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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
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   Accessions No.__^_/_^_^/ Shelf No 
 
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THE 
 
 NEW GERMAN 
 
 FIELD EXERCISE. 
 
 Part I. 
 THE PORTION ON DRILL IN EXTENDED ORDER. 
 
 Part II. 
 ATTACK AND DEFENCE— COMPLETE. 
 
 TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION OF 
 
 MAJ.-GEN. SIR EVELYN WOOD, v.c, g.c.m.g., k.c.b., 
 
 G. J. R. GLUNICKE, B.A. Lond. ; 
 
 ASSISTANT MASTER BEDFORD GRAMMAR SCHOOL ; CAPTAIN COMMANDING THE 
 I (BEDFORD) COMPANY TOWER HAMLETS VOL. F.F.R.E. ; (LATE 
 ROYAL PRUSSIAN ENGINEERS). 
 
 BEE)FORD: F. HOCKLIFFE. 
 LONDON : SlMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO. 
 188?''"^ 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 

 HERTFORD : 
 
 PRINTED BY STEPHExV AUSTIN AND SONS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE issue of the New German Field Exercise marks 
 an important epoch in Military Science. 
 After careful persual, I came to the conclusion that 
 the portion of Part I., treating of Drill in Extended 
 Order, and the whole of Part II., would make a very 
 welcome book of instruction to many Military Men, 
 and Civilians, who, as Volunteers, take an interest 
 in Military matters. Part II. especially, contains a 
 vast amount of new and original information and 
 instruction on that important part of military duty, 
 how to manage troops in battle. I obtained the 
 sanction of Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C, G.C.M.G., 
 K.C.B., to make and publish a translation of these 
 parts, and this little volume is the result of my work. 
 I offer it to the military public with the assurance 
 that it will prove useful to many, and in this opinion 
 I am confirmed by the following words used by a 
 leading military paper : ** We may observe that the 
 first two parts of the German Infantry Exercise are 
 of so simple and practical a nature that they might 
 usefully be applied with very slight modification to any 
 of our own forces — the Volunteers, for example, who 
 have not time to acquire all that is contained in our red 
 encyclopaedia." 
 
 G. J. R. GLUNICKE. 
 Bedford, November, 1888. 
 
INT 
 
 The Strength and Composition of different bodies of 
 Troops. 
 
 The Company of German Infantry, about 250 strong 
 on war footing (120 on peace footing), is divided into 
 3 divisions called Ziige, each Zug consisting of 2 Half- 
 Ztige, which are again subdivided into Sections of not 
 more than 6, not less than 4 files each. 
 
 The 2 formations for the Company are — 
 
 I. — In line. 
 
 2. — In column; the 2nd Zug leading, the 3rd Zug 
 bringing up the rear ; 7 paces distance between 2 Ziige. 
 
 The Battalion consists of 4 Companies, and may be in 
 either of the following 3 formations : — 
 
 I. — Double Column: ist and 3rd Companies in front, 
 I St on the right, both in Zug Column; 2nd and 4th 
 Companies behind ist and 3rd. 
 
 2. — Deep Column : the 4 Companies one behind the 
 other, each in Zug column, the ist Company leading. 
 
 3. — Broad Column : the 4 Companies in line of Zug 
 Columns, ist Company on the right. 
 
 A Regiment consists of 3 (sometimes 4) Battalions, 
 and is mostly formed up in 2 lines ; 2 Battalions in 
 Double Column in one line, i Battalion (or 2) in Double 
 Column in the other (either ist or 2nd line). 
 
EXTRACT FROM PART I. 
 Zug Drill in Extended Order. 
 
 General Remarks. 
 
 I. — When beginning to drill men in extended order, it 
 must not be done without intermediate steps from the 
 instruction of the single man to the instruction of 
 a Zug, but the men must first be practised in files and 
 small groups, when the individual will get to know what 
 he has to do as a part of a greater body. Not only 
 has he to follow the instructions and hints of the leader 
 of the group, but he must also, halting or moving, pay 
 attention to the men next to him. 
 
 2. — A single marksman moving freely over the ground 
 can find cover easily, and may therefore look for it ; but 
 in case of a Zug, and still more so in case of larger bodies 
 of troops advancing in extended order, this advantage is 
 attained only under certain circumstances, which it is the 
 duty of the leader to make best use of. The harmonious 
 movement of the whole troop must not be disturbed by 
 considerations for the cover of the individual. 
 
 For this reason connected movements of skirmishing lines 
 form a very important object of instruction. 
 
 The difficulty of executing these movements increases 
 with greater extent and thickness of the line ; practice 
 therefore must be started with shorter and looser lines. 
 
Formation of Skirmishing Line. 
 
 3. — Extending mnsi be done smartly in any direction 
 and from any formation with the greatest order and 
 quietness. 
 
 When a Zug halting or moving is to be extended to 
 the front, the word of command is: ''Extend'' If in 
 extending, the line is to advance towards a point not 
 straight in front, the required direction shall be pointed 
 out in the words of command, e.g. ''Direction towards 
 Windm ill — Extend.'' 
 
 The centre advances straight on or in the direction 
 pointed out, at first shortening the pace. The other 
 men draw off with half right and half left at a quicker 
 pace, the rear rank man stepping forward to the right 
 of his front rank man, till all the men are at intervals 
 of between i and 2 paces. If greater intervals have to 
 be taken, the Zug leader has specially to order it. 
 
 The skirmishers advance until a command is given 
 to halt, kneel or lie down. Each group is led by a 
 sergeant or corporal. 
 
 4. — If a Zug is to extend without advancing, the 
 tvord of command is : ** On the line — extend." 
 
 In this case the centre stands fast, the other men 
 draw off till the proper intervals are gained. 
 
 5. — If a retreating Zug is to extend, the men are first 
 turned to the front and then get the Order : " On the 
 line — Extend," 
 
Movements of a SkirmisMng Line. 
 
 6. — The movements of skirmishers are done at an 
 easy but long step and at the usual marching pace ; no 
 doubling is to be done without an order. In all commands 
 the word of caution is omitted. 
 
 The movements consist of advancing and retreating 
 Ziige, or parts of them, moving to half right or half 
 left, and changing direction of movement by pointing 
 out a certain object to march on. Movements with 
 right or left turn (in file) are to be avoided, exact 
 intervals and perfect dressing are not to be demanded. 
 Before moving, the men must unload and lower their 
 backsights ; the leaders of Ziige and sections are to be 
 in front of their detachments, next to the enemy. A few 
 sergeants, about one for each Zug, remain behind the 
 skirmishers to superintend the movements. 
 
 7. — Advance by rushes. After naming the detachment, 
 the Command is : ** Rush — Rise ! Double .^" 
 
 On the word ''Rush'' the skirmishers unload or ease 
 springs, put down the backsights, and get ready to rise. 
 The leaders of Ziige and sections step out before the 
 front. 
 
 On the words ''Rise! Double!'' the skirmishers rise 
 at once and rush forward. When the new position has 
 been arrived at, the men get the word : Down ! The 
 distance of each rush is seldom more than 80 yards. 
 
Fire of a Skirmishings Line. 
 
 8. — A skirmishing line fires only when stationary. 
 During movements firing is limited to special cases. 
 
 9. — Frequent practice is necessary to enable each 
 skirmisher to find the place best suited for himself, whilst 
 acting up to the directions of his leaders and taking 
 into consideration the men next to him. A man must 
 not be allowed to shift away from a spot he has 
 once occupied. 
 
 10. — Even when drillings care must he taken that the 
 sights are properly adjusted, 
 
 II. — Words of Command must be as short as possible, 
 and must mention, first the direction, then the object to 
 be aimed at, the range, and finally the kind of fire. 
 There must be no doubt about the object to be 
 aimed at ; hostile troops must be named as they are 
 seen from the skirmishing line, e,g. : *'The guns farthest 
 to the right," not ''The left wing of the Battery." 
 
 The words of command have to be repeated by the 
 leaders of the more distant groups. 
 
 The word ^^ Ready'''' is omitted, except in case of 
 volleys. 
 
 Examples: (i) for volleys: Artillery on green height, at 
 800 yards. Ready, Present, Fire, Ready, 
 (2) for independent firing : Skirmishers 
 opposite, at ^00 yards. Independent fire, 
 
 12. — To cease firing. This is ordered by the word 
 
10 
 
 '^ Cease fire'' or by a blow of the whistle, if the voice is no 
 longer audible. When the fire is to be continued at the 
 same object, the command is simply: *' Continue fire r 
 
 If the distance is altered, the command is : ** Change 
 800 to (^QQ>, continue fireT If within the same range the 
 aim has to be altered, the Zug leader commands, e.g. 
 ^^Aim at heady' after eventual use of the whistle. 
 
 13. — The effect of fire depends not only on a proper 
 management of the rifle, but also on the distance, loca- 
 tion, height, breadth, depth and close formation of the 
 object aimed at, as well as on the more or less accurate 
 consideration of atmospheric influences. 
 
 The more the fire eff'ect can be concentrated as to 
 time and object of aim, the greater will be the moral 
 influence on the enemy. 
 
 14. — Direction of fire. The fire must be kept under 
 proper control as long as possible, and the full utilising 
 of the rifles must rest in the hands of the leader. It is 
 easier to control the firing, when a Zug can be kept 
 together as much as possible, when it is separated from 
 the one next by a distinct interval, and when a certain 
 extent of line is fixed to be occupied by it. 
 
 If there is no time or opportunity to ascertain dis- 
 tances in front, they must be found out by enquiring 
 from other troops close by, or taken from a map, or fixed 
 by range finders, or by estimation. 
 
 The Zug leader ought to keep near him two or 
 three men practised in estimating distances, who will 
 take the range of any object appearing in front and 
 inform the Zug leader of their opinion. They will also 
 
11 
 
 assist him by keeping under observation, not only the 
 object aimed at, but also other parts of the field of 
 action. 
 
 A frequent change of the objects of aim is to be 
 avoided, as it results in deconcentrating fire. 
 
 15. — Kind of fire. The rapidity of firing depends on 
 the object of the combat, the kind of object aimed at, 
 and the quantity of ammunition available. Smoke in 
 front of the firing line and bad light will frequently 
 retard the rate of firing. 
 
 When objects are low and at moderate ranges, firing, 
 if even ordered, must be slow. Rapid firing is only 
 advisable at short ranges and against objects, which are 
 but for a short time visible at a favourable elevation. 
 Against Artillery rapid firing will be advisable, even at 
 ranges above 800 yards. Volley firing makes it easy to 
 keep men in hand, to observe where the bullets hit, 
 and thereby to find the proper range. But in the din of 
 battle the voice of the leader cannot carry over an ex- 
 tended Zug, therefore volley-firing must be limited to 
 the commencement of an engagement, and to such times 
 as when one's own men are not under effective fire. 
 
 The fire of a skirmishing line is usually independent, 
 with the probability of greater effect in hitting, because 
 the man can aim quietly and can wait for the most 
 favourable moment to deliver his shot. 
 
 If in independent fire the leader deems it necessary to 
 quicken or to slacken it, he gives the order : Fire more 
 quickly (more slowly) or Magazine fire ! 
 
