A STUDY OF ETHICAL PEINCIPLES A STUDY OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES BY JAMES SETH, M.A. PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BROWN UMVERSITV, U.S.A. WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCXCIV I fc 1 ^r 733700? TO MY MOTHER f&5**> IVJRSIIY: PREFACE. THE present volume is the outcome of several years of continuous reflection and teaching in this department of philosophy. As the title indicates, it does not profess to develop a system of Ethics, but rather to discuss the principles which must underlie such a system ; and while the treatment does not claim to be, in any strict sense, original, an effort has been made to re-think the entire subject, and to make the discussion throughout as funda- mental as possible. My chief hope is that I may have been able to throw some light upon the real course of ethical thought in ancient and in modern times. I have been anxious, in particular, to recover, and, in some measure, to re-state the contribution of the Greeks, and especially of Aristotle, to moral philosophy. For, in many respects, the ancient statement of the questions seems to me more instructive than the modern. As regards the method of discussion adopted, I have stated in the Introduction my reasons for the position Vlll PREFACE. that, to be fundamental, ethical thought must be philo- sophical rather than merely scientific. The intimate re- lation of Ethics to Metaphysics necessitated the Third Part, "Metaphysical Implications of Morality." Here particularly, in the investigation of the Metaphysic of Ethics, there seemed a call for further philosophic effort. The use of two terms calls for a word of explanation. I have distinguished " Eudaemonism " from " Hedonism," and adopted the former term to characterise my own position. Though these two terms are often identified, some writers have been careful to distinguish them ; and it seemed to me most important, for reasons which will appear, to emphasise the distinction, and to use " Eu- dremonism" in its original or Aristotelian sense. The second point is the distinction drawn between " the in- dividual " and " the person." The distinction comes, of course, from Hegel ; but, in making it a leading distinction throughout the discussion, I am following the example of Professor Laurie of Edinburgh in his ' Ethica, or the Ethics of Eeason,' a book to which I probably owe more than to the work of any other living writer on Ethics. My other obligations I have tried to acknowledge in the course of the book, but it is difficult to make such acknow- ledgments complete. I have especially to thank my col- league, Professor Walter G. Everett, for many helpful suggestions made while the work was in manuscript, and PREFACE. IX my brother, Professor Andrew Seth, of the University of Edinburgh, for his aid and advice while it was passing through the press. In the chapter on the " Problem of Freedom " (and, to a less extent, in that on the " Psychological Basis ") I have made use of a pamphlet entitled 'Freedom as Ethical Postulate/ published in 1891, and now out of print. JAMES SETH. BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND, August 1894. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. PAGE 1. Preliminary definition of Ethics. What is Morality ? What is Conduct ? Conduct and Character .... 3 2. In what sense is Ethics practical ? Relations of moral theory and practice . . . . . . .6 3. Relations of moral faith and ethical insight. Impossibility of absolute moral scepticism . . . . .10 4. Business of Ethics to define the Good or the Moral Ideal, by scrutiny of the various interpretations of it . . . 13 5. Ancient and Modern conceptions of the Moral Ideal compared. (a) Duty and the Chief Good ; their logical connection. Personality as Moral Ideal . . . . .15 6. (6) Ancient Ideal political, modern individualistic ; the in- adequacy of each, and their reconciliation in Personality . 18 7. Resulting definition of Ethics as the investigation of the uni- fying principle of human life . . . .20 CHAPTER II. THE ^METHOD OF ETHICS. 1. The Method of Ethics philosophical rather than scientific . 21 2. The Physical and Biological Methods . . . .22 3. The Psychological Method ..... 23 Xll CONTENTS. 4. The Historical Method ...... 5. Ethics as an " inexact " science ..... 6. The Metaphysical Method 7. Eelation of Ethics to Theology ..... CHAPTER III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 1. Necessity of psychological basis ; an inadequate view of human life rests upon an inadequate view of human nature 2. Voluntary activity presupposes involuntary ; various forms of the latter ....... 3. Voluntary activity, how distinguished from involuntary ; voli- tion as control of impulsive and instinctive tendencies ; con- trast of animal and human life .... 4. The process of volition : its various elements, (a) pause ; (b) deliberation ; (c) choice ..... 5. Nature and character. Effort. Second nature 6. Limitations of volition : (a) Economy, (b) Continuity, (c) Fixity of character ...... 7. Intellectual elements in volition : (a) Conception, (b) Memory. (c) Imagination ...... 8. Will- and Feeling. Is pleasure the object of choice ? . PART I. i THE MORAL IDEAlT TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY : HEDONISM, RIGORISM, EUD^MONISM 77 CHAPTER I. v HEDONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF SENSIBILITY. ^.-^-Development of the Theory. 1. (A) Pure Hedonism, or Cyrenaicism . . . .81 2. (B} Modified Hedonism : (a) Ancient, or Epicureanism . Sf 3. (6) Modern Hedonism, or Utilitarianism. Its cTnef variations ' from Ancient: (1) Optimistic v. Pessimistic." (2) Altruistic v. Egoistic. (3) Qualitative v. Quantitative ... 94 4. (c) Evolutional Utilitarianism ..... 101 5. (d) Rational Utilitarianism ... . . .110 CONTENTS. Xlll II. Critical Estimate of Hedonism. 6. (a) Its psychological inadequacy ' . . . .115 7. (b) Its inadequate interpretation of Character . . .119 8. (c) Its resolution of Virtue into Expediency . . .122 9. (fZ) Its account of Duty . . 125 10. (e) Failure of Sensibility to provide the principle of its own distribution. (1) Within the individual life. (2) Between the individual and society . . . . .129 11. (/) The final metaphysical alternative . .145 The merit and demerit of Hedonism .... 147 CHAPTER II. 1. Rigorism : its rational and idealistic standpoint. Its two forms extreme and moderate . . . . .152 2. (A) Extreme Rigorism, (a) Ancient : (a) Cynicism. (jB) Stoi- cism. How it differs from Cynicism : (1) Idealism v. Naturalism. (2) Cosmopolitanism v. Individualism. (3) The Stoic Melancholy . . . . .155 y3. (b) Modern : (o^CJirjgtiftn Asceticism . . . .163 V4. (#) Kantian Transcendentalism . . . . .165 v5. Criticigm^of Extreme Rigorism, and transition to Moderate . 167 15. () Moderate Qigbrism. (a) Its beginnings in Greek philosophy 173 \7. (&) Its modern expi!*ons. (a) Butler's theory of Conscience 174 8. Criticism of Butler'fr4h8*y . . . . .180 9. () Intuitionism. Its divergences from Butler. Its defects . 183 10. The service of Rigorism ^.ethical theory . . .189 11. Transition to Eud unionism . . . . .191 CHAPTER III. V* EUD^MONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF PERSONALITY. 4. The>Ethical Dualism. Its theoretical expression . .193 2. Its pracTWfaT'expre'ssion ...... 196 3. Attempts a af : reco2c'iliation . . . . 198 4. The solution aft!hTi5tiamty . . . . .199 5. The ethical problem : the meaning of Self-realisation . . 203 6. Definition of Personality : the Individual and the Person . 205 XIV CONTENTS. 7. The rational or personal self : its intellectual and ethical func- tions compared ...... 207 8. The sentient or individual self . . . . .210 9. "Be a Person" ....... 211 10. "Die to live." Meaning of " Self -sacrifice " . . .213 11. Pleasure and Happiness . . . . . .216 12. Egoism and Altruism . . . . . .217 13. The ethical significance of Law : the meaning of Duty. Animal "innocence" and "knowledge of good and evil." Various forms of Law. Its absoluteness . . . .219 14. Expressions of Eudsemonism : (a) in Philosophy. Butler. Hegel. Plato. Aristotle . . . . .226 15. (6) In Literature ...... 237 PAKT IT. THE MORAL LIFE. INTRODUCTORY. VIRTUES AND DUTIES. THE UNITY OF THE MORAL LIFE ........ 249 CHAPTER I. THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. I. Temperance, or Self-discipline. 1. Its fundamental importance ..... 251 2. Its negative aspect ...... 253 3. Relation of negative to positive aspect .... 255 4. Its positive aspect ...... 257 II. Culture, or Self-development. 5. Its fundamental importance . . . . 258 6. Meaning of Culture ...... 259 7. The place of physical culture . . . . .260 8. The individual nature of Self -development . . .262 9. Necessity of transcending our individuality. The ideal life . 265 10. Dangers of Moral Idealism . . . . 268 11. Ethical supremacy of the moral Ideal . . . .273 12. Culture and Philanthropy . . . . .276 13. Self -reverence. The dignity and solitude of Personality . 279 CONTENTS. XV CHAPTEK II. THE SOCIAL LIFE. I. The Social Virtues: Justice and Benevolence. 1. The relation of the social to the individual life . . . 283 2. Social virtue its nature and its limit .... 286 3. Its two aspects, negative and positive: Justice and Benevo- lence. Their mutual relations and respective spheres . 288 4. Benevolence .,....'. 292 5. Benevolence and Culture ..... 295 II. The Social Organisation of Life: the Ethical Basis and Functions of the State. 6. The social organisation of life : the ethical institutions : Society and the State . . . . . .297 7. Is the State an End-in-itself ? . . . .304 8. The ethical basis of the State . . . . .307 9. The limit of State action . . . . .313 10. The ethical functions of the State : (a) Justice . . 315 11. (b) Benevolence ....... 324 Note. The Theory of Punishment . . . .333 PAKT III. METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORALITY. THE THREE PROBLEMS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS ; THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS ...... 341 CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM. 1. Statement of the problem ..... 345 2. The " moral method " . . . . . . 350 3. The " reconciling project " . . . . .354' 4. Definition of moral Freedom : its limitations . . . 357 5. The resulting metaphysical problem. The problem of Freedom is the problem of Personality. The alternative solutions the empirical and the transcendental . . . 359 ^ XVI CONTENTS. 6. The transcendental solution ..... 363 7. Difficulties of the transcendental solution : (a) psychological difficulty offered by the "presentational " theory of Will . 366 8. (b) metaphysical difficulty of Transcendentalism itself. (1) In Kantianism, an empty and unreal Freedom . . .376 9. (2) In Hegelianism, a new Determinism, (i.) The Self = the character, (ii.) The Self = God .... 379 10. Resulting conception of Freedom . . . .386 CHAPTER II. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 1. The necessity of the theological question . . . 389 2. Agnosticism and Positivism ..... 393 3. Naturalism ....... 397 4. Man and Nature . . . . . . 402 5. The modern statement of the problem .... 408 6. Its ancient statement . . . . . .410 7. The Christian solution . . . . . .416 8. The Ideal and the Real . . . . . .417 9. The Personality of God . . . . . .423 10. Objections to Anthropomorphism : (a) from the standpoint of Natural Evolution . . . . . .426 11. (lj) From the standpoint of Dialectical Evolution . . 431 12. Intellectualism and Moralism : Reason and Will . . 441 CHAPTER III. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 1. The alternatives of thought . ... . .447 2. Immortality as the implication of Morality . . . 448 3. Personal Immortality ...... 454 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 1. ETHICS, or Moral Philosophy, is the Philosophy of Preiimin- Morality or Conduct. A preliminary notion of what tSn of "' is meant by these terms will serve to bring out the nature of the inquiry on which we are entering. " Morality " is described by Locke as " the proper what is science and business of mankind in general." In the same spirit Aristotle says that the task of Ethics is the investigation" of the peculiar and characteristic function of man the activity (tvepyeta), with its corresponding xcelleiice (aperrf), of man a^ man. And " can we sup- pose that, while a carpenter and a cobbler each has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature?" 1 Morality* might in this sense be called the universal and character- istic element in human activity, its human element par eoT| cellence, as distinguished from its particular, technical, and ' accidental elements. Not that the moral is a smaller and sacred sphere within the wider spheres of secular interests and activities. It is rather the all-inclusive sphere of human 1 Nic. Eth., i. 7, 11. INTRODUCTION. What is Conduct ? Conduct and Character. life, the universal form which embraces its most varied contents. It is that in presence of which all differences of age and country, rank and occupation, disappear, and the man stands forth in all the unique and intense signi- ficance of his human nature. Morality is the great level- ler ; life, no less than death, makes all men equal. We may be so lost in the minute details and distracting shows of daily life that we cannot see the grand uniformity in out- line of our human nature and our human task ; here, as elsewhere, we are apt to lose the wood in the trees. But at times this uniformity is brought home to us with start- ling clearness, and we discover, beneath the utmost diver- sity of worldly circumstance and outward calling, our common nature and our common task. The delineation of this common human task, of this " proper business of mankind in general," is the endeavour of ethical philo- sophy. Matthew Arnold was fond of calling conduct "three- fourths of life." I suppose the other fourth was the pro- vince of the intellectual and aesthetic as distinguished from the moral life. But when truly conceived, as expres- sive of character, conduct is the whole of life. As there is no action which may not be regarded as, directly or in- directly, an exponent of character, so there is no most secret thought or impulse of the mind but manifests itself in the life of conduct. If, however, with Spencer, we ex- tend the term " conduct " so as to cover merely mechanical as well as reflex organic movements, then we must limit the sphere of Ethics to " conduct as the expression of char- acter." But, in the sense indicated, the " conduct of life " may be taken as synonymous with " morality." Such con- THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 5 duct embraces the life of intellect and emotion, as well as that which is, in a narrower sense, called " practice " the life of overt activity. Man's life is one, in its most diverse phases ; one full moral tide runs through them all. But let us analyse conduct a little more closely. Spen- cer defines it as '* the adjustment of acts to ends," and we may say it is equivalent to " purposive activity,'/ or more / strictly, in conformity with what has just been said, '''con- ^ sciously purposive activity." It is the element of purpose, the choice of ends and of trie means towards their accom- plishment, that constitutes conduct; and it is this inner side of conduct that we are to study. Now, choice is an act of will. But since each choice is not an isolated act of will, but the several choices constitute a continuous and connected series, and all together form, and in turn result from, a certain settled habit or trend of will, a certain type of characterise may say that ^conduct is the ex-) ^ pression of character in activity. Activity which is not] thus expressive is not conduct ; and since " a will that wills nothing is a chimera," and a will which has not acquired some tendency in its choice of activities is no less chimerical, we may add that there is no character without conduct. Conduct, therefore, points to character, or settled habit * of will. But will is here no mere faculty, it is a man's " proper self." The will is the self in action ; and in order to act, the self must also feel and know. Only thus can it act as a se//. The question of Ethics, accordingly, may be stated in either of two forms: What is man's chief end ? or what is the true, normal, or typical form of human self-hood? Man has a choice of ends: what is INTRODUCTION. tlmt^end which is so worthy of his choice that all else is to be chosen merely as the means towards its fulfilment ? And since, in the last analysis, the object of his choice is a certain type of self -hood, this question resolves itself into the other : Into what universal human form shall he mould all the particular activities of his life ? This ques- tion, in either form of it, is at once a practical and a theoretical question. To man his own nature, like his world, is at first a chaos, to be reduced to cosmos. As he must subdue to the order and system of a world of objects the varied mass of sensible presentations that crowd in upon him at every moment of his waking life,' so must he subdue to the order and system of a rational life the mass of clamant and conflicting forces that seek to master him-J-those impulses, passions, appetites, affections that seem each to claim him for itself. The latter question is, like the former, first a practical and then a theoretical question. The first business of thought about the world the business of ordinary thought is to make the world orderly enough to be a world in which we can live. Its second business is to understand the world for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper scientific and philosophic unity of things. So the first business of thought about the life of man is to establish a certain unity and system in actual human practice. Its second business is to understand that life for the sake of understanding it, and the outcome of this is the deeper ethical theory of life. in what 2. Ethics is often called Practical, as opposed to Theoretical Philosophy or Metaphysics. The description sense is THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 7 is correct, if it is meant that Ethics is the ;philo^ophj;.,.or-mhics theory of Practice, and is indeed only another way of Delations saying what we have just said. It suggests, however, theory and the question of the relations of moral theory and practice. pra Life or practice always precedes its theory or explanation ; we are men before we are moralists. The moral life; though it implies an intellectual element from the first, is, in its beginnings, and for long, a matter of instinct, of tradition, of authority. /Moral progress, whether in the individual or in the race, may be largely accounted for as a blind " struggle " of moral ideals in which the " fittest " survive. J Human experience is a continuous and keen " scrutiny " of these ideals ; history is a grand contest of moral forces, in which the strongest are the victors. The conceptions of good and evil, virtue and vice, duty and desert, which guide the life, not merely of the child but of the mass of mankind, are largely accepted, like in- tellectual notions, in blind and unquestioning faith. But moral, like intellectual, manhood implies emancipation from such a merely instinctive life. The good man, like the wise man, " puts away childish things " ; as a rational being, he must seek to reduce his life, like his world, to system. The words of the oracle inevitably make them- selves heard, I7ELJ1TY! 1 8 INTRODUCTION. (6) Ancient 6. A second characteristic difference between the stand- iticai, P point of ancient and that of modern moral reflection brings dividual- 111 ' out still more clearly the necessity of such a personal view inadequacy ^ morality. The moral ideal of the classical world was a andtheir political or social ideal, that of the modern world is indi- ationh! 1 " vidualistic. To the Greek, whether he was philosopher or Personal- no t ; a ll the interests of life were summed up in those of citizenship ; he had no sphere of " private morality." The conception of the State was so impressive, absorbing even, to the Greek mind, that it seemed adequate to the inter- pretation of the entire ethical life ; and when confidence in its adequacy was shaken by the break-up of the State itself, and recourse was had of sheer necessity to the con- ception of a life of the individual apart from the State, when the notion of Greek citizenship was abandoned, as in Stoicism and Epicureanism, for that of " citizenship of the world," the Ethics of the ancient world had already, like its life and thought in general, entered upon its period of decay. The inadequacy of the classical standpoint has become a commonplace to us ; we detect it in even the best pro- ducts of the moral reflection of Greece, in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. If modern theory and practice are defective, it is in the opposite extreme. The modern ethical standpoint has been that of the individual life. This change of standpoint is mainly the result of the acceptance of the Christian principle of the infinite value of the individual as a moral person, of what we might almost call the Christian discovery of the significance of personality. The isolation of the moral individual has been made only too absolute ; the principle of mere THE ETHICAL PEOBLEM. 19 individualism is as inadequate as the principle of mere citizenship. Hence the difficulty of reconciling the claims of self with the claims of society a difficulty which can hardly be said to have existed for the ancients, who had not yet separated the individual from his society, and to whom, accordingly, the two interests were one and the same. Hence, too, the fantastic and impossible concep- tion of a purely selfish life, which has caused modern moralists such trouble. Hence the ignoring of the im- portance of ethical institutions, especially that of the State, resulting in the view of the State as having a merely negative or " police " function, and the Hobbes-Eousseau theory of society itself as an artificial product, the result of contract between individuals who, like mutually exclusive atoms, are naturally antagonists. For, in reality, these two spheres of life are inseparable, j \ The interests and claims of the social and of the indi- vidual life overlap, and are reciprocally inclusive. \ These are not two lives, but two sides or aspects of one undi- vided life. You cannot isolate the moral individual; to do so would be to de-moralise him, to annihilate his moral nature. His very life as a moral being consists in a net- work of relations which link his individual life with the wider life of his fellows. It is literally true that "no man liveth to himself," there is no retiring into the privacy and solitude of a merely individual life. Man is a social or political being. On the other hand, the individual is more than a member of society; he is not the mere organ of the body politic. He too is an organ- ism, and has a life and ends of his own. The Good every individual, a social or common Good, a Good i organ- )d is, for ( I jrood in \ 20 INTRODUCTION. which he cannot claim such private property as to ex- clude his fellows ; their good is his, and his theirs. Yet the Good the only Good we know as absolute is always a personal, not an impersonal good, a good of moral per- sons. The person, not society, is the ultimate ethical unit and reality. 7. The task of Ethics, therefore, is the discovery of the of ItWcsas central principle of moral or spiritual life, as the task of tigltioiiof Biology is the discovery of the central principle of physical ingp5S r ~ ^ e - ^ ie undertaking is a hard and difficult one; and cipieof L i s possible that Life, moral as well as physical, may human me. J " elude definition." It may be that all we can do, in the one sphere as in the other, is to describe its progressive outward manifestations; the life-principle itself may re- main a secret. In that case, a Science of Ethics, as distinguished from a Metaphysic of Ethics or a Moral Philosophy, would alone be possible. But the philosophic task must first be attempted, and not given up at the outset. May we not reasonably hope, with Aristotle, that the ova-la or essential nature will reveal itself in the ucr:9 or TL ea-Tiv of actual morality ? 21 CHAPTER II. THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 1. ETHICS being an integral part of Philosophy, its The Meth method must be the method of Philosophy rather than icspwio- that of Science. The general distinction between Philo- J2her than sophy and Science must be applied here. If Ethics is to scientlfic - provide a philosophy of life, and not merely a science of it, its method cannot be the merely scientific one of observation and generalisation of the " phenomena " of existing or past conduct and character. Such a scientific account of morality is no doubt legitimate, and, as Aris- totle insisted no less strenuously than recent " scientific " moralists, we must begin with " the facts." But philo- sophy must attempt here as elsewhere to travel beyond the scientific explanation to one that is deeper and ulti- mate. Beyond the Science of Ethics, whether it be " phys- ical Ethics," " psychological Ethics," or " historical Ethics," is the " Metaphysic of Ethics " or ethical Philosophy. The modern tendency, the tendency especially of con- temporary thought, is to " naturalise the moral man," to exhibit the evolulXon of human conduct and character 22 INTRODUCTION. from sub-human forms, to substitute physics for meta- physics, positivism for transcendentalism, science for philosophy. But we must not prejudge the ethical question the question whether there is any unique element in the nature and life of man by adopting the method of science and excluding that of philosophy. It is perfectly legitimate to attempt the resolution of man into nature, but the demonstration of such an identity would be itself a philosophical achievement. To adopt at the outset a naturalistic interpretation of morality, or to deny the possibility of an ethical philosophy, would be to beg the question of Ethics. The Phys- 2. The proposed " scientific " method of Ethics assumes ical and Biological various forms in the hands of contemporary writers. With Spencer, for example, and with the Evolutionary school in general, it is sometimes the method of physics and mechanics, sometimes the method of biology. Con- duct is regarded as a complex of movements, a series of adjustments of the human being to his environment. The Science of Ethics, accordingly, is the result of the application to human life of the Darwinian law of evolu- tion by natural selection ; the same formula of adjustment of the being to its environment covers the process of the physical and of the ethical life. Whether the adjustment is one of mechanical movement, of life, or of conscious purpose is, it is held, a matter of detail. There is a difference of complexity, but the process is one and continuous throughout. Even Professor Alexander, who, like Mr Leslie Stephen, emphasises the inner significance of conduct as the expression of character, would make THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 23 Ethics the verification of the evolutionary laws of " struggle for existence " and " survival of the fittest." 1 ISTow, it is obvious that conduct is a series of outward movements or activities, of biological and mechanical phenomena, and that it may be. interpreted as such. But the ethical inter- pretation of it must be based on another view ; in the view of Ethics, the outward movements and activities are merely the index and expression of a certain type of character. To apply biological and mechanical categories to character (or to conduct as conduct) is to indulge in unscientific, metaphorical, and pictorial thought. 3. Recognising this peculiarity in the subject-matter ThePsy- of Ethics, other writers would have us adopt the psycho- Method? logical method. The facts, it is acknowledged, are in this case facts of consciousness, psychological phenomena ; but we must not seek to travel beyond these facts. Let us classify the motives from which men act ; let us analyse, simplify, and unify this complex mass of inner activities. Let us trace the genesis of conscience, and show how the conception of an Ought- to-be has slowly emerged from the apprehension of the Is of human life. This psychological Ethics is no new thing : Ethics and Psychology have been long confused. But the progress of Psychology towards the position of a " natural science " has helped us to understand the distinction between its province and that of Ethics ; here, as elsewhere, scientific progress has come with self -limitation. The task of Psychology, it is now generally understood, is not to investigate the essential nature of mind, but only to give a methodical account 1 Cf, Alexander's ' Moral Order and Progress,' passim. 24 INTRODUCTION. of its phases or elements. It deals with the phenomenal manifestations of mind, it does not investigate the ulti- mate significance of these manifestations the place and function of self -consciousness in the economy of the universe. The latter problem is that of Philo- sophy. If we apply this distinction to morality, it will mean that while Psychology is perfectly competent to provide a "phenomenology" of the moral conscious- ness, it remains for ethical Philosophy to interpret the meaning of these phenomena. In particular, Ethics must investigate the objective validity of the grand moral distinction between the ideal and the actual, the Ought-to-be and the Is, a distinction which, inas- much as it is primarily a distinction within the sphere of consciousness, is for Psychology merely phenomenal and subjective. Accepting from Psychology the scientific explanation of moral phenomena, on their inner or psy- chical side, as it accepts from Physics and Biology the scientific explanation of the same phenomena on their outer or physical side, Ethics reserves to itself the task of accounting for the entire body of these phenomena, of giving their raison d'etre, of explaining their " morality." The His- 4. The demand that the ethical investigation be con- Method. \ ducted according to scientific method takes yet another form, closely connected with the preceding viz., that the true method of Ethics is the historical. The present popularity of this method is largely due to the fact that it is the method of evolution. To understand any pheno- menon, it is said, is to know its genesis : being and becoming are one and the same. And since there is an evolution of THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 25 morality, as of all else, the clue to its explanation will be found in the process of its historical development. Ethics assumes, therefore, the universal form of current science, and becomes a " study of origins." " Here, then, at last," says President Schurman, " we have an answer to the question, How is ethics as a science possible ? If it is ever to rise above the analytical procedure of logic, it can only be by becoming one of the historical sciences. Given the earliest morality of which we have any written record, to trace from it through progressive stages the morality of to-day, that is the problem, and the only problem, which can fall to a truly scientific ethics." 1 It is to the " history of moral ideals and institutions," there- fore, that this writer, with many other ethical thinkers, looks for " the solution of many of those vexed questions which have never failed to stimulate, and have always baffled, the ingenuity of all the schools of analytical philo- sophers." "The observation and classification of ethical facts, whether manifested in the individual or in the race, constitute the business of the science of ethics; all else is hypothesis, speculation, fancy. . . . Ethics, if it is to become truly a science, must shun the path of specula- tion, and follow closely the historical method." 2 1 ' Ethical Import of Darwinism,' 31. It should be noted that Dr Schurman, unlike many who use similar language about the method of Ethics, recognises the legitimacy of an ethical " philosophy " based upon the historical investigation above described. 2 Cf. Leslie Stephen (' Science of Ethics,' 447, 448). " Ethical investiga- tions, like others, will have some definite results when we turn to what are called historical methods of inquiry. . . . The tendency of modern speculation to take that form, or to look into the history of the past for an answer to problems which were once attacked by looking simply into our own minds, implies a recognition of this principle." 26 INTRODUCTION. But to make Ethics a merely historical science would be to give up all that is historically included under the term. The aim of Ethics is higher than the mere clas- sification of moral " phenomena " ; its business is to investigate their essential nature, to determine their objective meaning, to define the End or Ideal of which they are the progressive realisation. It is doubtless ethically instructive to study the history of morality, but just because it is the story of the gradual actualisation of the Moral Ideal in character and conduct, in individual and social life. The study of the history is an invaluable aid to the apprehension of the Ideal itself. But this ethical interest in history is quite different from the historical interest. Ethics is interested in historical facts, not as facts, but as containing the partial revelation of an Ideal without which the history itself would be impossible. It is not in the historical facts themselves, but in their eternal meaning and ultimate explanation, that the ethical interest centres. Ethics is, like Logic and ^Esthetics, a normative or ideal science. Its business is the discovery of the moral Ideal or criterion, and the appreciation of actual morality in terms of this Ideal. And though it is true that it is only by the study of its actual historical development that we can hope to discover the essential nature of the moral life, yet in practice it will too often be found that the advocates of the historical method are the victims of the fallacious idea that the earlier and simpler contains the explanation of the later and more complex, that the primitive is the primary, and the simple the essential. This idea, which inspired the Eousseau Ethics of " Nature," is also at the root of the THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 27 prevalent tendency to identify Ethics with Anthropology, and to find the key to all the mystery of man's nature in the crudities of infant and savage life. But surely the principle of Evolution, truly understood, teaches us to recognise the meaning of the lower forms in the higher, of the earlier in the later, rather than vice versd. The flower and fruit do not betray or cancel the life of the seed ; rather the one is the revelation of the other, the explanation of its real nature. If we are to be faithful to the principle of Evolution, we must recognise an identity and continuity in the changing forms of moral life. But if Evolution means progress, then it is in the later rather than in the earlier forms of morality, in the present rather than in the past, whether historic or prehistoric, that we must seek the key to the interpretation of the ethical process as a whole; for the later stages are more adequate ex- ponents of its meaning than the earlier, and the present than the past. 5. If by " scientific method " it is simply meant that Ethics as Ethics must seek to be methodical, we need not quarrel exact" with the phrase. But, even so, we must guard against misunderstanding. While the ideal of Science is exact or accurate knowledge, yet, within the scientific sphere itself, there is a distinction between the " exact sciences " and those whose procedure and results cannot be so character- ised. Mathematics and, to a large extent, physics are exact sciences; biology, in its various subdivisions, and still more obviously, psychology, are not exact. Nor is this difference in scientific method due to the difference in the progress of these sciences ; it is rather the result of 28 INTRODUCTION. the difference of their subject-matter. Life and thought cannot be measured, as can space and time, matter and motion. If, therefore, Ethics were to become a science in the stricter sense of the term, it is among the inexact, not among the exact sciences, that we should expect to find it. Mill proposed such a " science of ethology," which, taking human character as its subject-matter, should attempt the reduction of moral phenomena to a uniformity like that to which the physical sciences reduce the phenomena of nature. And if due allowance is made for the difference in the subject-matter, the same kind of allowance as the biologist makes when he distinguishes his science from that of physics, or the psychologist when he distinguishes his from that of physiology, I do not know that we need dissent from such a definition of Ethics as a science. 1 ] 6. Only I would claim for Ethics, in addition to the narrower task of science, even so conceived, the larger philosophic task. As already indicated, the science of Ethics must have for its complement an ethical philosophy or a metaphysic of Ethics. But here we are met by the agnostic objection to all metaphysics. Mr Leslie Stephen, the " Apologist " of Agnosticism, tells us, in his ( Science of Ethics,' 2 that, in his opinion, " it is useless to look for any further light from metaphysical inquiries." His demand is for ethical realism, which means for him ethical empiricism, positivism, or phenomenalism. Let us keep to the moral facts or phenomena, to " moral reality," and 1 Cf. Aristotle's reiterated insistence that we must not demand a greater scientific exactitude than the nature of the subject-matter per- mits, and that the subject-matter of Ethics is inexact. 2 450. THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 29 not seek to penetrate to its transcendental background, or think to find the sanctions of human conduct in the divine or the ideal. If we understand the inter-relations of the facts of the moral life, we shall sufficiently under- stand their moral significance. Let us ascertain "the meaning to be attached to morality so long as we remain in the world of experience ; and if, in the transcendental world, you can find a deeper foundation for morality, that does not concern me. I am content to build upon the solid earth. You may, if you please, go down to the elephant or the tortoise." l It is not necessary " to begin at the very beginning, and to solve the whole problem of the universe " before you " get down to morality." " My view, therefore, is that the science of Ethics deals with realities ; that metaphysical speculation does not help us to ascertain the relevant facts. ... This is virtually to challenge the metaphysician to show that he is of any use in the matter." 2 This challenge the metaphysician need have no hesita- tion in accepting, and his answer to it will consist in a careful definition of the ethical problem and of the possible solutions of it. That problem is not, What are the facts or phenomena of morality ? but, How are we to interpret the facts ? What is their ultimate significance ? The former question will no doubt help us to answer the latter ; knowledge of the (/>u<7t9, or actual nature, will lead us to the knowledge of the ovcria, or essential nature and meaning, of moral as of other facts. We must admit that the empirical and inductive method has its rights in the ethical as in all other fields of inquiry, and that the " high 1 Op. cit., 446. 2 Ibid., 450. 30 INTRODUCTION. priori road " is a road that leads to no result in ethical any more than in natural philosophy. We need always the instruction of experience, knowledge lies for us in an unprejudiced study of the facts. But the Baconian method of pure induction, or mere observation, will not serve us any better than the method of pure metaphysical deduction. The low posteriori road also will bring us to no goal of knowledge. It is never mere facts that we seek, it is always the meaning of the facts ; and our accumula- tion of facts is never more than a means towards the attainment of that insight into their significance which makes the facts luminous. Every fact, every element of reality, carries us beyond itself for its explanation ; if we would understand it we must relate it to other facts, and these to others, until, to understand the meanest, slightest fact or element of reality, we find that we should have to relate it to all the other facts of the universe, and to see it as an element of universal Eeality. In the perfect know- ledge of the " little flower," " root and all, and all in all, I should know what God and man is." Even so the lowliest flower that grows on the soil of human life is rooted in the deeper soil of universal Reality, and is fed by the sap of the cosmos itself. The controversy between agnosticism and metaphysics is, therefore, not a con- troversy between realism and idealism, between science and unscientific philosophy. It is rather a controversy between a narrower and a wider view of Eeality, between a more superficial and a more profound interpretation of the facts. As philosophy ought to be scientific, so must science be philosophic or metaphysical in its method and spirit. If the over-hastiness of philosophical speculation THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 31 must be checked by the caution and patience of scientific observation, the empirical observation of science must also be inspired by a metaphysical speculation which is always in advance of the facts observed. The distinction between science and philosophy is not a distinction of kind, but only of degree. Science abstracts certain elements of reality from the rest, in the hope of mastering these elements ; but always, as the investigation proceeds, it is found that the mastery of the elements selected for examination implies the mastery of others, and the mastery of these the mastery of others, until even from the scientific point of view it is seen that a perfect mastery of any would imply the perfect mastery of all. And on our journey towards this " master-light of all our seeing," it is hardly possible to say where science ends and philo- sophy begins. In the case now in question, the meta- physician only seeks to attain a more intimate and ex- haustive knowledge of moral reality than the scientific moralist, to penetrate to the deeper Eeality of moral phenomena, to understand what it is that thus " appears," to grasp the Being of moral Seeming. The scientific moralist insists on taking moral facts in abstraction from their bearing on the whole theory of the cosmos. So taken, they assume the character of mere facts, they lose their ethical meaning. An adequate ethical view is not reached, a satisfactory explanation of morality is not attained, so long as we separate morality either from Nature or from God. Eeality is one, and its elements must be seen in their mutual relation if they are to be understood as in reality they are. Ethics is therefore inseparable from metaphysics, and it needs no " ingenious 3 2 INTRODUCTION. sophistry " to " force them into relation." If, even in the strictly inductive stages of the inquiry, the metaphysician might well claim to be of some use ; in the later stages of it, at which we have now arrived, when the " facts " have been perhaps sufficiently accumulated, he is indispensable. If we would reach an adequate interpreta- tion of human life, we must place man in his true human " setting," we must discover his relation to the world and to God. The meaning of human life is part of the mean- ing of the universe itself, the moral order is part of the universal order, the " ethical process " is part of the "cosmic process." Eelationof 7. It is customary with the Evolutionary moralists, Theology, even with those who, like Mr Stephen, profess agnos- ticism, to correlate man with Nature, and to seek to de- monstrate the unity and continuity of his life with that of the physical universe. This is, of course, a metaphysical endeavour, and if its legitimacy is not open to question, I do not see why the effort to correlate the life of man with that of God should be pronounced illegitimate. If mo- rality has natural " sanctions," why should it not have divine sanctions ? Metaphysics is essentially and inevi- tably theological ; if we cannot exclude metaphysics, we cannot exclude theology. If we must ask, What is man's relation to Nature ? we must also ask, What is his relation to God ? It is probably fear of theology, rather than fear of metaphysics, that inspires the agnostic and positive ethics. Nor is the fear unreasonable, considering the views of morality which have been inculcated in the name of theology, the supernatural machinery that has been called THE METHOD OF ETHICS. 33 into play to execute the " sanctions " in question, and the " terms of hell " to which theologians have often striven to reduce the life of man. Such views are the expression of crude thought and blind dogmatism ; they are not entitled to the proud name which Aristotle claimed for his " first philosophy " or metaphysics, the name of Theology. "No less unworthy is it to employ the conception of God as a mere " asylum ignorantise "; the deus ex machind is as un- warrantable in Ethics as in the Philosophy of Nature. The " Will of God " is not to be invoked as a mere exter- nal authority, to spare us the trouble of discovering the rationale either of nature or of morality. God must be rather the goal than the starting-point of our philosophy. To " see all things in God " would be to understand all things perfectly ; to see anything in that Light would be to see all things as they truly are. Yet we cannot rest content in any lower knowledge; the world and life remain dark to us until they receive that illumination. To investigate the theological sanctions of morality is simply to go from the outside to the inside, from the cir- cumference to the centre, from a partial to a complete view of the ethical problem. If all questions are, in the last analysis and in the ultimate issue, theological ques- tions, since all are ultimately questions of metaphysics, the ethical question can least of all escape this fate. Ethics is not mere Anthropology. To interpret the life of man as man, we must interpret human nature, and its world or sphere ; we must investigate " man's place in nature," his relations to his fellows, and his relation to that life of God which in some sense must include the life of nature and of man. Man, with his moral life, is part c 34 INTRODUCTION. of the universe, and it has been truly said that it is really the universe that, in him, is interrogating itself as to the ultimate meaning of moral experience. For, in the moral world no less than in the intellectual, experience is not the last word. The transcendental or " metempirical " ques- tion will not be silenced : What, in Nature, Man and God, in the universal Eeality, is the basis, presupposition, or sanction of this experience ? We might perhaps distin- guish a scientific or " relative " Ethics from such a philo- sophic or " absolute " Ethics. But the scientific must in the end fall within the philosophic, the relative within the absolute ; and, short of a " metaphysic of ethics," there is no final resting-place for the human mind. That meta- physic may be either naturalistic or idealistic. On the one hand, the law of human life may be reduced to terms of natural law, the moral ideal may be resolved into the reality of nature. Or, on the other hand, the ultimate measure of human conduct and character may be found in a spiritual order which transcends the natural ; the moral ideal may be found to express a divine Eeality to which the real world of nature would, in itself, give no clue. But, be our " metaphysic of ethics " what it may, metaphysics we cannot in the end escape. 35 CHAPTER III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. /I. ETHICS, as the philosophy of conduct and character, Necessity j must be based upon Psychology, or the science of the logical \moral life. Inadequacies in ethical theory will be found adequate to be largely traceable to inadequacy in the underlying imum life Psychology. Kant, indeed, seeks to separate Ethics from inadequate Psychology, and to establish it as a metaphysic of the J^jf pure reason. But even Kant's moral philosophy is based nature - upon a Psychology. Abstracting from all the other elements of man's nature, Kant conceives him as a purely rational being, a Eeason energising; and it is to this abstractness and inadequacy in his psychology that we must trace the abstractness and inadequacy of Kant's ethical theory. So impossible is it for Ethics to escape Psychology ; so necessary for philosophy to take account, here as elsewhere, of scientific results. As Aristotle maintained in ancient times, and Butler in modern, the question, What is the characteristic excellence or proper life of man ? raises the previous question, What is the nature and constitution of man, whose characteristic life and excellence we seek to describe? Let us look a little more closely at the connection 36 INTRODUCTION. between Ethics and Psychology, as we can trace it in the history of ethical thought. In both ancient and modern philosophy, we find two main types of ethical theory, which affiliate themselves to two main psychological doctrines. This affiliation is even more explicit in ancient than in modern philosophy. Plato and Aristotle have each a double representation of the virtuous life, corresponding to the dualism which they discover in man's nature a lower and a higher life, according as the lower or the higher nature finds play. Man's nature consists, they hold, of a rational and an irrational or sentient part ; and while the ordinary life of virtue is represented by Plato as a har- monious life of all the parts in obedience to reason the city of Mansoul being like a well-ordered State in which due subordination is enforced, and by Aristotle as a life of all the parts (irrational included) in accordance with right reason, yet both conceive his highest or ideal life as a life of pure reason, or intellectual contempla- tion. Thus both resolving human nature into a rational and an irrational element, both give two representations of virtue and goodness. The life may be good in form, but bad in content a content of unreason moulded by reason ; or it may be entirely good its content as well as its form may be rational. This psychological and ethical dualism is further em- phasised by the Stoics and Epicureans, who had been an- ticipated by the Cynics and by the Cyrenaics respectively. The one school, making reason supreme, either condemns or entirely subordinates the life of sensibility ; the other, making sensibility supreme, either excludes or entirely subordinates the life of reason. The same two types may THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 37 be traced in modern ethical theory the Ethics of pure reason in Kant and the Intuitionists, the Ethics of sensi- bility in the Utilitarian and Evolutionary schools. The " abstractness " of both ethical theories is traceable to the " abstractness " of the underlying psychology. The half- view of human life rests upon a half- view of human nature. The true ethical life must be the life of the whole Man, of the moral Person. Conduct is the exponent of character, and character of Personality. If we would discover the life of man in its unity and entirety, we must see the nature of man in its unity and entirety. We must penetrate beneath the dualism of reason and sensi- bility of reason and unreason to their underlying unity. The ethical point of view must be neither that of reason nor of sensibility, but of Will, as the unity of both, as the true and total Self. Plato had a glimpse of this unity when he spoke of Ovpos as carrying out the behests of reason in the government of the passions and appetites. Aristotle spoke more explicitly of Will. But both, like their modern successors, insisted on construing man's life in terms either of reason or of sensibility, giving us an account of the intellectual or of the emotional life, but not of the moral life not of the total life of man as man. In Will we find the sought-for unity, the focal point of all man's complex being, the characteristic and distinguishing feature of his nature, which gives us the clue to his charac- teristic life. Man is not a merely sentient being, nor is he " pure reason energising." He is Will and his life is that activity of will in which both reason and sensibility are, as elements, contained, and by whose most subtle chemistry they are inextricably interfused. 38 INTRODUCTION. Voluntary 2. The moral life being the life of Will, we must endea- pres^ vour to reach a psychology of Will. But we must approach voluntary j volition gradually and from the outside. Voluntary pre- forms 1 ^ supposes involuntary activity. Volition implies a concep- the latter. ^ on o an en( ^ p ur p se, or intention. But we must exe- ' cute movements before we can plan or intend them. The original stock of movements with which the will starts on its life must be acquired before the appearance of will on the stage of human life. " The involuntary activity forms the basis and the content of the voluntary. The will is in no way creative, but only modifying and selective." 1 These primary and involuntary acts are of various kinds; some are the results of the constitution of the physical organism, others imply a mental reaction. The most important are the following: (1) Eeflex and automatic, like the beating of the heart or the moving of the eyelids. These are purely physiological and un- conscious. (2) Spontaneous or random movements, the involuntary and partly unconscious, partly conscious, discharge of animal energy, like the movements of the infant. (3) Sensori-motor, the conscious but non-volun- tary adaptation to environment the automatic response to external stimuli, due to the irritability of the nervous system. (4) Instinctive not, like (3), the mere momen- tary response to a particular stimulus, but complex, hav- ing their source within, in the motor centres, rather than in the external stimulus, and guided by reference to a " silent " or unconscious end. Now, all these movements are, or may be, accompanied by sensations, which may accordingly be called "motor- 1 Hoffding, ' Psychology,' 330 (Eng. tr.) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 39 sensations." Further, of these the psychical correlates of the physical movements, their "feels" we preserve a memory-image, which has been called a " kimesthetic idea." "We may, therefore, add to the sensori-motor (5) N ideo-motor activities, which embrace the great mass of the higher actions of our life. The movement here ensues directly upon the idea or representation of it, or rather of the sensation attending it, as in the former case it follows from the sensation itself. There is still no volition. "We are aware of nothing between the conception and the execution. . . . We think the act, and it is done." 1 An extreme case of ideo-motor action is found in the hypnotic trance, but the phenomenon is of constant occurrence in ordinary life. To remember an engagement at the hour appointed is, in general, to execute it. The business of life could never go on if we deliberated and decided about each of its several actions. Instead of this, we surrender ourselves to the train of ideas, and let them bear us on our way. For ideas are essentially impulsive "ide'es- forces." When an idea fills the mind, the corresponding movement follows immediately. Even when two such ideas occupy the mind, when we are attracted in two different directions, the one movement may be inhibited through the idea of the other. There may be a " block," and a clearance of the way, without the interference of any fiat of Will, a knot which unties itself, a struggle of ideas in which the strongest survives, and results in its appropriate movement. 3. All this provision there is for movement partly in Voluntary activity, 1 James, ' Principles of Psychology,' ii. 522. how dis- 40 INTRODUCTION. tinguished the nervous system, partly in the mind itself without any interposition of volition. This last is rather of the nature * inhibition of the natural tendency to movement the re g u ^ a ti n and organisation of movements than origina- tendencies ^ on * ^^ e beginnings are given by nature. But these contrast of primary movements and their sensational correlates are animal and human life, vague and diffuse; they constitute a "motor-continuum," which is gradually made discrete and definite. 1 This occurs largely, as we have seen, involuntarily. A move- ment is determined by the idea of the movement, that is, by the anticipation of the movement's sensible effects, without the explicit intervention of Will. Now if there be such a thing as voluntary activity, its source must be found in the manipulation of the ideas of move- ments already made. In this sense, all action is ideo- motor; its source is in an idea which at the moment fills the consciousness. The question of the nature of volition, therefore, resolves itself into this : What is the mind's power over its ideas ? What is the genesis of the moving idea in the highest and most complex activities ? The function of Will obviously is the regulation and organisation of activity through the regulation and organi- sation of those impulsive tendencies to action of which man is naturally the subject. We shall perhaps obtain the best idea of what the life of mere impulse without volition would be by considering the case of a volitional life in which the will is most in abeyance. The life of the habitual drunkard, for example, is a life whose notori- ous defect is the absence of self-control ; the man is the 1 Cf. Ward, art. " Psychology " iu ' Encyclopaedia Britannica,' 9th ed. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 41 slave of the idea of the moment, the vivid representation of the pleasures of gratified appetite or of social excite- ment. This idea moves him to act in the line of its guid- ance, and its continual recurrence carries with it, as its natural and immediate consequence, a life of debauchery. Such a life is the nearest approach, in human experience, to that of the animal; such a man, we say, "makes a beast of himself." The tragedy of it consists in the fact of the abdication of the will, in the enslavement by im- pulse of him who should have been its master. The case of the " fixed idea " in insanity or in hypnotism would illustrate even better a life of impulse without will. Here will seems to be simply eliminated, and the man becomes the prey of the idea of the moment or the hour. What- ever is " suggested " in the line of the dominant idea, he does forthwith ; his life is a series of simple reactions to such ideational stimulation. A life guided by Will, on the contrary, is a life in Which each impelling idea, as it presents itself, is dealt/ with, and subdued to a larger ideal or conception of life's , total meaning and purpose ; in which for " action of the ' reflex type" there is substituted action which is th^ result of deliberate choice ; in which, instead of the coeri cive guidance of the immediately dominant idea, we have, the guidance that comes from a reflective consideration' of the relative claims of the several ideas which now / appear on the field of consciousness and compete for the' mastery. Here is the unique and characteristic element of human activity, in virtue of which we attribute Will to man, and call his life a moral life. Even voluntary activity, in the last analvji^ belongs to the " reflex type," ".' ' ' ~ - j^V 07 T7T1 ^^ JI7Er.3IT.Tl 42 INTRODUCTION. or is ideo-motor ; but such is the new complexity of the process that it deserves a new name. A man does not, or at any rate need not, "react," as the mere animal reacts. The action of the animal, being strictly a re- action, and a mere immediate reaction, can be predicted, /the stimulus being given. But man is not, like the ; animal, the creature of impulse, even of that organised 'impulse which we call instinct. He is an animal, a creature of impulse, played upon by the varied influ- ences of his environment. But he is also, or may be, "the master of impulse as the rider is master of his horse"; his life may be the product of a single cen- tral purpose which governs its every act; it is his to live not in the immediate present or in the immediate future, but to "look before and after," to forecast the remote as well as the near future, and to act in the light arid under the guidance of such a far-reaching survey of his life. Volition, then, consists in the direction or guidance of given impulsive tendencies or propensities to act. The function of will is not to create, but to direct and control. The impulsive basis of volition, like the sensational basis of knowledge, is given; the former is the datum of the moral life, as the latter is the datum of the intellectual life. Man is, to begin with and always, a sentient being, a creature of animal sensibility. Such sensibility is the " matter " of which will is the " form," the " manifold " of which will is the " unity." That organisation of impulse which is already accomplished for the animal in the shape of instinct, has to be accomplished ly man himself. The animal, in following its impulses, fulfils entirely its life's THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 43 purpose; its impulses are just the paths that bring it securely to that end. We do not criticise its life, impul- sive though it is ; it is as perfect and true to its intention as the growth of the plant or the revolutions of the spheres. It looks not before or after: it "does not ask to see the distant goal," the " whither " of the forces that master it " one step enough " for it. Its life is blind, or, at any rate, sadly near-sighted, but unerring. Its path is narrow, but straight to the goal. But to man is given an eye to see his life's path stretching before him into the far spaces of the future, and to look back along all the way he has come. His moral life is, like his intellectual life, self -conducted. The animal is born into the world fully equipped for its life's journey, everything arranged for it, each step of the path marked out. Man has to do almost everything for himself to learn the intellectual and the moral meaning of his life, to put himself to school, above all, and from the beginning even to the end, to school him- self. As out of the vague, confused, "presentation-con- tinuum" he has to constitute, by his own intellectual activity, a world of objects, so, out of the "motor-con- tinuum " of " vague desire " he has to constitute, by his own moral activity, a system of ends. Each sphere is a kind of chaos until he reads into it, or recognises in it, the cosmos of intelligence and of will. The complete determination and definition of the one would be the Truth, of the other the Good. Where the animal acts blindly or from immediate and uncriticised impulse, man can act with reflection and from deliberate choice. Where the animal's life is the outcome of forces or tendencies of which it is merely " aware," man " knows " or discerns the 44 INTRODUCTION. meaning of the tendencies he experiences, and acts, or may act, in the light and by the force of such rational insight. Where the cause of the animal's activity is to be found without itself, in the appeal made to it by its cir- cumstances or environment, in the "push and pull" of impulsive forces, the true cause of human activities must be sought within the man himself, in his critical con- sideration of the outward appeal, in the superior strength of his rational spirit. The pro- 4. But we must note more closely the nature of the lition: Its process of volition. We may distinguish three stages. m a e r nts, S (a) e " ( a ) There is the temporary-inhibition of all the impulsive tendencies, the pause or interval during which the alter- native activities are suspended. We can hardly exaggerate the psychological " importance of the interval." It is this \j arrest of activity that breaks the immediacy and contin- uity of the merely reflex or ideo-motor life. If the drunkard only paused, and did not immediately proceed to realise his idea of gratification, he would probably not be a drunkard ; but he rushes to his fate. He who hesi- tates, he who can effect the pause, in such a case, isjzot lost, but almost saved. 1 The first step towards the con- trol of animal impulse, towards the subjection of a master- idea, is to postpone its realisation. The pause does not prejudge the question of our ultimate attitude to the impulse in question ; all that it implies is that we shall not follow the impulse in the meantime, or until we have considered its merits, and compared them with those (J)deiiber- of other alternative impulses. (6) There is deliberation, ation ; 1 Cf. James, ' Principles of Psychology,' ch. 26. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 45 reflection upon the various possible courses in the circum- stances, comparison and criticism of the result of follow- ing each competing impulse, a study of the entire situation, a " self - recollection," a " gathering oneself together," a " trying of our ways," a comparison of this and that pos- sible future with our present and our past, a bringing the course proposed to the touchstone of our prevailing aspirations, our dominant aims in life, our permanent x and deepest as well as our fleeting, momentary, super- ficial, though clamant, self ; a swerving from one side to the other, a weighing of impulse in the scales of reflec- tion ; and, sooner or later, (c) a decision or choice, the (c) choice, acceptance of one or other of the conflicting ideal futures, the surrender to it in all the strength of its now increased impulsive force, the identification of the self with it, and its realisation. The ideal future thus chosen is called the end or motive of the resulting activity. For, once grasped, it becomes the constraining stimulus to action, thsjidea which moves us. In it is now focused the energy of the entire man; it and he are, in a real sense, one. It is thus that ends are the exponents of character, that life attains to unity and system : it is thus that we conceive of the perfect life as one guided by a single all-compre- hensive Purpose, which runs through its entire course, and, gathering up within itself all its varied activities, imparts to each its own significance f The entire process is one of selective attention. In a sense, even the animal selects; only certain stimuli excite it those, namely, which find in it a corresponding susceptibility. And, in man's case, the original force of the momentarily clamant idea is a result of what may be 46 INTRODUCTION. called "natural selection." It is because he is the man he is, that this particular idea has for him such impulsive force; for another man, the same idea might have no impulsive force at all. This, too, is a case of attention, but it is only its rudimentary or involuntary form. The animal, or the man who does not pause to deliberate and choose, acts from a kind of fascination or charm. He has no eyes to see other paths, no ears to hear other guides ; he seems to himself to be shut up to this one course. But there is another kind of selection, as there is another kind of attention; and the voluntary is dis- tinguished from the involuntary by the element of de- liberation. The^poHfir of will is a power of attention; the distinction between, involuntary and voluntary atten- tion is the distinction between the life of will and a life without will. The process of volition is the process of the variation and oscillation of attention from one aspect of the practical situation to another. It is thus that, as the perspective changes, and ideas now in the foreground of consciousness retreat into the background, impulsive force is transferred from one idea to another, and the resulting activity is the outcome of a " conjunct view of the whole case." The function of will, therefore, is, by such a distribution of attention, to constitute the end or motive of activity. This end may at first be the weakest idea of all, the least fascinating, the one which, of its own original resources, would be least likely to move us ; yet through the medium of deliberation, through the strong intrinsic appeal it makes to the whole self, it may gather strength while the others as gradually and surely lose their early force, until, in the end of the day, in the final THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 47 deliberate choice, we find that the last is first, and the first last. And, since our several acts of choice are not isolated but organically connected with one another, the process may be described finally as an activity of moral apper- ception or integration. The activity of will is essentially an adjustment of the new to the old, and of the old to the new. Just as, in the case of any real addition to our in- tellectual life, the process is not one of mere addition of new to old material, but rather means the grafting of the new upon the old tree of knowledge, in such wise that the old is- itself renewed with the fresh blood of the new conception ; so, in the case of any real moral advance, any fresh act of choice, the new must be assimilated to the old, and the old to the new. For it is the man the self that makes the choice, and, in doing so, he takes up a nevi moral attitude ; the entire moral being undergoes a subtle but real change. The house, whether of our intellectual or of our moral nature, must be swept and garnished, and made ready for its new guest; and if that guest be un- worthy, the stain of his presence will be felt throughout the secret chambers of the soul. Or, to drop metaphor, and to state the matter more accurately, we must apper- ceive the contemplated act, place it in the context of our life's purposes, and, directly or indirectly, with more or with less explicit consciousness, correlate it with the master-purpose of our lives. It is thus that an originally weak impulse may be strengthened by being brought into the main-stream of our life's total purpose, ^choice is therefore an organisation, which is at the same time an integration or assimilation, of impulse. cnaract 48 INTRODUCTION. Nature and 5. This analysis of the process of volition prepares us to understand the distinction between nature, disposi- tion, or temperament, on the one hand, and character on the other. The former is our original endowment or equipment, the given raw material of moral life, the Natural, undisciplined, unformed, unmoralised man. The latter is acquired, the fruit of effort and toil, the spiritual, disciplined, formed, moralised man. From the first, the true spring of activity is rather within than without, in the unformed self of the man rather than in his external circumstances or environ- ment. It is because the man is what he is, that any particular stimulus is a stimulus to him. The " en- vironment" is his environment; to another it would be none. Susceptibility determines and constitutes environment, rather than environment susceptibility. Given a certain type of susceptibility, however, a great deal depends upon the presence or absence of the corre- sponding environment, to stimulate that susceptibility. In the case of a merely natural or animal being a being without a character or the possibility of its formation everything depends upon the presence or absence of such a stimulating environment ; the life of such a being is the product of this action and reaction. Man himself is, at first, such a merely natural being, a creature of impulse and instinct, an animal rather than a man. He, too, is nature's " offspring," a veritable " part of nature, which moves in him and sways him hither and thither " ; l and were there not in him a higher strength than nature's, he would remain to the end " the slave of nature." Did his 1 Prof. Laurie, 'Ethica,' 22 (2d ed.) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 49 nature remain as it originally is, his would be a merely natural or animal life. If he remained in this " state of nature," his life would either have no unity or order at all, and be swayed by each and every impulse as it came ; or it would attain merely to the unity of the animal life, where the organisation of impulse is the work of instinct. But for man there is the higher possibility of attaining to an ethical unity, to the organisation of natural impulse through self-control. The unity of moral self-hood is of a different order from the natural unity of force or instinct. As Professor Laurie puts it, man, as a Will or Self, " has to do for his own organism what nature through neces- sary laws does for all else." The " natural man," as such, 1 the animal nature in man, is neither good nor bad, neithei moral nor immoral, but simply non-moral. It is in the 1 possibility of transfiguring this natural animal life, and \ making it the instrument and expression of spiritual purpose, that morality consists. Morality is the forma- tion, out of this raw material of nature, of a character. The seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire, must be reduced to some common human measure. Man may not continue to live the animal life of unchecked impulse, borne ever on the full tide of natural sensibility. That life of nature which he too feels surging up within him, has to be directed and controlled ; it must be subjected to the moulding influence of reflective purpose. For man is not, like the animal, merely " aware " of tendencies that sway him ; he " knows " them, and whither they lead. His is a life of reflection and judgment, as well as of imme- / diate impulse ; and just because he can reflect upon and I D 50 INTRODUCTION. judge his impulses, he can regulate and master them. ^Where the animal is guided by primary feeling, man is guided by feeling so moralised or rationalised that we call it " sentiment " or " moral idea." It is only thus, by taking in hand his original nature or disposition, and gathering up its manifold elements into the unity of a consistent character, that man becomes truly man. He must thus " come to himself," however long and laborious be the way. Effort. The way from nature to character is laborious, and full of effort. " Before virtue the gods have put toil and effort." xa\7ra ra /ca\d. " Strait is the gate, and nar- row the way," of the life of virtue. For the voluntary or ^ moral life is, in its essence, we have seen, the inhibition of f natural (impulsive and instinctive) tendencies. It is a turning of attention in another than its natural direction, an effort, by distributing over a wider field the conscious- ness originally focused on a narrow area, to change its focus from one restricted area to another. This substitu- tion of voluntary for involuntary attention is difficult, and most difficult at first. The present and immediate, the natural or "attuent," 1 life is engrossing, clamant, fas- cinating. The lines of impulse and instinct the lines of nature are the "lines of least resistance"; thought and " cool " self -recollection the lines of character and virtue are at first the lines of greatest resistance. The child has to be helped over the first steps of its moral life, just as it has to be helped to walk alone both physically and intellectually; its weak will, so soon wearied with the 1 We owe this term to Professor Laurie, who uses it throughout his ' Metaphysica ' and ' Ethica.' THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 51 strange effort, has to be propped up by appeals to the well-rooted instincts of its childish nature. Long after- wards, the struggle still continues, arid the weariness returns, and still often " old Adam is too strong for young Melanchthon," and the wretched combatant cries out for deliverance from the body of this death. But gradually, and in due time, the deliverance comes. Second These pains and agonies are, in reality, the birth-pangs of a new nature in the man. Gradually he experiences " the expulsive power of new affections." Character is itself a habit of will, and habit is always easy. Virtue is not| virtue until it has become pleasant. 1 Character does not consist in single choices, made with difficulty, and after much deliberation and weighing of the pros and cons. It consists in the formation of grooves along which the activity naturally and habitually runs. He is not, in the highest sense, an honest man who does an honest act with difficulty, and who would rather act dishonestly. The honest man is the man to whom it would be difficult and unnatural to act dishonestly, the man in whom honesty is a " second nature." Thus we see how, since character isf itself a habit a new and acquired habit which has supj planted the primary habits of the mere animal nature thei difference between "nature" and "character" must be a) fleeting one. What was at first, and perhaps for long, the hard-won fruit of moral effort, becomes later the sponta- neous work of the new "nature" which has thus been born within us. Effort becomes less and less characteristic of the life of virtue ; self-control becomes less difficult, as virtue becomes a " second nature." The storm and stress 1 Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii. ch. 3. 