ADVANCED-GUARD, OUT-rOST, DETACHMENT SERVICE OF TROOPS, wrrH THIS ESSENTIAL PRffiCIPLES OF STRATEGY, AND GRAND TACTICS FOB THK USE or OFFICERS OP THE MILITIA AND T0LUNTEEK8. Br D. H. MAHAN, LL.D., PBOFE880E OP MIUTAKT AND CITIL ENGHfEERINO, AND OP THB ABT OF WAS U( THS UNITED BTATES UILITABY ACADBMT. NEW EDITION, WITH TWELYE PLATES NEW YORK : JOHlSr ^WILEY, No. 535 BROADWAY. 1864. 'J ff3 A/ 7,-. Kntercil, according *o Act of Congress, in tho year lft47, by D. II. MAIIAN, In Ihc Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United btJiteB for the Southern District of Kew York. 8. CRAIGHEAD, Prkntr, SicirKiyper.Hnii tloetroljrper, Carton ISiiiltiinQ, • n, as, a«( 85 Ctntrt :iirttt, N. Y, PREFACE. The suggestion of this little compilation orig- inated in a professional intercourse, some months back, with a few intelligent officers of the Volun- teer Corps of the city of New York. The want of a work of this kind has long been felt among our officers of Militia generally, as English military literature is quite barren in sys- tematic works on most branches of the military art, especially so on the one known among the miUtary writers of the Continent as La Petite Guerre, or the manner of conducting the opera- tions of small independent bodies of troops ; and but few of these officers are able to devote that time to military studies, which their pursuit in a foreign language necessarily demands. In making this compilation, the works in most repute have been carefully consulted, and a selec- tion made from them of what was deemed to be most useful to the class of readers for which it is intended. The object of the writer has been to give a concise but clear view of tlie essential vi1.7GR3i If PREFACE. points in each of the subjects introduced into the work ; if he has succeeded in tliis, he trusts that the very obvious defects of the work will be over- looked. An aclcnowledgment is here due from the wniter to Major-General Sandford, commanding the First Division of the New York State Militia, and to II. K. Oliver, Esq., Adjutant-General of the State of Massachusetts, as well as to the officers gen- erally of the First Division N. Y. S. M., for their kind aid in bringing forward the work. The previous editions of this work having met with very general circulation among the class of our offi- cers for whose use it was originally designed, and the approval of the most distingui.shed of our General Officers, it has been deemed well to enlarge the work by the addition of a concise statement of the Princi- l>ks of Strategy and Grand Tactics, with illustrations from several of the most celebrated campaigns of Napoleon. This new matter has been chiefly drawn from the writings of Thiers and Dufour. U. S. MlLITABT AOADEMT, ) Dec. let, 1862. 1 CONTENTS. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. FASK. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE MOST REMARKABLE EPOCHS IN THE MILITARY ART FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS TO THE PRESENT . 7 CHAPTER I. TACTICS 32 CHAPTER n. MANNER OF PLACING AND HANDLING TROOPS . 48 CHAPTER in. POSITIONS 63 CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED-GUARDS AND ADVANCED-POSTS . 83 CHAPTER V. RECONNAISSANCES 105 CHAPTER VI. DETACHMENTS 117 CHAPTER VII. coirvoTS 155 CHAPTER VIII. SUEPRISES AND AMBUSCADES . . . 165 VI CONTENTS. FAOB CHAPTER IX. PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY AND GRAND TACTICS . 169 CHAPTER X. ORGANIZATION OF THE U. a MILITARY FORCES . 267 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE MOST REMARK A.BL* EPOCHS IN THE MILITARY ART FROM THB TIME OF THE GREEKS TO THE PRESENT. 1. No one can be said to have thoroughly mas- tered his art, who has neglected to make himself conversant with its early history ; nor, indeed, can any tolerably clear elementary notions, even, be formed of an art, beyond those furnished by the mere technical language, without some historical knowl- edge of its rise and progress; for this alone can give to the mind those means of comparison, with- out which everything has to be painfully created anew, to reach perfection only after many cycles of misdirected mental toil. 2. To no one of the arts, that have exercised a prominent influence on the well-being of society, are these observations more applicable than to that of arms. To be satisfied of this, there needs only the most cursory glance at the grand military epochs of the ancient and modern world. Looking at the art as it was among the Greeks, under Epaminondas, Fnilip, and Alexander ; and among the Romans, about the time of Julius Cajsar, of eacli of which epochs we have full authentic records ; comparing it with the phases it assumed in the decline of the Roman Empire and during the Feudal period ; ana following it, iroiii the introduction of gunpowder down to the brief career of Gustavus Adolphus, its first great restorer in Europe, — it seems incredible that anytiiing, short of the most entire ignorance of the past, could have led professional soldiers to abandon the spirit of the organization and tactics of the early Greeks and Romans, so admirably adapted to call into play tlie mental and physical energies of man, for the lumbering and unwieldy engines that clogged the operations of the Imperial armies of the Empire ; or for tiie almost equally unwieldy iron- clad chivalry of the middle ages, whose presiigg was forever obscured by the first well-organized infantry brought against it. 3. Coming to a more recent period, did we not rememl>er by what slow and uncertain stages the. march of improvement in other arts has proceeded, — how much has been seemingly owing to mere chance, rather than to welUlirected investigation,^ how rarely a master has arisen to imbody into sim- ple formulas the often complicated processes and obscure doctrines of those who have preceded him, we should have still greater cause of astonishment, that, at a time of more general diffusion of science, art and literat\ire, and particularly of the classical writers of antiquity, no master-mind should have evoked, from the campaigns of a Marius, or a Han- nibal, the germ of the comparatively modem science of strategy ; nor have gathered, from that almost liom-book of the school-boy, Cajsar's Commentaries, the spirit of those rapid combinations by which, with a handful of troops, the great Roman capt;iin so uni- formly frustrated the powerful and oft-repeated struggles of a warlike and restless people ; but, that it should have been left to the great Captain of tliia age to brush aside the mosli-work woven by routine and mUitary pedagoguisin ; wliilo, by the develop- ment of gigantic plans, made and controlled with almost matliematical precision, he fixed immovably tliose principles wliich, when acted upon, cannot fail to connnand success, and which, when over- looked or neglected, lead to defeat, or else, leaving all to chance, make of victory only a successful butchery. 4. However desirable it might be to give to this b.-anch of the military art the consideration to wtiich it is justly entitled, it does not come within the scope of a work like this to do so. The most that can be attempted will be to make a brief recapitulation of the most marked epochs ; with a view to draw the attention of the young military student to the impor- tance of this too-frequently neglected branch, and to lead him into a field of research, where the spirit of inquiry will always be gratified, useful additions be made to his previous stock of acquirement, and hints be gleaned which he will find fully to justify the correctness of Napoleon's decision upon the influence which a study of the campaigns of Alex- ander, Hannibal and Caesar, must have in the edu- cation of a thorough captain. 5. Tactics of the Greeks. — The Greeks, if not the earliest people who reduced the military art to fixed principles, are the first of whose military institutions we liave any exact account ; and even of theirs, and of the system of their successors in • conquest, the Romans, several points still remain obscure. 6. A Grecian army, at the period when the mil- itary art was in the greatest perfection among them, was composed of infantry and cavalry. The formel was made up of three different orders of soldiers ; 10 termed, 1 . The OplUai, or heavily armed, who wore a very complete defensive armor, and bore the sarissa, or Slacedonian pike, a formidable weapon either fo the attack or defence, about 24 feet in length. 2. The Fsiloi, or light infantry, who were without de- fensive armor, and carried tlie javelin, bow, and sling. 3. The PeltasUc, who were intermediate be- tween tiie otlier two, carrying a lighter defensive armor, as well as a shorter |)ike than thg oplitai. 7. The cavalry consisted of two kinds. 1. The Cataphracti, or heavy cavalry, in which both rider and horse were well covered with defensive armor; the former armed with the lance, and a sabre slung from a shoulder-belt. 2. A light cavalry of an ir- regular character, who were without defensive armor, consisting of archers and lancers, who also carried a sword, javelin, and a small buckler. 8. The clemonlarj' tactical combinations, or formO' lions, of the Greeks, were methodical but very sim- ple. An army corps was composed, 1. Of a Tetra- phalangarchia, also termed a grand phalanx, con- sisting of 16,354 oplitai. An Epitagma, of 8192 psiloi ; and an epitJigma of cavalry of 4096 men. The heavy armed, or infantry of the line, bore to the light infantrv and cavalry the ratio of the numbers 2, 4, and 1.' 9. The composition of the grand phalanx was as follows: Tetraphalangarchia = 4 Phalanxes ^\(i Chiliarchi(C = 6i SyrUairmata =^256 Tetrarchuc^= 1 024 Z/cWtoi or files=4096 Emmilicc of 4 men each. It is thus seen that, in the various formations, a division of the whole could be made by the powers of 2 or 4. 10. This body of infantry was thus officered. Each tetrarchia, consisting of 4 files, or 64 men, 11 was commanded by a Tetrarch, who was filo leadei of the first file. 11. The syntagma of 16 files, which was the army unit, and corresponds to our battahon, was commanded by a Sijntagmatarch, who was stationed in front of his command, having an adjutant on his left ; a color-bearer immediately in hi;; rear ; on the right a herald-at-arms, to repeat the commands ; and on the left a trumpeter, to sound the signals. In the rear of the syntagma was stationed an officer who was the second in command. 12. The phalanx was commanded by a general officer bearing the title of Strategos. 13. The formation of the peltastae and psiloi was analogous to that of the oplitai, the number of files being 8, instead of 16 as in the last ; and the sub- divisions receiving ditfarent denominations also. 14. The epitagma of cavalry was divided into two equal parts, each composed alike, termed Telea. One was placed on each wing of the line of battle. The telos was subdivided into 5 divisions ; the strength of each subdivision being the half of the one next in order above it. The lowest, termed lla, of 64 horsemen, corresponding *d the modern squadron, was drawn up on a front of 16 with 4 files, and was commanded by an. officer with the title of Ilarch. 1 5. The grand phalanx, in order of battle, was divided into two wings, with an interval of 40 paces between them, and one of 20 between the phalanxes of each wing. 16. The oplitai, when formed for exercise or parade, were drawn up in open order ; leaving an equal interval between the men of each rank and between the ranks. When ready to charge, each man occupied a square of 3 feet, and tlie six lead 12 Ing ranks brought their pikes to a level; thus pre- senting an array in which tne pikes of the sixth rank extended 3 feet in advance of the front one. In attacks on intrenchments, or fortified cities, the men of each rank closed shoulder to shoulder, a sufficient inter\-al being left between the ranks to move with celerity; the leading rank kept theii shields overlapped to cover their front ; the others held them above their heads for shelter against the weapons of the enemy. 17. The peltast corresponded to our elite corps of infantry, selected for enterprises requiring both celerity and a certain firmness. 18. The psiloi performed all the duties usually devolved, in the present day, upon light infantry, both before and at the opening of an engagement. 19. The position of the cavalry, in line of battle, was on the wings. The duties of this ami were mainly to charge that of the enemy. The cata- phracii, for this purpose, were drawn up on each wing, with a portion of the light cavalry on each of their Hanks. The charge was made by the former, and the latter followed up any success gained by them. 20. Tlie marches of the Greeks were usually made by a flank. Sometimes, when tlie character of the ground permitted, two phalanxes marched side by side, presenting a front of 32 men, and being in readiness to offer a front on both the flanks, if ne- cessary. 21. Among the orders of battles among the ancients, that known as the ivcdge, or hoar's head^ is the most celebrated. In this disposition, the foint, or head; is formed of a subdivision of the phalanx of greater or less strength, according to circum- stances; tills being supported by t\TO, three, and 13 four subdivisions of the same force, one behind another. 22. Tactics of the Romans. Up to the time of Marias, by whom the germ of the decadence of the military art among the Romans was sown, a Con- sular Army consisted of two Legions; and of two Wings composed of social troops. The legion was composed of infantry of the line, light infantry, and cavalry. The infantry of the line was divided into three classes. 1. The Hastati. 2. Principes. 3. Triarii. These classes wore a very complete defensive armor; they were all armed with the sfiort straight Spanish sword ; the Pilum, a kind of javelin, about 7 feet in length, used equally to hurl at a distance and in hand-to-hand engagements, was added to it for the two first ; and the triaxii carried the pike. 23. The light infantry, termed Velites, used only the casque, and a buckler of stout leather, and bore the Spanish sword and a short javelin, termed the Hasta, only half the length of the pilum, and used as a missile. 24. The cavalry wore the helmet and cuirass, and (^.rried a buckler ; their arms were a long sabre, the Grecian lance, and a quiver with arrows. 25. The legion was officered by six Tribunes , sLxty Ceniurians, with an equal number of officers who served as file-closers for the infantry ; and twenty Decurions of cavalry ; besides these there were the officers of the velites, who fought out of the ranks. 26. Until about the period of the Civil Wars, the legion was commanded by the tribunes in succes- sion ; the tour of duty for each being two months ; afterwards the rule was adopted of placing tha legion in command of an officer styled Legatui 2 14 Wliilst the tribmios exorcised the command, those, who were not on this duty, served on all occasiona of detachment service generally. 21. Each class of the infantry of the line was eubdivided into ten portions, each termed a Manipu lus. The velites were attached to these by equal portions. The cavalry were divided into ten troops, termed Turma. To each munipulus there were assigned two centurions, and two tile-closers ; and to each turma two decurions. The v^tcs, although forming a part of the manipuli, had centurions as- signed to them, to lead them in battle. 28. The normal order of battle of the Romans, Erior to the time of Marius, was in three hnes : the astati in the first ; the principcs in the second ; the triarii in the third ; and the cawalry on the wings. liy. The manipulus, which was the unit of force, was drawn up in 12 tiles, with a depth of 10 ranks, in the linos of hastati and principes ; in the line of triarii there were only 6 files. The right and left Jiles of the manipulus were led by a centurion, and closed by an officer file-closer. 30. The manipu4i of the three lines were dis- posed in quincnn.\ order ; the manipulus of one line op[)osiie to die inten'al between the manipuh in the one in front, this being the same as the man- ipulus front. The intervals between the lines were the same as the depth of each line. An inter\'al of about 3 feet was left between the ranks and the tiles of the manipulus. 3 1 . The same order of battle was followed for Uie social troops on the wings. The two legions occupied the centre ; but what inter\'al was left between them, or between the centre and wuigs, or how far the cavalry was posted from the infantry, i» not well ascertained. 15 32. The velites, before engaging, were posted usually between the intervals of the triarii, and, m part, between those of the turma. 33. In both the legionary and allied cavalry the turma were formed in 8 files and 4 rank-;. An in- terval the same as its front, was left between each turma. Of the two officers commanding a turma, one was placed on the right, the other on the left of the front rank. Each wing of cavalry was com- manded by an officer styled Prefeclus. In some instances the cavalry was placed as a reserve, in rear of the triarii, and charged when necessary, through the intervals of the manipuli. 34. In their engagements, the velites performed precisely the same part as that of the light troops which form the advanced-guards and advanced-posta of the present day. Watching and occupying the enemy before the main body is brought into play ; then retiring and taking position to harass him far- ther, as opportunity may serve. 35. The main body, from its organization, and formation, was admirably adapted to meet any emer- gency ; presenting, if necessary, by advancing the manipuli of the principes into the intervals of the hastati, an unbroken impenetrable front ; or, by throwing the manipuli of the different lines behind each other, leaving an unobstructed passage to the front, or rear. 36. From the preceding brief exposition of the phalanx and legionary formations, the respective properties of these two celebrated bodies, on the field of battle, may be readily gathered. The legion was evidently far better adapted to circumstances of locality than the phalanx, which could only move well and effectively on even ground. In tiie phalanx, the keeping together of tJie entire body,— 16 whether in moving onward to bear down the enemj bv its ortssure, (^r in waiting to resist his shock by iis inertia, — was everj'thing. In the legion, indi- vidual activity and the ease with which the mani- puli lent themselves to every requisite movement, gave to the entire machine the vohtion and strength of life. The attack with the pilum, cast on nearing tlie enemy, was followed up immediately by the on- slaught with the terrible short straight sword, equally effective to hew, or thrust with. Each mauipulus, equal to any emergency, was prepared, bythe celerity with which its movements could be made, to improve every partial advantage, and meet the enemy on all sides. Against cavalry alone, was the impenetra- ble front of the phalanx, bristling with a forest of sarissas, superior to the legion. The open order adoj)ted for the vigorous action of the individual, who to the charge of the horse had only his pilum to oppose, so inferior to the fire of the musket, that dread of modern cavalry, proved fatal to the legion on more than one sanguinary field ; till experience taught, that safety might be found in ranks more serried, and by presenting a front of pike-heads, borne by the first four ranks of the hastali. 37. Marius, urged either by policy or the neces- sities of the times, made a fundamental, and it is thought fatal change, not only in the organization of the legion, but in other parts of the military sys- tem of his country. By substituting for that glow of patriotism with which an army drawn wholly from the bosom of the people is ever found to be an- imated, the mercenary spirit and its consequences, he aimed a vital blow against the only real safe- guard of a nation's honor, a national army. In a despotism, such as Prussia was under Fred* erick, the contriAong power of an energetic will 17 may, for a season, not only ward off the attacks of powerful neighbors, but reap conquests, and strug- gle with fortitude against great reverses, with an army recruited from the scum of mankind ; but so soon as a state with any pretensions to republican institutions, substitutes the mercenary wholly for the national spirit in its armies, its fate is sealed. Like Rome, during the brilliant career of Marius, Pompey, and Caesar, — like Venice, under some of her able condottieri, as the Colonnas and Sforzas, it may, through the singular ability of particular lead- ers, still present to the world the dazzling preatige that military success, under all aspects, carries with It ; but the result is as certain as the ashes that succeed to the flame ; anarchy comes in with all its ills, from the rival pretensions of successful par- tisan leaders, and the spectacle is again seen which Rome exhibited at the period referred to ; or else the imbecility and utter prostration which Venice presented, almost from the very moment when out- wardly she had attained to her loftiest flight, down to the pitiable closing scene that wiped her name forever from the book of independent states. 38. In the truly great days of Rome, the days of the Scipios, the raising of her legions was done with all the best guards of a constitutional popular election. Six tribunes for each legion, having first been chosen, either by the consuls or by the popu- lar voice, the conscripts to fill its ranks were de- signated in each tribe by the proper magistrate ; these were divided by the tribunes into the follow- ing classes : — 1 . The youngest and least affluent were selected for the VeUtes ; 2. The next in years and wealth for the Hastati ; 3. The next in the same gradation for the Principes; and 4. The oldeat and most wealthy for Triarii. The cavalry 2* or knights, formed a privileged class, into wf.ici only those were admitted who paid a certain tax. This ciassiticiition being made, the tribunes named [0 first and 10 second centurions for the infantry; with 10 first and 10 seco7id decurions for the cav- alry; and then in concert with the officers thus selected, divided the classes into manipuli and turma, assigning to each its two proper officers ; whilst tliose, in turn, selected the two officers in each maniple who acted as file-closers. 39. Besides tlie distinction of first and second centurion, these officers took rank according to class. The first centurion of the Triarii, termed Primipilus, was the highest in rank of his grade, and took command of the legion when the tribunes were absent. 40. In the time of ihe Scipios the legion was composed of 1200 velites. 1200 hastati, 1200 prin- cipes, 600 triarii, and 300 knights. 41. Polybius states that the Consular army con- tained 6000 legionaries of the line, 2400 velites, and 600 knights of Roman troops ; and of social, or allied troops, 6700 infaTitr\' and 800 horse for the wings ; with an additional extraordinary levy of 1700 infantry and 400 cavalry ; making a grand total of 18,600 men. 42. Marius introduced the Cohort instead of the maniple as the unit of force ; forming it of three maniples, and abolishing the ancient modes of clas- sification. The cohort preserved both the number and designation of the officers attached to the man- iples. It was commanded by the first centurion, until, under the emperors, it received a superior officer, termed the Prefect of the Cohort. The use was also introduced of making of the first cohort • 19 :orps cfelite, to tvhich was intrusted tho eagle, under the orders of its primiple. 43. Tiie order of battle by coiiorts depended upon circumstances ; usually live were placed in the tirst and tive in the second line. The number of ranks Off the cohort was also variable ; depending on the front necessary to be presented to the enemy. 44. With the settled despotism of the emperors arose, as a necessary consequence, in still bolder rehef, the mercenary system. The substitution of auxiliary cavalry for the Roman Icnights, arid the fntroduction of foreigners and of slaves, even among the legionaries, soon left not a vestige of the ancient military constitution of the army ; and that train of results was rapidly evolved in which defeat was followed by all its ills but shame, and the once proud legionary became an object of terror to his master alone. Effeminacy led to the abandonment of Ids defensive armor ; and, too craven to meet the foe face to face with his weapons of offence, the legionary sought a disgraceful shelter behind those engines of war which were found as powerless to keep at bay his barbarian opponent, as was the lum- bering artillery, chained wheel to wheel, of the Oriental, to arrest the steady t^read of the English foot soldier. 45. Feudal Period. To fohcw down the mili- tary art through all the stages of its fall until the rise of the feudal system, could not fail to be a most instructive lesson, did the limits of this work permit it. Grand as were the occasional deeds of derring do of the chivalric age, they were seldom more than exhibitions of individual prowess. Art and consummate skill there undoubtedly were in tills period, but no approach to science. Countries and provinces invaded and ravaged, cities ruined 20 and castles razed, accompanied b wholesale butch* ery of the frightened pousant, mocked with the ap- pointments and title of soldier, sucli, witiiout other re- sult, were the deeds of cliivalry, and such they must have continued, had not the Swiss pike, that broke the Austrian yoke, opened the way to free Europe from its wretched thraldom, and again to raise the profession of arms to its pro])er level, in which mind and its achievements have the first rank, and brute force combined with mere mechanical skill a very subordinate one. 46. Rise of Art in Modem Times. After the decisive day of Morgaten, the Swiss name re- sounded tliroughout Europe ; and in time it became a point with the leading powers to gain these moun- taineers to tlieir side in their wars ; and even to re- tain a body of them permanently in their pay. The same men wlio at home were patriot soldiers, were known abroad, in foreign service, as the real mer- cenaries ; deserting, or upholding a cause, as the one or the other party bid highest. The true rank of infantry now began again to be appreciated ; and, with the more permanent military estabhshments soon after set on foot, an organization on juster principles gradually found its way in ; and witli it some glimmering views of ancient art. 47. Although able leaders from time to time ap- peared, and order, with a rude disciphne, was intro- duced among the hireling bands of which the per- manent portions of armies in most European slates consisted, after the first essay of regularly paid troops made by Charles VII. of France; still no one arose who seemed to compreliend the spirit of ancient art, until the period of the Revolt in the Netlierlands brought forward the Princes of Orange and ISassau, William and liis son Maurice, both of 21 whom, but particularly the latter, gave evideriCe of consummate military talent. The camp of Mau^ rice became the school of Europe, from which came forth many of the most eminent generals of that day. 48. Epoch of Gustavus Adolphus. But the great captain of tliis age was Gustavus Adolphus ; a mau who combing the qualities of hero, warrior, states- man and philosoplier ; one who early saw, what in our day, and especially in our country, is still dis- puted, that war is both a science and an art, and that profound and varied learning — an intimate ac- quaintance with literature as well as science — is mdispensable in the formation of the thorough soldier. 49. Since the invention of gunpowder, the mili- tary art had, in some respects, retrograded, owing to a misapprehension of the true value of this new agent. The apprehension expressed by the bravest of the old chivalry, that it would be the means of extinguishing noble daring, was soon seen to be not ill-founded, in the disappearance of individual prowess in the cavalry ; whilst the cumbrous ma- chines put into the hands of the infantry, and the unwieldy cannon, that but poorly replaced the old engines, rendered all celerity, that secret of suc- cess, impossible. At the tight of Kintzig, for ex- ample, w^hich lasted from mid-day to evening, and which took place after the fork, that served the old musketeer as a rest, had been suppressed, and the cartridge been introduced by Gustavus Adol- phus, it is narrated, that the infantry were drawn up in six ranks, and that the tire of musketry was so well sustained that the slowest men even di3< charged their pieces seven times. 50. Besides tliis improvement in small arma, 22 Gustavus Adolphus was the first to make the cla* sification of artillery into siege and field-pieces, adopting for the latter the calibres corresponding nearly to those used for the same purposes in the E)resent day. He formed a light regiment of artil- ery ; and assigned to the cavalr}' some light guns. 51. Iinporiant changes were made by him in the cavalry ; its armor was modified, thg cuirassiers alone preserving a light cuirass, and being armed with a long sword and two pistols. 52. By adopting a new disposition for battle, which he termed the order by brigade, the idea of wliich was clearly taken from the dispositions in tlie Roman legions, he broke up the large unwieldy bodies into which troops had hitherto been massed ; and thus gave not only greater mobility, but de- creased the exposure to the ravages of missiles. In his order of battle, each arm was placed accor- ding to its essential properties ; so that ease of manoeuvring and mutual support necessarily fol- lowed ; and pecuUar advantages of position were readily seized upon. To this end, his forces were drawn up in two or three parallel lines ; either be- hind each other, or in quincunx order ; the cannon and musketry combined ; the cavalry either in the rear of the infantry to support it, or else upon the wings to act in mass. The cavalry was formed in four ranks. 53. The dispositions made at a halt at night were always the same as those to receive the enemy, should he unexpectedly attack. The order of march was upon several columns, at suitable distances apart. 54. Such, summarily, were the main points in the improvements made by this great captain, who, OQ the field of battle, exhibited the same warrior 23 instinct, in perceiving and availing liimself of the decisive moment. Betrayed, as every original mind that reposes upon its own powers alone must be into occasional errors, — such, for example, as inter- posing, on some occasions, his cavalry between bodies of infantry, he more than cancelled them, by being the earliest to perceive the true power of each arm, as shown, in massing his artillery, and by keep- ing it masked until the effective moment for its ac- tion arrived. 65. Epoch of Louis XIV. The wars that pre- ' ceded the period of the Spanish Succession, and those induced by it, developed the seeds sown bj Gustavus Adolphus and the Princes of Nassau. The old chivalry having become a thing that was, there arose that young chivalry, equally distin- guished by valor and courtesy, which, although sometimes assuming a fantastic hue, has trans- mitted some of its spirit even to this day, through terrific scenes of popular struggles, and t!ie loosen- ing of every evil passion engendered by such strifes, and converted the battle-field into an arena where glory is the prize contended for ; and where, the contest over, the conquered finds in the victor a brother eager to assist him, and to sympathize in his mishap. At the head of this distinguished band we find the Montecuculis, the Turennes, the Condes, the Eugenes, the Marlboroughs, the Catinats, the Luxembourgs, the Vaubans, and a host of others. Still, with the exception of some improvements in the weapons in use, as the changes in the musket, by substituting for the old match-lock the one with the hammer an.i flint, the addition of the bayonet, and the introduction of the iron rammer, together with a better organization of the artillery, the pro- gress made in the art during this period was in no 34 degree commensurate with the grand scale on whicli it.s mihtarji operalions were conducted. Tlie sci- ence of fortification, and its kindred branch, the mode of conducting sieges, form an honorable ex- ception to this general stagnation of the art. Each of these were brought by Vauban to a pitch of per- fection that has left but little for his successors to achieve, so lon^ as the present arms and means are alone employea. 56. It was also in this period that the infantry pike was abandoned. This change was first made by Marshal Catinat, in the army which he com- manded in Italy; and it was gradually adopted throughout the French service by the efforts of Vauban, who demonstrated the superiority of the musket and bayonet to the pike both as a defensive and an offensive weapon. At the same time the distinction between light and heavy infantry became more prominent, partly from the introduction of the hand-grenade, for the handling of which men of the greatest stature and strength were selected, who, from this missile, were termed grenadiers, and partly, from the practice of, at first, placing the improved musket only in the hands of the best marksmen. 57. With the more effective use of fire-arms, the necessity was felt of adopting a formation botli of infantry and cavalry, that would present a less ex- posed mark to their balls ; but the disinclination to innovation wliich seems natural to all professions, retarded this change, and it was onlv after the war of the Spanish Succession that the French gave the example of a formation of infantry in tliree ranks. The cavalrj' was still far from that point of efficiency which it subsequently reached. Its movements were slow and timid, and fire-arms, unwieldy im- 25 plements in the hands of horsemen, were still pre» ierred by it to the sword. • 68 The usual order of battle was in two oT three lines ; the infantry in the centre, and cavalry on the wings. The hnes were from 300 to 600 paces apart ; having intervals between their battal- ions and squadrons, in each equal to their front, so as to execute with ease the passage of lines. Tlii3 importance of keeping some troops in reserve, ta support those engaged, and also to be used for sj)e- cial objects, as turning the flank of an enemy, begun also now to be acted on. Yet the trammels of rou' tine were but slowly laid aside. Manoeuvres and marches made with a tediouaness and circumspec- tion ditficult to be comprehended in the present day ; engagements commenced along tlie entire front at once ; the intermingling of cavalry with infantry ; the power of artillery but vaguely felt ; little a[)- preciation of the resources to be found in varied ground ; battles fought apparently with no other view than to drive the enemy from the battle-field ; such were the prominent military features of this celebrated epoch, — -one of faults, wliich deserve to be attentively studied for the lessons they afford even to the present day. 69. The period intervening between the age of Louis XIV., and the rise of the Prussian power un- der Frederick II., was one of comparative stagna« tion in the military art. The Duke of Orleans, the afterwards celebrated Regent, on one it two occa- sions, gave promise of great military talents. The mad career of Charles XII. of Sweden, and the achievements of Marshal Saxe,— -to whom we owe the modern cadenced step, and the well-known axiom, that the secret of victory resides iri the legs of the soldiers, — ^re the most instructive events of tliia 3 26 time; particularly as regards the nse of fortified points at an element of tactics ; shown in the de« Btruction of Charles's force at Pultowa, and in the influence of tlie redoubts on the renowned day of Fontensy, with which flosed the military life of Marshal Saxe. 60. Epoch of Frederick II. With Frederick 11. of Prussia arose a new order of things ; a mixture of sound axtoms and execrable exactions upon the natural powers of man, of which the latter, for years afterwards, in the hands of ignorance and military pedagoguism, became the bane of the art, and the opprobrium of humanity, through the cruel tasks and wretched futilities with which the private soldier was vexed ; to convert a being whose true strength resides in his volition mto a machine ol mere bone and muscle. 61. What influence the early hardships to which Frederick was subjected by the half-mad tyrant to wliom he owed his being, or the mercenary ma- terial, fashioned under the same regimen as him- self, with whicli afterwards he was obliged to work, may have had, in creating this state of things, it is not easy to say ; but it seems incredible that, with- out some sucii bias, a man who sliowed such emi- nent abilities, as a statesman and soldier, — who, in most things, thought wisely, and acted well,-— should have fallen into an error so gross and la- mentable ; one that even the poor shallow pliiloso- phy, of wliich he made his plaything, ought to have detected and reformed. 62. Frederick's lirst attention was given to tlie drill, or the mere mechanism of the art, in which he attained a sad celebrity. Firing executed witli a celerity that rendered aim impracticable, and with au ensemble which made a point of honor of having 27 the report from a battalion undistinguishable from that of one gun; mancEuvres calculated 'with ma- thematical jirecision, applied with equal precision by human beings tutored as dancing-dogs; the cane of the drill-sergeant more dreaded than the bayonet of the enemy ; the field of battle, that arena where genius and military instinct should be least tram- melled, converted into a parade ground, for carrying on all the trivial mummery of a mere gala-day : such were some of the worst features of Frederick's system. 63. But whenever his mind was left free to carry out an original conception, the master of the art again shone forth. In his orders of march and encamp- ment, his choice of positions to receive an attack, he seldom failed to exhibit the consummate general. In his appreciation of the powers of the oblique order of battle, by which he obtained such decisive results on tlie field of Leuthen ; the perfect state to which he brought his cavalry, and the brilliant success with which he was repaid by it, for his exertions in restoring it to its essential purposes ; his introduc- tion of Hying artillery, and his clear-sighted views as to the proper employment of this arm generally on the battle-field ; Frederick has high claims upon the profession, as well as for liis written in- structions to his generals, which are a model both of miUtary style and good sense. 64. Frederick adopted invariably the formation of three ranks for his infantry, and that of two for his cavalry. From the preponderating va) ue gi\ on to the effects of musketry, his dispositions for battle were always with lines deployed, and so disposed as to favor an easy passage of lines. This, and the curious importance attached to preserving an exact ftligiuuent in all movements, deprived the troops of 28 Oic advantages of celeritj', and the use of the bay- onet, to which the present column of attack so ad- mirably lends itself. 