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 By 
 
 Oswald Garrison Villard 
 
 * t 
 
 President New York Evening Post Company 
 
 A Series of Eight Articles Reprinted 
 from The New York Evening Post 
 
 Copyright 1915 
 
 Price 10 Cents 
 
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Introduction 
 
 HE following articles, written for the New York Evening Post, are 
 an effort to show, first, the lack of any necessity for the extensive 
 military and naval programme urged by the President of the 
 United States, and secondly, that, unless a radical reform and over- 
 hauling of the army take place before any increase is made, the 
 tax-payer will have less assurance than ever that he will receive 
 his money's worth in military efficiency. Creating an army means some- 
 thing more than adding men or guns. In the articles that follow, facts are 
 given as to the conditions in the army and navy which every American ought to 
 know before he makes up his mind as to whether we need to enlarge our arma- 
 ments, and what is needed if the policy of army increase is determined upon. Since 
 these articles were written, Congressman Kitchin has given his word to the public, 
 as a member of the House Naval Committee of years' standing, that our navy is 
 twice as effective as the Japanese, and considerably more effective than the Ger- 
 man. In fact, he quotes three of the highest authorities, Admiral Fletcher, Rear- 
 Admiral Badger, and Admiral Winterhalter, all of whom testify that they would 
 not have any fear in pitting the American navy against the German. He has fur- 
 ther testified that in his judgment, if this programme goes through, it will no longer 
 be a question of wondering whether we may become a great militaristic and na- 
 valistic power, but of recognizing that we have become one. Surely this alone, from 
 a man of Congressman Kitchin's high standing as leader of the Democrats in the 
 House of Representatives, ought to give the nation pause — at least until the Euro- 
 pean war is over. O. G. V. 
 
 LIST OF ARTICLES 
 
 Page. 
 
 Preparedness — For What? 3 
 
 What Is the Matter with the Army? 5 
 
 The Present Military Foundation 8 
 
 Some Obstacles to Efficiency in the Army 10 
 
 Land Defences of Our Coasts 12 
 
 Shall We Pay the Militia? 11 
 
 Why Civilian- Control of the Navy 16 
 
 The Real Reform and the Real Problem, 18 
 
 '•'••••" ' •' : SPECIAL NOTICE 
 
 Additional copies of this pamphlet will be mailed for 10 cents each to any ad- 
 dress. Quantity prices on application to The New York Evening Post, 20 Vesey 
 Street, New York. 
 
THE 
 
 Question of Preparedness 
 
 PREPAREDNESS-FOR WHAT? 
 
 Shall We Reverse Our Historic Policy of a Small Army Without Re- 
 serves ?_Need of Denning Terms— Why All This Sudden Hysteria? 
 —Enormous Difficulties of Invasion by Any Foreign Power 
 
 IT IS CONCEDED that a sudden burst 
 of fear and anxiety as a result of the 
 European war will probably In- 
 duce the coming Congress, under Mr. 
 Wilson's guidance, to reverse our historic 
 policy of a small army without reserves 
 and to provide a still larger fleet. If this 
 - the possibility or probability, the tax- 
 yers, who will have an enormous an- 
 al bill to pay, and the masses of our 
 ople generally, upon whose welfare the 
 ■v departure will have such a far- 
 ichlng effect, should Insist upon the 
 lng down of certain national policies 
 er the most careful debate and dis- 
 3sion, and above all upon the definition 
 if many words and phrases relating to 
 1 armament now so loosely used. 
 
 Many politicians are solemnly rising 
 assure us that they believe In "rea- 
 s ;iable preparedness," a phrase that no 
 one can define, certainly not to suit the 
 advocates of large armies and navies any 
 more than a "reasonable tariff" could be 
 imed to suit both the protectionists 
 ■-hose pockets are lined by tariffs and the 
 nerican people from whose pockets the 
 \-idends are drawn. Newspapers with- 
 out number are also declaring that they 
 favor "reasonable preparedness" without, 
 however, the slightest effort to define 
 .'use words for their readers. Some of 
 (hem assure us that "reasonable prepar- 
 less" does not mean militarism, but If 
 l offered them untold sums they could 
 not draw for you the line which divides 
 ■ illtary preparedness from militarism. 
 Tjiey do not know whether 250,000 regu- 
 ' rs are one side of the line and 300,000 
 the other; they cannot tell you If they 
 uld just when a military caste becomes 
 c nenace to a nation. They admit that 
 it can be; they admit that In dealing 
 -,h any militarism a nation handles the 
 5sible seeds of evil — our forefathers, 
 who were familiar with British militar- 
 ism, wished no Inoculation of the virus 
 no matter how diluted the dose. 
 
 They fall back, If hard pressed, upon 
 
 l military experts, but here they are 
 
 on still less stable ground because no 
 
 3 1 :en officers can be got to agree on any 
 
 given proposal, and If they could be made 
 to agree, they would not "stay put" be- 
 cause they would steadily be adding to 
 the number of our possible or potential 
 enemies and to the strength of each of 
 those enemies, precisely as the British 
 naval officers have shifted their ground 
 In the last sixty years. Thus the latter 
 long held that they must have the largest 
 navy In the world to defeat any other 
 single navy. Then they decided upon the 
 historic "two-power standard," that Is, 
 one lar&e enough to defeat simultane- 
 ously the two navies next strongest. This 
 was the accepted policy, but just prior 
 to the present war proposals were seri- 
 ously made In naval circles that there 
 be a three-power standard In order to 
 take care at one and the same time of 
 the German. French, and United States 
 navies, the menacing growth of the last- 
 named being avowedly the reason for 
 this fresh demand upon the wealth of 
 the British people. 
 
 WHAT IS "REASONABLE PREPAREDNESS"? 
 
 If "reasonable preparedness" Is to be 
 defined, there must first be a decision on 
 certain far-reaching national policies. 
 Thus: [Are we to prepare merely for the 
 defence of our shores or are we to adopt 
 the military theory that often the best 
 way to defend one's territory is to take 
 the offensive and attack the other fellow 
 upon his? This has been, as the present 
 war has shown, the favorite theory of the 
 German General Staff, which is still very 
 proud of the fact that, barring Russian 
 Incursions Into East Prussia, all the 
 fighting has been on their enemies' ter- 
 ritory In a war which every German is 
 convinced Is purely a defensive enter- 
 prise. If we are to pay the Germans 
 the compliment of imitating them in this, 
 as we are going to Imitate them in many 
 other waysllf Mr. Garrison's plans are 
 adopted, it means that we must have a 
 far larger armada than for purely home 
 defensive purposes. We must have ocean- 
 crossing submarines, we must have hos- 
 pital ships, and endless other auxiliaries, 
 such as mine-laying vessels, "mother" 
 
 craft for submarines and hydroaero 
 
 322515 
 
 planes, floating machine-shops for re- 
 pairs, floating docks to be towed abroad 
 as the British have towed theirs to the 
 .33gean, and colliers by the hundred. The 
 183 war-vessels Mr. Daniels calls for 
 would by no means meet the need. For 
 if we send a fleet to defeat the Germans 
 and to blockade Germany, vast quantities 
 of coal and oil must be transported from 
 the United States and transferred at 
 sea, for there will be no friendly shelter 
 In which to provision or repair or coal, 
 and ordinary merchant vessels cannot be 
 equipped with coal-transferring appara- 
 tus over-night. All of these problems 
 become more Intensive if the objective Is 
 Japan; and the Philippines — a great 
 source of military weakness — would 
 probably help us not at all. 
 
 Again, the question of a two-power or 
 a three-power navy at once obtrudes It- 
 self, If we decide upon an offensive fleet. 
 Already naval officers declare the Pana- 
 ma Canal not the great help It was ex- 
 pected to be, but a source of weakness, 
 since it makes easy the splitting of the 
 fleet. And it has a habit of being 
 blocked. They, therefore, demand a Pa- 
 cific fleet as great as the 'Atlantic one, 
 and they want it all the more since, as 
 any one can see who wishes to dream 
 dreams and speculate as to the future, a 
 joint combination of Japan and Germanv 
 against us Is quite within the range of 
 possibility after the present hatreds havo 
 died out. Nothing Is impossible in view 
 of what has happened in Europe, they 
 say, and, therefore, we ought to prepare 
 against every possible contingency. Is 
 not China likely to arm now against us 
 and Japan? At any rate, should we be 
 any the less forehanded than the Brit- 
 ish? The enthusiasts of the Navy 
 League, who are demanding an Immedi- 
 ate bond Issue of $500,000,000 to be spent 
 on the navy alone, feel that we ought 
 to arm against Great Britain, and have a 
 navy larger than hers, no matter to what 
 "power standard" she should go. They 
 want, in their own words, a navy "capable 
 of meeting any possible force from across 
 the seas," 1. e., a navy equal to that of 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 T'r»ncc ; Germany, and England com- 
 bined. And of course, If we are to arm 
 against the British fleet, we must arm 
 against Canada and fortify the boundary 
 of whose defencelessness for a century 
 we have been so proud. 
 
 Then there is the question of commerce — 
 its destruction and protection. The United 
 States, being practically a self-support- 
 ing nation, could behold with compara- 
 tive equanimity all its merchant navy, 
 none too large, blockaded in its own or 
 neutral harbors. But naval officers do not 
 like to contemplate this. Shall we not 
 imitate the glorious careers of the Emden 
 and the Karlsruhe? Is there any better 
 way of protecting your own ships than 
 by driving those of the other nations o* 1 
 the seas? Hence for our offensive navy 
 we must at once create ocean-going sub- 
 mersibles, with an enormous cruising ra- 
 dius, particularly as we have taken the 
 first step in that direction by authorizing 
 the "fleet-submarine." 
 
 THE SIMPLER PROBLEM. 
 
 If, on the other hand, it is decided 
 never to contemplate anything beyond 
 a defensive navy, the officers admit that 
 the problem is immediately simplified. 
 They confess that much cheaper and 
 smaller submarines and more of them 
 can be constructed; that the huge auxil- 
 iary flotilla could be largely eliminated 
 and the monitor type of coast-defence 
 vessel, like those built for the Brazilian 
 navy, which the British have found most 
 useful on the shallow Belgian coast, can 
 be greatly developed. The problem of mine 
 fields could then be studied in coBpera- 
 tion with our land coast-defence forces, 
 and the latter taken into account in the 
 development of any purely naval-defence 
 problem, particularly as our coast de- 
 fences are considered impregnable by 
 our leading ordnance and coast-artillery 
 officers. The value of coast defences 
 would seem to have been amply demon- 
 strated in this war; the coast defences in 
 the Dardanelles and along the Belgian 
 coast have quite held their own in the 
 contest with the floating gun. The Brit- 
 ish have not been able to land troops 
 on the Belgian coast, despite the ef- 
 ficiency of their monitors. The question, 
 then, would seem to be whether we have 
 not a large enough fleet to make up the 
 deficiencies, if any, in our coast defences, 
 provided that we adopt as a fixed nation- 
 al policy the theory that we shall not 
 send them abroad to wage war under 
 any conceivable circumstances. 
 
 There was a time, and not so very long 
 ago, when our military experts were cer- 
 tain that we could protect our coasts 
 without any navy at all. This was the 
 belief of the Endicott Fortifications 
 Board, which drew up the present plan 
 of our coast defences in the days before 
 we had any navy worth speaking of. 
 They undertook to do this for a compara- 
 tively small sum. Since that time we 
 have spent $175,973,699.13, so that we 
 ought to have something for our money. 
 
 WHY ALL THE HYSTERIA? 
 
 After the questions of policy are de- 
 cided, would it not pay Congress and 
 the American people to Inquire calmly 
 and quietly — and not in the stress of 
 emotion of a world war — whether the 
 present coast defences for which the 
 builders vouch so unqualifiedly are not 
 
 enough in connection with a large fleet 
 of submarines to let us sleep o' nights? 
 
 The question is the more pertinent 
 because no writer who favors greater 
 preparedness seems to have any faith 
 whatever in our present navy. If I were 
 a naval officer, I should be deeply hu- 
 miliated by the fact that every one of 
 the dozens upon dozens of articles that 
 I have read which explain why it is 
 necessary that we should have a mobile 
 army with reserves of no less than 500,- 
 
 000 men to stand behind our coast de- 
 fences and to prevent the enemy from 
 landing at Atlantic City or Montauk 
 Point begins by taking it for gran'ed that 
 the fleet will be overwhelmingly defeated. 
 
 1 have heard learned Admirals make 
 after-dinner speeches which began with 
 the assumption — or the admission, if you 
 please— that in :iuy engagement our 
 fleet in Its present numbers would bf 
 smashed and sunk. They seem to 
 have no confidence in themselves or their 
 vessels unless they are given a com- 
 plete preponderance in numbers. They 
 have no belief in the possibility of a 
 superior skill and morale to offset small- 
 er forces. 
 
 So the civilian writers, even in the 
 days before it was popular to run down 
 the navy and to accuse Secretary Dan- 
 iels of every crime In the category, in- 
 cluding all the sins of omission and com- 
 mission of all his predecessors, have no 
 doubts whatever as to what will happen 
 to our fleet in any possible action. To 
 them, forsooth, any battle spells defeat, 
 overwhelming, disastrous, complete defeat. 
 They do not leave us even half a dozen 
 submarines after it with which to harass 
 any hostile fleet and the enormous ag- 
 gregation of hostile transports and aux- 
 iliaries which will be necessary for any 
 elaborate expedition against our shores, 
 particularly if it should be a joint mili- 
 tary and naval one. In all our military 
 arguments we start on the theory and 
 assumption that the worst conceivable is 
 bound to happen; our fleet to the last 
 destroyer and submarine goes down, and 
 the enemy then chooses in all delibera- 
 tion certain points well known to the 
 magazine writers on our next wars, and 
 the disembarkation takes place without 
 the slightest molestation. 
 
 ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES OF INVASION. 
 These writers are in no wise con- 
 cerned with the fact that it Is only with 
 great difficulty that a landing of all the 
 multifarious equipment of a modern 
 army could take place anywhere with- 
 out docks; that 42-centimetre guns, or 
 even those considerably smaller, can- 
 not be put ashore at Montauk with- 
 out pontoons, lighters, cranes of great 
 capacity, etc. One cannot land the mod- 
 ern field gun strapped across the bows 
 of a couple of steam launches; but If 
 one could, the process for a large army 
 would be interminable. Certainly no for- 
 eign general in his senses would seek 
 as his base a little harbor remote from 
 a railroad which could not contain any- 
 thing more than a fraction of the mighty 
 armada an Invading force must brlng 
 with It. Still less would he dream of 
 landing on the open beach. It is true 
 that Admiral Fletcher, when asked by 
 a Congressional committee last winter 
 whether an enemy could land on such a 
 
 shore as that between Norfolk and Port 
 Royal, where there are no anchorages 
 for deep-draught battleships or any other 
 craft, and a surf which so often becomes 
 impossible In stormy weather for the 
 stanchest lifeboats, replied that such a 
 landing could be made. 
 
 Unfortunately no Congressman asked 
 Admiral Fletcher what would happen to 
 the people who landed, or how long they 
 could keep In touch with their fleet, and 
 how secure a base and uource of supplies 
 a fleet off the beach landing every round 
 of rifle ammunition through the surf 
 would be. Some of our Civil War vet- 
 erans who spent three years rolling in 
 the seas off those coasts in the blockad- 
 ing squadrons and tried so hard to stay 
 at their posts in all weathers, could tell 
 some interesting things about life under 
 those conditions. Our commanding offi- 
 cers at Daiquiri in 1898, when we landed 
 our troops on the beach, could also tell 
 some stimulating facts about their own 
 anxieties lest the transport fleet be scat- 
 tered In every direction by a West Indian 
 hurricane. Yet that was a trifling un- 
 dertaking compared to any possible in- 
 vasion of the United Stages. Gen. Shat- 
 ter's army, for instance, had only 75 cav- 
 alry horses with it, and. of course, no 
 heavy siege guns, aeroplanes, motor 
 transportation, etc. 
 
 Merely to state the problems shows in- 
 to what endless fields of speculation and 
 of mere personal opinion one may be led. 
 With all respect for Admiral Fletcher, 
 his views — whatever they may prove in 
 detail to be — can doubtless be offset by 
 many other military opinions. Moreover, 
 when it comes to guessing upon such 
 matters as these a civilian opinion may 
 be just as valuable as a military, cer- 
 tainly on the question of the transporta- 
 tion problem. One may doubt, however, 
 whether Admiral Fletcher would deny 
 the recent statement (New York Times, 
 \ugust 21, 1915) of Capt Charles E. Kil- 
 bourne, of the Army General Staff, that 
 no frontal attack by a fleet upon coast 
 fortifications has ever been successful in 
 modern times, Captain Kilbourne describ- 
 ing the naval attack on the Dardanelles 
 as a "hopeless failure," as was the di- 
 rect assault on Port Arthur by the Japa- 
 nese ships. To this he might have added 
 that even if the German fleet were out 
 of the way the British navy would never 
 dare to attack the German coast forti- 
 fications, protected as they are by mine 
 fields, by the most treacherous shoals 
 through which the most experienced 
 pilot would take no ship if all the buoys 
 and marks were removed, and the light- 
 houses extinguished. All of which 
 merely reinforces the point already made 
 that before any action towards further 
 militarism is taken by the public the 
 public should know precisely what our 
 military problems are and what our real 
 dangers. This knowledge should not be 
 confined to the Army General Staff or to 
 the Navy War College because those ex- 
 perts are bound to take counsel of fh 
 worst fears; they see darkly at all tim 
 and, like all other military men the world 
 over, never could be given enough men 
 or ships or fortifications to satisfy the; 
 If they could be thus satisfied, they won 
 be unique in the history of militarisi 
 If it is true, as Mr. Henry A. Wise Woi . 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 asserts, that there are documents In the 
 War Department proving that 750.000 
 men could be landed on our Atlantic 
 Coast In forty-six days, and 350,000 on 
 our Pacific Coast in sixty-one days, both 
 armies with sufficient supplies for three 
 months, then the public ought to know 
 it, for that involves again the admission 
 that our fleet is of no value whatever 
 and that our coast defences are not 
 worth the vast sums spent upon them 
 since we began to modernize them in 
 1884. 
 
 QUESTIONS TO BE SETTLED. 
 