52 INTRODUCTION. of its earlier struggles is followed by the great calm of settled and established virtue. The " great currents of our lives, the habitual lines of activity, opinion, and interest," carry us with them. There is no longer the inhibition, the painful suspense of deliberation, and the anxious choice, but the even flow of the great main-stream. The energies of the will, which were formerly so dissipated, are now found in splendid integration, and the whole man seems to live in each individual act. If it were not that the way of virtue is long, as well as difficult, we should be apt to say that the element of effort which characterises its beginning is destined in the end to disappear; if it were not that there were always new virtues for even the most virtuous to acquire, we should be inclined to say that the path of virtue is steep and difficult only " at the first." But the ascent reveals ever new heights of virtue yet un- attained; and the effort of virtue is measured by the heights of the moral ideal as well as by the heights of moral attainment. Thus, what at a lower level was [' character " becomes, at the higher, again mere " nature," io be in turn transcended and overcome. " We rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things." There is no resting in the life of virtue, it is a constant growth ; to stereotype it, or to arrest it at any stage, however ad- vanced, would be to kill it. There is always an "old man " and a " new " : the very new becomes old, and has to die, and be surmounted. Limit- 6. Certain limitations of the volitional life are suggested volition : by what has already been said. omy. C01 ( a ) The principle of economy of will-power implies the THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 53 surrender of large tracts of our life to mechanism. Such a surrender is made in the case not only of purely physical activities, but also generally in the case of the routine of daily life. To deliberate and choose about such things as which boot we shall put on first, or which side of the garden-walk we shall take, is an entirely gratuitous assertion of our power of volition ; it is the mark of a weak or diseased, rather than of a strong and healthy will. Decision and strength of character are shown in the choice of certain fixed lines of conduct in such particulars, and in the abiding by the choice once made. Farther, a great economy of effort is secured by the choice of ends rather than of means. The means may require deliberation and choice, but, to a very large extent, they are already chosen in the end. And in general we may say that the details of an act which, taken as a whole, is strictly voluntary, may be cases of merely ideo-motor activity ; the operation may proceed with perfect smoothness, each step of it suggesting the next in turn, without any intervention of will. (&) The continuity of our moral life also implies a (b) Contin- large surrender of its several acts to mechanism or habit. The moral life is not a series of isolated choices ; it is a continuous and growing whole. As it proceeds, the sur- vey becomes more and more extended ; to use a con- venient technical term, the individual act is more and more completely " apperceived." The mature moral man does not fight his battles always over again ; he brings the individual act under a conception. His life, instead of being a constant succession of fresh choices, becomes a more or less complete system of ends, centring, implicitly or explicitly, in one supreme. The deliberation is chiefly 54 INTRODUCTION. about the placing of the individual action in its true relations to the context of this system, about the inter- pretation of it as a part of this whole. In general, we choose " sections " of life, rather than the individual details which fill those sections. In other words, all men, even those whom we call "unprincipled," have certain prin- ciples, of which their life is the expression. Choices are not, I have said, independent ; they inevi- tably " crystallise," or rather, they are seeds which develop and bear fruit in the days and years that follow. The moments of our life have not all an equal moral signifi- cance. Eather the significance of our lives, for good or evil, seems to be determined by moments of choice in days and years of even tenor. There are great moments when both good and evil are set before us, and we consciously and deliberately embrace a great end, or, with no less deliberate consciousness, reject it for a lower and less worthy. Every act is implicitly a case of such moral faithfulness or unfaithfulness. But, in such moments as those of which I now speak, the will gives large com- missions to habit, and leaves to it their execution. The commission is quickly given, its execution takes long. The moral crises of our lives are few, and soon over ; but it seems as if all the strength of our spirit gathered itself up for such supreme efforts, and as if what follows in the long-drawn years were but their consequence. (c) Fixity (c) What is generally called " fixity of character " sug- acter. gests a third important limitation of the will's activity. The course of moral life, as it proceeds, seems to result in the establishment of certain fixed lines of conduct and character, whether good or evil. Its course becomes more THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 55 and more settled ; law and system, of one kind or another, are more and more visible in it. The formation of char- acter means, as we have seen, the constant handing over to habit of actions which were at first done with delibera- tion and effort. "Association takes over the work of in- telligence " ; " we fall back under the lead of impulse " ; character becomes " second nature." We are always forg- ing, by our acts of deliberate choice, the iron chains of habit. Otherwise, there would be no ground gained, no fruit harvested from daily toil of will, no store of moral acquisition laid up for future years. Our life would be a Sisyphus' task, never any nearer its execution. But, as we roll it up, the stone does remain, nay, tends still up- wards. Of this gradual and almost imperceptible fixation in evil ways, the characters of Tito in George Eliot's ' Komola,' and of Markheim in Mr K. L. Stevenson's little story of that name, are impressive instances. What is exemplified in such cases is not, I think, loss of will-power so much as " fixity " of character itself the creation of will degradation of the will, a choice, apparently final and irrevocable, of the lower and the evil. This is the tragedy of the story in either case. Is not this, again, the meaning of the weird Faust legend which has so im- pressed the imagination of Europe ? Faust's " selling his soul" to Mephistopheles, and signing the contract with his life's blood, is no single transaction, done deliberately, on one occasion ; rather that is the lurid meaning of a life which consists of innumerable individual acts, the life of evil means that. And, at the other extreme of the moral scale, does not " holiness " mean a great and final exalta- tion of will, its perfect and established union with the 56 INTRODUCTION. higher and the good, " fixity of character " once more ? These infinite possibilities of evil and of goodness seem to be the implicate of an infinite moral ideal ; they are the moral equivalents of the heaven and hell of the religious imagination. What is Will itself but just this power or possibility, infinite as our nature, for each of us in the direction either of goodness or of evil ? Between these extremes moves the ordinary average life of the comfort- able citizen. The strongest and deepest natures are the saints and the sinners ; the weaker and more superficial fluctuate irresolute between the poles of moral life. On the side of goodness, at any rate, we readily admit the reality of that moral experience of which " fixity of character " is the natural interpretation. We have no interest in proving that the saint is potentially a sinner. The condition and attribute of the highest life, we readily admit, is not to hold oneself aloof from good and evil, and " free " to choose between them. Far rather it is found in the "single mind," in the resolute identification of the whole man or self with the good, in the will of the higher self to live. For, as Aristotle truly said, virtue is not virtue, until it has become a habit of the soul, and easy and spontaneous as a habit. Moral progress is a progress from nature and its bondage, through freedom and duty, to that love or " second nature " which alone is the " ful- filling of the law." So that, " after all, free-will is not the highest freedom." Free-will implies antagonism and resistance. " But the action of the perfect, so far as they are perfect, is natural. . . . Only it proceeds from a higher nature, in which experience has passed through reason into insight, in which impulse and desire have THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 57 passed through free-will into love." 1 This is freedom made perfect, the liberty of the children of God. Whether the identification of the will with evil can ever become, in the strict sense, fixed, is a hard and perhaps unanswerable question. The Faust legend seems to express such a belief, and for Tito, as for Esau, there is "no place left for repentance." In the impressive little story of 'Markheim,' I think I see a gleam of hope, a suggestion and no more, of the final possibility, even for the most debased, of moral recovery. That last act of deliberate self-surrender seems like the first step away from the evil past towards a better future. It was the last possibility of good for the man ; but even for him it was a possibility still. Arid does it not seem as if an evil character, however evil, being the formation of Will, might be ^formed and reformed by the same power ? Is not character, after all, but a garment in which the spirit clothes itself a garment which clings tightly to it, but which it need not wear eternally ? The tendency is towards such settlement or gradual fixation, whether in goodness or in evil. But absolute "fixity of character" is disproved by that indubitable fact of moral experience which Plato, equally with the Christian theologian, calls " conversion " such a complete change of bent as amounts not merely to a reformation but to a revolution of character " the turning round of the eye of the soul and with it the whole soul, from darkness to light, from the perishing to the eternal." It seems as if the past and the present life were never an ex- haustive expression of the possibilities of will. The man 1 G. A. Sirncox, in 'Mind,' iv. 481. 58 INTRODUCTION. is always more than the sum of his past and present experience, and often he surprises us by creating a future which, while it stands in relation to the past, yet does so only or chiefly by antithesis. It is as if the catastrophe which comes with the culmination of his evil career, by its revelation of the full meaning of the life he has been living, shocked him into the resolve to live a different and a better life. It is as if Markheim said to himself, after the tragedy of that fateful day, when he had connected it with himself, and confessed that the seeds of even that evil were thickly sown in the soil of his evil past : " That is not the man I choose to be " ; and as if, in the strength of that decision, accepting the full consequences of his deed, and surrendering himself deliberately to its retribution, he forthwith took the first step away from his past self and towards a future self entirely different. Might not even Tito, even Faust, even Esau, so choose at last the better part ? Christianity calls it a " new birth," so different is the new man from the old. Yet, however different, it is the same man through the two lives ; the same will, only it has changed its course ; the same player, but in a new role. We must recognise, therefore, a very considerable range of variation in the adequacy of activity as the exponent of character. In some actions we see the stirring of the deeps of personality, the revelation of the very self; in others only the waves on the surface of the moral life. There is a great difference in this respect even between individuals. Some men are reserved, and their character is a closed book to their fellows. Others are open, and readily reveal their inner being. In some there is less THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 59 depth of soil thaii in others, superficial natures, who have not much either to reveal or to conceal, the volume of whose character is quickly read and mastered by their fellows. In some, perhaps in all, there is a double life, an outer and an inner, never quite harmonised, and often directly opposed. This " double-faced unity " in the moral world, this co-existence and antagonism of " two men " in one, of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, is not necessarily duplicity or hypocrisy. Kather it seems to mean that there is al- ways a residuum of moral possibility, whatever the actual character may have become ; the man never is either Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde, the saint or the sinner, but he is potentially either, though actually partly the one and partly the other, more the one and less the other. And out of the deepest retreats of the unconscious or sub- conscious sphere there may emerge any day the buried, forgotten, yet truest and most real self. The man may have wandered into the far country, and may even seem to have lost all trace of goodness, and yet he may in the end " come to himself," and may recover those possibilities which had till then seemed possibilities no longer. " So long as there is life there is hope." Character may seem to have quite lost its plasticity, and to have become en- tirely fixed and rigid. But it is not so. Character is a living thing, and life is never fixed or rigid. After all, the ordinary average character is more apt to suggest the true state of the case than either of the extremes. These extremes are instability or absence of character on the one hand, and what we have called fixity or finality of char- acter on the other. The latter would be " fossilisation," or the cessation of growth, which is death. Character is 60 INTRODUCTION. essentially, from first to last, plastic. It implies " open- mindedness," freshness or ingenuousness, receptiveness for the new. The change is not, indeed, capricious or at random ; the new must be linked to the old ; the old must itself be renewed, recreated in every part. Yet the relation of the new to the old may be that of antithesis and revolt, as well as of synthesis and continuity. The development of character is not always in a straight line : it is ever returning upon and reconstituting itself. inteilec- *7. It is necessary, before leaving the psychology of the ments in moral life, to consider the relation of intellect and feeling (a)Concep- to Will. We find several intellectual elements in volition : (a) Conception. The natural or animal life is unthinking ; the voluntary or moral life is a thoughtful life. The Greeks understood this well ; we find Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all alike identifying virtue with knowledge or rational insight. It is not, however, true that the moral and the intellectual life are one, or that virtue is know- -^] ledge. It is the_ volition behind the intellection that is the essential element. We might say that virtue is attention, or the steady entertainment of a certain concep- tion of life or of its several activities. This is what dis- tinguishes the voluntary form of activity from both the instinctive and the impulsive forms. Instinct executes cer- tain ends unconsciously; it is the unconscious organisa- tion of impulse, nature's own control of natural tendency. Mere impulse, on the other hand, is momentary, and takes in but a single object ; the creature of impulse is touched at only one point of his nature, and follows the tendency of the moment. Since, therefore, man has the organisation, of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 61 his impulsive tendencies in his own hands, his first and essential act must be one of thought or conception. Tq think or conceive the proposed action aright, is the condition of right action ; and it is because the vicious man thinks or conceives his action wrongly, and under false colours, that he does it. " To sustain a representation, to think," says Professor James, " is, in short, the only moral act." It is because the drunkard " lets himself go," and will not con- ceive or name his act aright, because he will not acknow- ledge to himself that " this is being a drunkard," that he is a drunkard. So soon as he brings himself to this, he is on the way to being saved; if he keeps his mind on that idea, it will gradually be strengthened, until it is predominant, and issues in the inhibition of the tendency to drink. For thus to conceive an act is to apperceive it, to see it in all its relations to his total self ; and then how differently it looks, how its fascination pales in that larger light. The true centre of influence has now been/ found, in the deeper rational Self which assimilates and rejects according to its discrimination. Undue reflectiveness means, of course, weakness of will or indecision of character; it is fatal to that prompti- tude which is essential to effective activity. Plato has drawn a delightful picture of the dire practical effects of undue deliberation, in his contrast of the awkward, ineffective philosopher and the shrewd, quick, business- like little lawyer-soul. 1 In his parable of the Cave, also, he has given expression to the popular idea of the man of thought as little fitted to be, at the same time, a man of action; he represents the philosopher or true thinker as 1 ' Theaetetus,' 172-176. 62 INTRODUCTION. withdrawn from human affairs, and, by his want of in- terest in the concerns of ordinary life, in a sense unfitted for the conduct of life's business. Shakespeare, too, has created for us a Hamlet, a thinker but a dreamer, disabled by undue reflection for the part he is called to play on this world's stage, his will so embarrassed by the pros and cons of a restless intellect that it can accomplish nothing, a man in whom " the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." And our own century has furnished a sad living commentary on the familiar text. Amiel's ' Journal ' is the record of how the springs of all practical energy were sapped by a continual, brooding, Hamlet-like reflection which never found vent in action : it is one long bitter plaint of a soul praying for deliver- ance from the body of such a living death, the story of a life endowed with such clearness of intellectual vision, united to such sad impotence of will, that it could trace its own failure to this single source. So true is it that we all have "the defects of our qualities," and that these defects must be our ruin if we guard not against them. Yet life is not all tragedy ; and such dire consequences are not inevitable, or even normal. Even in these cases, it is not that the man thinks too much, but that his activity is not up to the measure of his thought ; unless thought finds its constant and adequate expression in action, it weakens where it ought to strengthen the power to act. The re- sult is what Professor James calls " the obstructed will," the will hindered by thought, which is just at the oppo- site extreme from the " explosive " or impulsive will, the will that does not think, but reacts with " hair-trigger " rapidity and certainty. Thejbrue^uncti^.n, xj thought is THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 63 to mediate between these extremes of character, not to sap the force of impulse, but to guide that force to more effective issues. The grey light of reason need not quench all the bright sunshine of enthusiasm ; the ruddy life of natural impulse need not be' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. Bather it is the function of reason to convert unthinking impulses into great enthusiasms, to inform the practical energies with far-reaching purposes, and thus to be the will's best helpmate in its proper task. The most effective man is he who, knowing best and thinking most profoundly about life's meaning, feels also most intensely, and acts most promptly and consistently in the common sphere of thought and feeling. (b) It is obvious that memory-images are necessary for (b) Mem- orv. the representation of future possibilities. We can con- ceive the future only in terms of the past : experience is our sole instructor in the conduct of life. And only a vivid and accurate memory of the past, the power to reproduce it as it was, can deliver us from the bondage of the engrossing present. The ability to look forward is < largely an ability to look backward. Experience is our common instructor here, but we are not all apt pupils. Some gain from experience far more than others, in re- tentive memory they garner its golden grain, and draw from it in all the exigencies of the present; the years bring to them their own peculiar gift the "wisdom of life." To others the years do not bring the philosophic mind ; they seem to pass through the same experience untouched by its lessons. Their life is in the fleeting present. They are like children who amuse themselves with life's changing show. They are the creatures of 64 INTRODUCTION. present impulse, passive and receptive, taking no thought for the morrow, because they take no heed of yesterday ; for " purpose is but the slave to memory." l Such lives are without perspective, without appreciation of the far and near; they have no future, because they have no past. The wise man's life is richly " fringed " on either side, and the fringe of the future is of the same pattern as that of the past. Memory is the true "measuring art." A truthful representation of the future depends upon a truthful representation of the past, and will go far to determine the present. (c) imagin- (c) The power to look vividly forward is no less necessary than the power to look vividly backward. It is a defect of imagination that is largely to blame for the unworthy and sensual lives we see. It is because the horizon is bounded by the day's needs and the day's capacities of enjoyment, that the life is so narrow and so mean. Could but the horizon lift, could but the man look into the far- distant future, and discern there all the consequences of the act he is about to do, could he but see its waves breaking on those distant shores against which some day they must break, how different his life would be ! And if we would lift the horizon of time itself, and see our life in time sub quddam specie ceternitatis, we must stretch our imagination to the utmost. Seen in that light, in the light of " the immensities and eternities," nothing is com- mon or unclean, nothing is trivial or commonplace ; the simplest and meanest acts become transfigured with a strange dignity and significance. Surely, then, the moral 1 Hamlet, Act iii. sc. 2, quoted by Hbffding, 327. Cf. his account of this entire subject. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 65 imagination which discovers to us the true perspective of life, is no less important for practice than is the scientific imagination for theory. 8. Two opposed views have long been canvassed, and Will and the controversy still rages, as to the place of feeling in is pleasure the moral life. On the one hand, it is maintained that of choice? pleasure is the constant and exclusive object of desire ; \ on the other hand, that pleasure is never the object of desire. On the one hand, it is said that our life is one continuous pursuit of pleasure ; on the other hand, that the pursuit of pleasure is impossible and suicidal. The one view sees in pleasure the sole actual end of life; the other sees in it the concomitant and result, but not the end or object of pursuit. The former view was held in ancient philosophy by the Cyrenaics, and in modern, among others, by Hume and J. S. Mill. The latter is the view of Aristotle among the ancients, of Butler, Sidgwick, and Green among modern moralists, and of James, Bald- win, and Hoffding among contemporary psychologists^ Both theories admit that feeling is an element in human life; the problem is to determine its psychological place and function. A glance at the role of feeling in the lower and non- voluntary activities of instinct and impulse may help us to understand the part it plays in the higher life of Will. We have seen that neither in the case of impulse, nor in that of instinct, is there consciousness of an end. Both are blind, unenlightened tendencies to act in a certain way. In impulsive activities there is no operation of an end at all ; in those which we call instinctive its operation 66 INTRODUCTION. is unconscious. But both these types of activity are ac- companied by feeling. There is not merely the tendency to act; the consciousness has a passive as well as an active side, a certain " tone " it is pleasant or painful. Nor is this primarily passive side merely passive, merely concomitant ; it is also influential in determining the activity of the sentient being. It is the single ray of light let into the darkness of the animal life of instinct /and impulse. There is no further vision of the Whither ; /there is no consciousness of purpose, no choice of ends. / But there is a feeling for pleasure and pain, of want and { the satisfaction of it ; and this feeling guides the being towards the objects that will satisfy it, that will quench its pain and yield it pleasure. This feeling for pleasure and pain has helped materially to guide the evolution of animal life. Pleasure-giving and life-preserving activities are, in the main, identical; and the importance of the addition of the conscious pressure of feeling to the un- conscious pressure of environment and circumstances can hardly be overestimated. That which distinguishes voluntary from involuntary activity is, we have seen, the conscious operation of ends as motives of choice. The guidance has now passed into the hands of intellect; we act in the light of rational insight into the issues of our activity. To the lower guidance of immediate near-sighted feeling there is now added the higher and farther-seeing guidance of ideas. But, even here, the guidance has not entirely passed from the hands of feeling. For, not only are there, in- terfused with ends, what Professor Baldwin calls " affects," or activities immediately determined by feeling ; but ends THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 67- themselves have an "affective" side, or contain an ele- ment of feeling without which they would possess no motive-force. " The simple presence of an idea in con- sciousness is itself a feeling, and only in as far as it affects us does it move us." x Feeling thus mediates between intellect and will, converting the cold intel- lectual conception into a motive of activity. In ends, then, there is always an element of feeling as well as of thought; it is the fusion of these two that constitutes the " interests " of the voluntary life. We are now de- livered from the immediate dominion of feeling; we see* | or foresee what course will yield us pleasure, and we act / under the guidance of this intellectual sight or foresight. But are we not still, indirectly if not directly, controlled by feeling ? The hedonist answers in the affirmative ; lie insists that the ultimate factor in the determination of our choice is feeling rather than thought, that thought is after all the minister of feeling, informing it how a de- sirable state of feeling may be attained and an undesirable state of feeling escaped. The dominion of feeling still persists, only it is an indirect dominion ; feeling has not abdicated, it has only delegated its authority to intellect, and become a constitutional sovereign. The anti-hedonistic answer is that pleasure, or an agreeable state of feeling, is never the end or object of desire and choice ; that while pleasure accompanies both the pursuit and the attainment of our ends, it never constitutes these ends. We never act, it is contended, for the sake of pleasure, but for the sake of objects, or interests, in which we " rest," and from which we do not return to a consideration of our own sub- 1 Baldwin, 'Psychology,' 313, 314. 68 INTRODUCTION. jective feeling of pleasure, either in their pursuit or in their attainment. Let us follow the argument on both sides, if we can, to the end. The primary direction of thought, the anti-hedonist maintains, is towards the object, not towards the pleasure which it is expected to yield. We do not, it is argued, look so far ahead as the pleasure ; that is not what moves us. To say that the anticipated pleasure is the motive of activity is to commit the psychologist's fallacy ; to read your own introspective and analytic consciousness of the conditions of consciousness into that original and natural consciousness which is the object of your introspective in- vestigation, but is not itself troubled with introspection or analysis. Even the voluntary life is, to this extent, blind ; even it is not endowed with the minute vision of the psy- chologist, still less with the microscopic eye of the logi- cian. The question is : What do we desire ? not What are the conditions of desire ? or Why do we desire what we desire ? It is a question of fact, not of the conditions or the rationale of the fact. Now, " a pleasant act, and an act pursuing pleasure, are, in themselves, two perfectly distinct conceptions. ... It is the confusion of pursued pleasure with mere pleasure of achievement, which makes the pleasure-theory so plausible to the ordinary mind." 1 In short, the " pleasure of pursuit " is psychologically different from the " pursuit of pleasure." Even the hedonists themselves seem to yield this point, and to admit the " paradox of hedonism " viz., that " to get pleasure you must forget it." Mill makes this confes- sion, both in his ' Utilitarianism ' and in his ' Autobio- 1 James, ' Principles of Psychology,' 556, 557. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 69 graphy.' He admits that the direct pursuit of pleasure is suicidal, that we must lose sight of the end in the means, and, adopting a kind of " miser's consciousness," affect a disinterested or objective interest, forget ourselves, and pursue objects as if for their own sake, and not for the sake of the pleasure which we expect them to yield. " Something accomplished, something done/' yields pleas- ure ; but if it is to yield the pleasure, at least the maxi- mum of pleasure, we must not do it for the sake of the pleasure. The life of pleasure-seeking is, in other words, by the very nature of the case, a life of illusion and make-believe. But, replies the anti-hedonist, such an interpretation of human life is in the highest degree artificial and un-psy- chological. " The real order of things is just the reverse of the hedonistic interpretation of it. Instead of begin- ning with the pursuit of pleasure, and ending by pursuing what was earlier the means to pleasure, we begin by pur- suing an object, and end by degrading this primary object to an artificial means to pleasure, or as a competitor with pleasure for the dignity of being pursued." 1 The passage is " from simple desire for an object which satisfies to I desire for the satisfaction itself." Here, once more, the hedonist seems forced to concede the point to his antagonist. Even such an arch-hedonist as Hume admits that " it has been proved beyond all controversy that even the passions commonly esteemed selfish may carry the mind beyond self directly to the object ; that though the satisfaction gives us enjoyment, yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passion, but, on the con- 1 Baldwin, ' Psychology,' 327. "70 INTRODUCTION. trary, the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter could never possibly exist." 1 The case now seems to be decided against the hedonist. The latter's interpretation of life seems to have been proved unnatural and forced. The Epicurean may, on reflection, adopt his scheme of life as the only logically defensible scheme ; but his practice will always contradict the logic of his scheme. The " hedonistic calculus " must be abandoned, and another measure found for practical use. But the hedonist is not yet silenced. There is a " previous question," he still insists, which his opponent has not answered viz., What is the " object " of desire, if it is not pleasure ? Are we not brought back to hedonism whenever we investigate the constitution of the object ? Does not that pleasure, which we had just put out at the door, come back through the window ? For what is the object apart from you ? It exists through its relation to you nay, it is yourself. What you desire is .not a mere object, but an object as satisfying yourself, and what moves you to act is the idea of yourself as satisfied in the attain- ment of the object. Not the object, but the attainment of the object by you or, more strictly still, your self-satis- faction in its attainment is the end that moves you to strive after it. And in what can the satisfaction of the self consist but in a feeling of pleasure ? Moreover, the " paradox of hedonism " turns out to be more seeming than real ? The distinction between_the end and the means towards its attainment is not a real but an artificial distinction. The end and the means are really the same, you can analyse the one into the other ; 1 ' Essay on Different Species of Philosophy/ 1, note. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 71 the end is the whole, of which the means are the parts or elements, and you can no more lose the end in the means than the whole in the parts. The means to pleasure are just the details of the pleasant life, and in pursuing them you are in truth pursuing, in the only rational manner, step by step, or bit by bit, that totality of satisfaction which can be constituted in .no other way. The life of pleasure is not an abstract universal ; it is a concrete whole, and consists of real particulars. Pleasure, further, is derived from pleasant things ; to divorce it from these is to destroy it. But such a divorce is entirely gratuitous ; no matter how it is reached, the pleasure itself is our real end. We have not " forgotten " the pleasure after all. In the words of J. S. Mill : " In these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. The desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness ; they are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole ; and these are 'some of its parts. . . . Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associ- 72 INTRODUCTION. ated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space^ of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity." x And now the anti-hedonist has to admit, on his part, that " on special occasions, . . . the pleasure of achieve- ment may itself become a pursued pleasure;" and that this is the case in that entire class of pleasures which we call " pleasures of pursuit." Hofifding, indeed, argues that " it springs from a distinct abstraction, when the feeling of pleasure, which we foresee in the attainment of the original object of the impulse, arouses our impulse." 2 But this abstraction, though difficult, is not impossible. We can- not otherwise interpret the " epicurean " life, and we can- not otherwise explain the pleasure-side of the ordinary moral life. Nay, it could easily be shown that our con- sciousness always is " abstract," inasmuch as it is always focused on some point ; abstraction is only the other side of attention. And does not the element of reflection mean that, however apparently objective, the life of Will is always essentially and fundamentally subjective, guided by an in- tellectual comparison of different ideas of self-satisfaction, or of different selves as satisfied by the pursuit of alter- native courses of activity ? Is not this self-satisfaction always the real object ? And is not the apparent absence of the subjective reference in some lives, and on certain occasions, more or less frequent, in all lives, to be traced to the varying ratio of introspection to outwardness and objectivity in different individuals and in the same in- 1 'Utilitarianism,' 56. 2 'Psychology,' 323 (Eng. tr.) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS. 73 dividual at different times ? Some men, also, are more apt to lose the whole in the parts, the wood in the trees, than others ; and in varying moods the same man will be more occupied, now with the general idea of self-satisfac- tion, now with the idea of the particular things which yield this self-satisfaction. It may be admitted, moreover, that it is not well to be too much given to introspection, that, on the whole, the objective mood and temper of mind ought to be encouraged rather than the subjective and epicurean, that objectivity and enthusiasm are essential to happiness. But this objective " abstraction " does not mean the elimination of subjectivity, any more than the opposite or subjective " abstraction " means the elimina- tion of objectivity. These are the two poles between which consciousness fluctuates, sometimes approaching the one, sometimes the other. Without either pole, the voluntary life, as we know it, would be impossible. The moral, like the intellectual life, is always at once objective and subjective. The idea of self-satisfaction is the con- stant background of our life's activities. But, amid the changing phases of human experience, there is a constant shifting to and fro. Sometimes this background of self- satisfaction is but dimly discerned; the action fills the foreground. Again, the action retreats, and the back- ground once more stands out in clear relief. Both the objective and subjective elements are present in every act of Will, but the emphasis or accent of consciousness may be now on the one, now on the other. We have now determined, as precisely as we can, the function of feeling in the life of Will. First, in that animal life of instinct and impulse which, though invol- 74 INTRODUCTION. untary, yet contains the germs of volition, we saw that the otherwise blind activity is guided by the illumination of feeling. Those animal tendencies are dark enough, they make for a goal by the animal unseen, along a path of which only the next step can be discerned ; it is a brief straight road, that .of animal life, and travelled step by step. Gradually, as we rise in the scale of human striving and achievement, the vision grows and strengthens, and further reaches of the road are seen, and at last the goal itself to which it leads. But the guidance of feeling is not even now given up ; it is only illuminated by the fuller light of intellectual insight. The goal itself is seized by feeling as well as by thought, and the several steps towards it are felt as well as known. But to detach feeling from thought, and to say that we pursue pleasure only, is as unscientific as to detach thought from feeling, and to say that our active life con- tains no element of feeling at all. Life means interests or focal points of attention, apperceptive centres; and we can neither have interests without a self to feel them, nor evolve them out of a merely sentient self. To at- tempt either explanation is to attempt an unscientific and contradictory tour de force. The entrance of Will upon the field of activity does not mean the deliverance from the guidance of feeling ; what it does mean is such a transfiguration of the old guide that it is hard to recognise the familiar face and voice. PART I. THE MORAL IDEAL THE MORAL IDEAL. WE are now prepared to attempt the solution of the ethical Types of problem the nature of the Moral Ideal or of the ethical Theory : End. We are led to state the problem in this way, whether we approach it from the ancient standpoint of Good, or from the modern standpoint of Duty and Law. In the former case, we^find that conduct, being " impulse organised by the reflective conception of Ends," implies, as its unifying or organising principle, the constant pres- ence and Deration, implicit or explicit, of some single central Eno* of some single Ideal of the total meaning of life, to be realised in the details of its several activities. The logic of the life of a rational being implies the guid- ance of a supreme End as its central and organising prin- ciple. The question of Ethics in this aspect of it is, What is the chief End of man ? What may he, being such as he is, worthily set before him as the Summum Bonum of his life ? Which of the alternative and conflict- ing types of self-hood may he take as his Ideal ? If, on the other hand, we approach the problem from the more modern standpoint of Law and Duty, we are led to sub- stantially the same statement of it. A rational being can- 78 THE MORAL IDEAL. not, as such, be content to live a life of mere obedience to rule, even to the rule of Conscience. Mere authority, human or divine, does not permanently satisfy him. The conflicts, or at least the difficulties, which arise in the application of the several moral laws or principles to the details of practice, lead to the attempt to codify these laws, and such codification implies once more a unifying principle the discovery of the common " spirit of the laws." For their absoluteness pertains to the spirit and not to the letter. They are the several paths towards some absolute Good. -Why is it right to speak the truth, to be just, and temperate, and benevolent ? What is the common Ideal of which these are the several manifesta- tions, the Ideal which abides even in their change ? The Law of the several moral laws can be found only in the claim of an absolute Ideal ; their authority must find its seat and explanation in the persistent and rightful dominion of some one End over all the other possible or actual ends of human life. Now, when we look at the history of ethical thought, we find that, from the beginning of reflection down to our own time, two opposed types of theory have maintained themselves, and each type has based itself, more or less explicitly, upon a corresponding view of human nature. On the one hand, man has been regarded as, either ex- clusively or fundamentally, a sentient being, and upon this psychology there has been built up a hedonistic theory of the Moral Ideal. If man is essentially a sen- tient being, his Good must be a sentient Good, or Pleasure ; this type of theory we may call Hedonism, or the Ethics of Sensibility. It is the theory of the Cyrenaics and INTRODUCTORY. 79 Epicureans among the ancients, and of the Utilitarians, whether empirical, rational, or evolutional, in modern times. On the other hand, it has been held, with no less confidence, that man is, either exclusively or essentially, a rational "being, and that his Good is, therefore, not a sen- tient but a rational Good. This type of theory we may call Eigorism, or the Ethics of Reason. It is the theory of -the ancient Cynics and Stoics, and in modern times of the Intuitionists and of Kant. Either theory might claim for itself the vague term " Self-realisation." The one finds in feeling, the other in reason, the deeper and truer self ; to the one the claims of the sentient, to the other the claims of, the rational self, seem paramount. A closer study of the course of moral reflection re- veals two forms an extreme and a moderate, of either type of ethical theory. Extreme Hedonism, excluding Reason altogether, or resolving it into Sensibility, would exhibit the ideal life as a life of pure sentiency, un- disturbed by reason, or into which reason has been ab- sorbed. Extreme Eigorism, on the other hand, denying the place of feeling in the Good of a rational being, would exhibit the ideal life as a life of pure thought, unstained by any intrusion of sensibility. But neither of these extremes can long maintain itself. Neither element can be absolutely excluded without manifestly deducting from the total efficiency of the resulting life. Accordingly, we find that, while the logic of their posi- tions would separate the theories as widely as possible, the necessities of the moral life itself tend to bring them nearer to each other. Hedonism cannot long avoid the reference to Reason, Eigorism the reference to Sensi- 80 THE MORAL IDEAL. bility. Hence result a moderate version of the Ethics of Sensibility, which, instead of excluding reason, sub- ordinates it to feeling, and a moderate version of the Ethics of Eeason, which, instead of excluding feeling, sub- ordinates it to reason. Moderate Hedonism recognises the function of reason, first in devising the means to- wards an end which is constituted by sensibility, and later even in the constitution of the end itself. Moderate Eigorism recognises the place of sensibility, at first as the mere accompaniment of the good life, and later as entering into the very texture of goodness itself. Such an approach of the one theory to the other, such a tendency to compromise between them, suggests the more excellent way of a theory which shall base itself on the total nature of man, and shall correlate its various ele- ments of thought and feeling in the unity of a total personal life. This theory we may call, after Aristotle, Eudoemonism, or the Ethics of Personality ; and we shall endeavour to demonstrate its necessity and value by a critical consideration, first, of Hedonism, the Ethics of Sensibility; and, secondly, of Eigorism, the Ethics of Eeason. 81 CHAPTER I. HEDONISM, OR THE ETHICS OF SENSIBILITY. I. Development of the Theory. 1. THE earliest statement of the hedonistic view of life (A] Pure is also the most extreme. We owe it to Aristippus, the o/Cyrenai- founder of the Cyrenaic school. He had learned from c Socrates that the true wisdom of life lies in foresight or insight into the consequences of our actions, in an accurate calculation of their results, pleasurable and painful, in the distant as well as in the immediate future. The chief and only good of life, then, is pleasure. And all pleasures are alike in kind; they differ only in in- tensity or degree. Socrates had taught that the pleasures of the soul are preferable to those of the body; Aris- tippus finds the latter to be better that is, intenser than the former. He had also learned from Protagoras that the sensation of the moment is the only ultimate reality, and his scepticism of the future, in comparison with the certainty of the present, leads him to refuse the Socratic principle of calculation. If the momentary ex- perience is the only certain reality, then the calculating wisdom of Socrates, with its measuring-line laid to the F THE MORAL IDEAL. fleeting moments, is not the best method of life. Bather ought we to make the most of each moment ere it passes ; for, even while we have been calculating its value, it has escaped us, and the moments do not return. Ought we not, then, with a miser's jealousy, to guard the interest of the moment ? is not this the true economy of life ? To sacrifice the present to the future, is unwarranted and perilous ; the present is ours, the future may never be. The very fact that we are the children of time, and not of eternity, makes the claim of the present ay, even of the momentary present imperious and supreme. To " look before and after " were to defeat the end of life, to miss that pleasure which is essentially a thing of the present. ISTot the Socratic prudence, therefore, but a (careless surrender to present joys, is the true rule of life. We live only from moment to moment ; let us live, then, in the moments, packing them full, ere yet they pass, y with intensest gratification. A life of feeling, pure and simple, heedless and unthinking, undisturbed by reason, such is the Cyrenaic ideal. It is a product of the sunny Pagan spirit, which has not yet felt " the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world." And if such a creed is founded in a deep scepticism, there is no pain or despair in the scepticism, but rather a calm and glad acceptance of the ethical limitations which it ini- , plies. Aristippus is glad to be rid of the Socratic concern- for an eternal and ideal welfare in which he has ceased to believe. His is, indeed, a life without a horizon, it has shrunk within the compass of the momentary present; \ it is a life of pure sensibility, with no end to satisfy the j reason. Yet it is a life that satisfies him. For is not the HEDONISM. 83 horizon apt to be dark and threatening, and to sadden the sunshine of the present with its lowering clouds ? and what is reason but sensation after all ? Cyrenaicism could hardly be the creecf of the modern Christian world. For us such an ideal would be at best an ideal of despair rather than of hope. Keason could hardly in us be so utterly subjected to sensibility ; such scepticism would, at any rate, make us so "sick arid sorry/' that we should lose that very joy in the present which the Cyrenaic reaped from his unconcern for the morrow. And yet our century and our generation has witnessed an attempted revival of the Cyrenaic ideal. Did not Byron and Heine, out of their scepticism of any other meaning in life, use words like these ? Was not their message to their fellows that to live is to feel, and that the measure of life's fulness is the intensity of its passion ? And what else does ^Estheticism mean than a recoil from an intellectual to a sentient ideal ; is it fanciful to see in Mr Pater's ' Marius, the Epicurean ' a splendid attempt to rehabilitate the Cyrenaic view of life ? Its closing words tell how perfectly its author has caught the echo of that ancient creed : " How goodly had the vision been ! one long unfolding of beauty and energy in things, upon the closing of which he might gratefully utter his ' Vixi.' . . . For still, in a shadowy world, his deeper wisdom had ever been, with a sense of economy, with a jealous estimate of gain and loss, to use life, not as a means to some problematic end, but, as far as might be, from dying hour to dying hour, an end in itself, a kind of music, all sufficing to the duly trained ear, even as it died out on the air." 84 THE MORAL IDEAL. And although it is only in the school of Aristippus that this pure form of the hedonistic creed has found its philo- (sophic expression, it is a "judgment of life" which has again and again gained utterance for itself in literature. It is a mood of the human mind which must recur with every lapse -into moral scepticism. Whenever life loses its meaning, or when that meaning sinks to the experience of the present, when no enduring purpose or permanent value is found in this fleeting earthly life, when in it is discerned no Whence or Whither, but only a brief blind process, then the conclusion is drawn, with a fine logical perception, that the interests of the present have a paramount claim, and that present enjoyment and un- concern is the only good in life. If indeed " We are no other than a moving row Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go Round with the Sun-illumin'd Lantern held In Midnight by the Master of the Show ; " if the movement of our life is from Nothing to Nothing ; if, truly seen, that life is but " A Moment's Halt a momentary taste Of Being from the Well amid the Waste And lo ! the phantom caravan has reach'd The Nothing it set out from," then surely Omar's logic is irresistible : " Some for the Glories of This World ; and some Sigh for the Prophet's Paradise to come ; Ah ! take the Cash, and let the Credit go, Nor heed the rumble of a distant Drum. Come, fill the Cup, and on the fire of Spring Your Winter-garment of Repentance fling : The Bird of Time has but a little way To fly and lo ! the bird is on the wing. N HEDONISM. 85 I must abjure the Balm of life, I must, Scared by some After-reckoning ta'en on trust, Or lured with Hope of some Diviner Drink, To fill the Cup when crumbled into Dust ! Oh threats of Hell and hopes of Paradise ! One thing at least is certain This life flies ; One thing is certain, and the rest is Lies ; The Flower that once has blown for ever dies." 1 It is the logic of Horace as well as of Omar ; for though the Koman poet is rather an Epicurean than a Cyrenaic, yet he strikes the true Cyrenaic chord again and again. Man is a creature of time ; why should he toil for an eternal life ? " Spring flowers keep not always the same charm, nor beams the ruddy moon with face unchanged ; why harass with eternal designs a mind too weak to com- pass them ? " " God in His providence shrouds in the darkness of night the issue of future time, and smiles if a mortal flutter to pierce farther than he may. Be careful to regulate serenely what is present with you ; all else is swept along in the fashion of the stream, which at one time, within the heart of its channel, peacefully glides down to the Tuscan sea; at another, whirls along worn stones and uprooted trees and flocks and houses all together, amid the roaring of the hills and neighbouring wood, whene'er a furious deluge chafes the quiet rills. He will live master of himself, and cheerful, who has the power to say from day to day, ' I have lived ! to- morrow let the Sire overspread the sky either with cloudy gloom or with unsullied light ; yet he will not render of none effect aught that lies behind, nor shape 1 ' RuMiyat ' of Omar Khayydm. Fitzgerald's translation. 86 THE MORAL IDEAL. anew and make a thing not done, what once the flying hour has borne away.' " l All things change and pass away, nor has man himself any abiding destiny ; his best wisdom is to clutch from the hands of Fate the flowers she offers, for they perish even as he thinks to pluck them. This logic of Omar and of Horace is also the logic of ' Ecclesiastejs.' " Too much wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. . . . For what hath man of all his labour, and of all the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun ? . . . Then I commanded mirth, because a man hath no better thing than to. eat, and to drink, and to be merry-; for that shall abide with him of his labour the days of his life which God giveth him under the sun." When we compare the Eastern with lihe Western, the Persian and Hebraic with the Greek and Roman, ex- pressions of the Cyrenaic principle, we cannot help feeling that, while the common basis of both is a profound moral scepticism, the loss of faith in any enduring end or sub- stantial good in life, this scepticism has engendered in the one case a pessimistic mood which is entirely absent from the other. Omar and Ecclesiastes clutch at the delights of sense and time, the pleasure of the moment, as the only refuge from the moral despair which reflection breeds. The only cure for the ills of thought is careless and unthink- ing abandon to the pleasures of the present. But always in the background of the mind, and, whenever reflection is reawakened, in the foreground too, is the sad and irre- sistible conviction that, for a rational being, such a merely sentient Good is in strictness no Good at all ; that for a 1 Horace, Ode xxix. Bk. iii. (Lonsdale and Lee's transl.) HEDONISM. 37 being whose very nature it is to " look before and after," and to consider the total meaning of his life, such a pre- occupation with the experience of the moment, as the only moral reality, must render life essentially unmeaning and not worth living. It is little wonder, therefore, that this moral scepticism soon became philosophically speechless. Even the Cyrenaics were unable to maintain their self- consistency in the statement of it. An ethic of pure Sensibility, an absolute Hedonism, is impossible. A merely sentient Good cannot be the Good of a being who is rational as well as sentient ; the true life of a reflective being cannot be unreflective. In order to construct an Ideal, some reference to reason is necessary ; even a suc- cessful sentient life implies the guidance and operation of thought. Accordingly, we find even the Cyrenaics admit- ting, in spite of themselves, that prudence is Essential, to the attainment of pleasure. A man must be master of himself, as a rider is master of his horse ; he must be able to say of his pleasures that he is their possessor, not they his e^w, OVK ef%o/a&. Such self-mastery and self-posses- sion is the work of reason, and a life which is not thus rationally ordered must soon be wrecked on the shoals of appetite and passion. 2. . This rehabilitation of the Socratic mas ter - virtue (B)Modi- of prudence, suggested by the Cyrenaics, was completed by the Epicureans, who, after the Platonic and Aristo- telian insistence on the supreme claims of reason in the amsm - conduct of human life, find it impossible to conceive a Good from which reason has been eliminated, or to which reason does not point the way. The end of life, they hold, 88 THE MORAL IDEAL. is not the pleasure of the moment, but a sum of pleasures, a pleasant life. All that was necessary, to effect the transi- tion from the Cyrenaic extreme to this moderate type of Hedonism, was to press to its logical development the Socratic principle that a truly happy, or consistently pleasant life, must be also a rational, reflective, and con- siderate life. Even within the Cyrenaic school, we find an approach towards the moderate or Epicurean position. Theodorus, a later member of the school, holds that the end is not momentary pleasure, but a permanent state of " gladness " (%apa) ; and Hegesias, still later, maintains that painlessness, reached through indifference to pain, rather than positive pleasure or enjoyment, is the attainable end of life. These suggestions were developed, through the re-assertion of the Socratic principle of prudence, strength- ened by the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine of the guid- ing function of reason in the life of a rational being, into the Epicurean system. * Epicurus fully recognises the indispensableness of reason in the conduct of life. The end is pleasure, but this end cannot be attained except under the guidance of reason ; feeling would be but a blind and perilous guide to its own satisfaction. Reason is the handmaid of sensibility, and without the aid of the former the latter would be reduced to impotency. The task of life is discovered, and its accomplishment is tested, by sensibility ; but the execution of the task is the work of reason. For it is reason alone that makes possible the most perfect gratification of feel- ing, eliminating the pain as far as possible, reducing the shocks and jars to a minimum, and, where the pain is un- avoidable, showing how it is the way to a larger and more HEDONISM. 89 enduring, a deeper and intenser, pleasure. The happiness of man is a subtler and more enduring satisfaction than that of which the animal, preoccupied with the feeling of the moment, is capable. Man's susceptibilities to pleasure and pain are so much keener and more varied, his horizon, as a rational being, is so much larger than the animal's, that the same interpretation will not serve for both lives. He cannot shut out the past and future, and surrender himself, with careless limitation, to the momentary Now. It is the outlook, the horizon, the prospect and the retro- spect, that give the tone to his present experience. He abides, though his experience changes ; and his happiness must, just because it is his, be permanent and abiding as the self whose happiness it is. Atomic moments of pleas- ure cannot, therefore, be the Good of man; that Good must be a Life of pleasure. An unorganised or chaotic life, at the beck and call of every stray desire, would be a life not of happiness but of misery to such a being as man ; in virtue of his rational nature, he must organise his life, must build up its moments into the hours and days and years of a total experience. While, therefore, the end or fundamental conception under which he must bring all his separate activities, the ultimate unifying principle of his life, is sentient satisfaction ; while the ultimate term of human experience is not reason, but sen- sibility, and man's Good is essentially identical with the animal's, yet so different are the means to their accom- plishment, so different is the conduct of the two lives, that the interests of clear thinking demand the emphatic assertion of the difference, no less than of the identity. "Wherefore," says IJpicurus, " we call pleasure the alpha 90 THE MORAL IDEAL. and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatso- ever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures, and submit to the pain for a long time, when it is attended for us with a greater pleas- ure. All pleasure, therefore, because of its kinship with our nature, is a good, but it is not in all cases our choice : even as every pain is an evil, though pain is not always, and in every case, to be shunned. It is, however, by meas uring one against another, and by looking at the conve niences and inconveniences, that all these things must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and th evil, on the contrary, as a good." " It is not an unbroke- succession of drinking feasts and of revelry, not the pleas- ures of sexual love, nor the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleas- ant life ; it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this, the beginning, and the greatest good, is prudence. Wherefore, prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy : from it grow all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice ; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice which is not also a life of pleasure. For the. virtues have grown into one HEDONISM. 91 with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them." 1 Deeper reflection upon the course of human affairs led the Epicureans, as it had led the Cyrenaics, to pessimism. The Good, in the sense of positive pleasure, is not, they find, the lot of man ; all that he may hope for is the nega- tive pleasure that comes with the release from pain. " By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul." And even this is not always to be attained. If we would escape the pain of unsatisfied desire, we must reduce our desires. Fortune is to be feared, even when bringing gifts ; for she is capricious, and may at any moment withhold her gifts. Let us give as few hostages to Fortune, then, as we can ; let us assert our independence of her, and, in our own self-sufficiency, be- come indifferent to her fickle moods. Let us return, as far as may be, to the " state of nature," for nature's wants are few. " Of desires some are natural and some are ground- less; and of the natural, some are necessary as well as natural, and some are natural only. And of the necessary desires, some are necessary if we are to be happy, and some if the body is to remain unperturbed, and some if we are even to live. By the clear and certain understand- ing of these things we learn to make every preference and aversion, so that the body may have health and the soul tranquillity, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear ; and when once we have attained this, all the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has not to go to find something that is wanting, 1 Epicurus' Letter (Wallace's 'Epicureanism,' 129-131). THE MORAL IDEAL. or to seek something else by which the good of the soul j and of the body will be fulfilled. When we need pleasure, is, when we are grieved because of the absence of pleasure ; but when we feel no pain, then we no longer stand in need of pleasure." 1 The great maxim of the Epicurean life is, therefore, like f that of the Stoic, that we cultivate a temper of indiffer- ence to pleasure and pain, such a tranquillity of soul (arapa^La) as no assault of fortune shall avail to disturb, such an inner peace of spirit as shall make us independent of fortune's freaks./ For the Epicureans have lost the Socratic faith in a divine Providence, the counterpart of human prudence, which secures that a well-planned life shall be successful in attaining its goal of pleasure. Their gods have retired from the world, and become careless of human affairs. The true wisdom, then, is to break the bonds that link our destiny with the world's, and to assert v our independence of fate. V Through moderation of desire, and tranquillity of soul, we become masters of our own destiny, and learn that our true good is to be sought v within rather than without. It is our fear of external evil or calamity, not calamity itself, that is the chief source of pain. [Let us cease to fear that which in itself is not terrible. Even death, the greatest of so-called evils,. * the worst of all the blows which fortune can inflict upon us, is an evil only to him who fears it ; even to it we can x become indifferent. "Accustom thyself in the belief that death is nothing to us ; for good and evil are only where they are felt, and death is the absence of all feeling; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to 1 Epicurus' Letter, loc. cit. HEDONISM. 93 us makes enjoyable the mortality of life, not by adding to years an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearn- ing after immortality. , For in life there can be nothing to fear to him who has thoroughly apprehended that there is nothing to cause fear in what time we are not alive. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present causes only a groundless pain by the expectation thereof. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that when we are, death is not yet, and when death comes, then we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or the dead ; for it is not found with the living, and the dead exist no longer."> Of this Epicurean ideal we could not have a better picture than that which Horace gives in the Seventh Satire of the Second Book : " Who, then, is free ? He who is wise, over himself true lord, unterrified by want and death and bonds ; who can his passions stem, and glory scorn ; in himself complete, like a sphere, perfectly round ; so that no external object can rest on the polished surface ; against such a one Fortune's assault is broken." It is an ideal of rational self-control, of deliverance from the storms of passion through the peace-speaking voice of reason. The state of sensibility is still the ethical End and criterion ; but all the attention is directed to the means by which that End may be compassed, and the' means are not sentient but rational. Nay, the End itself, as we have just seen, is rather a state of indifference, of neutral feeling, of insensibility, than a positive state of feeling at all. 94 THE MORAL IDEAL. (6) Modern 3. Modern Hedonism differs widely from Ancient. Hedonism, or utm- British from Greek. If we take Mill as the representa- tarianism. . its chief tive of the modern doctrine, perhaps the differences may be from And- said to resolve themselves, in the last analysis, into three. Optimistic (1) Ancient Hedonism, whether of the Cyrenaic or of tic? SS m ~' the Epicurean type, was pessimistic. Modern Hedonism is, on the whole, optimistic. 1 Where the Greek moralists found themselves forced to conceive the End as escape from pain rather than as positive pleasure, their suc- cessors in England (as well as recently in Germany) have no hesitation in returning to the original Cyrenaic con- ception of the End as real enjoyment, as not merely the absence of pain, but the presence of pleasure. Mill, it is true, in a significant admission, made almost incident- ally in the course of his main argument, comes near striking once more the old pessimistic note. " Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrange- ments that any one can best serve the happiness of others \ by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue to be found in man. I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives tjm best ! prospect of realising such happiness as is attainal^h For nothing except that consciousness can raise j^Berson above the chances of life, by making him feel umt, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him ; which, once felt, frees him from excess of 1 The pessimistic tendency has of late, to a certain extent, reasserted itself. HEDONISM. 95 anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Eoman Empire, to cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satis- faction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end." - 1 But Mill is delivered from pessimism by his firm conviction that the condition of the world is changing for the better, and that in the , end the course of virtue must " run smooth." The source of this confidence, in Mill and his successors, is not the rehabilitation of the old Socratic faith in a divine Provi- dence ; another ground of confidence is found in the new insight into the course of things which Science has brought to man. Knowledge is Power, and the might of virtue lies in the fact that it has Nature on its side. The principle of Evolution, it. is maintained, shows us that goodness does not work against Nature, but rather assists Nature in her work. Hedonism, therefore, finds a new basis in Evolutionism, and puts forward the new claim of being the only " scientific " interpretation of morality. Yet we find the most brilliant living Evolu- tionist maintaining that the " ethical process " and the "cosmical process" are fundamentally antagonistic, 2 . and one of the ablest of living evolutionary hedonists ad- mitting that "the attempt to establish an absolute co- incidence between virtue and happiness is in ethics what the attempting to square the circle or to discover per- petual motion is in geometry and mechanics." 3 1 ' Utilitarianism/ ch. ii. 2 Huxley, Romanes Lectures, 'Evolution and Ethics.' 3 Leslie Stephen, ' Science of Ethics.' 96 THE MORAL IDEAL. (2)Aitru- (2) The standpoint of ancient Hedonism was that of istic v. Egoistic, the individual, the standpoint of modern is that of society or mankind in general, or even, as with Mill, of the entire sentient creation. While ancient Hedonism was egoistic, ^the modern is altruistic or universalistic. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" has taken the place of the greatest happiness of the individual ; the End has been extended beyond the conception of its ancient ad- vocates. The " wise man " of the Epicurean school was wise for his own interests; his chief virtues were self- sufficiency and self-dependence. It is true that the Epicurean society was held together by the practice, on a fine scale, of the virtue of Friendship, and that they lived, in many respects, a common life ; but this feature of their practice had no counterpart in their ethical theory. The modern hedonist, -realising this defect, and the necessity of differentiating his expanded theory of the End from the narrow conception of the elder school, has invented a new name to express this difference viz., ' " Utilitarianism." The new conception has been only gradually reached, however ; there is an interesting bridge between the old egoistic form of hedonism and the new I altruistic or " utilitarian " version of it, in the philosophy of Paley. To this "lawyer-like mind" it seemed that we ought to seek " the happiness of mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happi- ness." The happiness of mankind, he holds, is the " sub- ject " or content of morality, but " everlasting happiness^" one's own, of course is the " motive." The End, there- w\ fore, is one's own individual happiness, and the happiness ( of others is to be sought merely as a means to that End. HEDONISM. 97 Such a theory is, it is obvious, thoroughly egoistic ; it is only an improved version of the egoism of Hobbes, which formed the starting-point of modern ethical reflection. It is to Hume, Bentham, and Mill that we owe the substitution of the General Happiness for that of the individual, as the end of life. According to each of these writers the true standpoint is that of society, not that of the individual ; from the social standpoint alone can we estimate aright the claims either of our own happi- ness or of the happiness of others. Mill's statement is the most adequate on this important point. The " utilitarian standard " is " not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether." The End, thus conceived, yields the true principle of the distribution of happiness. " As between his own happiness and .that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Xazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." Bentham had already enunciated this principle in the formula : " Each to count for one, and no one for morejthan one." But a new question is thus raised for the hedonist viz., bow to reconcile the happiness of all with the happiness of each, or altruism with egoism. " Why am I bound to promote the general happiness ? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference ? " Mill answers that there are two kinds of sanction for altruistic conduct, external and internal. Both had been recognised by his 98 THE MORAL IDEAL. predecessors. Bentham mentions four sanctions, all " ex- ternal" viz., the physical, the political, the moral or popular, and the religious. All four are forces brought to bear upon the individual from without, .and their common object is to produce an identity, or at least community, of interest between the individual and society, in such wise that he shall " find his account " in living conformably to the claims of the general happiness. But such external sanctions, alone, would provide only a secondary and indirect vindication for altruistic conduct. The individual whose life was governed by such con- straints would still be, in character and inner motive, if not in outward act, an egoist ; his end would still be egoistic, though it was accomplished by altruistic means. To the external sanctions must, therefore, be added the \ internal sanction which Hume and Mill alike describe as a " feeling for the happiness of mankind," a " basis of powerful natural sentiment " for " utilitarian morality," a feeling of " regard to the pleasures and pains of others," which, if not " innate " or fully developed from the first, is none the' less " natural." " This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind ; the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures, which is already a power- ful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation." (3) Quail- (3) The third characteristic feature of modern Hedonism, tative v. ^ Quanti- as contrasted with ancient, is the new interpretation which tative it offers of the gradation of pleasures. It is Mill's chief innovation that he introduces a distinction of quality, in \ addition to the old distinction of quantity. The End thus HEDONISM. 99 receives, in addition to its new extension, a new refine- ment. The Epicureans had emphasised the distinction between the pleasures of the body and those of the mind, and had unhesitatingly awarded the superiority to the latter, on the ground of their greater durability and their comparative freedom from painful consequences ; but they had not maintained the intrinsic preferableness of the mental pleasures. To Paley and Bentham, as well as to/ the Epicureans, all pleasures are still essentially, or ipf kind, the same. "I hold," says Paley, "that pleasures differ in nothing, but in continuance and intensity." Ben- tham holds that, besides intensity and duration,'the elements of " certainty," " propinquity," " fecundity " (the likeli- hood of their being followed by other pleasures), and "purity" (the unlikelihood of their being followed by pain), must enter as elements into the "hedonistic cal- culus." Such were the interpretations of the distinction prior to Mill ; the distinction was emphasised, but it was explained in the end as a distinction of quantity, not of quality. Mill holds that the distinction of quality is in-j dependent of that of quantity, and that the qualitative distinction is as real and legitimate as the quantitative. " There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanence, safety, costli- ness, &c., of the former that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on 100 THE MORAL IDEAL. all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case ; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." As to the criterion of quality in pleasures, or " what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer." That answer is the one which Plato gave long ago, the answer of the widest and most competent experience. " Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both, give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of dis- content, and would not resign it for any amount of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superior- ity in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestion- able fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the HEDONISM. 101 lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would con- sent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignor- amus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, or the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. . . . We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness, . . . but its most appropriate ap- pellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them." This higher nature, with its higher demand of happiness, carries with it inevitably a certain discontent. Yet " it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied /better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." tn \-ro z&cj; o > ,' o o i- o o i '6 f r 4. Not the least important modern modification of the (c) Evoi- hedonistic theory is its affiliation to an evolutionary utmtari- view of morality. The current form of Hedonism is ai Evolutional Utilitarianism. The reform in ethical method which the evolutionary moralists seek to introduce is, in words, the same as Kant's reform of metaphysics viz., to 102 THE MORAL IDEAL. I make it scientific. Apply the principle of Evolution to the phenomena of moral life, as it has already been ap- plied to the phenomena of physical life, and the former, equally with the latter, will fall into order and system. Morality, like Nature, has evolved; and neither can be I understood except in the light of its evolution. Nay, the evolution of morality is part and parcel of the general >/ evolution of nature, its crown and climax indeed, but of the same warp and woof. In the successful application of his theory to moral life, therefore, the Evolutionist sees the satisfaction of his highest ambition ; for it is here that the critical point is reached which shall decide whether or not his conception is potent to reduce all knowledge to unity. If morality offers no resistance to its application, its adequacy is once for all completely vindicated. Thus we are offered by the Evolutionists what Green called a ~> " natural science of morals." According to Mr Spencer, Morality is " that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution." Conduct is " the adjustment of acts to ends," and in the growing complexity and completeness of this adjustment consists its evolution. Things and actions are " good or bad according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends," or "according as the adjust- ments of acts to ends are or are not efficient." And, ultimately, their goodness or badness is determined by the measure in which all minor ends are merged in the grand end of self and race-preservation. Thus " the ideal goal to the natural evolution of conduct " is at the same time " the ideal standard of conduct ethically considered." The universal End of conduct, therefore, is " life " its HEDONISM. 103 preservation and development. But " in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful." Looking at the inner side of conduct, and seeking to trace " the genesis of the moral consciousness," Mr Spen- cer finds its " essential trait " to be " the control of some ~ feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings " ; and " the general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct, sub-human and human," is that, " for the better preservation of life, the primitive, simple, presentative feel- ings must be controlled by the later-evolved, compound, and representative feelings." Mr Spencer mentions three controls of this kind the political, the religious, and the ) social. These do not, however, severally or together, " constitute the moral control, but are only preparatory to it are controls within which the moral control evolves." " The restraints properly distinguished as moral are unlike those restraints out of which they evolve, and with which they are long confounded, in this they refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions, but to their intrinsic effects. The truly moral deterrent is ... -constituted ... by a representation of the necessary natural results." Thus arises " the feeling of moral obligation," " the sen-i timent of duty." " It is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated." On reflection, we observe that the common characteristic of the feelings which prompt to "good" conduct is that "they are all complex, re-representative 104 THE MORAL IDEAL. feelings, occupied with the future rather than the pres- ent. The idea of authoritativeness has, therefore, come to be connected with feelings having these traits." There is, however, another element in the " abstract conscious- ness of duty " viz., " the element of coerciveness." This Mr Spencer derives from the various forms of pre-moral restraint just mentioned. But, since the constant ten- dency of conduct is to free itself from these restraints, and to become self-dependent and truly " moral," " the sense of duty or moral obligation [i.e., as coercive] is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases. . . . While at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any conscious- ness of being obliged to perform it ; " and thus " the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it ought to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accom- panying consciousness," and the right action will be done " with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it." Since the consciousness of obligation arises from the incomplete adaptation of the individual to the social conditions of his life, "with complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is ex- pressed by the word obligation will disappear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sen- timents will guide men just as spontaneously and ade- quately as now do the sensations." J 1 'Data of Ethics,' 127-129. r HEDONISM. 105 For the conflict between the interests of society and those of the individual, which is the source of the feeling of Obligation as coercive, is not absolute and permanent. A "conciliation" of these interests is possible. Egoism and Altruism both have their rights. When we study the history of evolving life, we find that " self-sacrifice is nO| less primordial than self-preservation," and that, through- out, " altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism." "From the dawn of life egoism has been de- pendent upon altruism, as altruism has been dependent upon egoism ; and in the course of evolution the recip- rocal services of the two have been increasing." Thus " pure egoism and pure altruism are both illegitimate ; " and " in the progressing ideas and usages of mankind " a " compromise between egoism and altruism has been slowly establishing itself." Nay, a " conciliation has been, and is, taking place between the interests of each citizen and the interests of citizens at large; tending ever to- wards a state in which the two become merged in one, and in which the feelings answering to them respectively fall into complete concord." Thus " altruism of a social kind . . . may be expected to attain a level at which it will be like parental altruism in spontaneity a level such that ministration to others' happiness will become a daily need." This consummation will be brought about by the same agency which has effected the present partial conciliation viz., sympathy, " which must advance as fast as conditions permit." During the earlier stages of the evolution sympathy is largely painful, on account of the existence of " much non- adaptation and much consequent unhappiness." " Gradually, then, and only gradually, as 106 THE MORAL IDEAL. these various causes of unhappiness become less, can sym- pathy become greater. . . . But as the moulding and re- moulding of .man and society into mutual fitness pro- gresses, and as the pains caused by unfitness decrease, sympathy can increase in presence of the pleasures that come from fitness. The two changes are, indeed, so related that each furthers the other." And the goal of evolution can only be perfect identity of interests, and the con- sciousness of that identity. One favourite conception of the Evolutionary school is missed in Mr Spencer's statement of the theory, that of the " Social Organism." Mr Leslie Stephen has used this idea with special skill in his ' Science of Ethics.' " Scientific " Utilitarianism, he insists, must rest upon a deeper view of society and of its relation to the individual. The old Utilitarianism conceived society as a mere " aggregate " of individuals. The utilitarian was still an " individualist " ; though he spoke of " the greatest number " of individuals, the individual was still his unit. Now, according to Mr Stephen, the true unit is not the individual, but society, which is not a mere " aggregate " of individuals, but an " organism," of which the individual is a member. " So- ciety may be regarded as an organism, implying ... a social tissue, modified in various ways so as to form the organs adapted to various specific purposes." Further, the social organism and the underlying social tissue are to be regarded as evolving. The social tissue is being gradu- ally modified so as to form organs ever more perfectly adapted to fulfil the various functions of the organism as a whole ; and the goal of the movement is the evolution of the social " type " that is, of that form of society which HEDONISM. 