65. The great authority of Frederick overshad- owed, and kept down, the naturally rebeUioua promptings of common sense against parts of his system; and all Europe soon vied in attempts to rival its worst features, without comprehending its essence. In England, it was silently imposed upon a hired soldiery without difficulty; and showed it- self in a guise, in which, but for the painful fea- tures, the exhibition would have been eminently ludicrous. Throughout Germany it made its way, in spite of the impenetrable character of the insti- tutions of the day. In France, a furious war of words and writings was waged between the re- spective advocates for the true French laissez-faire, and the Prussian tournequetism and strait-jacket- ism ; as well as upon the more important question of the deep and shallow formations. If this con- test did nothing more, it provoked discussions in wliich the voice of the real soldier was occasionally heard in the din of mere military pedagogues. It produced the brilliant pages of Guibert, and the whimsical scene, so graphically described by De Segur, of the experimentum crticis, to which he in- voluntarily, and a comrade voluntarily were put, to ascertain man's powers of endurance under the punishment of the flat of a sabre. Then came that event which swept all these puerilities and most other futilities into one vortex, — the French Revolution. The value of proper control, and the evils arising from i*s want, were here equally dem- onstrated ; and a just medium at length hit upon, which left to the individual his necessary powers under all circumstances. 29 66. Epoch of the French Revolulion, and its Sequel. With tho emigration of her nobles, France saw herself deprived of nearly all those who were deemed capable of organizing and leading her ar- mies. Her enemies were upon her, still brilliant with the prestige of Frederick's name and Freder- ick's tactics ; and to these she had to oppose only ill-armed and disorganized masses, driven to the field, in some cases, more through apprehension of the insatiable guillotine, than through any other motive, dreading it more than the disciplined Prus- sian. But here the man, thrown on his own re- sources, lifted up and borne onward by an enthusi- asm bordering on fanaticism, showed himself equal to the emergency. Like our own first efforts, so those of the French were the actions of individitals. Where the drill had done nothing, individual mil- itary instinct filled up the want. A cloud of skir- mishers, soon become expert marksmen, harassed and confounded lines taught to fire only at the word of command ; the compact column, resounding with the Ca ira, scattered to the winds feeble, frigid lines, torpid with over-management, and effected a revo- lution as pregnant to the military, as the political one to which it owed its birth was to the social system. Thus was laid the foundation of the tac« tics of this day ; a system that partly sprung up in the forests of America ; and upon which, a few years later, the ingenious Bulow would have had military Europe to base its system. 67. The frenzy of enthusiasm past, reason and discipline again claimed their rights; and the v«-ell- judging, able generals of France, brought both the system of skirmishers and the column of attack, to their proper functions ; and the way was prepared for that Genius who swayed these two elementary 3* 30 facts with a power that shook Europe to its centrCj and caused her firmest thrones to reel. 68. Napoleon appeared upon the scene at a mo- ment the most propitious for one of his gigantic powers. The elements were prepared, and al- though temporarily paralyzed by a state of anar- chy, resulting from the political and financial cor>- dition of the country, they required only an organ- izing hand to call into activity their inherent strength. This hand, endowed with a firmness and grasp that nothing could shake, or unloose, was that of Napoleon. To him we owe those grand features of the art, by which an enemy is broken and utterly dispersed by one and the same blow. No futilities of preparation ; no uncertain feeling aboyt in search of the key-point ; no hesitancy upon the decisive moment ; the whole field of view taken in by one eagle glance ; what could not be seen divined by an unerring military instinct ; clouds of light troops thrown forsvard to bewilder his foe ; a crushing fire of cannon in mass opened upon him ; the rush of the impetuous column into the gap made by the artillery ; the overwhelming charge of the resistless cuirassier ; followed by the lancer and hussar to sweep up the broken dispersed bands; such were the tactical lessons practically taught in almost every great battle of this great military period. The task of the present one has been to systematize, and imbody in the form of doctrine, what was then largely traced out. 69. In an intimate knowledge of the peculiar application of each arm, and a just appreciation of their respective powers ; in all that is lofty in con- ception, skilful in design, and large in execution, Napoleon confessedly stands unrivalled. But it has been urged that, for the attainment of his endi 31 on the battle-field, he has shown a culpable &»• regard of the soldier's blood, and has often pushed to excess his attacks by masses. To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least exposure to ourselves, is a military axiom lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of vic- tory. How far this may have been disregarded by Napoleon, can be known, with certainty, onlj through Napoleon himself. He, who suffered no important fact, or its consequences, to elude his powers of analysis, could hardly have been un- Qiindful of the fate of the grand column at Fonte- nay, nor have forgotten the imminent danger in which those squares were placed that, at the battle of the Pyramids, resisted like walls of iron the head- long charge of the reckless Mameluke, when he launched forth the formidable column of M'Donald OQ the field of VVagiam. CHAPTER L 70. Tactics may be defined to be the art of ilrain* ing up, and moving troops systematically. It ad- mits of a classification into two divisions. 1. Mi' nor or elementary tactics ; under uhicli head may be placed all that refers to the drill, and other prepara- tory instruction of troops, to give them expertness in the use of their weapons, and facility of move- ment. 2. Grand tactics ; or the art of combining, disposing, and handling troops on the field of battle. 71. I'he manner of drawing up troops, or their disposition in their pritnitive order of batiie, evi- dently must depend upon the kind of weapon with which they are armed, and tlieir mode of righting. A glance, upon the preceding pages, will show how the primitive order of battle lias been modified by these circumstances, in difierent nations, and at dif- ferent epochs. Without stopping to consider these, or to enter into an analysis of the once vexed ques- tion respecting the merits of the deep and shallow orders, we shall take it as practically solved, for the present, by tlie adoption in all civilized states, of the uniform system now in use ; wiiich is for in- fantry troops, eitlier dispersed, or deployed in lines for firing ; and in columns of march, or attack, for movements ; — for cavalry, either deployed lines or dispersed order for attack, and columns for manoeu- vres, and exceptionally for attack. To this it may be added, that no soldier, who has made himself conversant witli the resources of liis art, will a Uov» 33 Iiimself to be trammelled by any exclusive system. What the case requires he will do, if conlident of his troops ; throwing a deployed line, with the bay- onet advanced, upon his enemy, if he judges the moment propitious ; or charging impetuously, with his horse in column, under like circumstances. 72. The systems of tactics in use in our service are those of the French ; not that opinion is set- tled among our oflicers on tliis point; some pre- ferring the English. In lavor of tJie French, it may be said, tliat there is really more affinity be- tween the military aptitude of the American and French soldier, than between that of the former and the English ; and that the French systems are the results of a broader platform of experience, submitted to ihe careful analysis of a body of offi- cers, who, for science and skill combined, stand unrivalled ; whereas the English owes more to in- dividual than to general talent; and therefore is more liable to the defects of individual pride of opinion, than where this can only be felt in discus- sion at the council board, at which its morgue is liable to be checked, and its fallacies exposed, by rival talent. 73. In all tactical combinations, experience has shown that for each arm there is a certain numeri- cal fc/rce, which lends itself best to the essential conditions demanded in all troops ; — which are strength, activity, and the faculty of moving in any direction. This force, termed the unit, varies in the different arms. In all cases, it should not be so great but that all the men of which it is com- p<>sed may be overlooked by, and be known to, the officer in command of it ; and also when drawn up in its order of battle, be within reach of his voice. These last conditions place a practical Umit to tha 34 tactical unit ; owing to the extent to which the hu. man voice can be distinctly heard ; the space taken up by each combatant ; and the form and dimen- sions of the figure covered on the ground by the unit in its order of battle. 74. The battalion is the unit of the arm of in- fantry ; the squadron that of the arm of cavalry ; and the battery of six guns that of the arm of ar- tillery. 75. For each of these units, particular subdi- \'isions have been adopted ; and their command in- trusted to officers of suitable grade, both to overlook and to lead ihem in the various combinations to which the unit may be subjected. For the details on all these points, as they do not come within the scope of this work, reference may be had to the systems of elementary tactics adopted in our ser- vice. 76. The order of battle of the unit is usually based upon the nature of the weapon used, and the space required for handling it freely. 77. The habitual ord.T of battle of infantry is in two or three ranks. With us, that of two ranks is generally preferred, partly because our battalion is small, and therefore requires all the front thai can be given without presenting a line liable to waver at every change of position ; but mainly because every musket can be made to tell effectively: a point of great importance where the troops, like ours generally, are habituated to handling fire- arms almost from childhood. 78. Cavalry is now universally formed in two ranks, in order of battle. The efficiency of this arm resides in the power of its shock ; and, as in a charge, the first rank alone is brought into actual contact willi the enemy, the only reason for placing 35 i second is to close up gaps made in the front, by casualties whilst charging ; and also in the mel6e tliat succeeds the charge, to have a sufficient num- ber of sabres in hand to do good service. 79. The order of battle of artillery is necessarily a line of pieces in front; a second of caissons for the supply of immediate wants, and a third line of caissons in reserve to the rear, beyond the reach of casualties from the enemy's fire. 80. The subdivisions of the unit have their ha- bitual position in the order of battle. This is ne- cessary, in order that the mechanism of the unit may have that simplicity and uniformity in which there will be no difficulty in its being comprehended and retained by ordinary minds, to the end that every movement may be executed with promptitude. Still cases may occur in which the requisite rapidity to meet an attack, or to move in a given direction, can- not be attained without changing the habitual order. Such cases are provided for by what are termed inversions, in which the subdivisions temporarily cliange places and parts. 81. In all changes of position that demand a dis- turbance of the fundamental order of battle of the unit, it is broken into its subdivisions, which are placed in certain relative positions with respect to each other, according to the object in view. These combinations are termed manoeuvres, and their chiet object usually is to change the direction of the li-unt of the unit, according to the particular exigency. 82. Mincpuvres, like all the rest of the mechan- ism pertaining to the unit, should be stainped with simplicity and uniformity, for reasons already as- signed. The tactics of the present day present, in this respect, a remarkable contrast to those of the period anterior to it ; wliich is owing, in no small 85 nieasyre, to the little scope left for individual fancy every proposal being submitted to the formal exam- ination of an enlightened board. Stage spectacles alone now occasionally fumish some notions of those whimsies of olden times ; so happily hit off in the well-known article of Salmagnndi, where the street-pump figures as an almost impassable ob- stacle to the show soldier of that day. 83. The foregoing observations, upon the spirit of the actual state of tactics, can doubtless convey nothing more than a vague idea of the subject. They were introduced with this view only ; so that the young student of the art might have some gen- eral notion, though a vague one, of what is pro- posed to be attained, before his mind gets more or less bewildered in what must seem, for some time at least, a maze of technicalities, and mere rote-work, — the systems of elementary tactics for conducting the drill. 84. Army Organization. Although not alto- f ether \\ithin the design of this work, a few words ere may be not out of place on army organiza- lion. Of all the civilized states of Christendom, we are perhaps the least militarj', though not behind the foremost as a warlike one. A sounder era, however, is dawning upon us. The desire for war, as such, is decreasing, wliilst a feeling of the neces- sity for being always ready for it is becoming more general. All our battle-fields, up to the glorious feat at Buena-Vista, have proved to the world that the American soldier was wanting in no military quality, but combined the \'ivacity of the French with the tenacity of the English. But this, how- ever, couid make but little impression upon the soldier -statesmen of Europe. To be warlike, does not render a nation formidable to its neigbbor!* 37 Tliey may dread to attack it, but have no appre- hensions from its offensive demonstrations. It was reserved for the expedition to Vera-Cruz, and its sequel, the victory of Cerro-Gordo, to bring into strong relief the fact, that wo were unostentatiously, and almost silently, becoming a powerful military state. The lesson will not be lost upon our neigh- bors, however slowly we, in the end, may profit by it. A shout has gone forth from the Rio-Grande, and the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, which, heard on the Tliames and the Seine, has resounded along the far-oif shores of tlie Baltic and Black Sea, and will reach the farther Ind, bearing with it a signifi- cance that no prudent statesman will hereafter affect to misunderstand. What are the military re- sources of this great Republic is no longer a ques- tion ; a more thorough organization is alone want- ing for their complete development. 85. Napoleon, at the period of the preparations for his descent uj)on England, had a moment of leisure which he could bestow upon his military or- ganization. Then, for the first time, it is believed, was introduced a systematic organization of grand masses, termed Army Corps ; each one comprising within itself all the elements of a complete army, and apt for any emergency. Since then this has served as a type to France, and other European states, in their organization. 86. An army is now composed of one, or more army corps, made up of infantry and cavalry ; an artillery equipage, comprising several batteries ; several artillery parks of reserve ; with a grand one to which is attached a bridge-train. 87. Each army corps consists of one, or more Divisions ; each division of several Brigades ; the brigade comprising two Regiments. 4 38 Two batteries of foot-artillery, of six pieces each, are attiiched lo each infantry division ; and one ot horse-artillery, of the same strength, to each division of heavy cavalry. Besides, for each army corps of infantry, there is a reserve of several batteries ; and a few served by foot artillery. In some cases, one of the batteries of reserve is served by the horse-artillery. 88. A company of engineer troops, termed Sap- pers, is generally attached to each infantry division; and to each infantry army corps a brigade of light cavalry ; with a company of PonLoniers, which has charge of the bridge-train. 89. In France, each brigade is commanded by a Marechal dc Camp, a grade corresponding to our brigadier-general ; each division by a Lieuienanl- General, which corresponds to our major-general ; and an army corps by a Marechal de France. 90. The particular organization of the General StaiF, and the diflerent arms of service, would lead to details of no importance here. The proportion, ^however, of each arm of an army to the others, is a subject of great interest, as upon this depends, ir .a great degree, the more or less of excellence ir ■the military institutions of a state. 91. The infantry, from its powers of endurance •its capabilities for battle in all kinds of ground, and its independence of those casualties by which the other arms may be completely paralyzed, is placed as the Jirst arm ; and upon it is based the strength of all the others. It generally forms about fouv' ffths of the entire force. 92. In all states where the military art is justly appreciated, the cavalry arm is placed in tlie secoiid rank to the infantry. To it an army is often in- debted for turning the scales of victory, and givmg 39 s decisive character to the issue. To it. the infan« try, wiien cxhau.sted by fatigue, or broken, often owes its safety, and through the respite gained by its charges, linds time to breathe and reform. Without it, much of advanced-post duty, patroles, and detachment service requiring great celerity, would be but badly performed. But the arm of cavalry by itself can effect but little ; and, in many circumstances, does not suffice even for its own safety. The smallest obstacles are sufficient to render it powerless ; it can neither attack nor hold a post without the aid of infantry ; and at night is alarmed, and justly so, at every phantom. The proportion borne by the cavalry to the in- fantry should vary with the features of the seat of war ; being greater in a c-:ami)agne than in a broken, or mountainous country. Tlie proportion of one^ fourth of the infantry for the first, and oiie-sixlh for the last, i.s generally admitted by received military authority as the best. 93. 'i'he artillery is placed iliird in rank among tlie arms. Its duties are to support and cover the other arms ; keep the enemy from approaching too near ; hold him in check when he advances ; and prevent him from debouching at particular points. To perform these duties it is considered that an al- lowance of one piece fur each thousand men of the other arms, and one in reserve forms the proper quota of this arm. It is to be remarked, however, that this proportion supposes the other arms in an excellent state of organization and discipline. In tlie contrary case, the quota of artillery musL be in- oeased ; for it inspires poor troops with conridence, ati they rely upon it, to keep off the enemy, and to cover their retreat. But here arises another disad- 40 vantage ; as artillery is utterly incapable of defend- ing itself, and therefore, when present in an ovef proportion, it must necessarily sustain great losses in guns and the other materiel. 94. The arm of engineering, although requiring more science and a higher grade of talent for it? dutios than any other, takes the last place in tactical cons id'Taf ions. To it is intrusted all that pertains to opposing passive obstacles to an enemy's advance, and removing those which he may have raised. To it is assigned that most difficult of all tasks to the soldier, paiicnt endurance of manual toil, and a dis- regard of cverytliing but the work in hand, wliilst exposed to the enemy's fire. The proportion of engineer troops will depend in a great measure upon the character of the operations undertaken ; being most in sieges, and least in those depending mainly on manoeuvres. In the French sen'ice, the engineers are one-half the strength of the artillery ; a large number, but rendered necessary by the pe- culiar military position of that country. 95. the troops which compose the three principal arms are generally subdivided into two classes, heavy and light ; partly arising from the nature of tlieir weapons, and partly from their destination on the field of battle. 96. This subdivision is less marked in the in- fantry than in that of the other arms ; for although in most foreign armies, a portion of the infantry carries a sabre with the musket, still this additional weapon is of rather questionable utility ; for the musket is the one which, under all circumstances of attack and defence, will be resorted to. 97. All inf-intry now receive the same instruc- tion ; but whether a portion of it ought not to be reserved especially for ihc duties consigned to light 41 troops, is still a disputed point. One thing is cer tain, that perfection is more easily reached by con fining the individual to one branch of his art. thai by requiring him to make himself con/ersant with the whole. Still it might be often foimd incon- venient, at the least, if infantry were not able tc perform all the functions required of it. 98. The service of light infantry often demands great individual address, intelligence, and well-de- veloped physical powers ; a combination of qualities not easily found, and seldom, -indeed, without care- ful habitual training. Whereas, in infantry of the line, tlie qualities of the individual are of less im- portance, as results here depend almost solely upon the action of the mass. 99. The habitual order of battle of light infantiy is the dispersed order; and whether actinn- ofFen- sively or defensively, it depends for its results upon tlje effect of its fire, resorting to the close order, and using the bayonet, only exceptionally. As each individual, although immediately supported by his own file-closer, and those on his right and left, is still often thrown upon his own resources, being obliged to take cover where he can most con- veniently find it, he must be a good marksman, cool, deliberate, and circumspect; since it may be- come necessary to keep an enemy occupied hours, and even days together, pressing on him at one mo- ment and yielding to him the next, or holding with tenacity, and disputing inch by inch some particu- lar point, as it may suit the views of the general in command. 100. In infantry of the line, as success depends upon the action of the mass, ensemble, coolness, and determination should characterize all its movements, whether it delivers its fire in line, forms in column 4* 42 to attack Avith the bayonet, or throws itself into square, to await the charge of the enemy's cavalry. 101. The duties of hght infantry are to open an On^gement, and, after it is fairly got under way, to keep it going ; turning it to advantage if suc- cessful, otherwise breaking it off. In its relations to the infantry of the line, it should cover the flanks of the latter; clear the way for its advance by rooting the enemy out of all covers, and then holding them if requisite. Upon it devolves all advanced-post, detachment, and advanced and rear- guard service. 102. To the infantry of the line is confided eve- rything where firmness is the essential requisite ; as the attack or defence of key-points, the forma- tion of all supports and reser\'es ; whether on the field, or in the attack and defence of posts. 103. There is a third class of infantry, termed rijlemp.n, which does not form a part proper of the arm of infantry ; partaking, when properly consti- tuted, more of the character of partisan than of regular troops ; being chosen only from that por- tion of a po])ulation whose habits lead them to a daily use of fire-arms, and give them an unerring aim. As an auxiliary in the defence of particular localities, where they are secure from the attack of the bayonet, or of cavalrv', and can deliver their fire with that deliberation which their weapon de- mands, riflemen will often be found invaluable ; as nothing is more dreaded b.y troops generally than this lurking, and often invisible foe, whose where- about is only divined by the destruction he deals around him. 104. In cavalry, the distinction between hca\7 and light is moie strongly marked, and the func> tions of each more clearly defined than in infantry 43 105. The cuirassiers, from their defensive ar- mor and heavy sabre, wliich in botli man and horse call for great physical powers, constitute the true tieavy cavalry. The dragoons and hussars belong to the liglit, and the lancers indifferently perform the functions of either. 106. The most essential quality of all cavalry, which distinguishes it from all other arms, and gives it tiie facidty of taking an enemy frequently at disadvantage, is that of celerity. If to tliis the rider unites boldness, and even, when called for, recklessness, it makes of tliis arm a truly fearful one. 107. Cavalry, to attain its ends, should unite several essential conditions ; horses and weapons in good condition ; suificient depth of ground both in front and rear to gather speed for the charge, or space for rallying ; to be led boldly but skilfully into action ; have its flanks covered against a sur- prise ; and be followed by a support, or reserve, to cover the retreat, or secure from tiie effects of con- fusion the line charging, if brought up unexpect- edly by the enemy. 108. There are qualities which are peculiar to each kind of cavalry, growing out of the duties re- quired of this arm. To the heavy cavalry, the cui- rassier sa7is peur, should belong the attribute of irresistibility. Apparently as careless and indiffer- ent to the maddening strife around, as was le Noir Faineant, in the " Gentle and Joyous Passage of Arms of Ashby-de-la-Zouche," whilst waiting the moment for action ; the cuirassier, when, with sa- bre raised, he rushes on his foe, should, like the tornado, level all before him, and leave nothing of his task unfinished but the gathering of the wreck he leaves in his track. 44 109. The dragoon, when first instituted to com- bine the functions botii of tlie foot soldier and cava- lier, was found, like most mongrels, to have the qualities of neither in a very serviceable degree. He still retains his musqucloon, and on outpost duty, and skirmisliing in broken ground, does a sol- dier's duty with this weapon. Apt for attacks, whether in close order or dispersed, he should lend himself to the charge kindly ; and in cases where thrown on his own resources, display all the intel- ligence, activity, and circumspection of tlie best light infantry. 110. The dashing bold hussar, that epitome of military impudence and recklessness at the tavern, should present those qualities in a sublimated form on the field. Regardless of fatigue and danger, Ms imagination should never present to itself an ob- stacle as insurmountable. On the march, con- stantly at the enemy's heels ; in position keeping him at all moments on the alert, harassing him either with fatigue, or apprehension for the secu- rity of liis rear and communications ; on the field careering with a falcon's speed and glance upon his quarry, however it may seek to elude his blow, such should be the hussar. 111. The lancer, like the poet, " is born not fash- ioned." In the hands of the Pole, the lance, whether used to charge in line or in the dispersion of pursuit, is a truly fearful weapon ; but to those to whom long practice in its use has not made it a second nature, it is only embarrassing, and more to be avoided by a comrade than by a foeman. Still the apprehension of being run through has a jx)werful moral effect upon a man ; and there is no sound more appalling to a flying enemy than " here come tlie lancers." 45 112. As the functions of heavy cavalry are to h-iar down all opposition, and present an impassa- bic wall to the enemy's efforts, its duties are con- fined to the battlc-tield ; there, placed in the reserve, it is held in hand until the decisive moment arrives, when it is launched forth to deal a blow from which the enemy hopelessly struggles to recover, either to achieve victory, or to fend otF utter defeat. 113. To light cavalry are intrusted the impor- tant duties of securing from surprise the flanks of the heavy ; to watch over the safety of horse artil- lery, and to perform the services required of them by infentry divisions, and those of detachment ser- vice in general. 114. The artillery, which had for a long period, and even still, preserves the character of eminent respectability, has of late years begun to infuse a dash of the dare-devil spirit of the cavalier into its ranks. If it has not yet taken to charging literally, it has, on some recent occasions in our service, shown a well-considered recklessness of obstacles and dangers, fully borne out by justly deserved success. 115. The distinction between light and heavy in this arm arises, not only from the difference of cal- ibre in the pieces, but also in a difference of their tactical application. * 116. The heavy field cahbre is the 12-pounder, which is reserved for batteries in position, and is seldom shifted during the action. 117. The light field calibre is the 6-pounder, and the 24-pounder howitzer, wliich are served either by foot or horse-artillery, and follow the movements of the other arms. 118. Improvements both in the materiel and the tactics of artillery have been very marked within 46 late years. Formerly, considered only in the light of an auxiliary on the battle-field, artillery now as- pires, and with indisputable claims, to the rank of a principal arm. Its decisive effects, at the late bat- tles on tlie Rio-Grande,* are supported by testi- mony too empliaiic to be overlooked. 119. From the studies required of him, the artil- lerist is well trained to maintain the characteristics of his arm ; courage of the highest order, in which the physical is always under the control of the moral element, producing, as a necessary result, un- bounded devotion to the task assigned ; a presence of tnind that nothing can disturb ; and tliat coolness which no danger, however appalling, can impair. 120. The tactical applications of artillery on the field depend on the calibre. To the heavy are as- signed the duties of occupying positions for strength- ening the weak points of the field of battle ; for securing the retreat of the army ; for defending all objects whose possession might be of importance to the enemy, as villages, defiles, &-c. ; and for over- turning all passive obstacles that cover the enemy, or arrest the progress of the other arms. 121. The light pieces, served by foot-artillery, follow the movements of the infantry ; covering the * In alludin? to the late brilliant achievements of our artil- lery, it is but just to call attention to the fact, that the country is indebted for it lo the [Inn. .Joi'l R I'oinsett, late Secretary oi War under the adininislration of President Van Buren. With- out the forelhou'rht and niilitiry sagacity of this accomplished genlleinan, and his unlirinfielforts. while in ofticp. to promote th'> public good and insure its safety if suddenly brnught into a si lie of war ; the country, in all probability, would have been found, on the breakuig out of the .Me.vican difficulties, in the same dilemma with regard to this most important arm, as it was in some other hardly less essential points. It is to be hoped that the m;i.vim so oi"ten idly repeated, and the value of which Was here forcibly illustrated, In Fca.ce prepare for fVir, may uot again be used in vain. 47 flanks of its position, preparing the way foi its on- set, and arresting that of the enemy, ll is of this that the principal part of the artillery in reserve is composed. 122. The horse-artillery is held in hand for deci- sive moments. When launched forth, its arrival and execution should be unexpected and instanta- neous. Ready to repair all disasters and partial reverses, it, at one moment, temporarily replaces a battery of foot, and at the next is on another point of the field, to force back an enemy's column. In preparing the attacks of cavalry, this arm is often indispensable and always invaluable ; brought with rapidity in front of a line, or opposite to squares of infontry, v/ithin the range of canister, its well- directed fire, in a few discharges, opens a gap, or so shakes the entire mass, that the cavalier finds but a feeble obstacle, where, vvathout this aid, he would in vain have exhausted all his powers. CHAPTER n. MANNER OF PLACING AND HANDLING TROOFS. INFANTRY. 123. Posfkion and Formation. On llie field of battle, whether the object be to attack, or defend, the infantrj' is divided into three bodies ; an advan- ced-guard, the main-body, and a reserve. Their relative proportion will depend upon the total force, and the character of the position occupied. The advanced-guard must be of sufficient strength to hold the enemy in check, but, at the same time, the main body, upon which the brunt of the action should fall, must not be left of insufficient force, by unnecessarily increasing the advanced-guard ; and the reserve should be strong enough to repair any disaster that may befall the main body ; or to profic by its success in accomplisliing the complete over ■ throw of the enemy. 124. These three bodies are separated from each other by intervals which will depend upon the na- ture of the ground. Tiie advanced-guard occupy- ing the front ; the main-body at a distance from 150 to 300 paces in its rear; and the resen'e at a like interval to the rear of the main body. Where the ground, for example, is undulating, and therefore favorable to masking the troops from the enemy's fire, these intervals may, if requisite, be reduced to 80 or 100 paces. 125. The troops composing these three bodies will be formed either in columns of battalions, or 4: be deployed, according to the circumstances nnder wliich they may be placed. For an attack, for evo- lution, or tor defence against cavalry, the formations of columns of battalions is best. To repel the enemy's attack by a tire, and in some cases, to pre- sent d loss favorable mark to his artillery, the bat- talions are deployed. The battalions, whether de- ployed or in column, preserve the proper intervals for evolutions ; these intervals may be increased in obstructed ground without weakening the defence. 126. The battalions composing the main-body may be drawn up in one or two lines. The latter usually obtains only when a large force is present. In this case tlie reserve no longer holds the position of a third line, as in the other ; but forms an inde- pendent body, to be used according to the emer- gency ; the second line supporting the battalions of the first, and, for this purpose, occupying positions to the rear, opposite to their intervals. 127. Defence. When the position is taken up to receive the enemy's attack, and then either to re- main on the defensive, or to assume the offensive, as circumstances may justify, the advanced-guard will be posted on the ground most favorable to hold the enemy in check, and so force him, by disputing it with tenacity, to develope his means and plans. Tills is best done by a judicious combat of skir- mishers, who, for this purpose, are thrown forward 300 or 400 paces, to feel the enemy, and are only reinforced when closely pressed. 128. Whether the advanced-guard shall maintain its ground obstinately until reinforced by the main- body, or whether it shall fall back, either on the flanks or to the rear of the main-body, must be de- termined by the strength of its position. If ttiis be so strong that the enemy's loss in carrying it must 5 60 be gieat, then it should be pertinaciously main> tuined ; in the ''ontrary case it must, after a suita- ble show of resistance, be abandoned. 129. As a general rule, troops should be placed as much out of view as practicable before they go into action, by taking advantage of covers offered ' by the ground. The main-body should be kept masked in this way until it is called to engage the enemy. If it advance to support the advanced- guard, it will usually attack with the bayonet ; if the advanced-guard is called in, the main-body will usually receive the enemy by its tire; the battalions being deployed for this purpose. If the enemy is staggered by this fire, or, in advancing, shows, by the wavering or confusion of his line, a want of confidence, the fire may be followed up either by a charge of the troops in line ; or they may be formed in columns of attack before charging, if the enemy perseveres in his onward movement. A charge by a colunm, when the enemy is within 50 paces, will prove effective, if resolutely made. 130. The reserve is composed of the most reU- able troops. It should be distinguished for cool courage ; acting under all circumstances, either de- fensive or offensive, with circumspection and de- termined resolution. As the object of the reserve is to infuse greater energy into the action of the main-body, and, if ne- cessary, to strike a last and decisive blow, it should be kept masked from the enemy's fire and view until called into action. The proper moment for engaging the reserve is either when the enemy has been shaken in his attack by the resistance offered by the main-body, or when the latter is unable far- ther to resist the enemy's efforts. If engaged too soon, the resistance offered to the reserve may pre- 51 vont its making a decisive blow ; if not engaged in time, the main-body may be too far exhausted and disorganized to rally. In cases where the reserve forms a second line, to support the main-body, it should approach the first line when it becomes engaged, to be ready to replace it when circumstances may render it neces- sary. The advanced-guard, in such cases, should retire to the rear, to act as a reserve. 131. Attack. In the attack of infantry, the same fundamental dispositions are made as for the defen- sive. The advanced-guard will not throw forward its skirmishers until they are near enough to en- gage the enemy. The line of skirmishers should be strongly supported, and will press the enemy with vigor and without relaxation. If the force engaged be small, the main-body will regulate its movements by those of the line of skirmishers ; if considerable, the reverse will obtain. 132. The main-body and reserve follow in col- umn the advanced-guard, preserving the requisite intervals. The columns should take every advan- tage of the ground to mask their movements ; get- ting rapidly over any where they are much ex- posed to fire. So soon as the advanced-guard is checked, it will fall back either on the flanks of the columns, or to the rear ; and the main-body will b^ immediately brought into action, either by deploying and opening its fire, or by a vigorous charge with the bayonet. If the main-body falters in its attack, or gives any signs of want of resolu- tion, the reserve should advance at once through the intervals, and make a vigorous charge with the bayonet. 133. If the attack by the main-body is made with the bayonet, the interval between it and the col- M 62 amns of the reserve may be lessened to 80 or 100 paces. The flanks of the columns of attack, and the intervals between them, should be occupied by skirmishers. This is an important precaution ; as, by forchig the enemy to deUver his fire before the columns have reached within a destructive range, the main obstacle to their onward movement will be removed. 134. Pursuit. If the assailed retires, the pur- suit must be conducted with system and in good order. The line nearest the enemy will throw for- ward a few troops in pursuit ; wliich, in most cases, will be preceded by skirmishers. The line in close order, will follow these troops until it attains a good position to receive the enemy, should he make an offensive movement, when it will be halted and formed i^n readiness for action. A pursuit by in- fantry alone cannot h?, pushed far, even should the enemy retire without any order, or show of resist- ance, as the retreating force will soon distance their pursuers. 135. Retreat. When, either in the defensive, or offensive, it becomes necessary to retire, the first point to be attended to is to withdraw the troops engaged ; either to a good position to their rear, where they can halt and face the enemy, or else behind the line in their rear, wliich should hold the assailants in check, and allow the retreating troops to fall back in good order. Having fairly got dis- engaged, dispositions must be promptly made to withdraw from the field. This may be done by the entire force moving off together, if the enemy shows no disposition to follow up his success with energy ; or, in the contrary case, by retiring by successive portions ; the line which withdraws fiill- ing some 150 paces to the rear o*^ the one by wliich 53 It is covered, whilst falling back, and thai forming, tc cover in turn the retreat of the latter. The dispositions made in the retreat will depend entirely upon the character of the enemy's pursuit, and the features of the ground. It will usually be made in columns, covered by skirmishers, if the pursuit is made by infantry alone ; if by cavalry, the retreat must be made with great circumspec- tion ; the troops retiring slowly and in good order, adopting the formation against cavalry ; never has- temng the march, unless very near a good position for defence, which should be attained as rapidly as possible, unless closely pressed by the cavalry. 136. If it be necessary to continue the retreat for some marches, under the eye of the enemy, a rear-guard must be formed ; selecting, from a fourth to a third of the entire force, for this service. The main duty of the rear-guard is to hinder the enemy from pressing too closely on the main-body ; and it should therefore, under no circumstances, allow itself to be forced back upon the main-body. The dispositions adopted by the rear-guard will depend Tipon the features of the ground ; its rear will usu- ally be covered by a line of skirmishers. The rear- guard will keep within good supporting distance of the main-body ; and, when pressed by the enemy, the latter, whenever a favorable position offers, will halt and form ; to cover the former, and force the enemy to greater circumspection. 1 37. Measures for protracting an Engagement. In the attack, as in the defence, it may frequently become an object to protract an engagement, with- out coming to any decisive result ; either for the purpose of holding a position for a certain time, to favor other objects, as the arrival of reinforcements ; or to occupy an adverst a flank movement on the line. If tliis manoeuvre succeeds in drawing tlie lire of the guns, and any confusion is observed among the men, then a rush must be immediately made upon them with the bayonet. The detachment against the supports of the bat- tery will make its dispositions according to the kind of troops whicli compose the supports. If of infan- try, the detachment to seize the guns, divided into two portions, will advance either in line, or column, as may be best, on the flanks of the line of skir- mishers ; gradually getting in advance of it, and closing on the Hanks of the batterj', so as to attack the supj)orls in flank ; or else they may keep to the rear of the line of skirmishers, in order to tempt the supports to move forward, and thus mask the fire of their guns. If the supports are of cavalry, the detachment, divided into two columns, will follow the line of skirmishers, in rear of the flanks j to cover it against a charge of the cavalry. 141. Position. This arm is usually placed in the rear of the infantry, on ground favorable to its manoeuvres, and where it will be masked from fire until the moment arrives to bring it into action; here, if acting on the defensive, the cavalry watches its opportunity to support the other troops, driving back the enemy, by prompt and vigorous charges, when these are hard pressed ; or, if on the offensive, biding its time, to rush upon the assailant, and com- plete his destruction ; when his ranks commence to waver or show signs of disorganization from the assaults of the other arms 57 142. Fiirmation. Tlie luibitual formation of cavalry for the attack is in a line of two ranks, with a reserve, or support to its rear. The supports are indisjiensably requisite to guard against tliose chances of danger to which cavalry is particularly expos(!d, if attacked in turn, when in a state of par- tial disorganization, after a successful charge ; or when tlireatened by an offensive movement against its flanks. The supports offer a safeguard against either of these dangers ; for, if the front line is brought up by the enemy, after a successful charge, it can retire and rally in the rear of the supports ; and if tiie enemy makes a movement against the flanks, the supports, placed behind them and in column, can form and anticipate the enemy's charge. For tlie foregoing reasons, cavalry should not give way to a headlong pursuit after a successful charge, unless its supports are at liand ; and, in cases where a charge is made without supports, a portion only should engage in pursuit, the rest being rallied to form a support. 143. Cavalry is seldom called on to use fire- arms. When on out-post service, or acting on the defensive on ground unfavorable to charging, a por- tion of the force may be dispersed as flankers, to hold the enemy in check by their fire. In this case their movements are regulated in the same way as other skirmishers. 144. Defence. The defensive qualities of cavalry lie in the offensive. A body of cavalry which waits to receive a charge of cavalry, or is exposed to a fire of infantry, or artillery, must either retire, or be destroyed. This essential quality of cavalry ren- ders its services invaluable in retreats where the enemy pursues with vigor. In such cases it should be held in constant readiness to take advantage of 58 every spot favorable to its action ; and, by short and energetic charges, force the enemy to move with circumspection. 145. Attack against Infantry. So 'ong as in- fantry maintains its position firmly, particularly if the ground is at all unfavorable to the movements of cavalry, the chances are against a successful at- tack by the latter. Cavalry should therefore either wait patiently until a way is prepared for its ac- tion, by a fire of artillery on the enemy's infantry ; or until the infantry has become crippled and ex- hausted by being kept in action for some time ; or else, watching its opportunity, make a charge whilst the infantry is in motion, so as to surprise it before it can form to receive the attack. Cavalry should direct its charge on that point of the enemy's infantry where it will itself be exposed to the least column of fire. If the infantry is in line, the charge should be made on one of its flanks ; if in square, on one of the angles of the square ; and when several squares are formed, so as to afl^ord mutual support by their fire, selecting the squares on the flanks as most vulnerable, from their po- sition. 146. The formation usually recommended for charging against squares, is that of three squadrons in line at double distance ; the leading squadron being followed by the others, either directly in its rear ; or else the squadrons may be formed in eche- lon, successively overlapping each other by about the front of a platoon. The angle of the square is charged by each squadron in succession, if the charge of the one preceding it fails ; the repulsed squadrons each wheeling to the right, or left on re- tiring ; to leave the way clear for its successor. A fourth squadron in column follows those in line ; to 5) enrronnd the square and ma.h: prisoners if it should be broken by the charge. 147. To draw the fire of the infantry before charging, a few skilful flankers may bo thrown forward, to open a fire on the square. Stratagem may also be tried, by moving along the front of the infantry, at some 400 paces, and tliei charging, if it is tempted to throw away its fire at this distance. In an attack where several squares are in line, if one fires to second another it should be instantly charged. 148. Atiack against Artillery. In attacks against artillery, the detachment of cavalry should be di- vided into three bodies ; one-fourth of the detach- ment being charged with carrying the guns ; one- half to attack the supports of the battery ; and the remaining fourth acting as a reserve, to cover the parties in advance, from an offensive movement against their flanks, or rear. The party to secure the guns make their attack in dispersed order, and endeavor to gain the flanks of the battery. When the battery has a fair sweep over the ground along which they must advance, they should, by manoeuvring and false attacks, try to confuse the artillerists, and draw their fire before making their charge. The attack against the support of the battery will be directed in the usual manner ; the party manoeuvring to gain their flanks. ARTILLERY. 149. Position. The manner of placing artil- lery and its employment must be regulated by ita relative importance under given circumstances, with respect to the action of the other arms. 60 In the defensive, the principal part is usually as* eig-ned to the artiiierj' ; and the positions taiicn up by the other arms will, therefore, be subordinate to those of this arm. In offensive movements the re- verse generally obtains. 150. Defence. In defensive positions the secu- rity of the batteries is of the last importance. Un- less the batteries are on points which are inacces- sible to the enemy's cavalry and infantry, they must be placed under the protection of the other troops, and be outflanked by them. As in the defensive, we should be prepared to re- ceive the enemy on ever}' point ; the batteries must be distributed along the entire front of the position occupied, and on those points from which they can obtain a good sweep.over the avenues of approach to it ; the guns being masked, when the ground fa- vors, from the enemy's view, until the proper mo- ment arrives for opening their fire. 151. The distance between the batteries should not be much over 600 paces ; so that by their fire they may cover well the ground intervening be- tween them, and afford mutual support ; the light guns being placed on the more salient points of the front, from their shorter range and greater f\icility of manoeuvring ; the heavier guns on the more re- tired points. Guns of various calibre should not be placed in the same battery. A sufficient interA'al should also be left between batteries of different calibre ; to prevent the enemy from judging, by the variations in the effect of the shot, of the weight of metal of the batteries. Those positions for batteries should be avoided from which the shot m.ust pass over other troops, to attain the enemy. And those should be sought for from which a fire can be maintained until the enemy 61 Lis approached even within good musket-range ctf them. Where tlie wings of a position are weak, batte- ries of the lieaviest calibre should be placed to se- cure thom. 152. A sufficient number of pieces — selecting for tlio object in view horse-artillery in preference to any other — should be held in reserve for a mo- ment of need ; to be thrown upon any point where the enemy's progress threatens danger; or to be uaed in covering the retreat. 153. The collection of a large number »f pieces in a single battery, is a dangerous arrangement ; particularly at the outset of an engagement. The exposure of so many guns together might present a strong inducement to the enemy to make an elfort to carry the battery ; a feat the more likely to succeed, as it is difficult either to withdraw the guns, or change their position promptly, after their tire is opened ; and one which, if successful, might entail a fatal disaster on the assailed, from the loss of so many pieces at once. 154. In all defensive dispositions the ammunition should be most carefully husbanded. A lire should never be opened until the enemy is within good range ; and, when once opened, be continued with perseverance and coolness up to the last moment in which it can be made effective. 155. AUack. In the outset of offensive move- ments, good positions should be selected for the heaviest pieces, from which they can maintain a strong hre on the enemy until the hghter pieces and the columns of attack are brought into action. These positions should be taken on the flanks of the ground occupied by the assailant, or on the centre, if more favorable to the end to be attained. In all 6 62 cases, wide intervals sliould be left between the heavy batteries and ihe other troops ; in order that the latter may not suffer from the return fire which the assailed will probably open on the batteries. For the same reason, care should be taken not to place other troops behind a point occupied by a battery, where they would be exposed to the return fire of the assailed ; when this cannot be avoided, the troops should be so placed as to be covered by any undulation of the ground ; or else be deployed in line to lessen the effects of the shot. 166. The artillery which moves with the col- umns of attack, should be divided into several strong baiteries ; as the object in this case is to produce a decisive impression upon a few points of the enemy's line ; by bringing an overwhelming fire to bear upon these points. These batteries should keep near enough to the other troops to be in safety from any attempts of the assailed to cap- ture them. Their usual positions will be on tho flanks and near the heads of the columns of attack ; the intervals between the batteries being sufficient for the free manoeuvres of the other troops, in large bodies. The mancEUvres of these batteries should be made with promptitude ; so that no time may be lost for the action of their fire. They should get rapidly over unfavorable ground to good positions for firing, and maintain these as long as pcssible ; detaching, in such cases, a few pieces to accom- pany the colunms of attack. In all the move- ments of the batteries, great care should be taken not to place them so that they shall in the least impede the operations of the other troops. CHAPTER m. 157. Among the most important modem addi- tions to the military art, is that of topography, ox the study of the natural features of positions, with a view to turn them to account in the first disposi- tions for battle, and its various succeeding phases. 158. It is only by this study that the coup (Tail ntiliiaire, or the art of disposing troops in harmony with the ground on which they are to act, can be brought to any high degree of perfection ; what- ever may be the natural gifts of the individual. 169. This study is not altogether of modern origin. Among the ancients, some of the Greek generals have given evidence of a feeling of its im- portance ; as in the examples of Epaminondas, Xenophon, Alexander, and particularly of Philopce- men. The Romans, although having adopted an order of battle which lent itself better to varied features of ground than that of the Greeks, still showed but little knowledge of this branch, until after the wars with Pyrrhus, when the art of Cas- trameialion underwent some change with them. 160. The tactics which grew out of the French Revolution gave to topography great prominence ; and no general perhaps has ever displayed more consummate attainments in this respect than Na- poleon ; whose descriptive memoirs, particularly of the Alps, are considered as models for all graphic writings; presenting with clearness and compre- hensiveness, a picture lliat the mind's eye cannot fail to seize. 64 161. The term Position is applied to any groima taken up by a body of troops either to malie, or to receive an attack. 162. To select a position imderstandingly, an officer must possess a thorough practical knowl- edgit of the tactical combinations of the different arm;< ; their respective qualifications for the offen- sive and defensive ; and of the adaptation of ground to th air particular manoeuvres. 163. In choosing a position, the ground must be examined not onl}'' with respect to its peculiar suitableness to the object in view, but also with reference to the influence of that in its vicinity upon this object. 1 64. The first point to be looked to is the extent of the position. This should be such that, deduc- tion made of the advanced-posts, and of the reserve, its front and flanks shall present an unbroken line of troops, from wliich a close and well-sustained fire can bo brought upon all points by which these can be approached. In estimating the front of a position, an allow- ance of about 180 yards may be made for each bat- talion, from 600 to 700 strong ; about 60 yards for each squadron of liorse of 48 files, the necessary inter\-als between thc^se imits being included in this estimate ; and from 12 to 20 yards for the interval between tlio pieces of a battery. In estimating the depth, an allowance of 600 to 800, yards at least, should be made from the front to the rear ; in order that the two lines and the re- serve may be posted in suitable relative positions for good support. 165. The position should offer no features by which the prompt movement of troops from one point to another, for mutual support, might be ob- 65 Btructed. Its deboucJies to the front for offensive movements, as well as those to its rear in case of retreat, should be ample. It should be beyond the effective cannon range of commanding heights both on its front and flanks. 166. The flanks, being the weakest points of a body of troops, must be secured from being turned, or attacked ; by resting them upon some strong natural feature of the position, as a river, precipice, &c., which tlie enemy can neither turn, nor seize upon ; or else on some point that will afford suffi- cient means of prolonging the resistance to enable reinforcements to reach it in time, as an intrenched village,* a held -,vork, &c. When the flanks can- not be secured in either of these ways, they must be strengthened by an accumulation of troops upon them ; to offer a vigorous resistance to the enemy should he attempt an attack. 167. Positions for the Defensive. When a posi- tion is taken up to maintain a strictly defensive attitude, the natural features of its front should be of a character to prevent an enemy from approach- ing in good order ; and to enable the assailed to dispute, with advantage, every foot of ground. The enemy, moreover, should not be able to turn the position, when it is unavoidably exposed to this manoeuvre, without great risk to his own safety, by an offensive movement of the assailed on his flanks, or rear. 168. The manner of disposing and handling troops in a defensive position will mainly depend upon its natural features. The only rule that can be laid down is, to post the different arms upon ground best adapted to their respective tactics • * See Chapters VII, IX. X, and XI, Mahan's F eld Fortifica tion, en lutreiichuienls, &.C., of I'ositions, &c. 6* 66 and in such relative positions as to afford mutual support, and not impede each other's movements. 169. The obstructions on the front and flanks of the position will be occupied by the advanced-guard, formed of light troops of each arm, if the ground is favorable to their combined action ; for the purpose of observing the enemy, and holding him in check if he makes an onward movement. 170. The main-body of the infantry will occupy every point, between the obstacles on which the flanks rest, in such a manner that no intervals shall be presented through which the enemy can penetrate without being exposed to a close and powerful line of fire. 171. The artillery will be placed on those points where it can have a commanding view of the ground in advance of the position, and sweep by its fire the approaches of the enemy, both in front and flank. 172. The cavalry, posted in rear of the infantry, should occupy ground upon which it can make effective charges, to support the infantry when pressed by the enemy. 173. In posting troops on obstructed ground, care should be taken not to place them on points where they can only be idle spectators of the combat: either from the impossibility of their being ap- proached by the enemy, or from their not being able to join the enemy at the proper moment. In like manner, those points should be avoided where, from obstacles in their rear, the safety of the troops might be compromised in case of retreat. When- ever it becomes necessary to dispute the possession of the latter class of points with the enemy, the avenues to the rear must be occupied by detach- ments of suitable strength, to secure the retreat of the troops in advance. 67 174. In order that the necessary manoeiivres may be promptly executed, without confusion; and to avoid olFering; a mark that might attract the enemy's fire, and occasion useless exposure ; no more troops should be placed on any ponit tnan its defence may indispensably require ; and whenever it becomes requisite to strengthen a weak point, by an accu- mulation of troops upon it, every advantage should be taken of the undulations, or other accidents of the ground, to mask them from the enemy's fire un- til the moment arrives for bringing them into ac- tion. 175. The value of obstacles, as supports for the flanks, or as obstructions in the front, or rear of a position, is altogether relative ; and depends on the number of troops. A veiy slight obstacle on a flank, which will serve to hold the enemy in check but a few minutes, may answer all the purposes of a small body of troops; by enabling them to make such changes in tlieir dispositions as the nature of the case may call lor ; whereas a larger body, un- der like circumstances, might be overwhelmed on their flank before they could make suitable ma- noeuvres to prevent it. A broken, obstructed coun- try to the rear, presenting few and narrow avenues of retreat, might be fatal to a large body of troops forced to retire in the face of an enemy ; whereas, to a small body, the same features of ground might present many points where strong positions could be momentarily taken up to hold the enemy in check, and force him to pursue slowly and circum- spectly. 176. When it is found that the enemy is moving upon the position, the advanced-guard makes suit- able dispositions to hold him in check ; by occupy- insT with its skirmishers all the obstacles in its front 68 laQ flanks ; when forced to retire upon the main position, these troops concentrate more and more as they approach it, taking care not to mask the fire, or impede the action of the main-body. 177. The artillery will only open its tire when the enemy is within a destructive range ; it will then concentrate its efforts against the columns of attack ; not replying to the fire of the enemy's bat- teries, unless it becomes urgent to do so, from their effects upon the other troops. The artillery will maintain its positions with pertinacity, as long as possible ; watching its opportunities, during the different phases of the action, to support and succor the other arms ; as, for example, when it becomes necessary to replace the front line of infantry by the reserve ; to advance the cavalry ; when the other arms are obstinately disputing a decisive point ; or when the enemy abandons the attack. The great mobility of, field-artillery, owing to the more recent improvements, places it in the power of this arm to act with great boldness in support of the others. The ground over which the guns may be required to move, for this purpose, should be well examined, before the attack commences, by the officer commanding the artillery ; that no delays may occur in bringing them into action upon the jroper point at the proper moment. 178. The main-body of the infantry sliould not open its fire until it can be thrown in with deadly effect. If tlie enemy, unchecked by the fire, still pushes forward, lie must be met by a charge, either in line, or column, from the point menaced ; a por- tion of the reserve immediately closing the interval left by the troops making the charge. 179. The reserve should not be brought into ac- tion unless its co-operation is indispensable for ol>« 69 taining some decisive result ; as forcing the enemy back from some important point from which the main-body has been compelled to retire ; or cover- ing the retreat of the main-body, until it can rally and form again in the rear. 180. The cavalry must be in readiness, from its position, to act promptly, either against any attempt upon the flanks of tiie infantry ; or to profit by any faults, or disorder of the enemy. If the enemy throws forward small detachments without support- ing them properly, or advances his main-line with- out securing his flanks, or shows symptem-s of con- fusion in his infantry, the opportunity should not be lost by the cavalry. In all movements of the in- fantry, either in advancing or retiring, the cavalry should be at hand to cover it from a sudden attack. 181. If the enemy is beaten off", pursuit is made, either by the cavalry or by detachments of infantry, according to the features of the ground ; whilst the main-body is promptly rallied, and placed in po- sition, to receive the enemy should the attack be renewed. 182. The dispositions for a retreat will depend upon the circumstances under which it may be made. When the troops retire by successive lines, the greater portion of the artillery should always be in the line nearest the enemy, and between the battalions ; the remainder being in the second line, ready to repulse any flank attack. The cavalry ia posted in rear of the second line, either upon one, or both wings, to be in readiness for a charge at any moment. 183. When the entire force moves oflT together, the rear is secured by a rear-guard of the best troops, composed of one, or several arms, as the circumstances of the groimd may require. The 70 rear-guard will profit by the features of the ^ound to check the enemy ; but will be careful not to lose time, by prolonging unnecessarily the resistance on any point ; as this might bring the main force of the enemy upon it. 184. Great circumspection should be shown in retreating through obstructed ground ; in watching the enemy's movements on the flanks; and in timely securing defiles leading to the rear ; to prevent the enemy from cutting off the retreat. 185. Attack. An enemy may be made to aban- don a defensive position, either by driving him from it ; or by mancEuvring to turn it, and so force him to fall back to secure his line of communications. In attempting the latter plan, it should not be for- gotten that the assailant is, to a greater or less de- gree, exposed to the same danger as his adversary, who, if active and enterprising, may turn the tables on him. The celebrated battle of Rivoli, in which a por- tion of the Austrian force turned the flank of the French position, and was there obliged to lay down their arms, — Napoleon, using on that occasion, when these troops were discovered in his rear, one of those magical expressions, " Those are ours,'^ by which he so well understood how to electrify the soldier, — is a remarkable e.xample on this head. The batile of Buena-Vista, where the Mexicans, after turning the flank and gaining the rear of our troops, barely escaped a similar fate, is another ; whilst that of Cerro-Gordo is as remarkable for the masterly and admirable manner in which the ene- my's position was turned and carried, although Testing upon ground which was fairly deemed im- practicable by him. 186. In planning the attack of a position, attei>» 71 tion must, in the first place, be directed to those points in which its main-strength resides, and for this reason termed the key-points, the loss of which will force the assailed to retire. As the assailed will probably put forth all his efforts to maintain these points, their attack will demand corresponding exertions on the part of the assailant ; and should be made only with troops of the best character. 187. In the second place, those points must be carefully examined, which, by their fire, flank the position ; as an advance upon its front cannot be made without great loss and hazard of success until the assailed is dislodged from them. 188. Finally, points which are weak, either from the features of the ground, or from a faulty dispo- sition of the troops ; as approaches which are badly swept by the fire of the assailed ; an exposed flank with too few troops ; or a point where they are not properly placed for mutual support. 189. The main effort of the assailant is seldom directed against more than one point of the position ; that one being usually selected which, if carried, will lead to the most decisive results ; as, for example, one of the flanks, when not resting upon any strong obstacles. But the main attack is always com- bined with demonstrations upon some other point ; both with a view of deceiving the assailed as to the real point of attack, and to prevent him from with- drawing troops from other points to strengthen the one menaced. 190. These demonstrations, or false attacks are, in some cases, made by the advanced-guard of the assailant, after driving in that of the assailed ; in others, by a special detachment. In the latter case, the detachment should seldom exceed a fourth of the entire force ; and should be composed of troops 72 of each arm ; both for its own safety against any offensive movement, and to present to the assailed a likehhood of danger. 191. The advanced-guard, composed of light troops of each arm, commences the attack, by driv- ing in the advanced posts of the assailed ; keeping within supporting distance of the main-body, and occupying such points as may be necessary to cover its manceu\Tes, or to secure its retreat in case of failure. If a reconnoissance of the posi- tion has not been previously made, it will be ef- fected under cover of the movements of the ad- vanced-guard. 192. The artillery takes position where it can silence the batteries of the assailed, and prepare the way for the advance of the other troops. The infantry is usually formed in two columns for the real attack ; the leading column being sometimes preceded by an advance. A part of the artillery advances either in one body, or in echelon, on the flank of the column of attack ; the leading section preceding, by about a hundred paces, the head of the column of attack. If the column of attack de- ploys to open its fire, the artillery moves to one of its flunks and seconds it by a fire of case shot. If the column charges with the bayonet, the advanced portion of artillery retires to the position of that in the rear ; to be ready to cover the infantry by its fire, if the attack fails. The cavalry follows in the rear of the infantry; to secure its flanks from any offensive movement, and to hold the assailed in check, should he attempt ia pursuit after beating off the infantry. 193. If the attack is successful, the artillcrj' and the greater portion of the infantry are immediately formed in good order, to be in readiness for any 73 emereencj' ; the pursuit bemg left to the cavalry and some detachments of infantry. In case of failure the troops engaged fall back under cover of tliose in their rear ; the artillery, by a well-di- rected tire, a-nd the cavalry by opportune charges, holding the enemy in check, until order is re-estab- lished in the retiring troops, as a preliminary to a retreat, or to a renewal of the attack. 194. Positions in obstructed Ground. This term may be applied to localities where the ground, al- though level, is cut up by ditches, hedges, broken roads, &c., wliich obstruct the free movement of troops. 195. Positions of this character are more favor- able to the defensive than the offensive. As, from the nature of the case, connected movements are, for the most part, impracticable, the commander will find it difficult to direct the engagement, and must rely upon the judgment and skill of his sub- ordinates for its successful issue. 196. The general disposition of the troops will be in dispersed order. Tliere will be but few op- portunities for the action of cavalry ; and the artil- lery can seldom find positions to act in mass. Tiie light cavalry and light pieces may be placed in front, wherever they can act with advantage, and support the infantry. The supports and reserves should be kept well to the rear of the troops en- gaged ; to be ready to meet the enemy should he attempt to turn the flanks, a manceuvre to which obstructed ground is frequently favorable. The heavy cavalry and heavy artillery take post to tlie rear, at any point which may offer a good position to cover the retreat. 197. The attack, like the defence, will be mainly conducted by the infantry, and some liglit pieces ; 7 74 the infantry, acting as skirmishers, and the artillery being employfcvl to force any opening, that may offer, for the advance of the infantry. Whenever the artillery gets a good position it should endeavor to keep it as long as practicable. The cavalry can effect but little; as the enemy's, even if infe- rior in strengtli, may watch its opportunities, from behind obstacles, to make short and successful charges. Tlie artillery not in action will occupy the roads, at points to the rear most suitable for covering the retreat, if the attack fails. 198. In positions of a mixed character, present- ing alternations of open and obstructed ground, the troops on the defen^sive must guard, with great care, every accessible point at wliich the assailant can dibiniche from the obstructed upon the open por- tions. A strong fire of heavy artillery should be brought to bear upon these points ; and cavalry should be posted in places where tliey can be masked from the enemy's fire, and be at hand to charge the assailant, as he attempts to debouche. These efforts should be seconded by the bayonets of the infantry, if a favorable opportunity occurs. 199. The obstructed ground to the rear must be strongly occupied, lo secure the retreat ; by post- ing light troops under the cover afforded by the skirts of woods, by ditches bordered with trees and hedges, &.c. ; and advantage must be taken of every small defile, to dispute the ground inch by inch. 200. In tlie phases of engagements in positions of this character, the defence must frequently be accommodated to th(! troops at hand ; as in tlie con- fusion of the most orderly retreat, in such cases, it is impracticable to preserve tliat connection between the movements of the different arms which would be best for mutual support. If the assailant, by 76 disconnected movements, or a disorderly pursuit, .ays himself open to an attack, it should be made and pressed with vigor, or not at all. 201. In the attack of mixed positions, the sup- ports and reserves should be kept well to the rear, whilst the troops are engaged in the obstructed por- tions ; to guard against otiensive movements on tho flanks by the assailed. Those engaged should close in as the groimd opens, to prepare to debouche upon it in force ; in which operation the infantry must be covered by the cavalry and artillery. In advancing upon the obstructed ground, the way must be pre- pared for an attack with the bayonet, by a heavy fire of the artillery, directed particularly upon the most accessible points. Operations of this character demand extreme pru- dence and forethought. Every forward movement must be made with great caution ; every point gained must be well secured ; and its possession disputed with tenacity if the assailed attempts to repossess himsel f of it. In no other way can the troops engaged be kept well in hand, and be pre- vented from the confusion and dangers of a hasty pursuit. 202. Positions in Forests. In occupying a for- est defensively, the skirts and the openings to it, as roads, &c., must be strongly guarded by a line of skirmishers with its supports and reserves, and by artillery so placed as to sweep in tiank those points which are most accessible, as the salient portions, and the roads. The line of skirmishers, besides availing themselves of the natural covers of the position, as trees, ravines, &c., will form abatis in front of the more accessible points ; and the cannon, in Uke manner, should be covered hj epaulments, when suitable means are at hand. 76 203. Tlie main-body will take up a central po« sition, on ground favorable to the dei'er.ce ; covering its flanks by marshes, or other like obstacles , strengthening, if requisite, its front by abatis ; and guarding all the approaches by a suitable dispo- sition of its heavy artillery. The points of junction of roads leading to the front should be strongly oc- cupied, and strengthened, when practicable, by tield-works. 204. The space between the skirts of the wood and the central position should be obstinately dis- puted ; advantage being taken of any clearings that may occur, to post light pieces and cavalry in ambush near them, to drive back the assailant, as he debouches on the open ground. 205. As cavalry can only act, under such cir- cumstances, in small detachments, the main body of it will take position to the rear, to cover the re- treat of the other troops from the forest, and check the assailant in dihouching from it. 206. The attack will be directed on the salient portions, and upon the entrances of the forest ; first by a heavy fire of artillery, to drive back the infan- try, and force the guns of the assailed to retire. This will be followed up by a rapid attack in line, with the bayonet, on those points, whilst demonstra- tions are made against the others occupied by the assailed. If the attack with the bayonet succeeds, the troops must secure the points seized before pushing forward in pursuit ; placing some cannon and iroops at the most suitable points, to cover the re- treat, should the assailed make a strong olTensive movement. 207. The pursuit should he made firmly but cau- tiously ; the skirmishers leading and rooting out the 77 assailed from everj* strong cover ; some field-piecea, and a column of infantry, each secured by skir* mishers on their flanks, following upon the main road, with a detachment of cavalry well to the rear but within supporting distance, to act according to the emergency. 208. If the assailed makes a firm stand at his central position, an attack upon his front will not only be bloody but of doubtful success ; an attempt should therefore be made to turn his flanks, whilst he is occupied in front by demonstrations and false attacks. If the assailed retires, the pursuit will be made by some light pieces followed by the infaniry and cavalry ; the ditferent arir.s being employed accord- ing to the varying circumstances of the ground. 209. Positions in Mountains. The best and only safe system of defence in mountainous po- sitions is to occupy, with the main-body, a central point, at which the principal passes meet ; and be always in a state of readiness to act offensively against the enemy, on whatever point he may ad- vance; throwing forward strong detachments in the principal passes to observe the enemy, and offer a vigorous resistance, in order to force him to de- velop his plan of attack. So soon as it is ascer- tained on what point the principal force of the enemy is concentrated, the main-body will advance, from the central position, to a point where it will be secure from a flank attack, to act offensively. The detachments on the other passes will act on the flanks of the enemy, by cross-roads, if they can do so, or will try to fall on his rear. 210. When circumstances constrain to a passive defence, a position must be taken up either acro3% 7* 78 or along the valley, which will best secure tha flanks, and cover the line of communication. 211. The attack in mountainous positions ia conducted on the same principles as the defence. The assailed must be threatened on eveiy point ; by throwing columns into the several passes, whilst tlie main-body advances along one of the principal lines. If the assailed maintains a strict defensive, the several columns luiite and make the attack ; if he assumes the offensive, the principal columns must be reinforced, and an attempt be made to throw detachments on his flanks and rear, to force him to fall back. The flanks of the troops in column, advancing in the valleys, must be covered by detachments of skirmishers on the heights. 212. The attack will be made mainly by the in- fantr}"-, as skirmishers. A strong line of fire must be maintained with great pertinacity ; the supports must be kept well to the rear ; the reserve and main-body holding the points of junction of the roads leading to the front, and not advancing until the engagement is well under way. Great prudence must be shown in advancing ; as the troops engaged are liable at any moment to an attack on their flank. If the assailed attempts this manoeu^Te, the line of skirmishers must hold on pertinaciously to the ground gained, whilst the supports display and keep the enem)'^ in clieck, un- til the reserves can be brought up to repel the attack with the bayonet. As the line of skirmishers force back the assailed, the main-body follows in column along the valley ; its flanks being secured by skir- mislicrs on the heights. If opposed by the assailed, £he main-body must attack with vigor, to carrj- ita point promptly ; as those engaged in front have no chance of being relieved. 79 213. There is here seldom any field of action fol cavalry ; the main portion of this force will there- fore be kept to the rear ; occupying the points of junction of the passes. Small detachments of dra- goons may occasionally do good service in front ; making charges, or tighting on foot, as the oppor- tunity offers. 214. The artillery can seldom find positions off the roads. A few^ light pieces, which can be placed in position on tlie heights and be well served, may frequently produce very decisive results. When it is necessary to open a way, for the main- body to advance, at points of peculiar strength, it should be done by the heaviest pieces. The horse- artillery will usually be attached to the troops charged with making a demonstration on the flanks of the enemy's position, through the secondary passes. 215. As the assailed will probably obstruct the passes by abatis, or other obstacles, a detachment of engineer troops should accompany each column, being kept always at hand to clear away the ob- structions. 216. Positions near Rivers. Positions may be selected near rivers either for the defensive, to pre- vent an enemy from passing ; or for the offensive, to force a passage. 217. A position for guarding a river should be selected at some central point, from which the troops can be rapidly marched to oppose the enemy wherever he may attempt to cross. Small posts are established along the course of the river, at the most suitable points for observing the enemy ; and communicating to the rear intelligence of his move- ments. So soon as it is known that a decided attempt is 80 to be made at any ])oint, tlic cavalrj', with somft batteries of horse-artillery, will move to oppose it. If, on reaching the point, it is found that the enemy has succeeded in throwing over a portion of his forces, they must be vigorously attacked, by suc- cessive charges of cavalry, and by a persevering fire of the artillery. If the ground is obstructed, so that the cavalry cannot charge, the dragoons should dismount and act as skirmishers. Positions should be selected by the artillery, where it can take that of the enemy, on the opposite bank, in flank ; the object being to silence it, or to draw off its fire, to enable the cavalry to act. Everything liere de- pends on lengthening the aiFair ; and preventing tlie enemy from reinforcing the troops that have passed, until the main-body can arrive from the central po- sition, to support the cavalry and artillery engaged. 218. The passage of a river in the face of an enemy is an operation of extreme difficulty ; and every means should therefore be employed to de- ceive the enemy, and draw off his attention from the point selected for the passage. The bridge- train and other requisites being in a state of readi- ness, the night-time is selected as most favorable to a successful issue. The point, selected to pass a river in the face of an eneni}^, should combine several properties, as a position ; to give the assailant a decided advantage over the assailed. Tiie river at tliis point should be narrow, so that the bridge may be rapidly con- structed ; the banks should form a bend towards the assailant, to enable him to plant his batteries in a position to concentrate their fire on tliat part of the ground, on the opposite bank, where the troops must form ; care being taken that these bat- teries are not exjiosed to an cntilading fire from 81 those of the assailed, within the proper range for this fire ; the ground near the landing place, on the opposite sliore, should present covers, in order that the troops, passed over in boats, before the bridge is ready, may not be exposed to the artillery and cavalry of the assailed, and may be enabled to maintain their position until reinforced by the main- body. If there are islands, near the point of land- ing, from which a fire of artillery and infantry can be brought to bear on the assailed, they should be occupied by infantry, and some field-pieces ; par- ticularly if they are wooded, or offer other covers. 219. In moving upon the point, silence and per- fect order should be preserved throughout. Batte- ries of the heaviest guns are placed at the most suitable points, to bring a converging fire to bear upon the approaches to tlie landing on the opposite shore. Light troops are thrown over in boats, to occupy the ground in advance of the landing ; which troops, if discovered by the advanced posts of the enemy, should be rapidly reinforced. So soon as the bridge is ready, an advanced-guard, composed of troops of all arms, will pass and take position, to cover the formation of the main-body. The advanced-guard will mainly keep on the de- fensive, acting with great prudence, not to ofler any advantage to the enemy ; its task being to gain time for the rest of the forces to pass. 220. The order in which the main-body should pass must be regulated by the character of the ground, and the resistance offered by the enemy. Usually a portion of the heavy guns follow the ad- vanced-guard, and take position to check the en- emy ; and these are followed by the main-body of the infantry; the main-body of the cavalrv with its batteries of horse-artillery passing last. In other 82 cases, it may bo best to throw over the cavalry an(f horse-artillery before the other troops. 221. The task, imposed upon the batteries, of covering the passage, is of the greatest moment. Careful attention should be given to the manage- ment of their fire ; directing it, in all cases, upon that portion of the enemy's force whose presence is most threatening. 222. A retreat across a river, when pressed by the enemy, is of all operations the most difficult; and requires every auxiliary means to save the re- treating force from destruction. The point selected for the passage should have the same requisites as one for the offensive ; and its natural strength should be increased by field works ; in order that the enemy may be kept from pressing too hotly upon the rear of the troops that pass the last. In a retreat of this character, all the usual strat- agems for deceiving an enemy must be resorted to before commencing the movement ; so that time sufficient may be gained for making the necessary dispositions to secure the point of passage, as well as to gain a march, or two, in advance. The heavy artillery should be dispatched at an early moment to the rear, to take a position on the oppo- site shore, for covering the passage. The rest of the force, covered by a strong rear-guard, formed of the best troops, will etfect their passage gene- rally in an inverse order to that followed in one for the offensive. One of the worst dangers to be guarded against is the confusion caused by hurry. To avoid this, the arrangements for the march of the different bodies should be made with the greatest care ; so that each may reach, at the proper moment, tha point of passage. CHAPTER rV. ADVANCED-GUARDS AND ADVANCED-POSTS. 223. To keep an enemy in ignorance of the state of our forces and the character of our position is one of the most indispensable duties in war. It is in this way that we obHge him to take every pos- sible precaution in advancing ; forcing him to feel his way, step by step, and to avoid risking his own safety in hazarding those bold and rapid move- ments which, when made against a feeble, or an unprepared enemy, lead to the most brilliant re- sults. 224. This object is effected, by placing between the position occupied by the main force, and the presumed direction of the enemy, a body detached from the main force, but acting always with refer- ence to it, termed an Advanced-Guard. This term is used for any body of troops so sep- arated from the main-body ; whatever its strength and composition ; and whether the troops be in position, or on a march. 225. For a large force, the advanced-guard is necessarily composed of troops of all arms ; its strength being proportioned to that of the ma'n force; — the more or less resistance of an inde- pendent character it may be required to make ; — and the greater or less extent it may be found necessary to embrace, by its advanced-posts, on the front and flanks, to watch and anticipate every movement of the enemy. The proportion of the advanced-guard to tjie 84 main-body may vary from a third to a fifth of the total force. In armies of some strength, or larpe corpf-cParrnep, particularly where the nature of the country requires a wide development of advanced- posts, the larger proportion is demanded ; as at least one-third, or even one-half of its strength will be required for the advanced-post service. In a small force of two or three thousand n>en, one- fifth will usually be all that can be well spared for the same purposes. 226. Our purpose, in all cases, should be to keep the enemy in a state of uncertainty as to our actual force, and movements ; and this can be ef- fected only by keeping constantly between him and our main-body a force of sufficient strengih to ofter an obstinate resistance, if necessary, to ever}' at- tempt he may openly make to gain information ; and even to act offensively against him, when oc- casion offers, so as to keep him in doubt as to the actual character and number of the troops before him; the old military axiom, being always kept in mind, that " a sirord opportunely drawn frequently heepn another back in its scabbard." 227. In all defensive positions, the advanced- guard and its advanced-posts should retire slowly but circumspectly, so that the main-body may have rime to take all its defensive measures. In the of- fensive, the attack of the advanced-guard should be decided and vigorous; pressing upon the enemy at every point ; and leaving nothing undone to de- moralize him, by the confusion which so often fol- lows from an impetuous onset. 228. Whilst ill position, the advanced-guard should take advantage of the natural, or other ob- stacles on its front and flanks which are within eupporting distance ; to strengthen itself, and gain 85 supports for its advanced-poats. In this way, its means of resistance, whether acting offensively, or otherwise, may be greatly augmented. Ground of this character, taken up by the troops, should not be abandoned without very cogent reasons for it ; since, should circumstances bring about a forward movement, it might cost more to regain what was given up than to have maintained it obstinately at tirst. 229. The ground to be taken up by an advanced- guard, and embraced within its advanced-posts, should be carefully chosen. To take position where the movements of the enemy can be well watched, whilst our own troops are kept concealed, and not liable to a sudden attack, either in front or flank, are the desiderata in such cases. If, in following this guide, it should lead to a development of ad- vanced-posts which would be too weak at any point for a tolerable resistance, there remains but the alternative to retire slowly before the enemy, — taking care that he do not slip behind the out-posts and their supports, — upon some central point to the rear, where the advanced-posts, united to tlie troops in reserve, may make a good stand ; and from which, if the chances are favorable, they may ad- vance upon the enemy, and make him pay dearly for his temerity. 230. In all affairs of advanced-guards great cir- cumspection is to be shown, both by the otScer in command of the advanced^guard, in throwing for- ward fresh troops to strengthen a point assailed, as well as on the part of the general-in-chief, in sus- taining the advanced-guard by weakening hia main-body. These are points that can only be de- cided on the spot. The safer rule, in all cases, is not to weaken the main-defence, or main attack, 8 86 by detaching from it, to support a feeble point If the force engaged, under such circumstances, does not suflice for its own defence, it is best for it to fall back in time ; and, taking position with the main-body, endeavor, by their combined efforts, to turn the scales of victory in their favor. 231. The duties of advanced-guards being so much more frequently to feel and occupy an enemy, preparatory to some decisive blow by the main-body, tlian to engage him with a view to follow up any advantage gained, it follows, as a matter of course, that they should be composed of the most efficient and active liglit troops at the general's disposal. Such troops, in the hands of a bold, energetic, but prudent leader, will be the right arm of an army. Prompt on all occasions ; never taken at fault, they keep the enemy constantly occupied ; harass him with fatiguing precautions, to secure his flanks and rear ; whilst their own force is kept relieved from these annoyances, and always fresh for any great emergency. 232. Advanced-Posts. The duties of the ad- vanced-posts are the same whether the troops are stationary, or in movement ; they are, 1. To keep a good look-out for the enemy, and when in his imme- ' diate presence, to take all means to be accurately informed of his strength, position, and movements ; 2. Should the enemy advance, to hold him in check long enough to give the main-body ample time to be prepared for his attack. 233. By a faithful discharge of these duties, the whole army can, at all tiuies, and under all circum- stances, be kept in a state of readiness for action without subjecting the soldier to any fatigue beyond the ordinary physical endurance of a well-developed manhood ; as but a small portion, comparatively, of 87 the force present Is required to watch over the safety of the rest, and can t! .>refore be frequently relieved, so that every one may have time sufficient for the repose demanded after extraordinary exertions. 234. The object being to secure the front and flanks of the position, occupied by the main-body, from any attempt either to reconnoitre, or attack it, the detachments which form the advance-posts must be so distributed as to embrace all the avenues by which the enemy can approach the position. The system adopted, in most services, to effect this object, consists of two, or three concentric lines of posts, disposed in ix, fan-shaped order. The exterior line, which forms the Out-Posts, embraces a wide cir- cumference ; and by means of a chain of Sentinels, posted in advance, prevents any one from penetra- ting to the rear between die posts, without being seen. 235. The second line, which is one of Grand- Guards, embraces a narrower circumference than the line of out-posts ; occupying the more important avenues from the out-posts to the interior ; so as to be in a position to support the out-posts in case of necessity ; and to receive them if driven in. 236. The interior line consists of several strong detachments, termed Pickets, posted upon the main- avenues to the position. They serve as supports to the two exterior lines, upon which they rally if forced to retire before the enemy. 237. Besides these dispositions for security, Pa- troles are kept up between the line of posts, to keep the one informed of the state of the other ; and also between the out-posts and chain of sentinels, to see that tlie duties of the latter are well performed ; and to search any ground not brought well under the eyes of the sentinels. The whole, in tliis way 8eo Plate 1. for Articles 234, 31T. 88 inns a connected system, for obsennnj^,- Lhc enemy and for mutual support in case of attack. 238. The duties of the out-posts, and of the grand-guards which form their supports, are strictly those of observation. If attacked, they offor no re- sistance farther than to enable them to feel the enemy perfectly, and never lose sight of him. The task of holding the enemy in check by a vigorou? resistance, so as to procure sufficient time for the hain-body to make its dispositions for battle, is con- iigncd to the pickets. 239. The ground taken up by the advanced- posts will depend on the capabilities which its natural features offer for defence ; on the number and character of the approaches it presents to an enemy for attacking the front, or flanks of the po- sition occupied by the main-body; and upon the facilities it may afford for communication between .the posts. 240. Out-Posts. The position of the out-posts, with respect to the rnain-body, will be regulated by the more or less broken character of the country. As a general rule, the mean distance may be taken at about two miles. The line occupied by these posts should take in all the approaches to the front and flunks of the main position. When a position is to be held for some time, or is taken up after a battle, the out-posts may be thrown farther in ad- vance ; to procure greater repose and security for the main-body. 241. The ground on which the line of out-posts is established should be carefully examined ; witli a view both to observation and defence. As far as practicable, those points should be selected for posts which present some natural advantages for the de- fence ; will screen the tr ops from the cnoniy'a 89 view; and enable them to watch all his movements. Whenever the features of the ground do not ofFef natural obstacles to cover the posts, artificial means of a slitrht character should be resorted to. The flanks of the line should rest upon strong natural obstacles ; when such cannot be found, without giving the line too great an extent, these points must be secured by strong pickets of cavalry or in- fantry, thrown back to form crotchets ; from which patroles must be constantly kept up on the flanks, in the presumed direction of the enemy. 242. The strength of each out-post, and the dis- tance from one to the other, will be regulated by the features of the ground, and the number of sen- tinels, or vedettes that each post must throw out. The posts should, as far as practicable, be within sight of the grand-guards to which they belong ; and the sentinels of their respective posts. When the ground does not permit this arrangement, sen- tinels should be placed at intermediate points, to communicate promptly whatever may happen at the line of posts, or of sentinels, to the rear. Posts of infantry should not, as a general rule, be placed farther apart than 600 paces ; nor their sentinels more than 300 paces in advance of the posts. Those of cavalry may be some 1500 paces apart; and their vedettes from 600 to 800 paces in ad- vance. The strength of each post should be cal- culated at the rate of four men for each sentinel, or vedette. 243. Sentinels. The sentinels and vedettes form a chain in advance, and are posted on points from which they can best watch the enemy, without being Been by, or exposed to him, in any way. As one of their main duties is to prevent any one from passing their chain, they should be so placed, with respect 8* 90 to eacli otlier, tli;it they can see all tnc ground be- tween their respective posts, and be able to stop any one who may attempt to pass between them. At night and in misty weather, the sentinels should be doubled and be drawn in nearer to the out-posts. Whenever it may be deemed necessary to post sentinels on points? beyond the line of out-posts, they should be furnished by posts detached in advance of the line. 244. Grand-Crvards. As the grand-guards fur- nish the out-posts, and serve as their supports, not more than one-third of their force should be taken for the out-posts. The grand-guards are posted on the principal avenues leading to the detachments on which they are to fall back, if driven in ; and, when of infantry, about 200 paces, and of cavalry, 600 to 800 paces, in the rear of the out-posts. The points which they occupy should be selected, both to secure them from the enemy's view, and to give a ready communication between them and their respective out-posts. No difficult, or broken ground, should lie between the grand-guards and their out-posts ; if any such occur, particularly if it be of a nature to offer facilities to an enemy to penetrate to the rear, the whole should be posted on the farther, or hither side of it ; and in preference in the latter position, if by it the chain of posts can be preserved unbroken. 245. Pickets. The main-detachments or pickets, which form the supports to the grand-guards and out-posts, occu])y the principal avenues to the po- sition of tiie main-body. As their duty is to hold the enemy in check ; the points which they take up should be susceptible of a good defence; such, for example, as villages, detilos, &c. ; whenever these advantages are not found at hand, resort should be had to any temporary obstacles, as abatis, &-Ch 91 which can be readily procured, to place, the troops under shelter. The points thus occupied should, as a general rule, be about midway between the line of out-posts and the position of the main-body. 246. Small posts should be thrown forward by the pickets, between their position and the line of grand-guards ; both for the greater security of the detachments, and as supports to the grand-guards In like manner, when the line of pickets is of con- siderable extent, intermediate posts must be estab- lished, to keep open a communication between them. 247. No pains should be spared to obstruct the approaches of the enemy to the points occupied by the pickets ; particularly those which lead to the flanks; leaving open such only as will oblige the enemy to attack under the most unfavorable cir- cumstances ; and if, between the advanced-posts and the main-body, a defile, or other unfavorable pass should occur, which the enemy, by turning the line of the advanced-posts, might seize upon, and thus cut off their retreat, it should be occupied by a strong detachment; both to prevent such a ma- ncBuvre, and to favor the retreat on the main-body. 248. Strength of Advanced- Posts. The entire strength of the advanced-posts, as \f ell as the relative strength of tiie pickets, grand-guards, and out-posts, will depend upon the character of the ground cov- ered by them; as being more or less open; and presenting more or less facilities for circumscribing the approaches of the enemy to the main-position. It rarely occurs that sufficient troops can be de- tached to cover all the accessible ground, and per- form the duties in a thorough manner. 249. The strength of each picket, and the kind of troops of which it is composed, will depend on the degree of resistance to be otfered to the enemy'a See Plate II. for Article 24T. 92 attack; and the character of the position occupied. In most cases, where a vigorous defence is called for, they will consist of troops of all arms ; and an aggregate of several hundred men. Tlie grand- guards, OTit-posts, and patroles, should not exceed one-tliird the strength of the pickets to which they belong. They will be composed of cavalry, or infan- tiy, according to the more or less broken features of the ground. 250. It rarely occurs that artillery is placed at the out-posts. Whenever it happens that a piece, or two, may be deemed necessary, to sweep some passage, or defile, in advance of the line of out- posts, the guns must be protected by a strong post, to insure their safety in a retreat. 251. If, from the character of the ground, the out-posts are mainly of infantry, some cavalry should always be attached to them, to patrol in ad- vance of tlie position, and to convey intelligence to the rear of what may be passing in tlie neighborhood of the out-posts. 252. When the advanced-posts cover an advan- ced-guard, tiie commanding officer of the whole should take a pesition, with his artillery and the main-body of his command, at some central point, in the rear of the pickets ; in order to be ready to sup- port them if hard pressed by the enemy. The cho'ce of this position is an object of the greatest imp\ .r- tance ; as the safety of the advanced-posts as well as that of the main-body may depend upon the de- gree of judgment shown in this selection. 253. So soon as the advanced-posts have taken up tlicir stations, instructions should be given to the officers of the dilFcrent posts, with respect to the pomts upon which they are to fall back, in case of being forced in; the lines of communication they 93 must retire by ; and the positron tbcy must take up, in joining the supports to which they respectively belong. 254. Duties of OJjlcer commanding an Out-Post. An officer in command of any of the out-posts must be capable of untiring vigilance and activity ; to perform the various duties which devolve upon him. He should be provided with a good map of tho country, a telescope, and writing materials. 255. He will thoroughly reconnoitre the ground upon which he is to dispose his command ; and also as far in advance as circumstances will admit ; questioning closely any inhabitant he may find. After taking up hijs position, he should go forward, with the half of his command, and post each sentinel himself. If, however, he relieves another in the command, and deems it advisable to make any changes in the dispositions of his predecessors, he should promptly report the facts to the commanding- officer in his rear. 266. When the officer finds that the enemy is not in his immediate neighborhood, he should endeavor to feel his way cautiously towards him by patrols ; and when in immediate presence, he should omit no means to watch tlie enemy's movements ; and from the occurrences of the moment, such as noises, the motion of clouds of dust, camp fires, conflagrations, &c., endeavor to divine what is passing in his camp, and his probable intentions. 257. Accurate written reports should be promptly sent to the officer in command, in the rear, on all these points. The reports should be legibly written, and should clearly, but concisely, state what has fallen under the officer's eye ; what he has learned from others ; and the character of the sources from which liis information is drawn. 94 258. He will particularly sec that no communi- cation with the enemy be allowed ; and that no flag bo permitted to pass the line of posts, without orders from the rear. 259. The post under the officer's command, whether horse or foot, should not all be allowed to sleep, or eat at once. The horses, when watered, should be taken singly, or by pairs, and always mounted. At night, one-half of the command should be under arms, prepared for an attack ; the other seated, their arms and the bridles of their horses in hand. The men should never be permit- ted to occupy a house ; and if the weather is such that a fire out of doors is indispensable, it should be as much concealed as practicable ; one-half only being allowed to sit near it ; the other posted, at a convenient spot at hand, to fall on the enemy should he attempt a stroke. 260. When the position taken up is to be held for some time, it will be well to change the locality ot the posts occasionally ; this should be don?, par- ticularly at night, in a hilly district ; changing the post from the brow of the hill, where the m?n can best keep a look-out by day, to the low ground at night, as more favorable to detect any movement above. 261. The out-posts are usually relieved at day- break, as, being the most favorable moment for the enemy to attempt a surprise ; the new-guard will serve to reinforce the old. For the same reason, the old guard should not be suffered to retire before the patrols come in, and report all safe. 262. As a general rule, no post should ever retire before an inferior force ; and, if attacked by one su- perior to it, resistance should be ca\itiously made with a view solely to give time to the grand-guard 95 to be In readiness to receive the enemy. When it is seen that the movement of the enemy is serious, the officer should draw in his sentinels as skirmish- ers, and retire upon the grand-guard ; the latter will usually be divided into two divisions, one of which will be sent to take up a position to the rear, to cover the retreat ; the other will act as as upport to the line of skirmishers, so as to feel the enemy. In all casea of retiring, whether of sentinels upon their posts, or of posts upon their supports, care should be taken to assume a direction towards the flank of the force in rear; so as to unmask its front and not impede any forward movement it may make, if necessary. 263. The degree of resistance to be offered by the pickets will depend on the object to be obtained, and the importance of the point occupied. They should not retire until they have received the whole of their grand-guards, out-posts and patrols. 264. At night the precautions should be neces- sarily redoubled ; and every movement be made with extreme caution. Whenever any noise ia heard in the direction of a sentinel's post, the officer should proceed, with a part of his command, in its direction ; to ascertain the cause of it. If he finds that it arises from an onward movement of the enemy, he should only fall back upon his grand- guard when he sees that resistance would be un- avaihng; retiring slowly and cautiously, and taking every advantage, wliich the ground offers, to check the enemy's advance. Should the enemy fliU sud- denly upon his command, he must endeavor to cut his way through, and reach his position in tlie rear by the best circuit he can find. 265. Advnnced-Gunrds. Measures of precau- tion, for a force in position, are far more easily ar- ranged than for one in motion. At a halt of some 96 days, but slight changes in the first dispositione, arising from a more thorough knowledge of the ground taken up, will be requisite ; on a march, the scene is continually shifting; and the enemy may fall on just at that point, or under those circum- stances in which we are least prepared to meet liim. Hence a necessity for doubling the ordinary pre- cautions on a march, and keeping the troops more in hand, so as to be, at all moments, prepared for any emergency. 266. The spirit of the dispositions is the same in both cases; changes in the details, so as to adapt our force to the changing features of the ground passed over, present the real difficulty. On a march, we may have to guard against an attack on tlie head of the column ; on either flank, or both ; and in the rear. Hence a necessary disposition of movable advanced-posts, in each of these directions, keeping pace with the progress of the main-body, and far enough from it to give it timely warning of a threatened attack. 267. Tlie dispositions in front is termed the Ad- xanced-Guard; those on the flanks, the Flankers; and those in rear, the Rear-Guard. 268. As the head of a column in march towards the enemy is the weak point, it is here that the principal strengtli must be accumulated, so that, if threatened with an attack, sufficient resistance can be offered, to enable the rear divisions to come up and take timely position for battle. The advanced- guard should therefore be composed of troops of all arms, and be always in a suitable state of readiness to receive the enemy, according to the nature of the ground upon which it may be formc^d. To watch the enemy; resist him with obstinacy, should he suddenly attack, until time h.\ gained for the 97 main-body to receive him; drive in his advanced* posts with impetuosity : such are the duties wliich this body may in turn be called on to perform. 269. The first of the&e duties, that of le-arning the whereabouts of an enemy, is intrusted to in- dividuals, or to parties of more or less strength, as the occasion may require ; light cavalry being usuaHy selected, in preference to any other arm, fur this service. 270. Head of Advanced-Ouard. A head or lead- ing detachment of some force, composed usually of both cavalry and infantry, and if requisite some pioneers, forms the advance of the main-body of the advanced-guard ; for the purpose of searching all the ground within a dangerous proximity ; and of clearing the way for the advancing columns. Through tliis detachment a communication is kept up with the flankers; and all the gi-ound is thus hemmed in around the advancing column, by which an enemy might approach it. 27 1 . The strength of the leading detachment will depend greatly upon the character of the country ; and upon tlie state of the weather and season being more or less favorable to the unobserved approach of an enemy. A teading detachment of one-fourth the total strength of the advanced-guard ; two flank detachments, to act as flankers, of one-eighth ; and a rear detachment, acting as a rear-guard, also of one-eighth ; taking, in all, one-half the total strength of the advanced-guard, is considered, under ordinary circumstances, a good distribution for the duties to be performed. 272. All the ground, within the proximity of tho advanced-guard, must be carefully searched by it. No invariable rule can be laid down on this subject, everytliing depending on the character of the coun 9 try; the state of the weather ; and tlie march benig by day or night, as to the more or less dispersed or- der that can be adopted for examining the ground. 273. The leading detachment, and those on the flanks, should keep in a position, with respect to each other, that will admit of prompt mutual sup- port, and guarding against the approach of an enemy unperceived. The flank detachments, for this purpose, keeping somewhat to the rear of the leading one. The most advanced portions of these troops should be of cavalry, unless the country be mountainous, or very thickly wooded, in wliich cases infantry is the best arm for the duty. 274. The distance that should be left between the leading detachment and the principal body of the advanced-guard, will depend upon the more or less of necessary precaution already alluded to. An interval of from a thousand to two thousand paces may be left between the leading detachment and *he main-portion ; the small detachments thrown forward from the leading detachment may precede it from two hundred to six hundred paces ; whilst the leading men, who form, as it were, the apex of this disposition, precede the last about one hiuidred paces. 275. Dispositions of Advanced-Guard. From these indications of the manner of distributing the troops of the advanced-guard, the following general dispositions, adapted to ordinary circumstances of locality, may be gathered. The apex, or most ad- vanced point, may be formed of a staff, or other in- telligent officer, under the escort of a few horsemen ; in his rear follow small detachments of horse, pre- ceded by a line of horsemen, as skirmishers, in dis- Sersed order, thrown out from them ; this line of small etachments and their men may embrace a frork See Plate III. for Articles 2T5, 285. 99 of a thousand or more paces, according to thfe face of the country. On each Hank of the detachments, from which the skirmishers are thrown forward, march small detachments of both horse and foot, as supports of the line. In the rear of this line, at a hundred paces or so, may be placed a small de- tachment, charged with patrolling either on the front or flanks. Finally, at some sixty paces in rear of .he detachment for patrols, follows the remainino portion of the horse and foot, composing the leading detachment. The main-body of the advanced- guard, following some hundred paces farther to the rear ; and the rear of its march, being closed by tlie small rear detachment already mentioned. It will be seen, by comparing this disposition of the troops of an advanced-guard in march, with the one adopted for the advanced-posts at a halt, that they are analogous, and differ in no material respect, as their object in each case is the same. 276. In a forward movement, this general dispo- sition of the troops of the leading detachment should be adhered to, as far as the features of the ground will permit. Whenever these features become such that a concentration on the centre is rendered neces- sary, a proper order should be temporarily taken, to enable the troops promptly to resume their original order, so soon as the ground opens. The leading line of skirmishers will carefully examine all the ground over which they pass ; and observe all that occurs around them. The men, for this purpose, keeping in pairs; and taking all suitable precau- tions not to place themselves in positions favorable to being seen from a distance. 277. If the enemy is met, dispositions are imme- diately tajien to receive him. The line of skii- mishers is strengthened ; the supports brought up ; 100 anj if there is any artillery, it takes position on the road, to sweep it. In tliis order, the whole of the leading detachment falls back slowly upon the mani-body of the advanced-guard ; and further dis- positions are made according to the exigency of the case. 278. The general order of march of an advanced- guard remains the same in all circumstances of ground ; the position of the troops alone varj-ing with changes of its features. In broken ground, for instance, the line of skirmishers of the leading detachment would be of infantry, and this line would be supported by some cavalry. 279. A strict observance of good order, partic- ularly among the troops of the leading detachment, is of the first importance ; nothing should therefore be permitted wliich might either withdraw their at- tention from their chief duty of watching ; or which might give warning to an enemy of their approach. They should especially guard against being drawn into the use of tlieir fire-arms, short of an actual surprise. 280. On a night-march the precautions should be redoubled. The leading detachment will be more concentrated, keeping mostly to the road. If the enemy is seeji, word will be sent at once to the rear, for a halt, and the suitable dispositions will be taken, as noiselessly as practicable. 281. All defiles met with of any length should be examined carefully by some scouts, before any number of troops venture into them ; and then proper measures should be t;iken for securing them from an attack, until the troops are all clear of them. All woods that can be easily gone round should be made the circuit of by some horse, before passing through them. Thick forests should be carefully 101 examined, a hundred or more paces on each side of the road. And in all cases any doubtful ground must be first searched, by the leading troops, before any large body approaches within musket-range of it. 282. Flank Patrols. Besides the flankers pro- per, which constitute a part of the movable ad- vanced-posts, detachments of an independent char- acter are sent out to patrol along the flanks of the main-column. These should keep themselves in communication, by suitable dispositions of vedettes, with the flankers. 283. As the flank patrols are frequently beyond direct supporting distance, they must adopt all the necessary dispositions against surprise of any other body marching independently; having their ad- vanced-guard, &c., &c. 284. These patrols keep on a level with their column; and particularly secure all latenl roods, or defiles, by which it might be suddenly attacked, until the column is beyond danger. Great activity, watchfulness, and caution, should characterize this service. The oiflcer in command of a flank patrol must use his discretion, in meeting an enemy, whether to attack him, or to let him pass, if he has not himself been observed. 285. Rear-Guard. The duties of a rear-guard, in retreat, will depend upon the more or less of activity and vigor shown by the enemy in pursuit. If the enemy is enterprising, then it will require all the sagacity of the commanding-officer ; all the firmness of the soldiers ; to cover and defend the rear of the column, and to guard against demonstrations upon its flanks. To hold the enemy in check, just the time necessary to enable the retreating column to extricate itself from unfavorable ground ; and then to withdraw from the fight, without being too 9* 102 far compromised ; to prevent the enemy from press* ing on so hotly as to force the main-body of the rear guard upon the tail of the column whose retreat ia to be secured, are problems of no easy solution ; and call for all the best military qualities, both in the officer and the troops to whom the solution is as- signed. 286. In mutual support among all the arms ; ap- titude for turning to advantage all variations in the features of the ground ; and tenacity in keeping every advantage offered until the last safe moment ; reside the excellence of a rear-guard. In inter- dicting by the fire of its skirmishers all approach to its covers ; in occasional bold manoeuvres of its light-artillery, when the enemy's columns are open to its fire ; in daring rapid charges of its cavalry, when the enemy presses forward to gain some critical point; a rear-guard may give an enemy such lessons as will force him to adopt that pru- dential course, on which its own safety, and that of its column, alone depend. 287. As the march of a rear-guard is an almost continual running fight, its dispositions should be taken for this phase of its duties. Its rear should accordingly be closed by a line of sldrmishers, properly supported by the other anns. This line must equally exhibit caution, coolness and firmness ; gi\ing way to no hasty movements ; and reserving its fire until it can be thrown in with murderous effect. If forced back by superior numbers, the skirmishers should concentrate on the flanks of the other troops, leaving the road clear, either for the fire of the artillery, or for the action of cavalry, or of infantry in mass. 288. In ail its acfions, the rear-guard should never lose sight of the danger it continually runs of 103 being surroanded, or cut off, by a movement on its flanks, or rear. Against this, its only course is to push out flank patrols, as far as they can safely venture ; restricting these to the duties of conveying timely warning, to the main-body of the rear-guard, of any appearance of a movement of tlae kind re- ferred to ; and of preventing it, if attempted, by a bold stand, either defensive, or offensive, as circum- stances may demand. 288. Advanced-Posts in CarUonments. As can- tonments are taken up either during seasons vrhen operations cannot be well carried on ; or to give the troops some extraordinary repose, after a harassing campaign ; more advanced-posts will geEerally be necessary tlian under ordinary circumstances; and to fulfil their end they ought to be placed on ground favorable to a strong resistance ; in order to give the separated corps time to concentrate against an earnest attack of the enemy. 290. A good disposition of stations for out-posts, from which the enemy can be seen at a distance ; a line of supports placed on strong ground in the rear ; easy communications for concentration on the main-body ; active and vigilant patrols, kept moving not only along the front, but penetrating on the flanks, and rear of the enemy, to get wind of his strategical plans: such are the general precau- tions demanded of its advanced-posts, by an army in (Station for some time. 291. In the disposition of the main force, to con- cur with the preceding, one precaution should not be omitted in a stay of any duration ; and that is, not to allow any one body to remain long enough in a village, or inhabited place, to becjomc in a degree domesticated. Nothing is more likely than this to injure the morale of tlie best troops. The seductions 104 of otherwise harmless pleasures, may lead to fata* habits of remissness in duty ; and the officer quietly indulging in his game at cards, in a family cir<-.le, may receive his summons for surrender, ;i» Ik; ia gatJieriug up his last trir.k. CHAPTER V. RECONNAISSANCES. 292. There are no more important duties, which an officer may be called upon to perform, than those of collecting and arranging the information upon which either the general, or daily operations of a campaign must be based. For tlie proper perform- ance of the former, acquirements of a very high or- der, in the departments of geography and statistics, are indispensable requisites ; to which must be added a minute acquaintance with topography, and a good coup (TiEil militaire for that of the latter. 293. However detailed and perfect may be a map, it can never convey all the information that will enable an officer to plan, even an ordinary march, with safety ; still less, operations that necessarily depend, for their success, upon a far greater num- ber of contingencies. To supply these deficiencies of maps,an examination of the ground must be made by the eye *, and verbal information be gained, on all the points connected with the operation over this ground. This examination and collection of facts is termed a Reconnaissance. 294. From the sendees demanded of a reconnoi- tring officer, it is, in the first place, evident, that he should possess acquirements of no ordinary charac- ter ; but in addition to these he should be gifted by nature with certain traits, without which his acqui- sitions would be of little account, in the discharge of the responsible duty in question. 295. With cleai and specific information before 106 him, one-half of a general's difficulties, in planning hia measures, are dissipated. In a letter from General Washington to Major Tallmadge, now to be seen framed in the office of the Commissary- General of New York, he remarks, in relation to reports made to him, on a certain occasion : " But these things, not being delivered with certainty, rather perplex than fonn the judgment." It is in truth this feeling of certainty that constitutes all the diiference ; having it, the general makes his dispo- sitions with confidence ; without it, he acts hesi- tatingly ; and thus communicates to others that want of confidence felt in his own mind. 296. An officer then, selected for the duty in ques- tion, should be known to be cool-headed and truth- ful ; one who sees things as *hey are, and tells clearly and precisely what he has seen. In making his report, whether verbally or in writing, the officer should study conciseness and precision of language. He must carefully separate what he knows, from his own observation, from that which he has learned from others ; and add all the circumstances of place, and time, with accuracy. 297. Duties of Reconnoitring Officer. The first thing to be done by an officer, selected for a recon- laissance, is to ascertain precisely the duty required of him; and what further should be done in case of certain contingencies that may, from the nature of tlie duty, be naturally looked for. In the perform- ance of the duty assigned him, and in making his -eport, the officer should keep always in mind the pecific character of his mission, as his guide in DOth points. 298. As the need of a reconnaissance supposes a deficiency in information ujion the features of the country, the officer, detailed to malce one, should 107 provide himself with maps, a good telescope, sich simple aids for judging of distances, and ascertain^ ing the relative positions of objects, as he can him- self readily make ; writing materials ; one or more good guides ; and gain all the knowledge he can, from the inhabitants at hand, bearing upon his mission. 299. The talent of judging of distances, and of the connection between the various features of a country within the field of vision, is partly a natural and partly an acquired one. Some individuals can never be brought to have any confidence in their own judgment on these points ; others have a nat- ural aptitude for them, which requires but little practice for their perfect development. The powers of the eye vary so greatly among civilized persons, that no general rules can be laid down, as a guide for the matter in question. Among uncivilized hordes, used to a roaming life, there are found stan- dards which are well understood by all, — the Arab, for instance, calling that distance a mile, at which a man is no longer distinguishable from a woman — growing out of their habits. 300. The first thing then to be done by an officer, in acquiring the coup (Tail militaire, is to learn, both from books and on the field, what space is taken up by a battalion and its intervals, by a squadron, and by a battery when in order of battle ; how much when in column of march ; and the average time required tor certain movements, under given circum- stances of the ground. This acquirement ne inav make by adopting some standard of his own ; un ordinary pace, and that of a horse, serving for com- puting time and distance reciprocally. The next step is to acquire the habit of estimating, by the ap- pearances of these different objects, from various 108 points of view, how far off they are. This must be done practically. A very simple aid to it is the following: — Upon ihe stem of a lead-pencil, cut square, and held out at a uniform arm's length from the eye, by means of a thread attached to it and fastened to the top button-hole, let the officer mark off, on one of the edges, the length seen on it by holding the pencil upright between the eye, and a man placed successively at different distances from it, as 100, 150—1000 yards. This will give one rough standard for practice. Another may be made by first ascertaining the average height of certain cultivated trees, as the apple, &-c. 301. For getting relative positions, a contrivance for measuring angles roughly must be used. This is done by first folding a leaf of paper across, and then doubling it along the folded edge, as if to divide it into four equal parts. The angle between the edge of the first fold and that of the second will be a tolerably accurate right angle. Now, by cutting off carefully along the fold, one of the pieces, we obtain a quadrant, or 90° ; then folding this at the angle, so that the two edges will exactly coincide, we get the half of a quadrant or 46° ; and so on, by successive bisections, we can mark oflf smaller an- gles. Then making a pen or pencil-mark along each of the folds, and numbering the angles succes- sively from to 90"^, we ha\e a rough proiracfar, that can be used both for measuring angles and setting them off on a sketch. To measure vertical angles, a thread with a light plummet, must be at- tached to the angular point. If the object is above the horizon of the eye, we hold the protractor ivi'h the avsrular point from the eye, so that the phuul)- line will fall along the face of the paper just tcuch- '\\\g it ; then directing the top edge of the pro*; ictoj 109 on the object, so that it is just seen by the eye, sighting along the edge, the angle formed between the plumb-line and the other edge, will be the same as the angle between the line of sight and the horizon of the eye. If the object is below the horizon of the eye, the angular point is placed towards the eye ; the same series of operations will give the angle below the eye's horizon. 302. Guides. Trustworthy guides are invalua- ble, but most rare, in an enemy's country. The best, from the information they acquire by their habits of life, are to be found among those classes whose avocations keep them much abroad, going from place to place within a certain sphere con- stantly ; such as common can'iers, hunters, smug- glers, t&c. Among the tirst thing to be attended to by an otficer, in taking post at any point, is to find out persons of this class, and to ascertain their whereabout when wanted. Kind treatment, dou- ceurs, and promises, should not be spared, to enlist either their good will or their interests ; and, if policy requires it, they may openly be treated with apparent harshness, to screen them from odium among their neighbors. 303. If none of this class can be found, then re- 8ort mustbe had to a higher ; local authorities being in preference selected, and if necessary forced to act. Here very careful treatment is requisite ; when the necessity of the case is admitted by them, much may be gleaned by kindness, courtesy, and a certain deference, from such persons, that cannot be looked for from their inferiors. 304. Before starting on his mission, the officer should question his guide thoroughly ; and if he has several, question each apart; like precautiona 10 no filiouUl be taken with respect to other inhabitants. Care must be had to find out the usual beats of one taken as a guide, so as not to take him out of his own neighborhood. In all cases, the guide must be well watched, however trustworthy he may seem. If unwilling, or sulky, he must, if needs be, be tied, and attached to a strong man, with a rope round his middle ; being first strictly searched for any cutting instrument about him. 305. Should there be but one guide, he must ne- cessarily be placed with the most advanced portion of the detachment accompanying the officer. If there are several, one must be there also ; the one apparently the most intelligent with the officer, who should ply him with questions ; and the others in the rear strictly guarded. 306. It may be well to remark, that guides are useful even in a country of easy communications ; as, in case of a rencontre, they may point out bye- ways convenient for retreat, if necessary. 307. Reconnaissmice. To designate all the ob- jects to be embraced in a reconnaissance, would load farther than the limits of this little work will alJow ; some general heads, which will serve as guides in all cases, will therefore be alone noticed. 308. A general view of the ground to be ex- amined must first be taken in, so as to obtain some notion of the forms of the parts, their connection, and relations to each other, before going into a detailed examimition. To one possessed of some topograph- ical knowledge, this study of what is before him will not demand much tinie. A level country, for example, he .knows is usually well cultivated, and therefore has plenty of hedges, ditches, &.c., which lend themselves well to affairs of light troops ; — may be not a little inconvenient to manoeuvres of artiU Ill t&ry ^,-^aiul frequently bring up cavalry very unex pectedly in full career. In a mountainous one, dangerous passes, narrow roads, torrents with rougli beds, ugly sudden turns, &.C., will necessa« rily be met with. Eacii and all of these demand a particular ejcamination, iind in bis report tbeir ad- vantages and disadvantages should be clearly pointed out by the officer. 309. If the reconnaissance is for an onward movement; the distances from halt to bait, as wel* as all others, should be estimated in hours of march ^ the nature of the roads, and the Obstacles along ihem be carefully detailed ; the means that may be gathered along the line to facilitate the movement, as veliicles, men and materials for removing ob- stacles, &LC. Tbe points where cross-roads are found, must be specified ; tlie direction of these roads ; their uses, &c. 310. All local objects aloiig the line, as villages, farm-houses, &.c., sliould be carefully designated, both as to tiieir position on the line, or on either side of it ; and also as to their form, and color, &c., as " square white house on the riglit ;" '* round gray stone tower on hill to left." 311. The names of localities, in tlie way in v/hich the inhabitants pronounce tliem, should be carefully written, and called over several times, so as to be eure to get them as nearly as practicable right in sound ; then the names, as written by an intelligent inhabitant, should bemadded. 31i!. All halting points idust be well looked to; their military capabilities, in case of attack: aa wed d.s their resources lor accommodating the 'ifoops, be thoroughly goue into. If the halt is to take position for some time, to await or watch tlie enemy , then more care must bfl 112 taken, the whole site be well studied as to its fulfill Ing the proposeLl end ; the points of support on the flanks be designated, as well as others in front and rear, that may require to be occupied ; the suitable localities to be chosen for parks, hospital, &c. ; the communications to be opened or repaired, pointed out ; and all the facilities either for an advance or a retrograde movement, be laid down. 313. Armed Ileconnaissance. Reconnaissances, made in the neighborhood of an enemy, require to be done under the protection of a proper detach- ment ; the strength and composition of which will depend on the object to be attained, 314. If the object be to gain secretly a knowledge of the enemy's whereabout and strength, then a detachment of light cavalry, conducted by a trusty guide, tlirough circuitous bye-ways, and moving with celerity, but with proper precautions against falling into an ambush, or ha\ang its retreat cut oft*, is usually resorted to. The details for tliis will be found under the head Patrols. 315. When an enemy's positioii is to be recon- noitred, with a view to force him to show his hand, by causing him to call out all his troops; then a large detachment of all arms, adequate to the task of pressing the enemy vigorously, and also of with- drawing with safety when pressed in turn, must be thrown forward. 316. Under the shelter of either of these forces, the officer, charged «ith the reconnaissance, takes the best moment, and best point of view, for care- fully ascertaining the dispositions made by the enemy. A good time will be at early dawn, when troops, in most services, are all made to stand to their arms. The points which the officer must ex ^ibit most attention in finding out, are those occ u? 113 piod by Ae batteries, and all those in any way in- trenched. 317. Patrols. Patrols are of two classes, from the different objects had in view. The tirst are those made with a view of insuring greater security from the enemy's attempts to pass, or force the line of out-posts, and may therefore be termed dffensive patrols. They consist usually of three or four men, who go the rounds, along the chain of sentinels and between the posts; seldom venturing farther than a few hundred paces beyond the sentinel's chain ; the object being to search points which might pre- sent a cover to the enemy's scouts, and to keep the sentinels on the alert. 318. The second class are those made exterior to the line of out-posts, with a view of gaining in- telligence of the enemy's whereabouts ; and may therefore be termed offensive patrols. They are composed of larger bodies of men than the first class, the number being proportioned both to tlia distance to be gone over, and the extent of front to be examined. In a position, presenting but few cross-roads, and sparsely settled, a patrol of ten or twenty horsemen, may be found ample, to search, with all desirable thoroughness, from twenty to forty miles in advance of the position, along the principal avenues to it ; whereas, with a more extended front, presenting many lateral avenues, double this num- ber might be required for the same duty. From the information obtained, through the ordinary channels of maps, and by questioning the iohabitants at hand, the commanding-ofiicer can usually settle, with siif- ficient accuracy, the strength of a patrol. 319. From the duties to be performed by patrols, cavalry are usually employed alone; in cases of very broken country, infantry may be necessary 10* 114 but they should always be accompanied by some norse, if for no other purpose than to transmit Intel ligence promptly to the rear. 320. The main duties of a patrol are to find tho enemy if in the neighborhood ; gain a good idea of his position and strength ; to make out his move- ments, and to bring in an accurate account of his distance from the out-posts of their own force ; and the character of the ground between the position occupied by the respective forces. 321. From the nature of these duties, it is evident that both officers and men, for a patrol, should be selected with especial reference to their activity, in- telligence, and the aptitude they may possess, from previous liabits of life, for a service requiring a union of courage, prudence, and discriminating ob- servation — usually to be met with only in indi- viduals who have been thrown very much upon their own resources. When the character of the country admits of it, the employment of such indi- viduals, singly, or in very small bodies, as scouts, is one of the most available means of gaining intel- ligence of an enemy, without betraying the secret of our own whereabout. 322. Dulu's of Officer in comviandofa Patrol. In conducting a patrol, the commanding-officer should provide himself with a good map, telescope, and guides ; and gain all the information he can before starting, by questioning persons in the neigh- borhood. Nothing should escape his eye along his line of search ; and he should particularly note points wliich might be favorable to his defence, if driven back by the enemy ; or by which his retreat might be endangered. 323. The order of march of the patrol will be regulated by tlie circumstances of its strength, kind 115 of troops employed, the character of the countrji passed over, the hour of the day, and the particular object in view. The intelligence and judgment of the officer in c jmmand will have sufficient exercise on these poin"s ; as he will be continually called upon to vary his dispositions. The general and obvious rule of keeping a look-out on all sides, will prompt the general disposition of an advanced- guard, rear-guard, and flankers, according to the circumstances of the case, however small his com- mand. The sole object being to carry back intelli- gence of the enemy, no precautions should be omit- ted to cover and secure his line of march, without making, however, too great a subdivision of his force. 324. Too much circumspection cannot be shown in approaching points favorable to ambuscades ; as woods, ravines, dehles, inclosures, farm-houses, vil- lages, &c. The main-body should always be haUed, in a good position beyond musket-shot, or where cover can be obtained, whilst a few men proceed cautiously forward, following at some distance in the rear of, but never losing sight of each other, to examine the suspected spot. If the officer deem it necessary, at any point, to detach from his command smaller patrols, to e.xamine points at some distance on his flanks, he should halt the rest, at the point where they s^arate, until the detachments come in and report; or, if he decides to move forward, he should leave three or four men at the spot, to con- vey intelligence promptly to the rear, if anything is discovered, as well as to himself. 325. It may frequently be found that some emi- nence on the flanks may present a good view of the surrounding country, in which case, if it be decided 10 use it, two or three men ought to be detached for Uie purpose, with orders to keep in sight of each 116 otlier, but far enough apart to guard against a sur- prise of the whole. 328. When the officer finds himself in the pres« ence of the enemy, he sliould hak his command at a convenient spot, where they wiU be screened from the enemy's view ; and, having made his dispo- sitions against a surprise, he will proceed with a few picked men to the most favorable point from which he can obtain a good look-out, to reconnoitre the position occupied, and the other points of in- terest. If he deem it advisable to keep his position, or change it for some other point more favorable, lie will first transmit a report to the rear of what he has observed. 327. When the patrol moves by night, the ordi- nary precautions must be redoubled. Signals must be agreed upon to avoid danger, should any of the party become separated from the main body. Care- ful attention must be given to everything passing around ; as the barking of dogs, noises, tires, &.c. On approaching any inhabited spot, the command should be brought to a halt, whilst a few picked men move noiselessly forward, and if practicable, by stealing up to the windows, learn the character of the inmates. 328. It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the mind of the officer in command of a patrol, that he must be all ears and eyes ; that he will be called upon in turn, to exercise great boldness, caution, presence of mind and good judgment, in accom- plishing a mission where the enemy must be seen but not encountered ; and such roads and halting points be selected, both in moving forward and re- turning, as shall be most favorable to his move« mcnts, and least liable to e.xpose him to a surprise or a disadvantageous collision with tlie enemy. CHAPTER VI. DETACHMENTS. 329. Detachments consist of small bodies of troops, composed of one, or several arms, to which are intrusted some mission connected with the ope- rations of the main-body, but, for the most part, performed beyond the sphere of its support ; such, for example, as the occupation of some post, or de- file, which is to be held temporarily, as necessary to the movements of the main-body ; the surprise of a post held by the enemy ; the seizure of a convoy, &c. 330. Tlie composition of a detachment will de- pend upon the nature of the duty to be performed ; the character of the country in which it is to ope- rate ; the distance of the point to be reached ; and the more or less celerity required in the operation. As a general rule, detachments should be formed only of light troops, well acquainted with their du- ties ; and, in every case where it can be done, they should consist of a proper proportion of each arm of the service, if the duty upon which they are sent is at all of an important character. By this combi- nation each arm is enabled to act with more bold- ness and vigor, from the support with which it will meet in the others ; and can better select its mo- ment for action, according to the character of the ground on which it finds itself. 331. The combats of detachments will be moslly restricted to firing, and the skilful employment of skirmishers. Tiie troops must be kept perfectly in hand for mutual support, tlie artillery keeping nea? 118 the mtantry, and the cavalry, whenever the oppo> tunity is presented, hazarding only short but \'igor« ous charges against the enemy. 332. The otficer placed in command of a detach- ment, should be thoroughly conversant with tho handling of troops ; so as to insure constant reci- procity of support ; and to be able to seize upon those opportunities of bringing the proper arm into action, and for passing from the defensive to the offensive, which combats between small bodies of troops so frequently present. 333. March of Detachments. As a detachment must rely mainly on its own resources, the prrson- n I end materiel of the troops should be rigidly in- spected before marching ; to see that the men and horses are in a sound state; that notiung is wanting in their equipments ; that the gun and other car- riages are in good travelling order ; and that the necessary amount of ammunition, provisions, and forage have been provided for the expedition. 334. Every source of information should be con- sulted with respect to the nature of the roads, and the country over which the column is to march; and good maps, telescopes, and guides should bo provided. If a reconnaissance of the line of march has been directed, it should be placed in charge of a well informed staff, or other officer, conversant with the duties required of him ; so that the com- mander of the detachment may be accurately in- formed of the state of the roads, as to their practica- bility for men, horses, and carriages; particularly the number of hours of march from station to station ; and the character of the obstacles with which he may be liable to meet, from the state of the bridges, tlie liaturo of the water-courses, and the defiles alonsf the route. 119 335. In order to avoid being anticipated in oui object by the enemy, every attention should be paid to preserve strict order among the troops, and to advance with celerity ; so that secrecy may be kept until the detachment reaches its destination. The troops, for this purpose, should bo kept as closely together as the character of the ground will permit ; and when guides are employed, they must be strictly watched, and not be dismissed until the march is completed. 336. The distribution of troops, or the order of march, will mainly depend upon the character of the country ; the general rule to be followed is so to place each arm in the column, that ihe troops may be formed for action by the most prompt and simjjle movements. In a very open country, the greater part of the cavalry will be at the head of the col- umn ; where it is somewhat broken, half of the cavalry may be in front, and the remainder in the rear ; and in a very difficult country the infantry will lead. The artillery may be placed in the in- tervals of the column where the country is not dif- ficult ; in the contrary case it will be in the rear, but covered by a small detachment which it pre- cedes. 337. The column must be secured from a sudden attack of the enemy by an advanced-guard, flankers, and a rear-guard. The advanced-guard will be composed of cavalry or infantry, or of the two com- bined, according to the character of the country. [n some cases it may be well to have two or three light pieces vi^ith the advanced-guard. The strength of the advanced-guard, for detachments not over two thousand men, need not be greater than one* filth of the whole ; for larger bodies it may be be- See riate V. for .\iticlcs 336, 875. 120 tween a fourth and a third, according to t.\e de^ee of resistance it rnay be required to offer. 338. The advanced-guard of a detachment should seldom leave a wider interval than about a thousand paces between it and the main-body. In a broken country, when this force consists of infantry alone the distance should be less, to avoid an ambush The main-body of the advanced-guard should al- ways be preceded a few hundred paces by a strong patrol of cavalry or infantry, to search the ground and secure the advanced-guard from falling into an ambush, or from a sudden attack. 339. The flankers will consist mainly of a few detachments, which march parallel to the column and a few hundred paces from it, according to the character of the ground ; these will throw out a few men, from a hundred to a hundred and fifty paces, on their exposed flank, to keep a vigilant look-out, in that direction, for the enemy. Occasional patrols may also be sent out on the flanks, when it is deemed necessary to push an examination to some distant point, or to gain a height offering a com- manding view' of the country. As the object of the flankers is rather to give timely notice to the main- body of an enemy's approach, than to offer any se- rious resistance, fhe detachments of which they are composed need only consist of a few men. 340. The rear-guard, except in a very broken or mountainous country, which would offer facilities to the enemy for slipping to the rear, need only be a small detachment, placed more to prevent strag- glers from falling to the rear than for any othei object. 341. Night marches should not be made, except in case of n'j'cessity. When their object is to sur- prise an cut-aiy, if thsre be an advanced-guard, it 121 should be kept near the head of the column. Patrola should be sent forward, with orders to advance with great caution, and not push on too far. Flying patrols may, if requ'site, be kept up on the flanks. The most exact order and silence should be main- tained, and extreme vigilance be exercised to avoid placing the enemy on the alert. 342. The following remarks, on the subject of marches, are taken from a little work, " On the Du- ties of Troops composing the Advanced Corps of an Armi/,'" by Lieut.-Col. Leach, of the British Army ; a work which, for its sound practical views, niade in the vein of a judicious, well-informed soldier, who has seen service, commends itself to the juniors of the profession generally. " At the time the following orders were first is- sued for the marcli of tlie light-division, in the sum- mer of 1809, on its route from Lisbon to Talavera, the troops moved otF by whole or half sections, ac- cording to the width of the road ; but, at a later pe- riod, a general order appeared, which directed that tlie infantry should march by threes. " The division having formed in rear of the lead- ing battalion, at whole, half, or quarter distance, or in close column, and the baggage being assembled in rear of it, the march was commenced with pre- cisely the same regularity as would be observed by a regiment or regiments moving in or out of a gar- rison town ; the bands playing, the light-infantry with arms sloped, and those of the ritlemen slung over the shoulder, the officers with swords drawn, and exact wheeling distances of the sections pre- served, and perfect silence observed. " After having proceeded a short distance in tliia manner, the word of commajid, ' March at ease,' was given by the general at the head of the leading 11 122 battalion, and this was passed quickly on to the rear from company to company. Tlie captains, instead of continuing at the head of tlieir companies, droo- ped back to the rear of them : the reasons for allot- ting this station to them was, that they might see any men of their respective companies who at- tempted to leave the ranks without leave. The officers and non-commissioned officers preserved the wheeling distances. The soldiers now carried tjieir arms in any manner most convenient. Some slung them over their shoulders, (most of them, indeed, preferred this mode as the least fatiguing,) others sloi)ed tliem, and many trailed them, and they con- stantly changed from the right hand or right shoul- der to the left. Whilst some lighted their short black pipes, others sung or amused their comrades with stories and jests, as is usual on those occasions. Although allowed to prosecute the march in this easy and unrestrained manner, a heavy penalty, nevertheless, awaited the man who quitted the ranks without permission from the captain or officer commanding his company. The captains were al- ways provided with tickets bearing their own signa- ture, on each of which was written, ' The bearer has my permission to fall out of the ranks, being unable to proceed with the regiment.' Any soldier found on the line of march by the rear-guard, with- out a ticket, was liable to be punished for disobe- dience of orders ; and, as no difficulty was ever ex- perienced by men who were sick, or knocked up, in procuring this certihcate of inability to keep up with their regiments, such offenders certa.inly merited punishment. " If a soldier wanted to fall out of the ranks for a few minutes only, he was required to ask leave of the captain to do so, and, moreover, to take otF hi* 123 Knapsack, and to give it, together with his musketi in charge of the men of his own section, to be car- ried by them until he rejoined them. This was an admirable order, and it operated in two ways ; first, the soldier was enabled, not being encumbered with either knapsack or musket, more speedily to over- take the column on its march ; and secondly, if he loitered unnecessarily on the way to rejoin his comrades, who were doubly burdened with his arms and pack, he would be certain to incur their dis- pleasure. " About once in every hour and a quarter or half, a halt 'was ordered, and ten or twelve minutes allowed for the men to rest. When practicable, this was done on ground near which there was water ; but it is almost unnecessary to add, that very frequently it was not possible to find such favorable spots. " Preparatory to those temporary halts, the word of command, 'Attention!' was given at the head of the leading regiment, and passed on rapidly (as already stated) from company to company. Upon this, the captains moved quickly from the rear of their companies to the front ; the arms of the soldiers were regularly shouldered or slung ; perfect silence was observed ; the pipes were instantaneously put out of sight, either in the haversacks or elsewhere ; the dressing and the wheeling distances of the sec- tions were correctly kept ; and in an instant there was a magical change from apparent irregularity to most perfect discipline and order. " On resuming the march after those halts, the troops observed the same extreme regularity during tho first hundred or two of yards, as I have already described. The words ' Marcli at ease' being again 124 pven, they returned to the song, the story, and the tobacco-pipe. " On approaching rivulets or shallow pieces of wa« ter, which it was necessary should be passed, neither officers nor soldiers were allowed to pick their way through, nor was the smallest break or irregularity permitted to exist in the ranks ; but the column marched througli by half sections, sections, or swb- divisions, (according to the width of the ford.) pre- serving the same order as if moving along a road. " That this regulation was, on some occasions, too rigidly enforced, I have never heard disputed ; still, the object at which it aimed, viz. that of ex- pending as little time as possible on each day's march, so as to give the soldiers time to take their rest, to construct huts in the bivouac, to wash their linen, to mend their clothes or shoes, to draw their rations, and to cook their meals, that they might be fresh for whatever fatigues happened to be in store for them, was indisputably a most de- sirable one. " Those who have campaigned know, that in ad- vancing to attack an enemy, or in retiring before one, the passage of rivers in the line of march, even if so deep as to reach their middles, and under the fire of an enemy also, are expected to be crossed by tiie troops without a greater derangement taking place in their order of march than the obstacles which they are in the act of encountering, must ne- cessarily produce in a greater or less degree. " With a detachment consisting of a few hundred men, at a distance from an enemy, and with ample time before them to get over their day's march, it would appear that this order might well be dispcn Bed with ; but with a division of four or five thou sand men, the case is widely different. 125 " Let it be supposed that it has arrived at a stream which admits of being passed by sections, subdivisions, or even by companies ; and that, in- stead of proceeding straight through it in this man- ner, every soldier is permitted to pick liis way across in any manner he may think proper, and to break off from his place in the ranks, — what a vast loss of time would this occasion ! When would the rear of the column have effected its passage ? Surely the patience of those belonging to the front, centre, and rear of this body of four thousand sol- diers, would be pretty well exhausted long before tJie opposite bank was gained by the whole, and the march resumed. " In the rugged and mountainous districts which the army so frequently traversed in the Peninsula, it encountered various defiles and other obstacles, which precluded the possibility of their being passed except by a very small number of men at a time ; and the following mode was therefore adopted by each company in making its way along. The first company of the leading battalion, as soon as it had disentangled itself from the defile, or broken ground, was directed to march forward, perhaps about a quarter of a mile ; there to pile arms, and the men to rest. The head of the next company, when it had cleared the defile, halted about thirty or forty yards on the other side, until all the men belonging to it came up in succession. This done, the cap- tain moved it forward independently until it joined the leading company, where it piled arms. Thus, each company, as soon as it had cleared the obsta- cles, was brought up en masse, and at a regular pace, without reference to those in its rear. By those means that most unmilitary exhibition of file 11* 126 after file running on, like a string of wild geose, lo catch tiiose in their front, was entirely avoided. " Few things tend so effectually to fatigue and irritate soldiers who are already jaded, as that of trotting on, bending under the weight of pack, belts, and musket, to overtake those who continue lo march on in their front. 343. " When the division was about to perform a march not in the immediate vicinity of an enemy, the following arrangements were made either for bivouacking or quartering it, (as the case might be,) so that no time should be lost after it had reached Us destination. " A staff-officer, accompanied by the quartermas- ters of the division, or (if other duties at that mo- ment were required to be performed by the quarter- masters) by a subaltern of each regiment, preceded the troops on horseback, so as to arrive long before them at the ground on which they were to halt for the day, or at the town or village in which it was intended they should be quartered. " A whole street, or part of one, (as circumstances admitted,) was allotted by the staff-officer to the quartermasters for each of their regiments, who immediately divided the street into equal portions for the different companies, reserving a house or two for the staff of the regiment. " A sergeant of every company of the division being sent forward so as to arrive long before the troops, and being told by his quartermaster how many and what buildings were set apart for his own people, again subdivided the houses into four equal parts for each of the sections. " In the event of any noise or disturbance taking place, whether by day or by night, the probabilities "vere, that the officers belonging to the companies 127 where such irregularities were going on, would cer- tainly hear it, and as instantaneously put an end to it. " If, then, the division marched into a town, each company was by its sergeant conducted to the houses allotted to it; in which they were estab- hshed in a very few minutes. It rarely happened, therefore, that the soldiers were kept wailing in the streets for any length of time, as has too often been the case. " Should it, on the other hand, have been intended to bivouac the division, instead of putting it into houses, arrangements of a similar nature were adopted, by sending forward officers and sergeants to take up the ground ; by which means each com- pany marched at once up to its own sergeant, on whom they formed in open column. " The rolls were immediately called ; the men first for duty were warned for guards, (also in- lying and outlying pickets, if near the enemy.) for fatigue duties, to draw the rations, to procure wood for cooking if none was near at hand, to go for water if no river flowed near the encampment, &.C. &c. " This done, and the alarm-post, or place of gen- eral assembly, having been pointed out to every one, the men were dismissed ; the arms piled, the cooking immediately commenced, and all further parades were dispensed with for the day, except a roll-call about sunset. "Parties to procure forage, whether green or dry, were sent out in charge of an officer as soon as the troops were dismissed. 344. " Amongst the various regulations laid down for the light-division, I must not omit to mention what were termed mule-guards. 128 " A corporal and three privates of every com- pany, mounted guard at nightfall, whenever the division was encamjicd. Tlie particular duty ex- pected from tlie sentinels of these company guards, was to keep an eye to the baggage animals belong- ing to their officers, (which were picketed to the trees or fastened in some other manner,) and to pre- vent them from breaking loose. " After the establishment of those little guards, but few instances occurred of whole troops of noisy mules, horses, and asses, chasing each other round and through the camp or bivouac, and galloping over tlie faces and bodies of the soldiers whilst lliey were asleep. '• Independent of their utility in this way, every company in tlie division, having its own sentinel, was sure to be instantly apprized of any alarm du- ring the night from the pickets in front ; and they were enabled, also, to communicate to their respec- tive companies, without the least delay, any orders arriving at the camp. " Tliose only who have witnessed it can thor- oughly understand with what uncommon facility and dispatch the division could suddenly get under arms, form in column of marcii, load tlie baggage, and proceed on the route chalked out for it." 345. Defensive ineasures of Dctachmenls. In the combats of detachments, whether offensive or de- fensive, as the employment of skirmishers is the princi|)al means resorted to, and tlie troops, but in rare cases, act in mass against the enemy, posi- tions should be chosen which will be favorable for this kind of combat. It but seldom happens, in selecting a position for the defensive, that strong points can be found to secure the wings from an attack J but no uosition should be taken up wliicli 129 does not present covers for the infantry ; good points for the action of tJie artillery, where it will be but little exposed ; as well as shelters where the cavalry may be kept at hand, ready for any emergency, and unexposed to the lire of the ene- my's artillery. 346. The natural features of the position will necessarily determine the dispositions for the de- fence. It must, however, be borne in mind that, as it is essential to keej) the troops well in hand for mutual support, they must not be too much dis- persed ; and that a position which requires this cannot be vigorously defended. The artillery should be kept within a hundred paces of the main- body of the infantry ; and the cavalry at about two hundred paces. Offensive movements will be mostly left to the cavalry ; which should be held in reserve as long as possible, in order that it may act with the more effect upon the enemy when he is weakened. The infantry should only resort to the bayonet under very favorable circumstances ; as, when acting in mass, it will be more exposed to the enemy's fire, and be more in danger of being surrounded. 347. Defiles in the rear of a position do not pre- sent the same dangers to small as they do to large bodies of troops, and may indeed be very favorable to the defence in a retreat ; but a position should not be taken up too far in advance of a defile, as it might give the enemy an opportunity of cutting off the retreat of the detachment. Whenever this dan- ger is to be apprehended, it must be guarded against by flankers ; whose duty it will be to give timely warning to the main-body of any movement of the enemy to gain their rear. 348. If the detachment is forced to retreat, the 130 greatest attention luust be given to keep the troops well together, and to inspire them with confidence in their mutual support. Every advant;ige should be taken of the strong features of the ground for chocking the enemy, by occupying it with skir mishers. A portion of the cavalry should be alwaya at hand, to act offensively when occasion offers. The artillery will retire by half batteries, or sec- tions, for the purpose of taking up successive posi tions to secure the retreat of the main-body. When ever a defile is met on the line of retreat, the en- trance to it should be timely secured, by occupying every strong point near it, to cover the retreating column. If the defile is of a character that admits of interior defence, some men should be sent in ad- vance to rai^e, at suitable points, barriers, or any other obstacles that will serve as shelters from which the enemy can be held in check. 349. Defence of Defiles. The term defile is ap- plied to any narrow passage through which troops can only pass in column, or by a flank; such, for example, as roads confined between mountains, causeways through marshes, a bridge, &,c. 350. Defiles are occupied either to secure them for our own purposes, or to prevent an enemy from passing them. In either case, the position taken up by the troops, whether in advance of, or in the rear of the defile, to hold it, will depend upon its length and the features of the ground at its outlets. If the ground in advance is open to the enemy's fire, the entrance to the defile cannot be defended with any chance of success. In like manner, if the ground in the rear is of the same character, and witliin range of the enemy's fire, it will not be practicable to prevent the enemy from debouching if in sufficient force. 131 351. Wlien the defile is to be secured lor our own use, the ground in advance must be occupied, by taking advantage of all the natural features fa- vorable to the defence. The flanks of the position should, if practicable, rest upon points that the enemy will not be able to turn. The entrance will be guarded by a strong detachment ; and if there are points within the defile which would be favorable for checking the enemy, in case of re- treat, they should be prepared for defence, by using such means as may be found at hand for strengthening them. 352. If it be deemed advisable to take position in rear of the defile rather than in front, the entrance to it should be occupied by a small detachment, for the purpose of observing the enemy ; and if there are points on the flanks of the defile which, if in pos- session of the enemy, would render him master of it, they must be strongly guarded. 353. The detachment for the defence of a defile will be composed of one or several arms, according to the character of the ground. Each arm will be posted on the points most favorable to its action, and for mutual support. If the position taken up be in rear of the defile, the artillery should be placed at three or four hundred paces in the rear, so as to command by its fire the interior and outlet. The cavalry should be at some two hundred paces back, ready to charge the enemy in flank as he debouches. The skirmishers should seize upon every point near the outlet from which the enemy can be reached, both within the defile and as he debouches from it ; whilst the main-body of the infantry will be posted on the right and left of the outlet, in the best posi- tions for throwing in a heavy fire, and then driving back the enemy with the bayonet. 132 854. When a position taken in advance of a de- file is likely to be forced, the retreat should be com- menced by scndino; all the artillery except two pieces to the rear, to take a position to secure the outlet. A portion of the cavalry will next retire, the rest remaining with the rear-guard, to check by its charges the enemy, should he press on with vigor to seize the entrance. The main-body of the infantry will riext retire by the usual movements, either from the centre or the wings, as the case may require. The rear-guard, having secured the entrance until the main-body is far enough to the rear to be out of danger, will retire ; the cavalry, or the infantry leading, as the defile may present fea- tures most favorable to the action of the one or the other arm. As the troops successively clear the outlet, they will take position to receive the enemy should he attempt to force a passage. 355. In mountainous passes, where the flanks of the defile can be attained by the heights falling into the hands of the enemy's skirmishers, these points must be occupied by detachments, as well as all paths, or roads leading to the flanks, or to the real of the defile. The reserves of the detachments should occupy in preference points where cross- roads meet. The communications between the de- tachments and the main-body must be well pre- served ; and if the detachments are driven in, they must fall back on their supports, and occupy other points on the llanks previously designated. A re • treat, under such circumstances, will demand tho greatest circumspection, and great unity of action. To secure the retreat of the rear-guard, the lateral issues should be well guarded by detachments. 356. Bridges and dikes are defended in the same manner as other defiles. A bridge in an oue» 133 country, particularly one over a small water* course, is not susceptible of a good defence, and the best thing to be done, to render the passage useless to the enemy, is to destroy it. If the country on the side towards the enemy is open, whilst on the opposite side it is broken so as to present good covers for the troops, a position may be taken up behind the bridge, and the dqfence be conducted in the usual manner. If, on the enemy's side, the ground is broken, whilst the other side is open, a defence can only be attempted at great risk ; as, in case of being forced to retreat, the movement must be made under strong disadvantages, arising from the exposed position of the flanks of the retreating force, whilst on the bridge, to fire, as well as that of the position which must be taken up on the opposite side, if an attempt is made to arrest the enemy at the outlet of the bridge. When both ends of the bridge are favorable to defence, the side towards the enemy may be occupied by a detachment whilst the main-body takes position on the opposite side. 357. Fords can only be defended with safety by taking up a position behind them when the ground presents good covers, near enough to the point of crossing, to bring a strong fire on the enemy whilst passing. Fords are usually the more difficult of defence, as several are frequently found in the same vicinity. The best plan to be resorted to generally, is to endeavor to obstruct them by any means at hand. 358. Villages, <^c. Villages which are acces- sible on all sides should not be occupied by a de- tachment which is obliged to rely only on its own resources ; but when they are so situated that they can be approached by the enemy only in front, having their flanks covered by natural obstacles 134 and the groiind in their rear being favorable to a movement of retreat, they may be defended with success, provided they are not commanded by the ground in advance, within the range of fire-arms, and that the approaches to them can be swept by the fire of tiie defence. 359. On occupying a village, the commanding- officer should immediately make himself acquainted with the environs to at least within the range of fire-arms ; and lose no time in erecting such obsta- cles, as barricades across the streets, abatis, «Sz.c., as the means at his disposal will permit. 360. The defence will mainly fall upon the in- fantry, which should be divided into three parties for this object ; tlie one will occupy all favorable points where cover can be obtained on the outskirts of the village, such as ditches, inclosures, &c. ; another, divided into a suitable number of detachments, will be posted, under cover, on the most accessible ave- nues to the position occupied by the first, of which they will form the supports ; the third will form one or more reserves, according to the extent of ground taken up, and will be posted at some central point most convenient to act, according as circumstances may demand. 361. The artillery will be placed at those points where it can best sweep the ground over which the enemy must approach to' attack the weak points of the position. It should bs covered by an epaul- ment, and be masked uniil it is necessary to open its fire. 362. Cavalry can aid but little in the interior defence of a village ; if it form a part of the detach- ment, it may take post so as to secure the flanks of the village, if they are not well covered ; otherwise a position should be taken by it in rear, to be readj 135 to cover the retreat, if the other troops should be driven out by the enemy. 363. In the defence of a village, the detachment, unless it should find itself decidedly superior to tho enemy, will rely mainly upon the effects of its hre. Sorties may be attempted, if the enemy commits any blunder ; such as exposing himself to a flank attack, or not supporting well his advanced line. When a sortie is decided upon, the point from which it is made should be strongly occupied, to cover the party sallying out in case of a repulse. The party for the sortie should attack with vigor, but with due precautions against being cut off; and if they suc- ceed in driving back the enemy, they must not en- gage in a headlong pursuit, but fall back under cover of the party holding the point from which they sallied. 364. If the troops occupying the exterior line are in danger of being turned by a flank attack, they must retire upon the village, and take up positions previously designated for this contingency. To insure good order and steadiness in this movement, the supports should hold the enemy in check by a sortie on his flank. 365. When it is found that the village must be evacuated, the supports will act with the line of skirmishers, to delay the progress of the enemy, by disputing every favorable point, in order that the reserves may have time to retire and take up a po- sition in the rear, to secure the retreat of the troops still engaged. In the retreat, the troops falling back on their supports, or reserves, should be careful not to place themselves so as to obstiuct either their movements, or 'heir fire upon the enemy. 366. Inclosures and Houses, In the defence of 136 posts, it frequently becomes necessary to occupy isolated houses nnd strong farm-yard inclosures, lo prevent the approach of the enemy on some point In such cases the doors and windows, through wliich an enemy might force his way in, must be strongly barricaded ; those from which a good fire can be brought to bear upon the enemy, siiould be arranged to give the men secure shelter whilst firing ; loojvholes must also be made through the walls to give more fire. If circumstances require that the house be held to the last extremity, the ar- rangements in the interior must be made to defend it story by story, until the object to be attained is accomplished. 367. The distribution of the troops will depend on the character of the inclosure. When it is spa- cious and open, the usual distribution of a line of troops around the walls, witli supports and a re- serve, will be made. In a house, the troops will be divided into several parties, each under the com- mand of a subaltern, or non-commissioned officer, who will direct the defence of their respective sto- ries. When there are men enough, two should be placed at each loop-hole, and a small reserve be kept in the most sheltered spot at hand. The main reseiTO will occupy the point most convenient to fall upon the enemy should he force his way in. The men at the loop-holes should be cautioned not to throw away their fire, and at suitable intervals they should be relieved by men from the reserve. 368. It is but seldom that artillery can be used in these cases. Some pieces may be posted with advantage in inclosures. Cavalry can be of no service, except it can act in ambush from some point where it may fall on the enemy's flank. 369. General Measures for the Attack. The dis» 137 positions made for the attack by the commantling* officer of a detachment, will necessarily be based upon the defensive measures of the enemy. There- fore, in the tirst place, a correct knowledge should be gained of the position taken up by the enemy, and the manner in which his troops are distributed for its defence. The points to which attention will be directed in these respects, are, ^rs/, the natural features of the position as adapted to a good de- fence ; and second, the distribution of the troops. 370. On the tirst point, the character of the ground in front of the enemy's position, as to its capabilities for the effective action of infantry, cav- alry, and artillery, must be carefully examined ; the flanks of the position, as to the practicability of turninc" them ; linally, its rear, as olTering a secure retreat to the enemy. 371. On the second point, we must endeavor to ascertain whether the enemy, in posting his troops, has taken advantage of the features of ground in his front, by placing each arm on those points most favorable to its action ; whether the extent of ground taken up by the enemy is susceptible of a strong defence by the troops which occupy it ; whether the different arms are so posted as to give a mutual support ; whether the enemy has neglected to give proper supports and reserves, or to place them within suitable distances ; whether he has crowded too many troops upon one point, or has posted too few on another; whether the points occupied by any portion of the troops, particularly by the artillery, or cavalry, are exposed to an enhlading fire of our own artillery ; whether his flanks are assailable; whether there are defiles to his rear which he has omitted to occupy; finally, whether he has neglected 12* # 138 to guard avenues by which either his flanks or rea may be reached. 372. If the enemy's troops are well posted in front, occupying all the advantageous points pre- sented by tlie ground, and well supported, we must look to see what can be done by operating on his flanks, or by turning his position and gaining his rear, whilst a feigned attack is made on his front. If the extent of his position is too great, and his troops too much dispensed, his flanks may be men- aced whilst a serious altack is made on his front. 373. Attacks on the flanks by a portion of the troops are verj' fovorable against an enemy not prompt at manoeuvring ; but, wben made against a skilful active enemy, ve expose oifrselves to the same attack that we attempt against him, besides weakening our front. 374. In moving forward to the attack, the troops should be kept well in hand for mutual support. The artillery and cavalry should avail themselves of all covers presented by the ground, to avoid ex- posure to the enemy's artillery. The artillery should reser\-e its fire until it can open with a de- cided efi'ect to clear the way for the action of the main-body ; leaving to the skirmishers to push for- ward, and by their fire drive the enemy from his covers. If, however, there are points from which the enemy cannot be well dislodged without the aid of artillery, it should be brought early into action, to avoid the blood-shed of unavailing attacks of the in- fantry. In no case should the artillery be isolated, but always covered by a strong escort; otherwise it might at any moment fall into the enemy's hands. 375. In attacks of the character in question, where tlie skirmishers ])lay so important a part, they will be required to resort frequently to tlie 139 bayonet, to dislodge the enemy fully from his covers whenever an opportunity offers, some cavalry should be at hand to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy when driven from such points. 376. The cavalry in its cliarges, however dash- ingly made, should use due circumspection, and not venture too far in a headlong pursuit, for fear^ of being brought up suddenly by the enemy, advan- tageously posted to profit by such faults. 377. The infantry will only act in mass and with the bayonet when the enemy has been well wearied by the tire of its skirmishers and artillery; if, when driven from his position, the enemy can be forced upon a defile, a few rounds of grape followed up by the bayonet can seldom fail of completing his de- struction. 378. Attack of Defiles. The length of a defile, and the circumstance of its being prepared by bar- ricades within it, to protract the defence, are points of grave importance in planning an attack. When the length is so great that the outlet is beyond the range of our cannon, the troops will not be able to pass it, except under the most favorable circum- stances, as the enemy can make the best dispositions at a short distance from the outlet, to crush the troops which first attempt to debouclie. If the de- file is barricaded, the barricades should not be at- tacked in front, except for very grave reasons, as, if skilfully defended, they can only be carried at great cost of life. 379. In attacking the entrance of a defile, the troops should approach along the most convenient and best sheltered avenues, and deploy when a lit- tle beyond musket range. The skirmishers and ♦he artillery should profit by the ground, in taking positions favorable both for shelter, and to reach 140 with their fire the enemy's tixops Skirmishers should be directed to close in, particularly on llie obstacles by which the flanks of the enemy's posi- tion are strengthened, and endeavor to dislodge his troops from tliem. The main-body, liold hi resen^e to carry the entrance with the bayonet, so soon as it is'seen that a serious impression has been made by the fire, should be kept under cover, and as near at hand as the ground will permit. If the enemy gives way, the main-body should make a vigorous attack in mass witii tlie bayonet ; and, following up closely the retreating troops, endeavor to secure the outlet by debouching from it before the front is so far unmasked by the retreating troops as to en- able those, in position for its defence, to act with freedom. As fast as the troops debouche, they must occupy the ground in front of the outlet strongly, leaving a sufficient force for the imme- diate defence of the outlet. The reserve should remain at the other extremity of the defile to act as circumstances may require. So soon as we find ourselves in secure possession of the defile, a part of the reserve, with all the cavalry, should pass and take positions indicated on the opposite side. The greater part of the artillery follows, and takes position on the flanks to open its fire on tlae retiring eneuiy. 380. If the attack on the entrance to the defile is unsuccessful, the troops will retire behind their re- serves, the latter covering this movement, and hold- ing the enemy in check should he attempt a pursuit. If a renewed attack is ordered, the troops first in action will form a reserve for the fresh troops thrown forward. 381. When it is found impracticable to force the entrance by a direct attack, resort must be had to 141 Btratagem, by pushing forward a few trcx ps to act on the enemy's flanks, and try to dislodge him from the obstacles by which they are covered. If this attempt is successful, the troops in action must be gradually reinforced to gain supports for the flanks of the column of attack in its advance movement. As the column penetrates the defile, ground must be gradually gained by throwing forward fresh troops which dislodge the enemy, secure the issues in case of retreat, and hold the points of support of the flanks. 382. In the attack of defiles forming mountain- ous passes, the column of attack must be well cov- ered on the flanks, by detachments which make a simultaneous attack on the enemy's posts on the heights, to prevent the one from aflx)rding support to the other. These detacliments should be strong enough for the duty assigned, so that should any post offer a vigorous resistance, they may be en- abled to renew their attacks with fresh troops. 383. Two-thirds of the detachments will act as skirmishers, the other third will be held in reserve. So soon as any post is carried, the reserves will occupy it. When the skirmishers move forward, a portion or the whole of the reserve will follow, as circumstances may demand. There should be no intermission in the attacks when once com- menced, but the enemy be driven by alternate at- tacks of fire and the bayonet, from point to point, to enable the detachments gradually to gain the immediate borders of the defile, so as to reach the rear of the enemy's troops, and force them to re- tire. The main-body, in the meantime, should oc- cupy the enemy in front, to prevent him from send- ing succor to the posts tliat secure his rear and flanks. 142 384. Attacks of Villages, rouglit against them. The same was true of the invasion of France by 261 Ihe Allies in 1814. But we have seen that, in the campaign of 1796, Bonaparte, ahhough he had driven the Austrians, in a demorahzed con- dition, into the German Tyrol, and wished to push forward by the same route to Vienna, did not think it prudent to leave the strong place of Mantua, with a competent garrison, in his rear. In the campaigns in the Spanish Peninsula, where the armies were smaller and more evenly matched, sieges were frequent and indispensable operations, and the success or failure of a cam- paign depended upon the termination of these means of gaining time and consuming the ene- my's active forces. Had Napoleon in 1813 been able to have held in check the Allied armies, he would have found the fortified places in Germa- ny, in which, to the weakening of his active force, he had thrown garrisons sufficiently strong to hold them against a covp-de-main, of the most essential importance, in any favorable turn in his affairs. Had Soissons been stronger, or even been resolutely held for a few hours, or had the inconsiderable place of Laon not afforded the support it did to the Allies, Blucher and his army would, in all Hkehhood, have been destroyed, and the Russians on the other side of the Aisne have been driven far beyond the zone of opera- tions of the Allies on the Seine. But still more important to the success of Napoleon's plana would have been even one or two places of some moment on his central position, between the Aube and Paris, and especially had Paris itself been encircled with fortifications secure from an open assault. With these aids, his comparatively small active forces would have been doubled in value. The audacity of Blucher would have 262 been checked, or severely punished, and the timid Schwartzenberg would have put still less than he did, to the hazards of Napoleon's skill and daring. 630. Marches. — In the descriptions of the pre- ceding campaigns, the influence of marches skil- fully combined and executed has been fully de- monstrated. No general perhaps of any age has shown such striking abilities as Napoleon in this respect. This was the result not only of admi- nistrative and executive talents of the highest order, but of the intimate knowledge he had ac- quired of the most minute details of every branch of the service, by the most indefatigable in- dustry. 631. As strategical operations, marches may be divided into two principal classes; those of concentration beyond the sphere of action of the enemy; and those o^ manceuvre executed within this sphere. In the former the forces are only brought to that point where the latter com- mences. In the campaign of 1805, we have seen how the two corps in Hanover and Hol- land, under Bernadotte and Marmont, were di- rected upon Wurtzburg, whilst those on the English channel were directed on the Rhine, be- tween Mannheim and Strasburg. Having reach- ed these points without any apprehension of an enemy's presence, the grand manoeuvre for throwing them on the enemy's right flank and rear commenced ; those columns on the right, being nearer the enemy, moving more slowly, and having their flank nearest the enemy care- fully guarded by a corps assigned to this service ; those on the left, moving more rapidly and pivot-" ing on the right, whilst the whole was so com- 263 bined that in a few hours a large force could be concentrated on any fraction, if unexpectedly attacked whilst carrying out this grand move- ment. 632. In the second splendid campaign of Na- poleon in Germany against the Austrians, that of 1809, the same admirable series of provisions is to be seen. Seeing the evidently hostile atti- tude of Austria, the first step of Napoleon was to mass his forces at those points from which they could be rapidly thrown upon the Austrian do- minions. For this purpose, he chose Wurtzburg, Augsburg, and Strasburg, PI. XI., as the points lor concentration. On and towards the first point, he directed the major part of his forces from Saxony and from the north of Germany. On the second, the forces in the neighborhood of llanau. On the third, those from the interior of France. Whilst in Italy he directed Prince Eugene, with 50,000 men, to approach the Frioul. These, with other minor movements, drew around Austria another of those Napoleonic meshworks which had already proved so disas- trous to her. The Austrian army of 200,000 men were to concentrate in the neighborhood of Ratisbonne, on the Danube ; part on one side, and a part on the other side of this stream, but so as to render mutual assistance. Not knowing where he with certainty should find the main body of the Austrians, Napoleon decided upon trusting nothing to mere hazard, but to be governed in his movements by recognised mili- tary principles. To this end he withdrew Da- voust from Eatisbonne, on the Danube, and threw forward Massena, so as to concentrate his entire force at Abensberg, a small place on the 264 river Abens, and about midway between Ingold- Btadt and Ratisbonne. Here he decided to break through the Austrian centre, thus sepa- rating the two Archdukes, Charles and Louis. In these plans, he was aided by the tardiness of movement of the Austrians upon which he counted, and also by the state of the weather, by which the roads were much injured. The result of these skilfully combined marches was that the Archduke Charles was forced upon Ratisbonne, and obliged to retreat across the Danube into Bohemia; the other main fraction of the Aus- trian army retiring successively behind the Inn and the Traunn, leaving the road to Vienna open to Napoleon. 633. In this conjuncture of operations. Napo- leon, after considering the military aspect of afiairs, decided to march direct upon Vienna. In taking this step he had not only to follow up the Archduke Louis, but to provide against the junction of the Archduke Charles with him, by recrossing the Danube. The principal points where this passage might have been effected are Straubing, Passau, Lintz, and Krems. These it was of the first importance to secure by antici- pating the Austrian movements on them. To carry out these measures, Massena received orders to descend along the Danube, to be fol- lowed by Davoust, and by General Dupas ; and each, in succession, to occupy the places just mentioned, thus securing the army from an at- tack either in flank or in rear, by the Austrians on the left bank of the Danube. At the same time, Bessic-res was ordered to push forward be- yond Landshut, on the Iser, and keep closely on the heels of the enemy's retreating column; 265 whilst Lannes, under the immediate command of Napoleon, moved between the columns of Massena and Bessieres, so as to throw this force upon either of these two, as circumstances might demand. Further to secure his right on their flank, the Bavarians, his allies, were directed to occupy Munich, and, pushing from there through Salsburg into the Tyrol, observe the Archduke John, and give timely warning of his movements. These profound combinations met with all the success they merited. Anticipated by the rapid movements and daring of the French at every point, the Archduke Charles was unable to join the forces on the right bank of the Danube, which last, despairing of being able to cover Vienna, effected a crossing to the left bank at Krems. . 