 And then the public should be told 
 whether besides the fleet the army must 
 be raised to a three-power standard, that 
 is, to a size capable of meeting the sup- 
 posititious maximum fleet and landing 
 forces of England, Germany, and France. 
 This knowledge is very important, not 
 only for Americans, but for the rest of 
 the world. For if we plunge into arma- 
 ment on any considerable scale it will 
 mean that the foreign countries will be- 
 gin to count us in on their two- or 
 three-power plan, provided always that 
 the peace to come in Europe does not do 
 away with the whole abominable and 
 wicked system of armament with its 
 frightful injustice to the working classes, 
 
 upon whose bowed backs it binds such 
 monstrous burdens. Proof of this is the 
 discussion in the British Parliament and 
 the Reichstag in recent years of the ne- 
 cessity of increasing the British and Ger- 
 man fleets because of the growing peril 
 from the American. The announcement 
 that the United States had definitely de- 
 cided on a policy, namely that of building 
 a purely defensive navy, and of putting 
 complete faith for defence in that and 
 our unsurpassed coast defences, would 
 at least free the European nations from 
 the fear of aggression by us. just as the 
 adoption by us of the reverse policy 
 would cause the European war lords to 
 take due notice and give them the excuse 
 to wring more millions out. of their op- 
 pressed subjects, and to draft more of 
 them for the unholy profession of arms.* 
 For the United States there is still an- 
 other decision possible: that we cling to 
 our historic policy of being unarmed; 
 that we go along as heretofore keeping 
 free from the European entanglements in 
 
 ♦Since the above was written, Lord Rosebery, 
 the English statesman, has publicly said: "I 
 know nothing more disheartening than the an- 
 nouncement recently made that the United States 
 — the one great country left in the world free 
 from the hideous, bloody burden of war — is about 
 to embark upon the building of a huge armada 
 destiued to be equal or second to our own." 
 
 accordance with Washington's solemn 
 admonition; that we instruct our Admin- 
 istrations to pursue the most pacific of 
 policies, as President Wilson has but 
 lately shown anew the power of the 
 moral influence and the ideals of this na- 
 tion to see us through a most difficult 
 situation, and that we preserve our 
 wealth for other and infinitely more val- 
 uable expenditures. For it must be clear- 
 ly understood that, if we adopt either 
 one of the other policies, we must at the 
 smallest possible estimate increase our 
 military expenditures to more than 
 $1,000,000,000 during the next five 
 years. To-day we spend, for military 
 purposes, with pensions, 74 cents out of 
 every $1 appropriated by Congress. We 
 shall not only have to raise this figure to 
 90 cents, but vastly increase the number of 
 dollars. Billion-and-a-half Congresses 
 will be a matter of course. The income 
 tax must go up and so must indirect tax- 
 es of every kind. We must also be pre- 
 pared to starve education, the conserva- 
 tion of national resources, the develop- 
 ment of rivers and harbors, of waste 
 lands, and the betterment of social con- 
 ditions in every direction. All as our trib- 
 ute to the greatness of the German Gen- 
 eral Staff and the God of War! 
 
 WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH THE ARMY? 
 
 Injured by Political Interference from the Outside and Wastefulness and 
 Sloth Within — Extravagance at West Point and Absurdity at Gover- 
 nor's Island— How We Misuse "Best Soldier Material on Earth " 
 
 IF THE advocates of peace were to run 
 down the regular army as the advo- 
 cates of greater preparedness have 
 been decrying it during the last year, 
 they would undoubtedly find themselves 
 charged with being unpatriotic, if not 
 traitorous, and certainly guilty of mali- 
 cious hostility to our land-defence forces. 
 The advocates of larger appropriations 
 do not hesitate to denounce the army as 
 being mismanaged and not up to its task, 
 but they usually lay the blame upon 
 Congress, which they say has "starved" 
 the army, has insisted on the mainte- 
 nance of forts of no earthly military value, 
 built, like those at Helena, Mont, Chey- 
 enne, Wyo., and Des Moines, la., for po- 
 litical purposes in order to placate certain 
 powerful politicians, and perhaps there- 
 by to purchase certain army reforms 
 which could not otherwise have been at- 
 tained. Senator Carter, of Montana; Con- 
 gressman Hull, of Iowa, and Senator 
 Warren, of Wyoming, were, in their per- 
 sons, the "military necessity" for the con- 
 struction of those three forts, which, like 
 the one near Denver, ought long since to 
 have been turned into civilian colleges 
 and abandoned by the military. 
 
 But while politics has been the bane 
 of the army, and Congress can be justly 
 indicted for its treatment of the ser- 
 vice, the faults in the army are by no 
 means due to Congress alone. As any 
 one who criticises the service and points 
 
 out its shortcomings, except in order to 
 ask that the taxpayers pour out more 
 money for its aggrandizement, is sure 
 to be denounced, let me say at once 
 that the statements in this and other 
 articles are obtained chiefly from army 
 officers, and from twenty-five years of 
 personal observation and study; that 
 they are actuated by no spirit of hos- 
 tility toward any individuals, though 
 frankly written from the point of view of 
 one who does not believe in a large army, 
 yet has for a quarter of a century la- 
 bored diligently to bring about the wise 
 expenditure of 100 cents for every dol- 
 lar appropriated by Congress, and has 
 invariably defended the army against the 
 politicians. It was an able Secretary 
 of War who remarked to the writer that 
 the trouble with the army was that its 
 "survey-boards did not survey, its courts- 
 martial did not court-martial, its retire- 
 ment boards did not retire, and its pro- 
 motion boards did not properly promote" 
 — a condiUon of affairs that cannot be at- 
 tributed to Congress, though its causes 
 hark back to politics. 
 
 INTERFERENCE OK POLITICS. 
 
 Indeed, this very Secretary of War 
 consented to the setting aside of sen- 
 tences of courts-martial and actions of 
 other military tribunals for personal or 
 political reasons. During his incumbency 
 we had some of the worst cases ever 
 
 known of officers being jumped, through 
 Presidential favoritism, over the heads of 
 hundreds of others. Under this Secre- 
 tary that order was first issued which 
 Secretary Garrison is the first head of the 
 War Department to enforce — that any 
 officer using political influence should 
 have it entered on its record against 
 him. 
 
 But the politicians did not then stop 
 going to the War Department; it was 
 even carefully explained by officials to 
 some of them that the order was issued 
 merely to head off those who were not 
 the Administration's favorites, or whose 
 favor was not necessary to the Adminis- 
 tration's success in Congress. Naturally, 
 army officers stuck their tongues in their 
 cheeks when this order was talked of 
 and the old game of pull and poliUcs 
 went on as blithely as ever unUl the 
 army discovered that Lindley M. Gar- 
 rison meant business, and that the use 
 of influence was being entered upon of- 
 ficers' efficiency records against them. 
 
 Now the corridors of the War Depart- 
 ment are not visited by Congressmen and 
 Senators, and there is at this writing 
 but one case on record where Presiden- 
 tial favoritism has been used to the det- 
 riment of the army under Mr. Wilson — 
 a rather flagrant case, too. How can one 
 expect army reUring boards to reUre 
 adequately if the War Department seta 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 aside their finding's to oblige a Senator? 
 The reason Is known Instantly, by the 
 army grapevine telegraph, from Pana- 
 ma to Alaska and the Philippines, and 
 the army guides Itself accordingly. 
 
 It is only rarely that an officer Is able 
 to rise by merit. As soon as he enters 
 the army, therefore, the young officer. If 
 he Is wise, marries the daughter of a 
 Senator, or of a powerful newspaper own- 
 er, or of a millionaire contributor to cam- 
 paign funds, and seeks to get ahead of 
 his fellows not by superior diligence or 
 ability, but by the free use of Influence. 
 It has been "the devil take the hind- 
 most." When Congressman Hull, by rea- 
 son of his being chairman of the House 
 Military Affairs Committee, was able to 
 land his son, a man of only mediocre 
 ability, In a position as major, from which 
 he rose In ten years to be a colonel and 
 Judge-advocate at the age of only thirty- 
 seven, what Incentive Is there to qualify 
 for such a position by legal study and 
 practice? Again, when the war broke out 
 in 1898 a lot of men, some good and some 
 bad, were ordered to Fort Monroe to take 
 the physical examination for commis- 
 sions. A number of them failed, but they 
 were all appointed just the same. Presi- 
 dent McKlnley saw nothing out of keep- 
 ing with his oath of office In appointing 
 them, although they might break down at 
 once In the war when capable officers 
 were needed, or, If not, were certain to 
 load up the retired list at an early age. 
 But how could any Secretary of War ex- 
 pect that, particular examining board to 
 take Its work seriously or to "find" can- | 
 didates when it knew that its reports were 
 utterly Ignored? 
 
 BOMB CONSPICUOUS INSTANCES. 
 
 Is it any wonder in view of this regime 
 of politics that the soldierly spirit in the 
 army is at a low ebb? Take the list of 
 our present generals, and run over the 
 reasons for their appointment to high 
 positions. Gen. Wood was promoted to 
 the rank of a regular brigadier because 
 he was credited with having cleaned up 
 Cuba — an excellent achievement, but not 
 a military one, he being, moreover, a doc- 
 tor without military training. Gen. Tas- 
 ker H. Bliss earned the same rank by 
 being an admirable collector of customs 
 at Havana, jumping up from the rank of 
 major for this worthy but non-military 
 service. Gen. Frederick Funston won the 
 same position because of excellent work 
 as a volunteer colonel, for which a cap- 
 taincy would have sufficed had not the 
 Kansas delegation achieved more; Gen. 
 J. J. Pershing jumped from captain to 
 brigadier avowedly because of a successful 
 expedition In the Philippines, but really 
 because he was a son-in-law of the all- 
 powerful Wyoming Senator. Gen. Albert 
 Mills rose in a bound from captain to 
 brigadier, thanks to Roosevelt's favor, be- 
 cause he had the good luck to be wound- 
 ed, In the first skirmish in 1898, near 
 the Rough Rider Colonel, and was a well- 
 thought-of officer. 
 
 Two of the present brigadiers won their 
 rank by act of Congress for excellent ser- 
 vice on the Panama Canal; they merited 
 reward, of course, but why should they, 
 trained and practiced chieflv as engineers, 
 be put Into a position to command troops 
 when one has never drilled more than 
 a company In his life and the other com' 
 
 manded a volunteer regiment for four 
 days only? 
 
 The rewards given by Congress for 
 Panama work have been utterly dispro- 
 portionate on the military side and mere- 
 ly drive home to the service the lesson 
 that the way to Jump from colonel to 
 major-general of the line, as Col. Goethals 
 did against his wish, Is by orilllant work 
 along non-military lines. Naturally, Ma- 
 jor-Gen. Goethals Is not Interested In 
 holding that rank or commanding troops 
 when he Is an engineer, and so he pro- 
 poses to retire as soon as his canal work 
 is done. The late Major-Gen. Frederick 
 Grant was, of course, a purely political 
 appointment; and so It goes. 
 
 RECENT APPOINTMENTS FOR MERIT. 
 
 Only recently have there been appoint- 
 ed generals who really merited the rank 
 In the eyes of the service, and there again 
 the credit lies with the Wilson Adminis- 
 tration. That several of the others like 
 Bliss, Wood, and Funston have made 
 good as generals In the opinion of the 
 service, does not, of course, weaken the 
 fact that their original appointments 
 were subversive of the Interests of the 
 army. Even the present Chief of Staff, 
 Gen. Scott, an excellent man, of particu- 
 lar usefulness in Indian and Mexican 
 negotiating, won his rapid rise under 
 Mr. Wilson not by military exploits, but 
 by non-military traits, his knowledge of 
 Indians, their sign language, his skill as a 
 plenipotentiary, etc. 
 
 This lack of the real soldierly spirit 
 is the great weakness of the service to- 
 day. By that is not meant that the army 
 should acquire Prussian arrogance or em- 
 brace the spirit of Prussian militarism — 
 though there are some officers quite 
 ready to go the whole hog — but It ought 
 to acquire German Industry, German ap- 
 plication, and German thoroughness. 
 Judged by those standards a good part of 
 the American army is lazy. Suppos- 
 ing every regiment of regulars were or- 
 dered to march out of its barracks and 
 drill every day from 5 A. M. until eleven 
 o'clock, as the German regiments do for 
 months at a time — what would happen? 
 There would all but be mutiny. The 
 regiments would be depleted by desertions 
 and most of the officers would think of 
 resigning or would run to their Con- 
 gressmen for help. Yet it is just such 
 hard work that makes a fine army. 
 
 Foreign officers admire our West Point 
 without exception; but there is no rea- 
 son on earth, they say, why the excel- 
 lence of drill attained there should not 
 be the standard of the army. If It can 
 be achieved in one place, It can In an- 
 other. Yet the regular regiments that 
 have passed through New York recently, 
 notably the Thirtieth Infantry, have 
 marched so badly and generally ap- 
 peared so slack that in most foreign 
 armies the colonel commanding would 
 have been Instantly cashiered or retired. 
 Yet the physical material in that regiment 
 was superb and the men looked wonder- 
 fully fit. Good marching on parade Is not 
 everything, and neither is soldierly ap- 
 pearance ; but if they are worth the time 
 and labor spent on them at West Point 
 they are worth It in the service. Good 
 shooting is worth far more, and so is 
 
 self in the field, how to Intrench, etc., etc. 
 But as a matter of fact every real sol- 
 dier knows that drill Is at the founda- 
 tion of discipline as the alphabet and 
 reading are at the bottom of mental dis- 
 cipline. 
 
 The great trouble is that the newly 
 graduated cadet finds the service slack, 
 many poor colonels, and latterly far more 
 interest In athletics than In purely mil- 
 itary functions. There Is no incentive 
 to soldierllness, and no chance to ad- 
 vance oneself by rigid application to 
 routine drills. Often a West Pointer, who 
 was a model In his bearing at the Acad- 
 emy, slouches like any civilian appointee. 
 
 For this Congress Is not responsible. 
 Nor is it accountable for the gross ex- 
 travagance in the service, and the con- 
 stant lack of soldierly honor in dealing 
 with the money Congress votes. If there 
 ever was a wasteful branch of the Gov- 
 ernment, It Is the army. I have myself 
 seen It march away from manoeuvre 
 grounds and leave behind shower-baths 
 and other facilities erected at a cost of 
 thousands — for the near-by farmers to 
 profit by. 
 
 A post surgeon recently requested, and 
 his request was approved by the post 
 commander, a $30,000 Isolation hospital. 
 The Secretary of War ascertained that 
 there had been not one or two contagious 
 cases In a year there; but that did not 
 interest the surgeon. Another wanted 
 a costly flight of stairs because the old 
 one was worn out. A high official and 
 three or four generals tested the stairs; 
 they were perfectly sound, but being 
 slightly worn, were offensive to the sur- 
 geon. Was not Uncle Sam's Treasury 
 full? Why not turn to It? 
 
 But the classic example Is West Point. 
 If there ever was a colossal blunder, It 
 was the reconstruction of West Point. 
 It is architecturally beautiful; every con- 
 ceivable comfort is provided. There is 
 a power station there that is wonderful, 
 and as spick and span as a cadet on 
 full-dress parade. The gymnasium is 
 superb, and, that the sons of Mars may 
 know something about the Prince of 
 Peace (though He was a Peace-at-any- 
 Price man), there is a $450,000 Protestant 
 chapel, which is one of the most beautiful 
 church edifices extant The post is lined 
 with splendid officers' quarters, costing 
 from $20,000 up, and the Superintendent 
 has just asked for thirty or forty more, at 
 $20,000 apiece. The administration of- 
 fices are magnificent Gothic, and the 
 cadets' quarters are quite beautiful com- 
 pared to the plain ones that Sherman, 
 Sheridan, Lee, and Grant occupied. What 
 a lesson for the humble farmers' sons, 
 the offspring of the plain American peo- 
 ple! What a contrast to the real dem- 
 ocracy with which the student body Is 
 recruited! What a complete reversal of 
 the lessons of simple,' hard living that a 
 soldier ought to be taught! 
 
 But the officers who have controlled 
 West Point care nothing for the example 
 set by Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany, 
 who slept in his palace on his soldier's 
 iron cot until the end of his life. 
 
 SOME WEST POINT EXTRAVAGANCES. 
 
 It actually costs $20,000, I have been 
 informed in military circles, to educate a 
 
 the knowledge of how to care for one- boy at West Point, as against $12,000 at 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 Annapolis. I do not vouch for the cor- 
 rectness of the figure, but give It as it 
 came to me. It is said to cost Harvard 
 $2,500 for each student Of course, Har- 
 vard does not house or feed its students 
 free of charge or pay them, but the dis- 
 proportion is still far too great 
 
 The Military Academy bill contains a 
 provision of $17,700 in extra pay for of- 
 ficers, in addition to their regular salaries, 
 and the Superintendent Is asking $125,000 
 for a laundry which will wash several 
 times as many clothes for the women 
 and children of the Academy as for its 
 cadets. What ideas as to what army 
 posts ought to be will these cadets carry 
 away with them? What are they to 
 think when they see women living in 
 costly quarters obtained from Congress 
 on the plea that they were to be used 
 only as bachelor quarters? What are 
 they to think of the use of Cullum Memo- 
 rial Hall for teas and social events of all 
 kinds, as to which there is no reference 
 in Gen. Cullum's will? Or of officers 
 families boarding in a part of the costly 
 bachelor officers' mess? Or that there 
 are four and a half persons, chiefly wo- 
 men and children, at West Point to each 
 cadet? That there are already 110 de- 
 tailed officers in addition to civilian teach- 
 ers to an average of 620 cadets, and many 
 more are asked for? That the officers' 
 quarters contain fine mahogany furni- 
 ture, costing between $400 and $500 of 
 the taxpayers' money? Can they take 
 away any other idea than that an army 
 post or school is erected primarily for 
 the purpose of promoting the personal 
 welfare and comfort of officers and their 
 families, particularly their families? 
 
 The truth is that West Point is, be- 
 cause of its physical formation, not at 
 all adapted for its purposes; but the fact 
 that there is not enough drill ground 
 now for 600 men in open-order tactics 
 does not prevent the present Superinten- 
 dent from asking that the corps be in- 
 creased to 1.100 men. 
 
 ABSURDITY. AT GOVERNOR'S ISLAND. 
 