 To get accustomed to slow firing the skirmisher must 
 
12 
 
 combine with the man next to him : whilst the one is 
 firing, the other observes and may (not musf) fire after 
 the first has got ready. When the firing has to be rapid, 
 this ahernate fire practice ceases; each one fires as soon 
 as he sees his object distinctly, or whenever he thinks 
 the smoke in front of the enemy's line a convenient 
 and profitable aim. 
 
 1 6. — Fire discipline. This embraces the conscientious 
 execution of all orders given during firing, as well as the 
 close observance of all rules for the management of the 
 rifle, and for the conduct in battle. Again, it demands 
 quiet perseverance under the enemy's fire, even when it 
 cannot as yet be replied to ; care in delivering the shots, 
 best use of natural cover to increase the chance of hit- 
 ting, constant attention to the leader and to the enemy's 
 movements. The fire must cease as soon as the object 
 disappears, at the sound of the whistle or at the order 
 to cease given in any other way. 
 
 The men must be so fully trained in fire discipline 
 that it does not lose its hold on them, even when in 
 course of the action the leader cannot completely direct 
 the fire, and when only individual deliberation or the 
 example of particularly courageous and cautious men 
 exercises an influence on the steadiness of the fire line. 
 In order to awaken and promote independent action, 
 the men must be accustomed to circumstances where 
 the direction of the firing by the officers ceases, and must 
 be instructed how to act in such cases. 
 
 17. — Observing the effect of fire. By means of field- 
 glasses, officers must always observe where the 
 
bullets strike, and whether the enemy shows in any way 
 that he is suffering by the fire ; only by doing so can 
 they ascertain, whether the range is right or whether 
 rectifications are necessary to increase the effect of the 
 fire. If the smoke in front of the line prevents a direct 
 observation from behind the skirmishers, it is advisable 
 to station on the flanks, and if possible, under good 
 cover, special men to transmit their observations to 
 the firing detachment by signals, by calling out, or by 
 means of connecting files. 
 
 Skirmisliers Closing In. 
 
 1 8. — To bring a Skirmishing line into closed order 
 the word of Command is : ** Colled^ 
 
 The skirmishers gather near the Zug-leader and form 
 in line, each man taking his former position. If the Zug 
 leader is not moving, the men form up at the Order ; if 
 the Zug-leader keeps on advancing, the men form up 
 at the Slope. 
 
14 
 
 PART II. THE COMBAT. 
 A. General Principles. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 I. — It is evidently impossible to represent to a full 
 extent on a Drill-ground the conditions of a field of 
 action. Not only are the losses by fire not realised by 
 the men, but they are also not impressed by the circum- 
 stances which in case of war produce an unfavourable 
 influence. 
 
 2. — These circumstances will, as a rule, cause a de- 
 crease of the ideal capacities of the troops, and the extent 
 of this decrease will be proportional to the moral value 
 of the troops and to the extent of loss sustained. 
 
 3. — It is therefore an essential part of the task in 
 times of peace to form and strengthen the morale of the 
 troops, and to use all means which tend towards this 
 object and towards the preservation of discipline. This 
 task is performed to a great extent by maintaining, 
 in all cases, strict order and discipline in carrying out 
 the different formations. 
 
 4. — It is not at all in accordance with the requirements 
 of warfare, if anything is omitted on the Drill-ground 
 that would tend to maintain this discipline. 
 
 Normal formations need not be strictly adhered to 
 
15 
 
 wherever the changing circumstances of an engagement 
 demand otherwise. But even when different units get 
 mixed up, strict order must not be lost. 
 
 5. — The rules of war will therefore be best observed 
 in practising attack or defence, if, after fixing on some 
 imaginary position, those formations are chosen which 
 are best adapted for the attainment of the desired 
 object. The choice must be such, as in case of real 
 war would be necessary for obtaining the greatest effect 
 of one's own armed strength and for diminishing that 
 of the enemy. If these two important points, the 
 former of which is always the most essential, are strictly 
 kept in view, the practice on the Drill-ground should 
 be in accordance with the conditions and rules of 
 actual warfare. The closer this rule is adhered to in 
 extending the practice from sections to companies, and 
 from companies to battalions, the more certainly will 
 the soldier succeed in overcoming the impressions likely 
 to unnerve him in real warfare, 
 
 Importance of the Drill Ground. 
 
 6. — In the first place the formations prescribed by the 
 Regulations must be practised on the Drill-ground. 
 
 7. — In attaining the object in view, the available 
 strength, the time, and the nature of the ground must 
 be taken into account in every engagement. 
 
 The first consideration, viz. the available strength, 
 is of most weight and exercises the greatest influence 
 on the arrangements made by the C. O. It rules the 
 choice between attack, defence, or retreat, without 
 
16 
 
 losing sight of the fixed conditions and directions. 
 It is chiefly taken into consideration on the Drill- 
 ground, and makes all practices on the same of the 
 utmost value. 
 
 But the employment of formations on the Drill- 
 ground is limited to such practices as represent 
 generally acknowledged tactical principles in using 
 troops and carrying on an engagement. With these 
 objects in view, the nature of the ground must 
 not and cannot be taken into consideration, because 
 the choice of the proper formations is subject more to 
 the particular nature of the assumed object of the 
 engagement, and to the connection with, and relations 
 to other fighting units, than to the condition of the 
 ground actually used. 
 
 8. — But this rule does not exclude the possibility of 
 occasionally taking advantage of the nature of the 
 ground as in real warfare. If on a Drill-ground 
 there is an opportunity of practising, in an assumed 
 position, the attack on a hill, village, or edge of a 
 wood, the arrangements for defending a ridge, the 
 advance or the retreat through a defile, it would be 
 refusing to take advantage of favourable circumstances, 
 if full use were not made of the opportunities as 
 offered by the nature of the ground. But as the 
 carrying out of the object of an engagement is of 
 more importance than the making use of the nature of 
 the ground, practices on the Drill-ground for attain- 
 ing the former object must be more numerous than 
 for the other. 
 
17 
 
 The men at Drill must be told when the Drill-ground 
 is to be used as representing a field of real action. 
 
 9. — In thus using the Drill-ground there is naturally 
 a want of change. The objects always remain the same 
 for the same garrison. Therefore particular care must 
 be taken that certain fixed formations do not take too 
 deep a root, by which Drilling degenerates into a 
 practice of rules of Tactics applicable only to a certain 
 locality, and finally into mechanical formality. 
 
 On the other hand, a desirable change can be given 
 to practices on a Drill-ground, if occasionally it is 
 explained in an intelligible way, how certain features, 
 defiles for instance, are supposed to be on the ground 
 for the sake of practice. 
 
 10. — In any case, frequent practices in the country 
 are necessary in addition to those on the Drill-ground. 
 If after continual and careful practice on the Drill- 
 ground, a foundation has been laid by which the de- 
 termining principles and the efficiency of the proper 
 formations are fully understood, then the men will reap 
 the greatest benefit from practices outside the Drill- 
 ground. For the same reasons a change between Drill- 
 ground and country for inspections is advisable. 
 
 II. — For practice in fighting formations of all kinds 
 it is expedient to mark the position of the enemy, even 
 if only by a few men and a few flags. Now and then 
 the enemy may be marked by somewhat greater 
 numbers, which would enable one to show the arrange - 
 ments and movements of their detachments farther in 
 
18 
 
 rear. Also good practice can be had occasionally by 
 opposing two detachments of nearly equal strength. 
 
 Extended and Closed Formation. 
 
 12. — Infantry in full marching order must be able to 
 fight and overcome considerable obstacles on any 
 ordinary ground. For this, the Extended Order is the 
 best formation. 
 
 13. — Infantry Combat is generally decided by the effect of 
 fire, which can be fully developed only in Extended 
 Order. Firing when in line formation is the exception. 
 
 14. — Larger bodies of troops in Column may suffer 
 most severe losses within a very short time, when under 
 effective fire of opposing Infantry. This consideration 
 makes it a matter of necessity to confine to the shortest 
 space of time their direct participation in an engage- 
 ment, whereas the skirmish in Extended Order may 
 last for hours. 
 
 15. — A close formation has for its object the uniform 
 movement of a greater mass under one command and 
 on a small space. Formerly, the size of such a mass 
 was merely determined by the distance to which the 
 voice of the Officer Commanding might carry. The 
 increased effect of fire now necessitates a further 
 splitting up of closed bodies of troops. 
 
 16. — When in Extended Order, the soldier is not bound 
 to keep to a certain spot, he also may neglect what he 
 is taught in the setting-up Drill, and a faultless adherence 
 
19 
 
 to the rules of Manual Exercise in handling his rifle. 
 But yet the marksman in Extended Order must show 
 power of judgment, agility, courage, and self-confidence ; 
 he must also show dexterity in the use of his rifle, 
 and in taking advantage of any irregularity of the 
 ground, and he must at the same time give undivided 
 attention to the commands of his officers. 
 
 17. — The difficulty of commanding a line in Extended 
 Order is increased by having to act in broken country, 
 as well as by the din and other distracting influences 
 of the combat. To meet and overcome this difficulty 
 great care must be taken with the instruction of the 
 men. It can easily be seen in Extended Order, whether 
 a detachment is completely drilled, instructed, and 
 disciplined, for the more the direct influence of the 
 leader in conducting the whole is diminished, the 
 greater are the claims on the independent action of 
 individual soldiers. 
 
 18. — The practice of fighting in Extended Order and 
 the proper employment of the formations used is there- 
 fore more essential than the use of the column forma- 
 tions. These latter were formerly the mainstay of the 
 Infantry combat, and the extended lines were used only 
 to assist them. 
 * 19. — The Extended Order is the formation which is 
 now principally employed in battle ; the combat is com- 
 menced in that order, and in most cases also continued 
 to the end. 
 
 The Extended Order is the essential Jightifig formation for 
 infantry. 
 
20 
 
 2 0. — But, all the same, Column formations retain 
 their full importance for the purpose of being kept in 
 readiness as support and reinforcement of the fighting 
 line, as well as for an eventual decisive movement. 
 Without the support of the Extended Order the column 
 formation can never carry on the fighting. 
 
 Fighting in Extended Order. 
 
 General Principles. 
 
 2 1. — The increased importance of the skirmishing 
 line gives particular value to the capacity of com- 
 manding it. 
 
 The greater liberty which is allowed to the individual 
 man in moving and in using his rifle is to make him 
 more fit and capable for the requirements of his position 
 as a marksman. 
 
 Although the marksman will be taught that fighting in 
 Extended Order will require more the exercise of his 
 faculties than the other formation, yet he must be made 
 to thoroughly understand, that he can do justice to the 
 demands made on him only by exerting all his strength and 
 capability. Being allowed greater freedom in moving, 
 he can therefore make the best use of his eyes and ears, 
 and must be ever ready to act quickly, determinedly, 
 and independently. 
 
 It is the duty of the officer to awaken in the soldier 
 self-confidence and power of judgment by explanations 
 adapted to his power of comprehension ; but first of all 
 he must make him fully understand the fact, that there is 
 
21 
 
 nothing more dangerous for a soldier than to turn his hack 
 to the enemy. 
 