107 represents " maximum efficiency " of the given means to* the given end of social life. In short, we may say that the problem which is receiving its gradual solution in the evolution of society is the production of a " social tissue," or fundamental structure, the most "vitally efficient." In describing the ethical End. therefore, we must substi- tute for " the greatest happiness of the greatest number " of individuals, the "health" of the social organism, or, still more accurately, of the social tissue. The true " util- ity " is not - the external utility of consequences. Life is not " a series of detached acts, in each of which a man can calculate the sum of happiness or misery attainable by different courses." It is an organic growth ; and the re- sults of any given action are fully appreciated, only when the action is regarded, not as affecting its temporary " state," but as entering into and modifying the very sub- stance of its fundamental structure. The " scientific cri- terion," therefore, is not Happiness, but Health. " We obtain unity of principle when we consider, not the vari- ous external relations, but the internal condition of the organism. . . . We only get a tenable and simple law when we start from the structure, which is itself a unit." Nor are the two criteria health and happiness " really divergent ; on the contrary, they necessarily tend to coin- cide." The general correlation of the painful and the pernicious, the pleasurable and the beneficial, is obvious. " The useful/ in the sense of pleasure-giving, must ap- proximately coincide with the ' useful ' in the sense of life- preserving. . . . We must suppose that pain and pleasure are the correlatives of certain states which may be roughly 108 THE MORAL IDEAL. regarded as the smooth and the distracted working of the physical machinery, and that, given those states, the sen- sations must always be present." And in the evolution of society we can trace the gradual approximation to coin- cidence of these two senses of " utility." Objectively considered, then, moral laws may be iden- tified with the conditions of social vitality, and morality may be called " the sum of the preservative instincts of a society." That these laws should be perceived with increasing clearness as the evolution proceeds, is a cor- ollary of the theory of Evolution ; as the social type is gradually elaborated, the conditions of its realisation will be more clearly perceived. Thus we reach the true interpretation of the subjective side of morality. Cor- responding to social welfare or health the objective end there is, in the member of society, a social in- stinct or sympathy with that welfare or health. The old opposition between the individual and society is fundamentally erroneous, depending as it does upon the inadequate mechanical conception of society already re- ferred to. " The difference between the sympathetic and the non-sympathetic feelings is a difference in their law or in the fundamental axiom which they embody." " The sympathetic being becomes, in virtue of his sympathies, a constituent part of a larger organisation. He is no more intelligible by himself alone than the limb is in all its properties intelligible without reference to the body." Just as " we can only obtain the law of the action of the several limbs" when we take the whole body into account, so with the feelings of "the being who has become part of the social organism. . . . Though HEDONISM. 109 feelings of the individual, their law can only be deter- mined by reference to the general social conditions." As a member of society, and not a mere individual, man cannot but be sympathetic. The growth of society im- plies, as its correlate, " the growth of a certain body of sentiment " in its members ; and, in accordance with the law of Natural Selection, this instinct, as pre-eminently useful to the social organism, will be developed at once extended and enlightened. "Every extension of reason- ing power implies a wider and closer identification of self with others, and therefore a greater tendency to merge the prudential in the social axiom as a first principle of conduct." Thus what is generated in the course of Evolution is not merely a type of conduct, but a " type of character " ; not merely altruistic conduct, but "the elaboration and regulation of the sympathetic character which takes place through the social factor." We can trace the gradual process from the external to the internal form of mor- ality, from the law " Do this " to the law " Be this." We see how approval of a certain type of conduct develops into "approval of a certain type of character, the exist- ence of which fits the individual for membership of a thoroughly efficient and healthy social tissue." This, it is insisted, is the true account of Conscience. " Moral approval is the name of the sentiment developed through the social medium, which modifies a man's character in such a way as to fit him to be an efficient member of the social tissue. It is the spiritual pressure which generates and maintains morality," the representative and spokesman of morality in the individual consciousness. 110 THE MORAL IDEAL. "The conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary conditions of its welfare." l I (d) Ration- 5. Hedonism is the Ethics of Sensibility, and we have tarianisin. traced how thinker after thinker of this school, each avail- ing himself of the new insight unavailable to his prede- cessors, has striven to solve the ethical problem in terms of feeling, to interpret the Good, whether our own or that of others, as, in the last analysis, a sentient rather than a rational" or intellectual Good. In particular, we have watched the gradual solution of the problem of the rela- tion of the Good of the individual to the Good of others, the problem of Egoism and Altruism. We have seen Mill reconciling these two Goods, or rather resolving them into one, through our " feeling of unity with our fellow- men," a sympathy which identifies their good with our own, and which all the influences of advancing civilisation and moral education are tending to foster and develop. We have seen the Evolutionists relying upon the same agency of sympathetic feeling for the accomplishment of the desired reconciliation, and invoking the law of Evolu- tion and the conception of the Social Organism in behalf of their prediction of an ultimate harmony of the interests of all with the interests of each. Now, Professor Sidgwick, coming to the solution of the problem as it is thus handed to him, or rather as it is handed to him by Mill (for he does not take any apparent interest in the Evolutionary solu- tion of it), concludes that, as a problem of mere feeling, it 1 The above sketch of Evolutional Utilitarianism is taken from an article by the author on the "Evolution of Morality " (' Mind,' xiv. 27). HEDONISM. Ill is insoluble, and that the only possible solution of it is a rational solution. His endeavour, therefore, is to establish the rationality of Utilitarianism, and thus to provide, its needed " proof." That proof is not, as Mill held, psycholo- gical, but logical ; and he sets himself, as he says, to dis- cover " the rational basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Benthani [and of Mill] regarded as an ethical doctrine." The resulting theory he calls " Kational Utilitarianism." Agreeing with the hedonistic interpretation of the End as a sentient Good or a Good of feeling, Mr Sidgwick finds it necessary to appeal to reason for the regulative principles the principles of the distribution of this Good. (1) Without passing beyond the circle of the individual life, we find it necessary to employ a rational principle in the choice of sentient satisfaction. The bridge on which we pass from pure to modified Hedonism, from Cyrenaicism to Epicureanism, from the irresponsible en- joyment of the moment to a well-planned and successful L_ life of pleasure, from pleasure to Happiness, is a bridge of reason, not of feeling. To feeling, the present moment's claim to satisfaction is paramount its claim is felt more imperatively than that of any other ; it is to the eye of thought alone that the true perspective of the moments and of their capacities of pleasure is revealed. When we ^ reflect or think, we see that the Good is not a thing of the passing moments, but of the total life ; reason carries us, as feeling never could, past a regard for our " momentary good " to a regard for our " good on the whole." Eeeling needs the instruction of reason our self-love has to be- come a rational, as distinguished from a merely sentient 112 THE MORAL IDEAL. love of self. Eeason dictates an " impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life," an equal regard for the rights of all the moments, the future as well as the present, the remote as well as the near; teaches short- sighted Feeling, with its eye filled with the present, that " Hereafter is to be regarded as much as Now," and that \| " a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future good." When the Good is enjoyed, now or then, to-morrow or next year, is, or may be, to Eeason a matter of indifference, while to Feeling it is almost everything ; it is for Eeason to educate Feeling, until Feeling shares her own perspective. This rational principle which guides us in the distribution of our own Good is Prudence. But the path of Prudence is not itself alone the path of Virtue. Even one's own " good on the whole " is not ipso facto the same as the general good. Whence shall we derive the principle of the distribution of Good when the Good is the Good of all, and noir merely that of the in- dividual. How construct the bridge that will span the interval between our own good and that of .others, and correlate altruistic with egoistic conduct? For, once more, mere Feeling does not constitute the bridge between Egoism and Altruism. The dualism of Prudence and Virtue, regard for our own good and regard for the good of others or the general good, remains for Feeling irresolvable. Society never quite annexes the individual ; his good and , its never absolutely coincide in Ufre sphere of sensibility. But reason solves the problem which is for feeling in- soluble. The true proof of Utilitarianism or Altruistic Hedonism is not psychological, but logical. When " the egoist offers the proposition that his happiness or pleasure HEDONISM. 113 is good, not only for him, but absolutely, he gives the ground needed for such a proof. For we can then point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus, starting with his own principle, he must accept the wider notion of universal happiness or pleasure, as representing the real end of Eeason, the absolutely Good or Desirable." To feeling it ' makes all the difference in the world, whether it is my own happiness or some one else's that is in question ; to reason this distinction also is, like the distinction of time, ' a matter of indifference. As, to the eye of reason, there is 110 distinction between the near and the remote, but every moment of the individual life has its equal right to satis- faction, so is there no distinction between meum and tuum, but each individual, as equally a sentient being, has an equal right to consideration. " Here again, just as in the former case, by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, we may obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any individual is of no more importance, as a part of universal good, than the good of any other ; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other. And as rational beings, we are manifestly bound to aim at good generally, not merely at this or that part of it." That " impartiality " which Bentham and Mill declared essential to utilitarian morality, in which " each is to count for one, and no one for more than one," is the impartiality of reason, to which mere feeling could never attain. This rational principle, which alone can guide us in the dis- H 114 THE MORAL IDEAL. tribution of happiness between ourselves and others, is " the abstract principle of the duty of Benevolence." To Prudence must be added Benevolence. But, in order to a perfectly rational distribution of Happiness, whether among the competing moments of the individual life or among competing individuals, yet a third principle of reason must be invoked. Whether we are considering the sum-total of our own happiness or of the general happiness, we find that the constituent parts have not all an equal importance. Some moments in the individual life are more important than others, because they have a larger or a peculiar capacity for pleasure ; and some individuals are more important than others, because they too have a larger or a peculiar capacity for pleasure. Neither in the individual nor in the social sphere is there a dead level of absolute equality ; there are rational grounds for recognising inequality in both. Accordingly, if the maximum of happiness is to be realised, the strict literal " impartiality " of the prin- ciples of Prudence and Benevolence must be enlightened by the better insight of a higher Justice which, witli its yet stricter scrutiny and more perfect impartiality, shall recognise the true claim and the varying importance of each moment and of each individual. It is, indeed, rather a principle of Equity than of Justice, a " Lesbian rule " which adapts itself to the inequalities and variations of that living experience which it measures. As such, it is the true and ultimate economic principle of Hedonism. In- stead of depressing the maximum to a rigid average, by distributing the " greatest happiness " equally among the " greatest number " of moments or of individuals, the priii- HEDONISM. 115 ciple of Justice directs us to aim at the greatest total happiness, or the greatest happiness "on the whole," whether in our own experience or in that of the race. II. Critical Estimate of Hedonism. 6. The formal merits of Hedonism as a philosophical () its psy- theory of morals are of the highest order. It is a bold made- and skilfully executed effort to satisfy the philosophical q demand for unity. It offers a xlear and definite con- ception of the End of life, a principle of unity under which its most diverse elements are capable of being brought, and under which they receive at least a very plausible interpretation. It acknowledges the growth t- and change which have characterised the course of moral theory and practice ; it recognises the fact that ^ morality is an evolution, and has a history ; and it offers a philosophy of this history, a theory of this evolution. Nor does it fall into the fallacy of reading its own philo- sophical theory into the ordinary naive moral conscious- ness of mankind. The dominating tendency of the entire ethical movement, it insists, is utilitarian and hedonistic ; but this tendency is present unconsciously and implicitly oftener than consciously and explicitly. Until we reflect,, ^ we may not realise that the End which we seek in all our actions is pleasure ; but let us once reflect, and we cannot fail to detect its constant presence and opera- tion. And when we follow the history of the theory, from its ancient beginnings in Cyrenaicism to its classical development in Epicureanism, and from the Egoism of Paley to the Altruism of Bentham and Mill, and the \ \ 116 THE MORAL IDEAL. Evolutionism of Spencer and his school, we must admire not only the strenuous perseverance with which the old formula has been stretched again and again so as to ac- commodate higher and hitherto unconsidered aspects of the ethical problem, but also the skill and open-mindedness, the sense of moral reality, the vitality of thought, which have enabled the theory to adapt itself so readily and so naturally to new moral and intellectual conditions. A peculiar and, to a certain extent, an unwarranted plausibility has, however, accrued to the theory from its appropriation of the term "Happiness" to express its conception of the ethical end. We hear the theory as often called " Eudsemonism " as " Hedonism," the " Happi- ness-theory " as the " Pleasure-theory." It would conduce to clearness of thought if these terms were kept apart. For, as Aristotle says, we are all agreed in describing the End as Happiness (ev&ai/jiovia), but we differ as to the definition of Happiness. Pleasure (fjbovrj) is one among other interpretations of Happiness, and, though it may be the most usual, its justice and adequacy must be con- sidered and vindicated, like those of any other interpre- tation. Happiness is, in itself, merely equivalent to " Well-being " or " Welfare," and the nature of this may be described in other terms, as well as in those of Pleasure. Pleasure is aesthetic or emotional welfare, welfare of Sen- sibility; but there is also intellectual welfare, and that welfare of the Will or total active Self which is rather \\Q\\-doing than v? oil-being (ev %fjv KOI ev r jrpd r rreiv). The Welfare or Happiness may be that of the sentient, or of the intellectual, or of the total (sentient and intellectual) or active Self. No doubt, Pleasure, or the Happiness of HEDONISM. 117 the sentient self, is the only term we have to describe the content of Happiness. But to exclude the possibility of any other interpretation by identifying Happiness and Pleasure at the outset, and using these terms interchange- ably throughout the discussion, is, it seems to me, to employ a " question-begging epithet." The thesis, of which Hedonism ought to be the demonstration, is that Happi- ness is pleasure or the "sum of pleasures." Kealising this to be the true state of the argument, we may now proceed to consider the legitimacy and adequacy of the hedonistic interpretation of Happiness. There need be the less hesitation in styling the theory in question the " pleasure-theory," rather than, more vaguely if more plausibly, the " happiness-theory," since the Epicureans of old, almost as eagerly as Mill and his successors in our own time, have maintained the claims of the term "pleasure" to the highest emotional connotation. The real question at issue, let us understand, is the legitimacy of the limitation of the conception of Happiness to the sentient or emotional sphere. Now, the fundamental inadequacy of Hedonism, already suggested in the above remarks, is a psychological one. The hedonistic theory of life is based upon a one-sided theory of human nature. Man is regarded as, fundamentally and essentially, a sentient being, a creature of sensibility ; and therefore the end of his life is conceived in terms of sensibility, or as sentient satisfaction. Now, there is no doubt that sensibility is a large and important element in human life; the question is, whether it is the ultimate and characteristic element. This question must, I think, be answered in the negative. We are so constituted as to 118 THE MORAL IDEAL. be susceptible to pleasure and pain, and we might con- ceivably make this susceptibility the sole guide of our life. That we cannot do so consistently with our nature, is because we are also so constituted as to regulate our feelings by reference not only to one another, but to the rational nature which belongs to our humanity and differ- entiates us from the animal creation. In the animal life, pleasure and pain are the " sovereign masters " ; in ours, they are subjected to the higher sovereignty of reason. " If pleasure* is the sovereign good, it ought to satisfy absolutely all our faculties ; not only our sensibility, but also our intelligence and will." Or rather, it must satisfy the "nature" which these faculties, in their unity and totality, constitute, and must satisfy that " nature " in its unity and totality. But pleasure, or sentient satisfaction, is not a category adequate to the interpretation of the life of such a being as man. . The hedonistic theory of life purchases its simplicity and lucidity at the expense of depth and comprehensiveness of view. -Its formula is too simple. Its End is abstract and one-sided, the exponent of the life of feeling merely ; the true End must be the exponent of the rational, as well as of the sentient 'self. It may be difficult to describe such an End ; but the dif- ficulty of the ethical task is the inevitable result -of the complexity of man's nature. The very clearness and simplicity of Hedonism is, in this sense, its condemnation. It is doubtless pleasing to the logical sense to see the whole of our complex human life reduced to the simple terms of Sensibility. But the true principle of unity must take fuller account of the complexity of the problem ; insight must not be sacrificed to system the true system HEDONISM. 119 will be the result of the deepest insight. Festina lente is the watchword in Ethics as in Metaphysics; the true thinker, in either sphere, will not make haste. And if Plato was right when he said that the good life is a harmony of diverse elements, he was also right when he said that the kgjr to this harmony is to be found rather in Keason than in Sensibility. To a psychologist who, like Mill and Bain, or like the ancient Cyrenaics, resolves our entire experience into feeling or sensibility, such a criticism would not, of course, appeal. He would disallow, the distinction between reason and sensibility, and maintain that the former differs from the latter only in respect of its greater com- . plexity, that " reason," so - called, is but the complex product of associated feelings. Hedonism in Ethics is the logical correlate of Sensationalism in Psychology. But, short of such a psychological demonstration, the Aristo- telian argument holds, that the End of any being must be in accordance with its peculiar nature ; and, since sensibility assimilates man to the animals, and reason differentiates him from them, his true well-being must be found in a rationally guided life, rather than in a life whose sole guide and " sovereign master " is sensibility. 7. This psychological error produces in its turn a mis- (J) its inad- equate in- leading and inverted view of Character, an estimate of terpreta- it which surely misses its true significance. The most character, obvious defect of^ the theory is its externalism. Its point ^ of view is that of consequences and results, and only in- directly that of motives and iiitgniipsisj conduct alone is 120 THE MORAL IDEAL. | of direct and primary importance, the significance of ) character is indirect and secondary. The attainment of / a certain type of character, or of a certain bent of will, is, indeed, of the highest importance, but only because it is I the surest guarantee for a certain type of activity. The I latter is desirable in itself, and as an end ; the former is I desirable only as the best means towards the attainment of this end. Character, in other words, is instrumental ; the " good-will "__is jLJiieans to^an^end, not an end-in- itself; will^ like_^reasqn,^is subordinated to feeling. The whole estimate of motives, as compared with actual con- sequences, in the hedonistic school, implies this view ; but we have the explicit statement of Mill himself as to the real importance of the good will. " It is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on our feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. In other I words, this state of the will is a means to good, not in- trinsically a good." 1 Which is to say that the state of feeling, or the production of pleasure, is the end, "the only thing always and altogether good " ; while the char- acter of the will is only a means to this end. Professor Gizycki forms precisely the same estimate of the good will : " Virtue is the highest excellence of man. It is not an excellence of the body, but of the mind ; and not of the understanding, but of the will. Virtue, therefore, is excellence of will, or, in short, a good will. Why is it the highest excellence ? Because nothing so much accords with the ultimate standard of all values. The 1 'Utilitarianism,' ch. iv. HEDONISM. 121 character of man is the principal source of the happiness, as well as of the misery, of mankind. Certainly also health, strength, and intelligence are essential conditions of human welfare ; but the good-will is still more essen- j tial, for only it guarantees a benevolent direction of the I others." l The good man, then, according to the hedon-l istic estimate, is simply a reliable instrument, warranted! not to go wrong, but to continue steadily producing the greatest amount of happiness possible in the circum- | stances, whether for himself or for others. Now, this interpretation of character, it seems to me, falsifies the healthy moral consciousness of mankind, by simply reversing its estimate. That estimate is that* character, the attainment of a certain type of personality \ or bent of will, is not a means but an end-in-itself ; that j this, and not the production of a certain state of feeling, ( is the only thing which is always and altogether good/j and itself "the ultimate standard of all values." And why ? Because character is the expression and exponent of the total personality. Neither the emotional nor the m-\ tellectual state, but that state of Will which includes them ' both, is the ultimate and absolute Good, the chief End of ' man. It is true that this form of being is always at the same time a form of doing, that character and conduct are inseparable, that et r^ , - 128 THE MORAL IDEAL. bility, and this necessity of feeling is still the Must, or rather the Is, of nature, not the Ought - to - be of morality. But is not such a translation of Ought into Must or Is a violation once more of the healthy moral consciousness of mankind ? The reality of moral obli- gation stands or falls with the reality of the distinc- tion between the ideal and the actual ; moral obliga- tion is man's attitude towards the moral Ideal. If, therefore, we resolve the ideal into the actual, as "psychological hedonism" does, we make the attitude of duty impossible. This consequence is frankly accepted by the Evolu- tionary school. The sense of obligation is, they say, only temporary, existing during the earlier stages of the evolu- tion of morality, but destined to disappear with the com- pletion of the process. Moral life is, in its ideal, perfectly spontaneous, and is always tending to become more entirely so. " The feeling of obligation tends to dis- appear, as fast as moralisation progresses." But is not the conception of Duty or Obligation a central and essential element of the moral life, to be explained and vindicated in its permanent and absolute validity, rather than explained awAy as only temporarily and relatively valid ? Moral progress, while in a sense it liberates us from the irksomeness of duty, also brings with it a larger sense of duty, and a more entire submission to it. The disappearance of the conception would mean either sinking to the level of the brutes or rising to the divine. As Kant contended, to act without a sense of obligation does not become our station in the moral universe. It is this characteristic of the moral life that HEDONISM. 129 separates it for ever from the life of nature. The moral life cannot, as moral, become " spontaneous " or simply " natural." The goal of the physical evolution and that of the moral are not ipso facto the same. A perfectly comfortable life, that is, a life in which the discomfort of imperfect adaptation to the conditions of life should no longer be felt, would not be a perfect moral life. Thus, as from the non-moral a ^^m-inorality was evolved, so into the non-moral it would ultimately disappear. To " naturalise the moral man " would be to destroy morality. To make the sense of duty a coefficient of the real, by interpreting it as merely the transitional effect and manifestation of the imperfect adjustment of the in- dividual to his environment, may be a partial account, but is at any rate a very inadequate account of the moral situation. That situation is not fully understood until, in the consciousness of Law and Duty, is heard the eternal claim of the ideal upon the actual. 10. This leads us to remark that Hedonism, as an (e) Failure of Sensi- ethical theory, can never account for more than the con- bmty to tent or " raw material " of morality ; the form, or prin- principle ciple of arrangement, of this raw material must be found distribu- elsewhere. In other words, sensibility does not provide tlon ' for its own organisation ; the unifying principle of its " mere manifold " must be found in a rational and not in a sensible principle. To adopt a Kantian phrase, we may say that if reason without feeling is empty, feeling without reason is blind. This is only to repeat what Plato and Aristotle, and even Socrates, said long ago viz., that the ordering and guiding principle of human life is to be I 130 THE MORAL IDEAL. found in " right reason," and that it is the place of feeling to submit itself to that higher guidance and control. Feeling is capricious, peculiar to the individual, clamant, chaotic; its life, unchecked by the control of rational insight and foresight, would be a chameleon-like life, a thing that owed its shape and colour to the moments as they passed. If the life of sensibility is to be unified or organised, it can only be through the presence and opera- tion in it of rational principle. This problem of the organisation of sensibility early forced itself upon the attention of hedonistic moralists. , It was seen that the ordering of man's life is in his own hands, that the organisation of sensibility which is effected for the animal must be effected ly man ; and the question forced itself upon reflection, Whither must we look for guidance ? Is feeling self-sufficient, or must the appeal be made from feeling to reason ? The^istoryj^Sedon- ism reveals, as we have seen, a growing place for reason in the life of feeling. The significance of this appeal to reason in an ethic of sensibility was not at first perceived, and we find the appeal made accordingly with all open- ness and confidence by the Epicurean school. A success- ful life of feeling, a life which shall attain the end of sentient existence, must be, as they maintain, a rationally conducted life, which plans and considers and is always master of itself. The supreme virtue is Prudence. Modern hedonists have been no less conscious of the necessity of solving the problem of the organisation of feeling. The utilitarians especially have widened the problem so as to include the organisation of the social as well as of the individual life. To the ancient virtue of Prudence they HEDONISM. 131 have added the modern virtue of Benevolence. The problem of organisation has thus become more clamant and more complex than ever. A rational solution of this problem, however, is seen to be inconsistent with Hedon- ism, and to involve a surrender of the case for the adequacy of that theory of life. The attempt has been made, accordingly, in different ways, to reduce this ap- parently rational control of sensibility to a mere control of feeling by feeling. Let us consider the success of these efforts, in the case (1) of the individual, and (2) of the social life. (1) One of the chief novelties of Mill's statement of the (l) Within the indi- hedonistic Ethics is his recognition of a qualitative, as well vidual life, as a quantitative, difference between feelings. Feelings are, he insists, higher and lower, as well as more or less intense, enduring, &c. ; they differ in rank, as well as in strength. A new element is thus added to the definition of Happiness. The pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body, not merely because the former are en- during and fruitful in other pleasures, while the latter are evanescent and apt to carry with them painful conse- quences, but because the former are the pleasures of the higher, the latter those of the lower nature. Now, the plea for this distinction of quality stands or falls with the validity or invalidity of the reference to the source of the pleasures compared. But the invalidity of such a refer- ence, from the standpoint of Hedonism, is perfectly ob- vious. If pleasure is the only good, then pleasure itself is the only consideration ; the source of the pleasure has no hedonistic significance, and ought not to enter into the hedonistic calculus. If Hedonism will be " psychological," 132 THE MORAL IDEAL. it must forego this distinction of source, and, with it, the distinction of quality in pleasures. Mill's appeal is, like Plato's, to those qualified, by their wide experience and their powers of introspection, to judge of the relative value of pleasures. The thinker knows the pleasures of thought as well as the pleasures, say, of sport, while the sportsman knows only the latter class of pleasures and not the former ; the thinker's preference for the pleas- ures of thought has, therefore, the authority of experience. The preference of the higher nature covers the case of the lower, but not vice versd. But, on the hedonistic theory, this claim to authority must be disallowed. The prefer- ence of the higher nature covers only the case of the higher nature, the case of those on the same plane of sen- sibility as itself. Its preference (and the deliverance founded upon it) cannot be authoritative for a lower nature, for a being on a different plane of sensibility. A "lower" pleasure will be more intense to a "lower" nature ; and if pleasure be the only standard, I cannot be asked to give up a greater for a less pleasure, to sacrifice quantity to quality. Quality is an extra-hedonistic crite- rion ; the only hedonistic criterion is quantity " the intensity of each kind, as experienced by those to whom it is most intense." Indeed, the so-called difference of quality will be found to resolve itself (so far as pleasure is concerned) into a difference of quantity for the higher nature. To the higher nature, the higher pleasure is also the more intense pleasure ; to the thinker, say, the pleas- ures of thought are more intense than the pleasures of the chase. This greater intensity is the only hedon- istic ground of the higher nature's preference for its own HEDONISM. 133 chosen pleasures. Upon the lower nature the lower pleas- ures have, gud pleasures, an equally rightful and irresist- ible claim ; and upon such a nature the higher pleasures will have no claim until for it too they have become more intense, or the means to a more intense pleasure. Only thus can they make good their superior claim at the bar of sensibility. If we press Mill to assign the ultimate ground of this preference, and of the corresponding difference in kind between pleasures, he refers us to the " sense of dignity " which is natural to man, and forms " an essential part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong." Socrates would rather be Socrates discontented than a contented fool ; he could not lower himself to the fool's status and the fool's satisfaction, without the keenest sense of dissatis- faction, and therefore of misery. But this " sense of dig- nity " cannot be resolved into desire of pleasure ; and while it certainly regulates man's pleasures, and becomes a real element in his happiness, it is itself the constant testimony to the possibility and the imperativeness for man of a higher life than that of mere pleasure. It is the utterance of the rational self behind the self of sensibility, demanding a satisfaction worthy of it the expression of its undying aspiration after a life which shall be the per- fect realisation of its unique possibilities, and of its eternal and " divine discontent " with any life that falls short of such realisation of itself. Not the attainment of pleasure as such, but the finding one's pleasure in activities which are worthy of this higher and rational nature, such is the end set before us by our peculiar human " sense of dignity." This interpretation of the end does enable us 134 THE MORAL IDEAL. to understand the intrinsic difference of pleasures, but only at the expense of surrendering Hedonism as a suffi- cient ethical theory. For it is not as pleasures that the pleasures are " higher " or " lower." The clue to the dis- tinction is found in N their common relation to the one identical rational self ; according as ft is more or less fully satisfied, by being more or less fully realised, is the pleas- ure " higher " or " lower." Otherwise, there is no such distinction. The " dignity " is the dignity of reason, not of feeling. So great is that dignity of reason that, in its presence, the claims of feeling may be hushed to utter silence ; that, before its higher claim, the question of pleas- ure and pain, in all their infinite degrees, may not be even heard. Are there not occasions at least when we must take this " heroic " view of life, and in our loyalty to an eternal principle of right, above all particular sentient selves and their pleasures and pains, be content to sacrifice all our capacity for pleasure, it may be utterly and for ever ? Such an action can only be described as faithful- ness to the true self, to the divine ideal of our manhood ; and the fact of the possibility of such an action and of other actions which, though on a more ordinary plane, would yet be impossible but for the inspiration of such a spirit, proves that, though man is an individual subject of feeling of passion so intense that it may seem at times to constitute his very life he is something more, and, in vir- tue of that " something more," is capable of rising above himself, above his own little life of clamant sensibility, and viewing himself and his present activity sub specie ceternitcdis, in the clear light of eternal truth and right, as a member of a rational order of being, and subject to the HEDONISM. 135 law of that order. But for such an estimate of life He- donism, as the Ethics of Sensibility, cannot find a place. Other hedonistic writers, recognising the impossibility of reconciling Mill's doctrine of the intrinsic difference of pleasures with orthodox Hedonism, have attempted to find the clue to the organisation of sensibility outside, in the " external sanctions " already mentioned, in the pressure of society upon the individual. The seat of authority is, they hold, outside the individual, in the law of the land, in public opinion, &c. ; not within, in the individual con- science. The inner authority is only the reflection of the outer. No doubt there is a great deal of truth in this, as a representation of the normal course of moral education. Until a moral being has learned to control himself, he must be controlled from without ; until the moral order is developed within him, that order must be impressed upon him. But the progress of moral education brings us, sooner or later, to the stage at which the outer law, if it is to maintain its influence, must produce its " certificate of birth," or, in other words, must show that it is only the reflection of an inner order. The rationale of the outward order, the Why of the social forces, must inevitably become a question. This solution, therefore, only pushes the problem a step farther back. The Evolutionists see that the external controls the physical, social, religious are really " pre-moral controls within which the moral control evolves," its scaffolding, to be taken down as soon as the structure is complete. The external pressure of environment must be superseded by an internal psychological pressure. This inner, and strictly moral, control is described by Spencer as the sub- 136 THE MORAL IDEAL. jection of the earlier-evolved, simpler, and presentative feelings to the later-evolved, more complex, and repre- sentative feelings. But why this subordination ? Not simply because the one set of feelings occur earlier and the other occur later in the evolution, but because the one class of feelings are more efficient factors in the evo- lution of conduct than the other. But how are we to judge of the value of the Evolution itself ? What is the ideal or type of conduct which it is desirable to evolve ? Our old question recurs once more, therefore, in the new form : What is the criterion of ethical value, by which we may define and determine moral evolution or progress ? Whither moves the ethical process ; what form of conduct do we judge to be worth evolving ? Are the " ethical process " and the " cosmical process " the same, or even coincident ? The fact that one of the greatest living representatives of scientific Evolutionism has found himself forced to deny both the identity and the coincidence, is striking proof that this is no capricious or imaginary question. 1 The fact of a certain order, and the fact of its gradual genesis or development in time, furnish no answer to the question of the raison d'etre of the fact; here, as elsewhere, the answer to the Quid Facti is no answer to the Quid Juris. I think we can now see that it is the sheer stress of logic that has driven Professor Sidgwick to appeal from the bar of sensibility to that of reason for the lacking element of moral authority, for the organising principle of the moral life. Even within the sphere of individual I experience, sensibility does not provide a principle which 1 Cf. Professor Huxley's Romanes Lecture on " Evolution and Ethics." HEDONISM. 137 shall determine its own distribution. How to compass the attainment of the " greatest happiness," not for the moment but " on the whole," is a problem which feeling alone is unable to solve. The content of the moral life may be furnished by sensibility, as the content of the intellectual life is furnished by sensation; but the form or principle of arrangement of this " raw material," the unifying and organising principle, is, in the one case as in the other, the birth of reason. (2) When we pass beyond the sphere of the individual (2) Be- life to that of society, we find the same impasse for Hedon- individual ism. If sensibility does not provide the principle of its ety. S own distribution within the individual life, still less does it provide the principle of its distribution between ourselves and others. If the life of Prudence cannot be reduced to terms of mere sensibility, still less can the life of Justice and Benevolence ; if the instruction of reason is necessary in the former case, it is even more obviously necessary in the latter. Yet the disciples of Hedonism have boldly thrown themselves into this forbidding breach, and in various ways have sought to demonstrate that, here again, what seems to be the product of reason is, in reality, the product of sensibility. In the first place, Mill has tried to extend his " psychological proof " of Hedonism in general to Altruistic Hedonism, or Utilitarianism. Since each desires his own happiness, it follows that the general happiness is desired by all. But the logical gap is so evident that it is difficult to believe that Mill himself was not aware of it. The aggregate happiness may be the end for the aggregate of individuals, and the happiness of each may be a unit in this aggregate end. But to con- suvi 138 THE MORAL IDEAL. elude that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is therefore directly, and as such, an end for each individ- ual, is to commit the notorious fallacy of Division. In- directly and secondarily that is, as the means to the attainment of his own happiness the general happiness may become an end for the individual ; and thus an altruism may be reached, which is merely a " trans- figured " or " mediate " egoism, and benevolence may be provisionally vindicated as only a subtler and more refined selfishness. This, however, is not the altruism of Mill and the Utilitarian school. Their aim is to establish benevolence as the direct and substantive law of the moral life, as the first, and not the second, commandment of a true moral code. They offer the greatest happiness of the greatest number as itself the End, not a means to one's own greatest happiness. J Mill is conscious of the difficulty of the transition from egoism to altruism, and he looks to sensibility to fill the logical gap. We have a feeling for the happiness of others as well as for our own, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Hume had already maintained ; let us take our ground upon this psychological fact this " feeling of unity " with our fellows, a mighty emotional force which must break down any barriers of mere logic. To this disinterested sympathy we may confidently commit the task of the complete reconciliation of the general with the individual happiness. For we may expect an indefinite development of the feeling, as the pain which sympathy now carries with it is superseded by the pleasure of sympathy with more complete lives ; or, as Spencer states it in the lan- guage of Evolution, as the pains of sympathy with the HEDONISM. 139 pains of mal-adjustment of individuals to their environ- ment are superseded by the pleasures of sympathy with the pleasures of more and more perfect adjustment to environment. Such a solution, however, confuses the practical with the theoretical problem. It does not follow that "con- duct so altruistic would be egoistically reasonable," and what we are in search of is such a rationale of altruism as shall reconcile it with egoism. Nor can the " feeling of unity " with our fellows, such love as casts out selfish- ness, such perfect sympathy as overcomes the dualism of virtue and prudence, of altruistic and egoistic conduct, and makes us " love our neighbour as ourselves," be found in all the universe of sensibility. Uninstructed feeling is incompetent for the discharge of such a splendid task ; though, when instructed and illuminated by rational in- sight, feeling alone can execute it. Like Mill's " sense of dignity," this " feeling of unity " has a higher certificate of birth to show than that of blind unilluminated feeling ; it, too, is the child of reason by sensibility. Only the marriage of these two can have such a noble issue. Sen- sibility alone might unite us with our fellows ; but it might just as probably separate us from them. Tor if feeling is naturally sympathetic and altruistic, it is also naturally selfish and egoistic. The problem is to cor- relate and conciliate these two tendencies of human sen- sibility. Can we trust the correlation and conciliation to their own unguided operation ? May we expect a parallelogram of these two opposing forces ? On the whole, must we not say that the tendency of mere sensibility is rather to separate and individualise, than 140 THE MORAL IDEAL. to unite and socialise men ? It is reason that unites us ; the sphere of the universal is the sphere of thought ; we think in common. Sensibility separates us, shuts us up each in his own little, but all - important, world of subjectivity; its sphere is the sphere of the particular; we feel each for himself, and a stranger intermeddleth not with the business of the heart. At any rate, sensi- bility alone, inevitably and intensely subjective as it is, would never dictate that strict " impartiality " as between our neighbour's happiness and our own which, utilitarians agree, must be the principle of distribution of pleasures if the maximum general happiness is to be constituted. From the point of view of sensibjlity, I cannot be " strictly impartial " in my estimate of the relative value of my own happiness and that of others ; I cannot count myself, or even others, "each for one, and no one for more than one " ; I cannot " love my neighbour as myself," any more than I can love all my neighbours alike. I cannot reduce the various pleasures that offer themselves in the field of possibility to a unit of value ; sensibility is not a unitary principle, it does not yield a common meas- ure. Ultimately, my own pleasure alone has significance for me as a sentient being. To detach myself from it, or it from myself, and to regard it from the standpoint of an " impartial spectator," would be to destroy it. If all were thus "strictly impartial," there would be no gen- eral, because there would be no individual, happiness. Utilitarianism puts an impossible strain upon sensibility. The formula of Evolution has been brought to bear, as we have seen, upon the problem of the reconciliation of egoism with altruism. Mr Spencer finds that there is HEDONISM. 141 gradually establishing itself, in the history of evolving con- duct, not merely a compromise, but a conciliation of indi- vidual and social interests ; and he confidently constructs a Utopia in which the happiness of the individual and the interests of society will perfectly coincide. Mr Stephen, on the other hand, acknowledges a permanent conflict between the two. " The path of duty does not coincide with the path of happiness. ... By acting rightly, I admit, even the virtuous man will sometimes be making a sacrifice ; " it is " necessary for a man to acquire certain instincts, amongst them the altruistic instincts, which fit him for the general conditions of life, though, in particular cases, they may cause him to be more miserable than if he were without them." And even Mr Spencer acknow- ledges " a deep and involved " though not a permanent "derangement of the natural connections between pleasures and beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental actions." But, it is contended, such a statement will not be " conclusive for the virtuous man. His own happiness is not his sole ultimate aim ; and the clearest proof that a given action will not contribute to it will, therefore, not deter him from the action." The individual, as a member of the social organism, forgets his own welfare or happiness in that of society. From the hedonistic point of view, however, we cannot thus merge the individual in society. We must not be misled by the metaphor of the "social organism," for it is only a metaphor, and a metaphor, as Mr Stephen fears, " too vague to bear much argumentative stress." As Professor Sidgwick remarks, it is not the organism, but /"the individual, after all, that feels pleasure and pain." j 142 THE MORAL IDEAL. It is true that " the development of the .society implies the development of certain moral instincts in the indi- vidual, or that the individual must be so constituted as to be capable of identifying himself with the society, and of finding his pleasure and pain in conduct which is socially beneficial or pernicious/' Yet the individual can never wholly identify himself with the society, simply because he remains, to the last, an individual. It is said that the antagonism of individual and social interests is incidental to the transition-stages of the evolution, and that, with the development of sympathy, and the perfect adaptation of the individual to his social environment, complete identity of interests will be brought about. But, so long as the interest is merely that of pleasure, perfect identity of interests is impossible. The metaphor of the " social organism " is here particularly misleading. As Professor Sorley remarks, " the feeling of pleasure is just the point where individualism is strongest, and in regard to which mankind, instead of being an organism in which each part but subserves the purposes of the whole, must rather be regarded as a collection of competing and co-operating units." 1 From the point of view of pleasure, society is not an organism, but an aggregate of individuals ; and, if we speak of the "health" of the society, we cannot mean its happiness, but simply the general conditions of the happiness of its individual members. As Mr Stephen acknowledges, there seems to be a permanent dualism between the " prudential " and the " social " rules of life, " corresponding to the distinction of the qualities which are primarily useful to the individual and those which are 1 'Ethics of Naturalism,' 139, 140. HEDONISM. 143 primarily useful to the society." The former code has not yet been incorporated in the latter. 1 Does not the stress of logic once more force us to appeal, with Professor Sidgwick, from sensibility to reason ? The latter writer holds that though strict egoistic Hedonism cannot be transferred into universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, yet "when the egoist offers . . . the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is good not only for him, but absolutely, he gives the ground needed for such a proof. For we can then point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus, starting with his own principles, he must accept the wider notion of universal happiness or pleasure as representing the real end of Eeason, the absolutely Good or Desirable." But such a hedonistic perspective is, as Mr Sidgwick sees, impossible for un- aided Sensibility ; to the sentient individual his own pleasure is indefinitely " more important than the equal happiness of any other person." The Good of Sensi- bility is essentially a private and individual, not a common and objective Good. It is in the common sphere of reason that we meet, and, having met there, we recognise one another when we meet again in the sphere of sensibility. To the rational, if not to the sentient individual, we can " point out that his own pleasure is no more important," objectively and absolutely regarded, " than the equal happiness of any other person ; " and sensibility, thus illuminated by reason, may be trusted to effect that reconciliation of the individual with the social 1 On the permanence of this dualism, cf. Kidd, ' Social Evolution.' 144 THE MORAL IDEAL. welfare, which it never could have brought about alone. From this point of view, the problem at once loses its hopeless aspect. The true altruism, we can see, is not reached by the negation of egoism, or only by the negation of the lower egoism. There is a higher egoism which contains altruism in itself, and makes "transition" un- necessary. I have not indeed discovered my own true End, or my own true Self, until I find it to be not ex- clusive but inclusive of the Ends of other Selves. I am not called, therefore, to transcend egoism, and exchange it for altruism, but to discover and realise that true egoism which includes altruism in itself. Since each is an Ego, the others as well as I, to eliminate egoism would be to uproot the moral life itself. The entire problem is found within the sphere of egoism, not beyond it; and it is solved for each individual by the discovery and realisation of his own true Ego. For, truly seen, the spheres of the different Egos are like concentric circles. The centre of the moral life must be found within the individual life, not outside it. The claim of society upon the individual is not to be explained even by such a figure as that of the " social organism." The moral Ego refuses to merge its proper personal life in that of society. The unity or solidarity of the individual and society must be so conceived as that the wider social life with which he identifies himself, so far from destroying the personal life of the individual, shall focus and realise itself in that life. But, if the social and the individual life are to be seen thus as concentric circles their common centre must be found ; and it can be found only in reason, not in sensibility. Lives guided by mere sensibility are eccen- HEDONISM. 145 trie, and may be antagonistic ; only lives guided by a sen- sibility which has itself been illuminated by reason are concentric and, necessarily, co-operative, because directed to a common rational End. 11. In coming to a final judgment as to the value of (/)The Hedonism as a theory of the Moral Ideal, we must be physical & guided by metaphysical considerations with regard to man's ultimate nature, and place in the universe. It has been truly said that a noble action or life is a grand practical speculation about life's real meaning and worth. Hedonism, like every ethical theory, is, in the last analysis, a metaphysical speculation of this kind. "What are we to say of its value ? The hedonistic view is the empirical, "scientific," or naturalistic view of human life; it is the expression of ethical realism, as distinguished from ethical idealism or transcendentalism. It derives the ideal from the actual, the Ought- to-be from the Is. To it the ideal is only the shadow which the actual casts before it. Its effort is " to base ethics on facts, to derive the rules of our attitude toward facts from experience, to shape our ideals not from the airy stuff of something beyond the ken of science, but in accordance with laws derived from reality." It is an attempt to " naturalise the moral man," by showing the fundamental identity of moral laws with the laws of nature. The moral order falls within the natural: " sociological laws are ... of a natural growth ; the evolution of the social affairs of mankind is deeply rooted in the conditions of things." This naturalism and empiricism of the hedonistic theory reach their K 146 THE MORAL IDEAL. culmination in the "scientific" ethics of the evolution- ary school. The metaphysical question is, more particularly, the question of the nature and worth of the human person. " Conduct will always be different," says M. Fouillee, " according to the value, more or less relative and fleet- ing, which one accords to the human person ; according to the worth, more or less incomparable, which we attri- bute to individuality." Is man an end-in-himself, the bearer of the Divine and Eternal, as no other creature is, capable of identifying himself with and forwarding the divine End of the universe by accepting that as his life's ideal, or of antagonising, and even, in a sense, of frus- trating it ? Is he a free spiritual being, with a sentient and animal nature, or is he only a " higher animal " ? In the words of the writer just quoted : " There are cir- cumstances in which the alternative which presents itself in consciousness is the following Is it necessary to act as if my sensible and individual existence were all, or as if it were only a part of my true and universal existence ? " Hedonism rests upon what Mill has happily named the " psychological " theory of the Self. What Professor James calls the Me, the "stream" of consciousness, is regarded as the total and ultimate Self; man is a "bundle of states," and nothing more. It follows that his sole concern in life is with these passing states of feeling, which are not his but he. If we are merely sentient beings, subjects of sensibility, then the nature of that sensibility must be all in all to us. If the per- manence of a deeper rational self-hood is a mere illusion, HEDONISM. 147 and the changing sentient self-hood is alone real; then our concern is with the latter, not with the former, and Cyrenaicism is the true creed of life. At most, Virtue is identical with Prudence. But we cannot thus identify the Self with its experi- ence. Interpret our deeper self -hood how we may, we must acknowledge that we are more than the " stream " of our feelings. Our very nature is to transcend the present, and to regard our life as having a permanent meaning and reality. These experiences are mine, part of my total and continuous experience, and I am more than they. It needs such an " I " to account for the " psycho- logical Me." The Self persists through all its changing " states," and its demand for satisfaction is the unceasing spring of the moral life. It is not a mere " sum " of feelings; it is their unity, that by reference to which alone they gain their ethical significance. In mere feel- ing there is no abiding quality, it is a thing of the moment. The devotee of pleasure is no richer at the close of life than the beggar or the martyr. His pleasures, like the latter's pains, have passed, as all mere feelings must. But he remains, and all his life's experience, from first to last, has left its record in his character, in the permanent structure of the Self. " Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure." A theory of life which concerns itself only with the passing experience, and not with the permanent character of the Self, is fundamentally inadequate. The merit 12. To sum up the merit and demerit of Hedonism, we and de- merit of may say that it does well in emphasising the claims of Hedonism. 148 THE MORAL IDEAL. sensibility in human life ; but that it errs, either in assert- ing these to be the exclusive claims, or in subordinating to them the more fundamental claims of reason. To take the demerit first, the history of Hedonism is itself a demonstration of the impossibility of an Ethic of pure Sensibility. The gradual modification of the theory which we have traced is a gradual departure from strict hedon- istic orthodoxy, a gradual admission of reason to offices which at first were claimed for sensibility. Man's pleasure- seeking, being man's, cannot be unreflective, as the hedon- v ists very early saw ; and, in the development of the theory, /the reflective element is more and more emphasised. The successful life of pleasure is acknowledged to be essen- tially a calculating life, a life of thought. Mere feeling, A it is found, is an insufficient principle of unity. It unifies neither the individual life itself, nor the individual arid the social life. It does not supply a regulative prin- I ciple, a principle of the distribution of pleasure. Sensi- bility, like sensation, is a " mere manifold " which has to be unified by the rational Self ; as the one is the content of the intellectual life, the other is the content of the moral life. But the form of knowledge and of morality alike is rational. Feeling does not provide for its own guidance ; if it is to be the guide of human life, the dark- ness of animal sensibility must receive the illumination of reason. Sooner or later, Hedonism finds itself com- ^ pelled to appeal to reason for the form of morality ; and the history of the theory is the story of how this rational- i ism which was implicit in it from the first has gradually ' become explicit. Yet sensibility is the content of morality, and if we HEDONISM. 149 would not have the mere empty form, we must recognise the momentous significance of the life of sensibility in- formed by reason. Feeling is an integral part of the ^ moral life, which no ethical theory can afford to overlook ; and Hedonism has done well to emphasise its importance. A merely rational life, excluding sensibility, is as impos- sible for man as a life of mere sensibility without reason. t The rational life is for him a life of sensibility rationalised f or regulated by reason, and his total rational "well-being must report itself in sensibility. This is the permanent truth in Hedonism. The ascetic ideal is a false and in- adequate one ; it means the dwarfing of our moral nature, the drawing away of the very sap of its life. The spring of the action, its origin, is in sensibility ; if the End or motive is a product of reason, the roots of its attractive power are in sensibility. And the way to the attainment of the End lies through pleasure and pain ; the state of feeling is not merely the index and concomitant of suc- cessful pursuit, it is a constant guide towards success ; and attainment itself brings with it a new pleasure, as failure brings with it a new pain. Pleasure is, as Aris- *-*-" totle said, the very bloom of goodness, it is the very crown of virtue. The threads of which our life is woven are *- threads of feeling, if the texture of the web is reason's work. The hedonist unweaves the web of life into its threads, and having unwoven it, he cannot recover the lost design. I think we must go even farther, and admit that, while the mere distinctions of feeling, as pleasant or painful, are not, as such, moral distinctions, and do not always coincide with the latter, yet tlise distinctions are natu- 150 THE MORAL IDEAL. rally connected and coincident. If pleasure is not itself the Good, it is its natural and normal index and expression, as pain is the natural and normal index and expression of evil. Hence the problem always raised for man by the suffering of the good, the problem that fills the book of Job, and seems to have been deeply felt by Plato. In the first book of the ' Republic,' we find an impressive picture of a life of perfect Justice (Plato's word for Righteousness), misunderstood and misinterpreted, a life that is perfectly just, but seems to men who cannot understand it to be most unjust. " They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified ; and thus learn that it is best (that is, pleasantest) not to be but to seem just." The " just man " generally has been misunderstood by his fellows ; goodness always has meant suffering, its paths never have been altogether paths of pleasantness and peace. The Christian world has drawn its inspiration from a Life that has seemed to it the fulfilment of the Platonic and pro- phetic dream a life of transcendent! goodness, which was also a life of utmost suffering, of suffering even unto the \ death of the Cross. We must indeed believe that the . goal of moral progress is the complete coincidence of good- ness with happiness. But at present it is not so, and the lesson of the best lives is that the way to that goal lies through suffering. Perhaps we cannot understand the full significance of pain in relation to goodness, but its presence in all noble lives tells of a higher End than pleasure, of an End in which pleasure may be taken up as an element, but which itself is infinitely more, of an End HEDONISM. 151 faithfulness to which must often mean indifference to pain, or, better even than indifference, a noble willingness to bear it for the sake of the higher Good which may not otherwise be reached, for the sake of that highest life which is not possible save through the death of all that is lower than itself. 152 CHAPTER II. RIGORISM, OR THE ETHICS OF REASON. Rigorism: 1. WE have traced the implicit rationalism of the hedon- its rational and ideal- istic theory gradually becoming explicit as we passed from istic stand- r , ; point. Cyrenaicism to Epicureanism, from Paley and Bentham to Mill and Professor Sidgwick. This appeal to reason became necessary, first, for the guidance of individual choice by reference to a criterion of the " higher " and " lower " in pleasure, and, secondly, as the only possible means of transition from Egoism to Altruism, from Self- ishness to Benevolence. But in both ancient and modern times the ethical rights of Reason have been emphasised no less strongly, and often no less exclusively, than the ethical rights of Sensi- bility. This assertion of the claims of Reason in the life of a rational being is at the basis of the common modern antithesis, or at any rate distinction, between Duty and Pleasure, between Virtue and Prudence, between the Right and the Expedient. In ethical theory, too, " duty for duty's sake " has been proclaimed with no less em- phasis than "pleasure for pleasure's sake," as the last word of /the moral life. The effort to idealise or spirit- RIGORISM. 153 ualise the moral man has been no less strenuously pursued than the effort to " naturalise " him. In Eeason, rather than in Sensibility, it has been maintained, is to be found the characteristic element of human nature, the quality which differentiates man from all lower beings, and makes him man. This is not so much an explicit theory of the End or Ideal, as a vindication of the absoluteness of moral Law or Obligation, of the category of Duty as the supreme ethical category. But it is, at any rate, a delineation of the ideal life, and therefore, implicitly or explicitly, of the Moral Ideal itself. The rational, like the hedonistic, Ethics takes two its two forms an extreme and a moderate. The former is that tremeand" the good life is a life of pure reason, from which all sensi- has been -eliminated. The latter is that it is a life which, though contaiimlg^ensibility as an element, is fundamentally rational a life of sensibility guided by reason. In either case, the entire emphasis is laid upon reason, and the theory may be called Eigorism, because the attitude to sensibility is that of rational superiority and stern control, where it is not that of rational intoler- ance and exclusiveness. Eeason claims the sovereignty, and sensibility is either outlawed, or degraded to the status of passive obedience. Whether in its extreme or in its moderate form, Eigor- ism is the expression of ethical Idealism, as Hedonism is the expression of ethical Eealism. The one is the charac- teristic temper of the modern Christian world, as the other is the characteristic temper of the ancient Classi- cal world. Our normal and dominant mood is that of " strenuous " enthusiasm, of dissatisfaction with the actual, - 154 THE MORAL IDEAL. of aspiration after the ideal ; the supreme category of our life is Duty or Oughtness. The normal and dominant mood of the Greeks was just the reverse the mood of sunny sensuous contentment with the present and the actual. That " discontent " which we account the evi- dence of our diviner destiny was foreign to their spirit. The ethics of Socrates is the philosophical expression of this characteristic Greek view of life ; moderation or self- control is the deepest principle he knows. For Aristotle, too, the sum of all virtue is the " middle way " between the two extremes of excess and defect. The master-virtue of the Greeks, in life and in theory, is a universal Tem- perance or (raxf>po bility a trap laid for the soul of man, in which he will ' be snared if he avoids it not altogether ; it is the first I and the most extreme expression of the ascetic principle. \ That principle was reasserted later, by the Stoics, with such impressiveness and dignity that the importance and originality of its earlier statement have perhaps been under-estimated. The Greeks do not appear to have taken the Cynics (?) stoi- cism, seriously ; much had to occur in their experience before they were ready to accept that lesson of self-discipline which had been the burden of the Cynic school. The course of the moral life ran very smooth in those pros- perous city-states ; it was not difficult to live a harmoni- ous, measured, rhythmic life in such conditions. And the Greek spirit always was aesthetic rather than ethical, the category of its life was the beautiful rather than the good. Not until the jar came from without, not till the fair civil order broke down, was the discord felt, or the 158 THE MORAL IDEAL. need for a more perfect and a diviner order, and salvation sought in conformity to its higher law. Then men re- membered the wistful note which had been struck by Plato, and by Aristotle too, how both had spoken of another life than that of this world, and were willing to listen to the Stoics as they repeated the old Cynic doctrine. How it But Stoicism differed from Cynicism in several important Cynicism : particulars. (1) For the crude " naturalism " of the Cynics, the Stoics substitute an idealistic or transcendental view natural- Qf ^ The k|eal nfe Qf plat() ftnd Aristofclej the life of reason itself, they regard as the only worthy life for man. The old Cynic phrase, " life according to nature " (6/jio\ova-i<;) whether the nature of things or their own nature they find, with Heraclitus, a common reason (\6yos), and a common law (vo/jios). They are thus able to identify the rational life with the life " according to nature," and both with the life " according to law." They do not, like the Cynics, fly in the face of custom and convention, the common reason has for them taken shape and embodiment in the established laws and usages of human society, and conformity, rather than non-conformity, becomes man's duty. In this sense, the Stoics are at once realists and idealists : for them " the ^ real is the rational." And, although they too counsel indifference and callousness to the events of fortune and the changing circumstances of human life, their resigna- tion to the course of things is supported by the conviction that " all things work together for good," that what happens is always most fit, and that it becomes man to RIGORISM. 159 accept as such all the events of life and the grand event of death itself. " Nothing can happen to me which is not best for thee, Universe." (2) For the sheer individualism of the Cynics, Stoi- (2) Cosmo- . politan v. cism offers to man a new and nobler citizenship than that individual- of any earthly State. The Stoic "cosmopolitanism" or "citizenship of the world" is no merely negative con-, ception. It is true that the Stoics are individualists, and that their ideal life is self-contained and self-sufficient. This aspect of the Cynic ideal they reassert. But their emancipation from the narrow limits of the Greek State gives them a spiritual entrance into a larger and nobler society, a " City of God," the universal kingdom of human- ity itself. On the earth that true city is not found ; it is not, like Plato's, a " Greek city," but a spiritual State,, and the Stoic citizenship is in the heavens. It is like Kant's Kingdom of Intelligence, in which each citizen is at once sovereign and subject, for its law is the law of reason itself. " ( KOO-JULOS uxravel 7ro?U9 ea-nv the world is as it were a commonwealth, a city ; and there are observances, customs, usages actually current in it things our friends and companions will expect of us, as the condition of our living there with them at all, as really their peers or fellow- citizens. Those observances were, indeed, the creation of a visible or invisible aristocracy in it, whose actual man- ners, whose preferences from of old, become now a weighty tradition, as to the way in which things should be or not be done, are like a music, to which the intercourse of life proceeds such a music as no one who had once caught its harmonies would willingly jar. In this way, the becoming, as the Greeks or manners, as both Greeks and 160 THE M0RAL IDEAL. Eomans said, would indeed be a comprehensive term for duty. Righteousness would be, in the words of the Caesar himself, but the 'following of the reasonable will and ordinance of the oldest, the most venerable, of all cities and polities the reasonable will of the royal, the law- giving element in it forasmuch as we are citizens of that supreme city on high, of which all other cities beside are but as single habitations.' " l (3) The (3) But the failure to find on earth any counterpart of anchoiy. that fair city in the heavens bred a new melancholy in the Stoics, which was strange to the buoyant spirit of the earlier Greeks. Not that the Stoics are pessimists ; the Cynics were pessimists, but their pessimism seemed to give them much satisfaction in the added sense of their own superiority. The Stoics, on the contrary, are opti- mists ; idealism is always optimistic. All things are, truly understood, most fit; rational order pervades the universe. But the shadow of the ideal and supersensible lies upon the actual and sensible ; the shadow of eternity is cast athwart the world of time. The soul that has beheld the abiding Eeality is possessed by the sense of the utter insignificance and transitoriness of all temporal interests, and sees in all things the seeds of quick decay and dissolution. Its cry is for rest and peace, cessation from futile striving. Vanitas vanitatum ! The wise man has awakened from life's fevered dream, and broken the spell of all its illusions. His is the quiet and imper- turbable dignity of spirit that goes not well with mirth or vulgar enjoyment. To him death is more welcome than life, for it is the way out of time into eternity. " I 1 Walter Pater, 'Marius the Epicurean,' ii. 15, 16. RIGORISM. 161 find that all things are now as they were in the days of our buried ancestors all things sordid in their elements, trite by long usage, and yet ephemeral. How ridiculous, then, how like a countryman in town, is he who wonders at aught ! Doth the sameness, the repetition of the pub- lic shows, weary thee ? Even so doth that likeness of events make the spectacle of the world a vapid one. And so must it be with thee to the end. For the wheel of the world hath ver the same motion, upward and downward, from generation to generation. When, then, shall time give place to eternity ? " 1 " To cease from action the ending of thine effort to think and to do there is no evil in that. . . . Thou climbedst into the ship, thou hast made thy voyage and touched the shore; go forth .now! Be it into some other life; the divine breath is everywhere, even there. Be it into forgetfulness for ever ; at least thou wilt rest from the beating of sensible images upon thee, from the passions which pluck thee this way and that, like an unfeeling toy, from those long marches of the intellect, from thy toilsome ministry to the flesh." 2 Thus the Stoic life is a life of pure reason, in which no place is found for natural sensibility. It is founded on the Platonic dualism of Form and Matter, the Ideal and the Sensible, as well as on the psychological dualism, com- mon to both Plato and Aristotle, of the rational and the irrational. The maxim, Live according to nature, means Live according to that rational order which is the deep est nature of things. Let the Logos which reveals itself in the universe reveal itself also in thee, who art a part 1 Walter Pater, op. cit., i. 205. ~ Op. cit., i. 206. L 162 THE MORAL IDEAL. of the universe. As for the life of passion and sensibility, that is essentially a lawless and capricious life. The animal may fittingly obey its claim, and submit to its slavery. But thou, who canst think, who canst enter into and make thine own possession the rational order of the universe, art surely called upon to follow the leading of that superior insight, and to conduct thyself in all thy doings as a sharer in the universal Reason. Nor is it only needful that thou regulate and be master of thy feelings, thou must be absolutely emancipated fronLjthem. No " harmony " of the rational and the irrational elements is possible, such as Plato fondly dreamed of ; there must be war to the knife, and no quarter given to the enemy of the soul, if the soul is to live. Feeling is the bond that ties thee to the external, to what is not thyself, and makes thee the slave of circumstance and fortune. Thou must assert thine independence of all outside thy- self; thou must learn to be self-contained and at home with thyself; and thou canst only be so by living the life of Reason, and obeying in all things and with a single mind its uncompromising Law. Therein lies thy proper Good ; all else is in reality indifferent, and must become so to thee, if thou wouldst attain the peace and complete- ness of the good life. With the true wisdom of rational insight into the eternal substance of things will come apathy to all the interests of time mere " shadow-shapes that come and go " and the emancipated spirit will lay hold on the eternal life of the universal Reason. It was not among the Greeks themselves, but in the larger Roman and Christian worlds, that Stoicism was to come to its real influence upon mankind. The Romans RIGORISM. 163 seemed to themselves to have realised the Stoic dream of a universal empire of Humanity, and in the " natural law " of the Porch they found a basis for their splendid juris- prudence. So powerfully did its stern ideal of life appeal to the characteristic " severitas " of the Roman mind, that Stoicism found at Eome a new life, and its finest achieve- ments are Eoman rather than Greek. It is, however, through the medium of Christianity that Stoicism has chiefly influenced the modern world. 3. The fundamental idea of Christianity is the idea of (&) Mod- . ern : (a) the divine Righteousness, with its absolute claim upon the Christian life of man. This idea was the inheritance of Christianity csm. from the Hebrews, but it was reasserted with a new emphasis and a new rigour. " Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." It is a righteousness not of external act or observance, but of the inner man, a righteousness of heart and will. And though the Founder of Christianity did not, by word or life, inculcate an ascetic ideal, but gave his ungrudging sanction to all the natural joys of life, his uncompromis- ing attitude towards unrighteousness meant inevitably, for himself and for his disciples, suffering, self-sacrifice, and death. The essential spirit of the Christian life is the spirit of the Cross. It is out of the death of the natural"" man that the spiritual life is born. " Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life." The way of the Christian life is the way of the Master, the way of utter self-sacrifice. " He that seeketh his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it." The natural life of 164 THE MOEAL IDEAL. sensibility is not in itself evil ; but it must be perfectly mastered and possessed by the rational spirit. If it " of- fends " the spirit's life and it may " offend " at any point it must be denied. " If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee : for it is better for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee : for it is pro- fitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." So exacting is the Christian ideal of righteousness. We know how this moral rigour of Christianity was developed by its disciples into an asceticism of life, in which the Stoic " apathy " was reproduced and given a new- ethical significance. Not to save himself from the attacks of a capricious and often evil Fate, but to save the spirit's life from the snares of the tempting Flesh, is man called upon to eradicate all desire. For the flesh, as such, is antagonistic to the spirit, and matter is essentially evil. The thought of this ethical dualism this home-sickness of the soul for the ideal world, whence it had fallen into this lower life of sense and time came to the Christian Church, as it had come to the Stoics, from Plato. To Plato all education had been a process of purification, a gradual recovery of what at birth man^ost, an ever more perfect " reminiscence " of the upper world. There is man's true home ; not here, in the cave of sensibility, the soul's sad prison-house. If this thought never took hold of the Greeks themselves, we know how potent it was with the Neo-platonists, and with the Mediaeval saints and mystics. The mediaeval world was a world of thought and aspira- RIGORISM. 