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 ;«
 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 fejA NEW (the eleventh) Edition of "A Handbook to 
 
 ^ Political Questions ; with the Arguments on Either 
 
 "< 
 
 M Side " was lately published. 
 
 .J 
 
 Among the new subjects contained in this 
 Edition, are chapters devoted to the latest phase 
 of the Fiscal Question, under the headings of 
 ^' Pi^otection, Retaliation, and Preference. 
 ^ The suggestion has been made to me, from 
 tj various quarters, that it would be useful to many, 
 ^ who were unwilling or unable to buy the Handbook 
 as a whole, if, under existing circumstances, these 
 Sections were separately published in a cheap form. 
 § Hence this little volume. 
 § The Sections have been revised for this purpose. 
 
 S. B. 
 December 1903. 
 
 •'584683
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 RETALIATION . 
 
 PREFERENCE . 
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES . 
 
 3 
 
 28 
 45 
 
 72
 
 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 The question of fundamental Tariff Changes has sud- 
 denly sprung into prominence. The three questions 
 that are most to the fore, are the re-adoption of 
 Protection, the imposition of Retaliatory Duties, 
 and the grant of Preferential Tariff advantages to 
 the Colonies. 
 
 These three questions can be supported as a 
 whole, or taken in twos, or advocated separately, 
 according to the view taken by the particular 
 person. 
 
 As the arguments for or against Protection are 
 generally applicable to the other two questions, they 
 are put first, and are supplemented, in the later 
 sections, by further arguments especially applicable 
 to Retaliation or to Preference. 
 
 The Tables in the Appendix, which have been com- 
 piled wdth some care, may be found useful. Other 
 facts and figures can be found in the oflicial returns, 
 and in the " literature " (not always so accurate as 
 could be wished) with which the country is inundated. 
 Fiscal Free Trade is founded on the principle of 
 non-interference with producer and consumer, and 
 
 A '
 
 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 on the complete freedom from taxation of all imports 
 and exports. To the extent that taxation has to be 
 imposed on imports, the necessary Customs tariff is 
 imposed for revenue purposes only, and with no 
 ulterior motives ; and the necessary Customs and 
 Excise duties are confined to a minimum number of 
 articles, and levied on those articles alone which 
 produce substantial sums. Further, whenever an 
 article taxed is produced at home as well as im- 
 ported from abroad, the Excise duty on the former 
 is equivalent to the Customs duty on the latter. 
 Thus the indirect taxation of a free trade country 
 would neither prohibit, protect, advantage, discrim- 
 inate, nor differentiate.* 
 
 It is proposed to subvert this principle, and to 
 levy on certain foreign imports a heavy Customs duty, 
 without any equivalent Excise duty. This with the 
 object (i.) of either excluding foreign goods which 
 compete in the home market with the home manu- 
 facturers or producers, or so to handicap these goods 
 by heavy taxation that the home industry would be 
 better able to compete with them ; (ii.) of utilising 
 the duties as a weapon against protective nations ; 
 (iii.) of enabling us by their means to give a prefer- 
 ence to the import of Colonial produce. 
 
 * An account of the adoption of the principle of Free Trade and Fiscal 
 Reform, and how it was carried out, will be found in Finance UTid Politics 
 and in il/r Gladstone as Chancellor of the F.rchequsr.
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 The advocates of the imposition of Protective 
 import duties on foreign goods base their proposals 
 on the grounds : — 
 
 1. (a) That the prophecies confidently made by Peel 
 and Cobden, that if we adopted free trade the other 
 nations would follow suit, and that trade would follow its 
 natural course, have been totally falsified. No other 
 nation has followed our example ; all other nations are 
 increasingly protective. — (6) That Great Britain alone has 
 adopted free trade ; and it is presumptuous to assume that 
 we are necessarily in the right, and all other nations neces- 
 sarily in the wrong. — (c) That whatever may have been the 
 position fifty years ago, all the circumstances and conditions 
 have so altered, that a reconsideration of our fiscal position 
 has become essential. 
 
 2. («) That at the time that free trade was adopted, Eng- 
 land (then protectionist, and in consequence of protection) 
 was in the van ; was indeed the only great manufacturing 
 nation. At first, therefore, free trade, combined with her 
 natural, physical, material and commercial advantages, led 
 to a great expansion of her trade. — (h) That the great revival 
 of industry which followed free trade was due primarily to 
 other causes which synchronised with the adoption of free 
 trade ; namely, improvements in machinery, the extension of 
 railways, the invention of the telegraph, the greater pro- 
 duction of gold, &c. — (c) That if it were true that commercial 
 prosperity were primarily due to fiscal freedom, the trade of 
 the other great nations would have remained undeveloped, 
 instead of becoming more prosperous than ours. 
 
 3. (a) That free trade was intended to create a free
 
 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 interchange of all commodities between all nations, and 
 this might have been beneficial. Such a result has 
 not, however, ensued. We have not got " free trade," but 
 only free imports. That is, we have opened our markets 
 free to the world, and every one is at liberty to sell us 
 what they like ; whilst other countries have not in return 
 opened their markets to us, and by their import duties 
 they have hindered us from selling our goods to them. — 
 (b) That while universal free trade might benefit the world, 
 partial free trade injures the country which adopts it. 
 
 4. That while it is true, generally, that the prosperity 
 of other nations is an advantage to us, this is not the case 
 when their prosperity is based on our decadence. 
 
 5. (a) That Germany and the United States have 
 acquired their wealth, not in spite of, but in consequence 
 of their system of protection. — (b) That it is clear, therefore, 
 that it is protection that stimulates and strengthens, and free 
 trade that enfeebles and injures, an industry. — (c) That 
 clearly also protection tends to develop industrial methods, 
 character, aptitude, economy, and industry. 
 
 6. (a) That protection encourages diversity of trades and 
 occupations, prevents the weaker industries from going to the 
 wall, and protects the stronger from unfair competition ; 
 while it enables the nation to take advantage of any new 
 opening for trade. — (h) Then a great variety of occupations 
 in a country minimises the loss and distress which is caused 
 by trade depression, for all trades are not equally depressed 
 at the same time. — (c) That free exchange tends to over- 
 specialisation of industries ; and any derangement of these 
 specialised industries involves disaster to the country. 
 
 7. That a country (or Empire) should, as far as possible, 
 be independent of other countries, both industrially and as 
 regards its food su plies ; and this can only be attained by 
 protection. Free trade tends to make the country more
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 and more dependent on other countries for its necessities 
 and its comforts. 
 
 8. (a) That one of the chief objects of the tariffs of 
 protective countries is to make themselves as far as possible 
 self-sufficient. This has been the result of protection, and 
 thus we are less and less able to find in civilised countries 
 a market for our manufactured goods. — (h) That in conse- 
 quence of their protective import duties, our trade to most 
 of the chief protective countries has of late years shown 
 a continual decline. It becomes increasingly difficult to 
 dispose of our exports — necessary to pay for our imports — 
 on advantageous terms, or on any terms at all. 
 
 9. (a) That until a few years ago, our commercial and 
 industrial supremacy was unchallenged. It is now not only 
 challenged, but has disappeared. Of late years, fostered by 
 protection, Germany and the United States have been rapidly 
 out-distancing and superseding England in commerce and 
 trade.* — (b) That, thanks to protection, they not only succeed 
 in keeping their home markets, but in increasing their 
 exports ; we neither guard our home markets nor increase 
 our exports.* — (c) That we are no longer the workshop of 
 the world. Nations which used to receive our goods are 
 now our rivals, not only in neutral, but in our own 
 markets. Instead of their buying manufactured goods of 
 us, we buy of them. We send them less and less of our 
 manufactured goods, they send us more and more of theirs.* 
 
 10. (a) That while the export trade of the chief pro- 
 tectionist countries is on the up-grade, our export trade is 
 on the down-grade.t — (b) That with the extension of the 
 trade of the world our trade ought to have largely expanded, 
 while at the best it has remained stagnant and stationary. 
 
 11. («) That our staple industries especially are waning. J 
 
 * See Retaliation. ■ t See Appendix III., Nos. 5 and 7. 
 
 X See Appendix III., No. 5.
 
 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 (i.) Looking to the vastly increased world demand for Iron 
 and Steel — for ships, railways, bridges, buildings, &c. — our 
 steel and iron industries should be making rapid headway. 
 But, on the contrary, the exports of these goods show an 
 almost continuous decline, while the imports of these articles 
 of foreign manufacture show a steady increase;* (ii.) That 
 it is notorious that Public Bodies, Eailway Companies, &c., 
 are increasingly induced to obtain their electric plant, 
 bridge work, rails, etc., from abroad, where they obtain 
 them better and cheaper than at home ; (iii.) That, as 
 regards Textiles, here again the English trade does not 
 obtain its share in the increasing consumption, while the chief 
 falling off in export has been in the most highly-finished 
 goods ; (iv.) That the Silk trade has been almost entirely 
 destroyed by the competition of foreign protected silks.* 
 
 12. That the highly protective America tariff has literally 
 killed some of our trades — such as the tin-plate trade — 
 which depended on the American market. 
 
 13. (a) That, thanks to free trade, the state of agri- 
 culture — still our largest industry — is disastrous to the 
 country economically, morally, and physically. — (b) That 
 our dependence on foreign food supplies would be a serious 
 national danger in time of war. 
 
 14. (a) That the Home Trade is the really important 
 trade, and any displacement of home products by foreign 
 products constitutes a dead loss to the country, in profit 
 and employment. — (b) That under our system of free 
 imports, manufactured goods, which could be satisfactorily 
 produced in England, are allowed to flood the home 
 market, in constantly increasing quantities,! thus ousting 
 our home industries, ruining our manufactures, and de- 
 priving the working-men of work and wages. | — (c) That, 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 5. t See Appendix III., Nos. 5 and 7. 
 
 i See Eetaliation.
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 with very few exceptions (some "fancy" wares), all these 
 imported goods could be produced, and equally well made, 
 at home ; and their production abroad is a dead loss to this 
 country. — {d) That in many trades the import of semi-manu- 
 factured articles is superseding that of the raw material, and 
 thus less employment and less profit ensues. 
 
 15. («) That the occupation of the working-man is 
 going, and with it his income. — (&) That not only is 
 labour displaced, but the community has cast upon it 
 the burden of the maintenance of the men thus thrown 
 out of employment. — (c) That it would be better for the 
 working-men (as well as for the community) to have to 
 pay something more for his articles of consumption, and to 
 receive compensation in increased wages and employment, 
 and protection against the competition of cheap foreign 
 labour. — {d) That wages in Germany have increased under 
 protection, and in the United States are very high.* 
 
 16. (a) That, under free trade, one-fourth of the whole 
 population are always on the verge of starvation ; a number 
 that is continually being recruited in consequence of the 
 gradual disappearance of profitable industries. — {h) That if 
 it be true that the physique of the population be deteriorated, 
 it must be in consequence of free trade, under which the 
 existing population has grown up. 
 
 17. That the greatest boon that could be conferred upon 
 the working people of this country would be such a fiscal 
 reform as would ensure to every industrious man full and 
 constant employment at fair wages; and this can only be 
 obtained under protection. 
 
 18. {a) That the displacement of British manufactured 
 goods by foreign goods in the home market has made rapid 
 and disquieting progress of late years.f — (h) That much of 
 
 * For the Wages question, see Blue Book, Cd. 1761, pp. 259-293, etc 
 t See Section on Retnliation, and Appendix III,, Nos. 5 and 7.
 
 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 this is due to the "dumping" of goods below cost price, 
 with which it is impossible for the home producer to 
 compete. — (c) That, up to now, the United States manu- 
 facturer has been chiefly occupied in driving the foreign 
 manufacturer out of the American market. This accom- 
 plished, he will be in a position, and intends to flood our 
 unprotected market with his goods. 
 
 19. (a) That, on all hands, our industries are gradually 
 and surely being undersold and destroyed ; when once 
 destroyed, they can never be revived. — (&) That under our 
 policy of free trade, such industries as remain to us are 
 impoverished, unprofitable, out of date, or are becoming ex- 
 tinguished. — (c) That, at the same time, no new trade or 
 industry has been started or developed in England during 
 the last twenty years ; and no new inventions introduced. 
 
 20. That the state of trade competition makes it clear 
 that protectionist nations can manufacture at a lower 
 rate for exportation than a free trade nation. 
 
 21. (a) That commercial energy, enterprise, and inven- 
 tion must be founded on some likelihood of an extended 
 market and an adequate return. The system of free trade 
 discourages the investment of capital, destroys enterprise, 
 prevents energy, checks invention, and offers no incentive 
 to improvement. — (b) That the protected manufacturer 
 can produce his goods at a cheaper rate than his free 
 trade rival, and is therefore underselling him, not only in 
 neutral, but in his home market ; and not only in special 
 articles, but in articles of every class. — (c) That it is not 
 merely a few individuals who are crushed out, but whole 
 trades are extinguished. 
 
 22. (a) That the cost of production, which formerly 
 depended on the cost of the material, the cost of labour, 
 and the working expenses, now depends, in most trades, 
 chiefly on the quantity produced. The larger the out-put,
 
 PROTECTION 
 
 the cheaper the cost of production of the article produced.* — 
 (h) That therefore cheapness depends on quantity, quantity 
 depends on demand, and demand depends on the markets 
 open to the producer. The protected manufacturer, with 
 two markets at his disposal, can manufacture larger quan- 
 tities at cheaper rates than his free trade competitor, who 
 has only one available market. 
 
 23. (a) That a manufacturer, in a protected country, 
 desiring to enlarge his business or to create a new industry, 
 is assured of the home market against foreign competition, 
 while he also has at his disposal the English market, free 
 of any taxation. His English rival has no reasonable 
 certainty or security of his own home market (which is open 
 equally to his protected competitor), and he is excluded 
 from, or handicapped in, the foreign market. — (&) That thus 
 the protected manufacturer is able, first, by a large out-put, 
 which reduces the cost of production, and secondly, by selling 
 in his home market at non-competitive prices,! to dispose of 
 the balance of his stock in the English market at a price at 
 which his free trade competitor cannot make a profit. 
 
 24. (a) That thus the insecurity due to the existence 
 of free trade fatally handicaps the home manufacturer, 
 and necessarily destroys confidence and security, energy 
 and enterprise. — (b) That protection, on the other hand, 
 gives security, reduces the risks of manufacturing, en- 
 courages new industries and inventions, promotes enter- 
 
 * I.e. an article manufactured by the hundred might cost 2d apiece to 
 produce ; if manufactured by the hundred gross, it might be produced at 
 a cost of only a halfpenny. 
 
 t This, it is also argued, is no hardship to his compatriot, the home 
 consumer, who has to pay dear for the article in order that it may be sold 
 cheaply abroad. If there were not the free trade market for the manufacturer 
 to fall back upon for his surplus stock, he would not be able to produce the 
 article so cheaply ; the hom« consumer would therefore have, in any case, to 
 pay as much, or even more- than he does now for it, while less cajiital would 
 be used and employment given in the country itself.
 
 10 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 prise, and evokes energy, and offers advantageous 
 conditions to the producer which enable him to cheapen 
 the cost of production. 
 
 25. That in consequence of the constant changes (usually 
 for the worse) in the protective tariffs of other nations, and 
 the unfair competition which cannot be anticipated due to 
 " dumping," British trade has no stability nor certainty, but 
 is subject to unforeseen and disastrous disturbances. 
 
 26. That it is a total fallacy to suppose that a manu- 
 facturer, driven by undue competition out of one trade, can 
 turn his knowledge, industry, and capital into a new channel. 
 On the contrary, the particular trade is destroyed, and with 
 it the capital and the employment it gave, and there is 
 nothing to take its place.* 
 
 27. That as regards our Colonies and Dependencies, we 
 are losing our commercial connection and hold over them. 
 Instead of trade following the flag, the flag is followed by 
 foreign trade ; we make the sacrifice, the foreigner reaps the 
 benefit.! 
 
 28. That the only way to resist foreign competition is by 
 Protection — there is no half-way house. 
 
 29. {a) That it is the duty of the State to foster and 
 develop the prosperity of its citizens, commercially as well 
 as otherwise. — (b) That it is the business of the State to 
 find out which industries, either existing or nascent, are 
 injured by foreign competition, and then to give them 
 protection. — (c) That, under a system of reciprocity, only 
 those industries would be assisted which were indigenous 
 
 * The particular case of Coventry is often instanced by the free trader as 
 a case in which one industry (silk and ribbon) which gradually ceased to be 
 profitably worked, has been superseded by another, the manufacture of 
 bicycles. The Protectionist argues that the destruction of the one trade was 
 not necessary to the growth of the other, and that there is no reason why 
 both trades should not have flourished together if the silk trade had been 
 protected from foreign competition. 
 
 t See Preference,
 
 PROTECTION 11 
 
 to the soil, and which had shown that with fair treatment 
 they could hold their own. 
 
 30. («) That in consequence of our free trade policy, the 
 manufacturer and producer are disappearing, and we are 
 becoming simply a nation of middlemen and consumers. 
 Such a state of things cannot last. We cannot continue to 
 buy or to handle if we do not continue to produce and to 
 sell. — (b) That, as regards the consumer, free trade means, in 
 the end, not cheapness but dearness. The foreign protected 
 producer may undersell at first (perhaps at even a loss to 
 himself), with a view of killing his free trade rivals and mono- 
 polising the trade. This accomplished, prices are raised. — 
 (c) That the welfare of the consumer is bound up with that 
 of the producer ; the purchasing power of the former depends 
 entirely on the continuance of profitable industries at home. 
 The disappearance of the producer would ruin the country. 
 Most men are actual producers as well as consumers, while 
 those alone who are consumers and not producers would 
 suffer without compensating gain from protective duties ; and 
 such persons are of little value to the country. 
 
 31. That the import duties are only paid for by the con- 
 sumer when there is no competing home industry ; where 
 such exists, the duty cannot be added to the price, but is 
 paid by the foreign importer.* 
 
 32. {a) That if protection raised prices, and increased 
 the cost of living (which is denied), profits, wages and 
 salaries would be proportionately increased, for the country 
 would be more prosperous. — (b) That with protection all 
 round, all industries would be benefited alike. 
 
 33. («) That a large revenue (paid by the foreign im- 
 porter) could be derived for the taxation of foreign imported 
 
 * For instance, it is argued that the corn duty of 1902 did not raise 
 the price of corn or of bread. But see for this, Bhie Book, Cd. 1761, 
 pp. 124-126.
 