 Of course, West Point is not the only 
 place where one finds this waste of the 
 public funds on the recommendation of 
 army officers. What could be more use- 
 less than Governor's Island, the chief 
 purpose of which is to provide a plea- 
 sant home for thirty or forty officers? 
 Its garrison is needless, and no other 
 army in the world would put a battalion 
 of infantry on a little island where it 
 could not march to save its souls. Hun- 
 dreds of thousands of dollars would be 
 saved if the place were closed up, the 
 officers made to live on their allowances 
 for commutation of quarters in the city 
 of New York or Newark or New Ro- 
 chelle, or wherever they pleased, just 
 as the officers of German and French 
 regiments find their own family quar- 
 ters; no one cares where they live as 
 long as they are on hand for duty. Surely, 
 Gen. Barry, a real soldier among our gen- 
 erals, is entitled to great credit for holding 
 down some of the extravagances at West 
 Point, and particularly for preventing 
 the waste of $25,000 for quarters there 
 for the Secretary of War and the Presi- 
 dent of the United States (to be used 
 once a year perhaps), for he was going 
 
 directly against the popular current in 
 the army. 
 
 Truly, if West Point is to be regarded 
 as setting the tone of the army, then 
 the tone of the service is one of un- 
 military living, and needless extrava- 
 gance, with the emphasis on anything 
 but those ascetic and virile qualities and 
 rigid, plain standards of living that go 
 so far to make the true soldier. The 
 cadets even go into camp in tents with 
 permanent wood floors, electric lights, 
 etc.. and only once in a year do they 
 leave the Point for a long march! Is it 
 any wonder that a Bavarian general once 
 said to me after seeing West Point: 
 
 "Your academy is splendid, your Corps 
 of Cadets is magnificent, but, if I were 
 the Superintendent, I would march them 
 away from the academy and put them 
 into camp in the hills behind the 
 Point." 
 
 NOT STUDYING THE PRESENT WAR. 
 
 Is it surprising to learn that the large 
 maps of the seats of war placed in the 
 officers' mess at West Point at the out- 
 break of the war have been taken down 
 because the fifty officers who resort to 
 that mess are no longer sufficiently in- 
 terested in the war to make it worth 
 while to retain them? 
 
 I asked particularly the other day 
 whether there were not weekly quizzes 
 on the progress of the war there; wheth- 
 er the senior officers are not lecturing 
 weekly on the strategy of the campaign 
 as it is unfolded; whether they are not 
 playing the war-game as it is presented 
 in each one of the fields of operation, 
 but I was assured that nothing of the 
 kind had happened — incredible as it 
 may seem — except a couple of lectures by 
 a professor and some study by a little 
 group of nine young officers, when the 
 cadets, to say nothing of the officers, are 
 supposed to be learning the art of war. 
 That in itself is the most striking proof 
 of the lack of the military spirit which is 
 the chief evil in the army, and for which 
 Congress is not responsible. 
 
 And what are co.det3, and what is the 
 public to think of the grave scandal 
 which has just been developed at the 
 trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Goodier now 
 going on in San Francisco, at which of- 
 ficers have sworn that certain of their 
 brother-officers of the Aviation Section 
 have been drawing the 35 per cent, 
 increase of regular pay, which is by 
 law awarded to officers who are risking 
 their lives by actually making ascen- 
 sions, when they could not even handle 
 an aeroplane? It was charged, under oath, 
 that Captain Cowan, commanding the 
 Aviation School at San Diego, had been 
 drawing $113 a month extra pay since 
 July, 1913, although not capable of tak- 
 ing a machine into the air alone, and 
 Captain Cowan has admitted that he 
 drew this unearned pay for twenty- 
 five months! Does this not again 
 suggest the need of a higher standard of 
 conduct by officers towards their Gov- 
 ernment, or at least a new kind of pre- 
 paredness for an officer's career? 
 
 The truth is that in many directions re- 
 sources available are knowingly diverted 
 from military to non-military purposes, 
 as for instance in the matter of trans- 
 
 portation; we have not modern military 
 transportation, but plenty of money for 
 busses and ambulances and non-military 
 vehicles. They even run a bus line from 
 one end of West Point to the other. Into 
 the effect of all this upon the enlisted 
 men of the army and their free use for 
 non-military purposes, such as officers' 
 servants, care-takers, etc., there Is not 
 space to touch In this article; but every- 
 one who knows the army, knows what 
 an abuse it is, and how it reduces the 
 number of men available for military 
 drills. It verges dangerously near the 
 line of "honest graft," which reminds me 
 that when the camp at Texas City of a 
 whole division of our troops was broken up 
 by the cyclone in August last there were 
 downright charges by a service Journal 
 that no worse place for military purposes 
 could have been selected .than the site of 
 this camp, as to which this defender of 
 preparedness declared there were grave 
 rumors of real graft 
 
 It is interesting to note, too, that the 
 storm nipped in the bud as it were, 
 the erection of several large dancing 
 pavilions and club houses that were being 
 built by the troops — military duty again 
 — for the use of themselves some nights 
 in the week, and of their officers the 
 others. I have been trying my best to 
 recall, if I ever heard of dance-halls 
 being erected by French or German 
 regiments, and I cannot remember that 
 I ever did. 
 
 THE BEST MATERIAL ON EARTH. 
 
 Now the maddening thing about all 
 this is that we can do a great deal bet- 
 ter if we wish to, for we have the best 
 material on earth out of which to build 
 armies. No one surpasses the American 
 in natural adaptability and the ability 
 to think for himself. Take the story of 
 Funston's Kansas regiment. It is ex» 
 actly like that of hundreds of volunteer 
 regiments in the Civil War, but it la 
 an amazing tale of resourcefulness, of 
 daring, dash, and Yankee ingenuity, and 
 natural born soldiering, without much 
 drill and next to no discipline. These 
 fine qualities are there and available. 
 Why do we not get them in peace times? 
 Moreover, there are a number of able 
 officers in our service who see the needs 
 and deplore the whole present situation, 
 and would do differently if they could, 
 who do not believe in the Government's 
 buying of polo ponies and foxhounds 
 or running a lot of costly suburban com- 
 munities, but would like to train real 
 soldiers. Why is it that for an ex- 
 penditure far out of proportion to what 
 the German army costs — we have put 
 according to a statement of Chairman 
 Hay of the House Military Affairs Com- 
 mittee, $1,007,410,270.48 into the army in 
 the last ten fiscal years, 1905 to 1915, 
 which is not so bad for a niggardly Con- 
 gress — we do not get a regular army as 
 good man for man as that of the Ger- 
 man and the French? 
 
 Incidently, the' taxpayer should ask 
 himself whether he ought to heed the 
 advocates of preparedness in adding more 
 sums to the frightful waste that is going 
 on. without the slightest assurance that 
 he will have a bit more efficient or more 
 military army than he has to-day. It is 
 throwing good money after bad. 
 
vTHE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 THE PRESENT MILITARY FOUNDATION 
 
 Defects in the Existing Organization of the Army— More Money Does 
 
 Not Assure Greater Efficiency — Heaven-Sent Opportunity 
 
 Neglected by President and Secretary of War 
 
 CONGRESSMAN HAY, Chairman of 
 the House Committee on Military 
 Affairs, recently wrote in the Sun- 
 day Magazine of the liberal $101,000,000 
 appropriated by Congress for the army 
 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, 
 and declared: 
 
 "To say that the use of such money in 
 the hands of officers of the United States 
 Army does not make us efficient In a 
 military sense, is to attack unjustifiably 
 the ability of a set of men famous the 
 world over for their contributions to mili- 
 tary science." 
 
 What could be more preposterous? One 
 might as well assume that because $200,- 
 000,000 a year is spent by such honorable 
 and patriotic gentlemen as compose the 
 Board of EsUmate of New York for the 
 city's upkeep, therefore every cent Is 
 wisely and economically disbursed! We 
 know it is not; we know that it is hon- 
 estly disbursed, but every one is aware 
 that savings could be made; that legisla- 
 tive enactments require a good deal of 
 expenditure that the city officials would 
 never sanction; that bad business meth- 
 ods of the past take their toll, and that 
 there are leaks and wastes in plenty 
 which can only gradually be eliminated 
 by that slow introduction of better meth- 
 ods adopted after most careful study and 
 inquiry, which is now going on. 
 
 So in the army; every one knows that 
 honesty prevails; that grafting is al- 
 most unknown and that an embezzle- 
 ment among officers is of the rarest Yet 
 every one should also be aware that 
 despite the enormous sums voted we 
 have very small military results to show 
 for the $100,000,000 which we have been 
 spending annually, on an average, dur- 
 ing the last ten years. In that period 
 our army has averaged about 85,000 men. 
 It cost, therefore, over $1,000 a man to 
 provide the necessary arms, quarters, 
 pay, supplies, fortifications, etc., for a 
 force of that size, and the taxpayer Is 
 without guarantee whatever that Ms 
 army is efficient. Pacifists, militarists, 
 and Secretaries of War, all are united In 
 saying that we do not begin to get what 
 we pay for; that the army Is wasteful 
 and extravagant because of antiquated 
 and red tape business methods, the 
 slowness of disbursements, the extrava- 
 gant expenditure characteristic of most 
 Government bureaus, the placing of the 
 emphasis upon luxurious accommodations 
 and private comforts rather than upon 
 absolute military efficiency, and partic- 
 ularly because of the interference of pol- 
 iticians. Under the circumstances, for 
 Congressman Hay to point to his $101,- 
 000,000 and swear we are therefore mili- 
 tarily efficient Is as absurd as to as- 
 sume that if Congress votes $180,000,000 
 or $200,000,000 this year for further pre- 
 paredness we shall get greater efficiency 
 at the very hands and by the very meth- 
 
 ods that have been causing us waste 
 and extravagance heretofore. 
 
 MORE MONEY DOESN'T GUARANTEE EFFI- 
 CIENCY. 
 
 There is not the slightest reason to 
 assume that we shall even get a greater 
 degree of military efficiency. A poor 
 army does not become a good army in 
 any country because you vote It, or give 
 it. more men, more guns, and more am- 
 munition. Russia has demonstrated that, 
 not only In this war, but long before 
 this war hove In sight 
 
 It is precisely here that Mr. Garrison 
 and President Wilson have thrown away 
 their great opportunity — an almost 
 heaven-sent opportunity — to reform and 
 overhaul the whole military establish- 
 ment. If they had said to the country 
 and to Congress: 
 
 "This whole thing is preposterous, be- 
 cause our methods are wrong and the 
 real military spirit is lacking; we shall 
 not recommend or ask the voting of a 
 dollar additional until you overhaul the 
 entire system, do away with the political 
 forts, put a stop to the whole business 
 of building extravagant suburban vil- 
 lages for our troops, and thoroughly in- 
 vestigate the entire military situation. 
 When you have done this and cut mil- 
 lions upon millions out of our present 
 Army bill, we shall recommend the ad- 
 ditional defences which we think the sea- 
 coast needs." 
 
 It is a double blunder that they have 
 committed, which smacks plainly both of 
 short-sightedness and lack of statesman- 
 ship. In deciding to arm further at this 
 stage of the world war without awaiUng 
 its outcome, they have in part thrown 
 away the commanding position of the 
 United States as the one great nation 
 that was not arming, and, therefore, was 
 in the best position to advocate universal 
 disarmament at the close of the war; 
 and they have neglected the best chance 
 for a great Internal reform, for the in- 
 troduction of scientific management in 
 one branch of the Government, that will 
 probably ever come to them. 
 
 BUILDING ON BAD FOUNDATION. 
 
 With an unsatisfactory and out of date 
 miUtary foundation, never well built, as 
 was conclusively shown in 1898, they are 
 preparing to build upon that foundation 
 an enormously costly additional super- 
 structure which will inevitably partake of 
 the weaknesses of the foundation. With 
 the only bit of scientific management the 
 army has ever known — that introduced 
 into some of our arsenals by General 
 Crozier, the chief of ordnance — practical- 
 ly ended by the dictation of labor unions, 
 it is a crying shame that the Secretary and 
 President did not unitedly stand for in- 
 troducing this system throughout the 
 army. The country would have listened 
 to them as one man because it would 
 
 have recognized at once that this is the 
 first step, and the best step, toward na- 
 tional prepardedness, if we really need 
 any preparednesa 
 
 More than that, groups of fine young 
 officers would have arisen in the service 
 to cooperate and even to take the lead. 
 The whole military spirit of the army 
 would have been quickened and rejuve- 
 nated. It would have ohtained an en- 
 tirely new sense of its duty and responsi- 
 bility to the Government if required to 
 see to it that not only 100 cents 
 are obtained for every dollar ex- 
 pended, but that at least 90 per 
 cent, of that dollar is given to construc- 
 tive military expenditure. Such a re- 
 organization would have given the army 
 new life and new pride in the service. 
 
 If Congress knows its business and is 
 not stampeded into voting the President's 
 programme, by the party lash; if it is 
 actuated by purely patriotic considera- 
 tions and really desires efficient prepared- 
 ness, if It is not going to vote large sums 
 under newspaper clan ,r with the quiet 
 purpose of securing as large a part of 
 that expenditure for particular political 
 bailiwicks, it will itself insist upon such 
 an overhaul and investigation. If that 
 sounds too much like a counsel of per- 
 fection; if it is expecting too much of 
 our Congress, so much the worse. 
 
 THE GREED FOR "PORK." 
 
 I was reliably told in Washington that 
 Congressmen were already serving notice 
 on Mr. Garrison that he would not get 
 a dollar from them for preparedness un- 
 less they were assured that their especi- 
 ally pet political forts, or arsenals, or 
 what not, were to be left undisturbed. Dis- 
 couraging as that, if true, would be, and 
 as the outlook for reform is, it is plainly 
 the duty of Congress to inquire what 
 has become of the enormous sums al- 
 ready voted. The German Kaiser is said 
 to have remarked that his army and navy 
 did not cost him more than ours, including 
 pensions. This Congress ought to as- 
 certain, and the reasons why this Is so, 
 beside the superficial ones that lie on 
 the surface. Let it find out, for Instance, 
 whether many expenditures made, like 
 that at Governor's Island, have not ac- 
 tually hindered the obtaining of real mili- 
 tary results. Let it not vote two or three 
 hundred millions more in the two years 
 of its life without the most careful ex- 
 amination of the past and the most care- 
 ful supervision of future expenditures. 
 
 It does not pay in this matter to trust 
 to the experts. The writer was, perhaps, 
 the first journalist in this country to 
 advocate a General Staff, but that august 
 body has been vastly more concerned 
 with planning increases of the army (with 
 unavoidable benefits in the way of in- 
 creased rank to its members) than with 
 pounding away in season and out of sea- 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 9 
 
 son. upon the deficiencies In the service 
 which would still stand in the way of 
 anything like an efficient army if it were 
 increased to 500,000 men to-morrow. 
 
 One of the ablest officers in the service, 
 a graduate of West Point, of nearly forty 
 years' service, who does not share the 
 writer's views as to preparedness, says 
 frankly that, as long as the army is "self- 
 governed and self-inspected, it can never 
 be trusted to govern itself well." He in- 
 sists that there must be more stringent 
 and direct civilian control by Congress; 
 but he admits, of course, that heretofore 
 Congress has declined to accept its re- 
 sponsibility in an unselfish spirit. He 
 believes that no expert opinion, whether 
 from the General Staff or any one else, 
 should be accepted without the most rigid 
 outside scrutiny. If, as he says, the 
 inspections in the army are "usually 
 farces, often overruled and restricted by 
 order, so that they tend to degenerate 
 into merely formal affairs carried on In 
 order to see that the routine of the ser- 
 vice Is adhered to," there may well be 
 reason to assume that the higher au- 
 thorities in the army are not as keen 
 to remedy any defects as they should be. 
 Thus, Gen. Wood has been making hun- 
 dreds of speeches in the past year, urg- 
 ing more troops and more reserves; I 
 have read many reports of those speeches, 
 but I have not found in one any refer- 
 ence to what is the matter with the 
 army itself. 
 
 It is also suggested that, according to 
 an army officer who ought to know, the 
 first plan for an increase In the army 
 that came from the General Staff to Sec- 
 retary Garrison began with a provision 
 for a full general and several lieutenant- 
 generals, major-generals by the dozen, 
 and brigadiers by the score. If this officer 
 is correct, these were not recommenda- 
 tions that really aimed at increased ef- 
 ficiency. 
 
 DETAILS SHOULD BE SCRUTINIZED. 
 
 How important It is that the details 
 of any Increase scheme should be care- 
 fully studied, appears from the question 
 how shall the army be enlarged. Sup- 
 posing 30.000 men are to be added: Shall 
 this be done by adding 30 more regi- 
 ments of 1,000 men each? Most officers 
 would say "yes." They would point out 
 that regiments cannot be raised hastily in 
 war-time, and quickly drilled, and would 
 insist that we cannot have too many extra 
 officers. 
 
 Probably most of the men giving this 
 advice would not be consciously influ- 
 enced by the fact that this would mean a 
 promotion of 30 lieutenant-colonels, and 
 60 majors and 150 captains, and that 
 therefore they would inevitably profit 
 thereby; some might even, and probably 
 would, regret that their own fortunes 
 were tied up with the question. 
 
 But there is another side to the matter. 
 European regiments number from 2,500 
 to 3,000 men; in Germany there are 
 more than 200 men in a company in 
 peace time so that a subaltern commands 
 a "Zug" of about 70 men. We allow 
 three officers to a company and the war 
 time strength of that company is 112 and 
 of a regiment approximately 1,300. Why 
 should we continue to stick at this figure? 
 
 The Civil War showed how rapidly regi- 
 ments of 1,000 men thinned down to tiny 
 battalions of 350. In one campaign, in 
 1864, a Connecticut heavy artillery regi- 
 ment serving as Infantry, shrank from 
 1,200 to 400 men In about six weeks 
 time. The Canadian Princess Patricia 
 Regiment is known to have been reduced 
 to 135 In a fortnight at the front. In 
 peace time our regular regiments 
 are weak at a strength of 800, and 
 few of them approximate that size. They 
 usually average between 600 and 760. 
 