165 tion, of " divine discontent " with the actual, an eternal world in which no room was found for the interests of time, a world of contemplation rather than of activity. Of this spirit the characteristic product was Monasticism, with its separation from the world, and its vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience. But Christian Asceticism did not pass away with the Middle Age. It survives not only in contemporary Catholicism, but, to a large extent, in the life of Protestantism as well. Christianity is still apt to be " other-worldly," to regard this life as merely a pilgrimage, and a preparation for that better life which shall begin with the separation of the spirit from the body of its humiliation, to regard Time as but " the lackey to Eternity," to think that here we have only the Preface, there the Volume of our life, here the Prelude, there the Music. Accounting his citizenship to be in the heavenly and eternal world, and preoccupied with its affairs, the Christian saint is apt to sit loose to the things of time, and to cultivate an aloofness and apathy of spirit no less real than that of Stoic sage or mediaeval monk. 4. The great modern representative, in ethical philoso- (p) Kantian phy, of the extreme or ascetic form of Rigorism is Kant, dentalism. the author of one of the most impressive moral idealisms of all time. For KanLiiie_zo_oil the only thing absolute and altogether good is the_goodjwill. And the good will is, for him, the rational will, the will obedient to the law of the universal reason. It is the prerogative of a rational being to be self-legislative. The animal life is one of heteronomy ; the course of its activity is dictated by ex-*" ternal stimuli. And if man had been a merely sentient 166 THE MORAL IDEAL. being, and pleasure his end, nature would have managed his life for him as she manages the animal's, by provid- ing him with the necessary instincts. The peculiarity of man's life is that he belongs to two spheres. As a sensible being, he is a member of the animal sphere, whose law is pleasure ; as a rational being, he enacts upon himself the higher law of reason, which takes no account of sensibility. Hence arises for him the Categorical Imperative of Duty the " Thou shalt " of the rational being to the irrational or sentient. As a rational being, man demands of himself a life which shall be reason's own creation, whose spring shall be found in pure reverence for the law of his rational nature. Inclination and desire are necessarily subjective and particular ; and in so far as they enter, they detract from the ethical value of the action. Nor do consequences come within the province of morality ; the goodness is determined solely by the inner rational "form" of the act. The Categorical quality of the imperative of morality is founded on the absolute worth of that nature whose law it is. A rational being is, as such, an end-in-himself, and may not regard himself as a means to any other end. He must act always in one way viz., so as to fulfil his rational nature ; he may never use his reason as a means by which to compass non-rational ends. The law of his life is : " So act as always to regard humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means." The moral law thus becomes for Kant the gateway of the noumenal life. As subject to its categorical impera- tive, man is a member of the intelligible or supersensible world the world of pure reason. From that higher KIGORISM. 167 vantage-ground, lie sees the entire empirical life disap- pear, as the mere shadow or husk of moral Eeality. As moral, he lives and moves and has his being in that noumenal world from which, as intellectual, he is for ever shut out. As he listens to the voice of Duty, and con- cedes the absolute and uncompromising severity of its claim upon his life, he "feels that he is greater than he knows" and welcomes it as the business of his life to appropriate his birth-right, and to constitute himself in- deed, what in idea he is from the first, a member and a citizen of the intelligible world. There too he finds the goodly fellowship of universal intelligence, and be- comes at once subject and sovereign in the kingdom of ; pure reason. 5. Such are the chief forms of Eigorism, in its extreme Criticism . , of Extreme type, and it is not difficult to see how the fundamental Eigorism, defects of such a view of life necessitated the transition to tSn to" 18 the more moderate form of the theory. The view rests Moderate - * upon an absolute psychological duajisj3i,_iiLJReaaQn^^Jid. Sensibility, of the rational and the irrational. Because reason differentiates man from the animal, and his life must therefore be a rational life, it is inferred that all the animal sensibility must be eliminated. The result is an intellectualising of the moral life, the identification of goodness with wisdom, of virtue with knowledge, of duty with rational consistency, of practical activity with phil- osophic contemplation. But this passionless life of reason is not the life of man as we know him. We_cannot sum- i marily dismiss the entire life of sensibility as irrational. If we do so, we lose the entire content of morality, and 168 THE MORAL IDEAL. what is left is only its empty form. It is notorious that the Kantian ethics are purely formal, giving us the sine qud non of the good life, but not the very face and lineaments of goodness itself. By identifying Will with Practical Eeason, and by demanding that the motive of all activity shall be found within reason, it provides the mere Form of will, a will that wills itself, a logical intel- lect rather than a good will. The ideal life of Plato and Aristotle is confessedly a purely intellectual or speculative life. But the flesh and blood of moral reality come from sensibility. It has been truly said that the movement of the real world is not " a ghostly ballet of bloodless cate- gories." No more is the movement of human life. In its dance, reason and sensibility must be partners, even though they often quarrel. Nay, their true destiny is a wedded life, in which no permanent divorce is possible. That feeling is simply the irrational, and incapable of becoming an element in the life of a rational being, is sheer mysticism ; and mysticism in Ethics is no less false than mysticism in Metaphysics. To deny the reality of any element of the real world, and to refuse to deal with \ it, that is the essence of mysticism. The very problem jof the moralist is set for him by the existence of this dualism of reason and sensibility in human nature, and by this alternative possibility, in human life, of guidance by feeling or guidance by reason. To eliminate or to disparage either element, to destroy the alternative moral possibility, is to cut the knot of life's great riddle rather than to unravel it. An implicit acknowledgment of this necessity of feeling, if the ends of reason are to take body and shape, and to RIGORISM. 169 find their actual realisation, is made by Kant when, after excluding all "pathological inclination," that is, all em- pirical sensibility, he brings back sensibility itself in the form of " pure or practical interest." 1 The moral law, he finds, demands for its_realisatipn_a spring or motive-force in sensibility ; only, the_feeling must be the^offspring of reason. The psychological distinction of reason and sensi- bility is, however, clearly admitted, as well as the ethical consequence that both must enter as factors into the life of Will. Plato and Aristotle may be said to make the same concession, in their description of ordinary " moral " or " practical " virtue as the excellence of the compound nature of man, mixed of reason and irrational sensibility. This life of feeling controlled by reason, they both seem to say, is the characteristic life of man, though the higher and divine life may be attained at intervals, and ought never to be lost sight of as the ideal. One phase of the problem seems to have been quite ignored by the school whose views we are considering namely, that it is through sensibility that we are delivered from ourselves, and find the way to that fellowship with mankind which the Stoics so impressively portray, and which Kant contemplates in his Kingdom of Ends. " Cool reason " is not a sufficient bond, we must fed our unity - with our fellows. Though reason is universal, the Ethics of pure Eeason are inevitably individualistic. The Stoic and the Kantian life the ascetic life, is essentially self-con- tained, is a life which withdraws into itself. Its dream *" of a kingdom of universal intelligence, of a City of God, of a communion of saints, remains for it a dream which 1 Cf. Dewey, ' Outlines of Ethical Theory/ 86. 170 THE MORAL IDEAL. can never be realised on earth. The bands that unite us with our fellows are bands of love ; reason, alone, is clear in its insight into the common nature and the common weal, but powerless to realise it. Kill out sensibility, and you not only impoverish your own life, but you separate ^ yourself from your fellows no less thoroughly than does the egoistic hedonist. We must say, therefore, that the Ethic of pure Eeason , is, no less than the Ethic of pnrp, Spmaihi"lif-,y ; a premature unification_of_haman life. The truejinity is the unity of the manifol^.; the true universal is the universal that contains and explains all the particulars ; the true a priori is the a priori which embraces the empirical. The sim- plification required is one which shall systematise and organise all the complex elements of our nature and our life, not one which is reached by the elimination of the complexity and detail. The rigoristic principle, like the hedonistic, is too simple. As well try to eliminate sensa- tion from the intellectual life, as sensibility from the moral. In the one case as in the other, the form of reason, without the content of feeling, is empty ; as the content of feeling, without the form of reason, is blind. The mere unity of reason is as inadequate to the concrete moral life as is the mere manifold of sensibility. The one provides a purely general ethical formula, as the other provides only the " data of ethics." Nor is self-sacrifice the last word of morality to any part of our nature. It is only a moment in the ethical life, one phase of its most subtle process, not its be-all and its end-all. The tru^Jife_^jLjnan_jnust be theJife_of RIGORISM. 171 the total, single self, rational and ^sentient,; the sentient^ self is to be sacrificed only as it opposes itself to the deeper and truer human self of reason. The sentient self is not, as such, evil or irrational, and it may be completely harmonised with the rational self. The ascetic ideal is thoroughly false and .inadequate, and must always be correcte^bj^^e^hedQriistic. It is not right that the ruddy bloom of youth and health should be all " sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," that the thrill of quickened life should be stilled and deadened to the stately march of reason in the soul, and that " apathy " and "impassibility" should take the place of the eager pulsing life of nature in the human heart. The spectacle of the world is always fresh and fascinating, and we should keep our eyes bright to see it. The music of life need never grow monotonous, and our ears should be alert to catch its strains. Life is life, and we should not make it a meditatio mortis. Its banquet is richly spread, and we should enjoy it with a full heart, nor see the death's head ever at the feast. Aloofness of spirit from the world and all its eager crowding human interests is not in the end the noblest attitude. The body is not to be thought of as the mere " prison-house of the soul," from which it must escape if it would live in its own element. Escape it cannot, if it would. The spirit and the flesh cannot cut adrift from one another ; each has its own lesson for its fellow. The way to all human goodness lies in learning "the value and significance of flesh." The passionless life of reason strikes cold and hard on the human heart. 172 THE MORAL IDEAL. " But is a calm like this, in truth, The crowning end of life and youth. And when this boon rewards the dead, Are all debts paid, has all been said ? Ah no, the bliss youth dreams is one For daylight, for the cheerful sun, For feeling nerves and living breath Youth dreams a bliss on this side death. It dreams a rest, if not more deep, More grateful than this marble sleep ; It hears a voice within it tell : Calm's not life's crown, though calm is well. 'Tis all perhaps which man requires, But 'tis not what our youth desires." 1 The Stoic and the Kantian view of life rests, as we have seen, upon a metaphysical idealism which finds no place for the reality of the sensible and phenomenal world. Such is the cleft between these two worlds that the one cannot enter into relation with the other, and withdrawal into the noumenal world of pure reason becomes the only path to the true or ideal life. The entire life of sensi- bility is disparaged and despised as shadowy and unreal, a dream from which we must awaken to moral reality. But such a transcendental idealism must always call forth the protest of a healthy moral realism. " The world and life's too big to pass for a dream." Nay, the advocate of sensibility will not hesitate to say that your world of pure reason is all a mystic dream, that moral reality is to be found in the fleeting moments and the pleasures and pains they bring, that he who has dulled his sensibilities, and lived the Stoic life of " apathy " to these, has missed life's only treasure. ThejOjrenaic argument for engross- 1 Matthew Arnold, "Youth and Calm." fllGORISM. 1*73 ment with the present is the same as the Stoic argument for apathy to it that the present is evanescent, and perishes with the using. If our idealism is to stand, it^ must contain realism within itself ; if the spirit is to live its own proper life, it can only be by annexing the territory of the flesh, and establishing its own order there. The necessity of this acknowledgment of the rights of sensibility and of the relative truth of the hedonistic interpretation of life has led to the more moderate statements of Eigorism or the Ethics of Eeason, which we find among both the Greek and modern moralists. J 6. Moderate rigorism is, one might say, the character- (B) Moder- istic Greek view of the moral life ; the Greek ideal is a fsm. 'fa)" life of rational sensibility. Such an ideal alone satisfies at once the intellectualism and the sensuousness of the national genius, its love of rational clearness and form, and of aesthetic satisfaction. The fact that the good is also for the Greeks the beautiful, and that the supreme category of their life is rather TO KaXov than TO ayaOov, carries with it the necessity that a life of reason divorced from sensibility could never prove satisfying. Their keen appreciation of the " things of the mind," of the purely scientific and philosophical interests, made it equally im- possible for them to rest content with a life of sensi- bility divorced from reason. It is not surprising, therefore, to find impressive and invaluable statements of the neces- sity of this ethical harmony in Greek philosophical litera- ture. We need only recall here Heraclitus' suggestions of that order, uncreated by gods or men, which pervades all things, of that " common wisdom " to which man ought 174 THE MORAL IDEAL. to conform his life, of those " fixed measures " which the Sun himself must observe " else the Erinnyes will find him out," of the universal " harmony of opposites " by which the process of things is made possible ; the Socratic life and teaching, with its perfect moderation, its firj^ev ayav, its reduction of the conduct of life to the discovery of the true " measure " of life's experience ; Plato's " harmony" of appetite and " spirit " with reason, and his picture of the soul as a well-ordered State in which Justice, the key to all the virtues, lies in the doing of its proper work by every element, and of the common weal that results from such a perfect division and co-operation ; and the Aristo- telian conception of Virtue as the choice of the Mean between the two extremes of excess and defect, of Happi- ness or Welfare as consisting in rational activity accom- panied by pleasure, of virtuous activity as essentially pleasant because habitual and easy, and thus finally of pleasure itself as the bloom and crown of the life of Virtue. (6) its 7. It is in modern philosophy, however, that the pressions. X " moderate version of Rigorism has received the greatest theory tlers attention and its most important development. Here it science' * s f am ^i ar to us under the name of Intuitionism, and the real founder of Intuitionism was Bishop Butler in his famous ' Sermons.' Butler's problem came to him from his predecessors of the seventeenth century. Hobbes, by his theory of the artificial and conventional char- acter of moral laws, by his resolution of " nature " into custom and contract, had given rise to several attempts to prove the directly rational and natural character of RIGORISM. 175 these laws. The mathematical moralists, Cud worth and Clarke, had sought to prove the " eternal fitness " of moral distinctions, their " immutable and eternal " nature, their mathematical necessity, their utter rationality. For them, as for the Stoics, morality was part of the " nature of things," and the bad was synonymous with the absurd or irrational. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, again, had contended for an immediate and unerring perception of moral distinctions, a " moral sense " of the beauty and deformity of actions. Butler, following on the whole the lead of the latter school, seeks to bring philosophy back to earth, and to find in the peculiar nature and constitu- tion of man the soil of all moral distinctions. In the little State of Mansoul, however, Butler finds, as Plato had already found, a principle which draws its right to rule from its community with the central principle of all things. The sum and substance of morality being contained in the maxim "Follow nature," the business of Ethics is to determine the true meaning of " human nature." In the determination of this, Butler uses to fine purpose Plato's figure of the State. A " system, economy, or constitution," is " a one or a whole, made of several parts," in such wise that " the several parts, even considered as a whole, do not complete the idea, unless, in the notion of a whole, you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other." Now, when we consider the various elements of human nature, we find that the most import- ant relation which they sustain to each other is precisely that relation which is most important in the civil economy viz., the relation of authority or right to rule. This 176 THE MORAL IDEAL. difference in authority, " not being a difference in strength or degree," Butler calls "a difference in nature and in kind." The supreme place in the hierarchy of natural principles belongs of right to the rational or reflective ; it is theirs to govern the unreflective, immediate, impulsive principles or " propensions." The chief of the reflective principles is Conscience. " There is a principle of reflec- tion in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions. We are plainly con- stituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in such degrees ; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience." Authority is " a constituent part of this reflex approbation " it is " implied in the very idea of reflex approbation ; " " you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency : ... to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it." "As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, various subordinations under one direction, that of the supreme authority, the different strength of each particular member of the society not coming into the idea ; whereas, if you leave out the subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose it. So reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing RIGORISM. in different degrees of strength, is not that idea or notion of human nature ; but that nature consists in these several principles considered as having a natural respect to each other, in the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a real part of our nature, but not the whole : add to these the superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon and vio- lated by power and strength prevailing over authority ; so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all." " Natural " action is, therefore, action proportionate to the nature of man as a whole, as a constitution or econ- omy ; or it is action prescribed by Conscience, as the su- preme regulative principle of the human constitution. The approval or disapproval of this Conscience, which makes man " in the strictest and most proper sense a law unto himself," is immediate or intuitive, and unerring. It " pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good ; others to be in themselves, evil, wrong, unjust." " Let any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong ? is it good, or is it evil ? I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue by almost any fair man in almost any circumstances." Butler recognises a second principle in human nature, . J 178 THE MOEAL IDEAL. which, since it also is reflective, has an equally authori- tative rank with Conscience namely, " cool " or " reason- able Self-love." Action in the line of Self-love is as " natural " as action in the line of Conscience. " If passion prevails over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural ; but if self-love prevail over passion, the action is natural. It is manifest that self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion. This may be con- tradicted without violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act conformably to man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern." The sphere of this second regulative principle is that of Prudence a part of the total sphere of Virtue, which is the empire of Conscience. " It should seem that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, in our language, it should seem that this is virtue, and the contrary be- haviour faulty and blameable ; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others." The ap- proval is as immediate in the one case as in the other. " The faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions and disapproves imprudent ones ; I say prudent and imprudent actions, as such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion." This principle of self-love " is indeed by no means the religious, or even moral, institution of life ; " but "prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice." As guides of conduct, " Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same RIGORISM. 179 way for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole ; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things." Under these two regulative principles conies the entire impulsive nature, which may be summarised in two main divisions the selfish and the benevolent, or, as we should say, the egoistic and the altruistic. " Mankind has vari- ous instincts and principles of action, as brute creatures have some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the community, and some most directly to private good." The latter may collectively be termed "passionate or sensual Selfishness," the former (passion- ate) Benevolence. Self-love, as " cool " or " settled " in its temper, and general in its range, is distinguished as well from Selfishness as from Benevolence, as well from pas- sionate and "particular" regard for self as from such passionate and " particular " regard for others. It follows that virtue consists neither in self-interest nor in dis- interestedness ; " the goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or dis- interested, may be applied to them any more than any other indifferent epithet." Hence, particularly, utility is not the ground of virtue. We judge actions to be good or bad, " not from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain, but from their being luliat they are viz., what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of the case requires, or the contrary." We are " constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice,- and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration 180 THE MORAL IDEAL. which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery." Butler can conceive " no more terrible mistake " than that " the whole of virtue consists in promoting the happiness of mankind, and the whole of vice in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness." Yet the only final justification or explanation of virtue is its reduction to self T interest. "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such ; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to our- selves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." Criticism 8. We thus find in Butler several lines of thought of Butler's i !' T/Y i /> -11 theory. which it is difficult, if not impossible, to harmonise with one another. He seems to be almost equally im- pressed by the interested and the disinterested sides of conduct, but to be more fully persuaded of the importance of its self-regarding than of that of its benevolent side. Virtue is not synonymous with Benevolence, but in a sense it is synonymous with Self-love. The latter is a reflective and reasonable principle of life; prudence and virtue are co-ordinate, if not coincident. In spite of the authority of Conscience, and the intrinsic quality of that rightness which it approves, Butler's morality is not dis- interested ; its raison d'etre is the individual happiness to which it leads. The " approval " or " disapproval " of Conscience is immediate and direct, independent of the consequences to which the action leads ; but the logical basis of this approval or disapproval is the bearing of the RIGORISM. 181 action upon the agent's happiness in the present and in the future. Though the approval of Conscience is im- mediate, and not the result of calculation, yet the course approved is always that of Self-interest. The authority of Conscience is, therefore, after all, not original, but secondary, derived from Self-interest. Butler's Conscience is in itself a merely formal principle ; and when he gives it content, that content is the content of Self-love.. Failing such an identification of Virtue with Prudence, of Conscience with Self-love, we have (1) no explana- tion of morality, no theory of virtue, but a mere psycho- logy of the moral life. And this is, in general, Butler's position. He is willing, in the main, to rest in the im- mediate and authoritative approval of Conscience, without investigating the object of its approval or the basis of its authority. Conscience is the regulative faculty in human nature, and virtue is that conduct which it dic- tates as fitting or natural to man. Even as a psycho- logical statement, we must dissent from Butler's artificial divorce between " act " and " consequence." Even psy- chologically, the action is not separated from its con- sequences, and judged to be " in itself " right or wrong ; the consequences reveal the nature of the action, and are themselves part of it. But we must advance beyond the psychological to the philosophical, or strictly ethical view ; we must investigate the why of Conscience's approval and disapproval, as also its right to approve and disapprove. (2) His refusal to identify Conscience with Self-love leads Butler to rest in an irreducible dualism of the spheres governed by these two principles respectively the spheres of Virtue and Prudence. For Conscience and 182 THE MORAL IDEAL. Self-love are at least co-ordinate in authority ; " the epi- curean rule of life," though not identical with the " moral/ 1 has its place alongside the latter. Eegard for one's " in- terest " or " good on the whole " is as legitimate as regard for the " right." This is Butler's way of modifying the rigorism of his rational standpoint ; he recognises the " reasonableness " of Self-love as a principle of conduct. But it is impossible thus to adjust the rival claims of Virtue and Prudence ; and Butler, when pressed, falls back, as we have seen, upon the old hedonistic device of resolving the virtuous into the prudential self. This dilemma is the result of his inadequate conception of virtue. The " right " must contain the " good," virtue prudence. Or rather, the true Moral Ideal must be the supreme Good, or simply the Good that Good which not only transcends all other goods but explains their goodness, and in undivided loyalty to which the moral being finds his perfect satisfaction. The true moral in- terest must be supreme, embracing and transcending, including and interpreting, all the interests of life. The mere suggestion of a " self " whose satisfaction or interest is still to seek after the moral task is done, is proof sufficient that that task has been inadequately conceived. The only way to make the various circles of our life's activities concentric, is by discovering their common centre. Finally (3) Butler's difficulty in reconciling Benevolence and Self-love arises from the same fundamental defect. If the self does not find its perfect satisfaction in the life of Virtue, neither, of course, will other selves find theirs ; and it is only because the self is thus inadequately RIGORISM. 183 conceived that the conflict of individual interests arises. It is the prudential, not the virtuous self which finds it necessary to compete with others for the " goods " of life, because its " interest " and theirs are mutually exclusive. If we would find deliverance from Hobbes's " war of every man against every man," we must learn to see how deeply winatural that warfare is. Again we must insist that, as the Good of human life is not conceived aright until it is seen to be a Good so complete that the indi- vidual has no " private " interests of his own apart from his participation in it, so it is not conceived aright until it is seen to be a Good so comprehensive that all individuals alike shall find in it their common good. 1 9. Contemporary Kigorism retains essentially the form (0) in which Butler stereotyped the theory. That his psycho- its diver- logical standpoint is still the standpoint of the school is f r m But- IfiET indicated by the term which it adopts to characterise its view viz., Intuitionism. That moral principles are directly and immediately recognised, that they are self- evident or axiomatic truths of reason, and that Conscience is the faculty of such immediate moral insight, all this is held in common by Butler and by the Scottish School of " Common-Sense.'' The absolute authoritativeness of these " first principles " of morality, and therefore of Conscience as the faculty which reveals them, is also common ground. But the Conscience of contemporary Intuitionism has a much narrower range than Butler's Conscience. The latter 1 Such a conception is perhaps suggested to us by Butler himself in his principle of the " Love of God," which seems to transcend both Conscience and Self-love. Cf. T. B. Kilpatrick, Introduction to Butler's 'Sermons.' 184 THE MORAL IDEAL. was a faculty of particular moral judgments or " percep- tions," which told the plain man unerringly and imme- diately the course of present duty " in almost any circum- stances." The contemporary Conscience is found unequal to this task. The historical sense has developed greatly since Butler wrote, and has forced us to acknowledge that the " human nature " which seemed to him. a constant and unchanging quantity is a growth, and, with it, its " virtue " and " vice," that the content of our particular moral judgments varies much with time and place and cir- cumstance, that these judgments are, in a very real sense, empirical judgments. The Intuitionist has accordingly been compelled either to acknowledge that Conscience, in Butler's sense of the term, is educated by experi- ence, and is dependent upon such " empirical instruction " for all the concreteness of its dicta, or so to narrow the meaning of the term Conscience as to make it the unerring faculty of general or " first " principles merely, and to attribute to the very fallible and empirically minded Judgment the application of these immutable principles to the variety of particular circumstances and cases as they arise. The latter alternative is the one chosen. The historical element in morality is carefully sifted from the unhistorical, the temporal and changeable manifestation from the eternal and unchanging essence. Morality is reduced to " simple " or ultimate ideas such as Justice, Temperance, Truthfulness ; these, it is claimed, have no history, and their a priori origin is the source of their absolute validity. its defects. The current intuitional doctrine is thus forced to sacri- fice all the concreteness and particularity which belonged RIGORISM. 185 to Butler's theory of Conscience. The uneducated Con- science, the " original " faculty, provides us with no more than the merest generalities or abstractions, which must be made concrete before they have any real significance. Moral life consists of particulars, of " situations," of def- inite circumstances and individual occasions; and an indeterminate or vague morality is no morality at all. Intuitionism, with its fixed and absolute principles of conduct, can find no place in its ethical scheme for the actual variation in moral opinion. What, for example, is the " equality " demanded by the principle of Justice ? Very different answers would be given to this question by different epochs of human civilisation, and by different communities in the same epoch. Make the conception concrete, and it is found to be a changing one; allow for the variation, and the general formula becomes a mere abstraction. It is the particulars and details of the moral life that are real ; our general moral conceptions or " principles " derive their reality from the particulars of which they are the " abstract " or transcript. Besides, the intuitive character of moral principles may be accounted for, as just suggested, by an empirical theory of morality. It may be shown that these principles are intuitive in the sense of being instinctive. To the indi- vidual in any age and country, the morality of that age and country (and even the particular modification of it in the atmosphere of which he has grown up) may be said to present itself as absolutely and immediately obligatory. The moral, like the intellectual consciousness of the nation and of the society to which he belongs is, some- how, focused and crystallised in the individual, who is 186 THE MORAL IDEAL. their " child." One might go. further, and say that the experience and education of the race itself is, in a sense, possessed by the individual, that the real education of Conscience is on a wider scale than the individual, and is what Lessing called an " education of the human race." The individual, as the child of the race, " the heir of all the ages " of its experience, accepts his inheritance, whether moral or intellectual, for the most part unquestioningly, and is only too content to " stand in the old paths." The absoluteness and originality of moral principles are there- fore, or may be, merely subjective. Objectively, morality is constantly changing ; and even the moral consciousness is found, when we regard it from without, to be changing too. The change in the one is correlative with the change in the other. All that is left, independent of experience, is a vague moral susceptibility or potentiality, which ex- perience alone can determine and define. In two respects, Intuitionism fails to satisfy the require- ments of an ethical philosophy. (1) It is a mere psychology of the moral consciousness. We may admit that moral intuitions are facts (though they have a history and are not original or simple), that they represent the subjective side of the Wliat of morality. But the philosophical question lies behind such facts ; it is the question of the Why of the facts. Certain moral principles, like certain intellectual principles, may be to us necessary and irresistible; but these characteristics do not, as such, tell us anything of the objective basis of the principles in question, anything of the nature of morality itself. They may be character- istic of our moral consciousness, and yet not be fit to stand as the criteria of moral value. The question which Hume RIGORISM. 187 raised with regard to the intellectual " intuitions " must also be raised with regard to the moral intuitions. Hume did not deny the " necessity " of the causal principle ; but he sought to resolve that necessity into its causes, showing that it might be entirely subjective, a feeling which was the product >i experience and custom, and had no objective validity. So the ethical question of the validity of moral principles, of their objective basis and explanation, is not answered by a psychological theory of their " necessity " or " universality." The real question of Ethics is not, as Intuitionists have stated, and answered it : How do we come to know moral distinctions ? but, What are these distinctions ? What is the Moral Ideal the single criterion which shall yield all such distinctions ? (2) Intuitionism is a mere re-statement, in philosophical I term's", of the ordinary moral consciousness. The several moral principles are conceived, as they are conceived by unreflective thought, as all equally absolute ; they are not reduced to the unity of a system. Short % of such unity, however, philosophy cannot rest. Further, what is " axio- matic " to Common-Sense is not axiomatic to philosophical reflection. The only axiom of ethical philosophy would be the rationality of the moral life ; but "it is for Ethics to exhibit its rationale. This philosophical articulation of the vague practical sense of mankind is possible only through a definition of the ethical End. But, taken even at its own profession, as a philosophy of " Common-Sense," Intuitionism is easily criticised. For, apart from its im- plicit Utilitarianism, Common-Sense admits exceptions of a large kind to the principles of conduct which it recog- nises. These principles are not to it more than high 188 THE MORAL IDEAL. generalisations, which have to be modified, temporarily or permanently, according to circumstances. As Professor Sidgwick has so convincingly shown, " the doctrine of Common-Sense is rather a rough compromise between con- , flicting lines of thought than capable of being deduced from a clear and universally accepted principle." l The morality of Common - sense is sufficiently definite for " practical guidance to common people in common circumstances ; " but " the attempt to elevate it into a system of scientific Ethics " is necessarily a failure. To fix and stereotype its principles, to conceive them as eternally and absolutely valid, is to construct a Common-Sense for mankind to suit a certain theory of it, rather than to interpret it impartially, as Intuitioiiism professes to do. Yet we must acknowledge that the Intuitionists have signalised an all-important truth, however they may have misinterpreted it. There is an absolute, an " eternal and immutable " element in morality. The fact that its history is a history of progress, and not of mere capricious varia- tion that there is an Evolution, a definite tendency, to be traced in the ethical process proves the presence and operation, throughout the process, of such an element. But that element lies deeper than individual moral laws or principles, deeper than any given form of moral practice ; for these are always changing. It is nothing less than the Moral Ideal itself. In virtue of the absolute claim and authority of the Ideal, its various changing expressions, the several so diverse paths along which, in different ages, in different circumstances, by different individuals, that Ideal can be reached and realised, derive a claim and 1 ' Methods of Ethics,' 347 (3d ed.) RIGORISM. 189 an authority as absolute as that of the Ideal itself. Their claim is its claim, their authority its authority. Nor is the individual's moral obligation in respect of these laws a whit less absolute than it would be if the pathway to the Ideal were fixed and unchangeable. This is the one path for him, here and now ; and in practice the question does not arise : " And what shall this or that man do, in this or that age, or country, or set of circumstances ? " but only, " What shall / do, in mine ? " But if we are to find the theoretic basis of this absolute and eternal obligation of morality, we must seek it not in the several moral laws themselves, but in the moral Ideal which underlies and gives meaning to them all. The Intuitional school can hardly be said to have done more than, by its insistence upon the Ought of moral life, upon the absolute signifi- cance of the distinction between right and wrong, to have emphasised the fact that there is such an absolute moral End or Ideal. The definition of that Ideal still remains as the task of ethical philosophy. 10. What, then, in sum, is the service of Eigorism to The service ethical theory ? sm |oeth- (1) It signalises the fundamentally important truth / cal theoiy ' that Eeason, rather than Sensibility, is the regulative principle in the life of a rational being. Only, it tends towards the extreme of saying that reason is the constitu- tive as well as the regulative principle, or that the life of man, as a rational being, must be a life of pure reason ; which is to miss the nerve of the moral life, and to identify it with the intellectual, to make man a Thinker only, and not a Doer. This, the characteristic error of Greek phil- 190 THE MORAL IDEAL. osophy, has reappeared in modern Eigorism, and notably in the ethics of Kant. (2) To the realistic interpretation of Hedonism, Eigor- ism opposes an idealistic view of morality. It signalises the notion of Duty or Obligation, the distinction between the Ought and the Is; or, in short, it asserts that the ethical End is, in its very nature, an Ideal, demanding realisation. It reaches, however, only the Form of the Moral Ideal. The content must come from sensibility, and for Sensibility, Eigorism, as the Ethics of Eeason, has no proper place. (3) The assertion, which is repeated again and again in the Eigorist school, of the dignity and independence of man as a rational being, is a sublime and momentous truth. Eor man rises out of nature, and has to assert his infinite rational superiority to nature. Goodness means the subjugation of nature to spirit. The good life is the rational life; the life of mere nature is, in a rational being, irrational. And it may well seem, in the great crises of the struggle, as if all else but the rational self were unworthy to live, and must absolutely die. Yet nature also has its rights ; and the moral life is not so entirely stern and joyless as Stoic and Kantian moralists would say. Even he who was called, by reason of phe greatness of his moral task, "a man of sorrows and ac- quainted with grief," had yet "his joy" the deep and abiding joy that comes of moral victory ; and, according to the measure of his faithfulness, each combatant may share that joy. 11. In Eigorism, therefore, no more than in Hedonism, RIGORISM. 191 do we find the final ethical theory. Eeason must indeed Transition be the governing power in the party warfare of the soul, monism." Without reason's insight, the moral life were impossible ; a rational self-mastery is the very kernel of morality. But such a true self-mastery is not effected by the with- drawal of Eeason from the fray, by its retreat within the sanctuary of peaceful thought and undisturbed philo- sophic meditation. This would be mere Quietism. Life is not thought or contemplation, but strenuous activity ; and the weapons of life's warfare are forged in the furnace of Sensibility, if the hand that wields them must be guided by the eye of Thought. We must either fight with these weapons, or give up the fight; for other weapons there are none in all the armoury of human nature. The inevitable confession of the abstractness of a pure Ethic of Eeason led, as we have seen, to the more mod- erate form of Eigorism, with its more or less grudging acknowledgment of the rights of Sensibility. The result was a transition from what we might call an abstract and negative ethical Monism to a concrete and positive ethical Dualism. The hedonistic principle, or the prudential maxim of life, since it can neither be eliminated nor annexed, is co - ordinated with the moral, rational, or virtuous principle. The only possibility of unifying these two principles would seem to be by reducing Virtue to Prudence; but this course would mean, from the stand- point of the theory, the disappearance of Virtue, as the reverse course had already been found to mean the dis- appearance of Prudence. The impossibility of a purely rational ethic is, however, most convincingly displayed -in the case of the extreme Eigorism of Kant. His final 192 THE MORAL IDEAL. appeal to Sensibility in the form of " practical interest," or " reverence," is closely parallel to the appeal to Eeason on the part of Hedonists like Mill and Professor Sidgwick. As the latter, hedonists or advocates of Sensibility though they are, are forced in the end to hold a brief for Eeason ; so is Kant, the arch-rationalist of modern Ethics, com- pelled at last to admit to his councils the despised Sensi- bility. The lesson of both events surely is, that neither in Hedonism nor in Eigorism, neither in the Ethics of Sensibility nor in the Ethics of Eeason, but in Eudaa- monism, or the Ethics of that total human Personality which contains, as elements, both Eeason and Sensibility, is the full truth to be found. 193 CHAPTEE III. EUMMONISM, OR THE ETHICS, OF PERSONALITY. 1. THE preceding discussion has revealed a fundamental dualism in ethical theory, corresponding to a fundamental ism. its theoretical dualism in the nature and life of man. The task which expression, now meets us is the solution of the problem raised by this dualism in ethical theory and practice ; but, before attempt- ing the execution of that task, it will be well to bring the two sides of the dualism into clear relief. Looking first at the theoretical side of the question, we have found the two comprehensive types of ethical theory to be the Ethics of Eeason and the Ethics of Sensibility. On the one hand, it has been felt, from the dawn of ethical reflection, that the true life of man must be a rational life. Eeason, it is recognised, is the differentiating attribute of man, distinguishing him from the animal or merely sentient being. At first, it is true, no cleft was perceived between the life of Eeason and the life of Sensibility. Even to Socrates, the proper life of man is one of sentient satis- faction, although it is essentially a rational life, the appro- priate life of a rational being. The Socratic life is a self- examined and a self-guided life ; the measure of sentient N 194 THE MORAL IDEAL. satisfaction is set by the reason which is the distinguish- ing attribute of man ; the criteria of goodness are self- mastery and self -consistency. The place of reason in the ethics of Socrates becomes evident in his central doc- trine of the supreme ethical importance of knowledge, of \the identity of knowledge and virtue, or human excellence. The wise man, or the man who, in the entire conduct of his life, follows the voice of reason, is the man who has attained the chief human Good. By Plato and Aristotle, more explicitly and absolutely than by Socrates, the secret of the good life is found in reason, and the life of sensi- bility is condemned as " irrational " (aXoyio-ntcov). Plato, in his doctrine of the #17409, recognises a secondary value in sensibility, but only in so far as it " shares in the rational principle," and is Eeason's " watch-dog." Aris- totle also recognises a higher and a lower virtue, a virtue which is the excellence of a purely rational being whose life is the life of reason itself, and a virtue which is the excellence of a compound nature like man's partly rational, partly irrational or sentient. B&t both -Plato and Aristotle, following in the footsteps of their common master, only going much farther than he had gone, find the ideal Good in the exclusive life of reason, the philosophic or contemplative life. To both, this is the Divine life, some participation in which is vouchsafed to man even now, and in the aspiration after which, as the eternal Ideal, he must seek to be delivered from the bondage of the lower world of sensibility. The Stoics did but accentuate this ascetic and ideal note, so prominent yet so surprising in the moral reflection of the Greeks, this " divine discon- tent " of the human spirit with its lot in the present and EUDJEMONISM. 195 the sensuous, this craving for a rational and abiding good behind the shows of sense and time, this sublime inde- pendence of all that suffers shock and change in mortal life. The Kationalism and Asceticism of modern ethics are little more than the echo of this ancient thought, that the only life worthy of a rational being is the life of reason itself. It is this thought that we have found working in the " mathematical " moralists, who seek to demonstrate the "absurdity" of the evil life; in their successors of the Intuitionist school, who maintain the " self-evidence " of moral law and the " self-contradiction " of moral evil ; and in Kant, the greatest of rationalists, to whom the " good will " is the will that takes as the maxim of its choice a principle fit for law universal in a kingdom of pure reason, and in whose eyes the slightest alloy of sen- sibility would corrupt the pure gold of the life of duty. On the other hand, the life of Sensibility has never been without its defenders, advocates wjio have shown no less enthusiasm ofl its behalf than their opponents have shown on behalf of Eeason. We have just noted the hedonistic element in the ethical teaching of Socrates. The im- portance of this element, neglected in the main by Plato, was signalised anew by Aristotle, who not only regarded the life of virtue as essentially a pleasant life, but saw in pleasure the very bloom and crown of goodness or well- being. The Epicureans among the Greeks and Eomans,. and the Hedonists among ourselves, have reversed the Aristotelian relation, and have made Keason the servant of Feeling, a minister to be consulted always, and listened to with respect and confidence, but still a minister only and not a ruler in the " party conflict of the soul." While 196 THE MORAL IDEAL. the interpretation of " Happiness " has varied so much that it might well have been the watchword of both schools, the hedonistic interpretation of it is always in terms of Pleasure, or of the life of Sensibility. But if we would find the perfectly consistent Hedonism, the thorough-going Ethics of Sensibility (corresponding to the Stoic and Kantian Ethics of Eeason), we must go back to the precursors of the Epicurean school, the early Cyrenaics. So complete is their confidence in Sensibility, that they surrender Eeason to it, or rather resolve Eeason into it. Sensationalists in intellectual theory, in ethics they are Hedonists. Since momentary feeling is the only moral reality, we must, if we would enjoy the Good of life, surrender ourselves to the pleasure of the moments as they pass. its prac- 2. This theoretical antinomy has its counterpart in the pression. practical life of man, and in the characteristic attitudes and moods of different ages, countries, and individuals in view of the actual business of life. Moral theory is the reflection of moral practice, and the interest of the high debate that has raged through all these centuries between the rival ethical schools has a practical and not a merely scientific, still less scholastic interest. Party-spirit runs high on the question of the Summum Bonum, for every man has a stake in its settlement, the stake of his own nature and destiny; and the side which each takes, in practice if not in theory, will be found to be the exponent of that nature, and the prophecy of that destiny. Let us look, then, for a moment at the practical expression of this fundamental ethical dualism. EUD^EMONISM. 197 It is not only in the philosophic schools, but in actual life, that we find the two moral types the Stoic and the Cyrenaic ; in all ages we can discern the rigorist, ascetic, strenuous temper of life from the impulsive, spontaneous, luxurious the Puritan from the Cavalier spirit, the Man of Eeason, cool and hard, from the Man of Feeling, soft and sensuous. We might perhaps call the two types the Idealistic and the Eealistic. In historical epochs, and in whole peoples, as well as in the individual life, the dis- tinction is illustrated. The Greeks were a sensuous people, but gradually the reason found the life of sen- sibility unsatisfying, and the Greek spirit took its flight to the supersensible and ideal to the world of pure reason. The result is found in Platonism, Stoicism, and Neo-Platonism. This mystic yearning after a satisfac- tion which the sensible world will not yield, this "home-sickness" of a rational being, is at the heart of Mediaeval Christianity, with its monastic life and its anxious denial of the flesh for the sake of the spirit's life. The Byronic temper represents the other extreme. Man regards himself as a creature of sensibility, of im- pulses, of enthusiasms and exaltations, of weariness and depression, a kind of mirror that reflects the changes of his life, or a high-strung instrument that vibrates in quick responsiveness to them all. The Realism of con- temporary fiction represents the same one-sided assertion of the rights of Sensibility, and the luxuriousness and material comfort of our modern life, the "practical" utilitarian spirit that threatens ideal aims, minister to the same result. But the two forces are always present and in conflict. 198 THE MOKAL IDEAL. Attempts 3. Each of these sides of our nature has its rights, just dilation, because both are sides of our nature, and, as Aristotle said, "life" and "virtue" must be in terms of "nature." In actual life, we find either the sacrifice of one to the other, or a rough and ready, more or less successful, compromise between their rival interests. The task of ethical philoso- phy, as it is the task of the moral life itself, is the recon- ciliation of these apparently conflicting claims the full recognition both of the rights of Eeason and the rights of Sensibility, and their reduction, if possible, to the unity of a common life governed by a single central principle. This task of reconciliation was attempted long ago by Plato, who, after condemning sensibility as " irrational," yet described virtue as essentially a "harmony" of all man's powers, a complete life in which every part of the nature, the lowest as well as the highest, should find its due scope and exercise, all in subjection to the supreme au- thority of reason. Aristotle, too, though he reasserted the Platonic distinction of the " rational " and " irrational," conceived of man's well-being as a full-orbed life, which, while it was " in accordance with right reason," embraced sensibility as well. The same kind of reconciliation has been attempted in modern times, only in view of a deeper realisation of the width of the cleft than the Greek con- sciousness had attained. Hegel, in particular, has sought, in the ethical as in the metaphysical sphere, to correct the abstractness and formalism of the Kantian theory, by vindicating the rights of sensibility, and harmonising them with the rights of reason, which Kant had so exclusively maintained. As, in the intellectual sphere, Hegel attempts to vindicate the rights of sensation and to demonstrate the K EUD^MONISM. 199 essential identity of sensation and thought, so, in the ethical sphere, he seeks to prove the essential rationality of the life of sensibility. In both spheres he offers a con- crete content for the abstract and barren form of the Kantian theory, for he holds that in both spheres "the real is the rational." This reconciliation has been so clearly and impressively set forth by the late Professor Green in his ' Prolegomena to Ethics ' that it is needless to reproduce it here. But, in order that the reconciliation may be successful, the conflict must first be felt in all its* ' intensity ; and if the ancient moralists tended to exag- gerate the sharpness of the dualism, the modern disciples of Hegel may perhaps be said to underestimate it. In that life of Sensibility which the ethical rationalists had condemned as the " irrational," the Hegelian idealist sees the image and superscription of Keason. Are not both interpretations a trifle hasty and impatient ? Were it not better to follow the workings of the moral life itself, and see there how the antithesis is pressed until it yields the higher synthesis ? If, even in the intellectual life of man, there is labour, the " labour of the notion," still more so is there in the moral life ; and an adequate ethic must take account of, and interpret, this labour. The defect of the Hegelian interpretation of morality is, that it is not faith- ful enough to the Hegelian method of dialectical progress through negation to higher affirmation. The " Everlasting Nay " must be pressed to the last, before we can hear the "Everlasting Yea" of the moral life. The solu- 4. In Christianity we find the antithesis at its sharpest, tion of It is just because Christianity recognises, and does full tianity. 200 THE MOEAL IDEAL. justice to, both sides of our nature, and because it asserts with a unique emphasis the conflict between them, that its interpretation of human life has been felt to be most adequate. The Greek ideal was one of Moderation or the Mean, a " measured" sensuous life. Christianity widens the breach between the spirit and nature, between the mind and the flesh, widens it that at last it may be overcome. The rights of the spirit are emphasised to the negation (in comparison with them) of the rights of the flesh. The flesh must be crucified, the natural man must die, the old man must be put off. The result is such a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, between the " two men " in each man, that the victory seems uncer- tain, and the bitter cry is wrung from the weary wrestling spirit : " wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? " But this widening of the moral breach is the necessary first step in the life of good- ness. The ascetic note is the primary and fundamental one, self-sacrifice must precede and make possible self- fulfilment, the moral life is mediated by death. For man rises out of nature, and must assert his superiority to nature, as a spiritual or rational being. That it may guide and master sensibility, reason must first assert itself to the negation of sensibility. The true self is rational and spiritual, and that it may live, the lower, fleshly, sen- suous self must die. Only through this " strait gate " is the entrance to the pathway of the spirit's life. But Christianity is no merely ascetic or mystic system. It does breed in its disciples a profound sense of dis- satisfaction with the actual life, it does lead to the dis- paragement of nature and sensibility ; but it does so just EUDJ^MONISM. 201 because it inspires in them the conviction of an ideal of which the actual for ever falls short, and shows man how much more and greater he is than nature. The sunny gladness of the Pagan spirit had to be darkened by the shadow of this prophetic discontent ; but a new gladness came with Christianity. There can be no literal " re- naissance " or re-birth of Paganism. The spiritual his- tory of man does not repeat itself, there is no return to former stages of moral experience. The human spirit has been born anew, and has learned in Christianity lessons about its own dignity and task and destiny which it can never more unlearn. And in view of the fundamental lesson of Christianity, of the infinite, eternal, and divine worth of the human spirit, it may well seem as if all else were unworthy to live, and must absolutely die. The good life is a rational life, a life in which reason, the 1 same in God and man, must guide and be master. Yet nature has its rights, though they are not independent of' the supreme rights of the spirit ; and Christianity recog-*^ nises the rights of nature. For each there is a crown of joy, though the way to it lies through the pain and toil and death of the Cross. As in the victorious march of the Eoman arms, the vanquished territory of " nature " is not ravaged and laid waste ; the conquering reason an-' nexes nature ; the kingdom of nature and " the flesh " becomes the kingdom of the rational spirit. The whole man is redeemed from evil to goodness ; the " old " be- comes " new." There is a re-birth of the entire being ; nothing finally dies, it dies only to "rise again" to its true life. All lives in the new, transfigured, spiritual life ; all becomes organic to the one central principle, an ele- 202 THE MORAL IDEAL. ment in the one total life. The " world * becomes part of the " kingdom of God." All other, separate and rival, in- terests die, because they are all alike superseded, tran- scended, and incorporated in this one interest. Nay, the individual self, in so far as it insists upon its separate and exclusive life, upon its own peculiar and private interests, must die. The " world " is indeed just the sphere of this narrow selfish self, and both together must be super- seded. " It is no more I that live." But the narrow and selfish self dies that the larger and unselfish self may live. Only he that so loseth his life shall truly find it. All this is symbolised in Christianity in the incarna- tion, death, and resurrection of its Founder. The idea of Incarnation the root-idea of Christianity is a splendid and thoroughgoing protest against the ascetic view of Matter as in its very essence evil, a mere prison-house of the soul, to be escaped from by the aspiring spirit, some- thing between which and God there can be no contact or communion any more than between light and darkness. Christianity sees in matter the very vehicle of the divine revelation, the transparent medium of the spiritual life, the great opportunity for the exercise of virtue. "The Word was made Flesh." 'O Ao709 adpj; eyevero. Nor, in word or life, does Jesus suggest any aloofness of spirit from the things of this world, any withdrawal from its affairs, as dangerous to the soul's best life, any superi- ority to its most ordinary avocations. " The Son of Man came eating and drinking," sharing man's common life, and realising the divine ideal in it. Even so, by his lowly and willing acceptance of human life in the entirety EUD^MONISM. 203 of its actual relations, did he transfigure that life, by turn- ing to divine account all its uses and occasions, by making of each an element in the life of goodness. This trans- figuration of human life was no single incident or crisis in the career of Jesus ; men did not always see it, but his life itself was one continuous Transfiguration. Nay, the life of goodness always is such a transfiguration ; every- thing is hallowed when it becomes the vehicle of the divine life in man, nothing is any more common or un- clean. Yet the persistent holding to the ideal good of this earthly life means suffering and death ; only so can the earthly nature become the medium of the divine. There are always the two possibilities for man, the lower and the higher; and that the higher may be realised, the lower must be denied. "From flesh into spirit man grows;" and the flesh has to die, that the spirit may live. The eager, strenuous spirit has to crucify the easy, yielding flesh. But the good man dies only to live again ; his death is no clef eat, it is perfect victory victory signed and sealed. From such a death there must needs be a glorious resurrection to that new life which has been purchased by the death of the old. 5. The conclusion to which we are forced by the facts' The eth- of the moral life is, that the true and adequate interpreta- lem : the tion of it must lie, not in the exclusive assertion of either seif-reai- side of the dualism, but in the discovery of the relation of the two sides to one another. In order to the statement of this relation, we must have recourse to a fundamental principle of unity. In other words, we are led to consider the meaning of Self-realisation. 204 THE MORAL IDEAL. As the watchword of Hedonism may be said to be Self- satisfaction or Self-gratification, and as that of Eigorism is apt to be Self-sacrifice or Self-denial, so the watchword of Eudaemonism may be said to be Self-realisation or Self- fulfilment. It seems, however, almost a truism to say that the End of human life is Self-realisation. The aim and object of every living being, of the mere animal as well as of man nay, of the thing as well as the animal and the person may be described as Self-preservation and Self-development, or in the single term Self-realisa- tion. In a universe in which to " exist " means to " struggle," self - assertion, perseverare in esse suo, may be called the universal law of being. Moreover, every ethical theory might claim the term " Self-realisation," as each might claim the term " Happiness." The question is, What is the " Self " ? or Which Self is to be realised ? Hedonism answers, the sentient self ; Rigorism, the ra- tional self ; Eudaemonism, the total self, rational and sen- tient. The ethical problem being to define Self - realisation, is, therefore, in its ultimate form the definition of Self- hood or Personality. When we wish to describe the characteristic and peculiar End of human life, we must either use a more specific term than Self-realisation, or we must explain the meaning of human Self-realisation by defining the Self which is to be realised. And since man alone is, in the proper sense, a " self " or " person," we are led to ask, What is it that constitutes his personality, and distinguishes man as a " person " from the so-called animal or impersonal self ? The basis of his nature being animal, how is it lifted up into the higher sphere of human personality ? EUDJEMONISM. 205 6. Self-hood cannot consist in mere Individuality ; for Definition , T . ^T^. of Person - the animal, as well as the man, is an individual self a'aiity: the self that asserts itself against other individuals, that and the excludes these latter from its life, and struggles with them for the means of its own satisfaction. Man is a self in this animal sense of self -hood ; he is a being of impulse, a subject of direct and immediate wants and instincts which demand their satisfaction, and prompt him to struggle with other individuals for the means of such satisfaction. These impulsive forces spring up in man as spontaneously as in the animal, their " push and pull " is as real in the one case as in the other. And jif might were right, these forces in their total workings/ would constitute the man, as they seem to constitute tne animal ; and the resultant of their operations would be the only goal of the former, as of the latter life. But might is not right in human life ; it is this distinction that constitutes morality. As the Greeks said, man is called upon to " measure " his impulses in Temperance or Moderation lies the path to his self-fulfilment ; and the " measure " of impulse is found in " right reason." That is to say, man, as a rational being, is called upon to bring impulse under the law of the rational self ; man is a rational animal. Butler and Aristotle agree in their definition of " human nature " and in their view of human life. In Aristotle's opinion that which differentiates man from other beings is his possession of reason, and the true human life is a life " according to right reason. " The distinctive characteristic of man, according to Butler, is that he has the power of " reflecting " upon the immediate animal impulses which sway him, and of viewing them, one and all, in relation to a 206 THE MORAL IDEAL. permanent and total good. In this critical and judicial " view " of the impulsive and sentient life, consists that Conscience which distinguishes man from the animal crea- tion, and opens to him the gates of the moral life, which are for ever closed to it. It is this Self - consciousness, this power of turning back upon the chameleon - like, impulsive, instinctive, sentient or individual self, and gathering up all the scattered threads of its life in the single skein of a rational whole, that constitutes the true Self-hood of man.. This higher and peculiarly human Self-hood we shall call Personality, as distinguished from the lower or animal self -hood of mere Individuality; and, in view of such a definition of the Self, we may say that Self-realisation means that the several changing desires, instead of being allowed to pursue their several ways, and to seek each its own good or satisfaction, are so correlated and organised that each becomes instrumental to the fuller and truer life of the rational human self. This power of rising above the impulse of the moment, and of viewing it in the light of his rational self-hood ; this power of transcending the entire impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life, and of regarding the self which is but the " bundle of impulses " as the servant of the higher rational self, is what makes man (ethically) man. It is this endowment that con- stitutes Will. We do not attribute Will to the animal, because, so far as we know, it cannot, as we can, arrest the stream of impulsive tendency, but is carried off on the back ' of present impulse. That is a life " according to nature " for it ; in such a life it realises the only " self " it has to realise. But man, as we have seen, can take the EUD^MONISM. 207 larger view of reason, and can act in the light of that better insight. It is given to him to criticise the im- pulsive " stream," to arrest and change its course, to sub- due the lower, animal, natural self to the higher, human, rational self ; to build up out of the plastic raw material of sensibility, out of the data of mere native disposition, acted upon by and reacting upon circumstances or " envi- ' ronment," a stable, rational character. We do not attri- , bute "character" to the mere animal; its life is a life - of natural and immediate sensibility, unchecked by any thought of life's meaning as a whole. In its life there is no conscious unity or totality. But for man, the rational animal, the natural life of obedience to immediate sensi- bility is not a " life according to nature," according to his higher and " proper" nature as man. All his natural tendencies to activity, all the surging clamant life of natural sensibility, has to be criticised, judged, approved or condemned, accepted or rejected, by the higher insight of reason which enables him to see his life in its meaning as a whole. His life is not a mere struggle of natural tendencies ; he is the critic, as well as the subject, of such A promptings ; and it is as critic of his own nature that he is master of his own destiny. Just in so far as he makes impulse his minister, as he is master of impulse, or is mastered and defeated by it, does man succeed or fail in the task of Self-realisation. 7. Thus interpreted, the business of Self-realisation The ration- might be described as a work of moral synthesis. Since sonai^sSf : the time of Kant, Epistemology has found in rational Actual and synthesis the fundamental principle of knowledge. Green ethlcal 208 THE MORAL IDEAL. functions has elaborated the parallel, in this respect, between know- ledge and morality, and shown us the activity of the rational Ego at the heart of both. Professor Laurie, in his conception of " Will-reason," has also emphasised the identity of the process in both cases. The task of the rational Ego is, in the moral reference, the organisation of Sensibility, as, in the intellectual case, it is the organisation of Sensation. Impulses and feelings must, like sensations, be " challenged " by the Self, criticised, " measured," and co-ordinated or assigned their place in the Ego's single life. The insight of reason is needed for this work of organisation or synthesis, as Plato and Aristotle saw. As, in the construction of the percept out of the sensation, the Ego recognises, discriminates between, selects from, and combines the sensations pre- sented, and thus forms out of them an object of know- ledge ; so, in the construction of the End out of the impulse, we find the same recognition, discrimination, selection, and organisation of the crude data of sensi- bility. Only through this synthesis of the manifold of sensibility, through this reduction of its several elements to the " common measure " of a single rational life, can the Ego constitute for itself moral ends, and a supreme End or Ideal of life. Following the cue of the epistemological parallel, we find that Hedonism in Ethics rests upon the same kind of psychological " atomism " as that which forms the basis of the sensationalistic or empirical theory of know- ledge. Hedonism rests upon the " atomism " of the sep- arate individual feeling or impulse, as Sensationalism rests upon the " atomism " of the separate individual EUD^MONISM. 209 sensation. A thorough - going empiricism, whether in ethics or in epistemology, fails to see the need of rational synthesis or " system." The empiricist seems to think that the " atoms " of sensation or of sensibility will mass themselves, he endows them with a kind of dynamical property. And it is true that sensibility, like sensation, already contains within itself a kind of synthesis, that there is a certain continuity in the sentient as in the sensational life ; that each is to be regarded rather as a " stream " than as the several links of a " chain " not yet in existence. But this elementary synthesis must be supplemented in either case by the higher and completer synthesis of reason, if we would pass from the level of the animal to the higher level of human life. Feeling gives a " fringe " or margin, narrower or broader, but " system " comes with Eeason. The answer of Kant to epistemological Empiricism may therefore be extended to ethical Empiricism. Psychology itself suggests the Kantian answer, and helps us to cor- rect it. Feelings and impulses are not, any more than sensations, separate and atomic, but, even in their own nature, they form parts in the continuous " stream " of the mental life. But the life of feeling and impulse, as a whole, is " loose " or " separate," and has to be " apper- ceived," * or made an element in the life of the rational Ego. The dualism of reason and sensibility is very real. The life of the spirit is never smooth and easy, like the _ life of nature ; there is always opposition, an intractable " matter " to be subdued to spiritual " form." And the labour and effort of the spirit is greater, the " matter " 1 In the Kantian sense of that term. 210 THE MORAL IDEAL. is more intractable, and the struggle with it harder, in the moral than in the intellectual life. The sen- 8. But while we thus extend to the ethical life the individual transcendental or Kantian answer to empiricism, we must be careful not to go to the other extreme, and lose the truth of Hedonism. Ethical, like intellectual empiricism, contains an important truth. Adopting Kant's termino- logy, we may say that ethical Personality constitutes itself through the subsumption of the empirical or sentient Ego, by the transcendental or rational Ego. Neither in the life of the empirical Ego alone, as the Hedonists maintain, nor in that of the transcendental Ego alone, as the ethical Eationalists maintain, but in the relation of the one to the other, or in the " synthetic unity of Apperception," does morality consist. We must conserve the real, as well as the ideal, side of the moral life. The error of transcendentalism whether Kantian or Hegelian is that it sacrifices the real (ethically as ontologically) to the ideal, that it sublimates the life of feeling into the life of reason. This is precisely the error of the ancient Greek moralists, the error of sacrificing the moral life, with all its concrete reality of living throbbing human sensibility, on the altar of intellect or cool philosophic reason. We must insist that the Person is always an In- dividual ; his personality acts upon, and constitutes itself out of, his individuality. The doctrine of the abstract universal, of pure rational self -hood, or form without content, is no less inadequate than the doctrine of the abstract particular, of mere individual sensibility, of con- tent without form. In the moral as in the intellectual EUD^EMONISM. 211 sphere, the " real " is concrete, the universal in the par- ticular, such a unity of both as means the absolute sacri- fice of neither. Such a " moral Eealism " at once recog- nises the truth of Idealism (Kantian or Hegelian) and supplements it by a more adequate interpretation of ethical fact. For, morally as intellectually, "the indi- vidual alone is the real." 9. The key to the ethical harmony, then, is: Be #"BeaPer- Person constitute, out of your natural Individuality, the true or ideal self of Personality. The difference be- tween the life of man and that of Nature is, that while nature is under law, man has to subject himself to law. The law or order is, in both cases, the expression of reason; but the reason which shows itself in nature as- Force, shows itself in man as Will. "Will is the power of self-government which belongs to a rational being, or, as Kant said, "practical reason." For, while the entire life of man is permeated by feeling, and may even be regarded as the outcome and expression of feeling, the Law of that life, the Law of feeling itself, is found not in feeling, but in reason. Feeling must become organic to reason, the life of the former must become an element in the life of the latter, not vice versd. For feelings do not control themselves, as Mill said the "higher" control the "lower," and as Spencer says the " re - representative " control the " representative," and they in turn the " presentative." The " represen- tative " or " higher " feelings have not, gud feelings, any authority over, or superiority to, the " presentative " or "lower." It is the rational Self which interprets 212 THE MOEAL IDEAL. all feelings by its self - reference, or by its synthetic activity upon them, and which, by such self-reference, makes them "higher" and "lower," assigns to each its place and value. Here we find the true " Autonomy " of the moral life. The Law of his life, the criterion of the manner and the measure of the exercise of each impulse, is the proper " nature " or rational Self -hood of the man. He cannot, without ceasing to be man, abjure this function of Self- legislation, or cease to demand of himself a life which shall be the fulfilment of his true and characteristic nature as man. Virtue is not a spontaneous growth, still less an original endowment, of Nature. Man has to! constitute himself a moral Person : slowly and laboriously, out of the raw material of individual feeling and impulse, he has to raise the structure of ethical manhood. We have seen that, even in the animal life, there is an organ- isation of impulse ; but we regard it as the result of in- stinct, because it is not self-planned and self-originated, as in man's case, who can say " A whole I planned." It is the privilege and dignity of a rational being to have the ordering or systematising of impulse in his own hands, to construct for himself the order and system of reason in the life of sensibility. For, as Aristotle truly said,, nature gives only the capacity, and the capacity she gives is rather the capacity of acquiring the capacity ! of virtue, than the capacity of virtue itself. The best reward of virtue is the capacity of a higher virtue ; " as it is by playing on the harp that men become good harpers, so it is by performing virtuous acts that men become virtuous, and as at a race it is not they who EUD^EMONISM. 213 stand and watch, but they who run, who receive the prize," so is the life of virtue rewarded with the crown of a future that transcends its past. 10. But the course of true virtue, like that of true love, " Die to never did run smooth. Its path is strewn with obstacles, Meaning of . , . ,, . -,-,. , T . i " Self-sao and its very life consists, as Fichte perceived, in the rifice." struggle to overcome them. The subjection of the indi- vidual, impulsive, sentient self to the order of reason is a Herculean taski The immensity, the infinity, of the task is not indeed to be misinterpreted, as if sensibility were a surd that cannot be eliminated from the moral life. Sen- sibility is not to be annihilated in that case the moral task would be an impossible and futile one but co- ordinated or harmonised with the rational nature, made the vehicle and instrument of the realisation of the true or rational self. But this co-ordination is also a sub- ordination ; sensibility must obey, not govern. Here we find the relative truth of Asceticism, and the deeper truth of the Christian principle of Self-sacrifice. The higher or] personal self can be realised only through the death of/ the lower or individual self, as lower and merely indi4 vidual. In its separateness and independence, the sentientl self must die; for there may not be two lives, or two selves. Individuality must become an element in the life of personality. I must die, as an individual subject of sensibility, if I would live as a moral person, the master of sensibility. I must crucify the " flesh " (the Pauline term for the "natural," impulsive, and sentient or uii- moralised man), if I would live the life of the spirit. I must lose my lower life, if I would find the higher. With 214 THE MORAL IDEAL. the Law of the rational spirit comes the consciousness, and the fact, of sin or moral evil that is, of subjection to mere animal sensibility ; this condemnation, by reason, of the life that is not brought into subjection to its Law is a condemnation unto death. But as the life of the lower is the grave of the higher self, so from the death of the lower comes forth, in resurrection glory, the higher and true Self. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Each selfish impulse (and all impulses, even the benevolent, are selfish, in the sense that each seeks " its own," and disregards all other claims) must be denied, or brought under the Law of the life of the total ' rational self. The " Everlasting Nay " of such self-sacri- fice precedes and makes possible the " Everlasting Yea " of a true self-fulfilment. The false, worthless, particular, private, separate self must die, if the true self, the rational Personality, is to live. I have said that this struggle, with its pain and death, precedes the joy and peace of the higher life. But the sequence is logical rather than chronological ; for in truth the process of death is always going on, simultaneously with the process of life, or rather death and life are two constant elements negative and positive in the life of virtue as we know it. Even the good man " dies daily," daily crucifies the flesh anew. Daily the " old " or " nat- ural man " is being " put off," and the " new " or " spiritual man" "put on." There is a daily and hourly death of nature, and a daily and hourly new birth and resurrection of the spirit. As in the life of a physical organism, disin- tegration mediates a higher integration. La vie c'est la EUD^MONISM. 