 Movements during the combat. 
 
 2 2. — Every engagement begins with the extending of 
 skirmishers. 
 
 The first question then, is to get touch of the enemy, 
 and to preserve for one's own side freedom of action. 
 Therefore the first development of skirmishers must be 
 on a small scale, and must be done without undue 
 haste. But in order to avoid surprise, it is necessary to 
 deploy a weak line of skirmishers in the direction, 
 whence it might be expected, a line such as would be 
 required at the beginning of an engagement. If after all, 
 a detachment is taken by surprise, the first thing to be 
 done is to oppose quickly a force equal to the strength 
 of the enemy's attack, in order to regain freedom of 
 action. 
 
 23. — Any further decisions on the lines to be followed 
 will depend on the nature of the engagement, that is, 
 whether it is to be one for the purpose of merely holding 
 the enemy, or a decisive combat. In the latter case, there 
 must be no hesitation to deploy the forces necessary for 
 the attainment of the object, as soon as a distinct idea of 
 their extent has been obtained, and to stake them in a 
 formation which will favour the effective co-operation 
 of all parts. For there is no greater mistake than to employ 
 forces insujficient for the carrying through of an action with 
 the idea of supplementing them by degrees » 
 
 The advantage of superior numbers would in that case 
 
22 
 
 be entirely and voluntarily renounced, while the fight 
 would be carried on right through with smaller against 
 larger numbers. An unsuccessful attack not only causes 
 useless loss, but demoralises the troops. 
 
 24. — Every engagement that is meant to lead to a 
 decision will necessitate the full use of the actual space 
 available which is to be occupied by dense lines of 
 skirmishers. 
 
 The space available is conditioned by the nature of 
 the ground and by the position of other troops engaged 
 on the same side. 
 
 25. — When commencing an action, for the carrying 
 through of which the CO. will reserve to himself the 
 further employment of the greatest part of his troops, 
 at first a comparatively short front only is required. 
 
 Different degrees of solidity may be given to the first 
 deployment of skirmishers. But care must be taken not 
 to lengthen the front so much that it cannot maintain 
 its full fire effect, or that it cannot be continuously thickly 
 occupied with marksmen in case of a more protracted 
 action and of heavy losses. Accordingly, a Company 
 of 1 00 men ought not to occupy a front of much more than 
 40 yards. 
 
 Also on field-days in time of peace with smaller numbers 
 the same extent of front for a company would be service- 
 able. This extent is of course greater than in war in 
 proportion to numbers, but the difference is about 
 equalised by the fact that in peace practice the skirm- 
 ishing line is not thinned by losses. 
 
23 
 
 26. — There is no necessity to pay particular attention 
 to keeping the proper intervals between men in the ex- 
 tended line. On the contrary, especially when the 
 deployment is done in a forward movement without 
 intention of opening fire at once, men must be taught to 
 close, or to make intervals greater, according to the 
 nature of the cover afforded by the ground. Neither 
 the direction nor the pace of the advance must suffer, 
 nor must the total extent of the line be increased. 
 
 27.— The careful observance of having the line well 
 dressed is of even less importance than the keeping of 
 the intervals. All that is required is that the single 
 parts of the skirmishing line do not interfere with each 
 other in moving and firing. 
 
 But while the advance of smaller units is not yet 
 affected by the enemy's fire, it is permissible (with a 
 view of preserving better command) for the leader to 
 name a certain part of the extended line, with which 
 the other parts are to keep in touch. 
 
 28. — If the skirmishing line approaches the position 
 to be occupied for the opening of fire, or if skirmishers 
 are extended directly for the purpose of occupying 
 such a position, the subordinate commanders have to 
 lead their detachments so that the individual men find 
 places most favourable for the use of arms and for cover 
 within the space that is at the disposal of the detachment. 
 
 If the flanks are not covered by other troops or natural 
 obstacles, it is necessary to send a few men under a 
 cautious leader as Fighting Patrol for observation on 
 the flank. 
 
24 
 
 29. — If the skirmishing line, under supposition of losses 
 sustained, is to keep up the full fire effect, or if this effect 
 is to be increased, or if the line is to be pushed forward, 
 reinforcements must be brought up. 
 
 Fire. 
 
 30.— The fire in Extended Order is the principal 
 fighting means of Infantry. Not only does it effect the 
 repulse of the enemy and prepare the actual attack, 
 but under circumstances is by itself sufficient to 
 decide the combat. In most cases the gradual approach 
 of an overpowering fire concentrated on the decisive 
 points will have such an effect that the final attack will 
 have to be made only against a position either evacuated 
 or only weakly defended by the enemy. 
 
 To make a full use of the greatest effect of fire, every 
 man must be cool, collected, thoroughly efficient in 
 the use of his rifle, and accustomed to a good fire 
 discipline, 
 
 31. — The greatest effect of the fire of entire skirmish- 
 ing lines consists in the co-operation of the greatest 
 possible number of rifles. 
 
 It is not necessary that all the parts of a skirmishing 
 line should always use the same kind of fire at the same 
 time. Particular objects which require a particular kind 
 of fire may be assigned, as occasion requires, to single 
 detachments. 
 
25 
 
 32. — The proper time for using magazine fire is : 
 i) In the attack: the last preparation for the assault: 
 
 2) On the defence : the repulse of the enemy's assault : 
 
 3) Repulse of cavalry, and all moments of an action 
 in which a sudden and close contact with the enemy 
 takes place (as when fighting for entrenchments, in 
 villages or in a forest) : 
 
 4) In pursuit of a retiring enemy. 
 
 As a rule magazine fire is only employed at very close 
 ranges. Only exceptionally it may be used at distances 
 between 300 and 800 yards, in cases when the fire at 
 particularly advantageous objects is limited to a short 
 time, during which the greatest possible effect of fire 
 must be attained. In the vicissitudes of combat justi- 
 fying the delivery of magazine fire, the use of the maga- 
 zine will frequently be left to the judgment of the in- 
 dividual man. In order that the fullest eff'ect of the 
 magazine may not be spent at the wrong time, the marks- 
 man must be properly trained to spare it for the decisive 
 moment, or when a threatening danger must be averted. 
 
 33. — For the delivery of fire in any position the rule 
 is laid down that it can only be of decisive effect when 
 it is directed against hostile troops who are well within 
 range. It does not matter very much to which arm these 
 troops belong ; for although in most cases the enemy's 
 Infantry will be the most important and best paying 
 object of aim, one must not hesitate to fire at batteries. 
 Altogether the choice of the object depends on its 
 tactical importance for the time being. Again, the fire 
 
26 
 
 ought to be directed against such objects as, by their 
 height, depth, width and close formation, are likely to 
 suffer most from rifle fire. Well-drilled troops must be 
 able to keep steady under the enemy's fire without replying to 
 it, if their own fire is likely to have no effect. 
 
 34. — An effect by indirect firing can only be expected 
 in very rare cases, and ought only to be attempted, when 
 the known distance of a stationary object makes an 
 adequate result likely : e.g. fire against an enemy holding 
 field works. 
 
 35. — As a rule only the officers who are in the fire- 
 line, viz. Company and Half-Company leaders, have to 
 do with directing the fire. In battle the higher Officers 
 have to concentrate their attention on other tasks which 
 they must not neglect by interfering with what ought to 
 be done by their inferiors. It is their business to dis- 
 pose the necessary forces at those parts of the foremost 
 fighting line, from which an increased or concentrated 
 fire effect is required. 
 
 However, in Sham-fights, etc., in time of peace, the 
 higher officers are to have an eye on their subordinates, 
 to make sure that the latter direct the fire properly. 
 
 36. — In the course of an engagement it is often im- 
 possible to direct the firing perfectly, as a proportionally 
 heavy percentage of the officers in the skirmishing line is 
 sure to be put hors de combat when an engagement under 
 fire is protracted. But, even then, the fire discipline of the 
 men who are more or less left to their own resources 
 must hold good. In a well-drilled and disciplined 
 
27 
 
 detachment the intelligence of the single man and the 
 example of a few particularly steady and courageous 
 men will have a decisive influence on the behaviour 
 of the firing line, and will make it possible to carry on 
 the engagement successfully against an enemy who is in 
 the same difficult condition. 
 
 3-7. — From the very beginning of the fire combat it 
 must be remembered that the number of cartridges carried 
 is limited, and that the expenditure of a certain quantity 
 of ammunition means an expenditure of strength which 
 must only be permitted where it pays. On the other 
 hand, if it has been determined to bring a certain object 
 under full fire, the amount of ammunition required for 
 the attainment of the object of the fight must be fully 
 risked, since fire without effect weakens the morale 
 of one's own troops, and increases that of the enemy. 
 It is therefore a strict condition to economise am- 
 munition, especially at long distances, so that at the 
 decisive moment it may be ready to bring about a suc- 
 cessful issue of the engagement. 
 
 Movements. 
 
 38. — The movements of extended skirmishing lines are 
 executed under the supposition of being in touch with 
 the enemy. They therefore require the greatest simplicity. 
 
 Outside the reach of the enemy's fire it is of the first 
 importance to keep the troops in good order and well 
 together. When moving under fire, the main considera- 
 tion is how to get at the enemy in the shortest way. 
 
28 
 
 3g. — When moving to the front or rear, it is par- 
 ticularly important to keep to the direction pointed out. 
 This may be slightly altered by closing to either side 
 as long as the enemy's fire is not yet very effective, but 
 greater flank movements under hostile fire are not per- 
 missible. Changes of front under fire by wheeling can 
 only be executed in quite exceptional cases. If the 
 necessity arises to form a skirmishing line in a different 
 front, this is done by forming a new line in the intended 
 front from the supports of the skirmishers, whilst the 
 parts of the former fire line no longer employed are 
 withdrawn. 
 
 40. — As a rule the movements of the skirmishers are 
 done in quick time. If it is required to gain a certain 
 line or position before the enemy, or to cross ground 
 well commanded by the enemy's fire, the Double is used. 
 
 If the distances to be covered are rather extensive, it 
 may be advisable to make a pause after a certain distance 
 has been done at the Double, and to let the men lie 
 down. When arrived within effective range, the farther 
 advance is prepared by the fire of the skirmishers during 
 these pauses. When thus advancing by rushes, the parts 
 of the whole fighting unit must keep the enemy alter- 
 nately under fire, thus affording each other the possibility 
 of moving forward. The length of the rushes will in 
 action be determined by very different circumstances 
 (nature of ground, moral stability of troops, force of 
 hostile fire, etc.). 
 
 41. — But with regard to this means of attack, it must 
 be taken into consideration that it uses up considerable 
 
29 
 
 strength and yet easily delays the advance. Another 
 reason for being cautious about using the advance in 
 rushes, is the great difficulty (increasing with every rush) 
 of repeatedly leading forward a skirmishing line which is 
 lying under good cover whilst the fire is most effective. 
 
 If in spite of the effect of the enemy^s fire it is 
 possible to maintain an uninterrupted advance, this must 
 be done at any cost, and therefore in practising attack 
 the advance by rushes must be begun at very long ranges, 
 and it must not be practised as the only formation of 
 advance across a level piece of country. On the con- 
 trary, every soldier must be made fully to understand 
 that only irresistible pushing forward ]o\xi^di with well-con- 
 sidered preparation by fire can ensure success, whereas 
 all long stoppages under fire of an adversary from behind 
 better cover must entail heavy losses, and a retrograde 
 movement is equivalent to destruction. 
 
 42. — The most favourable circumstances for the unin- 
 terrupted advance are those under which it is possible to 
 keep down the enemy's fire by superior fire from an 
 enfilading (flanking) or higher position. 
 
 43. — Firing while moving is of limited effect, because 
 cool handling of the rifle, deliberate aiming and careful 
 observation are made very difficult. Therefore it is to be 
 resorted to only under special circumstances, e.g. when 
 on the retreat of a skirmishing line it is necessary to pre- 
 vent the enemy from delivering his fire without exposure 
 to losses. 
 
30 
 
 Closing. 
 
 44. — A skirmishing line is closed when the troops 
 engaged have accomplished their object, and the fire 
 on the retreating enemy has been kept up as long as 
 is necessary. In a retreat the line cannot be closed in 
 till after the enemy has ceased pursuit. 
 
 45. — Closing must be done with the front to the 
 enemy ; if it is done whilst moving, in the direction of 
 marching. 
 
 46. — It is not very important in action that each man 
 and each smaller detachment should re-occupy their 
 original place in the greater unit ; all that is necessary 
 is that troops are quickly assembled in closed order. 
 
 Opposed to Different Arms. 
 
 47. — In a combat of Infantry against. Infantry the 
 success depends, not reckoning moral factors, on marks- 
 manship, fire discipline, and direction of the fire. It is 
 the task of the leaders to bring as many rifles as possible 
 into action, or to establish superiority by concentrating 
 the fire eff*ect of extensive lines on the decisive points. 
 
 The carrying out of this principle is made easy, if one 
 can find cover against the other parts of the enemy's line. 
 
 48. — The individual foot soldier must he fully aware of the 
 fact that even on open ground he is more than a match for the 
 single horseman if he meets him ready for firing. He need 
 not even mind a combat against several of them, if he 
 keeps calni and deliberate and uses his rifle properly 
 without taking his eyes off" his opponents. 
 
31 
 
 Likewise Infantry must he convinced that with coolness 
 and firm hearing they have nothing to fear from Cavalry^ 
 even if in superior numhers. To repel Cavalry every forma- 
 tion is suitable which admits of a mass fire calmly de- 
 livered and well aimed. Against Cavalry the hringing 
 into action of the greatest possible numher of rifles is most 
 effective, and therefore only such alterations of formation 
 or changes of front as favour this principle must be 
 adopted. Infantry which do not dare to receive Cavalry 
 in line, the flanks being secured by the fire of other 
 troops farther back, will not be safe in squares. 
 
 49. — Skirmishers running are at the mercy of Cavalry, 
 but when firing calmly they may await the attack with 
 full confidence ; their superiority increases if the nature 
 of the ground allows of protection and cover. Skirmishers 
 engaged with hostile Infantry must by all means try 
 to avoid taking close formations, even if threatened by 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Infantry ought also to be able to advance in the open 
 field without taking any consideration of hostile Cavalry 
 as long as the latter are not supported by superior 
 Artillery or Infantry, or have such superior numbers 
 that they can attack simultaneously from different sides 
 in several successive lines. 
 
 50. — Only when particular circumstances require it, 
 does the formation of squares recommend itself as suitable, 
 e.g. when a detachment has spent its ammunition, 
 when its firmness is shaken by a previous combat at- 
 tended with severe losses, or when a retreat is executed 
 
32 
 
 over open country threatened continuously by superior 
 Cavalry. 
 
 In all other conditions Infantry fighting against Cavalry 
 must remember that the latter think they have obtained a 
 success, even if they have only forced the Infantry to stop 
 their advance or to assume formations which do not admit 
 of the greatest development of fire, 
 
 51. — In fighting against Artillery \t must be remem- 
 bered that this arm possesses a distinct superiority of 
 fire for long, and even moderately long distances. Only 
 at distances of 1000 yards and less is this difference 
 more equalized, and for closer ranges the Infantry has 
 the superiority. 
 
 Infantry must attempt, by using natural cover, to get as 
 near as possible to hostile Artillery. The fire must be 
 directed first against the horses if visible, then against 
 the gunners. There are cases when Infantry may 
 produce an effect on Artillery at long distances. Then 
 it is necessary to be prepared for the expenditure of a 
 considerable quantity of ammunition. 
 
 But Infantry must never think it their task to try to 
 replace Artillery at long distances or to rival the effect 
 of Artillery fire. Such attempts would lead solely to 
 squandering ammunition. 
 
 Use of Intrenching Tools. 
 
 52. — In the present time when firearms are so effective, 
 artificial cover attains increased importance. Executed 
 in the proper place it renders important, sometimes 
 
33 
 
 invaluable services to troops and their management. But 
 it is a distinct condition that intrenchments should only 
 serve the purposes of the Commander, and that they do 
 not succeed in directing the latter. This would happen if 
 the work were commenced before the object is absolutely 
 settled. A premature strengthening of the ground there- 
 fore is distinctly dangerous and prevents the freedom 
 of movement. It requires good knowledge of Tactics on 
 the part of the Commander to know where and when 
 intrenching tools are to be used. 
 
 The simplest kind of artificial cover is the shelter trench^ 
 which at first is made for men firing when lying down, and 
 if time allows is deepened and strengthened for men 
 kneeling or standing. When shelter trenches are made 
 for defence, distances on the ground in front must be 
 paced oif and marked. Even in the attack, intrenching 
 tools may render valuable services for holding and 
 strengthening lines or positions gained in the attack. 
 
 On the Drill-ground and in practices during times of 
 peace the making of shelter trenches must often for 
 various reasons be omitted, even when the assumed con- 
 ditions of actions would demand the use of the spade. 
 In such cases the trenches must at any rate be marked 
 as though existing. 
 
 Duties of Officers and Soldiers in Action. 
 
 The Officer. 
 
 53- — Commanding and directing becomes more diffi- 
 cult the less a personal influence down to the smallest 
 
 2 
 
34 
 
 units is possible, and the less effectively words of com- 
 mand can be used. In action therefore such means 
 must be resorted to, which are most suitable to the 
 purpose. In the first place the C. O. must make the 
 choice of a convenient spot. 
 
 Even in sham fights, therefore, all C. O.s are to 
 issue their orders from that spot and in that very 
 position which they would occupy in case of action. The 
 directing Officer may always allow himself to disregard 
 this principle for himself, and to insist on it for his 
 Subordinates, whenever and in how far it seems service- 
 able for the instruction of the men. Mounted Officers 
 will learn, by dismounting occasionally, to know and 
 completely overcome the difficulties of commanding, 
 and they will also thereby accustom the soldiers to see 
 their leaders on foot under hot fire. 
 
 54. — ^As the Extended Order is the one chiefly used, 
 the attention of all Officers commanding greater or 
 smaller bodies of troops must be directed to maintain- 
 ing connection, order, and supervision. Besides this, 
 the superior Officers have to be careful that the troops 
 do not get out of hand, and all the Officers commanding 
 smaller bodies must make it their business to join their 
 superior officer quickly, or to place themselves at his 
 disposal after they have carried out the order entrusted 
 to them. 
 
 These conditions are fulfilled if the superior officers 
 do not order more than they ought to or are able to order, 
 if the different officers who have to execute a certain 
 order co-operate for the object aimed at and do not 
 
35 
 
 abuse the independence accorded to them, nor indulge 
 in arbitrary measures. 
 
 Independent action of inferior leaders within such limits 
 is the fundarnental cause of great successes in war. 
 
 These conditions are imperative for leaders of even 
 the smallest detachments. 
 
 55. — The leader of the Zug (each company is 
 divided into 3 Ziige) has to choose a position from which 
 he can control the fire of his Zug. He orders the 
 disposition of his Zug in the position allotted to him, 
 and determines the objects of fire independently or in 
 accordance with instructions received. He carefully 
 follows the measures taken by the enemy, and tries as 
 much as possible to work in agreement with the Ziige 
 adjoining his own in the fighting line. First of all he 
 tries to see clearly how the skirmishing line, or parts of it, 
 can be got nearer to the enemy in the advance, whether 
 and how the enemy can be outflanked or whether a weak 
 point can be assaulted. Also it often happens that the 
 Zug leader can see best in the skirmishing line where it 
 is possible to seize a favourable bit of ground or get 
 some other advantage over the enemy. He must then 
 settle with himself how far he may utilise such advantage 
 on his own responsibility, 
 
 56. — The Section leader assists the Zug leader, and 
 is responsible for directing the fire of his men, for 
 the proper use of the backsight, the proper handling 
 of the rifles, the expenditure of ammunition, and the 
 refillino: of the magazines. 
 
36 
 
 The Soldier. 
 
 57. — The soldier generally goes into battle after 
 previous fatigues and marches, which in war time are 
 often made still harder by privations. Even under such 
 circumstances he is to keep up his energy and courage^ 
 to deliberate calmly, and cherish the faculty of taking a 
 decision quickly. He needs these qualities most in the 
 moments of greatest danger; they must therefore be 
 drilled into him. 
 
 A man who has been well trained to be firm in 
 character, independent, and regardless of himself, who 
 has gradually accustomed himself to overcome and 
 stand a severe strain of his bodily strength, and who 
 has been well instructed in the simple rules for the 
 constantly recurring contingencies of an action, will 
 keep steady even under the severe conditions of an 
 Infantry combat, and will prove a reliable soldier. 
 
 58. — In advancing he must fully remember that he 
 must not halt without orders, however great the losses, 
 however hot the fire. Running away means destruction. 
 On the contrary, an attack must always succeed if carried 
 on right up to the enemy with firm determination, 
 
 59. — When acting on defence the soldier must remain 
 on the ground which he is to hold. He may do so 
 with full confidence, for the nearer the enemy advances, 
 the more destructive becomes his own fire. The man 
 therefore has to save his ammunition for close range, 
 and then to use it, sure of success. 
 
37 
 
 6o. — Every soldier must take care to remain with the 
 detachment to which he belongs. Whoever is found in the 
 rear of his company without special order and not being 
 wounded, whoever removes wounded out of action 
 without order, is guilty of cowardice. Any one who 
 loses touch with his Company, at once joins the nearest 
 body of troops in the fighting line, places himself under 
 the orders of the Officer or Sergeant in command, and 
 obeys him as he would his own superiors. After the 
 engagement every soldier who has got away from his 
 company must join it again without delay. 
 
 6i. — Any one who notices that in the pressure of 
 action he is losing resolution and coolness is to look 
 to his officers. If they are no longer alive, there will 
 be plenty of sergeants and brave men by whose example 
 he may brace himself up. 
 
 Extending and Splitting up of Troops. 
 
 62. — The extension of a detachment is guided by 
 circumstances ; either it has to carry on an action inde- 
 pendently or to fight in close contact with other troops. 
 In the latter case it finds touch either on both flanks or 
 on one. 
 
 Also it must be taken into consideration whether a 
 detachment has to attack, defend, or retreat. 
 
 63. — The necessity of being compelled to carry on an 
 independent action under changing circumstances and 
 through different phases makes it impossible to employ 
 from the beginning the whole force in one line. 
 
As a rule it will be necessary to obtain in the intro- 
 ductory stage a closer knowledge of the circumstances 
 which will determine how to carry on the engagement. 
 
 64. — This consideration alone necessitates the arrange- 
 ment in two bodies, the foremost of which must be 
 numerically the weaker, and is employed to introduce 
 the engagement. When the action of this body has 
 cleared up the situation sufficiently to take measures for 
 the continuance of the fight, it will be again necessary 
 to retain a part of the troops as reserve for unfore- 
 seen contingencies, and for the purpose of bringing 
 about the decision. Thus the whole strength available 
 must be disposed in three successive bodies, and even a 
 further splitting up may become necessary, if particular 
 circumstances, such as an exposed flank, should demand 
 it. But the latter ought, if possible, to be avoided, since 
 a proper use of the reserves renders it for the most 
 part unnecessary. 
 
 65. — No stringent and permanent rule can be laid down 
 as to the relative strength of the three different parts 
 of a body engaged. On principle, the part used for the 
 introduction of an action is to he made as weak as would he 
 consistent with safety, whereas the part retained as reserve 
 is to he as strong as possible. In general not more than one 
 fourth of the total strength will be employed for the 
 introductory stage, and not less than one fourth will 
 be retained as reserve. But these figures are only ta 
 represent an approximate estimate and must not lead to- 
 the breaking up of the fighting units. 
 
39 
 
 66. — 1"his assumed subdivision cannot be retained 
 in the course of the fight. First, the part intended to 
 carry through the action will have to co-operate all 
 at once or by degrees with the detachment employed 
 for the introductory stage, and the reserve then will 
 have to be sent forward as required either for the final 
 decision or for covering a retreat. 
 
 This splitting up of the different bodies will nearly 
 always cause a lengthening of the front of attack. 
 
 67. — On this account therefore the front development 
 in the early part of the fight ought to be comparatively 
 small. Otherwise it will be found in the further stages 
 that the front is unduly lengthened or that different fight- 
 ing units get mixed up too soon. 
 
 In taking the first steps for the disposition of troops 
 for action, the question arises, how many lines to 
 arrange and how narrow the front may be made. 
 
 A detachment fighting independently must remember that 
 deployment of men in front can only further the intended 
 result, if at the same time the wings are protected against 
 outflanking. 
 
 68. — In case of a hody of troops fighting in contact 
 -with others the extent of front will mostly be fixed. 
 There is no possibility of expecting or making a flank 
 attack, if both flanks are covered. These circum- 
 stances point to a disposition which will strengthen 
 the first line and dispense with a special or particularly 
 strong Reserve. 
 
40 
 
 A body of troops, therefore, that is supported on both 
 flanks may justly develop a very strong front ; if only in 
 touch on one side, the supports and reserves will in most 
 cases be arranged on the exposed flank. 
 
 69. — Our Infantry/* so well instructed in shooting, is 
 able to repel by their fire any attack in front. The attack- 
 ing force will sufl"er such enormous losses that they will 
 be thoroughly shaken and broken, and once repelled 
 will hardly renew the attempt. 
 
 70. — Infantry which does not mind losses sustained 
 by fire at long ranges and opposes a deliberate fire to 
 the assault of the enemy, is so strong in front, if it makes 
 good use of the advantages offered by the ground, or 
 created by the spade, that it can do without an im- 
 mediate (direct) support. 
 
 7 1 . — There is one vulnerable spot, and that is the flank. 
 This is vulnerable, if not secured by the nature of the 
 ground or by other troops. 
 
 Thus the securing of the flanks is of the greatest 
 importance as regards the result of the combat. The 
 most effective means to secure a flank is a disposition 
 of troops in several successive lines. But for the object in 
 view the position given to the detachments kept back 
 as reserves is of the greatest consideration. 
 
 72. — If behind the centre of the front, the reserves 
 may easily suffer heavy losses at an early stage by the 
 fire poured into the advanced fighting line. In order 
 
 * i,e. the German Infantry. 
 
to withdraw them from this conting'ett^^Fpfliey must 
 be kept back so far that their timely employment becomes 
 doubtful on account of distance. 
 
 73. — Therefore, if special circumstances do not de- 
 mand otherwise, it will he most serviceable to place the 
 reserves behind the flanks of the advanced fighting line, 
 
 74. — It depends on position and nature of ground to 
 determine behind which flank the Reserves are to be 
 disposed. The flank which is most likely to play a 
 decisive part must be looked after first of all. 
 
 It must be remembered that the shifting of reserves 
 towards flanks means the loss of much time, and has 
 for the most part to be executed under the enemy's fire. 
 
 75. — The distances for supports and reserves depend 
 on the object of the engagement. 
 
 Before approaching a decision, troops in close forma- 
 tions must be withdrawn from fire as much as possible. 
 
 If it is intended to bring the engagement to a decision^ 
 the distances must be decreased gradually. Then all 
 the leaders, even those of the smallest units, must show 
 but one endeavour, viz., to be in front, so as to be able to 
 help in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis 
 is mostly short, and troops that have not been employed 
 till then must be disposed and used without the 
 slightest loss of time. 
 
 As long as a decision is not yet aimed at, the distances in 
 depth must be greater. 
 
 76. — Again, the distances must vary according to the 
 nature of the ground. 
 
42 
 
 Open ground necessitates greater distances, and under 
 the enemy's fire broader formations (strong skirmishing 
 line with line formations in rear). If, in advancing, the 
 lines in rear cannot be withdrawn from the enemy's 
 fire, care must be taken to avoid one Infantry volley or 
 one shrapnel hitting two successive lines. The required 
 distance is thereby increased to more than 200 yards, 
 and must only be decreased when the decisive moment 
 approaches. 
 
 Broken ground allows shorter distances. The leader 
 must be all the more careful not to neglect this ad- 
 vantage, as a sudden and rapid reinforcement of the 
 front line is more frequently necessary on such ground. 
 A small front, short distances, closer formations, and 
 strong flank reserves are what are required. This is 
 particularly the case for combats in forests, when closed 
 bodies of troops can only be moved along the roads. 
 
 When fighting in the darkness, the importance of all 
 the features of the ground is considerably altered, and 
 it is impossible to direct the aim on decisive points. 
 For movements of attack a distinct object must be 
 marked beforehand ; there must be no change in the 
 direction of the movements, and they must be limited 
 to short distances over a known and not extensive 
 piece of ground. In the simplest formations of 
 Companies in Column (3 Ziige) by the side of, or 
 behind each other, with but few skirmishers close before 
 the front, the attack is best prepared for the hand-to- 
 hand fight, or it is possible to carry on a short energetic 
 fire combat as the heads of the columns are so close. 
 
43 
 
 Any more complicated arrangement for the attack 
 would be liable to create confusion. 
 
 When on defence, it is required to hold out in the 
 position occupied without altering the disposition of 
 the troops. The fire combat is to be limited to close 
 ranges, and must be short and sharp ; during the day- 
 time precautions must be taken to ensure the full 
 command by fire of the roads leading up from the 
 enemy to the position occupied. If then a body of 
 troops think themselves particularly exposed to a night 
 attack, the front line must be strengthened to ensure 
 greater safety. The co-operation of troops nearest to 
 those attacked at night time is limited to unexpected 
 counter-attacks in flank. 
 
 77. — On the Drill-ground the distances in depth have 
 often to be shortened on account of the space available. 
 If this is not necessary, the distances ought to be fixed 
 in accordance with the requirements of warfare, because 
 such an arrangement would be of great advantage for 
 the instruction of leaders and troops. 
 
 78. — Troops in closed bodies have to he guided in their 
 viovc77ie7its by those of the skirmishers. 
 
 Whenever they are led up to the skirmishing line, the 
 decision may be expected to be at hand. They may be 
 used to reinforce the fire line, or to deliver the attack 
 in a closed body. 
 
 The object of the combat, the time at disposal, and 
 other considerations decide in which way they are to 
 be used. 
 
44 
 
 Attack and Defence. 
 
 79. — In the Attack there is a great difference between 
 (i) an engagement with troops met with on the advance 
 (Rencontre), and (2) an attack against a front disposed and 
 prepared for resistance. 
 
 80. — In a Rencontre, so frequent with moving armies, 
 the troops are deployed from columns on the march, 
 mostly against an enemy likewise engaged in deploying. 
 
 In such engagements the heads of columns must by 
 their action give time and room for the columns to form 
 up for fighting. 
 
 Subordinate leaders must in such cases act inde- 
 pendently as far as possible, without endangering the 
 connection of their detachments with the movements of 
 the main body in deploying. In this sense the Com- 
 pany acts as the head of the Battalion, the Battalion as 
 the head of the Vanguard. On one hand, it is necessary 
 to form up for fighting more quickly than the enemy, on 
 the other hand it must not be done too quickly, so as not 
 to be obliged to begin the fight sooner than might be 
 agreeable with the intentions of the CO. 
 
 It is evident how important it is that the CO. should 
 be at the head of the column at the commencement of a 
 Rencontre, for then the orders for the deployment and 
 for the combat can be issued at the same time. 
 
 The attack must be delayed by the deployment as 
 little as possible ; previous deployment on the front line 
 of the leading company tends to loss of time. The 
 
45 
 
 introductory phase of our battles will mostly be carried 
 out in this way. 
 
 8 1. — If the enemy has nearly completed his disposi- 
 tions for the engagement, or if he is already partly 
 in position, the deployment of the head of a column 
 must be carried out with greater caution. The de- 
 ployment must be continued so as to obtain a greater 
 breadth for the fighting formation, and the orders of the 
 superior officer must be waited for. This officer must 
 without question be on the spot, to issue his orders in 
 time. 
 
 82. — The Attack on a fully developed fro?it of defence 
 (especially when prepared for the defence) must be 
 carried out from the very beginning on the plans of 
 the CO. The independent action of a single officer 
 must not be allowed to expose the general dispositions 
 to the influence of chance. 
 
 The enemy in such a case has evidently renounced 
 an attack in first line, so that the CO. of the advancing 
 force has obtained the advantage of choosing the 
 direction and the nature of the attack. In such a case 
 therefore, the troops are first fully formed up in ac- 
 cordance with the intentions of the CO., before any 
 part may begin the engagement. 
 
 The difficulty of crossing ground commanded by 
 hostile fire may make it advisable to use the darkness 
 for the approach. In such a case an advance will 
 generally be made on the previous day up to the limit 
 of the effect of the hostile fire, and towards morning the 
 
46 
 
 troops of the first line will be led forward in the dark so 
 far, that with the beginning of dawn firing may commence. 
 
 The only prospect of success of a planned attack is to 
 attain superiority of fire. 
 