 Every officer knows that this is an in- 
 efficient number. In a recent article 
 which appeared in the Journal of the 
 V. 8. Cavalry Association, Captain S. D. 
 Rockenbach, 11th Cavalry, told some 
 wholesome truths not often seen in 
 print, at least by laymen, as to the 
 present organization. He writes as 
 follows: 
 
 "My testimony after nearly twenty-four 
 years of commissioned service is that 
 under the organization and system w» 
 have, it Is Impossible to make a troop 
 efficient for war. If It is the overhead 
 cost that counts, why can't we get the men 
 to work with? Supposing we got the 41 
 [men of a troop] ready for combat with- 
 out stunting their mental and physical 
 growth, what would be left of them In 
 a week's, a month's campaign, without 
 a depot squadron to send up trained men 
 and horses? We delude ourselves with 
 the idea that we have a great excess 
 of regular officers in time of peace; we 
 must, but we must have something to 
 train them with. I would have learned 
 more in two years with a full troop, 
 In a full squadron, in a full regiment, 
 In a full brigade, in a full division, than 
 I have in ten times that length of time 
 under the existing conditions. Yiet the 
 American public expects the regular of- 
 ficer to be supertralned in the art and 
 science of war practically." 
 
 INCREASE EXISTING UNITS. 
 
 There is no doubt that If Captain Rock- 
 enbach were asked what he would do 
 with 30,000 more men for the army, he 
 would put them into the existing troops, 
 squadrons, regiments, brigades, and divis- 
 ions. That would be real scientific man- 
 agement both from the point of view of 
 the army and the point of view of the 
 taxpaying public which is desirous of 
 efficiency and does not want to be taxed 
 for colonels and majors that add strength 
 to the army only on paper. There could 
 be no clearer illustration of the point 
 that I have been trying to drive home 
 in this entire article; that the foundation 
 system of the army is wrong and that 
 piling on more organizations without 
 remedying the defects would be folly. 
 Why Is it not the proper thing to raise 
 our regiments to 2,400 or 3,000 men at 
 once if we must have more soldiers? 
 It is Interesting to note that some ad- 
 vance towards this policy appears In Mr. 
 Garrison's plan to have three of the 
 new regular regiments he proposes re- 
 cruited to our war strength; but that is 
 less than half the peace strength of some 
 European regiments. If additional of- 
 ficers are needed, let Congress provide 
 them separately to be used for detached 
 service as are hundreds of officers to-day 
 
 who are away from regimental work. 
 It Is interesting also to note how Cap- 
 tain Rockenbach arrives at the figure 
 of 41 men cited above, which he says 
 could not be trained for a month under 
 war conditions without needing reserves 
 of men and horses. This is his very 
 important analysis of an average troop 
 of cavalry as it reports for duty in our 
 army to-day. 
 
 Troop N, Xth U. S. Cavalry, has on the 24th 
 of May: 
 
 Aggregate 81 
 
 Present and absent 73 
 
 Training remounts 13 
 
 Charge of stables 2 
 
 In quarters — 1 mess sgt., 2 cooks, 2 room 
 
 orderlies 6 
 
 D. 8-, absent sick and furlough 8 
 
 Recruits 1 
 
 Sick 8 
 
 S. D., veterinary hospital and exchange.. 2 
 
 Machine-gun troop 2 
 
 Headquarter troop 1 
 
 Total absent from drill (combat) .... 35 
 Total present for drill (combat) 41 
 
 The only criticism of this that most 
 officers would make is that he does not 
 allow sufficiently for detached service, for 
 men on guard duty, acting as servants 
 to officers, gardeners, etc. But as is the 
 strength of the troop so is the strength 
 of the regiment. 
 
 Everybody who has served knows the 
 thrill and the inspiration that come from 
 full ranks and large numbers. Is it any 
 wonder that Capt. Rockenbach writes 
 that "we do not admit that the regular 
 army is inefficient, but, when we say 
 that it is efficient, the American public 
 should understand our mental reserva- 
 tions. It Is efficient not considering any 
 possible or probable use against modern 
 troops, only up to 60 per cent of Its 
 total strength, and it would not last a 
 brief campaign against a modern army, 
 even could we find one so small as to 
 take us seriously and fight us. . . 
 There should be no compromise, either 
 a proper army or none at all, and once 
 for all remove the delusion from the 
 minds of the public as to their protec- 
 tion." 
 
 There are dozens of officers who share 
 Capt. Rockenbach's feeling; there are 
 dozens of problems, just like this on« 
 of where the proposed increase of men 
 if voted should be placed, that ought not 
 to be decided offhand either by Presi- 
 dent or Secretary or Congress, and the 
 last persons whose advice should b6 
 taken as final in this matter are the 
 men who are responsible in the army for 
 the present system which Capt. Rock- 
 enback so clearly thinks a grave mis- 
 take. 
 
 If the system of the regular army Is a 
 mistake, or is inefficient in any degree, 
 is it not absolute folly to graft upon 
 it the reserve army of 400,000 men 
 which Mr. Garrison and the General Staff 
 have proposed and the President has 
 accepted? What guarantee is there that 
 the 400,000 reserves will be relatively 
 even as efficient as our regulars? How 
 can we avoid the conclusion that it is 
 the duty of Congress to make our ex- 
 isting system modern, efficient, and real- 
 ly worth while before it adds one dol- 
 lar to the one hundred millions it now 
 blindly lavishes? The road to real pre- 
 paredness, if we must prepare, leads no 
 other way. 
 
10 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 SOME OBSTACLES TO EFFICIENCY IN THE ARMY 
 
 Despite West Point Training and Ostensibly Rigid Examinations, Many 
 Unfit Continue in Service — Shining Exceptions of the Ordnance 
 Corps — Effects of Certain Social Conditions 
 
 WHY is it there is not greater mili- 
 tary efficiency in our regular 
 army to-day? The average lay- 
 man can understand that politics has 
 done serious damage to the service, and 
 much money is wasted through the con- 
 struction of costly barracks which are 
 in effect costly suburban villages. He 
 knows, too, that all Government depart- 
 ments are apt to be loosely administered 
 as contrasted with private concerns or- 
 ganized to make money. 
 
 What the layman cannot understand is 
 why there should not be among the of- 
 ficers of the service a high standard of 
 professional efficiency. Are not 40 per 
 cent of the officers graduates of West 
 Point? Have not hundreds of them at- 
 tended the graduate schools in the army? 
 Are there not examinations for promo- 
 tion? Are not civilian candidates and 
 those who would rise from the ranks 
 rigidly tested? How can it be, therefore, 
 that the army itself is inefficient? 
 
 To this the answer is: Primarily be- 
 cause the individual officer is held prac- 
 tically to no standard of professional ef- 
 ficiency, and this despite examinations 
 for promotion, efficiency records, etc. 
 
 The law calling for the examination 
 of all officers below the rank of major 
 before they can be promoted to the next 
 highest rank has, it is true, existed ever 
 since 1891. At the present time there 
 are under suspension for promotion for 
 one year one captain and three first 
 lieutenants who have failed in their first 
 examinations, but during all these years 
 since the law was passed only seventeen 
 line officers have been dropped from the 
 army for failure to qualify professional- 
 ly. Fully nine-tenths of those suspended 
 are passed on reexamination, and in one 
 case an officer who was discharged from 
 the artillery arm and reappointed to the 
 cavalry arm has been serving acceptably 
 ever since. 
 
 Now, it would be most gratifying if 
 we could assume that this record meant 
 that the high professional ability of the 
 officers of the army was easily demonstra- 
 ble, for it would show that there is vast- 
 ly less professional mortality among our 
 officers than among a similar group 
 of lawyers and doctors, to speak of only 
 two other expert professions. 
 
 BUI MANY UNFIT SLIP THROUGH. 
 
 But every Secretary of War knows, 
 and every officer knows, that the exam- 
 ining board is not nearly as rigid as it 
 ought to be, and that many a man slips 
 through who is professionally unfit to 
 continue in the service. Either because 
 the board does not set high enough 
 standards or because it has become dis- 
 couraged by political interference with 
 the verdicts of other examining boards, 
 or because out of a kind-heartedness to- 
 ward a fellow-officer, which is one of the 
 greatest weaknesses of the service, it 
 
 sometimes gives a man a passing mark 
 for the sake of his future and that of 
 his wife and his children. 
 
 It is unfortunately the truth that there 
 Is no punishment for an officer who is 
 professionally slack or lazy or who is 
 unfit, precisely as there is no real re- 
 ward for an officer who does his rou- 
 tine work zealously, studies incessantly 
 to keep himself abreast of military de- 
 velopment at home and abroad, and seeks 
 in every way to fit himself for high com- 
 mand. There is a saying that to lose 
 his commission an officer must either 
 commit a crime or go far beyond the 
 limits of toleration in bad personal habits. 
 Let him be as dull as an ox, let him be 
 temperamentally unfitted to command 
 men, let him be so crabbed and narrow 
 as to be a nuisance whenever he fills a 
 position of independent command, he is 
 still sure of his rank if his personal 
 habits are exemplary — that is, if he does 
 not drink, or steal, or offend against 
 other commandments. Moreover, he will 
 rise steadily in rank and retire with a 
 handsome pension at the end of his ser- 
 vice. 
 
 On the other hand, the man who has 
 soldierly instincts, is devoted to his ca- 
 reer, and is willing to work day and night 
 for personal advancement and the bene- 
 fit of the service — there are many such 
 in the army — soon finds that nothing that 
 he can do will advance him except in 
 rare, exceptional cases. In the past, 
 such an officer has needed political in- 
 fluence to get him ahead. It is true 
 that at all times he won the esteem of 
 those with whom he came in contact 
 who valued a good officer. At times some 
 bureau chief or some general during the 
 Spanish War was able to pick out such 
 an officer for temporary volunteer rank 
 or for some important assignment. Such 
 an officer, too, might find his way to 
 the War College and the General Staff, 
 but the chances have been that he must 
 sit by and see an officer like Gen. Clar- 
 ence R. Edwards jump from captain to 
 Drigadier-general, not because of any 
 military service of distinction whatever, 
 but because he was an excellent chief of 
 the Bureau of Insular Affairs — non-mili- 
 tary service again — and a warm personal 
 friend of William H Taft. Such an in- 
 cident as that alone gravely discourages 
 many a professionally zealous officer. 
 
 HOW EXAMINATIONS HAVE WORKED. 
 
 Yet high hopes were builded upon the 
 examination for promotion when it was 
 instituted. The examiners were given a 
 wide latitude, and as it often happened 
 that a man was examined far away from 
 his regiment, it was hoped that so- 
 cial influence would be reduced to a min- 
 imum. But it hasn't worked that way, 
 and the standards of examination have 
 varied so much here and there — that is, 
 an examining board at Manila might be »o 
 
 much more rigid than one at Fort Leav- 
 enworth — as to work an injustice to the 
 service. Hence, for a time an effort was 
 made to have all officers in continental 
 America examined by one board in Fort 
 Leavenworth. But this too has been 
 abandoned and men are constantly pass- 
 ed upward who ought not to be ad- 
 vanced. Moreover, it is ridiculous to say 
 that because a man has qualified as ma- 
 jor, therefore he does not need to be 
 tested as to his fitness for lieutenant- 
 colonel or colonel or brigadier-general or 
 major-general. There is no reason what- 
 ever why examinations should stop with 
 the captain, but every reason that more 
 and more severe tests should be applied, 
 as officers rise higher in rank and as- 
 sume increasing responsibilities for the 
 welfare and discipline and efficiency of 
 their subordinates in peace and for their 
 lives, as well, in war time. 
 
 It seems to be generally admitted to- 
 day that the German army is the most 
 efficient in the world. It is the German 
 army which is most rigid in its examina- 
 tion of officers and its elimination of men 
 who are unfit. No major can become a 
 lieutenant-colonel until he has demon- 
 strated that he can fulfil the functions of 
 a lieutenant-colonel under the eyes of a 
 board of officers whose devotion to the 
 service is so great that they do not hes- 
 itate to cut him off and end his career 
 if he does not qualify. A German major 
 is expected to show that he is fitted to 
 be a colonel, and a lieutenant-colonel that 
 he can, if necessary, take hold of a bri- 
 gade. Social influence does not avail, 
 neither does rank, and to a lesser de- 
 gree the same has been true in France, 
 but that it is in a lesser degree is brought 
 out by the large number of French gen- 
 erals who have been summarily retired 
 by Gen. Joffre. 
 
 When President Taft made Capt. Ed- 
 wards a brigadier-general because he had 
 been an excellent bureaucrat in Wash- 
 ington, he did not know whether Gen. 
 Edwards really had the qualities of a 
 general or not, because Capt Edwards 
 had never even commanded a regiment, 
 much less a brigade. There was nothing 
 to indicate that Gen. Edwards, if sud- 
 denly given command of a brigade in 
 Mexico, would demonstrate that he had 
 the capacity for the handling of 
 masses of men, or had the personal 
 quality of quick decision in emergencies 
 which the successful general must have. 
 Perhaps Gen. Edwards would prove to 
 have these qualities. It is extraordinary 
 how many of our haphazard generals 
 have become valuable. But that is luck, 
 or is due to American adaptability under 
 responsibility, and is not because, but in 
 spite of, as vicious a system of appoint- 
 ment as could be imagined. 
 
 GRATIFYING SIGNS OF BEFOBM. 
 
 Lately, it is gratifying to record, Sec- 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 11 
 
 retary Garrison has adopted the policy 
 of promoting colonels to brigadier-gen- 
 erals, not because of any conspicuous 
 non-military service or in response to 
 political pressure or social influence or 
 friendship, but on the recommendation 
 of the various generals, the General Staff 
 corps, etc. But, gratifying as this de- 
 parture is, it does not in itself give any 
 assurances of stability, nor does it help 
 to weed out the inefflcients in the lower 
 grades. 
 
 Among the officers who have been 
 much stirred by this state of affairs is 
 the chief of ordnance, Brig.-Gen. William 
 Crozier. In season and out of season, 
 on every occasion, he has urged that 
 we introduce into our army a system of 
 promotion, not by seniority, that is, lon- 
 gevity, but by selection, the selection of 
 the worthy and industrious officers and 
 the elimination of the unworthy. He 
 aims, in other words, at the introduction 
 of a merit system, and in principle every 
 one must agree with him, particularly be- 
 cause, as will be shown later, he has ap- 
 plied those principles to his own, the 
 Ordnance Corps. If it could be car- 
 ried out without favoritism or so- 
 cial or political influence, it would make 
 an ideal system. The difficulty is that 
 in a republic it seems almost impossible 
 to constitute a board of officers which 
 shall be free from these hampering in- 
 fluences, and a system of selection which 
 was influenced by other than purely mili- 
 tary considerations would be more de- 
 moralizing than the present one. 
 
 FAILURE OF NAVY PLUCKING BOABD. 
 The experience of the navy's "pluck- 
 ing board" does not lead to the belief 
 that the right kind of a board to promote 
 by selection could be formed. 
 
 Mr. Roosevelt and many others were 
 certain when this navy board was con- 
 stituted in 1901 that it solved the diffi- 
 culty in the navy, and that the board 
 could be relied upon to do justice. Yet 
 the last Congress abolished the board, 
 whose decisions had in some cases caused 
 the bitterest heart-burnings. For the 
 army, none the less, it appears that for 
 the present the best policy is elimination 
 for military unfitness or incapacity. That 
 is, by the slow process of improving the 
 moral tone of the service the promotion 
 boards, like the courts-martial, must be 
 educated up to performing their func- 
 tions without thought of anything but 
 the interests of the service. As long as 
 this is not done the army personnel will 
 be far from the maximum of efficiency. 
 As long as it is not done all the money 
 that President Wilson and Mr. Garrison 
 may get from Congress for additional 
 officers and men will not in a single re- 
 spect improve the morale of the army, 
 but will merely add to its numbers. It 
 will in no wise give us a more efficient 
 army than we have now, for true pre- 
 paredness has much less to do with 
 numbers than it has with the spirit and 
 military efficiency of our army. 
 
 Now, Gen. Crozier is not merely an 
 officer who preaches; he practices what 
 he preaches, and the result Is that the 
 Ordnance Corps, over which he presides, 
 is to-day the one highly efficient branch 
 of the army. Why? Because he can 
 eliminate unworthy ofllcers and reward 
 the worthy that come to his corps. This 
 
 is due to the fact that, barring some per- 
 manent ones, the bulk of his officers are 
 detailed from the line, after a most 
 searching examination, for periods of 
 four years. After these four years they 
 must go back to the cavalry or artil- 
 lery or infantry, whence they came, and 
 serve two years with troops, befor* 
 being again eligible for re-detail to the 
 Ordnance. If an officer did not do well 
 while with the Ordnance, Gen. Crozier 
 simply forgets his existence; he has no 
 right to demand a re-detail. If he is a 
 good officer. Gen. Crozier keeps his eye 
 on him and gets him back when the 
 two years with troops are up. 
 
 Moreover, Gen. Crozier made his corps 
 especially attractive by getting from 
 Congress increased rank for the officers 
 that come to him. That Is, if a second 
 lieutenant is detailed to the Ordnance, 
 he gets the rank and pay of a first lieu- 
 tenant during his four years of service; 
 if a first lieutenant is detailed he gets 
 the rank and pay of a captain ; if it is a 
 captain who goes to the Ordnance, he 
 receives the rank and pay of a major 
 as a reward for his ambition, for his 
 zeal in volunteering for the Ordnance, 
 and his industry in fitting himself for 
 the searching technical examination. 
 
 RECOGNIZED BY. PRIVATE INDUSTRIES. 
 
 I am one of those who think that the 
 rush to secure Gen. Crozier's officers for 
 civilian arms factories this year is in 
 large part a tribute to the kind of men 
 Gen. Crozier has secured by his merit 
 system. Even in these boom times pri- 
 vate concerns that have to earn divi- 
 dends pick and choose their superin- 
 tendents, and do not select military auto- 
 mata for responsible positions. 
 
 This is the only way to-day in tlfe 
 entire army in which an officer can ad- 
 vance himself in rank and pay by his 
 own industry and merit! Surely, before 
 it builds further upon the present un- 
 satisfactory military foundation, Congress 
 ought to inquire into the whole situa- 
 tion and ask Gen. Crozier and others 
 why it is that this bit of scientific man- 
 agement cannot In one form or another 
 be applied to the entire service. 
 
 A few years ago another device, which, 
 if applied to the entire army and rigid- 
 ly enforced, would do much good, was 
 introduced into the Engineer Corps. It 
 was provided by law that, when an of- 
 ficer was appointed to that corps as a 
 second lieutenant from civil life, he 
 should serve as a probationary officer 
 for the period of one year, at the ex- 
 piration of which he could be dropped 
 for professional incapacity, moral unfit- 
 ness, or, what is even more important, 
 temperamental unfitness for the military 
 profession. So far only two officers have 
 been appointed under this law, and 
 neither has been dropped. But the 
 scheme is an admirable one, and, as has 
 been urged by Lieut.-Col. Robert H. No- 
 ble, of the infantry, ought to be applied 
 to all second lieutenants, whether ap- 
 pointed from the ranks, from West Point, 
 or from civil life. There would be some" 
 considerable chance of this being en- 
 forced because a new officer has not 
 formed any of those domestic ties which 
 play so great a part in army life and 
 in the decisions of its boards and courts. 
 The War Department could withhold 
 from such an officer permission to marry. 
 
 It would all make the probationer walk 
 a very straight line during his first year, 
 and work very hard. While a choleric 
 colonel might occasionally do an injus- 
 tice in dropping an officer, the injustice 
 would be slight compared to the good 
 that would result if men were freely 
 discharged when they failed to show in- 
 dustry, good character, and adaptability 
 to the profession of soldiering. The Ger- 
 mans call some of their candidates for 
 commissions "Offlziersaspiranten" — which 
 tells the whole story. 
 
 Congress ought not to add thousands 
 of additional officers to the army in the 
 year 1916 without throwing this and 
 other safeguards around their appoint- 
 ment, for nine-tenths of them will be 
 inexperienced and with only the slight- 
 est military training, if any. Among 
 them will be many temperamentally un- 
 fit or unable to exercise the power to 
 command. 
 
 ATHLETICS AND DOMESTICITY. 
 
 There are officers in the army who 
 think that athletics and domesticity are 
 injuring the service to-day as much as 
 whiskey did in the old days when the 
 army was scattered over the plaina It 
 is unquestionably true that the provid- 
 ing of homes for officers has become an 
 almost unmitigated evil, and no survey 
 of the causes of the army's inefficiency 
 would be complete without a reference 
 to it I have already touched upon it. 
 but it is worth while to. record the fact 
 that the American army is the only one 
 that makes a practice of providing of- 
 ficers' families with residences. The cus- 
 tom grew up in the days of frontier 
 duty and Indian-fighting when forts 
 were forts and not barracks or canton- 
 ments. Now the most Important posts 
 are in or near cities so that the army 
 could make vast savings If It allowed 
 liberal sums for rentals and made the 
 officers live in the towns. This might not 
 be practical in Alaska or Panama or at 
 certain remote coast artillery stations; 
 but If the Government simply abandon- 
 ed the policy of housing officers' families, 
 it would save enough to maintain a num- 
 ber of regiments, besides doing away 
 with a large amount of special "duty" as 
 gardeners, servants, ice-suppliers, bus- 
 drivers, postmen, etc., a detached ser- 
 vice which, as already pointed out, 
 leads to intense dissatisfaction among the 
 enlisted men, besides depleting the 
 strength of companies. In some cases 
 it has led in fact to the abandonment 
 of guard duty. To one familiar with 
 the old army it is something of a shock 
 to see the disappearance of sentries and 
 the substitution of post policemen; for 
 sentry duty, in the West at least, was 
 one thing that was never slighted, and it 
 has heretofore been deemed one of the 
 most important functions of the soldier. 
 But it is now disappearing as is the his- 
 toric cavalry seat, which has been aban- 
 doned in our army in favor of the (for 
 military purposes) abominable hunting 
 seat 
 
 EFFECT OF CERTAIN SOCIAL CONDITIONS. 
 
 Just what effect the suburban village 
 type of barracks has upon the moral 
 tone and social life of the army has 
 often been set forth and never flatter- 
 ingly, it 13 never good for a group of 
 
12 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 families to be thrown together constant- 
 ly, any more than it is good for single 
 men to live In barracks. Purely aca- 
 demic communities suffer in the same 
 way as military posts, yet they are 
 without the endless dissensions due to 
 jealousies arising out of rank, prece- 
 dence, etc., and are supposed to be ab- 
 sorbed in intellectual pursuits. It would 
 be a gross libel on the army to accept 
 Gen. Charles King's novels as a true pic- 
 ture of garrison conditions; but if one- 
 fifth were true they would be an un- 
 answerable argument for the simple sys- 
 tem in vogue In England and all the 
 Continental armies of letting army of- 
 ficers live like other folks and not apart 
 from their own kind. It would do them 
 infinite good to live among the people 
 of the United States, for it would broaden 
 them and render them less likely to con- 
 sider themselves a caste, superior to all 
 in civil life. There are plenty of officers 
 
 who have sought detached service and 
 been for years away from their regiments 
 expressly to avoid the conditions of life 
 In posts like Missoula, Benjamin Harri- 
 son, Logan, etc., just as there are officers 
 who have served abroad who have ear- 
 nestly urged the placing of all our regi- 
 ments in barracks in cities as a step 
 towards efficiency. 
 
 Why would it not pay Congress to in- 
 quire into all of this before it adds new 
 regiments to our army? Is it the pork- 
 barrel which prevents? Or is it the fail- 
 ure of the army leaders to point the 
 way? Or is It both? The public ought 
 to know. Incidentally, Congress ought 
 to inquire into the mischief done by the 
 constant transferring of officers of the 
 fifteen regiments on foreign service, 
 which makes regimental loyalty and 
 esprit de corps Impossible. 
 
 Let Congress look at the marines. This 
 branch of the navy shines whenever con- 
 
 trasted with our soldiers. There are no 
 West Pointers among its officers and 
 only a few graduates of Annapolis and 
 men from the ranks. The rest were 
 green civilians when appointed. Five- 
 sixths of its officers have entered the 
 marines since 1898. It is a service to 
 be proud of. Why? Is it wholly due to 
 its connection with the navy, or its con- 
 stantly seeing foreign service and going 
 to sea? No; its admirable efficiency, the 
 smartness, the neatness, and excellent 
 set-up of the men and the esprit de corps 
 of its officers, cannot be so easily ex- 
 plained. Some one ought to tell us why, 
 some one like a committee of Congress. 
 Would such a committee dwell on the 
 fact that the Marine Corps provides no 
 quarters at permanent posts — save here 
 and there one at navy yards — for the 
 families of its officers, in addition to some 
 of the other differences between these two 
 fighting forces? 
 
 LAND DEFENCES OF OUR COASTS 
 
 Why Are They, Like the Navy, So Lightly Ignored by the Militarists ?- 
 Their Adequacy Attested by Experts — Instance of the Dar- 
 danelles — Effectiveness of Mine Fields Shown in 
 Present War — Difficulties of Invasion 
 
 NEXT to the navy officers, who in ev- 
 ery discussion of national prepar- 
 edness are brushed aside with the 
 humiliating assumption that they will 
 inevitably be defeated in any and every 
 fleet action, it would seem as if our 
 coast defences and their officers were the 
 most shabbily treated by advocates of 
 greater national preparedness. Thus I 
 heard the president of the National Se- 
 curity League the other night dismiss 
 our costly and elaborate system of coast 
 defences with a wave of his hand and the 
 remark: 
 
 "You know what our coast defences 
 are. They may be good where they are, 
 but anybody can land and walk around 
 them." 
 
 His audience might surely have been 
 pardoned for asking why, in that case, 
 the fortifications were built at all. It 
 was plainly merely scratching the sur- 
 face of the subject. But Mr. Menken is 
 hardly an exception to the rule ; there are 
 plenty of others who assume at the be- 
 ginning of their plea for a greater army 
 that our coast defences are no more of 
 value than so many match-boxes. It is, 
 therefore, worth while setting down a few 
 little-known facts about them. 
 
 In the first place since 1888 there has 
 been expended upon the seacoast de- 
 fences of the United States proper no less 
 than $126,112,068.50. There has been ap- 
 propriated for all fortifications and re- 
 lated purposes in the United States and 
 its insular possessions since 1888 a grand 
 total of $176,973,699.13— rather a large 
 sum if honestly spent, and it has been 
 honestly spent, to wave aside as not 
 worth considering. But, of course, large 
 sums of money may be unwisely invested 
 In an Inadequate plant. Let us, there- 
 fore, see what the experts, to whom the 
 
 Security League invariably turns for 
 leadership, have to say as to the merits of 
 the seacoast fortifications. 
 
 SOME TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT. 
 
 Testifying before the Sub-Committee of 
 the House Committee on Appropriations 
 in charge of the Fortifications Appropri- 
 ation bill of 1915-1916, during February 
 of this year, Secretary of War Garrison, 
 in reply to a question whether in a 
 broad sense our coast defences were ade- 
 quate, replied as follows: 
 
 "Yes, sir; they certainly are adequate 
 for the purpose for which they were 
 placed there, qualifying only to the ex- 
 tent, that I do not mean to say that some 
 guns may not be on naval ships that 
 can shoot more effectively at extreme 
 ranges, but when you come down to that 
 you see how small a part that plays; 
 those ships could not corrfe in near the 
 shore; they would have to lie out there 
 and occasionally shoot, perhaps shoot- 
 ing on the hit-or-miss plan; and doing 
 some damage or doing no damage." 
 
 Congressman Gardner and others hav- 
 ing made much of this fact that the guns 
 on the new Queen Elizabeth and other 
 super-Dreadnoughts can outrange our 
 coast ordnance, Secretary Garrison was 
 asked what the War Department was do- 
 ing as to this. He replied that he was 
 asking for money to alter the mounting 
 and elevation of the guns in the existing 
 forts which would give them approxi- 
 mately the range of the guns on these 
 new ships, and he suggested that in any 
 new construction, guns equal or superior 
 to any afloat should be installed. "But," 
 he added, "there is no occasion to rush 
 into that [the replacing of many old guns 
 with new and larger ones], now, and to 
 attempt to scatter 14 or 16-inch guns all 
 
 over our continent would certainly result 
 In our getting nowhere." 
 
 WHAT REAL, SOLDIERS THINK. 
 
 Now, Secretary Garrison may be ob- 
 jected to on the ground that he is a civili- 
 an and not a military expert. Fortunately, 
 there were military experts also in attend- 
 ance upon this Committee. One of them 
 was Brigadier-General Erasmus M. 
 Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, whose 
 duty it is, he said, to "be advised as to 
 the character and sufficiency of our 
 seacoast armament." In reply to a 
 question. Gen. Weaver said: 
 
 "My opinion is that our system of for- 
 tifications is reasonably adequate for all 
 defensive purposes which they are likely 
 to be called upon to meet." A little later 
 he again said: 
 
 "I have been a close student of the 
 whole subject, naturally, for a number 
 of years, and I know of no fortifications in 
 the world, as far as my reading, obser- 
 vation, and knowledge go, that compare 
 favorably in efficiency with ours." 
 
 Now, to make coast defences valuable 
 something else is needed besides guns — 
 properly trained officers and men. As 
 to our Coast Artillery force, Gen. 
 Weaver said: 
 
 "I think it is at least equal to that of 
 any coast-defence personnel in the 
 world." 
 
 In his annual report, dated Washing- 
 ton, September 19, 1914, Gen. Weaver 
 had previously had the following to say 
 about the efficiency of his men: "The 
 work of the personnel has been main- 
 tained at a high standard of efficiency, as 
 is evidenced below under the heading 
 'Instruction' and 'Target PracUce.' At- 
 tention is particularly invited to the effi- 
 ciency of gun and mortar practice at 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 13 
 
 night. This is the second year that night 
 practice has been attempted, and it Is 
 encouraging to note that the efficiency 
 of both day and night gun and mortar, 
 as well as mine, practice has been fully 
 maintained. The effort has been, in both 
 practices, to assimilate the conditions as 
 closely as possible to those that would 
 be met with in war." 
 
 GENERAL CROZIEIt'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 The greatest expert in this country on 
 fortifications and guns. Gen. William 
 Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, was also called 
 by this committee. Being asked what, 
 in his judgment, would be the condition 
 in our fortifications after the alterations 
 to which Secretary Garrison referred 
 were made in the mounting and eleva- 
 tion of the existing guns in our forts. 
 Gen. Crozier replied: 
 
 "I am of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, 
 that they [our fortifications] will be of 
 such power and will be recognized of 
 such power that naval officer* would 
 not put their ship* up against them in 
 a fight. The 12-inch guns that we have 
 mounted in our fortifications, after the 
 alterations to which you have alluded, 
 will have with this heaviest projectle a 
 range of something over 17,000 yards, 
 and I have not any belief that naval 
 vessels, even when their guns will per- 
 mit them to fire at a greater range than 
 that, would stand off at a greater range 
 and attempt to injure our fortifications 
 by bombardment, because the chances 
 of their inflicting injury would be so 
 small that they would not consider the 
 waste of the ammunition to be justified. 
 Now, by another change, with the use 
 of a lighter projectile, of 700 pounds 
 weight, we could still further increase 
 the range by 2,000 yards, or running up 
 to about 19,500 yards for this old type 
 of 12-inch gun. You have had some 
 testimony before you to the effect that 
 the claim had been made that after 
 these changes these guns would be just 
 as good as the best guns now being 
 mounted on foreign vessels of war. No- 
 body that I know of has made any such 
 claim, and I do not think anybody would 
 claim that a modern 12-inch gun, no 
 matter what you did with it, would be 
 as good as a modern 15-inch gun; but 
 in my opinion these guns, with the other 
 advantages which land-defence forti- 
 fications have, will be adequate for main- 
 taining a successful combat with vessels 
 of war armed with any gun which is 
 now under construction anywhere in the 
 world, to my knowledge." 
 
 It would be hard to obtain a more posi- 
 tive statement as to what would happen 
 if the Queen Elizabeth should appear off 
 our coasts than this. 
 
 COAST DEFENCES STILL BELIEVED IN. 
 As has already been pointed out in 
 a previous article, there has been noth- 
 ing in this war to shake the faith of 
 ordnance officers in coast defences. 
 The German coast defences are pro- 
 tected by shoal waters and tremendous 
 mine fields; navigation there is said to 
 be so difficult that the most skilful pilot 
 would not dare take a ship in when all 
 beacons and lighthouses are extinguish- 
 ed and all the floating aids to naviga- 
 tion have been removed. As a result 
 the British fleet has delivered no at- 
 
 tack whatever upon the island of Heli- 
 goland or any other point of the land 
 defences, thus indicating that there are 
 other defences besides our own that na- 
 val officers will not, as Gen. Crozier 
 said, "put their ships up against them 
 in a fight." 
 
 In the Dardanelles we have had the 
 Queen Elizabeth herself at work, and 
 have witnessed her hasty flight to Eng- 
 land just as soon as the German sub- 
 marines appeared and torpedoed six 
 of the Allies' battleships. American 
 correspondents are among those who 
 have testified that the guns on the Brit- 
 ish fleet did surprisingly little damage 
 to the coast defences of the Darda- 
 nelles. A few guns were dismounted, 
 but only one or two of the defences 
 were, it is stated, actually put out of 
 business. It is true that the guns of 
 the ships made possible the landing (at 
 a terrible cost of lives) of the Allied 
 troops; but, once ashore, they have 
 made little or no headway since, and, 
 what is of greater importance In the 
 discussion of our own defence prob- 
 lem, it is widely believed that as soon 
 as the inclement weather sets in, about 
 the 1st of December, the troops will 
 have to abandon their positions and 
 retreat to their ships, because in the 
 absence of any harbor it will probably 
 be impossible tnen to keep up communi- 
 cation with the troops. If this proves 
 to be the case, it will be an interest- 
 ing example as to what might happen 
 to the enemy that is so blithely landed 
 by the advocates of military prepared- 
 ness on the open shores of Long Island 
 or Atlantic City. 
 
 EFFECTIVENESS OF MINE FIELDS. 
 
 But a coast defence does not comprise 
 only men and guns. There are other 
 means of opposing an enemy. Of these 
 the most important is the floating mine, 
 which has taken such tremendous toll 
 of ships and lives during the present 
 war, that did such effective work dur- 
 ing our Civil War in the rivers of the 
 Confederacy, a-id, more recently, in the 
 Russo-Japanese War. It will be re- 
 membered that when Admiral Beatty 
 was victoriously pursuing the German 
 battle-cruiser squadron he had to let 
 the enemy escape with the loss of only 
 one ship, because he found himself ap- 
 proaching German mine-fields and Ger- 
 man submarines. He did not run on a 
 mine, nor did a submarine, so far as 
 known, attack one of his ships; none the 
 less, he hauled off and started straight 
 back for home, thus giving the best pos- 
 sible evidence of the respect that naval 
 officers have for two methods of defend- 
 ing coasts. 
 
 The effectiveness of an individual mine 
 has been many times illustrated but 
 never better than by the sinking of the 
 German cruiser Torek, with a loss of 
 three-quarters of her crew after striking 
 one of the mines laid by Germans in 
 their own waters. In addition to six 
 Allied battleships submarined in the Dar- 
 danelles, two, the Ocean and the Irresisti- 
 ble, were sunk by floating mines, without 
 the enemy's risking a man.. After this 
 all the battleships disappeared. 
 
 Gen. Weaver has testified that the 
 American defence plan involves subma- 
 rines, especially in Puget Sound and San 
 
 Francisco, in places where the water is 
 so deep that mines cannot be used. One 
 of the greatest submarine experts in the 
 country writes me that with 200 sub- 
 marines properly distributed "we should 
 be secure from invasion." As long as 
 there was a single American submarine 
 afloat, any invading fleet would have a 
 very uncomfortable time as it lay off our 
 coast defences outside of the mine fields, 
 with all lights out, with buoys removed 
 and channels mined, and tried to put the 
 fortifications out of business so that a 
 landing could be achieved not on the 
 open beach, but in a sheltered harbor. 
 
 Much is made by the advocates of 
 greater preparedness of the fact, official- 
 ly confirmed by Gen. Weaver in his tes- 
 timony already referred to, that our coast 
 defences are "open from behind." But 
 so are all coast defences the world over; 
 so they always have been since the day 
 of the round masonry fort. This war has 
 shown what a simple method of defence 
 not only for the rears of coast defences 
 but for forts, exists in the trench with 
 barbed-wire entanglements. Gen. Kitch- 
 ener's raw recruits have brought home 
 the fact that they can hold off the Ger- 
 man veterans in such trenches. Trenches 
 have indeed saved the great line of 
 French forts from Verdun to Belfort. 
 Had the German siege artillery been 
 able to approach near enough to these 
 forts to hit them, they would have been 
 smashed to pieces as rapidly as have 
 been the Russian and Belgian fortresses 
 that were deemed impregnable and the 
 French forts that have succumbed. 
 
 AS TO SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. 
 
 Finally, as to the supplies of ammuni- 
 tion available for coast defences, it is 
 true that Gen. Crozier, Gen. Wotherspoon, 
 and Gen. Weaver have testified that we 
 have not the amount of ammunition on 
 hand which those officers think necessary. 
 Gen. Weaver considers that an allowance 
 of two hours' supplies for each coast gun 
 in the United States is sufficient, because 
 of the possibility of transferring ammuni- 
 tion from one coast to another and one 
 fort to another. Gen. Weaver testified 
 that he had a full supply of ammunition 
 on hand for the 10-inch and 12-lnch 
 rifles, but less than 50 per cent, in the 
 case of the mortars. If, therefore, the 
 advocates of preparedness wish to de- 
 mand additional supplies for the larger 
 guns and more for the mortars, they will 
 be on sure ground and will have the 
 hearty cooperation of these experts, par- 
 ticularly as the progress of events in 
 Europe shows that far greater quanti- 
 ties of ammunition can be shot away in 
 battle than any one had heretofore 
 Imagined. 
 
 Here again the question of policy 
 comes up. If it is decided that we shall 
 pursue the plan of defensive operations 
 only, we can well afford, if we must have 
 defences, to strengthen our coast defences, 
 lay in all the mines we can possibly use, 
 submarines in plenty, and dirigible torpe- 
 does according to the plans of young 
 Mr. Hammond, and any other devices 
 that the Naval Inventions Board may 
 work out. With a clear goal and defi- 
 nite problems assigned to it, the country 
 should, with the cooperation of both ser- 
 vices, be able to accomplish so much as 
 to make it impossible for a foreign na- 
 
14 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 tion to consider the question of Invasion 
 and at the same time save ourselves from 
 the cost of a huge fleet and army. 
 
 THE QUESTION OP AN OVERSEAS RAID. 
 
 As for this question of Invasion, about 
 which such utter nonsense has been 
 written, still one more word Is In place. 
 Representative Williams, of Illinois, has 
 estimated that it will require 1,000 trans- 
 ports, each conveying 1,000 men, with 
 provisions, munitions, and arms and 
 equipment, convoyed by 100 battleships, 
 if Japan should seriously make an at- 
 tempt upon our shores. Thirty-one trans- 
 ports and sixty-two war vessels were 
 necessary to take the Canadian expedi- 
 tion of 33,000 troops to England at the 
 beginning of 1915, and the 28,000 troops 
 from Australia required forty ships. Ger- 
 many could not do better. It is well 
 worth while to quote in this connection 
 what Representative Witherspoon, of 
 Mississippi, said January 29 last on the 
 Naval Appropriation bill about Germany's 
 twenty pre-Dreadnought battleships: 
 
 But what I want to call your atten- 
 tion to especially about these ships is that 
 they ought not to be considered by us at 
 all, for the reason that it is an impossi- 
 bility for them to cross the ocean. They 
 cannot carry coal enough to bring them 
 across the ocean, not one of them. The 
 maximum coal capacity of the first five 
 of those German battleships is 1,050 tons. 
 The maximum coal capacity of the next 
 five is 1,400 tons. The maximum coal 
 capacity of the next five is 1,600 tons, 
 and of the other five is 1,800 tons of coal. 
 You cannot get those ships across the 
 ocean with that much coal. They can 
 not carry enough coal to bring them, the 
 largest of them, closer than within 500 
 miles of our shores, and I do not believe 
 the smallest of them could get half-way 
 across the ocean. 
 
 Even more striking is a statement in 
 the brilliant book by a dissenting Ger- 
 man, "I Accuse," in which he bitterly 
 criticises his own Government from the 
 beginning to the end. Speaking of a pos- 
 sible expedition from Germany to Great 
 Britain, he says: "Notwithstanding all 
 the admiration we may feel for the 
 achievements of our heroic navy, it 
 would be foolish to close our eyes to the 
 fact that the gigantic superiority of the 
 English fleet cannot be equalized by 
 means of Zeppelins and submarines — of 
 which latter, be it observed, England 
 possesses a greater number than we do 
 [in 1912 eighty-five, to which must be 
 added ninety French]. And in all this 
 we have to bear in mind the fact that 
 the English fleet would be the assailant; 
 the German fleet would be the fleet as- 
 sailed, in so far as it managed to press 
 forward to the Channel. The German 
 fleet would, however, have to protect 
 not only itself, but also clumsy cargo 
 boats, incapable of self-defence, on which 
 there would have to be transported to 
 England a number of army corps, with 
 the appropriate light and heavy artillery, 
 cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automo- 
 biles, and aircraft material. Is such an 
 attempt at all conceivable? Is it pos- 
 sible that there are human beings who 
 are prepared to expose to destruction at 
 a blow on such a scale as this hundreds 
 of thousands of their fellowmen?" 
 
 WHOLE EXPEDITION IN PERIL. 
 
 This mere statement of the problem 
 would seem to show its impracticability. 
 
 As far back as February, 1909, a com- 
 petent writer in the Contemporary Re- 
 view pointed out that any fleet which 
 
 could bring German troops to England 
 could move only at a speed of six or 
 seven knots an hour, the speed of the 
 slowest vessel, and that these slow-going 
 merchant ships, "crowded with men, 
 would form an easy target for torpedo 
 craft or mine layers, even in small force, 
 and the sinking of a few would prob- 
 ably cause panic among the remainder." 
 
 The same writer pointed out that If 
 150,000 Germans were to be transported 
 on 200,000 tons of shipping it would have 
 to be "a force destitute of artillery, cav- 
 alry, and land transport," He also proved 
 that 200,000 tons of shipping cannot be 
 found lying in German ports at any one 
 time, and that to gather them together 
 would take days and probably weeks, and 
 give due notice of their intention of mov- 
 ing. That it would take such an armada 
 about three weeks to cross the Atlantic 
 has recently been pointed out by Mr. 
 Jonathan A. Rawson, jr., and this allows 
 for fair weather and smooth seas all the 
 way. 
 
 While it is true that the United States 
 has not the overwhelming superiority of 
 the English fleet, that does not alter the 
 fact that an expedition to the United 
 States, a distance of 4,000 miles from 
 Bremen and Hamburg — and the Germans 
 have no nearer base from which to oper- 
 ate — would be an undertaking so vastly 
 more difficult than an invasion of Eng- 
 land, that not even the Germans would 
 contemplate it 
 
 Surely there is nothing in the condi- 
 tion of our coast defences or in this prob- 
 lem of overseas invasion to make us give 
 in to the sudden fears of the militarists! 
 
 SHALL WE PAY THE MILITIA? 
 
 Militia Pay Bill a Sop to the National Guard — Arguments Against the 
 Proposal — Enormous Expense Certain to Grow, Even if the Be- 
 ginning Were Moderate — Administration Preparedness 
 Plan a Reversal of Historic American Policy 
 
 THE Administration plan for the en- 
 largement of the regular army by 
 the enlistment of a special reserve 
 force in addition to the State militia is a 
 radical departure in our history — first, 
 because no such reserve has ever been 
 undertaken before and, secondly, because 
 it means the final abandonment of the 
 plan to make of the existing National 
 Guard a first-line reserve in time of war. 
 As such It has served in several of our 
 wars, more or less — generally less — suc- 
 cessfully. But legal experts in the War 
 Department and others have come to the 
 conclusion that it cannot go any further 
 in the Federalizing of the militia than it 
 has now gone, without coming into vio- 
 lent contact with the Constitution of the 
 United States. Hence the abandonment of 
 the militia as a first reserve and the com- 
 ing transfer of the affections and inter- 
 est of the War Department to the new 
 Federal reserve, provided that Congress 
 shall sanction it. 
 That this will cause heart-burnings in 
 
 the militia is obvious. That body has felt 
 hurt because it was unofficially noised 
 about that graduates of the publicity- 
 achieving civilian camps of the past sum- 
 mer were to be regarded as In line for 
 commissions as regular officers in war 
 time. Militiamen, especially officers, who 
 serve faithfully, put in much more time 
 soldiering in one year than do those who 
 spend a month at such a training camp. 
 The drill is more trying and monotonous, 
 and there is no glare of the lime-light 
 about it 
 
 Now, if it becomes known that the War 
 Department will hereafter be only second- 
 arily interested in the State troops, there 
 is bound to be further disappointment 
 which cannot have a favorable effect 
 upon enlistments, particularly in view of 
 the fact that the new Federal Reserve 
 will not have to drill throughout the win- 
 ter, or to be in readiness for strike or 
 riot duty, but will drill in summer time 
 in the open. To offset this discourage- 
 ment the War Department again holds 
 
 out the Militia Fay bill, this time as a 
 sop, whereas heretofore It has been her- 
 alded as the one necessary step to make 
 the National Guard the complete and ef- 
 ficient organization It ought to be. 
 
 WHAT THE PAY BILL OFFERS. 
 
 This pay bill is now a familiar one on 
 the calendars of Congress, but not until 
 last winter did it receive the sanction of 
 the President, the War Department, and 
 of the chairman of the House Military 
 Affairs Committee, Congressman Hay, in 
 addition to the National Militia Board, the 
 National Guard Association, etc., or pass 
 the House. Its object is simply to pay of- 
 ficers and men of the militia for all their 
 drills in winter time; that is for service 
 which, since the foundation of the re- 
 public, has been performed without re- 
 muneration as a patriotic free-will offer- 
 ing to the States and to the Union. The 
 reason given for it is the assertion that 
 greater efficiency and a better grade of 
 militiamen can be secured by paying for 
 the winter drills; that it costs men money 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 15 
 
 to belong: now: that many cannot, there- 
 fore, afford to, and that more serious and 
 valuable recruits could be obtained if the 
 militia could offer 50 cents a drill, or $2 
 a month, as compensation. 
 
 It Is estimated that this bill will cost 
 all the way from $8,000,000 to $15,000,000 
 a year. The more effective it might be, 
 that is, the more it brought men Into the 
 ranks— if any— the higher would be the 
 cost It has been eagerly seized upon by 
 certain State authorities whose slogan 
 is: "Let Uncle Sam support the militia." 
 
 The proposal that if the militia is to be 
 paid at all, it should be paid by the sev- 
 eral States whose creation It is, evokes no 
 enthusiasm whatever In the various State 
 capitals. Hence the powerful militia lobby 
 which has been working for the bill has 
 wasted no time at home, but gone straight 
 to Washington. 
 
 Even there, however. It has run upon 
 some serious rocks. There are constitu- 
 tional lawyers In plenty to point out that 
 there Is no provision in the Constitution 
 which confers upon Congress the right to 
 "support" or "maintain" the militia, and 
 that the bill as drawn would make it pos- 
 sible for the President to strip a State of 
 all its troops, leaving it powerless to sup- 
 press violence within its own borders or 
 to enforce Its laws. If he thinks occasion 
 warrants his sending the entire militia 
 elsewhere. In our recent border troubles, 
 for Instance, had this proposed law been 
 In force, the President might have sent 
 the entire New York mllltla to the Rio 
 Grande on the ground of the "grave emer- 
 gency" existing there, leaving the State 
 bare of troops. 
 
 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSAL. 
 
 The arguments against the bill — argu- 
 ments advanced not merely by captious 
 civilian critics, but by some National 
 Guard officers like Col. W. G. Bates, of 
 the Seventy-first New York, and regular 
 officers, and by others who have studied 
 the question, among them a minority of 
 the House Committee on Military Affairs 
 — may be summarized as follows: 
 
 (1.) There Is no guarantee whatever 
 that the payments authorized will ac- 
 complish the desired end of increasing 
 the efficiency of the militia. 
 
 (2.) The bill will create a new class of 
 public servants to be paid out of the 
 Federal Treasury for all time. 
 
 (3.) It will create another powerful 
 military machine well organized, as its 
 lobby shows, to bring pressure to bear 
 upon Congress for further increases. 
 
 (4.) It Is special legislation urged by 
 men who will profit financially by its 
 passage. 
 
 (5.) No reliable forecast whatever can 
 be made of Its cost, as Is shown by the 
 fact that the estimates vary by $7,000,- 
 000; that Is, they run from $8,000,000 to 
 $15,000,000 a year. One Congressman be- 
 lieves that it will go to $100,000,000 in a 
 few years. 
 
 (6.) It makes possible a grave conflict 
 of authority between a State and the 
 Federal Government, and is a further 
 blow at States' Rights. 
 
 (7.) The constitutionality of such a 
 measure is more than dubious. 
 
 As to the first of these points, pay for 
 the voluntary service now performed 
 could only give us a better militia if the 
 sole evil were non-attendance at drills 
 
 and the money paid were sufficient to 
 lure the men In the ranks to the armories 
 on drill nights. Nor would It be a cure- 
 all If the trouble were the quality of 
 the men now enlisted. No pay of fifty 
 cents or a dollar a night could tempt the 
 men who compose the best-drilled and 
 most efficient regiments such as the Sev- 
 enth Regiment, Squadron A, the Twenty- 
 third Regiment, and the crack regiments 
 everywhere. As for the others — and the 
 writer served in the ranks of an unfash- 
 ionable regiment — they contain a good 
 cross-section of the working classes of a 
 city, very much the same kind of men 
 who turn out in case of hostilities. 
 
 SUM MUST BE MUCH LARGER. 
 
 Undoubtedly they would be glad to 
 have the United States give them real 
 money for services they now render free- 
 ly, but to most of them the sum would 
 have to be far larger than Is contem- 
 plated In order to induce them to enlist 
 If there were no other motive. If there 
 are some regiments In which the mate- 
 rial Is Inferior, then the fault is largely 
 with the officers; poor officers attract 
 poor recruits, and make poor regiments. 
 Well-officered and well-disciplined regi- 
 ments, in which there Is a good soldierly 
 spirit, naturally draw recruits to them. 
 There is the gravest doubt, moreover, 
 whether the kind of men who would be 
 lured Into the service of the State by a 
 bait of $2 a month, would be really worth 
 having, as good, for Instance, as the 
 present material. 
 
 But If the whole trouble is with the 
 officers, can better men be lured into the 
 service by 20 per cent, per annum of the 
 regular officer's pay? It Is again doubt- 
 ful, because in most States, officers are 
 elected by the votes of the soldiers, who 
 are all too apt to choose "good fellows," 
 but weak disciplinarians, men rather of 
 their own kind with whom they can be 
 on terms of intimacy. So long as this 
 system continues Its evil workings will 
 merely be Intensified by the desire of of- 
 ficers in need of money, or pecuniarily 
 ambitious, to intrigue with the men in 
 order that they may succeed to the high- 
 er salaries of their captains or majors. 
 The advocates of the bill Ignore this 
 point, but insist that regular pay will 
 retain in the service "capable officers, 
 many of whom might otherwise be com- 
 pelled to resign," and enable "officers of 
 moderate means to devote the time 
 necessary to military duties and studies." 
 It Is my observation that the bulk of 
 the capable officers who resign do so be- 
 cause of pressure of business, that is, be- 
 cause of prosperity. Few officers of mod- 
 erate means try to eke out their salaries 
 by night work; hence, the drills do not 
 Interfere with securing of men of this 
 class, and the pecuniary burden for uni- 
 forms, etc., Is far less severe than Is the 
 demand for the time of an officer. 
 
 In our New York Guard troop, battery 
 and company commanders, and some 
 staff officers spend from three to five 
 nights a week throughout the season at 
 their armories. After a while the strain 
 becomes too great or the officer's home 
 life demands more attention. Not In one 
 case In a hundred Is the resignation due 
 to Inability to earn enough above one's 
 living expenses to pay for the extra ex- 
 pense one is put to. It Is the time de- 
 manded of the studious and ambitious 
 
 officer that Is the real stumbling block, 
 and If officers of leisure can be found 
 they are usually in no need whatever of 
 25 per cent, of a regular lieutenant's pay. 
 
 A LESSON FROM PENSION INCREASE. 
 
 As for the question of cost and the 
 creation of a new political military ma- 
 chine, the former Adlutant-General of 
 New York State, William "Verbeck, In a 
 twenty-six page pamphlet issued by him 
 when in office, asked the question: "Will 
 the National Guard, if the bill Is passed, 
 demand additional compensation?" He 
 answered It thus: "This bill provides rea- 
 sonable compensation and it is not fair 
 to presume that the National Guard will 
 undertake to make any unreasonable de- 
 mands. By so doing, they would only 
 Injure the good reputation which they 
 have already obtained. Unreasonable de- 
 mands would be met by a Just rebuke 
 from Congress." 
 
 This was just what the country heard 
 in the early days of the pensions after 
 the Civil War. Did anybody say that 
 the veterans of the Grand Army wished 
 a pension for everybody? How scanda- 
 lous to Insinuate It, or to say that In a 
 few years Government pap would be 
 asked for skulkers, cowards, and camp- 
 followers, or that more than a few mil- 
 lions would be! Yet we know what has 
 happened In the last fifty years. 
 
 The minority of the House Military 
 Affairs Committee on December 10, 1912, 
 thus expressed Itself as to the dangers 
 that lurk behind this legislation: 
 
 The minority making this report Is con- 
 vinced that the legislation proposed by 
 the pending bill is not only unwise, but 
 that it Is dangerous in the extreme. 
 Rather than enter upon a legislative 
 course that will Inevitably entail upon the 
 general Government an enormous ex- 
 pense, which may be found in dire emer- 
 gency to hay^ been wasted, a course that 
 will surely lead to the creation of a great 
 mllltarv force that will become so power- 
 ful politically that Congress will be no 
 more able to resist Its demands than It 
 has been to resist the demands of the 
 far less compactly organized and man- 
 ageable army of pension applicants and 
 their friends, this minority would favor a 
 reasonable increase of the regular army, 
 leaving the States to maintain their own 
 troops In their own way, and at their 
 own expense, without any aid whatever 
 from the United States. ^Objectionable 
 as such an increase of the regular army 
 would be. It would have the merit of 
 assuring us the possession of an armed 
 force that in time of war would, by Ms 
 persistent training, be worth all of Its 
 cost, which undoubtedly would be cheap- 
 er In the end than the cost of the gTeat 
 semi -military. Reml-clvll organization, 
 wielding tremendous political power, that 
 will grow up as surely as the sun will 
 rise and set If the course of legislation 
 outlined by the pending bill Is once en- 
 tered upon. 
 
 CERTAINTY OF PROGRESSIVE DEMANDS. 
 
 Congressman Fitzgerald, of New York, 
 Chairman of the Appropriations Commit- 
 tee In the last House. In speaking against 
 the bill In Congress, after pointing out 
 that the Federal Government Is already 
 paying out $4,000,000 annually for the 
 equipment of the mllltla, said: "When 
 men are put upon a basis where they re- 
 ceive 25 per cent, of the pay of an en- 
 listed man, they will very quickly demand 
 the compensation be increased to 50, to 
 75, and then to 100 per cent, of the pay 
 of an enlisted man; and then, with this 
 organized movement extending Into every 
 little hamlet throughout the country will 
 
16 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 come an irresistible demand that the pay 
 of the enlisted men of the army be in- 
 creased so that the militia may be the 
 beneficiaries, and instead of imposing an 
 annual charge of six or eight million dol- 
 lars, as some well-informed persons pre- 
 dict, it will very easily result in a fixed 
 charge of over thirty million a year 
 . . . but now it is proposed that we 
 change our policy, and, instead of rely- 
 ing upon patriotic motives that we rely 
 
 upon selfishness and greed, and entirely 
 upon a financial Inducement for men to 
 undertake service In the militia." 
 
 What the militia needs, if it is to be 
 developed, Is not pay, but popular en- 
 couragement, further advances along the 
 lines of the last few years, during which 
 it has made very great strides, notably 
 la the East; the abolition of the election 
 of officers; the freeing of its business 
 methods from much of the regular army 
 
 red tape, which often causes waste, and 
 above all, its removal from the sphere of 
 politics. It Is politics and the lack of real 
 military standards that have been the bane 
 of the militia service. Of course, it is true 
 that it needs greater efficiency, but it is 
 getting this in a remarkable degree In 
 these days — and wholly without the Mili- 
 tia Pay bill. 
 
 WHY CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE NAVY? 
 
 Inherent in Our Theory of Government that Professional Soldiers and 
 
 Sailors Shall Be Under Civil Authority — Blunders and Pride of 
 
 Expert Opinion in the Navy's Past — Civilians Should 
 
 Control Both Purse-Strings and Military Policy 
 
 WHY does the Navy need civilian 
 control ? Why should we not turn 
 over the Navy Department, the 
 navy itself, and everything relating 
 to the service afloat to naval officers, 
 making some Rear-Admiral the Secretary 
 of the Navy, with a seat in the Cabinet? 
 They do it in Prance and Germany and 
 elsewhere. Why not turn over the whole 
 business of the navy to the experts? 
 
 Primarily because it is contrary to the 
 accepted Anglo-Saxon tradition, which 
 has ever guarded most jealously the su- 
 premacy of civilian authority over the 
 military. Our forefathers had been dom- 
 inated by the military throughout their 
 Colonial days; they were in no mood to 
 exalt it after they had achieved their in- 
 dependence. They saw that even in the 
 mother-country the control of the navy 
 and army was kept in civilian hands, and 
 they stuck to the principle not only in 
 the administration of the Government, 
 but In the safeguarding of the rights of 
 the civilian individual from any interfer- 
 ence by courts-martial — an echo of which 
 we have just had in this State in the 
 debate over the proposed Constitution. It 
 is true that Washington appointed his old 
 Chief of Artillery, Henry Knox, as the 
 first Secretary of War, and it is a fact 
 also that there is no law prohibiting the 
 appointment as Secretary of War of a 
 General on the active list or an active 
 Admiral as the Secretary of the Navy. 
 Generals Sherman and Schofield were two 
 generals who acted as Secretary of War 
 for considerable periods while also on the 
 army's active list. Former officers in 
 number have served as Secretary of War; 
 fewer as Secretary of the Navy. But 
 the principle that there should be com- 
 plete civilian control has none the less 
 been upheld by public sentiment and by 
 tradition. 
 
 Indeed, President Wilson well stated 
 the reason for it in his speech In New 
 York on May 17, In which he- defined the 
 sphere of activity of our naval officers 
 thus: 
 
 "The mission of America is the only 
 thing that a sailor or a soldier should 
 think about. He has nothing to do with 
 the formulation of her policy. He is to 
 support her policy, whatever it is, but 
 he is to support her policy in the spirit 
 
 of herself. And the strength of our 
 policy is that we, who for the time being 
 administer the affairs of this nation, do 
 not originate her spirit We attempt to 
 embody it. We attempt to realize it In 
 action. We are dominated by it We do 
 not dictate It" 
 
 The reason for this Is that the expert 
 however patriotic and highminded, can- 
 not but look at things from a rather nar- 
 row and partisan professional point of 
 view. When one thinks of the courtly 
 and gentle Dewey, of Farragut, of C. R. 
 P. Rodgers, and a host of other naval 
 celebrities, to say nothing of the leaders 
 of our present generation of naval offi- 
 cers, it Is Impossible to conjure up an 
 American von Tirpitz, and yet it is true 
 that there have been some men in high 
 positions who seemed bent on subordinat- 
 ing everything to their own and the 
 navy's aggrandizement But even if this 
 is exceptional, it is difficult for the men 
 at the top in either the army or the 
 navy to view things from the standpoint 
 of the country as a whole. They have 
 long been detached from civilian life, with 
 the business side of which they may 
 never have come into contact. Theirs 
 is not the responsibility for raising funds, 
 that is, for providing the ways and means 
 for purchasing the armaments they de- 
 sire. Their entire training leads them, 
 moreover, to fear the oncoming of an 
 enemy, and they habitually think of ev- 
 ery possible combination that may be 
 brought against them. 
 
 THE SOLDIER IS ALWAYS FEARFUL. 
 
 Hence, as already pointed out in these 
 articles, no naval or military officer is 
 ever satisfied with the forces at his dis- 
 posal — at least, there is no record of such 
 a one. The German General Staff was 
 not — even after their levy upon the peo- 
 ple of Germany in 1913, when they took 
 a portion, not of the citizen's income, but 
 of his property, in order to defend Ger- 
 many against its menacing foes. No 
 French or British general ever had 
 enough men, and so it goes. Now, we 
 are as a nation very certain, from the 
 President down, that none of our officers 
 of the army or navy will ever get into 
 (liia frame of mind. Do we not all of 
 us know Smith, Brown, and Jones, of the 
 navy, and Robinson, Allen, and Tucker, 
 
 of the army? Are they not peace-loving? 
 Is there anything of the militarist about 
 them? Well, the answer is that there 
 is not Individually, but that they are 
 parts of a system and a machine which 
 inevitably make for the subordination of 
 everything civilian to the military. What 
 ether lessons can be drawn from the 
 present experience of the world? 
 
 Is it not true that there have been 
 French militarists, from the Louis down, 
 as menacing to the world's peace as any 
 made in Germany? True, under the Re- 
 public they have been held in check, but 
 the Republic produced a Boulanger, and 
 the Dreyfus trial, with its sickening 
 revelations, also took place under it. 
 Have we not even seen signs in one of 
 the youngest of the great nations of the 
 world, Japan, that its internal order was 
 threatened by militaristic influences? Did 
 not a Cabinet fall on the question of a 
 naval increase or the refusal thereof? 
 Were there not shocking stories of naval 
 corruption from there a year ago, which 
 proved to have been linked up with cor- 
 ruption in Berlin by agents of the 
 German armament firms? "Since the 
 war with China in 1894 brought in an 
 era of huge contracts for supplies," says 
 Robert Young, editor of the Japan Chron- 
 icle, "corruption in places high and low, 
 in the army as well as the navy, has 
 been a constant theme of the Japanese 
 newspapers. . . . But the most fertile 
 source of demoralization has been the 
 temptation offered by huge contracts for 
 armament material and the competition 
 of rival firms." Rear-Admiral Fujii was 
 arrested in 1914 for taking bribes ag- 
 gregating $176,350. 
 
 Have we not got our own Navy League, 
 headed by a former navy officer, which 
 has just solemnly declared as its pro- 
 gramme that we shall have not only the 
 largest navy in the world, but one com- 
 petent to meet and overcome the fleets 
 of any three Powers that may be brought 
 against us — say, Germany, Kngland, and 
 France? This is surely out-Bernhardiing 
 Bernhardt! Yet this is solemnly urged by 
 a rich and prosperous body of Ameri- 
 can citizens. If their policy were carried 
 out, and there were a similar annual ex- 
 pansion of our ljind forces, is it too much 
 to say that the business of preparing for 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 17 
 
 war would take precedence over every 
 other department of Government, whether 
 conce ned with education, or the devel- 
 opment or conservation of resources, of 
 water powers and waste lands, etc., etc.? 
 Were that policy to be accepted by the 
 American people, this country would be- 
 come as much dreaded for its navallsm 
 as England has been, and it would be a 
 standing- menace to the peace of the 
 world, however certain President Wilson 
 and others may be that this country at 
 this day and hour is not contemplating 
 aggression, and never could think of ag- 
 gression. 
 
 PERIL IS IN THE SYSTEM. 
 
 No, it is not the Individual In the mil- 
 itary and naval system that Is to be 
 inveighed against, but the system itself 
 in which the Individual is but a 
 cog. The individual is swept along 
 by the tide; he cannot help him- 
 self, and that tendency is best checked 
 under free Governments by civilian con- 
 trol. More than that, is it not true, that 
 in every walk of life the expert must 
 needs be controlled, lest his absorption 
 in his specialty make him subordi- 
 nate everything to the development of 
 that specialty? We have seen some cu- 
 rious evidences of this in the medical 
 profession. Have we not had plenty of 
 signs right here in New York city of 
 the trend of certain medical men to- 
 wards assuming autocratic control of the 
 public? Do they not desire to vaccinate 
 us by law, not once, but a number of 
 times at once; do they not wish to pass 
 laws demanding a rigid physical inspec- 
 tion of every individual at least once a 
 year? Do we not find a conservatism as 
 hostile to any departure from the old 
 traditions as any one could find in the 
 army or navy? Do we not find insanity 
 experts who think that every Individual 
 varies mentally from the normal, and 
 experts in other sad diseases who insist 
 that 60 to 70 per cent, of the entire world 
 is affected by them? Do we not find 
 lawyers in plenty who look upon every 
 problem that is presented from the point 
 of view of the courts and the machinery 
 of the law? The tendency of the expert 
 to become absolutely absorbed In his sub- 
 ject is surely too obvious to need dwell- 
 ing upon, and particularly when authori- 
 ties confer upon him complete power, 
 do we got excesses which serve to alarm 
 the public. 
 
 But there is still another and a very 
 particular reason why the control of the 
 navy and army should not be completely 
 handed over to experts. It is that the pub- 
 lic does not get the best results when 
 the experts are solely in charge. As to 
 that, there could be nothing more il- 
 luminating than the history of the Unit- 
 ed States navy itself, in which is to be 
 found instance after Instance where pro- 
 fe sional conservatism and the pride of 
 lion of experts have combined to keep 
 service in a narrow rut and routine, 
 , therefore, prevented the adoption 
 • ; development of new types of vessels 
 engines of war. It is easy to pick 
 out a few historical instances. 
 
 :ASE OF THE FIRST DREADNOUGHT, 
 or example, the first Dreadnought 
 • built was constructed, not in Eng- 
 I, a dozen years ago, but in the Unit- 
 States in 1814. True, she was a 
 
 wooden Dreadnought, but she was an 
 all-big-gun vessel, and her vital parts 
 were surrounded by an armor of oak ex- 
 actly comparable to the armor of the 
 battleship of to-day. This was the Dem- 
 ologos, or Fulton, built under the direc- 
 tion of Robert Fulton himself, and it was 
 the first war steamship ever built. Be- 
 sides having a wheel in centre, and the 
 radical innovation of steam, her batteries 
 of twenty long 32-pounders were rein- 
 forced by a submarine gun carrying a 
 100-pound shot. She measured 145 feet 
 over all, and was built with two hulls 
 separated from end to end by a channel 
 15 feet wide and 66 feet long, in which 
 the waterwheel revolved absolutely pro- 
 tected from the enemy's shot. The main, 
 or gun, deck, was protected by a parapet 
 4 feet 10 inches thick of solid timber, 
 and on the upper deck many hundreds 
 of men could have paraded. She had 
 two stout masts and four rudders, so 
 that she might go either way without 
 turning. In addition, she had a furnace 
 for hot shot, and could discharge an im- 
 mense column of boiling water into 
 an enemy's port-hole. She could have 
 steamed through the British fleet from 
 end to end unscathed, but, the war com- 
 ing to an end, she was tied up in the 
 Brooklyn navy yard, and there she lay 
 for fifteen years, until she blew up. The 
 navy made no attempt to improve upon 
 her or to make use of Fulton's ideas, 
 or to lead the world in producing war 
 steamships. It was actually not until 1841 
 that two twin side-wheelers, the Mis- 
 sissippi and the Missouri, were finally 
 built by the navy as its first steam cruis- 
 ers, by which time war steamships were 
 almost a commonplace abroad. Even as 
 late as 1835, the famous Commodore 
 Matthew Calbraith Perry nearly threw 
 away his reputation when he asserted 
 that a war steamship of 1,300 tons would 
 be built to cruise the sea for twenty 
 days at a time without accident. 
 
 The history of the Monitor affords still 
 another bit of evidence. What difficulties 
 Ericsson had in overcoming the conser- 
 vatism of the Navy Department has been 
 well pointed out in the admirable life 
 of the inventor written by Col. William 
 C. Church, the veteran editor of the 
 Army and Navy Journal. Yet the Mon- 
 itor, hastily built as it was, played a 
 great r&le in revolutionizing warfare. The 
 cause of its failure to become a dom- 
 inating naval type was the lack of a 
 proper ventilation system, the lack of any 
 decks on which to parade the crew when 
 at sea, and because the navy could not 
 get used to the fact that water 
 rolled over the deck while the Monitor 
 was at sea. As soon as the war was 
 over, the newest and best of the ships, 
 the Dunderberg, etc., were sold to for- 
 eign governments. True, the Miantono- 
 moh and the Monadnock cruised success- 
 fully, the one to Europe and the other 
 around Cape Horn, but the navy stuck 
 to the high-sided wooden ships until the 
 new navy came, when it squarely turned 
 its back upon this American invention 
 and followed the British precedent in 
 building the high-sided predecessors of 
 the present battleships. These took, it is 
 true, the principle of Ericsson's turret 
 and armor, but abandoned some of the vital 
 features which distinguished the Monitor. 
 Curiously enough, to-day, in November, 
 1815, we have the British Prime Minis- 
 
 ter Asqulth, lauding in the House of 
 Commons, the service of the British 
 Monitors as having been the most dis- 
 tinguished of any vessels since the war 
 began, and praising Lord Fisher for his 
 development and use of these boats which 
 more nearly approach, If the fragmen- 
 tary descriptions which arrive here are 
 correct, the Ericsson Monitors than any- 
 thing built since, with the exception of 
 the two or three that the American Navy 
 has constructed in modern times, only 
 to abandon. 
 
 SO WITH TORPEDO BOATS AND SUBMA- 
 RINES. 
 
 The history of the torpedo boat Is the 
 third illustration of the Inability of our 
 naval officers to become enthusiastic 
 about new types of craft. The Confederates 
 in the Hunley and David produced boats 
 that brought us right up to the era of 
 modern submarines. Cushing's torpedo- 
 ing of the Albermarle, and the Confed- 
 erate use of the torpedo and the near-sub- 
 marine, were, despite the lapse of years, 
 the step just preceding modern mine and 
 torpedo developments. But the navy 
 pressed not at all for the development o' 
 the torpedo boat until about 1890. It had 
 In the seventies a torpedo ram, the 
 Alarm, which like the Demologos was al- 
 lowed to rust out In a navy yard. Its 
 officers concerned themselves not at all 
 with the study of the development of the 
 floating mine, and for this the whole re- 
 sponsibility cannot be put upon the 
 civilian Secretaries, for there were navy 
 officers at the head of every bureau of 
 the Department during these years. They 
 could easily have slipped Into the ap- 
 propriation bills a few thousands for ex- 
 perimental torpedo boats, but they did 
 not even protest very vigorously against 
 the building In the late seventies of the 
 Trenton and the Adams and other com- 
 fortable wooden ships of the old type th»t 
 had been the rage before the outbreak 
 of the Civil War, although in the sev- 
 enties all of the rest of the world was 
 going In for other kinds of vessels, and 
 the modern mobile torpedo and torpedo 
 boat were being developed soon after. 
 
 Even after the beginning of our mod- 
 ern navy, our officers were but little In- 
 terested, Rear-Admiral C. McR. Wins- 
 low being one of the few to take a deep in- 
 terest in this new type of torpedo vessel 
 at the outset 
 
 And so the story has been with 
 the submarine, too. The first group 
 of under-water boats was tied up In the 
 navy yards! Only gradually was practice 
 with them begun. Not until Secretai" 
 Daniels appointed Capt. A. W. Grant, of 
 the navy, last May, to take charge of 
 the submarine, was a separate or- 
 ganization for them deemed worth while. 
 Indeed, the makers of these boats charee 
 emphatically that a great deal of tn» 
 trouble which has happened on these 
 most delicate craft has been due to the 
 fact that very young and inexperienced 
 officers — ensigns, the ink on whose com- 
 missions was hardly dry — have been 
 given charge, while officers of great skill 
 and experience were demanded. All this 
 is being remedied under Secretary Dan- 
 iels's guidance, but the fact remains that 
 the submarine was a step-child of the 
 navy from the time that It appeared until 
 the war abroad showed what others could 
 do with it, and yet it was an American 
 
18 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 Invention and the outgrowth of Con- 
 federate Ingenuity and skill, as It had 
 been, further back, the invention of Bush- 
 nell and Fulton. Indeed, the submarine 
 has been but like numerous other Ameri- 
 can inventions which have had to find 
 a market abroad because the designers 
 could not interest the home authorities. 
 
 Surely, therefore, Secretary Daniels 
 has done a great service in appointing a 
 civilian board to cooperate with the navy, 
 thereby not only bringing into touch with 
 the service great talents, but creating a 
 machinery that will examine and test all 
 inventions offered and invite others, 
 without professional prejudice, and put 
 squarely alongside of the best navy tal- 
 ent a fresh civilian point of view untram- 
 melled by red tape, precedent, routine, or 
 traditions or customs. These are all prac- 
 tical reasons for the civilian control of 
 the navy. 
 