215 mort. 1 Always, therefore, there is pain ; but always be- neath the pain, in the depths of the moral being, there is a joy stronger and more steadfast even than the pain, in the assurance that " old things are passing away, and all things are becoming new." For " the inward man is being renewed day by day," and, in the joy of that renewal, all the " pity " of the pain and sorrow that make it pos- sible sinks out of heart and mind, or lends but a deeper and a graver note to the joy which it has purchased and made possible. So ever with the negative goes the posi- tive side of the ethical life. The spirit has ever more room and atmosphere, and its life becomes richer and fuller; as the flesh becomes a willing instrument in its hands, it finds continually new and higher ends for which to use it. And the goal of the moral life, the ideal after which it \ strives, is a spontaneity and freedom and " naturalness " 7 like that of the life of original impulse. As Aristotle said, virtue is first " activity " (Ivepyeui), then " habit " (ef^) ; \ evepyeua leads to SvvajjLis, the originally indefinite poten- tiality the potentiality of either vice or virtue, becomes a definite capacity for virtue in the established character of the good man. This " second nature," which makes virtue so far easy, is virtue's best reward. There is all the difference in the world between the mere " rigorist " or negatively good man, who thinks out his conduct, whose life is a continual repression, and the positively good man, who knows the expulsive power of a new affection, whose goodness seems to bloom spontaneously, like the flower, 1 Cf. Professor Royce's article on " The Knowledge of Good and Evil " (' International Journal of Ethics,' Oct. ] 893). 216 THE MOEAL IDEAL. with a life that, " down to its very roots, is free." The one life is stiff, stereotyped, artificial; the other breathes of moral health, and commends goodness to its fellows. "Pleasure" 11. Such a complete moral life we have called Self- P?ness." ap realisation or Self -fulfilment. We might have called it by Aristotle's name of Happiness, and thus reclaimed the word from the exclusive possession of the Hedonists. Only, in that case, we must distinguish, as Aristotle did, between Happiness and Pleasure. The name contains a reference to pleasure, but pleasures, even in their " sum/' do not constitute Happiness. Happiness is not the sum or aggregate of pleasures, it is their harmony or system. The distinction between Happiness and Pleasure, even within the sphere of feeling, could hardly be better stated than by Professor Dewey : 1 " Pleasure is transi- tory and relative, enduring only while some special activ- ity endures, and having reference only to that activity. Happiness is permanent and universal. It results only when the act is such a one as will satisfy all the interests of the self concerned, or will lead to no conflict, either present or remote. Happiness is the feeling of the whole self, as opposed to the feeling of some one aspect of self." As Misery or Unhappiness is not pure pain, or even a balance of pain over pleasure, but lies in the discord of pleasures, so Happiness lies in the harmony of pleasures, or in the reference of each to the total Self. Happiness is, in a word, the synthesis of pleasures. And, since pleasure is the concomitant of activity, Happiness, or the synthesis and harmony of pleasures, depends upon and is 1 'Psychology,' 293. EUDJSMONISM. 217 constituted by the synthesis of activities, and ultimately by that supreme activity of " moral synthesis " which we have been considering. We thus ascertain the true place of feeling in the life of goodness, and the truth of He- donism as ethical theory. "We may regard pleasure, with Aristotle, as the bloom of the virtuous life, as the index and criterion of moral progress. The End of life is neither to know nor to feel, but to be. The life of man's^ total Self- / hood is its own End, a doing which is the expression of being, and the medium of higher and fuller being, of a deeper and richer unity of thought and sensibility. In so far as we attain that end, we learn to " think clear, feel deep, bear fruit well." The life of Personality is, in its very essence, a completely satisfying life. " Resolve to be thyself ; and know, that he Who finds himself, loses his misery." 12. This interpretation of Self-realisation enables us to Egoism and co-ordinate and unify not merely the several elements of the individual life, but also the several individual lives. Since each is not a mere individual, but a person, in the '. common personality of man is found the ground of the conciliation and harmony of the several individual lives. As Kant put it, each being, in virtue of his rationality, an end-in-himself, and each self-legislative, there is found a common Law : " So act as if thou couldst will the prin- ciple of thine act law universal." Every other Person is, as a Person, an end-in-himself, equally with me ; my atti- tude to him must therefore be essentially the same as my attitude to myself. The Law or Formula that expresses both his life and mine is that we are to be regarded 218 THE MORAL IDEAL. (whether by ourselves or by one another) always as ends, never as merely means or instruments. He cannot, any more than I, accept a law which does not find its sanction in his own nature as a rational self. Here we find a com- mon ground and meeting-place : however we may differ in our individuality, yet in our deepest nature or in our rational personality we are the same. We are the same in the Form of our nature, and therefore in the Law of our life, however diverse may be its content. When we submit ourselves to the common law of Per- sonality, we cease to be a number of separate, competing or co-operating, individuals ; we together constitute a society, a " system " or " kingdom of ends." Individuality separates us ; personality unites us with our fellows. It is as persons that we are fellows. The only strictly com- mon or social Good is a personal Good the Good of Persons. The hedonistic or sentient Good is subjective and individual the good of the feeling subject or individ- ual. The common Good must be the product of reason, not as excluding feeling, but as containing its regulative form and law ; of personality, as including and domi- nating individuality. Here, in the general as in the individual case, we find the clue to the harmony and co-ordination of sensibility. Feeling, being made organic to rational personality in each, comes under the wider as well as under the narrower law. Since man cannot, as a rational person, separate himself from his fellows, and shut himself up in his own individual being, he cannot do so even as a sentient individual, or as a subject of sensi- bility. For he is not two selves but one ; his personality has annexed his individuality. This is the real unity and EUD^EMONISM. 219 solidarity of mankind. We are joined to one another, and breathe the same atmosphere, in the deeper things of the rational spirit, and therefore also in the lesser matters of our daily life. Our life is one, because our nature is one* From the true ethical standpoint, there is no cleft between egoism and altruism, as there is none between reason and I sensibility. We are at once Egoists and Altruists in every 1 moral action. Each is an Ego, and each sees in his brother ) an " Alter Ego." The dualism and conflict here, as in the individual case, arises from the " rebellion " of the individ- ual against the person. The claims of individuals con- flict, always and necessarily ; the claims of persons never* The moral task, therefore, on its social as well as on its individual side, lies in effecting the subjugation of individ- uality to personality, or in obeying the Law of reason, which embraces the lives of our fellows as well as our own : " Be a person, and respect others as persons ; " subject your own clamant individuality to your abiding rational personality : " To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man." 13. The conception of Law, prominent in the ethical Theeth- reflection of Plato and the Stoics, and farther emphasised cance of by Christianity, has been made a corner-stone of modern meaning of ethical theory by Butler and Kant. Not only in Intu- u y ' itionism and Transcendentalism, but even in Hedonism and Evolutionism, the conception plays an important part. What significance can we attach to it from the standpoint of Personality ? The foregoing discussion has partly anticipated the 220 THE MORAL IDEAL. answer to this question. We have seen that the moral task of man is the co-ordination or organisation of im- pulse into a system of rational ends, and that the co- ordinating or organising principle is the idea of rational Self -hood or Personality. In this idea of tru human | Self -hood is found the Law of man's life./ It is a law I universal ; for while the content of these personal ends will vary with the individuality of the sensible subject, and with the stimuli that excite such individual ^sensi- bility, their form will be the same in all, being con- stituted by the common rational Ego iit each. We thus avoid, on the one hand, the formalism of the Intuitional and Kantian Ethics, with their insistence upon mere obedience to rational, and therefore universal, Law ; and, on the other hand, the subjectivity and particularism of Hedonism, which finds the moral criterion in the feeling of the individual subject. The interpretation of Person- ality as including individuality provides for the form of reason a content of sensibility, and thus secures a con- crete view of the moral life : it shows us the universal in the particular. I am different from you, for we are both individuals ; and since our individuality must colour our respective ideals of life, these ideals are, so far, different. But while it is the individual self that has to be realised, it is the complete Self or Personality of the individual, into whose common life the individuality of each must be taken up and interpreted as an element ; and this secures a common ideal for all. The peculiar form or category of moral experience is thus seen to be Law, Duty, or Obligation. The difference between moral or spiritual and natural Law is just the EUD^EMONISM. 221 difference between the life of a being that shares con- sciously in reason and one that does not so share. The universe being rational through and through, the " Law " or Formula of all phenomena, of all occurrences, is ra- tional. But that Law may be expressed consciously or unconsciously, ly the being or merely through the being. Now, the Law of the life of a rational being must be Autonomy: moral self-realisation is "realisation of Self by Self." The Law of Nature's life is Heteronomy; it is part of a larger system, and comes under the Law of that system. But a rational being is an End-in-himself, and can find nowhere save in his own nature the Law of his life. This is the prerogative of Eeason to legislate for itself, to be at once subject and sovereign in the moral kingdom, as it is at once teacher and scholar in the intel- lectual school. *S The transition from the " innocence," or non-moral con- Animal dition, of the animal or the child, which has not yet cenee** and broken with Nature, but remains in unconscious subjec- iedgeof tion to its Law, to the moral status, in which " Law " asserts itself in the very consciousness of a possible and actual disobedience to it, thus creating the distinction between good and evil, has been naively represented by the imagination of early man as a "Fall" from a pre- vious state of bliss. A Fall, and yet also an ascent in the scale of being; a fall from Holiness, but an ascent from Innocence. "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil ; " " lest they eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and become as one of us." Christianity has touched and changed this yearning after a Golden Age in the past experience of the race into a 222 THE MORAL IDEAL. yearning after a future Golden Age. The conception of Evolution also teaches us to regard human history as a progress, not a regress. And we have ourselves seen that the consciousness of the breach between the ideal and the actual, of the dualism between nature and spirit, is the essential condition of a finite Self -consciousness and Self- realisation. It may be that we cannot explain the origin of evil ; but, evil being there, we can understand its moral significance. Evil is the shadow cast by the moral Ideal upon the actual life. The sense of Failure comes with the consciousness of an ideal; nature never " fails," man always does. And so long as the breach continues between the actual and the ideal, so long must the element of Law or Obligation enter into the substance of the moral consciousness. Various But Law or Obligation) assumes different aspects at Law. the successive stages of the moral life of the individual. It is first external, then internal ; first " Do this," then " Be this." It is first the outer Law or Command, accompanied by Coercion, whether of reward or punish- ment, of the parent, of the State, of social opinion, a kind of pressure of his environment, moulding the indi- vidual from without. This is the stage of "Abstract Right," as Hegel terms it, the stage of passive and un- critical acquiescence by the individual in the conven- tional morality in whose atmosphere he has grown up. As he advances to moral manhood, the individual passes from this allegiance to the outer law to the severer rule of the law which he finds written in his own heart. This is the stage of Moralitat, of the reign of the inner Law of the individual " Conscience," of the assertion of EUD^EMONISM. the "right of private judgment" in the moral sphere, the stage at which the life, become a "law unto itself," is full of introspective " conscientiousness," and liable, in its revolt from the morality of custom and convention, to become the prey of individual or sectarian enthusiasms and fanaticisms. Necessary as this stage is, and per- manent as, in a sense, it may necessarily be for the individual, he yet must seek to escape from its subjec- tivity and limitation, and to reach the insight into the partial, if not complete, identity of the outer and the inner Law the stage of "Ethicality" or " Sittlichkeit." Still, the critical point in the moral history of the indi- vidual is that at which the Law passes from the outer to the inner form. The outer Law is always, in truth, from an ethical standpoint, the reflection of the inner ; it is the deepest Self of humanity that makes its con- stant claim upon the individual man, and demands its' satisfaction. And the continual criticism of the outer \ by the inner Law, of convention and custom by Con- I science, is the very root and spring of all moral progress. Indeed the breach between the inner and the outer is never entirely healed ; the ideal State is never reached. The inner demand is absolute, a " categorical impera- its abso- lve." Its unyielding " Thou shalt " is the voice of the luteness ideal to the actual man, and the ideal admits of no concession, no " give and take," no compromise with the actual. This demand of the rational and ideal Self is not to be misinterpreted, as if its absoluteness meant the annihilation of feeling or " nature." The demand is for such a perfect mastery of the impulsive and sentient, or "natural" self, that in it the true self, which is 224 THE MORAL IDEAL. fundamentally rational, may be realised ; that it may be the rational or human, and not the merely sentient or animal self, that lives. What produces the constant contradiction between ideal and attainment is not the presence of feeling, as a surd that cannot be eliminated. It is that the harmony of a life in which feeling is subdued to reason must become ever more perfect, the life of the true Self must become ever more complete, as moral progress continues. For the demand of the inner Self for realisation is an infinite demand. The Self never is fully realised, it remains always an ideal demanding realisation. Here, in the constant ethical antinomy, the perpetual contra- diction between ideal and attainment, is the source of the undying moral consciousness of Law or Obligation. Ever as we attain in any measure to it, the Ideal seems to grow and widen and deepen, so that it is still for us the unattained. One mountain-path ascended only reveals height after height in the great Beyond of the moral life. It is those that stay on the plane of a superficial and con- ventional morality who think they can see the summits of its hills. Those who climb know better. It is they who scale the mountain-tops of duty who know best what heights are yet to climb, and how far its high peaks penetrate into God's own heaven. It is the infinity of the ideal Self that makes it, in its totality, unrealisable, and the life of duty inexhaustible, by a finite being. No improvement in environment, physical or social, can effect the entire disappearance of the contradiction between the Ideal and its attainment. For the Idea 1 originates, not without but within ourselves, in "the abysmal deeps of EUD^MONISM. 225 personality," and the fountain of those deeps is never dried up. The Ideal is always being realised, it is true, in fuller and richer measure. But " to have attained " or " to be already perfect " would be to have finished the moral life. Such an absolute coincidence of the ideal and the actual is inconceivable, just because the Good is the Ideal, and not a mere projection of the actual. The latter interpretation of the Good would make it finite, and attainable enough by human weakness. But to limit the Ideal were to destroy it. The man inspired with a loyal devotion to the Good is willing to see the path of his life stretch ever forward and upward, to lift up his eyes unto the eternal hills of the divine Holiness itself. For he knows that he has laid the task upon himself, and that, if failure and disappointment come inevitably to him in the attempt to execute it, his is also the dignity of this "high calling," and his too a success which, but for the Ideal and the failure which faithfulness to it implies, had been for him impossible. He would not exchange this human life, with all its pain and weariness, with all its humiliation and disappoint- ment, for any lower. Better surely this noble human dissatisfaction than the most perfect measure of animal content. Is not such failure "only the other side of success ; " is not such " discontent " indeed " divine " ? To seek to rise above Duty or Law is, as Kant said, " moral Fanaticism." It is the peculiar category of human life, of the life of a being at once finite and infinite ; it is the expression of the dualism of Form and Matter, of Eeason and Sensibility. Certainly we shall not overcome the dualism by minimising it ; rather it must be pressed p 226 THE MORAL IDEAL. until, it may be in another life or in prophetic glimpses in the religious life even now, it yields the higher unity and peace for which our spirits crave. Meantime, it is no ignoble bondage ; if the spirit is imprisoned, it is ever breaking through the bars of its prison-house. Man lays the law upon himself ; it is because he is a citizen of the higher world that he feels the obligation of its law, and the bondage of the lower. And when he recognises the source of the law, it ceases, in a sense, to be a burden ; or it becomes one which he is willing and eager to bear, and which becomes lighter the longer and the more faith- fully it is borne. The yoke of such a service is indeed easy, and its burden light. Expres- 14. It may help to the understanding as well as the Eudse? vindication of the general position above described, to JoJinPhil- glance at one or two of the most striking expressions of Mophy. Eudaeinonism in philosophy and in literature. In philo- sophy, I will select rather from the Greeks than from the moderns, partly because their contribution to ethical theory is less familiar, or at any rate less appreciated, and partly because the modern statements are in a great measure dependent upon the ancient, and can be fully understood only in the light of the latter. Among the moderns, we owe the most adequate expressions of Butler. Eudsemonisni to Butler and to Hegel. From the sketch already given of Butler's ethical theory, it will have been observed how much he owes to the Greeks. His leading conceptions of human nature as a civil constitution, of the authoritative rank of the rational or reflective principles, of the harmony which results from the just division of EUD^MONISM. 227 labour among the various elements of our nature, and the discord which comes from their mutual interference and- the insurrection of the lower against the rule of the higher all this we already find in Plato. And Aristotle had, like Butler, discovered the secret of human virtue in that reason" which is the differentiating attribute of human nature. It is Hegel who, of all modern philosophers, has given Hegel, most adequate expression to the essential principle of the ethical life, alike on its negative and on its positive side. With Kant he recognises the full claim of reason, but he insists upon correlating with it the rightful claim of sensi- bility. In ethics as in metaphysics, Hegel finds the uni- versal in the particular, the rational in the sensible. In the evolution of the moral as of the intellectual life, he discovers the dialectical movement of affirmation through negation, of life through death ; in the one as in the other phase of human experience, " that is first which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual." The life of nat- ural sensibility is only the raw material of the moral life ; to be moralised, it must be rationalised. In the words of Dr Hutchison Stirling i 1 "To Hegel, then, even the body, nay, the mind itself, require to be taken posses- sion of, to become in actuality ours. Culture, education, is required for both. The body, in the immediacy of its existence, is inadequate to the soul, and must be made its ready organ and its animated tool. The mind, too, is at first, as it were, immersed in nature, and requires en- franchisement. This enfranchisement is in each subject the hard labour against mere subjectivity of action, and against the immediacy of appetite, as against the subjec- 1 'Philosophy of Law,' 42. THK 228 THE MORAL IDEAL. tive variety of feeling and the arbitrariness or caprice of self-will. But through the labour it is that subjective will attains to objectivity, and becomes capable and worthy of being the actuality of the idea. For so particularity is wrought into universality, and through universality be- comes the concrete singular." Yet this " concrete singular " of the universalised par- ticular or the rationalised sensibility is not, for Hegel, the Person ; for him Personality is only a provisional category, not the ultimate category of the moral life. Hegel's Per- son is the legal person, subject of rights, not the moral person, strictly objective and rational. Hence the prin- ciple, " Be a person, and respect others as persons," is for him only a stage in the ethical life, to be transcended in its perfect development. It is of the essence of his pan- theistic metaphysic to sink the Personality of man in the universal Life of God, and to conceive human life as ulti- mately modal and impersonal rather than as substantive and personal. Yet Hegel does much for the conception of Personality both in the intellectual and in the moral reference, and, if we sit loose to his final metaphysical construction, we shall find in his philosophy as striking and adequate ethical statements as are to be found any- where. Take, e.g., this statement of the distinction between the individual and the person : " In personality, indeed, it lies that I, as on all sides of me, in inward desire, need, greed, and appetite, and in direct outward existence, this perfectly limited and finite individual, am yet, as person, infinite, universal, and free, and know myself, even in my finitude, as such." But our indebtedness to Hegel and his school for the position we have reached is so large as to EUD^EMONISM. 229 have necessarily forced itself upon the reader's attention, and to render superfluous any further illustrations from that quarter at the present stage. Let us turn, then, to the Greeks, to whom Hegel would be the first to acknow- ledge his own indebtedness. Whether one takes Plato's psychology or his ethics Plato, and they are inseparable one is equally surprised at the completeness of his apprehension of the eudsemonistic interpretation of the moral life. He distinguishes three ele- ments in human nature reason, spirit, and appetite (\6yos, Ovfjbos, TO eTriOvfjirjTiKov). Eeason is a unity, so also is spirit, but appetite is a manifold. Further, while both spirit and appetite are impulsive in their nature, their relation to reason is not the same. Appetite is antagon- i istic to reason, and is strictly irrational (TO akoyicmKov) ; ' spirit is reason's natural ally, reason's watch-dog sent forth to curb the alien force of appetite, and again re- called and kept in check by its master reason. Here we * find a recognition, first, of the dependence of reason upon J sensibility for the execution of its own ends, and, secondly, of the seeds in the human soul alike of harmony and dis- cord with the ends of reason. The various elements have in them the possibility of harmony as well as of discord, and it is for reason, which possesses the key to the har- mony, to use the force provided to its hand in the impul- sive nature for the harmonising of these diverse elements. The figure of the Charioteer has the same lesson. The Charioteer is the rational Self, whose function it is to guide the journey of the soul. But the Charioteer were helpless without the steeds ; his is the guidance only, it is theirs to perform the journey. And, again, there are 230 THE MORAL IDEAL. two steeds ; and while the one is rebellious, like the horde of ungoverned appetites that would disturb the fair order of reason in the life of the soul, the other is, like the rationally minded spirit, apt to obey the rein of the wise Charioteer. " Let our figure be of a composite nature a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them noble, and of noble breed, but our horses are mixed: moreover, our charioteer drives them in a pair ; and one of them is noble and of noble origin, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble origin ; and the driving, as might be expected, is no easy matter with us." That soul " which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the Charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see, by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world, and they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round in the deep below, plunging, treading on one another, striving to be first ; and there is confusion and the extremity of effort, and many of them are lamed, or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers." l But let the Charioteer only do his driving well, holding the rein tightly over the unruly steed of earthly passion, and it, too, will be guided into the upward path, and will at last become the other's fellow there. " For the food which is suited to the highest part of the soul comes out of that meadow, and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this." 1 ' Phsedrus,' 248 ( Jowett's transl. ) EUD^EMONISM. 231 And, once more, the highest life of the soul, the life of philosophic contemplation, so far from being a passionless life of pure thought, is itself an intensely passionate life. For the supremely true and good is also the supremely beautiful, and the soul that is weaned from the beauties] of the merely sensible world is rapt in the passion of that j Beauty absolute and eternal, which is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. " He who, under the influence of true love, rising upwards from these, begins to see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This ... is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute. . . . What if man had eyes to see the true beauty the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mor- tality, and all the colours and vanities of human life thither looking, and holding converse with the divine beauty, divine and simple ? Do you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue, to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may." And Socrates adds, that "in the attainment of 232 THE MORAL IDEAL. this end human nature will not easily find a better helper than love. And therefore, also, I say, that every man ought to honour him, as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love, according to the measure of my ability now and ever." 1 For the loves of earth are our schoolmasters to bring us at last, when all the tem- pest of the soul is laid, and all its passions purified and ennobled, unto the heavenly Love, . the Love of God Himself. Plato's central ethical conception is cast in the mould of his psychology. It is that of a perfect harmony of all the elements of the soul. (' The good life is for him the musical life ; the life of a soul perfectly attuned to reason! * \J cannot but " make music." His favourite figure is that of the State ; the soul, like the true State, ought to act as a unit, the sovereign will of the whole being accepted by each of the parts. The sovereign element in the soul is, of course, reason, whose insight into the Good of the whole fits it to plan for the whole and to compose the symphony of its common life. But if there is to be sovereignty, there must also be subjection and sub- mission ; and the subject-class is the brood of " appetites," the artisans and labourers of the city of the soul, to be "kept under" and controlled, for they have no self- control. The " spirit " fulfils the military and executive office, enforcing the behests of reason in the sphere of sensibility. Thus the harmony has two sides a negative and a positive ; it is at once Temperance or self-control and Justice or self-realisation. If the order of reason is 1 'Symposium/ 210-212 (Jowett's transl.) EUD^EMONISM. 233 to be maintained, the disorder of sensibility must be put down ; if the good of the whole is to be attained, the in- surrection of the parts against the whole must be quelled. Temperance, or the non-interference of any part with the proper work of another part, is no less essential than Justice, or the doing of its own work by each part of the soul. The essential evil in this spiritual city is the claim of the part to be the whole the evil of dis- integration. The unjust life is the intemperate or re- bellious, the discordant life. Justice is " the health and beauty and well-being of the soul," the integrity of the nature ; injustice is the " disease and deformity " which come from the uprising of the part against the whole, of the inferior against the superior principle. The life of righteousness is the life of the integrated and harmonised * nature, which has reduced itself from a " mere manifold " of sensibility to the unity of rational system (cva yevopevov ' e/c TToXAwz'), and attained to friendship with itself ($L\ov yevo/jievov eavra)). But we have seen that there are in human nature the seeds of discord as well as of har- mony, of war as well as of peace, of disease as well as of health ; and its true welfare must be reached through stern discipline and hard struggle. This struggle is the fight of clear reason against blind irrational impulse ; and victory conies with the opening of the eyes of impulse to see that larger rational good which includes its own. Aristotle's term for the Good is evScu/movia, and the Aristotle, entire spirit of his ethics is eudsemonistic. I will here signalise only one or two of his fundamental ethical ideas, and suggest their interpretation in the line of the theory here called by his own name, Eudaemonism. 234 THE MORAL IDEAL. In the first place, Aristotle recognises the difference between the moral and the natural development or self- realisation, between the ethical and the physical process. In both cases we have the actualisation of the potential, but the manner of the actualisation is different in the two cases. In nature the potentiality is a single and necessary J one, the acorn can only become the oak, the boy the man. In morality there is always a double or alternative poten-{ tiality, a man may become either virtuous or vicious. It is, moreover, by doing the same things, only in a different way, that either of the alternative potentialities is actual- ised. As it is by playing on the harp that men become either good or bad harpers, by playing well that they be- come good, by playing ill that they become bad musicians, so is it with all the activities of life ; in the same activi- ties are the beginnings of both good and evil habits, of both the virtues and the vices. Whether a man shall be- come virtuous or vicious, depends on the manner of these activities. Whether, however, he becomes virtuous or vicious, he has only actualised the character which already existed in him potentially. The seeds of the particular vice or virtue which reveals itself in his character lay in his original nature and the circumstances of his lot. For it is not in the choice of the absolute Mean, but of the Mean relative to the individual, that virtue lies. Virtue is universal and not of private interpretation, for it is always " according to right reason " ; but it is also particular, and constituted by individual temperament and concrete circumstances (the latter being called by Aristotle " furniture of fortune "), or " as a prudent man would decide." Virtue and vice are EUD^EMONISM. 235 the correlates of the individuality and its opportunities of actualisation ; nor does Aristotle hold that these elements of idiosyncrasy can be eliminated, or the concrete life of man contained within the limits of an exact mathematical formula. If his moral Ideal is, in a sense, universal and absolute an Ideal of reason, it is also, in a sense, par- ticular and relative an Ideal of sensibility. The doctrine of the Mean is itself most significant of its author's regard for the life of sensibility as well as for that of reason. Vice consists in excess or defect of that which, in itself and in its appropriate measure, is good. And if in reason he finds the " common measure " of sensibility, he yet admits, as we have just seen, that this rational measure must be modified by a fresh refer- ence to sensibility itself ; that, in a way, sensibility also is a measure. In his psychology Aristotle may be said to anticipate the distinction between the individual and the person in his distinction between the irrational (or non-rational), passive, nutritive and animal soul, on the one hand, and the rational, active, creative soul, on the other, as well as in his interpretation of the latter as the true being and perfect actualisation of the former. But the real psycho- logical basis of Aristotle's ethical Eudsemonism is to be found in his conception of the relation of the soul to the J body. The soul is for him the Entelechy of the body, its perfect fulfilment and actualisation, ~ its final Form, its very Essence, Truth, and Being. This conception necessitates a revision, and a new interpretation, of Aristotle's own division of human nature into " rational " and " irrational " elements. From this standpoint there 236 THE MORAL IDEAL. can be no finally " irrational " element in man, any more than in the universe. For, in man as in the universe, all " matter " is quick with " form " ; the one is the poten- tiality, the other the actuality of Form. Everywhere we have the promise and pot'ency of reason : the " irrational " is but reason in the making, in the slow process of its increasing manifestation. Nothing is irrational, since in all things are the seeds of reason ; everything is irrational, in so far as it is yet urfactualised potentiality, or mere "matter" not yet formed. The Soul or the Self is, then, the Logos of the body, the articulate expression of the body's total Meaning, its End and its true Being (TO TL^V elvai). The soul's true life ^ . must, therefore, be the summation of all the possibilities of the body, such an activity as shall be the perfect expression of every element and the evolution of that nature in its totality, the final and perfect Form which is "without matter" because it has taken up into itself all the "matter," and expressed it, leaving nothing out. The only evil, the only " irrational " life, would be that in which the process of the victorious reason was arrested, and in which that was accounted as Form which was not yet the final form, but, to him who had seen its form, only " matter " after all. The essence of evil would be to act as if we had already attained or were already perfect, instead of pressing to- ward the mark of our nature's perfection. Filled with this aspiration, the virtuous man is unwilling to stereotype any of virtue's forms, however fair, knowing that to stay the process of the life of reason is to kill that life. 15. Let us look, in closing, at one or two of the most EUD^EMONISM. 237 striking and comprehensive literary expressions of the (6) in Lit- erature, ethical dualism and of the process by which, in the ethical life, it is overcome. Take first the Faust story one of the most remarkable of these expressions in Goethe's treat- ment of it. The temptation of Faust is to sacrifice the life of thought, the fruits, won by hard labour, of the scholar's life, for a career of merely sensuous satisfaction. Why " scorn delights and live laborious days " ? Why miss the pulse-beats of life's keenest joys ? Both lives he cannot live ; he must make his choice between them, and, once made, the choice shall be irrevocable. The problem comes to Faust as the representative of the conflict be- tween the spirit of the elder and the newer time. His has been the life of the mediaeval scholar, a life of thought apart from the world of real present interests and events, and, in the keen realisation of the emptiness of such a life, he longs for contact with reality, with nature, with human passion, with life in all its forms. The revolt of his eager unsatisfied spirit sends him forth into the un- tried world of common human experience, to seek there the satisfaction which has eluded him in his scholar-life of seclusion and stern thought. The new way is easy enough ; it is the broad smooth path of sensuous delight, ' and crowded with the multitude. If Faust can deliber- ately choose this life of carnal pleasure, if in it he can find the perfect satisfaction of his being and accept it as his portion, it will be the definitive choice of evil, the critical surrender of the higher to the lower nature. For if such sensuousness of life as that which Faust is now , to put to the proof leads inevitably to sensuality and what is commonly called " vice," the evil lies in the 238 THE MORAL IDEAL. sensuousness itself, of which the sensuality is but the full-blown flower. That a being capable of, and there- fore called to, a life of rational and strenuous activity, because of the pain and toil and disappointment implied in such a life, should choose the immediate and effortless delights of sensibility, " herein is sin." But for Faust there is no satisfaction in the new life of which he is represented as making trial. When, first as a black poodle, and then as Mephistopheles himself, the spirit of evil appears, we feel that it is only the manifestation and externalisation of the lower, undisciplined, irrational nature which, in Faust as in every man, is struggling for the mastery with the rational and higher Self : " Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach ! in meiner Brust, Die eine will sich von der andern treimen ; Die eine halt, in derber Liebeslust, Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen ; Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust Zu den Gefilden holier Ahnen." But though all the glory of the world is spread out be- fore Faust, and he tastes of the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eye and the pride of life, the moment never comes when he can say of it : " Verweile doch ! du bist so schoii ! " And deeply though he falls, we feel that, even at the lowest, he has fallen only to rise again, and, learning the deeper dissatisfaction of this new life, to choose at last, with a new decision wrought by the strong hand of a bitter experience, the higher way of the victorious spirit. The lesson of the legend, or, at any rate, of the drama, surely is, that if a virtue cloistered and untried ECJD^EMONISM. 239 is no virtue at all, yet all virtue contains self-sacrifice at its heart, and the only true and complete self-fulfilment is mediated and made possible by self-renunciation. " Und so lang which is its own sufficient end, the actualisation and development of the man's true "soul" or self. The ir utilitarian" estimate of education is essen- tially superficial ; it is the estimate of the Philistine who asks always for the " practical " value of culture, and thereby shows that he does not know what culture is. The true " practice " of a human being is not that in which he discharges best a task which has no essential relation to himself ; it is that which calls forth and develops all his human powers, the man in the man. 6. I have said that it is the total Self that is to be de- Meaning of veloped, the intellectual, the emotional, and the active or volitional elements, each in its perfection, and all in the harmony of a complete and single life. Culture means not merely the cultivation of the several capacities, but 260 THE MOEAL LIFE. the symmetrical development of all. As in the physical organism the health of each member depends upon the health of the organism as a whole, so the true development of any part of our nature implies the concurrent develop- ment of all the other parts. The defective character of the " intellectual " man, whose emotional nature is atrophied and whose undue reflection has wellnigh incapacitated him for practical activity ; of the " man of feeling," who has forgotten how to think or to act ; of the " practical " man, who has no time for thought, and to whom, perhaps, the emotional life seems a weakness or a luxury which he can- not afford himself is matter of common observation. It is perhaps not so commonly realised that true intellectual cul- ture itself implies the culture of the emotions, if not also of the will, that true aesthetic culture implies the culture both of will and intellect, and, above all, that the best activity is the outcome of the largest thought and the deepest and warmest sensibility. In all spheres, the key- note of true culture is symmetrical self -development. The place 7. The relation of physical to ethical well-being is apt culture. 10 * to be misconceived. It is that of means to end ; physical well-being is not an integral part of the ethical End, though it is perhaps the most important means towards the realisation of that End. Health is the basis of the moral life, it is no part of that life itself. The body is only the instrument or organ of a life which is, in its essence, spiritual. It becomes a duty to care for the body, but this care is only part of our care for the soul or the spiritual Self. My body is mine, it is not /. To make physical well-being an end-in-itself, is to forget that animal THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 261 perfection is no worthy end for a rational being. It is the ends for which the human mind can use the body that give the human body its peculiar dignity; and if man makes the mind the minister of the body's perfection, he is reversing their true ethical relation. Matthew Arnold has wisely and well criticised the popular estimate of physical health as an end-in-itself ; 1 it is that for the mere animal, but it cannot properly be that for man. " Physical culture " is not an integral part of " ethical culture." As a means towards the attainment of the ethical End, as the basis of the moral life, the importance of physical well-being can hardly be exaggerated. Self-preservation and self-development are, in this sense, always primarily the preservation and development of the physical life. I must live, in order to live well ; and my power of realis- ing my moral purposes will be largely determined by my physical health. The ethical value of life, both in its length and in its breadth, in the duration and in the richness of its activities, is to a considerable extent within our own power, being determined by our care or neglect of the body. To despise the body, or to seek to escape from it, as the ascetic does, is as wrong as it is futile. The body is the main condition of the moral life, its very element and atmosphere ; and the athletic exaggeration of the importance of the body, like the estimate of " clean- liness" as not even "next to godliness," is probably, in the main, a not unnatural reaction from the ascetic ex- treme of contempt and neglect fostered by Puritan tra- dition. Above all, it is obvious that if care for the body is an important although an indirect duty, the destruction 1 See 'GlS!S=Skd Anarchy,' 21. 262 THE MORAL LIFE. of the physical life, or suicide, is an exceeding great sin. Our moral life being physically conditioned, the destruc- tion of the body is an indirect attack upon that life itself. Suicide, being self-destruction (so far as that is possible to us), must always contradict the fundamental ethical principle of self-development. Health is only part of that individual good which is, as such, subordinate to the personal good, and has only an instrumental value. Like money and position, social or official, it is part of our moral " opportunity." But we have seen that the prudential life, whose concern is with the opportunity rather than with the exercise of virtue, does not coexist alongside the life of virtue, but is organic to that life. It would perhaps be helpful to clear ethical thinking to make the term Prudence cover the instrumental or the "occasional" those aspects of human life which, like physical health, pecuniary affairs, worldly position, or office, have in themselves no moral significance, but acquire such a significance through their being the physical basis of the virtuous life. 8. We have seen that self - development means the tare of sett- development of individuality into personality, that the person is always an individual. It is essential to true self - development, therefore, that the individuality be conserved, not destroyed. Many factors of our modern civilisation tend to substitute monotonous and dead uni- formity for the living and interesting diversity of indi- vidual nature. Specialisation is apt to dwarf the individ- uality ; political and other forms of social organisation tend in the same direction. We are much more apt than THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 263 our forefathers to imitate others, and to be unwilling to be ourselves. Yet it is clear that vocation is determined chiefly by individual aptitude, though modified by the pressure of circumstances. The true " career " for a man is that which shall most fully realise his individuality. Fortunate indeed is he to whom a thorough understanding of his own nature and an appropriate course of circum- stances open up the path of such a career. To too many their so-called career is a mere routine, a " business " for their hands which leaves their deeper nature idle and unoccupied, longing for a life more satisfying than is offered by the activities which consume its weary days, finding something of that true life it may be elsewhere, in some pursuit which has no relation to the daily avoca- tion, There is a pathos in some men's " hobbies " ; they indicate that the " soul " is not dead, but sleeping, and needs but the touch of an understanding sympathy to rouse it from its sleep. For the only true " life " is evepyeia -^1^7)9, activity of the Soul or Self. Happiest is he who' can put his whole soul, all the energies of his spirit, into each day's work. His work, even as work, as sheer pro- duct, will have a different value. It will be honest work, the best work. It seems as if brute matter itself took the impress of the soul that moulds it ; we feel, for ex- ample, that Carlyle's appreciation of his father's masonry is essentially a true appreciation. 1 And as the means of 1 " Nothing that he undertook but he did it faithfully, and like a true man. I shall look on the houses he built with a certain proud interest. They stand firm and sound to the heart all over this little district. Not one that comes after him will ever say, Here was the finger of a hollow eye-servant. They are little texts for me of the gospel of man's free will." ' Kemim'scences, ' 5, 6. 264 THE MORAL LIFE. spiritual expression and expansion, the difference between nominal and real "work" is incalculable. How many imprisoned, unexpressed, unfulfilled souls behind the bleared, indifferent faces of the world's workers ! For in every man there is a soul, a self, unique and interesting, waiting for its development; and sometimes, even from the deadest man, in the home among his own who under- stand him, or touched to life by some sign of brotherly interest in another, the soul that had slept so long will suddenly leap forth and surprise you. The true doing is that doing which is also a being, and the medium of better and fuller being, of a higher self- development. But such doing is as unique as such being ; the measure of it is found in the individuality of the worker. Each man, like each planet, has his " appointed course," appointed him by his nature ; " so starts the young life when it has come to self-discovery, and found out what it is to do by finding out what it is" Here positively, for self -development, as already negatively for self-discipline, we see the need for self-knowledge. Hav- ing found the end or purpose of our life, the course of our self - development, and holding to this course steadily through all the storm and stress of passion and of cir- cumstance, through the fiery time of youth and the deadening effect of years, we cannot fail of the complete- ness, fulness, and symmetry of our appointed life. Such a care for our own true culture or self -develop- ment in all our work is the true " self-love," and at the opposite pole from selfishness. We ought not to be always trying to " do good " ; the first requisite for doing good is to be good. Philanthropy or benevolence will grow out THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 265 of this self-development, as its flower and fruit. But self- culture is fundamental, and the unconscious and indirect philanthropy of faithfulness to ourselves is often the best and farthest-reaching. Such self-culture fits us for service to others ; when the time comes, the man is ready. More- over, we must first live the true life ourselves, if we would help others to live it too ; it is thus we get the needed understanding. We must "be, ourselves, before we can help others to be. It is because God is all that we would be, that we say and feel, " Thou wilt help us to be." So it is that, though we are separate from one another, separate by the very fact of Personality, each " rounded to a separ- ate whole," and though each man's single life, each man's " own vineyard," needs constant and exclusive care, yet the good man feels no cleft, as there is none, between the egois- tic and the altruistic sides of his life. Egoism, in the sense explained, is fundamental, but it is the presupposition of an enlightened and genuine altruism. No narrowness is possible for him who cares for and develops his own true life ; in himself he finds the moral microcosm. The best ambition a man could cherish, both for himself and for his fellows, is that he and they alike may, each in himself, and each in his own way, so reflect the moral universe that none may have cause to travel beyond himself to find the fellowship of a common life and a common Good. 9. Yet it is necessary to transcend our individuality ; Necessity personality is essentially universal. " Whatever truly de- serves to be held up as a worthy object of man's striving and working, whether it be the service of humanity, of JJj; ideal one's country, of science, of art, not to speak of the service 266 THE MORAL LIFE. of God, is far beyond the sphere of individual enjoyment." It is this inherent universality that gives life its note of nobility. The personal life is never merely particular and individual ; its atmosphere is always the objective and universal, whether it be the intellectual pursuit of the true, the artistic pursuit of the beautiful, or the religious pursuit of the good. All these pursuits lift the individual out of the sphere of the particular and transi- tory into that of the universal and the abiding, out of the " finite " into the " infinite relations." This is the touch that transfigures human life, and lends to it a divine and absolute significance. For a full self-development it is need- ful that we thus escape from the " Cave " of the particular, above all, from the Cave of our own individuality, into the freer atmosphere of the infinite and ideal, and let its winds blow about the soul ; they are the very breath of its higher life. This is equally true of all three sides of our nature, the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the volitional. How the horizon of the mind lifts with the apprehen- sion of Truth, how the pursuit of it takes a man out of himself, how faithfulness to it delivers him from self- seeking and narrow aims, how the scientific and the philosophic life are essentially disinterested, and how educative of the Personality is such a course of pure in- tellectual activity, on all this there is little need to insist in a scientific age like the present, which has been accused of the " deification of Truth." It was with no little moral insight, as well as with Greek partiality for the things of the mind, that Plato and Aristotle de- - scribed the highest life of man as a purely intellectual activity, as the speculative life. That the contemplation of THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 267 the Beautiful in nature and in human life, the apprehen- sion of " the light that never was on sea or land," is also uplifting and enlarging to the soul ; that the companion- ship of the graceful and harmonious makes the soul itself harmonious and graceful, the Greeks at least knew well. To them the true education was " musical." The man who has seen the beautiful is easily recognised, his face shines with the light of that divine vision, his footsteps move to noble numbers, he is delicate and tender, and about him there is a gentleness and grace which you miss in the hard practical man, and even in the mere intellectualist. The beauty of the world has "passed into his face." Least of all can we be ignorant of the influence of the contemplation of the ideal Good. The soul that believes in, and lives in communion with, Goodness absolute, is touched to goodness as a soul that sees only the poverty of the actual cannot be. The moral value of an ethical Religion is an undoubted fact, acknowledged by every one. Nor is the essence of Eeligion mere constraint, its sanction of goodness mere fear of punishment or hope of reward. Far more powerful, though more subtly exer- cised, is the purifying influence of the divine Vision itself. The Hebrews felt this so deeply that they were afraid of that vision which we have learned to call "beatific." " No man can see God's face and live." Evil cannot live in the presence of utter Holiness. Even among men, we know how stern to the impure is the silent rebuke of purity, how humiliating to the worldly and selfish soul the contact with unselfishness and generosity; and we can understand something of the meaning of the words, " Our God is a consuming fire." 268 THE MORAL LIFE. Therefore it is well and healthful for the soul that each should breathe at times the pure atmosphere of the in- finite and ideal, should lift up his eyes unto the hills from whence cometh his aid, should retire into Plato's "ideal world," and gaze upon the archetypal Truth and Beauty and Goodness of which the actual shows us but the faint reflection. Some must, and by natural vocation will, con- secrate themselves to the more direct and immediate service of these ideals. The man of science and the phil- osopher, the artist poet, painter, sculptor, musician the priest or minister of religion, these are, in a peculiar sense, the servants of the ideal. But they are only the representatives of our common humanity in that supreme service and consecration. And if these live habitually " within the veil," in the inner sanctuary of the Infinite, it is needful that they whose preoccupation with the world's business detains them in the outer courts of the finite world, if they would preserve their manhood and draw strength for life's casual duties, should sometimes enter too. Dangers of 10. Yet we must never, in our devotion to the ideal and idealism, infinite, neglect the paramount claims of the actual finite world. We must always return even the ministers of the ideal in art, in science, and in religion, must return to the secular life, to the finite world and its relations. Nor must the vision of the infinite and ideal ever be allowed to distort our vision of the finite and actual. Emancipa- tion from the " Cave " of the finite brings with it its own new danger, it tends to unfit man for the life of the Cave. Those who have lived in the upper air, and have seen the THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 269 absolute Eeality, are apt to be blinded by the darkness of the Cave in which their fellows spend their lives, and, knowing how shadowy and illusory are all its concerns, to lose their interest in them. They are apt, as Plato said, to be awkward and easily outwitted, for their souls sit loose to this world and dwell apart. The peculiar temptation of genius, moral, aesthetic, or intellectual, the peculiar tempta- tion of those whose lives are spent habitually in the in- finite relations, is to minimise the finite, and fail to see the Infinite shining through it. Gazing at the stars, they are in danger of falling into the well. So it is that " respect- ability " is often on a higher ethical plane than " genius " and "saintship." Even Plato said that we must bring the travellers back to the Cave, and force them to take their part in its life. Idealist and transcendentalist though he was, he saw that most men must live in the Cave. For, as a contemporary writer has well said, " to finite beings recognition of the finite occupation with, or even absorp- tion in it is quite as necessary as is the recognition of what transcends it." 1 No service of the ideal will atone for unfaithfulness in the actual. "He that is unfaith- ful in that which is least is unfaithful also in much." The individual's duty is determined and defined by his "station," or his place in the actual finite relations, and even his cultivation of the ideal must be regulated by the imperious claims of this moral " station." "We know how inexorably severe were Carlyle's judgments of self-con- demnation for his failure in the little services of domestic piety, how, if these judgments were even in a measure true, his " spectral " view of life, his preoccupation with 1 Professor Knight, ' Aspects of Theism,' 205. 270 THE MORAL LIFE. "immensities and eternities," shut out from his field of vision the duty that lay next him. Carlyle's uncorrupted moral insight finds in his " genius " (which was perhaps as much moral as intellectual in its quality) no excuse for shortcoming in the " minor moralities " of life. Nor does the " world's " keen moral judgment find in the peculiar religious attainments of " professing Christians " any ex- cuse for such obvious moral defects as malice and ill- temper. In such cases the severity of our judgment is apt to be intensified by the very height of the ideal to which the life professes its devotion. The highest and completest the sanest natures recognise most fully this claim of the actual, and most willingly surrender themselves to the burden of its fulfilment. In this meekness and lowliness of spirit Wordsworth sees the crown of Milton's virtue : " Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart ; . . , Pure as the heavens, majestic, free, So didst thou travel on life's common way, In cheerful godliness ; and yet thy heart The lowliest duties on herself did lay." And Tennyson, in the " Idylls of the King," sings in a like strain of the ideal life : " And some among you held that if the King Had seen the sight, he would have sworn the vow ; Not easily, seeing that the King must guard That which he rules, and is but as the hind To whom a space of land is given to plough, Who may not wander from the allotted field Before his work be done." So must each man be content, king or subject, genius or day-labourer, to go forth unto his labour until the evening; THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 271 for in this world each has his appointed task, and if he do it not, it will be left undone. Even if our duty be to consecrate ourselves in Science, in Art, or in Eeligion, to the peculiar service of the ideal the noblest service that life offers, and that which calls for the highest aptitudes we still must not forget that, in respect of our duties in the actual, we stand on the common level. The priest, the artist, and the philosopher are also " ordinary men," and have no exemption from the common domestic, social, and civil duties. Such exemption would unfit them for their own great task the discovery of life's ideal mean- ing and its interpretation to their fellows. NOT must any man allow his excursions into the ideal world to dull the edge of his interest in the ordinary business of life. It is true that we all have need of leisure from the very finite occupations of life, for such communion with the Infinite ; for in that communion the soul's best life is rooted, and it will wither if not well tended. The world of Knowledge, of Art, of Eeligion, does claim us for itself, and our visits to it ought to be all the more frequent be- cause our actual world is apt to be so meagre and con- fined. But our acquaintance with the splendours of its " many mansions " must never breed in our souls contempt for the narrowness and the mean appointments of the house of our earthly pilgrimage. It is a danger and temptation neither unreal nor unfamiliar. Let us take two illustrations of it. The artistic temper is apt to be impatient of the cornmonplaceness of its daily life ; we are wont, indeed, to attribute to it a kind of practical irresponsibility. Led by visions of the beautiful into the romantic country of 272 THE MORAL LIFE. the imagination, the spirit is loath to return to the prosaic fields of ordinary daily duty. Its emotions are ideal, and find no issue in action on the earthly plane ; and more and more it is felt that there is no scope for such emotions in the actual world. That other world the world of the imagination is so much more interest- ing and exciting, that, by comparison with it, the actual world of daily life, where duties lie, seems "stale, flat, and unprofitable." It is the Quixotic temper that we all know in childhood. Nothing will satisfy us but knight- errantry, slaying giants, and rescuing fair ladies. The life of the Middle Ages would have suited us much better than that of the Nineteenth Century. It was so much more picturesque, there was so much more colour, the lights were brighter and the shadows deeper; life was "romantic" then. But, in reality, life is always the same; it presents always the same moral opportunities. The elementary realities do not change, the Alphabet of human life is the same from age to age. The imag- ination is always apt to picture the Golden Age of life's great opportunities of action either in the Past or in the Future, while really, if we had eyes to see them, they are always in the Present. The pattern of man's life may be very different in different ages, its colours may be brighter or more sombre ; but its warp and woof, its inner texture, is always the same, and is wrought of the threads of good and evil, virtue and vice, faith- fulness and unfaithfulness to present duty. Or take the " Saint " who, with his eye fixed on the Beyond, abstracts himself from this earthly life, either physically as in mediaeval Monasticism, or actually and THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 273 in the inner temple of the heart, like many a modern Protestant, mingling with his fellows as if he were not of them, not in hypocrisy or pride, but in real rapt abstrac- tion of spirit, afraid lest he soil his hands with the world's business and render them unfit for the uses of the heavenly commerce. Such a life not only misses the influence it might have exerted on the world, but proves itself un- worthy of, and unfit for, the higher just in the measure that it fails in the lower duties. The peculiar human , way to the ideal is through utter faithfulness to the ' actual ; and the reason why we need to leave the actual at all is just that we may get the inspiration which will enable us to see the ideal in it. It requires an eye that has seen the ideal shining in its own proper strength, to detect it in the disappointing surroundings of the actual. In activity, not in passive contemplation, lies man's salvation. " This is Christianity, as distinguished from Buddhism;" it is also modern, as distinguished from mediaeval, Christianity. The ideal must be found, after all, in the actual, the things unseen and eternal in the things which are seen and temporal ; the infinitely true and beautiful and good in the finite relations of daily life. It is the function of the chosen servants of the ideal to open the eyes of their fellows that they may see life even on "this bank and shoal of time," sub specie ceternitatis ; and thus to make the secular for them henceforth sacred, the commonplace infinitely interesting and significant. 11. But the supreme category of the moral life is the Ethical /^ i -IT i iii supremacy Good, not as excluding, but as containing in itself, the of the Beautiful and the True. To make either the True or the ideal. s 274 THE MORAL LIFE. Beautiful the containing notion leads to moral misap- preciation. JEstheticism and Intellectualism are both ethically unsatisfactory ; the former is weak, as the latter is hard and cold. He who so gives himself to Science or to Philosophy as to intellectualise himself, or reduce his entire nature to terms of the True, does not even reach the highest Truth. He who so gives himself to Art or the culture of the Beautiful as to sink the ethical in the aesthetic, must miss the vision of the highest Beauty. These failures teach us that the fundamental term of our life is the Good ; in so far as we attain to this ideal, we shall inevitably attain the others also. Greek philosophy illustrates the inadequacy alike of the intellectual and of the aesthetic ideal. For both Plato and Aristotle the ideal life was a life of speculation or intellectual contemplation, in which no place was found for practical activity or the play of the ordinary sensibilities. For Plato's artistic nature, again, as for the Greeks generally, the temptation always was to conceive the Good under the form of the Beautiful, and, as Mr Pater has remarked, for Plato " the Beautiful would never come to seem strictly concentric with the Good." But until we see the three circles as concentric, we do not see any one of them as it really is. The Greeks were perhaps too intellectual to be conscious of the danger that lay in a too exclusive devotion to the intellectual life ; they certainly do not betray such a con- sciousness. But Plato, poet and artist though he is, shows a nervous apprehension of the dangers for the individual and the State that lie in ^Estheticism. He has no place for the poets in his ideal State. His quarrel with them, THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 275 it is to be noted, is a characteristic Greek one ; the poets are condemned in the interests of Truth, rather than of Goodness. Where truth and beauty do not coincide, Plato would seem to say, truth must be preferred to beauty. Art the poetic art at least being in its essence imitative, substitutes fiction for reality, and its fiction is apt to be a misrepresentation of the real. Therefore, though none has a higher appreciation of literary art than Plato, though none finds a more honourable place for " music " in the education of the ideal man and citizen, he finds himself compelled, in loyalty to the higher interests of Truth, to banish the poets lest they corrupt the State by making its citizens believe a lie. It is an impressive instance of the war of ideals, and of faithfulness to the highest knowledge. And if for us the war has ceased to exist, and the circles of our life's interests have become concentric, it is not so much perhaps because we have reached a truer appreciation of the function of Art than Plato knew, as because we have learned to include both the aesthetic and the intellectual life as elements in the undivided life of Goodness. Let us separate any one of these three ideals from the others, and all alike are in that measure impaired and misunderstood. We can see that even the Greek devotion to the True is not the highest or completest devotion of human life ; our devo- tion to the True, as well as to the Beautiful, must, if we are to be " perfect," be part of our supreme devotion to the Good. Hence the supreme value of the religious life, as compared with the other avenues to the universal and the Infinite. Our deepest thought of God is Righteousness, 276 THE MOKAL LIFE. and by reason of this, its ethical basis, the religious ideal not only includes the others, but also comes nearest to actual life, touching the otherwise commonplace and trivial duties of the finite relations and transfiguring them, shedding over the actual the light of the ideal life. Culture 12. Hence also it is in the service of our fellows that anthropy. we find the continual emancipation from the prison-house of our individual self -hood, in philanthropy that we find the surest and most effective method of our self-develop- ment. The lower and selfish self, because it is selfish, cannot serve; the very life of the true and higher Self consists in ministry. Nor is there danger, in such a life, of Quixotic knight-errantry or abstract moral Idealism, of our failing, through our devotion to the ideal, in our duty to the actual. The most commonplace service, " the cup of cold water," any deed done fof another, takes us quite out of ourselves, idealises our life, breaks down its limita- tions. For a true ministry to any human need implies a perfect sympathy and identification of ourselves with the needy one, and we know the enlargement of the spirit's life that comes from such a sympathy. It opens up other worlds of experience the world of poverty, of sickness, of sorrow, of doubt, of temptation, of sin ; it unlocks the secret chambers of the human heart. How much the man misses who, with miserly greed, hoards up his little selfish life and will not share it with \ his fellows, how miserably poor and valueless even to himself his life becomes, Butler has described in his strong clear didactic manner in his ' Sermons,' and George THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 277 Meredith has pictured in his powerful story ' The Egoist.' Such a picture George Eliot has given us in ' Silas Marner/ adding, with consummate skill, the companion- picture of the deliverance that came with the first out- goings of the poor shrunken heart towards its fellows, and how there was born in the spirit of Silas Marner, through the love of a little child, a new and larger life. The specialist in science, the business man, the profes- sional man, all alike need the expansion that comes from such a contact with the universal human heart and its universal needs. The least apparently significant duty to our fellows, to be adequately done, calls forth the whole man, intellectual, emotional, active ; and it is most wholesome for the " specialist " and more and more we all, in some sense, are specialists to be distracted from a too entire preoccupation with his peculiar calling by the common everyday duties of our human life. Many illus- trations might be offered of how truly the service of others is a service of our own best selves. "What a force, for example, in self-development is the faithful and adequate discharge of any office or responsibility; men grow to the dignity of their calling, and duties which at first almost overpowered them become in the end no burden at all. The expectation of others, silent it may be and undefined, is an incalculable force in steadying and elevating a nature which might otherwise have been unstable and even have become ignoble. To feel that we stand to another in any measure for the ideal, as the parent stands to the child, the teacher to the pupil, the preacher to his people, and friend to friend, is a tremendous spur to 278 THE MORAL LIFE. us to live up to and justify, not disappoint, these expecta- tions. Is not this one of the secrets of greatness ? To stand, like the prophet and reformer, to a whole people in this relation, must be an immeasurable stimulus to faithfulness to the responsibility thus created. Chris- tianity has done much to bring home to the human mind the essential dignity and the high privilege of service, and to teach us how, in serving our fellows and in bearing one another's burdens, we may find the path of a perfect self-realisation. Here we find the bridge from the indi- vidual to the social virtues, the essential identity of altruism with the higher egoism. In this also lies the Christian idea of moral greatness, the greatness of humil- ity and self-sacrifice, as opposed to the greatness of pride and self-assertion, the Pagan vanity and pomp of indi- viduality. If we wish to feel the contrast of the Pagan and the Christian ideals of greatness, we have only to compare the Aristotelian picture of the /jLeyahotyvxos, the proud aristocrat who lives to prove his independence and superiority, with that other picture of a Life that poured itself out in the service of others, that came not to be ministered unto but to minister, that was willing, for the sake of such a ministry, even to be misunderstood. This picture has touched the heart of the world as the other never could have touched it. For it is a revelation of the blessedness that lies in escape from the prison-house of the " private " and selfish life, and feels throbbing within it the universal life of humanity itself. 13. Yet it is never to be forgotten that the moral life THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 279 remains always a personal, and even an individual life ; Seif-rever- PT1PP TllG it never becomes impersonal or " self-less." The unselfish dignity life is not self -less or impersonal ; rather, as we have just tucUMrf" seen, the life of Self is enlarged and enriched in direct pro- portion to the unselfishness of that life. Even the indi- viduality is not, in such self -development any more than in self-discipline, negated or annihilated; it is taken up into, and interpreted by, this larger social Good. Nor must we forget that the fundamental and essential attitude of a man towards himself is one of self-respect, what Milton calls " the inward reverence of a man towards his own person," reverence for the humanity which he represents. This is the true " greatness of soul " which is perfectly consistent with the utmost humility as to our actual achievements and individual desert, with remorse and shame and bitter self-condemnation. For such self- reverence is reverence for the ideal and potential manhood in oneself, and means the chastisement of the actual by comparison. This noble self-consciousness should enable a man to preserve his dignity in all the affairs of life, and make him, in the true sense, sufficient unto himself, his own judge and his own approver. We are told that Goethe had no patience with " over-sensitive people," with those " histrionic natures," who " seem to imagine that they are always in an amphitheatre, with the assembled world as spectators ; whereas, all the while, they are play- ing to empty benches." Doubtless, if we filled the benches with the great and good of all ages, as with a " great cloud of witnesses," and brought our actions to the penetrating gaze of their clear judgment, such a consciousness would 280 THE MORAL LIFE. be most beneficial and worthy. But we are far too apt to be play-acting instead of living, contented if only we suc- ceed in playing a certain role, and appearing to be what we are not. Such a " histrionic " life is the very antithesis of the good life ; and, when detected, it is rightly named " hypocrisy." But oftener it passes undetected, and gains the applause for which it has striven. And even those who are not consciously masquerading, for whom life is real and earnest, are too apt to be dependent upon the judgment of others, and to forget that a man is called upon to be his own judge, and in all things to live worthily of himself. The general level of moral opinion subtly insin- uates itself into our judgments of ourselves, we lose our independence, and sink below our own true level. All strong natures are self-contained ; it is the secret of moral peace and calm, the mark -of the wise and good of every age. " Such a man feels that to fail in any act of kindness and helpfulness would be foreign to his nature. It would be beneath him. His sense of honour forbids him to stoop to anything selfish, petty, or mean." The " opulent or royal soul that has felt itself to be one with the great human life about it, would feel itself narrowed, and thus dishonoured, by any act through which it should cut itself off from these larger rela- tions." 1 It would feel like a prince deposed. " In this sense it is that we may speak of stooping to a selfish act, or may say that such an act is not only foreign to the nature, but is unworthy of it and beneath it." 2 So sub- limely independent, so nobly self-contained, is the life of 1 C. C. Everett, ' Poetry, Comedy, and Duty,' 245. - Ibid., 246. THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE. 281 personality. The good man is at home with himself, and his real life is an inner rather than an outer life. " The world is too much with us ; late and soon, Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers." The moral weakling lives always, or for the most part, abroad, and never retires within himself, to find behind the veil of his own inner being that vision of the perfect life for which the spirit yearns. For the lowly and con- trite heart is His temple who dwelleth not in temples made with hands, and the pure and upright soul is his continual abode. But this truly " sacred place " must be' kept sacred, and it cannot be, if it is opened to all the riot and confusion of the market-place. " Solitude is to character what space is to the tree." The loneliness of personality is never to be forgotten ; " the heart knoweth its own bitterness, and a stranger intermeddleth not there- with." In a deep sense, we are separate from one another, and each man must bear his own burden. The walls of personality shut us in, each within the chamber of his own being and his own destiny. It is therefore good and most necessary for a man to be alone with himself. It was one of the most genial and social-hearted of men who said : " If the question was eternal company, without the power of retiring within yourself, I should say, ' Turnkey, lock the cell.' " l But, happily, that is not the alternative. In the solitary places of the human heart, in the deep quiet valleys and on the high mountain-tops of our moral being, is to be found the " goodly fellowship " of the great 1 Scott, Journal. THE MORAL LIFE. and noble of all the ages of man's long history nay, the fellowship of the Universal Spirit, the meeting-place of man with God. We must cherish the solitude, even as we would cherish that fellowship. 1 1 Archbishop Trench has given fine expression to this feeling in the following sonnet : "A wretched thing it were, to have our heart Like a thronged highway or a populous street ; Where every idle thought lias leave to meet, Pause, or pass on, as in an open mart ; Or like some roadside pool, which no nice art Has guarded that the cattle may not beat And foul it with a multitude of feet, Till of the heavens it can give back no part. But keep thou thine a holy solitude, For he who would walk there, would walk alone ; He who would drink there, must be first endu.-d With single right to call that stream his own ; Keep thou thine heart, close-fastened, unrevealed, A fenced garden, and a fountain sealed." 283 CHAPTEE II. THE SOCIAL LIFE. I. The Social Virtues: Justice and Benevolence. 