 First of all, the superiority of Artillery fire must be 
 established, as it has to open the way for the attack by 
 Infantry. If on the ground in front of the attacking 
 force there are useful points d'appui, the attack has to 
 gain them on the first line. Under the protection 
 offered by such points (Tappui the further developments 
 take place. It is a settled principle to bring the lead- 
 ing troops as near to the hostile position as the nature 
 of the ground admits before opening fire. 
 
 Strong lines of skirmishers will try to work their way 
 up to the hostile position and to weaken or defeat it by 
 their fire. It is advisable to take the skirmishers from 
 the Battalions or Brigades which are intended to carry 
 out the attack. If the skirmishers have approached 
 close to the hostile position, the supports must be held 
 ready for an immediate intervention as near as possible 
 behind the skirmishers. 
 
 As long as the superiority of fire has not been at- 
 tained, or as long as the enemy does not seem con- 
 siderably shaken, the execution of the attack is only 
 possible under great loss. The superior effect of the 
 fire then must be awaited before delivering the final 
 attack. The skirmishing line can judge best of the results 
 obtained ; they feel first when and where the resistance 
 of the enemy grows weaker, they are able to make the 
 
47 
 
 quickest and best use of all advantages, so that the 
 initiative for the delivery of the attack will frequently 
 come from this quarter. If such is the case, the sup- 
 porting or closed bodies must at once follow the 
 skirmishing line, so as to support and secure it against 
 the chance of counter attacks. But, in general, 
 the Officer commanding the whole force will have to 
 take such measures that the order for the assault will be 
 given by himself. When the skirmishing line has gained 
 close distance, and, continually reinforced, has suf- 
 ficiently prepared the assault by the greatest effect of 
 fire possible, the successive lines in rear must be led 
 up to the first line by an uninterrupted advance, so as 
 to bring about the decision in connection with the 
 skirmishers. Drums are beaten in all closed bodies of 
 troops from the moment when the advance can no 
 longer be concealed from the enemy. Whether at such 
 a moment the bodies of troops are by the side of, or 
 behind each other, what formations they are in, and 
 whether the Commanding Officer be able to keep a 
 reserve, all this depends on circumstances. 
 
 In this crisis of the attack there can be only one aim 
 for the attacking line, only one idea, viz. forward^ 
 straight at the enemy. The beating of the drums and 
 the incessant sound of the advance by all the bugles 
 makes all forces at hand move forward, and the attacking 
 troops throw themselves with Hurrahs on the enemy. 
 
 Any further formulating of the Method of Attack is 
 forbidden. 
 
48 
 
 ^^.—How io proceed after a successful attack. It is not 
 sufficient to have conquered a hostile position, one must 
 make sure of holding it. This implies pursuit of the 
 retreating or retiring enemy, and securing the objects 
 gained. If villages, farmsteads, woods are included 
 in the hostile position, the attack must be continued 
 without interruption up to the farther boundary of such 
 objects. The farther pursuit is generally not carried 
 out by immediate continuation of the attack move- 
 ment, but in first line by fire, whilst the troops who 
 have made the assault occupy the conquered position 
 and at the same time re-form their different units. In 
 this way they become in a short time ready for renewed 
 fighting. 
 
 84. — Outflanking is the easiest way to obtain that 
 superiority of fire which is indispensable for a suc- 
 cessful attack. But it must be prepared already in the 
 first deployment, either by marching up in different 
 lines or by advancing lines in rear to a flank of the 
 first line. 
 
 There is no chance of success in trying flanking move- 
 ments in the foremost line with parts of bodies of troops 
 already extended, or perhaps even fighting; such attempts 
 would only result in splitting up the forces in a dangerous 
 manner. 
 
 85. — The Defence. No kind of fighting depends so 
 much on the nature of the ground and country as a 
 successful defence, which requires villages, heights, 
 ravines, woods, defiles, etc. 
 
49 
 
 At every defence the utmost use of the rifles is requisite. 
 
 From this point of view the position must be selected 
 and artificially strengthened. 
 
 As soon as the direction of the enemy's attack has 
 been found out, the firing line will, from the first, be 
 made as strong as seems necessary for the holding of 
 the position in accordance with the object of battle and 
 the nature of the ground. Shelter trenches will be made 
 and other means of shelter provided, distances of im- 
 portant points in front will be ascertained, reserve 
 ammunition from the ammunition carts will be brought 
 up and distributed to the troops, who will put it where 
 it will be ready at hand after occupying the line of de- 
 fence. The supports are moved up close, sometimes 
 drawn up close behind the skirmishers. All distances 
 in depth are to be shortened, reserves are only to be 
 withdrawn far enough to be out of the reach of the 
 enemy's fire, but near enough to be at hand for the 
 defence of the portion allotted to their main body. 
 
 The number and width of the different lines of the 
 defensive position will differ very much with the natural 
 conditions of the position. The more difficult the ground 
 is to move on and to overlook, the more numerous and 
 the smaller will be the subdivisions of the position. 
 The occupation of a position thus arranged demands as 
 first condition the disposition of troops in depth. Every 
 subdivision is allotted to one fighting unit of corre- 
 sponding strength, which provides its own reserve. 
 
 To find the proper place for the general reserve, />., such 
 
50 
 
 forces as are not intended for any particular subdivision, 
 the following considerations must be taken into account: 
 a defence which only intends to repel the enemy (as in 
 outpost and rear-guard engagements) may be limited to 
 holding its own ground ; whereas a defensive action which is 
 intended to bring about a success of arms, must be coupled 
 with oiTensive measures. Defence alone can never lead 
 to destruction of the enemy. Therefore the forces for 
 the defence of the local positions must be rather 
 moderate and the general reserve must be assembled at 
 a point which is most likely to favour an offensive move- 
 ment at a given moment. As a rule, this will be at one 
 of the flanks, and this choice also guards best against 
 that most dangerous enemy of strong positions, out- 
 flanking. The greater the body of troops on the defence, 
 the greater must be the lateral distance of the general 
 reserve, which will give room for deployment and for 
 advance of the eventual attack, wdll threaten the flank 
 of the enemy's attack, and will increase the protection 
 against outflanking. 
 
 Care must be taken not to complete the occupation of 
 positions before the direction of the enemy's attack has 
 been ascertained. 
 
 86. — No regulations can be laid down for a retreat, 
 supposing previous defeat. Any body of troops engaged 
 with the enemy has no longer the choice of the direction 
 of retreat when repulsed or withdrawn from an un- 
 successful attack. If the enemy pursues, the troops 
 must retreat perpendicularly to the front without change 
 of formation and they require to be received behind a 
 
51 
 
 supporting line to prepare for renewed resistance. This 
 fact shows that the order for retreat can only be executed 
 when the troops are still in formations to depth. But it 
 must be well considered that it would be wrong for 
 troops brought up for a decisive combat, to keep a reserve 
 for the cover of their own retreat instead of using it to carry 
 through the engagement. The Commanding Officer must 
 decide in time whether he will accept the decision or 
 carry out a retreat. 
 
 The position to be taken up by troops for receiving a 
 retreating body has to be chosen in accordance with 
 the capacity for resistance, but above all it must be 
 sufficiently near so as not to expose the retreating line 
 to destruction. A position. for this purpose is always 
 more favourable when sideward of the line of retreat. 
 The Officer in command takes from the fresh part of 
 his troops the detachments intended to occupy that 
 position. Then the enemy finds resistance which must 
 be made so that the retreating troops gain time and 
 space to re-form on their now unmolested farther retreat. 
 This determines the duration of the resistance, after 
 which the receiving troops themselves have to com- 
 mence the retreat unless a turn of events can be hoped 
 for from the timely intervention of fresh troops. In 
 most cases it will be necessary to prepare and arrange 
 a second position behind which to retreat in turn. 
 
 A well-conducted engagement of troops in retreat 
 must finally lead to the formation of Columns on the 
 march with a rearguard arranged in successive bodies. 
 In order to carry this out the Officer Commanding will 
 
52 
 
 have to indicate plainly the point to be marched on, 
 and to order where, and by which detachments the 
 relieving positions are to be occupied. He will only be 
 able to accomplish this task, if he leaves the battle-field 
 after issuing these orders and receives the retreating 
 troops at the different relieving positions with the 
 special orders for each. For everything else the 
 Subordinate leaders are responsible. To present a front 
 to the enemy at random for the sake of supporting a 
 relieving position is often a fatal mistake, as it greatly 
 increases the difficulty of getting away from the enemy. 
 
 87. — The regulations give no rules or points of view 
 for all possible kinds of combats, they say nothing about 
 feints, retardive or demonstrative engagements. How to 
 conduct them is the task of the Commanding Officer 
 in each case, and their conditions will vary entirely with 
 different circumstances. It will always be a case for 
 the consideration of the Commanding Officer to decide 
 whether troops have to be arranged in depth or breadth. 
 
 B. Combat of Fighting Units. 
 Company Combat. 
 
 88. — The Company must be able to execute at a short 
 order or wave of the hand all regulation formations, 
 such as extending, closing in, and a rapid change from 
 one formation to the other. 
 
 Fighting in Extended Order implies the condition that 
 
53 
 
 each Zug and each Section can independently find the 
 means to execute the tasks allotted to it or resulting 
 from the circumstances of the combat. An extended 
 Zug closes and joins without further order the Company 
 in Column as soon as the object of the engagement no 
 longer requires the Zug to remain in Extended Order. 
 A Section, when having executed its task, acts in the 
 same way, and after closing, joins the remainder of the 
 Zug. This principle must become custom by practice. 
 The Zug leader receives the order to extend, and at the 
 same time he is given the command of his Zug. In the 
 course of the engagement there is often no time and 
 more frequently no means of transmitting an order for 
 changing front or closing. At the end of the combat 
 therefore each Zug and each Section must be found in 
 its proper place ; where this is, cannot be fixed before- 
 hand. 
 
 89. — The Company is only exceptionally (when de- 
 tached) under necessity of having to carry through an 
 engagement independently; as a rule it fights as part 
 of the Battalion unit. Whereas the Company leader 
 when detached, has to act exclusively on his own re- 
 sponsibility so as to carry out his orders, he has to 
 consider in his disposition his relation to the other 
 companies when acting in the Battalion unit. This 
 means that the Captain must have an eye on what 
 happens on his flanks and behind him, although the 
 conditions and events to his front particularly occupy 
 his attention. 
 
 The combat of the Battalion is an ensemble, the 
 
54 
 
 frame of which must not be overstepped by any of its 
 parts. But even within this limit the independence of 
 the company is great and indispensable, as soon as it 
 has entered into action. Orders coming from far 
 in the rear are easily rendered unsuitable by events. 
 Continual waiting for orders would make it impossible 
 for the Company to act in the right way and in proper 
 time. The decisions of the Company leader, however, 
 must always be ruled by the principle that connection 
 with the Battalion, and the proper place within it, must 
 be kept up through all the changing circumstances of 
 a combat. 
 
 90. — When entering into an engagement it is advisable 
 to employ at first a weak skirmishing line, because 
 changes of front with strong skirmishing lines are 
 always difficult to execute, and are attended by loss 
 when under the enemy's fire. As a rule, whole Zlige 
 are employed for the fire line only gradually, one after 
 another. It will be required only under particular cir- 
 cumstances to extend several Zlige at the same time ; 
 again, in cases when the Company is only to be as- 
 sured against surprises, the skirmishing line may consist 
 of merely half a Zug, or of even a smaller body. 
 
 9 1 . — The development of the combat demands the increase 
 of fire effect in the first line, as well as the compensa- 
 tion of loss sustained. The skirmishing line of a 
 Company may for this end be lengthened or be 
 strengthened by bringing into it fresh forces. The 
 former way must be chosen where possible, as it favours 
 
55 
 
 the proper command over, and the direction of fire in 
 the different small units. But the latter way will be 
 resorted to more frequently, because there is seldom 
 room for lengthening the skirmishing line on account 
 of other troops fighting next in line. A Company 
 must therefore have been drilled so that the hold 
 over the men is not lost when the skirmishers of differ- 
 ent Ziige and sections are mixed up in the same line. 
 The leaders of the Ziige share the length of the line 
 between them ; subordinate leaders act similarly. 
 
 92. — The breaking up and extending of the whole 
 Company must be avoided, or postponed as long as 
 possible, otherwise the Captain will have it no longer in 
 hand when attacking, and even when in a position, he 
 will not always have it under complete control. Still 
 more the Company would be withdrawn from the con- 
 trol of the Battalion leader. The Captain must therefore 
 endeavour to keep a closed body behind the skirmish- 
 ing line as long as possible, which alone will enable 
 him to make up for losses, to give greater effect to 
 attack or defence, or to repulse a threatened movement 
 against a flank. 
 
 93. — As a rule a Company which has extended 
 Skirmishers will keep the remaining part in a closed 
 body as support. To arrange for a weaker support as 
 connecting link between skirmishers and main support 
 will only be necessary when it is important to keep a 
 similar body in greater proximity to the skirmishers. 
 Likewise, the consideration of covering a flank may 
 
56 
 
 necessitate the disposal of special detachments behind 
 one of the wings of the skirmishing line. But such sub- 
 dividing is a drawback, which must only be risked in 
 exceptional cases. 
 
 The distances in depth of the closed parts of a 
 company depend on the state of the combat and the 
 nature of the ground. The timely support of the fire line 
 must he assured. The choice of formation also depends 
 on the nature of the ground and the effect of the 
 enemy's fire. If in view of the enemy, line formation 
 is advisable, whereas columns find cover more easily in 
 the undulations of the ground. 
 
 94. — To carry through the combat the whole strength of the 
 Company must be put forward, if necessary. Whether 
 in this case all are drawn into the first line, or whether 
 closed bodies also are finally employed, depends on cir- 
 cumstances. At any rate the force of the fire must he raised 
 to the utmost^ and he maintained if possible until the decision 
 is arrived at, 
 
 A Company fighting independently, which has to keep up 
 its divisions and flank-cover to the last, will use the 
 support most suitably as a closed body, in attack as well 
 as in defence. When Companies act as parts of a 
 Battalion, they will share the different exigencies of 
 the attack or defence. 
 
 The assault is made, after obtaining the desired effect 
 of the fire, on the command of the leader, by a quick 
 rush at a point in the hostile position which has 
 been pointed out as the object to go for. 
 
57 
 
 95' — The Captain must keep in hand the direction of 
 the movements of his Company during the combat. He 
 communicates his dispositions to the Zug leaders by 
 means of short clear orders and must keep his place where 
 he thinks he will be able to direct his Company. He must 
 look after getting fresh supplies of ammunition and dis- 
 tributing them by all means at his disposal. 
 
 Combat of the Battalion. 
 
 96. — The Battalion possesses in its four Companies 
 a disposition and division of strength which make it 
 peculiarly adapted to the execution of all the require- 
 ments of an engagement. 
 
 The Major manages the Battalion by allotting their 
 special tasks to the different Companies. Only in case 
 of evident misunderstandings or mistakes in selecting 
 order of procedure, which might enforce movements 
 not intended, will the O.C. the Battalion directly 
 interfere with Companies, Ziige, etc. 
 
 On entering upon an engagement the CO. of the 
 Battalion has to issue his orders in short, precise, and 
 distinct manner to each of the company leaders — if 
 possible in presence of all of them — but he has to leave 
 to them the choice of the means and measures to be 
 adopted. He is to be guided by the same principle 
 during the course of the action. It must be his main 
 endeavour to keep up the connection between the com- 
 panies whilst engaged. The companies also in executing 
 their tasks endeavour to keep up this connection. 
 
58 
 
 The Officer commanding the Battalion has often not 
 sufficient time, often not the means for transmitting 
 an order at the right moment. But, all the same, 
 the end of the engagement must find each company in 
 its right place. Where this is, cannot be fixed before- 
 hand. 
 
 97. — The CO. of the Battalion will in most cases find 
 it advisable to avoid as long as possible extending whole 
 companies ; for when they are entirely extended, he 
 cannot keep them in hand in an attack and even in the 
 defence of a position he can no longer control them as 
 one unit. In case strong, thick skirmishing lines are 
 required, it will be preferable to employ at once several 
 Companies who keep their own supports. By doing so 
 it is possible to avoid different Companies being mixed 
 up at an early stage. 
 
 98. — The formation of the Battalion depends on the 
 object of the action and on the nature of the ground. 
 There is no generally applicable principle to determine, 
 whether a Battalion should take parts of all four com- 
 panies into the first line or only one, whether it begins 
 an engagement with one, two, or three lines disposed as 
 supports. The CO. has a free choice according to 
 circumstances. 
 
 The Battalion may deploy entirely for action by 
 making a sort of line formation on a given company, or 
 it may be done by bringing one company to the front. 
 The former movement will be rare, but will have to be 
 practised. 
 
59 
 
 None of the different formations may become a fixed 
 scheme. 
 
 99. — In most cases it will be advisable to deploy the 
 Companies only when each is needed, and to keep the 
 remainder of the Battalion in hand. If, for instance, a 
 *' Rencontre" is commenced by one company in front, 
 and it is later on found necessary to extend the front 
 to one flank, a second Company is employed to do it. 
 When it is seen in the course of the engagement on 
 which flank the greatest force must be disposed, or which 
 flank is threatened, then the reserved forces are arranged 
 in successive bodies behind that flank. There may be a 
 great variety of circumstances to determine the way in 
 which the four Companies may have to co-operate. The 
 Battalion leader will always be equal to all different cir- 
 cumstances, if he keeps to an arrangement of his forces 
 in depth, and if he uses his Companies only when he has 
 clearly recognised the necessity of any new movement. 
 He must bring into action sufficient forces in the right 
 time, but he must guard against any hasty expenditure of 
 force. 
 
 100. — The movements of the Battalion when once 
 developed are to be regulated by marking the common 
 object on which to march. 
 
 The greatest breadth in which a Battalion could be 
 disposed would occur in case of all four Companies being 
 formed up by the side of each other. But it is evidetit 
 that in such an arrangement the leader 0/ the Battalion has 
 
60 
 
 given up an essential part of the influence he ought to 
 exercise on the course of the action. Also there is seldom 
 space for such a breadth of formation for a Battalion 
 which fights by the side of others. But if a Battalion 
 fights an independent action, in which case space 
 would be available, it is frequently necessary to have 
 a small front and an arrangement of greater depth. 
 Therefore on the whole the fighting front ought to be 
 rather small. 
 
 The necessity for disposing bodies in depth is greatest, 
 when in positions of defence, when a Battalion is 
 fighting independently, and always at an introductory 
 stage. The smaller the fighting front is, the more the 
 lateral distance of flank echelons must be increased. 
 
 loi.— Td? carry through the engagement, the Major can 
 only dispose of the reserved force, which is either 
 behind the centre or behind a flank. He has to choose 
 his own place under consideration of this circumstance. 
 Only in exceptional cases can he be with the front 
 line ; he must be as much as possible close to his 
 reserves, in any case at a spot from which he can well 
 overlook the fighting of his Battalion. 
 
 His influence on the fire-action of his Companies will 
 always be limited ; generally he cannot do more than 
 regulate the supply of extra ammunition, so that it is 
 taken to those points where the need of it is greatest. 
 
 102. — If a Battalion is brought up from the Reserve 
 for the purpose of pushing to final conclusion an 
 
61 
 
 engagement which has been prepared by the fire combat 
 of other troops, it will be advisable to make full use of 
 the advantage accruing from its closer formation. 
 
 In such a case it will be expedient for fighting to 
 extend the Companies with short intervals. 
 
 Combat of the Regiment. 
 
 103. — The Regiment is particularly adapted to carry 
 out objects of fighting allotted to it as a unit, through 
 its historical associations, through the uniformity of 
 instruction, through the close relations amongst its 
 officers, and through the number of its divisions: three or 
 four Battalions. Within the regiment, the impulse for co- 
 operation will be most active, and its subdivision makes 
 it easy for the leader to calculate exactly the numbers 
 to be put forward at every phase of the fight. 
 
 The leader addresses his special orders to the Battalion 
 leaders, and leaves to them the manner and form of exe- 
 cuting them. 
 
 A direct interference with the action of single com- 
 panies must be limited to exceptional cases, and is 
 only justified when the carrying out of the general 
 plan seems seriously threatened by the proceedings of 
 the subordinate commanders, and when there is no 
 time to transmit the order through the usual channel. 
 
62 
 
 The leader secures his influence on the action of the 
 Battalions in the foremost line in the most efficient 
 manner, if he assigns to them certain parts of the front 
 when on defence, and if he prescribes to them the objects 
 to move on when marching or attacking. According to 
 circumstances the latter can be done in three ways : 
 either a common object is given to the Battalions to 
 march on, which must be sufficiently distant in front, 
 or a particular object is assigned to each Battalion, or 
 finally the direction of the march respecting the attack 
 is fixed for one Battalion, and the others are ordered to 
 keep in touch with this one. 
 
 The co-operation of Battalions fighting by the side of 
 each other can be regulated by pointing out an object 
 in front, never by dressing one Battalion on the one 
 next in front. Although therefore Battalions fight in 
 the same line without taking up their dressing from 
 each other, there will frequently be the necessity of the 
 order to get touch in the fighting formation towards the 
 centre or one of the flanks. 
 
 104. — Only the forces kept back as reserves are at the 
 disposal of the Colonel to further develop his action, 
 either in breadth or depth, according to the require- 
 ments of a certain stage or to the plan laid down. He 
 will never give out of hand more Battalions than is 
 demanded by the gradual development of the action. 
 Thus he retains the command over the portion of the 
 battle-field assigned to him, and keeps well prepared 
 
63 
 
 for the contingencies of the combat. This arrangement 
 only will allow of a flanking movement being made, or 
 of the repulse of an attack in flank. A change of 
 front can only be executed by employing Battalions kept 
 in the rear and disposed in depth ; Battalions already 
 engaged are bound to keep their fighting front. The 
 difiiculty of drawing to a side the foremost fighting 
 line increases in proportion with its numerical strength. 
 