6.34. The disposal of the troops for a march and the manner of executing it belong to the practical details of the profession, for which spe- cific rules are laid down in every service ; and with which it is presumed that every man who accepts the responsibility of a general's position has made himself acquainted. All of this may be summed up in a few words. First, the trains of every description must be covered by the troops, for which purpose they must, in an advance movement, be either in the rear, or on that flank where they will be least exposed to the enemy. In a retreat they must be in ad- vance. When an army moves in several nearly parallel columns, the combination must be such that an imposing force can soon be concentrated on any point threatened. The divisions of each column must, in like manner, be in supporting distance of each other, but, for convenience, not 23 266 crowded on the marcli. As to advanced guards, flankers and rear guards, both their strength and composition must depend on the general's judg- ment, founded on the force, character, and posi- tion of the enemy, and of the nature of the coun- try through which the march is made. Just in proportion as he has read, has reflected, has had opportunities for action, will his judgment lead him to take right measures; whilst still more certainly, if he has wanted these aids to forming an enlightened judgment, will he take wrong ones. Let no man be so rash as to suppose that, in donning a general's uniform, he is forthwith competent to perform a general's functions; as reasonably might he assume that in putting on the robes of a judge he was ready to decide any point of law. 26T , CHAPTER IX. BATTLES. 635. Battles, though planned and fought al- most solely on tactical principles, have in many cases important strategical bearings which it is the province of an able general to see and to take advantage of. Skilfully combined strategical marches, when ably executed, may alone decide the fate of a campaign, without the necessity of coming into collision with the enemy ; but this is a rare case, and a battle is usually the necessary sequence to an important strategical movement, and, if well planned and successfully fought, may prove decisive of the war. 636. Orders of Battle. — Mihtary writers desig- nate by this expression the general combinations made to attack one or more points of an enemy's position ; whilst they apply the term line of hat- tie to the disposition of the troops, in their rela- tions to each other for mutual co-operation, act- ing either offensively or defensively. 637. Whatever may be the disposition of the troops, the line of battle of any considerable force will present a well defined centre and two wings ; thus offering to an assailant one or more of these as his point of attack. This has led to dividing orders of battle into several classes, arising from the necessary disposition of the as- sailing force, as it moves to attack one or more of these points. 638. If an equal effort is made to assail every 268 point of the enemy's line, the assaihng force must necessarily advance on a line parallel to the one assailed, and this therefore has received the name of the parallel order of battle. If the line of the assailing force is sensibly perpendicular to that of the assailed, the disposition is said to be the perpendicular order. If the main attack is made by one wing, the centre and other wing being held back, or refused as it is termed, the positions of the lines of the two parties become naturally oblique to each other, and this is term- ed the oblique order. In like manner, the concave order results from an attack by both wings, the centre being refused, and the convex order from refusing the wings and attacking by the centre, &c. 639. The order of battle should result from the position in which the enemy's forces are pre- sented for attack ; and as these, if skilfully dis- posed, will be posted so as to take advantage of the points of vantage which the position they occupy offers, the order of battle for assailing may vary in an infinity of ways. Still it is not to be inferred that one order is not superior to another, or that the choice between them is one at pleasure. In the parallel order, for example, the opposing forces being supposed equal in all points, there is no reason why one point of the enemy's line should be forced rather than another, and, therefore, success depends either upon destroying his whole line, or simply push- ing it back ; as chance alone will determine a break in any part of his line. In the oblique or- der, on the contrary, one wing being refused, or merely acting as a menace, the other may be strongly reinforced, so as to overwhelm th© 269 ■wing opposed to it, and, if this succeeds, the as- saiHng army, by its simple onward movement, is graduaUy brought to gain ground on the enemy's rear, and to threaten his Une of retreat. Again, in crossing a river on a bridge, or passing through any other defile to assail an enemy op- posing this movement, the order of battle be- comes necessarily convex ; the extremity of the defile itself becoming the centre from which the assailing forces radiate, to enlarge their front, whilst they are obliged to secure the defile on each flank. To lay down rules therefore as to what order of battle should, in every case, be employed would be pure pedantry. Talent, skill, and experience can alone enable a general to decide this point in any given case, 640. Line of Battle. — Whether acting offen- sively or defensively, troops of the same arm, as well as those of different arms, must be so disposed as not only to lend mutual support, but not to ob- struct or impede each other's operations. On this point there are rules so self-evident that it would seem almost unnecessary to repeat them ; yet they have been violated, with the loss of bat- tles consequent on them, by some generals of fair abilities and experience ; whilst others of great military skill have done the same, through ne- cessity, with successful results. But let not this tempt any man to throw aside well established precedent to depend on the inspiration of the moment. There is no surer way to bring down defeat and disaster. 641. Defensive battles are usually fought upon positions selected beforehand, with the defensive properties of which the general is supposed to have made himself master. With this know- 23* 270 ledge, he should be able to dispose the different arms to the best advantage for injuring and re- pulsing the enemy. In this case, he naturally seeks so to post his troops that he may obtain the greatest amount of fire, upon every point of approach on his position, whilst, at the same time, the troops may find shelter from that of the enemy. The occupation of heights, woods, undulations of ground, stone or brick houses, stone fences, and of slight field works thrown up at the moment, as each of these present themselves along the front and flanks of his po- sition, by his infantry and artillery, are obvious measures. The judgment of course will find play here so to select among several points as to obtain the best results sought. The disposition of the troops will depend on the relation between their number and the extent of the position. Where the troops are in excess, they must ne- cessarily be disposed in several successive lines; placing, as far as practicable, all who cannot take a part in the earlier phases of the action far enough be3'ond the range of fire to secure them from damage. Where there is a deficiency in numbers, a single line may have to be resorted to, and the intervals of battalions, &c., increased; but it is obvious that, except in ground of a very difficult nature to an enemy's approach, this would be a very weak distribu- tion of the troops. But these are extreme cases. The normal distribution of infantry being that of two lines for mutual support; and a re- serve read}' to prevent or repair disaster, and to make, when the opportunity offers, a decisive Btroke. As to the distances between the linos, and the intervals left in each line, these again 271 must depend on the judgment of the eommand- ing general and his subordinates. Whilst they endeavor to expose no troops to fire which are not themselves engaged, they must see that their second line is near enough to support the first, at every new position taken up by the assailant. Battalions will, to this end, be placed either im- mediately behind those they are to support, op- posite their intervals, or more or less to the right or left, as the ground may favor, and as, by so doing, the necessary manoeuvres of one or both lines shall not be impeded. Like considera- tions apply to the battalion, brigade, and division intervals of each line. All of this supposes at least plain good sense, and some experience on the part of the commanding officers. 642. The positions chosen for the artillery will be wherever they can get the widest and longest range. This may require the batteries, in some cases, to be distributed throughout the front of the position ; in others to be massed. In the lat- ter case, the effects upon any one point will be the more staggering to the enemy, but risk of greater loss is run, should the enemy throw him- self upon and capture the artillery so massed. A. gap in a line has been filled by artillery, but the general, who would imitate this, should be very certain of the other arms by which his artillery is supported. Raking fires along roads, &c., cross fires over wide open spaces, and concen- trated fires upon openings that cannot be raked, such are the services that the general should en- deavor to secure from his artillery. 643. As for cavalry it has no passive defensive properties ; in the defensive therefore it must be kept out of fire, until called upon to act oflen- 272 Bively to support either the infantry, or the ar- tillery when hard pushed. This of course it can only do where horses can be led to the charge. Here the general has to show his knowledge of what this arm can reasonably be called upon to perform. That it has sometimes charged up or down steep broken ground, where infantry might have found an advance not easy, that it has swum rivers, and dashed up against fortifica- tions, are all very creditable to the audacity of this arm ; but no general, in making his distribu- tion of it, would count upon seeing it of cours'j perform such feats. 644. Phases of Defensive Battle. — The artillery, of course, opens the ball and keeps on thunder- ing, and holding on to its position as long as '\\a fire can be made telling from it ; losing no time in shifting about. Next come into play the light troops, who, as sharpshooters, have taken up every advanced cover to meet the enemy by their fire far off; these too hold on for dear life, as every man picked off destroys not only one, but demoralizes his neighbors. When they are forced back, they judiciously, both for their own skins and to let the enemy have the benefit of it, slip into the rear, by any opening not likely to be swept by the fire of the first line. Now comes into play the deadly volley firing, which soon runs into that of every man for himself It is now that the second line becomes all alive. Now that the reserve is kept firmly in hand and bid to keep cool. If forced to yield, the first line, without scampering, should soon leave an open field between the second and the eneoiy; and the second must have well made up its mind that the bayonet must be finally theii re- 273 liance for a decisive stroke ; knowing that the reserve is still behind them, untouched and ready for any work. As to throwing forward the re- serve, if the commanding general's eye and in- stinctive appreciation of the moment do not lead him to seize it, no written rules, however elabo- rate, will. 645. Offensive Battles. — To know what we are going to encounter is half the battle in almost all affairs of life ; for we are, thus far, secure from the surprise of finding something in our way that we had not counted upon. In no transaction is this beforehand knowledge more important than in preparing for a battle. There is hardly any labor, any personal risk to which a general should not subject himself to gain precise and accurate information on this head. Here he must see for himself, at the risk of finding his orders misconstrued, and his plans defeated by the carelessness or stupidity of his subordinates. 646. A personal reconnoissance therefore of the enemy's position is indispensable, and if this is made on the eve of the attack the general ehould take another last look in the morning, be- fore moving, to see that the enemy has not anti- cipated him, and taken steps that call for changes on his part. Of course, whatever is ad- vantageous to the defensive will particularly en- gage his attention ; but, as his great object is, not only to drive back the enemy, but to bring on him a great disaster, the chief point to which he will bend his thoughts, will be to see by what mode and by what point of attack he can secure the greatest strategical results. 647. Considerations therefore both of a tacti- cal and strategical character must receive tlio 274 careful examination of the commanding general, in deciding upon his plan of attack. The first, as carrying with it the most important advan- tage, is the strategical result ; the two principal of which are, first, either to direct the main ef- fort upon that wing of the enemy which, if overthrown, will naturally bring us on the hne of retreat of his forces, or, second, upon some point between his two wings which, if pierced, may force his disconnected forces on divergent lines of retreat, and thus expose them to the dis- aster of being beaten in detail, or to the capture or destruction of one of the fractions. In the battle of Austerlitz, for example, in which the Allies at first acted offensively, their plan was made subservient wholly to the strategical result. The right of the French position was nearest to their line of retreat on Vienna ; by forcing this point, the AUies would have been brought be- tween the French and Vienna, thus throwing them further from their base. If repulsed in this attempt, the Allies still covered their own line of retreat, so long as their centre and right held firm. The strategical object of Napoleon, on the contrary, was to pierce the Allied centre, and thus secure the advantages of a successful operation of this kind. 648. Next in importance come what may be termed the grand tactical considerations ; that is, the means of doing most damage to the enemy on the field of battle itself. For example, if the enemy's position is such that he has an impassa- ble obstacle on one of his wings, as a river, lake, or a narrow defile, tactical considerations alone would suggest to direct our main attack on tho opposite wing, as, by defeating this, the centre 275 and remaining wing may be thrown upon the o'jstruction which it either cannot pass, or must pass with difficulty, and thus be captured or greatly cut up. In like manner, tactical consi- derations would engage us to attack a height on the enem\''8 position which, if gained, would give our forces a decided advantage ; or, if his line of battle presents a very salient point, upon Avhich our efforts can be concentrated to attack this point; or if his line at any point presents a wide break, into which we can force our way, to do so; any one of these points if gained would give decided tactical advantage. 649. Though not necessarily leading to the same decisive results as the two preceding, a third consideration, in choosing the point of at- tack, is the facility which the natural features of the ground, over which we must move upon it, afford for the combined operation of the troops of the different arms that are to make the attack. Too much weight, however, is not to be given to this, in selecting the point of attack ; as ground, however difficult, may almost always be got over by troops of all arms, and very often it more than compensates for the labor of doing so, by the cover and other advantages it may afford in advancing. 650. In the battle of Austerlitz the tactical ad- vantages were greatly against the Allied point of attack, as they, in the first place, had to ad- vance against the villages occupied by the French and through narrow, hollow roads, in which their columns became confused and disordered ; and they had moreover, on the flank and rear, several ponds, with only narrow causeways be- tween them, on which, if thrown, there was no outlet of escape except over these narrow defiles, 276 ttU of wliich were exposed to the artillery of the French. The result, as we know, was a frightful disaster. Prudence counsels, in all such cases, to forego the tempting object of a grand result if to gain it we expose ourselves, if unsuccessful, to a great disaster. The general who looks for- ward alone, not providing for his own rear or flanks, or who, intent only upon some striking success, rushes recklessly, in the pursuit of it, within the jaws of destruction, has learned but half his trade, and that the most easily acquired and the most dangerous in its apphcation in such hands. 651. It is in nicely weighing these considera- tions and selecting the best, that the great gene- ral shows his powers. Recognising settled prin- ciples as his guides, he does not apply them blindly. Finding, for example, his opponent in a position as PI. VII., Fig. 19, having his line of battle, A,B, oblique to his hne of retreat, a,c; his right resting on high ground, and his left on an impassable marsh, or river, there could be no hesitation as to selecting a as the point of attack ; since, by carrying it, he naturally cuts the ene- my's line of retreat, throws him back on the im- passable obstacle, and obtains command of the field of battle. This is a case where the general, accepting battle in such a position, and his line of battle as supposed, has committed the blunder of following too implicitly the military dictvm that the wings should be secured by resting them on strong features of the position chosen. The wing b fulfils this condition, whilst a, occu- pying the heights, has a commanding view of the field of battle ; still the position is a danger- ous one, and the risk to the assailant, if repulsed, 277 but trifling. The better plan here would have been, for the party on the defensive to have taken the position c,d, the left resting on the heights, and the right e,c, thrown back, en po- tence as it ia termed, with a strong support f. In tliis case, if attacked on the left, the assailant would be obliged to place himself in the perilous position of an impassable obstacle behind him*; if attacked on the right, the defensive has the advantages of the heights ; and, in either case, if forced hack, the line of retreat is covered. G52. As a further illustration, suppose an army on the defensive to have taken the posi- tion A,B, PI. VII., Fig. 20, its right wing a, un- covered, its left resting on an impassable obsta- cle, and its line of retreat being a,c, running parallel to this obstacle. Here the strategical consideration would designate b, as the point of attack, as, this wing being driven back, the army is cut off from its line of retreat ; but, in at- tempting this the assailant necessarily places himself between the assailed and the impassable obstacle, and thus exposes himself to a great dis- aster if repulsed. Here prudence and sound principle dictate rather to attack at a, and by vigorous pursuit, if successful, endeavor to reap every advantage. G53. Although but one point, known as the key-point, is usually selected for the main effort of the assailant, still the whole line of the as- sailed is more or less menaced, to prevent the key-point from receiving reinforcements. A different course, one by which we endeavor, so to speak, to envelope the assailed, can only be attempted with a prospect of success, when we are greatly superior in force. Had the Allies at 24 278 AuKterlitz, instead of pressing with such vigor the French left whilst they weakened their cen- tre in moving on the French right, thus leaving the plateau of Pratzen a comparatively easy prey to the French, simply menaced the left and held the plateau with a strong force, not suc- ceeded in their main attack, they would at least Jiave avoided the subsequent disaster. 654. Connected with enveloping attacks is that of sending a strong detachment, by a cir- cuitous route, to fall on the enemy's rear, whilst an attack is made on him in front. Such ma- noeuvres are wrong in principle, and military history presents striking instances of their failure in practice. The topographical features of the immediate theatre of operations can alone de- termine whether to risk turning operations. When this is in a very broken or obstructed country so that such a movement may be con- cealed for the time necessary to perform it, the risk will be less, but the chances are still against it. As an example of such a case, let us suppose, PI. VII., Fig. 21, an army holding the position N, covering q, and that the line of operations p,q, of the assailant is covered on one flank by an impassable river, whilst on the other the region is mountainous, but having roads which lead to the rear of n. Taking advantage of a tributary covering his line of communication, the assailant, by posting a detachment, m, behind it, sending another, N, to occupy the height on the right, behind which the road leads, so as to cover the flank march of the main force, might move by this road with safety, and, taking the position M, turn the army N, and thus force it to retire, or to accept battle under dangerous circumstances. 279 If repulsed, the main body, m, could retire with safety, as the two detachments, m and n, would secure it from either an attack in flank, or in rear. The principle then is, that, in all turning movements, or attacks in flank, the assailant ex- poses himself to a like attack, and he should, therefore, only attempt them when the ground is peculiarly favorable to the movement. 655. An attack on the centre is the obvious operation when the enemy's line is too extended for the number of his forces. It may also be the best course when the enemy's line of retreat is through a defile in the rear of his centre, as, in case of success, each wing is cut ofif from the line of retreat, and the troops of the centre, if forced upon the defile, cannot escape from a serious disaster. Where both flanks of the ene- my's position are secure, and it becomes a case of necessity to attack, some point of the front must be selected for the main effort, which, if gained, will give a decided advantage. For example, if there is a commanding eminence on his front, every effort should be made to carry it, as, from there, the field of battle being overlook- ed the enemy would be obliged to fall back. In this case the order of battle would necessarily become convex ; the divisions of the centre, to make the assault, being in advance, whilst their flanks and rear would be secured by the divi- sions of the wings advancing in echelon, those nearest the centre being most advanced. 656. Eliminating all exceptional local features, the general case which presents itself is that, where the entire line of the enemy is equally exposed, and where success therefore depends upon the ability of the assailant to keep the 280 whole line so threatened that its reserve alone can be moved with safety from one point to another, whilst a powerful effort with concen- trated forces is made on some one point, usually one of the wings. In this case the assailing wing will be strongly reinforced, particularly with artillery ; the centre also strengtheneil, whilst the opposite wing will be refused, the di- visions receding from towards the centre, in eche- lon, so as to parry any attempt at turning them, or at making a flank attack on this part. 657. The only general rules that can be well laid down for the distribution of the different arms on the field of battle have already been given. Details on this point must be necessarily left to the siibordinates, who, if well acquainted with the true functions and resources of their respective arms, will seldom fail to post them so as to do as much injury to the enemy and be ex- posed to as little danger to themselves as the natural features of the field of battle will admit of. The plan of the battle having been decided on, the manoeuvres to carry it out should be as simple as possible, so as to guard against the failures that almost invariably attend any at- tempt at complex movements, within striking distance of the enemy. All distributions for what are termed passages of lines should be avoided, even in the case of thoroughly drilled troops. The distribution of infantry in echelons, wherever it can be adopted, is one of the best, as each division has its support at hand on its flank, whilst the interval left between the flank of the one in advance and that of the one next it in rear, should offer sufficient space for cavalry or artillery to move forward to the front if wanted. 281 658. As \x> the distribution of troops belong- ing to the separate fractions of the entire force, as an army corps, a division, &c., the rule is to so distribute them that they shall fight under the immediate eye of their respective commanders, and support each other. Having, for example, a division, composed of four brigades, to distri- bute in line of battle, the question may arise as to whether all four of the brigades shall be in one Hne, the first, for instance, or two be in the first and two in the second line. By the first distribution, the four brigades will be under the immediate eye of the division commander, but their supports of the second line may be a stranger division, and be led by a general, a rival, or enemy of their own commander. In the second case, the commanding general, being separated from the two divisions in the first line, will not be able to give them that direct super- vision as in the first case ; but a more hearty co- operation of the brigades and more unity of con- cert may be looked for than in the contrar^'case. 659. This branch of the subject may be closed by some examples of supposed cases which may aid in fixing the essential principles. That all may not be left to hazard, some regulations on this subject have to be laid down ; variations in these, according to circumstances, must depend on the general's ability to adapt his troops 'to the position they are to fight on. 660. The first case, PI. XII., one supposed by Dufour, is the distribution of an army of about 37,000 troops of all arms, to attack an enemy'a position, the main effort being directed on the enemy's left wing, our left being refused. Thia force he supposes to be organized as follows : 24* 282 40 battalions of 750 men each, 30,000 12 squadrons " 120 " 1,440 18 batteries, 72 pieces, 130 men each 2,340 30 companies of sharpshooters, 3,000 2 companies engineer troops, 200 Total, 36,980 661. In this organization, it will be noticed that the proportion of cavalry to the infantry is very small, and that but two guns are allowed to every thousand men ; proportions which would be only suitable for a theatre of war in which cavalry would but rarely find any but a very confined field of action, and in the case also of excellent infantry, which admits of a reduc- tion in the amount of artillery. 662. Having divided the battalions of infantry into four divisions, one of these is taken to form part of the reserve, to which is assigned the whole of the cavalry, and all the disposable artil- lery, *nd the sharpshooters. 663. The other three divisions are designed to move on the right, the centre, and the left of the enemy's position. As the main attack is on the right, ten companies of sharpshooters are at- tached to it, and five to each of the other two ; ten being with the reserve. 664. In the attack on the right and centre, each division, when formed in line of battle, is to occupy only a front of four battalions, the re- , maining six of each to be so placed, in second or third line, as the respective generals of division may deem best. 665. Five battalions of the left division will deploy, in echelon, on the left of the second di- 283 vision ; tlic remaining five being in column to the rear, so as to move to the support of either the second, or third division, as circumstances may demand. 666. Having decided upon this preUminary plan of attack, the three first divisions are put in motion on their respective points, the heads of column on the same level ; the reserve following the centre column. 667. The advance of each leading column will be covered by an advanced guard, composed of the sharpshooters, and the flank companies of the leading brigade of each, and by one battery of artillery. 668. The deployment will be that which natu- rally results from the positions of the brigades in column of march ; each brigade forming one line, its artillery on the right, the sharpshooters in the intervals of the battalions, and the flank companies on the wings. 669. So soon as the three advanced guards, which are from 1,000 to 1,500 paces in advance of their respective columns, have come within good range, the sharpshooters are thrown out as skirmishers, the flank companies supporting them, each of these companies keeping nearly opposite to the battalion to which it belongs. The artillery, in the mean time, having opened at a convenient range for its round shot. 670. The skirmishers stick to their work until they are either repulsed, or called in, when they will retire behind the flank companies; one half of these last forming the new chain of skirmish- ers, the other half the supports ; and, in this or- der, they fall back, but keeping up their fire, to the intervals between the battalions. The sharp- 284 shooters then take position to the rear of the first line in the battalion intervals; the flank companies doubling on the wings; and the bat- teries, which have thus been unmasked, proceed- ing, on a trot, to the front, to pour in a heavy- continued fire on the enemy. The two first di- visions in this ^Tay enter into the engagement; the third merely covering its position by its bat- teries. 671. This stage of the action is here shown on the plate as the intentions of the commanding general may have been interpreted by his subor- dinates. The commander of the first division has taken a battalion from each of his lines to form a small reserve, which he has placed in a third hne, to be ready for any emergency. The commander of the second division has formed his first line into two echelons, and has placed a se- cond battalion to support the right one of the advanced echelon, and has thrown forward all his sharpshooters into the first line. In dispos- ing of his second brigade, he has placed three hattalions nearer to the centre to strengthen the troops engaged. The commander of the third division has deployed the battalions of the first line in echelons, at 150 paces from each other, £^nd has thrown out one of his batteries on his left, giving it the companies of sharpshooters as a support, with the view of checking any move- ment on this wing. 672. In the meantime, the general command- ing, seeing the affair well under way, has massed his reserve, in rear of the centre of the first di- vision, seeing the moment come to complete his stroke, has detached a brigade of the reserve, four companies of sharpshooters, six balterios, 285 and the half of his cavalry to the front; giving the artillery orders to take position on the right and left of the batteries of the first division, so as to get a slant fire on the enemy's line ; the infantry to mass itself on the right of the artille- ry, to cover it, and also by proper precautions to guard itself from a flank movement ; the cavalry to post itself, in echelon, on the right of the in- fantry, to prevent a flank movement of the ene- my's cavalry. At the same time, tvpo batteries are also sent forward to reinforce those of the second division. To give room for these move- ments of the batteries, the flank battalions of the first Une of the first division are thrown into column in mass, whilst those of the second in- chne towards the centre so as to avoid being behind the batteries. 673. As the reserve is weakened by these movements, the commanding general orders the second brigade of the third division to take post in rear of the centre of the second division, to be on hand for any emergency. 674. The order of battle which, in the early phase of the engagement, was parallel, has now become oblique. The first division, having kept its centre battalions of the first line deployed until ready to charge, will, for this last stage, throw these two battalions also into column, whilst the battalions of the second line will spring forward and fill the intervals of the first, so as to present an unbroken wall to the enemy. In this way the division will move forward ra- pidly, bringing down the bayonet, only when within ten or twenty paces of the enemy's Une, If the line should be forced to deploy, to again open fire, the battalions of the first hne will fall 286 to the rear, foriD-ng as the second, leaving thia task to those of the second and the sharpshoot- ers. This onward movement of the right will be followed by the centre and left, care being taken that the whole movement is performed connect- edly. 675. This example gives the spirit of the phases of an action for the case supposed. The problem to be resolved, with the arms now in the hands of troops, being to extend our front as much as possible, without, however, weakening too much our line of battle, so as to bring all the fire we can upon the enemy's line. 676. Pursuit. — The more vigorous the pursuit of a broken enemy, the less are his chances of retrieving himself. It is seldom prudent, how- ever, unless in case of evident panic on the part of the enemy, to make a headlong pursuit. It is no unusual thing for an army to be successful on one point and to be beaten on another, thus bringing round a complication equally dangerous to both sides ; and which the general, who has best kept liis troops in hand, will have the greatest chance to profit from. If the enemy therefore breaks at any one point, it is always the part of good generalship to rally and speedily reorgan- ize the main portion of the successful army, until the state of the whole field is ascertained with some certainty, detaching only a small force of the freshest troops to improve the partial advan- tage, and prevent the retiring enemy from rally- ing. 677. This reorganization for pursuit must not however be pushed too far ; all that is needed, if the troops can endure more fighting at once, 287 is to collect the scattered fragments and put them again into marching or battle array, and then lose no further time to follow up success. This is a part of generalship that no theory can teach to one to whom nature has not given the faculties of a general. 678. Defensive Battles. — The fact that a party acts on the defensive supposes something want- ing either in the numbers or efficiency of his troops ; either of which defects can only be re- medied by resorting to aids, offered either by nature or art, for restoring the equilibrium be- tween the opposing forces. The requisites of defensive positions have been so much insisted upon, in other places, that it will hardly be ne- cessary to repeat them here. There is but one point that needs to be strongly inculcated, which is that a position should not only be strong tacti- cally, but good strategically. It should not only lend itself to the manoeuvres of our troops and to the efficacy of their fire ; but, if forced, should favor a safe retreat. 679. The advantages offered by heights for the defensive may induce into serious disaster, a general who takes a position of this kind from purely tactical considerations, without regard to their strategical bearing; or, when this latter consideration does not come up, who looks sim- ply at the defensive properties without examin- ing also the advantages that a skilful enemy, operating offensively, might derive from them. 680. Suppose an army, PI. VII., Fig. 22, a,b, to occupy a ridge of heights, crossing obliquely its line of retreat x,y ; its right resting on an in- accessible obstacle, as a precipice, &c. Now an army, c,i,d, advancing to the assault of thisposi- 288 tion, might look upon it in two aspects. First, strategically, seeing that by making the attack on the right, although the ground there is the most difficult, it will force the assailed back, so as to expose his line of retreat, and may there- fore be well worth the eifort and cost. Second, tactically, to assail vigorously the more exposed left wing A, and, throwing it back on the right, necessarily produce a disaster ; as the character of the ground, a narrow plateau, is supposed to be such that it will not admit of a change of position of the assailed to meet this attack in front. However otherwise advantageous, it would evi- dently be imprudent then for a general to take np a position of this kind, unless so superior to the enemy that he will be able to foil an attack on either wing. 681. Field Works. — There still remains, how- ever, one more resource to the general, in a similar case, when he has ample time to employ it, and that is fortification. This is one that every great general has, at one time or another, availed himself of, and, in every case, with ad- vantage. Military history is full of examples where the scale of great and decisive battles has turned on the taking or holding a mere field work that had occupied but a few hours time to throw it up. This, however, belongs to the domain of fortification, one of the most diffi- cult as most important branches of the military art, and which demands for its proper exercise, military quahfications of a high order. There probably has existed no great engineer who, when called upon, has not shown himself a superior general ; nor a great general who did not fully acknowledge and appreciate the art oi' 289 fortification. Wlien persons therefore express tlaemselves of a skilful engineer and say that he is only an engineer, they show their own igno- rance, and proclaim themselves as little to be trusted with the command of large bodies of troops. 