1. MAN has social or other-regarding, as well as individual The rela- tion of the or self-regarding, impulses and instincts. By nature, and social to even in his unmoralised condition, he is a social being ; vidual life, but this sympathetic or altruistic nature must, equally with the selfish and egoistic, be formed and moulded into the virtuous character. The primary feeling for others, like the primary feeling for self, is only the raw material of the moral life. And the law of the process of moralisa- tion is the same in both cases ; the virtuous attitude to- wards others is essentially the same as the virtuous atti- tude towards oneself. For in others, as in ourselves, we are called upon to recognise the attribute of Personality. They, too, are ends in themselves ; their life, like our own, is one of self-realisation, of self-development through self- discipline. We must treat them, therefore, as we treat ourselves, as Persons. The law of the individual life is also the law of the social life, though in a different and a wider application. Virtue is fundamentally and always personal; and when we have discovered the law of the 284 THE MORAL LIFE. individual life, we have already discovered that of the social life. Since men are not mere individuals, but the bearers of a common personality, the development in the individual of his true self-hood means his emancipation from the limitations of individuality, and the path to self- realisation is through the service of others. Not that we serve others, the better to serve ourselves : we may not regard another person as the instrument even of our own best self-development. They, too, are ends-in-themselves : to them is set the self-same task as to ourselves, the task of self-realisation. The Law of the moral life, the Law of Personality, covers the sphere of social as well as of in- dividual duty ; the Law is : " So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means to an end." We may use neither ourselves nor others. Truly to serve humanity, therefore, is to realise oneself, and at the same time to aid others in the same task of self-realisation. In serving others, we are serving ourselves ; in serving ourselves, we are serving others. For, in both cases, we serve that Humanity which must ever be served, and which may never serve. The life of virtue, even on its social side, is still a per- sonal, not an impersonal life. This is apt to be over- looked, owing to the illusion of the term " social " and the antithesis, so commonly emphasised, between the indi- vidual and the social life. The individual and the social are in reality two aspects of the one undivided life of virtue, and their unity is discovered with their reduction to the common principle of Personality. The social life is, equally with the individual life, personal ; and the per- sonal life is necessarily at once individual and social. We THE SOCIAL LIFE. 285 must not be misled by the phrase "social life," as if society had a life of its own apart from its individual members ; society is the organisation of individuals, and it is they who live, not it. Apart from its individual members, society would be a mere abstraction ; but we are too apt, here as elsewhere, to hypostatise abstractions. In reality, society is not an " organism," but the ethical organisation of individuals. Obviously, we must not isolate the organisation or the relation from the beings organised or related; this would be a new case of the old Scholastic Eealism, or substantiation of the universal. Moral reality, like all finite reality, is, in the last analysis, individual. But while the life of virtue is always indi- vidual, it is not merely individual : to be personal, it must be social. If in one sense each lives a separate life, yet in another sense " no man liveth unto himself." A common personality is to be realised in each, and in infinite ways the life of each is bound up with that of all. Only, the individual may never lose himself in the life of others. As a person, he is an end in himself, and has an infinite worth. He has a destiny, to be wrought out for himself ; the destiny of society is the destiny of its individual mem- bers. The " progress of the race " is, after all, the progress of the individual. The ethical End is personal, first and last. As the individual apart from society is an unreal abstraction, so is society apart from the individual. The ethical unit is the person. Thus we can see that there is no necessary antagonism between Individualism, truly understood, and Socialism, truly understood. Nay, the true Socialism is the true Individualism, the discovery and the development of the 286 THE MORAL LIFE. person in the individual. Society exists for the indi- vidual, it is the mechanism of his personal life. All social progress consists in the perfecting of this mechan- ism, to the end that the ethical individual may have more justice and freer play in the working out of his own individual destiny. The Individualism of the mere individual means moral chaos and is suicidal ; such a life is, as Hobbes described it, " poor, nasty, dull, brutish, and short." But the Individualism of the person is, in its idea at least, synonymous with the true Socialism. For social progress does not mean so much the massing of individuals as the individualising of the social " mass " ; the discovery, in the " masses," of that same humanity, in- dividual and personal, which had formerly been discerned only in the " classes." The " socialistic " ideal is to make possible for the " many " nay, for all, or better for each that full and total life of personality which, to so large an extent, is even still the exclusive possession of the few. Social organisation is never an end in itself, it is always a means to the attainment of individual perfection. Social vir- 2. We have seen that social or altruistic impulse, like nature and individual or egoistic, is only the raw material of virtue, 5 llmlt> part of that " nature " which has to be moralised into " character." Mere " good-will " or " sociality " is not the virtue of Benevolence; the natural inclination to help others needs guidance, and may have to be re- strained. So true is Kant's contention that mere un- guided impulse or inclination has, as such, no ethical value. We have also seen that the law, in the one case as in the other, is found in personality. Each man, being THE SOCIAL LIFE. 287 an Ego or Person, has the right to the life of a Person. The true ethical attitude of other persons to him, there- fore, is the same as his attitude towards himself; and accordingly social, like individual, virtue has two sides, a negative and a positive. The attitude of the virtuous man towards his fellows is first, negatively, the mak- ing room for or not hindering their personal life, and secondly, the positive helping of them to such a life, the removing of obstacles from their way, and the bringing about of favourable conditions for their personal develop- ment. Here, with the conditions of the moral life in our fellows, we must stop ; no man can perform the moral task for another, there is no vicariousness in the moral life. Not even God can make a man good. Goodness, by its very nature, must be the achievement of the individual ; each must work out his own salvation. The individual must fight his own battles, and win his own victories, and if he is defeated, lie must suffer and strive through suffering to his final perfection. The moral life is essen- tially a personal life; in this sense all morality is "private." Life lies for each in " the realisation of self by self " ; that is our peculiar human dignity and privilege and high responsibility, and it is not allowed that any man come between us and our " proper business." But every- thing short of this moral interference and impertinence, we may do for our fellows. " Environment " counts for much, especially the social environment, and we can im- prove the moral environment of those whom we wish to aid. The will can be stimulated by suggestions from another, though no amount of pressure can coerce it. Ideals are potent, and, once accepted, seem to realise THE MORAL LIFE. themselves; and we can suggest, especially by our own practice and example, true moral ideals to others. In such ways, society can stimulate in the individual, and in- dividuals can stimulate in their fellows, the life of virtue. Only, we cannot take the moral task out of the hands of the individual, we cannot even strictly " co-operate " with him in the execution of that task. Such is the solitariness of the moral life. its two negative BeneT- tfonsand spheres iVe 3. Social virtue, on its negative side, we may call Jus- tice, with its corresponding duty of Freedom or Equality ; on its positive side, we may call the virtue Benevolence, an( l the duty Fraternity or Brotherliness. I use these terms, of course, very generally, to cover much more than c ^ c excellence in the one case, and than what is ordin- ari1 ^ called " Philanthropy " in the other. Whenever I do ' not repress another personality, but allow it room to develop, I am Just to it; whenever, in any of the senses above suggested, I help another in the fulfilment of his moral task, I exercise towards him the virtue of Benevolence. There is the same kind of relation between Justice and Benevolence in the social life as between Temper- ance and Culture in the individual. As self-discipline is the presupposition of a true self -development, so is Justice the presupposition of a true Benevolence. This logical priority is also a practical priority. We must be just before we can be generous. We earn the higher power by our faithful exercise of the lower. This is obvious enough in the case of political action ; the phil- anthropy of the State must be founded in Justice, the THE SOCIAL LIFE. 289 interests of Security form the basis of the interests of Well-being. Indeed, the Benevolence of the State is really a higher Justice. But the principle is not less true of the relations of individuals to one another ; here, too, Benevolence is only Justice made perfect. When the parent, out of a full heart and without a thought of self-interest, does his best for his child, when friend acts thus by friend, or teacher by scholar, what is each doing but striving to mete out to the other the full measure of a perfect Justice ? More or higher than that, no man can ask from another and no man can give to his fellow. The distinction, though so convenient, is artificial ; it is one of those division-lines which, since they do not exist in reality, disappear with a deeper insight into the nature of things. Most pernicious have been the effects of the neglect of the true relation of priority in which Justice stands to Benevolence. The Christian morality, as actually preached and practised, has been largely chargeable with this misinterpretation. " Charity " has been magnified as the grand social virtue, and has been interpreted as a " giving of alms " to the poor, a doing for them of that which they are unable to do for themselves, an allevia- tion, more or less temporary, of the evils that result from the misery of their worldly circumstances. But this " charity " has coexisted with the utmost injustice to those who have been its objects. Instead of attacking the stronghold of the enemy the poverty itself, the shameful inequality of conditions the Church as a social institution, and individuals in their private capacity or in other forms of association, have apparently accepted the evil as per- manent and inevitable, or have even welcomed it as the great T 290 THE MORAL LIFE. opportunity of the moral life. It has been assumed that we must always have the poor with us, and their poverty has been regarded as a splendid field for the exercise of the virtue of benevolence. Yet a moment's reflection will convince us that this virtue cannot find its exercise in the field of injustice : the only field for its development is one which has been prepared for it by the sharp ploughshare of a thoroughgoing justice. Injustice and Benevolence cannot dwell together; and when justice has done its perfect work, there will be little left for the elder " phil- anthropy" to do, and "charity" will be apt to find its occupation gone. When the causes of distress have been removed, the distress itself will not have to be relieved, and benevolence will find its hands free for other and better work. When all have justice, those who now need help will be independent of it, and men will learn at last that the best help one can give to another is " to help him to help himself." It is because we have really given our fellows less than justice that we have seemed to give them more. For what is Justice ? Is it not to recognise in one's fellow-man an Alter Ego, and to love one's neighbour as oneself ? Is it not the principle of moral equality that each shall " count for one, and no one for more than one" ? And when we remember that the reckoning is to be made not merely in terms of physical life or of material well- being, but in terms of personality; that we are called upon to treat our fellow-man as literally another " self," and to take towards him, as far as may be, his own atti- tude towards himself, do we not find that such Equality is synonymous with Fraternity, that others are in very THE SOCIAL LIFE. 291 truth our " fellows " and our " brothers " in the moral life? Might it not be less misleading to speak only of Justice in the social relations of negative and positive Justice than of Justice and Benevolence ? The fact of the essential identity of Justice and Benev- olence suggests that they have a common sphere. That sphere is the social, and more particularly the political life. Yet here also there is a distinction within the identity. While both virtues may be exercised in the political sphere, it is of the genius 'of Justice to spend itself upon the community, of Benevolence to single out the individual. The peculiar sphere of Benevolence or the highest justice is that of private and domestic life, and of the non-political association of individuals. The characteristically individual nature of this aspect of virtue was recognised by the Greeks, whose name for it was " Friendship." So far is the conception carried that Aristotle is led to question whether one can have more than one true " friend," whether it is possible to stand in this relation of perfect fellowship to more than one individual ; for hardly shall we find more than one alter ego, happy indeed are we if we find even one. The modern conception is that of universal Love or " Human- ity." But the essence of the virtue is the same in both cases, " brotherliness " or " fellowship." This conception signalises that intimateness of the relation which converts Justice into Benevolence or imperfect into perfect Justice. Where Justice insists upon the " equality " of men in virtue of their common personality, Benevolence seizes t the individuality in each. Benevolence is more just than * Justice, because it is enlightened by the insight into that 292 THE MORAL LIFE. " inequality " and uniqueness of individuals, which is no less real than the " equality " of persons. 4. It is in the case of Benevolence especially that we realise the necessity of the regulation or moralisation of the original natural impulse or affection. Whether we take the promptings of the parent, of the friend, of the patriot, or of the philanthropist, we see that altruistic impulse is originally as blind as egoistic, and needs, no less than the latter, the illumination of reason. "We need the wisdom of rational insight into the Good of another, if we are to aid him in any measure in the attainment of it, and all our benevolent activity must be informed and directed by this insight. Without such guidance, we can- not be really " kind " to another. Unwise kindness is not kindness, that, for example, of the " indulgent " parent, teacher or friend, of blind philanthropy, of indiscriminate charity. The vice of such conduct is that it destroys the self-reliance and self-dependence of the individual so blindly "loved." The only true benevolence is that which helps another to help himself, which, by the very aid it gives, inspires in the recipient a new sense of his own responsibility, and stirs him to a better life. It is amazing how potent for good is such a true benevo- lence. It seems to touch the very springs of the moral life. By this intimate apprehension of a brother's nature and a brother's task, it may be given to us to stir within him the dying embers of a faith and hope blighted by failure after failure, and to reawaken in him the old high purpose and ideal of his life. The fact that some one else has a real and unwavering confidence in him, sees still THE SOCIAL LIFE. 293 in him the lineaments of a complete and noble manhood, will inspire such a man with new strength, born of a new hope. There was once a Purpose in his life, but it has long ago escaped his grasp, and seems for ever frustrated ; what once was possible seems possible no longer, his life is broken and can never again be whole. But one comes who reminds him of that former and truer Self, and reawakens in him the old ideal. The way back may be long and difficult, but the sight of the goal, even at such a distance and up such steeps, will give the traveller strength for the journey. What does he not owe to him who shows him the open path ? Zaccheus, the " publican and sinner," owed his " salvation " so far as this can be a debt to him who reminded him that, in his deepest nature and best possibility, he was still a " son of Abra- ham " ; and others who had fallen lowest, when they heard from the same wise and tender lips, instead of the scath- ing condemnation they had feared, the words of a deeper insight and a larger hope, " Neither do I condemn thee," were filled with a new strength to obey the authoritative command : " Go, and sin no more." It must have been this grand insight, this hand of brotherly sympathy and sublime human hope, stretched out to raise a fallen humanity to his own ideal of it, that made tolerable that Teacher's scathing exposure of every hidden evil. And even in the ordinary course and less grave occa- sions of human life, we must acknowledge the power for good that lies in a sympathetic appreciation of another's task, and of his capabilities for its discharge. The parent may thus discover in the child possibilities which had else remained undiscovered an^j^realised. The teacher may 294 THE MORAL LIFE. thus discover in the pupil the potential thinker, scholar, artist, and awaken in him the hope and ambition which shall be a lifelong inspiration. Here is the moral value of optimism and enthusiasm as contrasted with pessimism and cynicism. If we would help another, in this high sense of helpfulness, we must believe deeply, and hope strenuously, and bear courageously the disappointment of our expectations and desires. The gloomy severity of condemnation, unlit by any ray of hope of better things, which marks the Puritanical temper, will crush a life which might otherwise have been lifted up to a higher plane. What many a struggling soul needs most of all is a little more self-reliance and buoyancy of hope, and the know- ledge that another had confidence in him would breed a new confidence in himself. Why leave unspoken the word of encouragement or praise which might mean so much of good to him, out of the foolish fear of nourishing in him that quality of self-conceit which may be entirely ab- sent from his character ? Aristotle's observation was that most men suffered from the opposite fault of " mean-spirit- edness," and a deficient appreciation of their own powers. This true benevolence means getting very near to our fellow-man, becoming indeed his fellow, identifying our- selves with him. It means the power of sympathy. We are apt to be so external to one another, and " charity " is so easily given : we must give ourselves. We must put ourselves alongside our fellow, enter into his life and make it our own, if we would understand it. For such understanding of another's life, such a right appreciation of another's task, is not easy. It is apt to seem a gift of moral genius rather than a thing which may be learned. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 295 The perfection of it is found in love and in true friend- ship, where a man finds an alter ego in another, and perhaps, as Aristotle says, it is only possible to have one such friend. But there is a great call for the quality, in some measure of it, in all the relations of life ; without it no true benevolence is possible. 5. Such benevolence implies self-sacrifice; we cannot Benevo- lence and thus serve others, and at the same time always serve our- Culture. selves. The altruistic principle of life does sometimes con- flict with the egoistic, even in its highest form. The ques- tion, therefore, inevitably arises, How far ought self-sacrifice to go ? How far ought devotion to the interests of others to supersede the individual's devotion to his own highest interest ? This is a peculiarly modern difficulty, and arises from the new spirit of altruism which Christianity has brought into our ethical life and thought. To the Greeks the question did not arise at all. They did not contemplate the possibility of any real conflict between the individual and the social Good ; for them it was an axiom of the moral life that the individual received back with interest that which he gave to the State. In the Hellenic State, of course, many gave without receiving; but they were not regarded as citizens, nor did their life enter into the ethical problem. The many existed for the few, but the few existed for themselves. A life of complete self- culture was the Greek ideal, and one could never be called upon to sacrifice any part of this life for the sake of " doing good " to his fellow-men. But Christianity, with its watchwords of " service " and " philanthropy," has forced us to realise with a new intensity and rigour of 296 THE MORAL LIFE. conviction the claim of others upon our life, and has left no part of our life exempt from the claim. Self- sacrifice, rather than self-realisation, has become the prin- ciple of life, and the relation of the one principle to the other has become the most baffling problem of ethical thought. How far shall self-sacrifice be carried, and how far does a loyal and thorough-going self-sacrifice interfere with a true and faithful self-realisation ? In the case of devotion to the State, we must say that, while the life of true citizenship may mean for the indi- vidual a willingness to die for his country's good, and while the rightful service of the citizen must always far transcend the limits of a virtue which calculates returns, yet the State can never legitimately demand of the indi- vidual a moral sacrifice, or ask him to be false to his own ideals of life. The State, being an ethical institution, can- not, without contradicting its own nature, contradict the ethical nature of the individual. And what is true of the State is true of all other institutions, as the Family and the Church. In the case of all institutional life, however, the same question arises as in the individual relations viz., How far is the individual called upon to sink his own well-being in that of others ? That all may have the opportunity of true self-culture, many an opportunity of self-culture must be sacrificed by the few. The very possi- bility of social progress implies such sacrifice on the part of the existing society for the sake of the generations to come. And often friend must be willing to make this sacrifice for friend, and parent for child, and teacher for scholar, and neighbour for neighbour. Whether the sacrifice shall ulti- mately be compensated in a richer and completer life for THE SOCIAL LIFE. 297 the individual who has made it, is a question which proba- bly must remain unanswered ; but the willingness to make the sacrifice, without the certainty or even the likelihood of compensation, would seem to be of the very essence of the highest goodness we know. That the dualism be- tween the good of others and of self must remain per- manently unsolved, we can hardly think. In part, indeed, we have already seen that the best service to others is the true service of ourselves, that the most effective method of doing good is to le good, that the truest care for others is to keep carefully the vineyard of our own nature. We must also recognise that since service implies the " gift " to serve, and there is an endless " diversity of gifts," he who finds his peculiar work and mission for others finds that into which he can put himself, the channel for the expression of his individual capacities, the sphere of his self-realisation. And when we remember that the Good of the moral life is not a merely individual and exclusive Good, but universal and identical in all, the postulate of an ultimate harmony between the life of Benevolence and the life of Culture becomes a datum of our faith in the reason- ableness of things. II. The Social Organisation of Life : the Ethical Basis and Functions of the State. 6. The moral life, on its social side, organises itself in The social certain external forms generally described as the ethical tion of life: institutions e.g., the Family, the State, the Church. The mstitu- total social organisation may be called Society, and the c iety and" most important of its special forms that which in a sense tt 298 THE MORAL LIFE. includes all the others is the political organisation, or the State. Since man is by nature and in his ethical life a social being, he is inevitably also a " political " being (tyov iroKiTiKov). The question is thus raised, What is the true form of social organisation ? and, more particularly, What is the ethical basis and function of the State ? How far should society become political ? The classical world, we may say, had no idea of a non- political society ; to it Society and the State were synony- mous terms, the social life was a life of citizenship. The distinction between Society and the State is a modern one. The Greek State was an adequate and satisfying social sphere for the individual ; he wanted no other life than that of citizenship, and could conceive no perfect life for him- self in any narrower social world than that of the State. So perfect was the harmony between the individual and the State that any dissociation of the one from the other contradicted the individual's conception of ethical com- pleteness. It is to this sense of perfect harmony, this deep and satisfying conviction that the State is the true and sufficient ethical environment of the individual, that we owe the Greek conception of the grand significance of the State. Our modern antithesis of the individual and the State is unknown ; the individual apart from the State is to the Greek an unethical abstraction. The ethical individual is, as such, a citizen ; and the measure of his ethical perfection is found in the perfection of the State of which he is a citizen, and in the perfection of his citizenship. We find this characteristic Greek conception carried to its consummation in the ' Eepublic ' of Plato. This is at once a treatise on politics and on ethics, on the THE SOCIAL LIFE. 299 State and on Justice. Plato's problem is to find the ideal State, or the perfect sphere of the perfect life. The good man shall be the good citizen of the good State, and with- out the outer or political excellence the inner or ethical excellence is of little avail. The just man is not an iso- lated product, he is not even " self-made " ; he grows up in the perfect State, and unconsciously takes on the colour of its laws ; he is its scholar, and even in the inmost centres of his life he feels its beneficent control. To separate him- self from it in any particular were ethical suicide ; to seek to have a " private life," or to call anything " his own," were to destroy the very medium of his moral being, to seek to play his part without a stage on which to play it. That is to say, social organisation is necessary to the perfection of the individual life, and the only perfect social organisa- tion is the communistic State, which directly and immedi- ately controls the individual, and recognises no rights, individual or social, but its own. But the growing complexity of the ethical problem, the growing perception of the significance of personality, and the growing dissatisfaction with the State as the ethical sphere of the individual, led even the Greeks themselves to a revision of their view of the relation of the individual to the State. Greek ethics close with the cry of individualism and cosmopolitanism. The State proved its ethical insufficiency, as the individual discovered his ethical self-sufficiency ; the outward failure co-operated with the deeper inward reflection, to effect the transition from the ancient to the modern standpoint. Christianity, with its universal philanthropy, its obliter- ation of national distinctions, its insistence upon the 300 THE MORAL LIFE. absolute value of the individual, its deeper and intenser appreciation of personality, added its new strength to the forces already in operation. The political societies of the ancient world were gradually supplanted by a Cath- olic ecclesiastical society. The Church to a large extent displaced the State, and reasserted on its own behalf the State's exclusive claim upon the life of the individual. Controversy was thus inevitably aroused as to the respec- tive jurisdictions of Church and State. The Family, too, acquired a new importance and a new independence. The break-down of Feudalism the political order of the Middle Age was followed by the break-down of its ecclesiastical order also, and the individual at last stood forth in all the importance of his newly acquired inde- pendence. Our modern history has been the story of the gradual emancipation of the individual from the control of the State, and its product has been an individualism in theory and in practice which represents the opposite extreme from the political socialism of the classical world. The principle of individual liberty has taken the place of the ancient principle of citizenship. We have become very jealous for the rights of the individual, very slow to recognise the rights of the State. Its legitimate activity has been reduced to a minimum, it has been assigned a merely regulative or " police " function, and has been regarded only as a kind of balance-wheel of the social machine. Not that the individual has emancipated him- self from society. That is only part of the historical fact ; it is no less true that the various extra-political forms of social organisation have assumed functions formerly discharged by the State. But the result is THE SOCIAL LIFE. 301 the same in either case viz., the narrowing of the sphere of the State's legitimate activity. Various forces have conspired to bring about a revision of this modern theory of the State in its relation to the individual and to the other forms of social organisation. The interests of security have been threatened by the development of the principle of individual liberty to its extreme logical consequences in Anarchism and Nihilism, the very life, as well as the property, of the individual i& seen to be endangered by the gradual disintegration of the State, and the strong arm of the civil power has come to seem a welcome defence from the misery of subjection to the incalculable caprice of "mob-rule." Individualism has almost reached its reductio ad absurdum ; the prin- ciple of the mere particular has, here as elsewhere, proved itself to be a principle of disintegration. That each shall be allowed to live for himself alone is seen to be an impossible and contradictory conception. Experience has taught us that the State is the friend of the individual, securing for him that sacred sphere of individual liberty which, if not thus secured, would soon enough be entered and profaned by other individuals. The evils of a non- political or anti- political condition of "atomic" individ- ualism have been brought home to us by stern experi- ences and by the threatenings of experiences even sterner and more disastrous. The complications which have resulted from industrial competition, the new difficulties of labour and capital which have come in the train of Laissez faire, have lent their strength to emphasise the conviction that the State, instead of being the worst enemy, is the true friend of the 302 THE MORAL LIFE. individual. The doctrine of the non-interference by the State with the industrial life of the individual has pretty nearly reached its reduction to absurdity. The evils of unlimited and unregulated competition have thrown into clear relief the advantages of co-operation ; the superior- ity of organised to unorganised activity has become mani- fest. And what more perfect form, it is said, can the organisation of industry take than the political ? Only through the nationalisation of industry, it is felt in many quarters, can we secure that liberty and equality which capitalism has destroyed : only by making the State the common guardian, can we hope for an emancipation from that industrial slavery which now degrades and im- poverishes the lives of the masses of our citizens. Capitalism has given us a plutocracy which is as bane- ful as any political despotism the world has seen ; \ve have escaped from the serfdom of the feudal State only to fall into the new serfdom of an unregulated industrialism. The evils of leaving everything to " private enterprise " force themselves upon attention, especially in the case of what are generally called " public interests " those branches of activity which obviously affect all alike, such as the means of communication, railways, roads, and tele- graphs. A more careful reflection, however, discovers a certain " public " value in all forms of industry, even in those which are apparently most " private." That mutual industrial dependence of each on all and all on each, in which Plato found the basis of the State, has once more come to constitute a powerful plea for the necessity of political organisation, and we have a new State-Socialism THE SOCIAL LIFE. 303 which maintains that the equal interests of each can be conserved only by the sacrifice of all private interests to the public interest, that only by disallowing the distinc- tion between meum and tuum, and identifying the interest of each with that of all, can we hope to establish the reign of justice among men. One other force has contributed to the change of stand- point which we are considering namely, the changed conception of the State itself. The progress towards indi- vidual freedom has at the same time been a progress towards the true form of the State ; and as the oligar- chical and despotic have yielded to the democratic type of government, it has been recognised that the State is not an alien force imposed upon the individual from without, but that, in their true being, the State and the individual are identical. Upon the ruins of the feudal State the individual has at length built for himself a new State, a form of government to which he can yield a willing obedi- ence, because it is the creation of his own will, and, in .obeying it, he is really obeying himself. L'ttat cest moi. Such causes as these have led to the return, in our own time, to the classical conception of the State and its func- tions, and to the substitution of the question of the rights of the State for the question of the rights of the indi- vidual. The tendency of contemporary thought and effort is, on the whole, to extend the political organisation of society, to socialise the State or to nationalise Society. What, then, we are forced to ask, is the ethical basis of the State ? What, in its principle and idea, is it ? If we can answer this question of the ethical basis of the State, we shall not find much difficulty in determining, 304 THE MORAL LIFE. on general lines, its ethical functions, whether negative or positive, whether in the sphere of Justice or in that of Benevolence. is the 7. From an ethical standpoint the State must be re- EnViu- 11 garded as a means, not as in itself an end. The State exists for the sake of the person, not the person for the sake of the State. The ethical unit is the person ; and the mission of the State is not to supersede the person, but to aid him in the development of his personality to give him room and opportunity. It exists for him, not he for it ; it is his sphere, the medium of his ethical life. Here there is no real difference between the ancient and the modern views of the State ; in principle they are at one. For Plato and Aristotle, as for ourselves, the_State is the sphere of the ethical life, the true State is the com- plement of the true individual, his proper milieu. The Greek State, it is true, as it actually existed and even as Plato idealised it, contradicts, in some measure, our conception of personality; but it did not contradict the Greek conception of personality. From our modern stand- point, we find it inadequate for two reasons. It exists only for the few, the many exist for it ; the Greek State is, in our view, an exclusive aristocracy, from the privi- leges of whose citizenship the majority are excluded. Yet, in the last analysis, we find that the end for which the State exists is the person ; those who exist merely for the State are not regarded as persons. If the Greeks could have conceived the modern extension of personality, it is safe to say that they would have entirely agreed with the modern interpretation of the relation of the THE SOCIAL LIFE. 305 State to the individual. Then, in the second place, it is to be noted that, with all their intellectual and aesthetic appreciation, the Greeks had not yet so fully discovered the riches of the ethical life. With our profounder appre- ciation of the significance of personality, the merely in- strumental value of the State is more clearly perceived. But to those who did reflect upon its essential nature, the Greek State also was a creation of the ethical spirit, the great ethical institution. The ancient, as well as the modern State, based its right to the loyal service of its citizens upon the plea that, in serving it, the individual was really serving himself ; that, in giving up even his all to it and counting nothing " his own," he would receive from it a return of full and joyous life out of all proportion to what he gave. It is only when we reflect, however, that we discover this instrumental nature of the State. In our ordinary unreflective thought we are the victims of the association of ideas, and in this, as in so many other cases, we confuse the means with the end. It is a case of the familiar " miser's consciousness." As the miser comes to think of money, because of its supreme instrumental importance, as an end in itself, and to regard the real ends of life as only means to this fictitious end, so does the citizen come to regard the State, because of its supreme importance as the medium of the ethical life, as itself the end, and him- self as but its instrument. Yet it is the function of a medium to mediate and fulfil, not to negate and destroy, that which it mediates ; and whenever we reflect we see that thelrue function of_the-State is to mediate and fulfil the personal life of the citizen. This theoretic insight is, u 306 THE MORAL LIFE. of course, not necessary to the life of citizenship ; we may most truly use the State for this highest end, when we act under the impulse of an unreflecting and uncalculating loyalty to the State itself. But the very fact that we can thus serve the State without disloyalty to our highest Self implies . that we are not serving two masters, that the only master of our loyal service is the ethical and personal Ideal. The ultimate sanction and measure of political obedience is found in the ethical value of the State as the vehicle of the personal life of its citizens. The true relation of the State to the individual has been obscured in modern discussion by the constant an- tithesis of " State-action " and " Individualism." The an- tithesis is inevitable, so long as we regard the individual as a mere individual. So regarded, he is like an atom that resists the intrusion of every other atom into its place ; the mere individual is anti-social and anti-political, and to " socialise " or " nationalise " him is to negate and destroy him. His life is one of "go-as-you-please," of absolute laissez faire. But the ethical unit is not such a mere atomic individual, but the person who is social and political as well as individual, and whose life is forwarded and fulfilled, rather than negated, by the political and other forms of social organisation. To cut him off from others, to isolate him, would be to maim and stunt his life. That the State has seemed to encroach upon the life of the ethical person, is largely due to the constant use of the term " State-interference." In so far as the State may be said to " interfere," it is only with the individual, not with the person ; and the purpose of its " interference " always is to save the person from the interference of other THE SOCIAL LIFE. 307 individuals. Neither the State nor the individual is the ultimate ethical end and unit, but the person. " The State at best is the work of man's feeble hands, working with unsteady purpose ; the person, with all his claims, is the work of God." 1 What is called " State-interference " is in reality the maintenance of this ethical possibility, the making room for the life of the person. If all individuals were left to themselves, they would not leave each other to themselves ; but individual would encroach upon individual, and none would have the full opportunity of ethical self-realisation. 8. Just here lies the ethical problem of the basis of the The ethical State. The essence of the State is Sovereignty, and the the state. maintenance of the Sovereign Power through control or coercion. In order that each may have freedom of self- development, each must be restrained in certain ways. Is not the process ethically suicidal ? Is not the personality destroyed in the very act of allowing it freedom of self- development ? Does not State - control supplant Self- control, the sovereignty of the State the sovereignty of Personality ? Does not the political negate the ethical life, and the State constrain the person to act impersonally ? Two extreme answers are offered to this question. The first is the answer of Anarchism, the refusal of the self to acknowledge any control from without. This is the answer of pure Individualism, and confuses liberty with licence. The individual who refuses to acknowledge any obligations to other individuals, and denies the right of society to control his life, will not control himself. The 1 Professor Laurie, ' Ethica,' 69 (second ed.) 7BESITY 308 THE MORAL LIFE. life of individuals who refuse to become " political," will be a " state of war," if not so absolute as Hobbes has pictured it, yet deplorable enough to teach its possessors the distinction between liberty and licence, and to awaken in them the demand for that deliverance from the evils of unrestrained individualism which comes only with the strong arm of law and government. The other answer is that of Despotism, which allows no freedom to the individ- ual. This would obviously de- personalise man, and, de- priving him of his ethical prerogative of self-government, would make him the mere instrument or organ of the Sovereign Power. Do these alternative extremes exhaust the possibilities of the case ? Is Despotism the only escape from Anarchy; can we not have liberty without licence ? It seems at first as if there were no third possibility, as if the very existence of the State, of Law, of Government, carried with it a derogation from the personal life of tlie citizen. So far as its dominion extends, the State seems to take the management of his life out of the individual's hands, and to manage it for him. Another Will seems to impose its behests upon the individual Will or Person, and he becomes its creature and servant ; losing his self- mastery, he is controlled and mastered by another Will. " It is the specific function of Government to impose upon the individual, in apparent violation of his claim to free self-determination, an alien Will, an alien Law. . . . Preach- ers and teachers try to instruct us as to what course our own highest reason approves, and to persuade us to follow that course. When they have failed, Government steps in and says : ' Such and such are the true principles of justice. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 309 I command you to obey them. If you do not, I will punish you.'" 1 Autonomy is of the essence of the moral life, it is essentially a personal life. But the very existence of the State seems to imply Heteronomy, or an impersonal life in the citizens. The difficulty does not arise, it is to be observed, from the artificiality of the State, or from the natural egoism of human nature. Let us admit that the State itself is the product and creation of the human spirit, that man is by nature a political being, i.e., a being whose life naturally tends to the political form. The question is whether the human spirit is not imprisoned in its own creation, whether the ethical life is not lost in the political, autonomy in heteronomy. The first thing to be noted is, that the imposition of the Will of another upon the individual does not destroy the individual Will. We are apt to think of the divine Will as so imposed, of certain restrictions as laid by the very nature of things upon the life of the individual ; yet we do not find in this any infraction of human Personality or Will. All that is imposed is a certain form of outward activity, the inward movement of the Will is not necessarily touched. Thus, all that is enforced by the political Will or the Sovereign Power is outward obedience, not the inward obedience of the Will itself. It is for the individual to say whether he will complete the outward surrender by the inward self -surrender. He may render either an out- ward conformity or an inward conformity, the act re- quired may be performed either willingly or unwillingly. The appeal is to the Will or Personality, but it is for the Will to respond or not to the appeal. What is coerced is 1 Taylor, ' The Right of the State to Be,' 44. 310 THE MORAL LIFE. the expression of the individuality in outward act ; the citizen is not allowed to act (outwardly) as the creature of ungoverned impulse. Not that the task of self-control is taken out of his hands, or his individuality mastered by another will or personality rather than by his own. The mastery of the State extends only to the expression of individual impulse in the corresponding outward activ- ities. He may still cherish those impulsive tendencies the expression of which on the field of overt activity has been re- strained, as the criminal so often does cherish his criminal instincts and habits, notwithstanding the outward repres- sion. The criminal may remain a criminal, though the State prevents his commission of further crime. He can- not be mastered by another, but only by himself; it is for himself alone, by an act of voluntary choice, to say whether he will remain a criminal or not. By its punishments, the State not merely restrains the outward activity of its citizens ; it -further, by touching the individual sensibility, appeals to the person to exer- cise that self-restraint which is alone permanently effec- tive. It is for the person to say whether he. will or will not exercise such self-restraint. Just in so far as he re-enacts the verdict of the State upon his life, or recog- nises the justice of its punishment, just in so far as he identifies his will with the will that expresses itself in the punishment, and what was the will of another becomes his own will, is the result of such treatment permanently,, and thoroughly, and in the highest sense successful. When the person has thus taken the reins of the government of sensibility into his own hands, political coercion ceases to be necessary. The will now expresses itself in the act,. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 311 the dualism of inward disposition and outward deed has disappeared, and the life is, even in these particulars, a personal life. Thus interpreted, the coercion of the State is seen to be an extension of the coercion of Nature. Nature itself disallows certain lines of activity, does not permit us to follow every impulse. The organisation of life in political society implies a farther restraint upon individual ten- dencies to activity, a certain farther organisation or co- ordination of the outward activities. But the organisation and co-ordination of the impulsive tendencies to activity, this is in the hands not of the State but of the individual will. The right of the State to coerce the individual, in the sense indicated, is grounded in the fact that it exists for the sake of the interests of personality. As these interests are superior in right to the interests of mere individual caprice, so are the laws of the State superior to the instincts and impulses of the individual. The State restrains the expression of the individuality that it may vindicate the sacred rights of personality in each individual. Its order is an improvement upon the order of nature; it is more discriminating, more just, more encouraging to virtue, more discouraging to vice. The civil order foreshadows the moral order itself; it is a " version," the best available for the time and place and circumstances, of that order. And although the action of the State seems at first sight to be merely coercive, and its will the will of an- other, a closer analysis reveals the fundamental identity of the State, in its idea at least, with the ethical Person. The sovereign will represents the individual will, or 312 THE MORAL LIFE. rather the " general will," of the individual citizens. Here, in the general will of the people, in the common per- sonality of the citizens, is the true seat of sovereignty. The actual and visible sovereign or government is rep- resentative of this invisible sovereign. The supreme power in the State, whatever be the form of government, is therefore, truly regarded, the " public person," and, in obeying it, the citizens are really obeying their common personality. The Sovereign Power is " the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be con- sidered as the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth ; " " and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law." l Obedience to the State is obedience to the citizen's own better self, and, like Socrates, we ought not to " disobey a better." The apparent heteronomy is really autonomy in disguise ; I am, after all, sovereign as well as subject, subject of my own legislation. The right of the State is, therefore, supreme, being the right of person- ality itself. ' For the individual to assert his will against the will of the State is ethically suicidal. ) Socrates went willingly to death, because he could not live and obey the State rather than God ; he accepted " the will of the people " that he should die. Death was for him the only path of obedience to both the outward and the inward " better." The individual may criticise the political order, as an inadequate version of the moral order. He may try to improve upon and " reform " it. He may even " obey God rather than man," and refuse the inner obedience of the will. But, where the State keeps within its proper function, he may not openly violate its order. 1 Locke, ' Treatise of Civil Government,' Bk. ii. ch. 13. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 313 9. If the State should step beyond its proper function, and The limit invade instead of protecting the sphere of personality ; if action. the actual State should not merely fall short of but con- tradict the ideal, then the right of rebellion belongs to the subject. If a revolution has become necessary, and if such revolution can be accomplished only by rebellion, rebellion takes the place of obedience as the duty of the citizen. Even in his rebellion he is still a citizen, loyal to the law and constitution of the ideal State which he seeks by his action to realise. This contradiction may occur in either of two ways. In the first place, the Sovereign Power may not be repre- sentative or " public," but may act as a private person or body of persons. As Locke again says : " When he quits this public representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and without will that has any right to obedience the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society." The true sovereign must count nothing his own, must have no private in- terests in his public acts ; his interests must be those of the people, and their will his. If he acts otherwise, as- serting his own private will, and subordinating the good of the citizens to his own individual good, he thereby uncrowns himself, and abnegates his sovereignty. Then comes the time for the exercise of the " supreme power that remains still in the people." The necessity of the English and the French Eevolution, for example, lay in the fact that the actual State contradicted the ideal, seek- ing to destroy those rights of personality of which it ought to have been the custodian, and to which it was called to 314 THE MORAL LIFE. give an account of its stewardship. At such a time the common Personality, in whose interest the State exists, must step forth, assert itself against the so-called " State," and, condemning the actual, give birth to one that shall be true to its own idea, that shall help and not hinder its citizens in their life of self-realisation. The power re- turns to its source, the " general will," which is thus forced to find for itself a new and more adequate expression. This brings us to the second form of the contradiction between the actual and the ideal State. When the present formulation of the general will has become inadequate, it must be re-formulated ; and this re-formulation of its will by the people may also mean revolution as well as reform- ation. The actual sovereign or government is the steward of that power whose real seat is in the will of the people, and may be called before that bar to give an account of its stewardship. Such a criticism and modification of the State is indeed always going on, " public opinion " is always more or less active, and more or less articulate, and it is the function of the Statesman to interpret, as well as to guide and form, this " public opinion." : As long as there is harmony between the " general will " and the will of the government, as long as the govern- ment is truly " representative " of the governed, so long the State exists and prospers. V As soon as there is discord, and the government ceases to "represent" the general will, so soon does a new delegation of sovereignty become necessary. " Emperors, kings, councils, and parliaments, or any combinations of them, are only the temporary representatives of something that is greater than they." l 1 D. G. Ritchie, ' Principles of State Interference,' 69. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 315 " The acts of the government in every country which is not on the verge of a revolution are not the acts of a minority of individuals, but the acts of the uncrowned and in- visible sovereign, the spirit of the nation itself." 1 In the very indeterminateness of the general will, in the fact that no one of its determinations or definitions of itself is final, that no actualisation of it exhausts its potentiality or fixes it in a rigid and unchanging form ; that, like an organ- ism, it grows and in its growth is capable of adapting itself always to its new conditions ; that, like the indi- vidual will, it learns by experience and allows its past to determine its present, lies the undying strength and vitality of that invisible State which persists through all the changing forms of its visible manifestation. 10. The State, being the medium of the ethical life of The ethical the individual, has two ethical functions : (1) the negative function of securing to the individual the opportunity of ( a self-realisation, by protecting him from the encroachments of other individuals or of non-political forms of society the function of Justice ; (2) the positive improvement of the conditions of the ethical life for each of its citi- zens the function of Benevolence. In the exercise of the former function, the State cares for the interests of " being," in the exercise of the latter it cares for the in- terests of " well-being " ; and as the interests of " being " or " security " precede in imperativeness those of " well- being," so is the political duty of Justice prior to that of Benevolence. In the case of the State, as in that of the in- dividual, however, the one duty passes imperceptibly into 1 ' Principles of State Interference/ 74. 316 THE MORAL LIFE. the other, and Benevolence is seen to be only the higher Justice. This relation of the positive to the negative function suggests, what a closer consideration makes very plain, that there is no logical basis for the limitation of State-action to Justice, and that these* who would thus limit it are seeking artificially to arrest the life of the State at the stage of what we may call the lower Justice. Even at this stage the activity of the State is, in its essence, the same as it is at the higher stages of that activity. Even here the function is not a mere " police " one ; even here the State " interferes " with the individual. To protect the individual from the aggression of other individuals and of society, the State must " interfere " with the individual, and be in some considerable measure " aggressive/' Already the imagined " sphere " of sheer independent and private individuality has been penetrated, and the right of the State to act within that "sphere" established. While it is true that the preservation of the integrity of the individual life implies a large measure of freedom from government control, it is also true that the only way to secure such freedom for the individual is by a large measure of such control. If other individuals and non-political society are not to encroach upon the individual and destroy his freedom, the State must be allowed to encroach and set up its rule within the life of the individual. The tyranny of the individual and the tyranny of unofficial " public opinion " are not to be com- pared in evil with what some are pleased to call the " tyranny " of the State. The justification of " State-in- terference " in all its forms is, -as we have seen, that it is exercised in the interest of individual freedom. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 317 The fundamental limitation, as well as the fundamental vindication, of State-action is found in its ethical basis. Since the State exists as the medium of personal life, the limit of its action is reached at the point where it begins to encroach upon and negate the strictly personal life of the citizen. The State must maintain the life of the individual, not simply annex and take possession of it for itself ; it must not abolish but establish the life of the in- dividual. If the individual apart from the State is "as* good as nothing," a State in which the individual is lost is no true State. The best State is that in whose citizen- ship the individual most fully lives his own individual life, that which includes, and integrates in a higher and richer unity, the greatest number of individual elements, and, like an organism, incorporates in its own total life the t lives of its several members. The simplest State is likely to be the worst rather than the best, since in the best there must be room for indefinite differentiation without the loss of the State's integrity. The true unity is, here as elsewhere, unity in difference. The true political identity is that which, like the identity of the organism, conceals itself in endless differentiation of structure and function. If the idea of the State is not to be contradicted, room must be found in it for the ethical individual in all the wealth of his individual possibilities. Does not the State exist to provide the true sphere for the actualisation of these possibilities ? Take, for example, the question of the attitude of the State to individual " property." From of old the spell of the simple or communistic State has fascinated the im- agination of political speculators. It has seemed self- IVSKSIT7J _ . J 320 THE MORAL LIFE. of it is in my own hands ; I have the right of use and ex- change, as well as of possession. This right also the State must establish and interpret, not destroy. Yet it is often argued that, as the State ought to be the sole owner, so it ought to be the sole disposer of property ; that here again the individual life, instead of being maintained and reg- ulated, should be simply absorbed by the State. It is to be noted that, in thus limiting the functions of the State, we are not maintaining individualism in the ordinary sense of that term. The individual for whose sake the State exists is the ethical individual or the person, and his " security " from the encroachment of other individuals implies a large measure of State con- trol or " interference." The State must not only establish the right of the individual to " his own " and to the dis- position of " his own " ; it must also correct the abuses which are apt to occur in these spheres of the individual life. For it is as true in the life of ownership as in other spheres that " no man liveth to himself." The individual cannot isolate himself, even in these particulars of his conduct ; in them also his life has a public, as well as a private side. And if great possession, instead of being used as a great ethical opportunity, becomes an instru- ment of moral evil to other citizens, it is for the State to intervene and, it may be, to interdict. The rule is the constant one of guarding the security of personal rights. No criterion of amount can be laid down a priori, cer- tainly no rule of abstract " equality." But, when the individual owner abuses his rights as a proprietor, that is, where he so uses them as to injure the free and fruit- ful self-development of others, the State may step in. It THE SOCIAL LIFE. 321 is a case of punishment, and does not amount to a viola- tion of the rights of personality. It is the freaks of the man's individuality his greed, his laziness, his selfish indifference, that are punished (and the life of ownership is liable to such freaks like any other life), not the essen- tial and inviolable life of the person. The State may even generalise from its experience of the actual working of private ownership in the case of particular commodities and industries, of land, or of public services, and decide to nationalise them. The sphere of private ownership may thus be limited by the State, on the principle that the free and equal self-development of all its citizens is the treasure in its keeping. In comparison with this, the selfish satisfaction of the individual is of no account, and must be sacrificed. But the theory of Communism or State- Socialism, that the State shall be the sole pro- prietor, is suicidal, destroying as it does those very rights of personality which are the basis of the rights of pro- perty, and in the absence or annihilation of which the State itself, as an ethical institution, would have no ex- istence, or at least no raison d'Stre. A further limitation is set to the action of the State by the principle of the existence and freedom of other social institutions within it. The completely commun- istic or socialistic State would absorb into itself, along with the individual, all extra-political forms of associ- ation, and would identify Society with the State. Now, it is obvious that no form of social organisation can be, in an absolute sense, "extra-political," inasmuch as these minor societies must all alike be contained within the larger society which we call the State. They, like the 322 THE MORAL LIFE. individual, depend upon the State for their very existence. Yet each of these minor societies has a sphere of its own, which the State preserves from invasion by any of the others, and which the State itself must not invade. Each must be allowed to exercise its own peculiar functions, with due regard to the functions, equally rightful, of the others. Even the State must not usurp the functions of any other ethical institution. It has its genius, they have theirs ; and as they recognise its rights, it must recognise theirs also. The most important of these institutions within the State are the Family and the Church. The function of the State is not paternal, it does not stand in loco parentis to the citizen ; nor is its function ecclesiasti- cal, Church and State are not to be identified. The State is the guardian of these institutions ; but the very notion of such guardianship is that that which is guarded shall be maintained in its integrity, and allowed to fulfil its own proper work and mission for mankind. In the exercise of this guardianship, the State may be called upon to act vicariously for the institutions under its care ; but its further duty must always be, so to improve the conditions of institutional life, that that life shall pursue its own true course without interference or assistance from without. Institutions, like individuals, must be "helped to help themselves." Eor example, the State may be called upon not merely to superintend the institution of the Family, but to discharge duties which, in an ideal condition of things, would be performed by the parent. The State may also not merely recognise the right of ecclesiastical association, but even establish and endow an ecclesiastical society. All that is ethically imperative is that, within the Church THE SOCIAL LIFE. 323 and within the Family, freedom of initiation and self- development be allowed ; that each institution be permitted to work out its own career, and to realise its own peculiar genius. On the other hand, neither the Family nor the Church must be allowed to encroach upon the proper functions of the State ; here the State must defend its own prerogative. In general, the political, the domestic, and the ecclesiastical functions must be kept separate, since, however closely they may intertwine, each deals with a distinct aspect of human life. The final principle of limitation that which in a sense underlies the others mentioned is the principle of indi- vidual freedom. The State may not use the individual as its mere instrument or organ. In a sense, and up to a certain, point, it may and must do so ; only it must not appropriate, or altogether nationalise him. The industrial State, e.g., of many Socialists, would reduce the individual to a mere crank in the social or political machine. But if we thus destroy the proper life of the individual for himself, we undo the very work we are trying to do. Ultimately the State exists for the individual, and it is only because the individual some individual gets back with the interest of an added fulness and joy in life what the individual has given to the State in loyal service, that the service is ethically justified. The State has a tre- mendous and indefinite claim upon the citizen, but that claim is only the reflection of the individual's claim upon the State. The Socialism which neglects the individual side of this claim is no less unsound than the Anarchism which neglects its social side. The measure of the service which the State can demand of the individual is found in 324 THE MORAL LIFE. his manhood. If the individual is not an independent unit, neither is he a mere instrument for the production of national wealth. The true wealth or well-being of the nation lies in the well-being of its individual citizens ; and if this universal well-being can be reached only through that partial sacrifice of individual well-being which is im- plied in the discharge by the individual of the functions demanded by the State as a whole, the limit to such a demand is found in the right of the individual to the enjoyment of a return for his service in a higher and fuller capacity of life. In the language of political economy, the individual is a consumer as well as a producer, and even if in his latter capacity he were " exploited " by the State, he would still in the former have claims as an individual. It is probably because the emphasis is placed on the pro- duction, and the consumption is so largely ignored, that the communistic State proves so fascinating to many. But, in truth, regard must be had to the individual life in both these aspects, if it is not to suffer in both. The State, in short, must not demand the entire man ; to do so is to destroy its own idea. The most perfect State will be that in which there is least repression, and most en- couragement and development, of the free life of a full individuality in the citizens. 11. Within these ethical limits the State may do any- thing, and need count nothing human foreign to its province. The State has positive as well as negative functions ; it may set itself to effect the higher as well as the lower, the spiritual as well as the material, welfare of its citizens. There is, of course, no special virtue in THE SOCIAL LIFE. 325 the fact that a thing is done by the State rather than by some other agency. The reason for the exercise of the higher functions by the State is the practical one, that the action of the State is most effective and on the largest scale. The State, e.g., can care for the education of its citizens, as no individual or group of individuals can. We must remember also that the action of the State may be indirect as well as direct, local as well as central. What functions the State shall take upon itself in any particular country, how far it shall go in their discharge, and how long it shall continue to discharge them, these are ques- tions of practical politics, to be answered by the States- man, and not by the political philosopher. All that Ethics, in particular, can do is to formulate the ethical principles of State-action in general. How the negative function of the State passes into the positive, its activities of Justice into those of Benevolence, may be indicated in one or two of its chief aspects. The protection of the individual (or rather of the community of individuals) from the evils of ignorance implies, especi- ally in a democracy, the education of the citizens. Com- pulsory, and even under certain conditions free, education thus become necessities of political well-being ; and once the process of education has been undertaken by the State, it is difficult to say where it shall be abandoned. For the higher education, even though limited directly to the few, penetrates, perhaps no less effectively than the lower, the mass of the citizens and affects the common weal. Every loyal citizen may well, with John Knox, thank God for "another scholar in the land." Again, the permanent and thorough-going prevention of crime implies a concern 326 THE MORAL LIFE. for the positive ethical well-being of the criminal. Pun- ishment, in the older sense, is now seen to be a very inadequate method of social protection. The only way in which the State can permanently deter the criminal from crime is by undertaking his education as a moral being, and providing for him, as far as may be, the stimulus to goodness. Only in so far as punishment is reformative and educative, is it truly deterrent. Further than this, and still in the interests of " security," as well as those of well-being, the State must remove as far as possible the stimulus to crime that comes from extreme poverty; it must so far equalise the conditions of industrial life, as to secure to each citizen the opportunity of earning an honest livelihood. And, if it would prevent the general loss which comes from the existence of a pauper class, the State must take measures to secure the individual against the risk of becoming a burden to society ; by taking upon itself the burden of providing him with the opportunity of self-maintenance, it will save itself from the later and heavier burden of maintaining him. Since, also, the pro- gress of society must often mean a temporary injustice to the individual, the State must, again in its own per- manent interest, provide some remedy for this injustice. Social progress " costs " much, and it is for the State to reckon up these costs of progress, and, as far as possible, to make them good to its citizens. 1 The State must seek to maintain the equilibrium which progress seems always temporarily to disturb. 1 Cf. Professor H. C. Adams's suggestive article, entitled, " An Inter- pretation of the Social Movements of our Time," ' International Journal of Ethics,' October 1891. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 327 When, however, we realise the fuller meaning of the State as an ethical institution, nay, as the all-containing ethical institution, we see that it must go further than that indirect or secondary Benevolence which is implied in the lower or ordinary Justice. The sphere of the higher Justice or that of true Benevolence is part of the sphere of the State's legitimate activity. This higher justice means that all be provided with the opportunity of the ethical life which is so apt, even in our own^ civilisation, to be open only to the few. It is for the State to emancipate from the slavery of social condi- tions the toiling masses of society, to endow those who are citizens only in name with a real ethical citizen- ship, to make those who have neither part nor lot in the true life of humanity heirs of its wealth and partakers in its conquests. The development of our modern industrial system has given us back the essential evils of ancient slavery and of feudal serfdom in a new and, in many ways, an aggravated form. To the " working class," to the " hands," into which machinery and free competition have transformed the masses of our modern population to these the State must give not merely the political fran- chise, but the ethical franchise of a complete and worthy human life. As the custodian of the ethical interests, and not merely of the material interests of its citizens, the State must see that the former are not sacrificed to the latter. The political sphere, being the ethical sphere, in- cludes the industrial as it includes all others ; and while the industrial life ought to be allowed to follow its own economic laws in so far as such independence is consistent with ethical well-being, it is for the State to co-ordinate I7SR 328 THE MORAL LIFE. the industrial with the ethical life. Industry is an ethical activity, and must be regulated by ethical as well as by economic law ; there must be no schism in the body- politic. If men were mere brute agents, their lives as producers and consumers of wealth would, no doubt, be subject to economic law as undeviating as the law of nature ; but the fact that, as men, they are in all their activity moral beings, implies that even the economic world must come under the higher regulation of moral law. The State alone can enforce this higher regulation, and the advance from the theory of absolutely " free com- petition " or laissez faire to that of industrial co-operation and organisation is bringing us to the recognition of the ethical function of the State in the economic sphere. It is for the State to substitute for the " mob-rule " of un- ethical economic forces the steady rational control of ethical insight. In the words of Professor Adams, in the article already quoted : " Unless some way be discovered by which the deep ethical purpose of society can be brought to bear upon industrial questions, our magnificent material civilisation will crumble to ashes in our hands. ... A peace born of justice can never be realised by balancing brute force against brute force. . . . The ethical sense of society must be brought to bear in settling business affairs. . . . Above the interest of the contending parties stands the interest of the public, of which the State is the natural guardian, and one way to realise the ethical purpose of society in business affairs is, by means of legislation, to bring the ethical sense of society to bear on business affairs." This means, of course, " State- interference " with the industrial life of society ; but " by THE SOCIAL LIFE. 329 such interference society is not deprived of the advantages of competition, but the plane of competition is adjusted to the moral sense of the community." 1 This maintenance by the State of the true relation of economic to ethical good, of material to spiritual well- being, may take many forms. The ultimate measure of well-being having been found in the perfection of the development of the total nature of the individual, his instrumental value as a producer of wealth will be sub- ordinated to his essential and independent worth as a moral being; regard to the external and industrial cri- terion will be checked by regard to the internal and ethical. In this ultimate regard, all men will be seen to be equal; here, in the ethical sphere, will be found the true democracy. Class -interests do not exist here, the capitalist and the " day-labourer " stand here on the same level, and the true State will regard the interests of each alike. And if, even here, the highest well-being of all implies a certain sacrifice of well-being on the part of the individual, the State will see that such sacrifice does not go too far, that no citizen loses the reality of citizen- ship and sinks to the status of a slave or of a mere in- strument in the industrial machine, but that for each there is reserved a sufficient sphere of complete ethical living. If the preservation and development of the highest manhood of its citizens is the supreme duty of the State its ultimate raison d'etre an obvious case of this duty is the securing of a certain amount of leisure for all its citizens. The lowest classes those which are technically 1 'International Journal of Ethics,' October 1891. Cf. President Andrews's 'Wealth and Moral Law.' 330 THE MORAL LIFE. called the " working " classes need this leisure far more clamantly than the middle and higher classes. Their " work " is a far harder tyrant than the work of the latter, since it calls forth so much less of their true manhood ; they are " dominated " far more largely " by the needs of others than by their own." Yet they too have needs of their own not less real and not less urgent than their " betters " ; they too have a manhood to develop, a moral inheritance to appropriate. How much more need have they of leisure to be with themselves, and to attend to their " proper business " ? Such a shortening of the hours of labour, such an extension of the area of the free indi- vidual life, as shall secure for them also their peculiar ethical opportunity this surely is the duty of the State as the custodian of the higher justice. The case of the regulation of the industrial life of the community offers perhaps the best example of the via media in which the true view of the ethical function of the State is to be found. The socialistic extreme would place all industrial activities in the hands of the State, and would thus endanger, if not destroy, the proper life of the individual by negating the principle of free competition. The individualistic extreme, on the other hand, would exclude the .State from the industrial sphere, and leave economic law to operate unguided and unchecked by any ethical considerations a course equally fatal to the moral life of the community. The true view would seem to be that while the industrial sphere is to be recognised as having a nature of its own, and economic law is not to be confused with ethical, yet the ethical sphere includes the industrial as it includes all others, THE SOCIAL LIFE. 331 and its law must therefore operate through the law of the latter. The State, accordingly, as the all-inclusive social unity, must guard and foster the ethical life of its citizens in the industrial as in the other spheres of that life. As regards the distribution of material wealth, the State has also a function assigned to it by its ethical constitu- tion. In order that the struggle for mere " bread and butter " may not consume all the energies of the masses of its citizens, but that each individual in these " masses " may have scope for the development of his higher ethical capacities, for his proper Self -development, the State must see that the " furniture of fortune " is not so unequally distributed that, in any individual, the activities of the moral life are rendered impossible, or so narrowly limited as to be practically frustrated. For though it may be true that the ethical Good is in its essence spiritual, and that " a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth," it is also true that the moral life, as we know it, has a physical basis, and that, without a cer- tain measure of material well-being, the " good will " can find but little expression and realisation in activity. The potential manhood in each can be actualised only by an act of individual choice : yet, without certain conditions, such actualisation is impossible. It is for the State so to improve the conditions or " environment " of those against whom " fortune " it may be in the shape of economic law has discriminated, as to make a full ethical life for them also possible. 12. In such ways as these the State may serve the ethi- The Per- cal End. The question may finally be raised, whether the 332 THE MORAL LIFE. of the State is itself a permanent ethical institution, or destined, after discharging a temporary function, to give place to some higher form of social organisation. Is the final form of society non-political rather than political ? As the in- dividual emancipates himself from political control by assuming the control of himself, may not society ultimately emancipate itself from the control of the State ? And may not the narrower virtue of Patriotism, or devo- tion to our country, give place to the larger virtue of a universal Philanthropy and Cosmopolitanism ? This is, of course, a question on which we can only speculate, but our practical attitude towards the State will be to some extent affected by our disposition to answer it in the one way or the other. It seems to me that while the form of the State may continue to change, the State itself must remain as the great institution of the ethical life, unless that life undergoes a fundamental change. Peace may permanently supplant war, and harmony antagonism, in the relation of State to State. But the permanence of the State itself seems consistent with the highest development of the ethical life. The concentration of Patriotism is not necessarily identical with narrowness and limitation. " It is just the narrower ties that divide the allegiance which most surely foster the wider affections." 