.
Egotism is infinitely skilful in insinuating and con-
cealing itself in the bosom of the sincerest patriotism ;
and I will not afi&rm that the recollection of my
rupture with M. Mole, in 1837, and the secret desire
of personal retaliation, while supporting a good public
cause, may have been without its influence on my
adhesion to the coalition in 1839, and the ardour
with which I accompanied it. Even with the most
honest of men political life is not the chosen avoca-
tion of saints : it has its necessities and obscurities
which, with a good or ill grace, we recognize while
submitting to them; it excites passions and supplies
opportunities for self- complaisance, from which no
one, if he conscientiously examines his soul after the
trial, can feel confident of having entirely escaped;
and he who has not made up his mind to bear with
tranquillity the weight of the complications and im-
perfections inherent in the most upright public life,
will do well to confine himself to privacy and pure
speculation.
Be this as it may, I relate without addition or
reserve the disposition I brought to the committee on
the address. The various shades of the opposition
286 THE COALITION.
were present there in a majority. They agreed with-
out difficulty, and the draft of the address pre-
sented on the 4th of January, 1839, to the Chamber
of Deputies, was their free and deliberate work.^
The external policy of the cabinet was therein for-
mally censured as to the evacuation of Ancona,
On the negotiations in the affairs of Belgium and
Switzerland, the address maintained reserve in which
intentional anxiety was manifested. Internally, the
cabinet was considered insufficient to establish be-
tween the Crown and the Chambers that steady
understanding and active harmony, which, under the
representative system, can alone guarantee the
strength and security of power by concentrating all
responsibility in its advisers. I think to-day, as I
thought then, that on this participation of the Cham-
bers in the government of the country, the drafts
of the address, otherwise sincerely and avowedly
monarchical, did not exceed the limits of constitu-
tional right. The general tone wanted neither mea-
sure nor conformity in its coldness. But the attack
was palpable and direct. No one affected to misun-
derstand it ; and the cabinet accepted the contest as
frankly as it was offered by the opposition.
The struggle was fiercer than the opposition looked
for. During twelve days M. Mol(3 displayed a firm-
ness and presence of mind, a becoming and able
perseverance which animated the zeal, at first a little
wavering, of his partisans, and compelled his o]>
• See Historic Documents, No. XII.
THE COALITION. 287
ponents to redouble their efforts. On all the para-
graphs in the draft of the address, in which the
policy of the cabinet was directly or indirectly in-
criminated, amendments were proposed to rebut the
censure ; and after long debates, in which M. Mole,
faithfully seconded by his supporters, nobly defended
himself, nearly all the amendments were adopted by
very weak majorities, but despite the combined efforts
of the leaders of all the different degrees of op-
position. Thus we were definitively led to vote
against the address so amended, which was adopted
in revenge, with a mixture of satisfaction and anger,
by the partisans of the cabinet, mortally stricken but
still erect on the ground it had so valiantly defended.
In this combat it found a brilliant ally. M. de
Lamartine, who until then had held a little aloof from
the militant policy, took an energetic part against the
coalition. I cannot encounter the name of M. de
Lamartine in my reminiscences, or himself in our
streets, without an impression of profound melan-
choly. No man ever received from God more valuable
gifts, — gifts of person and position, of intellectual
power and social elevation. Neither have favourable
circumstances been withheld from him, in addition to
those original advantages ; every chance, as well as
every means of success, have attended his steps. He
grappled them with ardour ; for a moment he played
a lofty part in a lofty drama ; he reached the end of
the highest ambition, and enjoyed its most consum-
mate glories. Where is he now ? I speak not
of the reverses of his public career, nor of the
288 THE COALITION.
trials of his private life. In our days who has not
fallen ? Who has not experienced the blows of
fate, the anguish of the soul, the inflictions of for-
tune ? Labour, disappointment, sacrifice, and suffer-
ing have held in all times, and will continue to hold,
their place and portion in the destiny of man, — with
the exalted more than with the humble. What sur-
prises and saddens me is that M. de Lamartine should
be astonished or irritated at this. It is not alone the
pain of his position, but the state of his feelings, such
as he has revealed them to us, which I cannot con-
template without melancholy. How can a spectator
who looks on events from such a height, be so in-
tensely moved by the accidents which affect himself ?
How can such a sagacious appreciator of other men
be possessed of so little self-knowledge ? How does
he abandon himself to so much bitterness after such
extensive enjoyment of the favours of Heaven and of
the world ? In that richly endowed nature there
must be great blanks and a want of controlling har-
mony, to cause his fall into such internal trouble and
its manifestation with so much vehemence. I have
seen too little of M. de Lamartine to know and under-
stand him thoroughly : he seemed to me like a beau-
tiful tree covered with flowers, without fruit that
ripens or roots that hold ; a brilliant meteor without
fixed place, and with no assigned course in the
general system of the firmament ; a great spirit in-
cessantly passing and repassing from the regions of
light to those of clouds, and catching at every step a
glimpse of truth without being arrested by it ; a
THE COALITION. 289
noble heart, open to all generous sympathies, but
still governed by personal prepossessions. And I
am more confirmed in my general impression of this
eminent man, as I perceived in his first appearance in
the midst of our debates, in his speeches of the 10th
and 19th of January, 1839, on the coalition, the
features I recognize at present. He attacked the
coalition warmly, but without rescuing and almost
giving up M. Mol^, for he wished to please the oppo-
sition as well as the friends of the cabinet. He
defended the prerogative of the crown while treating
constitutional monarchy as a government of transi-
tion, and occasionally sufi*ering his republican ten-
dencies to escape. He paid compliments and made
advances alternately to all the parties which divided
the Chamber, without classing himself with any one
in particular, endeavouring to draw them to himself
without giving himself to them ; and when in the
midst of this flattering description of all the internal
fractions of the assembly, M. Arago demanded from
his place, " And what of the social party ? " "I am
asked what is the social party," replied M. de
Lamartine ; " Gentlemen, it is no longer a party, it
is an idea ;" casting around his blandishments, so to
speak, in all directions, to obtain universal admiration
and assent. His language was that of a great but
superficial ambitionist, more greedy of incense than
of empire, ready to rush with haughty improvidence
into the most hazardous attempts, prodigal to all of
hopes and promises, but ofi*ering nothing beyond
vague and incoherent perspectives which disappoint
VOL. IV. u
290 THE CO^UilTION.
the desires tlicy excite. To be effective and truly
great, policy demands a more distinct end; a firmer
and more simple choice between ideas, designs, and
parties. In his attack on the coalition, M. de Lamar-
tine was, on the side of the cabinet, the oratorical
ornament of the debate ; but he left it, more cele-
brated than influential, without obtaining the serious
confidence even of those to whom he had lent his
eloquent support.
The address being voted, M. Mole and his col-
leagues, justly considering their success too weak
for the burden, tendered their resignations to the
King. Called upon by his Majesty, Marshal Soult
attempted, without success, to form a cabinet.
M. Mole resumed office, and the dissolution of the
Chamber of Deputies was immediately announced.
This was the second time, Avithin two years, in which
M. Mole, to carry on his government, had been
obliged to appeal to the country. A single session
had sufficed to compromise the existence of the
cabinet in a Chamber assembled by himself, and the
election of wliich he regarded as his triumph.
This single fact established a strong presumption
against him. But the coalition, on its side, if it had
materially shaken tlie cabinet, had also seriously
compromised the opposition. We had been deficient
in plan and foresight. Some of our complaints
against the foreign policy of M. MoM were, in reality,
extremely questionable, and had been effectually dis-
puted in the debate ; we had fallen into the common
error of parties under a representative system, of
THE COALITION. 291
exaggeration ; and on the points on which our attacks
were founded, such, for instance, as the evacuation
of Ancona, time and events had not yet vindicated our
views. Our second mistake, want of foresight, was
even more weighty. We had not sufficiently calcu-
lated the effect which would be produced upon re-
flecting and honest men, friends of order, and spec-
tators rather than actors in the political struggles,
by the reconciliation and alliance of parties so lately
in antagonism, and whose maxims, traditions, and
tendencies still continued so distinct. Not only did
these judges of the field, who formed the centre
of the Chamber, blame the coalition, and experience
severe uneasiness while witnessing its progress, but
anger sprang up in their hearts with censure and
inquietude. They opposed the coalition, at first for
the cabinet, but subsequently on their own account.
They displayed in this opposition an unusual degree
of ardour, accord, and perseverance ; and the govern-
ment party, dismembered and dispersed since the fall
of the cabinet of the 11th of October, 1832, came to
itself, and, without its old leaders, once more formed
round M. Mole, at the precise moment when we were
accusing M. Mole and his cabinet of being a govern-
ment too weak, too much estranged from the Chamber
of Deputies, and imable to secure for the country
and crown the active co-operation of all the consti-
tutional powers. Never, for three years, had the
government party been so compact, nor the cabinet
so certain of its support, as on the day when, the
victory between the ministry and the coalition being
292 THE COALITION.
still undecided, the King, on the demand of M. M0I6,
and to sustain him to the end, appealed to the
country by declaring the dissolution. Springing up
under such auspices, the elections were strenuously
contested, and carried through as a grand pell-mell
of opinions and alliances. I endeavoured in several
printed letters to explain fully the reasons of public
interest which had induced me to join the coalition,
and the fidelity I intended to preserve to the policy
I had advocated for nine years, while demanding
what I considered the legitimate and necessary in-
fluence of the Chambers in the government.^ The
elections gave the coalition an evident but limited
triumph, M. Mole and his colleagues perceived that
in the new Chamber of Deputies they were unequal
to the struggle ; they accordingly retired definitively,
and the coalition was called to form a cabinet.
The work appeared to be easy, and the solution
naturally indicated. M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Thiers,
and myself, had participated together in the attack ;
we were now to share in the victory, and to pass
from concert in opposition to concert in ofiice. But
in this transition M. Odilon and I encountered an
obstacle, which in the debates on the coalition we had
ourselves overlooked. Our maxims, tendencies, con-
duct, and words had been for nine years profoundly
different; from the first months of 1830 we had been
not only divided but opposed. We had recently, in
our provisional alliance, reminded each other of this
• See Historic Documents, No. XIII.
THE COALITION. 293
past, and declared our intention of not contradicting
it. The temptation of governing in common was
interdicted to us by the general state of parties, and
by our own honour. We entertained no such idea.
It was understood that M. Odilon-Barrot and I
could not enter the ministry together.
Between M. Thiers and me no similar difficulty
existed. We had maintained and practised the same
policy together ; we could conjointly resume power;
our past dealings and our present and prospective
union created no point of insurmountable embarrass-
ment. Could we not also, when forming a cabinet
in concert, accept M. Odilon-Barrot as President of
the Chamber of Deputies ? Here was an office un-
connected with the government and the opposition,
independent without being hostile. By the gravity
of his character and manners, by the elevation of his
mind, by his respect for law and liberty, M. Odilon
was eminently well suited to the post. The recon-
ciliation which the coalition had brought about
between us, authorized the friendly relations without
common action or responsibility, which ought to be
established between the ministry and the President
of the Chamber. I declared my readiness to admit
this combination.
But when M. Thiers and M. Barrot proposed it at
the meetings of the Left, Centre and the Left they
encountered an opposition to my admission to the
new cabinet in any capacity, which they surmounted
with difficulty; and their success was limited to a
stipulation by their friends that I should resume the
u 3
294 THE COALITION.
ministry of Public Instruction, and M. Duchatel that
of Finance. This was all that our recent allies of
the coalition would allow to us, the old defenders of
the policy of resistance, in the parliamentary govern-
ment about to be restored.
I had lately given a proof, by contenting myself,
in the cabinet of M. ]\Iole, with the portfolio of
Public Instruction, of the little personal importance
I attached to any specific department, when I felt
otherwise confident that the general policy to which
I was devoted would prevail in the government. I
was not in 1839 more exacting than in 1836. I had
some right to feel surprised at the opposition I
encountered from the victorious coalition, for I had
not been anion o-st the least in its struo-o-le and
o (DO
triumph. More than once, in the course of that
great debate, several of the. coalescing parties had
been tempted to compromise, and to accept, at the
sacrifice of the resolute and clear address we had
drawn up, a few of the somewhat equivocal amend-
ments proposed by the friends of M. Mole. I had re-
jected and defeated these inclinations. As long as the
battle lasts all appearance of hesitation and retreat is an
error, even though we may repent of having engaged.
Assuredly M. Duchatel and I exhibited no very
exorbitant pretensions when proposing to join the
cabinet about to be formed under the presidency
of Marshal Soult ; we only required two departments
out of nine ; but it was at least reasonable, that if not
in number, in quality these departments should suffi-
ciently guarantee our influence and action. The
THE COALITION. 295
more decided I had been in the coalition, the more
I determined to remain, when in power, faithful to
the policy of order and resistance. To satisfy what
I regarded as a right, and a specific interest of the
parliamentary system, I had separated at the moment
from the body of my friends; the end obtained, I
was anxious to re-establish their position as well as
my own, to rally them round the government of
which they were the natural and necessary allies,
and to assure their influence in the new cabinet,
together with their support to its measures. This,
with me, was a question of political duty and per-
sonal dignity. I declared that I could not join the
ministry unless, while M. Thiers filled, according to
his desire, the department of Foreign Aifairs, and
some of his friends were appointed to other posts,
M. Duchatel should receive the portfolio of Finance,
and I that of the Interior. I laid little stress on the
numerical equality of offices; but I demanded abso-
lutely, for my cause, a real division of power.
M. Thiers, and I believe also M. Odilon-Barrot,
endeavoured, but without success, to induce their op-
ponents to accept this arrangement. In the Left and
Left Centre, they were as determined that I should
not exercise a direct and important action in the
government as I was resolved not to be satisfied with
an indirect and ineffective influence. Men are much
more governed by their instincts and prejudices than
by their real and well-considered intentions. The
greater portion of the members of the Left and Left
Centre had, in reality, no other end or desire than the
u4
296 THE COALITION.
cstablislimcnt of the constitutional monarchy ; but
they had lived, and still lived, under the empire of
revolutionary theories, traditions, and routines.
Although they had no design to react the Revolution,
they accepted it helter-skelter, and without exami-
nation. I had endeavoured, on the contrary, to
submit this contemporaneous past to a free inquiry,
to separate openly the good from the evil, the truth
from the falsehood, the sound grain from the chaff ;
and to show that our misfortunes and mistakes since
1789, had not resulted from imprudent exaggerations
or accidents beyond the reach of foresight, but were
the natural consequences of the false ideas, bad pas-
sions and extravagant pretensions with which that
great social and intellectual movement had been
infected, and from which it was imperatively neces-
sary that it should be purified. In this difficult
undertaking I had clashed with cherished sentiments,
wounded susceptible vanities, offended superstitions,
and disturbed rooted habits. I was looked upon as
aggressive, officious, and compromising. They wished
to do without me, and witliout having incessantly to
dispute or reckon with me on the affairs of the new
system we were all vowed to defend.
The lofty and liberal spirits, the leaders of the
parties, felt the vice of this disposition of their sup-
porters, and the advantage of my concurrence in the
work we were pursuing together. But in our days
it is the error of the most distinguished men to want
confidence in themselves, in their o^vn ideas and
personal strength, and to yield too readiiy to
THE COALITION. 297
extraneous impressions and desires. Of what use
is it to tliem to hold their heads above the crowd, if
they do not profit by this superiority to extend their
views and march more directly to their end? They
know not what additional power they would wield if
they acted with greater independence, and in the
plenitude of their own convictions. I am far from
denying the value of popular feelings and the neces-
sity of considering them; but they ought to be
anticipated and justly estimated beforehand, instead
of waiting until they expound and decide themselves ;
for, in fact, peoples and parties trust to those who
regulate their affairs skilfully, in preference to leaders
who obey them.
The combination called " the Cabinet of the great
Coalition," and which united all the components of its
strength, being set aside, every variety was tried from
which I and my friends could be excluded. Propo-
sitions were made, debates and negotiations were
entered into to form, at one time, a ministry from
the Left Centre allied to the Left; at another, from
the Left Centre exclusively, or rather, from the Left
Centre reinforced from the Centre, properly so called,
amongst the adherents of M. Mole. It was round
Marshal Soult, and under the flag of his Presidency,
that this attempt was carried on ; he applied himself
to the work with supple and tenacious judgment,
though with some degree of confusion, holding him-
self apart from the internal dissensions of the Chamber,
ready to treat with the influential men of all sections,
but determined not to surrender power to the Left,
298 THE COALITION.
to pay full deference to the sentiments of the King,
and not to separate himself from the old party of
resistance, the only firm support of government.
M. Thiers was the essential soul, destined to be the
real chief in all these prospective cabinets ; but he
also had his reserves and conditions from which he
was disinclined to recede. It was his fundamental
notion to make the Left Centre, and also the moderate
portion of the Left, the rallying points of the old
party of resistance ; but he encountered in all tliese
groups, and in the Left Centre itself, rivalries,
jealousies, suspicions, and demands, impossible to
surmount. By rejecting my friends and myself they
had scattered the necessary and natural strength of
the government they wished to create from the
coalition; they endeavoured through the mediation
of the Duke de Broglie to redeem this error, as people
recal steps when they perceive the danger, without
a full conviction of the mistake. A -wish was ex-
pressed to include the Duke de Broglie and M. Du-
chatel in the new cabinet, leaving me and also M.
Thiers aside. This was met by a peremptory refusal.
A universal feeling existed that the proposed course
was incomplete and precarious, the responsibility of
which no one felt disposed to accept ; and every day
witnessed the renunciation and failure of the com-
bination which on the eve they were eager to nego-
tiate, and believed to be on the point of accom-
plishment.
The King looked on during this laborious confusion
as a highly interested spectator, indulging a slight
THE COALITION. 299
cast of ridicule in his remarks, always too freely
communicated ; but without opposing any obstacles
to the various combinations attempted, or indicating
any refusal. On the 29th of March he desired M.
Thiers to form a cabinet himself, and accepted, as to
general policy, and particularly toAvards Spain, the
propositions which, eight days before, and through
the medium of Marshal Soult, M. Thiers had sub-
mitted to him. M. Thiers replied, " That he would
have undertaken the mission twelve days earlier, but
that now it was impossible, as the jDosition was
completely vitiated, and the combination which
promised success had been essayed in vain. A few
days later, the King said to one of the ministerial
candidates, " I am prepared for every thing ; I will
accept all ; I will submit to all ; but for the general
interest of which I am guardian, I am bound to
caution you that it is quite a different aifair to treat
the King as vanquished, or to propose palatable
conditions to him. You may force on me a ministry
to which I must submit, or may give me one to
which I can unite myself. In the first case, I shall
not oppose it secretly ; I shall never beti'ay my
cabinet, be it what it may ; but I warn you that
I shall not hold myself pledged to it, and that if any
incident places it in danger I shall do nothing to
prevent its fall. In the second case, I will support
it frankly."
In using this language the King exercised only
his constitutional prerogative ; and, in the estimation
of thinking and loyal men, he merited praise rather
300 THE COALITION.
than censure. But in the opinion of the public, to
whom his words were more or less amplified, and
who distorted them in their turn, he would have
acted more prudently had he declared with less
openness his feeling and intention.
At the expiration of three weeks, thus consumed
in abortive efforts to construct a ministry, and which
had tended only to aggravate the difficulties, it was
felt to be absolutely necessary to take a step beyond
this position, so unsatisfactory and compromising to
all the authorities. It was pre-eminently essential
to the crown to show that the confusion produced
by such prolonged hesitation and delay in the govern-
ment of the country was not its act, and to throw
the responsibility on the Chamber of Deputies. It
was expected, moreover, that the Chamber being
called to resume its labours and practical debates on
public affairs, instead of wasting time in idle con-
versations in the hall of conferences, would clearly
demonstrate its ideas and wishes ; that a majority
would be declared, that the doubts of parties would
reach a termination, and that a cabinet would finally
be formed, affording a glimpse of that most likely to
be accepted and supported by the Parliament. Here
was another token of that general timidity, of the
absence of that provident and firm initiative I have
alluded to above, as one of the most embarrassing
weaknesses of our time. Neither the King nor the
leaders of the different parties and fractions of parties
were disposed to hazard of themselves a solution of
the question, as to when or how a majority could be
THE COALITION. 301
formed in the Chamber capable of sustainiDg a min-
istry, and of pointing out its course by anticipation.
To organize the government, the Chamber was called
upon to understand and organize itself ; and to place
it in a position to reply, the King, on the 31st of
March, 1839, appointed provisional ministers, called
into office to resume the suspended duties of admin-
istration and of the Chambers, without having
themselves the slightest prospect of becoming a
definitive and permanent cabinet. This was merely
an expedient to satisfy appearances and current
aiFairs, while waiting a permanent solution ; and a
means of ascertaining the parliamentary majority so
much sought for and so completely concealed. With
a meritorious devotion to the service of their King
and country, seven honourable men, experienced in
administrative functions, and little mixed up with
political struggles, MM. de Gasparin, Girod de
I'Ain, Gautier, the Duke of Montebello, Eupinier,
Parant, and General Cubieres undertook this unam-
bitious mission. The provisional ministry commenced
their duties by proclaiming their own character, and
the active session immediately resumed its course.
The Chamber of Deputies in its first step was
called upon for an act which revealed its bias, and
the nature of its internal majority. It had to elect a
President. This choice necessarily divided it into two
parties, each proposing a candidate, and thus conso-
lidating the fragments into which it had been broken
up. Neither of the two principal sections, the Centre,
properly so named, and the Left, possessed a majority
302 THE COALITION.
in itself, and Wcas therefore unable by its own strength
to return its candidate. It was in the floating group,
in the Left Centre, that the tAVO fixed divisions were
compelled mutually to seek the balance they required.
The Left Centre had been for some time the habitual
ally of the Left, and seemed disposed, in this new
trial, to continue its aid. But, on a closer view, my
friends and I concluded that the Left Centre was not
homogeneous, and that we also might possibly find
allies in its ranks. By the side of men undecided
through interest or pusillanimity, from malice or a
taste for intrigue, there were there, in fact, others
of distinguished character, conscientious in their
doubts, independent even to insanity, and to Avhom
neither the domination nor declared alliance of the
Left, nor perhaps even the empire of the eminent
leader of the Left Centre, M. Thiers, would afford
satisfaction. M. Passy and M. Sauzet, in particular,
appeared to us animated by these dispositions, and
inclined to exercise an act of liberty, in selecting
the President of the Chamber. We induced the
Centre, the old party of resistance, not without
difficulty, to adopt for their candidate M. Passy,
who allowed himself to be put in nomination. How
many voices from the Left Centre would join us to
carry his election ? . We knew not, but in any case
an important result was thus attained. The Chamber
bisected itself into two great divisions, and the old
party of government, from which the coalition had
for a moment estranged us, re-formed in mutual
THE COALITION. 303
concert, with a good prospect of regaining the
majority it had so recently lost.
M. Thiers did not mistake the importance of this
attempt, and used his utmost efforts to retain the
Left Centre intact in its alliance with the Left, and to
enable these two sections to place M. Odilon-Barrot
in the presidential chair. Repairing one day to the
sitting, I met M. Thiers in the Tuileries, and we
walked together for some moments conversing freely
on this new position. " You have long profited,"
I said to him, " by the hesitating dispositions of the
Left Centre ; it is now our turn ; we shall fight you
with your oAvn weapons; you will see that M. Passy
will be appointed. He did not believe in this result,
and persisted openly in supporting the canvass of M.
Odilon-Barrot. On the 6th of April, M. Passy was
elected President of the Chamber by 226 votes;
M. Barrot only obtained 193.
This was a step towards the re-organization of
the government party, and the formation of a solid
cabinet ; but this step was far from being promptly
decisive. The President being appointed, they began
to negotiate, to feel their way, to try the various
combinations already attempted, and other analogous
proceedings. Summonses were addressed to the
parties who had engaged in them ; in the tribune we
had long and animated explanations. Nothing re-
sulted; the same hesitations and incompatibilities
were everywhere encountered. For the moment, the
nomination of M. Passy to the Presidency had only
304 THE COALITION.
increased the dismemberment of the Left Centre from
the other jDarties, and thrown into the Left a new
ferment of suspicion and ill-humour. The victorious
coalition appeared destined to end in a sterile and
impotent confusion.
On the 24th of April, the King wrote to say he
desired to see me.^ I repaired to the Tuileries.
After explaining his embarrassments, " which are also
yours," he said, "for the coalition has created them
for us, for you as well as for me," he asked if I
should object to some of my friends, naming M.
Duchatel and M. Dumon, joining a cabinet with
myself. "I have not the slightest objection, Sire,
provided the composition of the cabinet gives to the
policy I and my friends have supported, and intend
always to support, elFectual guarantees." "Be as-
sured," replied the King, " that I wish this as much
as you ; no one has less desire that the government
should be given over to the' Left; God knows where
the army Avould lead its leaders. But you see the
strait that we are in. It is only a ministry somcAvhat
neutral, a ministry in which great self-loves will not
be brought into collision that can extricate us from
it." — " Let this ministry be formed. Sire, let it re-
concile and unite the two Centres ; I shall not only
refrain from dissuading my friends to join it, but I
will support it with my utmost power." The King
took my hand with warm satisfaction, mingled with
a tinge of satire ; nothing suited him better than a
cabinet, which, while putting an end to his embar-
' See Historic Documents, No. XIV.
THE COALITION. 305
rassments, was, at the same time, an acknowledgment
of error by the coalition.
My friends met; under their remonstrances and
mine, M. Duchatel declared himself disposed, pro-
vided he was not left alone, to follow the path in-
dicated by the King. Nevertheless, uncertainty still
continued; various combinations were sought and
sounded for under every signification; an address
to the King was proposed in the Chamber to press for
a conclusion ; a committee was appointed to draw it
up. No one felt disposed to assume the responsi-
bility of a positive solution, for the success of any
solution appeared doubtful. In presence of this
parliamentary hesitation, revolutionary excitement
sprang up once more in Paris. Permanent conspi-
rators, clubs of secret societies, particularly the
society called at first of the Families^ and subse-
quently of the Seasons, met, communicated informa-
tion, lists of numbers, and hopes ; the rank and file
urged on the chiefs : could they ever expect a more
favourable opportunity? could they ever find them-
selves in presence of a more disturbed and undecided
power? A sudden resolution was taken. On the 22nd
of May, about three in the afternoon, a band of three
or four hundred men issued forth in Paris, shouting
Z,07ig live the Republic ! breaking open the armourers'
shops, firing in the streets, assailing the stations of
the national guards and regular troops, and direct-
ing their infuriated attempts against the Guildhall,
the Hall of Justice, and the Prefecture of Police.
By this headlong and unforeseen attack, a few posts
VOL. IV. X
306 THE COALITION.
were carried ; officers, municipal guards, and national
guards were killed, some resisting the insurgents,
others endeavouring to parley with them. In a few
minutes several quarters of Paris became the theatre
of confused tumults and sanguinary encounters, and
without speaking of the slain, the number of which
was never ascertained, 143 wounded men, insurgents
or defenders of order, soldiers or civilians, were suc-
cessively carried to the different hospitals. Towards
five o'clock this frantic effort was completely stran-
gled, and the principal leaders were in the hands of
the magistrates. In the evening, a great number of
persons, peers, deputies, officers, public functionaries,
and partisans of the government or of the opposition,
presented themselves at the Tuileries ; Marshal Soult
had repaired thither on the first report of the out-
break, and I find, in notes taken by his son, the
Marquis of Dalmatia, at the very moment, these
plain phrases : "In the midst of this concourse of
people, the idea struck my father of profiting by it
to put an end to the general hesitation, and at last
to form a ministry. He obtained the King's consent.
As any of the persons arrived who were considered fit
for office, the King called them into the cabinet where
he was sitting with my father. M. Dufaure, who
happened accidentally to be one of the last, and who
had been sent for, was somewhat more tardy than
the rest in making up his mind ; but the weight of
impending circumstances prevailed over his doubts,
and before the evening closed, the revolutionary out-
break had effected what all the parliamentary agita-
THE COALITION. 307
tion had vainly attempted for two months : the cabinet
of the 12th of May 1839 was formed."
This was precisely the ministry the King had hinted
at and desired. Marshal Soult, President, as minister
for Foreign Affairs; General Schneider and Admiral
Duperre in the departments of War and the Marine ;
three men from the Right Centre, MM. Duchatel,
Villemain, and Cunin Gridaine ; and three from the
Left Centre, MM. Passy, Dufaure, and Teste ; — these
divided political influence together. M. Odilon
Barrot, M. Thiers, and myself, were entirely excluded.
In the conflict of passions, pretensions, and hesita-
tions of the various parties and fractions of parties
into which the Chamber of Deputies was broken up,
such was the result of the coalition.
It was not to be expected that a cabinet thus
formed would openly adopt and practise the decided
and consistent policy we so anxiously desired. Sepa-
rated until now by ideas, position, and tendencies,
the new ministers had been draAvn together and united
under the pressure of a sudden necessity, to escape
from an urgent danger, without concert or under-
standing on the questions to be solved or the principles
of the government they undertook. Incoherent in
composition, the ministry could scarcely be other
than vacillating in conduct, at least as much so as that
of M. Mole had been. On this essential point, the
coalition, therefore, had not gained the end pro-
posed. In the common error, my friends enjoyed
only this advantage, that the Left looked upon the
formation of the new cabinet as a defeat, and instantly
X 2
308 THE COALITION.
began to oppose it. M. Passy quitted the presiden-
tial chair of the Chamber ; it was necessary to replace
him. The ministry selected for their candidate M.
Sauzet ; the opposition chose M. Thiers. M. Sauzet
was elected by a majority of seven only, but after a
contest in which the two parties classified themselves
distinctly and measured their mutual strength. The
cabinet, although recruited from the Left Centre,
commenced operations, not by a concession to the
Left, as M. ]\IoM had done, but by a battle and victory
which satisfied and rallied at the outset the old party
of resistance.
The coalition scarcely succeeded better in another
of its patriotic expectations. The new ministry
contained, it is true, members of the Left Centre, as
also of the Right Centre ; several honourable and well-
esteemed men, until then divided, had now combined ;
but looking at the position in its entirety, it could
scarcely be said that the basis of the government
was enlarged, or that the crown had gathered to its
councils all the leading elements of the great party
sincerely anxious to establish constitutional monarchy.
The principal leaders, the most practised orators,
were not in office ; parliamentary government was
neither more complete nor more fortified and arrayed
in its full force than it had been under the adminis-
tration of M. Mold.
On one point alone, the capital point in truth, the
coalition had gained its object. The necessary in-
fluence of the Chamber of Deputies in the construc-
tion and composition of a ministry could no longer
THE CO^VLITION. 309
be disputed or avoided. In spite of its internal dis-
sensions and weaknesses, that Chamber had made
manifest the extent to which, on questions of persons
and conduct, it could be depended on. Government
had remained for two months uncertain, and, as it
were, in suspense, until the Chamber had resumed its
fitting place and part. While defending his preroga-
tive, and notwithstanding his displeasure and desires,
sometimes too freely exhibited, the King had waited,
with judicious patience, until the Chamber had, so to
speak, disentangled itself, and indicated the combina-
tions and men capable of giving the crown autliori-
tative counsels and effective support. The country
had taken a decisive step in the path of free govern-
ment ; the parliamentary system was acknowledged
and accepted in its first and vital condition.
In this confused melange of opposite results, the
errors were more apparent than the success, and the
coalition felt neither satisfied with nor proud of its
victory. It had overthrown the cabinet it attacked,
but it had failed in forming the ministry it proposed.
It had brought to light the peremptory importance
of the Chamber of Deputies in government, but also
its inability to create a government of itself. The
coalescing parties had exhibited little political sagacity
and many petty passions. While submitting to a
check, the crown had inflicted a severe blow on its
conquerors. On my own personal account, at the
distance and in the repose from which I now con-
template that noisy incident, I incline to think that
I should have done more wisely to have taken no
X 3
310 THE COALITION.
active part in it, and to have remained passive in my
tent, instead of issuing forth in arms to combat in a
listed field. After what had passed between M. Mole
and myself, neither my conviction nor my honour per-
mitted me to defend him ; but I was not called on to
assail, and might have marked my censure by silence.
He would have fallen nevertheless, and the govern-
ment party would then have rallied round me Avith
eagerness. On the contrary, it felt irritated at my
attacks, and by what was designated, on my part, a bad
example of opposition. It cost me much time and
manv trials before I could recover its confidence and
resume my place in its ranks. I foresaAV this evil, and
regretted my resolution while taking it. But we do
not easily disconnect ourselves from a long-cherished
and intimate idea. It was really a free government I
anxiously wished to found, and the acknowledged in-
fluence of the Chamber of Deputies was, in my eyes,
its most essential condition. In my enthusiasm to
obtain this end, I committed the error of not paying
sufficient regard to the general sentiment of my
political camp, and of consulting my individual feeling,
and the aspiration of my o^vn mind, rather than the
maintenance of my situation. A rare mistake in our
days, and which, to speak the truth, I can readily
forgive myself for, when I call it to remembrance.
311
CHAPTER V.
THE EASTERN QUESTION.
SITUATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 12tH OF MAY 1839, ON ITS ACCES-
SION. MY OWN POSITION. HOW I EMPLOYED MY POLITICAL LEISURE.
I AM REQUESTED TO SUPERINTEND THE TRANSLATION AND PUBLICATION
IN FRANCE OF THE LETTERS AND WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON. 1 UNDER-
TAKE THE CHARGE. GREAT INTEREST WITH WHICH THIS WORK INSPIRES
ME. MY "HISTORICAL STUDY " ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF WASH-
INGTON. ITS SUCCESS. TESTIMONIALS OF GRATITUDE RECEIVED FROM
THE AMERICANS. LETTER FROM KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE. REVIVAL OF
THE EASTERN QUESTION. WHY THAT NAME WAS GIVEN TO THE QUARREL
BETWEEN THE SULTAN AND THE PACHA OF EGYPT. GENERAL STATE OF
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. DISPOSITIONS AND POLICY OF THE GREAT
EUROPEAN POWERS. WAR BREAKS OUT BETWEEN MAHMOUD AND
MEHEMET ALL GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.
DEATH OF THE SULTAN MAHJIOUD. BATTLE OF NEZIB. DISAGREE-
MENT COMMENCES BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND ON THE TERRITORIAL
QUESTION BETWEEN THE SULTAN AND THE PACHA. VICISSITUDES OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LONDON. ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA. SHE PLACES
HERSELF AT THE DISPOSAL OF ENGLAND. FRANCE PERSISTS IN HER
OPPOSITION, AND THE ENGLISH CABINET IN ITS RESOLUTIONS. GENERAL
SEBASTIANI. M. DE BRUNNOW IN LONDON. LORD PALMERSTON. THE
FRENCH CABINET OFFERS ME THE EMBASSY TO LONDON. 1 ACCEPT IT.
MY REASONS. KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE EVINCES OPPOSITION. HIS
MOTIVES. THE CABINET INSISTS. THE KING YIELDS. MY APPOINT-
MENT. THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES REFUSES THE DOTATION PROPOSED
FOR THE DUKE OF NEMOURS. UNCERTAIN POSITION OF THE CABINET.
I LEAVE PARIS FOR LONDON.
{From 12th May 1839, to 2Wi Feb. 1840.)
The formation of the cabinet of the 12th of May-
produced in the Chambers and in Paris a feeling of
satisfaction more general than warm. A term was
X 4
312 THE EASTERN (JUESTION.
thus given to the longest ministerial crisis that had
yet been kno^\^l. Not that the solution appeared
permanently secured, but at last there was a ministry ;
public uneasiness was put an end to, and even those
who were not satisfied were glad to be relieved from
their hesitations and embarrassments.
The cabinet also had within itself, and on its o-\vn
account, causes for satisfaction and confidence. Its
members could not be taxed with intrigue and ambi-
tion : the urgency of the public interest and peril had
alone decided them. In accepting office they performed
an act of devotion and courage. They were well dis-
posed and in friendly relations towards each other,
although, until then, they had marched in different
ranks. M. Duchatel and M. Villemain on the one
side, M. Dufaure and M. Passy on the other, mutually
recognized themselves as men of worth and honour,
enlightened and moderate in their views, and capable
of combining loyally in the management of public
affairs. They had common ties of reason and
integrity, divested of all troublesome rivalship. The
Chambers appeared to be satisfied with their ap-
pointment, and received them with an expression of
good-will which called for care to preserve rather
than for efforts to conquer a majority.
For my own part, I determined to support the
cabinet firmly. I had confidence in the friends who
there represented my opinions; I felt neither ill-
humour nor impatience ; in the Chambers I was
commended for having laid aside all personal con-
siderations ; the King felt obliged to me for having
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 313
aided him to emerge from the crisis. From the com-
plicated and militant attitude in which the coalition
had entangled me, I subsided into a clear and cahn
position : it suited me for the present, and left me
unfettered for the future.
An unexpected incident filled up the leisure
and revived the animation of suspended politics.
The founder, both by the sword and by law, of the
RexDublic of the United States of America, — Wash-
ington, — had left, at his death, two hundred volumes
in folio, including his entire correspondence, the
letters he had received, as well as those he had
written, during the course of his public life. The
Congress of the United States purchased these
precious documents from his heirs, and lodged them
in the archives of the nation. A skilful editor, Mr.
Jared Sparks, already known by important historical
labours, — amongst others, by the publication of the
" Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States
during the War of Independence," — examined, classi-
fied, and arranged in order this great collection. He did
more ; he traversed Europe and America ; the public
depositories and private collections of France and
England were freely opened to him ; he sought out
and collected every document tending to complete
the authentic biography of a great man, which forms,
in fact, the history of the cradle of a great people ;
and, as the fruit of this patriotic undertaking, a com-
plete and beautiful edition of the "Writings and Let-
ters of Washington" appeared at Boston between 1834
and 1837. As soon as it was completed, in 1838, the
314 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
American editors, anxious that Washington should
be as well kno^vn in France as in his own country,
entreated me to select, from this vast series, such
letters and documents as might appear to me specially-
calculated to interest French readers, and to super-
intend the translation and publication. I most wil-
lingly undertook the task.
At that time I had not particularly or deeply
studied the foundation of the American Republic. I
Avas occupied with constitutional monarchy, and the
more I have advanced in the experience of govern-
ment, the more I feel convinced that it is the only
form suited to France; but I have always felt, and
still cherish, an ardent sympathy for the great nation
which has formed itself in Northern America, and
for the great political trial it braved. It is now a
mere hackneyed phrase to say that we should lay
more stress on the practical results of governments
than on their names and forms. I suspect this
common-place expression is more frequently repeated
than well understood or adopted. In spite of so
many unfortunate experiments, the name and form
of the Republic maintain in our days a dangerous
power, for they still comprise the dream of many
ardent and generous spirits, — a dream to which our
existing habits and new social position often lend the
appearance of a possible and approaching reality.
There are, moreover, between some of the principles
of constitutional monarchy and those of a republic,
affinities which seem to render natural the passage
from one to the other, and maintain, for republican
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 315
hopes and tendencies, a strength which their repeated
checks would otherwise seem to have taken from
them. A serious investigation of the originating
causes and first steps of the great American demo-
cracy, has therefore, for us, as much importance as
attraction. In no other inquiry on the nature of
government can we better learn to penetrate beyond
appearances, to estimate the end rather than the
outward form, and to recognize what are, in all
cases, the true characteristic and imperious condi-
tions of liberty.
Besides the event itself, another fact in the
foundation of the United States of America power-
fully attracted and interested me, — the individual
who had directed the movement in war and in peace,
Washington: — a great man by compulsion, as we
may say, and against his own choice, who found
himself equal to all situations and tasks, without
seeking or desiring any ; who felt no natural or
ardent necessity to undertake the great deeds he was
capable of and has accomplished; and who might
have lived on, a small proprietor, agriculturist, and
unambitious hunter, had not necessity and duty
transformed him into the general of an army and
the founder of a nation.
As I more closely studied the event and the man,
I became the more attracted and enlightened, as well
in the convictions of my public life as in my solitary
thoughts. I passed and repassed incessantly from
France to America, from America to France. I saw
before me two social conditions, profoundly different :
316 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
the one old and catholic, free in spirit, without pub-
lic liberty, overflowing with monarchical traditions,
aristocratic remembrances, and democratic passions,
mixed up throughout all history with the affairs of
Europe and of the world; the other, new and protes-
tant, trained to republican habits, although faithful to
the legal and respectful manners of the mother-
country, without rivals or neighbours, isolated in
space, careless of the past and boldly confident in the
future. These two societies had recently accomplished
two revolutions as opposite in character as themselves,
— America a revolution of national independence,
France a revolution of social re-casting ; and to both
succeeded the labour of the formation of two govern-
ments equally distinct from each other, the one re-
publican and federative, the other monarchical and
unitarian, but both inspired by the same wish and
tending to the same end, — political liberty. For a
man called to take part in this difficult object of the
France of 1789, the establishment of the United
States in 1776 presented a grand spectacle for con-
templation and a productive source of instruction.
When, in the progress of the American event, I
closely examined the man who had directed it, the sub-
ject became much more striking, and the information
more clear. 1 beheld Washington possessed from his
first movements by a judicious and virtuous apprehen-
sion, — the dread of popular and anarchical violence.
He had, amongst the earliest, accepted and proclaimed
the dangerous enterprise of the American revolution ;
THE EASTERN QUESTION. ' 317
for nine years he had sustained it to ultimate triumph,
by war. As soon as he applied his hand to govern-
ment, he devoted himself to a policy of resistance
and peace, — the only course which, in his eyes, could
establish national independence and liberty in his
country.
Two features predominate in the character of
Washington : a profound attachment to the cause he
had adopted, and a firm independence of judgment
and conduct in the service of his country. He was
a genuine Anglo-American planter, strongly imbued
with English traditions and American manners, sym-
pathizing perfectly with the general sentiment and
desire of his fellow-countrymen, but whose mind,
imperturbably sound, rejected all public passions, pre-
judices, and caprices, judging them with equal free-
dom and calmness whenever they presented them-
selves before him; never quarrelling with them
abruptly, but ever resolved to resist when they com-
promised the policy which, in his strong conviction,
the public interest called on him to maintain. While
possessing the instinct and natural gift of authority,
he was eminently prudent and scrupulous in the
exercise of government : full of respect for men in
general, and for the common rights of all, but with-
out any democratic bias, and dignified in manner, on
all occasions, almost to severity. An admirable com-
pound of lofty intelligence and tempered judgment,
as of pride without ambition, which commanded, at
the same time, respect and confidence, and raised
318 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
him to the undisputed leadership of a people who
saw in him their most disinterested, their safest,
ablest, and worthiest servant.
I took continually increasing pleasure in the con-
templation of this noble portrait, less varied in its
lineaments, less brilliant and warm than that of other
great men in the same rank, but marvellously serene,
harmonious, pure from egotism, powerful in wisdom
and virtue, and perfectly adapted to his country, his
time, and his mission. The " Historical Study "
which I dedicated to the life and character of AVash-
ington, obtained, in America as in Europe, a success
which gratified me sincerely on my own account, and
as a symptom of the general state of minds. In our
epoch of transformation and transition we are at-
tainted by many social and moral diseases ; there are
many follies in our heads, many evil passions and
weaknesses in our hearts. But the pure springs
are not all dried up : honest impulses are not entirely
extinct ; and when men witness the appearance, in a
brilliant personification, of health of mind and soul,
they bow down with respect, and voluntarily adopt
it for counsellor and guide. Washington is not
alone a grand political model ; he is also an encoura-
ging example ; for, through all the obstacles, dangers,
misfortunes, and mistakes inseparable from any great
human enterprise, he triumphed beyond his expecta-
tion, and even during his life obtained as much suc-
cess for his cause as glory for his name.
I do not hesitate to introduce here two evidences
of the effect produced by this historical portrait of
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 319
Washington, and of its appreciation by the most com-
petent judges. Shortly after the work had been
translated and published in the United States, the
follo\ving letter was addi^essed to me by twenty-five
Americans of distinction : —
" Sir,
" The undersigned, citizens of the United
States of America, sojourners in Paris, being deeply
impressed with the friendly spirit and general ex-
cellence of the Introduction to your valuable edition
of the 'Life and Writings of Washmgton,' have
united for the purpose of soliciting you to sit for
your picture to an American artist who has earned
a high reputation in his profession. Our ulterior
purpose is to transmit the portrait to the speakers
of our Congress, and to request for it a place in the
library of that body, as a permanent memorial of the
profound respect we entertain for your personal cha-
racter and intellectual trophies, and, in joarticular,
of the gratitude which all Americans should feel for
your liberal agency in exhibiting anew to Europe
the true nature of their revolution, and the distinctive
pre-eminence of its hero." ^
This double intention was accomplished. Mr.
Healy, a clever American artist, painted my portrait,
which was placed at Washington in the library of
the Hall of Congress, and I received from him as a
present the portrait of Washington, with that of
* See Historic Documents, No. XV.
320 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Hamilton, undoubtedly the most eminent, in cha-
racter and power of thought, of the political associates
of the founder of the American Republic, and who,
in Europe at least, has not attained, in that great
history, his due position.
It was at Val-Richer, far from the noise of the
world and of state complications, that I wrote this
" Historical Study." I presented a copy to King
Louis-Philippe, who, during his residence in the
United States, had been personally acquainted with
Washington, of whom he had related to me some
remarkable anecdotes. On my return to Paris I
received the foUo^dng letter, dated the 26th of De-
cember 1839: —
" My dear late Minister,
" If I have so long delayed my reply, it is
because I wished to thank you myself for your work
on Washington, and to tell you how much I should
be gratified if I could command time to read and
talk over it with you. You know too well how com-
pletely I am deprived of these tranquil relaxations.
Nevertheless I shall endeavour, at least, to read the
Introduction, which I hear spoken of as a master-
piece. My three years' residence in America pro-
duced an important hifluence on my political opi-
nions and judgment on the march of human events.
The puritanic and democratic revolution, vanquished
in England, and driven for refuge to the little
States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Con-
necticut, overflowed and subdued all the other ele-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 321
ments of population in the vast continent on which
the European tempest had impelled it. For, although
the Dutch at New York, the English catholics under
Lord Baltimore at Baltimore (1632), and, earlier
than either, the French (under Henry IV.), had
attemj)ted this great colonization, all were extin-
guished under the puritanic democracy, and the frag-
ments of the Long Parliament and its army. But
Washington was neither puritan nor aristocrat ; still
less was he a democrat. He was essentially a man
of order and government, seeking ever to combine
and use to the best advantage the often discordant and
always weak elements with which he had to combat,
and to rescue his country from anarchy. I feel con-
vinced that you have drawn him thus, and my con-
fidence on this point adds much to my regret at not
having time to read your Washington ; but it always
gives me pleasure to repeat the assurance of my sen-
timents towards you."
While applying myself to this labour, delighted
at finding between the policy of Washington in the
dawning government of the United States, and that
which my friends and I had maintained since 1830,
an evident analogy, new perspectives opened them-
selves before me. France ceased to be violently dis-
turbed in the interior. Public order and the security
of the constitutional monarchy seemed to be no longer
menaced. Our foreign affairs became the principal
occupation of minds and the prevailing interest of the
moment. I was on the point of being called upon to
VOL. IV. Y
322 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
take an active part. The Eastern question sprang up
again, more complicated and urgent than before.
I say the Eastern question^ for this was in fact the
name given by all the world to the quarrel between
the Sultan Mahmoud, and his subject the Pacha of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali. Why was this sounding title
applied to a local contest ? Egypt is not the whole
Ottoman empire. The Ottoman empire is not the
entire East. The rebellion, even the dismemberment
of a province, cannot comprise the fate of a, sove-
reignty. The great states of Western Europe have
alternately lost or acquired, either by internal dis-
sension or war, considerable territories ; yet under the
aspect of these circumstances no one has spoken of
the Western question. Why then has a term never
used in the territorial crises of Christian Europe,
been considered and admitted to be perfectly natural
and legitimate when the Ottoman empire is in argu-
ment ?
It is that there is at present in the Ottoman em-
pire no local or partial question. If a shock is felt
in a corner of the edifice, if a single stone is de-
tached, the entire building appears to be, and is in
fact, ready to fall. Opinions may differ as to the
degree of strength and probable life still remaining
to this great invalid; but no one seriously believes in
his cure. His death, more or less imminent, more or
less natural, is a fact which governs the entire po-
sition, a presentiment which agitates all Europe. The
Egyptian question was in 1839 the question of the
Ottoman empire itself. And the question of the
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 323
Ottoman empire is in reality the Eastern question,
not only of the European but of the Asiatic East ; for
Asia is now the theatre of the leading ambitions and
rivalries of the great powers of Europe; and the
Ottoman empire is the highway, the gate, and the
key of Asia. In that quarter lies for the European
and Christian world an immense future, already vi-
sible and perhaps impending.
Nothing can be more simple than that, at the pro-
spect of such a future, political philosophers and spe-
culative theorists should excite themselves; that
they should give way to all the freedom of their
thoughts, that they should imagine twenty solutions
of the great problem laid before them. All these
inventions, more or less brilliant and specious, we have
seen displayed; some have proposed the resurrection
of the Ottoman empire; others have suggested its
decease, violently precipitated with such and such a
partition of the spoils; others again, the foundation
in its place of a great Arabian sovereignty ; and there
have not been wanting those who proposed the erec-
tion of a new Christian empire at Constantinople.
These are all freaks of fancy or illusive meditation,
diplomatic or warlike utopianisms. Let practical and
serious politicians deride them ; this also is perfectly
natural. When we undertake to direct affairs, when
we assume the responsibility of events, we weigh the
collective difficulties of a problem, and estimate the
full variety of solutions so cavalierly offered. But if
serious politicians have a right to smile at chimeras,
they are not privileged to disown or forget facts.
T 2
324 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Now, I do not hesitate to affirm that the mcurable
illness and inevitable death of the Ottoman empire
are certain facts, the definitive explosion of which
may be more or less at hand; but from this hour
every rational politician, whether it pleases him or
not, is bound to look upon the issue with the deepest
interest.
I have already stated what, in the presence of these
facts, was the resf)ective attitude of the great Euro-
pean powers. Two amongst them, England and
Austria, seemed to overlook the future entirely, and
to be anxious only to maintain and defend the Otto-
man empire in its actually existing state. Russia,
on the contrary, followed step by step its progressive
decline, and was preparing to profit by its fall, with-
out exciting, by accelerating or anticipating the
catastrophe, the premeditated resistance of Europe.
Prussia lent herself with indifferent curiosity and
alternating complaisance to the conservative or de-
stroying efforts of Russia, Austria, and England. I
was appealed to on the 2nd of July 1839, in the
Chamber of Deputies, to characterize mth precision
the policy which France ought to adopt in these cir-
cumstances. I shall repeat here my words of that
epoch, for they still convey the true expression of
my thought: "We have no occasion," I said, "to
search far for the policy suitable to France ; we find
it long since established. It is a traditional, secular
policy, it is our national policy. It consists in the
maintenance of the European equilibrium by the main-
tenance of the Ottoman empire, according to the po-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 325
sition of the times and within the limits of the pos-
sible, those two laws for the government of states.
" If I sought for illustrative names, I should en-
counter those of Henry IV., Richelieu, Louis XIV,,
and Napoleon ; they all practised this policy and no
other.
" What did the orators of yesterday say to you?
That this is in fact the best policy, and, if still available,
should be still followed. They have merely denied
or called in question its possibility, and then each
produced his own system in place of that which he
declared impracticable.
" This, then, is the true question : Is the national
and historical policy of France, the maintenance of the
European equilibrium by the maintenance of the
Ottoman empire, still practicable?
" The answer depends on two things ; — the state of
the Ottoman empire itself, and the state of the great
European powers.
"As to the Ottoman empire, I am far from con-
testing its declme ; the fact is evident. Nevertheless,
Gentlemen, take care ; be not too rapid in your fore-
sight. Empires which have lasted long are extremely
slow m fallmg ; the catastrophe is long foreseen and
expected before it happens. Providence, which par-
ticipates not in the impatient precipitations of the
human mmd, seems to take pleasure in falsifying the
predictions of which the Ottoman empire is at pre-
sent the object. It has given this contradiction on
the same soil, withui the same walls, by perpetuating
there another empire, the Greek empire, not for
T 3
326 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
years but for ages, after the most intelligent spirits
of the time had prophesied its ruin.
" I might confine myself to this general answer, and
the contradiction would probably suffice. But let
us go more deeply into facts ; let us examine more
closely how the decline of the Ottoman empire has
operated for the last fifty years, with the circum-
stances which have accompanied and still accompany
it down to our own days.
" That empire has lost much ; it has lost provmces
equal to kingdoms. How has it lost them? Not by
conquest, for a long time; many years have elapsed
since any European power took any possession by
war or open force from the Ottoman empii*e. The
Crimea is the last dependency thus snatched away;
for I speak not of the regency of Algiers, which had
become almost entirely estranged.
"What then has happened? How has the Otto-
man empire nearly lost the Danubian Prmcij)alities,
Greece entirely, and Egypt more than half ? Here
are stones, allow me the expression, which have fallen
naturally from the building. I readily accord that
foreign intrigues and ambition have had some
share in producing these events ; but they have not
created them ; they would not even have carried them
to an end. They arise from natural, spontaneous dis-
memberment. These provinces, by their own action
and internal movement, have detached themselves
from the Ottoman empire, which had no power to
retain them.
"And once detached, what has become of them?
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 327
Have they fallen into the hands of any given Euro-
pean power ? Not yet ; they have laboured to make
themselves independent states, to stand alone, under
specific protectorship more or less pressing, more or
less dangerous, but which has left and still leaves
them the title of distinct peoples, of new sovereignties
in the great family of nations.
" And do you believe, Gentlemen, that without this
perspective, without the hope of seeing these frag-
ments of the Ottoman empire transform themselves
thus into new states ; — do you believe that we should
take such a lively interest, such an active part, in
what has passed in the East, — in the fate of Greece,
for example? No, certainly not. If the question
had been to detach fi^om the Ottoman empire a par-
ticular province to bestow it on some other power,
assuredly you would not have witnessed amongst us
the national impulse which hastened to the rescue of
Greece and saved her.
" What I say of Greece I shall say also of Egypt :
in spite of evident distinctions, here is an analogous
fact. It is not we who have so nearly severed Egypt
from the Ottoman empire. Undoubtedly, by our
expedition of 1798, by the examples and triumphs
of the French army and its glorious chief, we reckon
for something in the apparition of this new power.
It has not, however, proceeded from our act; it also
is a natural dismemberment of the Ottoman empire,
attempted and nearly accomplished by the genius
and controlling will of a smgle man. Mehemet Ali
has made Egypt what it is by taking possession of
Y 4
328 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
the movement imparted from us. We protected tliis
new state from its origin, and still more recently, in
1833, as under the Restoration we had protected the
dawn of Greece, and for the same reasons. We beheld
in Egypt a natural dislocation of the Ottoman em-
pire, and perhaps a rising j^ower destined at some
future day to become independent and to play its
part in the affairs of the world. Consider well.
Gentlemen, what has passed durmg the last thirty
years in the East, and in all the dominions under the
Ottoman rule. You will recognize every^vhere the
same fact. You will see that empire naturally dis-
member itself on certain f)oints, not for the advantage
of any specific power amongst the great states of
Europe, but to commence, to attempt at least, the
formation of some new and mdependent sovereignty.
No one, in Europe, would have consented that con-
quest should bestow such acquisitions on any of the
old kingdoms. This is the true cause of the course
wliich the progressive disorganization of the Ottoman
empire has taken, and it is to these conditions and
within these limits that France has given her accord.
To maintain the Ottoman empire for the equilibrium
of Europe, and when by the force of events, by the
natural progress of facts, some dismemberment takes
place, some province detaches itself from that de-
clining power, to favour the transformation of that
province into a new and independent sovereignty
which may take its place in the family of nations,
and assist at a future day in the new Euroj)ean equi-
librium, destmed to replace that whose elements will
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 329
exist no longer : — such is the policy suitable to
France; to this she has been naturally led, and in
this, accordmg to my opinion, she will do well to
persevere."
Such were the dispositions of the great European
cabinets when they learned, towards the middle of
May 1839, that the arrangement concluded on the
5th of May 1833, at Kutaieh, between the Sultan
Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali, was broken ; that the
Turkish army had passed the Euj)hrates on the 21st
of April to attack that of the Pacha, commanded by
his son Ibrahun ; and that thus the Eastern question
was revived with all its chances and embarrassments.
In a first impulse of displeasure and equity, it was
asked who was the aggressor ? Even the English
cabinet, despite its disposition to side with the Sultan,
appeared anxious on this point. " The actual event,"
said Lord Palmerston to Baron de Bourqueney, at
that time charge d'affaires in London, " surprises us :
the fact of aggression, attributed by the new telegraph
to the Turks, has its moral importance, for there is
a principle of justice, the power of which we cannot
deny, in a first disposition to throw back the con-
sequences of war on the aggressor." ^ It was soon
established beyond doubt that the aggressive move-
ment came from Constantinople. For several months
everything in that city presaged and announced pre-
parations for war. On the 16th of May Admiral
Roussm wrote as follows to Marshal Soult: — "Emis-
saries arrive daily from Egypt and Syi^ia, secretly
1 See Historic Documents, No. XVI.
330 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
despatched by the Sultan; they rej)ort to him that
all the populations are ready to rise against Mehemet
Ali at the first signal. Tahar Pacha, despatched two
months ago to the camp of Hafiz Pacha, was ostensibly
charged to order him to remain within the frontier ;
but he had private instructions from the Sultan ; they
are not positively avowed, but surmised. The Sultan
is determined to destroy his vassal or to perish; he
declares this openly. It is not known or believed
that the army has passed the frontier ; but it is sup-
posed to be so near that point as to render the attack of
the Egyptians inevitable, and this the Sultan ardently
desires." The Consul-General of England at Alex-
andria, Colonel Campbell, wrote thus to Lord Palmer-
ston on the 28th of May : " The passionate violence
of the Sultan, who is acting contrary to the advice
of the ambassadors at Constantinople, will not only
exhaust his resources, but will materially weaken his
moral influence in Turkey; while the moderate and
prudent conduct of Ibrahim Pacha, — ^who, m obedience
to the orders of his father, has abstained from every
act of hostility, — will elevate Mehemet Ali, and in-
crease his power over men's minds throughout the
Ottoman empire." Finally, the English ambassador
at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, so prejudiced
against Mehemet Ali and always ready to condemn
him, had wi'itten on the 20th of May to Lord Palmer-
ston in these words : " The Sultan has declared that
he would die rather than not destroy his rebellious
vassal;" and again, on the 22nd: "I am convinced
that the Sublime Porte has definitively resolved to
THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 331
make war upon the Pacha of Egypt. It does not
appear that hostilities have yet commenced." ^
How could Mahmoud have restrained his passion?
Lord Ponsonby himself urged him to gratify it.
When the aggressive intentions of the Porte became
evident, Admiral Roussin addressed the Sultan with
anunated remonstrances; Lord Ponsonby refused to
second them. " This refusal is much to be lamented,"
wrote Marshal Soult, on the 6th of July, to M. de
Bourqueney ; " the silence alone of the English am-
bassador, in such a conjuncture, is a positive encou-
ragement to the rash projects of the Porte." M. de
Bourqueney was instructed to communicate on this
subject with Lord Palmerston. " I am. not charged,"
he said, " with any official complamt ; some strange
facts have taken place ; I am directed to place before
you the documents which verify them, and to await
the explanations which you may consider due to the
mutual confidence of our two cabinets." " Lord Pal-
merston rang the bell," continues M. de Bourqueney;
" he ordered the last four months of the correspon-
dence of Lord Ponsonby to be brought to him, and
also the last two years of that of Colonel Campbell.
' Let us speak of Lord Ponsonby first,' said he to me;
' I will prove to you that my instructions have never
varied on this fundamental j)oint, that the English
ambassador should do his utmost to restrain the war-
like propensities of the Sultan; we have constantly
repeated to Lord Ponsonby, " Prevent war from
1 See CoiTespondence relative to the Affaii'S of the Levant,
Parti, pp. 28, 56, 106, 153.
332 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
breaking out." ' Lord Palmerston then made me
read seven or eight despatches written by him to
Lord Ponsonby between the end of January and the
middle of June, and all founded on this general
datum. ' Now,' he continued, ' I cannot conceal from
you that the personal opinion of Lord Ponsonby — an
opinion in which I do not at all participate — has ever
been opposed to the maintenance of the status quo of
Kutaieh; he even preferred extreme measures, as
susceptible at least of a favourable issue ; but I have
good reason to believe that, in his official relations at
Constantinople, the ambassador has subordmated his
personal convictions to his instructions : this at least
I am bound to infer from his correspondence.' And
Lord Palmerston then read to me, at hazard, all the
last despatches of Lord Ponsonby, in e\adence of his
pacific efforts with the Sultan. I observed to Lord
Palmerston that it seemed to me very difficult to
reject the impression that the personal opinions of the
ambassador, readily penetrated on the spot, and trans-
parent even in the despatches I had just read, must
have detracted in some degree from the efficacy of his
peaceful action at Constantinople. Lord Palmerston,
Tvithout directly concurrmg in the same sentiment,
replied in such a manner as to convmce me that he
entertained similar apprehensions. Li any i)ther
country the result of this conversation would have
been the probable recall of Lord Ponsonby. Here
matters are differently arranged. Foreign affairs are
regulated by internal influences." '
' The Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult, July 9th, 1839.
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 333
The question as to whether the Sultan or the Pacha
had recommenced the war soon disappeared before
the unportance of the event, and the uneasiness it
inspired. The feeling was simultaneous in Paris and
London ; both cabinets had the same desire to arrest
the struggle in the East, and to prevent Russia from
taking advantage of it to increase her predominance
at Constantinople. Marshal Soult immediately de-
spatched two of his aides-de-camp, one to Constan-
tinople, the other to Alexandria, to demand the im-
mediate suspension of hostilities, and to convey
themselves the respective orders to the Turkish and
Egyptian armies. A credit of ten millions was
called for in the Chambers, to give our naval arma-
ments the necessary development. Baron de Bour-
queney received orders to communicate to the English
cabinet all the information that reached Paris, all the
ideas that sprang up, and all the measures that were
preparing in consequence of the new position, and to
establish between the two governments the most
frank and intimate co-operation. " In thus exposing
to the cabinet of London our full and comprehensive
view of the important circumstances of the moment,"
the Duke of Dalmatia wrote, " we tender to it an
unequivocal pledge of our confidence, and of our
desire to act reciprocally in the most perfect accord-
ance." ^
The English cabinet received these overtures with
satisfaction unhesitatingly declared. " We under-
stand each other on all points," said Lord Palmerston
1 Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney, June 17th, 1839.
334 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
to Baron de Bourqueney, after reading Marshal
Soult's despatch ; " our agreement will be complete.
Pi-inciple, end, means of execution, all are full of
reason, simplicity, and foresight. This is not the
communication of one government to another; call it
rather a bond between colleagues, between members
.. of the same cabinet." When practical measures came
to be considered, the understanding proved to be
prompt and effective. The respective strength of the
French and English fleets was settled without the
slightest difficulty, as also were the instructions to
the two admirals to act in concert for the prevention
of hostilities. In order to combine the five gi'cat
powers in one conamon action, and to profit by the
influence of Austria at Constantinople, Marshal Soult
proposed Vienna for the seat of general deliberation.
Lord Palmerston at first suggested some doubts as
to this arrangement. He feared, he said, that the in-
fluence of Russia might exercise itself more effec-
tually on Prince Metternich in Vienna, than on Count
Appony in Paris, or on Prince Esterhazy in London;
but he soon conceded the point. " I have uttered
my thoughts quite openly before you," he said to M.
de Bourqueney. " I see the for and against, and,
taking all together, I think the for will cany it ; but
I must consult the cabinet ; I will let you know its
decision ; " and the decision of the English cabinet
was favourable to the Marshal's' proposition. It was
agreed that some Austrian men-of-war should join
the French and English fleets in the Mediterranean.
There was also full concert on the idea and terms of
THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 335
a solemn declaration, by which the powers pledged
themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman
empire, and to accept no portion of its territory. A
more difficult question presented itself. What was
to be done, if in virtue of the treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi, and on a demand from the Porte, Russian
ships and troops should arrive suddenly at Constan-
tinople to protect the Sultan against the Pacha ? The
French cabinet had expressed some anxiety to M. de
Bourqueney, as to the dispositions of the English
ministry under this hypothesis. The Duke of
Montebello, at that time provisional minister for
Foreign Affiiirs, wrote to him on the 30th of May, to
this effect: — " I fear that in London they may treat
too lightly the idea of a new Russian expedition
to Constantinople." Marshal Soult was speedily
satisfied on this point. M. de Bourqueney replied on
the 17th of June: " The council has debated on the
probable case, in which, uncalled for by circum-
stances, and exceeding even the bounds of reasonable
anticipation, we should find the Russians established
at Constantinople, or in march towards the capital of
the Ottoman empire. This paramount question has
been argued under the strong effect produced by the
phrase in your Excellency's despatch. No. 16: 'I
fear that in London they may treat too lightly the
idea of a new Russian expedition.' The council is
of opinion that in this case our squadrons should
appear before Constantinople as friends, if the Sultan
accepted our aid, and by force if he refused it. The
question of the military passage of the Dardanelles
336 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
has also been debated. It is considered possible, but
dangerous during the six winter months, when the
wind sets from the Mediterranean. During the six
others it is looked upon as easy ; but troops for dis-
embarkation will be required. I need scarcely add,
that the idea of this last measure is, if I may so ex-
press myself, an extreme conjecture; and that our
influence must be exerted to induce England to act
upon it. Marshal Soult immediately rej^lied to these
dispositions of the English cabinet: — "We think,"
he wrote to Baron de Bourqueney, " that at the same
moment when the Russians arrive at Constantinople,
the great interests of the EurojDean equilibrium, and
perhaps still more the jealousies of public opinion,
justly exactmg, would require that the flags of Eng-
land and France should display themselves there also :"
and he forwarded to M. de Bourqueney the draft of
a note wliich Admiral Roussin was to be instructed
to present to the Porte, concluding thus : — " The
King's government feels convinced that it only anti-
cipates the intentions of the Sublime Porte, in re-
quiring that in case the land or sea forces of one or
more of the allied courts should be summoned to
Constantinople, orders would be given to open at
once the passage of the Dardanelles to a French
squadron, hastening, on its part, to protect the Sultan's
throne from peiils, the imminence of which would
render such a measure imperative."
There was some difference of opinion and plan be-
tween the two cabinets, as to the tenns and mode of
execution of this step; but these secondary diffi-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 337
culties were easily smoothed, and produced no check
to the active harmony of the two governments. As-
sured of the co-operation of England, King Louis-
Philippe and his advisers evmced as little hesitation
in 1839, to act energetically m the East, and to force
the Dardanelles if necessary, than they had shown
in 1832, by entering Belgium and laying siege to
Antwerp.
In presence of these sudden events, of the di-
plomatic movement they excited throughout Europe,
and above all of the intimate understanding between
Paris and London, the Court of Russia looked on in
silence and remained in suspense, visibly disturbed
by the impending future, and doubtful of the at-
titude it would have to assume. The hereditary
grand duke, now the Emperor Alexander II., was at
that time in London accompanied by Count Orloff.
" Whenever I have met Count Orloff during the last
five days," M. de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal Soult
on the 29th of May, " he has denied with affecta-
tion, in my presence, the authenticity of the news of
the resumption of hostilities between the Turks and
Egyptians. He founds his assertion on the last
letters of the Emperor. Your Excellency knows that
he assumes freely to be the confidant of the Imperial
thought. He has held the same language to nearly
all the members of the diplomatic body." And some
days later, on the 17th of Jtme, the envoy continued
— " The Russian embassy listens, watches, but hesi-
tates both in action and language. There have been
many Russians during the last month in London, and
VOL. IV. z
338 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
amongst them some enjoying the highest confidence
of the Emperor. I venture with tmiidity an opmion
hastily formed; but it appears to me that in that
quarter they are not prepared for extreme mea-
sures." Precisely at the same date, the instructions
of Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, at that
time Russian ambassador in London, fully confirmed
Baron de Bourqueney's conjecture. "Far from seek-
ing to provoke a complication in the Levant," the
vice-chancellor of Russia wrote, " we are using our
utmost endeavours to prevent it; and ui place of
availing ourselves eagerly of our treaty of alliance
Avith the Porte, we are foremost in desiring to ward
off the renewal of a crisis which Avould compel us
against our ^vill, to resume a militar}^ attitude on the
shores "of the Bosphorus." ^ Three weeks later, on
the 8th of July, the English ambassador at St.
Petersbourg, Lord Clanricarde, wrote as follows to
Lord Palmerston : " On all occasions Count Nessel-
rode has expressed to me the desire of the Russian
government to avoid the possibility of a casus foederis
in virtue of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. He has
held the same language to all my colleagues, and I
believe this desire to be as sincere on his part as it
is anxiously conveyed." Facts soon proved that the
pacific inquietudes of the Russian cabinet were
genuine. It consented without difficulty to the pro-
posals for common deliberation submitted by Prince
Metternich, and on the 11th of July, Lord Beauvale,
the ambassador of England at Vienna was able to
• Correspondence on the ulHurs of the Levant, Part I. p. 98.
TIIE EASTERN QUESTION. 339
write thus to Lord Palmerston : " The j^lan of paci-
fication between the Porte and Mehemet Ali is
already sketched out, and may be considered as
adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
France alone remams. Prince Metternich expects
the English government to persuade France."^
While the diplomatists were conversing or corre-
spondmg, events had hurried on and materially altered
the position. The aide-de-camp despatched by Marshal
Soult to Egypt, Colonel Callier, had obtained from
Mehemet Ali a letter commanding his son Ibrahun to
suspend hostihties ; but when Colonel Callier reached
the Egyptian head-quarters, he found not only the
war commenced, but the Turkish army beaten and
destroyed. Five days before his arrival, on the 21st
of June, 1839, a battle had been fought near the
\illage of Nezib, and after two hours of weak combat,
the forces of the Sultan, general and soldiers, fled in
confusion, leaving in the hands of the victor 9000 pri-
soners, their artiUery and their camp. When the
news of this defeat reached Constantinople, the Sultan
Mahmoud had ceased to live. He expired six days
before, on the 30th of June, cursing with frenzy the
name of Mehemet Ali, and nevertheless grantmg an
order to Marshal Soult's second aide-de-camp. Colonel
Foltz, for the suspension of hostilities. Fifteen days
had scarcely elapsed from the accession of the young
son of Mahmoud, the Sultan Abdul Medjid to the
throne of his father, when the commander-in-chief
of the maritime forces, the Capitan-Pacha Achmet-
' Correspondence on the affairs of the Levant, Parti, pp. 169, 177.
z 2
340 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Feruzi, who had recently left the Sea of Marmara,
carried his squadron consisting of nineteen men of
war to Alexandria, and surrendered it to Mehcmet
Ali. Within three weeks Turkey had lost her sove-
reign, her army, and her fleet.
So many disasters, rapidly accumulated, plunged
Constantinople into utter dismay. The young Sultan
and his ministers expected to see the Pacha of Egypt
advance immediately by land and sea, against the
capital of the empire. They hastened to anticipate him
by peaceful arrangements. His old enemy, the grand
vizier Khosrew-Pacha, wrote thus on the 5th of July :
" His Highness, actuated by justice and wisdom,
qualities ^Yith which heaven has blessed him, has
declared on mountino* the throne that ' the Pacha of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali, ha\dng indulged in certain
offensive proceedings against my late father of glorious
memory, many events have occurred in consequence,
and even recently preparations have been undertaken.
But I neither desire the tranquillity of my subjects
to be disturbed, nor Mussulman blood to be shed. I
therefore forget the past, and provided that Mehemet
Ali perfonns without scruple the duties of subjection
and vassalage, I bestow on him my sovereign pardon ;
I reserve for him a magnificent decoration similar to
that of my other illustiious idziers, and I grant to his
sons the hereditary succession to the government of
Egypt.'" Two days before, on the 3rd of July, the
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nourri-Effendi,
convened at his palace the representatives of the five
great powers, and communicated to them this resolution
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 3J:1
of the Sultan. " We inquired," Lord Ponsonby wrote
on the 5th to the Consul-general of England, at Alex-
andria, " whether it was intended to leave Mehemet
Ali in possession of Syria, of Mecca, of Medina, or of
St. Jean d'Acre, and the answer was in the negative."
The Porte, however, was far from being firmly resolved
on these limits to its concessions, for on the 22nd of
July following, the first dragoman of the English
embassy at Constantinople, M. Frederic Pisani, wrote
to Lord Ponsonby, saying, " The Porte is well dis-
posed to treat with Mehemet Ali on the following
bases, proposed, as it atfirms, by Prince Metternich,
and approved of by the cabinet of St. James's : 1 . The
government of Egypt to be assigned hereditarily to
Mehemet Ali; 2. the government of all Syria to
Ibrahim Pacha; 3. on the death of Mehemet Ali,
Ibrahim Pacha to succeed to the government of
Egyi^t, and Syria to return again as formerly, to the
immediate authority of the Porte."
Prmce Metternich had neither proposed, nor had
the English cabinet approved of these conditions ; but
the Porte, treating exclusively with the Pacha of
Egypt had given reason to believe that it was pre-
pared to concede them.
When the news of this direct negotiation between
Constantinople and Alexandria, with its probable
issue, reached the European cabinets, very opposite
impressions were produced. At St. Petersbourg warm
satisfaction was expressed, with a ready approval that
the Turco-Egyptian question should be debated and
settled between the interested parties themselves.
z 3
312 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Russia tlius escaped from the common intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of the East, and from
the necessity of losing, by association with them, her
isolated and independent position. On the 27th of
July, Count Nesselrode forwarded instructions on this
subject to M. de Kisseleff, Russian charge d'affaires
in London \ and on the 9th of August follomng,
M. de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal Soult : " Lord
Palmerston informed me yesterday that according to
news from Berlin, Russia withdrew from the projected
negotiations at Vienna. M. de Kisseleff, who followed
me at Lord Palmerston's, was charged with a com-
munication to the same effect. It is from a feeling of
respect for the independence of sfevereign states, that
the Russian caljinet declines all intervention in the
internal affairs of Turkey. Before the events in Syria,
previous to the death of the Sultan, when there ap-
peared no other possible issue than war to the diffe-
rences between the Porte and Egypt, the Russian cabi-
netmight have agreed in opinion with the other powers
of Europe, on the advantage of opening a negotiation
irrespective of the parties immediately concerned;
but now when the Porte itself anticipates a recon-
ciliation, and proposes acceptable terms of adjustment
to Egyi^t, it feels disposed to allow the negotiation at
Constantinople to proceed without interference, and
merely to second it by good intentions. Such is the
spirit of Count Nesselrode's communication. The
King's government will feel no surprise at this over-
' Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant, Part. I.
r- 157.
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 343
ture from tlie cabinet of St. Petersbourg; your Ex-
cellency's correspondence has repeatedly announced
it. Here, where they readily adopt what they wish to
believe, more confidence had been entertained, not in
the sincerity of the dispositions of Russia, but in the
necessities of the European position. Greater asto-
nishment has therefore been evinced than will be ex-
pressed in Paris. But, finally, the motives of M. de
Nesselrode's last despatch have been understood, and
an evident proof thereby conveyed that if the Imperial
cabmet does not believe the fittmg moment to be ar-
rived for committmg itself openly with Europe on the
aifairs of the East, it is at least determined to struggle
diplomatically against the written guarantees which
might threaten to enchain the future. Lord Palmer-
ston received the communication of M. de Kisseleff
courteously, but without permitting him to deceive
himself as to the opinion he had formed of it."
Lord Palmerston felt perfectly at ease m declining
the overture of the Russian court, and in allowing it
to appear that he correctly estimated its motives.
He knew beforehand with certainty, that in this new
phase of the Egyptian question, the policy of England
would meet with the adhesion and co-operation of
Erance. As early as the 26th of July, on learning
the pacific overtures of the Porte to Mehemet Ali,
Marshal Soult had written to Baron cle Bourqueney :
" The rapidity with which events proceed excite ap-
prehension that the crisis may unravel itself by some
arrangement in which the European powers will have
no time to interfere, so that the interests essential to
z 4
3-14 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
general policy might not be sufficiently considered.
For England as for France, for Austria also, although
she does not openly avow it, the principal, the true
object of concert is to control Russia, and to accustom
her to treat in common on Eastern affairs. I think,
therefore, that the powers, while giving full approba-
tion to the conciliatory sentiments manifested by the
Porte, ought to compel it to precipitate nothing, and
to treat with the Viceroy only through the interme-
diation of the allies, Avhose concurrence would un-
doubtedly furnish means of obtaining less disad-
vantageous and better secured conditions." Lord
Palmerston eagerly accepted this perseverance of the
French cabinet to make the accommodation between
the Porte and Egypt a European question. " He is
strongly impressed," M. de Bourqueney replied to
Marshal Soult, "with a fear that the Eussian cabinet
may urge the authorities at Constantinople to a direct
settlement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali,
which would cause the negotiations at Vienna, and
the contingent guarantees, to fail, by rendering them
useless ; but he thinks that even in the admitted case
of direct intervention, we should continue our efforts
to educe from the moral concurrence of the four
courts an act to which the fifth would be constrained
to subscribe."^
This result was easily accomplished. The court of
Eussia, as circumspect in conduct as haughty in atti-
tude, considered it more important not to become
isolated in Europe than to maintain its isolated posi-
' Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult, July 27th, 1839.
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 345
tion at Constantinople. It ceased to insist that the
Porte, from respect to its independence, should be
left alone in presence of Mehemet Ali, and free to
negotiate directly with him on its own proposals.
The Emperor Nicholas declared himself ready to act
in concert with England, Austria, France and Prussia,
if they still felt themselves called upon to take the
negotiations in hand; and on the 27th of July, the
representatives of the five courts at Constantinople
addressed the following note to the Porte : " The
undersigned have this morning received instructions
from their respective governments, in virtue of which
they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte
that the five powers are perfectly agreed upon the
Eastern question, and also to require that all defini-
tive arrangements may be suspended until their con-
currence is obtained, while waiting the effect of the
interest they conjointly feel and exert."
At this step the English ambassador. Lord Ponsonby,
expressed unbounded joy. On the 29th of July he
wrote to Lord Palmerston : " On the morning of the
27th, Baron de Stiii-mer received Prince Metternich's
instructions, and on the same evening the note was
signed and remitted. I beg here to express, vnih all
humility, my approbation of the activity and promp-
titude with which the Baron has acted. I consider
this measure as the most salutary it was possible to
adopt. It was also extremely opportune, as the
Ottoman ministry had resolved on concessions to the
Pacha of Egypt, which at this moment would have
been on the road to Alexandria, and would have
34G THE EASTERN QUESTION.
deplorably comj^licated the affairs of this empire. Our
step has given the grand vizier strength and courage to
resist the Pacha and to defend the rights and interests
of the Sultan. It will also, I think, secure the tran-
quillity of the capital, and, in consequence, the
security of its foreign and Christian inhabitants. It
opens the path to every measure that her Majesty's
government may consider good and useful to be
adopted. It has given her Majesty's government a
position which enables it to guarantee the future
integrity and independence of Turkey."'
The French cabinet was not sIoav in discovering;
that this step placed it in a less convenient and power-
ful position than that which England expected to ob-
tain. It had pledged itself to prevent the Eastern
question from being settled in the East itself between
the two interested parties, and to decide it in the West,
by mutual accordance of the five great powers ; it had
declared to the Porte " that this accordance was as-
sured;" Avhile far from feeling convinced of this assur-
ance, it had already begun to perceive how much its
views on the definitive arrangement between the Sul-
tan and the Pacha differed from those of Eng^land.
As far back as the 16th of June, Lord Palmerston had
said to M. de Bourqueney : " We must open a negotia-
tion at Constantinople and Alexandria, on the double
basis of the establishment of the hereditary succession
in Egypt of the family of Mehemet Ali, and of the
evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops. The
' Correspondence relative to the afTiiirs of the Levant, Part I.
pp. 292, 293.
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 347
opinion of the Council is that we shall encounter no
serious difficulty at Constantinople ; and that if any
should present itself at Alexandria, it would suffice
to convince the Pacha of our union to overcome it."
Without at first formally rejecting this view of the
English cabinet, and without a frank explanation of
what was to be conceded to Mehemet Ali, Marshal
Soult instructed M. de Bourqueney to express different
dispositions. " It is necessary," he wrote to him, on
the 26th of July, "that the firmness — I had almost
said the severity — of the advice which the powers
may tender should be tempered by a tone of modera-
tion and good-will, which, while checking the boldness
of Mehemet Ali, may not too deeply wound his pride
and ambition. There would undoubtedly be affecta-
tion in seeming to believe that after the success which
the mad aggression of the Porte has opened to him,
he has nothing more to expect than he had a right to
demand before. This would be to deny the empire
of facts and the necessities of the position. If the
Viceroy were to convince himself that he had nothing
to expect from the equity of the powers, he would re-
volt against their imperious representations, and his
irritation might lead, from one moment to another, to
consequences the simple possibility of which is suffi-
cient to startle every calculating mind." When M. de
Bourqueney communicated to Lord Palmerston this
despatch, at once clear and vague, the English minister,
in reply, developed his entire thought. " The more
I reflect," he said, " on this Eastern question (and
I assure you I divest my mind of all prepossession on
318 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
the subject exclusively English), the more I arrive
at this conclusion : that France and England can only
desire identically the same thing, — the security and
strength of the Ottoman em2:>ire ; or, if these words
are too ambitious, its return to a state which leaves
the least possible chance for foreign intervention.
Well; we shall only attain this object by placing the
desert between the Sultan and his vassal. Let Mehemet
Ali remain master of his Egypt, let him obtain the
heirship which has been the constant aim of his efforts ;
but let there be no nearer vicinity, and consequently
no possible collision between the rival powers. Russia
covets (prospectively) the European provinces, and at
the bottom of her heart she rejoices to see the Asiatic
limbs separate themselves from the Ottoman body.
Can we promote this interest? Evidently not. They
speak of the material difficulties we shall encounter in
accomplishing our end. I think Mehemet Ali could
not slight a sincere desire expressed in common by
the great powers; but should he do so, his rights
would not be strengthened by contemning the coun-
sels of Europe, and if force became necessary, the re-
sult could neither be long nor doubtful. Such is the
well-considered opinion of the English cabinet. If we
thought that Mehemet Ali could seat himself, strong
and respected, upon the Ottoman throne, and possess
the empire in its independence and integrity, we should
say, — let it be so; but feeling convinced that if any
thing still survi\'es in Turkey, it is a religious reverence
for the imperial family, and that the Avhole nation will
never consent to look on Mehemet as a descendant of
THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 349
the Prophet, God forbid that we should embark hi such
a policy ! We should find a second South America in
the East; and this last would have neighbours who
would not suffer it to consume itself eternally in in-
testine struggles." And six days later, returning to
the conversation with ardour, — "I cannot sufficiently
repeat to you," observed Lord Palmerston to M. de
Bourqueney, " how entirely my conviction is divested
of all political considerations exclusively English.
But I suppose Egypt and Syria hereditarily invested
in the family of Mehemet Ali, and I ask myself how
Europe can flatter herself that the slightest incident
may not occur to sever the last and feeble tie which
will unite these provinces to the Ottoman empire?
Independence must follow in the track of heirship.
And do you consider what Europe will then say when
Eussia resumes her long-indulged craving after the
European provinces? — that the Ottoman Empire,
dismembered by the separation of a part of the Asiatic
dependencies, is no longer worth the risk of a war for
its maintenance. Such is the train of ideas I follow
in judging this important question. But at the same
time, I lay no stress on the infallibility of my OA^ai
opinion: I perfectly conceive that another may be
adopted ; and I look for no French prepossession in the
views expressed by Marshal Soult. I am so strongly
impressed with the good faith of that policy, that here
is an aro'ument which would con\dnce me if I were
disposed to doubt it : France requires the exercise of
influence in Egypt ; this is and ought to be ; it is one
of those data which must be admitted in general policy.
350 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Well ; you -wish to make Egypt stronger than we do, —
and, nevertheless, your influence over the sovereign of
Egy|3t, be he who he may, would increase by reason
of his weakness. You see that I seek for no mental
reservation, under the divergence of our two points
of view."
However they might differ, it was not the diver-
gence of these two points of view in the general
policy which, as regarded the French cabinet, formed
the difficulty of the question and situation. In its
perseverance in demanding for Mehemet Ali the here-
ditary possession of Syria, it was decided by two
motives less systematic and more direct. The cause
of Mehemet Ali was extremely popular in France.
Influenced, as I have said, by our recent reminiscences,
and by an indefinable and instinctive confusion of our
conquests with his conquests, of our glory -with his
glory, we took a warm interest in the fortunes of the
Pacha, and looked upon them as immediately con-
nected "with the power of France. The brilliant
debates of which this matter had lately been the
subject, the remarkable report of M. Joufiroy on the
ten millions demanded by the cabinet for our mari-
time armaments, the eagerness of the Chambers to
vote this credit, — all had combmed to increase the im-
portance of the question, and to elevate the sovereign
of Egypt. We had, moreover, an extremely exag-
gerated idea of his strength; we pictured him as
able and determined to confront the powers, if they
resisted his desires, vdih a desperate oj)position, and
to plunge in flames, at first the East, and subse-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 351
quently Eui'ope itself. Governed by the public feel-
ing, and deceived by its o^vn presentiments, the French
ministry persisted in contravening, on this point, the
views of the English cabinet, and in supporting the
Pacha in his pretensions to the hereditary government
of Syria, which England persevered in peremptorily
refusing.
This was, on our part, a serious error; an error
which, from the first moment, entangled our policy in
an evil path, and which we had the less excuse for
falling into, as it was in contradiction with the con-
duct we had pursued, a few years before, in an ana-
logous conjuncture. When Europe determined to
sanction a first dismembemaent of the Ottoman
empire, and to estal)lisli the kingdom of Greece, we
demanded, in addition, for the new state, a more
extensive territory; we wished to bestow on it Thes-
saly, Candia, and better frontiers. On this point we
were opposed by the English government, and re-
nounced a portion of our plan, justly attributing
more importance to the actual establishment of a new
sovereignty than to its extent, and to our general
success than to a partial disappointment. In 1839
we were in a similar position, which recommended the
same forbearance. Looking at things as they were,
and in themselves, it would assuredly have been better
that instead of falling back under the power of the
Porte, Syria should remain in the hands of Mehemet
Ali. By his close vicinity, by the vigour of his ad-
ministration, the energy of his power, and his freedom
from all Mohammedan fanaticism, the Pacha of Egypt
o.K^:
52 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
would have maintained in that countiy, for the be-
nefit of its different populations, and above all for the
advantage of the Christians, more order and security
than the Porte was either able or disposed to afford.
If this solution had been then adopted, Europe would
perhaps have escaped the lamentable spectacles and
inextiicable embarrassments at this moment presented
by Syria. But for France and her government it
would have been a much wiser and more skilful
policy to have confirmed, in concert with England,
the pnncipal conquest of Mehemet Ali, than to have
separated from the British cabinet to second the Pacha
in all his desires. Egypt, held in hereditary j^osses-
sion by princes almost independent, was a great addi-
tional step in the course of the partial and natural
dismemberment of the Ottoman empire recognized by
Europe, and in the formation or preparation of new
states. Such, in that crisis, was the true policy of
France ; she had recently proclaimed it openly, and
exercised it with success ; she compromised it through
an inconsiderate exigency, at the moment when she
coidd have illustrated it by a new and brilliant
application.
One fact alone should have revealed to France the
danger of her obstinate demand, — the satisfaction un-
reservedly evinced by the English cabinet, as it had
betrayed itself in tlie correspondence of Lord Pon-
sonby, when informed that the Russian minister at
Constantinople, M. de Bouteneff, liad signed the note
of the 27th of Jul v, which detached the Porte from
all direct communication with Mehemet Ali, and pro-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 353
mised the concurrence and support of the five great
jDowers. Baron de Bourqueney wrote to Marshal
Soult': "This sudden adhesion of the Russian
minister to a step of such importance was little ex-
jDected. In London, as undoubtedly in Paris, people
reasoned on the general datum that the Russian cabi-
net had not only declined to ^participate in the com-
mon negotiation at Yienna, but was labouring to
render it useless, by encouraging the conclusion of a
direct arrangement between the sovereign and the
vassal, without any (at least apparent) external mter-
vention A great change has taken place within
the last eight-and-thirty hours in the spirit of the
members of the English cabinet. The jDossibility of the
concurrence of Russia was not previously admitted ;
now it is hoped for : the co-oj^eration of Austria was
hoped for to the end ; it has now become certain. It
is therefore concluded that the time has arrived for
relaxing, in some degree, the threatening and sus-
pticious attitude assumed towards Russia, without
j)rejudice to its subsequent resumption, in a more
decided form, should circumstances so require."
There was as little expectation in Paris as in London
that Russia would suddenly renounce her isolated
position, and accede fully to the common action of the
five powers. But without belie^dng in such a reso-
lution, the possibility and danger were foreseen. On
the 1st of August Marshal Soult wrote to Baron de
Bourqueney : "I have never expected that in the
actual question Russia could be brought to associate
1 Despatch of the 18th of August, 1839.
VOL. IV, A A
354 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
herself frankly witli the other cabinets in a policy so
opposed to her own. I thought that while appearing
to Avork to that end, while adopting towards Russia
the most conciliatory style, the sole object we could
propose to ourselves would be to restrain and intimi-
date her to a certain point by a demonstration of the
perfect understanding between the other great powers
united in one common mterest. With this object in
view, it Avould be essential that the powers, more
particularly France and England, should hold a
language with the cabmet of St. Petersbourg entirely
uniform, and should only act by concerted measures.
Thus I saw with regret the step which Lord Clanri-
carde was instructed to take "with M. de Nesselrode.
The Russian government will naturally deduce from
thence that on one point at least, — the limits to be
imposed on Mehemet Ali, — England expected to find
more sympathy with it than with the other cabinets.
It will be led to conclude, very erroneously without
doubt, that an alliance in which such divergencies
manifested themselves could possess few homogeneous
or imposing elements."
The French cabinet might regret the step which,
by an order from Lord Palmerston, dated the 9th of
July preceding. Lord Clanricarde had taken with the
Russian government \ but it had no right either to
express astonishment or complaint. That step was
perfectly simple, and the natural result of the general
position. Lord Palmerston directed Lord Clanri-
carde to make the same communications and proposi-
' Correspondence relative to tlie affairs of the Levant, Part I.
pp. 156, 158.
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 355
tions at St. Petersbourg which Lord Granville was
commissioned to deliver in Paris. He had given to
the representatives of England at the four great
continental courts the same mstructions on the
Egyptian question, and had manifested in all quarters
the same views founded on the same reasons. In his
conversations with Baron de Bourqueney, he expressed
without reserve his mistrust of Russia and his desire
for a close connection with France. But he could
not exclude Russia from the European concurrence
he demanded, nor address her in a language different
from that adopted towards the other powers. In
allowing itself to be led away, on this occasion, by an
impulse of exclusive humour, the French cabinet fell
into the mistake which Prince Metternich pointed
out when he said, " France, in speaking to others, is
too often disposed to think herself single ; when we
negotiate, we are many."
Two mcidents, nearly simultaneous, occurred at
this epoch, to hasten without changing the course of
the negotiation. At the commencement of September
1839, General Sebastiani, who until then had been
on leave of absence in Paris, returned to London to
resume his post as ambassador; and a few days later,
Baron de Brunnow arrived from St. Petersburg, spe-
cially instructed to treat of the affairs of the East,
and to superintend the Russian legation in general.
Both were able negotiators, although of extremely
different characters. General Sebastiani possessed a
firm, calm, sagacious mind, clear but not complicated,
a little slow and unimaginative, not particularly
A A 2
356 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
ready with tongue or pen, but imperturbably judicious
and provident; prompt to recognize the attainable
end, and how to demand or concede for its accom-
plishment. Baron de Brunnow, brought up in the
designs and traditions of the Kussian chancery, was
well-informed, clever, persevering without obstinacy,
neither exacting nor impatient, an eloquent and lively
talker, an experienced and ready reporter, dexterous
in unravelling the aims of others, and in enveloping
his own under a thick mantle of concessions, reserves,
and commentaries. They began to work, from the
moment of their arrival, the one to lead back Lord
Palmerston to the paths to which France still held,
the other to persuade him that Russia would follow
in those in which he was disposed to march.
General Sebastiani speedily delivered his govern-
ment from all illusion. On the 5th of September he
wrote to Marshal Soult : "I have to announce to your
Excellency that the impression resulting from my
first interview with Lord Palmerston is, that the
English government desires with us, to the same
extent, and with as little mental reservation, the
maintenance of the Ottoman empire in its full inde-
pendence and integrity, and that it wishes to accom-
plish this end pacifically and without compromising
the great powers amongst themselves But I
cannot conceal from your Excellency the disposition
of the English cabinet to employ coercive measures
against Mehemet Ali to obtain the restitution of the
Ottoman fleet, and to force him to accept the here-
ditary sovereignty of Egypt as the basis of the
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 357
intervening accommodation with the Porte. This
disposition may from time to time yield, upon certain
points, to the representations of France, but it ever
re-appears ; and if it encounters on our part an in-
vincible and absolute repugnance to the adoption of
any compulsive means whatever against the Vice-
roy, I fear that they will become persuaded here that
it is useless to continue a negotiation which takes
beforehand from their counsels the sanction, should it
eventually become necessary, of force."
On the 14th and 17th of September, General Se-
bastiani, returning from Broadlands, Lord Palmer-
ston's country seat, where he had passed two days,
again wrote to Marshal Soult : "In the midst of our
conference. Lord Palmerston's courier from London
arrived, bringing despatches from St. Petersbourg,
Berhn, Vienna, and Constantinople. Lord Palmer-
ston read them all to me. Lord Ponsonby writes
from Constantinople that the divan has re-assembled,
and has decided that nothing should be ceded to Me-
hemet Ali beyond the hereditary investiture of Egypt.
From Vienna Lord Beauvale announces that the
Austrian cabmet adopts more and more the English
point of view as to the necessity of confining to
Egypt the territorial possessions of the Viceroy. At
Berlm, the same favour towards the English project.
Finally, Lord Clanricarde writes from St. Petersbourg
that the Russian cabmet coincides sincerely with the
intentions of the British mmistry ; that it accords in
opinion with the bases of the projected arrangement,
and offers its co-operation. ' Judge,' contimied Lord
A A 3
358 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Palmerston, ' whether it is jDossible to renounce a sys-
tem we have adopted, at the very moment when it com-
bines the wishes and efforts of nearly all the powers in
concert with whom we have undertaken to settle pa-
cifically the question of the East. This system, I camiot
too often repeat to you, is founded on a single basis.
The dangers of the Porte at this moment proceed from
its vassal alone. There are others which threaten,
but they belong to the future. It is from the perils
of the present that we must furnish a guarantee. We
have given a serious warning to the power from
whence the prospective mischief may be expected.
Mehemet Ali must be rendered incapable of repeat-
ing, and perhaps of rendering more decisive, the blows
he has already inflicted on the Ottoman empire.
Such is the general datum on which all the de-
terminations of the English cabinet are founded. I
am here only its organ; but I cannot sufficiently
express to you how profoundly grieved I am to see
the French cabinet, with which we have entered upon
the question in such perfect cordiality, separate from
us and from all the other powers. I allow fully for
the particular circumstances in which you are placed ;
I know that you have prejudices of public opinion
to deal with ; but whatever may be the cause of our
misunderstanding, I bitterly deplore it, and nothing
would be more agreeable to us than to obtain a glimpse
of its probable termination.' I asked Lord Pahner-
ston whether he did not find matter for reflection
in this facility with which Russia anticipated the
English project. It is an extremely ephemeral con-
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 359
junction, I added, a coincidence of views too fortuitous
to demand the sacrifice of an alliance of principles
and sentiments. ' Yes,' answered Lord Palmerston,
' we are perfectly well aware that this is entirely an
arrangement of circumstance, which ^vill not prevent
the two Imes of policy from resuming in due tune
their natural walk; but how reject it, when it comes
in aid of the mterests we wish to defend, and when,
by the simple admission of our mutual concurrence,
it seems to renounce the exclusive protectorate and
almost preponderating influence against which we
are contending? I tell you, moreover, frankly, and
I am far mdeed from bemg pleased at it, I feel con-
vinced that the Russian cabmet, m its blmd and
senseless prejudice against France, has been strongly
prepossessed Avith an anxiety to place our disagree-
ment in evidence, and to take part with our view
against yours. There is no imaginable conciliation
which Russia has not practised towards us during
the last year to divide our two governments; we
have remamed cold to all her advances; we started
with you, and we wish to continue marching mth
you; but how can you expect us to abandon our
point at the very moment when Russia yields ac-
cordance, and when the two other powers have al-
ready adopted it? The French cabinet seems at this
moment to separate itself, not alone from us, but from
the combined European movement. We are un-
willing to abandon the hope of its return. . . . The
formal and preliminary renunciation of all coercive
measures against Mehemet Ali would, in fact, raise a
A A 4
360 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
barrier between France and England. Declare at
least that you do not sanction all the pretensions of
the Pacha, and that these pretensions, if they remained
in their full integrity, would find you disposed, as our
allies, in case of need to employ force. The negotiation
then can take its course. If the French cabinet per-
sists, on the contrary, in proclaiming beforehand that
under no circumstances will it consent to use com-
pulsion against the Pacha, there is no longer any
possible unity in the question.' "
General Sebastiani concluded his despatch by
saying, " To-day M. de Brunnow is to have his first
audience of Lord Palmerston."
Notwithstanding the information transmitted, and
the opinion clearly conveyed, although with some
reserve, by our ambassador, the French cabinet per-
sisted in its attitude. It was resolved not to compel
Mehemet Ali to renounce the hereditary possession
of Sp'ia, and not to associate itself, if he maintained
his pretensions, with coercive measures against him.
The English government felt perplexed. Eager as
the conciliatory overtures of Russia had been, the
first proposals of M. de Brunnow were not satisfac-
tory. While accepting European concert on the
afi'airs of the East, the cabinet of St. Petersbourg
demanded that her men-of-war and troops should
enter alone into the Sea of Marmara to defend the
Porte in the name of Europe. This was, at the same
time, to abandon and maintam the treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi. Russia renounced the protection of Con-
stantmople in virtue of an exclusive right and on
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 361
her own account; but she remamecl, m fact, its sole
defender. In London, as in Paris, oifence was taken
at this mixture of obstinacy and condescension.
Several members of the English cabinet, however,
accorded with hesitation Lord Palmerston's views as
to the conditions of settlement between the Sultan
and his vassal. In the hope of obtaining the con-
currence of France, a concession was determined on
to the advantage of Mehemet Ali. General Sebas-
tiani wrote to Marshal Soult on the 3rd of October :
" The English cabinet does not adopt the propositions
presented by Baron de Brunnow. Lord Palmerston
announced this morning to the Russian envoy that
France, on her part, could not consent to the exclu-
sion of the allied fleets from the Sea of Marmara in the
event of Russian forces entering the Bosphorus ; and
that England would not detach herself from France,
with whom she had acted in perfect unity from the
commencement of the negotiation. This point being
laid down. Lord Palmerston suggested, mstead of
the convention presented by the Russian cabinet,
an agreement between the five powers, by which
they should regulate their respective action in the
existmg crisis of the afi'airs of the East, without
acknowledging any privilege to the Russian flag not
accorded to those of France, England, and Austria.
Russia, in case of resistance on the part of Mehemet
Ali to the conditions proposed to him, to employ her
troops in Asia Muior, but on her own side of the
Taurus. The independence and integrity of the
Ottoman empire under the reigning dynasty to be
362 TUE EASTERN QUESTION.
stijuilated for, for the longest jDossible time; finally,
the closing of the Dardanelles to become a principle
of public l^Airopean law. Passing from this Euro-
pean act to the conditions of the impending ar-
rangement between the Sultan and the Pacha, Lord
Palmerston, pressed by my arguments, and by a
desire, Avhich I believe sincere, to perform an act of
deference towards France, consented, after a long
discussion, to add to the hereditary investiture of
Egypt, in favour of Mehemet Ali, the possession,
equally hereditary, of the pachalic of Acre. The
to^vn of Acre alone to remain to the Porte, and the
frontier to be marked out from the glacis of that
fortress in the direction of Lake Tiberias."
The French cabinet Avas disturbed by this offer.
It had always felt convinced that Mehemet Ali would
support his pretensions with equal force and perse-
verance, and that the English government would
never go to the extreme of allying itself in the East
with Russia. Popular opinion in France, moreover,
and the periodical j)ress, maintained with daily in-
creasing ardour the cause of the Pacha of Egypt,
watched anxiously for all rumours, all appearances,
however slight, of any arrangement entered into to
his detriment with the English cabinet, and treated
them beforehand as acts of anti-national baseness.
Marshal Soult rej^lied on the 14th of October to
General Sebastiani : " The King's government, after
having maturely weighed the objections of the cabinet
of London, feels bound to persist in the views I
have already communicated to you on the basis of
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 363
a settlement of the affairs of the East. If our own
interest alone were concerned, we might make con-
cessions in favour of our desire to bind more closely
our alliance with England ; but the question is not
of that nature. It consists solely in determining
conditions which, while combining in just measure
the rights of the Sultan and the future security of
his throne with the pretensions of Mehemet Ali,
may tend to the pacification of the Ottoman empire.
We feel convinced that the proposals of the British
cabinet could not attain this end, and that, rather
than submit to them, Mehemet Ali, who would see
in them his ruin, would plunge into the chances of a
resistance less dangerous to himself but more embar-
rassing and compromising for Europe. . . . We
should decline driving him to this course, even
though we felt absolutely certain that our refusal
would be the signal for a close alliance between
England and Russia. Fortunately, this certainty is
far from existing; the reasons which have once al-
ready caused the failure of such a strange combi-
nation, subsist still in all their strength. I do not
believe they can escape the penetration of Lord Pal-
merston, and I know positively that some of his
colleagues are very deeply impressed by them.
Finally, if, contrary to all appearance, this combi-
nation should be realized, without doubt we should
sincerely lament it as the rupture of an alliance to
which we attach so much value; but we should
apprehend little from its immediate effects, because
a coalition contrary to the nature of things, and
3G4 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
condemned beforehand, even in England, by public
opinion, would necessarily be tainted with impo-
tence."
Being instructed to deliver such a peremptory
answer to the concessional offers of the English
cabinet, General Sebastiani, on the 18th of October,
reported the result of his interview with Lord Pal-
merston in these terms : " I have laid before Lord
Palmerston your Excellency's communication. I
repeated all the considerations which deteniiine the
King's government to persist m its first resolutions
relative to the basis of the impending treaty between
the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. Lord Palmerston
listened to me mth the most earnest attention. When
I concluded, he replied in these plain words : ' I an-
nounce to you, in the name of the Council, that the
concession we had agreed to of a portion of the
pachalic of Acre is withdrawn.' I endeavoured to
resume the general question in debate; Lord Pal-
merston met me invariably by a polite but freezing
silence. I have repeated textually to your Excel-
lency the only words I could extract from him. My
efforts naturally ceased at the point wliich my own
personal dignity no longer suffered me to exceed."
Lord Pahnerston, in reality, felt little regret that
his offer of ceding the pachalic of Acre to Mehemet
Ali was not accepted by France. He had made it m
consideration of the anxiety of some of his colleagues
rather than of his own ^vill and with the desire of suc-
cess. Although he had rejected the first propositions
of the Kussian court as to the common action of the
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 365
five powers in the East, his interviews with Baron de
Brunnow had given him confidence that the Northern
court would greatly extend its complaisance ; and he
did not deceive himself. M. de Brmniow, after de-
manding fresh instructions from St. Petersbourg, quit-
ted London towards the middle of October to return
to his post in Germany at Darmstadt; "I believe,"
General Sebastiani wrote to Marshal Soult, on the 8 th
of October, 1839, " that he refrained from commencing
his journey suddenly, to avoid gi\Tng too much no-
toriety to the rejection of his proposals ; but I know
that he does not m the shghtest degree beguile him-
self as to the possibility of the adhesion of his court
to a common naval movement in the Bosphorus ; and
what proves it is, that he does not wait the answer
from St. Petersbourg to his last despatches." It was
General Sebastiani who deceived himself on the pro-
bable sense of that answer. It was fully conform-
able to the hopes of Lord Palmerston, and on the
6th of December, 1839, the French ambassador was
called upon to write to his government as follows :
" I forward without delay to your Excellency the
confidential information which Lord Palmerston has
just communicated to me, and which he only re-
ceived himself yesterday evening from the Russian
charo;e d'afi'aires. M. de Brunnow will return im-
mediately to England with full powers to ratify a
convention relative to the afiiiirs of the East. The
principle of the simultaneous admission of the allied
flags into the waters of Constantinople, or of their
general exclusion, will thus be formally decided. In
3G6 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
case of interference, the number and force of the ships
admitted under each flag will be settled by a par-
ticular convention. The importance of this commu-
nication will impress on your Excellency the value I
attach to the most complete instructions and com-
mands."
The French cabinet felt surprised and disturbed.
It was not prepared to see Russia abandon so clearly
her pri\ileged position with Turkey, and so ready to
admit that French, English, and Austrian ships of
war should appear simultaneously with her OAvn m
the waters of Constantinople. She thus lost one of
her leading arguments agamst the ideas and plan of
Lord Palmerston. On the 9th of December, 1839,
Marshal Soult instructed General Sebastian! to con-
vey to the English government his satisfaction at the
unlooked-for concession of the court of Russia. " The
King's government," he said, " acknowledging, ^\ath
its accustomed loyalty, that a convention entered mto
on such bases would materially change the aspect of
affairs, would find in it a sufficient motive to recon-
sider the Eastern question, even with regard to the
pomts on which each of the powers seemed to have
formed its opinion so absolutely that prolonged debate
appeared impossible." But, at the same time that he
amiounced these conciliatory dispositions, the Duke
of Dahnatia evhiced much uneasmess as to the secret
motives which could have determined the court of
Russia to such a falsification of its policy, raising
doubts on the results Avliich Lord Palmerston pro-
mised himself; and some days after, returning to the
THE EASTERN QUESTION. . 387
theme which he had ah'eady often availed himself of
to repulse the urgencies of the English cabinet while
exciting its suspicions, he wrote to General Sebas-
tiani : " I repeat to you that all these tactics resolve
themselves into two words ; Russia seeks to break up
the Anglo-French alliance, to which Europe owes for
ten years the preservation of peace. The cabmet of
London cannot fail to see this as clearly as we do ;
and as I am certam it would deplore such a result
equally with ourselves, as I feel convinced that result
could not be less injurious to England than to France,
I feel no hesitation in callmo; the most serious attention
of Lord Palmerston and his colleagues to the existing
state of thmgs."
This immovable position, this diplomatic monotony,
utterly ineffective m London, disturbed and wearied
the soundest politicians in the French cabinet, M.
Duchatel, M. Yillemain, M. Passy, and M. Dufaure.
They asked whether there were no means of trying
a new course, and of exercising more influence over
the ideas and proceedings of the English government.
They sympathised little with General Sebastiani.
From his antecedents he was looked upon as too
favourable to Turkey, and so nearly in accord with
the opmions of Lord Palmerston as to be ill fitted
for the strenuous support of opposite vievv^s. He
appeared to them to be neither a true representative
of the French government, nor an effective inter-
preter of the policy for which the recent debates in
our Chambers had established a predominance. I
had advocated that policy in the Chamber of Deputies ;
368 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
I liad compared it with that of the other great powers,
particularly of England, applying myself to extract
from thence the general convenience of Europe. I
had repeated these words of Lord Chatham : " I argue
not with any one who tells me that the mamtenance
of the Ottoman empire is not, with England, a ques-
tion of life and death ; " and I added, with eagerness,
" As to myself, gentlemen, I am less timid. I do
not thhik that for such powers as England and France
there exist thus in the distance, and with certainty,
questions of life and death ; but Lord Chatham was
passionately impressed with the importance of main-
taining the Ottoman empire; and England still sides
so strongly with his opinion, that she devotes herself
to that cause, even, as I think, with a degree of
superstition. She has often shown herself hostile to
the new states that have been formed, or have tended
to form themselves, out of the natural dismemberments
of the Turkish sovereignty. Greece, for instance,
has not always found in England a friend; Egypt
still less so. I shall not enter into an examination
of the motives which, under such circumstances, have
influenced the English government. I believe that
it has sometimes deceived itself, and has sacrificed
great policy to small, the general and permanent
interests of Great Britain to secondary considerations.
The first of all British interests is, that Russia should
not predominate in the East. If I may be permitted
to express in this place an opinion on the policy of
a great foreign country, there is, I think, a degree of
weakness on the part of England in listening to
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 369
jealous susceptibilities, or to any momentary commer-
cial interest, in place of employing all her efforts, all
lier influence, for the consolidation of those new and
independent states which may become, and ought to
become, effectual barriers ao;ainst the indefinite ao;-
grandizement of the only power whose rivalry in the
East England can have reason to apprehend."
In this language was perceived a real sympathy
with, and a firm mdependence towards the Englisli
policy, pledges of mutual understanding and resist-
ance, and perhaps also the chances of an effectual re-
sult. Parliamentary considerations combmed them-
selves with diplomatic motives. Present in the
Chamber, but not a member of the cabinet, I was to
the latter a source of uneasiness, if not of embarrass-
ment. I supported it loyally, but I had no share in
its responsibility. Absent from Paris, I should no
longer inconvenience it in the debates, while I should
become more closely associated with it. After coming
to an understanding with Marshal Soult and all their
colleagues, those amongst the ministers who were my
private friends asked me if I would accept the em-
bassy in London, and if the cabinet should make the
formal proposition to the King.
The proposal suited me. I foresaw that the forth-
coming session would be as embarrassing to myself on
account of the cabinet, as to the cabinet on my ac-
count. Its policy had been ineffective, and its posi-
tion was evidently precarious. By absence, I re-
moved myself from parliamentary intrigues and
struggles, and assumed an isolated position, at once
VOL. IV. B B
370 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
friendly and independent. I shared, moreover, to a
certain extent, in the illusions of the partisans of
jMehemet Ali ; I believed in his power, in the dangers
which the peace of Europe might incur from his
obstinate resistance, and I thought it possible that, in
this respect, some influence might be exercised over
the ideas and resolutions of the English government.
Some months before, the mmisters, my friends, had
proposed to me the embassy to Constantinople, which
I formally declined; Constantinople removed me too
far from Paris, and involved me too directly in the
affairs of the East. London only connected me with
them remotely, and left me in close propinquity with
the affairs of Erance. I accej)ted the offer of the
cabinet.
King Louis-Philippe, in the first instance, objected
to it. He was much attached to General Sebastiani,
who had served hun zealously, from whom he ex-
pected an accordance, at once constant and enlight-
ened with his OAvn policy, and who, in London, was m
friendly relations with the English cabinet, and
especially ■with Lord Palmerston. The King felt
no want of confidence iii me, in my general views,
and in my firmness in sustaining them ; but I was a
man of the Chamber as well as of the govermnent;
I was anxious for the close union and concerted
action of the tribune and the cro^\ii; I had recently
taken a prominent part in the coalition : the Kmg knew
hoAv to lay his displeasures aside, but was unable to
forget them. He resisted for some time the proposal
oi the cabinet. Meanwhile, the position, externally
THE EASTERN QUESTION. 371
and internally, became more and more urgent ; Russia
was gaining ground in London, yet the English
cabhiet still hesitated to separate itself openly from
France. It debated various projects of convention;
it declared that the presence of a Turkish plenipo-
tentiary was indispensable to the negotiation; it
evidently wished to gain time, and to leave a door
open to France. " I cannot persuade myself," said
Lord Palmerston to Baron de Bourqueney, " that we
shall be unable to re-establish concert between all
the great powers. I will accede to the most liberal
terms which according to my ideas can be possibly
granted to Mehemet Ali, to afford France a facility
of accepting the bases of the pending arrange-
ment." ^ Was it not an urgent matter to turn these
delays and doubts to advantage? The cabinet per-
sisted strenuously; even the ministers who were not
my personal friends, M. Dufaure amongst others,
declared themselves resolved to make my appoint-
ment a cabmet question. The King yielded. I had
several interviews with him. He received me with
a mixture of good-will and ill-humour, passing from
a token of confidence to a mark of displeasure.
" They are very exacting," he said to me one
morning; "but I understand the matter; people are
always glad to bestow an mcome of 300,000 livres on
a friend." " Sire," I replied, "my friends and I are
amongst those who would rather give than receive
an income of 300,000 livres." The question of the
" Despatches of the 28th of January and 21st of February,
1840.
372 THE EASTERN QUESTION.
dotation of 500,000 livres per annum, demanded for
the Duke of Xemours, was then on the point of com-
ing on. The King smiled and resumed his temper.
On the 5th of February my appointment was signed
and published. Fifteen days later, the rejection of the
bill of dotation, mthout debate, placed the cabinet
in an extremely uncertain position, and I took my
departure for London on the 25th of Februaiy, 1840,
anxious to escape from the troubles, hesitations, prac-
tices, and attempts of the Chamber and the court,
which were on the point of displaying themselves.
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS
VOL. IV. C
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
No. I
(Page 26.)
The Duke de Broglle to the Marshal Marquis Maison,
Ambassador of France in Russia.
Paris, 28th Oct. 1833.
MONSIEUK LE MaEECHAL,
The government near which you are called to represent
the King's administration, is perhaps that whose relations
with France have been the most essentially changed by the
Revolution of July.
Before the events of 1830, France and Russia were united
in an alliance which seemed to draw closer from day to day.
This alliance, based on the strongest ties which can exist
between two States, a community of adversaries and a total
absence of all points of contact and motives for rivalry, had
resisted the utmost efforts of Austria for its dissolution. If
M. de Metternich had succeeded for the moment in throwing
coldness upon it by disquieting the Emperor Alexander as
to the strength and stability of our government, by making
him dread that, carried away by the revolutionary movement,
we might not be in a position to lend him profitable aid in
c c 2
376 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
circumstances under which he might desire to rely on us,
these insinuations too lavishly offered had ended by losing
nearly all their effect. The Emperor Nicholas, who then
showed himself less suspicious, less impassioned than his
predecessor, and, above all, less governed by the theories of
absolutism, had moreover learned, in the midst of the embar-
rassments in which for a time the Turkish war had placed him,
the frankness and efficacy of our co-operation. This important
circumstance, even by having raised France from the inferiority
of position in which she had seen herself as regarded Eussia
since the events of 1814, and from having placed her in the
condition of exercising in her turn the character of protector
-towards that power, had given additional strength and solidity
to an alliance which, between two states of the first rank,
could, as was evident, only subsist on the footing of perfect
equality.
The Eevolution of July has completely changed this
position.
On the one hand, it has excited in several quarters, espe-
cially in Poland and in Belgium, questions in which the
inclinations and interests of the cabinet of St. Petersburg
have found themselves in absolute opposition to ours. On
the other, by a consequence less immediate, but which has
not delayed to develop itself, it has produced between France
and England a juxtaposition the simple fact of which would
have sufficed to modify the nature of our relations vnth the
court of Russia. Finally, this revolution, a powerful reaction
against the spirit of the treaties of 1815, and of the Holy Alli-
ance, or rather against the facts and doctrines which during ten
years have invested Russia with a sort of European dictatorship,
attacked, at the same time, that power in all the suscep-
tible points of its ambition and pride. Beyond all other
motives, perhaps this last suffices to inspire the Emperor
Nicholas and his subjects with a lively irritation against the
new order of things established in France.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 377
More than once it has been thought that this feeling would
manifest itself by some sudden stroke ; those hostile aspira-
tions which the force of events alone has probably dissipated,
have formed besides an insurmountable barrier in the more
circumspect policy of Prussia and Austria. But the neces-
sity which thus restrained the unfriendly sentiments of the
sovereign of the North, from that cause alone increased their
bitterness and intensity. Every one knows how they came
to light on several occasions in proceedings which, while tibey
revealed the impotent rage of the cabinet of St. Petersburg,
fortunately wounded only its own dignity.
The position of the French embassy in Eussia became
therefore the more delicate, as in that country the higher
classes model their attitude and political impressions on those
of the sovereign. The King's representative found himself
everywhere exposed to difficulties and dangers which elsewhere
he would only have encountered at the court. I need not
remind you of the trials your predecessor had to undergo.
You know that, by a singular refinement, the Emperor
Nicholas, while loading the Duke of Treviso with personal
attentions ostensibly bestowed on his military reputation,
while at the same time affectedly abstaining from addressing
a single word to him in his diplomatic capacity, evidently
intended to demonstrate the coldness of the reception accorded
to the ambassador of the King of the French.
We have reason to think. Marshal, that you will not have
to submit to similar treatment. We find an unequivocal
guarantee on this point in the assurances, entirely spontaneous,
which the Russian government has at several intervals
transmitted to us of the satisfaction it feels at the selection
of the new representative of his Majesty, and of the eagerness
with which your arrival is expected. It would be difficult
not to see in these multiplied protestations a sort of honour-
able reparation for a proceeding the inconvenience of which
has at leng-th been undoubtedly acknowledged.
c c 3
378 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Be this as it may, if, notwithstanding- our anticipations, the
Emperor Nicholas should resume, as regards you, the attitude
he perseveringly maintained towards the Duke of Treviso,
he would thereby point out to you the course you should
adopt. Renouncing from that moment direct intercourse
with the Emperor, as inconsistent with the dignity of France,
and consequently with your o-svn, your duty then would con-
line itself to the discussion of such official matters with the
vice-chancellor as may be strictly required by the exigencies
of the service, and you will await further orders from the
King.
If it should happen, as we have no reason to foresee, since
this hypothesis has not been realized under circumstances
in which it seemed much less improbable, — if it should
happen, I sa}^, that the discontent of the Emperor Nicholas,
newly awakened by some fresh incident, should display itself
towards you by any more decided symptoms than coldness
and reserve ; — if, which seems to us impossible, he should
address words to you at which the King's government would
have a right to take offence, I need not tell you that, without
waiting an order of recall, you will at once demand your
passports and leave the direction of the embassy under a
charge d'affaires. But, I repeat, this painful supposition
wll not be realized.
I have pointed out to you the ground on which you are to
place yourself at St. Petersburg. I must now enter into
some details on the political relations of France and Russia.
In these latter days, the diplomacy of the two cabinets has
had few direct communications. In the ferment of spirits
it would have been too difficult to have come to a mutual
understanding. It was through the interposition of Prussia
and Austria, allies of Russia, but more calm and moderate,
that the varying incidents of the Hollandic-Eelgian affair
have been negotiated. As to the Greek question, become
entirely secondary since the Revolution of July, and in which.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 379
in consequence of their antecedents, the cabinets of Vienna
and Berlin could not possibly interfere, it has gone on, in
some manner, at hazard. France and Russia, without mutual
concert or explanation, have not ceased their endeavours to
incline it towards their respective policy. The same has also
occurred more signally with respect to questions in which the
two courts were not naturally called upon to a common or
simultaneous action.
It would have been desirable, until more conciliatory
feelings had entirely replaced the irritation of the cabinet of
St. Petersburg, that the two powers should continue to abstain
from all immediate contact, too apt to awaken exasperated
feelings scarcely in a degree calmed down ; but to accomplish
this it would have been necessary that no important event
should place in collision their essential interests, and the
susceptibilities of their national pride. We could hardly
expect this at a time so fertile in sudden changes.
The events of the East added a new crisis to those which
already menaced the repose of Europe. The King's govern-
ment foresaw, at an early period, all the embarrassments and
dangers of which the contest between the Porte and Mehemet
Ali might furnish the principle. Solely occupied with the
desire of avoiding them, it has never ceased to employ, with
that view, its utmost influence at Alexandria and Constanti-
nople. To induce the Porte to concessions evidently indis-
pensable, and which, granted a little sooner, would have been
less onerous, — to restrain the Viceroy of Egypt, as much by
prudent representations as by an imposing display, — to
confine his demands within reasonable limits, — and to pacify
thus the Ottoman empire without incurring the risks of
foreign intervention: — such were the objects we avowed, and
in which we had the concurrence of England. This plan was
unquestionably the best in itself, and the most favourable
for the interest of Europe at large, which it rescued from
threatening complications ; and also for the advantage of the
c c 4
380 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Sultan, whom it presei-ved from the humiliation and perils
inseparable from the course into which he had suffered himself
to be drawn.
Unfortunately, Russia did not bring to this question views
of equal disinterestedness. She desired to profit by the
difficult position in which the Grand Seignor found himself,
and through the weakness of that unfortunate monarch to
transform into a species of sovereignty and protectorate the
preponderance she already exercised at Constantinople. Not
content with astonishing the world by the spectacle of a
Russian fleet and army introduced into the Bosphorus, and to
the very gates of Constantinople, under the pretext of afford-
ing Mahmoud the succour which did not ameliorate a single
condition of the peace, the Russian government, as if it had
resolved to brave the other powers, alarmed and uneasy at such
an unprecedented fact, thought to consecrate by a solemn
act the menacing position it had assumed ; and, at the moment
when consenting to withdraw its forces, compelled the Porte
to sign a treaty of alliance by which the latter formally bound
itself not only to become the enemy of all the foes of Russia,
but also to close the Dardanelles against foreign flags whenever
the cabinet of St. Petersburg should find itself engaged in
war.
We do not exaggerate to ourselves. Marshal, the bearing
of engagements subscribed to under such circumstances.
We recognize that intrinsically they are not of a nature to
produce much change in the state of things which has actually
existed since the last events. But it seems to us evident
that the cabinet of St. Petersburg has wished to proclaim
openly in the face of Europe, to establish as a principle of
public law, exclusive and exceptional preponderance in the
affairs of the Ottoman empire. By this provocation, the in-
fallible effects of which, we are strongly disposed to think had
not been well calculated, we were forced to emerge from the
reserve within which, from views of conciliation, we had
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 381
consented to restrain ourselves up to that time. We found
it necessary, in concert with England, to protest against the
consequences of a treaty which tended to change, with-
out our participation, the relations of the powers in the
East ; and a declaration to this effect, a copy of which I sub-
join, has been transmitted first to the Porte, and subsequently
to the cabinet of St. Petersburg. <
We cannot yet learn how it will be received by the Impe-
rial Grovernment. Perhaps it may consider its dignity in-
volved in preserving, on this subject, absolute silence ; and
in that case you will only have to follow its example. If, on
the contrary, it should indulge in recriminations, the state-
ment I have here drawn up will place you in a condition to
reply in terms which, as you will readily understand, ought
to be, at the same time, firm, moderate, and exempt from all
bitterness and irritation. You might add that we have no idea
of contesting with Kussia the high influence appertaining to
her in the affairs of the Porte, and which results from the force
of events. But to seek to convert that influence into an in-
strument of exclusion and injury against other states is to call
for and necessitate, on their part, the most just and energetic
opposition. However serious and difiicult the Eastern ques-
tion may be, it is not, nevertheless, the most delicate of those
which have sprung up, within the last three years, between
France and Eussia. The subject of Poland has, in a very
different manner, contributed to divide the two nations, and to
exasperate the Emperor Nicholas against us. I shall not
recapitulate these sad details. You know the reserve we never
ceased to exercise in a matter to which it was impossible for
us to remain indifferent. While the contest was still pend-
ing, that reserve was naturally suggested to us by the promises
of moderation and clemency which M. de Mortemart had re-
ceived. After the fall of Warsaw and a fatal experience had
compelled us to acknowledge that our intercession in favour
of the unhappy Poles served only to enhance the resentment
382 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
of an implacable victor, we felt that a duty of humanity pre-
scribed to us, for the moment, a most painful silence. We
should have continued to preserve it if the cabinet of St.
Petersburg had not, some time since, indulged in the unfor-
timate suggestion of inserting in its official " Gazette " an
article the object of which was to present the question of
the existence of Poland as placed beyond general policy, and
subjected exclusively to the will of Kussia. Not to have dis-
puted such an assertion would have been to admit it on our
own account. We found it necessary to take it up in a semi-
official publication, the irrefragable arguments of which
you may develop if, which is unlikely, the discussion should
be pressed upon you.
It only remains for me, JNIarshal, in concluding, and in
recapitulating your instructions, to explain to you, in a few
words, the aspect under which we regard our futui'e relations
with Russia. Your judicious apprehension will easily deduce
from thence the rules of conduct you have to follow, accord-
ing to the conjunctures in the midst of which you will find
yourself.
Without undervaluing the advantages which, at another
epoch, the intimate alliance of the cabinet of St. Peters-
burg afforded to us, we understand perfectly that, under ex-
isting circumstances, not only is it impossible to re-establish
it, but that there would even be a dangerous blindness in
seeming to desire it, and to direct the combinations of our
policy ostensibly towards that end. Invincible obstacles at
present oppose themselves to a close union, which otherwise
would be without object between two cabinets whose ten-
dencies have no longer anything in common. As, notwith-
standing this, a future, more or less nearly connected with
both, may give rise to questions in which it would be equally
the interest of France and Russia to concert and mutually
understand each other, we ought, without affectation, and
without lending ourselves to advances which might possibly be
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 383
turned against us, to endeavour to replace ourselves in those
friendly relations, at least aj)parent, with the Eussian govern-
ment, which do not invariably end in a complete reconcilia-
tion, but which, when such an event is destined to take place,
infallibly precede it. It is nearly on this footing that we at
present stand with Prussia and Austria. Our only desirable
point at this moment is to reach the same position with
regard to Eussia, and this is the result which the King's
government recommends to jowr enlightened zeal.
384
No. n.
(Page 63.)
il/. Mignet to the Duke cle Broglie.
3Iadnd, Oct. 12ih, 1833.
My Lord Duke,
I hasten to inform you of the first results of the mission
with which the King's government has charged me, and to
communicate the information I have collected since my
arrival here.
I reached Madrid on the morning of the 10th. I was
delayed some hours at Vittoria, where a popular insurrection
in favour of Don Carlos had just burst forth. The royalist
volunteers held military possession of that city, and debated
as to whether they should allow me to pass. The fear of
offending France, whose determinations they were yet un-
acquainted with, undoubtedly decided them to permit me to
continue my journey. I had learned at Bayonne the revolt
of Bilbao, and the bad feeling in the Basque Provinces. These
dispositions are generally participated in all the countries
bordering on our frontier. Without customs, almost without
imposts, denuded of garrisons, except on a few military
points, and enjoying many privileges to which they perti-
naciously cling, these countries seem to me opposed to every
kind of innovation from self-interest.
The absence of knowledge and the want of commerce,
except on the coast of Catalonia, strengthen their estrange-
ment from all that might change their condition. From
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 385
Vittoria I passed through nothing but tranquil districts, and
they continue so to this moment.
On my arrival I waited on the Count de Rayneval. The
uncertainty in which he had been left as to the part which
France intended to take relative to the Spanish succession
had kept him entirely inactive since the death of King Fer-
dinand. I acquainted him with the resolutions of the King's
government, and I was happy to find that they accorded with
his own views, The despatch which you received from him
immediately after my departure will have apprised you that
in the various courses to be selected in this weighty con-
juncture, M. de Eayneval confined himself strictly to that
which has been adopted by the government. I have detailed
to him the motives which have determined the King and his
council to sacrifice the Salic law to that which formerly regu-
lated the succession to the Spanish monarchy. France has
always had, and will continue to have, the strongest desire
to secure her rear in Europe by causing Spain to adopt, and
by supporting that country in the maintenance of her own
systems. She cannot make front to the north but by resting on
the Pyrenees as a secure base. The intervention of Louis XIV.,
and that of Napoleon in the Peninsula, resulted from this per-
manent necessity of France. The Salic law represented under
the old monarchy the alliance of the two countries which the
dynasty of Napoleon was destined to represent under the
Empire. To-day the interest is the same, and in the com-
petition of two dynasties, one of which, founded on a
system contrary to ours, enters into the Northern alliance,
and makes the Peninsula the head-quarters of the malcon-
tents and conspirators of France, while the other relies on
our friendship, rejects our adversaries, and is inevitably
called to follow our directions, — the King's government is
bound to declare for the latter. The female succession has
become (for France), under existing circumstances, what in
other times and positions the Salic law had been. These
386 HISTORIC D(3CUMENTS.
arguments had impressed themselves on the Count de Kay-
neval, who warmly approves the resolution of the govern-
ment.
The end being fixed, nothing remained but the course to
follow, which was equally pointed out by your despatch and by
the oral instructions you delivered to me. To acknowledge,
sustain, and direct this government ; — such, summarily, is the
policy of France, and the duties imposed on her ambassador.
M. de Rayneval has found the plan as sound as the object.
To fulfil the first part of the intentions of our government,
he hastened, on the day of my arrival, to present himself to
M. de Zea and to the Queen Eegent. He announced to
them that France recognized the young Queen, and ofiered to
support her. This intelligence was received with extreme
joy, emotion, and gratitude. As M. de Rayneval will un-
doubtedl}^, in his despatch of this day, give you an account of
his conference with the Queen, I shall enter into no details
on that subject. The Spanish government has hastened to
make them known through the " Madrid Gazette," which
you will receive with our despatches, expecting to find in
this publicity an accession of strengifh. It does not seem to
me to reject the idea of recurring to the assistance of France,
should circumstances render it desirable, and this is an even-
tuality for which minds are preparing themselves. The
French government should also prepare itself, determine its
resolutions on this point, and arrange its resources. Let us
now estimate, as far as I can judge, the actual position of
the government which the interest and inclination of France
incline her to support.
This government has in its favour a fact, powerful in all
countries, and which seems to be additionally so with a
nation accustomed to obedience and slow in its determina-
tions. • It is an administration composed of the Queen's
partisans, of loyal captains-general, with finances in a tole-
rably flourishing state, an army well commanded, better dis-
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 387
ciplined than it has been for a long time, in which there has
been no defection, and the fidelity and co-operation of which
appear to be secured. It has also the Liberal party, which
has no hope but in the triumph of that cause. This party
predominates on the coast and in the greater part of the
commercial towns, but is not numerous in the interior of the
country. Finally, it has in its favour the limited capacity of
Don Carlos, with the fear inspired by his wife, the people he
has about him, and the tribunal of the Inquisition.
But it has against it the clergy, forming a compact or-
ganization which continues to exercise a powerful influence
over the masses, and, with very few exceptions, is favourable
to Don Carlos ; the corps of royalist volunteers, who, inferior
in discipline and arms to the regular troops, are much more
nmnerous, and scattered over the entire surface of the
country ; the democratic spirit of particular localities, which
is the opposite of liberalism, and dreads reforms as abolition
of privileges ; and the popularity of the infant Don Carlos,
who, in the eyes of a people with all the nationality of isola-
tion, represents the country, while the Queen Kegent has to
struggle with the disadvantage of being a foreigner.
With such formidable enemies to confront, the government
and the Queen's party require the closest unanimity. Un-
happily there is already division amongst them. The Council
of Eegency has a more liberal bias than the ministry, and
according to all appearance they are not likely to work to-
gether. The Queen, who at this moment acts under the
advice of M. de Zea, is, it is said, on cold terms with her sis-
ter ; and M. de Zea has estranged the Liberals by his mani-
festo of the 4th of October. This want of harmony under
such pressing circumstances presents an unfavourable augury.
M. de Zea governs alone since the accession of the young
Queen, as he did during the last six months of the reign of
Ferdinand. He has superior qualities and high reputation in
the opinion of everybody ; courage, firmness, and rare activity.
388 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
But he is perhaps wanting in the prudence and address de-
manded by such a complicated position. He seems to rely ex-
clusively on authority. He is generally reproached with having
unnecessarily alienated the Liberals, if not by granting them
nothing at present, at least by leaving them no hope for the
future; and with having compromised the Queen by inducing
her to abandon those who had declared in her favour. In
acting thus, his object appears to have been to retain the
confidence of the purely royalist party, by re-assuring it
as to the maintenance of unlimited power and individual
privileges. He has thought that the absolutists, confirmed
in their interests and opinions, would contest ^^ath less
ardour the cause of Don Carlos, thus rendered more personal
and less political. Has he deceived himself? This, time will
speedily show ; and this is what we may apprehend from the
insurrectionary movements at Bilbao, Vittoria, Talavera, and
Logrono on the Ebro. But, be this as it may, all agree in
looking upon him as the only man capable, by his firmness,
of establishing the Queen's authority, always provided that
he does not fail in handling it adroitly when confirmed. The
Liberals have no one of equal vigour to face immediate diffi-
culties, and who could advantageously replace him for the
interest of the Queen and of France.
As the energy of the first minister and the support of the
Liberals are equally essential to the Queen's cause, I deemed
it proper to name conciliation to M. de Zea in the interview
I had with him yesterday. M. de Zea volunteered to me his
confession of faith in regard to parties, as he has done on
several occasions to M. de Rayneval. He spoke with deeply-
rooted animosity against the Carlists. He said they had
raised the banner of revolt, but that his arm was long and
strong enough to seize and beat it down ; that it would then
be seen whether he feared or was able to manage them ; that
he knew his country, and what would be the influence over it
of a good cause, and firm resolution; that in 1824, despite
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 389
the urgency of the clergy, and against the advice of all his
colleagues, he had dared to attack the inquisition directly in
face, and had overthrown it; that he gloried in this, and in
the credit he now assumed of having done more than any
one else to secure the throne to the young Queen, by remov-
ing the obstacles to her accession (the Princess of Beira and
the infant Don Carlos), and by giving her certain supports in
the oaths of the Cortes, and the organization of a strong mini-
stry and a loyal army ; that the cause to which he had devoted
himself was that of the nation and of justice ; that the Queen
Eegent had resolved to transmit the trust of royal power to
her daughter, intact, as she had received it ; that Spain was
not sufficiently advanced to support another form of authority ;
that the Queen and her government were nevertheless far
removed from being friends to superstition and darkness;
that they rejected both, and sought, on the contrary, to
enlighten and improve their country; that this was their
constant thought, and would evince itself as soon as the
commotions were put down, and legislature could supersede
contest. As to the Liberals, he declared that he desired no
better than to come to a friendly understanding with those
amongst them who were not animated by the spirit of faction ;
that there were many of them reasonable men, who would
associate with him in defending the Queen's rights, and were
readily employed ; that, in short, he opened his arms to all
who presented themselves in sincerity. While developing
his system and intentions, which I here recapitulate, he
repeated several times that he piqued himself on yielding to
no Spaniard in conviction and loyalty, but that he was still
liable to error, and was anxious, above all things, to profit by
the counsels of those who tendered proofs of so much friendly
interest in the authority of his sovereign.
Although it may be difficult to deal with a mind so strongly
prepossessed, I thought it right to enter on the reasons
which rendered the union of the different partisans of the
VOL. IV. D D
390 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Queen most desirable. Mr. Villiers, who had seen M. de Zea
before my interview with him, has informed me that he spoke
to him in a similar strain, and that it is possible this common
language of those who interest themselves most in the Queen's
government may induce M. de Zea, by his future acts and
selections, to diminish the impressions produced by his mani-
festo. He has commissioned me to make kno^vn to my
government his own good intentions, and the unqualified
gratitude of the Eegent. That Princess, to whom I had the
honour of being presented to-day by M. de Eayneval, and
of placing in her hands the letter intrusted to me by the
Queen her aunt, repeated to me personally the same senti-
ments towards their majesties, and appeared to be much
affected by those which I conveyed to her on their part.
She received me graciously, as did the two Infantas, to
whom I also delivered the letters and compliments of the
Queen. There was no allusion to public affairs, and indeed
there could be none in these court audiences, which the
ambassador may repeat, although I cannot.
The situation of Spain to-day is much less encouraging
than that of Portugal, and on this subject, my Lord Duke, I
abstain from speaking, as M. de Eayneval will include it in
his despatch. It is impossible at present to conjecture the
result. The extent to which the Carlist insurrection may
spread is unknown, or whether the vigour of the first minister,
who has sent troops to repress it in the north of the Penin-
sula, where it has already intercepted the principal high
road of communication with the continent, will be seconded
by forces sufficient to assm-e a triumph. The presence of Don
Carlos on the Spanish territory would enormously increase
his chances. It is not exactly known where he is, since he
left Santarem to approach Spain in the character of Pretender
to the throne.
A report is circulated that the insurgent Biscayans have
invited him to join them. It will, however, soon be ascer-
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 391
tained what has become of him, and at the same time an
estimate formed of the strength of the opposing parties.
Meanwhile France should prepare herself to maintain her
interests, and the resolutions which the King's government
may consider it proper to adopt.
I believe that my presence here, now that the impulse has
been given and received, will be less profitable than it might
be in Paris, where I could enter more fully into the details
of information which are never sufl&ciently conveyed in formal
despatches.
Our government has here an able representative, full of
the resources, intelligence, and penetration which are in-
dispensable in a land of intrigue ; one who possesses much
experience, and an intimate knowledge of the Peninsula, is
well looked upon, well informed, in perfect understanding
with Mr. Villiers on all points, and entering warmly into the
plan adopted by the council, — a plan to the execution of
which he desires to devote himself, and is bent on rendering
successful.
I conclude my over-long letter, in praying you, my Lord
Duke, to accept the assurance of my high consideration and
respectful attachment.
(Signed) MiGNET.
DD 2
392
No. III.
(Page 76.)
The Duke cle Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.
Jan. m?i, 1834.
It is unnecessary for me to tell you that the situation of
Spain has been for a long time the object of our most anxious
solicitude. We say it with regret, that she seems herself to
aggravate it greatly. It is not in the attempts of Don Carlos's
party that we see the principal and immediate source of the
dano-ers which threaten the Peninsula and the throne of
Queen Isabella ; that party has proved that, left to itself, its
chances of success are few, and the errors and disagreements
of the Queen's partisans can alone improve them. Un-
fortunately, these divisions, instead of diminishing, have
become more serious every day, and nothing indicates that
the course pursued by the ministry of the Kegent is likely
to lead to their termination. M. de Zea, confident in the
sincerity of his intentions and the frequently successful
courage which he has at such extremely varying periods
opposed to the efforts of the factious, persists, almost alone,
in the system he proclaimed on his accession to power,
and at the moment of the late King's death. He does not
abandon the idea of improving the civil government and
legislation of Spain ; he labours for this object with surprising
activity ; but determined to preserve to the royal authority
the independence which he considers necessary to its bene-
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 393
ficial action, he wishes it to rely solely on itself, and to
abstain from all engagements ; that in accepting the co-opera-
tion of loyal and enlightened men, it should yield no conces-
sion of principles to the opinions of which they are the
representatives.
On the other hand, the adversaries of M. de Zea fand we
must recollect they form an immense majority amongst the
partisans of the Queen), even those who are not led away either
by a revolutionary tendency, or a purely theoretical bias,
refuse to recognize a pledge for the future prosperity of their
country in reforms established by a simple act of arbitrary
power, and which another act of the same kind might
speedily revoke; they believe that these reforms have no
real value, and could inspire no just confidence unless they
are guaranteed in some specific form by the consent of the
nation : in fine, they are convinced that this consent would
give a support to the Queen's authority far more solid than
that which it can find in titles importunately contested.
We are not now called upon to decide between these
views. An exact knowledge of the state of minds in Spain
could alone have placed us in a condition to distinguish
which of the two is founded on truth ; and at our distance
from the theatre of events we must wait until enlightened
by facts. You know, moreover, with what religious anxiety
we have avoided any step that might lead to a suspicion of
our being disposed to mix ourselves up with the internal
government of Spain. A feeling of delicacy, which M. de
Zea has undoubtedly appreciated, has compelled us to push
this reserve even to a scruple, at a moment when the neces-
sity, on the part of the Queen's government, of requiring our
aid, might have apparently given to our representations a
totally different character from that of simple advice. I will
not conceal from you that this consideration alone sufficed
to prevent us from expressing, at the time, the regret we
felt for an act which the enemies of M. de Zea have since
DD 3
394 niSTOEic documents.
turned into such a powerful weapon against him, — his noto-
rious manifesto of the 4th of October. We also feared, by
the slightest indications of censure, to encourage adversaries,
or to diminish the means of success to a minister we never
ceased to hold in the highest esteem ; and being resolved to
excite no obstacles in his path, we have not hesitated, on our
own account, to endure the mischievous consequences of the
passive and expectant attitude to which we resigned our-
selves. We have allowed the opinion to gain ground, in
France as well as in Spain, that not only did the King's go-
vernment employ its entire credit with the Queen to main-
tain M. de Zea in power, but that it also attaches to that
support the condition of setting aside all constitutional
enactments and liberal innovations. I repeat, that we neither
desired to interfere gratuitously in the internal affairs of
Spain, nor to offer any obstacle to the realization of a system
in which such a man as ]\I. de Zea declared that he saw the
only prospect of safety for the country. Meanwhile events
have advanced, and they are of a nature to make us appre-
hend that M. de Zea has not thoroughly estimated the
necessities of the actual condition of Spain. If, until now,
he has succeeded in keeping the government isolated from
all parties and opinions, we believe that the regency has
rather drawn from that isolation a principle of weakness than
of real independence. The choice it has made, the mea-
sures it has necessarily decreed, and which might have won
popularity if the whole character of its proceedings had indi-
cated the result of a system, have produced no other effect
than that of conveying (erroneously, without doubt) an ap-
pearance of inconsistency, and of yielding up to the enemies
of the ministry important positions, whence they may, in
future, direct their attacks with more efficacy. The party
which calls for reforms, convinced that those hitherto ob-
tained have been reluctantly yielded under the plea of
concession, and that the slightest pretext would be taken for
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 395
retracting them, far from finding therein a motive for rally-
ing round the first depositaries of power, seeks only with
augmented ardour to overthrow them, because these very
reforms supply an index of their weakness. Even some of
the men called to the most important posts, convinced that
they owe their appointment solely to the irresistible empire of
public opinion, second more or less the efforts of the opposi-
tion.
The royal authority thus progressively weakens itself.
The measures which ought to strengthen lead to its ruin,
because it is placed in a false position. Anarchy reigns in
all minds, and begins even to mingle with the acts of power,
which, disarming itself by degrees, without allaying the discon-
tents and exigencies by which it is weakened, will, in all pro-
bability, be at last reduced to the point of no longer being
able to deny to force the concessions which it considers in-
compatible with its safety.
A catastrophe appears to be imminent. It is impossible
that so clear a mind as that of M. de Zea can deceive itself
on this point ; and however convinced he might be, at another
time, of the soundness of the system to which he has linked his
name, and of the perils attending any combinations founded
on other principles, we should find it difficult to persuade
ourselves that he will wish singly to persevere in a struggle so
unequal, a struggle which his courage might still prolong,
but in which he would ultimately fall, and in which, perhaps
(and this consideration ought pre-eminently to move a heart
like his), he would not fall alone. We admit, readily, that
an accommodation, at the point matters have now reached,
may present important obstacles, and that it may even give
rise to real dangers ; but in that course the dangers are only
possible, in any other they are certain. A choice must be made.
In such a state of things M. de Zea has necessarily traced out
for himself a plan of conduct. He cannot have contemplated
abandoning the destinies of his country to the hazard, or, to
D D 4
39G HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
speak more correctly, to the certainties of a desperate combat.
The interests of Spain are, in these days, too closely united
to those of France to permit us to remain indifferent to the
future which prepares itself for that country ; and we should
be guilty towards France herself were we not to exert our
utmost efforts to avert the misfortunes which menace our
neighbours. It is in the name of these common interests.
Count, and in that of the kind feeling which the King has
ever cherished for his august niece, that you will invite M.
de Zea to communicate to you his views and projects. Frank
and complete explanations, such as may be expected from a
man equally well known for his rectitude and firmness,
we absolutely require. They alone can determine our doubts,
and prescribe to us the course we have to follow in our rela-
tions with Spain. I expect them with impatience.
397
No. ly.
(Page 83.)
The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Rayneval.
March ISth, 1834.
I cannot conceal from you that the intelligence from Spain
produces a most painful impression on the King's govern-
ment, and that the situation of that country has been the
object of the most serious deliberations of the council.
I need not repeat the lively interest manifested by France,
from the first moment, for the consolidation of Queen Isa-
bella's throne. On the day when we learned the death of
Ferdinand VII. we hastened to recognize the authority of
the Eegent. We did more ; we offered her our support, not
indeed with the idea of sustaining against the wishes of the
Spanish nation an authority they might desire to reject, but
to give to that power which we thus thought, and still think,
based upon the leading moral forces and most honourable
influences of the country, the time necessary to organize and
place itself in a condition to sustain the struggle against a
faction which, during twelve years of almost absolute rule,
had possessed every means of preparing itself for the combat.
Far from wishing to impose upon Spain a government
chosen by us, our sole thought has been to secure to the
sound national majority, the possibility of unfettered mani-
festation. We judged, moreover, that by the position and
398 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
antecedents of the men who had avowed themselves its
defenders, the Queen's government would naturally find it-
self disposed to recall Spain to paths of improvement,
progress, and salutary reform ; and assuredly this expec-
tation contributed not a little to the promptitude with
which we declared in its favour. But, penetrated with
the most profound respect for the independence of nations,
we have sedulously avoided, at the moment when the po-
sition of that government might render our aid so precious,
all that might lead to a belief that we attached to it con-
ditions relating to the forms of its internal system : we
abstained for a long time, as you are well aware, from offering
on this point, and in this sense, the slightest official advice.
Such were our scruples that we even refrained from ex-
pressing any opinion on the manifesto on the 4th of October,
by which the ministers of the Kegent proclaimed their
determination to maintain absolute power, while, at the same
time, they announced measures of clemency and adminis-
trative reform. Nevertheless, we foresaw from that moment,
that this imprudent declaration would become the germ of
mistrust and suspicion amongst the Queen's friends ; that it
would entail the fall of its authors ; and that, as it would be
impossible to carry out its principles, — authority, by thus
compelling itself to make a retrog-rade movement, would find
that it had struck a first and fatal blow against that sponta-
neity of action so invaluable to it in epochs of political
regeneration.
Our expectations, unfortunately, were soon verified.
Loud complaints resounded in opposition to the system
recently announced. The Regent was in no condition to
impose silence on an opinion from whence her entire strength
was derived. She persuaded herself that, in default of
political institutions, it might be satisfied by concessions of
another character.
Undoubtedly, it would be unjust to deny all the good
mSTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 399
which the Eegent has already done. The recall of the
exiles, the termination of proscriptions, the admission to
public employment of all that Spain contains of able and
honourable men, the creation of a civil legislature so long
desired, the important reforms introduced into the organi-
zation of the tribunals : — - all these measures, and others in
addition, which Queen Christina has carried through in the
space of a few weeks, would have sufficed in ordinary times to
render beneficent and illustrious a long reign.
If, under existing circumstances, they have passed almost
without notice, it is that public opinion believed itself en-
titled to expect something better, and that taught by long
experience to dread the uncertainties and variations of
absolute power, it was not disposed to place much confidence
in partial amendments, — the fruit of a generous impulse,
and a pressure of circumstances which might disappear,
before fresh combinations. It is, in fine, that in the eyes of
the men who have, until now, supported the regency, the only
complete and enduring reform, the only one which could
place all others on a solid basis, and assure them a sufficient
guarantee, is the establishment of a representative system.
The natural results of this fatal discord between the
system adopted by the regency, and the almost unanimous
conviction of its adherents, speedily manifested themselves.
To the anxious welcome with which it was at first hailed,
has succeeded a feeling of suspicion, undoubtedly unjust,
but extremely difficult to assuage. Authority has lost its
action. Even at Madrid, its orders are with difficulty exe-
cuted. In the provinces, the captains-general most devoted
to the Queen's cause, have found it necessary for her service,
and not to exasperate the disturbed and discontented popu-
lations, to act, in a manner, independently, and to pay no
attention to the instructions they receive.
Encouraged by these symptoms of weakness and anarchy,
the partisans of the Pretender raise their heads. In the
400 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
districts from whence they have never been completely ex-
pelled, they increase in number and audacity. Their pro-
gress even threatens to extend to points where, at the outset,
their attempts failed.
To contend against their numerous bands, to accomplish
their extinction, the army, despite its loyalty, is evidently
too weak, and the exhausted state of the treasury, unfor-
tunately, does not permit the frame-work to reach the
necessary expansion. An energetic union of the Queen's
friends could alone supply this deficiency. It is enough to
say how much we deplore the causes which, up to this
moment, have rendered this union impossible, and which,
detaching towards other prepossessions the thoughts and
efforts of the constitutionalists, have left the field open to
their bitterest enemies.
. We had reason to think, for the last two months, that
these causes were about to disappear. When the Regent,
yielding to an imperious necessity, determined to dismiss
M. de Zea, when she called to her councils men whose names
awakened powerful sympathies, the enthusiasm and hopes
which then displayed themselves seemed to restore to power
all its moral strength.
Unhappily these sentiments, which attached themselves
even less to the persons of the new ministers than to the idea
of which they were looked upon as representatives, were soon
suffered to waste away. When days, weeks, and whole
months passed on, and no official manifestation announced to
Spain an actual change of system, astonishment sprang up at
these delays and this silence. Fears arose that all was to be
again placed in question. Injurious suspicions pervaded
the public mind, and the accusations that resounded assumed
a more serious character than those which had within two
months displaced M. de Zea. At that period, in fact, the
attack was confined to the ministry, to which was imputed the
only obstacle which shackled the benevolent and liberal action
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 401
of an august mil. To-day — I speak it with sorrow — cora-
plaints are directed against a higher source.
The evil I am now pointing out is great indeed ; it may
become irreparable if suffered to increase.
It would be vain to expect that public impatience could
be calmed by these ameliorations of detail, and by reforms
similar to those I have now recapitulated. Such means,
which were unsuccessful when hearts were less open to hope,
must fail completely at the present crisis. Uneasy and sus-
picious as minds now are, they would see in concessions thus
successively yielded, nothing but artifices intended to abuse
them. Far from feeling the slightest gratitude, they would
irritate themselves more and more with what they would
interpret as a fresh symptom of fear and bad faith. Eoyalty
would become weaker through its own benefactions, and when
finally determined to enter on a new course, would cease to
retain the strength necessary to follow it to a successful end.
Perseverance in such a system would be to accelerate its own
ruin, and to expose itself gratuitously to great dangers which
may yet be avoided.
Let the Eegent then hasten to escape from the false posi-
tion in which she finds herself involved; let her adopt,
finally, a plan of conduct calculated to settle all these doubts,
to rally round her all reasonable spirits, and to secure to the
government the confidence it so imperatively needs. Perhaps
it still preserves the requisite authority for decreeing firmly
and maturely, according to the inspirations of prudence, the
changes to be effected in the institutions of the country. A
little later, this liberty may escape from it, and public
opinion, more exacting as it becomes more suspicious, would
impose its own law. New delays, instead of diminishing the
difficulties which press so exclusively, would serve only to
aggravate them. These difficulties, besides, are more for-
midable than the Spanish government appears disposed to
consider them. It is, unquestionably, an arduous as well as
402 HISTORIC DOCUIMENTS.
a great and noble task to regenerate a nation by modifying
its legislature. But we believe that the dangers of such an
enterprise are singularly exaggerated when an attempt is
made to confound the present epoch mth former ones, the
conditions of which were absolutely different, — those of 1812
and 1820.
In the first place, sufficient regard is not paid to the dis-
position of minds. In 1812 and 1820, ideas of innovation
existed only in a small number of heads who ill comprehended
them, exaggerated them in consequence, and with this dan-
gerous prepossession gave themselves up to the most unlimited
utopianisms.
To-day the so-called party of reform has been instructed
by the experience of its errors and the misfortunes to which
they have led. By becoming moderate, and by rejecting
impracticable theories, it has fortified itself with the adhesion
of a great number of men whom its extravagance alone had
estranged. It is now at once active and more numerous : its
moral and material strength have increased together.
In 1812 the monarchy was absent; in 1820 it was van-
quished and captive. All was carried on without it, in spite
of it, against it, because there was a rooted determination to
consider it hostile to liberty, and a predominant dread of
placing it in a position to overthrow the constitution.
There is nothing similar in the situation of the existing
government. Far from being considered as the natural ad-
versary of reform and rational liberty, every one knows that
their causes are inseparably united ; that it will fall with
them ; that it has itself taken the initiative in ameliorations :
all, notwithstanding the suspicions which begin to break
forth, are disposed to leave to it this free action. Nothing
is required but increased activity.
We find here. Count, great advantages and a vast superi-
ority of position. Eoyalty has never ceased to be powerful in
Spain, more so, perhaps, than in any other part of Europe ; it
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 403
is therefore called upon to yield something to the general
movement of the human mind, and to seek new supports in
place of those which time has broken. But these supports
would become useful and effective instruments when accepted
with frankness and without mental reservation. It is not in
Spain that monarchy has to fear abolition. For a long time
to come the Spanish people will see in their sovereigns the
direct representatives of divinity ; for a long time they will
be the objects of a kind of worship which could not be
attacked with impunity; and if, under the late reigns, this
enthusiastic sentiment has appeared to suffer a momentary
check, it is because the princes to whom it was applied
have seemed to forget that such homage rendered by a nation
so noble, demands in return from him who receives it, not
only generous and warm-hearted feelings, but requires
to be encouraged by external evidences of that simple and
exalted majesty, those rigid habits, perhaps verging on
austerity, which in former ages have characterised the most
illustrious predecessors of Queen Isabella.
I have now explained to your Excellency the aspect in
which we regard the actual condition of Spain. You have been
already instructed several times to speak in this sense to the
Regent's ministers. It is now the intention of the King and
his council that you should communicate directly with her
Catholic Majesty, to whose reading you may even submit the
present despatch. The Queen will undoubtedly recognize
in such a step a new pledge of the tender affection of which
the King, her uncle, has already given her so many proofs, an
additional evidence of the friendly sentiments which have so
long united France and Spain, rendered still more ardent
by recent events which have blended the interests of the two
states. She will understand how weighty existing circum-
stances appear to us, when the French government, so
careful of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
nations, has ventured to tender such pressing advice to Spain.
404 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
The considerations you are instructed to lay before her
Catholic Majesty are those which we believe the best calcu-
lated to make an impression upon her heart, because they
are drawn from the internal state, and in accordance with
the wishes and wants of a people whose happiness is confided
to her care. We might add, that in the interest even of the
respect which Spain has a right to claim from foreign govern-
ments, the close of that system of temporization to which
she is now subjected will be a wise and well-combined
measure.
It would be fruitless, in dispute of this assumption, to
allege the little sympathy of some of those governments
with the principles laid down by the partisans of the Eegent ;
it is not the less true that they look upon Spain, at present,
as forced by her position to admit at least a portion of those
principles ; and that the power of the Eegent will continue to
retain, in their eyes, a provisional character, up to the period
when it must submit to that condition of its existence. It is,
therefore, certain, that the Spanish government, from the
moment when it thus determines, will acquire more strength,
and inspire more confidence, not only in its allies, but even
with the states by which it is as yet unrecognised.
2. Tlce Same to the Same.
March l^h, 1834.
The King has judged it proper to prescribe to you, under
existing circumstances, a direct communication with Queen
Christina. His Majesty thinks the time has come for
making known openly to that Princess the impression with
which we regard the situation of Spain, and our judgment
on the course her government has pursued to this day. But
in a despatch intended to be placed under the eyes of the
Kegent, it was impossible to include certain considerations,
to describe particular views, without weakening the character
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 405
of a communication made in the King's own name. We,
therefore, feel the propriety of leaving it to you to make
a verbal exposition to Queen Christina of many observa-
tions and counsels, the effect of which may be the more
impressive as being laid before her in the freedom of a con-
fidential interview. It is thus, for instance, that in dis-
cussing the question of the Coi'tes, you will not omit to
introduce the importance of offering, in the mode of forming
the national representation, and particularly in the constitu-
tion of the higher Chamber, those guarantees of legal and
regular independence, no less essential to the stability of
the throne of the young Queen Isabella, than conformable
with the principles of a wise and true liberty in the kingdom.
On this point our opinion is known to you ; you will, there-
fore, create the opportunity of imparting it to the Eegent.
You will equally have to show her how important it is that
power should be composed of elements perfectly homogeneous.
Until now, the composition of the cabinet has not presented
this accordance of principles, this identity of views, without
which, authority, divided and tortured into opposing interpre-
tations, can have neither strength nor consideration. I shall
not enlarge farther on this subject ; your reports satisfy me
that there is no occasion to suggest to you the arguments
and opinions which we desire to impress on the attention of
Queen Christina,
In conclusion, it is not our wish that you should maintain
any mystery with M. de la Eosa as to the general character
and spirit of the step which the King prescribes to you.
VOL. IV. E E
406
No. Y.
(Page 110.)
TJie Duke de Broglle to the Count de Rayneval.
Count, Paris, 23rd 3fmj, 1835.
I have received the despatches you have done me
the honour to write, up to No. 32 inchisive. The King's
government has learnt, with a sentiment of much pain, the
disorders which agitated INIadrid on the day of the 11th inst.,
and which have again called forth the courage and self-pos-
session of M. Martinez de la Eosa.
It was easy to foresee that the late events in Navarre, by de-
ceivint' the hopes which had been founded on General Valdes
for the conclusion of the civil war, would augment in Spain
the number of advocates for French intervention. Minds
are naturally led, when difficult circumstances continue, to
adopt the means which promise the readiest termination,
^vithout troubling themselves much as to the inconveniences
they produce in other respects. What most surprises us is
that men so enlightened as the Eegent's ministers should
suffer themselves to be led to participate in this impression.
I am disinclined at present to decide absolutely on the
question of intervention ; it has not been formally proposed,
and consequently the council has not been called upon to
discuss it. If it should present itself hereafter, our determi-
nation would be guided by an estimate of the circumstances
which have rise to it ; but without anticipating eventualities.
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 407
I feel it my duty, at present, to direct your attention to the
serious objections which such a measure would excite.
The Eegent's ministers cannot be ignorant how unpopular
the idea of intervention is in France. Without speaking of
the obstacles it would encounter from the passions of the
different parties, the mass of the nation, prepossessed with
unfortunate reminiscences, would only recognise in it an
opportunity for new expences and inextricable embarrass-
ments ; and the King's government, supposing it possible not
to regard this repugnance, would incur a responsibility the
more onerous that it would have no confidence in the success
of the enterprise for which it would consent to the risk.
In England, a serious opposition of a totally different
character would be declared against the march of a French
army beyond the Pyrenees. Nothing, perhaps, would be
better calculated to revive the old national jealousies. The
ministry in office, whatever might be its personal dispositions,
would see itself compelled to adopt the public sentiment,
and if disposed to resist it, it is more than probable that the
weak majority on which it relies would speedily give way ;
that an administration taken from other ranks would come
into power ; and to obey the impulse which had carried it
there, would commence by breaking the salutary alliance
which at this moment unites England to France and Spain.
It is not less evident that the other powers would regard
this intervention with at least equal displeasure ; and without
openly resenting it, would strive to embarrass us in the com-
plications which the general position of Europe might easily
originate. Undoubtedly this consideration would not of itself
restrain us, but, combined with all those I have pointed out,
it has also a certain weight.
I need not add that the intervention condemned in France
and England by public opinion, and rejected in the rest of
Europe by the policy of the cabinets, would find in Spain
itself a number of opponents ; that it would take, in appear-
E E 2
408 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
ance, from the Queen's government the character of nation-
ality, which is the first of moral forces; and that, on the con-
trary, it would strengthen the party of Don Carlos, by
supplying it with an opportunity of presenting itself as the
defender of the independence of the country.
An absolute necessity alone could explain why the Spanish
cabinet shoidd determine to brave such consequences by
calling in the aid of a French army. If it had lost all hope
of pacifying Navarre through its own efforts; if it had reason
to believe its existence threatened by the progress of the
insurrection, we might then understand that in despair of
the cause it would be driven to appeal to such an extreme
resource. Fortunately, matters are far removed from that
emergency.
The Queen's authority has not ceased to be acknowledged
throughout nearly the whole monarchy. Almost everywhere
the attempts in favour of the Pretender have been vigorously
put down. Some small mountainous districts alone, situated
at one extremity of the Peninsula, have been able until now,
omng to the difficulties of the ground and the well-known
energy of the inhabitants, to maintain themselves in a state of
revolt which applies more to particular and local grievances
than to the common interests of the country at large. A skilful
leader has there united, independently of the volunteers who
casually swell his numbers, ten or twelve thousand men,
organized with some degree of regularity, although badly
armed; he has also at his disposal two hundred horses and
nine pieces of cannon.
With this force, and relying, moreover, on the sympathies of
the population, he has, up to this period, been able to repulse
the attacks of more numerous troops, but chiefly composed
of young, inexperienced soldiers, engaged in positions where
numbers are of little importance, and cavalry and artillery are
almost useless. But it is evident that were he to emerge from
his mountains, he would lose the advantages from which he
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 409
derives superiority, and that he would find himself abandoned
by the greater portion of his companions in arms : the Navar-
rese and Biscayans in particular, exclusively attached to their
soil and institutions, and accustomed from time immemorial to
consider themselves a distinct people from the rest of Spain,
would certainly refuse to fight at a distance from their homes,
for a cause which could no longer be that of their franchises
and privileges.
Zumalacarreguy, even if so disposed, would fail to draw
them to Castille; and he is not likely to form such a wish; for
he well understands that in the midst of the vast plains which
cover that country, his hopes of success would be materially
diminished.
The insurrection in Navarre and Biscay, therefore, has
nothing in it which directly threatens the throne of Queen
Isabella. Undoubtedly, by the moral effect it produces
throughout Spain, it constitutes a danger I do not pretend
to disavow ; it keeps up a baneful agitation ; it revives the
hopes of parties, and their dependence on the chances of events.
It is both important and pressing to bring it to an end : but
once more, the state of things does not assume the character
of that desperate urgency which no longer permits a choice
of means ; and the despondency which might induce the
Queen's government to proclaim its own impotence by a de-
mand for our intervention would in no manner be justified.
We are certainly not inclined to refuse the assistance and
succour which we are able to afford, without compromising
at once ourselves and our allies. Between an armed inter-
ference and what we have already done, there are intermediate
steps which might reconcile many difficulties. It belongs not
to the King's government to point these out to the cabinet
of Madrid ; we might be erroneous judges of what the neces-
sities of the position require and admit. But if, laying aside
all notions of direct intervention, which nothing could sanction
at this moment, the Spanish ministry were to apply to us
E E 3
410 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
with confidence to take part in its views and exigencies, if it
would indicate what it thinks we could effect, the question
would present itself under a totally different aspect. What
we ask of it, above all, is not to take from the cause of the
young Queen the features of independence and nationality ;
and that the employment of the resources which the govern-
ment may obtain from its allies should be directed by none
but Spanish hands.
Whatever may be the propositions which Spain might
judge fitting to be made to us, it would be essential that she
should communicate them at the same time to the other two
powers who took part in the treaty of the 22nd of April, and
that in some degree she should also obtain their concurrence,
or, at least, that of England; All that tends to place beyond
doubt the maintenance of that treaty, and to connect with it
the consequences of the measures that might be adopted,
would be sound policy. The reasons are so evident that I do
not think it necessary to detail them.
2. The Duke de Broglie to the Count de Eayneval.
Count, Paris, July \Uh, 1835.
I have received the despatches you have done me the
honour to write under the dates of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of
July.
The King's government sees with regret that at Madrid an
erroneous idea is still entertained of the nature of the motives
which have induced us to refuse direct intervention in the
affairs of Spain. Owing to a false interpretation of the terms in
which that refusal was expressed, they seem resolved to look
upon it as merely a provisional adjournment. They appear to
think that a closer investigation of the state of the Peninsula,
and more pressing instances on the part of the Spanish
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 411
cabinet, would induce us, in the actual state of things, to
rescind our determination.
This is a mistake which it becomes important to rectify.
Undoubtedly, the King's government does not propose to
establish the absolute doctrine of non-intervention in all
cases whatever. It has no desire to lay down in principle
that there might not have been and never may be circum-
stances in which intervention would be reciprocally advanta-
geous to France and Spain, and therefore legitimate. It is
^for the reservation of eventualities, entirely hypothetical,
that we have given our refusal the circumspection which
has deceived the Spanish cabinet. But such has been our
only object; and it would be a great mistake to apply in any
other sense the expressions we have used.
It is necessary that this should be clearly understood.
Before pausing on the resolution adopted, we had carefully
examined all sides of the question. We calculated every
possible and probable chance, and it is only after the ma-
turest deliberation that our choice has bounded itself by the
measure which we consider, not exempt from all serious in-
conveniences, but subjected to less weighty objections than
any of the others proposed.
It would, therefore, be useless, by any considerations of
detail, drawn from the particular position of the Spanish
government, to attempt to shake our decision. Besides
that such considerations change nothing in the nature of the
question, and that they merge more or less in those which
have already been presented to us, they could not, evidently,
prevail against motives founded on the most essential in-
terests of France.
Any fresh insistance on this point would therefore be worse
than futile. All that tends to prolong the illusion of the
Spanish government, and induces it to make new efforts with
this object, could have no other result than to induce mutually
unpleasant explanations, and at the same time to impress on
E E 4
412 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
its proceedings the imcertainty so strongly calculated to
paralyze all vigorous determination ; to prevent it from
employing with advantage the real resources of which it can
dispose, as well as those we offer, and to retain it in the
deceitful expectations of an assistance it cannot receive.
It rests with you. Count, to call back the cabinet of Ma-
drid to a more just appreciation of the true state of things.
I cannot too strongly recommend you to use your utmost
efforts to effect this object.
413
No. YL
(Page 127.)
To M. Guizot, Deputy, Paris.
Sir, Algiers, 3Iay 27th, 1836.
The colonists of Algeria remember with gratitude that
during the dangers which last year so formidably threatened
their existence, your credit and the power of your eloquence
decided the success of their cause, which you identified with
that of France. They then devoted themselves to their
labours, animated by hope, the nourisher of new-born esta-
blishments, and the only incentive that can promote the
entire development of colonization. When, subsequently,
between the interval of the two sessions, the adversaries of
the colony announced fresh hostilities, our confidence in the
interest you had evinced prevented us at first from enter-
taining serious alarm. Moreover, how could we persuade
ourselves that after the solemn recognition of our possessions
in Africa, they would, in the following year, renew the
attacks against which a colony more securely established
than ours would find it difiicult to oppose efifectual defence ?
Despite our hopes, we are again compelled to combat, and
we have recourse to our former defenders. The Colonial
Society, whose solicitude extends to everything which involves
the general interest, is too strongly impressed with the influ-
ence of your advocacy, not to intreat you to repeat in the
tribune the arguments of reason and experience, which from
your lips have already obtained such signal success in our
414 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
favour. Our gratitude and acknowledgments will be but
feeble returns for all we owe you ; but the glory of bringing
triumph to a cause so dear to the country and to humanity,
is a noble and estimable reward, sufficient to satisfy great
minds, and which men of elevated thought have ever desired
to win.
We have the honour to forward to you such details as we
have been able to collect on the progress of the colony,
convinced that your ability will induce a conviction of their
value, and that the vote of the Chamber, while dissipating
our apprehensions, will consolidate our future, and afford
you an additional triumph.
i Deign to accept, Sir, the assurance of our highest con-
sideration.
FiLHON, President.
EosEY, Vice-President.
Ch. Solvet, Vice-President.
2. Tlie Same to the Same.
Sir, Algiers, June 2dth, 1836.
In the debate in the Chamber of Deputies which determines,
as we hope at least, the fate of the colony of Algiers, and
attaches it irrevocably to the mother-country, your speeches,
equally wise and benevolent, have convinced us that we had
good reason to found our hope on your patriotism and elo-
quence. With such an ally we are henceforward confident of
the future. The Colonial Society, powerfully moved at the
news of the success of the cause of Algeria, forgets not to whom
it owes its triumph, and hastens to offer you the testimony of
its gratitude. It takes pride in enumerating you amongst
the firmest supporters of a colony, the importance of which
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 415
to France and to humanity you have so completely re-
cognised.
Deign, Sir, to accept the assurance of our highest con-
sideration. The President of the Colonial Society,
FiLHON.
EosEY, First Vice-President.
SoLVET, Vice-President.
416
No. YII.
(Page 141.)
Account of the Abbey of Val-Richer.
(Taken from the History of the Diocese of Bayeux, by M. Hermant,
parisli priest of Saint PieiTe de M.albot : a -work commenced in 1705, and
ended in 1726. It fonns three vohimes in folio, the first of which only
has been printed ; the second and third, in mannscript, are in the library
of Caen.)
" The church of Val-Eicher can boast that, under the rule
of Abbot Eobert, the first of that name, Thomas-a-Becket,
Archbishop of Canterbury and Chancellor of England (who
received the crown of martyrdom in 1170), when flying from
the anger of his Prince, sought refuge there for a con-
siderable time, wearing the habit of the Cistercians, which he
had received from the hands of the sovereign pontiff; oc-
cupying himself, like the other monks, in prayer, in manual
labour, in vigils, and in all the painful exercises of peniten-
tial and monastic life. They even preserved there the sacred
ornaments he was accustomed to use in the holy sacrifice of
the mass, as precious relics ; but they were despoiled by the
barbarities which the Calvinists exercised in 1562 on all that
was worthy of respect and veneration. The spot is still shown
in a small wood adjoining the abbey, where he often retired
to occupy himself in the contemplation of heavenly matters."
417
No. VIIL
(Page 148.)
1. The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Count de
Rayneval at Madrid.
Count,' Paris, December 12th, 1835.
I see by your despatch of the 4th of December, No. 96,
that M. de Mendizabal was on the eve of concludinor with Mr.
Yilliers a treaty of commerce, and that the greater part of
the articles were already drawn up. On this occasion you
ask me to acquaint you immediately with the intentions of
the King's government. I shall without delay forward to you
detailed instructions on the subject. But it appears to me
that in the mean time you can positively demand from M. de
Mendizabal (with reservation), the clause in our treaties with
Spain, which assures to us the treatment of the most favoured
nation. This clause is formal and peremptory, and gives us
the right of openly claiming for ourselves all the advantages
which may be awarded to England in the convention of
which you have apprised me. Accept, &c.
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Count de
Rayneval, at Madrid.
Count, Paris, Decemler l^th, 1835,
I have received the despatches you have done me the
honour to write, up to No. 98 inclusive.
The King's government gives the fullest approbation to
418 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
the measure you have adopted to prevent French interests
from being- injured by the arrangements in negotiation
between Spain and England. You have well understood that
to prevent such an untoward result, it would not suffice to
associate ourselves, after the treaties which secure to us the
privileges of the most favoured nation, with the stipulations
accorded to England ; that thus an apparent equality could,
in fact, be nothing more than the most absolute inequality ;
and that this hypothesis would become, for instance, a reality
in cases where a reduction of duties would bear on produce
belonging exclusively, or only partially, to British nianu-
facture. Such reductions ought evidently to be Jsalanced by
others, of which French merchandize would be the object in
turn. I am led to believe that such is the sense of the
promise contained in M. de Mendizabal's note, and my
answer conveys this to him. In fact, it would be an insult
to his loyalty to suppose that, under the appearance of a
declaration satisfactory to us, he has simply accorded a
guarantee absolutely deceptive, and so much the more su-
perfluous that, as I have just remarked, it is explicitly con-
tained in the treaties which give us a right to demand the
usage of the most favoured nation.
I am far, moreover, from thinking that this is an oppor-
tune moment for concluding the commercial negotiations
entered upon at Madrid. The simple fact of their existence
has already given, in France, an unfavourable confirmation
to the opinion, which, from the first moment, represented
M. de Mendizabal as inclined to rely on the support of
England, and to direct all his combinations with this ten-
dency. The only method of gradually doing away with these
impressions, would be to abandon altogether the negotia-
tions in question. It will be fruitless to say that when ter-
minated, their result will dissipate uneasiness, and tran-
quillize suspicions, by proving that they have been conducted
in a spirit equally favourable to all the allies of Spain.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 419
Whatever may be the result, whatever care may be taken to
establish in the modifications introduced into the tariff of
customs, an equal balance between English and French
interests, this equality will not be sufficiently evident to
prevent complaint on the part of those on either side, who,
right or wrong, would believe themselves injured. We may
be sure that our southern departments, which already submit
impatiently to the sacrifices imposed on their commerce by
the aid we lend to the cause of Queen Isabella, would
eagerly receive the reports spread by malevolence or pre-
judice as to the damage, perhaps imaginary, of which these
innovations would become, in their eyes, the source. The
animated disputes already excited in our journals of the
South by the imprudent as well as unjust recriminations
indulged in at IMadrid, against the pretended facilities ac-
corded to smuggling in favour of Don Carlos, would speedily
assume an additional character of violence. More than ever
the King's government would be accused, in that particular,
of sacrificing the commerce of France to that of England,
by attaching itself too scrupulously to the observance of the
clauses in the convention of the 22nd of April, and the
additional articles ; and perhaps would soon find itself in-
capable of resisting demands which would base themselves,
in part at least, on the wounded sentirhent of national
pride ; it might even be constrained, if not to abandon, at
least to modify, the line of conduct, which its sincere attach-
ment to the cause of the Queen has, up to this period, en-
abled it to follow in the midst of so many difficulties.
It is for M. Mendizabal to judge whether it is desir-
able to provoke such eventualities by measures which the
interest of Spain assuredly does not call for at this moment,
and which that of England may the more readily permit
to be postponed in the present state of the Peninsula, as
the scale of customs, whatever may be its proscriptions,
opposes no very formidable barriers to the movements
420 IIISTOrvIC DOCUMENTS.
of commerce. I beg you will draw the attention of the
minister to this point. Eepeat to him emphatically that
he would vainly flatter himself with the hope of obviating
the inconveniencies I have pointed out, by granting us
advantages equal to those conceded to England. Such an
equality not being capable of mathematical demonstration,
the blindness of passions and interests would ever be pre-
pared to deny it
421
No. IX.
(Page 179.)
Speech of M. Ouizot, Minister of Public Affairs, on the
reopening of the Lectures of the Noimial School.
Gentlemen, Paris, Oct 21st, 1836.
After the flattering Report which has just been read, I have
only to congratulate myself and you on the state of the
school.
In every department, both as regards discipline and study,
progress, gradually more marked during six years, is newly
confirmed and developed. I have no encouragement higher
than this to offer you. Such a well-merited result is a re-
compence for the noblest efforts. Your present life, gentle-
men, is extremely toilsome ; your labours are silent and
almost obscure ; but your future is full of greatness. Yes,
gentlemen, of greatness ; I use the word designedly. A
double career awaits you. On leaving this school you will
proceed to teach in our establishments of public instruction
what you learn here to-day ; and you will not only teach,
but you will do so in the name of the state, appointed by it,
and holding from that source your mission. This principle,
on which the existence even of the University is based, will
take root and extend itself more and more in our institutions
and our laws. It presides at present over the whole system
of elementary instruction. It is consecrated and explained
in the new propositions of which secondary education has
VOL. IV. F F
422 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
already been made the object. It will obtain, I feel confi-
dent, in our plan of superior teaching, the same place and
the same empire. It alone can establish truly national edu-
cation, real public instruction, while, at the same time, it
harmonizes wonderfully with the rights of liberty. You will
speak and act, gentlemen, in the name of this principle, and
your presence will infuse into it the authority, stability, and
dignity which emanate from public power, and expand over
all who speak and act as its representatives.
This is not all, gentlemen, neither does teaching include your
whole career. To you also, to a certain extent, the state confides
the disinterested culture of letters, science, philosophy, history,
of all branches of intellectual activity. You are not alone
charged to distribute, through instruction, the riches already
acquired by the human mind : you are called to increase them.
Those great literary and scientific works, that continued
search after truih, which formerly occupied so many learned
societies, so many illustrious corporations, to-day especially
belong to you; — you are appointed to gather in this noble
inheritance. In the midst of the perpetually increasing
empire of special destinations and professions which charac-
terizes our modern society, your particular avocation is intellec-
tual life, the pure love and free culture of truth and knowledge.
Their future conquests belong to your domain, as well as
the direction of those which they possess already. There are,
I know not how many unknown glories awaiting you, and
these, I feel assured, you will take possession of, for France
and for yourselves.
Have no doubt on the question, gentlemen. This double
object of your existence, this double career opened before
you, will extend from day to day your own importance and
that of the school. The actual modesty of your lives and
labours will not extinguish their importance. Eemain
modest, and, nevertheless, confident in your destiny. Enter-
tain wise pretensions and elevated thoughts ; you have a right
HISTOEIC DOCUIVIENTS, 423
to do so. I cannot take upon myself to guarantee the ac-
complishment of the legitimate desires of your honourable
principal for the distinct, definitive, and adequate establish-
of this great seminary ; but I shall devote myself to it with my
utmost power ; and be assured that sooner or later you will
obtain it. The Normal School will take too strong a hold in
France, for France to abstain from giving it on our soil and
in our streets the position it requires.
FF 2
424
No. X.
(Page 196.)
General Count cle Damremont to M. Guizot.
, ,^. . dlarseilles, Dec. 10th, 18SG.
Sir and jMinister,
1 have forwarded an account to the government of the
mission I undertook by its order, to Marshal Clauzel ; but
the particular interest you evinced in that mission, which
you were kind enough to impart to me at the moment of my
taking leave, and which you also entertain for the fate of our
possessions in Africa, make it my duty to communicate to
you directly the results of my voyage to Algeria. I am,
moreover, encouraged by the kindness with which you have
always received my remarks on the questions connected with
this important subject.
You have, without doubt, been made acquainted with my
reports to the minister of War. I have drawn up, as far as
depended on myself and my position allowed, an exact
description of the state of affairs ; and as that state is partly
to be ascribed to the system hitherto adopted, and partly to
the men who exercise it, I have found it necessary to speak
ec|ually of persons and things. This duty has been frequently
a painful one, for there were sad revelations to be made.
Moreover, I have said little that was not known before.
Public notoriety had quite recognised these imputations,
more or less precise in character ; and in the greater number
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS- 425
of cases I have only added a more direct and authentic testi-
mony to those already supplied.
You will appreciate the motives which, even with you, and
in this entirely confidential communication, restrain me
from pressing on details of a certain order, to occupy myself
exclusively with the system adopted in Africa, and with that
which it would be desirable to substitute in this place.
I have already had the honour to lay before you my ideas
on this point, and the satisfaction of finding that they met
your approbation and were entirely in conformity with your
own personal views. All that I have seen and heard in
Africa, all that I have been able to collect, has served only
to confirm and render more profound my conviction that the
only system capable of producing fruits is that of a restrained,
progressive occupation, pacific in its spirit, such as you have
so well conceived and repeatedly proclaimed in the Chambers.
To establish ourselves first at Algiers, and on the most im-
portant points of the coast or territory ; to select those points
sparingly, following the nature and configuration of the
ground they command, and the facilities of defending and
cultivating them, such as Algiers and Bona ; or being guided
by their topographical position, if favourable to relations with
the interior of the country, and to the influences desirable to
create and exercise them, as at Oran ; to settle in these
localities firmly, powerfully, and permanently, and to convert
each into an essential French territory.
To open to colonization all that can be protected, but
effectually and continually protected ; to attract capital and
industry by the most infallible of all encouragements, the
most powerful of guarantees, — material security; to create
populations of European race, connected with us by blood
and community of interest ; to make these populations centres
of power, and by and by of wealth, on which we may found
and at all times rest our action over the remainder of the
country.
FF 3
426 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Through these, to form amicable relations with the indi-
genous inhabitants, purchase their commodities, and stimulate
them to exertion by opening a market to their produce ; to
incline them to labour by the allurement of profit to which
they are extremely sensible ; to attach them to the soil by
proprietorship and material interests ; to see them, under the
spur of these interests, mingle with us, improve their cultiva-
tion, their habits, and their industry, in imitation of ours ; to
impregnate them gradually with our customs, manners, and
civilization ; and to lead them to submit themselves to us, as
much from their own wants as from a dread of our power.
To join thus agricultural colonization, where it can be esta-
blished under assured protection, to commercial colonization
in all quarters where the inhabitants are willing to barter their
goods for ours ; to reconcile the conquered with the conquering
population, by giving them the means of living side by side in
the interchange of mutual services : — such is a summary of
this system which, in my opinion, is founded on a correct esti-
mate of things as they exist, and which, to ensure success,
requires application, consistency, and steady perseverance.
Thus conceived, the occupation may be accomplished with
the means which the Chambers seem resolved to devote to
that object. As economy is a primary advantage, it is also
one wliicn escapes the discussions invariably attendant on a
demand for fresh sacrifices, and which incessantly hold the
fate of the colony in a precarious condition.
We shall only occupy what we can keep and defend. But
by proportioning the occupation to the forces we may have at
disposal, and by concentrating those forces on the small num-
ber of fixed points, on those points we shall be masters. On
all the others we shall act and influence by information,
exercised with care, in turning to advantage the numerous
divisions amongst the indigenous septs, and the frequent
rivalries between the chiefs ; by means of temptation judi-
ciously employed ; and, if necessary, by force of arms.
HISTORIC DOCmiENTS. 427
confined, of course, to the most serious cases, when
the question may be to chastise a hostile or to protect a
friendly tribe. But by no longer carrying on a war of con-
quest, the occasions for an appeal to force will be rare, and
when we hold the natives by the bonds of their material inte-
rests, we shall retain a powerful means of action ; and a simple
threat to break off mutual relations and close our markets
would keep them in a state of wholesome apprehension.
Meanwhile, our establishment in Africa will take root in
the soil ; it will assume a fixed character, and will produce
within an approximate time substantial results, the reward
and absolution for sacrifices already made, and an encourage-
ment for others to be risked in future.
To appreciate more clearly these ideas, we must look at the
effects of different notions in the mode of their application to
the colony of Algeria.
Military expeditions have been multiplied, and many towns
taken ; the greater portion of which were speedily abandoned,
and as speedily the enemy, who had been driven out, resumed
possession of them. We occupied Bougia, we left there a
numerous garrison, we constructed magnificent military works
at an enormous expense. What do they protect ? what do
they defend ? We placed a force at Tlemcen ; it is blocked
up in the Casbah. Of what use is it ? But this garrison, five
hundred in number, requires every six months an expedition
to revictual it. At this moment a new expedition of five
thousand men is about to leave Oran with all the chances of
war, and in an execrable season, to carry supplies to the five
hundred at Tlemcen.
But these different expeditions, which have cost so many
men destroyed by the enemy or by the diseases of the climate,
and the enormous expenditure of materiel in enterprises
which have left no result even when successful, have they, at
least, produced a salutary influence on the minds of the
natives ? Have they increased security in the places origi-
FF 4
428 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
ginally occupied ? On the contrary, the natives attack us
with undiminished audacity and inveteracy at Oran, at
Bona, and at Algiers itself. The radius sheltered from their
attacks becomes daily more restricted. Two years ago we
could travel without danger to a distance of twelve leagues
from Algiers and fifteen from Bona. At present it is diffi-
cult to go beyond the walls with impunity, and our perpetual
incursions, while they irritate the Arabs, remove from them
all idea of peace and friendly understanding, and keep them
in a constant spirit of hostility and warfare.
To-day we march on Constantine ; but Constantine taken,
what will be done next ? A French garrison might be left
there, but to support that garrison the same course will be
adopted as at Tlemcen ; a strong corps must be established at
Bona, which every six months will have to place itself in
movement to revictual the garrison of Constantine.
To k^ep up such a system, fifty thousand men, at least,
would be required; but having only limited resources, and
wishing to occupy too many points at a time, we are com-
pelled to send in one direction the troops required for another,
and thus to endanger the disarmed post. The natives then
resume their courage and return ; the colonists, if any have
establishments there, become alarmed, and fall into helpless
despondency. In no quarter is there stability or safety, and
day by day all has to be commenced anew.
To go to Constantine, Algiers was stripped, and the Arabs
immediately appeared upon the walls. If they knew how to
combine, and were well commanded, this imprudence might
have led to a lamentable result. Algiers has thus been compro-
mised. "NMiat will the taking of Constantine produce as an
equivalent for so great a risk, and what has been gained by
the capture of Bougia, Tlemcen, Mascara, and Medeah ? A
heavy loss of men and money, perpetual occasions for expen-
diture, but nothing for the progress of our settlement in Africa.
These opinions are those of all in Algeria who have any
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 429
knowledge of the correct state of things, and have carried
into that country thoughts of the future, or interests uncon-
nected with intrigue.
The last expedition has been looked upon with much pain.
Deep regret is expressed at this perseverance in a system, the
disastrous effects of which the residents are in a better posi-
tion of estimating than any one else.
I cannot refrain from my own observations on the subject.
This expedition will add one more to the difficulties of a
return to the only direction which I consider reasonable and
sound. The occupation of Tlemcen, Bougia, and so many
other points is incompatible with that course, and are diffi-
culties in substantial existence. To abandon these posts
would be dangerous : on the one hand, as regards the natives,
who, seeing in that retreat an evidence of our weakness and
uncertainty, would redouble their boldness ; on the other, as
regards public opinion in France, which is often highly sus-
ceptible, but with little intelligence.
If we do not take care, every day will add to difficulties
of this character.
The actual state of things in Algeria presents this singular
anomaly. The government conceived the occupation under
a special point of view. The person who represents the
government at Algiers, and who is delegated to carry out its
idea, has himself regarded the occupation in an entirely
different aspect, so that the execution is a secret but perpetual
struggle with the superior thought which is supposed to direct.
But as the agent in Africa has the advantage of position, and
it is through his reports that the government receives its in-
formation, he naturally presents it in a sense favourable to his
personal connections, and the government finds itself reduced,
wdthout its own knowledge, to act contrary to its own inten-
tions. If it resists, public opinion is brought into the ques-
tion. Now, you, sii-, are well aware how readily public
opinion allows itself to be prejudiced, and becomes a panic
430 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
to wliicb concessions are often yielded and afterwards re-
gretted.
This is precisely the case with the expedition to Constan-
tine. It has been loudly proclaimed;, it has been sedulously
repeated that it was necessary, and thus it has been allowed
to take its course. But from this necessity others will spring
up, and from concession to concession the government may
find itself led on to such a point as to be unable to retrace
its steps, and will be reduced to choose between these two
alternatives, — to embark completely in a system which is not
its own, is disastrous, and demanding incalculable sacrifices,
and to consent to those sacrifices — or to abandon the colony
altogether.
I have told the government my opinion on the expedition
to Constantine, as much on the very equivocal necessity and
utility of the enterprise, as on the danger of undertaking it
at such a period. I have even expressed serious apprehen-
sions as to its result, while deploring the departure of the
Duke of Nemours. Unhappily, the reports spread within the
last few days, and the echo of which must have reached
Paris while I am writing, have already given a confirmation
to my words far exceeding what I anticipated, but which I
trust will not be verified.
These reports, the prolonged absence of news from the
expeditionary force, the anxiety thereby produced, the de-
monstrations recently made by the Arabs under the walls of
Algiers, and the consequent alarm, — all these circumstances
have revived the interest attached to the African question.
The session of the Chambers being about to open under the
influence of so many painful prepossessions, it is probable
that this feeling may re-exhibit itself in the debate on the
address.
The African question principally affects you as a personal
consideration. As you said to me, it is your individual affair.
It will therefore be upon you that the weight will fall of
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 431
replying to the questions of which it cannot fail to be the
subject, and of calming the uncertainties which recent events
have cast upon the destiny of our possessions.
You will have once more to declare the formal and irrevo-
cable intentions of the government, for such is the fatality
attached to this question, despite the assurances given every
year, that each annual debate renews the necessity of their
repetition. The declarations of Marshal Soult did not exempt
M. Thiers, and those of M. Thiers will not enfranchise you.
It seems, in defiance of so many restricted announcements,
and of time itself, that this matter is to remain ever in
dispute.
It is not that the country doubts the sincerity of the words
addressed to it, or the intentions of the government. But
seeing that nothing yet corroborates these words and inten-
tions ; that the despatch of troops and expeditions increases ;
that expenses accumulate without positive progress; and
that, on the contrary, things seem to recede rather than to
advance; not perceiving anything indicative of establish-
ment in future, it demands a guarantee for these solemn
declarations which it fails to discover in facts, and which,
without the support of facts, will ever prove insufficient.
On the present occasion, the declaration of the government
passing through your lips will derive new strength from the
authority of your character. But to balance the baneful
effect of what has recently happened in Africa, to do away
with prepossessions, which, to speak wdthout reserve, have
been perfidiously entertained and encouraged, it is indispen-
sable that this declaration should be as explicit in its terms as
absolute in its sense. You will, therefore, sir and minister,
be called upon to repeat openly that Africa is a part of
France, and that the government is resolved to make all the
necessary sacrifices to secure to the country the benefits
which ought to accrue from that possession.
This declaration being made, perhaps it would be prudent
432 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
not to enter into the details of the restrictive system Avhich
the govermnent might think it suitable to apply to Africa.
The public in general have a confused idea of restrictions ;
they more readily grasp absolute ideas because they are more
simple. If you speak of restriction, it will give rise to a reserved
apprehension of abandonment ; people will misinterpret the
meaning of your words, as they did once before, when you
spoke with so much justice, truth, and enlightenment on
the Algerian question.
The system of occupation is more an executive fact, on
which the Chamber is less inclined to interfere. The appro-
bation it bestowed two years since on the principles laid
before it on this point, did not prevent its acquittal of
Marshal Clauzel for having deviated from these principles.
This, therefore, is a matter to be reserved for the reports
between the minister and the officer appointed to carry out
his instructions, — the Chambers care only for the expenditure
and the definitive result.
But considering the delicate position in which the African
question is placed at this moment, it is important to say
nothing which might be laid hold of to augment the -sus-
picions to which the public mind is now inclined, and to
discredit beforehand the measures which the government
may adopt to lead the affairs of the colony to a better
direction.
You will, I hope, Sir, excuse the freedom ^vith which I
address you on subjects respecting which you can have no
better inspiration than your own judgment. But having
recently returned from Algiers, and still retaining the im-
pression of all I saw there, residing in a city closely con-
nected with Africa by the multiplied ties of its interests and
hopes, and where everything that passes on the opposite
side of the Mediterranean is so directly echoed, I have
thought that the information collected in this double position
might have some value in your eyes. If I have deceived
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 433
myself, you will pardon me for an excess of interest in a
subject to which I am strongly attached by the mission
with which I have lately been charged, and the manner in
which that trust was confided to me.
I beg, above all things, that you will find in my pro-
ceeding a token of high deference, and of the respect with
which I have the honour to remain.
Sir and Minister,
Your very humble and most obedient Servant,
The Lieutenant-General, Peer of France,
(Signed) Comte Damremont.
434
No. XL
(Page 218.)
Flan and Notes prepared for the Debate on the Bill fov the
Disjunction of Prosecutions in cases of crimes imputed to
civil and militai^ offenders, — 1837.
Gentlemen,
A day will come when the causes which now divide us
will have disappeared, when the passions which agitate us
will be extinct, and what we now see and do will have
passed into history.
People will then read that on emerging from a great
revolution, after I know not how many riots, conspiracies,
and insurrections, the government of France, her King, and
her institutions, were attacked, in open day, in a fortified
city, by soldiers who imprisoned their general, marched
comrade against comrade, regiment against regiment, and
that this military revolt was brought to judgment, and
absolutely acquitted.
It will be read that this was neither an isolated fact
nor a solitary instance of the weakness or insufficiency of
the laws in similar or in analogous circumstances.
It will be read, that in presence of such facts, in the
midst of such a position, the government demanded of the
Chambers — what? exceptional laws, more rigorous penal-
ties, extraordinary powers ? — no ; but simply the surren-
der of military traitors and rebels to military tribunals.
At the same time will be read an account of all the
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 435
indignation, invectives, extravagant accusations, and sin-
ister predictions of which, on this occasion, and through
this Bill, the government became the object.
Grentlemen, I do not hesitate to affirm that all this will
neither be comprehended, explained, nor believed.
What is there, in fact, in the bill, which can, I will not say-
justify, but even account for these recriminations and this
passion?
Nothing, gentlemen, absolutely nothing; nothing at least
in the eyes of resolute spirits unclouded by prejudice.
Nothing contrary to essential rights, to reason, and to
immutable justice.
I believe in a right anterior and superior to written rights,
which precedes, but does not proceed from them. I vash this
right to be respected on all occasions.
It is perfectly respected by the bill which consigns military
offenders, in all cases when the military element predominates
in the act, to military tribunals.
This jurisdiction is founded on reason. There is a special
peculiarity in the position of the soldier.
In his offence there are two constitutive elements of crime :
first, the moral wrong ; and secondly, the social danger ; both
are quite distinct from the crimes committed by civilians.
The necessity of judges capable of fully appreciating these
distinctions: 1. The moral wrong; 2. The social danger.
That is to say, capable of rendering justice to the accused
party and to society.
Hence the essential and rational legitimacy of military
jurisdiction in military cases : it is thus natural and right.
It contains nothing contrary to constitutional right. I
have a profound respect for the Charter. It contains nothing
in opposition to this bill.
1. It plainly supports military jurisdiction, not as an ex-
ceptional procedure, but as ordinary justice in certain crimes
committed by certain individuals. Nothing is exceptional
436 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
but what is transitory, which does not rest on a permanent
and ever reasonable motive.
The military tribunals belong to ordinary justice^ as do the
tribunals of commerce and police.
2. But the Charter, it is said, assigns political crimes to the
trial by jury.
What ! To all criminals whatever, even when they are im-
plicated in other offences ?
Evidently not.
The exceptions are numerous with regard to persons.
1. Ministers; 2. Peers; 3. The jurisdiction of the Chambers
and tribunals in certain cases of offence ; 4. Certain attempts
against the safety of the state.
All this is written in the Charter. But there is also here
another consideration. Political offences committed by soldiers
are always, or nearly always, mixed up with military crimes.
Not only does the offence receive, from the quality of the
offender, a totally different character, but it becomes complex,
mixed ; there are, in fact, two different crimes.
But supposing that these two crimes fall under different
jurisdictions, which is to absorb or annul the other? Must
one remain unpunished ? or must it be punished by a juris-
diction to which it does not belong ?
Comparative table of political and military offences, ac-
cording to the two codes.
Evidently the Charter prescribes nothing as regards these
mixed crimes, and it is perfectly according to law to remit
them to military judges.
A thousand notions of public interest suggest the course.
3. The disjunction, that is to say, the removal of persons
distinctly accused to their respective natural judges, is, on the
other hand, a true and constitutional solution of the difficulty.
Until now, one jurisdiction has been absolutely sacrificed
to the other; alternately the military to the civil, and the
civil to the militarv.
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. - 437
In fact, the alternate struggle and triumph of two absolute
principles has been for a long time the condition of France.
This presents a special feature: the invariable result has
been anarchy or despotism.
There is neither true nor durable order, true nor durable
liberty, except under the condition of accepting natural dis-
tinctions and their consequences. We cannot long or with
impunity outrage facts and social necessities. Uniformity,
that idea which, by a false air of greatness, seduces so many
little minds, as Montesquieu says, has done much mischief in
legislation, as in other matters, and has led to much disorder
and oppression.
We ought to emerge from it whenever natural distinctions
command. This is the true constitutional principle.
I hold the religion of the jury, not its superstition : no
idols.
Nothing, then, either in natural or constitutional law
rejects the bill.
4. A single principle is opposed to it : the indivisibility of
prosecution, the connection of crimes.
The principle exists neither in natural nor in constitutional
law. It is affirmed to be in the very necessity of things. I
deny this.
Historical argument. This, it is said, is the constant,
eternal principle of our legislation. An error. Variety
of competency in courts, and, consequently, disjunction of
causes, according to the quality and position of persons, is,
on the contrary, the old European law.
1. Legislation and competency were at first exclusively
personal and not actual. A law anterior to feudal law.
2. Under the feudal law, competency was founded on the
quality of persons, — nobles, citizens, ecclesiastics, — each were
remitted to their appropriate judges.
The connection of crimes and the indivisibility of prosecu-
tions have been the means of which royalty, and the judicial
VOL. IV. G G
438 ' HISTORIC documents.
power emanating from that source, have very skilfully and
happily availed themselves to struggle against all those varied
jurisdictions proceeding from as many different pretensions
to sovereignty, to abolish these last, and to establish amongst
us that unity of nation, monarchy, power, and law, which
has so much contributed to the strength and beauty of our
civilization.
I never deny to my adversaries their share of truth. I
reserve my own, and call upon the Chamber to weigh them
together.
Indivisibility of prosecution has been thus introduced into
our law and practice. This is its origin and the cause of
its empire. It is not with us an eternally historical prin-
ciple.
2. Philosopliic argument. Not to enter too far into the
question ; a few fundamental observations.
When a crime is committed by several persons, two facts
are essential :
1. The unity of the crime.
2. The diversity of the actors.
When I say the unity of the crime, the expression is too
vague. There are in the crime as many facts, that is to say,
as many crimes as there are authors or accomplices.
And these facts and crimes are as distinct as the criminals.
But I admit the unity of the crime.
Legislation and criminal prosecution may take for their
point of departure, for their dominant idea and guiding rule,
one of these two facts ; — either the unity of the crime or
the diversity of its authors.
Hence arise two different systems :
1 . General and simultaneous prosecution.
2. Individual and successive prosecution.
And not only have these two systems been adopted, but
they are still adopted and followed in practice. General and
simultaneous prosecutions in France, individual and successive
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 439
prosecutions in England, at the selection of the accused, and
usually adopted by them.*
And the choice between the two systems depends, above
all, upon the idea formed of the situation of the accused, and
of the method it suggests of discovering the truth.
In France it is especially from interrogating and confront-
ing the accused that the discovery of the truth is expected.
The accused are held as liars who must be brought to con-
fession, and compelled to see the truth exhibited before them
and through themselves.
Hence the necessity of general and simultaneous prosecu-
tion.
In England they do not look for the discovery of the truth
to what can be extracted from the accused, to their avowals
or contradictions. They are held as liars from whom no
truth can be expected. The witnesses alone are relied on.
Hence the faculty and natural adoption of individual and
successive prosecution.
The first plan possesses the advantage of placing crime in
a more complete and evident light. It is more systematic
and dramatic.
The second plan has the advantage of confining the accused
within a narrower circle; of examining his case more spe-
cially; and of obtaining a more exact estimate of his share
in the crime and of the consequent penalty.
I do not compare the two systems. I bring them to-
gether to discover their essential features. I show that both
may flow from the nature of things ; that both are practicable
and practised ; — with different consequences in the ad-
ministration of justice, but which neither threaten nor change
in the slightest degree justice itself.
I do not propose to abandon generally the system which
* TransIato7-^s Note. — A remarkable exception cccuii'ed in the case of
Lord Cocliraue, who chose to be included in the general indictment, and
in some measure owed his conviction to that mistake.
G G 2
440 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
has hitherto prevailed with us ; despite its serious objections
it has great advantages. I conclude only from all this, and
I conclude with strong conviction, that if powerful motives,
and motives of public interest recommend the proceeding,
we may, in certain cases, depart from this system and re-
nounce indivisibility of prosecution without offending either
reason, justice, the Charter, or practical possibility.
Do these motives at present exist with us ? Does the actual
state of society and of facts recommend and require the bill ?
— Reply to M. Teste and to the taunt of alleging the neces-
sity. •
I. Necessity of strengthening military jurisdiction.
Why is the bill introduced on the occurrence of a fact ? I
have already answered this taunt on the occasion of the bills
of September. A fact manifests a pre-existing social neces-
sity ; the public is impressed by it ; the government then acts.
Thus we proceed in free countries. This is a homage to the
necessity of convictions and to the Kberty of intelligence.
Progressive enfeeblement of military jurisdiction:
1. State of siege in 1832. Not to discuss the merit of
that ordinance. Proposed law. Not enacted. Blank re-
maining to the detriment of military jurisdiction.
2. Change of jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal on the
subject of decoying and kidnapping.
3. Verdict of Strasburg.
Greneral consternation of the military chiefs. Loss of dis-
cipline ; and, in effect :
1. The political offences of soldiers are essentially mixed
up with the most serious military delinquencies, which are
thus transferred to the trial by jury. The connection of per-
sons carries soldiers before the jury. The connection of facts
equally delivers them to military jurisdiction.
2. Simple military offences not mixed with political crimes
will be handed over to the jury by the sole fact of civil
complicity.
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 441
An evident weakening, almost a complete abolition of mili-
tary jurisdiction, which is not alone compromised. Eemind
the Chamber of its own impressions on the news of the
verdict. Necessity of long reminiscences, of profound impres-
sions. This is true wisdom. Danger of improvidence and
oblivion.
Necessity of restoring the military spirit
There has been a talk of suspicion against the army.
A strange proof of suspicion to call upon it to judge itself.
In the army, as in all other departments, the government
mistrusts the bad and confides in the good. This is its
duty.
There, as elsewhere, it recognizes the well-disposed in a
great majority.
But we must go farther and obtain a more complete
account of the position of the army in society as it now
exists.
1. The army is national, taken impartially and blindly
from the bosom of the nation. The ideas, therefore, and
differences of opinion which exist in the nation will be found
again in the army. There will be republicans, legitimists,
and an immense majority of the moderate party.
The military spirit will diminish, melt, and absorb many
of these different shades. But they will still exist. We
may believe this, and endeavour to regulate them.
We ought neither to be astonished nor uneasy at this fact,
neither should we deny nor treat it lightly.
2. The army is idle, — we are at peace; we shall remain
long at peace. Inaction furnishes to external attempts more
power over the army, and more room for the non-military
activity of its internal dispositions.
3. The army lives in the same atmosphere with the citi-
zens, — surrounded by the publicity and liberty of the press ;
— there is no more of the isolation, of the special and clois-
tered life of the armies of earlier days. — Everything now
gg3
442 HISTORIC documents.
reaches the army, — everything acts upon it. — It lives under
the same influences with society in general.
From all these new facts springs the enfeeblement of the
military spirit, of that special and powerful spirit which
stamps on the army ideas, sentiments and habits peculiar
to itself.
I do not absolutely lament this change. It has its good
and evil ; it suppresses old dangers, but it creates new ones.
The absolute necessity of the military spirit :
1. For the power of the army abroad and in case of need.
It is not number nor even ardour which constitutes the
sole strength of the army. Its first power lies in the
peculiar spirit, the energetic tastes, and deeply-rooted habits
of the military vocation.
2. For the power and discipline of the army at home :
The military spirit is the first element of obedience
and discipline in the army ; even as penal enactments
would prove insufficient without public morality, to maintain
order in society, so the police courts and prisons would be
unable, without the military spirit, to preserve discipline in
the army.
3. The military spirit has an extremely beautiful moral
code, necessary for its particular application, and the more
so that the virtues it develops are less regarded in general
society. These virtues are especially :
Eespect to the regulated system.
Fidelity to the oath. The importance of these virtues in
the existing state of society. Shall we allow them to become
effete in the army ? — Shall we allow that military spirit, so
noble and excellent in itself, so useful and essential on many
accounts, to deteriorate ? No, no.
Such, however, would be the inevitable effect of an en-
feeblement of the military jurisdiction. The ties which unite
inferiors to superiors in the army would become weakened
thereby in full proportion, and we should thus add to all the
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 443
injurious influences which already tend to enervate the mili-
tary spirit, and to take from it its moral and practical supre-
macy.
Thus the proposed bill is :
1. Conformable to reason and natural justice.
2. Conformable to the Charter, and to constitutional rights.
3. Practicable.
4. Necessary to re-establish and strengthen, 1. Military
jurisdiction; 2. Military spirit. Will it accomplish these
benefits ?
Not alone, but it will co-operate in obtaining them. Good
laws do not absolve governments from good conduct; but
good conduct requires good laws.
We have already passed several. They have not done
everything. They have done much. There is still evil,
much evil, in our society. But an infinitely greater pro-
portion of good, enough to conquer the evil. But the
struggle will be long.
Nothing ends rapidly in free countries. The prolongation
of strife is a demonstration of liberty. We would not, even if
we could, stifle liberty. But we shall never cease to combat
with its aberrations. I respect and love liberty. I do not
fear it. We cannot promise repose to honest men and
good citizens, — we can only promise them victory. — Mode-
rate laws and measures applied by^ energetic legislators
are what our state of society requires at present; these
are what we endeavour to bestow on it. *
G G 4
444
No. XII.
(Page 286.)
Draft of an Address to the King, presented to the Chamber
by the Committee*
Sire, Session of Jmmary ^th, 1839.
The Chamber of Deputies reciprocates your Majesty's
satisfaction at the prosperity of the country. This prosperity
will develop itself, more and more, in the bosom of the peace
we have maintained, and the duration of which a prudent
and firm policy can alone secure to us.
Under a government jealous of our dignity, and the
faithful guardian of our alliances, France will always main-
tain in the world, and in the esteem of other nations, the
rank which belongs to her, and from which she desires not
to fall.
Your Majesty hopes that the resumed conferences in
London will furnish new pledges for the repose of Europe
and the independence of Belgium. We offer up sincere
wishes for a people closely allied to us by conformity of
principles and interests. The Chamber awaits the issue of
the negotiations.
You announce to us, Sire, that in virtue of engagements
• This committee consisted of MM. Passy (ITyppolitc), Debellcyme,
Giiizot, De Jussieu, Etienne, Thiers, Mathicu do la Iledorte, Dc la
Pmsonuiero, and Uuvergier de Ilaurauuc.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 445
entered into with the Holy See our troops have left Ancona.
We have given signal testimonies of our respect for treaties,
but we reo-ret that this evacuation was not effected under
more opportune circumstances, and with the guarantees
which a wise and provident policy ought to require.
A misunderstanding has arisen between your government
and that of Switzerland. We hope it may not alter the re-
lations of old friendship which united the two countries, and
which were even more closely drawn together by the political
events of 1830.
With profound sorrow we see Spain exhaust herself in the
horrors of civil war. We ardently desire that your Majesty's
government, while continuing to lend the cause of Queen
Isabella II. the support which consists with the interests of
France, may, in concert with her allies, exert its utmost in-
fluence to terminate these deplorable excesses.
The Chamber, deeply affected by the misfortunes of Poland,
renews its constant hopes in favour of a people, whose an-
cient nationality is placed under the protection of treaties.
The insults and spoliation to which our countrymen have
been subjected in Mexico, called for signal satisfaction.
Your government felt the necessity of demanding it, and the
brilliant exploit of St. John d'Ulloa, while covering our
army with fresh glory, has given France a just subject for
exultation. She has seen. Sire, one of your sons sharing the
dangers and successes of our intrepid mariners.
We accord heartily with your Majesty's satisfaction at the
state of our possessions in Africa. We have full confidence
that this condition will improve from day to day, through the
discipline of the army, the regularity of the administration,
and the beneficent action of an enlightened faith.
Your Majesty announced in a preceding session that pro-
positions relative to the reimbursement of the public debt
would be laid before us as soon as the state of the finances
permitted. The condition of the national revenue becoming
446 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
continually more favom-able, affords us the right of expecting
that the co-operation of your government will not long be
wthheld from this important measure.
The wants of our colonies and our navigation will be
objects of our undivided solicitude. We shall study to
reconcile them ^^^th the interests of our agriculture, the
development of which is of the highest importance to the
prosperity of the country.
The Chamber will examine with equal care the bills des-
tined to realize the promises of the Charter, and to introduce
new improvements in general legislation, as well as in par-
ticular branches of public government. Our desires also call
for the bill relative to the organization of the general staff
of the army.
Sire, all France has hailed with acclamation the birth of
the Count of Paris. We encircle with our homage the cradle
of this young prince, granted to your love and to the most
cherished wishes of the country. Educated, like his father,
in respect for our institutions, he will learn the glorious
origin of the dynasty of which you are the head, and will
never forget that the throne he is destined one day to occupy
is founded on the controlling power of the national will. We
associate ourselves. Sire, in common with all Frenchmen, in
the domestic and religious sentiments with which this auspi-
cious event must inspire you as a father and a king.
Why, Sire, at the moment when we are returning thanks,
are we called upon to deplore with you the loss of a beloved
daughter, the model of every virtue ! May the expression
of the unanimous feeling of the Chamber afford some conso-
lation to the sorrows of your august family I
We feel convinced. Sire, that the intimate union of authori-
ties restrained within their constitutional limits can alone
establish the security of the country and the strength of your
government. A firm and skilful administration, based upon
generous sentiments, causing the dignity of your throne to
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 447
be respected abroad, and covering it with its responsibility at
home, is the surest pledge of the co-operation we are so
desirous to offer. Trust us, Sire, in virtue of our institutions ;
they will secure, rely upon it, your rights and ours ; for we
hold it for certain that constitutional monarchy guarantees at
once the liberty of the people, and the stability which forms
the greatness of states.
448
No. XIII.
(Pago 292.)
1. M. Giiizot to his Constituents.
Gentlemen, Paris, Feb. Gth, 1839.
The Chamber of Deputies is dissolved. It is dissolved by
a cabinet which, eight days before, after a formal debate, had
dissolved itself in its presence, not being able to obtain there,
by its own avowal, a sufficient majority for its support.
This is the second Chamber with which, within the space
of sixteen months, this cabinet has been unable to exist, and
feels compelled to dissolve.
Wherefore ?
Have these Chambers, in the internal constitution of the
state, adopted any of those great innovations, those impor-
tant concessions to which the crown objects, and with reason,
until the necessity of their adoption has been long felt and
clearly proved ?
Or have they di-iven the government, in its relations with
other states, to any of those doubtful and dangerous enterprises
which the wisdom of the crown ought to discourage ?
In no sense whatever.
During no period of their existence have the two dissolved
Chambers pressed on the crown any debilitating concession
or compromising enterprise. Not for a single day have they
shoAvu themselves possessed with the spirit of innovation or
of war.
Quite the contrary.
HISTORIC DOCUaiENTS. 449
In the interior, they have both assented to nearly all the
demands of the cabinet, without demanding anything them-
selves.
Their only expressed desire, the desire for the reimburse-
ment of the funds, assuredly comprised nothing dangerous to
our institutions, nothing hostile to power.
Externally, these Chambers sanctioned and sustained, in
the most thorny questions, the policy adopted in 1830.
And in this session, scarcely opened, even in the draft of
the address so vehemently attacked, the Chamber about to
expire held precisely the same conduct.
Internally it has urged no new demand.
Externally : —
As regards Belgium, it has scrupulously abstained from
indicating a design or uttering a word which might shackle
the government and compromise it with Europe.
As to Spain, it has maintained the expression of the reserved
and pacific sentiment maintained in its first session.
Facts proclaim this loudly ; and it must be recalled to those
who forget facts. The Chamber of 1837 was in 1839, as at
its commencement, like the preceding Chamber, a stranger to
all internal encroachment or foreign enterprise, favourable to
the system of conservatism and peace.
Yet, nevertheless, these two Chambers have been dissolved,
dissolved before their term. Neither with the one nor the
other, not more with the Chamber convoked by itself than
with that which it found, could the cabinet exist.
Once more, what has led to this strange and important
fact?
Here is one, and the principal cause. The cabinet was
unknown to the Chamber of Deputies : it had with the Cham-
ber no reciprocal interest, no intimate and natural authority.
Hence arose two consequences. The policy of the cabinet
at home and abroad was weak and unnational. Even while
still existing, the cabinet itself became more and more feeble.
450 niSTORIC DOCUMENTS.
and less national, incapable of maintaining with strength or
credit its own policy.
Here is the fact in its truth ; here is the evil in its full
extent.
This fact, this evil, the cabinet itself has recognized, re-
vealed, and palpably demonstrated by these two precipitate
dissolutions of two Chambers, so moderate, and exacting so
little.
The parliamentary impotence of the cabinet has, twice
within two years, condemned the parliament to death.
Perhaps, if we had no Charter, no chamber, no tribune, no
liberty of the press, — under such circumstances, possibly, the
cabinet of the 15th of April might have sufficed to govern.
It wants nothing of the dexterity and conformity, of the skill
in saving appearances and treating with persons, of the art
and qualifications which, under the old system, acquired and
retained power.
But, fifty years ago, in 1789, our fathers conceived a noble
desire, the desire of living in a free country ; that is to say,
of taking part themselves in the government of their country.
This participation in power is the only strong and real
guarantee of liberty.
This is the end which, through so many misfortunes and
efforts, France has had in view for fifty years. Napoleon,
with his immense genius, his immeasurable activity and
boundless glory, could only detach her from it for a moment.
France is in the right. All her interests and rights are
herein comprised, her entire safety and honour.
When the country powerfully influences the government,
and the government frankly accepts the influence of the
country, the powers become united and effective. Their
strength passes into and appears in their acts, theii- attitude,
their language ; everywhere, within and without, instead of
retiring, they advance; instead of postponing, they decide;
affairs move on ; questions are solved. The road may be
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 451
strewed with obstacles, the horizon may be charged with
clouds, but we see and feel a leader who marches onwards, a
sun which shines through the horizon.
In place of that, what is the spectacle we actually look
on ? Where, now, in the opinion of all men, are France and
her government ?
Within :
The crown is said to be weakened and menaced in its
prerogative ;
The Chamber of Deputies is pronounced to be weakened
and menaced in its prerogative;
A struggle, without parallel since 1830, is in action be-
tween the crown and the chamber ;
"WTiile the powers are in contest, the affairs of the country
are at a stand-still. The administration is nullified. All
questions are in suspense ; the sugars, the railroads, the funds,
the abolition of slavery, and public education. Material
interests are not better treated or comprehended than moral
interests.
Without :
I lay aside all generalization ; I speak only of specific,
evident facts, and I speak of them in the most moderate
terms ;
In Italy, in Switzerland, the influence of France has
deteriorated ;
In Belgium, in Spain, the position is aggravated.
Where we are not compromised, we have retired and
isolated ourselves. Where we are still present and in action,
we are more compromised than ever.
This is the situation which the cabinet of the 15th of
April has created for us ; this is the point to which, in two
years, it has led authorities and affairs, the government and
the country.
And this in the bosom of profound peace, in presence of
the most amenable Chamber, despite the most favourable
452 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
incidents, without encountering any important obstacle or real
danger.
I wish this favourable aspect of fortune to endure ; I
desire that the same facilities may continue to present them-
selves in the Chambers and throughout Europe, on the part
of men and events. If the cabinet remains in office, what
will happen ?
What has happened for the last two years. The same
simultaneous enfeeblement of the public powers, the same
confusion amongst them, the same nullity of administration,
the same adjournment of questions, the same decline of our
influence, the same increase of our embarrassments.
Some day, I know not when, but the day is infallible, a re-
action will come on, which will rudely rouse up the humbled
powers, the adjourned questions, the bruised feelings, the for-
gotten interests ; and which, without any possible presenti-
ment of its bearing, will add its own evils and perils to the
ills it proposes to cure.
The sentiment of this existing evil, and the anticipation
of the evil in perspective have determined my opposition.
I love and respect the government of July. France
founded it, and it has saved France. It is one of the pro-
foundest and proudest enjoyments of my thoughts to foretel
what the future will say of that glorious epoch, of that
double national effort, the one so bold, the other so pru-
dent; of those two serpents, absolutism and anarchy, both
strangled in their cradle. It costs me much to displease
when I love, and to oppose to serve. But I do not hesitate.
The favour of my king or country is equally dear to me ;
but I hold more closely still to their true interest and my
own duty.
I have seen more than one government compromised by
weak or improvident friends. I have never seen that the
warnings, even the resistance, of loyal and devoted partisans,
could be, I will not say a serious, but even a possible danger.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 453
If I am mistaken, the mischief will recoil on myself ; if I am
right, I have never rendered more effectual service.
But the coalition ?
Here, I confess, if I were not well acquainted with the
empire of words and prejudices, I should be unable to re-
strain my astonishment.
What ! when for a great and cherished interest, a warning,
an act appears to me to be necessary, if a hundred persons,
otherwise extremely opposed, wish to speak and act with me,
I am required to pause and be silent ? I am not to do what I
think right, because I cannot do it alone, or only in concert
with my usual associates !
For, observe well, it is understood, it is certain, that to
those persons, who, while acting with me on this occasion,
conceive and desire in reality other objects than mine, I
make no concession, I lend no support. The Republicans
and Carlists approved of the address ; — granted. Was the
address either Carlist or Republican ? And if it tendered
profitable advice to the monarchy of 1830, if it drew
it away from serious danger, was I bound to reject the ad-
dress because the Carlists and Republicans seconded it ?
I see the flame originate ; it smoulders, it will blaze forth ;
and am I not to cry Fire! for fear of some scattered mis-
chief-mongers who will repeat the cry with a different in-
tention ?
But the approbation, the joy of enemies is suspicious. I
admit it. It is therefore very necessary to be careful as to
what you say or do before them. That in itself the question
of the address was serious, that thus to point out the evil,
to do an act of opposition, serious motives were necessary,
no one is more convinced of than I am. I comprehend,
I admit, I provoke the most scrupulous examination of the
gravity of these motives. But the evil being recognised,
to refuse the remedy because enemies will rejoice in seeing
that evil admitted, or may endeavour "to profit by the
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454 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
fact, — this, permit me to say, is a line of conduct neither
sensible nor manly.
Let us take care of this : we desired a system of pub-
licity, discussion, and liberty. We live under it. It has its
trials, its annoyances. If we do not know how to accept
them; if we hesitate whenever an effort must be made, a
vexation endured, if the conflict disturbs, or the noise
dismays us, if the movement, the rapid and somewhat con-
fused jostling of opinions, interests, pretensions, and passions
chills and petrifies us, let us talk no more of liberty ; let
us abandon representative government, let us retrace our
steps.
Has this been well considered ? Has the position been
properly calculated? I cannot too often repeat, that the
draft of the address, just, according to my conviction, in its
censure of the cabinet, was loyal, respectful, and even
affectionate towards the monarchy of July. Is it then
nothing to have brought all parties, I will say, if it be so
desired, all factions to place themselves on such a ground,
to adopt such language? Hereafter, the draft of that
address will be read again, and some astonishment will be
excited on finding that the Kepublicans and Carlists joined
their approbation to ours. For myself, I am neither sur-
prised nor grieved that it should be so. I do not believe
in the conversion of all the enemies of the government of
July. For a long time there will be some, who, despite
the will of the country and their own experience, will
persevere in their hostility. But I also know that, even
in their obstinacy, the most inveterate parties will not
entirely escape the action of the time, the progress of
things ; and I accept, I accept with eagerness, every attitude
and conduct, entirely new for them, and which to a certain
point niay turn aside their enmity. Propose a good object,
a good employment even to dangerous passions, they will suffer
themselves to be drawn in that direction, and will lose
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 455
something of their dangerous character. For myself, when
I see Kepublicans and Carlists engage in the service of a
national cause, a national grievance, I watch them care-
fully, but I rejoice at the fact. The good also is con-
tagious; whoever touches it imbibes a little; we do not
place a foot on the right path without advancing a step;
and when vdse and moderate designs once begin to be
entertained, some impression will remain of wisdom and
moderation.
On much better grounds, and more keenly, I congratu-
lated myself on seeing opinions and persons sincerely
friendly to the government of July, and who restrain them-
selves within the circle of our institutions, meet together
on this ground of the address, and act in concert. I
may speak of true and honorable conciliation, for I have
always rejected false and cowardly concession; that by
which on both sides something is sacrificed of what we
think and wish, in the hope of reciprocal deception. I
hold such combinations as shameful in themselves and
unworthy of representative government. But when the
friendly understanding is sincere, when we bring to the
common stock all that we have of corresponding sentiments,
ideas, and intentions, I should like to know who can main-
tain a right, who could have the audacity to say any thing
against this proceeding? It is not only legitimate, but
excellent. It is one of the best results of our admirable
institutions, which, incessantly holding ideas and men in
contest, lead them to understand and purify each other,
and sooner or later produce a compromise in the bosom
of reason and the public interest. The representative system
is a system of constant agreement and concihation. Liberty
divides at first, and brings together afterwards. Who would
not be struck, to-day, by the progress of equitable sen-
timents and moderate ideas, which everywhere manifests
itself and tends towards accomplishment. And is not this
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456 HISTORIC documents.
to be permitted to pass into the practice of public business ?
If not, political camps would become prisons, in which men
would remain eternally shut up and savage, inaccessible
to each other, as on the day of the most determined combat !
Such a pretension, at all times false and mischievous, could
not be considered in our days, after all our revolutions,
as anything better than an interested lie or a palpable
absurdity. For myself, confident of never having deserted
my standard, proud of having always carried it myself in
the hour of danger, I am open, without embarrassment, to
all honest approaches, to every loyal coalition ; I look upon
that accomplished on the ground of the address as a
triumph for representative government; and I have no
more fear of losing my liberty for the future than I had
hesitation in using it on that occasion.
A passing word on the subject of the coalition, with
reference to two expressions frequently applied, — ambition
and intrigue.
I believe I may say without presumption, that if I had cared
little for my ideas and my friends, I should have found it
easy to gratify what is called ambition. I repeat here what
I have said elsewhere : I have an ambition, but not such
as that.
As to intrigue, of all accusations it is, in truth, the most
extraordinary. Every thing took place in the broad light
of day, under the eye of the country. WTiat I have said,
I have done ; what I have done, I have said. I have gone
farther: I have recorded what I did and said formerly.
I have scrupulously sought publicity on the present, and
fidelity for the past. On these two conditions, which con-
stitute my law, I shall never hesitate to act and to follow up
my object.
A last question remains ; I have reserved it because I have
it sincerely at heart. They have spoken of the crown, of its
inviolability, and of the respect which is its due. They say
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 457
that the draft of the address and its defenders were wanting
in that respect.
This is a spectacle without example. Here is an op-
position which declares and maintains, that it addresses
itself to the cabinet alone; it sees and exhibits nothing
but the cabinet. And the cabinet retires, expunges itself,
places the crown in front of it, affirms and repeats that it is
with the crown that we are dealing ! In vain the opposition
persists ; the cabinet persists in turn. It absolutely demands
that the crown should descend into the arena and act as its
shield.
But, ministers of the King, even though you indulged in
the most injurious supposition, even though you believed
that in addressing you exclusively, the opposition lied and
concealed its true idea, your first and simplest duty was, to
accept the lie of the opposition, and to hold royalty aloof
from the combat. It was for you to prevent its being reached
by the most trifling allusion, to keep its very name from
being pronounced ; you ought to have covered it with your
own bodies. And at the very moment when you assert that
you are capable of this, that you are fully equal to it, you
prove the contrary by your anxiety to drag the King upon
the scene to cover yourselves ; yes, you yourselves, under
the respect borne to him, and to demand in his name the
votes you ought to be able to obtain on your own account,
by your own influence, and which are refused to j^ou alone.
Under a constitutional monarchy I recognise nothing more
anti-monarchical and unconstitutional than the attitude and
language of the cabinet in this debate.
No, it is not the royal authority that we have called in
question. We bear towards it the greatest respect; we know
how much its presence and strength are necessary to France,
the services it has rendered, and will still render, to our
country. Let it then display its prerogatives freely and
fully ; let it, in its councils, enlighten and persuade its ad-
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458 HISTORIC DOCmiENTS.
visers ; let it exercise over them its lawful influence. It is
its right to do so. It is also your privilege, ministers, to
enlighten the royal authority in your turn, to convince it
and make it thoroughly understand the influence of the
country; You will then answer to the country for all that it,
has done by your advice and with your concurrence.
This is what the country expects, what the Charter com-
mands from the advisers of the crown. This is what we find
you incapable of. You are too little acquainted with the
country and its immediate representatives ; you do not re-
present it yourselves, truly or firmly, with the crown. The
interests, the sentiments, the whole political and moral life
of the country, fail to reach the throne through your medium.
And, then, when you appear in the presence of the Chambers
as advisers of the crown, we find, on the one part, that the
crown has been badly advised by you, and the country ill
represented to the crown; and, on the other, that you ill
represent and defend the crown before the Chambers. For,
in our opinion, your weakness is double, and your insuffi-
ciency is double also. The crown suffers from both, with the
country and in the Chambers, and the Chambers and the
country suff'er equally in the councils of the crown.
Hence comes, as we think, the impossibility in which you
find yourselves of living with the best disposed and most
judicious Chambers. Hence arise those repeated and sudden
dissolutions, which reveal the troubles of power and aggra-
vate without the capability of curing them.
Now, you have already tried this remedy twice, and the evil
is not abated. It will re-appear on the opening, or soon after,
of new Chambers as in those that you have dissolved ; for it
exists in you, in you alone, in your insufficiency for the
Chambers with the crown, and for the crown with the
Chambers.
This is our opinion, our full opinion, in this great emer-
gency. It addresses itself to the cabinet, to the cabinet
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 459
alone, and nothing will induce us to exceed this limit of our
rights as of our duty. But we shall fulfil our entire duty ;
we shall exercise our utmost rights. Representative govern-
ment is our conquest ; the Charter is our truth. We cannot
lose a particle of either. The honour of France is implicated
in maintaining both : the honour of her fame and existence
since 1789; more since 1814; and more than all since
1830.
Her repose too is not less engaged than her honour. As
long as the actual cabinet subsists, you may hold this, gen-
tlemen, for certain : all things 'will remain as they are, or be
remitted to suspense and question. The dignity and security
of the country will totter together. You will see prevail,
in internal and external affairs, in the management of
material and moral interests, the same improvidence, the
same thoughtlessness, the same weakness ; and, for the com-
mon term of all, the same trials to which you are called
to-day.
I have exposed the evil ; the remedy, gentlemen, lies with
you.
GrUIZOT.
2. M. Guizot to M. Leroy-Beaulieu, Mayor of Lisieux.
My dear Sir, I'aris, Feb. 18th, 1839.
The cabinet proclaims in all directions, that to vote with
them is to vote for peace ; to vote with the opposition is to
vote for war.
On the 16th of January last, in the debate on the address,
I said, in the tribune :
" For eight years France and her government have been
engaged in the policy of peace. They were in the right.
I have maintained that policy ; I have maintained it in and
out of office, on all the benches of this Chamber. I am con-
H H 4
460 IIISTOKIC DOCUMENTS.
vinced, convinced to-day as then, that the morality and pro-
sperity of our revolution counselled and commanded that
policy. I am, and shall ever remain, faithful to it."
Repeat, I beg of you, repeat everywhere, what I said a
month since, and what I reiterate to-day. Yes, we desired,
we always desire peace; and peace can only be assvired
through our policy. The ministry which harangues so loudly
on the subject compromises peace.
What sensible man would desire war at present ?
We have made war for twenty years to liberate and esta-
blish ourselves. We required, we, new France required, first to
be masters at home, and next, to prove our strength to Europe
and to assume our proper rank.
The end is attained, thoroughly attained. We are masters
at home. In 1830, we plainly exhibited this fact. Europe
has acknowledged it. And as to glory, that baptism of peoples,
what old State, what ancient race can relate more than
■what we have done ?
In our fierce combats for our independence and rank
amongst nations, two elements have mingled; the spirit of
propagandism and the spirit of conquest. We have learnt
the evil of both ; we desire no more of either.
The propagandism of truth by force is the corruption of
truth. Violence in the name of liberty is the ruin of liberty,
first for the victors, secondly for the vanquished. We are not
disciples of the Koran. We respect the ideas, sentiments,
institutions, and rights of others, as we wish others to respect
ours. We have faith in intelligence and in the times. We
aspire to give the world the spectacle of free, true, and general
civilisation, — of that civilisation towards which Europe ad-
vances through so many ages. We believe that this spectacle
is a great example, and sufficient for our greatness.
Peace is dear to us for the interest of national morality.
We ardently desire to see the spirit of order reign amongst
us, the family spirit, respect for law, and confidence in the
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 461
future. Above all, we honour intelligence, industry, and good
manners. We wish ambition to be regulated, souls to be
tranquillised, minds to be enlightened ; that in social life
there may be much activity and little hazard.
We confine ourselves solely to the course of public prosperity.
Thanks to Grod, it is already great, and increases daily. Our
agi'icvilture improves, our industry develops itself, our com-
merce expands ; but how far are we still from what we can
achieve, from what we ought to be ! Capital is not equal to
labour ; knowledge is not adequate to the good employment
of capital. In every case and class, whether the question is
of material or intellectual means, of public administration
or private affairs, how many gaps are to be filled up, how
much progress is still to be made ! Progress which ought to
j)enetrate in every quarter, to infuse itself into all conditions ;
which will never be truly satisfactory until all society takes
part in it, both in the labour and in the produce.
For all this we require peace, long settled peace. This, to-
day, is the universal conviction and desire. Europe wants
peace as well as France. In France, the country wants peace
as well as the king's government. One of the noblest claims
of our monarchy to public gratitude is its constancy in
the policy of peace. And if I may be permitted to speak of
myself in such weighty matters, I also have constantly
associated myself with the same policy ; I also have pro-
claimed and practised in this respect, and under the severest
trials, the most unyielding conviction.
But it is not enough to desire ; it is not enough even to
will. Such is the weakness of man, that against his thought,
against his wish, he may be led, by his own acts and errors,
to the very result he most dreads, and anxiously endeavours
to avoid.
This is the danger to which the cabinet of the 15th of
April exposes us. This is the consequence of its policy. It
compromises peace in place of securing it.
462 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Peace may be compromised in two ways. By a weak
policy, unworthy of and injurious to the national honour ;
By an improvident, unskilful policy, which conducts affairs
badly.
France is jealous, extremely jealous, of her national dignity
and of her attitude in the world. Let us be thankful that she
is so ! Public, popular susceptibility, that sudden electrical
feeling, somewhat blind, but powerful and devoted, constitutes
the honour and greatness of democratic societies. It is through
that sentiment, in spite of their inconsistencies and weak-
nesses, that they elevate]themselves and resound brilliantly when
once that noble fibre is touched. And let the government
believe this thoroughly. The fibre may appear slackened and
sluggish, but it may also become suddenly excited and shaken,
and shake everything with its own agitation. You love peace ;
you desire peace. Be careful of the national dignity ; give
it full satisfaction and security. If it doubts and suspects, do
you also doubt and tremble for peace. The blessings of peace
are great and gratifying, but a free country will not long
purchase them at the cost of moral suffering and offensive
uncertainty.
It is moreover a position so desirable, an increase of power
so important for the government, to sympathise with the na-
tional pride, and to use it as a buckler ! What embarrassments
will it not escape, what questions will it not solve through
this medium ! On all occasions, at every instant, the
foreigners with whom you have to deal, watch you and feel
your pulse. Let them know that you are proud and deter-
mined; — they measure, they restrain their words and acts.
But if they find and look upon you as timid, irresolute, dis-
posed to evade and yield, do you believe that they will offer
you better conditions, or treat you with more consideration ?
Quite the contrary. They will insist, press, and annoy.
They will care little to transact busisess with you ; they will
hold you in light esteem ; and peace clogged \nth. embarrass-
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 463
ments, questions, vexations, and disgusts, will gradually be-
come more difficult and troublesome, and will find itself in
peril, do what you may to maintain it.
What will be the result if, in other respects, affairs are con-
ducted with thoughtlessness and improvidence, under the
control of first impressions, with the sole end of escaping
from the difficulty of the moment ; of contriving an evasive
answer, of temporarily saving appearances ; without that power
of attention and memory which keeps an account of all facts;
without that prudent maturity of design which prevents
incautious measures, and never sacrifices the security of the
future to the convenience of the present?
Do you believe, my dear Sir, that on such conditions, with
such conduct, in presence of the national dignity saddened
and wounded, in the midst of affairs rashly commenced, and
becoming hourly more complicated, peace can be either strong
or sure ? Do you believe that this can be the true policy of
the country?
Examine facts — recent — proved facts. They speak more
loudly than I can. They display everywhere, in our foreign
relations, the weakness, improvidence, thoughtlessness of the
cabinet, and their dangerous consequences. They exhibit
peace incessantly compromised and on the point of escaping us.
In Switzerland, to remove from our frontier a young mad-
man, a division of the army has been put in motion ; and we
have seen ourselves placed at the mercy of Louis Bonaparte
and the radicals of Thurgovia, who, with fifteen days of
obstinacy, were perfectly in a position to compel us to make
war upon a friendly and valuable neighbour.
Wherefore ?
Because the cabinet had neglected to maintain, in our
relations with that neighbour, our sound and natural policy, —
the policy adopted by its predecessors. Because it had
commenced and conducted its remonstrances against the resi-
dence of Louis Bonaparte in Switzerland, hastily, confusedly,
464 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
witliout discretion or foresight, in a manner offensive to
Switzerland, and which left neither to the Eepublic nor to
us any honourable or pacific road through which to escape
from the embarrassment.
In Belgium, matters proceeded to the last extremity. Eevo-
lutionary passions were placed in movement; the Belgian
people and their king found themselves engaged, compro-
mised, and placed between an impossible resistance and an
unworthy retreat.
Wlierefore ?
Because, from the beginning of the affair, our cabinet
dared not adopt a firm and clear resolution ; because it had
no influence in Europe, if that could have prevailed in the
question of territory, to obtain favourable modifications for
Belgium ; and if not, to determine promptly the execution
of the treaty, and to spare the Belgians the deplorable alter-
native to which they are now reduced, or ourselves the humili-
ating attitude we hold ; — serious inconveniences, and perhaps
important dangers to both.
In Mexico we have reaped success and glory ; but the suc-
cess and glory have settled nothing. Our countrymen are
ill-treated, oppressed, persecuted, and banished by the Mexi-
can government more violently than ever; the contest has
become more bitter, and the issue more obscure; we are
drawn into an enterprise infinitely greater than its motive
and object, the means, sacrifices, and termination of which are
equally difficult to calculate. We are engaged in a war more
than two thousand leagues from home, in face of deserts and
savages, and equally undecided whether to advance or retreat.
"WTierefore ?
Because the cabinet neglected to calculate the difficulties
of the enterprise ; because, from the beginning, it has allowed
operations to languish from want of suflficient and well-com-
bined means ; because it has failed to engage, on our side,
the gi-eat commercial nations, England and the United States,
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 465
for instance, whose interests there are analogous with ours ;
but on the contrary have placed us, with regard to those
nations, in a very delicate position, which becomes more
delicate from delay.
Thus, in every direction, our affairs are complicated and
aggravated. Peace has been compromised; war has emanated
from that cause, or has been, or still is, on the point of
springing up.
And for a great people, for France, there are no means
of avoiding these complications. We cannot retire from all
quarters, as from Ancona, and isolate ourselves like the little
republic of San Marino. France is present and interested
everywhere; everjnvhere when a question arises, when an
event occurs, we must be present and act. Everywhere and
always, you desire peace : you are right ; peace is most
desirable : to break it now, vast reasons are required, reasons
of national honour and security. But peace, the peace which
becomes France, is a lofty and laborious work, requiring
much activity, courage, foresight, ascendancy ; which has its
contests and demands its glory, like war. If you are weak
and imprudent, truckling and unskilful ; if you know not how
to solve questions by negotiation or by arms ; if you leave
them to rise up lightly, or to establish themselves profoundly,
by showing yourselves equally incapable of supporting or pre-
venting, of removing or unravelling them, speak no longer
of peace ; cease to call yourselves ministers of peace : you are
not more fitted for peace than for war ; you profane the name
of peace; you compromise its existence. Instead of owing
you anything, it is by you and through you that peace debases
itself and declines.
I pause, my dear Sir; for our country, in the natural dis-
turbance under which it still suffers after so many rude
shocks, dreads the energetic expression of even the most
moderate sentiments, and pictures exaggeration in the lan-
guage of every strong conviction. But rest assured that
466 HISTORIC documents.
light and pusillanimous policy is not the policy of peace, and
that in the hands of the cabinet of the 15th of April peace is
not more in safety than is our national honour.
GuizoT.
3. S'peech delivered by M. Ouizot in the Electoral College of
Lisieux, on the SrcZ of March, 1839, immediately after his
election*
Grentlemen,
You have conferred on me a great honour : I thank you
for it with profound gratitude. I see in this more than a
personal success : I perceive in it a sanction of the conduct I
have held in these latter times, a proof that I have judged
soundly and acted well.
And do not believe, gentlemen, that I have acted incon-
siderately. I have watched long and maturely deliberated.
It is not by choice that I have placed myself at variance
with the government I love and have served, which I still
intend to serve, now and always. I foresaw the consequences
of this division, the evil interpretations, the insults, the
calumnies, and what touches me more nearly, perhaps, the
sincere disapprobation of some of my oldest friends, estimable
men, for having marched in concert with whom so long, I
take honour to myself, and whose sympathy mil ever be dear
to me.
Nevertheless, I have not hesitated ; I beheld two urgent
and decisive points.
I saw, within, the weakness of our representative govern-
ment, especially in the Chamber of Deputies; that is to say,
of the influence of France in her own affairs.
Without, I saw the deterioration of our attitude, of our
acts and alliances ; that is to say, the deterioration of the
influence of France in the affairs of Europe.
* M. Gviizot had 477 votes in this college out of 525 voters.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 467
And as a consequence to this prolonged change of national
policy, I perceived a lamentable and perhaps dangerous re-
action.
Experience, gentlemen, is not wanting to us. We know
how governments engaging in an erroneous path, gradually-
become compromised, and end by losing themselves, ever sur-
rounded by friends, but blind and weak friends, who are unable
to guide or restrain them. This is no general idea or vague
reminiscence. We have seen it. We shall not see it again.
We have a double guarantee against it, — the wisdom of the
King and the wisdom of the country. But this wisdom
consists precisely in noting and pointing out, in good time,
the deviation and the danger.
It is on the brink of the abyss that we ought, and are able
to pause. It is the merit of free governments, it is the duty
of good citizens in free governments, to combat the evil as
soon as it appears, to repulse it before it augments. Our
readiness to become alarmed and fortified for the present,
constitutes our security for the future.
Do you also know, gentlemen, who would suffer most from
the reaction necessarily produced by the enfeeblement of oiu:
institutions, and the change of our national policy ? Grovern-
ment, and power. They would be held accountable, and by
them the penalty would be paid. You would see the prin-
ciples and resources of government become weakened in
their turn. You would see revive in the country the desire
for extensive guarantees, for precautions which enervate and
disarm authority. We require authority to be strong, and I
fear its deficiencies, at least as much for the mistrusts they
inspire as for the inunediate evil they produce.
This is what has determined my conduct, gentlemen ; these
are my reasons for opposing the cabinet. As I have had the
honour to tell you, just now, I did not dissemble to myself
the difficulties of such a position. I did not flatter myself
that it would be at once understood and universally approved.
4(j8 historic documents.
But I hoped that a long session, numerous and varied
debates, would bring it to general light. It has not been so.
An abrupt and unexpected dissolution has as suddenly-
brought before you, gentlemen, and before the country at
large, questions scarcely enunciated and still obscure. I
have dreaded, and freely acknowledge, mischievous conse-
quences. I have apprehended one of two evils, both suffi-
ciently serious, — the irritation or weakness of the country.
I feared lest it should go beyond the mark or ignore the
danger.
I have resumed confidence, gentlemen, for what has taken
place in this district, what you have just done cannot be
an isolated fact. It is undoubtedly, a symptom and type of
what is now taking place throughout France. A majority will
declare itself, a decided and powerful majority, stronger and
more influential than it has ever been. Never, gentlemen,
during nine years, and allow me to feel proud of the fact,
have I ever received from you so many votes. And this strong
majority is not an impulse of passion, the effect of enthu-
siastic party spirit ; it is, on the contrary, as conciliatory as
decisive ; it rallies, I would say, if I dared, nearly all the
sincere friends of our revolution of 1830, of our monarchy
of 1830, of the Charter and dynasty of 1830. Divided for
several years, to-day they approach and unite.
Gentlemen, there is yet another point which touches me
nearly. What is the pressing, the evident necessity of our
epoch ? What is the method, the only method by which to
fix a term to our embarrassments and to the dangers of our
situation ? Precisely that which you are now adopting : a
majority at once decided and not exclusive, powerful and
conciliatory.
A decided majority is indispensable to the strength and
moral influence of our constitution, to the strength and
moral power of government itself. We suffer, we decline to-
gether for five years, chambers and cabinets, authority and
HISTORIC DOCUIMENTS. 469
liberty, through those narrow, floating majorities, which take
from government all fixity, elevation, and ascendancy, to con-
fer on miserable intrigues and paltry interests a lamentable
and ridiculous importance.
For five years there has been much talk of conciliation.
It is a powerful and a soothing word, which all parties have
endeavoured to appropriate. I also, gentlemen, love and
desire conciliation. I have ever contested for a moderate
policy, a policy which considers and reconciles all rights and
interests. And when I examine myself, I find nothing,
absolutely nothing which should render conciliation difficult
to me. I carry within me no violent or bitter feelings. I hate
no one ; I have injured no one. I defy any man in France
to say that I have ever been guided by evil Avishes or per-
sonal resentment. I have learnt from experience to com-
prehend and explain much ; and I believe that the energy of
conviction does not exclude some degree of impartiality in
the judgment and of benevolence in the heart.
But, gentlemen, whenever I hear conciHation named, I
consider two things ; public security, and my individual
dignity.
As long as the state appeared to me in danger ; as long as
I saw the King and the Charter menaced and attacked ; and
as often as conciliation has seemed to be proposed as the
price of a disavowal of the policy of resistance, which saved
both in evil days, I neither wished nor ought to lend myself
to it.
Such was the state of things, gentlemen, in 1834, 1835,
and 1836. These were the times of Fieschi, of Alibaud, of
Meiinier, of the conspiracy of Strasbourg ; times assuredly of
struggle and danger ; times which demanded a vigilant and
enero-etic policy, the policy of the 13th of March, and of the
11th of October. I have not abandoned it. You would not,
gentlemen, have counselled me to do so. What do I say?
You would not have forgiven it. You are vigilant for the
VOL. IV. I I
470 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
security of the government of July ; you are jealous of the
honour of your deputy. I have preserved both. I feel
confident of your approbation.
Times are changed. The safety of the state is no longer
threatened. Eesistance has borne its fruits. The King
and the Charter breathe freely under the shelter of the
laws and of the public sentiment. Questions have arisen,
foreign to our old debates, relative to the reality of our insti-
tutions, the dignity of our foreign policy, and the judicious
conduct of our affairs ; — questions on which I have nothing
to disavow ; a free and elevated ground on which a true and
honom-able conciliation may take place. I lend myself -to it
with eagerness. Therein lies the principle of a numerous
and reconciling majority, which can concentrate the sincere
friends of the government of July, without fixing on any
of them the charge of weakness or falsification. Much is said
of the coalition. Grentlemen, observe what passes amongst
yom'selves in this district, in this college. Has any one
renounced his opinions, his antecedents, his friends? Do
you feel guilty of defection or hypocrisy ? No, certainly
not ; you are consistent with yourselves ; faithful to all that
you have thought, done, loved, and served. Yet, neverthe-
less, you have approached each other. You think, you vote in
unison, under the empire of the same idea, the same convic-
tion : attachment to representative government, to its dig-
nity and vigour, to the desire of seeing it real and effective.
Such is the coalition, gentlemen ; there is no other. That
which has taken place amongst you, naturally, usefully, and
morally, is the same which has been accomplished in the
Chamber. In all respects equally legitimate and honourable,
it will, I hope, be everywhere equally salutary : it will every
where restore to our institutions their truth and energy ; it
will every where become the source of true parliamentary
majorities by leaving to all the honour of our past and the
liberty of our future.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 471
Greutlemen, in what I do and require to-day there is
nothing new or strange to me. I am faithful, strictly faithful,
to what I have always done and required. Nearly three years
ago, in August 1836, in this place, many amongst you did
me the honour of inviting me to a banquet. I then deli-
vered a speech to which the press and the tribune have often
referred. I gladly seized that opportunity of doing homage
to the wisdom of the King ; of recalling the eminent, the im-
mense services, rendered by the King to France in the cause
of order and peace, ^^^lat I then said I should repeat, I do
repeat still, with the same conviction, the same gratitude.
And- then I also said :
" To support the King is not to leave all on his hands.
Our adhesion ought not to be passive, ineffective, a mere
adhesion of spectators. The King can do nothing without
the country ; his firmness needs the support of our firmness ;
his wisdom draws its strensfth from our wisdom. Let not
the national majority, which has so well sustained the King
in the policy of a judicious medium, relax, disunite, or
give way to discouragement: let it openly manifest its
thought and boldly exercise its influence. Penetration, vigi-
lance, perseverance, and energy, are its imperious duties.
Let them be fulfilled. The perils of the King will con-
tinually remove to a greater distance with the perils of
France. Liberty, real and universal liberty, will gradually
develop itself, and we shall see the security of the people and
the throne, the dignity of the country and the influence of
power establish themselves together."
What did I intend by these words, gentlemen, if not to
demand the realization, the actual energy of representative
government, the influence of the Chamber of Deputies in the
affairs of the country, the influence of a strong, active, becom-
ing majority in the Chamber of Deputies? Never, gentle-
men, for a single minute have I deserted that noble cause ;
never have I supposed our institutions to become enervated,
ii2
472 msTomc documents.
eluded, deteriorated ; never have I admitted that an adminis-
tration without principles or vigour could represent the true
government of the country. Under such attributes I no
longer recognise the proud and free government we won by
conquest in 1830. I wish to see it complete and regular.
I believe that its security and honour reside in the energetic
development, in the constant equilibrium of all its elements.
I wish to see them increase and strengthen, and all in con-
cert. To-day, gentlemen, as in 1836, as at all times, I
exclaim. Long live the King I Long live the Charter ! This
is the rallying cry of our country.
473
No. XIV.
(Page 304.)
King Louis-Philijppe to M. Guizot.
Sunday, 2 o'clock, March 24:th, 1839,
At the moment when I believed that all was on the point
of being settled, all is broken off, and the Marshal has just
announced to me that he retires. I wish most anxiously to
see you, to hear and talk with you on this subject. Come
then to me as soon as you possibly can.
I i3
474
No. XV.
(Pago 319.)
Signatures to the Letter addressed to M. Guizot, by twenty-
Jive American citizens, on the 1st of February, 1841.
E. S. Burd, Tho. van Zandt, Jared Sparks, Matthew Mor-
gan, Eugene Avail, M. Brimmer, F. P. Corbin, Eobert Walsh,
Andrew Eitchie, Herman Thom, Eobert Baird, Gras. M.
Gibbs; Leonard Hoods, Professor of Brunswick College,
INIaine ; Henry Seybert, E. N. Gibbes, H. L. Preston, M,
Smiller, H. G. Dyar, Charles J. Biddle, E. C. Biddle, J. Ean-
dolph, J. Archer, W. van Eeusselaer, Tho. Warner, Alex, van
Eeusselaer.
475
No. XVI.
(rage 320.)
1. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal SoulV.
Lotidon, May 25th, 1839,
Marshal,
As I announced to your Excellency yesterday, Lord Pal-
merston has communicated without delay to all the members
of the council, the news of the renewal of hostilities between
the Turkish and Egyptian armies. This evening, at the
Queen's ball. Lord Melbourne, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord
Normanby, all three mentioned to me the serious aspect
with which they regard this event. They sought, neverthe-
less, to persuade themselves still that the intelligence could
not be perfectly correct, and they founded their opinion on
the contrast it presents with that which preceded it from
Constantinople and Alexandria. Although I concealed my
communication as carefully as possible, it had already trans-
pired. During the evening, Redschid Pacha, who was this
day to take leave of the Queen, being informed by Lord
Palmerston, announced openly that he had suspended his
departure. Count Orloff was also aware of the news, and
without commenting on the consequences, proclaimed its
importance with affectation.
Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me again to
day. We have had a fresh conference, which lasted two
hours. Time will not permit me to forward a detailed
ii4
476 IIISTOIUC DOCmiENTS.
account of it to your Excellency, but I prefer confining
myself to the leading points of the conversation to the post-
ponement of a more complete analysis.
Lord Palmerston had just received a despatch from Lord
Grranville, which entirely confirms that which I communi-
cated to him yesterday, and which adds also that the intelli-
gence had reached Malta from two different points, Syria
and Alexandria. We have therefore discarded the doubts of
yesterday, and the evil being admitted, nothing now remains
but to consider the remedy.
Lord Palmerston commenced by declaring that he was
going to submit to me his personal views on the state of
the question, that on Monday he should lay them before
the council, but that nothing could be definitively decided
before the arrival of answers from Paris. It is unnecessary
to add, that throughout this long conversation I took care
to represent myself as entirely without instructions, so that
nothing I said could even in the .most remote degree be
construed into the authorized expression of my government.
Lord Palmerston at once laid down a h^^othesis, from
which flows the entire current of the ideas he has adopted.
" I assume for point of departure," he said, " that the
object of our common policy is the support of the Ottoman
empire, as the least objectionable guarantee for the main-
tenance of the European equilibrium. There is here, as in
France, a certain amount of opinion favourable to the deve-
lopment of Egyptian power. This opinion the English cabinet
by no means partakes in, but it forms one of the many
difficulties we have to encounter in the path of Eastern
affairs.
" The preservation of the Ottoman empire being admitted
as our end, we have to i3rotect it against its friends and
enemies.
" The actual event surprises and leaves us in ignorance as
to Avhat we have to fear from the friends of the Ottoman
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 477
empire. This is an eventuality we shall have to ward off
at a later period. Let us begin with the enemies.
"The act of aggression (attributed to the Turks by the
latest telegraph) has its moral importance, for there is a
principle of justice, the power of which we cannot deny,
in a first disposition to retort the consequences of war on
the aggressor; but we must at the same time remember
that we never became a guaranteeing party to the arrange-
ments of Kutaieh ; that we have never, by any act, obliterated
the quality of vassal in the conqueror or of sovereign in
the conquered : we have yielded to the pressure of things ;
these things being changed, we are now bound to inquire
to what point the sovereign has a right to repossess himself
by arms of what the arms of the vassal have wrested from
him.
" Let us pass by the fact of aggression, and suppose it to
be decided in favour of Egypt. We can neither desire that
the victorious Pacha. should again reduce the Ottoman em-
pire to the brink of ruin, and force it to throw itself into
the arms of Russia; nor that the Sultan, excited by past
successes (very doubtful ones !) should leave the peace of
Europe in danger as long as it may please him to dispute
with the Pacha his recent conquests, and perhaps his old
possessions.
" Our first duty then is to arrest, as soon as possible, the
collision so unfortunately precipitated. With what means
of action, and within what limits ?
" The means of action may be of two kinds ; ships of war,
and troops for disembarkation. I know not whether it
would fall within the views of the French government to
despatch an expeditionary corps to the theatre of passing
events. Occupied as we ourselves are in India and America,
we could not appear there Avith a sufiicient force in avail-
able time. This last condition would also apply to the
military intervention of France ; for an expeditionary force
478 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
ought at least to amount to fifteen thousand men, who could
not be assembled and embarked in less than from two to
three months. There remain, then, the sqviadrons. They
are on the spot, and can be quickly reinforced. We have
eight ships of the line in the Archipelago, and two in the
Tagus. Our united fleets are sufficient for all maritime
events.
" The instructions to our admirals ought to provide for two
contingencies ; whether, in presenting themselves on the
coast'of Syria they would find the Pacha victorious, or arrive
to be present at his defeat.
" If the advantage remained with the arms of the Pacha, our
admirals should be empowered to order him to pause in the
position in which he might find himself on their arrival,
under the threat of seeing his communications with Alexan-
dria cut o£f, and all supplies by sea rendered thenceforward
impossible. A sufficient number of ships should at the same
time appear before Alexandria, declare the port in a state of
blockade until Ibraham received the orders of his father to
suspend his victorious march, prevent the egress of the
Egyptian fleet should it be in the harbour, and interdict
its return if at sea, until the acceptance of the proposed
conditions.
" If the Ottoman army has commenced by a success, the
same intimation should be conveyed to the Pacha in com-
mand ; our admirals would have to use all their influence to
restrain him from pushing his advantages beyond a boundary
to be fixed in common, and to announce to him that they
should instantly demand instructions from their government
in the event of their representations being disregarded.
During this time the efforts of our united embassies at Con-
stantinople should be exerted without intermission to bring
back and confine the Sultan within the limits of a wise
moderation."
Such, Marshal, in a few words, is the naval action to be
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 479
adopted by the two powers, according to the recommendation
of Lord Palmerston ; this is what he intends to propose to
the council on Monday, and this he submits to the conside-
ration of the King's government. He added, as a necessary
accompaniment, that to be effectual, their action should be
immediate, and that not a moment is to be lost in combining
the movements of our fleets, and preparing the instructions
to our admirals.
I now pass on to the diplomatic action : —
Lord Palmerston is of opinion that we should, without
delay, present ourselves at Vienna as entirely united in inten-
tions and efforts for the maintenance of the Ottoman empire ;
that we should frankly avow the object we propose to accom-
plish, and that we should press for the co-operation of Austria
by every means in her power. A similar step should at the
same time be taken at Berlin.
" Here, again," Lord Palmerston resumed, " we have two
contingencies to provide against. The Porte may already
have implored and received the aid of Eussia in men and
ships ; or, they may have been demanded and Russia may
hesitate to comply.
"In the first case we should propose to the Austrian
cabinet to join with us in declaring that Western Europe
demands, in the name of the European equilibrium, that
the Russian auxiliary troops should immediately return to
their own territory after having accomplished their mission,
and without any conquests being obtained by Russia, or any
stipulations for political or commercial advantages. This
declaration, in whatever terms it might be couched, should
be peremptory to the point, and should leave Russia in no
doubt whatever as to the consequences to which a line of
conduct in opposition to that of the allies would inevitably
expose her.
" In the second case, we should press the court of Vienna
to propose with us to St. Petersburg a preliminary concert
480 HISTORIC DOCUIMEN.TS.
between the five great powers, the object of which would be
the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, and the action to
be determined in common. We should then arrange the
auxiliary interference of Eussia, and confine it within the
limits of a common understanding.
" Under these two hypotheses, we shall extenuate, as much
as lies in our power, the disastrous effects on the destinies of
the Ottoman empire, of being committed solely to Russia.''
I have given you the most faithful summary which my
memory can suppl}^, of my two conferences Avith Lord Pal-
merston, and I believe that I have conveyed to you his exact
ideas. I venture to request that your Excellency will enable
me, as soon as possible, to make knowTi to him the opinion
of the King's government.
Deign to accept, &c.
BOUEQUENEY.
2. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Sir, Pai-is, June 13th, 1839.
We have not yet received the letters arrived by the last
packet-boat from the east, but a telegraphic despatch from
Marseilles, inserted in the Aloniteur, proves that at the most
recent date, notwithstanding a brawl between the Turkish
and Egyptian soldiers, the fears of a collision between the
two armies had not yet been realised. The time which
passes mil undoubtedly strengthen the hope we may be per-
mitted to build, for the maintenance of peace, upon a concert
between all the great European powers.
The reception given at Berlin, and more particularly at
Vienna, to our first overtures for the accomplishment of a
mutual accord to secure this object, is of the most satisfactory
nature. The Prussian cabinet, placed as it is in a secondary
position as to all that regards the East, could only show
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 481
itself disposed to support, according to its means, the efforts
of its allies ; but that of Vienna, whose situation is totally
different, has not hesitated to declare itself frankly and
categorically on the arrangements indispensably called for in
this serious emergency. Count Appony has received orders
to communicate to me a fully developed despatch, in which
M. de Metternich explains, with his habitual diplomatic for-
malities, the view he has adopted on this important point.
He commences by admitting that, in the present state of
things, a statu quo, the source of so much anxiety, and
almost equally objectionable to the two contending parties,
is a matter of the utmost difficulty. If it could be solved by
the restoration of Syria to the authority of the Porte, by the
sole effort of the Turkish arms, he would approve of the
solution ; but he regards this as more than improbable, and
believes that in the contest that might ensue, all chances
would be in favour of Mehemet Ali. In this position of
affairs, and without prejudice to the proposed negotiations
for a definitive settlement, he agrees with us in opinion that
the great courts ought to come to an understanding, with the
object of preventing hostilities, if possible ; of terminating
them if they have commenced; and of reconciling, while
admitting the power of existing facts, the reasonable claims
of the two parties by an arrangement which may secure the
future, while checking the exaggerated pretensions of both.
Admitting, as indisputable axioms, that the powers neither
desire the dethronement of the Sultan, nor admit the possi-
bility of expelling Mehemet Ali from Egypt, and finally that
not one of them seeks to aggrandise itself at the expense of
the Ottoman empire, he concludes from these premises that
it will be easy for them to agree, and repeats that they hold
in their hands all that is necessary to give weight to their
determination. French and English fleets are in the Medi-
terranean ; land and sea forces are not wanting to Russia ; a
firm and uniform language at Alexandria and Constantinople,
482 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
seconded by the attitudes, equally imposing but expectant,
assumed by the combined squadrons, would in all probability
suffice, according to M. de Metternich, to secure success to
the mediation of the powers. Such is the substance of the
despatch communicated to me by Count Appony. It con-
eludes with an observation which has struck me, as I see in
it the timid apparition of an idea, ever fondly cherished by the
Austrian cabinet and as constantly rejected by Kussia, — that
of establishing, in the capital of Austria, a conference on the
affairs of the East. Vienna, says M. de Metternich, is, with
regard to the great question in debate, a point so central that
answers may reach it from all quarters at the same time.
Communications similar to that contained in the despatch
written by Count Appony have been transmitted to St.
Petersburg, to Vienna, and to Berlin
As soon as I learn anything further, I shall hasten to let
you know, for the information of Lord Palmerston.
3. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Paris, June 17th, 1839.
• ••••••*•«•
My preceding despatch has acquainted you with the answer
of the cabinet of Vienna to our first communications . . .
The intelligence brought three days since by the packet-
boat from the East, comprises no news of the slightest im-
portance. The armies were still facing each other on the
banks of the Euphrates, but nothing indicated a desire on
the part of their leaders to come to action . . . The Turks
can scarcely be in a condition to commence hostilities. Their
army, it is reported, does not exceed 36,000 men, weakened
by want of supplies and desertion.
The state of affairs, as it presents itself at this moment, is
quite sufficient to ju. tify serious anxiety. I am now going to
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 483
place you in a position to answer the questions addressed to
you by Lord Palmerston, as to the opinion formed by the
King's government on the measures to be adopted under the
exigencies of the moment.
The King's government comprehends the utility and con-
venience of an understanding between the great powers to
settle the means of securing, by a common attitude and
language, the maintenance of the Ottoman empii-e, and it
thinks the seat of the deliberations to be opened with this
object should be established at Vienna, as the most desirable
locality.
It . considers that to prevent hostilities, if they are still
suspended, or to bring them to an end if they have unhappily
commenced, the French and English fleets should operate as
a sort of armed mediation, commanding the sea, to contest
the movements of the Egyptian and Turkish armaments ; to
oblige them to return to their ports, in case they have issued
from them.
The English squadron appears to amount to six sail of the
liae, without counting smaller vessels. Ours >vill also be
increased to that number, and will include four or five frigates,
with four steamers, at the least, and other smaller vessels.
Six men-of-war are already collected at Smyrna, or on the
way there. Three others will sail for that place immediately.
It is important that instructions, not exactly common, but
dictated by the same idea, and previously arranged between
the two courts, should be forwarded without delay to the
officers commanding the two squadrons, to direct their opera-
tions.
As soon as it becomes known in the East that these forces
act in the same spirit and with a similar object, it is not
possible to believe that either the fleet of the Sultan or that
of the Pacha will be disposed to risk a conflict with them.
I go still further; this demonstration, by rendering war
almost impossible, will take from Russia all pretext for
484 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
placing in movement her fleet at Sebastopol, or even her
land forces.
To attain more completely the end we have ^n view, per-
haps it would be desirable that the Austrian flag should
display itself in conjunction with the combined squadrons of
France and England. One or two frigates, with some lighter
ships, would suffice for that purpose. It is to be observed,
moreover, that M. de Metternich has already expressed his
opinion to that effect.
Such are the measures which I think should be at once
adopted, if we do not wish to be surprised by events. I now
pass on to those which, as soon as formal deliberations
are opened between the cabinets, might be put in force to
terminate the existing crisis and definitely to prevent its
renewal.
In the event of our resolutions and the attitude of our
squadrons not being able to prevent the two contending par-
ties from having recourse to arms, the necessity of a common
action would become evident ; and there is no reason to ex-
pect that we should then be able to induce Eussia to abstain
from material interference in a question in which her interests
would be so directly engaged. What we ought to insist on
is, that her action should be determined and lunited in con-
cert with the other courts ; that she should confine herself
to the course adopted by France and England ; and, in fact,
that a European convention should replace the stipulations
of Unkiar-Skelessi. I cannot estimate the full amount of
obstacles that such a project might encounter from the
cabinet of St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, it would find few
available arguments, however speciously they might be
set forward, by which to repulse combinations evidently pro-
ceeding from a desire for peace, and supported by all the
allies.
It remains for me to speak of the final object of this nego-
tiation, of the arrangement by which it would be possible to
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 485
place the Sultan and his powerful vassal in more satisfac-
tory relations with each other, and in a position offering
better security for the future repose of the East.
The importance of conceding to Mehemet Ali the investi-
ture of at least a part of his actual possessions seems now to
be almost unanimously admitted. It is felt, that at the point
of greatness he has reached, the necessity of assuring the
future fortunes of his family, and of placing it, after his
death, in security from the vengeance of the Porte, has too
strongly impressed itself upon his mind to suffer him to
entertain pacific notions until he has obtained satisfaction on
that leading point.
On the other hand, we cannot flatter ourselves with a hope
that the Porte will consent to yield to him this increase of
moral force, unless, by way of compensation, some advantage
is granted to itself which may furnish a material guarantee
against the eventual enterprises of an enemy whose power it
has thus augmented. The nature and extent of this advantage
is not easily determined. Lord Palmerston thinks that it
should not fall short of the entire restitution of Syria.
At Berlin, they seem to admit that the Sultan should con-
tent himself with merely a portion of that province. For
ovirselves, we acknowledge that the Porte has a claim to a
substantial compensation ; but we think that the moment for
fixing the exact proportion has not yet arrived ; that such a
question cannot be decided until after many important and
complicated data have been considered, the full appreciation
of which cannot be the work of a moment ; and that this point
ought to be referred to the concerted understanding, which,
if our views prevail, will be established between the powers.
You will have the goodness to let Lord Palmerston read the
present despatch. In thus laying open to the cabinet of
London, without reserve, the aspect under which we regard
the important circumstances of the moment, we offer it an
unequivocal pledge of the confidence with which it has
VOL. IV. K K
486 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
inspired us, and of our desire to act in the most perfect
accordance.
4. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Marshal, London, June 17th, 1839.
Yesterday Lord Palmerston wrote to request I would
call upon him, stating also that he wished to confer with me
on the affairs of the East. I repaired to him without delay.
I had abstained for several days from pressing too urgently
for an answer to the overtures which I was instructed by
your Excellency to make to the English cabinet ; but the
answer being announced, I considered it right to evince the
most eager anxiety to receive it from the lips of Lord Pal-
merston.
Lord Palmerston stated that the council had occupied
Saturday in deliberating on the affairs of the East, and that
he was authorized to communicate to me the result of that
consultation. He also added that Prince Esterhazy would
only be informed of it after me.
" Hitherto," Lord Palmerston began, " you have only
heard my personal impressions on the Eastern question. I
am now going to tell you the mature opinion of the Council ;
that opinion I beg you will convey to the knowledge of your
government, adding, -svith the transmission, that before acting
we shall wait its judgment on the question."
I shall now lay before you, in a faithful summary, all that
my memory has retained and my reason has classified on the
result of these deliberations of the Council.
The Council has thus decided :
That England is called on to proceed in strict uniformity
with France ; that everything is impossible without this
perfect understanding ; that, with it, all is easy, or at least
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 487
possible. The Council has divided the question into two
parts :
1. Immediate action in the event of a conflict having-
already commenced between the Turkish and Egyptian
armies. 2. The negotiation of such an arrangement as shall
render the renewal of this conflict impossible.
The immediate despatch of our combined squadrons to the
coast of Syria is considered indispensable.
Our admirals should be instructed, if they find hostilities
already commenced, to order the two generals in command
to arrest without delay the march of their armies, and to
extend the radius of distance which six weeks since separated
their respective advanced guards. This order should be
accompanied by a declaration in the name of their govern-
ments, that at Constantinople and Alexandria the great
powers had entered on a treaty of settlement calculated to
satisfy the just pretensions of both parties.
If the Turks refused to stop, the admirals should, without
a moment's delay, despatch two officers to Constantinople to
announce to our ambassadors the refusal of the commandant
of the Ottoman army to acquiesce in our suggestions, and
they would hold him responsible for such a serious infringe-
ment of the relations of the Porte with all the powers of
Europe. Our squadrons would maintain a strict look-out on
the coast of Syi'ia.
If the Egyptians slighted our summons, the admirals
should be instructed to intercept all supplies by sea, and to
detach a considerable portion of the fleet to Alexandria,
where we should appear in imposing force, and with the
threat of blockading the harbour in case Mehemet Ali refused
to suspend the advance of his son.
The Council is of opinion that this demonstration would
suffice to prevent hostilities from breaking out, or to arrest
their progress if they have already commenced.
K K 2
488 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Meanwhile, we should open negotiations at Constantinople
and Alexandria on the double basis of the establishment of
the hereditary right of the family of Mehemet Ali over
Egypt, and of the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptian troops.
The Council thinks that we should encounter no serious diffi-
culty at Constantinople, and that if any presented itself at
Alexandria, we should surmount it by convincing the Pacha
of our union. The Council has neither determined the place
nor details of negotiation ; it merely proposes the basis and
recognizes its indispensable necessity for securing the peace of
the world on a solid foundation.
To render this negotiation successful, the council relies
much on the efficacy of the co-operation of Austria ; but it
also considers that such co-operation should be governed
and led by the union of our two cabinets. Let a single
doubt arise at Vienna on that union, and all will evaporate in
words.
Finally, the Council has weighed the conjuncture under
which, unauthorized by events and even beyond the limits of
reasonable prevision, we might find the Eussians already
established at Constantinople, or in march towards the capital
of the Ottoman empire. This most important question has
been discussed here under the profound impression caused by
the phrase in your Excellency's despatch. No. 16: "I
fear that in London they may treat too lightly the idea
of a new Eussian expedition." The Council thinks that,
in this case, our combined squadrons should appear before
Constantinople as friends, if the Sultan accepted our
aid, and by force, if he refused it. The question of the
passage of the Dardanelles, in a military sense, has also
been debated. It is looked upon as practicable, but dan-
gerous, during the six winter months when the wind blows
from the Mediterranean ; during the six others it is con-
sidered easy, but with troops for disembarkation. I need not
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 489
add, that this last step is, if I may so express myself, an ex-
treme conjecture, but for the accomplishment of which it
rests with us alone to prevent the retractation of England.
Your Excellency has now before you an exact analysis of
the resolutions adopted by the Cabinet Council held the day
before yesterday. My despatch will convey them to you
before you receive a more direct and detailed communication
which Lord Palmerston is at this moment preparing. I
strongly represented the necessity of drawing up a plan of
instruction for the admirals; such points cannot be too
minutely defined. This plan will be communicated by Lord
GTranville to your Excellency.
Prince Esterhazy followed me at Lord Palmerston's. He
will have received the same overtures which were made to
me (perhaps with certain reservations). The Prince is full
of hope as to the success of the Turco-Egyptian negotiation.
The Eussian embassy listens, watches, but hesitates in its
action as in its language. There have been many Eussians in
London during the last month, and some amongst them high
in the confidence of the Emperor. I venture with timidity
an opinion hastily formed, but it appears to me that in that
quarter also they are not prepared for extreme measures.
I venture to entreat that your Excellency will acquaint me
as soon as possible with the opinion formed by the King's
government on the plan proposed by the British ministry.
That opinion will be decisive as to the march of events.
It is long since I have so thoroughly comprehended as I
now do the weight of France in the balance of Europe.
• • • • •
Deign to accept, &c.
BOURQUENEY.
KK 3
490 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
5. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Marshal, London, June 20th, 1839.
I received yesterday the despatch (No. 23) which your
Excellency has done me the honour to address to me under
the date of June the 1 7th, with extracts from the latest corre-
spondence with St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople,
and Alexandria. I informed Lord Palmerston that I had a
communication to make to him on the part of the King's
government. He appointed an interview for the same day, but
the sitting of the House of Commons having commenced by
an important vote in which he was compelled to take part,
my visit was of necessity postponed until the day following.
My despatch (No. 53), which has crossed your Excellency's,
already contained an answer to the greater portion of the
questions on which you now direct me to call for the decision
of the English cabinet. My conference of this day enables
me to complete my information.
I placed your Excellency's despatch in Lord Palmerston's
hands, requesting him to read it himself, and to weigh well
its bearing and object.
Lord Palmerston, after having read the despatch, addressed
me in these words: — "We understand each other upon all
points; our accordance will be complete. Principle, end,
means of execution, all is full of reason, simplicity, and
clearness. This is not the communication of one government
to another ; call it rather an understanding between col-
leaofues, between members of the same cabinet."
I then requested Lord Palmerston to allow me to recapi-
tulate the points on which I perceived some diversities of
opinion, slight, in truth, but real, between the exposition of
the views of the King's government and that of the English
cabinet, as he had explained it to me in our last conversation.
I began with the instructions to the admirals. Lord
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 491
Palmerston had told me that Lord Granville was charged to
communicate to your Excellency a plan of instructions which
approached so clearly to the spirit and letter of the despatch
he had just perused, that he regarded the question of identity
as settled. I observed to him that our naval action was pro-
posed under the form of mediation, and consequently with
the character of impartiality suitable to that position, — that
is to say, that we should use the same language to the respec-
tive commandants of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets. Lord
Palmerston no longer appeared, as on the first day, opposed
to that plan. He added that in the plan of instructions trans-
mitted to Lord G-ranville for communication to your Excel-
lency, it was even proposed to separate the two fleets, and to
direct one on Constantinople, the other on Alexandria. Lord
Palmerston entirely coincides mth the opinion of your Excel-
lency on the advantage of thus vmiting the moral effect
which cannot fail to be produced in the East and elsewhere
by this imposing development of our maritime power.
Passing from the instructions to the admirals, to the
relative strength of the squadrons. Lord Palmerston evinced
sincere satisfaction at the increase we were hastening to
make to ours, and assured me that the English fleet, already
comprising eight sail of the line, would immediately be aug-
mented to ten, to which would be added four or five frigates,
three steamers, and a considerable number of light vessels.
Eeturning then to the very improbable contingency of
our squadrons, on their arrival on the coasts of Syria, finding
the Eussians already in march towards the scene of events.
Lord Palmerston repeated to me that the English cabinet
proposed that our admirals, after summoning the belligerent
parties to cease hostilities, should, through our ambassadors
at Constantinople, demand from the Porte the entrance of
our fleets into the Bosphorus. He added that he was unable
to imagine any pretext under which the Sultan could refuse
our aid, without unmasking such a submission to Kussian
K K 4
492 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
influence as would compel us to adopt other methods, either
to share or oppose it.
But on this point I found Lord Palmerston much dis-
posed to admit, with your Excellency (and building also on
the correspondence from Petersburg and Vienna), that Kussia
would hesitate in any attempt to execute the treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi, and that she is in no manner prepared for
a rupture with Western Europe.
We then reverted to the negotiation, the seat of which
your Excellency proposes to fix at Vienna, and the principles
and object of which are explained in the despatch.
Lord Palmerston, on the first point, that of fixing the seat
of negotiation, requested permission to expose frankly the
doubts he entertained. He stated that he had fears lest the
influence of Eussia should exercise itself more effectually at
Vienna on Prince Metternich, than on Count Appony in Paris,
or on Prince Esterhazy in London. In reply, I urged some
of the objections which naturally presented themselves to my
mind. I said that Prince Metternich would probably feel
flattered by the choice of Vienna as the place of negotiation ;
that this feeling would more readily dispose him to the co-
operation we sought ; that in a question not implicating the
policy of principle, and in which Austrian interests presented
themselves in full evidence as opposed to the interests of
Russia, Prince Metternich would himself be more controlled
at Vienna, than elsewhere, by an Austrian opinion very
strongly declared. Finally, I represented the central position
of Vienna, as a decisive argument in favour of the proposed
selection. Lord Palmerston ended by saying : " I have
thought quite openly before you. I see the for and against ;
and all things considered, I believe the for will carry it, but
I must consult the cabinet, and will acquaint you with its
decision." I expect that it will be favourable.
As to the general datum of the negotiation, that is to say,
the hereditary succession in the family of Mehemet AH, and
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 493
the territorial compensation to the Sultan, Lord Palmerston
repeated to me that the English cabinet entered completely
into the views of the King's government. The arrangement
of the limits of that territorial compensation will undoubt-
edly become a question of debate ; but Lord Palmerston wishes
me to assure your Excellency, that from the point of de-
parture to the end of the treaty, from the principle to the
execution, the most intimate understanding and concert
cannot cease to reign between the two cabinets.
You have here, Marshal, an exact analysis of the conver-
sation I held this morning with Lord Palmerston.
Lord Palmerston requested permission to communicate to
Lord Melbourne your Excellency's despatch. I felt it my
duty not to refuse this mark of confidence.
I pray you to accept, &c. Bouequeney.
6. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Paris, June 27th, 1839.
The approbation given by the British cabinet to the plan
you were instructed to communicate to Lord Palmerston for
the settlement of the affairs of the East, a plan, which, in all
its parts, approaches so closely to the ideas which that
minister himself transmitted to us, has afforded warm satis-
faction to the King's government. We find an additional
pledge of concert in the instructions destined for Admiral
Stopford, the substance of which Lord Grranville has made
me acquainted with. The spirit in which they are conceived
is in general relation with our own views, as to the means of
solving the crisis which threatens the peace of the world.
You will judge of this by the conformity of the English in-
structions with those which our minister of Marine has this
day forwarded to Admiral Lalande. I enclose you a copy,
that you may place them under Lord Palmerston's eyes. We
have not thought it necessary to touch on a highly important
49-i IIISTOIUC DOCUMENTS.
point, which might embarrass the arrangements of the British
Admiralty, — the hypothesis of the arrival of Russian forces
at Constantinople. Tliat hypothesis involves considerations
I am about to explain to you, and which I request you will
submit to the examination of Lord Palmerston.
It appears to us that in directing its attention solely to the
prolongation of the stay of the Russians after the retreat of
the Egyptian army, by referring to that epoch, and in re-
serving for that single contingency the measures to be.
adopted to obtain the passage of the Dardanelles for the
allied squadrons, the cabinet of London has not sufficiently
provided for the exigencies of the situation. We think that
at the moment of the arrival of the Russians at Constanti-
nople, the great interests of European equilibrium, and still
more, perhaps, the susceptibilities of public opinion, justly
exacting, would require that the English and French flags
should show themselves there also. We believe that, instead
of waiting the course of events, and of leaving to the am-
bassadors and admirals themselves the initiative and the
responsibility of the important events that may become
necessary, France and England ought, without losing a
moment, and obtaining, if possible, the assent of Austria, to
demand from the Porte the free passage of the Dardanelles
for their ships, at the same time when the Russian forces
reach the Bosphorus, so as to enable them to co-operate
together for the protection of the Sultan's throne. It is
certain that the Porte, if left to itself, could not fail to accept
joyfully the additional guarantees which would thus be
offered against the conflicting dangers to which its inde-
pendence and security are exposed. Should any external
influence, on the contrary, impel it to a refusal, such a re-
jection wovild be significant, and France and England would
then have to understand each other on the resolutions to be
mutually adopted in consequence. But I think that according
to the positive data we possess on this point, it would be pre-
HISTOlllC DOCUMENTS. 495
mature to confide to the admirals eventual, and in some degree
hypothetical powers, which, under circumstances easily con-
ceived, might lead to serious and irremediable complications.
Let me know, I pray you, as soon as possible, what Lord
Palmerston thinks of this proposition. If the British cabi-
net feels disposed to adopt it, I am of opinion that not a
moment should be lost ; the least delay might deprive it of
all its value.
You have alreadyrlearned the commencement of hostilities
between the Turks and Egyptians. I send you an extract
from the despatch of M. Cochelet, which announces this deplo-
rable fact. It contains, in addition, the most complete and
peremptory refutation of the pretended grievances by which
the Porte endeavoured to fix on the viceroy the blame of
provocation.
At Constantinople they were still ignorant, up to the
seventh of this month, as to what was passing in Syria, but
intelligence was expected. The Ottoman fleet was preparing
to put to sea. I ought not to conceal from you that all
reports confirm the assertion of our ambassador as to the
influence exercised by Lord Ponsouby.
7. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Paris, July 9th, 1839.
. . . The King's government has learned with much
satisfaction the consent of the cabinet of London to the proposi-
tion of a step being taken with the Porte to obtain the passage
of the Dardanelles for the squadrons of France and England,
in case the forces of another power should be invited to the
succour of Constantinople. The anxiety manifested by the
cabinet in preparing the necessary instructions for Lord
Ponsonby, furnishes an unequivocal pledge of the sincerity
and earnestness of its adhesion. Nevertheless, I know not
496 msToiiic documents.
whether in London they have sufficiently considered the
importance of a complete understanding, in form as well as
in object, in a negotiation of so much moment and delicacy,
and which is about to be confided to two ambassadors whose
reciprocal antecedents unfortunately ill dispose them to a
perfect concert. To guard as much as possible against this
last inconvenience, I had prepared the draft of the subjoined
note, with the intention of communicating it previously to
the British cabinet, and of arranging its -adoption in mutual
accordance. As you will see, the leading idea is to impress
on the step of which it treats, a European character. I
request you to lay it before Lord Palmerston. It may so
happen that it arrives after the despatches to Lord Ponsonby
have been forwarded ; but if approved of by the British
government, supplementary instructions might be sent to
its representative. . . . M. de Sainte-Aulaire will acquaint
Prince Metternich with the mission entrusted to the two
ambassadors, and he will endeavour to associate the Austrian
internuncio mth it in some degree or other.
What you have made known to me on the substance of
the instructions transmitted to Lord Ponsonby, has suggested
a reflection to which perhaps it would not be inappropriate
to call Lord Palmerston's attention. To ask the Porte, in
a specific case, to call for the aid of our squadrons, is not
this in some degree affording it a facility of keeping them
at a distance from the Dardanelles, by eluding or delaying
this invitation through the means of some pretext more or less
specious ? Would it not be better to ask the Porte simply to
issue the necessary orders for their reception in the straits,
on their presenting themselves after the accomplishment of the
condition which permitted the^ to appear there ? I think
we should obtain a substantial advantage by thus reserving
to ourselves the initiative, and in this sense the draft of the
note I forward is drawn up.
The news from Alexandria comes down to the 19th of
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 497
June. The viceroy, informed of the progress of the Ottoman
army in the invasion of Syria, had forwarded orders to
Ibrahim Pacha to repulse and pursue it beyond the frontiers,
when my orderly officer, M. Callier, whose mission I apprised
you of, reached Alexandria. The viceroy, after listening
to the representations which M. Callier, in concert with M.
Cochelet, communicated to him on my part, consented, not
without repugnance easily conceived, to recall the authority
he had transmitted to Ibrahim, and to command him to
limit himself to the repulse of the invasion, and this result
being accomplished, to pause wherever he might then find
himself. M. Callier was instructed to carry this order
to Ibrahim Pacha. ... It would be difficult not to admit
that in the whole progress of this affair, the Turks seem
to take pleasure in leaving to their adversaries the advan-
tages of sincerity and moderation.
This remark assumes a character of much more incontes-
tible evidence, when we compare the reception given by
the viceroy to our counsels, with that which the warnings
of Admiral Roussin obtained at Constantinople. In vain
did that ambassador, without suffering himself to be dis-
couraged by the ill success of his friendly remonstrances,
demand explanations as to the sailing of the fleet ; in vain,
after receiving fresh instructions forwarded to him by me,
did he return to the charge, and seek to open the eyes of
the Sultan on the dangers into which he thus wantonly
precipitated himself. . . . The Porte has completely thrown
off the mask with which it covered itself only a few days
before; it now avows its hostile projects, and that the fleet
is destined to effect a disembarkation.
The refusal of Lord Ponsonby to support the representations
of his colleague is a lamentable circumstance. The mere
silence of the English ambassador, in such a conjuncture, has
acted as an encouragement to the rash designs of the Porte.
Unfortunately, that encouragement results even more di-
498 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
rectly in a strange circumstance to which allusion is made
in the correspondence of Admiral Eoussin, namely, the
promise of the despatch of English forces to Bassora, with a
view of preventing the pretended aggressive projects of the
Egyptians. One of the smallest dangers resulting from such
a measure would be the pretext or rather the justification it
would prepare for the occupation of Constantinople by a
Russian army. I have spoken to Lord Granville on this
subject without reserve, while avoiding at the same time any
expression that might give my language the appearance of an
official complaint. On your part you will confine yourself to
placing under the eyes of Lord Palmerston the documents I
forward to you, and you will acquaint me with any explana-
tions he may feel disposed to give.
8. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Lmuhn, July "dth, 1839. .
On reaching Lord Palmerston's residence yesterday, I
began by inquiring whether the courier bearing the instruc-
tions to Lord Ponsonby had commenced his journey. Lord
Palmerston informed me that the despatches were not yet
completely ready, and -could not be so for four and twenty
hours. " I rejoice to hear it," I replied, " for I come by order
of my government to suggest to your Lordship, in the form
of your proposal to the Sultan, a modification, the propriety
of which I have no doubt you will fully appreciate." I then
began to read your Excellency's despatch. I paused at the
third paragraph, intending to return subsequently to that
with which it concluded, but in the mean time confining
myself to the separate discussion and arrangement of the
questions respecting the instructions to our ambassadors. I
then placed in Lord Palmerston's hands the draft of the note
prepared for Admiral Eoussin.
Lord Palmerston, who listened with the most profound
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 499
attention to your Excellency's despatch, and who read de-
liberately, weighing each expression, the draft of the note for
the King's ambassador at Constantinople, renders full justice
to the political view under which that note has been drawn up.
He acknowledges, with your Excellency, that both cabinets
will obtain a real advantage by reserving to themselves the
initiative in the step of immediately requiring the Porte to
issue the necessary orders for the admission of our squadrons,
after the accomplishment of the conditions to which we
ourselves subordinate that admission. In its form, Lord
Palmerston thinks that the first part of the note, notwith-
standing all the precautions of language with which it is
invested, presents to the Sultan a picture too faithful, but at
the same time too sombre, of his actual position. He fears
that such a frank expression of the truth may incline him to
reject our proposal. He feels satisfied that these documents
will be communicated by the Porte to Eussia on the same day
when they reach Constantinople ; and he apprehends, over the
haughty and blind spirit of the Sultan, the abuse by Eussia
of a language which she might represent to him as humiliating
to his crown. The second part of the note, and all the con-
siderations on which it founds European concert, he considers
excellent. But Lord Palmerston does not even insist upon
the first objection ; he is satisfied to leave it to the enlightened
consideration of the King's government. He merely apprises
us that the note of Lord Ponsonby will, in this part of its
detail, present a slight difference to that of Admiral Eoussin.
I could not refrain from observing to Lord Palmerston that
there was no method of escaping from the necessity of fore-
seeing or of making foreseen a catastrophe, in the form of
drawing up a note, the object of which was to offer the means
of preventing it, and which only founded the occasion for the
measure adopted on the very 'preliminaries of that expected
catastrophe. I added that our action on the Porte since the
events in Syria had always consisted in alarming the Sultan,
500 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
80 as to restrain him within the bounds of moderation ; in
telling him the truth, in fact, to render him wise. " You are
right," replied Lord Palmerston; "I admit the necessity
which controls us ; thus I do not reject the idea ; I adopt it
even to the letter. I only think we ought to be cautious in
its development."
I promised Lord Palmerston to communicate this observa-
tion to your Excellency.
I offered Lord Palmerston, for bearer of his despatch to
Lord Ponsonby, the courier your Excellency has appointed
to proceed overland to Admiral Eoussin. Lord Palmerston
thanked me, but he will naturally avail himself of the
messenger who should have left London yesterday, but whose
departure is now delayed for forty-eight hours to insert in
the instructions to Lord Ponsonby the modifications proposed
by the King's government.
The English courier, as will also yours, must go through
Vienna, and Lord Beau vale, with M. de Sainte-Aulaire, will
receive orders to exert their utmost efforts to induce the
Austrian cabinet to associate itself with our measure.
This first question being disposed of, I resumed and finished
the reading of your Excellency's despatch. I then handed to
Lord Palmerston the extracts from the last despatches of the
King's ambassador at Constantinople, and added : '* I am not
charged with any official complaint. Some strange facts have
taken place. I am ordered to place before your Lordship the
documents which verify them, and to wait the explanations
which yovi may consider due to the mutual confidence of our
two cabinets.
Lord Palmerston rang the bell, and ordered the four last
months of Lord Ponsonby's correspondence to be brought to
him, with the two last years of that of Colonel Campbell.
"Let us confine ourselves at first," he said to me, "to
what concerns Lord Ponsonby; we will then turn to the
affair of Bassora. I feel boimd to prove to you that my
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 501
instructions have never varied on this fundamental point ;
that the English ambassador at Constantinople was to con-
sider it his constant duty to restrain the warlike propensities
of the Sultan. On the basis of the question there is no
divergence between us ; that we may be a little more pre-
possessed with the quality of the sovereign than with that of
the vassal, that our bias may incline on the side of that
principle, is quite true. But the reason is, that in our esti-
mation the fact is on the side of the principle. The inde-
pendence and stability of the Sultan's throne seem to us to
requu'e that partiality, and we have always dreaded lest in
wounding the pride of the sovereign of Constantinople we
should furnish Eussia with a weapon against us. But I
affirm to you that we have incessantly repeated to Lord Pon-
sonby, ' Prevent war from breaking out.' "
Lord Palmerston then made me read seven or eight de-
spatches written by him to Lord Ponsonby, from the end of
January to the middle of June, and all founded on this general
datum.
" Now," Lord Palmerston resumed, " I cannot conceal
from you that the personal opinion of Lord Ponsonby, an
opinion in which I by no means participate, has always been
opposed to the maintenance of the statu quo of Kutaieh ; he
preferred even extreme measures as at least susceptible of a
favourable termination. But I am justified in beUeving, that
in his official relations at Constantinople the ambassador has
subordinated his personal opinions to his instructions."
(Lord Palmerston then read to me, at hazard, all the last
despatches of Lord Ponsonby, which verified his pacific endea-
vours with the Porte.)
I observed to Lord Palmerston that it seemed to me very
difficult to suppose that the personal opinions of the ambas-
sador — easily penetrated on the spot, and traTisparent, even
in the despatches I had just read — must not have detracted
in some measure from the efficacy of his pacific action at
VOL. IV. L L
502 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Constantinople. Lord Palmerston, without directly assenting
to my opinion, answered in such a manner as to convince me
that he entertained similar apprehensions.
In any other country, the result of this conversation would
have been the probable recall of Pord Ponsonby. Here mat-
ters are differently arranged. External affairs are entirely
regulated by internal influences.
With reference to the refusal of Lord Ponsonby to associate
himself with the step reported by Admiral Eoussin in his
despatch of the 14th of June, I demanded of Lord Palmer-
ston whether such a circumstance would be repeated after
the close union now manifesting itself between the two
cabinets on the affairs of the East. Lord Palmerston assured
me that Lord Ponsonby had already received, and would
speedily receive in addition, official and confidential instruc-
tions which would give an entirely new character to his lan-
guage and conduct.
*' I now come," said Lord Palmerston, " to the affair of
Bassora. IMore than two years have elapsed since we en-
gaged Mehemet Ali not to extend his occupation towards
the Persian Gulf. To our remonstrances at Alexandria he
has always replied by a denial of the facts. The reports of
our agents convinced us that the occupation had actually
taken place, and that Egyptian officers had entered Bassora,
Lalesa, and Katif, and were menacing the small island of
Baleraie, under the pretext of preventing it from becoming
a focus of insurrection against themselves. At Alexandria we
had threatened to employ force to prevent any Egyptian
establishment in the Persian Gulf ; but before adopting that
extreme measure we had thought it right to apply to the
sovereign cle jure to ascertain whether he had given consent
to this extension of Egyptian power. Undoubtedly we knew
that the reply would be in the negative ; but we thought by
this course to render our action regular. This is the step
alluded to in the despatches you have just read to me. After
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 503
that, I may add that we never contemplated anything beyond
sending out a ship of war without troops for disembarkation.
This demonstration alone appeared to us likely to be more
than sufficient. I must also inform you that this question,
exclusively special for us, with relation to the Persian Grulf,
has nothing in common -with the events of Syria, and will
have no influence whatever on our course in the general
negociation."
I asked Lord Palmerston whether he did not apprehend
that at Constantinople the recent proceeding of Lord Pon-
sonby might be translated into an encouragement of the
warlike propensities of the Sultan. He answered, that if so,
it was because they were determined to deceive themselves
as to its bearing, for it was well known, for a year at least,
that the matter was in dispute between the English govern-
ment and the Pacha of Egypt.
Lord Palmerston placed before me the entire correspon-
dence of Colonel Campbell since November 1837, and I am
bound to admit that it settles the question on the data he
had previously laid down.
It is not for me to decide whether the King's government
will be contented^ with those explanations ; but I can assure
your Excellency that there is here every desire to render
them satisfactory.
I pray you to receive, &c.
BOUEQUENET.
9. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult
Marshal, -^^^^^""' '^"^^ 1^^^*' ^^39.
. . . Lord Palmerston gives his most unreserved con-
sent to the plan of declaration by which the powers engage
themselves to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire,
without excepting any portion of its territory. Lord Palmer-
ll2
501 HISTORIC DOCUxMENTS.
ston is ready to make this announcement in the name of the
British ministry ; and he proposes, moreover, to the King's
government, when all the declarations reach Vienna, to
combine them under the most solemn form of a general
engagement. ...
10. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Monsieur le Marechal,
Lord Palmerston had just received his courier from Vienna
when I brought to him your Excellency's despatch (No. 27),
and the extracts from the correspondence of the Count de
Sainte-Aulaire. After reading them, he replied by commu-
nicating to me the despatches and confidential letters of Lord
Beauvale, without the omission of a single syllable.
Our ambassadors agree entirely on the dispositions of
Prince Metternich : they entertain the same hope of inducing
the Austrian cabinet to join in our political action at Con-
stantinople ; the same anticipation of the death of the Sultan ;
and the same approval of the plan of declaration by which
the European powers would solemnly pledge themselves to
maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, — the initiative
of which plan has been assumed by M. de Metternich in his
successive conferences with M. de Sainte-Aulaire and Lord
Beauvale.
As I had the honour of announcing yesterday in my des-
patch (No. 62), Lord Palmerston has ratified without reserve
the favourable opinion which your Excellency expressed on
the proposition of Prince Metternich respecting all the mea-
sures to be adopted. Starting always from this general
datum, that Russia is at the present moment incapable,
Lord Palmerston expects that we shall obtain her concurrence.
A refusal would completely change the order of facts.
Lord Palmerston asked me if the King's government.
HISTORIC DOCURIENTS. 505
favourable as it had expressed itself to the idea of M. de
Metternichj had found time to determine on the form of the
declaration by which it would reply to the Austrian cabinet.
I told him that I had as yet received no information on that
point. He then requested me to consult our ministry on the
project of uniting at Vienna, in a general European act, all
the individual declarations of the powers as soon as they
should reach the seat of negotiation. Ever since his lordship
has admitted the advantage of fixing on Vienna for that pur-
pose, I owe him the justice to acknowledge that I cannot
perceive the slightest disposition on his part to reserve any
points for exclusive consideration in London, beyond the
share of control which every cabinet has naturally a right to
exercise in communication with its own ambassador.
Lord Palmerston is equally anxious to ascertain whether
our government coincides with the opinion he expressed to
me yesterday, and which I have already had the honour of
transmitting to your Excellency, on the necessity of making
the presumed death of the Sultan a plea for the admission of
our squadrons into the Sea of Marmara. This project will
lead to a certain increase of latitude and responsibility in the
instructions to be conveyed to our ambassadors at Constan-
tinople ; for in such an eventuality they must necessarily be
left to judge of circumstances which we cannot possibly fore-
stall at this distance from the scene of action. ,
In his despatch of the 1st of July, Lord Beauvale strongly
recommends to Lord Palmerston the plan of adding to our
squadrons on the coast of Syria some Eussian men-of-war
from the Black Sea. The arguments are ably set forward : —
" We flatter Russia, and lead her into the European concert ;
we take from her all pretext for using her influence at Con-
stantinople to close the Dardanelles against our ships ; finally,
we extort from her a pledge, for such her detachment would
be in the midst of our two fleets." These arguments have
not, up to this date, shaken the opinion which Lord Palmer-
L l3
506 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
ston had previously expressed to me on the closing of the Sea
of jNIarmara by the Bosphorus and the straits. The general
manner of contemplating the question remains the same,
with the single exception to which we have recourse at this
moment;, as our couriers are on the road to Constantinople
bearing a demand for the admission of our squadrons in a
given case ; and the expected death of the Sultan adds to the
probable contingencies which may render that admission
necessary. " But," Lord Palmerston observed, " the advan-
tage of the presence of Eussian ships on the coast of Syria
does not appear to me to be sufficiently demonstrated to call
for a deviation from principle." He then added this curious
fact: "When we returned to power in 1835, I waited on the
Duke of Wellington : my intimacy with him j ustified a coU'
fidential step. I mentioned to the Duke that the East being
called upon to act an important part in the affairs of Europe,
I was extremely anxious to ascertain his opinion on the two
plans which offered themselves to our policy, — either to open
the Sea of Marmara to our fleets, and consequently to those
of the other powers, or to close it to all, including our own..
The Duke replied, without hesitation, — 'Close it; on those
shores we are too far from our resources, while Eussia has
hers at hand.' His words struck me," continued Lord
Palmerston, " as being full of sense and sound argument."
Lord Palmerston read to me the despatch he was about to
send to Lord Clanricarde, in answer to the last communication
from Count de Nesselrode. The English cabinet thanks the
cabinet of St. Petersbourg for the readiness with which it
offers to co-operate in restricting the theatre of the struggle
between the two belligerent parties ; but it insists on the
necessity of rendering impossible a repetition of events which
might compromise the peace of the world ; and it considers
a permanent arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet
Ali as the surest means of obtaining the end proposed by the
European powers. The despatch adverts several times to
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 507
the close union existing between the cabinets of London and
Paris, — a union which has dictated the instructions forwarded
to the admirals commanding our respective squadrons in the
Mediterranean.
Lord Beauvale had added to his despatch of the 2nd of
July to Lord Palmerston, a private letter from Lord Pon-
sonby, which reached him by the last post from Constan-
tinople. Lord Palmerston expressed a wish that I should read
it. My impression is that Lord Ponsonby does not always
confine himself to the views of his oivn cabinet The letter
is an appeal to his colleagues and to the cabinets they
represent. In it he speaks of the death of the Sultan as
of a realized fact; he exclaims against the policy of the
statu quo, which, according to him, has ruined the East
since 1832. He says there is not a moment to be lost in
repairing its errors. Our flags must wave before Constan-
tinople ; Austria must declare her determination to push an
army in advance, &c. Constantinople once in the power of
the Eussians, and there no longer remains one single first-
rate power in Europe, — England alone excepted, if she
stoops to enter into a disgraceful bargain with the cabinet
of St. Petersbourg. All this is a compound of good and bad
ideas, nearly always ingenious, but often inapplicable. I was
before inclined to think that Lord Ponsonby is not a very scru-
pulous organ of the policy of his cabinet ; now I am convinced
of it. I venture to request that your Excellency will maintain
secrecy on the communication which I owe entirely to the
confidence^ of Lord Palmerston.
I pray you to accept, &c.
BOURQUENET.
L L 4
508 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
11. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Monsieur le Baron, ^""'"'^ '^"^^ 1^^'*' ^^^^-
Under the very serious crisis into which the death of the
Sultan Mahmoud, happening in the midst of the events which
have marked the last months of his reign, has plunged the Otto-
man empire, the union of the great powers of Europe could
alone offer a satisfactory guarantee to the friends of peace.
The communications exchanged for several weeks have for-
tunately proved that this union is as complete as can
possibly be wished. All the cabinets desire the independence
and integrity of the Ottoman Porte under the dynasty
actually on the throne; all are disposed to employ their
means of action and influence to secure the continuance of
this essential element in the political equilibrium, and they
would not hesitate to declare themselves against any com-
bination whatever that might seek to assail it. Such a
perfect unanimity of sentiment and resolution being suffi-
cient, since no one can refuse to doubt it, not only to
prevent any attempt against this great interest, but, in
addition, to dissipate the anxieties, the urgency of which
constitute in themselves a substantial danger in consequence
of the general agitation they excite, — the King's government
is of opinion that the cabinets wovild take an important step
to the secure establishment of peace, by announcing in
written documents, reciprocally communicated, and which
would of necessity soon obtain publicity more or less com-
plete, a statement of the intentions I have named above.
As far as we are concerned, I declare formally that such
are and will continue to be ours, and I authorize you to
leave a copy of the present despatch with Lord Palmerston,
having previously given it to him to read. I feel satisfied
that the British government in the answer it will undoubtedly
consider due to the letter with which you will accompany
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 509
this despatch, will adhere, in the most formal manner, to
this profession of faith, so entirely conformable to the repeat-
edly expressed avowal of its policy. If, as I have reason
to hope, the cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersbourg,
reply in the same tone to similar communications I am
about to forward to them, the end which the King's govern-
ment purposes to itself will be accomplished.
His Majesty, desirous of affording an unequivocal testi-
mony of the friendly dispositions with which he is animated
towards the Porte, has instructed me to forward to Admiral
Eoussin, without waiting the official intelligence or even
a direct confirmation of the death of the Sultan Mahmoud,
his credentials as ambassador to the new Emperor.
12. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueiuy.
Paris, July 17th, 1839.
Monsieur le Baron,
I have made known to you by telegraph the death of
the Sultan Mahmoud, the news of which we received through
the same channel, and which the last despatches from Con-
stantinople announced as being then imminent. It is to
be apprehended that the order transmitted to Hafiz Pacha
for the suspension of hostilities may have reached him too
late to prevent the expected battle. Although it is at
present extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the
influence which this change of reign may exercise upon the
destinies of the East, it is evident that they have reached
a crisis which calls for the most serious and loyal concurrence
of all the cabinets to secure the continuance of peace. It
seems to me that the moment has arrived to act upon the
idea already suggested by M. de Metternich, of guaranteeing,
by means of an interchange of diplomatic declarations, the
maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman
510 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
empire ; and to* prevent any delay, I have resolved to
assume the initiative myself in the necessary steps to be
taken for that object. The accompanying despatch formally
expresses on our part the engagement of which I now speak.
Lord Palmerston will, I have no doubt, reply to the com-
munication you will make to him, in terms sufficiently precise
to attain the end we have in view.
13. Baron de Bourqueney to Lord Palmerston.
London^ July \Qth, 1839.
My Lord,
I obey the orders of my government in transmitting to
your Excellency, without delay, a copy of the despatch I
have this moment received from the Marshal Duke of
Dalmatia, bearing date July the 17th.
The King's government, my Lord, feels assured before-
hand that it will find in the cabinet of her Britannic Majesty
principles and sentiments conformable to those which direct
and will invariably continue to direct its policy in the
affairs of -the East; but it attaches an important value to
the acknowledgment of a new testimony of that happy
unanimity.
I pray your Excellency to acknowledge the receipt of
this letter, &c.
Bourqueney.
14. Lord Palmerston to the Baron de Bourqueney.
Foreign Office, July 22nd, 1839.
Monsieur le Baron,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note
of the 19th inst., enclosing, by order of your government, a
copy of a despatch, dated the 17th inst., which you have
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 511
received from the Duke of Dalmatia, relative to the present
posture of affairs in Turkey.
I have to express to you, in reply, the great satisfaction
Avith which her Majesty's government has received this
communication, and lose no time in authorising you to assure
your own government that the British cabinet, like that of
France, desires to uphold the integrity and independence of
the Ottoman empire under its existing dynasty ; and is
ready to use its influence and its means of action for the
purpose of maintaining this essential element of the balance
of power in Europe; and like that of France, would not
hesitate to declare itself openly against any combination
which might be conceived in a spirit of hostility to the prin-
ciples above mentioned.
I have the honour to be, with high consideration.
Monsieur le Baron,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Palmekston.
15. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Monsieur le Marechal, ^'''^'''' '^"^^ 2^'^^^' ^^^^'
I have communicated to Lord Palmerston the two tele-
graphic despatches of yesterday's date, which your Excel-
lency has done me the honour to forward. They have
naturally produced a most painful impression upon his mind,
and he was unable to restrain an ebullition of displeasure at
the blindness which has exposed Mahmoud and his empire to
such a disastrous event.
Upon considering, however, more calmly, the general
position, and assuming that Ibrahim Pacha may not have
followed up his successes to an extremity dangerous to the
actual safety of the Ottoman empire. Lord Palmerston has
gradually come to a conclusion analogous to that of his first
512 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
reasoning, when I informed him of the death of the Sultan.
The second event, like the first, finds, as he thinks, the great
powers nearly determined as to the means of preventing
all European complication ; the interchange between our
two cabinets of declarations relative to the maintenance of
the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, is
even an additional step in this sound direction; by perse-
vering in the same course. Lord Palmerston hopes that every
impending catastrophe may be prevented.
^ At the same time his mind is strongly impressed by the
deplorable prostration of the Ottoman power, at the moment
when it passes into the hands of a sovereign of sixteen years
of age ; and this prostration must of necessity form a serious
cause of regret and alarm to the powers who are the disin-
terested protectors of the Porte. Lord Palmerston associates
this reflection with a natural tendency to suspect that Russia,
without absolutely desiring a European complication, but
looking upon the weakness of the Ottoman power as favour-
able to her views for the future, may have secretly urged on
Egypt and the Porte to this last collision. This suspicion he
holds as confirmed by the recent efforts of the Russian
cabinet to resti-ict the theatre of contest within certain limits,
and to prescribe to the presumed victor, Ibrahim Pacha, the
route of Diarbekir, — a direction which would not compel the
Porte to demand the fulfilment of the treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi, and for which Russia feels herself at this moment
unprepared.
Passing from these general considerations to the practical
side of the question, I asked Lord Palmerston whether he
considered that the news of the defeat of the Turkish army
required any modification in the measures already adopted
by our two cabinets under an anticipation of the event now
realized. Lord Palmerston replied that as yet he saw no
such necessity.
" The instructions to our admirals," he said, " enable them
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 513
to deal with the event of the 24th of June. Ibrahim Pacha
will probably have paused of his own accord in his first
successes. Should he prosecute them, the commanders of
our squadrons have their course traced out ; if, on the other
hand, terror should again have thrown the Porte into the
arms of Eussia, our first instructions to the ambassadors
peremptorily indicate to them the demand they will then
address to the Porte for the admission of our fleets into the
Sea of Marmara. We must redouble our efforts and activity
at Vienna to push on the conclusion of a permanent settle-
ment, the general bases of which have already been pre-
arranged by the other powers as the limits within which the
negociation is to proceed. Egypt will, of course, become
more exacting ; but European concert will be able to triumph
over all these obstacles.
Your Excellency has now a summary of the principal
points of Lord Palmerston's conversation. ... I may
add, in confidence, that in case the King's government
should feel the necessity of modification in the course pur-
sued up to this moment, any overtures on that subject will
be received here with sincere deference.
Lord Palmerston requests me to thank your Excellency in
his name for the promptness and accuracy of your com-
munications.
Pray accept, &c.
BOUEQUENEY.
16. Marshal Soidt to Baron de Bourqueney.
Paris, July ^Qth, 1839.
• •••••
The answer given by Lord Palmerston to the declaration,
a copy of which I instructed you to remit to him, is satis-
factory on all points.
514 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
The important news which have reached us within the last
few days from the East, have given an entirely new aspect to
the state of affairs. Whatever may have been our anxiety as
to the future, arising from the magnitude of the danger to
which the late policy of the Sultan Mahmoud exposed the
Ottoman empire, the event has exceeded all conjectures.
The death of the Sultan, the utter defeat of the Turkish
army in Syria, the defection of the fleet, have placed that
empire in such a position, that henceforward the protection
of Europe and the j^rudence of Mehemet Ali are the only
securities remaining to the throne of the young Abdul
Medjid.
. . . The Porte, a few days after the death of the
Sultan Mahmoud, while still unacquainted with the defection
of the fleet, but doubtlessly aware of the defeat of Hafiz
Pacha, announced officially to the representatives of the
great powers, its intention to seek a reconciliation with the
viceroy, and to make concessions to him with this object.
JMehemet, inflated by the feeling of superiority derived from
recent circumstances, evinced a disposition to exorbitant
demands.
The rapidity with which events hasten onwards, excite ap-
prehensions that the crisis may wind up by some arrange-
ment in which the European powers will not have time to
interfere, and that, consequently, the interests essential to the
general policy may not be sufficiently considered. This danger
is an inevitable consequence of our distance from Constanti-
nople, and there are no means of providing an absolute re-
medy. I think, however, that it will be desirable to continue
the course adopted up to this time, and which consists in sub-
ordinating as much as possible to an intimate and sustained
concert between the cabinets, the action which some amongst
them are prepared to exercise in the Eastern question. As
regards England and France, including also Austria, although
she does not as openly proclaim her views, the principle and
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 515
veritable object of this concert is to restrain Eussia, and to
accustom her to treat in common on oriental affairs. It is
enough to say, that under existing conjunctures, there is
more reason than ever for our strict unanimity, and the same
sentiment prevails at Vienna. M. de Mettermich even evinces
a strong prepossession on this point.
This being agreed, I consider that the powers, while giving
full approbation to the conciliatory sentiments of the Porte,
should insist upon nothing being precipitated, and should in-
terdict all treaty with the viceroy, except through the inter-
vention and concurrence of its allies, whose co-operation
would undoubtedly supply the best means of securing better
and more securely guaranteed conditions.
I think that the same powers should at Alexandria assume
a tone and language with the viceroy calculated to make
him feel that, whatever advantages he may have obtained, he
would encounter the risk of compromising by seeking to
push them too far, and that if he attempted, under any form
or pretext whatever, to extort from the Sultan conditions
incompatible with the dignity and security of his throne,
combined Europe would interfere in opposition. To render
such language effectual, the consuls should be empowered to
adopt it simultaneously, and in such terms as to prove their
entire accordance. It is also essential that the firmness, I
had almost said the severity of the advice conveyed, should
be tempered by a tone of moderation and good feeling which,
while checking the audacity of JMehemet Ali, would ab-
stain from wounding too deeply his pride and ambition.
There would assuredly be affectation in seeming to believe,
that after the successes he has obtained through the senseless
acfsression of the Porte, he would not feel himself in a con-
dition to expect more than he had a right previously to
demand. This would be to deny the empire of facts, and
the necessities of the situation. If the viceroy were to con-
vince himself that he had nothing to expect from the equity
516 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
of the powers, he would revolt against their imperious re-
presentations, and his irritation might, from one moment to
another, bring on consequences, the very possibility of which
is sufficient to alarm all provident minds.
Such are the first impressions the King's government has
received from the latest oriental news. You will make them
known to Lord Palmerston, and ascertain whether they coin-
cide with the views of the British cabinet.
You will remark in Admiral Roussin's despatch, in which
he details the propositions submitted by the Porte to Me-
hemet Ali, that which concedes to the Pacha the investiture
for life of the sovereignty of Egypt. Our ambassador has
mistaken the intention of Nourri Eflfendi. The question is
of hereditary investiture, as evidently results from two docu-
ments appended to the report of the Austrian charge d'af-
faires on the conference in which these reports were com-
municated to the representatives of the powers, and also
from the letter Avith which the Grand Vizier transmitted them
to the viceroy.
17. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Monsieur le Marechal, Lmdon, July Tith, 1839.
I received this morning the telegraphic despatch, in
which your Excellency announces to me the defection of the
Capitan Pacha. I wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston to
acquaint him with this important intelligence. He replied
by requesting me to call on him at two o'clock at the
Foreign Office ; a cabinet council was being held there, and
I believe he was anxious to consult his colleagues during that
sitting.
Lord Palmerston left the Council to read the telegraphic
' HISTOllIC DOCUMENTS. 517
desj^atch, and returned to communicate it to the other
members of the cabinet. The result of their deliberation
was, that until they ascertained the particulars of this
new event, nothing should be modified in the preceding
instructions.
A courier from Vienna, who left that city on the 17th
instant, arrived this morning in London. He brings news
from Constantinople to the 8th. The treason of the Capitan-
Pacha was already known at that date. Prince Esterhazy
handed to me the despatch of M. de Metternich to read, and
the extracts from the correspondence of Baron Sturmer.
The description given by the charge d'affaires is extremely
sombre. Prince Metternich writes to Prince Esterhazy that
time must not be luasted in lamentation, and that the
moment has arrived for cementing more closely than ever
the union of the governments in the projected negotiation at
Vienna.
Lord Palmerston spoke with me this morning in the same
sense ; he thinks we should press as urgently as possible the
conclusion of the arrangement, under the protection of the
five courts. He says that Lord Beauvale is amply provided
with instructions and powers to that effect. These instruc-
tions, as your -Excellency is aware, include the hereditary
sovereignty in the family of Mehemet Ali, and a territorial
compensation for the Ottoman Porte. I hear that, in the
opinion of the English cabinet, this compensation amounts to
the complete restoration of Syria I but I do not think it will
be insisted on as a sine qua non.
Lord Palmerston is strongly apprehensive that the Eussian
cabinet will urge at Constantinople a direct arrangement be-
tween the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which would break down,
by rendering them useless, the negotiations of Vienna, with
the accruing guarantees ; but he thinks that even admitting the
case of direct settlement, we should continue our efforts to
VOL. IV. M M
518 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
produce from the moral concurrence of the four courts an act
to which the fifth would be compelled to subscribe.
• •••••
Deign to accept, &c.
BOURQUENEY.
18. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
Monsieur le Marechal, London, July Zlst, 1839,
• «•«•*
Yesterday, when I was preparing to send off the portfolio
of the embassy, Lord Palmerston wrote to request I would
call upon him. He had just received his courier from Paris,
and he was anxious to show me the correspondence of Lord
G-ranville, being struck by some discrepancies of detail
between his despatch and that which I communicated to him
the day before.
Lord Granville writes, on the evening of the 26th, that
your Excellency had declared to him that, in the opinion of
the King's government, —
" Neither the disastrous defeat of the Turkish army, nor the
treason of the Capitan-Pacha, nor the dejected attitude of
the Divan, ought to modify the course which the great powers
of Europe propose to follow. That any arrangement entered
into between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at the moment
when the ministers of the empire were either paralyzed by
fear or traitorously occupied in satisfying their own personal
ambition, in contempt of the rights of their sovereign, ought
to he considered as null and void, and that a declaration to
this effect should be conveyed to Mehemet Ali. Finally, your
Excellency is stated to have added that i/ou would ^vnte
on the same day to Vienna to the French ambassador, to
transmit to him this opinion of the King's government.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 519
instructing him also to obtain the adhesion of the Austrian
cabinet.^''
I quote Lord Grranville's despatch according to the text.
Lord Palmerston replies to Lord Granville that the English
ministry adheres to every syllable of your Excellency's declara-
tion ; that, without previous concert, the two cabinets adopt
an identical conclusion, and that nothing can more decidedly
prove the community of the object they propose, and the
mutual responsibility by which they are animated.
But Lord Palmerston also remarked, with some anxiety,
certain divergencies between the declaration of your Excel-
lency, as reported by Lord Granville, and the following
phrases in the despatch you did me the honour to address
to me : —
" We must make the enemy feel that, whatever may be the
advantages he has obtained, he would encounter the risk of
compromising, by seeking to push them too far." . . .
" There would be affectation in seeming to believe that after
the advantages Mehemet Ali has obtained, through the sense-
less aggressions of the Porte, he would not feel himself in a
condition to expect more than he had a right previously to
demand. This would be to deny the empire of facts, and the
necessities of the situation." ....
I endeavoured to weaken, as much as I possibly could, the
contrast which Lord Palmerston pointed out to me. I even,
reduced it to a mere obscurity in the formula ; I called his
attention to the idea which predominated, as well in the
declaration of your Excellency to Lord Granville as in the
despatch you did me the honour to forward, — an idea com-
prised in preventing a direct settlement between the Sultan
and the Pacha, in which the interests of the Ottoman
empire would be sacrificed to a combination of disastrous
circumstances, and the interests of Europe deprived of the
guarantee they looked for in a treaty concluded under the
influence of the great powers. But not being furnished
M M 2
520 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
with positive information as to the basis which the King's
government desires to give to this arrangement, I avoided
entering on that ground of discussion. Lord Pahnerston, how-
ever, did not allow the opportunity to escape of notifying to
me more clearly the views of the English cabinet. He said : —
" The more I reflect on this Eastern question (and I assure
you that I do not suffer any exclusively Englisli prepossession
to enter my mind on the subject), the more I arrive at this
conclusion, that France and England must, of necessity,
desire identically the same thing, — the security and strength
of the Ottoman empire ; or, if these expressions are too
ambitious, its return to a state which presents the fewest
possible chances of foreign intervention. "Well, we shall only
attain this object by placing the desert between the Sultan
and his vassal. Let Mehemet Ali remain master of his
Egypt, — let him obtain the hereditary sovereignty which has
been the constant aim of his desires ; but let there be no
longer any possible collision, and, consequently, no neigh-
bourhood between these two rival powers. Eussia covets
(prospectively) the European provinces, and, at the bottom
of her heart, sees with joy the Asiatic limbs separate them-
selves from the Ottoman body. Can we promote this interest ?
Evidently not. They speak of the material difficulties we
shall encounter in obtaining our object. I believe that
Mehemet Ali will not resist a sincere desire expressed in
common by the great powers. Should he do so, his claims
will not be increased by this contempt for the advice of
Europe, while endeavouring to save appearances; and, if
force should become necessary, the result would neither be
long nor doubtful.
" Such," continued Lord Palmerston, " is the well-consi-
dered opinion of the English cabinet. If we thought that
Mehemet Ali could seat himself, strong and respected upon
the Ottoman throne, and possess the empire in its indepen-
dence and integrity, we should say — let it be so. But,
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 521
convinced as we are, that if any strong feeling yet survives in
Turkey, it is a religious attachment to the Imperial family,
and that the whole empire will never consent to look upon
Mehemet AH as a descendant of the prophet, Gfod forbid
that we should embark in such a line of policy ! We
should find a second South America in the East, surrounded
by neighbours who would not always leave her to be con-
sumed by internal dissensions."
I have repeated Lord Palmerston's opinion in the exact
style of the conversation in which he developed it. I need
not add that it in no way replied to even a presumed idea
of the King's government ; but the last publications of the
press in both countries have recently given circulation to
certain notions which Lord Palmerston took the opportunity
of refutino-.
I promised Lord Palmerston, on leaving him, that I would
call your attention to the slight shade of difference he pointed
out to me between Lord Grranville's correspondence and your
Excellency's last despatch.
In compliance with Lord Palmerston's remonstrances, the
Prussian envoy had requested his cabinet to explain itself
on the basis of the projected arrangement between the Sultan
and Mehemet Ali. M. de Werther has just read to me the
confidential answer he has received from his father. The
Baron de Werther states in this letter that the Prussian
cabinet, not wishing to take any initiative in the Eastern
question, it is not the opinion of his government, but merely
his own, that he transmits to London ; and this opinion is,
that the bases of the arrangement ought to be the hereditary
sovereignty of Egypt in the family of Mehemet Ali, and the
complete restoration of Syria to the Sultan. M. de Werther
has communicated his father's letter to Lord Palmerston.
• •••••
I beg you to receive, &c.
BOUEQUENET.
M M 3
522 IIISTOKIC DOCUMENTS.
19. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Sir, Paris, Augtist 1st, 1839.
I send you a copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have
just received from the Consul-General of France at Alexan-
(hia. We learn from this that the Turkish fleet, on the 14th
of July, placed itself at the disposition of Mehemet Ali,
who has formally announced his intention of not restoring
it to the Porte until the removal of the Grand Vizier, and his
OAvn hereditary investiture of the country he governs. In
communicating this information to Lord Palmerston you will
have the goodness to ascertain the opinion of the cabinet of
London on the new attitude which France and England may
find themselves called upon to assume in consequence of this
serious complication.
M. de Metternich has forwarded an answer in conformity
with our declaration in favour of the independence and in-
tegrity of the Ottoman empire. According to what M. de
Sainte-Aulaire writes, the Chancellor of Austria, who recently
appeared to be quite satisfied with the intentions manifested
by Kussia, is now extremely uneasy on that point. It ap-
pears that the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, far from continu-
ing the assurances, otherwise sufiiciently vague, which it had
at first proffered of its desire to act in concert with the other
powers, now recedes under frivolous pretexts from all that
might substantiate or reduce them to formal acts. I am
surprised at the astonishment that M. de Metternich evinces
at this proceeding. I never imagined that, in the actual
question, Eussia would be brought to associate herself
frankly with the other cabinets whose policy is so opposed to
hers. I thought that, while appearing to labour with that
view, while using the most conciliatory forms, we only pro-
posed to restrain and intimidate her to a certain point, by
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 523
a demonstration of the perfect concert of the other great
powers, united in one common interest. With that object
it would be necessary for the powers, particularly France and
England, to hold a language towards the cabinet of St. Peters-
bourg absolutely uniform, and to address it only by combined
measures. I have, therefore, felt some regret at the step
lately taken by Lord Clanricarde with M. de Nesselrode.
»
• •••••
The Eussian government has naturally concluded from
thence that on one point at least, the limits to be imposed, on
Mehemet AH, England expected to find more sympathy from
that quarter than from the other cabinets ; and will therefore
conclude, very erroneously without doubt, that an alliance
in which such discrepancies are manifested can neither be
very homogeneous nor imposing.
It is not, as I believe, only at St. Petersbourg essential to
neglect nothing to impress a conviction of the intimate
understanding between the courts of London and Paris. At
Vienna, also, notwithstanding the powerful interest which would
seem, at least for the moment, to impose silence on the nar-
row prejudices of a superannuated policy, — at Vienna they are
too much given to receive with a sort of satisfaction all that
tends to encourage a belief that this union exists not, or has
only existed imperfectly. M. de Metternich incessantly affects,
I am not quite sure with what object, to impress on our am-
bassador, that in Paris and London we are not agreed, and
that on that point he knows more than he chooses to disclose.
He collects with minute anxiety the most trifling circum-
stances that can lend support to this assertion. Thus, on
the most recent occasion, he remarked that Lord Beauvale was
not instructed, as M. de Sainte-Aulaire had been, to engage
the court of Vienna to demand with us the free admission
of the allied squadrons into the Sea of JNIarmara. And thus
also he pointed out with exaggeration the difference in the
instructions forwarded to the two admirals.
MM 4
524 HISTORIC documents.
You are requested to direct the attention of Lord
Palmerston to the considerations I have here indicated. In
the frankness of our lanj^uage he will unquestionably dis-
cover a striking testimony of the desire we entertain to
preserve in our relations with the English cabinet the
character of intimacy so imperatively required by all the
leading interests of Europe.
20. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
London, August 1839,
Monsieur le INTarechal, 9 o'docJi in the Evming.
. . • • •
I wrote immediately to Lord Palmerston, to inform him
that your Excellency had instructed me to announce the
arrival of the Ottoman fleet at Alexandria, and to consult
the Eno-lish cabinet on the new attitude which France and
England might find themselves called on to assume, in conse-
quence of this serious complication.
Lord Palmerston appointed me to meet him at four
o'clock, at the Foreign Office. A cabinet covmcil was to
assemble at two, — the important intelligence I had trans-
mitted to be the subject of debate.
Lord Palmerston left the Council, accompanied by Lord
Minto ; he informed me, on entering his closet, that the
First Lord of the Admiralty would be present at our
conference.
"The Council," Lord Palmerston said, "has deliberated
on the news which the French government charged you to
communicate to me. Its first care was to re-peruse the
instructions addressed to Admiral Stopford. Nothing could be
found there to serve as guide to the commander of our
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 525
squadron, under the existing circumstances ; and it has been
decided to furnish him with more special directions.
" The Council thinks that the consummated defection of
the Capitan-Pacha cannot modify the political view which has
governed our mutual proceedings for six weeks. It furnishes,
on the contrary, an additional motive for perseverance and
progress in the same course.
" The principle being admitted, the Council is of opinion
that we ought to adopt coercive measures to obtain the
restitution of the Ottoman fleet. These measures must form
the subject of the fresh instructions to Admiral Stopford,
which Lord Minto and I will now draw up in your presence."
I replied to Lord Palmerston that the King's government
would duly appreciate this mark of confidence ; but I added
that I was myself without instructions ; that I was merely
authorized to coiisu/i, and not to deliberate; that, consequently,
anything I might say would in no manner commit the King's
government. Lord Palmerston said that this was perfectly
understood, and took up his pen.
Your Excellency will find, appended to my despatch, a
draft of the instructions drawn up by Lord Palmerston and
Lord JMinto, while the Council was sitting.
The object is the restitution of the Ottoman fleet to the
Sultan ; the means of coercion to be regulated by the degree
of resistance which the summons of the admirals will
encounter, on the part of Mehemet Ali, — from the appearance
of the allied squadrons before Alexandria, to the taking
possession of the Egyptian fleet and the blockade of the
port, — the rights of neutrals being duly respected. Lord
Palmerston and Lord Minto argue on the ground that the
Egyptian fleet would be at sea, because, as it cannot re-enter
Alexandria without being lightened, that operation would
amount to a dismantling ; and Mehemet cannot dispense
with his fleet at this moment, even for the necessities of his
army in Syria. Much latitude is left to the two admirals, as
526 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
to the selection of points on which to direct themselves,
under specific circumstances.
Finally, a supplementary instruction provides for the
emergency under which the course of events might call upon
our ambassadors to require, in conformity with the orders of
their respective courts, tbe presence of our fleets in the
Bosphorus, at the moment when the admirals receive their
fresh orders. In this hypothesis, the admirals would have
to answer the appeal at once, and they would reserve, for a
future epoch, the execution of the present instructions.
Such is the summary of the document I append to my
despatch.
Feeling strongly the advantage of not losing a moment,
under these pressing circumstances, and still more convinced
of tbe necessity of acting in perfect concert with us, Lord
Palmerston and Lord Minto have urgently requested me to
transmit the copy of instructions to your Excellency this
evening. A courier from the English Admiralty will leave
London to-morrow, for Paris, and "will place himself on
Monday at the disposition of Lord Granville. If tbe King's
government approves the plan, and feels disposed to address
analogous instructions to Admiral Lalande, your Excellency
will, perhaps, be so kind as to announce this to Lord
Granville, and the English courier will then continue his
route to Marseilles. Should tbe conclusion be contrary,
your Excellency will equally have the goodness to acquaint
Lord Granville, and the courier then will wait in Paris for
fresh instructions from London. The objections of the
King's government, should any arise, will be weighed here
with a sincere desire of arriving at a perfect understanding
between the two cabinets.
• •••••
I thought it essential not to allow this conference to ter-
minate without calling the most serious attention of Lord
Palmerston to the considerations developed in your Excel-
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 627
lency's last despatch. The presence of Lord Minto appeared
to me an additional reason for pointing out to the English
government the mistaken interpretations adopted in Europe
on the differences manifested between our foreign agents;
and the conclusions drawn from thence against the solidity
of the alliance between the two courts. I insisted with some
pertinacity on the necessit}'- of arranging their proceedings
beforehand, particularly at St. Petersbourg ; I quoted the in-
stance of Lord Clanricarde as being of a nature to create false
impressions by giving credit to the idea that the English
government was looking for a point d'appui with the Rus-
sian cabinet on the question of the limits of the Egyptian
restitution, — a question entirely se.condary to the leading
object we all propose, — the establishment of the principle that
the affairs of the East can only be arranged by mutual con-
cert between all the great powers of Europe.
Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto received these observa-
tions in good part. Lord Palmerston assured me that Lord
Clanricarde had exceeded his instructions if he had given his
step any character contrary to an expression of the most per-
fect unity between the two cabinets.
I was not anxious to extend further the circle of recrimi-
nation ; but the sincerity of our desire to maintain a perfect
imderstanding with the English cabinet, gives us on all
occasions a right to be frank with its organs ; this frankness
is in itself an additional pledge of our loyalty, and I can
assure you that this is the impression conveyed to the minds
of Lord Palmerston and Lord IMinto by the reading of your
Excellency's last despatch.
I pray you to accept, &c.
BOURQUENEY.
528 IIISTOllIC DOCUMENTS.
21. Marshal Soult to Baron de Bourqueney.
Sir, Paris, Avgtist 6th, 1839.
I received yesterday the letter you have done me the
honour to address to me, with a copy of the instructions to
the admirals handed to you by Lord Palmerston to be sub-
mitted to the approbation of the King's government. The
Council which has now debated on it, does not consider it pos-
sible to adhere in all points to the proposed plan. I appre-
hend that the English cabinet, under a first impression of the
untoward news from Alexandria, may not have sufficiently
considered the position in all its points. Hostilities are evi-
dently terminated in the East. Neither by land nor by sea
have we any announcement of an intention to continue, or
rather to resume them. On the one side, they have not the
means, even under the supposition, which is doubtful, that
they have the desire. On the other, they have no interest to
gain, and they are well aware that they could not continue
the war without exposing themselves to very serious conse-
quences, and without gratuitously compromising a most ad-
vantageous position. In this state of things, the defection of
the Ottoman fleet is an unfortunate and much to be regretted
event, for which we must endeavour to provide a remedy,
but it scarcely constitutes one of those cases of imminent
danger which justifies such extreme measures as are now
proposed to us. This fleet, in the hands of Mehemet Ali, is
now nothing more than a deposit, a pledge by aid of which
he proposes to obtain the hereditary investiture of all that he
at present possesses. France and England, while strongly
insisting on the demand already made to Mehemet Ali,
through our consuls, to restore the Turkish ships, ought im-
doubtedly to take such measures, in the improbable event of
his rene"sving the war, as may prevent him from using them
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 529
against the Porte ; and perhaps the best method of depriving
him of any such desire, would be to announce to him formally
that henceforward the French and English squadrons will act
in perfect unanimity to protect the Sultan against all aggres-
sions or invasions of whatever description they may be. Any
step or demonstration made in the sense I now indicate,
would meet with our fullest approbation, because we see in
it a real utility and great chances of an effectual result. But,
I repeat it, an act of hostility against Mehemet Ali would not
facilitate the plan proposed by England and France in con-
cert. The destruction of the Egyptian fleet would neither
add to the strength of the Porte nor induce the enemy to
abate his pretensions in the sKghtest degree. The material
and moral power which at this moment he exercises hy land,
would render his action much less dependent than is sup-
posed on his maritime resources. To attack him when he is
not disposed to attack, would be to run the risk of driving
him to extremes. Feeling convinced, when his ships were
taken from him, of having nothing more to fear from Europe,
who would thus have exhausted her means of coercion in a
comparatively secondary object, he would naturally conclude
that it was no longer necessary to temporize ; and even svip-
posing that he abstained from ordering the immediate ad-
vance of Ibrahim on Constantinople, it would suffice, for a
threatening diversion, to excite such a rising in Asia Minor,
Macedonia, and Albania, as would revive the question of
Russian interference. We know unfortunately that he would
find ready instruments for this work, and that probably to
set it in action, he would not require to move a single
soldier. Such eventualities are surely worth the trouble of
grave deliberation before they are risked. I must add, that
in London they seem to attach too much importance to
Mehemet Ali, or rather to his aggrandisement, because they
persist in considering that side of the question as if treating
of a European state. There can be no doubt that in the
530 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
hands of such a man as the Pacha of Egypt, the possession of
extensive territories may entail dangers which explain and
justify the efforts of the powers to put a stop to his encroach-
ments. France is the first to acknowledge this, and she has
never ceased her efforts to restrain the projects and moderate
the pretensions of this Pacha. But we must not exaggerate
the evil. The Ottoman empire, even divided administratively
by stipulations to which the clause of hereditary sovereignty,
however expressly conveyed, could not in other respects con-
vey a character of conclusive permanence, — the Ottoman
empire, united, notwithstanding this partition more or less
durable, by the controlling ties of manners and religion,
will still continue to form, in face of the European powers,
that great body whose existence has ever been considered in-
dispensable to the maintenance of the political balance. The
resources it still possesses in both its existing divisions concur
equally to this end, and I do not hesitate to say that in ruining
the Pacha of Egypt we shall operate the destruction of the
Ottoman empire. Our policy to-day, as from the commence-
ment of the crisis, ought to be to take care, above all other
considerations, that Constantinople receives no foreign pro-
tection without our common consent.
Such are the objections suggested to the King's government
by the proposition of the cabinet of London, and which prevent
tin unqualified adhesion. Be so good as to make them known
to Lord Palmerston, while indicating to him the course which
we consider preferable. It consists, you will observe, in repeat-
ing our demand for the restitution of the Ottoman fleet, and
in case of a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali, in declaring
to him that henceforward he must look upon the allied
squadrons as mutually and specially instructed to repulse all
attempts directed against the territory or authority of the
Porte. The English cabinet will, I doubt not, on reflection,
acknowledge that such an attitude suffices for the necessities
of the moment ; that without any compromise, it will attain,
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 531
according to all probability, the end which France and
England have in view ; and that placed, to our great regret,
under the impossibility of acceding without reserve to the
plan of the British government, we could not more effectually
evince our absolute confidence and the perfect accordance of
.our policy with theirs.
. 22. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult
Monsieur le Marechal, London, August 9th, 1839.
Lord Palmerston informed me yesterday that according to
news from Berlin (Lord Clanricarde's informations are slow and
rare), Kussia withdrew from the projected negotiations at
Vienna. M. de Kisseleff, who followed me at Lord Palmer-
ston's, was charged with a communication to this effect.
It is under a plea of respect for the independence of sovereign
states that the Eussian cabinet declines all intervention in
the internal affairs of Turkey. Before the events in Syria,
before the death of the Sultan, when there was no other pos-
sible issue than war to the disputes between the Porte and
Egypt, the Eussian cabinet felt disposed to participate in the
opinion of the other powers of Em-ope as to a negotiation
carried on independently of the interested parties. But now,
when the Porte itself anticipates an arrangement, and ad-
dresses acceptable overtures to Egypt, Eussia is of opinion
that the treaty in progress at Constantinople should be
allowed to advance, and should be seconded only by her good
qfices ; otherwise there is no longer an independent Ottoman
power. Such is the spirit of the step taken by M. de Nessel-
rode.
The King's government will feel no surprise at this overture
from the cabinet of St. Petersbourg, which the correspondence
of your Excellency has repeatedly foretold.
532 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Here, where they readily believe what they wish, more
confidence had been evinced, not in the sincerity of Russia's
intentions, but in the necessities of her European position.
They therefore indicate more surprise than will be exhibited
in Paris, but they now comprehend the motives which dictated
M. de Nesselrode's last despatch, and they read in it an evi-
dent proof that if the Imperial cabinet does not consider the
appropriate moment arrived for committing itself openly with
Europe on the affairs of the East, it is, at least, determined
to struggle against the written guarantees which might
threaten to control it for the future.
Lord Palmerston received the communication of M. de
Kisseleff with due courtesy, but he left him under no delu-
sion as to the opinion he had formed of it.
While entirely deferring yesterday to the wish manifested
by the King's government relative to the draft of instructions
to the admirals, Lord Palmerston entered more than he
usually does into the discussion of the general question. In
reply to that part of your Excellency's despatch (No. 36),
which combats the predisposition of the English cabinet to
reduce the limits of the Eg}^tian sovereignty, Lord Palmer-
ston informed me that with himself and many of his col-
leagues, it was a strongly determined point, that nothing
useful or permanent could be established in the East unless
the provinces wrested from the Porte by Mehemet Ali were
restored. " I cannot too often repeat to you," Lord Palmer-
ston resumed, " how entirely this conviction is, as far as I am
concerned, independent of all political considerations ex-
clusively English ! But I suppose Egypt and Syria heredi-
tarily invested in the family of Mehemet Ali, and I then,
ask myself how can Europe flatter herself that an incident of
the most trifling nature may not arise to break the last and
feeble tie which unites those provinces to the Ottoman empire.
Independence will come as heirship came ; and do you con-
sider what Europe will then say when Eussia resumes her sus-
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 533
pended cravings after the European provinces? That the
Ottoman empire, dismembered by the separation of a part of
its Asiatic provinces, is no longer worth the risk of a war for
its maintenance." i
" Such," continued Lord Palmerston, " is the order of ideas
that occur to me when deliberating on this great question. But
I by no means rely on the infallibility of my o-svn judgment.
I perfectly understand that others may differ from me, and
I look for no French jprejpossession in the opinion you have
conveyed to me from Marshal Soult. I am so well convinced
of the good faith of that policy, that here is an argument which
could confirm me, had I still any inclination to doubt.
France wishes to make Egypt stronger than we do, and yet
your influence over the sovereign of Alexandria, be he who he
may, would increase by reason of his weakness ! You see now
whether I seek for any reserved thoughts in the discrepancies
between our two points of view."
I replied to Lord Palmerston that his reasoning supposed
a question to be settled which was at least open to contro-
versy, namely, that of ascertaining whether in a future, more
or less remote, the Ottoman empire could gather from Egypt
and Syria the elements of strength and vitality, — elements
which it would be a great error to disperse if they could, one
day or other, be turned to the advantage of the body we were
anxious to preserve.
" That is true," replied Lord Palmerston ; " and I agree
with you that the question lies there. My own conviction is
fixed in the negative ; but there are members of the English
cabinet who decide affirmatively."
• •••••
Your Excellency will undoubtedly perceive that there is a
difference between the two cabinets on an important point ;
but such is the identity of the object proposed b}^ both, so
great is the absence of all mistrust, of all reserved meaning,
that I feel strongly convinced some slight mutual concessions
VOL. IV. NN
534 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
as to the means to be employed, would suffice to maintain
between the two governments the perfect understanding
which, until now, has directed their proceedings, and can
alone render them efifectual.
I pray you to accept, &c.
BOURQUENEY.
23. Baron de Bourqueiiey to Marshal Suult,
London, August 17th, 1829.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• •••••
Yesterday evening Lord Palmerston received news from
Constantinople to the 29th of July, and from Vienna to the
10th of Auoust. The first announced the remission of the
collective note signed by the ambassadors of the five courts,
and the immediate suspension of the direct treaty between
the Porte and Mehemet Ali.
The news from Vienna represents Prince Metternich as
advancing steadily in the path on which he has entered, and
confident in the hope of inducing Kussia to follow, or rather
of preventing her from escaping from it with credit.
Under the impression of this intelligence the council de-
bated this morning on the plan of instructions to be for-
warded to Admiral Stopford for the special case of the
restitution of the Ottoman fleet.
The council approves of that portion of the instructions to
Admiral Lalande, in the event of the Turkish fleet being
under sail.
Should the fleet have entered the port of Alexandria, the
council is of opinion that our consuls ought to summon the
enemy to restore it under a throat of their departure ; but
in compliance with the concert which appears to manifest
itself at Constantinople, by the despatch of the 29th of July,
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 535
and with the satisfactory dispositions of the Austrians, evi-
dently increasing, it also expresses a wish, " that the French
and English cabinets should forward their instructions to the
admirals to Vienna, and, at the same time, propose to the
Austrian cabinet to unite its squadron to ours in case the
Ottoman fleet should be at sea within the limits of action
designated in the orders to Admiral Lalande, and to associate
their consul-general with ours in the measure proposed,
should the Turkish fleet have entered the port of Alex-
andria."
In conclusion, the council, after examining the project
previously set forward by Lord Palmerston for carrying
out an act to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire,
between France, England, and Austria (giving up the hope
of associating the two other powers), accords the most unquali-
fied approbation to this proposal, and recognizes, at the same
time, that the negotiation ought to be conducted with great
reserve, so as to refrain from alarming Eussia, and from afford-
ing her the means of impeding it. The council thinks that
this would be in reality a commencement of the work of
peace and of the balance of power, which France and Eng-
land are equally anxious to accomplish.
Since the commencement of the Eastern crisis I have never
seen Lord Palmerston so well satisfied with the aspect of
affairs.
I pray you to accept, &c.
BOURQUENET.
24. Baron de Bourqueney to Marshal Soult.
London, August 18th, 1839.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• •••••
. . . . I was only able to forward an extremely con-
cise account to your Excellency of the last intelligence from
NN 2
\
536 ITISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
Vienna ; but I was anxious to inform you without delay of
the profound impression it had produced on the English
cabinet.