 The front line in which the fighting is to be done 
 must be fixed as accurately as possible before the 
 Colonel orders the first deployment of any Battalion for 
 the combat. The arrangement of formations in breadth 
 or depth depends on the main front line, and on the 
 connection with other troops on the same side. The 
 narrower the first development in front, the greater the 
 lateral distance of the successive lines kept in reserve. 
 
 105. — It makes a great difference whether a Regiment 
 enters an engagement when in Marching Column, or 
 when in its usual regimental formation. When deploy- 
 ing from Marching Column the leading Battalion may 
 be already fully engaged, whilst the one next only arrives 
 on the battle-field. This case requires arrangement in 
 depth with the leading Battalion, and the following 
 Battalions must form up in Columns as quickly as 
 possible so as to shorten the depth of the whole 
 Regiment. Even when advancing to occupy the position 
 pointed out by the Colonel, the Battalions must already 
 be forming up from the Marching Column. 
 
64 
 
 io6. — If a flank march becomes necessary in front of 
 the enemy's main line, it cannot be undertaken with 
 sufficient safety, unless the timely deployment in a suit- 
 able disposition towards the enemy is prepared by the 
 arrangement of the troops on starting. Within effective 
 range of the enemy such a flank movement can only be 
 executed under cover of the ground. 
 
 107. — A normal extent of front of the Regiment can- 
 not be fixed. The breadth of the front depends on the 
 object of fighting and on the nature of the ground, as 
 well as on the strength of the forces of which it forms 
 a part. But if a Regiment carries on an engagement by 
 itself, its extent of front at first must not exceed the 
 length of line occupied by two Battalions deployed for 
 fighting by the side of each other. 
 
 108. — In carrying an attack right through, the move- 
 ments of a Regiment when once deployed are, on 
 principle, directed straight ahead. Any closing to a 
 side, when required at this stage, shows that there was 
 a mistake in the first deployment. As a rule, it is better 
 to correct such a mistake by drawing forward the suc- 
 cessive reserve lines arranged behind a flank, but nearly 
 always the force of the attack will be weakened in 
 consequence. 
 
 109. — In order to do what is required of him, 
 the Colonel of a Regiment has to choose the most 
 suitable spot for himself. During the introductory stage 
 he will be well to the front. Especially in case of 
 
65 
 
 ** Rencontres " the front is the place where he is re- 
 quired. For the direction of the later phases of the 
 combat the most suitable place for him will be near the 
 reserves, in fact anywhere whence he can secure a full 
 view of the troops under his command. In case his 
 Battalion fights as part of a Brigade, he must remember 
 in the choice of his place that he must be in easy com- 
 munication with the leader of the Brigade. 
 
 Combat of the Brigade. 
 
 no. — The Brigade is the greatest unit for fighting 
 and commanding which can be practised and drilled on 
 a limited space. 
 
 A Battalion on war footing with Small Baggage oc- 
 cupies in Marching Column a depth of 400 yds. ; hence 
 the extent of a Brigade on the march is so considerable 
 that the arrangements of fighting formations are some- 
 times forcibly ruled by this fact. The Commander of 
 the Brigade becomes dependent on the length of time 
 required for deploying, and it is therefore important to 
 keep in sight the difference between the length of 
 Marching Columns on war footing and that of the same 
 columns in times of peace. 
 
 III. — A Brigade (2 Regiments-6 Battalions) is best 
 arranged for the Combat when the two Regiments fight by 
 the side of each other, share the battle-front and de- 
 termine the forces gradually brought up by their indi- 
 
 3 
 
66 
 
 vidual requirements. But this ideal arrangement cannot 
 be always made from the outset ; also more important 
 tactical considerations must not be sacrificed to it. 
 
 112. — Especially in a *' Rencontre " fight, the require- 
 ments of the first fighting line may urgently demand an 
 accelerated increase of breadth, and thus bring the 
 majority of the Battalions of the leading Regiment into 
 the first line by the side of each other. Such circum- 
 stances make it indispensable for these Battalions to 
 provide for being separately arranged in depth forma- 
 tions ; for the leading Regiment must never assume that 
 the one following it would be kept at disposal to support 
 it in its own front. In all cases it must he a fixed rule that 
 the regiments receive their separate orders^ and that the 
 Brigadier only gives his orders to the Regiments, Mixing 
 up regiments is a disadvantage, and must only be re- 
 sorted to in cases of absolute need. 
 
 The Regiment second in the Marching Column will 
 in most cases march up behind one of the wings of the 
 one already engaged ; it will have to be kept all the 
 more concentrated for a decisive advance, the more 
 the circumstances of the case at first necessitate a rapid 
 , extension of front. 
 
 113. — The Brigade, by means of its fighting power 
 and its size, is a force of such consequence that it may 
 be required to act on different fronts simultaneously and 
 uniformly. The deployment in the different directions 
 of march must be made from considerable depths. A 
 
67 
 
 lateral moving of fronts once deployed is no longer 
 admissible. 
 
 When marching up into action, the Brigadier must 
 take care that the depth of the Brigade is decreased in 
 good time, by forming up the Battalions and making the 
 successive lines close up. Any halt will be used by each 
 subdivision so as to avoid useless delays in the deploy- 
 ment of the whole body. 
 
 When the Regiments receive their orders for the 
 combat, the objects of attack or the portions of ground 
 to be defended will be then assigned to them. The more 
 concentrated and uniform these are for the same 
 regiment, the more concentrated will be the co-opera- 
 tion of the forces. 
 
 114. — The choice of his own position is of great 
 importance for the Brigadier; he will have to change 
 it as little as possible. 
 
 The commencement of a battle must find him at the 
 head of his brigade, because his own observation of 
 the circumstances concerning enemy, nearest troops 
 on the same side, and nature of ground, cannot be made 
 up for by reports received or by consulting a map. In that 
 position he is best able to direct correctly the first develop- 
 ment, on which the course of the fight depends so much, 
 to obtain advantages over the enemy by timely resolves, 
 to save his own troops long d6tours, to lead their action 
 into certain lines, and to preclude the possibility of 
 arbitrary decisions on the part of the O.C. the leading 
 troops. 
 
68 
 
 But during the further course of action the Brigadier 
 keeps far enough back to overlook all parts of the 
 brigade. As a rule he will find the most conve- 
 nient position near those bodies of troops which he 
 has retained for his own disposal. There only can he 
 command the action as it is going on. On principle he 
 addresses his orders to the Commanders of Regiments. 
 But if circumstances force him to deviate from this rule 
 and to send direct orders to a Battalion for the sake 
 of executing certain movements which require great 
 rapidity, he must at the same time send information to 
 the Officer Commanding the Regiment, with whom he 
 must remain in constant uninterrupted communication. 
 
 115. — In other respects the combat is carried on in 
 accordance with the rules laid down for Regiments and 
 Battalions. 
 
 116. — Experience in past wars will show the average 
 frontage to be allotted to a Brigade in action. 
 
 The fighting breadth of a Brigade of 6 Battalions 
 ought to be about 1000 to 1200 yards in the first 
 deployment. 
 
 C. Final Remarks. 
 
 117. — The simplicity of forms and principles in the 
 regulations must have a good effect on the thorough- 
 ness in instruction. 
 
 They suffice for the necessary uniform Drill and In- 
 struction of the Infantry of the whole Army, and their 
 
69 
 
 simplicity makes it likely that Reserve men called out 
 to serve with the colours will find it easy to master them 
 again in a very short time. But rigorous care must be 
 taken, that the smartness and discipline as taught on the 
 Drill-ground must, as far as exterior circumstances allow , 
 be maintained in sham fights and on the field of battle. 
 
 1 1 8. — The points of view mentioned offer abundant 
 changes for the practice of fighting formations. Under 
 supposition of the most simple conditions of war, the 
 principles of deployment for attack, defence, retreat 
 or flanking movements have to be shown, practised 
 and' clearly impressed on the men ; they have also to 
 be practised with or without lateral support by troops 
 or ground, whilst changing front, and finally on the 
 Drill-ground with or without utilisation of the nature 
 of the ground. 
 
 119. — A Commanding Officer has the duty of practis- 
 ing all the principles laid down by the regulations during 
 the period of time that he is allowed for the complete 
 Instruction and Drill of his force. 
 
 120. — At any Inspection the Inspecting Officer sets 
 the task. This is the only way by which he can form 
 a right judgment on the tactical efficiency of the body 
 of troops, and particularly on that of the Officers of 
 all ranks. 
 
 121. — Officers are reminded that these forms and 
 principles only take into account the simplest con- 
 ditions and will often have to be altered by different 
 
70 
 
 circumstances, when employed in face of the enemy. 
 In case the contingencies of a battle demand a deviation 
 from these rules, all Commanding Ofificers, each in his 
 position, must be accustomed to adapt their orders 
 quickly and without hesitation to the case in point, and 
 they must well remember that omission and neglect is a 
 greater fault than a mistake in the choice of means. Their 
 attention must never be detracted from the essential 
 point by a tendency to stick to fixed forms. 
 
 122. — In all Sham-fights as well as in the course of 
 the complete Drill Instruction care must be taken that 
 the inclination for attack which is innate to Infantry 
 be kept up and maintained. 
 
 As soon as a fairly open ground for the use of the 
 rifle presents itself, and as long as circumstances do not 
 make it necessary to come at once to decisive action, 
 Infantry must try to make full use of the superiority 
 which is attained by a calm deliberate fire of stationary 
 detachments. All Infantry must therefore be accustomed 
 to develop their fire to the utmost, even if only for a 
 short time, at any moment and at any turn of the action, 
 so as to be able to attack the enemy with all the more 
 vigour and effect. 
 
 123. — When practising larger bodies of troops in open 
 country, it is of much importance to consider the proper 
 times when forces ought to be spared. This considera- 
 tion ought to recommend itself to 'the attention of all 
 Commanding Officers all the more, as in case of real 
 need advance at all hazards, extreme exertion and self- 
 sacrifice must be expected of troops. 
 
71 
 
 124. — The greater the dimensions of a battle, the 
 greater the field for the action of the individual. The 
 attention of the leaders must be more directed to the 
 execution of their special task within the frame of the 
 ensemble than to the superintendence of details. There- 
 fore it is not very important, that all parts of a larger unit 
 should use the same means to attain the one object in 
 view. But the free action which is allowed to sub- 
 ordinate leaders must never endanger the safety of the 
 higher direction, and it is indispensable under any cir- 
 cumstances, that the tactical order and the internal unity 
 of troops must not be lost. 
 
 125. — More extensive practices in connection with 
 other arms lead to a number of tactical contingencies 
 and decisions which are far beyond the limits of the 
 Regulations. They do not intend to exhaust the laws of 
 Tactics, they are limited to fundamental principles. But 
 troops will be equal to any task in case of war if they 
 have fully mastered by practice the principles of the 
 regulations. Their instruction has been carried out from 
 the right point of view, when they can do what war re- 
 quires of them, and when they have not to abandon on the 
 field of battle what they have been taught on the Drill- ground. 
 
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