 LBSSON8 OF THE PRESENT WAR. 
 
 Perhaps this new arrangement may 
 lead to a reconsideration of our entire 
 naval policy In the light of the European 
 war. At present Secretary Daniels Is 
 asking for a little bit more of everything 
 old and something new In the battleship 
 cruiser, which In the opinion of many 
 people has not yet demonstrated its 
 worth. Nor has anybody yet really 
 
 gauged the extent of the success of the 
 German submarines, which at this writ- 
 ing are sinking merchantmen In the very 
 narrows of Gibraltar right under the eyes 
 of the fortress and in a passage-way so 
 narrow that it would seem as If they 
 could be guarded against there better 
 than anywhere else, and the mystery of 
 how they can operate hundreds or thou- 
 sands of miles from a known base re- 
 mains unexplained. We have not -stopped 
 to decide whether the battleship is on 
 top or the submarine. 
 
 Least of all, as was pointed out in the 
 first article of this series, have we real- 
 ly decided whether ours is to be an of- 
 fensive or a defensive navy. 
 
 But after all, the prime reason for the 
 civilian domination of the policy and 
 management of the navy is that this 
 Government is not warlike, that it places 
 the arts and ideals of peace above those 
 of war, and even above preparation for 
 war. Those is control, therefore, must be 
 men who are detached from any one in- 
 terest, military or civilian, so that they 
 may survey the whole field of the na- 
 tion's development and ambitions, and 
 proportionately divide the finances of the 
 country between the various contending 
 branches of Government. Moreover, the 
 people in control must be those who are 
 
 also charged with the responsibility for 
 raising the funds. This suggests one of 
 the dangers and weaknesses of the mil- 
 itary programme in any country, for the 
 officers of the General Staff can never 
 be got to take any cognizance of the 
 financial resources and needs of the Gov- 
 ernment; they not only demand the Uon'a 
 share of the taxes wrung from a pt 
 but they are absolutely Indifferent to the 
 starving of any other branch of govern- 
 mental enterprises. We shall hear much, 
 If the Wilson programme of prepared >i<- ,s 
 goes through, about the next step, the 
 formation of a committee of national de- 
 fence to coordinate the functions o 
 army and the navy, and of all the cl' 
 enterprises which it Is now recog 
 must also be mobilized when war comes. 
 If that committee is not supervised 
 controlled vigorously by Congress it will 
 become a veritable Frankenstein monster, 
 using all its influences to have the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States not only 
 pour forth the bulk of its income ' 
 preparedness (the Japanese now 
 one-third of their Income in direct 
 indirect taxation), but to make pre; 
 tion for war the chief business of this 
 nation, as it has long been of France, 
 Germany, Austria, and other countri 
 
 THE REAL REFORM AND THE REAL PROBLEM 
 
 Never Was There Less Need for Haste in Military Measures— The Question 
 One of Morale Rather than Enlargement — Present System Can- 
 not Reform Itself — Warnings from Europe's Situation 
 
 IF THE ARGUMENTS and facts ad- 
 vanced in this series of articles 
 are of any value, it must be 
 plain that any haste In building up 
 either army or navy will not result in 
 real preparedness. To add to the navy 
 before the lessons of the war are gleaned, 
 may easily mean to squander millions In 
 an inexcusably fatuous fashion. This is 
 so self-evident that, across the water, the 
 British astonishment at Mr. Wilson's 
 programme has been thus voiced by the 
 London Telegraph: 
 
 "We have the spectacle of the great- 
 est democracy in the world, although 
 separated from Europe by more than 
 3,000 miles, in such a hurry for more 
 men of war that it has decided not 
 even to wait for the lessons on construc- 
 tion and armament which the war may 
 teach. Moreover, this decision has been 
 reached by a party which came into 
 power in opposition to the Rooseveltian 
 policy of the 'big stick' and pledged 
 itself to economy in armaments." 
 
 Similarly to build upon the present 
 unsatisfactory and criminally wasteful 
 military system will not result either In 
 greater efficiency or better preparedness, 
 with the exception of the matter of ad- 
 ditional matiriel — new fortifications and 
 reserves of ammunition. All of which 
 makes haste in arming absolutely 
 inadvisable. Even if there were occasion 
 for hurrying, an overhauling of our 
 present army would seem the only wise 
 policy. 
 
 NEVER LESS NEED FOR HASTE. 
 
 As a matter of fact, there never could 
 be a time when there was less need 
 of haste in arming. Every month that 
 passes with the war in full blast in- 
 creases the safety of the United States 
 by further exhausting the combatants 
 abroad. The President and Mr. Garri- 
 son themselves admit this, not only be- 
 cause they adduce no positive reasons 
 which would warrant our preparing as 
 if the foe were at the door, but because 
 Mr. Wilson wishes to spread his naval 
 programme over a period of five years, 
 and Mr. Garrison desires Congress to 
 take two years for the increase of the 
 regular army. Would they delay thus 
 if they felt that there were a grave 
 crisis at hand? As a matter of fact, Mr. 
 Wilson, barring political reasons, could 
 perfectly well have repeated at the Man- 
 hattan Club the appeal of his message 
 of a year ago — that the country keep 
 calm and beware of changing the Unit- 
 ed States into an armed camp. 
 
 That men as sensible as President Wil- 
 son and Mr. Garrison have yielded to 
 the latest argument of the militarists that 
 at the close of the war we shall become 
 the objective of robber-raids by Germany 
 and Great Britain, because we shall be 
 the only really prosperous nation, with 
 large supplies of cash, is not to be be- 
 lieved. Munchausen never invented a 
 more absurd fairy-tale. But if they did 
 believe it, and were to convince Con- 
 gress that something must be done, 
 
 there is surely still time for a cons 
 tive procedure like the following. Fir* 
 a decision as to what the policy of the 
 United States shall be, whether defer : 
 or offensive, and whether the count, 
 to defend itself by Its navy or prim;-, 
 by its coast defences and mobile sole 
 How important this is appears from v. 
 ter I have just received from a high < 
 thority in the War Department, who 
 states that every consideration of pos- 
 sible invasion presupposes the total ion: 
 of the command of the seas. That is, ' 
 take It, that every American subm: 
 must disappear beneath the waves before 
 our secondary defence on land will ever 
 come Into play, for it is imposslbl to 
 conceive of an armada of a thou.-: m 
 ships crossing to our shores while there 
 are still ten American submarines a 
 The British success in moving tr 
 across the Channel, a two hours' run 
 fords no basis for comparison. 
 
 Secondly, Congress should inform the 
 country specifically aaainst what pos-.' i 
 foes we are arming: There can only, 
 be three — Germany, Japan, and Engl..' i. 
 With France, Russia, or Italy the pros- 
 pect of any hostilities is so absolutely- 
 remote as to be inconceivable ; but if 
 did come, it could only be a question of 
 naval combats. If there are only three 
 probable enemies, the problem become;: at 
 once greatly simplified, even from the 
 point of view of the wildest military m: • 
 and we shall put an end to much loi.-s» 
 talk about a possible European combi .< - 
 tion against us in the manner of the i 
 
THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 19 
 
 ber-ourons of the Rhim in the Middle 
 Ages. 
 
 A QUESTION OF MOBALB. 
 
 Thirdly, Congress should itself show a 
 realization of the fact that military values 
 are not to be measured in terms of the 
 size of fleets nor armies by their num- 
 bers. Morale, discipline, efficiency in 
 shooting, and ability in high command 
 are all determining factors. Examples 
 of this are unending. Of what value to 
 Russia was her fleet in the war with 
 Japan, when her ships flred on each 
 other at the Dogger Bank, and were so 
 utterly unfit to combat the Japanese in 
 the deciding naval battle? In the present 
 war the Austrian army, for all its large 
 numbers, was defeated by Servians and 
 Russians until German efficiency took 
 charge and competent German generals 
 began to lead. Russia always has troops 
 in great masses, yet in her whole mod- 
 ern history has never won in a conflict 
 in which conditions were fairly equal, de- 
 feating the Turks in 1877 only because of 
 Rumanian aid. What guarantee can 
 Congress give to the country that the 
 new Continental army Mr. Garrison asks 
 will have any effective military value 
 whatever? If Congress does realize that 
 the question of efficiency is far more vital 
 than that of mere numbers, It should be- 
 gin its work by investigating the army 
 from a purely military standpoint, un- 
 muzzling every officer who appears before 
 it, and giving him a guarantee that no 
 criticisms of the service as it exists to- 
 day will affect his future career. It 
 would be impossible to exaggerate the 
 startling character of the information 
 that would come to it, from the younger 
 officers in particular. It would demon- 
 strate beyond question the existence of 
 evils, which, however consecrated by 
 years of growth and tolerance, are ab- 
 solutely inconsistent with any efficient 
 military service and work grave hard- 
 ships to deserving and ambitious officers. 
 
 Such an inquiry would, of course, be 
 compelled, if frank and honest, to place 
 a large share of the blame upon poli- 
 ticians in and out of Congress. It would 
 establish that there are economies to be 
 effected, beginning with the present an- 
 nual waste of $5,500,000 upon "politi- 
 cal forts" which would not only result in 
 increased efficiency but make possible a 
 considerable enlargement of the army 
 without additional cost. The most de- 
 sirable outcome might even be the teach- 
 ing of Congress how to make military 
 appropriations so that it will not be In- 
 duced to appropriate $17,700 in extra 
 pay for officers engaged in the hazardous 
 work of teaching cadets at West Point or 
 to pay $1,500 every year for wooden 
 floors for the tents of these cadets when 
 they go Into "camp" — youngsters who are 
 to train men in real camps in the field liv- 
 ing in electrically lighted tents with per- 
 manent Iron frames and board floors! Such 
 a committee of Congress, if really search- 
 ing in its Inquiry, would be particularly 
 amazed at the army of civilians attached 
 to our garrisons, wh'le If they should put 
 a stop to the free use of soldiers as "strik- 
 ers," as gardeners, as drivers of lce-wa- 
 K"ns, as servants and laborers of every 
 ind and description, they would make 
 army vastly more attractive to 
 worthy Americans. 
 
 Such a committee would speedily learn, 
 
 among many other facts, (1) that general 
 army appropriations lead to abuses and 
 waste; that the exercise of discretion In 
 expenditures in army posts and else- 
 where leads to the precedence of the com- 
 fort of officers and their families over 
 what would be of benefit to the public 
 service; (2) that the lack of any actual 
 supervision of the disposition of moneys 
 appropriated or results obtained leads 
 directly to inefficiency; (3) that reform 
 from within is almost hopeless as long as 
 there is no critical supervision from the 
 outside, inspections by officers having 
 less and less value; that there should be 
 inspection by those free from army influ- 
 ences, precisely as we call in bank exam- 
 iners to pass upon the condition of our 
 banks— without any one feeling that that 
 is a reflection upon ttie uprigut bankers; 
 (4) that many of the army's faults are 
 due to the carrying over into the mili- 
 tary service, as reorganized in 1898, of 
 customs like the building of homes for 
 officers' families, which were not faults 
 under the conditions controlling when the 
 army was on the frontier and engaged in 
 Indian campaigns; (5) that there is no 
 better evidence of the necessity of a 
 complete overhauling of the service than 
 the so-called "Manchu" law passed by 
 Congress Itself in 1912, in order to put an 
 end to favoritism and to absence on easy 
 detached duty of many officers for long 
 periods of years. This law requires that 
 after four vears of absence from his or- 
 ganization an officer must be returned 
 to his corps or else his pay will 
 be taken out of the pay of the officer on 
 whose order a violation took place. This 
 law is a military monstrosity In that it 
 is a direct Interference of the Federal 
 legislature with the management and dis- 
 position of the army's personnel. Tet the 
 army welcomed It and believes that It 
 adds not only to the officer's chance of 
 getting a square deal, but to the efficiency 
 of the service as well. None the less it 
 stands as a grave indictment of the past 
 yielding of the War Department to social 
 and political pressure and of the military 
 chiefs who permitted these grave abuses 
 to go on and took part in them. 
 
 Once these facts were ascertained, Con- 
 gress would have no difficulty in building 
 up anew. The efficiency of the Ord- 
 nance Corps, and the Engineers along 
 certain lines, the growing efficiency and 
 ability of the Coast Artillery — which has 
 made wonderful strides since the writer 
 of this was drilled by officers of the old 
 foot artillery in the days when an enlist- 
 ed man In that branch might serve five 
 years and never see a shotted gun flred — 
 point the way. Congress could then strive 
 for real preparedness by seeing to it that 
 military neglect, indifference, and inef- 
 ficiency are punished, and merit, zeal, and 
 industry rewarded; that the political type 
 of general forever disappears, and really 
 capable generals be chosen who shall be 
 kept so busy at their tasks that they 
 shall not have the time to command di- 
 visions and departments and also make 
 speeches all over the country In fav- 
 or of more troops, more guns, and 
 more reserves, with never a word 
 as to the abuses that honey-comb 
 the service. If Congress makes these 
 changes it will put the army In a 
 position where it can reform itself and It 
 will find plenty of officers to respond and 
 
 to take the lead for efficiency. For, as 
 has previously been pointed out, we have 
 many capable officers — as we have many 
 shirkers and blatant self-advertisers — 
 and the best soldier-material In the world 
 since It is the most upstanding, self-re- 
 liant, adaptable, and intelligent. 
 
 MERE MONEY WIIX NOT DO IT. 
 
 Unless this reorganization takes place 
 Congress will have voted more men, yet 
 have little more ut any army and perhaps 
 less efficiency, than at present. Certainly 
 no one knows whether Mr. Garrison's 
 proposed Continental army will have any 
 military value whatsoever — which would 
 suggest that before the raising of 400,000 
 men be attempted the experiment be es- 
 sayed with say 40,000 to see if it is prac- 
 tical and whether Americans can be had 
 for that sort of service. 
 
 But when all the details are discussed 
 and when all the matters of military pol- 
 icy have been settled one way or the 
 other, the great question still remains: 
 Should the United States, in the fevered 
 disquiet of a world-crisis, alter the pol- 
 icy of its national life, and go in for 
 large armamentsT It cannot be success- 
 fully averred that what Mr. Wilson pro- 
 poses is merely an enlargement of the 
 old policy. As Mr. Bryan has correctly 
 pointed out, it is a complete hr«»'- 
 certalnly so far as the army Is concerned, 
 ir. that thus far the army has been re- 
 garded as a national police and not as 
 a body to prepare for invasion or war 
 abroad. For more than a century the 
 country has beer., unarms ■". I hwver 
 
 had a foreign war save of its own seek- 
 ing. Even In the days when It was 
 weakest, no one assailed it Only since the 
 days when we began to have a large 
 navy have the rumors of war and the talk 
 and gossip of war been abroad In the 
 land to unsettle the public and to form 
 the basis of militaristic appeals to 
 Americans slavishly to imitate the military 
 follies of the old world, to join the Inter- 
 national alliance of the militarists who 
 everywhere coin money out of the fears 
 of the professional soldiers and keep the 
 masses of the people In subjection by 
 means of their armed fellows who are 
 primarily instructed that they must kill 
 their own relatives if the sovereign orders 
 it. 
 
 What has been the pride of America — 
 that we were free from a large profes- 
 sional soldiery, that the military and 
 naval votes of our Congress could not, 
 until recently at least, be used as the 
 basis for increasing the burdens of mili- 
 tarism abroad and clamping still heavier 
 loads upon the hard working peasantry, 
 who, in the end, carry the soldiers on 
 their backs — all this is now to be put 
 aside without deliberation, without even 
 the assurance that if the sacrifice is made 
 the end sought will be achieved, and with- 
 out, of course, waiting to put the issue 
 squarely before the whole people a year 
 hence. Is it any wonder that the Presi- 
 dent's words had but a half-hearted ring, 
 or that foreign observers consider us the 
 most volatile of people? 
 
 LIGHT-HEARTED DRAUGHT OF POISON. 
 
 It is, of course, partly due to the su- 
 preme self-confidence we have In our- 
 selves, for which we are often criticised. 
 
20 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PREPAREDNESS 
 
 Those who with clean hands urge that we 
 take far-reaching steps towards naval- 
 ism and militarism believe, light-heart- 
 edly, that there is such a thing as a 
 reasonable preparedness which would sat- 
 isfy our generals and admirals. They, 
 witnessing Germany's spiritual, moral, 
 and now economic undoing through the 
 poison of militarism, believe that we, too, 
 can us* the hypodermic syringe and es- 
 cape the habit, indulge mildly in the drug, 
 and profit only by its virtues, avoiding 
 all Its evil effects. That no one else has 
 escaped the poison — not even democratic 
 France — seems to count not at all in 
 this hour, though every generation of 
 Americans has thought differently until 
 this day. 
 
 We are sure that with great arma- 
 ment works springing up about us like 
 mushrooms over night, we shall escape 
 
 the armament scandals of Europe, those 
 due to international concerns like the 
 Harvey United Steel Company, com- 
 posed of British, German, American, 
 French, and Italian companies, all of 
 them engaged in booming the market for 
 armor plates in their respective countries 
 on the plea that each country needed to 
 defend itself against the othefs; or the 
 scandal of the Krupps, whose cannon and 
 ammunition are now being used against 
 Germany and the Germans that made 
 them. But we, being satisfied with our 
 experiences with the patriotic unselfish- 
 ness of our trusts and our protected 
 manufacturers, take no fear from the 
 enormous transformation of peaceful 
 American industries Into those that make 
 the supplies of war — we are beyond 
 price and beyond temptation! We listen 
 gravely to the assurances that we must 
 
 increase our "national Insurance" blU — 
 now seventy-four cents on every dollar — 
 as the only meat I o national safety, and 
 forget that never have such large sums 
 been spent in th' vay of national "In- 
 surance" as since IS 00, and that never In 
 any similar fifte' . years In the world's 
 history have the been so many or so 
 terrible wars. We do not stop to ask 
 whether a differc kind of Insurance is 
 not needed; whether anybody else could 
 be so utterly and hopelessly discredited as 
 the militarists who raise this false cry 
 have been by the events abroad. 
 
 Surely the way to true national pre- 
 paredness for the genuine tasks of hu- 
 manity, for the el Uion of mankind, for 
 the carrying on of the ideals of the 
 great and unarmed American democracy 
 of which we are so proud, lies elsewhere, 
 along totally different lines I 
 
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