674. Distribution of Troops. — Where an army is forced to accept a defensive battle in an open position, which affords no points on which its flanks can rest with security, there is but one disposition of combat open to it, and that is to secure the wings by such an accumulation and distribution of troops upon them that the assail- ant will run a greater risk in an attack on one of them than on the front. The centre in this case will be deployed in the first line, so as to bring all its fire to bear, both direct and cross, over the approaches to it. The troops to sup- port the wings will be massed, so as to be ready to act promptly, as the phases of the action may demand ; and the reserve will occupy a central position in the rear, from which it can promptly be thrown upon any point pressed by the assail- ant. 675. It is in such positions that the formation of the order of battle by squares is resorted to when the assailant is very superior in cavalry. This is done either by a formation of small squares by single battalions, or by resorting to larger ones, as to those formed of four or more battalions. The first have the advantage of be- ing very promptly formed, but they afford hardly more interior space than is wanted for their own staff, leaving whatever cavalry and artillery we have to find shelter between the squares. The large squares demand more complication of ma- 25 290 noeuvre, and more time in their formation, but afford a large interior space, where the caissons of the artillery, and even the cavalry, if in small numbers, may find shelter. In this last disposi- tion some of the artillery would be in battery in front of those angles of the squares where its fires can best sweep the approaches on the two adjacent sides of the square ; other portions will be in the intervals of the squares, so as to tlirow a flank and cross fire over the approaches to them. The sharpshooters may be advanced a little on those angles which are not occupied by the artillery so as to strengthen these weak points. The cavalry, if in sufiicient force to charge opportunely, will take post between the squares, where it will be least exposed to the enemy's artillery, and be ready to seize the pro- per moment for entering into action. CHAPTER X ARMT ORGANIZATION. The word Army is used, in either a general or a particular sense, to designate either the whole, or a part of the armed force of the state, whose duties are confined to the land ; and, in this re- spect, it wants that quality which is essential to a word employed as a definition. To em- brace therefore all that is comprehended un- der the term army, in its general sense, we have to resort to the expressions, the land force, or the military force as distinguished from the naval force. The military force of the United States as at present organized may be represented under the following tabular form. Regular Army, composed of Officers who hold commissions for an indefinite period. Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates who enUst or engage to serve for a definite period. Volunteers, composed of Commissioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, all of whom are enrolled voluntarily only for a definite period. 292 Mtliiia, composed of Commissioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, all persons in the U. S. be- tween the ages of 18 and 45, who, subject to military duty, are enrolled according to law, and required to serve for a definite period. REGULAR ARMY. The regular army comprises the general staff, the staff corps, and the line. General Staff. — Under this head are comprised the general officers, and the officers attached to the departments known as the adjutant generals department, the inspectors general, the quarter- master^s department, the subsistence department, the medical department, the pay department, the judge advocate^ s department, and the signal de- partment. Staff Corps. — These comprise the engineer corps, the topographical engineer corps, and the ordnance corps. lAne. — The infantry, the cavalry, and the artil- lery, are comprised under this head. General Officers. Major Generals. Brigadier Generals. By the Act of July 29, 1861, each Major General is allowed three aides-de-camp to be taken from the Captains or Lieatenants of the army, and each Brigadier General two aides-de-camp to be taken from the Lieutenants of the army. By an Act Ang. 5, 1861, the President is authorized "on the recommendation of any Major General of the regular army of the United States, commanding forces of tho 293 United States in tlie field,'' to appoint, temporarily, at discretion, aides-de-camp with the rank of Ciiptain, Ma- jor, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel. This Act was re- pealed by the Act July 17, 1862, leaving, however, those aides-de-camp appointed under the Act Aug. 5, 1862, in the enjoyment of their rank and offices. Adjutant Generals Department. 1 Adjutant-General with the rank of Briga- dier General, 2 Assistant Adjutants General with the rank of Colonel. 4 Assistant Adjutants General with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. 13 Assistant Adjutants General with the rank of Major. Inspectors General. 3 Inspectors General with the rank of Colo- nel. 5 Assistant Inspectors General with the rank of Major. Judge Advocate's Department 1 Judge Advocate General. 1 Judge Advocate with the rank of Major. By the Act July 17, 1862, a Judge Advocate with the rank of Major is allowed to each army In the held. Signal Officers' Department. 1 Signal Ofi&cer with the rank of Major. Quartermaster's Department. 1 Quartermaster General with the rank of Brigadier General 25* 294 2 Assistant Quartermasters General with the rank of Colonel. 4 Deputy Quartermasters General with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. 12 Quartermasters with the rank of Major. 42 Assistant Quartermasters with the rank of Captain. By the Act Aug. 8, 1861, each Assistant Quartermaster having served 14 years in the grade of Captain is entitled to be promoted to the grade of Major. Ten military storelceepers are attached to the Qnarter- master's department, and as many master wagoners as sergeants, and as many wagoners as corporals, as the President shall direct Subsistence Department, 1 Commissary General with the rank of Colo- nel 1 Assistant Commissary General with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. 6 Commissaries with the rank of Major. 16 Commissaries with the rank of Captain. Medical Department. 1 Surgeon General with the rank of Briga- dier General. 1 Assistant Surgeon General with the rank of Colonel. 1 Medical Inspector General with the rank of Colonel. 8 Medical Inspectors with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. 49 Surgeons with the rank of Major. 14 Assistant Surgeons with the rank of Cap- tain. 100 Assistant Surgeons with the rank of a Lieutenant. 295 By the Aot Ansr. 3, 1861, fifty medical ondots nre anthorii- ed, by the Act May 20, 1862, six medicul storekeepers are autiiorized aud one chaplain to each permanent hob- pluil. One hospHal steward, as sergeant, allowed to each per- manent hospital. Pay Deparvmeni. 1 Paymaster General with the rank of Colo- nel. 2 Deputy Paymasters General with the rank of Lieut. Colonel. 25 Paymasters with the rank of Major. Engineer Corps, 1 Colonel. 4 Lieutenant Colonels. 8 Majors. 12 Captains. 15 First Lieutenants. 15 Second Lieutenants. Topographical Engineer Corps. 1 Colonel. 3 Lieutenant Colonels. 8 Majors. 10 Captains. 13 First Lieutenants. 13 Second Lieutenants. By the Act March 3, 1853, any lieutenant of the engineer, topographical engineer, or ordnance corps, who shall have served continuously for 14 years iu this grade, is entitled to promotion to that of captain. By an Act April 29, 1812, " the military aca- demy shall consist of the corps of engineers " and certain named professors, and the cadets 296 then appointed into the army, or appointed into it in future, " may be attached, at the discretion of the President of the United States, as stu- dents, to the miUtary academy." Ordnance Corp$. 1 Brigadier General 2 Colonels. 2 Lieutenant Colonels. 4 Majors. 12 Captains. 12 First Lieutenants. 12 Second Lieutenants. Engineer Soldiers, Four Companiet. 1 Captain. 1 First Lieutenant. 1 Second Lieutenant. 10 Sergeants. 10 Corporals. 2 Musicians. 64 Privates 1st Class, or Artificers. ^ 64 Privates 2nd Class, or Laborers. c a a o O Topographical Engineer Soldiers, One Company. 1 Captain. 1 First Lieutenant. 1 Second Lieutenant. 10 Sergeants. 10 Corporals. 2 Musicians. 64 Privates 1st Class. ^ 64 Privates 2nd Class. a O 297 Ordnance Soldiers. One ordnance sergeant is allowed to each per- manent military post, and beside these not more than one hundred and fifty enhsted men, as the President may direct. Infantry. This corps consists of nineteen regiments, ten of which, termed the Old Regiments^ are each composed of ten companies ; the remaining nine, termed the New Regiments, are each composed of twenty-four companies, divided into three bat- talions of eight companies each. r iri r Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel. Majors. Adjutant. Keg"t'l Quar. Master. Sergeant Major. Quar. Master Sergeant Principal Musicians. Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel. Majors. Regt'l Adjutant Kegt'l Quar. Master. Drum Major. Principal Musicians. l 1 Captain. 1 First Lieutenant 1 Second Lieutenant. 4 Sergeants. 4 Corporals. 2 Musicians. 42 to 74 PriTates. 1 Major. 8 Captains. 8 First Lieutenants. 8 Second Lieutenants. 1 Battalion Adjutant. 1 Battalion Quar. Master 1 Sergeant Major. 1 Hospital Steward. 1 Captain. 1 First Lieutenant. 1 Second Lieutenant. 1 First Sergeant 4 Sergeants. 8 Corporals. 2 Musicians. .82 I'rirates. 298 Cavalry. Six Regiments of twelve companies eacK 1 Colonel. ■ 1 Captain. 1 Lieutenant Colonel. 1 First Lientenant 3 Majors. 1 Second Lieutenant. 1 Surgeon. 1 Sup. Second Lieutenant. 1 Assistant Sursteon. 1 First Sergeant. 1 Regimental Adjutant. ti. 1 Quar. Master Sergeant. 1 Regt'l Quar. Master. § 1 Commissary Sergeant, 1 Kegt'l Commissary. c- 5 Sergeanta. 1 Sergeant Major. 1 8 Corporals. 1 Quar. Master Sergeant. O 2 Teamsters. 1 Commissary Sergeant. 2 Farriers. 2 Hospital Stewards. 1 Saddler. 1 Saddler Sergeant. 1 Wagoner. 1 Chief Trumpeter 78 Privates. 1 Chief Farrier. L Artillery. Five Regiments. Four One New Organization. Old Organization, Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel. Majors. Adjutant Kegt'l Qaar. Master. Sergeant M^or. 1 1 8 2)1 Quar. Master Sergeant. 2 Captains. First Lieutenants. Second Lieutenants. Companies. 1 Captain. 2 First Lieutenants. 1 Second Lieutenant 4 Sergeants. 4 Corporals, 2 Musicians, 2 Artificers. 42 to 54 PriT&te& 299 "5 1 Captain. 1 Kiist Lieutenant. 1 Second Lieutenant, 1 First Sergeant. ■ 1 Quar. Master 8erge*nt. 4 Sergeants. 8 Corporals. 2 Musicians. 2 Artiflcers. 1 Wagoner. 122 Privates. 1 ColoDftl. ri 1 Lieutenant Colonel. S 3 Majors. a 1 Adjutant. P 1 Kegimental Quar. Mas. g, and Commissary. ^ 1 Sergeant Major. ^ 1 ('ommissary Sergeant. % 2 Principal Musicians. ^ 1 Hospital Steward. ^ 12 Captains. g 12 First Lieutenants. o. 12 Second Lieutenants. S (2 (.12 Companies. O The Adjutants, Quarter Masters and Commissaries of the regiments of the Hue to be taken from Lieutenants of the Ke< giment. VOLUNTEERS. Bj an Act approved by the President, July 22, 1861, the President was authorized to call for volunteers not to exceed 500,000 men, to be organized in such proportions that for each regi- ment of infantry not more than one company of artillery and one company of cavalry be allovred, these companies to be organized as in the regu- lar army. This force, by the same Act, may be divided in- to divisions of three or more brigades, each divi- sion to be commanded by a major general, each brigade to consist of four or more regiments to be commanded by a brigadier general. A major general commanding a division to be allowed three aides-de camp and one assistant adjutant-general, each with the rank of major; a brigadier general to be allowed two aides-de- camp and one assistant adjutant-general, each with the rank of captain ; and one surgeon, one assistant quartermaster and one commissary of subsistence to be also attached to each brigade. By the Act July 25, 1861, the President is authorized to appoint as many major generals 300 and brigadier generals to command the volunteer forces as in his judgment may be requisite. By the same Act the Governors of States are to appoint the Field, Staff and Company officers, and on their failing to do so, these offices to be filled by the President. By an Act Aug. 6, 1861, Governors of States are authorized to fill vacancies occurring in offi- cers of volunteers. By an Act approved July 17, 1862, the Presi- dent may accept 100,000 additional volunteers for nine months, and an additional number for twelve months for filling up the regiments of in- fantry then in service. By the Act July 17, 1862, the President is au- thorized to organize army corps. By the same Act the staff of the commander of an army corps is to consist of three aides-de- camp with the rank of major, and two with the rank of captain ; one assistant adjutant-general, one quartermaster, one commissary of subsist- ence, and one assistant inspector general, each with the rank of lieutenant colonel ; the senior officer of artillery to act as chief of artillery and ordnance. Infantry. f ] Colonel 1 Lieutenant Colonel. 1 Major. 1 Adjutant 1 Quarter Master. 1 Surgeon. 1 Assistant Burgeon. p" 1 Chaplain. g_ 1 Sergeant Major. g 1 Qiiar. Master Sergeant. « 1 Cyinuiissary Sergeant. 1 Hospital Steward 2 I'l'iiicipal Musicians. 10 Captains. 10 First Lieutenants, ,10 Second Lieuten&nta. 1 Captain. 1 First Lieutenant 1 Second Lieutenant 1 First Sergeant. 4 Sergeants. 8 Corporals. 2 Musicians. 1 Wagoner. S2 Privat«a. 301 Engineer Soldiers. By an Act July 17, 1862, volunteer regiments and in pendent companies mustered into the service under orders of tlie President or Secretary of War or comma ing general of a military department, or reorganized t employed as engineers, pioneers, or sappers, are placed same footing as engineer soldiers of the regular army. MILITIA. By the Act July 17, 1862, the President is au- thorized to call forth the mihtia of the States for a term of service not to exceed nine months. By the same act, the enrolment of the militia is made to include all ablebodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five ; and it authorizes the President to make all necessary rules and regulations for enrolling if not provid- ed for by the laws of the States. The militia so called forth to be organized as the volunteers. MIUTART HIERARCHY. Commander-in- Chief. — The President, by the Constitution, is " commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United Statea" Under the same authority he nominates, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoints, and commissions all commia- eioned officers of the regular army. By an Act July 17, 1862, the President is au- thorized " to dismiss and discharge from the military service either in the army, navy, marine corps or volunteer force in the United States service, any officer, for any cause which, in hia 26 302 judgment, either renders such officer unsuitable i for, or whose dismission would promote, the j public service." i. By a Joint Resolution, April 4, 1862, the Pre- / sident is authorized " whenever military opera- tions may require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade, in the same field or department, to assign the command of the forces in such field or department, without regard to seniority of rank." General Officers. — But two classes of this title exist permanently by law, major general and bri- gadier general ; the first being the highest army grade, the second the next highest. Unless otherwise assigned by the President, they take rank and command according to the date of their commissions in their respective grades. The functions of general officers are to com- mand armies or fractions of an army greater thaa a regiment in the field, or to command the mili- tary forces distributed over any district and usu- ally known as a military department. AU the orders and military correspondence affecting their commands emanate from or pass through them if coming from or addressed to higher miU- tary authority. Colonels. — The grade of colonel is next to that of brigadier general Colonels rank and take command according to the dates of their com- missions in this grade. Their functions are to command regiments, being also charged with their administration, good order, and discipline. All orders and military correspondence affijcting their commands emanate from them, or pass through them if from a higher military source. Lieutenant Colonel. — This grade is next to that 303 of colonel. The functions of the lieutenant colo- nel in the economy of the regiment in our ser- vice are very vague during the presence of the colonel, although a tactical position is assigned to the grade. It seems to form an anomaly in almost every service. In that of the English the lieutenant colonel is the actual commander of the regiment, the colonelcy being usually held by some general officer. In France the grade was created first, and then duties for it had to be looked up. Major. — This grade is next to that of lieute- nant colonel. No administrative functions are specifically attached to it except to take charge of the effects of deceased officers. In our nevy regiments of the line a specific command is as- signed to each major. Captain. — The captain ranks next to major. He is the head of the company, vs^hich may be termed the administrative unit, as the battalion is the tactical unit. He is held responsible for the administration, good order and discipline of bis company, and upon the strict performance of these duties depends the character of the army. Lieutenant. — In our service we have the grades of first and second lieutenants and that of brevet second heutenant, the last being conferred alone on cadets, graduates of the military academy, and non-commissioned officers, who, under certain prescribed conditions, pass an examination for this grade before a board of officers. The func- tions of the lieutenant are to assist the captain in his company duties. Cadet. — This grade ranks next to that of bre^ vet second lieutenant, the cadet however not holding a commission like those of the grades 304 above, but a simple warrant or letter of appoint- ment from the President, and he is therefore termed a warrant officer. All cadets at present are attached as students to the military academy. Non- Commissioned Officers. — Sergeant is tlie highest grade of this class and that of corpoial next in rank. . The functions of these grades are to assist the captain and lieutenants in their company duties. Brevet Rank. — Besides the rank to which an officer is entitled from his position in his arm of service, the President has the authority to con- fer upon him, by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate, a superior grade known as a brevet. This grade is conferred for distinguished services of which the President and Senate are the judges. It confers of itself no right to com- mand in accordance with the rank, but the Pre- sident is authorized to assign an officer to a com- mand in accordance with it. It confers a right to precedence in court-martials and of command in detachments composed of troops of several arms. Command of Staff Officers. — Officers of the general staff and of the staff corps cannot assume any command out of their own corps unless as- signed by the President. Pro7notion. — In the Une promotions up to the grade of captain are made by seniority of grade and by regiments, from captain to colonel by corps in the arm to which the officer belongs. General officers are appointed by selection without regard to corps or previous rank. Promotion iu the general staff and staff corps ie conlhied to the corps and is made by seniority of rank. 505 MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. The military administration of the land forces is confided to the general staff of the army; that of any fraction of an army to a particular staff termed an army corps staffs a regimental staffs &;c. Under this head may be comprised the corres- pondence, the quartering, the subsistence, the sanitary arrangements, legal proceedings, and the payment of troops. Correspondence. — This is conducted through the various grades of adjutant-generals, assistant adjutant-generals and adjutants, through whom all orders and other information pass to and from the head of the force to which they are severally attached. Quartering. — Everything connected with lodg- ing troops in garrison or in the field, providing transportation, clothing, fuel and forage for them, is conducted by the various grades of officers and non-commissioned officers belonging to the quar- termaster's department. Subsistence. — The food of the troops is provid- ed by and distributed under the direction of the various grades of officers and non-commissioned ofi&cers of the commissariat. Sanitary Arrangements. — The duties under this head are performed by the officers and enlisted men of the medical staff. Legal Proceedings. — Every thing connected with the proceedings of military legal tribunals is committed to the various grades of judge advo- cate. Payment. — This duty is confided to the various grades of paymasters. 26* PLATES ILLUSTRATE MAHAN'S OUTPOSTS EXPLANATION OF PLATE I. Fig. 1 {Art 234, p. 87.) represents the general disposition of advanced posts of an army corps, A, A, in position. F, F, line of sentinels. E, E, line of out-posts to which the sentinels belong. D, D, grand guards, or supports of out-posts. C, C, line of pickets occupying defensible points to secure the retreat of the grand guards, etc. B, main body of the advanced guard occupying a strong central position on the line of approach to A, A. Figs. 2 and 3 {Art. 317, p. 113.) represent res- pectively the disposition in march of a patrole of fifteen or thirty men. a, leading men of the advanced guard h. c, main body of the patrole about 150 paces in rear of a. e, flankers. dj rear guard about 100 paces in rear of c. Fig. 14 {A7-t. 430, p. 159.) represents a position taken up at night by a train with its escort on a small island traversed by the main road on which the convoy is moving. A, train packed with a detachment c on each flank for its immediate police. 6, b, cavalry out-posts and sentinels posted in advance of the bridges leading to the island with infantry supports a in their rear. B, main body of the escort composed of infan- try with detachments of cavalry on its flanks, and the artillery in the rear, posted on the most acces- sible point of approach. s c ca B A r- I on each flank, and throTvs ou» sentinels along the outskirts of the Tillage. These are supporte( by a grand guard ofinfantry at E, on the road at the outlet of the village. To guard the approach by the road L, an out-post of cavalry is placed at H ", and throw forward vedettes on the right; this post is supported by a grand guard of infantry E'" whicl occupies the enclosure of the cemetery, « The bridge across the stream M is enfiladed by two guns with infantry supports on theh flanks The reserve D, consisting of a picket of cavalry and infantry of sufficient strength to suppor the out-posts and grand guards, is placed in a suitable position to the rear of the bridge. EXPLANATION OP PLATE IL Fig. 4 {Art. 247, p. 91.) represents a disposition of advanced posts to guard a position taken up, by a detachment A of infantry, cavalry, and artil- lery, on ground diversified with the various natu- ral features, and with villages and farm enclosures ou the avenues of approach to A which will afford temporary cover for troops. The main approach to A is by the roads which traverse the village B, in front, and cross the small stream M, which has its source in the pond N, by a stone bridge. On the right is a marsh Q, which is impassable, the ground between it and the ridge on the left of the pond N and in advance, being unobstructed and favorable to the action of cavalry. The approaches to the flanks of A, by the roads K on the left, and L on the right, being supposed out of the hne of approach of any con- siderable body of the enemy, and requiring there- fore only a patrole along each of them. From the character of the ground in advance of the village B and the pond N, the out-posts will be of cavalry, and these will be posted in the positions H, H, at the proper distance in the rear of their chain of vedettes P, posted along the ridge extending between the village and pond. The strength of each out-post will be determined by the number of vedettes which it throws for- ward. A similar disposition H will be made along the ridge on the left of the pond. To support these as well as a cavalry post H, at the farm enclosure R to patrole over and watch the road K, grand guards of infantry E, E" are posted at the enclosures G- and I. To guard the approach to the village B an infantry out-post F is placed Q 2 7 9 9 s>' Q :? ''i 2 2 2 2? ".^v. .::: -.no h-^ ^ f 2? o>' 1" Ui r ^^oggg^^ V 9 g 9. \&'l on each flank, and throws ou* sentinels along the outsVJt; by a grand guard of infantry at E, on the road at the oi To guard the approach by the road L, an out-post c forward vedettes on the right ; this post is supported 1: occupies the enclosure of the cemetery. ^ The bridge across the stream M is enfiladed by two g|s The reserve D, consisting of a picket of cavalry and the out-posts and grand guards, is placed in a suitable fiii 2 ^',9.2^ e ofJIi'Ies of the village. These are supported , of the village. ivalry is placed at H ", and throws , grand guard of infantry E'" w^hich with infantry supports on their flanks, itry of sufiBcient strength to support ion to the rear of the bridge. Fig.5. At* Fisr. 3^/ i « *i**i**i^ ^i^ .A 1 r,£ * ji * vK ^ f EXPLANATION OF PI.A'J*ii; III. Fig. 5 {Art. 275, p. 98.) shows the disposition of the troops composing tlie head, or leading detachment of an advanced guard marching over ground comparatively unobstructed. A, leading file of the staff officers' escort. B, staff officer. C, remainder of escort. D, D, line of cavalry in dispersed order. E, E, supports of D, D, composed of sections of six or eight cavalry with a non-commissioned officer to each section. F, detachment of twenty cavalry under an officer for patrolUng on either flank. G, Gr, reserves of the lines D and E of thirty cavalry each under an officer, each preceded by a file to connect with E. I, I, flankers of G, G. J, two companies of cavalry and three of infantry L forming the main reserve of the head. Three horsemen K preserve the connection be- tween J and L. A', main body of advanced guard. Fig. 6 {Art. 285, p. 101.) shows the disposition of a column in march to the rear. A, A, regiment of infantry. B, battery of twelve-pounder guns. C, regiments of cavalry. E, battery of six-pounder guns with two com- panies D of infantry as supports. F, battery of six-pounder guns. N, N, closing Hne of cavalry in dispersed order supported on each flank by one company M of infantry, one company L of cavalry, and a reserve of four companies of cavalry on the centre. K, patrol of cavalry on the flank in the direc- tion of the enemy. px:iir. I^*».*M M Fig:?. > (y. d. AJl 1 -»- , c , AJ: C B_ \ B ^T,n-_B' B_ B' '^ — B' B= B — J.' = i =e'/ Dl E = d i H a r = •a iSr'i E = cs; F = b= H= 1 = H = =1' C3 = l'= §K' -i5 _ _ J 115 y K= = !•' is K = L'= =M' 1.= ■"■~~%.-' 1,= N= M= N Cf, the twelve and six-poimder guns. b, two squadrons. H, I, K, L, regiments. il, battery of six-pounder guns. N, two squadrons. 0, rear-guard of cavalry. The letters B', C, D' etc., sho%v the dispositions of deployment ( 1 the right. EXPLANATION OP PLATE IV. Fig. 7 (Art. 275, p. 98.) shows the disposition, in order of march and of battle, of the main body of an advanced guard in an open country ; the disposition in march of the head, or leading de- tachment of which is shown in Fig. 5, /V. IJI. The whole force is supposed to consist of ten squadrons of cavalry, three field batteries, and six regiments of infantry. A, leading detachment disposed as in Fig. 5, PI. Ill B, B, four squadrons. C, battery of six-pounder guns. These troops are thrown between A and the main body as a support to A. D, four squadrons. E, regiment. F, four companies of rifles. G, regiment. H, two batteries, one of six-pounders and one of twelve-pounders. I, K, L, M, regiments. N, small rear-guard of cavalry. B', C, B', show the disposition of B, C, B, in order of battle. D', E', etc., the corresponding dispositions of D, E, etc. Fig. 8 shows the dispositions in order of march and deployment of the same body in obstructed ground. B, B, one regiment of infantry. C, battery. D, two squadrons. These as before form the support of A. E, four companies of rifles. A J: Fi^.7. A. 1 i E_ B= B C JB D I>= E'= ==/ EG-' E: ee d i H a T: ii : G= H. I'= =K' HI l'= =m' I : L M M= N 1 F, one regiment. G, tlie twelve and six-pounder guns, b, two squadrons. H, I, K, L, regiments. i[, battery of six-pounder guns. N, two squadrons. O, rear-guard of cavalry. The letters B', C, D' etc., show the dispositions of de .PL. TV. : V. disposition three regi- ivahy, and ground of on the left fipanies of ers. The 'alrj, and ^ns; one, ik; with oports of , divided and one, IS a sup- npanies. try and orm the on the rj; the having e main etween V, BB. rto A, at on the right. ensive etreat, iiJff in 0, to The e one ching T and pany of cavalry is deployed on the left to the rear. Havinc; made these dispositions, t akirmishera push forward, keepinp; up a warm 6re on the enemy. At a suitable moment, t reserves on each flank of the Une attack rapidly, with the bayonet, the enemy on both flan! If he retire the cavalry will endeavor to throw themselves on his rear at h, whilst a detachme of skirmishers throws itself forward at a, behind the height, to occupy him, and the reserv press upon him to gain the bridge, thus keeping the retreating body between themselves aj their supports on the other side of the bridge. Should the attack fail, the company of cavalry forms in line at 6, to cover the retreat of t infantry. . . EXPLANATION OF PLATE Y. Fig. 9 {Art. 336, p. 119.) shows the disposition in march of a detachment composed of three regi- ments of infantry, five companies of cavahy, and a half battery of six-pounder guns, over ground of an ordinary character, but more open on the left than on the right flank. One regiment of infantry and two companies of cavalry form advanced guard and flankers. The head of the advanced guard is of cavalry, and consist of a leading file, a, of three sections ; one, 6, in the centre, and one, c c, on each flank ; with a support, c?, of one platoon. The supports of the head are one company of infantry, divided into three sections, one, e, in the centre, and one, //, on each flank, and one company, g, as a sup- port. The main reserve, A, of six companies. The remaining two companies of infantry and the one of cavalry, divided into sections, form the flankers. The sections, n n, of infantry, on the right flank, having supports, 1 1, of cavalry ; the sections, k k, of cavalry, on the left flank, having supports, i i, of infantry. The three companies of cavalry, A, of the main body lead, followed by the half battery between them and the two regiments of infantry, B B. A small rear guard, o, of cavalry belonging to A, closes the column of march. Fig. 10 (Art. 285, p. 101.) shows the defensive dispositions of the column, in march in retreat, as represented in Fig. 6, PL III., in moving in the presence of the enemy, from the point C, to gain the position U, beyond the woods Z. The hue of retreat is along the two roails, the one leading directly from C to U ; the other branching ofl" to the right, and traversing the villages and EXPLANATION OF PLATE V. S, bordering the pond on the right. The right flank of the march is supposed to be covered from an attack by the two ponds ; the left alone being exposed from the open character of the country between C and U. The first defensive position taken up is along the skirts of the woods, X, up to which the ground rises from the pond and the brook run- ning into the head of it, and the following dispo- sition made of the troops. C, the rear regiment of cavalry to rally the line of skirmishers and their supports which close the column of march. A, B, one battery of field guns, on the rising ground, and on each side of the road. D, a regiment of infantry, deployed on the right of the guns and concealed by tho wood, from which skirmishers are thrown out along the margin of the brook. E, a regiment of infantry in column, on the left of the guns, and masked by the houses near them to cover the retreat of the guns. F, two regiments take post at this point, drawn up in column on the two roads, with a half bat- tery of the six-pounder guns. Gr, the two companies of infantry take post in the village at G, which is hastily put in a defen- sive state. H, the forward regiment of cavalry deploys on the open ground on the main road. M, two regiments of infantry with the other half battery of six-po'mder guns. • K, the battery of twelve-pounder guns to cover the movements in retreat from F and M, to the next position, K. In retiring from this first position on the second EXPLANATION OF PLATE V. at K, which is favorable for the defensive, the following dispositions are made. The cavalry at C retreats along the road to the right, and takes post at L, to cover the move- ments of the regiments at F, in their retreat on K. The artillery at A B, retires along the main road to a, with the same object. The regiments D and E retire alternately on F. The half batteries at E and M pass through the village and take position at N. The whole of the regiments retire through the village and over the ground between it and the main road to K. To cover the retreat from K the artillery will quit the position a, so soon as the rear guard has neared the village G, and will take post at R. The skirts of the wood and the walled enclosure at T will be strongly occupied by infantry. The retreat of the main body from K will be com- menced by sending first the battery of twelve- pounders to the rear to U ; retiring the other field guns by half batteries ; the infantry by alternate regiments; the cavalry covering this movement, and retiring last, under the support of the infantry holding the skirts of the wood. Fig. 13 {Art. 375, p. 138.) shows the disposi- tions for the attack of a post taken up by the enemy on a rising ground to cover a bridge in its rear. The attack is made by eight companies of infantry, and one of cavalry. The enemy being supposed to have occupied by skirmishers the skirts of a wood at the foot of the hill, two of the eight companies are thiown out as skirmishers, and are supported by the other six formed in column on each flank. The com- flan an . exp bet a the gro nin sitii C of I coll I gro rigl froi ma ] left the ] up ter ( the siv ] the hal the ne: pany of cavalry is deployed on the L skirmishers push forward, keepino; up i reserves on each flank of the line attacl If he retire the cavalry will endeavor to of skirmishers throws itself forward at press upon him to train the bridge, thus their supports on the other side of tlie - Should the attack fail, the company i infantry. tl:^ ilto the rear. Having made these dispositions, the 1 irm fire on the enemy. At a suitable moment, the : bidly, with the bayonet, the enemy on both flanks. ibvv themselves on his rear at 6, whilst a detachment libehind the height, to occupy him, and the reserves lj;ping the retreating body between themselves and ir|a:e. [[ivalry forms in line at 6, to cover the retreat of the EXPLANATION OP PLATE VI. Fig. 11 {Art. 356, p. 132.) shows the disposi- tions made to defend a bridge. At the outlet, towards the enemy, there is a saw mill with a walled enclosure in advance of which stretches a small grove. Beliind the bridge is a ridge along A, i. The detachment for the defence consists of one regiment of infantry; two companies of rifles ; two squadrons ; and two six-pounder guns. One company of cavalry will patrole beyond the grove towards the enemy. One company of rifles a wiU be posted under cover in the centre of the grove, and a half company on each flank at 6 and c. Two companies of infantry take post at d in the centre, and one on each flank at e and / aa supports to the rifles : the enclosure will be held by a post. The two guns are placed at 300 paces in rear of the bridge to enfilade it. Two compa- nies are posted at h and i on each side of the hedge as skirmishers, they are supported by the remaining companies in column at m; and the remainder of the cavalry is posted to the rear at n in a favorable position to cover a retreat. Fig. 12 {Art. 345, p. 128.) shows tire defensive dispositions made by a detachment consisting of three regiments of infantry, six squadrons, and a battery of six-pounders, to hold an enemy in check for several hours arriving from Y towards the village X. At Y there is a small village through which the main road to X passes; the road traverses the brook S R, which discharges into the pond P on the left ; this brook receives a smaller one near /; the ground between the brooks and Y is gen- tly undulating and interspersed with small groves. EJtPLANATIOlT OF PLATE VI. Between the brook and the village, the ground rises so as to overlook tlie portion towards Y. Between the pond and village lies a wet meadow. The main body takes position on the heights along A, B. A half battery takes position at a, with its support of infantry, from 4 to 600 paces in rear of the bridge to enfilade it; the other half battery in the rear at k. The main portion of cavalry at m on the right flank ; a small detach- ment of it at c on the left flank. The wood &kirt- ing the brook S R is occupied by skirmishers, their supports being beyond it on the right and left of the road, A detachment of cavalry at g patroles on the right. The bridges at n and o are guarded and patroles pushed out on the lell. In front, skirmishers are placed at T along the brook from i to// a small post of cavalry at Y to patrole in advance ; a posv of cavalry and infantry at h to watch the woods and roads on the left; and one of cavalry in the wood on the right at d to patrole towards the right. At night the exterior posts are drawn in and join the post at T behind the brook. If attacked and forced to retreat, the infantry and artiUery will retire by alternate half batteries and regiments to the position p, r, s, t behind the small brook running to the meadow at M ; the cavalry on the right flank. In the retreat through the village and around it, the ditches across the meadow can be disputed by skirmishers, as well as the outskirts of the village, these will be sup- ported by a regiment in column occupying the open square in the centre. If the ground is favor- able for cavalry on the right of the village, it will be taken advantage of for a flank attack on tho enemy. FZ.VT. A •- - t «f' V =^ J^^ Pt. M B ' — ^';^ — * 9. ;N ^M' :*^/ /"^ p ^ B -1^ /Y. vjr. T^p'./r. I I N\ i ft4.i3n: ■ I PL IX. f i^K-X^ o k f8 CH> Lin* oj Battle oj Ate&iled C A jj' » 't=^ yd ■" ^•'■a-v- s ^ ass a^ s* I* galled PL.JHL ^^ / .^ Reterye/ /'""; I — -^ da ^ "*■-■ f'-i;^ *^\ s .^ I ^ I r- o e "T 'I '^ GENERAL LIBRARY UCBEBKEUY UX. BERKELEY LIBRARIES^ cosHaofi^'^s