 12 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 manufactures, now amounting to £100,000,000 a year;* and 
 this sum could go to the relief of taxation elsewhere. — 
 (b) That the protective duties would either diminish the 
 imports of foreign goods, and so advantage the home 
 indvistries ; or if foreign goods still come in, the taxpayer 
 would benefit by the revenue derived from them. 
 
 34. (a) That there would be no difficulty in drawing a 
 clear distinction between the fully manufactured imports 
 ready for immediate use, and the partly manufactured 
 articles which are subsequently worked up here. — (b) That 
 the former, as giving no employment to English capital and 
 labour, should be subjected to the highest duty. — (c) That, 
 even as regards the latter, as it would be better for the 
 country that all the stages of manufacture should be done 
 here, the partly manufactured articles should also be 
 subjected to a duty. 
 
 35. (a) That while it is admitted that an excess of imports 
 (the goods we buy) over exports (the goods we sell) is not 
 unsatisfactory, the enormous and increasing discrepancy 
 between them has increased alarmingly of late years.! The 
 adverse balance is so large, and so increasingly large, that, 
 making every allowance for shipping, profits, interest on 
 investments, &c., it is clear that we%are now selling less than 
 we are buying, and that we must be living on our capital. — 
 (h) That to the extent of our exports of coal (£27,000,000 in. 
 1902) we are consuming our natural capital. — (c) That con- 
 tinued consumption of capital implies ultimate bankruptcy. 
 
 36. (a) That a great distinction should be drawn between 
 competitive and non-competitive imports. — (b) That the first, 
 and non-competitive, phase of imports, that of raw material, 
 was wholly and universally beneficial. In the second phase, 
 when some imports, those of foodstuffs, began to be com- 
 petitive, they were still mainly beneficial, by cheapening 
 
 * See Appendix III., Xo. 4. t See Appendix, III. No. 2.
 
 PROTECTION 13 
 
 food, though, by depressing agriculture, partly destructive. 
 In the third and most dangerous] phase, competitive im- 
 ports in the form of finished goods have become mainly 
 destructive, and are only partly beneficial. 
 
 37. («) That it is a delusion to suppose that imports depend 
 on exports, or that the purchase of the goods of a particular 
 nation must necessarily lead to a corresponding purchase by 
 it of our goods. The trade returns show that there is no 
 relation between the two. — (6) That in the case of the United 
 States, the disproportion, and the increasing disproportion, 
 between our purchases from her, and her sales to us, is so 
 great that we must be rapidly becoming her debtor.* 
 
 38. That there need be no fear of retaliation on the part 
 of the foreigner. Everything that could be done to cripple 
 our export trade has already been done ; while our imposi- 
 tion of protective duties could be used as a lever wherewith 
 to obtain better terms from the foreign protective country.! 
 
 39. That a policy of taxation of manufactured goods is 
 not inconsistent with a policy of free imports — namely, the 
 free entry of food and raw material, neither of which (under 
 Protection) it is proposed to tax. 
 
 40. That as our manufacturers are hampered by Factory 
 Acts, Mines Acts, Merchant Shipping Acts, &c., burdened 
 by heavy rates and taxes, &c., they cannot, without the help 
 of partial protection, successfully compete with those of other 
 nations ; and as these restrictive laws have been imposed 
 upon them by the legislature, they may fairly ask for 
 compensating protective assistance. 
 
 41. That improved technical, commercial, or other educa- 
 tion is no advantage to the community, if there are no trades 
 
 * The value of our total exports to the United States in 1890 was 
 £46,300,000; in 1901, £37,600,000; in 1902, £43,000,000. The imports 
 from the States were £97,300 000 in 1890, £141,000,000 in 1901, and 
 £127,000,000 in 1902. 
 
 t See Retaliation.
 
 14 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 left to learn nor to conduct : the question is economic, not 
 educational. 
 
 On the other hand, the imposition of Protective 
 Duties is opposed on the grounds : — 
 
 1. That protectionist England, fifty years ago, was in the 
 last throes of industrial and agricultural depression. Trade 
 was declining, profits dwindling, the people were in distress, 
 pauperism and crime were increasing, discontent was ram- 
 pant, the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. 
 
 2. That though, no doubt, invention, railways, gold 
 discoveries, &c., stimulated our trade, it was the adoption 
 of free trade which initiated our prosperity ; and each 
 successive repeal of import duties has been followed by a 
 further expansion of commerce. 
 
 3. (a) That there are no signs of incipient decay in our 
 industries, commerce, or shipping. No reason exists for 
 resorting to drastic remedies. The trade of the country 
 must be taken as a whole, and not merely inevitable fluc- 
 tuations in particular industries. The British external trade 
 of last year was the largest volume of trade ever trans- 
 acted by any country in the world, — namely, £877,000,000, 
 or £20, 18s. 5d. per head of the population.* — (b) That our 
 export trade of manufactured goods is twice as great per 
 head as that of Germany, and six times as great per head 
 as that of the United States.f 
 
 4. That too much stress is laid on the question of our 
 external trade, which probably represents not more than 
 ten per cent, of the whole volume of our home trade. The 
 home trade is in a flourishing condition, 
 
 5. That all returns, whether of income-tax, death duties, 
 Savings Bank deposits, railway receipts, employment, pauper- 
 ism, &c., show a progressive increase in the wealth and pros- 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 2. t See Appendix III., No. 7.
 
 PROTECTION 15 
 
 perity of the country.* — (c) That the shipping trade of the 
 country, both actually and relatively to that of other nations, 
 shows an increase of tonnage and clearings.* — {d) That there is 
 no diminution, but a continuous increase, in the imports of 
 the raw materials of manufactures t — a proof that there is 
 no falling off in the total amount of manufactures ; and 
 that the home consumption more than makes up for any 
 slackening in the foreign demand. 
 
 6. {a) That, deplorable as is the poverty that still exists 
 among us, the poverty in protectionist countries is far greater, 
 and the standard of living far lower. We are, on the whole, 
 the best fed, the most regularly employed, and the most highly 
 paid people in Europe. | — (6) That the rate of wages is lower, 
 the hours longer, and the conditions of labour worse in pro- 
 tectionist Germany than in free trade England.;]: — (c) That 
 in the United States, while wages are, on the whole, higher, 
 the strain of work is greater, and the cost of living much 
 higher. 
 
 7. That twenty years ago, when the last protectionist 
 epidemic occurred, similar doleful apprehensions prevailed. 
 Our trade, it was alleged, was going from bad to worse, 
 and the excess of imports spelt speedy ruin. These pre- 
 dictions have been entirely falsified ; trade, incomes, wages, 
 have all expanded, and instead of living on our capital, we 
 have been increasing it.§ 
 
 8. (a) That while, no doubt, in aggregate value our foreign 
 trade has not greatly progressed of late years, this is due to the 
 great fall in prices all the world over, in the last thirty years. Ii 
 Our out-put and consequent employment have largely and 
 progressively increased ; and if prices and profits have been 
 lower, trade has been steadier and less fluctuating. 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 1, and Cd. 1761. t See Appendix III., No. 6. 
 X For the Food and Wages qiiestion, see especially tlie interesting tables 
 iu Blue Book, Cd. 1761, pp. 209-258, and 259-293. 
 
 § See Appendix III., No. 1. || See Appendix III., No. 3.
 
 16 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 9. (a) That whether the adoption of free trade was right 
 or not, this country, highly organised and densely populated, 
 has grown up under commercial and social conditions founded 
 on a system of free imports, and any tampering with these 
 conditions would be disastrous. — (b) That, desirable as was 
 a free trade system fifty years ago, to-day it is essential. 
 Not to have chosen the path of free trade fifty years ago 
 would have been a pity ; to abandon it to-day would be a 
 calamity and a disaster. 
 
 10. That it was not to be expected that, as time went on, 
 and other nations developed, we should be able to retain 
 our relative commercial supremacy. Foreign production and 
 international competition was bound to increase. But this 
 competition is due to many causes other than fiscal. Our 
 free trade system enabled us the longer to maintain the 
 lead, and now best enables us to profit from the prosperity 
 of other nations. 
 
 11. (a) That our two greatest commercial rivals, 
 Germany and the United States, while in a sense protec- 
 tionist, are largely free trade countries. They have partial 
 protection applicable to comparatively small parts of their 
 total industries, but the rule is free trade. — (&) That Ger- 
 many, by its ZoUverein, has established complete free trade 
 among its 58,000,000 of inhabitants, while only a certain 
 number of its industries are "protected." — (c) That the 
 commercial prosperity of America is largely due to the 
 fact that she has within her borders complete free trade. 
 Her inter-State commerce to-day, among a community of 
 80,000,000 of people, is the largest trade carried on anywhere 
 under conditions of absolute free trade ; while, moreover, 
 the protected industries do not employ more than a fraction 
 of the occupied population. — (d) That it is this, and her great 
 natural and commercial advantages,* which, in spite of her 
 
 * The area of the United States is as great as that of Europe proper. New 
 York State alone has an area equal to that of the United Kingdom. 
 
 i
 
 PROTECTION 17 
 
 protective system, has made the United States so prosperous. 
 The most fatally false fiscal system would do no more than 
 delay her progress, 
 
 12. That the limits of a Kingdom are equally artificial 
 with those of an internal State. If the principle of protection 
 be advantageous, the United States and Germany would have 
 each been more prosperous if they had enjoyed protection 
 between the various States that go to make up their respec- 
 tive ZoUvereins. But admittedly their internal free trade 
 has been enormously to their economic advantage. 
 
 13. (a) That the commercial expansion of Germany and 
 of the United States is mainly due to their system of scientific 
 and technical education, to superior trade and economic 
 methods, to adaptability, energy, and perseverance. — (h) That 
 British manufacturers should " wake up." They are too much 
 inclined to rest on the success of past years when international 
 competition was far less, instead of adapting themselves, like 
 their rivals in trade, to the requirements of the day and the 
 needs of their customers. 
 
 14. (a) That protectionist countries complain greatly of 
 our competition ; are more afraid of us than we are of them, 
 and endeavour to protect themselves still further against 
 us. — (b) That, in spite of protection, we are able, thanks 
 to our free trade, to send to protectionist countries in every 
 instance, and in the aggregate, a far greater amount of 
 manufactures than they send to us. 
 
 15. (a) That free trade is founded on the principle of 
 non-interference with producer and consumer, taxation for 
 revenue purposes only, and simplification of the tariff. — (b) 
 That free trade, by allowing each country to produce that 
 which it can most easily produce or manufacture, promotes 
 division of labour and economy, in their best and most 
 extended sense. — (c) That the fewer the obstacles in the 
 way of trade, the better will it flourish ; capital and labour, 
 
 B
 
 18 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 if let alone and unfettered, will find out the most profitable 
 fields for investment. — (d) That some industries can no doubt 
 be fostered and developed by protection, but only at the ex- 
 pense of all other industries. 
 
 16. That Free Trade widens the circle of exchange ; 
 and the possibilities of economic advantage increases as it 
 widens. Mutual wants are developed that can only be 
 satisfied by exchange of goods. A " self-contained " country 
 must forego many of the necessities and the comforts of life. 
 
 17. (a) That the extension of the area and sources of 
 supply and of exchange are the best preventive to any far- 
 reaching collapse of trade and industry. — (b) That, thanks 
 to free trade, there are a greater variety of trades and in- 
 dustries in England than in any other country. 
 
 18. That free trade gives stability and certainty to a 
 trade. Protective tariffs can be and are continually being 
 altered, giving rise to disturbance and uncertainty. 
 
 19. That protection tends either to over-production or to 
 the creation of a monopoly — both economically an evil. 
 
 20. (a) That free trade is in itself a good thing, even if 
 rejected by other nations. Though, undoubtedly, the pro- 
 tective system adopted by other nations injures our inter- 
 national trade, it would be still more injured and curtailed 
 if we also adopted a system of protective tariffs, and erected 
 barriers at the other end of the bridge as well. — (h) That we 
 admit the goods of other nations free, for our benefit, and 
 not for theirs. The act of trading is a purely voluntary 
 one, and would not take place if it did not suit both 
 parties. Each side expects to make a profit ; and if we 
 make our profit, it cannot injure us if the other side also 
 makes a profit. — (c) That the imposition of protective 
 duties would seriously diminish the volume of the trade 
 of the world ; and we, more than any other nation, are 
 interested in its expansion ; the increasing wealth of other
 
 PROTECTION 19 
 
 nations is to our advantage. Our principal rivals are our 
 best customers. — {d) That free trade enables us to purchase 
 in the cheapest, and sell in the dearest market ; and any 
 restrictions must alter this for the worse. 
 
 21. {a) That the imposition by us of protective duties 
 would reduce our imports — i.e. our purchases — and by the 
 amount of that reduction would the power of other nations 
 to take our exports — i.e. our sales — be diminished. If they 
 cannot sell to us, they will not have the where- with-all to 
 buy from us ; exports largely depend on imports. — {li) That 
 our introduction of protective duties would be met by the 
 imposition of still higher duties abroad ; and trade on both 
 sides would be still further dislocated and diminished. 
 
 22. {a) That, under free trade, London has become the 
 banking, the financial centre, and the clearing-house of 
 the world. — (b) That a large trade of imports as well as ex- 
 ports has enormously developed the shipping and carrying 
 trade, by enabling it to be conducted cheaply and profitably ; 
 the shipowner is certain of obtaining a return cargo. We 
 have become the carriers of the world. — (c) That, owing to 
 the system of free imports, Britain has become an important 
 centre for the distribution of the produce of other countries, 
 which she sells along with her own. 
 
 23. {a) That the tariff could, no doubt, be made to 
 "protect " in the home markets. But it would not avail us 
 in the neutral or protective markets. On the contrary, free 
 trade, by enabling us to produce cheaply, enables us to com- 
 pete better. Protection, by increasing the cost of production, 
 and by raising all round the price at which goods could be 
 profitably sold, would diminish our powers of competition, 
 and therefore our trade in all foreign markets, whether pro- 
 tective or neutral. — (&) That the chief falling off in our 
 exports is to the United States, consequent on its heavy 
 Protective duties, and they have unquestionably injured
 
 20 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 various branches of our trade. But the grant of protective 
 duties to these industries would not help them to compete 
 better in the American market.* 
 
 24. That if we have a difficulty now in maintaining our 
 commercial position, we should maintain it with still greater 
 difficulty if we threw further obstacles in the way of the 
 extension of trade, or further handicapped our powers of 
 competition. If we are badly off under free trade, we 
 should be much worse off under protection. 
 
 25. (a) That protection does not create capital, nor trade, 
 nor markets, nor add to the sum-total of production ; all it 
 can do is to displace and divert capital and labour from one 
 industry to another. — (h) That it is a fallacy to suppose that 
 there is an unlimited supply of labour, and especially of 
 skilled labour, in the country, or that we can do everything 
 at once. — (c) That, therefore, a new trade is not worth 
 creating unless it is a more profitable trade than the one 
 it displaces. 
 
 26. (a) That it would be impossible justly to decide 
 which particular industry should be selected for protec- 
 tion ; and pressure, wire-pulling, and corruption would be 
 rampant. — (b) That, under protection, the general interest 
 is left out of account. In the United States, the capitalists 
 and protected manufacturers spend millions at the elections, 
 dictate to a considerable extent the nomination of members 
 of Congress, control its actions, own the great newspapers, 
 purchase favourable legislation, and debauch the people. — 
 (c) That free trade has done much to maintain a high 
 standard and absolute purity in the British Government, 
 House of Commons, and Civil Service. 
 
 27. (a) That only a limited number of trades and in- 
 dustries could possibly benefit from protection, nor, indeed, 
 be protected. The great export trades in cotton, woollens, 
 steel, iron, &c., would not be assisted by protection. — 
 
 * See Retaliation, and Appendix HI., No. 13,
 
 PROTECTION 21 
 
 (h) That a vast number of home industries are unassailable 
 by foreign competition, and do not therefore require to be 
 protected. — (c) That the most that could be done would be 
 to protect some home industries at the expense of all the 
 other industries ; for the cost of production of all industries 
 would be increased. 
 
 28. That it would be impossible, however, to protect one 
 branch of manufacture or industry without assisting all. 
 Each has as good a claim to protection as another, and would 
 not rest content to see others protected at its expense, whilst 
 obtaining no advantage itself. 
 
 29. That though, at the moment of imposition, protective 
 duties might benefit the particular manufacturer, the inevit- 
 able rise in the price of all commodities would soon make 
 them worse off than before. 
 
 30. That the artificial fiscal assistance given to one class 
 of the community would be given at the expense of all other 
 classes. As the object of protection is to enable the parti- 
 cular home producer to obtain a higher price, the consumer 
 would have to pay more for his purchases, inasmuch as the 
 price of imported goods would be enhanced by the duty, and 
 more than the duty ; while the price of similar goods pro- 
 duced at home would be correspondingly raised.* 
 
 31. {a) That protective import duties are paid by the 
 importing consumer, not by the exporting producer.! — 
 (6) That the more the consumer has to pay for his goods, the 
 less he has to spend on other things, and therefore the less 
 the demand for commodities as a whole. 
 
 32. (a) That all the classes in the community dependent 
 on non-competitive trades — building trade, railways, &c. — 
 or receiving fixed incomes or salaries — professional men, 
 clerks, servants, employees, &c. — while suffering from the 
 increased cost of living, could gain no corresponding 
 
 * See Preference, against, No. 35. 
 
 t See as to a corn duty Blue Book Cd. 1761, pp. 124-126.
 
 22 TARIFF GRANGES 
 
 benefit. — (h) That even if working-men obtained more 
 employment (which is denied) and higher wages (which is 
 also denied) in consequence of protection, they would be 
 none the better off — the price of commodities would rise in 
 a still greater ratio, and the purchasing power of their wages 
 would be diminished.* 
 
 33. (a) That the most vigorous, healthy, and profitable 
 trades do not require protection, and would be injured by 
 it. State assistance (at the expense of the community 
 and of other trades) would be chiefly invoked to bolster up 
 the least efficient and worst equipped branches of trade ; 
 industries which would not naturally flourish, and the capital 
 invested in which could be better employed in some other 
 way. — (b) That trade that cannot maintain its existence 
 without State assistance is not sufficiently advantageous to 
 the country to be worth protecting. 
 
 34. That a trade which is unsuitable, and cannot hold its 
 own, does not suddenly disappear, throwing a large number 
 of men out of work, but gradually shrinks and decays, giving 
 time and opportunity to labour and capital to transfer them- 
 selves to another industry. 
 
 35. (a) That a free market and open competition is 
 stimulating, invigorating, and productive; while State pro- 
 tection is enervating and deteriorating. — (b) That in the 
 old days of protection, it was the most protected trades, 
 such as the silk trade and the woollen trade, &c., which 
 suffered most from vicissitudes and from depression. — 
 (c) That freedom of enterprise and cheapness of production 
 has induced and enabled many of the trades most injured by 
 protective duties to seek and to find better markets else- 
 where. — (d) That some trades, the iron trade especially, are 
 continually passing through natural crises owing to the 
 replacement of old processes for new. These improvements 
 and developments would be hampered and delayed under 
 
 * See Preference, against, Nos. 37-42.
 
 PROTECTION 23 
 
 protection, and the British manufacturer would be less able 
 to compete with his foreign rival. 
 
 36. (a) That protective duties, once imposed, could never 
 be repealed ; and, however moderate at first, would infallibly 
 be increased. The industry, enervated by protection, would 
 be less able to stand against foreign competition ; and (as 
 seen abroad) would be ever clamouring for, and receiving, 
 greater protection at the expense of the community ; while 
 vested interests would be created, and grow stronger every 
 year. — (h) That the producer would depend on Parliament 
 for his profits rather than on his own industry. 
 
 37. («) That in Germany protection has created Syndi- 
 cates and Cartels, and has increased Socialism to an alarm- 
 ing extent. In America it has produced and fostered Trusts, 
 Eings, and multi-millionaires. — (h) That Trusts, Syndicates, 
 and Combines are only possible, on a large scale, when they 
 are free from foreign competition. They flourish under pro- 
 tection and retaliation, not under free trade. — (c) That if 
 the foreign competitors were withdrawn or reduced in con- 
 sequence of protection, Eings and Trusts would be formed, 
 which would force up the home price of articles used in 
 manufacture or in shipbuilding, &c., greatly to the detriment 
 of these industries, and to trade generally. 
 
 38. (a) That the excess in the value of our imports (the 
 goods that we buy) over our exports (the goods that we sell), 
 indexes our accumulated wealth and our profitable foreign 
 trade.* It does not in any way show that our expenditure 
 exceeds our income.! — (b) That the excess balance is due (i.) 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 2, and Cd. 1761, p. 102. 
 
 t A sample imaginary ease vd\l illustrate the point. Woollen goods to 
 the vahie of £1000 are exported to the Argentina, and appear as £1000 in the 
 export tables. The freight (paid to an English shipowner) is, say, £50, and, 
 including this, the goods are sold in Buenos Ayres at a profit of £100. "With 
 the £11.')0 he has thus received, the merchant buys £1150 of wheat, and brings 
 it to England. The freight is, say, £60, and this is added to the value of the 
 wheat when declared an importation here. Thus, declared exports, £1000, 
 declared imports, £1210, excess of imports, £210, and this ou a transaction 
 that is clearly advantageous to this country.
 
 24 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 to the interest on our foreign investments, and (ii.) to the 
 profits on our trading, shipping, insurance, etc.* — (c) That 
 trade is in essence merely barter, the exchange of goods 
 against goods. Money is merely a go-between; a useful 
 common denominator, but goods are not paid for in gold. 
 Imports are paid for by exports. — (d) That our exports are 
 the sacrifice we make (the goods we give), the imports the 
 reward (the goods) we receive ; and on balance there is a 
 large gain ; unless this were so, we should be impoverished 
 instead of being enriched by our foreign trade. That the 
 greater the amount of exchange, the greater the gain. 
 Diminish the imports, and the exports will be affected. 
 It is the volume of trade, not specially the amount of the 
 exports, that is the true test of trade prosperity. 
 
 39. (a) That clearly we are not living on our capital. The 
 whole income-tax returns, and the estimated income derived 
 from foreign investments, prove that both our home and 
 foreign investments are increasing, and not diminishing.f — 
 (b) That the export of coal is no more the export of capital 
 than is the export of articles which consume coal in their 
 manufacture. Further, coal is of no value unless worked 
 and sold ; operations which imply employment, conveyance, 
 handling, and which increase the wealth and capital of the 
 country. 
 
 40. (a) That the practical difficulties in the way of 
 imposing protective duties are very great ; such imposi- 
 tion would be fiscally, financially, and commercially inex- 
 pedient. — (h) That the imposition of manifold protective 
 duties would necessitate a complicated and elaborate 
 tariff, which would involve great expense and loss of time, 
 harassing fiscal regulations, and impediments to trade, in 
 declaration, examination, and handling of goods ; would 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 1. In Cd. 1761, pp. 101-103, (i.) is officially 
 estimated at 60 to 70 millions, and (ii. ) at 90 millions, 
 t See Appendix III., No. 1.
 
 PROTECTION 25 
 
 involve an army of officials and custom-house officers, 
 and would lead to the recrudescence of smuggling. 
 
 41. (a) That it is not proposed, for purely protective pur- 
 poses, to levy a duty on Articles of Food (including articles 
 of consumption already highly taxed, like tea, tobacco, sugar, 
 wines, spirits, etc.), amounting in all to £230,000,000. — 
 (6) That it is generally agreed that the Baw Material of 
 Manufacture, amounting to £180,000,000, must not be sub- 
 jected to a duty ; for such a tax would greatly injure our 
 own manufacturers. — (c) That these two items (taking the 
 total imports at £530,000,000) make up four-fifths of the 
 whole imports.* 
 
 42. {a) That the balance of about £120,000,000 consists of 
 Manufactured articles and Semi-manufactured articles. But 
 these last, amounting to £30,000,000, are the raw material 
 of finished manufacture, which it would be inexpedient to 
 tax. ■ Thus is left a total trade in " manufactured " articles of 
 some £90,000,000 at the most against which protective 
 duties might be levied. — {h) That much of this total consists, 
 however, of " fancy goods," which do not really compete with 
 home industries,! or which would only be bought if of foreign 
 make. Of the balance, few articles are of such a character, 
 or imported to such an amount, as would either repay the 
 imposition of a duty, or give protection. | (c) That, further, 
 much of the so-called " manufactured articles " really con- 
 stitute the raw material for divers home industries ; and its 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 4. 
 
 t Such as china, artificial flowers, pigments, marbles, toys, drugs, 
 musical instruments, embroidery, pictures, &c. Taxation on these or 
 similar articles would only bring in a few thousand pounds to the Ex- 
 chequer. 
 
 X The only finished manufactures imported to any substantial amount are 
 as follows : — Silk goods, thirteen millions ; woollen goods, nine millions ; 
 iron and steel goods (including machinery), nine millions ; cotton goods, 
 four and three-quarter millions ; glass, three millions and a half ; gloves, 
 one and three-quarter millions ; and lace, two millions. Considerably under 
 fifty millions sterling in all. Of these, moreover, silk, gloves, and lace are 
 foreign specialities. See Appendix III., No. 4.
 
 26 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 importation enables the British manufacturer to produce 
 at a cheaper rate, and therefore to compete better abroad. 
 No real dividing line can be drawn between the raw material 
 and the finished manufacture.* The finished article of one 
 branch of trade forms the raw material of another, and gives 
 rise to the further employment of capital and labour. 
 
 43. That the ramifications of trade are so diverse and 
 complicated, that the protective taxation of a particular 
 article, at a particular stage, while possibly benefiting (by 
 protection) one branch of trade, might, and probably would, 
 seriously injure another, and even more important branch of 
 trade. 
 
 44. That it would be madness to reverse our whole 
 commercial and fiscal system, and to disorganise our external 
 trade of between £800,000,000 and £900,000,000 for the 
 sake of attempting to tax, at the most, some £50,000,000 of 
 foreign maaufactures. 
 
 45. That it is a fallacy to suppose that, with pro- 
 tection, the home manufacturer, instead of the foreigner, 
 would supply the demand for the manufactured goods, now 
 imported, and that by that amount the home trade would 
 be increased. As the price of all manufactured articles 
 would be raised, less goods would be consumed at home ; 
 while as less goods would be bought from the foreigner, 
 by that much his demand for our goods would be reduced, 
 and our export trade would be diminished. Moreover, a 
 large portion of the manufactured imports are articles of 
 luxury or fancy make, such as could not be made in Eng- 
 land, or if of English make would not be bouglit. 
 
 46. (a) That our imposition of protective duties on 
 
 foreign goods would lead to retaliation on their part ; they 
 
 could injure us much more than we could injure them ; 
 
 * "What is raw material? Take the iron industry for instance. Pig 
 iron is raw material to the bloom-makers. Blooms, again, are raw material 
 to the bar-rollers, and bars, again, are raw material to sheet-rollers and wire- 
 drawers ; and, again, ^\•ire is raw material to the screw-makers, etc."
 
 PROTECTION 27 
 
 while the mutual retaliation would seriously affect the 
 volume of trade. — (h) That our exports of manufactured 
 goods on which protective duties could be placed vastly 
 exceed the imports of manufactured goods against which 
 we could impose protective duties. Thus our powers of 
 attack, as compared to the power of retaliation, are out 
 of all proportion, making it practically impossible for us 
 successfully to retaliate on foreign countries.* — (c) That, 
 with the single exception of France, we export to every 
 protectionist country a greater amount of manufactured 
 goods than we import from them. 
 
 47. («) That protective duties, as a means of raising 
 revenue, are hurtful and unsatisfactory. The cost to the 
 consumer of the whole supply of the article taxed, whether 
 home, colonial, or foreign, is raised by the amount of the 
 tax, while revenue is received only from that portion of 
 the article which is imported from abroad.! — (b) That so 
 far as the system of protective duties was effective, we 
 should get neither goods nor revenue ; both tax-payer and 
 consumer would lose. 
 
 48. That it is perfectly compatible with real free trade 
 to impose import duties for revenue purposes only (i.) By 
 levying import duties on certain articles not produced at 
 home, and therefore not competing with home produce or 
 manufactures ; (ii.) by levying a custom duty equal to the 
 excise duty imposed on articles of domestic production, 
 or vice versd. 
 
 49. (By some.) That the present system of partial 
 free trade is, on the whole, beneficial to England, especi- 
 ally in regard to the United States of America. If America 
 were not handicapped by her protective system, she would 
 constitute a most formidable commercial rival to England. 
 
 * See Het.alidtion, against, Nos. 10, 14, and 15. 
 t See Prcferetice, against, No. 35.
 
 28 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 "EETALIATION" 
 
 It is proposed that we reassert our right, in carrying 
 out fiscal arrangements, or in negotiating Commercial 
 Treaties with other nations, to impose on the import of 
 their goods "retaliatory" duties, if they on their part — 
 
 (i.) Penalise the imports of Colonial produce 
 because the Colonies, or a particular Colony, has 
 granted to the Mother country, or has received from 
 her, preferential treatment. 
 
 (ii.) Will not give reciprocal or "fair" treat- 
 ment to the goods we export to them; or treat us 
 "with outrageous unfairness." 
 
 And (iii.) that such retaliatory action should 
 be more especially directed against the import of 
 foreign goods that are " dumped " here, i.e. that 
 are imported and sold here at a price below the 
 commercial cost of production. 
 
 The retaliatory duties would be maintained until 
 the foreign protective country agreed to our terms, 
 when they would be relinquished, and only held in 
 reserve."* 
 
 The arguments already given in favour of Pro- 
 tection for the most part a^^ply equally to the 
 question of Retaliation, 
 
 But the proposal is also upheld on the grounds : — 
 
 1. («) That free trade means the unrestricted interchange 
 of commodities at their natural price. — (b) That this principle 
 
 * No definite and specific scheme lias yet been formulated, or placed before 
 the country, whereby a general policy of Retaliation can be carried out.
 
 "RETALIATION" 29 
 
 is entirely abrogated as regards our exports to protective 
 countries, in consequence of the hostile, protective, or pro- 
 hibitory duties that they levy against our goods. — (c) That 
 the position has become generally worse, especially in the 
 last twenty years. Tariff walls have shut out our competi- 
 tion in protectionist countries, while free imports facilitate 
 the sale of their goods in this country. 
 
 2. («) That the form which protection has taken has 
 sensibly altered during recent years. Foreign countries no 
 longer restrict their activity to the protection of their own 
 market. They give a kind of protection which assumes an 
 offensive shape, and which leads to the invasion of the 
 markets of other countries by their highly-protected pro- 
 duce. — (b) That, sheltered by the constantly - increasing 
 tariffs, there have grown up in Europe and America huge 
 trade combinations, or huge trusts, which not only monopo- 
 lise the home market of their own country, but which stimu- 
 lates the production of vast quantities of goods which the 
 home market cannot absorb, and which are sold at very low 
 rates, in some cases below the cost price, in the markets of 
 other countries. — (c) That these transactions are rendered 
 possible by bounties, subsidies, relief from taxation, low 
 charges on freights, &c., given sometimes by the Government 
 itself, sometimes by trading associations. — (d) That the 
 foreign producer, having the monopoly of the protected 
 market, as well as free access to the English market here, 
 is able to produce on a large scale, and to keep his machinery 
 running full time, and thus to produce at a low price.* — (e) 
 That thus, in all these ways, the foreign producer is able to 
 export goods to this country at a price with which it is 
 hopeless for the home producer to attempt to compete. 
 
 3, (a) That, besides this, there is the unfair and illegiti- 
 mate competition of the foreign sweated industries, against 
 which the British manufacturer and the British workman 
 
 * See Protection, for, Nos. 22 and VJ3, .
 
 30 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 should be protected. — (h) That the British workman is pro- 
 tected against insanitary conditions and against sweating, by 
 Factory Acts ; and, by the operation of Trade Unions, the 
 "Fair Wages' Clause," &c., enjoys good wages and short 
 hours. This very protection, by increasing the cost of pro- 
 duction, tends to destroy British industries, unless it is sup- 
 plemented by protection against underpaid industry abroad. 
 If sweating is prohibited here, the produce of foreign sweated 
 labour should also be prohibited. 
 
 4. (a) That in all these instances there should be retalia- 
 tion, either by prohibition or by means of retaliatory import 
 duties, to counteract the illegitimate advantages enjoyed by 
 the foreign producer and importer ; and sufficient to place the 
 British producer and exporter on a fair competitive footing, 
 — (h) That each particular case must be judged by its merits, 
 and a decision come to as to how far, by means of cheap 
 labour, by actually maintaining a high price in the home 
 market, by bounties, subsidies, or trade combinations, &c., 
 the articles in question can be brought over here and sold at 
 a price below the fair cost of production. The retaliatory 
 tariff' would be based on these considerations. 
 
 5. That, more especially, should retaliation be directed 
 against the Syndicates, Trusts, Cartels, and Combines that 
 have sprung up so rapidly of late years, and which are 
 becoming increasingly formidable, by artificially and unduly 
 inflating or depressing prices, and by dislocating and dis- 
 organising the course of trade.! 
 
 t For instance, " Tlic syndicate of rail manufacturers sells rails in Germany 
 at 115 marks the ton and at 85 marks abroad ; sheet iron is sold at 125 marks 
 a ton in the home market and at 100 marks a ton on the foreign market ; the 
 Union of Nail Manufacturers sells its products at 250 marks a ton in Germany 
 and at 140 marks a ton abroad. The absurdity of the system in respect of 
 the home market was very well shown last year during the period of the 
 so-called ' coal famine,' when the price of pit coal in Germany rose to 18'50 
 marks the ton, while it was being at the same moment exported to Austria 
 at 8-80 marks a ton." — Lord Lansdowne, quoting Br Raffalovich, H, of L. , 
 15th June 1903.
 
 ''RETALIATION'' 31 
 
 6. (a) That we are entitled to demand reciprocity, i.e. 
 equal treatment on both sides, and this can only be obtained 
 by means of retaliation. — (&) That " Retaliation " in no way 
 implies " Protection." Reciprocity is the keystone to free 
 trade, and without it the latter cannot exist. The object of 
 retaliation is to extend the freedom of trade and of com- 
 merce, by forcing other nations to adopt the principle, or at 
 least to move in that direction. 
 
 7. {a) That the way to encourage freedom of trade is to 
 discourage high tariffs. This can only be done by negotia- 
 tion, and negotiation can only be effective if both sides have 
 something to give and something to withhold. Without 
 liberty to negotiate, and something to negotiate with, a good 
 bargain cannot be made. — (&) That the weapon of retaliation 
 is necessary in order to bring protectionist nations to their 
 senses, and to force them to come to terms. — (c) That Eng- 
 land, ■ in the process of adopting free trade, has gradually 
 stripped herself of the fiscal weapons by which alone the 
 war of tariffs can be fought. These she must resume, and 
 place at the disposal of the Government, in order to retain 
 freedom of negotiation, which means freedom of trade. 
 
 8. {a) That it is idle to expect other nations to modify 
 their policy, or to adopt the principle of low duties, unless 
 we retain in our hands the power, by retaliation, of forcing 
 them to adopt it, at least as regards our goods. — (6) That, if 
 they refused to come to terms, we should be able to continue 
 to tax or prohibit their goods so long as they taxed or 
 penalised ours. 
 
 9. (a) That though nominally we enjoy " most-favoured- 
 nation treatment," as a matter of fact, in consequence of our 
 being unable to negotiate on equal terms, the heaviest duties 
 are imposed on the goods imported from us, the lightest 
 duties are on the goods principally imported from other 
 protective (and retaliatory) countries. — {h) That this is more
 
 32 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 especially the case in regard to the more highly refined or 
 finished goods, which are the really profitable part of 
 manufacturing. 
 
 10. (a) That the imposition of reciprocal duties would 
 give us a leverage whereby we should be enabled to 
 negotiate fair Commercial Treaties with other countries ; be 
 saved from their hostile interference or caprice ; be less 
 dependent on them for our supplies of goods and food ; and, 
 in the long run, we should be buying in the cheapest market 
 and selling in the dearest. 
 
 11. (a) That, being as we are the one open market of 
 the world, we are the one " dumping " ground of the world ; 
 our isolated free trade position greatly aggravates the situa- 
 tion. — (b) That, thus, our one-side fiscal system greatly 
 handicaps our produce and manufactures, and renders fair 
 competition v/holly impossible, both in the home as well as 
 in foreign and neutral markets. 
 
 12. (a) That, British trade and commerce, which, if given 
 a fair field, is perfectly able to hold its own, is gradually 
 being ruined by illegitimate competition. — (b) That this is 
 more especially the case in regard to the oldest and most 
 important trades — the textile trade, and the iron and steel 
 trades — which are not only suffering in the matter of exports, 
 but which are severely hit by the foreign competitive 
 imports.* — (c) That "dumping" is especially prevalent in 
 the case of the iron and steel trades.* 
 
 13. (a) That the chief object of " dumping " is to capture 
 the British market by ruining the British producer. Once 
 captured, the prices would be put up to monopoly level. — (b) 
 That, therefore, while the consumer, or some producers, may 
 for the time being gain from " dumping," by being able to buy 
 their commodities artificially cheap, the result in the end, 
 when the competition is destroyed, will be that they will 
 
 * See Appeudi-x, No. III., Nos. 5 and 7,
 
 ''RETALIATION" 33 
 
 have to pay intiated prices. — (c) That auy present gain to 
 one home industry, due to " dumping," is more than counter- 
 balanced by loss and ruin to other home trades. And by the 
 time the " dumping " has served its purpose and prices are 
 again put up, the latter trades will have disappeared, while 
 the former trade, over-dependent on artificially cheap material 
 will find itself crippled. 
 
 14. That it is not an advantage that one particular home 
 industry, or one section of the community, should benefit at 
 the expense of others ; or that the workers in one trade 
 should work short time, in order that the workers in another 
 should earn higher wages. 
 
 15. That as the object of retaliation is to obtain a reduc- 
 tion in the protective duties, and fairer terms of competition, 
 a temporary loss (in consequence of the imposition of retalia- 
 tory duties) to a trade or to the consumer (even if it occurred) 
 would be more than offset by the future advantages to trade. 
 In such a matter as this, we may fairly do temporary damage 
 for permanent gain. 
 
 16. {a) That no war of tariffs or reprisals need be feared. 
 Ours is the " biggest revolver," and the foreign nations would 
 " come down " if we made it clear that we should not hesitate 
 to shoot.* — (b) That the protective duties of other countries 
 are already so high that they could not well be increased. 
 The war of tariffs exists, but at present it is all on one side. 
 
 17. {a) That if the Executive were entrusted with a 
 general power to retaliate where it was thought necessary, 
 or to negotiate on reciprocal terms, no action on their part 
 would probably be necessary ; the power and the threat 
 would be sufficient to ensure success. — (h) That even if it came 
 to a war of tariffs, we, possessing the largest trade, and being 
 in the strongest financial position, would come off victors. 
 
 18. (a) That, already, the first step in retaliation has been 
 
 * See Appendix III., Nos. 5 and 8.
 
 34 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 taken, and taken successfully, in regard to sugar. Our mere 
 threat to prohibit bounty-fed sugar was sufficient to bring 
 about a general International agreement to abolish the 
 bounties. — (b) That the principle can easily be extended to 
 coal, iron, textiles, and any other of our productions which 
 are unfairly treated. 
 
 19. (a) That if action became necessary, it would not be 
 difficult to decide what foreign import should be penalised, 
 and in what way, and how far this should be done, in order 
 to bring the foreign nation to its senses, and to place the 
 British competitor on equal terms. — (h) That the particular 
 home competitive industry would be benefited while the 
 protection lasted ; and would be permanently placed in a 
 satisfactory position when retaliation ceased, in consequence 
 of the protective country agreeing to our terms. 
 
 20. (a) That the United States are the greatest offenders, 
 and we could easily retaliate on her by heavily taxing her 
 imports, which amount to £127,000,000 a year, while our 
 imports to her only amount to £43,000,000 a year.* — 
 (b) That, moreover, our exports to the States consist largely 
 of articles of the nature of luxuries, which are so heavily 
 taxed that the duties could not easily be increased ; or, even 
 if they were, the demand would not be much affected. 
 
 21. That, as regards Germany, our greatest trade rival, 
 we import £34,000,000 from her, and export £33.000,000 
 to her. She is therefore as vulnerable as we are. 
 
 22. (a) That more especially must we retain in our hands 
 the power of retaliation against any foreign nation that seeks 
 to prevent the free exercise of the right of a British self- 
 governing Colony to enter into closer trade relations with 
 the mother country. The fiscal relations between the mother 
 country and the Colonies must be absolutely protected from 
 foreign interference, direct or indirect.* — (6) That we cannot 
 
 * But see Appendix III., No. 13, * See Preference,
 
 ''RETALIATION" 35 
 
 allow our Colonies to be treated by foreign nations as sepa- 
 rate entities, and not as integral parts of the Empire, simply 
 because we have given them self-government and fiscal 
 freedom. 
 
 23. (a) That unless we come effectually to the rescue of 
 the Colonies, and assert ourselves, there is an end to all hope 
 of closer fiscal union within the Empire. — (b) That, under 
 present conditions, we are in the humiliating position of 
 being absolutely helpless to protect Canada or the other 
 Colonies from hostile or discriminating attack. — (c) That the 
 German Government has penalised Canada's imports, on the 
 avowed ground of the preference she has given to goods 
 from the United Kingdom. In spite of repeated expostula- 
 tions, the German Government have maintained their hostile 
 reprisals, and also threaten further discrimination, not only 
 against Canada, but against every other Colony that follows 
 her example, and even against Great Britain herself if she 
 accepts these advantages to the detriment of German trade. 
 
 The arguments already given against Protection 
 mostly apply also to the question of Retaliation. 
 But the imposition of Retaliatory duties is also 
 opposed on the grounds : — 
 
 1. (a) That trade is not warfare, for which retaliating 
 " weapons " are required. Mutual trade is an advantage, 
 not an evil. It is a benefit to obtain goods as well as to sell 
 them ; and indeed, in the long run, the one cannot be 
 done without the other. — (b) That greatly to our own 
 advantage, England lias been, till now, the peaceful mart for 
 all goods from all the world. By entering into a war of 
 tariffs we should become a hostile and disturbing factor in 
 international trade. 
 
 2. (a) That the imposition of Retaliatory duties would
 
 36 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 result, not in greater freedom of trade and of commerce, but 
 in greater restrictions all round. Experience shows that 
 retaliation does not lead to agreement and reduction of 
 duties, but to further retaliation ; not to the breaking down 
 of tariff walls, but to the erection on both sides of still 
 more insuperable barriers to trade. — (b) That, indeed, as the 
 object of protective duties is to protect, and as the object of 
 bounties, &c., is to foster trade, it is highly improbable that 
 other nations would give way to our demands ; and certainly 
 not without a severe fiscal struggle, and a disastrous war of 
 tariffs. — (c) That the competition that the foreign producer 
 most fears is that of British goods, and retaliation is more 
 likely to be answered by prohibition than by reduction of 
 duties. 
 
 3. (a) That Eetaliation would involve us in commercial 
 war with the whole world. — (5) That we, being the greatest 
 trading nation, and the greatest exporting nation, stand to 
 lose most from any further restrictions on trade, or disloca- 
 tion of commerce.* 
 
 4. (a) That, though we are a free trade nation, and 
 therefore have no " weapon " of offence for use in our 
 commercial negotiations, we nevertheless enjoy the "most- 
 favoured-nation treatment" in every country (i.e. any fiscal 
 benefit or relaxation given to another country is granted 
 also to us). In no case (with the exception of Portugal 
 and Haiti) are products worse treated, and in some cases 
 we enjoy considerably better treatment than other nations 
 who negotiate Commercial Treaties by means of threats 
 and retaliation. Our valuable custom and our open mart 
 are our best " weapons." — (h) That the benefits we thus 
 derive would be lost if we discriminated between country 
 and country, or between goods and goods ; and especially if 
 we plunged into a war of retaliatory tariffs. 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 7.
 
 "RETALIATION'* 37 
 
 5. (a) That to base our tariff on, and to vary it accord- 
 ing to, the conditions under which production takes place 
 abroad would be pure protection. — (b) That Eetaliation is 
 simply Protection in disguise ; and, whatever the ultimate 
 object, it would inevitably and rapidly lead to a system of 
 protection all round. 
 
 6. («) That even if originally imposed for the some- 
 what harmless purpose of negotiation, the retaliating duties 
 would soon be looked on, and become purely protective. — 
 (h) That in each case (and they would be frequent) in which 
 retaliation was unsuccessful, the retaliatory duty, imposed 
 for a temporary purpose, would remain a permanent, and 
 therefore a protective, duty to the particular home industry. 
 — (c) That experience conclusively proves that a protective 
 duty, under whatever guise, once imposed, becomes subse- 
 quently difficult or impossible of relinquishment. 
 
 7. (a) That the object of a retaliatory duty is to 
 protect a particular industry from a particular form of 
 competition, legitimate or illegitimate, by placing heavy or 
 prohibitive duties on the foreign article of import. No one 
 trade has a greater claim to protection than another, and 
 nearly every industry could show " unfair " treatment also in 
 its own case, and would be equally justified in claiming 
 reciprocal protection. — (h) That, as the protection of one 
 trade leads directly or indirectly to the disadvantage or 
 injury of others, each industry could claim some compen- 
 sating assistance or protection. — (c) That, thus, protection 
 under the name of retaliation imposed in one case, would 
 inevitably lead to a claim for protection in all cases. 
 
 8. That under free trade the fiscal interests of the various 
 industries do not conflict. But retaliation would benefit one 
 industry, and injure another, and by giving rise to conflict- 
 ing claims for assistance, would lead to sharp and direct 
 antagonism and conflict between trade and trade. 
 
 •Ja4683
 
 38 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 9. (a) That it would be absolutely impossible for any 
 Government, or any Department, to work out the equity of 
 a particular reciprocal duty ; to say which industry was 
 especially entitled to receive protection, and in what way ; 
 and to decide to what extent it was unfairly treated, and in 
 what way and to what extent it should be protected. — 
 (h) That none of the factors which go to make up the alleged 
 " illegitimate advantage " can be reduced to figures, and so 
 be accurately countervailed. The adverse effect of trusts, 
 of cheap labour, of indirect bounties or subsidies cannot be 
 estimated ; nor the advantage obtained by the competing 
 producer from protection. 
 
 10. (a) That in most cases, the retaliatory duties could 
 not be effectively applied against the import of goods 
 similar to those of the industry that was suffering most 
 from protective duties. Retaliation would have to be carried 
 out by the taxation of a foreign import of a different nature 
 to the home trade that it was desired to protect.* — (b) That, 
 thus, for the time being, so long as the retaliatory duties 
 remained in force, the particular trade for whose benefit they 
 were imposed, would receive no benefit, and indeed might 
 suffer from further retaliation ; while another industry alto- 
 gether, that was not suffering from undue foreign competition 
 (or it could itself have claimed to have retaliatory duties 
 imposed), would be protected and subsidised. — (c) That, if 
 the retaliatory policy were unsuccessful, this trade (that 
 
 * For instance, Russia, the most protective nation, heavily taxes our 
 imports, especially our manufactures. But we import practically no manu- 
 factures from her. Thus Retaliation on Russia must take the form of taxa- 
 tion of food-stuffs or raw material, for there are no manufactures to penalise. 
 Similarly, the United States, only second to Russia in the severity of its 
 protection tariff, hits, for instance, our linen and our woollen manufactures 
 very hard ; but we import no linen or woollen stuffs from America, and so 
 some other American industry, other than the woollen or liuen industry, 
 must be singled out for attack. This would have to be food-stufls, or raw 
 materials, for we import only a small amount of manufactured articles from 
 the United States, See Appendix III., No. 13.
 
 ''RETALIATION" 39 
 
 required no assistance) would continue to benefit, while the 
 other trade (that required assistance) would continue to 
 suffer. — (d) That if the policy were successful, and the 
 retaliatory duties thereupon relinquished, the latter trade 
 would at last benefit ; but the former, by losing its protec- 
 tion, would now itself be injured.* 
 
 11. (a) That the industries that, in the long run, would 
 suffer most, if the policy of retaliation were successful, would 
 be just those which had been picked out for experimental 
 protection. The imposition of heavy import duties would 
 protect the particular home trade, and by so doing, would 
 foster an increased output at home. — (b) That sooner or 
 later, the retaliatory policy would be successful in inducing 
 the foreign nation to come to terms, and to reduce her 
 duties. The retaliatory duty must then be taken off, and 
 the foreign goods are again freely imported, in competition 
 with the home industry. The artificial inflation in prices and 
 production in the home industries, created and stimulated 
 by the retaliatory -protective duties, would disappear ; the 
 industry would be adversely affected, and capital and labour 
 would suffer. It cannot be a sound fiscal policy to foster or 
 to create by the imposition of a duty, only to destroy when 
 the duty, having played its part, has to be repealed. 
 
 12. That the probable alternative would be that the 
 powerful vested interest that would spring up under the 
 retaliatory duties, would be strong enough to resist their 
 abolition. The policy of retaliation would have therefore 
 failed to lower the foreign duties, and would have saddled us 
 with protective duties of our own. 
 
 13. That, in international competition, the best protection 
 
 * For the development of the above arguments, and of the argument con- 
 tained in No. 14, the reader is referred to a Paper of mine, Jietaliation : 
 Is it Feadhle ? published by the Cohden Club.
 
 46 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 for our working classes lies in good conditions of employ- 
 ment. These are best obtained and retained by free trade.* 
 
 14. (a) That it is not sufficient to assert that the mere 
 threat of retaliation would bring a particular protective 
 nation to its senses. If we threaten, we must be prepared 
 to act, and the method of action must be thought out before- 
 hand. — (b) That the policy of Eetaliation can only succeed 
 if we can convince the particular protectionist country that 
 we have the power and the will to injure her trade more 
 than she can injure ours ; and so induce her to come to terms. 
 
 15. (a) That we are not in a position to retaliate without 
 injuring ourselves more than we should injure the foreigner. 
 In every case our exports of manufactured goods, which 
 are most hit by the tariff, are greatly in excess of the 
 imports to us of their manufactured goods on which we 
 could retaliate. — {h) That this is more especially the case in 
 regard to the most Protective countries, Eussia and the 
 States. — (c) That the United States injures us most in the 
 matter of protective duties and of " dumping " ; yet, except 
 by taxing the food of our own people, or the raw materials 
 of industry, we are powerless to retaliate on her. The same 
 holds good of Eussia.t 
 
 16. That Eetaliation (equally with "Preference") would 
 inevitably lead to a tax on food. By the taxation of food- 
 stuffs alone (the taxation of raw materials being barred) 
 could successful retaliatory pressure be brought to bear on 
 the more protective nations.:[: 
 
 17. That retaliation on our part would diminish and not 
 increase the export of our goods to protective countries ; for 
 retaliation would be met by the imposition of higher duties 
 on our goods. 
 
 18. (a) That while the Customs difficulties in the way of 
 
 * See No. 6, p. 15. 
 
 t Fide ante, note p. 38, and Appendix III., No. 13. 
 
 t See Appendix III., No. 13.
 
 ''RETALIATION" 41 
 
 carrying out a system of protection are great, the difficulties 
 of carrying out a retaliatory policy are far greater, for it would 
 necessitate discrimination between countries as well as between 
 goods. — (b) That universal examinations of all imports, with 
 the attendant evils of cost, friction, and delay, would be 
 necessitated. Moreover, certificates of origin would be 
 essential ; and certificates of origin are vexatious, open to 
 great abuse and easy evasion. — (c) That selective taxation 
 is moreover impracticable, for there is no criterion by which 
 Customs officers could decide on importation whether goods 
 were going to be " dumped " or not. The declared value of 
 the goods might be satisfactory, and yet the goods might be 
 ultimately sold below cost. The goods cannot be followed 
 into the market. 
 
 19. That there is a great exaggeration in regard to 
 the amount of "dumping." How little the iron trade, the 
 alleged chief sufferer, has been really injured by dumping, is 
 shown by the figures of trade, and by the gross income 
 assessed to income-tax under the head of ironworks.* 
 
 20. (a) That much of the underselling by foreign goods 
 is due to the very prosperity of our own industries of late 
 years. The English manufacturer, working to his full capa- 
 city, either cannot take further urgent orders, or will not 
 quote a low price, and the goods are obtained from abroad. 
 — (h) That "dumping" can only be a temporary matter 
 and due to temporary causes, such as miscalculation, over- 
 production, or compulsory sale under commercial pressure. 
 No producer can afford indefinitely to continue to sell at a 
 loss. 
 
 21. (a) That while there may be cases of goods sold 
 
 * The profits (as assessed to income-tax) of the iron trade were £3,000,000 
 iu 1898-99, £3,211,000 in 1899-1900, and £5,380,000, in 1900-1. Between 
 1896 and 1900 the value of steel and iron manufactures imported from Germany 
 was £891,000 ; our total similar exports during the same period wer« 
 £49,000,000.
 
 42 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 here at unduly low prices, the vast bulk of the imported 
 goods, which compete with home production, are produced 
 legitimately and sold at a fair profit. To tax such goods 
 would be pure protection to the British producer. — (b) That 
 retaliation would be directed against the free import of the 
 best and cheapest goods — for if not cheap and good they 
 would not find a market here — to the disadvantage of the 
 consumer, and of the manufacturer who largely utilises such 
 goods. 
 
 22. That it cannot be to our disadvantage to be able to 
 buy cheaply, or at even below cost price. We benefit 
 entirely at the expense of the foreigner. 
 
 23. (a) That goods are "dumped" elsewhere than in 
 England, and the foreign producer, who is thus enabled to 
 buy cheap, would be advantaged in his competition with the 
 English producer if the latter were prevented from buying 
 cheaply also. — (h) That if " dumping " is prevented here, the 
 goods would be diverted to the neutral or Colonial markets, 
 increasing the present severity of the competition in those 
 markets. 
 
 24. That any system of preference, retaliation, or protec- 
 tion that checked foreign imports, and competition in raw 
 materials, would be far more disastrous than any possible 
 " dumping." 
 
 25. That the Colonies are strongly protectionist, ajid 
 also " dump " goods here as well as foreign nations. If 
 foreign protection and cheap goods are an injury, Colonial 
 protection and cheap goods equally injure us, and would 
 equally necessitate retaliation, 
 
 26. (a) That in any case the consumer benefits from the 
 low price at w^hich he can buy. — (b) That, in most cases, 
 these cheap goods form the basis of some further process, 
 and the fact of being able to buy them cheap, enables the
 
 "RETALIATION" 43 
 
 British manufacturer to sell cheaper to the consumer, and to 
 compete better with his foreign rival* — (c) That what the 
 maker of semi-manufactured goods loses from " dumping," the 
 maker of finished goods gains, and the community as a whole 
 benefits, for the manufacture of finished goods gives the 
 most profitable employment. 
 
 27. (a) That Trusts, Kings, Combines, Syndicates, &c., 
 are best dealt with by the operation of the unrestricted 
 competition which goes with free trade. Any limitation of 
 free interchange would assist the operations of existing 
 foreign Trusts, &c., and would encourage their creation here. 
 Tariffs breed Trusts. — (h) That the German syndicates, &c., 
 constitute a greater evil to their own home industries, by 
 artificial interference on the operations of trade, than they do 
 to the British competitor, and great complaints are made 
 against them in Germany. 
 
 28. (a) That it might be conceivably necessary to take 
 action against another country, or against the action of 
 Trusts or Combines, if commercial treatment were meted 
 out to us, that was specifically hostile and unfair. But, 
 before resorting; to retaliation, it should be shown that there 
 was no other way of achieving the desired result, that 
 commercial reprisals would be effective, and that they would 
 not injure us more than our adversary. — (b) That a new 
 fiscal policy should not be inaugurated in order to deal with 
 an emergency that may seldom, perhaps never occur; and 
 which, if it did occur, could and should be dealt with by 
 
 * For instance, Spanish iron ore is imported into England in English 
 ships. It is worked into iron bars here. These are sold at a fair price to 
 Germany, and are made by them into steel forgings. The steel forgings are 
 sent to England, again in English ships, and sold here at a low price, much 
 lower than the price prevailing in the German market ; and they are then 
 used in building ships, etc. The consequence is that the ships can be built 
 at a much cheaper rate here than in Germany, which enables us to retain the 
 supremacy in our shipping trade.
 
 44 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 special legislation. — (c) That the case of the sugar bounties 
 forms a precedent for exceptional treatment when a particu- 
 lar case arises. 
 
 29. (a) That it is not necessary to arm the Executive 
 with any fresh fiscal powers. Under the existing state of 
 things, the Government can, if they wish, at any time, ask 
 Parliament for power to deal, by way of retaliation or 
 otherwise, with any special fiscal question that may arise. — 
 (h) That the only alternative to this, is to give the Executive 
 Government a general power to impose retaliatory duties 
 on their own initiative, and without asking the assent of 
 Parliament. To give power to a Government arbitrarily to 
 interfere with any trade at any time, and to alter taxes with- 
 out Parliamentary sanction, would be unconstitutional and 
 dangerous. 
 
 30. That if the Government possessed a general power of 
 imposing retaliatory duties at their will, the Executive would 
 be perpetually exposed to undue pressure or corrupt in- 
 fluences on the part of different trades. * 
 
 31. («) That the question of the fiscal treatment of the 
 self-governing Colonies does not really arise in connection 
 with Retaliatory duties. — (h) That the British Government 
 has already declared that the self-governing Colonies are 
 fiscal units, with entire fiscal independence ; and this absolute 
 fiscal freedom the Colonies desire to retain. If they are' 
 treated as fiscal units in one matter, they must be treated as 
 fiscal units in all matters. — (c) That, as the exports from 
 foreign countries to the Colonies consist mainly of manu- 
 factured articles, while Colonial exports to them consist 
 almost exclusively of articles of food, it is recognised that, 
 if discrimination did take place, " the Colonies have an effec- 
 tive remedy in their own hands." f 
 
 * See also 26 (a), p. 20. 
 
 t Report of Colonial Confereuce, 1902, p. 38,
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 45 
 
 COLONIAL PEEFERENCE 
 
 It is proposed that fiscal arrangements should be 
 negotiated within the Empire which would give 
 a material commercial advantage to all its parts. 
 Under this scheme, the Colonies and Dependencies 
 would give preferential advantages to the Mother 
 country, in the nature of lower duties on the import 
 of the goods of Great Britain over those charged 
 on the goods of other countries ; while, reciprocally, 
 the Mother country would admit Colonial produce 
 free, or at a lower rate than that charged on 
 competing Foreign imports, either already taxed, or 
 to be taxed if the scheme came into operation. 
 This proposal is supported on the grounds : — 
 
 1. That Imperial Federation can only be founded on 
 a system of fiscal union. Imperial unity involves commercial 
 solidarity. Political Union is no use without commercial 
 ties. 
 
 2. {a) That if the different portions of the Empire are 
 not to drift apart, they must be knit together more closely 
 by commercial ties. The realisation or abandonment of 
 the idea of Imperial Federation is involved. — (b) That "a 
 system of preferential tariffs is the only system by which 
 this Empire can be kept together."* In other words, "No 
 Preference, no Empire.". 
 
 * Mr Chamberlain at Constitutional Club, 26th June 1903,
 
 46 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 3. {a) That the Empire can alone rest upon community of 
 interest, and community of sacrifice. — (Jb) That the Colonies, 
 both in respect of the assistance they gave us in the South 
 African war, and in the desire they have evinced to 
 contribute to the naval and war expenditure of the Empire, 
 have shown a practical loyalty, which we should reciprocate. 
 — (c) That the Colonies strongly desire a preferential fiscal 
 system, and it is worth some sacrifice on our part (if sacrifice 
 be involved) to bring about this consummation. 
 
 4. (a) That the Colonies are anxious to meet us in 
 the matter, Canada is prepared to give further preferential 
 advantages to our goods ; Australia and New Zealand have 
 declared that they will place our imports in a better position 
 than foreign imports ; the Cape has already granted a pre- 
 liminary preference. — (&) That it will be deeply disappoint- 
 ing and discouraging to the Colonies if we decline to meet 
 their advances. 
 
 5. That especially will they feel resentment if we leave 
 them open to the retaliatory attacks of protectionist countries, 
 because they grant advantages to British goods.* 
 
 6. That it would be the refusal to meet the laudable 
 desire of the Colonies, not its acceptance, that would lead 
 to friction and ill-feeling. 
 
 7. {a) That it depends on us whether the preferential 
 advantages already given or promised by the Colonies shall 
 be developed in the future, or withdrawn as non-acceptable to 
 those whom it was sought to benefit. — {h) That if the oppor- 
 tunity of fiscal union be neglected, it may never recur; the 
 Colonies, if repelled by the Mother country, must seek com- 
 mercial reciprocity elsewhere. — (c) That, already, in the case 
 of Canada, it is a question of a reciprocal commercial treaty 
 with us, or with the United States. If we can offer Canada 
 
 * See Retaliation,
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 47 
 
 no advantages, and she is forced to negotiate with the 
 States, she will gradually drift away from us and towards 
 America. 
 
 8. {a) That, as regards India, there would be no practical 
 difficulty in giving her preferential advantages (for 
 instance on tea) without interfering with her free trade 
 system. — (h) That similarly, in the case of the Crown 
 Colonies, some advantage could be given to each of 
 them. 
 
 9. That the arrangement would not lead to any inter- 
 ference with the political independence or fiscal freedom of 
 the Colonies. Each part of the Empire would still retain 
 its entire fiscal freedom, subject only to a voluntary 
 arrangement for the mutual benefit. 
 
 10. (a) That the scheme involves no real question of 
 free .trade or protection. The question is Imperial and 
 Colonial more than fiscal or financial. — (h) That the justice 
 and expediency of a policy must be judged by the needs 
 of the day, not by the musty formulas of fifty years 
 ago. 
 
 11. That Preference is not Protection. While Tariffs 
 restrain the field of commerce, Preference enlarges it. 
 
 12. {a) That in the case of Germany, the introduction of 
 the Zollverein system {i.e. fiscal freedom within the Empire) 
 has politically and commercially knit together its various 
 parts in a strong bond. — (&) That the fiscal freedom which 
 exists between the States that make up the United States 
 of America has been of enormous advantage to the trade of 
 that country. 
 
 13. (a) That complete free trade is not as yet feasible be- 
 tween the different parts of the British Empire. But prefer- 
 ence is the first necessary step towards free trade within and 
 throughout the Empire, and the greatest commercial prosperity
 
 48 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 of the future is for the nation with the largest free trade area. 
 — (b) That if tlie British Empire were knit together by 
 fiscal ties, she would have a great industrial and political 
 future before her ; otherwise she must remain a conglomerate 
 of isolated economic units. 
 
 14. (a) That British trade is becoming ever more and more 
 dependent on inter-Empire trade. Foreign protective nations 
 are increasingly building up their tariff walls, and are de- 
 veloping their own industries. Neutral markets are diminish- 
 ing, and our trade there is open to ever severer competition.* 
 — (b) That our only hope for the future lies in the Colonial 
 markets, and unless we speedily obtain command of them, 
 they will be captured by the foreign competitor, or become 
 themselves self-sufficient. 
 
 15. That it would be to the advantage of the Colonies 
 themselves to make some sacrifice of protection and of 
 revenue for the common object. They would gain by the 
 greater demand for their produce; by shipping it by 
 the trade route protected by the Imperial navy ; by 
 exporting it to the country that provides the best and 
 cheapest means of transport, and the greatest and most 
 stable market. 
 
 16. (a) That our trade with the Colonies is expanding, 
 our trade with foreign countries is contracting. j- — (b) That 
 the British Possessions already take two-fifths of our total 
 home exports ; f and at the present rate of development 
 the Colonial will soon exceed the Foreign trade. Trade 
 follows the flag. Preferential duties would encourage the 
 most valuable and the most hopeful part of our external 
 trade. 
 
 17. (a) Tliat the Colonies buy far more from us in pro- 
 
 * See Protection and Retaliation. 
 
 t See Appendix III., No3. 2, 9 and 10,
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 49 
 
 portion to population than foreign countries.* — (h) That their 
 population is growing rapidly, and its prosperity and increase 
 would be accelerated by the preference given to Colonial 
 agriculture. 
 
 18. That it is " best to cultivate trade with our own 
 kinsmen and fellow-subjects, who take from us at the present 
 time more than £100,000,000 in manufactured goods. Shall 
 we lose the opportunity for the sake of an attempt to con- 
 ciliate 300,000,000 of foreigners, who take from us only a few 
 shillings a head ? " * 
 
 19. (a) That the value of trade is not to be measured only by 
 its volume. The comparative character of the foreign and the 
 colonial trade must also be taken into account. The Colonies 
 take far more in proportion of our manufactured goods, 
 and especially of the most highly manufactured goods. Ex- 
 ports to foreign countries consist, in a larger proportion, 
 of coal and other irreplaceable raw material. Our exports to 
 these protected countries are decreasing in quantity, and 
 deteriorating in tlieir profitable character. — (&) That our 
 exports of manufactures to foreign countries are rapidly 
 diminishing under the development of their own manu- 
 factures, aided by their tariffs. Compensation for the loss of 
 foreign trade must be found in larger Colonial trade. — {c) That 
 •' the exports of our manufactured goods to our own Colonies, 
 including India, equal the total exports of our manufactured 
 goods to all the protected states in Europe and the United 
 States of America." 
 
 20. («) That it is better to cultivate the trade with our 
 own people than to let it go in order to keep the trade of 
 those who are our competitors and rivals. — (h) That the more 
 we buy from British possessions the more they will buy in 
 
 * Total white population of the self-governing Colonies eleven million ; 
 or about £5, 10s. per head of our imports to them, amounting to about 
 £60,000,000. 
 
 D
 
 50 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 return, whereas the gold we pour into foreign countries helps 
 to foster and develop the very industries which are compet- 
 ing with ours more successfully every day. 
 
 21. (a) That any loss of foreign trade involved by the 
 change would be very much more than made up by increased 
 Colonial trade. — (b) That there would be no reason why our 
 export foreign trade need be adversely affected. 
 
 22. (a) That while our foreign trade is stationary, there 
 are infinite possibilities in our Colonial trade. — (b) That every 
 article that we now obtain from abroad could be produced 
 within the Empire, which might be made self-supporting and 
 self-sufficient. The Empire is so wide in area, its products 
 are so various, its climates so different, that there is absolutely 
 nothing which is necessary to our existence, hardly anything 
 which is desired as a luxury, which cannot be produced 
 within the borders of the Empire itself. — (c) That the Mother 
 country, at least, through the development of the Colonies, 
 could be made entirely independent of foreign food or 
 foreign raw material. 
 
 23. That preferential treatment of the Colonies would 
 greatly develop their national resources, by giving them a 
 larger and preferential market for their producers. Thus, not 
 only would their prosperity be increased, but they would 
 become far better customers for our goods. 
 
 24. (a) That the scheme involves not the mere exchange 
 of a definite quantity of one trade for a definite quantity of 
 another, but a scheme for the stimulation of every industry 
 within the Empire. A preference given to Canadian corn, for 
 instance, would mean an enormous influx of settlers into 
 Canada. These settlers will want furniture of every kind 
 for their houses, tools and machines of every sort for their 
 farms, tram lines and electric light for their new towns, rail- 
 ways to bring them in touch with their markets. — (b) That 
 these wants would far exceed the power or the capacity of
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 51 
 
 the Colouial manufacturer to supply, and would be supplied 
 by the United Kingdom. 
 
 25. That the whole of the Colonial trade in articles which 
 we can supply, and which are at present supplied by the 
 foreigner, amounting to many millions a year, would, in 
 consequence of the preference, be absorbed by the British 
 producer.* 
 
 26. That experience shows that a preference does advan- 
 tage trade. The Canadian preference given to British goods 
 since 1897 has not only stopped the decline in British im- 
 ports, but has largely increased them. A similar system 
 applied to other parts of the Empire would lead to similar or 
 even more satisfactory results.f 
 
 27. That neither the English manufacturer nor the 
 English consumer would suffer from a system of preferential 
 tariffs. It is not proposed to tax raw materials ; and the 
 necessary taxation on food stuff's would be compensated 
 for by reduction in the existing taxation on other articles 
 of consumption. 
 
 28. (a) That the English manufacturer would greatly 
 benefit, for he would have a larger and ever-increasing 
 market for his goods consequent on the increased prosperity 
 of the export trade to the Colonies. — (h) That the working 
 man would likewise benefit from the increased trade and 
 consequent employment that would ensue, 
 
 29. That " even if the price of food is raised, the rate of 
 wages will certainly be raised in greater proportions." | 
 
 30. (ft) That the cheaper the staple food the lower is the 
 minimum of wages that the poorest class of labour will 
 accept, and vice versa. — (h) That wages in Germany have 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 11. 
 
 t The rebate is now one of 33^ per cent, on goods from the United 
 Kingdom. The imports from the United Kingdom in 1897 were £6,000,000 ; 
 in 1902 they were £10,100,000.. See note, p. 43 ; also P.P. 310 of 1903, 
 
 X Mr Chamberlain, letter, 3rd June 1903.
 
 52 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 increased under protection, and in the United States are 
 very high. — (c) (By some) That the taxation derived from 
 the foreign imports of food could be applied to the benefit 
 of working men in the form of old age pensions, or in 
 some other way. 
 
 31. (a) That the preference need not involve any very 
 heavy duty on food-stuffs ; a small preference would be 
 sufficient to stimulate Colonial production and gradually to 
 substitute for foreign imports. — (h) That there is no proposal 
 to restore the old corn law ; half the supply of corn (Colonial 
 and home) would be free, and an abundant food-supply 
 would be secured. — (c) That the proposal is not to raise the 
 price of wheat, but to stimulate the production of wheat 
 within the Empire, on areas most peculiarly adapted to its 
 cheap production on a large scale. The development and 
 organisation of the wheat industry in Canada would probably 
 lead to a fall rather than a rise in the price of wheat. 
 
 32. That, while it cannot be stated with certainty on 
 whom falls the burden of a particular indirect tax, it is 
 certain that the main portion of an import duty (such as 
 this) falls not on the consumer, but to a large extent is 
 distributed between the foreign producer, the foreign im- 
 porter, and the various middlemen.* 
 
 33. (a) That, while it is true that "if we are to give a 
 preference to the Colonies we must put a tax on food," f the 
 taxation levied from corn and from meat could be counter- 
 balanced by the remission of taxation on other articles of 
 consumption which are already taxed (tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, 
 currants, etc., as well as tobacco), to the extent of £25,000,000 
 a year. — (b) That thus, for instance, " if a working-man were 
 called upon to pay 3d. a week additional on the cost of his 
 
 * This, it is argued, was the case in regard to the Corn Duty of 1902. 
 See, however, Bhie Book, Cd. 1761, pp. 124-26. 
 
 t Mr Chamberlain, House of Commous, 29th May 1903.
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 53 
 
 bread, he might be relieved by a reduction of a similar amount 
 in the cost of his tea, his sugar, or his tobacco. What was 
 taken out of one pocket would be put into another." * 
 
 34. That by a duty upon corn, we should be making 
 the foreigner contribute to the revenue ; and by simul- 
 taneous relief on other articles of consumption, we should 
 be benefiting the producers of tea and other commodities in 
 the British Colonies and Dependencies. 
 
 35. (a) That even if the scheme involved an actual net 
 tax on food, it would be worth the doing, with a view to 
 knit the Empire together, to extend trade, and to enlarge 
 commerce. — (b) That by encouraging the interchange of 
 British manufactured products for Colonial agricultural 
 products, it would stimulate Colonial farming, direct the 
 stream of emigration to our own Colonies, and so hasten 
 the time when the Empire would be competent to feed 
 itself, and it would be no longer necessary to maintain the 
 tax on food. 
 
 36. That dependence on foreign sources for our own food 
 supplies is inexpedient ; and would be very dangerous in time 
 of war, when corn might be declared a contraband of war and 
 could not be imported in neutral bottoms, 
 
 37. (a) That the home agricultural interest, which has 
 admittedly been most injured by the policy of free imports, 
 would be greatly stimulated and benefited by the taxation 
 of foreign food stuffs. — (h) That thousands of acres would 
 be brouglit back into cultivation. — (c) That the continuing 
 immigration of the population from the country into the 
 towns, with all its attendant evils — social, economic, moral, 
 and physical — would be stayed. 
 
 38. That the old system of Colonial preference was 
 founded on a totally different basis to the scheme now pro- 
 posed, and forms no precedent nor analogy. 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 14.
 
 54 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 On the other hand, it is contended : — 
 
 1. That all are iu favour of knitting together more closely 
 the Colonies aud the Mother country, and are prepared to 
 make sacrifices with that object in view. 
 
 2. (a) That fiscal union is not necessarily a part of 
 Imperial Federation. — {h) That the best links are those 
 based on the consciousness of kinship, of common blood, of 
 pride of race, and of history ; links that unite without 
 galling, — (c) That, under this system, the Empire has become 
 stronger, wealthier, more united, has grown and flourished 
 prodigiously. There is nothing in the present conditions to 
 warrant the belief that the Empire is on the verge of dis- 
 solution, or that it requires the adoption of a new fiscal 
 system to keep it together. 
 
 3. (a) That instead of making for Imperial unity, a 
 system of preferential duties would embitter and strain the 
 harmonious relations now happily subsisting between the 
 different parts of the Empire. — (h) That, at present, each 
 self-governing Colony, as well as the Mother country, enjoys 
 complete independence aud freedom of action iu fiscal, finan- 
 cial, commercial, and industrial legislation. Once make the 
 fiscal system of the Empire inter-dependent, this freedom 
 would disappear, and the interests of the different parts of 
 the Empire would come into collision, 
 
 4. That an arrangement which would bind us to admit 
 Colonial goods into our markets on equal terms with our 
 own producers, while English goods were refused admission 
 to the Colonial markets on equal terms with their own 
 producers, would be manifestly unfair. The scheme would 
 be unworkable; an Imperial fiscal system cannot be based 
 at the same time on free trade and on protection. 
 
 5. That to associate the Colonies with a tax on food, 
 to connect them with hardship, privation, and discontent,
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 55 
 
 would render them a grievous burden in the eyes of the 
 English people ; and thus the Imperial sentiment, and even 
 the unity of the Empire, would be greatly endangered. 
 
 6. (a) That the proposal of preferential rates is mainly 
 based on business grounds, and must be judged from that 
 point of view ; namely, whether the price that would have 
 to be paid is greater than the mutual benefits which would 
 accrue. — (h) That the Colonies are asking of us infinitely 
 more than they are prepared to grant to us. A change in 
 our free import policy is of far greater consequence to us 
 than any fiscal change can be to the Colonies. Their grant 
 of preference does not touch their supplies of food or raw 
 material. Our grant of preference would directly affect 
 the whole of our population in the matter of food. The 
 interests of 40,000,000 of people would be sacrificed to the 
 interests of 11,000,000. 
 
 7. (a) That the object, and the result of the adoption by 
 Germany of a " ZoUverein " was the abolition of all internal 
 barriers to trade. Germany is a free trade nation as re- 
 gards its 58,000,000 of inhabitants, and over its whole area, 
 which is twice the size of the United Kingdom. — (b) That, 
 similarly, the United States is the greatest free trade 
 nation in the world ; there is absolute free trade between its 
 80,000,000 of people, and over an area of the size of Europe. 
 
 8. (a) That the German Zollverein has been of immense 
 political, fiscal, and financial advantage to Germany, by free- 
 ing and increasing internal trade, and by consolidating and 
 unifying the interests of the different parts of the German 
 Empire. It has done much to counteract the disadvantages 
 of protection. — (ft) That, similarly, the internal free trade of 
 the United States, combined with her natural advantages 
 of climate, soil, minerals, and water, has enabled her trade 
 to develop enormously in spite of her protective system. 
 
 9. That a real Zollverein, i.e. the adoption of absolute
 
 56 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 free trade within the Empire itself, and the abolition of all 
 internal custom-houses (which might be advantageous), is im- 
 practicable. The self-governing Colonies being protectionist, 
 and desiring to foster their own industries, would not consent 
 to the free entry of British goods. Depending also, as they 
 do, on customs duties (chiefly on British goods) for their 
 revenue, they could not afford to relinquish these duties. 
 
 10. (a) That while a Zollverein, or Customs Union, 
 would constitute a great step in the direction of free trade, 
 preferential and discriminating duties would be essentially 
 protective ; and would involve separate bargains of a pro- 
 tective nature with each Colony. — (b) That a system of 
 preferential duties, instead of freeing trade, would necessitate 
 the erection of new and additional fiscal barriers to free 
 intercourse. — (c) That it would involve great complication 
 of tariff, universal examination of goods, extreme vexation 
 and great loss of time ; all of which would tend to the dis- 
 turbance, dislocation, and injury of trade. — (d) That it would 
 be necessary to enquire in each case into the source of 
 origin — a fruitful source of worry, delay, irritation, and fraud. 
 
 11. That, at the best, it would merely divert our trade 
 from foreign countries to the Colonies. To divert trade 
 is to diminish trade. 
 
 12. (a) That not only is the United Kingdom a free 
 trade country, but India and the Crown Colonies, and to a 
 large extent the South African Colonies also, are on a free 
 trade basis — i.e. the taxation is imposed for revenue pur- 
 poses. The other self-governing Colonies, Canada, Australia, 
 New Zealand, alone are protectionists. — (h) That, thus, under 
 a system of preferential tariffs, free trade England and the 
 free trade Colonies would cease to be free trade, while the 
 protectionist Colonies would remain protectionist. 
 
 13. That the Empire would cease to be an Empire at 
 fiscal peace with all the world, and would become an Empire
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENGE 57 
 
 bristling with tariffs at every point, brimful of retaliation 
 on the slightest pretext, and an object of hostile attack all 
 over the world. 
 
 14. (ft) That our trade with the Colonies and India 
 represents but a small portion of the whole trade of the 
 country — £225,000,000 out of £880,000,000.* — (5) That 
 India takes nearly one-third of our whole Colonial export 
 trade ; and being on a free trade basis, has little to gain and 
 much to lose from the introduction of any system of pre- 
 ferential duties.f — (c) That the various Crown Colonies have 
 little or nothing to gain from a system of preferential duties. 
 — {d) That the protectionist self-governing Colonies (for 
 whose benefit the preferential rates are proposed) represent 
 a total trade with us of about £120,000,000, of which only 
 £60,000,000 represent our exports. — (e) That thus our enor- 
 mous trade of £880,000,000 is to be disturbed and risked 
 for a problematical advantage to us on a trade of only 
 £60,000,000.+ 
 
 15. (ft) That our trade with Europe is not falling off; 
 and is more progressive than our trade with the Colonies. § 
 Comparing 1899-1901 with 1896-98, while our exports to 
 continental nations increased 18 per cent., our exports to 
 British possessions only increased 15| per cent. — (h) That 
 our foreign trade is of greater importance to us than our 
 Colonial trade. Our exports to Germany, Holland and Bel- 
 gium alone are double our exports to Australia and Canada.]] 
 
 16. (ft) That as is admitted by the preferentialists ^ — our 
 
 * See Appendix III., Nos. 9 and 10. 
 
 t See Debate, House of Lords, lOtli .January 1903. 
 
 X See Nos. 21-26. 
 
 § See Appendix III., Nos. 2, 8. 9 and 10. 
 
 II Exports (1901) to Germany, Belgium, and Holland, £60,600,000 ; to 
 Canada (9) and Australia (2.4), £3.3,000,000. 
 
 H "You must promote Colonial Trade with the Mother country by means 
 of Preferential Tariff . . . even, if by doing so, we lessen somewhat the trade 
 with our Foreign Competitors."— J/^;- Chamberlain.
 
 58 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 whole trade would he injured and jeopardised hy any altera- 
 tion in our fiscal system. Trade would he forced out of its 
 natural channels into others, from which less economic 
 advantage would he derived ; as we should huy less from 
 foreign countries they would be able to buy less from, us; 
 protectionist nations would retaliate and injure us ; while 
 the cost of production would be increased. — (&) That our 
 foreign trade, our Colonial trade, and our trade with neutral 
 markets, and even our powers of meeting competition in our 
 own markets, would be severely handicapped by the in- 
 creased cost of production consequent on the increased cost 
 of living, due to the preferential rates. 
 
 17. That the taxation of food products would (with the 
 exception of the United States) hit hardest the least pro- 
 tectionist countries — Denmark, Holland, Argentina, etc., — 
 and injure our considerable trade with them ; while our 
 greatest trade rivals, Germany and France, would escape 
 altogether. 
 
 18. (a) That there would be great danger of reprisals on 
 the part of foreign countries, especially in the case of the 
 United States, who could, if they wished, seriously injure our 
 trade by imposing (for instance) an export duty on cotton, or 
 by prohibiting the export passage of Canadian wheat over her 
 territory. — (b) That, in any case, we should lose the immense 
 advantage we at present possess of "most-favoured-nation 
 treatment " applied to our foreign exports, which constitute 
 two-thirds of the whole. 
 
 19. That if we place a duty on foreign food-stuffs for the 
 benefit of the Colonies, we shall have relinquished all power 
 of utilising, in our commercial negotiations, or for purpose 
 of Eetaliation, the most effective (in some cases the only) 
 weapon in our armoury — the taxation of food stuffs.* A 
 food- tax cannot be utilised both for Preference and for 
 
 * See Appendix III., No. 13.
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 59 
 
 Eetaliation. For Preference it is necessarily permanent, for 
 successful Eetaliation it is necessarily temporary. 
 
 20. (a) That the home trade is more important to the 
 prosperity of the country than its external trade. To raise 
 the food bill of the whole population of 40,000,000 must 
 diminish their purchasing power on every other article, and 
 exercise an injurious effect on the vast internal trade of the 
 country. — (6) That the social system of the country has 
 grown up under tlie policy of free imports of food and 
 raw material. Any radical alteration would injuriously 
 affect many classes, and especially the poorest and most 
 struggling. 
 
 21. {a) That the great bulk of the internal trade of the 
 Empire is already done with the mother country ; * and 
 being carried on largely on a free trade basis, while it might 
 possibly be diminished, it would not be increased by any 
 protectionist device. — (h) That our exports to our self- 
 governing Colonies are increasing rapidly and satisfactorily 
 under the present system. It is best to leave well alone. 
 
 22. (a) That neither the present capabilities, nor the 
 possible future development of the self-governing Colonies 
 of Australia and Canada, give promise of greatly enlarged 
 capacity for the purchase of British goods. — (h) That Canada, 
 great though her fertility, is ice-bound for a considerable 
 portion of the year, and is not capable of indefinite develop- 
 ment. — (c) That Australia, through lack of water, and in 
 consequence of droughts, can never be more than a populated 
 fringe of a great continent. 
 
 23. (a) That the foreign trade of the self-governing 
 Colonies is comparatively small, and the bulk of it is in 
 articles which we do not, and cannot produce, such as wine, 
 tobacco, oil, or raw materials and food stuffs. These deducted, 
 the amount left of foreign imports which could be replaced 
 
 * See Appendix III., Nos. 9 and 10.
 
 60 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 by English goods is not great ; * and is infinitesimal com- 
 pared to our whole trade. — (b) That, therefore, even if English 
 goods were admitted free into the Colonies, the amount of 
 additional Colonial trade that could be won is small. 
 
 24. (a) That both workmen and employers in Canada 
 and Australia are strongly protectionist, and there is not the 
 least intention on their part to admit British goods free, or 
 other than at duties sufficiently heavy effectually to protect 
 their own manufactures. — (&) That under the so-called 
 " Canadian preference," Canadian manufactures still enjoy a 
 protection of 24 per cent, over English goods ; and Canada 
 is not prepared to give any further substantial concessions. — 
 
 (c) That Australia and New Zealand have specifically de- 
 clared that they cannot reduce their very high protective 
 tariff directed against British goods, and that all they can 
 do is still further to penalise foreign competitive goods. — 
 
 (d) That, indeed, all these Colonies depend so largely on 
 their Customs for their revenue, that they could not afford 
 appreciably to lower their tariff.! 
 
 25. (a) That " preference " such as this is of little 
 practical advantage to the English producer. Our competi- 
 tion in Colonial markets is not so much with the foreign 
 importer as with the Colonial producer. The displaced 
 foreign trade would be absorbed by the Colonial, and not by 
 the English manufacturer. — (b) That, indeed, as a result of 
 the increased cost of production, here consequent on the 
 tax on food, and probably on raw materials, the home 
 manufacturer would be in a worse position than before to 
 compete in Colonial markets, either with the foreign or 
 Colonial competitor. — (c) That, further, the object of each 
 protectionist Colony in fostering its own industries, is to 
 become in time self sufficient, or even to become exporters. 
 Even if at first, therefore, the British manufacturer were 
 
 * See Appendix III,, No. 11. t See P.P. 299 of 1903.
 
 COLONIAL PBEFEBENCE 61 
 
 able to increase his Colonial trade, he would eventually be 
 driven out of the Colonial market ; and, meanwhile, he would 
 have jeopardised or lost his foreign market. 
 
 26. That the one concrete case — namely the preference 
 given by Canada to British goods — has not produced any 
 material effect in increasing our Colonial trade, though it has 
 been in force for five years, and has been carried out under 
 favourable auspices, and without any disturbing influences.* 
 
 27. That it is not therefore probable that our export 
 trade to the Colonies would be greatly promoted ; while the 
 whole foreign trade of the country would be disturbed and 
 proportionately diminished ; and, at the same time, we 
 should be called upon to pay a heavy tax on our food (and 
 probably raw materials) for the benefit of the Colonies. 
 
 28. (a) That it would pass the wit of man to devise a 
 scheme of preferential treatment that would be equitable 
 and workable as between ourselves and the Colonies, and 
 between the Colonies themselves. — (l) That the interests of 
 all the different parties to the arrangement, and of their 
 respective industries, are diverse, conflicting, and often 
 antagonistic. A preference given on one article from one 
 Colony might be disadvantageous to another Colony or to 
 another trade, a duty imposed on some other article (raw 
 material, for instance) might be disastrous to the mother 
 country. — (c) That the basis of preferential treatment is 
 equality of gains and losses ; a fiscal bargain impossible to 
 make between a country which was seeking to increase its 
 exports of manufactures, and a country which was chiefly 
 concerned to protect its industries from competition. 
 
 * While the total amount of the exports from the United Kingdom to 
 Canada have somewhat increased since the grant of preference, their pro- 
 portionate amount to the whole Canadian imports has fallen from 27.. 'iS per 
 cent, in 1897 to 24.95 in 1902. There was a greater increase of trade with 
 foreign countries than with Great Britain. "The substantial results have 
 been altogether disappointing." — Mr Chamberlain, Coloiual Conference, 1902, 
 and see P.P. 310 of 1903.
 
 62 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 29. (a) That any scheme or preferential treatment would 
 involve a series of bargains with the Colonies, a process of 
 haggling and wrangling in which each party would be trying 
 to get the most from, and to give the least to, each other. — 
 (6) Tiiat not only would there be disputes in each case 
 whether the equivalent either party received was sufficient, 
 but each colony would question whether what it was to 
 receive were equal in value to that granted to the others. 
 Friction, discontent, ill-will, and disunion would ensue. — 
 (c) That there would be no central authority to whom 
 appeals could be made, and who could, in the last resort, 
 authoritatively decide the rights of the case and the points 
 of issue. 
 
 30. That if a particular Colony refused to grant a 
 preference, or only gave a preference less advantageous 
 than that granted to the Mother country by some other 
 Colony, it would be necessary, in order to give equality of 
 treatment, to have a different and less favourable scale of 
 preference applied to her goods. The tariff would become 
 absolutely unworkable. 
 
 31. (a) That the divers and conflicting interests of the 
 various home trades affected (and in the Colonies the interest 
 of their home trades) would be almost impossible of adjust- 
 ment. — (b) That by adhering to free trade, the Executive 
 have been able to avoid having to deal with extremely 
 difficult and irritating problems concerning the interests 
 of competing industries in this country, and concerning 
 the conflicting interests of the different Colonies. 
 
 32. That the introduction of a preferential system would 
 in the end inevitably lead to a system of " protection." Each 
 trade, in which the cost of production, consequent on the 
 preferential duties, had been increased without any corre- 
 sponding benefit, would claim, and justly claim, beneficial 
 treatment also. Thus first one, and then another trade,
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 63 
 
 would receive a preference, and finally all trades would be 
 protected.* 
 
 33. («) That the preference once given, the step, as far 
 as this country is concerned, is irrevocable, and would only 
 be reversed at the risk of disruption. Vested Colonial and 
 home interests would have been encouraged to grow up, and 
 whatever the circumstances, and the necessity and urgency 
 of repeal, they would command the situation. — (b) That 
 yet there could be no security nor permanency in the 
 arrangement. A change of view, or a change of Government, 
 in Australia or Canada, might withdraw them from the 
 arrangement, with but little disturbance to their trade. But 
 England would have ceased to be a free trade country, would 
 have lost much foreign trade, and would remain saddled with 
 a tax on food. 
 
 34. (a) That it is admitted, that " if you are to give a 
 preference to the Colonies, you must put a tax on food."f 
 For in order to give an effective preference to Colonial food 
 imports, and in order to obtain the revenue necessary 
 for other fiscal pm^poses, or dependent social reforms (and 
 certainly if the scheme is to bring land back under cultiva- 
 tion), a "considerable duty" must be imposed on foreign 
 corn, meat and dairy produce, etc. — (b) That however low 
 the duties might be fixed at first, they (like all protective 
 duties) would be certain to be gradually raised on the 
 ground that they were not sufficiently effective. 
 
 35. (a) That as foreign food stuffs represent 75 per cent, 
 of our food supplies, a tax on their import would raise 
 their price, and correspondingly the price of all Colonial 
 imports and home-grown food. J — (&) That, thus, the amount 
 taken out of the pockets of the consumer would be far 
 
 * See sections, Protection and Retaliation. 
 
 t Mr Chamberlain, House of Commons, 29th May 1903. 
 
 X See Appendix III., No. 4.
 
 64 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 greater than the benefit accruing to the Colonies, or than 
 the amount received by the Exchequer.* Further, the more 
 the plan were successful, the less would be the propor- 
 tionate receipt from the duty, though the aggregate burden 
 on the community would remain the same. 
 
 36. (a) That the rise in the price of food consequent on the 
 duty, would increase the cost of living, and wages, salaries, 
 or income, would purchase less than they did before. Thus 
 all classes would be worse off, and the increased cost of living 
 would fall severely upon the working and lower middle 
 classes. — (h) That those millions who now just manage to 
 subsist on a living wage would be put to much hardship 
 and suffering; the margin which exists between them and 
 absolute want would be broken down. 
 
 37. (a) That there is no reason why dearer food should 
 be followed, either immediately, or at any time, by a general 
 rise in wages or salaries — they are indeed more likely to 
 fall. — (h) Why, when, where, at what point, and to what 
 extent, and how, would wages rise because of the increase 
 in the cost of living ? Where is the fund to come from, 
 which would enable the increased wages to be paid ? — 
 (c) That, in any case, no immediate rise of wages, even in 
 the benefited trades, could take place. Development of 
 trade is a slow process. 
 
 38. (a) That even if the prosperity of a few trades, 
 especially interested in Colonial commerce, were promoted, 
 the other export industries (representing an infinitely larger 
 
 * A charge of 2s. a quarter on foreign corn would produce about £3,300,000 
 in taxation ; besides this, the price of Colonial corn consumed here would be 
 enhanced by some £875,000, and that of liome-grown corn by about £4,000,000. 
 Thus the English consumer would pay some £8,000,000 additional, while the 
 Exchequer would only gain some £3,300,000, and the Colonial grower only 
 £875,000. 
 
 Further, if a 5 per cent, duty were placed on foreign meat and dairy pro- 
 duce, it would cost the people of the United Kingdom some 7 millions' a year, 
 of which the Exchequer would only receive some 2^ millions, while the gain 
 to the Colonial importers would be about three-quarters of a million only.
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 66 
 
 trade), would not be in any way benefited ; but would, by the 
 general dislocation of trade, and by the increased cost of 
 production, be materially injured. — (J) That the home trade 
 could not be benefited by the preferential tariffs ; while its 
 general prosperity would be checked by the diminished 
 power of purchase, and the increased cost of production. — 
 (c) That the prosperity of the shipping trade, and these 
 directly or indirectly interested in it, is absolutely dependent 
 on the low cost at which ships can be built, combined with 
 free access and free exchange, free imports and free exports. 
 Any diversion of or obstruction to trade would seriously 
 cripple this great industry. 
 
 39. {a) That none of the working classes, men or women, 
 employed in the various home trades — builders, miners, 
 stevedores, dock labourers, carriers, busmen, gas-workers, &c., 
 &c. — could hope to receive increased wages ; these trades 
 would be unaffected by the preferential duties. — {h) That the 
 lower middle class — the clerks, men and women, those 
 employed by business firms, &c., &c. — where wages and 
 salaries are kept down by acute competition, could not hope 
 to obtain any general or individual increase. — (c) That there 
 would be no valid reason why the wages or salaries of those 
 employed by Government, by municipalities, by public 
 bodies, by the railways, by public companies, &c., should rise. 
 Or if they were to rise, the taxpayer, the ratepayer, the 
 shareholder would suffer doubly. — {d) That the tradesman, 
 the middleman, &c., would not be able to increase their 
 profits to cover the increased cost of living ; or if they did, 
 the customer would doubly suffer. 
 
 40. {a) That the wages would either remain the same, go 
 up or go down. If they went down, the workmen would be 
 in a sorry plight. If wages remained the same, the employer 
 would be paying the same wage for an inferior article of 
 labour ; for corn and meat are the raw material of labour, and 
 
 E
 
 66 TARIFF CHANGES 
 
 labour less well nurtured is less efficient and economical 
 labour. On the other hand, if wages were to go up corre- 
 spondingly to the increased cost of living, the employer 
 would be paying more for an article of labour equal only to 
 that which he was receiving before. — (b) That thus, unless 
 wages go down, the cost of production must go up. — (c) That, 
 already, competition, abroad, at home, and in the Colonies, 
 in protected and in neutral markets, is very severe, and any 
 increase in the cost of production would greatly handicap 
 the British manufacturer and producer, and seriously injure 
 trade all round. — (d) The employer therefore would not be 
 in a position to increase wages, and in most cases he would 
 be obliged to reduce them. 
 
 41. That it is doubtful, therefore, whether, in any trade, 
 wages would rise in consequence of preferential rates, while 
 it is certain that in the overwhelming majority of cases they 
 would not rise ; and that in very many cases they would 
 fall ; * while in every case the cost of living would be 
 increased. 
 
 42. (a) That wages in Germany (where the cost of food 
 is higher than in England) are lower than in England, while 
 the hours are longer ; of late, too, wages have fallen there.f 
 — (b) That wages in the United States are higher than here, 
 but the cost of food is even lower there than in England. 
 
 43. That the demand for increased wages on the part of 
 the men to enable them to bear the increased cost of living, 
 or their resistance to a demand on the part of their employers 
 for a reduction of wages in order to enable them to reduce 
 the cost of production, would give rise to far-reaching 
 industrial disputes and injury to trade. 
 
 * "A tax on food would mean a decline in wages. It would certainly 
 involve a reduction in their productive value." — Mr Chamberlain, House of 
 Gommons, 12th August 1881. See Cd. 1761, pp. 259-293. 
 
 t See Blue Book, Cd. 1761, pp. 209-268, 259-293.
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 67 
 
 44. (a) That uo relief of taxation on tea, sugar and 
 tobacco would be an equivalent offset to the hardships 
 involved by the taxation of bread or meat. Bread and meat 
 are indispensable and primary commodities of universal con- 
 sumption, and form the staple and essential articles of food 
 of the great mass of the people. — (6) The poorer the family, 
 the more the food tax would affect them. Their expenditure 
 on bread constitutes a irreducible minimum that should not 
 be touched by taxation ; and the suffering that would be 
 caused to them by an increase in the cost of the necessities 
 of life could not be relieved by any reduction in the cost of 
 their luxuries. 
 
 45. (a) That as the tax on food-stuffs would raise their 
 cost to the consumer to a far greater extent than it would 
 benefit the revenue, the relief that would possibly be given 
 by corresponding remission of other taxation, could not 
 represent more than a portion of the whole burden involved.* 
 — (b) That if the preferential policy were successful, the 
 Colonies would ultimately provide all the food-stufifs we 
 require, and the revenue derived from the tax on foreign 
 imports, which is to be utilised for the remission of the tea, 
 sugar and tobacco duties, would disappear. The tea, sugar 
 and tobacco duties would have again to be imposed ; while 
 the cost of food-stuffs would continue to be enhanced by the 
 preferential duty which would have still to be maintained 
 in order to continue to protect the Colonies. 
 
 46. That, in any case, the country was entitled to look to 
 the remission of the tea and sugar duties at some future time, 
 in the ordinary course, without any offset. 
 
 47. (a) That any system of preferential tariff would not 
 only involve a duty on food-stuffs, but, whatever the original 
 intention, would inevitably lead to a duty also on the 
 raw material of manufacture — wool, cotton, iron, timber, &c. 
 
 * See No. 35, and note.
 
 68 V V ^^^^^i^^'^'^ARIFF CHANGES 
 
 — (h) That each Colony produces some considerable article 
 of commerce distinct from the other Colonies. A preference 
 given on one particular article (for instance, corn), while 
 advantageous to Canada, would be no advantage to the Cape. 
 Yet each Colony can justly claim equal consideration, and 
 some particular article that she produces in abundance 
 must receive preferential treatment. Preferential treatment 
 cannot therefore be confined to food-stuffs.* 
 
 48. (a) That when once the principle of preferential 
 treatment is agreed to, each particular Colony and the 
 dominant interests in it, would have the controlling voice in 
 deciding which of her products should be favoured ; we 
 could not dictate to her in the matter. — (b) That Australia 
 and South Africa would claim, and justly claim, preference 
 on their wool and their hides ; India and some of the 
 Crown Colonies, a preference on their cotton or their sugar ; 
 some of the other Colonies a preference on their wood, etc.* 
 — (c) That each industry would expect to be equally 
 advantaged. The Australian wool - merchant is as much 
 entitled to preference as the Canadian wheat-grower. — 
 (d) That thus, in order to carry out the policy of equitable 
 preference, a tax on the raw material of manufacture of our 
 staple industries would be absolutely inevitable ; and it is 
 generally admitted that to impose duties on the raw 
 materials of manufacture would be disastrous to our trade, 
 and especially to the cotton, woollen and iron industries. 
 
 49. That the agricultural interest which has been most 
 severely injured by the policy of free imports, would have 
 nothing to gain from preferential duties, the object of which 
 is merely to transpose free Colonial for free foreign food- 
 stuffs. 
 
 50. That the introduction of a preferential system would 
 necessitate a policy of retaliation on foreign countries.f 
 
 "" See Appendix III., No. 12. t See Eetaliation. 
 
 4
 
 COLONIAL PREFERENCE 69 
 
 51. That the system of Colonial preference that formerly- 
 prevailed was admittedly injurious to the Colonies as well as 
 to the Mother country. 
 
 51. That it is very questionable whether it would not 
 constitute a grave danger in time of war to have our food 
 supplies concentrated in British hands. A large foreign 
 importer (say the United States) would be less inclined 
 to admit that food-stuffs were " contraband of war " if she 
 were largely interested in supplying Great Britain. 
 
 52. That (to sum up) a system of trade preference would 
 be disastrous. On political grounds — for it would lead to 
 friction and misunderstandings and disputes between various 
 parts of the Empire, tending to disintegration rather than to 
 consolidation. On economic grounds — the possible trade to 
 be won is infinitesimal, while the rest of the trade of the 
 Empire would be dislocated and diminished. On social 
 grounds — inasmuch as the cost of living would be increased, 
 and the position of the working and struggling classes would 
 be worsened. 
 
 [Some would argue that the Colonies might of them- 
 selves well grant certain preferences to British goods, as a 
 contribution to the cost of the Empire, now almost entirely 
 borne by Great Britain, without asking for any equivalent 
 from the Mother country.]
 
 APPENDIX
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 No. 1. 
 INCOME TAX. 
 
 (From Report of Commissioners of Inland Revenue. Cd. nil.\ 
 
 Gross Income Schedide D. 
 (Trades and Professions). 
 
 r £173,054,000* 
 t 271,973,000* 
 
 Gross Income Assessed. Increase. 
 
 £145,500,000* 
 
 1868-69 ... £398,794,000* 
 1875-76 ... 544,376,000* 
 
 1894-95,.. 657,097,000 1^ 210 000 000 i 340,559,000 
 
 1901-02 ... 866,993,000 J ' ' I 487,731,000 
 
 * "Periods of the gi'eatest prosperity." 
 
 Estimated Income from certain Investments Abroad. 
 
 1881-82, £30,600,000 1891-92, £54,700,000 1901-02, £62,000,000. 
 
 ("A minimum ligirre which is probably largely exceeded." — Board of 
 Trade. Cd. 1761, p. 103.) 
 
 POST OFFICE SAVINGS BANKS. 
 
 
 1887 
 
 1897 
 
 1901 
 
 No. of Depositors .. 
 
 . 3,952,000 
 
 7,240,000 
 
 8,788,000 
 
 Due to Depositors . . 
 
 £54,000,000 
 
 £116,000,000 
 
 £140,000,000 
 
 MERCHANT SHIPPING. 
 
 {From Parliamentary Paper 290 of 1903.) 
 
 The total net tonnage of British ships is 11,120,000 tons, 
 against 12,500,000 tons of the Shipping of the principal foreign 
 countries. 
 
 The annual tonnage built in the United Kingdom was (in 
 tons) 394,000 in 1870; 473,000 in 1880; 813,000 in 1890; 
 944,000 in 1900; and 950,500 in 1902. 
 
 The tonnage of vessels entered and cleared at Ports in the 
 
 United Kingdom, was — 
 
 1870 1890 1902 
 
 British ... 25,000,000 54,000,000 65,000,000 
 
 Foreign ... 11,600,000 20,300,000 35,000,000 
 
 RAILWAY TRAFFIC {from Cd. 1761). 
 
 Annual Average. 
 
 1880-4 ■ ... 
 1890-4 
 
 1902 
 
 72 
 
 Goods TraflBc. 
 
 Passengers 
 
 (Million Tons.) 
 
 (Millions.) 
 
 252 
 
 652 
 
 308 
 
 862 
 
 437 
 
 1188
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES 73 
 
 No. 2. 
 TOTAL TRADE UNITED KINGDOM. 
 
 {From Statistical Abstract.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 1860 
 
 Exports. 
 164 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 Imports. 
 210 
 
 Total Trade. 
 374 
 
 Per head of 
 Population. 
 
 £ S. D. 
 
 12 18 
 
 Excess of 
 
 Imports over 
 
 Exports. 
 
 46 
 
 1870 
 
 244 
 
 303 
 
 547 
 
 17 10 10 
 
 59 
 
 1880 
 
 286 
 
 411 
 
 697 
 
 20 3 
 
 125 
 
 1887 
 
 281 
 
 362 
 
 643 
 
 17 11 8 
 
 81 
 
 1890 
 
 328 
 
 420 
 
 748 
 
 19 19 7 
 
 92 
 
 1895 
 
 286 
 
 416 
 
 702 
 
 17 17 10 
 
 130 
 
 1897 
 
 294 
 
 451 
 
 745 
 
 18 12 4 
 
 157 
 
 1899 
 
 830 
 
 485 
 
 815 
 
 19 19 4 
 
 155 
 
 1900 
 
 354 
 
 523 
 
 877 
 
 21 6 4 
 
 169 
 
 1901 
 
 348 
 
 522 
 
 870 
 
 20 18 9 
 
 174 
 
 1902 
 
 349 
 
 528 
 
 877 
 
 20 18 6 
 
 179 
 
 
 Other years v 
 
 •ill be found in 
 
 I the Statistical Abstract, p. 
 
 49. 
 
 No. 3. 
 THE YEAR 1873. 
 
 The years 1872 and 1873 are often taken by Protectionists 
 for comparison with other years. But these were both years of 
 enormously inflated prices, higher than any year since 1826, 
 consequent on the ending of the Franco-Prussian War, and on 
 a sudden bubble revival of industry. 
 
 If the Imports and Exports of other years are calculated on 
 the basis of the values prevailing in 1873, the following results 
 (the Exports are of domestic produce only) would appear (in 
 Million £) : — 
 
 
 Declared Values of 
 I. E. 
 
 Total. 
 
 On approximate basis c 
 Value of 1873. 
 I. E. 
 
 )f 
 Total. 
 
 1873 
 
 371 
 
 255 
 
 626 
 
 371 
 
 255 
 
 626 
 
 1883 
 
 426 
 
 240 
 
 666 
 
 526 
 
 295 
 
 821 
 
 1893 
 
 405 
 
 218 
 
 623 
 
 611 
 
 329 
 
 940 
 
 1902 
 
 528 
 
 283 
 
 811 
 
 797 
 
 418 
 
 1,215 
 
 (From answer, President, Board of Trade, Aug. 12, 1903.) 
 
 In other words, the trade of 1902 was double that of 1873 ; and if the 
 value of the Exports (our sales) has fallen, the value of the Imports (our 
 purchases) has fallen in a still greater proportion.
 
 74 APPENDIX in. 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 IMPORTS CLASSIFIED (1902). 
 1. Food-stuffs (Food and Drink) — 
 
 From Foreign Counti-ies . . . £179,500,000 
 
 „ British Possessions . . . 43,800,000 
 
 £223,300,000 
 Tobacco . . . 5,800,000 
 
 iJ, Raiv Materials- 
 
 From Foreign Countries . . . £124,800,000 
 
 „ British Possessions . . . 51,800,000 
 
 £176,600,000 
 
 (Siich as cotton, wool, flax, jute, hemp, hides, petroleum, 
 gutta-percha, wood, seeds, iron and metal ores, oil, 
 manure, tallow, etc.) 
 
 3. Semi- Manufactured Articles — 
 
 From Foreign Countries . . . £19,200,000 
 
 ,, British Possessions . . . 8,300,000 
 
 £27,500,000 
 
 (Such as yarns, unwrought iron and steel, iron pig and 
 puddled, lead pig and sheet, tin blocks, copper wrought 
 and unwrought, leather, etc. ) 
 
 4. " Manufactures " — 
 
 Foreign. Colonial. Total, 
 
 (i. ) WTiolly manufactured 
 
 material and plant .£59,800,000 £3,100,000 £62,900,000 
 
 (Such as manufactures of wood, iron and steel, machinery, glass, linen, 
 cotton, woollen and jute goods, leather, chemicals, soap, matches, hats, paper, 
 glue, drugs, cement, etc.) 
 
 Foreign. Colonial. Total. 
 
 (ii.) Luxuries . . . £28,500,000 £105,000 £28,600,000 
 (Such as silk, motors, pictures, musical instruments, watches, pipes, books, 
 embroidery, toys, furs, playing cards, lace, beads, curios, etc. ) 
 
 5. Miscellaneous — £3,500,000 (such as horses, ice, cut flowers, plants, and 
 
 parcels post). 
 
 Total Imports, £528,000,000.
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES 
 
 75 
 
 EXPORTS CLASSIFIED (1902). 
 
 {From Trade and Navigation Returns, December 1902.) 
 
 I. Animals, Lmng . . . £824,361 
 II. Articles of Food and Drink . *16,439,603 
 
 III. Raw Materials . . . 31,171,616 
 
 IV. Articles Manufactured and 
 
 partly manufactured, viz. : — 
 
 A. Yarns and Textile Fabrics . 103,336,862 
 
 £. Metals and Articles manu- 
 factured therefrom (except 
 Machinery and Ships) . 42,612,141 
 
 a Machinery and Mill Work . 18,751,812 
 
 D. Ships new (not registered 
 
 as British) . . . 5,891,775 
 
 E. Apparel and Articles of Per- 
 
 sonal Use . . . 12,150,371 
 
 F. Chemicals and Chemical and 
 
 Medicinal Preparations . 9,586,728 
 
 G. All other Articles, either 
 
 Manufactured or partly 
 Manufactured . . . 39,296,233 
 S. Parcel Post . . . 3,478,478 
 
 Total Value 
 
 £283,539,980 
 
 Total Value 
 
 (as below) £283,540,000 
 Foreign and 
 
 Colonial 
 
 Merchandise 65,810,000 
 
 Total 
 Exports £349,350,000 
 
 A large proportion of these are manufactured articles. 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SOME SPECIAL 
 
 MANUFACTURES. 
 
 (From Statistical Abstract.) 
 
 Woollen Manufactures — 1887 1901 
 
 E £20,600,000 £14,200,000 
 
 1 7,700,000 9,580,000 
 
 Cotton Manufactures — 
 
 E 59,600,000 65,700,000 
 
 I. . . . . . 2,280,000 4,780,000 
 
 Silk Manufactures — 
 
 E. . . ... . 2,330,000 1,430,000 
 
 I. ..." . . . 10,380,000 13,030,000
 
 76 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 Exports and Imports 
 
 — continued. 
 
 
 Glass Manufactures — 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 1887 
 £1,020,000 
 1,670,000 
 
 1901 
 
 £1,060,000 
 
 3,530,000 
 
 Furniture, Frame and Woodwork — 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 574,000 
 488,000 
 
 634,000 
 2,280,000 
 
 Iron and Steel (wrought and unwrought) — 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 25,000,000 
 3,650,000 
 
 25,300,000 
 
 11,500,000 
 
 Machinery — 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 10,600,000 
 * 
 
 16,300,000 
 3,600,000 
 
 Cutlery — 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 2,920,000 
 
 * 
 
 3,540,000 
 1,152,000 
 
 Leather Manufactures — 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 2,470,000 
 2,245,000 
 
 2,770,000 
 2,237,000 
 
 Clocks, Watches and Parts — 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 154,000 
 1,150,000 
 
 104,000 
 2,030,000 
 
 * Not separately distinguished in 1887. 
 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 IMPORTS OF RAW MATERIALS. 
 
 Iron Ore (tons) 
 Raw Cotton (lbs.) 
 Wool (lbs.) 
 Leather (cwt. ) . 
 Indiarubber (cwt.) 
 Wood (loads) . 
 Silk (lbs.) 
 Copper (tons) . 
 
 (From Statistical Abstract.) 
 
 1887 1901 
 
 3,760,000 5,550,000 
 
 *1, 500,000,000 *1,623,000,000 
 
 ♦258,000,000 *398,200,000 
 
 754,000 1,315,000 
 
 237,000 466,000 
 
 5,650,000 9,200,000 
 
 3,010,000 2,000,000 
 
 200,000 264,000 
 
 Actual amount retained for home consumption.
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES 
 
 77 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 TOTAL EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE (including 
 Food stufts, Raw Material, and Manufactures) of certain 
 Countries. 
 
 (From Board of Trade Returns. Cd. 1199 and 1761.) 
 
 1883 
 1885 
 1890 
 1895 
 1900 
 1901 
 
 U.K. 
 
 240 (213) 
 213 (188) 
 263 (228) 
 226 (195) 
 283 (224) 
 271 (221) 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 France 
 138 (74) 
 
 124 
 150 
 135 
 164 
 160 
 
 (65) 
 (80) 
 (76) 
 (90) 
 (90) 
 
 Germany 
 164 (98) 
 143 (90) 
 166 (107) 
 166 (109) 
 230 (149) 
 222 (144) 
 
 (The numbers in brackets represent the respective exports 
 wholly or partly manufactured, of each country.) 
 
 U.S.A. 
 
 168 (28) 
 151 (31) 
 176 (31) 
 165 (38) 
 286 (90) 
 304 (86) 
 of articles, 
 
 E. 
 I. 
 
 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED 
 ARTICLES FROM AND TO THE U.K. 
 
 1883 
 
 213 
 
 53 
 
 1885 
 
 188 
 
 54 
 
 1890 
 228 
 63 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 1895 1900 
 
 195 224 
 
 76 93 
 
 1901 
 221 
 94 
 
 1902 
 229 
 99 
 
 (The exports, in both tlie above tables, are exclusive of the value of ships. ) 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 TRADE WITH CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1902. 
 
 {From Statistical Abstract.) 
 
 Imports from 
 
 Germany ... 34 
 
 Holland ... 35 
 
 Belgium ... 26 
 
 France ... 51 
 
 Russia ... 26 
 
 Denmark ... 16 
 
 United States 127 
 
 (Tables showing our Trade with France, Germany, Holland, and U.S.A., 
 for the last twenty years, will be found in the Board of Trade Eeturn. 
 Cd. 1191, p. 11, etc.) 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 Exports to 
 
 33 
 
 Total Trade 
 67 
 
 13 
 
 48 
 
 13 
 
 39 
 
 22 
 
 73 
 
 14 
 
 40 
 
 4 
 
 20 
 
 43 
 
 170
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 TOTAL TRADE OF U.K., distinguishing between Foreign 
 Countries and British Possessions. 
 
 (Extracted from Parliamentary Paper 214 of 1903.) 
 
 
 
 IMPORTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 
 
 
 
 From BritisTi Possessions 
 
 
 
 
 From 
 
 Self- 
 
 
 
 
 Foreign 
 
 Governing India Others 
 
 Total 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 
 ('ountries 
 
 Colonies 
 
 
 
 Average 1881-85 
 
 305 
 
 43 36 16 
 
 95 
 
 400 
 
 1886-90 
 
 300 
 
 42 32 15 
 
 89 
 
 389 
 
 1891 
 
 336 
 
 50 32 17 
 
 99 
 
 485 
 
 1895 
 
 321 
 
 52 26 17 
 
 95 
 
 416 
 
 1900 
 
 413 
 
 62 27 21 
 
 110 
 
 523 
 
 1901 
 
 416 
 
 60 27 18 
 
 106 
 
 522 
 
 1902 
 
 421 
 
 60 29 18 
 
 107 
 
 528 
 
 (Bullion and specie excluded from these tables. ) 
 
 EXPORTS OF BRITISH AND IRISH PRODUCE. 
 
 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To British Possessions 
 
 
 
 
 To Foreign 
 Countries 
 
 Self- 
 Governing India 
 Colonies 
 
 Others 
 
 Total 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 erage 1881-85 
 
 151 
 
 38 80 
 
 13 
 
 81 
 
 232 
 
 1886-90 
 
 155 
 
 87 32 
 
 12 
 
 81 
 
 236 
 
 1891 
 
 161 
 
 41 31 
 
 14 
 
 86 
 
 247 
 
 1895 
 
 156 
 
 33 25 
 
 12 
 
 70 
 
 226 
 
 1900 
 
 197 
 
 48 30 
 
 16 
 
 94 
 
 291 
 
 1901 
 
 175 
 
 52 35 
 
 18 
 
 105 
 
 280 
 
 1902 
 
 174 
 
 60 33 
 
 16 
 
 109 
 
 283 
 
 TOTAL EXPORTS (including Foreign and Colonial 
 Produce). 
 
 
 
 In Million £ 
 
 
 
 
 
 To British Possessions 
 
 
 
 
 To Foreign 
 Countries 
 
 Self- 
 Governing India Others 
 Colonies 
 
 Total 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 Average 1881-85 
 
 207 
 
 42 31 15 
 
 88 
 
 295 
 
 1886-90 
 
 210 
 
 41 33 14 
 
 88 
 
 298 
 
 1891 
 
 216 
 
 45 32 16 
 
 93 
 
 309 
 
 1895 
 
 210 
 
 37 26 18 
 
 76 
 
 286 
 
 1900 
 
 252 
 
 53 31 18 
 
 102 
 
 354 
 
 1901 
 
 235 
 
 68 36 19 
 
 113 
 
 348 
 
 1902 
 
 232 
 
 67 88 17 
 
 117 
 
 349
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES 
 
 No. 10. 
 TOTAL COLONIAL TRADE. 
 
 {From Parliamentary Pajyer 262 of 1903.) 
 
 The total aggregate Colonial Trade in 1900 was 482 million £ 
 — imports 244, and exports 238. Of this (1) imports 117, 
 exports 108 — total 225, was with the U.K. ; (2) imports 46, 
 exports 43 — total 89, was with other British Possessions ; and 
 (3) imports 81, exports 87 — total, 168, was with Foreign Countries. 
 
 (Note. — The above figures include bullion and specie, excluded in the 
 previous tables. ) 
 
 No. 11 
 TRADE TO BE WON. 
 
 Foreign imports into Self- Governing Colonies, 1901 :■ 
 
 Canada and New foundland . . £29,300,000 
 Australia and New Zealand . . 14,500,000 
 
 Cape and Natal 5,900,000 
 
 £49,700,000 
 
 Of this (roughly) : — 
 
 United States sends .... £31,000,000 
 
 (Mostly raw materials, coal, cotton, 
 metals, etc., food-stuffs, oil, etc.) 
 European Countries send . . . 12,000,000 
 
 (Largely sugar, oil, wine, etc. ) 
 Other Countries send . . . 6,700,000 
 
 (Chiefly tea and tropical produce.) 
 
 £49,700,000
 
 80 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 (2). 
 
 Imports from Foreign Countries into certain Colonies and 
 Dependencies. 
 
 {From Board of Trade Return. No. 322 of 1903.) 
 
 
 
 1901. 
 
 Manufactures and 
 
 
 Food and Drink. 
 
 Raw Materials. 
 
 Semi- Manufactures 
 
 Australia 
 
 £2,315,000 
 
 £910,000 
 
 £9,211,000 
 
 New Zealand 
 
 313,000 
 
 58,000 
 
 1,647,000 
 
 Natal . 
 
 605,000 
 
 193,000 
 
 756,000 
 
 Cape 
 
 1,930,000 
 
 334,000 
 
 2,103,000 
 
 Canada . 
 
 7,253,000 
 
 7,503,000 
 
 14,065,000 
 
 Newfoundlauc 
 
 I 268,000 
 
 20,000 
 
 185,000 
 
 Total . 
 
 £12,700,000 
 
 £9,000,000 
 
 £28,000,000 
 
 India 
 
 3,270,000 
 
 1,310,000 
 
 9,850,000 
 
 Crown Colonic 
 
 s 6,600,000 
 
 4,700,000 
 
 4,300,000 
 
 No. 12. 
 THE TAXATION OF RAW MATERIALS. 
 
 (From Custom House Return. Gd. 1617.) 
 Imports, 1901, from — 
 
 
 Australia 
 
 New Zealand 
 
 Wool 
 
 £11,500,000 
 
 £3,900,000 
 
 Skins and Tallow 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 880,000 
 
 Meat 
 
 1,900,000 
 
 3,500,000 
 
 Corn "1 
 
 
 
 Butter, Cheese, J- 
 
 3,300,000 
 
 1,550,000 
 
 Fish, etc. J 
 
 
 
 Imports from — 
 
 
 
 
 Food 
 
 Other products 
 
 Canada 
 
 £13,000,000 
 
 £6,800,000 
 
 Australia and N.Z. 
 
 10,200,000 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 Cape . 
 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 If preference be limited to food stuffs, Canada would gain on 
 two-thirds of her whole imports to the United Kingdom ; New
 
 TRADE AND TARIFF TABLES 
 
 81 
 
 Zealand would gain on one-half; Australia would gain on a 
 fifth only ; and the Cape would not gain at all. 
 
 The imports from the Cape (exclusive of gold), are, roughly, 
 £10,000,000, of which about half are diamonds. Of the balance, 
 £3,000,000 is wool, £900,000 feathers, £500,000 skins, and 
 £340,000 copper. 
 
 No. 13. 
 RETALIATION. 
 
 (From Custom House Return. Cd. 1617, and Cd. 1761.) 
 
 Estimated average ad valorem equivalent import duties levied 
 by the undermentioned countries on the principal articles of 
 British export from the United Kingdom : — Russia, 131 per 
 cent. ; United States, 73 ; Austria-Hungary, 35 ; France, 34 ; 
 Italy, 27 ; Germany, 25; Belgium, 13. 
 
 (1) Imports from Russia (1902) — 
 
 Food-stuffs . 
 Raw materials 
 Manufactures (chiefly paper) 
 Semi-manufactures 
 All other articles . 
 
 (2) Imports from U.S.A (1902)— 
 
 Food-stuffs 
 
 Raw materials (chiefly cotton) 
 Manufactures . . . . 
 
 Semi-manufactures (chiefly leather) 
 All other articles (chiefly tobacco) . 
 
 £13,500,000 
 
 10,000,'000 
 
 195,000 
 
 205,000 
 
 1,770,000 
 
 £25,670,000 
 
 £62,500,000 
 
 44,000,000 
 
 9,500,000 
 
 4,750,000 
 
 6,250,000 
 
 £127,000,000 
 
 Thus, in the case of Russia, if food-stuffs and raw material 
 are excluded (as is generally agreed) from Taxation for 
 retaliatory purposes, the amount of Russian Imports on which 
 
 F
 
 82 APPENDIX III. 
 
 retaliatory duties can be placed, amounts in all to £195,000 of 
 manufactured goods, and £205,000 of semi-manufactures, the 
 latter being, however, the raw material of home manufactures. 
 Against this we export to Russia '£14,000,000 of goods, on 
 which further retaliatory duties could be placed. 
 
 Similarly, in the case of the United States, the total amount 
 of American goods on which retaliatory duties could be placed 
 is £9,500,000 of so-called manufactures. Against this we ex- 
 port to the States £24,000,000 of British produce, and 
 £19,000,000 of Foreign and Colonial re-exports, on which 
 re -retaliatory duties could be placed. 
 
 [See my Paper, Retaliation : Is it Feasible ? published by the 
 Cobden Club. Messrs. Cassell & Co., Ludgate Hill, London,] 
 
 No. 14. 
 MR CHAMBERLAIN'S PROPOSALS. 
 
 (As detailed at Glasgoiv, October 6, 190S.) 
 
 Duties to be Imposed — 
 
 On foreign corn (except maize), 2s. a quarter. 
 
 On foreign f-our, a duty which will "give a substantial 
 preference to the miller." 
 
 On foreign meat (except bacon), 5 per cent. 
 
 On foreign dairy produce, 5 per cent. 
 
 On foreign loine and fruit, duties which will give " a sub- 
 stantial preference to the Colonies." 
 
 On all manufactured goods imported, a duty " not exceeding 
 10 per cent, on the average, and varying according to 
 the amount of labour on the goods." 
 
 Taxation to be Remitted — 
 
 Three-fourths of the Tea Duty. 
 
 Half of the Sugar Duty, with corresponding reductions on 
 cocoa and coffee.
 
 BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 FINANCE AND POLITICS: 
 
 AN HISTORICAL STUDY, 1783-1885. 
 
 Two Volumes. Svo. 26s. 
 
 "A couple of extremely interesting and readable volumes." 
 
 — Spectator 
 
 "A thoughtful and carefully elaborated work. . . . Mr Buxton 
 is a cultured man, with a lively fancy and a keen appreciation of the 
 sensational, the ludicrous, and the pictviresque. " — Times. 
 
 "The value of these two volumes lies in the lucid exposition of 
 the development of the true principles of taxation ; but their interest 
 not a little depends on their style, which is throughout vigorous 
 and terse." — Daily Telegraph. 
 
 "The author . . . makes a sort of half aj^ology for the length to 
 which his work has run out. He may, however, be certain that 
 in the opinion of his readers no such excuse is needed. A title in 
 w^hich the word ' finance ' occurs is, of course, a danger signal for 
 many people, showing them what to avoid by reason of its want 
 of interest. In Mr Buxton's case the warning wovdd be false. He is 
 alwa^ s interesting." — Scotsman. 
 
 "A well-digested history of the government of England during 
 the last hundred years . . . though the book must have been 
 terribly hard to write, it is pleasantlj' easy to read. The author 
 has the great gift of lucid statement ; indispensable in dealing with 
 those complicated questions of policy which have a special attraction 
 for him. " — Liverpool Post. 
 
 MR GLADSTONE 
 AS CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER 
 
 A STUDY 
 
 Large Crown Svo. ^s. net. 
 
 "The author writes well, and he has been successful, no small 
 achievement, in giving a thoroughly readable and interesting 
 account of the most inspiring page in English financial history." 
 
 — The Spectat(yr. 
 
 " This book should be both read and used as a handbook of 
 finance for the latter half of the century. It is a difficult task 
 to render a book on Budgets and fiscal reforms agreeable to the 
 ordinary reader ; but it is a task which the author has accomplished. " 
 
 — Westminster Gazette. 
 
 ". . . The manner of Mr Buxton's work calls for a concluding 
 sentence. It is written in a terse and vigorous style, thanks to 
 which the subject, not of the lightest, is made remarkably interesting 
 and readable." — Glasgoiv Herald, 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 
 [SEE OVER
 
 BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 Third Edition. Svo. los. 6d. net. 
 
 FISHING AND SHOOTING 
 
 Illustrated by Archibald Thorburn, and from Prints 
 
 "The great charm of the book to the general reader will be the 
 sympathetic descriptions of river scenery and the notes on the birds 
 who frequent the banks. Then the author is a man of rare culture, 
 without a trace of pedantry. He is familiar with the riverside and 
 woodland poets, and his quotations are always felicitous. Moreover, 
 he goes in for the archaeology of fishing and shooting literature, and 
 there his sense of the humorous comes in. ... A fascinating book." 
 
 —The Times. 
 
 " Success in field-sjDorts is a matter of temperament, and observa- 
 tion and nerves, in a high degree. So is the enjoyment of the 
 surroimdings. The author is not insensible of this, and he succeeds 
 in nearly every page in being in the right mood, and bringing his 
 readers to the same happy state of mind. . . . The author does not 
 merely write about shooting, and at the reader. He takes you out 
 shooting, which is another thing." — Spectator. 
 
 "One of the most fascinating books of the season. The charm 
 of Mr Buxton's book is that of his pet occupation— its infinite 
 variety. Practical instruction, philosophic moralising, quaint 
 humour, nature painting not unworthy of Jefferies, personal anecdote, 
 a due attention to the disagreeables and the blank days. ... As 
 charming a library companion as the sportsman could desire these 
 forlorn winter evenings." — Morning Post. 
 
 " On sporting subjects there cannot be too many good books, 
 because when a man is unable to shoot or fish, the next best thing is 
 reading about them ; no one who has ever brought trout or pheasant 
 to bag will regret the fireside hours spent over this book . . . 
 altogether an admirable book." — Country Life. 
 
 " The book is one which should be in every sportsman's library. It 
 is needless to comment on the excellence of ]\Ir Thorburn's 
 illustrations. " — Badminton Magazine. 
 
 "Mr Thorburn is even better than usual in this book. The 
 frontisiDiece of heavy trout on the rise is quite one of the most 
 attractive things of the kind we have seen." — Saturday Review. 
 
 " He writes in so lucid and charming a manner, that we have not 
 often read a book on fishing with greater interest, and have no doubt 
 that Mr Buxton's readers will be many." — The Field. 
 
 "We can recommend the book to all who care for either of the 
 sports in question; the author's experience, close observation, and 
 strict fairness to the game, coupled with a pleasant style, enlivened 
 by many a dash of humoiir, makes him a most congenial companion." 
 
 — Land and Water. 
 
 JOHN MUKRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
 
 PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 
 9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET.
 
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