The two predominating facts are: 1st. The signature of
M. de Eoutenief attached to a collective note, declaring that,
in the accordance of the five great powers on the affairs of
the East, the Ottoman Porte had found a sufficient guarantee
against the dangers of its position to enable it to break off all
direct negotiation with the viceroy. 2nd. The immediate
interruption of that same negotiation.
Neither the despatches of M. de Barante to your Excel-
lency, nor those of Lord Clanricarde to Lord Palmerston, nor
even the last communications of Prince Metternich, had pre-
pared our courts for this sudden adhesion of the Russian
ministry to a measure of so much importance. In London,
as imdoubtedly in Paris, they reasoned on the general datum
that the Russian cabinet not only declined participating in
the negotiation of Vienna, but sought to render it futile by
favourinoj the conclusion of a direct arrangfement between
the sovereign and his vassal without any foreign interven-
tion whatever, at least any that could be apparent.
Here, they have not given themselves much trouble to ex-
plain a fact in open contradiction with the dispositions which
were not even held in doubt on the day before it was made
known. They repeat readily ; " Russia will not, because she
cannot. M. de Boutenief has heard the name of the Dar-
danelles pronounced by France and England, and so has passed
on to the step she has taken." (This last hypothesis, before
forming a definitive judgment, requires that the act of the
minister should be acknowledged by his court.) But all these
explicatory considerations are sacrificed to the simple fact, and
people say; " Here has Russia joined the co-operation by an
official act ; she could not keep aloof from it but by provoking
complications for ivhich she is not prepared.^^
From this first datum, the English cabinet, in its consulta
to
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 537
tions of yesterday, has decided that the moment has arrived
for relaxing in some degree the threatening and suspicious
attitude assumed towards the Eussian cabinet, without pre-
judice to its resumption hereafter under a more decided form
should circumstances so require. .
It feels, moreover, that an act of respect is due to Prince
de Metternich for his perseverance in the course he has
adopted in common with France and England, a perseverance
which manifested itself at Vienna on the 8th of August,
when there was reason to believe that the Eussian cabinet
declined all concert with the other powers, but the expression
of which became more clear and decisive on the 10th, after
receipt of the news from Constantinople of the 29th of July.
Under the influence of this double exprdfesion, Monsieur
le Marechal, the English cabinet proposes to forward to
Vienna a copy of our instructions to the admirals, relative to
the defection of the Ottoman fleet, so that there may not be a
single act of the drama now beginning to unfold itself, from
which France and England may appear disposed at this mo-
ment to isolate the allied powers, and most especially the
cabinet of Austria.
Your Excellency is aware that the English cabinet has not
considered the attitude of observation prescribed to our
admirals as sufficient, in case the Ottoman fleet should have
entered the port of Alexandria, or the viceroy may have
refused its restitution. To the demand of our consular ao-ents
it has thought of adding means of moral coercion; sach as
the retirement of our consuls-general ; but this part of the
question it equally proposes to the King's government to
transfer to Vienna, and to treat it there in common with the
Austrian cabinet.
Your Excellency will perceive by what precedes, the
extent of the change which has taken place, within thirty-
eight hours, in the spirit of the members of the English
cabinet.
N N 3
538 IIISTOKIC DOCUMENTS.
The possibility of the concurrence of Kiissia was positively
denied ; now it is hoped for.
The concurrence of Austria was hoped for to the end ; now
it is assured.
I have now, as I think, explained the motives upon which
the satisfaction, exaggerated perhaps, is founded, which has dis-
played itself here since the reception of the news from Vienna
and Constantinople, mth regard to the position in all its
bearings.
They start from the principle that, when once the bases of
the intervening arrangement between the Sultan and the
viceroy are determined by the five powers, the employment
of force will be superfluous to obtain their acceptance by
Mehemet Ali ; '" a menace will suffice in case of his refusal.
With respect to these bases, Austria is supposed to incline
more closely than France to the views of the English cabinet,
and as it is well known that the official differences manifested
between the two great maritime powers might sap all the
foundations of the pacific work in hand, it is presumed that
these differences will dissolve more readily in a concurrence
of the five powers than in a direct negotiation between two
or even three.
When once the arrangement between the sovereign and the
vassal is accepted and guaranteed by the powers of Europe,
that is to say, the practical question regulated, they feel con-
fident of finding in Paris, and it is hoped in Vienna also, the
eagerness that will be manifested here to crown this act of
peace for the present by a diplomatic transaction which may
equally secure the future.
• •••••»
I pray you to accept, &c.
BOURQUENET.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 539
25. Marshal Soult to Baron de Boiirqueney.
Paris, August 22nd, 1839.
• •••.*•
The King's government regards as a fortunate circum-
stance the adhesion of the Porte to the measure by which the
five powers have engaged it to conchide no treaty, except
under their concurrence, with the Pacha of Egypt ; an adhe-
sion of which, however, the official intelligence has not yet
reached me. Meanwhile we do not attach much weight to
the lively joy which this event seems to have caused in
Vienna, and more particularly in London. There is, as I
think, even an excess of exaggeration in concluding that be-
cause M. de Boutenief has associated himself Avith this step,
Eussia has determiaed henceforward to link her actions in the
Eastern question to that of the allied courts. A result of this
importance, such a deviation from the prosecution of a policy
hitherto immutable, can scarcely be presumed ; to believe
it, the most formally declared evidences could not be too
much, and these evidences I look for in vain. So far from
this, the correspondence of M. de Barante exhibits to me the
cabinet of St. Petersbourg proceeding more than ever in its
isolated views, even where believing itself compelled to admit
some concessions of form. Moreover, to appreciate the
true bearing of the act to which such important conse-
quences are attached, it is enough to remember that amongst
the arguments set forward by the Eussian government in
rejection of the proposed conference at Vienna, one was parti-
cularly conspicuous, which maintained that the seat of nego-
tiation would more naturally be fixed at Constantinople ;
implying in fact, that Eussia, by the natural ascendancy
which her envoy exercises upon the Porte, would be more
advantageously placed there, either to impede or influence
the progress of the treaty.
N N 4
540 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
If I dwell on the exaggerated hopes which the cabinet of
London appears to have conceived, it is because I fear lest
this misconception should impress a false tendency on its
policy, and may induce it to lose sight of the essential end
towards which PVance and England are equally directed, —
the means of preventing the Porte from falling back under the
exclusive and dominant protection of one of the great powers.
In London, I incline to think they are too confident on this
point, and disposed to concentrate their anxiety on the danger,
relatively a secondary one, of the exclusive aggrandisement of
Mehemet Ali. If the expression of the disagreement which
exists on this point between France and England were con-
fined to the circle of the communications exchanged between
the two governments, little inconvenience would then result ;
but, unfortunately, I acquire every day a positive convic-
tion that it is not so. The cabinet of London, governed
by its prepossessions, does not sufficiently conceal them from
the other cabinets ; it sometimes appears to see in them
auxiliaries whose co-operation may assist it to bring us into
its way of thinking, and the courts to which it addresses
these confidences, mistaking the intentions by which they are
dictated, discover in them a serious relaxation of the Anglo-
French alliance. Already several indications give me reason
to think that one of these courts is endeavouring by advances,
adroitly calculated, by apparent concessions, to draw the
British government into a new course. I have little fear of the
definitive result of these attempts. England will resist them as
we have ourselves resisted them at other times, when similar
artifices were employed in respect to us. But it would be
lamentable if simple appearances should for a single moment
inspire the authors of these machinations with the slightest
hopes of success. Little more wovild be wanting to infuse
a most injurious perturbation into the progress of the general
policy.
Lord Granville has, as yet, said nothing to me on the new
HISTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 541
views of his court with respect to the means of obtaining
the restitution of the Ottoman fleet. I imagine that in
London they will have recognised the unseasonableness of the
mutual recall of tlie consuls at the moment when the decision
adopted at Constantinople renders the presence of Euro-
pean agents near Mehemet Ali more indispensable than
ever.
• ••••••
General Baudrand will not be sent to Constantinople, as I
apprised you. The King, on learning the names of the
persons entrusted by the Emperors of Austria and Eussia
with an analogous mission has thought it more suitable to
send an officer of his household less elevated in rank.
26. General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult
London, September 5th, 1839,
Monsieur le Marechal,
• ••••••
. . . I have to render an account to your Excellency of
my first interview with Lord Palmerston.
Before entering on the questions which have been sepa-
rately discussed, I must declare to your Excellency that my
impression resulting from this conference is, that the English
cabinet desires with us, to the same extent, and as com-
pletely without mental reservation, the maintenance of the in-
dependence and integrity of the Ottoman empire ; and that
it wishes to accomplish this end pacifically, without compro-
mising the great powers amongst themselves.
• ••••«
I took the first opportunity which presented itself of dis-
cussing and combating the measures proposed by the
542 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
English cabinet, and communicated by Mr. Bidwer to your
Excellency.
I commenced by establishing that the question of the
Ottoman fleet ought not to be treated specially, and pre-
liminarily to the final arrangements now about to commence
between the Sultan and the Pacha. I said we ought not to
employ our strength against an incident, but to reserve it
entire for the principal fact. I even enjoined Lord
Palmerston to reflect seriously on the consequences of suc-
cess, that is to say, on the return of the Ottoman fleet to
Constantinople with a body of officers imbued with admira-
tion for Mehemet Ali, and little confident themselves, in
spite of the guarantee of the powers, against the reactionary
vengeance of the Porte.
These last arguments produced an impression on • Lord
Palmerston's mind. He replied, nevertheless, that if the
powers, all equally penetrated as they were "svith the neces-
sity of repressing, or rather of repairing, an act so culpable
on the part of a vassal against his sovereign, should pause
before a peremptory refusal of Mehemet Ali, he, on his side,
would feel more encouraged in his resistance to the accepta-
tion of a final arrangement.
I represented the full weight of the motives which ought to
restrain us from an armed demonstration against the island of
Candia ; I spoke of the Greek party who might take advantage
of it to declare their independence, and I added that it would
disseminate throughout the remainder of the empire the ex-
ample and necessity of internal risings. I hope I have con-
vinced Lord Palmerston that no substantial advantage could
accrue from the occupation of Candia by the forces of
England and France.
I discussed with him the recall of the consuls-general from
Alexandria, and I demonstrated the serious inconveniences
that must result from leaving us without agents near the
viceroy at the very moment when we have the most pressing
need of influencing his mind l)y active communication.
HISTOEIC DOCUMENTS. 543
Lord Beanvale has already received instructions and powers
relative to the Ottoman fleet ; I cannot, therefore, lead your
Excellency to hope that these instructions will be recalled or
even modified ; but the question being carried to the very
centre of negotiation, the influence of the King's govern-
ment may exercise itself there in a powerful manner, and I
believe that even from London, those points will be indicated
to Lord Beauvale on which he is not to insist, if he perceives
the course adopted by France to be entirely opposed to that
of England.
I cannot, however, conceal from your Excellency that the
disposition of the English cabinet to the employment of
coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, whether to obtain
the restitution of the Turkish fleet, or to make him accept
exclusively the hereditary sovereignty of Egypt on the basis
of the impending arrangements with the Porte, may from
time to time yield upon certain points to the representations
of France, hut it incessantly re-appears, and if it encounters
on our part an invincible and absolute repugnance to the
adoption of violence in some shape against the viceroy, I fear
they will persuade themselves here that it is useless to con-
tinue a negotiation in which even the eventual sanction of
force is denied beforehand.
I endeavoured to excite the apprehensions of Lord Palmer-
ston on the consequences to which the peace of the world would
be exposed from the extreme measures to which the viceroy
might be driven if the powers persisted in refusing the con-
ditions he exacted for his reconciliation with the Porte.
Lord Palmerston replied that unquestionably a march on
Constantinople was possible, but that nothing would be easier
to the European powers than the preservation of the Ottoman
capital; that we should all concur in that object with our
fleets, and Eussia with her armies ; but that we should limit
the amount of the Eussian troops and fix the date of their
departure. " We should arrive together," he continued,
" and we should depart together. Eussia is fettered at this
544 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
moment, be assured of it. I know to a certainty that this
arises from her not being prepared ; but it is a fact, and we
ought to take advantage of it. She will not act without us,
and if she acts at all it will be with us, and in the same
manner."
Lord Palmerston spoke to me of the dispositions of the
Prussian cabinet and of the cabinet of Vienna, as agreeing
entirely with those of the cabinet of London in all that
relates to the bases of the final arrangement between the
Porte and the viceroy.
Lord Palmerston has replied to the last Russian com-
munication by a despatch to Lord Clanricarde which he
allowed me to read, and in which he formally establishes the
union and mutual responsibility of France and England in
all that relates to the conjoined entry of our sc^uadrons into
the sea of JMarmara.
• ••••*••••
I redoubled my efforts to bring back the point of view of
the English cabinet to that of the Kind's orovernment.
Lord Palmerston, with respect to the withdrawal of our
consuls-general from Alexandria, informed me that he never
thought of extending that measure to the actual consular
agents ; that it was only on account of the diplomatic cha-
racter of our consuls-general that he wished to make this
recall a demonstration of discontent on the part of the
powers against Mehemet Ali ; but that we should maintain,
after their departure, should it take place, acting consuls who
would still serve as organs with the viceroy. Lord Palmerston
also informed me that, under any circumstances. Colonel
Campbell would be replaced by another agent. His conduct
during late events was not approved of, and his successor
was appointed. Lord Palmerston has just received de-
spatches from Constantinople, informing him that an
Egyptian brig had carried agents of the viceroy to Salonica.
Lord Ponsonby had ordered Admiral Stopford to chase the
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 545
Egyptian brig, to take possession of her, and to secure the
faihire of her mission. Admiral Koussin had signified his
approbation of this measure.
I pray you to accept, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
27. General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, September 2Zrd, 1839,
Monsieur le Marechal,
Lord Palmerston passed several hours this morning
in London. I have to detail to your Excellency the important
conversation I have just held with him.
Baron Brunnow proposes in the name of his government
to regulate and define the degree of coercive action to be
exercised by each of the five powers against Mehemet Ali
to obtain a final settlement between the Sultan and the
Pacha. With this object, a convention to be signed between
the five courts, stipulating that France and England shall
employ their fleets against Mehemet Ali if he refuses to
accept the proposed conditions ; that Russia, in the event of
Ibrahim Pacha advancing upon Constantinople, shall employ
her army and fleet in the Bosphorus and in Asia Minor, on
their side of the Taurus, to protect the existence of the Ottoman
empire, but that for the future the closing of the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles shall remain a principle of public
European law, and that Russia shall pledge herself not to
renew the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. Finally, it is to be
understood, although not specified in writing, that under
existing circumstances, the derogation of Russia from the
principle of closing the two straits is to be admitted with-
out authorising the maritime powers to consider it a legiti-
546 iiisTomc docuaients.
mate reason for the presence of their respective fleets in the
Bosphorus.
This convention Russia proposes to the acceptance of the
four powers, but she is ready to sign it here with three, if
France is not inclined to admit the stipulations.
Such is the substance of the propositions of which Baron
Brunnow is the organ ; I need not dwell on the immense
importance of their bearing.
Lord Palmerston informed me that he should speedily sum-
mon the members of the cabinet at present in the neighbour-
hood of Windsor or London, to lay before them the state of the
question ; but he did not conceal from me that he was per-
sonally favourable to the Russian overtures. It is probable
that the determination of the cabinet may conform to the
opinions of Lord Palmerston.
I asked what bases Russia proposed to give to the arrange-
ment between the Sultan and the Pacha ? Lord Palmerston
replied that M. de Brunnow was not charged with any
specific proposition to that effect, but that the Russian
cabinet, like that of England, was in favour of the complete
restoration of Syria and its appendages.
Lord Palmerston is inclined to add to the Russian project
the despatch of an Austrian corps to Syria in the event of
the viceroy's resistance. This corps, united to the relics of
the Ottoman army, to obtain by force the evacuation of the
provinces held by the Egyptian army.
I began by declaring that I was without instructions from
the King's government on the greater part of the questions
submitted to me ; but, that I felt nevertheless authorised
to reject and contest, at least in my own name, nearly all the
data on which the new plan, proposed by Russia and almost
adopted by England, is founded.
Object, means, and facility of execution, I equally
objected to. I argued on the consideration that Mehemet
AH, hereditary possessor of Egypt and Syria, would naturally
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 547
fall within the sphere of the influence and action of the two
maritime powers ; and that these same powers could in their
turn employ the Egyptian forces to restrain Eussia in her
projects on Constantinople. I shall not tire your Excellency
by a repetition of the arguments I used ; they are all drawn
from the order of ideas and facts set forward by the King's
government in its correspondence with the embassy.
It is evident to me, that the English cabinet regards the
abolition of the treat}^ of Unkiar-Skelessi as an ample success
for its actual policy in the East. Now, this success it does
not consider as too dearly purchased by the appearance of
Eussian forces in the Bosphorus ; and, moreover, as this mea-
sure is dependent on the advance of Ibrahim Pacha against
Constantinople, it hopes to lay down a hypothesis that will
not be realised.
I told Lord Palmerston that the convention, the bases of
which he had explained to me, would be treated in Europe
as an act of weakness and pusillanimity towards Eussia. He
considers it, on the contrary, as an able measure. The very
action of Eussia at Constantinople, defined beforehand by
the concurrence of the other powers, seems to him the
action of the five courts and an abdication of the exclusively
Eussian protectorate.
Your Excellency's last despatch enabled me to demonstrate
to Lord Palmerston how far, up to this point, the different
cabinets are from agreeing as to the activity and energy of
actual measures against Mehemet Ali. Lord Palmerston
replied that he could not doubt for an instant that the propo-
sitions of which M. de Brunnow was the bearer would receive
the most sincere and cordial support from the cabinets of
Vienna and Berlin.
Prince Esterhazy, who saw Lord Palmerston to-day,
opened the interview by pleading the absence of instructions
from his court, to avoid giving any opinion on all the new
projects submitted to him, and particularly as to the despatch
54.8 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
of an Austrian corps to Syria ; but evidently he feels con-
vinced that the plan of the Russian cabinet will be approved
of by the Austrian government.
The restoration of the Turkish fleet is now confounded -
with the general question from which Lord Palmerston
declines to separate it.
• ••••••
Lord Palmerston, on my asking him where the negotiation
of the convention he had detailed to me would take place,
replied, " I have not thought of that, but in London if they
please."
I pray you to accept, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
28. General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, October Srd, 1839.
Monsieur le Marechal
The English cabinet rejects the proposals from the imperial
cabinet presented by the Baron de Bruunow. Lord Palmer-
ston announced this morning to the Russian envoy, that
France, on her part, could not consent to the exclusion of the
allied fleets from the sea of Marmara in the event of the
entry of Russian forces into the Bosphorus, and that England
would not separate herself from France, with whom she had
moved in perfect union from the commencement of the
negotiation.
This point being determined, — in place of the convention
originally presented by the imperial cabinet. Lord Palmerston
proposes an act between the five powers, by which they would
regulate their share of action in the existing crisis of Eastern
affairs, but without any privilege accorded to the Russian
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 549
flag to the exclusion of the flags of France, England and
Austria. Eussia, in case of the resistance of Mehemet Ali
to the conditions proposed to him, to employ her troops in
Asia Minor, but on their own side of the Taurus. The indepen-
dence and integrity of the Ottoman empire under the reign-
ing dynasty to be stipulated for, for the longest possible
time ; finally, the closing of the Straits to become a principle
of public European law.
Such is the important modification attached by the British
cabinet to the Russian overtures.
Passing from the European act I have here analyzed, to
the conditions of the arrangement pending between the
Sultan and the Pacha, Lord Palmerston, pressed at once by
my arguments and by a sincere desire, as I believe, to per-
form an act of deference to France, after a long discussion,
adds to the hereditary investiture of Egypt in favour of
Mehemet Ali, the possession equally hereditary of the Pacha-
lic of Acre : the town of Acre alone to remain to the Porte,
and the portion to be measured from the glacis of the fortress
in the direction of Lake Tiberias. The Porte to recover all
the rest of Syria, including the Holy Cities, considerations of
preponderating weight in the estimation of the English cabi-
net : this second concession rests on the datum that the Kino-'s
government, having agreed with its allies on the territorial
limits of the arrangement, will accept its share of action in
constraining Mehemet Ali, should he refuse the conditions.
This new position results from our persevering efforts to
bring back the English cabinet to the same point of view
with France on the Eastern question. Undoubtedly this
return is not as complete as we could desire, but the actual
step is of the highest importance. I fear, however, it will be
the last.
I asked how Baron de Brunuow had received the announce-
ment of such a serious modification in the final dispositions
of the British cabinet. Lord Palmerston replied that he took
VOL. IV. O O
550 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
these new proposals ad referendum. His disappointment
must have been excessive.
Lord Pahnerston appears to flatter himself that we shall
induce Kussia to accede to the European act he proposes. I
do not see the data on which he bases this confidence ; but
whatever they may decide on at St. Petersbourg, it is not the
less highly important to have arrested here all arrangement
independent of France, and to have restored the English
cabinet to its first sentiment of the necessity of our alliance.
I pray you to accept, &c.
H. Seb.vstiani.
29. General Sehastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, October 10th, 1839.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• "^ • • • • •
I have read your Excellency's last despatch to Lord
Palmerston. He had already been prepared by Mr. Bulwer,
for the intelligence that the cession of the Pachalic of Acre
was not considered sufficient by the King's government.
This news has thrown him back upon his former course of
argument. I left none of his objections without answer ; but
I convinced myself yesterday that it would be almost a hope-
less task to attempt to obtain anything beyond the last con-
cession. Lord Palmerston enlarged upon the importance of
this sacrifice, made in the hope of renewing his first ties with
France, and gave me clearly to understand that if the English
cabinet found itself disappointed in this attempt, it would
necessarily be forced to seek elsewhere the support it could
no longer find in us.
• ••••••
Nothing will be done here until the final determination
of the King's government is positively and formally an-
HISTORIC DOCUIVIENTS. 551
nounced. . . . My impression is that the English cabinet
will return to the first proposals of Eussia if the last conces-
sions are rejected.
Baron de Brunnow embarks on the 13th for Eotterdam.
Accept, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
30. Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.
Paris, December 9th, 1839.
• «••••*
The news you have given me of the approaching return of
M. de Brunnow to London, furnished with full powders to
sign a convention regulating on the foot of equality the
degrees of protection to be afforded by the powers to the
Porte, has excited, as you will readily believe, the most
serious attention of the King's government. We impatiently
expect the details. If they are such, in fact, as the language
of Lord Palmerston leads us to suppose, if they embrace on
the part of Eussia an effective abandonment of the excep-
tional position she had assumed at Constantinople, if the
addition of no secret or indirect clause does not interfere to
paralyze, on the other hand, the apparent concessions of the
cabinet of St. Petersbourg, I need not tell you that the deter-
mination of that cabinet, be the motive what it may, will con-
vey to us the most lively satisfaction. It will, in fact, gain
our cause, on the point which has constantly appeared to us
the most important in the Eastern question ; it will yield us
the result we have always had in view, and which for some
time we despaired of obtaining. You know that from the
origin of the negotiation our object was to deduce from it
the abolition of the exclusive protectorate exercised by Eussia
2
552 IIISTOKIC DOCUMENTS.
over the Sultan, and that we have demonstrated this object
to our allies as one that ought to be accomplished by every
possible means. We have said and repeated incessantly, that
it was at Constantinople, in particular, that the independence
of the Porte should be guaranteed, and that the knot of the
difficulty lay in that quarter. It is not our fault, if in persist-
ing too long to see it, where it was not be found, in the rela-
tively secondary questions as they regard Europe, of the rela-
tions between the Sultan and the viceroy, complications and
embarrassments have been multiplied to the extent of render-
ing them almost insoluble. We may now, at last, hope for a
return to the true path ; assuredly it is not we who have
placed obstacles in the way; and I repeat, if the overtures
of Kussia are such as they have been described to you, if they
contain nothing more, nothing at least that can change their
bearing, I am ready to authorize you to accede to them for-
mally. I even go farther ; the King's government, recogniz-
ing with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention settled on
such bases would signally alter the state of things, would
find in it a sufficient motive for submitting itself to a new
examination of the Eastern question in its entirety, even with
regard to those portions on which each of the powers seems
to have so decidedly adopted its opinion that prolonged dis-
cussion was considered impossible.
Such, Count, is the impression conveyed to us by the im-
portant intelligence you have just transmitted. I ought not
to conceal from you, however, that I have more desire than
hope of speedily learning their entire confirmation. I confess
that I am apprehensive lest the proposals intrusted to M. de
Brunnow should contain some insidious clause which would
render our adhesion impossible, and would, undoubtedly, lead
also to a fresh refusal on the part of the cabinet of London.
I am strengthened in this fear by the impossibility I feel my-
self under of accounting for the motives which could induce
the Russian government to a concession, just and reasonable
mSTOKIC DOCUMENTS. 553
without doubt, but to which until now it has manifested such
an invincible repugnance. If, indeed, we were inclined to
suppose that its idea was to place itself in a position of accord-
ing, in concert with England, a more effectual protection to
the Porte, and of imposing more rigorous conditions on the
Viceroy, this conjecture would find itself falsified by what is
now passing at Constantinople. Eedschid Pacha said, in fact,
to M. de Pontois that the cabinet of St. Petersbourg had
engaged the Porte to treat directly with Mehemet Ali, and
that M. de Tattitscheff had given this advice at Vienna to the
Ottoman ambassador. Such advice, reasonable in itself, as
we think, if there is no change about to take place in the
situation, is, nevertheless, very extraordinary on the part of
a government which affects to place itself in relations of in-
timacy with England. . . . When Lord Palmerston, to
strengthen himself in his own convictions, rests on the adhe-
sion they receive from the Chancellor of Austria, I can under-
stand the tactic he employs in conversation with you, to present
matters imder this aspect ; but I find it difficult to believe
that he considers really as an adhesion the equivocal declara-
tions of the cabinet of Vienna. Austria, after accepting our
propositions, ends by acceding in principle to those of Eng-
land, but at the same time rejects the measures of constraint
which could alone render them effectual. If this is a suffi-
cient adhesion in Lord Palmerston's eyes, he is, without
doubt, easily satisfied, and we should at least be as
much justified in assuming that Austria had adopted our
ideas.
A few words will suffice to tranquillize the anxiety Lord
Palmerston has allowed me to discover on the subject of the
formation of a squadron of reserve at Toulon. The appoint-
ment of Admiral Eosamel has no other object than to give
eventually a superior chief to our squadron, commanded by
two officers of equal rank, from which inconveniences might
arise. There is no question at this moment of augmenting
GO 3
554 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
our naval forces, and if such should arise, we should not fail
to notify it to our allies.
The last news from Constantinople contains little of interest.
Mehemet Ali persists in all his demands. He protests that
he will not surrender Adana, at least, unless the governorship
is confided to one of his sons. — " It is the key of the house,"
he says, " and I shall only give it up to a member of my own
famil}^"
, 31. General Sehastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, January 5tJi, 1840.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• ••••••
Lord Palmerston, in conformity with his promise, read to
me the project of the Eussian proposals left in his hands by
M. de Brunnow. After having discussed and commented on
its details, he promised to send me a copy to-day that I
might forward it this evening to Paris, and take it for the
basis of the account of our conversation.
For the textual communication of the Eussian pamphlet.
Lord Palmerston substitutes a sort of summary, extremely in-
complete, the blanks in which I shall endeavour to fill up. I
followed the reading yesterday with sufficient attention to feel
convinced that I shall omit nothing of importance.
To give substance to the ideas of the cabinet of St. Peters-
bourg, while taking care not to impress on them an official
character, the finesse of the Eussian envoy has had recourse
to a strange expedient : he has consigDed them to an official
despatch addressed to another agent of his court.
On the subject of his interview at Calais with M. de Neu-
mann, M. de Brunnow expresses to M. de Tattitscheff" the
satisfaction he felt at the despatch of the Austrian diplomatist,
the accordance between the two courts of Vienna and St.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 555
Petersbourg, of which he considers this mission a pledge, and
the hope that M. de Neumann will receive the necessary
powers to co-operate in the great results which the Emperor
his master has instructed him to prosecute in 'London.
Then follows the detailed development of the Russian
policy, and plans on the Eastern question.
The court of St. Petersbourg proposes ;
" That the quarrel between the Porte and the Pacha be
definitively settled under the guarantee of the powers by a
territorial partition :
" That the portions offered to the Pacha, with hereditary
investment, shall be Egypt and Syria to the fortress of Acre
as boundary ; that the restoration of all the other posses-
sions held by Mehemet Ali shall be immediately carried
out:
" That in the event of resistance on the part of the Pacha,
a choice shall be made of the various coercive measures suc-
cessively debated in the preceding communications of the
cabinets :
" That all those of a nature to hasten the settlement of the
question shall be instantly and vigorously executed ; but
that all shall be abstained from which would seem to en-
croach upon the right we desire to see triumphant:
" That thus, maritime forces shall be despatched to the
neighbourhood of Alexandretta, because their armed object
would be to threaten the flank of Ibrahim's army ; but that the
coasts of Syria should not be declared in a state of blockade,
as this would imply that we are in hostility with the legitimate
sovereign of territories momentarily occupied by a revolted
subject:
"That a Turkish expedition be directed and supported
ao-ainst Candia, but that the consuls shall not be withdrawn
from Alexandria, because the measure would be to treat a
victorious Pacha too much in the light of a sovereign ; it
would, moreover, deprive ourselves of means, influence and
4
55;] HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
information important to maintain, and would at the same
time compromise the commercial interests of the power.
" The Tur co-Egyptian part of the question being settled,
we shall occupy ourselves conjointly, in London, with the
European part.
" The mode of Kussian intervention, in case she should be
appealed to by the Porte, will be agreed upon and regulated
between the powers.
" Russia, in the event of the march of Ibrahim Pacha upon
Constantinople and of the appeal of the Divan, tvill pass the
Bosphorus with troops for disembarkation, and will under-
take the defence of Constantinople in the name of Europe.
" The other powers may then pass the Dardanelles ivith
some ships of ivar, to cruise in the waters of the Sea of
Marmara, from Broussa to Gallipoli.
" The number of these ships to be from two to three under
each flag.
" As soon as the object proposed by the powers is attained
by the submission of Mehemet Ali, the Porte will resume full
and immutable possession of the right of closing the two
straits against all the flags of Europe.
" This right will be equally and formally consecrated in
principle by the convention to be held in London, previous
to any action in the East.
" We are certain of the concurrence of Austria, of England,
and also of Prussia, on all the above-named points ; we hope
that France will not isolate herself from the other powers,
but will unite her action to theirs.
" The Emperor addresses his views to all the cabinets ; his
earnest advice is to promote and establisTi the general inter-
ests of Europe, &c."
I have now recapitulated the substance (and I believe my
memory to be faithfid) of this confidential despatch, the
only written document which up to this time has been received
on the negotiation opened by M. de Erunnow.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, 557
I have no time to enter into details, but I imagine I have
here transmitted information which will not be without
interest for your Excellenc}'-. Yesterda}^, when we reached
the paragraph relative to the portion of territory to be
assigned to Mehemet Ali^ namely, the cession of Syria to St.
Jean d'Acre, Lord Palmerston paused in his reading and ob-
served, " I have strongly opposed this idea in my conversa-
tion with M. de Brunnow ; it would compromise the 'princi'ple.
Egypt alone and the desert for frontier, — this is the true
position. I have convinced M. de Brunnow, and I feel certain
of the adhesion of the two others."
Accept, I pray you, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
32. General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, January 10th, 1840.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• ••••••
I did not consider it necessary, after the terms in which
the last communication of Lord Palmerston had placed me,
to evince any eagerness to make known to him the substance
of your first despatch ; the arrival of the second, which ap-
peared to me to contain at once the complement and corrective
which existing circumstances require, has furnished me with
a natural opportunity of seeking an interview of which they
successively formed the object, and the principal features of
which I have now the honour of relating to you.
To the warning so replete with sense and moderation which
your Excellency has again addressed to our ally on the real
object which Russia has in view. Lord Palmerston replies : " I
never thought of abandoning the alliance, and least of all of
sacrificing it to Eussia. The only understanding between
Russia and us relates to a special question, that of the East ;
558 HISTORIC documents.
on all other points the alliance continues ; and even when I
say understandinrj behveen Russia and us, I express myself
badly ; I ought to say, behveen us and all the powers."
I then communicated to him the information which had
reached the King's government as to the presumed intentions
of the Viceroy relative to the possession of Arabia and the
Holy Places. Lord Palmerston received it with satisfaction.
• ••••••
Accept, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
33. Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.
Paris, Jcmum-y 20^A, 1840.
• •••••
I am anxious to learn the tone adopted by the diplomatic
body, and particularly by the embassies of Austria and Eussia
on the last phase in the mission confided to M. de Brunnow.
The information you may give me on this point will enable us
to understand the bearing of that incident.
I must also tell you that in the difficult position in which
the ministry of her Britannic Majesty appears to be placed
at this moment, I regret that I cannot always discover in
your correspondence those details and conclusions on the
internal state of the country you are in to which your accurate
judgment would impart so much value.
You will see by the accompanying extract that the Russians
do not uniformly hold the same language with regard to the
conditions to be proposed to Mehemet AH.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 559
34. General Sebastiani to Marshal Soult.
London, Jmmary 20th, 1840.
Monsieur le Marechal,
Lord Palmerston explained to me that before deciding
on the plan, the drawing up of which had been intrusted to
him, and of which we have spoken at several intervals since
the last meeting of the cabinet, he intended to make me
acquainted with it. He has done so this morning.
The plan being as yet only sketched out, and Lord Palmer-
ston appearing desirous of having my personal opinion before
producing the definitive formula of the English propositions,
I venture to request that your Excellency will receive this
communication in its exclusively confidential character.
The plan is that of a convention of eight articles preceded
by a preamble.
The convention is not concluded as in the original project,
between the great poivers, but between the great powers on the
one part and the Porte on the other.
The object of the preamble is to state the question in this
sense : The powers being convinced that the integrity and
repose of the Ottoman empire are important to the balance
of power and the peace of Europe, and taking, of common
accord, into consideration the circumstances in which the
Sultan finds himself, place at his disposal the succours of
which he may stand in need to secure the tranquillity of his
empire and the submission of his vassal to the conditions it
becomes him to offer.
The Sultan declares that he grants to Mehemet Ali the
hereditary investiture of Egypt, on condition of the im-
mediate surrender of the other territories occupied by the
Pacha,
In the event of this surrender being refused, or of any
movement of the Egyptian army tending to menace Constanti-
nople, the Sultan will appeal to the aid of the powers.
5G0 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
This aid, the amount and composition of which is de-
termined by consent between the contracting parties, will
operate simultaneously.
The Sultan will at the same time demand from Russia
the despatch of six sail of the line and two frigates, having
on board troops for disembarkation (Lord Palmerston has
not yet fixed the number, but he thinks of proposing 15,000
men), which will pass the Bosphorus.
From France and England, six sail of the line and two
frigates (three sail of the line and a frigate under each
flag), which will pass the Dardanelles, and cruise on the
coast of Asia.
From Austria a detachment of her squadron, which will
accompany the French and English flags to the Sea of
Marmara.
The Sultan being provisionally deprived of his fleet by
the treason of the Capitan-Pacha, at his request the com-
bined squadrons will cut off communication between Egypt
and the coasts of Syria from the ships of the Viceroy, and
will seize all transports conveying warlike stores or pro-
visions.
The powers, moreover, will place at the disposition of the
Sultan a sufficient convoy to protect the passage and arrival
of the governor he may think proper to send to Candia ;
these forces will also contribute by maritime interference to
secure the re-establishment of the authority of the Porte in
that island.
The object which the Sultan proposes by calling the aid
of the powers to the waters of the Sea of Marmara being
attained, that auxiliary succour will retire as it was admitted,
at the same time.
The closing of both straits to all flags of war is formally
recognized as a permanent and inalienable privilege belong-
ing to the Porte, and constitutes henceforward, as heretofore,
a portion of public European law.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 5G1
Meanwhile, the Porte guarantees, in time of peace, to all
merchant flags, free access to the waters of Constantinople,
and also to any frigate having on board a diplomatic envoy,
under the condition, that only one frigate at a time under
such flag will be admitted into the Sea of Marmara.
Such is in substance the plan which Lord Palmerston has
read to me.
Your Excellency will observe that the measures against
the Pacha are limited to the obstacle opposed to the re-
victualling of Ibrahim Pacha's army on the one hand, and
on the other to the mutual protection of a Turkish govern-
ment in Candia. There is no reference to blockade nor to
any other eo-action whatever. Your Excellency will re-
mark also that there is no question of any communication
to be made at Alexandria ; the powers do not acknowledge
the independent existence of the Pacha ; they address them-
selves solely to the Porte.
The project has been already communicated to Messrs.
de Brunnow and Neumann.
M. de Brunnow has raised objections to the form, and
insists on the return to the original plan of a convention
between the powers themselves, who would subsequently act
with the Porte in conformity with stipulated clauses.
It is needless to tell your Excellency, that having been
consulted on this point by Lord Palmerston, I neglected
nothing which I thought calculated to confirm him in his
resolution, and that while maintaining all necessary reserve
on the great object of the question, I recommended for adop-
tion the form best suited to preserve its European character.
If I am correctly informed in other particulars, the dissatis-
faction of M. de Brunnow is not confined to the mere form of
the proposed convention ; but up to this time, the manifes-
tation of his discontent is restrained. M. de Neumann, if a
credible report can be trusted, is less reserved, and freely
exhibits his disappointment at the plan of the English
5G2 msTomc documents.
cabinet. Altogether, the two special envoys are evidently
disconcerted by the turn which the negotiation confided to
them has taken.
Lord Palmerston also invited my opinion as to the utility
and convenience of inserting a complemental article, by which
the ambassadors of the powers at Constantinople would be
charged to superintend the execution of the convention.
I thought it right to encourage this idea, which would per-
mit and even requii-e the continuance of men-of-war in the
Sea of Marmara, under the orders of our resident representa-
tives at the Turkish court.
I need not add that the point of departure of every opinion
delivered by me during this conversation has been that of
perfect ignorance of the intentions of the King's government,
and that I have not uttered a word which Lord Palmerston
could interpret as going beyond my own personal ideas. I
must merely mention a remark made by his lordship when
he finished reading his plan : " That he had drawn it up in
such a manner as to render it easy for France to adopt it,
and to unite herself to the common action of the other
powers."
Before its official transmission to the King's government
this plan may receive important modifications from Lord
Palmerston himself, and from the British cabinet in council.
As to the council, I believe that the majority, if not the
whole body, coincides with Lord Palmerston's ideas. The
conversations I have held within the last few days with
several of its members lead me to think that their opinion is
formed. I neglected nothing in these interviews which might
convey to each the true motives by which the policy of the
King's government has been directed, and convince them of
the sincerity of the desire by which it is animated, of main-
taining, to tlie utmost possible extent, the most perfect under-
standing with its allies.
Accept, I pi"ay you, &c. H. Sebastian i.
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 5G3
35. Marshal Soult to General Sebastiani.
Paris, January 2Q>th, 1840.
Monsieur le Comte,
I have received the despatch you have done me the
honour to forward. The importance of its details has en-
gaged the most serious attention of the King's government.
You will understand that I do not yet explain myself fully on
Lord Palmerston's communication. The confidential cha-
racter of that communication, the basis of which, and even
the mode of dramng up, were not definitively settled by the
British cabinet, demand the less urgently on our part an
immediate and official answer, inasmuch as in such a case the
object can scarcely be separated from the form. Be that as
it may, and without pausing on points of detail, which might
require explanation, I do not hesitate to say, that in all that
regards the mode of protection to be afforded to the Porte
against an eventual advance of Ibrahim Pacha against Constan-
tinople, the modifications proposed by Lord Palmerston to
the plan of the cabinet of St. Petersbourg appear to me to
embrace an important amelioration. The idea of introducing
the Porte as a party to the treaty regulating this mode of
protection, is especially a most happy concession, and highly
advantageous in its bearing. I regret that I cannot equally
approve, in Lord Palmerston's project, the part relating to
the territorial arrangements to be settled between the Sultan
and the Viceroy. We continue to believe that the minister
undervalues the resources of Mehemet Ali, the energy of his
character, and the moral impossibility of a man of that stamp
accepting without resistance conditions which would take
from him a considerable part of his material power, with the
whole weight of opinion from which he draws his principal
reliance. Eather than submit to them, I feel convinced he
would expose himself to the greatest extremities, and that
even if he suspended the march on Constantinople, he would
564 HISTOIUC DOCUMENTS.
not hesitate to invade Mesopotamia, and to wrest from the
Porte provinces the resources of which would enable him to
meet the resolutions of the powers with the most determined
resistance. Against such enterprises what would the co-action
indicated by the new English plan avail ? What could even
the intervention of Russia effect, within the limits to which it is
proposed that it should be restrained ? Is it not evident, that
having adopted that course, the powers would have no alter-
native but to recede before Mehemet Ali, or to revert to the
only real mode of protecting the Porte, by authorizing the
influence of Eussia in its most extended sense ? Unless de-
termined to abandon the Sultan to his weakness, would they
not be compelled to allow an Imperial army to traverse Asia
Minor and Syria to drive back to Egypt the forces of
the Viceroy ? I do not think this extremity would be more
agreeable to England than to France. In pointing out to
you the insufficiency of the coercive measures proposed by the
cabinet of London, I wish above all other points to impress
upon you the amount of contradiction in the magnitude of
the concessions demanded from Mehemet Ali and the weakness
of the ' aeans proposed to extort them. Undoubtedly the
cabinet of London persuades itself that the Pacha will yield
to the first demonstration of the powers, and that being
unable to sustain for any length of time the burdens of a
statu quo, rendered more onerous by the sort of blockade we
should establish on the coast of Syria, would hasten to relieve
himself from it by accepting the proposed arrangement. I
firmly believe this to be a mistake ; and even admitting, which
is scarcely probable, that Mehemet Ali would not laugh at the
idea of plunging Europe into the most fearful complication,
the prolongation of the actual statu quo, with its uncertainties
and dangers, would be, at the least, the consequence of his
passive resistance. It would be a strange miscalculation of
the respective positions of the two parties to believe that this
prolongation could be more disadvantageous to the Viceroy
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 565
than to the Sultan. In the state to which the Porte is at
present reduced, she particularly requires to recover herself,
so as to resume the degree of consistency and consolidation
demanded by the general interest ; as also to regain repose,
security, and a sentiment of confidence in the future. Such
advantages are infinitely more important to her than the im-
mediate restitution of certain provinces, which she would find
it extremely embarrassing to govern, and the sovereignty over
which, under any circumstances, would be secured to her.
But the Porte can only reap these advantages by a prompt
reconciliation with Mehemet Ali, and to afford this recon-
ciliation a reasonable chance of success, it should be founded
on bases justly proportioned to the relative force and power
of the contracting parties.
These are the reasons which induce us to look upon it as
dangerous and impracticable to impose on Mehemet Ali the
conditions enunciated in Lord Palmerston's communication.
On our part there is neither obstinacy, blind predilection
nor engagement of any description. Our motives are all
drawn from the general interest, from the force of things as
they exist, and from profound conviction. Let Lord
Palmerston consider them as inspired by the most ardent
desire for a perfect understanding, and for the establishment
between om- two governments of that identity of views and
tendencies which would furnish the best guarantee for peace
as well as for the interests of both countries.
It is unncessary to add that the King's government leaves
entirely to your own judgment the selection of the time and
mode that may appear to you the most suitable for urging
with advantage the arguments I now suggest.
I have received your despatch of the 24th. The details it
contains with allusion to the attitude of MM. de Brunnow
and Neumann are important. I can readily understand the
difficulties Lord Palmerston finds in drawing up his counter-
project. I am too anxious to see means of reconcilia-
VOL. IV. P P
566 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.
tion, between the causes really mixed up with the pacification
of the East, spring from these very difficulties, not to en-
tertain a certain degree of hope.
36. General Sehastiani to Marshal Soult.
Landan, Jamuiry 28th, 1840.
Monsieur le Marechal,
I h^ve just left Lord Palmerston. He has informed me
that the Council, consulted by him on the question as to
whether the projected convention should be concluded be-
tween the five powers only, or between the powers and the
Porte, has decided unanimously in favour of the latter view,
and that the Sultan ought to be admitted as a contracting
party.
This resolution, the only one as yet definitively settled in
the matter, being disposed of, the British cabinet seems neces-
sarily to adjourn not only any conclusion but even debate on
the negotiation commenced, and to postpone its resumption
until sufficient time elapses for the arrival of a Turkish pleni-
potentiary. Notwithstanding your Excellency's justly founded
impatience to see the solution of a question so full of difficul-
ties and dangers, you will find that this delay, with the chance
of reconciliation and action that it opens to us, with the new
and increasing embarrassment it adds to the attitude and
proceedings of the Austrian and Russian envoys, is not with-
out advantage for the King's government, and that we may
permit ourselves to read a success in every impediment op-
posed by the English ministry to the eagerness and activity
of MJVI. de Brunnow and Neumann. Such is at least my
own conviction, and until I receive fresh orders from your
Excellency, by this I shall regulate my conduct and language.
' You will also perceive with satisfaction the decision of the
English cabinet to include the rights of the Porte, and the
HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. 567
stipulations concluded by her, within the circle of public
European law.
Your Excellency, in addition, will recognize that, in spite
of the daily fluctuations to which a negociation must of
necessity submit, in which so many opposite and powerful
interests are in presence and in competition (fluctuations, the
returns and even the inconsistencies of which are reflected in
my correspondence), no interest essential to us has yet been
compromised, and no irrevocable position assumed.
On the territorial question. Lord Palmerston has just
informed me that he would endeavour, according to his con-
victions, to obtain the utmost possible extent for Mehemet
Ali, with a view of facilitating the acceptance, by France, of
the bases of the projected arrangement.
Accept, &c.
H. Sebastiani.
37. Baron cle Bourqueney to Marshal Soult
London, February \Uh, 1840.
Monsieur le Marechal,
• »•••••
I was about to retire when Lord Palmerston forced me, if I
may so say, to ask him whether anything new had occurred
since his last conversation with Greneral Sebastiani on the
affairs of the East. " Nothing," he replied. " I have even for
the moment suspended the drawing up of the protocol, of
which I had requested Greneral Sebastiani to apprize his
government. I restrain the eagerness of the Kussian nego-
tiator, and since M. Gruizot is soon expected in London,
bearing undoubtedly the last and complete idea of the French
cabinet, I think it much more desirable to wait his arrival
before resuming the discussion." " Thus then," I resumed,
" not only has nothing taken place, but nothing is preparing
during the interval ? " " No," replied Lord Palmerston,
568 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS. .
" absolutely nothing." I smiled at the word eafjeimess applied
by Lord Palmerston to the Eussian negotiator, at first to
show him that I did not confound what belongs to the personal
part of the envoy with a pretended anxiety for the instructions
of his court; and, secondly, because the protocol committed to
the charge of the Baron de Brunnow, as an initiative, is repu-
diated by him in his confidential conversations, and I did not
wish Lord Palmerston to suppose me ignorant of that circum-
stance. I added nothing to this short digression. It belonged
neither to my instructions nor to my position to approach the
question in its entirety ; and I know from experience how
essential it is to be cautious in fastening on those axioms,
delivered on a first impression, which influence here more
than anywhere else, and too often clog the future with diSi-
culties. The ground is now clear ; the negotiation is really
suspended, and the King's new ambassador will enter on it
with the secret of the weakness of his adversaries. This
position is good, although still delicate. I should not like to
have to reproach myself \nth a single word tending to modify
it on the arrival of M. Guizot.
Baron de Brunnow replies to the questions addressed to
him, on the subject of his departure, that he has received
no counter-orders from his court, and that his instructions
directed him to leave London for Darmstadt on the 20th of
February ; but he adds that the journey of the Imperial
Grand Duke is delayed, and that this circumstance appears
to him naturally to entail the postponement of his own. In
fact, he assumes the air of preparing people's minds for the
prolongation of his residence.
• ••••••
Accept, &c.
BOURQUENEY.
THE END.
PlllNTED Dy 3POTTI3WO0DB AND CO. NEW-STREET S«UABE, LONDON
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