1 On the other hand, Cosmopolitanism has proved a failure when sub- jected to the test of history. The Stoics were Cosmopoli- tans ; so also were the Cynics before them. But, in both cases, Cosmopolitanism proved itself a negative rather than a positive principle ; it resulted in individualism and social disintegration. We best serve humanity when we serve 1 MacCunn, ' Ethics of Citizenship,' 46. THE SOCIAL LIFE. 333 \ our country best, as our best service to our country is our service to our immediate community, and our best service to our community is the service of our family and friends and neighbours. For here, once more, we must be on our guard against the fallacy of the abstract universal. " Humanity " is only a vague abstraction until we particu- larise it in the nation, as the latter itself is also until we still further particularise and individualise it. The true universal is the concrete universal, or the universal in the particular ; and we can well believe that in the life of domestic piety, of true neighbourliness, and of good citizenship, our best duty to humanity is abundantly ful- filled. The true philanthropy must always " begin at home " ; and, as far as we can see, nationalism is as permanent a principle of the ethical life as individualism. NOTE. THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT.* A GROWING number of ethical thinkers, as well as of practical philanthropists, maintain the necessity of a radical change in our view of punishment. We must substitute, they contend, for the older or retributive theory the "deterrent" and "reformative" theories. The new "science of criminology" is founded upon the theory that crime is a " pathological phenomenon," a " disease," a "form of insanity," an "inherited or acquired degeneracy." 2 It 1 The greater part of this note appeared as a " discussion " in the ' Inter- national Journal of Ethics,' Jan. 1892. 2 Cf. Donaldson, "Ethics as applied to Criminology " (' Journal of Mental Science,' Jan. 1891). 334 THE MORAL LIFE. follows that the proper treatment of the criminal is that which seeks his cure rather than his punishment. Prisons must be superseded by hospitals, asylums, and reformatories. An advance in human feeling, as well as in intelligence, is to be seen in this movement, both in its theoretical and in its practical aspects ; an advance from the hard, blind desire for justice and the unrelenting and unreasonable spirit of vindictiveness to a gentler and wiser humanity. And society is now so securely organised that it can afford to be not only just, but generous as well. The ques- tion, however, is, whether the newer and the older views of pun- ishment are mutually exclusive, and, if not, what is their relation to one another ; whether the substitution of the deterrent and re- formative for the retributive view is ethically sound, or whether, in our recoil from the older view, we are not in danger of going to the opposite extreme and losing the element of truth contained in the retributive theory. We must acknowledge, to begin with, that the new theory can point to many facts for its basis. The general principle of heredity is operative in the sphere of crime and vice no less than in that of virtue. We might almost say that the criminal " is born, not made," or, rather, that he is more born than made. Crime seems to be almost as " instinctive " in some natures as goodness is in others. This instinctive tendency to evil, developed by favourable circum- stances or " environment," blooms in the criminal act and in the life of crime. There is a criminal class, a kind of caste, which propagates itself. Crime is a profession, with a "code of honour" and an etiquette of its own, almost a vocation, calling for a special apti- tude, moral and intellectual. Have we not here a great " pathologi- cal phenomenon," a " disease " to be cured, not punished 1 But we cannot carry out the " pathological " idea. It is only an analogy or metaphor after all, and, like all metaphors, may easily prove misleading, if taken as a literal description of the facts. We distinguish cases of " criminal insanity " from cases of " crime " proper. In the former, the man is treated as a patient, is confined or restrained, is " managed " by others. But he is, by acknowledgment, so much the less a man because he may be treated in this way ; he is excused for that which, in another, would be punished as a crime ; he is not held accountable for his actions. The kleptomaniac, for example, is not punished, but excused. Are we to say that the differ- THE SOCIAL LIFE. 335 ence between these actions and crimes proper is only one of degree, and that the criminal is always a pathological or abnormal specimen of humanity ? Do all criminals " border close on insanity " ? Even if so, we must recognise, among bad as well as among good men, a border-line between the sane 'and the insane ; to resolve all badness into insanity does not conduce to clear thinking. A point may in- deed be reached in the life of crime, as in the life of vice generally, after which a man ceases to " be himself," and may therefore be treated as a " thing " rather than as a " person " ; a point after which, self-control being lost, external control must take its place. But normal crime, if it has anything to do with insanity, is rather its cause than its result. To reduce crime to a " pathological phenomenon " is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments ; merit as well as demerit,, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined. Such a view may be scientific ; it is not ethical, for it refuses to recognise the commonest moral distinctions. After all these explanations- have been given, there is always an unexplained residuum, the man himself. A man knows himself from the inside, as it were ; and a man does not excuse himself on such grounds. Nor would the majority of men, however criminal, be willing to have their crimes put clown to the account, of " insanity " ; most men would resent such a rehabilitation of their morals at the expense of their " in- tellects." This leads us to remark a second impossibility in the theory viz., that the ordinary criminal, whether he is a pathological speci- men or not, will not submit to be treated as a " patient " or a case. For he, like yourself, is a person, and insists on being respected as such ; he is not a thing to be passively moulded by society accord- ing to its ideas, either of its own convenience or of his good. Even the criminal man will not give up his self-control, or put himself in your hands and let you cure him. His will is his own, and he alone can reform himself. He will not become the patient of society, to be operated upon, by it. The appeal, in all attempts at reformation, must be to the man himself ; his sanction must be obtained, and his co-operation secured, before reformation can begin. He is not an automaton, to be regulated from without. The State cannot annex the individual ; be he criminal or saint, his life is his own, and its springs are deep within. It is a truism, but it has to be repeated 334 THE MORAL LIFE. follows that the proper treatment of the criminal is that which seeks his cure rather than his punishment. Prisons must be superseded by hospitals, asylums, and reformatories. An advance in human feeling, as well as in intelligence, is to be seen in this movement, both in its theoretical and in its practical aspects ; an advance from the hard, blind desire for justice and the unrelenting and unreasonable spirit of vindictiveness to a gentler and wiser humanity. And society is now so securely organised that it can afford to be not only just, but generous as well. The ques- tion, however, is, whether the newer and the older views of pun- ishment are mutually exclusive, and, if not, what is their relation to one another ; whether the substitution of the deterrent and re- formative for the retributive view is ethically sound, or whether, in our recoil from the older view, we are not in danger of going to the opposite extreme and losing the element of truth contained in the retributive theory. We must acknowledge, to begin with, that the new theory can point to many facts for its basis. The general principle of heredity is operative in the sphere of crime and vice no less than in that of virtue. We might almost say that the criminal " is born, not made," or, rather, that he is more born than made. Crime seems to be almost as " instinctive " in some natures as goodness is in others. This instinctive tendency to evil, developed by favourable circum- stances or " environment," blooms in the criminal act and in the lii'e of crime. There is a criminal class, a kind of caste, which propagates itself. Crime is a profession, with a "code of honour" and an etiquette of its own, almost a vocation, calling for a special apti- tude, moral and intellectual. Have we not here a great " pathologi- cal phenomenon," a "disease" to be cured, not punished ] But we cannot carry out the " pathological " idea. It is only an analogy or metaphor after all, and, like all metaphors, may easily prove misleading, if taken as a literal description of the facts. We distinguish cases of " criminal insanity " from cases of " crime " proper. In the former, the man is treated as a patient, is confined or restrained, is " managed " by others. But he is, by acknowledgment, so much the less a man because he may be treated in this way ; he is excused for that which, in another, would be punished as a crime ; he is not held accountable for his actions. The kleptomaniac, for example, is not punished, but excused. Are we to say that the differ- THE SOCIAL LIFE. 335 ence between these actions and crimes proper is only one of degree, and that the criminal is always a pathological or abnormal specimen of humanity 1 Do all criminals " border close on insanity " ? Even if so, we must recognise, among bad as well as among good men, a border-line between the sane "and the insane ; to resolve all badness into insanity does not conduce to clear thinking. A point may in- deed be reached in the life of crime, as in the life of vice generally, after which a man ceases to " be himself," and may therefore be treated as a " thing " rather than as a " person " ; a point after which, self-control being lost, external control must take its place. But normal crime, if it has anything to do with insanity, is rather it& cause than its result. To reduce crime to a " pathological phenomenon " is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments ; merit as well as demerit, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined. Such a view may be scientific ; it is not ethical, for it refuses to recognise the commonest moral distinctions. After all these explanations have been given, there is always an unexplained residuum, the man himself. A man knows himself from the inside, as it were ; and a man does not excuse himself on such grounds. Nor would the majority of men, however criminal, be willing to have their crimes put down to the account of " insanity " ; most men would resent such a rehabilitation of their morals at the expense of their " in- tellects." This leads us to remark a second impossibility in the theory viz., that the ordinary criminal, whether he is a pathological speci- men or not, will not submit to be treated as a " patient " or a case. For he, like yourself, is a person, and insists on being respected as such ; he is not a thing to be passively moulded by society accord- ing to its ideas, either of its own convenience or of his good. Even the criminal man will not give up his self-control, or put himself in your hands and let you cure him. His will is his own, and he alone can reform himself. He will not become the patient of society, to be operated upon by it. The appeal, in all attempts at reformation, must be to the man himself ; his sanction must be obtained, and his co-operation secured, before reformation can begin. He is not an automaton, to be regulated from without. The State cannot annex the individual ; be he criminal or saint, his life is his own, and its springs are deep within. It is a truism, but it has to be repeated IVER3ITY1 336 THE MORAL LIFE. in the present connection, that all moral control is ultimately self- control. In virtue of his manhood or personality, then, the criminal must be convinced of the righteousness of the punishment. Possessing, as he does, the universal human right of private judgment, the right to question and criticise according to his own inner light, he must be made to see that the act of society is a punishment, and to accept it as such ; he must see the righteousness of the punishment before it can work out in him its peaceable fruits of righteousness. Here, in the force of this inner appeal, in such an awakening of the man's slumbering conscience, lies the ethical value of punishment. With- out this element, you have only a superficial view of it as an ex- ternal force operating upon the man. Such a violent procedure may be necessary, especially in the earlier measures of society for its own protection. But it is not to be taken as the type of penal procedure, nor is it effective beyond a very narrow range. A man may be re- strained in this way from a particular act of crime on a particular occasion ; but the criminal nature in him is not touched, the crim- inal instincts are not extirpated, they will bloom again in some other deed of crime. The deepest warrant for the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent and reformative agent is found in its ethical basis as an act of retribution. True reformation conies only with the acceptance of the punishment, by mind and heart, as the inevitable fruit of the act. For punishment thus becomes a kind of revelation to the man of the true significance of his character and life. A man may thus be shocked into a better life. For "acci- dental" calamity, or for suffering which he has not brought upon himself, a man does not condemn himself. Such self-condemnation comes only with insight into the retributive nature of the calamity. It is just this element of retribution that converts " calamity " or " misfortune " into "punishment." The judgment of society upon the man must become the judgment of the man upon himself, if it is to be effective as an agent in his reformation. This private re-enactment of the social judgment comes with the perception of retribution or desert. Punishment is, in its essence, a rectification of the moral order of which crime is the notorious breach. Yet it is not a mere barren vindication of that order ; it has an " effect on character," and moulds that to order. Christianity has so brought home to us this THE SOCIAL LIFE. 337 brighter side of punishment, this beneficent possibility in all suffer- ing, that it seems artificial to separate the retributive from the reformative purpose of punishment. The question is not " whether, apart from its effects, there would be any moral propriety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake." l Why separate the act from its " effects " in this way ? In reality they are inseparable. The punishment need not be "for the sake of punishment, and for no other reason ; " it need not be " modified for utilitarian reasons." The total conception of punishment may contain various elements indissolubly united. The question is, Which is the fundamental ; out of which do the others grow ? Nor do I see that such a theory of punishment is open to the charge of " syncretism." I should rather call it synthetic and concrete, as taking account of all the elements and exhibiting their correlation. Might we not sum up these elements in the word " discipline," meaning thereby that the end of punishment is to bring home to a man such a sense of guilt as shall work in him a deep repentance for the evil past, and a new obedience for the time to come ? Whether, or how far, such a conception of punishment can be real- ised by the State, is another question. Its realisation would mean that the State should stand to the individual, in some measure, in loco parentis, that the State is a great moral educator. Such a " pater- nal " function is, at any rate, no less practicable for the State than the curative function assigned to it by the theory we have been con- sidering ; for the latter function to be effectively discharged would imply an exhaustive " diagnosis " of each criminal " case." And we have seen that the State has a moral end, that its function is not the merely negative or "police" one of protection of individual from individual, but the moral education and development of the individual himself. It is, indeed, mainly to the external and in- adequate modern conception of the State that we must trace the external and, I have sought to show, inadequate view of punishment as primarily deterrent, and (even when reformative) undertaken for the protection of society from the individual rather than in the interests of the individual himself. Civil punishment is, or ought to be, undertaken in the interests of the moral individual ; it is one of the arrangements of the State, which is the individual's moral 1 H. Rashdall, ' International Journal of Ethics/ October 1891. Y 338 THE MORAL LIFE. "sphere." But even if we refuse to go beyond the protective or deterrent point of view, we have seen that this standpoint coincides with both the reformative and the retributive. In proceeding from the one to the other of these views of punishment we are only pro- ceeding from an external to an internal view of the same thing. To be permanently deterrent, punishment must be educative or re- formative as well ; there must be an inner as well as an outer reformation. To the social prevention must be added self-prevention, and this comes only with inner reformation. Such a reformation, again, implies the acceptance, by the criminal, of the punishment as just, his recognition in it of the ethical completion of his own act ; and this is the element of retribution or desert, which is thus seen to be the basis of the other elements in punishment. PART III. METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MOEALITY METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MOEALITY. WE have sought to base our ethical theory upon psy- The three chology ; since, as philosophy always rests upon science, Ini the scientific account of man's nature must be the basis sico/Eth of the ethical theory of his life. But when we try to think out the life of man, and to discover its total and latlons - perfect meaning, we are inevitably thrown back upon the ultimate metaphysical questions which, here as elsewhere, lurk behind the questions of science, and to which there- fore science, as such, provides no answer. Indeed, it must have been felt that the most important posi- tions taken in the course of the preceding discussion whether critical or constructive rest upon some deeper basis than that of the introductory psychological analysis. It seemed well, however, to reserve the direct investiga- tion of this metaphysical basis till the end. For while in strict logical order the Metaphysic of Ethics ought to precede Ethics itself, yet the order " for us " is rather the converse ; we proceed from the circumference to the centre of knowledge, rather than from the centre to the circumference. Now, however, we must try to discover the metaphysical centre of our circle of ethical theory; 342 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. only if we can describe the circle from that centre, shall we have verified the philosophical character of the ethical theory itself. The central or metaphysical principle of morality the ultimate presupposition of ethical theory assumes differ- ent aspects when we examine it from different standpoints or in different moral lights. The single problem pre- sents itself for solution in three different forms, as Kant says the metaphysical problem necessarily does. When we try to discover the ultimate warrant for our ethical interpretation of human life, we find (1) that it must be a certain interpretation of man's nature, of his essential being, as either a product of nature, sharing nature's life, and without an end essentially different from that of the animal and the thing, or a being apart from nature, with a being and a life in which nature cannot share, standing in a different relation to the course of things, and possessed of a unique power to order his own life and to attain his own end, a unique capacity of failure or success in the attainment of his life's possibility. In other words, the world-old problem of human Freedom, and the comparative merits of the two rival solutions Libertarianism and Determinism inevitably present them- selves and claim our consideration. (2) We cannot help asking the question whether Nature, the physical cosmos, is a sufficient sphere and environment for man as a moral be- ing, or whether it is necessary to postulate a higher and super-natural sphere, a moral order other than the physical order, a moral Being or God other than Nature. This is only another aspect of the first question. For if, on one hand, we can naturalise the moral man, or resolve INTRODUCTORY. 343 man (and with him his morality) into Nature, then there will be no call for an order higher than the order of Nature, or for a God other than Nature itself. If, on the other hand, such a naturalistic theory of man is im- possible, we shall be forced to postulate a universal ethical Principle or Being, answering to the ethical being of man. Even then the relation of man to this universal Principle or Being will have to be determined, a problem which will be found to be only the problem of Freedom in another aspect. (3) Last of all, there is the problem of the destiny of man as a moral being, and this again is only a new form of the old problem. If, on the one hand, man is a merely natural being, his destiny must be that of Nature ; only a unique being with a unique life can claim a unique destiny. If, on the other hand, it is found impossible to resolve man into Nature, and necessary to postulate for him a being and a life different in kind from Nature's, and an ethical universe as the sphere of that life, it would seem to be necessary to the fulfilment of his being and the completion (instead of negation) of his task, that he should have an immortal destiny. Here, again, however, the solution of the problem would depend upon our inter- pretation not only of man's relation to Nature, but also of his relation to God ; and both these interpretations throw us back once more upon the question of the essential and ultimate nature of man himself. It is maintained by some, as we have seen, 1 that such a Metaphysic of Ethics is both superfluous and futile that a Science of Ethics is all that is needful and pos- sible. Such a position is characteristic of the " agnostic " 1 Introduction, 21 ff. 344 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. or " positive " temper of contemporary thought ; it is also of the essence of an empirical Evolutionism to disallow any non-naturalistic, or specifically spiritual, principle of explanation. Transcendental explanations are at a dis- count, and men are in love with empirical or " scientific " views. But the establishment of the superior claims of such an explanation is itself a metaphysical undertaking, and demands, for its successful accomplishment, a com- parison with the rival " transcendental " or " metaphysi- cal " view. We must, in any case, test the metaphysical possibilities of the case, before we have any right to pro- nounce against Metaphysics, here or elsewhere. I need hardly add that I do not attempt, in what follows, to give an exhaustive answer to the metaphysical questions, but merely to indicate the kind of answer which, in an ethical reference, these questions seem to me to demand. 345 CHAPTEE I. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM. 1. AFTER what has been said in general about the neces- statement sity of raising the metaphysical question in an ethical problem. reference, we need not further attempt to vindicate the propriety of discussing the problem of Freedom. That problem is, like the other metaphysical problems, very old, but not therefore, as some would say, antiquated. It is not " a problem which arose under certain conditions,, and has disappeared with the disappearance of these con- ditions, a problem which exists only for a theological or scholastic philosophy." 1 The conditions of the problem are always with us, and the problem, therefore, can never become obsolete. It is one of the central questions of metaphysics or rather, it is one aspect of the central metaphysical question ; and though its form may change > the question itself remains, to be dealt with by each suc- ceeding age in its own way. For us, as for Kant, the question of freedom takes the form of a deep-seated antithesis between the interests of the scientific or intellectual consciousness on the one ipaulsen, immanence of the Self in the process of its experience, or 380 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the identity of the Self with the character ; and, secondly, the entire immanence of God in the process of the uni- verse, and therefore in that of human life. Both positions seem to me to negate our moral Freedom. (i) As regards the identification of the Self with its character, we have the following, among other, explicit statements of the late Professor Green. " The action is as necessarily related to the character and circumstances as any event to the sum of its conditions." l " What a man now is and does is the result (to speak pleonastically, the necessary result) of what he has been and has done ; " " he, being what he is, and the circumstances being what they are at any particular conjuncture, the deter- mination of the will is already given, just as an effect is given in the sum of its conditions. The determination of the will might be different, but only through the man's being different." 3 Thus the identification of the Self with the character results in a new version of determinism no less absolute than that of the empiricists themselves. The " I " is once more identified with the " me " ; the refusal to acknowledge any extra - empirical reality means the denial of freedom. The only way to save that freedom would seem to be by maintaining the distinction between the Self and the character, not in the absolute or Kantian sense, but in the sense that while the Self is what in its character it appears to be, it yet is always more than any such empirical mani- festation of it; that, while it is immanent in its expe- rience, it also for ever transcends that experience. The 1 ' Prolegomena to Ethics,' 112. - Ibid., 113. 3 'Works,' ii. 318. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM. 381 alternative is not, as Green states it, between a Self which is identical with its character and a Self which stands out of all relation to its character, so that " a man's action " does not " represent his character, but an arbitrary freak of some unaccountable power of unmotived willing," 1 and that " I could be something to-day irrespectively of what I was yesterday, or something to-morrow irrespectively of what I am to-day." 2 We may regard the Self as, through its character, standing in the most intimate re^ lation to its experience, and yet as being always more than that experience, and in this more containing the secret of its moral life. Dr Martineau has happily expressed this view by calling the character a " predicate " of the Self ; the moral life might be described as a process of Self- predication. The predicates are meaningless without a Self of which they may be predicated nay, without a Self to predicate them of itself. As Professor Upton has well put it : " While our character determines the nature of our temptations, we are, I believe, clearly conscious that it is not the character, but the Self ivhich has the character, to which the ultimate moral decision is due. In every moral crisis of a man's life he rises in the act of moral choice above his own character, envisages it, and passes moral judgment on the springs of action or desire which he feels present within him ; and it is because a man's true Self can thus transcend and judge his own character, that genuine moral freedom and moral respon- sibility become possible and actual." 3 The freedom of the moral life lies in the fact that it is the original energy 1 ' Prolegomena to Ethics,' 113. 2 Ibid., 115. 3 'New World,' i. 152. 382 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. of a Self the measure of whose activity is never to be found in the history of its past achievements. The Hegelian identification of the Self with the char- acter leads us back to determinism, because, by a kind of irony of fate, it leads us back to empiricism of the most unmistakable kind. The Self is once more lost in its experience, resolved into its states. At most, the Self is conceived as the " principle of unity " of its states, as the " form " of its experience ; and even then the unity is rather a cognitional than an ethical unity, the essentially dynam- ical character of the moral life is ignored, the volitional is once more resolved into the intellectual. What has been said above in answer to the psychological view of the Self need not be repeated here in answer to the transcen- dental denial of its reality and activity. (ii) The Self (ii) The Hegelian doctrine of the immanence of God in man leads to the same result. History, like the course of things, is a logical process, the process of the universal Reason ; in the one case as the other, " the real is the rational," and " all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature." As to the Self, it is accounted for by being referred to the Absolute Reality of which it is the passing manifestation. If the biological and mechanical evolutionists, refusing to regard the individual self as ulti- mate and self-explaining, trace it to a past beyond itself, and see in it the highly complex resultant of vast cosmic forces, the Absolute Idealist, seeing in the universe the evolution of divine Reason, finds in the life of the Self the manifestation or reproduction in time of the eternal Self- consciousness of God. There is only one Self the uni- versal or divine ; this all-embracing Subject manifests THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM. 383 itself alike in the object and in the subject of human con- sciousness, in Nature and in man. Both are God, though they appear to be somewhat on their own account. Obviously, if we are thus to interpret man as only, like Nature, an aspect of God, we must de-personalise him ; it is his Personality that separates, like a " middle wall of partition," between man and God. Nor is this conclusion shunned. Personality is explained to be mere "appear- ance"; the Pteality is impersonal. This is Mr Bradley 's view. " But then the soul, I must repeat, is itself not ultimate fact. It is appearance, and any description of it must contain inconsistency." The moral life is governed by two " incompatible ideals," that of self-assertion and that of self-sacrifice. "To reduce the raw material of one's nature to the highest degree of system, and to use every element from whatever source as a subordinate means to this object, is certainly one genuine view of good- ness. On the other hand, to widen as far as possible the end to be pursued, and to realise this through the distrac- tion or the dissipation of one's individuality, is certainly also good. An individual system, aimed at in one's self, and again the subordination of one's own development to a wide-embracing end, are each an aspect of the moral principle. . . . And, however much these must diverge, each is morally good ; and, taken in the abstract, you can- not say that one is better than the other." l " Now that this divergence ceases, and is brought together in the end, is most certain. For nothing is outside the Absolute, and in the Absolute there is nothing imperfect. ... In the Absolute everything finite attains the perfection which it 1 'Appearance and Reality,' 414, 415. 384 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. seeks ; but, upon the other hand, it cannot gain perfection precisely as it seeks it. For . . . the finite is more or less transmuted, and, as such, disappears in being accom- plished. This common destiny is assuredly the end of the Good. The ends sought by self-assertion and self-sacrifice are, each alike, unattainable. The individual never can { in himself become an harmonious system. And in the wider ideal to which he devotes himself, no matter how thoroughly, he never can find complete self-realisation. . . . And, in the complete gift and dissipation of his per- sonality he, as such, must vanish ; and, with that, the good is, as such, transcended and submerged." * After such a frank statement of the full meaning of the Hegelian metaphysic of the Self, it is hardly necessary to argue that it sacrifices, with the freedom of man, the reality of his moral life. If I am but the vehicle of the divine Self-manifestation, if my personality is not real but only seeming the mask that hides the sole activity of God my freedom and my moral life dissolve together. It is true that God reveals himself in me in another way than he does in the world ; but my life is, after all, only his in a fuller manifestation, a higher stage, really as necessary as any of the lower, in the realisation of the divine nature. Such a view may conserve the freedom of God ; it inevitably invalidates that of man. If man can be said to be free at all, it is only in so far as he is iden- tical with God. If it be contended that just here is found our true Self -hood, and with it our real freedom, I submit that this view of the Self means the loss of Self -hood in any true sense of the term, since it means the resolution 1 'Appearance and Reality,' 419. THE PROBLEM OF FEEEDOM. 385 of man and his freedom as elements into the life of God, the single so-called " Self." Thus freedom is ultimately resolved by the Transcendentalists into a higher necessity, as it is resolved by the Naturalists into a lower necessity : by the former it is resolved into the necessity of God, as by the latter it is resolved into the necessity of Nature. Hegelianism, like Spinozism, has no place for the Person- ality of man, and his proper life as man. Equally with Naturalism, such an Absolute Idealism makes of man a mere term in the necessary evolution of the universe, a term which, though higher, is no less necessary in its sequence than the lower terms of the evolution. It may be that the doctrine is true, and that "necessity is the true freedom." But let us understand that the freedom belongs to God, the necessity to man ; the freedom to the Whole, the necessity to the parts. Such a Transcendentalism, equally with Naturalism, also and at the same time invalidates the distinction be- tween good and evil, resolving apparent evil into real good, and seeing things as, in their ultimate "reality," " all very good." Or rather, both good and evil are resolved into a Tertium Quid. " Goodness [and, of course, badness too] is an appearance, it is phenomenal, and therefore self- contradictory." l " Goodness is a subordinate and, there- fore, a self-contradictory aspect of the universe." 2 Such distinctions are fictions of our own abstraction, mere " entia imaginations," as Spinoza called them, the results of a partial knowledge, and destined, therefore, to disap- pear from the standpoint of the Whole. But man, as an ethical being, is part of the universe, 1 Bradley ^ 'Appearance and Keality,' 419. 2 Ibid., 420. 2B 386 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. and as a part, he must be explained, not explained away. To interpret his moral life as mere " appearance," to de- personalise and thus to de-moralise him, is to explain away his characteristic being. This pantheistic resolu- tion of man into God is too rapid an explanation ; the unity thus reached cannot be the true unity, since it negates, instead of explaining, the facts in question. Such an unethical unification might conceivably be a sufficient interpretation of Nature, and of man in so far as he is a natural being, and even in so far as he is an intellectual being; it is not a sufficient interpretation of man as man, or in his moral being. The reality of the moral life is bound up with the reality of human freedom, and the reality of freedom with the integrity of the moral personality. If I am a person, an " Ego on my own account," I am free ; if I am not such a person or Ego, I am not free. Resulting 10. It would seem, then, that the only possible vmdi- conce] " of Fr< dom. conception of Free- cation of I reedom is to take our stand on the moral Sen or Personality, as itself the heart and centre of the ethical life, the key to the moral situation. The integrity of moral Personality may be tampered with, as we have found, in two ways. Man may be de-personalised either into Nature or into God. And although the Naturalistic resolution may be the favourite course of contemporary determinism, the greater danger lies perhaps in the other direction ; it was here that the older determinists like Edwards waged the keenest warfare. The relation of man as a free moral personality to God is even more difficult to conceive than his relation to Nature ; theology has THE PKOBLEM OF FREEDOM. 387 more perils for human freedom than cosmology. To think of God as all in all, and yet to retain our hold on human freedom or personality, that is the real meta- physical difficulty. To see in our own personality a mere appearance behind which is God, is to destroy the reality of the moral life ; yet when we try to think of that life from the divine standpoint, the difficulty is to understand its reality. But, even though the ultimate reconciliation of divine and human Personality may be still beyond us, I do not see how either conception can be given up, whether for a religious Mysticism or for an absolute philosophical Idealism. The Mystic has always striven to reach the God-consciousness through the nega- tion of Self -consciousness ; it must rather be reached * through the deepening and enriching, the infinite ex- pansion, of Self-consciousness. Even for metaphysics, Personality or Self-consciousness would seem to be the ultimate category. For, after all, the chief guarantee of a worthy view of God is a worthy view of man. To maintain the reality of the moral life must give us in the end a higher view of God, as well as enable us to conceive the possibility of a higher union with Him the union and communion not only of thought with Thought, but of will with Will. It is through the conviction of his own superiority to Nature, of his own essential dignity and independence as a moral person, that man reaches the conception of One infinitely greater than himself. To resolve the integrity of his personality even into that of God, would be to negate the divine greatness itself, by invalidating the conception through which it was reached. We must, indeed, think of our life and 388 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. destiny, as like the course and destiny of the worlds, ultimately in God's hands, and not in our own. If man is an " imperium," he is only an " imperium in imperio" If God has, in a sense, "vacated" the sphere of human activity, he still rules man's destiny, and can turn his evil into good. The classical concep- tion of Fate and the Christian thought of a divine Provi- dence have high metaphysical warrant. All human ex- perience " Should teach us There's a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will." Yet man cannot regard himself as a mere instrument in the divine hands, a passive vehicle of the energy of God. Activity (evepyeia) is the category of his life as man, and his highest conception of his relation to God is that of Co-operation (o-vvepjia). He must regard himself as a fellow-worker even with God. This is his high human birthright, which he may not sell. 389 CHAPTER II. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 1. THE demand that we shall be " positive," " scientific," or The neces- sity of the un-metaphysical in our thinking, reaches its climax when theological we approach the problem of the divine government of the world. If a scientific theory of morals is not based upon the doctrine of moral Freedom, still less does it rest, we are told, upon a doctrine of God ; if a rational psychology is illegitimate, still more obviously so is a rational theol- ogy : if metaphysics in general is ruled out as unscientific, then theology, which is metaphysics run wild, is a forti- ori condemned. The command, " Be un-metaphysical " is more closely interpreted the command " Be un-theo- logical." The entire argument of contemporary Agnos- ticism and Positivism is to the effect that God is either the unknown and unknowable, or the most unreal of all abstractions, the merest fiction of the human imagination. The phenomenal alone is real and intelligible. The noume- nal is either unreal, or, if real, unintelligible. Let us be content, then, with the relative and phenomenal, the " positive " reality of experience, whether that experience be intellectual or moral. Why continue to weary our- 390 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. selves with beating our wings against the cage ? Why seek to burst the bars of our intellectual prison-house ? There is abundant room and breathing-space within the prison- walls which so inexorably shut us in. Outside the walls of experience there is nothing, or, at least, nothing for us; within is contained all the treasure which we had vainly sought without. Yet we cannot think of the moral life in this way. The foundation of this human experience lies deep in the unphenomenal the unphenomenal Self and the unphenomenal God. Either to refuse us any access to the unphenomenal, or to deny its existence, is to lose the true significance of the phenomenal, to misunderstand that moral experience which we are seeking to interpret. Nay, we cannot be unmetaphysical and untheological, merely " positive " or scientific. Even the man of science does not limit himself to " the facts," to " what he sees," to mere occurrences or happenings. Science, not less than philosophy, is " the thinking view of things " ; what the man of science seeks to apprehend is the meaning of the facts. And the philosopher is ambitious to gather from the hints of science the total meaning of the facts. The metaphysician is, therefore, no more unscientific than the man of science is unmetaphysical. Where science seeks to think the facts, philosophy seeks to think them out. Metaphysics, we are told, is " a leap in the dark." But even the man of science makes his " leap in the dark," his leap from the light of the known to the darkness of the unknown. It is only by such venturesomeness that the light of knowledge is let into the darkness of the unknown (but not unknowable). Why should a limit be put to this THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 391 speculative courage, which is at the root of all intellectual progress ? Why should not the metaphysician be allowed to make his bolder leap into the deeper darkness ? The darkness is thick indeed, but not therefore impenetrable. At any rate, " it is vain," as Kant says, " to profess in- difference to those questions to which the mind of man can never really be indifferent." Of these " not indiffer- ent " questions, the supreme is the question of God, of his relation to the world and to our human life and destiny. The agnostics invite us to follow with them the well- trodden paths of moral and religious faith, of practical or ethical belief. Indeed the deepest motive of modern agnosticism, as it originated in Kant, was the preserva- tion of such moral faith, the defence of ethical and re- ligious Eeality, as unknowable, from rationalistic dissolu- tion. The agnostic is not generally content, with Spencer, to celebrate the " Unknown and Unknowable," or, with Hamilton and Mansel, to proclaim the inspiration that comes of " mystery," to glory in the " imbecility " of the human mind and the "relativity" of all its knowledge. He is apt to insist, with Locke and Kant nay, with Hamilton and Spencer themselves on the rights of the ethical and religious spirit, and its independence of the intellectual or scientific understanding. The interest of the former, he contends, is practical, not theoretical ; its sphere is not thought, but life. Its instrument is the creative imagination ; its atmosphere is not the " dry light " of the intellect, but the warmth and glow of the emotional nature, and the moving energy of the will. It is with the appreciation of true culture and of delicate moral and religious susceptibility, that this acknowledg- 392 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. ment is made. It is made in slightly different ways by Lange and Tyndall, no less fully than by Huxley and Spencer. To speak of such writers as " atheistic " or " irreligious " is most unfair and most misleading. It is not the heart, but the head, that is at fault. Their view of human nature is both broad and deep ; what it wants is logical clearness and coherence. That there is a moral, as well as an intellectual reality, and that the moral life, as such, is independent of any theoretical understanding of it, is surely true and im- portant. But that this independence is absolute and ultimate we cannot believe. Unless we are sceptics, and have only Hume's blind " belief " of custom, we cannot say that. The Kantian agnostic is right when he recognises a spiritual element in man, and concedes its claim to an appropriate life. Man is an ethical, as well as an in- tellectual being ; the will and emotions demand a sphere of their own. But if the world of man's moral and religious life is the mere projection of the emotional imagination, it is a world in which that life cannot continue to live. "If there is no God, we must make one ; " but a God of our own making is no God. If the moral and religious ideal is a mere ideal, the shadow cast by the actual in the sunshine of the human imagin- ation ; if the ideal is not also in very truth the real ; if the good is not also the true, the reality of man's spiritual life is destroyed, and its foundations are sapped. Man cannot permanently live on fictions; the insight that his deepest life is founded on "the baseless fabric of a vision" must bring with it, sooner or later, the downfall of the life thus undermined. Agnosticism, if it THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 393 is true, must carry with it the ultimate disappearance of religion, and, with religion, of all morality higher than utility. For we cannot permanently separate the ethical and intellectual man. His nature and life are one, single, inclissolubly bound together; and ultimately he must demand an intellectual justification of his ethical and religious life, a theory of it as well as of the world of nature. The "need of ethical harmony" must make itself felt ; a moral being demands a moral " environ- ment " or " sphere." The attempt to divorce emotion and activity from knowledge is a psychological error of a glaring kind. Our life is one, as our nature is one. We cannot live in sections, or in faculties. Temporarily and in the individual, an approximation to such a divorce may be possible, but not permanently or in the race. The practical life is connected, in a rational being, with the theoretical ; we cannot be permanently illogical, either in morality or religion. The postulate of man's spiritual life is the harmony of Nature and spirit, or the spiritual constitution of the universe. 2. If we ask, then, Where is the source of ethical Ag:nos- enthusiasm to be found ? the answer of the " scientific " Positivism. or unmet aphysical philosopher is, Either in the Unknow- able Absolute, or in that phenomenal moral reality which we know, in the ethical life of Humanity. The former is the answer of Agnosticism, the latter is that of Positivism. The first answer is purely negative and does not carry as far. If it has any positive meaning, it is simply that the real is not the phenomenal, that "phenomena" or " facts " are but " shows " of a deeper Eeality. It is indeed 394 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. a most important truth, that the universe is not a mere " flux " or process, a " stream of tendency " which tends no whither, but that it has an abiding meaning. But no more is the universe a sphinx, on whose dead expres- sionless face we must for ever gaze without a suggestion of a solution of the riddle of the earth. If the mean- ing of things is one which we can never hope in any measure to decipher, then for us there might as well be no meaning at all. And as for the needed moral inspira- tion, an unknovm quantity can hardly be the source of inspiration. One can hardly wonder at Mr Harrison's travesty of the agnostic's prayer to his Unknown God: " # nth love us, help us, make us one with thee ! " If the Agnostic sends us to an Unknown and Unknow- able Absolute for the inspiration of our moral life, the Positivist bids us see in that never-ceasing human proces- sion of which we ourselves form such a humble part the object of reverent adoration, and draw from the sight the moral inspiration which we need. Comte and his followers would have us, in this the day of our race's intellectual majority, dethrone the usurper Gods of our theological and metaphysical " minority," and place on the throne the true and only rightful God the Grand fitre of Humanity itself. In our weakness, we may cast ourselves upon its greater strength ; in our foolishness, upon its deeper wisdom ; in our sin and error, upon its less erring righteousness. Nay, we can pray to this "mighty mother" of our being; we are her children, and she is able to sustain us. Nor need we stop short of worship, for the Grand fitre is infinitely greater than we, and contains all our greatness in itself. And if we THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 395 ask for a "moral dynamic," for an energy of goodness which shall make the good life, otherwise so hard or even impossible, a possibility and a joy to us, where shall we find such an abiding and abundant source of moral inspiration as in the " enthusiasm of Humanity " ? There is a motive-force strong enough to carry us steadily for- ward in all good living, deep enough to touch the very springs of conduct, enduring enough to outlast all human strivings and activities. It would be ungrateful to deny or to minimise the importance of this truth to deny or to belittle the fact of the solidarity of the race, and the capital importance of that fact for human conduct. That we are not separate from our brethren, but members one of another, that in our deepest interests and best endeavours we are one with our fellows, and that in the realisation of that fellowship there is a deep moral inspiration all this is true and most important. But in order that we may find in humanity all the inspiration that we need in order that it may become to us a Grand $tre, which shall claim our un- wavering trust and reverence we must abstract from the concrete and actual humanity of our experience, from the real men and women whom we know, and know to be imperfect, to have failings as well as virtues and excel- lences of character, whom we love even in their weakness, and perhaps even because of it, but whom we cannot wor- ship, or regard as the complete embodiment of the moral ideal. Not men, but man, then, must be the object of our worship and the source of our ethical enthusiasm ; not the members of the race, but the race itself, must be our Grand fitre. What is this but to set up, on the throne vacated 396 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. by the fictitious deity of metaphysical abstraction, a new fiction, the latest product of " hypostatisation," the last relic of scholastic " realism," a " great being," which de- rives its greatness and worshipf ulness from the elimination of those characteristics which alone make it real and actual ? The race consists of men and women, of moral individuals; and the moral individual is never quite worshipful. " Humanity " is only a collective or generic term ; it describes the common nature of its individual members, it does not denote a separate being, or the existence of that common nature, apart from the individ- uals who share it. A touch of logic, or, at any rate, of that " metaphysic " which we are supposed to have out- grown, but which we cannot afford to outgrow, is enough to reveal the unreality and ghostliness of the positivist Grand $tre. The Positivist Eeligion of Humanity is, it seems to me, a misstatement of an all-important truth viz., that God is to be found in man in a sense in which he is not to be found in Nature, that he is to be found in man as man, as an ethical and non-natural being. But this very differ- entiation of man from Nature, on which the Eeligion of Humanity rests, must be vindicated, and its vindication must be metaphysical. Such an interpretation of human life implies an idealisation of man, the discovery in his phenomenal life of an ideal meaning which gives it the unique value attributed to it. Man is divine, let us admit ; but it is this divinity of man that has chiefly to be accounted for. What is the Fountain of these welling springs of divinity in man ? Unless behind your fellow and yourself, and in both, you see God, you will not catch THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 397 the " enthusiasm of Humanity." The true Enthusiasm for Humanity is an enthusiasm for God. When in the good man we see the " image of God," when behind all the shortcomings of actual goodness we see the infinite divine potentiality of Good, we can mingle reverence with our human love, and hope with our pity and regret. But the roots of our reverence and our hope are deep in the Absolute Goodness that we see reflected in the human as in a mirror. If this human goodness is the original, and reflects not a higher and more perfect than itself, its power to stimulate the good life is incalculably diminished. 3. I have devoted so much attention to Agnosticism and Natural- Positivism, because these are the contemporary equivalents of that anti-theological spirit which, till quite recently, called itself Materialism or Atheism. The general atti- tude of mind common to the earlier and the later form of thought might be described as Naturalism or Phenom- enalism, as opposed to Supernaturalism or Noumenalism. It adopts a mechanical or materialistic explanation, rather than a teleological or idealistic. But the absolute or ontological materialism of former times has been sup- planted by the relative or " scientific " materialism of the Agnostics. The Agnostic denies the possibility of meta- physical knowledge in general, and of a " metaphysic of ethics " in particular. All knowledge being " positive " or scientific, and the ultimate positive reality being physical energy, it follows that all " explanation," even of psychi- cal and ethical phenomena, is in terms of this energy, in mechanical and material terms. In spite of his pro- 398 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. fessed impartiality between matter and mind, Spencer does not hesitate to offer such a materialistic or natural- istic interpretation of the moral life. And even when the attempt is not made to explain the moral life in terms of mechanism, the possibility of any other explanation is denied, and we are asked to be simply "agnostic" or "positive" in our attitude to it. This is the position of Professor Huxley in his notable Eomanes Lecture on ' Evolution and Ethics,' a brilliant statement of the con- sistent and characteristic Ethics of Agnosticism. What, then, are we offered in the name of scientific explanation, and as a substitute for metaphysical specula- tion ? A naturalistic scheme of morality, the correlation of the ethical with the physical process, the incorporation of man, his virtue and his vice, his defects and his failures, his ideals and attainments, as a term in the process of cosmical evolution. We are offered, in short, a new version of the " Ethics of Naturalism " far superior to the old Utilitarian version, superior because so much more scientific. Man, like all other animals, like all other beings, is the creature of his conditions ; his life is pro- gressively defined by adjustment to them ; his goodness is simply that which has given or gives him the advan- tage in the universal struggle for existence, and has enabled him to survive. The ethical category is one with the physical ; the " best " is only the " fittest." The ideal is the shadow of the actual, and the distinction arises from the very nature of evolution as a process, as the becoming of that which is not yet but shall be. Thus would the Evolutionist in Ethics "naturalise the moral man," account for him and even for his ideals THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 399 by reference to that Nature of which he forms a part, and make the " ethical process " only a later stage of the "cosmical process." Thus for God we are asked to sub- stitute Nature, and in " the ways of the (physical) cosmos to find a sufficient sanction for morality." Where is the need of God, whether for moral authority or for moral government, when Nature is so profoundly ethical, so scrupulously discriminating in her consideration for the good, and in her condemnation of the evil ; when goodness itself is but the ripe fruit of Nature's processes, and evil, truly interpreted, only goodness misunderstood, or good^ ness in the making ? But, as we have learned to know Nature better, better to understand the ways of the physical cosmos, we have found that these ways are by no means ways of righteousness. The doctrine of Evolution has itself made it infin- itely more difficult for us than it was for the Stoics to unify the ethical and the " cosmic process." It is one of the keenest living students of Nature, as well as one of the keenest thinkers of our time, Professor Hux- ley, who has stated this difficulty in the most emphatic terms, who has confessed in the fullest way the failure of the scientific effort " to make existence intelligible and to bring the order of things into harmony with the moral sense of man," : and who speaks of " the unfathomable injustice of the nature of things." 2 He has reminded us how ancient the problem is, and how ancient the confession of man's inability to solve it, how " by the Tiber, as by the Ganges, ethical man admits that the cosmos is too strong for him," how the roots of pessimism 1 ' Evolution and Ethics,' 8. 2 Ibid., 12. 400 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. are to be sought for in this contradiction, how " social pro- gress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best ; " l how " the prac- tice of that which is ethically the best what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence ; " how the history of civilisation is the record of " the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos ; " and how Nature's " moral indifference " culmi- nates in her undoing of that moral creation which had seemed her fairest work ; how she, for whom there is no " best " and " worst," and for whom the " fittest " is only the "ablest," will yet undo her own work, and man's resistance to her mighty power will avail him nothing to " arrest the procession of the great year." Perhaps Professor Huxley goes too far when he says that " the cosmic process bears no sort of relation to the ethical," but he has at any rate stated clearly the issue at stake viz., the question of the legitimacy of the identifi- cation of the ethical process with the process of the physi- cal cosmos, the identification of " the power that makes for righteousness " with the necessity of natural evolution. If, as I have contended, a Naturalistic explanation of the moral Ideal is impossible, if that Ideal has another and higher certificate of birth to show, then we need not 1 ' Evolution and Ethics/ 33. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 401 wonder that Nature should prove an insufficient sphere for the moral life, and that we should fail to harmonise the order of nature with the order of morality. If man is not part of nature, but disparate from nature, then his life and nature's may well conflict in the lines of their development. If we acknowledge such a conflict, we may either be candidly agnostic, and, regarding physical ex- planation as the only explanation, may say that moral- ity, just because it is undeniably different from nature, is inexplicable ; or we may seek for another explanation of it, and try to answer Mr Spencer's question : " If the ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what X is he a product of ? " l Does not the very insufficiency of Naturalism necessitate unless we are to remain agnostic a supernatural or transcendental view of morality? Does not the non-moral character of Nature necessitate a moral government of man's life higher than the govern- ment of Nature, a discipline, retribution, and reward that shall excel hers in justice, insight, and discrimination ? Mr Huxley's lecture, with its emphatic, almost passionate, assertion of the dualism of nature and morality, with its absolute refusal to merge the latter in the former, is itself a fine demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysical indifference ; the profound ethical faith which it expresses is the best evidence of the author's superiority to his creed, the best proof that agnosticism cannot be, for such a mind, a final resting-place. For the mere assertion of the dualism and opposition of the ethical and the cosmical process is not the whole case. That dualism and opposi- tion raise the further question of the possibility of their 1 ' Athenamm,' August 5, 1893. 2 C 402 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. reconciliation. As one of Professor Huxley's reviewers said : " The crux of the theory lies in the answer to the question whether the ethical process, if in reality opposed altogether to the cosmical process, is or is not a part of the cosmical process ; and if not, what account can be given of its origin. In what way is it possible, in what way is it conceivable, that that should arise within the cosmical process which, in Mr Huxley's comprehensive K^ phrase, ' is in all respects opposed ' to its working ? " Man and 4. The dualism of Nature and morality raises for us the question whether we must not postulate for man as a moral being another, and a higher, environment or sphere than Nature. The fact that the physical scheme is not the ethical scheme, renders necessary, for the justification and fulfilment of morality, a moral theology, a scheme of moral government which shall right the wrongs of the physical government of the universe. The fact of opposi- tion between nature and spirit, the fact that man's true life has to be lived in a foreign element, that the power which works in the physical cosmos is not a " power which makes for righteousness " or a power which cares for righteousness, the fact of " these hindrances and antip- athies of the actual," the indubitable and baffling fact of this grand antinomy, forces us beyond the actual physical universe and its order, to seek in a higher world and a different order the explanation and fulfilment of our moral life. Intellectually, we might find ourselves at home in Nature, for her order seems the reflection of our own intelligence. But morally, she answers not to the 1 'Athenaeum,' July 22, 1893. ' THE PKOBLEM OF GOD. 403 human spirit's questionings and cravings; rather, she seems to contradict and despise them. She knows her own children, and answers their cry. But man she knows not, and disclaims : for, in his deepest being, he is no child of hers. As his certificate of birth is higher, so is his true life and citizenship found in a higher world. Thus there comes inevitably to the human spirit the demand for God, to untie the knot of human fate, to superintend the issues of the moral life, to right the wrongs of the natural order, to watch the spiritual fortunes of his children, to be himself the Home of their spirits. Nature is morally blind, indifferent, capricious. Force is unethical. Hence the call for a supreme Power akin to the spirit of man, conscious of his struggle, sympathetic with his life, guid- ing it to a perfect issue the call for a supremely right- eous Will. This belief in a moral order is necessary if we are to be delivered from Pessimism. Mere Agnosticism means ethical Pessimism: the only escape is to "see God." Without such a vision the mystery of our human life and destiny is entirely dark, the "riddle of the pain- ful earth " is absolutely inexplicable. Unless our human nature and life are, in Professor Huxley's phrase, " akin to that which pervades the universe," unless God is for us, and we are in a real sense not alone but co-workers with him, our life is, as Hume described it, "a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery." The problem raised for human thought by this dual- ism of Nature and morality is as old as human thought itself. It is the problem of Fate or Fortune, a Power blind but omnipotent, that sets its inexorable limit to the life of man, that closes at its own set time, and in its own 404 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. appointed way, all his strivings, and blots out alike his goodness and his sin ; a Power which the Greeks quaintly thought of as superior even to the gods themselves, and which to the modern mind seems to mean that there is no divinity in the world, that the " nature of things " is non- moral. That which so baffles our thought is " the recog- nition that the Cosmos has no place for man " ; that he feels himself, when confronted with Nature's might and apparent indifference, an anomaly, an accident, a for- eigner in the world, a " stranger from afar." The stream of good and evil seems to lose itself in the mazes of the course of things ; the threads of moral distinctions seem to get hopelessly intertwined in the tangled skein of Nature's processes. " Streams will not curb their pride The just man not to entomb, Nor lightnings go aside To give his virtues room : Nor is that wind less rough which blows a good man's barge. " Nature, with equal mind, Sees all her sons at play : Sees man control the wind, The wind sweep man away ; Allows the proudly riding and the foundering bark." 1 I have said that it is a world-old problem, this of the ultimate issues of the moral life. And it has seemed as if the only escape from total pessimism lay in a calm and uncomplaining surrender of that which most of all in life we prize. Let us cease to make our futile demand of the nature of things ; ceasing to expect, we shall also cease 1 Matthew Arnold, "Empedocles on Etna." THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 405 from disappointment and vexation of spirit. Be it ours to conform with the best grace we can to Nature's ways, since she will not conform to ours. Let us meet Nature's " moral indifference " with the proud indifference to Nature of- the moral man. A stranger in the world, with his true citizen- ship in the ethical and ideal sphere, let man withdraw within himself, and escape the shock of outward circum- stance by cutting off the tendrils of sensibility which would take hold on the course of the world and make him its slave. " Because thou must not dream, thou needst not then despair ! " But neither the philosopher nor the poet, no, nor even the " ordinary man," will consent to' forego his dreams and hopes, nor will humanity pass from its bitter plaint against the evil course of things and the tragic wreck of human lives. Such a dualism and contra- diction between man and his world presses for its solution in some deeper unity that shall embrace and explain them both. The Stoics themselves, the great preachers of Kesig- nation, had their own solution of the problem. The ways of the cosmos were not for them dark or unintelligible ; the " nature of things " was, like human nature, in its essence altogether reasonable. The question raised by the impossibility of correlating man and Nature by " natural- ising the moral man " is, whether we cannot reduce both man and nature to a deeper unity: whether, though " human nature " is for ever distinct from physical nature, and the world of morality " an artificial world within the cosmos," both are not expressions or exponents of a deeper " nature of things." Such a question the unifying instinct of man cannot help raising. Even Professor Huxley admits that "the ethical process must bear some sort of relation to 406 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the cosmic." Nor need this relation be that of levelling down, of reducing man to Nature. Why should we not level up ? Why should not Nature, if in one sense the eternal enemy of man, to be subdued under his feet if he is to ~be man, yet also be the minister and instrument of man's moral life, charged with a moral mission even in its moral " enmity " or " indifference " ? If the ethical pro- cess is not part of the cosmic process, may not the cosmic be part of the ethical ? or better, may not both be parts of the Divine process of the universe ? Since man has to live the ethical life in a natural world, in a world Which is in a sense the enemy of that life, and in a sense indifferent to it, may not the ethical process be " more reasonably described as an agency which directs and controls rather than entirely opposes the cosmical process " ? 1 To the question whether we can thus correlate the ethical with the cosmical process, man and Nature, by seeing God in both, in such wise that Nature shall become the instrument and servant of the ethical spirit ; or whether Nature must remain for man an alien and opposing force which, by its moral indifference, is always liable, if not to defeat, to embarrass and endanger, moral ends, to this question I do not see that we can give more than a tentative answer. Our answer must be rather a specula- tive guess, a philosophic faith, than a reasoned certainty. "Nature" in ourselves we may annex, our natural dis- positions, instincts, impulses, we may subdue to moral ends ; this raw material we may work entirely into the texture of the ethical life. But what of the "Nature" i ' Athenaeum,' July 22, 1893. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 40*7 which is without ourselves ? What of that " furniture of fortune" of which Aristotle speaks, which seems to come to us and to be taken away from us without any reference, oftentimes, to our ethical deservings ? What of that " fate " in which our life is involved, whose issues are unto life and unto death, which disappoints and blights our spiritual hopes, whose capricious favours no merit can secure, whose gifts and calamities descend, without discrimination, upon the evil and the good ? Call it what we will " fortune," " circumstance," " fate " does there not remain an insoluble and baffling quantity an x which we can never eliminate, and whose presence destroys all our calculations ? Yet the ground of moral confidence is the conviction, inseparable from the moral life, of the supremacy and ultimate masterfulness of the moral order. Professor Huxley himself expresses a sober and measured confidence of this kind. "It may seem an audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to set man to subdue Nature to his higher ends ; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times . . . and our day lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain meas- ure of success." Man has learned, with the advance of science, his own power over Nature, the power, which increasing knowledge brings, to subdue Nature to his own ends, and his confidence inevitably grows that he is Nature's master, not her slave. But whether he can ever entirely subdue her, whether the natural order will ever be so filled with the moral order as to be the perfect ex- pression and vehicle of the latter ; or whether the natural 408 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. order must always remain the imperfect expression of the moral, and some new and perfect expression be framed for it, we cannot tell. Only this we can say, that since each is an order, since Nature itself is a cosmos, not a chaos, and since they issue from a common source, Nature arid morality must ultimately be harmonised. The mod- 5. This, in itself unchanging, problem assumes two mentofthe different aspects as it appears in ancient and in modern speculation. It is in the latter of these aspects that we are naturally most familiar with it, and in this form perhaps its most characteristic statement is that of Kant. The ultimate issue of goodness, he contends, must be happiness ; the external and the internal fortunes of the soul must in the end coincide. This is the Kantian argument for the existence of God, as moral Governor of the universe, distributor of rewards arid punishments in accordance with individual desert. For though the very essence of virtue is its disinterestedness, yet the final equation of virtue and happiness is, for Kant, the pos- tulate of morality. We have seen that the hedonists, who reduce virtue to prudence and the right to the expedient, find themselves forced, in order to the vindica- tion of altruistic conduct, or of that part of virtue which refuses to be resolved into prudence, to make the same postulate in another form. Either the appeal is made to the future course of the evolutionary process, which, it is argued, cannot stop short of the identification of virtue and prudence, individual goodness and individual hap- piness; or it is maintained, as by Professor Sidgwick, that the gap in ethical theory must be filled in by a THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 409 theological hypothesis of the Kantian sort. The Socratic conviction is reasserted, that " if the Eulers of the universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust, it is better to die than to live." Nor is such a demand the expression of mere self-interest. " When a man passionately refuses to believe that the ' wages of virtue ' can ' be dust,' it is often less from any private reckoning about his own wages than from a disinterested aversion to a universe so fundamentally irrational that ' God for the Individual ' is not ultimately identified with ' Universal Good.' " 1 The assumption of such a moral order, maintained by a moral Governor, is accordingly accepted as " an hypo- thesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contra- diction in one chief department of our thought." 2 Even in this aspect, the problem is not exclusively modern. The coincidence of outward prosperity with righteousness, individual and national, was the axiom of Hebrew thought an axiom whose verification in national and individual experience cost the Hebrews much painful thought, and often seemed to be threatened with final disappointment. Even the lesson, learned by bitter experience, that man must be content to "serve God for nought," never carried with it for them the defini- tive divorce of righteousness and prosperity. Their in- tense moral earnestness persisted in its demand for an ultimate harmony of external fortune with inward merit ; sin and suffering, goodness and happiness, must, they felt, ultimately coincide. And, like our modern Kantians and Evolutionists, they were compelled to adjourn to 1 Sidgwick, ' Methods of Ethics/ 504 (3d ed. ) 2 Ibid., 505. 410 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the future, now of the community, now of the indi- vidual, the solution of a problem which their present experience always left unsolved. Yet one cannot help feeling that this is not the most adequate or the worthiest statement of the problem. There is a feeling of externality about such a moral universe as that of the Hebrews, of Kant, or of Professor Sidgwick ; such a God is a kind of deus ex machina, after all, an agent introduced from outside into a scheme of things which had seemed already complete, to re-adjust an order already adjusted. Especially in Kant we feel that, in spite of all his skilful pleading, there is a fall from the elevated and consistent Stoicism of his ethics to the quasi -Hedonism of his moral theology; the old keynote sounds no longer. Nor is his God much better than " a chief-of-police of the moral universe." It seems to me that the ancient Greek statement of the problem was much more adequate than the characteristic modern version of it, and that the Greek solution is also more suggestive of the true direction in which the solution must be sought. its ancient 6. The Greek problem was that of an adequate sphere for the exercise of virtue. In general this sphere was found in the State, and Plato held that there was no contradiction more tragic than that of a great nature condemned to live in a mean State ; great virtue needs a great sphere for its due exercise. And the Greek State, at its best, did provide a splendid, and to the Greeks a satis- fying, sphere for the exercise of human virtue. It en- larged and ennobled, without annulling, the life of the THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 411 individual citizen. For Aristotle, though the State is still the ideal sphere of virtuous activity, and Ethics itself " a sort of political inquiry," the problem has already changed its aspect, and become more directly a problem of the individual life. To him the question is that of the opportunity for the actualisation of the virtue or excel- lence which exists potentially in every man. The actual- isation (evepyeia) of virtue is for him of supreme im-~~\ portance ; and whether any man's potential virtue shall be actualised or not, is determined not by the man him- self, but by his circumstances, his initial and acquired equipment, his " furniture of fortune," wealth, friends, honour, personal advantage, &c. These things constitute the man's moral opportunity, and determine the scale of his ethical achievement. A good, or passively virtuous, man might " sleep all his life," might never have a fit opportunity of realising his goodness, never find a suffi- cient stage for the demonstration of his powers in act, or never find his part in the drama of human history. The tide of fortune might never for him come to the flood, and as it ebbed away from him he might well feel that it carried with it all his hopes of high enterprise and achievement. Here Aristotle seems to find a baffling, inexplicable surd in human life a " given " element which, in a moment, may wreck our lives, and which must fill some men from the first with despair, or at best must imprison their lives within the narrowest horizon. For, so, we are not masters even of our own characters ; character is the result of exercise, it is not the strong, but they who run, that receive the crown of virtue. But we may never be allowed on the course, or we may not 412 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. have the strength that is needed for the race. The ethical End cannot be compassed at least it cannot be fully compassed without the external aid of Fortune ; and Fortune, Aristotle seems to feel almost as irresistibly as Professor Huxley feels about Nature, is ethically in- different. The most a man can do is, he says, to make the best use of the gifts of Fortune, such as they are, "just as a good general uses the forces at his command to the best advantage in war, and a good cobbler makes the best shoe with the leather that is given him." l But oftentimes the forces available are all too scant for any deed of greatness, and the leather is such that only a very indifferent shoe can be made out of it. So that, after all, it is rather in the noble bearing of the chances of life than in any certainty of actual achievement, that we ought to place our estimate of true nobility of soul. Even in the most untoward circumstances, in those calamities which mar and mutilate the felicity of life by causing pains and hindrances to its various activities, nobility may shine out when a person bears the weight of accumulated misfortunes with calmness, not from in- sensibility, but from innate dignity and greatness of soul. In this attitude of Aristotle we are already very near the position of the Stoics. The problem of Fortune, which Aristotle never completely solved, became the chief problem of his successors; and the Stoics and Epicureans found in part the same solution of it. The only salvation from the evil chances of life is to be found, they agree, in a self-contained life which is inde- 1 Eth., I. xi. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 413 pendent of outward change and circumstance. The life of the wise man is a closed sphere, with its centre within the man himself; his mind to him a kingdom is, he is his own sufficient sphere. For the outward sphere has become manifestly inadequate; the splendid life of the Greek States has disappeared in narrow provincialism; Fortune lias played havoc with man's life, and shattered the fabric of his brave endeavours. The lesson is that man must find his good, if he is to find it at all, entirely within himself, and must place no confidence in the course of outward things. And has he not the secret of happiness in his own bosom ? Is it not for him to dictate the terms of his own true welfare ? Can he not shield himself from Fortune's darts in a complete armour of indifference and " impassibility " ? Yet this is not the final resting-place, either for Aris- totle or for the Stoics. The problem of Fortune, it is quite manifest, is not yet solved, nor can the attempt to solve it be abandoned. There is a very real kinship and community, it is felt, between man's "nature" and the " nature of things." The latter is not the sphere of blind chance, after all ; its essence is, like man's, rational. " Live according to nature " means, for the Stoic, " Live according to the common reason, obey that rational order which embraces thy life and nature's too." Nothing happens by chance, everything befalls as is most fit ; and man's true salvation is to discover the fitness of each thing that befalls him, and in all things to order his behaviour in accordance with the eternal fitness of the divine order. Fortune is in reality the Providence of God ; no evil can happen to a good man ; his affairs are 414 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. not indifferent to God. The universe is itself divine, the perfect expression of the divine Keason, and therefore the home of the rational spirit of man. Nor is man, after all, alone, or his life a solitary and exclusive one, contained within the narrow bounds of his individual selfhood. Without ever straying beyond himself, he can become a citizen of a fairer and greater City than any Greek or earthly State, a Civitas Dei, the " goodly fellowship " of humanity, yea, of the universe itself, for his life and the life of the universe are in their essence one. This splen- did and spacious Home it was that the Stoics built for themselves out of the wreck of worldly empire and the shattering of their earlier hopes ; such sweet uses hath adversity for the human spirit. Aristotle's problem seerns pretty near its solution. Aristotle had himself suggested this Stoic solution, and had even, in his own bold metaphysic, transcended it. He could not stop short of a perfect unification of man's life with the life of Nature, and of both with the divine universal Life. The universe has, for him, one End, and one perfect Fulfilment. The Form of all things, and the Form, if we may say so, of human life, are the same ; the Form of the universe is Eeason. And the apparent unreason, the " matter " of the world and of morality, is only reason in the making or " becoming." It is " the promise and the potency " of reason, and will in due time demonstrate its rationality by a perfect fulfilment and actualisation. The process of Nature and the process of human life are really only stages in the one entirely rational process of the divine life. To God all things turn, after his per- fection they all aspire, in him they live and move and THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 415 have their being. And if we ask, What, then, of " man's place in nature " ? we have Aristotle's answer in his doctrine of the human ^v^rj. It is the Form of the body, its perfect actualisation or eVreXe^eta. Nay, the true soul of man, the soul of his soul, is that same Active and Creative Eeason, that pure activity of thought, which is the Alpha and the Omega of Being. In fulfilling the End of his own nature, therefore, man is a "co-worker with God" in the fulfilment of the universal End. Eor the End of the universe is the same as the End of human life. Man can, in virtue of his higher endowment of reason, accomplish with intelligence and insight that which the lower creation accomplishes in its own blind but unerring way. So that ultimately man cannot fail of his End, any more than Nature can fail of hers ; let him link his for- tunes with those of the universe itself, and he cannot fail. The " cosmic process " is not indifferent to man, who is its product and fulfilment, and also, in a sense, its master and its end. Aristotle does not bring together his ethical doctrine of Fortune as an external and in- different power which may as readily check as forward the fulfilment of man's moral nature and his attainment of his true end, and his metaphysical doctrine of the unity of the divine or universal End with the end of human life, a unity which would imply that there cannot be, in man any more than in Nature, such a thing as permanently unfulfilled capacity, or potentiality that is not perfectly actualised. But the profound meaning of his total thought about the universe would seem to be that man must share in the fruition of the great con- summation, that without his participation it would be no 416 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. consummation at all, and that into that diviner Order the lower order (or disorder) of outward accident in which his life had seemed to be confined and thwarted of its fulfilment, must ultimately disappear. Thus in- terpreted, the thought of Aristotle would at once antici- pate and transcend the Stoic philosophy of man and Nature, in the measure that the Aristotelian theology anticipates and transcends the theology of the Porch. The Chris- 7. Christianity offers its own bold solution of the tian sol- ution, problem we are considering. It knows no ultimate dis- tinction between the course of the world and the course of the moral life, but sees " all things working together for good," and discerns in each event of human history a manifestation of the divine Providence. The natural order is incorporated in the moral ; and even where, to the Greek mind, and to the pagan mind always, the latter seemed to thwart and retard the former, it is felt most surely to pro- mote and help it on. Misfortune and calamity, instead of being obstacles to the development of goodness, are the very soil of its best life, the atmosphere it needs to bring it to perfection. Not the wealthy, but the poor ; not the prosperous, but the persecuted ; not the high-minded, but the lowly, the weary, and the heavy-laden, are called blessed. A new office is found for suffering and calamity in the life of goodness ; man is " made perfect through suffering." And while Aristotle thought that length of days was needed for a complete life, Christianity has taught us that " In short measures life may perfect be." THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 417 Nor is salvation found any longer in a mere Stoical in- difference or apathy to misfortune; such a "bearing" is no real bearing of calamity, but rather a cowardly retreat from it. It is in the actual suffering of evil that Chris- tianity finds the " soul of good " in it. Its office is discip- linary and purifying, and " though no suffering for the present seemeth joyous but rather grievous, yet afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruits of righteousness in those that are exercised thereby." Instead of negating the exer- cise of virtue (as Aristotle thought), calamity provides the very opportunity of its best and highest exercise, and therefore must be regarded as the most perfect instrument in the development of goodness. 1 8. If philosophy finds itself precluded from going the The ideal whole length of the Christian doctrine of divine Provi- Real, dence, yet it seems to me that Christianity puts into the * ^ hands of philosophy a clue which it would do well to f\^. follow up, especially since the conception is not altogether new, but is the complement and development of the Aris- totelian and Stoic theology which I have just sketched. All that I am concerned at this point to maintain is the speculative legitimacy and necessity of the demand for a Moral Order somehow pervading and using (in however 1 Addison has given quaint expression to this Christian estimate of so- called "Misfortune" in his fine allegory of "The Golden Scales." "I observed one particular weight lettered on both sides, and upon applying myself to the reading of it, I found on one side written, ' In the dialect of men,' and underneath it, ' CALAMITIES ' : on the other side was written, ' In the language of the gods,' and underneath ' BLESSINGS.' I found the intrinsic value of this weight to be much greater than I imagined, for it overpowered health, wealth, good-fortune, and many other weights, which were much more ponderous in my hand than the other." 2D 418 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. strange and unexpected wise) the order of Nature, and thus making possible for the moral being the fulfilment of his moral task, the perfect realisation of all his moral capaci- ties. That the universe is not foreign to the ethical spirit of man, or indifferent to it, but its sphere and atmosphere, the soil of its life, the breath of its being ; that " the soul of the world is just," that "might" is ultimately "right," and the divine and universal Power " a power that makes for righteousness " ; that so far from the nature of things being antagonistic to morality, " morality is the nature of things," this at least, it seems to me, is the metaphysical implication of morality as we know it. A moral universe, an absolute moral Being, is the indispensable Environment of the ethical life, without which it cannot attain its perfect growth. A " first Actuality," of goodness as of in- telligence, is the presupposition of, and the only sufficient security for, the perfect actualisation of moral as of in- tellectual capacity. Philosophy must acknowledge the right of a moral being to self-realisation and complete- ness of ethical life, and substantiate his claim upon the universe whose child he is, that it shall be the medium, and not the obstacle and negation, of his proper life ? This ultimate and inalienable human right is not a " right to bliss," "to welfare and repose," but a right to self- fulfilment and realisation. To deny this right, to invali- date this claim, is either to naturalise, i.e., to de-moralise man, or to convict the universe of failure to perfect its own work, to say that, in the end, the part contradicts the whole. Our reasons for dissenting from the former alternative have been already given, and belong to our entire ethical theory ; to assent to the latter would be to THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 419 deny the reality of the universe, and to surrender the pos- sibility of philosophy itself. Accordingly, we seem not only warranted, but compelled, to maintain the moral constitution of the universe. This is, in the words of a recent French writer, " the only hypothesis which explains the totality of phenomena, moral phenomena included, which grasps the harmony between them and us, which gives, with this unity and harmony, clearness to the mind, strength to the will, sweetness to the soul." l Fichte's question is most pertinent, " While nothing in nature contradicts itself, is man alone a contradiction ? " 2 The same conclusion is reached by pressing the investi- gation of the ultimate significance of morality itself. We have seen that the moral life is in its essence an ideal life a life of aspiration after the realisation of that which is not yet attained, determined by the unceasing antithesis of the Is and the Ought-to-be. What, then, we are forced at last to ask, is the source and warrant of this Moral Ideal, of this imperious Ought-to-be ? To answer that it is entirely subjective, the moving shadow of our actual attainment, would be irrevocably to break the spell of the Ideal, and to make it a mere foolish will- o'-the-wisp which, once discovered, could cheat us no longer out of our sensible satisfaction with the actual. An ideal with no foothold in the real, would be the most unsubstantial of all illusions. As Dr Martineau has strikingly said : " Amid all the sickly talk about ' ideals ' which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are dreams of future possibility, and not faiths in present realities, so long as 1 Ricardou, ' De 1'Ideal/ 325. 2 ' Popular Works,' i. 346 (Eng. tr.) 420 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, . . . they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air- bubbles, gay in the sunshine, and broken by the passing wind/' What is needed to give the Ideal its proper dignity and power is " the discovery that your gleaming Ideal is the everlasting Keal, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls." 1 The secret of the power of the Moral Ideal is the conviction which it carries with it that it is no mere Ideal, but the expression, more or less perfect, and always I becoming more perfect, of the supreme Eeality ; that " the rule of right, the symmetries of character, the require- ments of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet ; they are known among the stars ; they reign beyond Orion and the Southern Cross ; they are wherever the universal Spirit is." 2 The entire preceding discussion goes to show * that to make morality entirely relative and subjective, to give a merely empirical " evolution " of it, is to destroy its inner essence, and to miss its characteristic note. That note is the ideal without whose constant presence and operation moral development would be impossible. But we have reserved the question of the origin and warrant, of the Ideal itself; and when we ask it to produce its " certificate of birth," it is compelled to refer us to the "nature of things," and to proclaim that the way in which it has commanded us to walk is the Way of the Cosmos itself, the Way of the divine Order. 1 Martineau, 'Study of Religion/ i. 12. Cf. Ricardou, ' De I'lde'al,' 262 : " It is not enough that the ideal charm the imagination by its poetry, it is necessary that it satisfy the reason by its truth, its objective and absolute truth." 2 Martineau, op. cit., i. 26. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 421 Thus an adequate interpretation of morality compels us 'to predicate an ultimate and absolute moral Reality, a supreme ground of Goodness as well as of Truth, and the moral idealism which we have maintained against empiri- cal realism in Ethics brings us in the end to a moral Real- ism, to a conviction of the Reality of the Moral Ideal. We are driven to the conclusion that the Ideal is not simply the unreal, but the expression and exponent of the Real ; that that which on our side of it is the Ideal, is, on its farther side, the Real ; that behind the Ought lies the Is, behind our eternal Ought-to-be the eternal I am of the divine Righteousness. But that supreme moral Reality we can only apprehend on this, our human side ; its farther side we may not see. " No man shall see God's face and live ; " the full vision would scorch man's little life in the " consuming fire " of the divine perfection. To see God, we must be like him ; it is a moral rather than an intellectual apprehension. Yet, as we obey the Ought-to-be, and realise in ourselves the Ideal Good, we do in our human measure and in our appropriate human way come to the fuller knowledge of the divine Goodness. The veil that hides it from us the veil of our own failure and imperfection is gradually taken away, and "the pure in heart see God." To make the antithesis between the ideal and the real final/and to refuse to recognise the reality of the ideal, is to betray a radical misunderstanding of the ideal and of its relation to the real. We must distinguish carefully between the real and the actual, between the absolute and eternal Real and the empirical and historical Actual. The ideal is, as such, always opposed to the actual ; but 422 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. this does not prevent its being the exponent of the real. Whence comes the ideal of the actual but from the Eeality or true Being of the actual itselH Thus the ideal brings us nearer to Eeality than the actual ; the one is a more perfect, the other a less perfect, expression of the single Eeality in relation to which both stand, and out of rela- tion to which the distinction between them would disap- pear. For that distinction must be interpreted as having an objective, and not merely a subjective, basis and sig- nificance. " The ideal, founded upon the reasoned and positive knowledge of the essential nature of being, is at once true and possible ; it is superior, not contrary, to the actual fact ; in a sense it is truer than fact itselfj for it is fact purified, transformed, such as it would be if nothing opposed its development ; it is reality tending to its com- plete actualisation." 1 The ideal is, truly understood, the mirror in which we see reflected at once the real and the actual ; it is founded in the real, and is at the same time and for that reason the heart and truth of the actual. The ideal or potential is not simply what the actual is not, it is also the prophecy and guarantee of what the actual shall be-^nay, the revelation of what in its essence it is its very being, its rL fjv elvai. The Ought of morality is the dictation of the ethical Whole to its parts, for the true nature of the parts is determined by the nature of their common Whole. Jft is only the empiricist who sub- ordinates the ideal to the actual, who makes the actual the only real, and sees in the Whole but the sum of the parts. 1 Ricardou, 'De 1'Ideal,' 22. Cf. Professor Caird, 'Evolution of Re- ligion,' ii. 229 : " The ideal reveals itself as the reality which is hid beneath the immediate appearance of things." THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 423 But evolution itself should teach us to find the real al- ways in, or rather behind, the ideal ; never in, but always ahead of, the actual. The empirical time-process, if it has a meaning, implies an eternal Eeality, a Being of the Be- coming, a Something that becomes, the Beginning and the End of the entire process of development. The process is the evolution the gradual unfolding or appearing of that essential Eeality which is its constant implication. 9. Such an interpretation of Moral Eeality, as only the The Per- other side of the Moral Ideal, enables us to be faithful to of God. the great Kantian principle of the essential Autonomy of the moral life. It is a principle divined by other moralists, by Plato and Butler especially, that man cannot properly acknowledge subjection to any foreign legisla- tion, but is for ever " a law unto himself," his own judge, at once subject and sovereign in the moral realm. But the Kantian Autonomy is not a final explanation of morality. How comes it, we must still ask, that man is fitted for the discharge of such a function ; whence this splendid human endowment ? Kant does not himself connect the self-legislation of man with the divine Source of moral government in the universe ; but his doctrine of Autonomy teaches us that the connection must be no external one. The supreme Head of the moral universe he who, as Holy and not placed under Duty, is only Sovereign and never Subject must be akin to its other members who occupy the " middle sfcate," and are subjects as well as sovereigns, legislators who with difficulty obey the laws of their own making. But what is this but to say that as the ideal is the truth of the actual, so the 424 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. Supreme Keality can only be the perfect embodiment and realisation of the ideal. In no one of these three terms do we depart from the single concrete fact of moral experience ; abstract any one of them, and that concrete experience becomes impossible. And what is the concrete fact, the single term of which these three are only aspects, but Self -hood or Personality ? Behind the actual there is the ideal Self, and behind the ideal the real or divine Self. The whole drift of the argument goes to show that, in essence, God and man must be one, that God the supreme moral Source and Principle, the Alpha and the Omega of the moral as of the intellectual life is the eternally perfect Personality, in whose image man has been created, and after the pattern of whose perfect nature the archetypal essence of his own he must unceasingly strive to shape his life. Since the Moral Ideal is an Ideal of Personality, must not the Moral Eeality the Eeality of which that Ideal is the after- reflection as well as the prophetic hint be the perfection of Personality, the supreme Person whose image we, as persons, bear and are slowly and with effort inscribing on our natural individuality ? We must thus complete the Kantian theory of Autonomy ; that alone does not tell the whole story of the moral life. Its unyielding Ought, its Categorical Imperative, issues not merely from the depths of our own nature, but from the heart of the universe itself. We are self-legislative ; but we re-enact the law already enacted by God, we recognise, rather than constitute, the law of our own being. The moral law is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal, " whose offspring we are." THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 425 All this, I need hardly say, is not intended as mathe- matical demonstration. Philosophy never is an " exact science." Eather it is offered as the only sufficient Hypo- thesis of the moral life. The life of goodness the ideal life is necessarily a grand speculation, a great " leap in the dark." It is a life based on the conviction that its source and its issues are in the Eternal and the Infinite. Its mood is "strenuous," enthusiastic, possessed by the persuasion of its own infinite value and significance. The man lives under the power of the idea of the supreme reality of moral distinctions, and as if their significance were absolute. To invalidate the hypothesis would be to invalidate the life which is based upon it. But the life of goodness is unyielding in its demand for the sanction, in ultimate divine Eeality, of its own Ideal. For that Ideal is infinite to make it finite were to destroy it ; and, as infinite, it must seek its complement in the Infinite or God. And if a life thus founded is in reality an infinite Peradventure, one long Question always repeated, its pro- gress brings with it the gradual conversion of the specula- tive Peradventure into a practical certainty, and the per- sistent Question is always answering itself. The touch of this transcendent faith alone transfigures man's life with a divine and absolute significance, and endows it with an imperishable and unconquerable strength. "If God be for us, who can be against us ? " " We feel we are nothing, but Thou wilt help us to be." If indeed we are in alliance with the Power that rules the universe, we may well feel confident that " we can do all things " ; if we are going this warfare at our own charges, we may as well give up the struggle. But the ve'ry essence of good- 426 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. ness is that it will never give up, but perseveres even to the end. One thing alone would be fatal to it the loss of belief in its own infinite reality, in its own absolute worth. With that surrender would come pessimism. But again the good life never is pessimistic. 1 Objections 10. The objection is made to such an ethical or personal pomor- conception of God, that it is anthropomorphic, and rests, like all anthropomorphism, upon a false estimate of man's ofNaturai place in the universe, upon such an exaggerated view of his 011 ' own importance as is fatal to the vision of God in his true being. This objection comes from two sides, from that of Naturalism and from that of Transcendentalism, or from that of empirical and from that of dialectical Evolu- 1 Cf. Professor James, ' International Journal of Ethics/ i. 352, 353 : " When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and to utter the in- finitely penetrating, shattering, tragically challenging mode of appeal. . . . All through history, in the periodical conflicts of puritanism with the don't-care temper, we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite needs. The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and en- durance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will, on the battle-field of human history, always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall." THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 427 tion. The former need not detain us long ; the latter will require more careful consideration. The evolutionary view of the universe, it is held, em- phasises the lesson of the Copernican change of stand- point. As the geo-centric conception was supplanted by the helio-centric, so must the anthropo-centric view give place to the cosmo-centric. As man has learned that his planet is not the centre of the physical universe, he is now learning that he himself is only an incident in the long course of the evolutionary process. His imagined superiority to nature, his imagined uniqueness of endow- ment, must disappear when he is found to be the product of natural factors, and the steps are traced by which he has become what he is. But such a deduction from the theory of evolution is the result of a misinterpretation of that theory. Here, as elsewhere, the theological consequence is a metaphysical deduction from scientific statements, rather than a finding of science itself. It is for science to discover the " laws " of phenomena, or the manner of their occurrence, to describe the How of the world and of man. The What and the Why are questions for philosophy. The " laws " of " nature " which science discovers may be at the same time the " ways " of God, the modes of the divine activity. Why should not evolution by natural selection be the mode of the divine activity ? Even if Evolution be the supreme Law of the universe, it is only the "highest generalisation," the most comprehensive scientific state- ment of the phenomenal process. But the process does not explain itself. The " genetic method " may be adequate for science, it is not adequate^iac-.-giyosophy. Philo- 428 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. sophy can never rest in a universe of mere " Becoming," it must explain the Becoming by its " Being " rather than conversely. Heraclitus, as a philosophical evolutionist, recognised this in his assertion of the Law or path (0809) of the process ; and Aristotle saw still more clearly that the process of evolution is not self-explanatory, that Be- coming rests on Being, that the TL ecmv of the actual pre- supposes the ova-la or TI fjv elvai of the essential and ideal. In other words, we understand the Becoming only when we refer it to the Being that is becoming. The very con- ception of Evolution is teleological. Evolution is not mere change or indefinite movement ; it is progress, movement in a certain direction, towards a definite goal. " The pro- cess of evolution is itself the working out of a mighty teleology, of which our finite understandings can fathom but the scantiest rudiments." 1 It has been truly said that "Evolution spells Purpose." The philosophic lesson of Evolutionism is the constant lesson of science itself, that the universe is a universe, a Many which is also a One, a Whole through all its parts. And while it is the business of the scientific Evolutionist to analyse this Whole into its component parts, it is for philosophy to make the synthesis of the parts in the Whole. To discover this total meaning of the evolutionary process, this End which is at the same time the Be- ginning of the entire movement, philosophy must reverse the evolutionary method, as understood by science, and explain the lower in terms of the higher, rather than the higher in terms of the lower ; the earlier in terms of the later, rather than the later in terms of the earlier ; the 1 Fiske, ' Cosmic Philosophy,' ii. 406. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 429 simpler by the more complex, rather than the more com- plex by the simpler. For it is in the higher and later and more complex that we see the unfolding of the essential nature of the lower and earlier and simpler forms of being. In the latter we discover what the former had it in them to become, what the former in promise and potency already were. The oak explains the acorn, even more truly than the acorn explains the oak. Now, the highest and latest and most complex form of being that we know is man, and thus teleology becomes inevita- bly anthropomorphism. The superiority of the anthropo- centric view to the cosmo-centric receives a new vindi- cation when we see that man includes nature. " That which the pre-Copernican astronomy naively thought to do by placing the home of man in the centre of the physical universe, the Darwinian biology profoundly accomplishes by exhibiting man as the terminal fact in that stupendous process of evolution whereby things have come to be what they are. In the deepest sense it is as true as ever it was held to be, that the world was made for man, and that the bringing forth in him of those qualities which we call highest and holiest is the final cause of creation." : For in man we now see, with a new distinctness, the microcosm ; he sums up in himself, repeats and transcends, the entire process of the world. Anthropomorphism is more adequate than Naturalism, because in man we are nearer the Whole, and nearer the Centre, than in nature. Evolutionism sends us, for the explanation of nature, from nature to man. The con- tinuity of the process of evolution in nature and in man 1 Fiske, 'Idea of God,' Pref. 21. 430 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. is a new vindication of anthropomorphism. As long as man could separate himself from nature, and regard him- self as unique, a Melchisedec-birth, he had no right to interpret the process of nature in terms of himself ; the unity of man and nature which science is slowly establish- ing is the vindication of that right. It does not matter where man's home may be, at the centre or the circum- ference of the physical system ; it does not matter what his history has been, by what slow stages he has become what he is. It is in what he is, and always in " promise and potency " was, that man's supreme importance lies. The Darwinian, like the Copernican "change of stand- point," has forced us to revise our conception of " man's place in nature," of his temporal as well as of his spatial place. But his true being shines out all the more clearly in the changed light. If we regard the universe as one continuous evolution, we must find in man the key to the entire process. For while in the organic we find the fulfilment and raison d'etre of the inorganic, the end to which the latter is a means, in the rational soul of man we must find, with Aristotle, that for the realisation of which his body exists (o-&>//,o.T09 evT\exeia). The course of evolution, as we can empirically trace it, should teach us this. Till man is reached, there is no stopping anywhere, each species seems to exist only as a step towards the next. Nature seems to be not merely " careless of the single life," but to be careless even of " the type." But with man the move- ment seems to change its course, and the progress seems to be inwards rather than onwards. The human species once evolved, the function of evolution seems to be the THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 431 perfecting of this species. The material world seems to exist for the body of man, and man's body for his soul. " On earth there is nothing great but man : in man there is nothing great but mind." '" Man seems indeed to be the microcosm, the focal point of the evolutionary process, the universe itself in miniature. It seems as if in his perfec- tion it attained its end, and accomplished its mission. 11. But the charge of Anthropomorphism comes from C6) from the standpoint the Transceridentalists as well as from the .Naturalists, of Diaiec- from the dialectical as well as from the empirical Evolu- ution. tionists. Absolute Idealism has no place for Personal- ity, or at any rate for a plurality of Selves, human and divine. It is difficult to define Hegelian " orthodoxy," but it seems to demand an impersonal view both of God and man. God thus becomes either the One which is not the Many, or the All, the universal process itself. Both views are found, I think, in the latest English ex- position of Hegelian theology, Professor Edward Caird's Gifford Lectures on ' The Evolution of Eeligion.' On the one hand, it is maintained that we must not conceive God in terms either of the Object or of the Subject, that Naturalism and Monotheism are alike inadequate. God, being the principle of unity that underlies both subject and object, must not be identified with either. The result would seem to be the impossibility of conceiving God at all. If, in order to think God, we must think away all the reality we know, it is clear that we cannot know God at all. A mere " principle of unity," beyond the dualism of subject and object, is hardly to be distinguished from the Spencerian Absolute, neither material nor spiritual, but 432 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the unknown and unknowable basis alike of material and spiritual phenomena. Professor Caird is evidently con- scious of this difficulty, and tries to answer it : " What, it is asked, can we make of a Being who is neither to be perceived or imagined as an object, nor to be conceived and determined as a subject, but only as the unity in which all difference begins and ends ? Must we not content ourselves with the bare acknowledgment of such a Being, and bow our heads before the inscrutable ? " The answer is, that though " in a sense such a universal must be beyond knowledge, ... it is the ground on which we stand, the atmosphere which surrounds us, the light by which we see, and the heaven that shuts us in." l But if the God of Idealism must remain mere indeterminate Being, a Something of which we cannot predicate any attributes, Idealism has only brought us round by a new path to Agnosticism. At best, such a " principle of unity " could be only the form of our knowledge, and a form into which we are not allowed to put any content must needs remain empty arid abstract. The only escape from this formalism of a mere " prin- ciple of unity " seems to lie in the identification of God with the process of experience, the " system of relations," the dialectical movement of reason in nature and in man. God thus becomes the All regarded as One, the Whole, the Universe itself. Now, since this Whole, to be inter- preted as such i.e., as the unity of the all must be re- garded as the rational order which makes the cosmos a cosmos, the result is Pan-logism. Of this position we have various statements. To Hegel himself God is the " Abso- 1 'Evolution of Religion,' i. 153. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 433 lute Idea," the self-contained and self-completed Thought which lives and moves to its self-realisation in " all think- ing things, all objects of all thought." To Professor Caird God is neither Subject nor Object, but the higher term presupposed in and containing both. This Absolute is obviously Kant's "Unity of Apperception," left alone after the withdrawal of the Kantian Things-in-themselves, objective and subjective alike. For Kant himself this was the mere Form of experience, the principle of its possibil- ity, and was not to be substantiated as a Being outside experience. If, therefore, we deny the reality of Kant's noumenal or supra-experiential world, 1 there remains what was for Kant himself the only knowable Keality, the rational system of experience itself. The " thinking thing " disappears, with the " objects " of its thought, in thought itself; the real is the rational; form is filled with content, because form and content are one. If the former view led us to the Eleatic unity of inde- terminate Being, this brings us to the Heracleitean unity of mere Becoming. This version of Hegelianism is indeed essentially a revival of Heracleiteanism. Nothing is, every- thing becomes ; the process itself is the entire reality ; and the process is rational. It is instructive to notice how near " pan-logism " thus comes to " pan-phenomenalism." The one theory interprets the process rationally, the other empirically ; but in both alike the process is everything. But Heracleiteanism is no more adequate than Eleaticism. Becoming implies Being, as Being implies Becoming ; either alone is a half-truth. Thought without a Thinker, Eela- 1 From what follows it will be seen that I am not here contending for the rehabilitation of the Kantian Ding-an-sich. 2E 434 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. tions between nothing, Order without an Orderer, are unintelligible. To hypostatise the Thought, the Eelation, the Order, is the very acme of scholastic Eealism. This impersonal and merely " dynamical " conception of the Absolute Eeality is connected inseparably with an im- personal and dynamical view of man. As " mind " was for Spinoza only " idea corporis " or " idea idere corporis," a collective name for the " ideas " or " states," but represent- ing no " substantial " reality, so for the Hegelian school is the Thinker resolved into his Thought. The subject has no more reality than the object ; both are " aspects " or " modes " of the Absolute which contains them. But if, as I have tried to maintain, 1 we cannot resolve the finite subject into its experience, whether intellec- tual or moral, no more can we identify the Absolute with experience, or with " the process of the actual." The very conception of Experience implies a reference to a Subject or Self, permanent amid its ceaseless flux, and never ceasing to distinguish itself, as one and identical, from the changing manifold of that experience. That the ultimate Eeality should be found by transcendental Ideal- ism in Experience itself is one more example of how, in the history of thought, philosophical extremes may meet. If, however, Hegelianism is to maintain itself as an idealistic and spiritual interpretation of the universe, it is obvious that it must be by accepting the subject as a more adequate exponent of the ultimate divine Eeality than the object. Hegel himself regarded God as the Absolute Subject, and conceived the grand superiority 1 Pp. 366 ff. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 435 of his system to Spinozism to lie in the substitution of " Subject " for " Substance." It is indeed the consequence of Hegel's evolutionary view of the universe, that in the later stage, that of human Self-consciousness, the manifes- tation of ultimate Eeality should be more adequate than at the earlier stage of mere Nature. And it is of the essence of Idealism, as distinguished from Spinozism, to perceive that spirit and nature, thought and extension, subject and object, are not co-ordinate, but that the former always " overlaps " the latter. Accordingly we find Green characterising God as the "Eternal Self" or "Self-con- sciousness," and many Hegelians professing Theism or the doctrine of divine Personality. Professor Caird, for ex- ample, holds that on the basis of Absolute Idealism " we can think of God as He must be thought of as the principle of unity in all things, and yet conceive Him as a self-conscious, self-determining Being." 1 But it is a pretty obvious deduction from Absolute Idealism that if God be Subject, His absoluteness pre- cludes the existence of any other subjects or any relation to them. Accordingly the finite subject is regarded by Green as the " reproduction in time " of the one Eternal Self. Professor Caird also maintains explicitly the entire immanence of God in man as well as in Nature, and the resulting unity of God with man. To deny that identity, he insists, is to rest in an external view of the universe, to stop short of the divine Unity. The immanence of God precludes his transcendence ; his unity with man as well as with nature makes impossible that separateness of being, whether in him or in ourselves, which we are accustomed 1 ' Evolution of Religion,' ii. 82. 436 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. to call Personality. " It is equally impossible for us to recall or to maintain the attitude of mind of the pure monotheists, for whom God was merely one subject among other subjects ; and though lifted high above them, the source of all their life, was yet related to them as an external and independent will. Our idea of God will not let us conceive of Him as external to anything, least of all to the spirits who are made in His image, and who live and move and have their being in Him. We cannot, therefore, avoid thinking of God as a prin- ciple who is within us as He is without us, present in self-consciousness as in consciousness, the presupposition, the life, and the end of all." 1 On the theory of Absolute Idealism, on the other hand, " it becomes possible to think of man as a ' partaker in the divine nature/ and, therefore, as a self-conscious and self-determining spirit, without gifting him with an absolute individuality which would cut him off from all union and communion with his fellow- creatures and with God." 2 These statements, while they contain most important and much - needed truth, also reveal the nature of the reasoning upon which the central position of Hegelian Idealism rests. That position, it seems to me, derives its chief plausibility from the pressing into the service of philosophic thought of the spatial metaphor which underlies such terms as " externality," " relation," " separation," &c. Things which are external to one another, related to one another, separated from one another in space, are not one and the same, but manifold and different. But the spatial metaphor must not blind us to the fact that, in investigat- 1 Op. cit., ii. 72. 2 Ibid., ii. 84. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 437 ing the relation of man to God, we are dealing not with spatial but with spiritual existence ; and in the spiritual sphere it does not follow that a real separateness of being, a real relation between man and God, is fatal to the unity of the terms in question. " When we speak of God all idols of space and time must be forgotten, or our best labour is in vain." l The Hegelian unity is too easy ; its synthesis of the elements of reality human and divine is too rapid. Its conception of God is the result of the exclusive intellectualism of its view of the universe. From the standpoint of the intellect, such a synthesis might conceivably be satisfactory. But Will and Feeling are factors of human reality, no less than Intellect ; and from the point of view of Will and Feeling we cannot unify, in the sense of identifying, man with God. For the Hegelian, as for the Spinozist, the process of the universe is one. But that is because the Hegelian view is, no less than the Spinozistic, a purely intellectual view, and its unity is therefore the unity of thought, not the unity of feeling and will. The process of thought might conceiv- ably be one in God and in man ; the process of will and feeling is not one. It is the very nature of Will to separate, to substantiate, if also to relate, its possessors * and, as a moral being, man claims for himself a moral sphere of freedom and independent Self-hood. It is this inalienable human quality of freedom, of independent moral initiation, that dictates the true moral relation of man to God. It is not the intellectual burden of finitude, but the moral burden of evil, that sends man beyond himself to God ; and the moral relation of man to 1 Herder, quoted by Knight, 'Aspects of Theism,' 161. 438 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. God is in its essence a personal relation a relation of Will. " Our wills are ours, to make them Thine." If we absolutely unify or identify God and man, the ethical attitude, which is one of relation, not of identity, becomes impossible. In avoiding the evils of the doctrine of the divine transcendence, Hegelianism falls into the no less serious evils of the doctrine of the mere immanence of God. Morality implies, in the last analysis, a relation between man and God, "union and communion of the human will with the divine Will " ; not such a unity and identity of man and God as must mean the dissolution of all relation between them. It is the spiritual difference or separateness of being that gives the union its entire moral and religious significance ; it is the very possibility of saying " I will " that gives its infinite value to man's "Not my will, but Thine, be done." A philosophy which includes the life of man in the one divine process of the universe, and makes his life, like nature's, simply a " reproduction " of the life of God, may perhaps be intel- lectually satisfying, but it cuts away the roots of morality, and of " ethical religion." The greatest strain comes upon such a unitary view when it meets the problem of evil. Is evil an element in the life of God ? If so, it must cease to be real evil, and this is precisely Professor Caird's solution. He invokes the sanction of Christianity in favour of such a thoroughly optimistic interpretation of moral evil. The characteristic truth of the Christian religion he takes to be " the omni- potence of good." But, in order to the perfect develop- ment of goodness, evil must be struggled with and over- come. Goodness is, in its very essence, deliverance from THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 439 evil; and "with the increasing pressure of the conflict, and the growing consciousness of the evil with which he has to contend, there comes a deepening sense of the necessity for such a conflict with evil, and of all the suffering it brings with it, to the highest triumph of good." 1 Thus, in the supreme conflict of evil with goodness, " even the powers that opposed and persecuted the good were secretly its instruments, and even the malice and hatred of men were no real hindrances, but rather the opportunities required for its manifestation." 2 " Nay, even sin itself, as its utmost power is shown only under the Law which produces a distinct consciousness of sin, and so prepares the way for the negation of it and for the reception of a new principle of life even sin itself, from this point of view, is seen to be part of the divine order." 3 "The intensification of sin, due to the consciousness of it awakened by the Law," works out the greater triumph of the good. For while " sin is not sin in the deepest sense till it is conscious, the sin of one who knows the divine law he breaks ; yet just this very consciousness, while it deepens the sin, in another way prepares for its extinction." 4 This solution of the problem of evil seems again too rapid and easy. I cannot see how, on the unitary theory, evil is a necessary element in the process of the good ; how, in such a universe as Professor Caird's, the evil which is an indubitable fact of moral experience, should occur; how human sin can be a part or stage of the necessary process of the divine life; how this unreason 1 'Evolution of Religion,' 139. - Ibid., 165. 3 Ibid., 207. * Ibid., 208. -:* 440 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. should infect a universe which is rational through and through. The explanation offered may be satisfactory as an explanation of how the knowledge of evil is instru- mental to the life of goodness ; but it is not satisfactory as an explanation of the existence of evil, it does not justify the occurrence of evil as a real fact in the universe. We can see how evil, once there, is utilised and converted into an instrument of goodness ; but why evil should be there at all, we do not see. Even if we grant the necessity of evil as affording an opportunity for the choice of the good, still the existence of evil, that is, the fact that the good is not chosen, is left out of the explanation. And in every case of moral evil we have such a misdirection of the will. To make evil only a necessary element in the life of goodness seems to me to imperil, if not to destroy, the reality of the moral life both on its good and on its evil side. The earnestness of that life, whether in its bitterness or in its joy, finds no adequate interpre- tation in a theory which makes it in all its parts and phases absolutely and simply "necessary." The true Absolute must contain, instead of abolishing, relations ; the true Monism must include, instead of ex- cluding, Pluralism. A One which, like Spinoza's " Sub- stance " or the Hegelian Absolute, -does not enable us to think the Many, cannot be the true One, the unity of the manifold. The one Subject which negates all subjects is hardly better than the one Substance which negates all substances. The true unity must be ethical, as well as intellectual ; and an ethical unity implies dis- tinctness of being and activity. To deify man is as illegit- imate as to naturalise him. But morality is the medium THE PROBLEM OP GOD. 441 of union, as well as of separation, between man and God. Will unites, as well as separates, its possessors. " Barriers exist only for the world of bodies ; it is the privilege of minds to penetrate each other without confusion with one another. In communion with God we are one with Him, and yet we maintain our personality." x The very surrender of the finite will to the infinite is itself an act of will ; neither morality nor ethical religion is self -less or impersonal. 12. Hegelianism, we have seen, finds it necessary, in intellect- order to the establishment of an intelligible theory of the Moraiism : universe, to conceive God in terms of the subject rather n than in terms of the object ; it is, to this extent, anthro- pomorphic. But if we are to find the key to the inter- pretation of the Absolute in the subject rather than in the object, with what right do we exclude the ethical and emotional elements of the subject's life, and retain only the intellectual ? Intellectualism, Gnosticism, or pure Eationalism must always prove itself an inadequate exposition of a universe which includes the human sub- ject, and must continue to call forth Moraiism or the philosophy of Will and Emotion as its needed comple- ment. For while, as- an intellectual being, man might resolve himself into unity with God, and regard himself as a mere mode or aspect of the one Subject, a moral being must " round itself to a separate whole." The reality of the moral life implies man's independence of God as well as of Nature, and forces upon him, to that extent, a pluralistic rather than a monistic view of the universe. 1 Kicardou, ' De 1'Iddal,' 143. 442 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. And if a moral theology is no less legitimate than an intellectual theology, it follows that we may interpret God not merely as Thought, but as Will. It was with a true insight that Aristotle and the Schoolmen thought of God as "pure activity." Im Anfang war die That is as true as Im Anfang war das Wort. But we must no more separate Will from Intelligence than Intelligence from Will. Will, separated from Intelligence, would not be Will. What Schopenhauer calls " Will " is only blind brute Force ; its activity is necessarily disastrous, and what it does has to be undone when Intelligence is born. But Aristotle's ultimate Reality is the unity of intelligence and will ; the divine life is for him identical in its essence with the ideal life of man, rational activity. Perfection of will implies perfection of intelligence, and perfection of intelligence and will implies also emotional perfection. In us, it is true, " feeling, thought, and volition have all defects which suggest something higher." l But the " something higher " which these defects suggest is some- thing higher in the same kind, the perfection of these elements, their harmonious unity. To think of God as perfect Personality, to conceive the divine Life as the harmonious activity of perfect Will informed by perfect Intelligence and manifested in the Feeling of this har- mony, is to conceive God as like ourselves, but with our human limitations removed, and to conceive our relation to God as a moral and emotional, and not merely as an intellectual relation. If, therefore, we are to maintain a spiritual, and more particularly an ethical, view of the universe, we must be 1 F. H. Bradley, 'Appearance and Reality,' 182. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 443 in earnest with the conception of Personality. Hegelian- ism is altogether too vague in its utterances here. Accord- ing to the latest exposition of that philosophy, that of Mr Bradley, God is to be conceived as " super-personal" rather than as " impersonal." " It is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. But neither mis- take shall be necessary. The Absolute stands above, and not below, its internal distinctions. It does not reject them, but it includes them as elements in its fulness. To speak in concrete language, it is not the indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes. But it is better in this connection to call it super-personal." 1 Yet Mr Bradley closes his book with the statement that, accord- ing to " the essential message of Hegel, outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and the more anything is spiritual, so much the more is it verit- ably real." 2 But is not spirit essentially personal, and must we not think of the Infinite Spirit rather as complete Personality than as super-personal ? It is objected that to conceive God as a Person is to contradict His infinity. " The Deity which they want is of course finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time. ... Of course for us to ask seriously if the Absolute can be personal in such a way would be quite absurd." 3 " For me a person is finite or is meaningless." 4 " Once give up your finite and mutable person, and you have parted with everything which, for you, makes per- sonality important. . . . For me it is sufficient to know, 1 'Appearance and Reality,' 533. 2 Ibid., f>52. 3 Op. cit., 532. 4 Loc. cit. 444 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. on one side, that the Absolute is not a finite person. Whether, on the other side, personality in some eviscer- ated remnant of sense can be applied to it, is a ques- tion intellectually unimportant and practically trifling." x Such statements as these and they are typical of the criticism constantly made upon ethical Theism seem to me to rest upon the ambiguity of the term Personality. When we think of Personality as essentially finite, we are confounding Personality with Individuality. The individual is essentially finite, the person is essentially infinite. So far is Personality from contradicting the In- finite, that, as Lotze says, 2 " only the Infinite is completely personal." If we think of God as being all that we ought to be, as the Eeality of the moral Ideal, must we not say that, as we gradually constitute our Personality, we are tracing the divine image in ourselves, and learning more fully the very nature of God ? " The Absolute is not a finite person ; " but to say that personality is necessarily " finite," " with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time," is to beg the whole question at issue. The question just is whether the "infinite" and the " personal " are, or are not, contradictory conceptions. The essentially unethical character of an impersonal or super-personal universe is finely suggested by Professor Eoyce in a little fable of his own invention : " And so at worst we are like a child who has come to the palace of the king on the day of his wedding, bearing roses as a gift to grace the feast. For the child, waiting innocently to see whether the king will not appear and praise the 1 'Appearance and Reality,' 533. 2 ' Philosophy of Religion,' ch. iv. 41. THE PROBLEM OF GOD. 445 welcome flowers, grows at last weary with watching all day and with listening to harsh words outside the palace gate amid the jostling crowd. And so in the evening it falls asleep beneath the great dark walls, unseen and for- gotten ; and the withering roses by and by fall from its lap, and are scattered by the wind into the dusty highway, there to be trodden under foot and destroyed. Yet all that happens only because there are infinitely fairer treas- ures within the palace than the ignorant child could bring. The king knows of this yes, and of ten thousand other proffered gifts of loyal subjects. But he needs them not. Eather are all things from eternity his own." l Nay, but to the very palace of the King every child of man can bring a gift and treasure which He will not de- spise the priceless gift of a free and loving service, the treasure, more precious than all besides, of a will touched to goodness. We cannot believe that man's good and evil are indifferent to God, that evil is only " an element, and a necessary element, in the total goodness of the Universal Will," that in God our " separateness is destroyed," and with our separateness our " sin," that our goodness fol- lows, like our sin, from " the necessity of the divine nature." In our good, as in our evil, we feel that our life is our own, personal, separate from God as it is separate from Nature, our own to give to Him who gave it to us, or to withhold even from Him. Instead of surrendering the idea of Personality, we must cherish it, therefore, as the only key to the moral and religious life. It is the hard-won result of long experi- ence and deep reflection. The depth and spirituality of 1 ' Religious Aspect of Philosophy.' 446 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the conception of God have grown with the growth of the idea of human personality. It is the presence and opera- tion of this idea that distinguishes Christianity from other religions, that makes Hebraism a religion, while the lack of it makes Hellenism hardly more than a mythology. As man has learned to know himself, he has advanced in the knowledge of God. Our age is the age of science, its prevailing spirit is what we may call the " intellectualism " of the scientific mind. Its ambition is to understand, and to understand Nature. As in the earliest age of Greek philosophy, the eye of thought is directed outward. The task is a great one ; no wonder that the energies of the time are wellnigh exhausted by it. But, sooner or later, the view must be turned again inwards, and when it is, the eternal spiritual realities will be found there still, and the lessons which were not written upon the face of Na- ture will be found graven on the " living tablets " of the human heart. Man is not all intellect; and if intellect now thrives at the expense of the rest of his nature, as in the Middle Ages intellect was itself in large measure starved and sacrificed that morality and religion might develop, it only means that the " education of the human race " is conducted, like the education of the individual, bit by bit, step by step. But the education cannot stop until, in insight as in life, humanity has attained the measure of its divine perfection. 447 CHAPTEE III. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 1. THE third postulate of morality, according to Kant, is The aiter- the immortality of the moral being. If we have found thought, it impossible to demonstrate the Freedom of the Will and the existence of God, as the term demonstration is used in the exact sciences, we need not hope to succeed in demonstrating Immortality. All that we need attempt is to understand the bearing of our view of man's nature and life upon the question of his destiny. For the problem of the ultimate issues of the moral life is as inevitable as the problems of its origin and its relations to the universal Eeality, nor can the first question be separated from the other two. And if, in a sense, moral- ity may be said to depend upon immortality, in another sense and, in Aristotle's phrase, " for us " immortality must be said to depend upon morality. Our answer to the question, What is the destiny of man ? must depend upon our answer to the previous questions, What is man ? and What is his proper life as man ? Our answer to the question whether the moral life points to immor- tality as the destiny of the moral being, depends upon our 448 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. interpretation of morality. And ultimately destiny, like life, must depend upon the nature of the being whose life and destiny we are considering. Hence it is that we do not generally find the problem of immortality dis- cussed with anything like the same fulness or explicit- ness as the other problems we have been considering. The answer to this question is contained in the answers to the others; the position taken here is a corollary or deduction from the positions already taken on the nature of the moral being and the consequent nature of the Moral Ideal. Two main lines divide philosophical opin- ion. The affirmation or denial of immortality follows in the first place from the acceptance, respectively, of an idealistic and transcendental, or of a naturalistic and em- pirical, interpretation of morality. If man is a merely natural being, nature's destiny must be his also; if the Ideal of his life does not transcend his present experience, the present life must be his all-in-all. But, in the second place, the affirmation or denial of immortality follows from the acceptance or the rejection of personality as the key to the interpretation of man's nature and life. Pan- theism has not, any more than Naturalism, a place for personal immortality, because it has no place for person- ality. In Spinozism and Hegelianism , as truly as in Sen- sationalism, there is no survival of the Self because there is no Self to survive. Let us glance in turn at these alternatives of thought : our own position has been suffi- ciently foreshadowed in the preceding discussion. immortal- 2. The implication of Immortality in a transcendental imputation view of the moral life is most explicitly stated by Kant. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 449 The " Thou shalt " of moral law implies " Thou canst," and of Morai- an infinite " Thou shalt " implies an infinite ability to ful- 1 y ' fil it. But an infinite Moral Ideal cannot be realised in finite time ; it follows that man, as the subject of such an Ideal, must have infinite time for the task of its realis- ation. A man is immortal till his work is done, and the work of man as a moral being is never done. 1 It is true that Kant states this argument in the negative form re- quired by his ethical theory. The Moral Ideal is for him a life of pure reason in which the surd of sensibility has been eliminated, and it is the eternal presence of this fatal surd which constitutes the Kantian argument for Immortality. The moral task is not accomplished till this surd has disappeared, but it never disappears from the life of man, mixed as his nature is of reason and sensi- bility ; therefore the task must always remain, and, with the task, the possibility of its accomplishment. The essence of the argument, however, is independent of this particular view of the ethical life, and Kant's own deeper argument for Immortality we might consistently accept. Kant's real deduction of Immortality is from the tran- scendental source and significance of the Moral Ideal. Faithfulness to the true Self means that we live as if we were immortal ; in the moral life we constitute our- selves heirs of immortality by living the life of immortal or eternal beings. Man's true life is not, like the ani- mal's, a life in time ; its law issues from a world beyond " our bourne of Time and Place," from a sphere " where time and space are not." In every moral act, therefore, man transcends the limits of the present life, and becomes 1 Cf. Caird, ' Critical Philosophy of Kant,' Bk. ii. ch. 5. 2F 450 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. already a citizen of an eternal world. He has not to wait for his Immortality ; it broods over him even in the present, it is the very atmosphere of his life as a moral being. This is an argument as old as Plato and Aristotle ; it is the real argument for Immortality. Man is, as such, an " eternal being " ; he not only can, but must transcend time in every act of his moral life. The law of his life comes from that higher sphere, to which, in his essential being, he belongs. Is he called to an illusory task to live as an immortal while in reality he is only mortal ; to conduct himself as a citizen of eternity while in reality he is only a denizen of time ? The strenuous and ideal- istic moral temper is rooted in the conviction of the eternal meaning of this life in time, and is willing to stake everything on this great Perad venture. Nay, it is not to it a Peradventure, but a silent certainty, under whose constraining power considerations of time are scorned as mere irrelevancies. Such a life Browning has pictured in "The Grammarian's Funeral." He has chosen the scholar's devotion to his ideal, but that is only a type of what the good life always is a life " not for the day, but for the day to come," a life that knows it has the leisure of eternity for the execution of its eternal tasks. 1 1 " Others mistrust and say, ' But time escapes ! Live now or never ! ' He said, ' What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes, Man has Forever ! ' Was it not great? did not he throw on God (He loves the burthen !> God's task to make the heavenly period Perfect the earthen?" It is noteworthy that the two great poets of our time Tennyson and Browning have been almost equally fascinated by this problem, and have dealt with it so philosophically that quotations might be multiplied almost indefinitely from their poems, especially those of Browning. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 451 There is surely a great ethical truth, if only one side of the truth, in the Platonic and Mystic, the Mediaeval and the Kantian, view of Time as the antechamber to Eternity, of this life as a pilgrimage, a place of tabernac- ling, an inn where we abide for a night, to go farther on the morrow nay, even as the prison-house of the eternal spirit, from which it must take its flight to its home in the unseen and eternal world whence it has come and where its real interests and concerns are. Everything perishes with the using everything but man, the spec- tator of the universal change and passing away, who feels amid it all that he is living a life which has no essential relation to change or death, a life which these things do not touch. For is he not building in the eternal world of his own spirit a " house not made with hands" of virtuous character, which no storms of time can reach or move from its foundation ? " Sweet spring, full of sweet days and roses, A box whose sweets compacted lie, My music shows ye have your closes, And all must die. Only a sweet and virtuous soul Like seasoned timber never gives ; But though the whole world turn to coal, Then chiefly lives." The refusal of man to accept Time as the measure of his life's possibility manifests itself in the essentially prophetic nature of the moral consciousness. This is the meaning of progress, the distinctive attribute of human life. The present life, man feels to the end, is a probation, a school where his spirit is learning lessons which shall 452 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. serve it after it has passed far beyond the limits of the school. " No end of learning," and no time here to put the lessons into execution. Can it be that just when we have learned our lesson best, when we have best mastered the " proper craft " of living, the tool is dashed from our hands, the activity for which we have been preparing is shut against us ; that just when, through the illumination of life's experience, the true meaning of life becomes most clearly visible, that insight shall prove futile ? " We spend our lives in learning pilotage, And grow good steersmen when the vessel's crank ! " Shall we not be promoted to a nobler craft when at last we have mastered something of the currents of "that immortal sea " ? There is no fruition and fulfilment, no perfect realisation, in this life, of this life's Purpose. Life is a preparation, a discipline, an education of the moral being. Is all this elaborate and painful work of moral education to be undone ? Is death the consummation of our life, its grand catastrophe and cttnoument ? Were not this Failure absolute and supreme, Failure at the heart of things ? as if the universe could not support the moral life to which it had given birth, as if here it failed and could not realise its own end ? Against such a contradic- tion between man's being and his destiny, between the magnitude of his task and the narrow limits set to its execution, our whole moral nature rises in protest. If we regard man as a merely natural being, part and product of Nature, we can well believe that for him too death is the end ; but if we regard him as for ever Nature's superior, as made in the divine likeness and " but a little THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 453 lower than God," we cannot think of him as sharing Nature's destiny. "Poor man, God made, and all for that!" Man's very greatness, his capacity for thought and action, and for ideals that always put his attainments to the blush, were then the grimmest of all ironies, con- trived to mock him into despair. " "What a piece of work is a man ! How noble in reason ! how infinite in faculties ! in form and moving, how express and admirable ! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a God ! the beauty of the world ! the paragon of animals ! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust ? " 1 The shadow of that contradiction would lie across man's life in the present, and darken all its joy; the knowledge of that ultimate Failure would make all success unreal. Well might we wish that we had never heard of " those ineffable things which, if they may not make man's happi- ness, must make man's woe," 2 had never been " summoned out of nothingness into illusion, and evolved but to aspire and to decay ! " 3 The question of Immortality is the question of the reality or illusoriness of the moral life. It is only another aspect of the question discussed in last chapter viz., whether " morality is the nature of things," whether 1 Hamlet, act ii. sc. 2. 2 Myers, ' Science and a Future Life,' 70. 3 Ibid., 75. Cf. Thomas Davidson, "Ethics of an Eternal Being" ('International Journal of Ethics,' April 1893): "Sense, as such, has a very limited range, and hence its correlate, instinct, can be satisfied with very finite things. Intellect, on the contrary, from its very nature, knows no limits ; and hence its correlate, will, can be satisfied with nothing less than the infinite. If that infinite were unattainable, man's gifts of intelli- gence and will would be the cruellest of mockeries, and human life the saddest of tragedies." 454 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. the Moral Ideal has its correlate in universal Beality. Here, once more, the good man gives hostages to fortune, and casts 011 the universe the burden of completing his efforts after an End too great to be attainable in the present. He trusts that what he has done shall not be undone by the Universal Power, since he believes it to be " a Power that makes for righteousness." Were it not so, life would lose its meaning, and, with the discovery of the hollowness of its make-believe, all earnestness of moral purpose would be exchanged, in an earnest nature, for cynicism and despair. Personal 3. But it is denied that personal immortality is the taiity. necessary completion of the moral life. Our attitude to this question must depend upon our attitude to the pre- vious question of the Moral Ideal. The ideal life, we have found, can be determined only by a consideration of the nature of the being whose life we are considering. Des- tiny and life, therefore, ultimately depend on nature. And the view which we have been led to adopt is that man is, in his deepest nature, a Person, a Self whose total being, rational and sentient, is expressed in the activity of will. The Moral Ideal, therefore, we have inferred, is an ideal of character; the typical and characteristic activity of man is Self-realisation, " realisation of self by self." Man's " proper business " is in the inner world of his own being, not in the outer world of material produc- tion. Producer and product are here one ; the moral activity is an end-in-itself, or, if it has a further end, it is only the acquisition of a higher capacity for such activity. What is really being accomplished in the moral THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 455 life is, therefore, always an invisible and spiritual result ; whatever the man seems to be doing or making, he is really always making himself, actualising the potentiality of his own nature. The Moral Ideal is an ideal of char- acter, and this personal ideal implies a personal destiny. The problem of Immortality is thus the old Aristotelian problem of the Opportunity of the moral life. We must repeat, though in a somewhat different sense, Aristotle's demand for " length of days " as the condition of a com- plete moral life. No finite increase of time would suffice for the accomplishment of an infinite task. And the moral task is, we have concluded, an infinite one; the capacity of the Self which we are called upon to realise is an infinite capacity. The reality of the moral life implies the possibility of attaining its ideal ; a potenti- ality that cannot be actualised is a contradiction in terms. But the opportunity is not given in this life, however well and wisely this life is used, for the full activity of all man's powers, intellectual, aesthetic, or volitional. At the end of the best and fullest life, must we not " contrast the petty Done, the Undone vast " ? And even if, in the eye of the world, the accomplishment seems great and the life complete, shall not the worker himself inscribe upon it " Unfinished " ? He knows, if others know not, the unrealised potentiality that is in him, the character yet unexpressed and waiting for its more perfect expression, the capacity yet unfulfilled and waiting for its fulfilment. If we add to this consideration of the universal human lack of moral opportunity the consideration of the in- equality of opportunity in the present, and the sacrifice which many make ofjthe = .iprtunity they have that 0? TH* nrxTiRsxfr 456 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. they may enlarge the opportunity of others, above all, if we think that, without a Future Life, not only is the opportunity of further moral progress suddenly and for ever foreclosed, but the work already so laboriously done is all undone, the fruits of moral experience, so care- fully gathered and garnered, are all wasted, the character so hardly acquired is all dissolved, and, in a moment, is as though it had never been, are we not compelled, in the interests of clear and coherent thought about the meaning of our life, to postulate the Immortality of our moral being ? Has not the moral individual, as such, a claim upon the universe ? Is not this the axiom of his life ? Would not annihilation mean moral contradiction ? But, it is said, the completion of the work of the individual is in the larger life of the race ; the true immortality is not personal but "corporate." The race shall live on, though the individual passes away; and he ought to be content to work for the race rather than for himself. Other battles will be fought, and other victories won. He has played his part, and it is time for him to make his exit ; why should he linger on the stage ? The individual falls, like a withered leaf, from the tree of Life ; but the tree itself will feel the renewing breath of spring. It is through the constant death of the individual that to the race there comes a continual resurrection. As for the individual, he ought to rest with satisfaction in the anticipation of that moral influence which he bequeaths to his successors, and find in that influence his real immortality. This changed view of immortality, it is insisted, " lends life a new meaning. The good we strive for lives no longer in a world of dreams on the THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 457 other side of the grave ; it is brought down to earth and waits to be realised by human hands, through human labour. We are called on to forsake the finer egoism that centred all its care on self-salvation, for a love of our own kind that shall triumph over death, and leave its impress on the joy of generations to coine." 1 In answer to this, I would remark (1) that such an argument is strictly irrelevant to the question at issue. Can a life which, throughout its course, is personal, end by becoming impersonal or by passing over to other persons ? The question is whether the individual has, in these brief earthly years, lived his life, and realised his total Good. Moral progress is progress in character, and character cannot be transferred ; if at death the Self ceases to exist, the task of its life is ended and undone. (2) The Good of others is, like my own, a personal and individual Good, and if there is no permanent Good for me neither is there for them. Thus the Good of others to which we had wedded our souls is, like our own, destined to disintegra- tion. Has the transition for the individual to the race ac- complished what it promised viz., the substitution of an abiding Good for the perishing Good of the individual life ? The answer is, Yes ; the permanence of the Good of Hu- manity is founded in the unity and solidarity of the race. We are not to work even for other individuals (at least not for any particular individual or group of individuals), but for the Eace. This forces us to ask (3) whether the race itself is permanent ? The writer just quoted from raises this question, and answers : " The question as to the final destruction of the human race, whether by sudden catas- 1 C. M. Williams, ' A Review of Evolutional Ethics,' 580. 458 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. trophe or slow decay, can little affect happiness, at pres- ent, or for very many ages to come. . . . The pessimist is fond of making much of the final end of our planet ; but the healthy and successful will be happy in spite of future ages, and the extent and degree of happiness will continue to increase for such an immense period of time that there is no reason for considering the destruction of our race as exerting any important influence on ethical theory." l But we must face this future, and think our way through it, to the darkness and nothingness beyond. Would not that Beyond turn all the joy of the present to dust and ashes in our grasp ? Or must we cease to think, as the writer seems to intimate that the healthy and successful will do. That we cannot, without being false to our highest nature. Is this, then, the " Future of the Species " for which we are to work ? All this progress, progress towards Nothing ! Surely, if life is worth living, there must be something that does not suffer shock and change. But nowhere can that something be found save in the spiritual sphere ; only character is permanent. The Absolute Idealist will still refuse to entertain the plea for individual immortality, on the ground that eter- nity belongs to Thought, not to the individual thinker, since, truly understood, the finite Self is not a Self at all, but must be resolved either into the universal Thinker or into universal Thought. This raises anew the questions which we have discussed in more than one connection already : (1) whether we can conceive of Thought without a Thinker ; (2) whether, admitting the necessity of a Sub- ject of thought, we must not admit the reality of the 1 Loc. cit. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. 459 finite subject; and (3) whether, in the moral life, if not in the intellectual, we must not assert the relative indepen- dence of the finite Self, the active if not the intellectual independence of man. Our answers to these questions about the ultimate meaning of our life in the present must determine our answer to the question about our future destiny. If a regard for moral reality forbids us to re- solve the present life of man into the life of God, such a resolution in the future must be no less illegitimate. The Idealistic objection to the immortality of the indi- vidual seems to me to rest upon two misunderstandings : (1) the misinterpretation of individuality and of finitude in general, which finds expression in the principle Omnis determinatio negatio est. Spinoza, subject as he is in large measure to this principle, suggests the deeper truth viz., that the finite, instead of merely negating, realises the Infinite, that the perseverare in esse suo of the finite is also the "perseverance" of the Infinite in its proper being. And we have found that, in the moral life as we know it, the finite principle of individuality does not contradict the infinite principle of personality. Why, in the future more than in the present, should the finite contradict the Infinite ? (2) The objection rests upon a confusion of moral with intellectual unity and identity. The ethical unity, which consists in identity of will, implies, we have seen, a real independence of will ; apart from such inde- pendence, there could be no surrender of the finite will to the Infinite. The maintenance of the ethical relation be- tween God and man implies, therefore, the persistence of the human will or Self-hood in the future as in the pres- ent. The dissolution of this would mean the dissolution 460 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS. of the ethical life, and the grounds on which we refuse to accept this have already been sufficiently indicated. Our Origin and our Destiny are one ; it is because we come from God that we must go to him, and can only rest in fellowship with him who is the Father of our spirits. That fellowship the fellowship of will with Will in the present is our best pledge of its continuance in the future. The fellowship with the Eternal cannot but be eternal, and such fellowship is of the very essence of the moral life. God is the Home of his children's spirits, and he would not be God if he banished any from his presence, nor would man be man if he could reconcile himself to the thought of such an exile. THE END. PRINTED BY 'rt'lLLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SOXS. THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.OO ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. pp .;*. : ...-* NOV251940M I'BPAfrY USE APR 4 196 * *W I R.:C-D i^D AVR 4 1961 LD 21-100m-7,'40 (6936s) YC 30920 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARV