I THE SOUL A STUDY AND AN ARGUMENT THE SOUL A STUDY AND AN ARGUMENT DAVID SYME M AUTHOR OF "OUTLINES OF AN INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE," " REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND," AND " THE MODIFICATION OF ORGANISMS " HonDon MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY I903 All rights reserved 57 ^-NERAL PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES. PREFACE In publishing this book I have no expectation that it will prove much of an attraction to the general reader. The utmost that I look for is that it will provoke further inquiry amongst those who, like myself, are profoundly dissatis- fied with current opinion on the subjects herein discussed. I do not profess to have done more than give an outline of my views, and that in the briefest manner possible, for to treat these thoroughly would have taken a much larger volume. The fact that these views differ widely from those generally entertained by my contemporaries may be a sin past praying for In V 2834 vi PREFACE the opinion of the many, but a saving grace in the estimation of the few. I shall be more than content if they meet with the approval of the latter. THE AUTHOR. Melbourne, Nov. ^oth, 1902. INTRODUCTION The term Soul — What the soul really is — Method of investiga- tion — The brain not the sole seat of sensation — Nerves, nerve cells and their functions — A theory of reflex action — On organic modifications — The phenomena of unconscious mental action. Is there a soul ? Is there any purpose or design in nature ? Is there any after life ? These questions are simple in statement but not in solution ; they must occur to all who care to consider, even in an incidental way, their own existence or the system of things of which they form a part. Most of us at times feel an interest as to the warrant we have for believing as we are taught, or as to the reasons that others have for their opinions on these subjects. We speak lighdy of Life and Mind, Matter and Spirit, Sensation and Consciousness, and of many other entities or attributes of which knowledge is assumed. As a matter of fact, viii INTRODUCTION however, there is no agreement among our doctrinaires or experts as to what any such terms actually represent. The purpose of this little book is to arrive if possible at a clear idea of what is signified by these terms, and a better understanding of some elementary truths which all of us have an interest in finding and keeping if we can. If the opening pages appear some- what technical or abstruse it is because the authorities generally relied upon, and whose views it was necessary to explain, have been very technical in their treatment of their subjects. In breaking new ground, or in the turning up of old, some preliminary clearing is generally necessary. We must at least remove' such obstructions as will permit us to see the character of the land we propose operating upon before putting in the plough. As in the following pages I shall have occasion to say a good deal about Mind, it will be advisable to clear the ground of any false ideas on this subject before entering on any discussion as to its relations, its functions and its sphere of action. We have what we are pleased to call a Science of Mind, but we have no settled idea as to its INTRODUCTION ix subject matter — a Psychology, as Schopenhauer said, but no Psyche. Opinions on this subject vary in a remarkable degree. According to some writers, Mind is a State ; according to others, it is a Quality or Property ; by many again it is a Product, and by not a few it is regarded as a Function. It has been variously described as Consciousness, as the Non-extended, as Soul (without the definite article), as Thought and as the Thinking Process. The last word on this subject is from Professor James, and according to him it is none of these. The term Soul, he "says, " explains nothing and guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible things about it, and definitely to ascertain the correlations of those with brain processes is as much as Psychology can empirically do," and he accordingly apolo- gises for employing the term on the ground that it is in common use. The term Soul is, therefore, according to Professor James, a mere figure of speech, and the thing itself a pure fiction. Consciousness, described _by Mj l1_as _a " series ofstates," and by Mr._ Herbert Spencer-as — " feelings and the relations of feelings^ is a x INTRODUCTION radically defective definition of mind, as Per- ception and Volition, both properties of mind, can in no sense be regarded as " states " or "feelings." But assuming mind to be a State we are compelled to ask, What is the subject of that state ? If it be a Quality or Property, What is the substance in which this property inheres ? If Thought, What is the thinking subject of which it is the product ? And, lastly, if it is a Function, What is the operating agent ? These questions confront us at the very outset, for it is manifest we cannot have a state without a subject, a property without a substance, thought without a thinking subject, or function without an operating agent. The two prevailing theories on this subject are — (i) that mind is a function of the nervous system, especially of the brain, or more specifi- cally of the cerebral hemispheres ; (2) that it is a metaphysical entity, an undefined and sup- posititious something which has the property of non-extension. That mind, according to our experience of it, is invariably associated with organic matter, no one can entertain a doubt ; but to argue that because of that rela- tionship mind is the function of the nervous INTRODUCTION xi system is to beg the whole question at issue. We might with more reason assert that mind operates through the organism, or that organ- ised matter is the product of mind. On the other hand, mind in the metaphysical sense is an illusion. It is not an entity because it is not a substance, but at the most only the property of a substance, which process has by a process of mental legerdemain been substituted for a substance — a hypothetical property of mind for mind itself. Non-extension is a purely negative property, and conveys no idea of any positive quality whatever — a property, in fact, that is non-existent. Nevertheless, this view of mind was not only held by the older metaphysicians, but also by the later, like Sir William Hamilton, and is even now entertained by the modern school of physiological psychologists like Pro- fessors Bain and Ladd. There is, however, another theory, which represents mind, not as an abstraction, nor as a negation or property, but as a substance ; as that something which feels, thinks and wills — the thinking substance, subject or agent ; The Mind, in fact, as distinguished from its counter- part the body. But the substance has been so xii INTRODUCTION refined away in these latter days that there is now nothing left but the shadow. If we must proceed scientifically, we must alter our method of investigation ; we should begin with the simplest mental phenomena, and thence proceed to the more complex. But we reverse this process. We begin by introspec- tion, we interrogate our own minds, which exhibit mental phenomena in their highest state of complexity. The system of gradation in organic beings shows that nature reverses the order followed by the psychologist. She begins with the simple, and thence proceeds to the complex. The unicellular precedes the multi- cellular organism, and organic complexity cor- responds with functional efficiency. Nature proceeds by the aggregation of units and by the differentiation of functions. We have first the single cell, then its multiplication by division, then the aggregation of the cells thus produced into tissues and organs and systems of organs, each organ having its own special function and sphere of action. The same method is followed in the formation of the nervous systems ; first the single nerve cell or ganglion makes its appearance, next its multiplication by division, INTRODUCTION xiii then the aggregation of the cells into organs or centres or systems of centres, each organ again having its own special function and its own special sphere of action. Thus the tissue cell is the physiological unit, the multicellular cell an aggregation of such units ; the nerve cell is also a unit, and the nerve centres aggregations of such nerve units. To select one of these centres (say, the brain) for investigation, and to ignore all the other centres, or all the units of which they are composed, is to proceed on altogether wrong lines, for it is as necessary for the psychologist to understand the functions of the other centres, and of the units composing them, as it is for the physiologist to know the functions of the organs of the body and of the units of which they are constituted. The tissue cell is the physiological unit, because it manifests all the phenomena of a living being — assimila- tion, dissimilation, growth, reproduction and decay. Can we say that the nerve cell is the psychological unit ? The invariable association of mental action with nerve action would indi- cate that an affirmative answer should be given to this question, and if the relation between the mind and a ganglion be that of the thinking xiv INTRODUCTION subject or agent to its organ, or medium of communication, then the ganglion may without impropriety be provisionally regarded as the psychological unit. Introspection should not be neglected, how- ever. It is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Our own minds do not supply the requisite data, nor are the data always reliable. Minds differ, and conclusions founded upon personal experience also differ. Besides, absolutely correct observation is impossible. We cannot think and at the same time observe ourselves thinking ; we cannot be subject and object at the same moment. By introspection we can only get a glimpse of the process of thinking when we have done thinking. It is because of the persistent adherence to this method of in- vestigation that Psychology has become a mere catalogue or classification of mental faculties, and classification is not explanation. What we want is a Comparative Psychology. We require to study mind in its least as well as in its most complex form ; in the lowest as in the highest organisms. 1 am aware that psychologists deny that the lowest organisms are conscious beings, at least in the same sense that man is a INTRODUCTION xv conscious being. But are we justified in drawing an arbitrary line between the lower organisms and the higher, and in asserting that all above that line are conscious beings, while all below it are mere automata ? We have first to deter- mine the criterion of " consciousness." Whether or not a monad or a mammal is a conscious being is a question of evidence. It is also necessary to understand the nature and functions of the different nerve centres in the human body, and their relation to each other. In the cerebral hemispheres there are large masses of ganglia in the cranial sub- centres, and in the spinal cord there are smaller masses, while numerous groups of ganglia are distributed throughout the organism, all inter- laced and bound together by a network of nerves. What is the meaning of this arrange- ment ? All the nerves are supposed to reach the cerebral hemispheres (although often by very circuitous routes), and it is therefore assumed that the cerebral hemispheres consti- tute the organ where all stimuli converge, and from whence all motor power proceeds. If we are to believe our text-books it is an indis- putable fact that the cerebral hemispheres are xvi INTRODUCTION the sole seat of sensation ; that we do not really feel where consciousness assures us that we feel ; that it is a delusion to suppose that we see with our eyes, hear with our ears, smell with our nose, taste with our palate, or feel with our finger tips ; that when we have a sensation of pain in the finger the sensation is really not there at all, but in the brain, or in that particular part of the hemispheres called the sensorium. This is neither good physiology nor good psychology. It is not good physio- logy, because molecular motion does not proceed direct from the periphery, nor even from the end organs of sense, direct to the brain, for such stimuli are liable to be, and in fact are, constantly intercepted, deflected, reflected (as in the case of reflex action), or in- hibited by the nerve cells along the lines of communication. It is not good psychology to assert that consciousness deceives us, for in such cases the testimony of consciousness is confirmed by the evidence of our senses, which is the very evidence that the empiricist relies upon to prove the contrary. If I bruise my finger I feel a sensation there, and not in my brain, and by looking at my bruised finger I INTRODUCTION xvii have ocular demonstration that consciousness is right, and that the empiricist is wrong in his diagnosis. When John Hunter asked his paralysed patient whose leg jerked when the skin was irritated, if he felt any pain in it, he replied, " No, sir, but you see my leg does." We must bear in mind the difference between a nerve and a nerve cell. Nerves are only conductors, nerve cells are generators of nerve force, and it is with the latter that sensation is associated, whether these cells are located at the periphery, at the end organs of sense, in the sub-centres or in the cerebral hemispheres. If all the nerves were directly connected with the hemispheres, and all the nerve cells centred in the same organ, it might reasonably be con- cluded that the hemispheres were the sole seat of sensation. But such is not the case ; all the nerves are not in direct communication with the hemispheres, and the nerve cells are not confined to that organ, but are located in such positions as render it highly probable that they perform similar functions to the nerve cells in the hemispheres. The mere fact that no sensa- tion is experienced in the chief nerve centre if the nerve connecting the periphery, the end b xviii INTRODUCTION organ of sense, or the sub-centres, with the brain — as in the case when the nerve is severed — proves nothing. It only shows that the mole- cular motion has not reached the brain, as of course it could not in the circumstances. The sensation might nevertheless have been ex- perienced in the peripheral cells, or at the nerve junctions ; and, if so, and the connection with the brain were intact, what would reach those cells as stimuli might by them be converted into sensation, and be passed on to the brain qua sensation, and would appear as a local sen- sation as represented in consciousness. Some- where the stimulus becomes sensation ; the question is where that transmutation takes place. Nerve cells occur along the lines of nerve fibres, which obviously interrupt or obstruct the passage of the molecular motion from the periphery to the brain, or the nerve force from the brain to the periphery. There are also nerve cells at the junctions in the lines of nerves between the periphery and the brain which serve as switching places where the nerve force is modified, deflected, reflected or inhibited. How is the presence of these nerve cells to be accounted for on the theory that all sensation is INTRODUCTION xix in the brain ? Not only would these nerve cells be of no use where they are, but they would prove a positive obstruction to the passage of the molecular motion. The end organs of sense are also provided with special groups of nerve cells lying between these organs and the brain, which we may assume to exist for the purpose of interpreting and transmitting as sensation to the brain the ex- ternal stimuli which they receive through these organs. And surely a stimulus which did reach the brain and did not indicate whence it came would be as valueless to consciousness as a telegraph message would be to the recipient without the address of the sender. The spinal cord is a column of nerve cells, bound together for the reception, modification and distribution of sensory impulses, and it per- forms its functions independently of the brain. The Medulla is another important centre, which controls the functions of the heart, the blood- vessels and the respiration and certain reflex actions. The basal ganglia of the brain and of the cerebellum are sub-centres for the co- ordination of muscular movements with the impulses of sense, all of which perform their xx INTRODUCTION functions unconsciously. What conceivable purpose can these organs serve unless they share with the cerebral hemispheres the con- trol of organic functions ? Why should it be assumed that the ganglia at the periphery and in the sub-centres perform functions not only different in degree but of a different order from the ganglia in the brain ? The assump- tion could only be justified by evidence show- ing that the ganglia in the brain are different in kind from those in other parts of the organism, or that the mere aggregation or massing of them in the brain will enable them to act differently from those elsewhere ; but no evidence whatever has been produced in favour of either alternative. On the other hand, the behaviour of brainless and headless frogs and other animals proves conclusively that the brain is not the sole organ of sensation and of consciousness. Moreover, the theory under consideration altogether ignores the principle of division of labour which almost everywhere prevails in organic life. Only in the very lowest forms of life (the unicellular) do we find the whole organism employed in performing every organic INTRODUCTION xxi function ; in all animals higher in the scale special organs are provided for the performance of special functions. But if the brain were the sole seat of sensation it would also be the sole means of communication between the organism and the outside world, and all organic functions, voluntary and involuntary alike, would be directly controlled . by the brain, and there would consequently be no necessity for any system of division such as now exists. The recognition of the principle of the division of labour in mental science will throw a flood of light on a large class of phenomena, and help us towards the solution of many difficult problems. For example, it will explain — (i.) The true character of reflex action. As the term implies, reflex action is a twofold process ; it is action and reaction, both of which are generally supposed to be physical in their nature. Literally, reflex action is action thrown, and action thrown back — a bound and a re- bound ; but the bound is not of the same nature as the rebound. The former is no doubt mechanical ; but the latter, or reaction proper, is action of another kind ; it is a response to the mechanical movement, an answer to a call xxii INTRODUCTION or an intimation of some sort. But there can be no response to a movement, molecular or mechanical, which has not been felt. Sensation must therefore precede the response, otherwise the latter would be a mere repetition of the molecular movement, which would be mean- ingless and futile. The most simple reflex action must necessarily have a psychical content, whether it proceeds from the brain or from a sub-centre, or a peripheral ganglion. The sub-centres and ganglia react on a stimulus precisely in the same manner as the brain reacts on a stimulus. In both a sensation precedes a response ; in both the sensation is accompanied by consciousness ; but the sensation in the one case is local, and in the other it is general, the stimulus in the latter case having reached the chief centre (the brain) of sensation and of consciousness. Such stimuli as do not reach the chief centre are not lost ; they are inter- cepted and dealt with by the sub-centres or the local ganglia. There is the same system of division of labour here as in the social com- munity. In the latter there is a chief centre, and there are also local and provincial centres ; so in the cell community there is a chief centre INTRODUCTION xxiii and sub-centres, and the chief centre concerns itself as little with purely local matters as does the high court of Parliament with the affairs of the parish vestry. Or we may compare the system of mental division of labour to the relation existing between the premier and his colleagues under responsible government. In this case the cabinet is not only a corporation ; it is also a personality. The premier rules with the assistance of his colleagues, who have the management of their own departments. But these colleagues he may transfer from one department to another, or he may dismiss and replace them by others if he thinks proper. His is the synthetic activity which moulds the policy of the cabinet. In the smaller matters of their departments his colleagues act on their own initiative, but in matters of importance the premier is paramount. He is the Ego, the personality, the ruling power. (2.) On the same principle I explain the origin of organic modifications. These are not the result of physical causes, as Darwin supposed, but of psychical laws. The physical conditions are the occasions, not the causes, of organic modifications. Organic changes I conceive to xxiv INTRODUCTION be the result of unconscious psychical action ; unconscious because sensation has not reached the chief centre of consciousness, and psychical because sensation, desire and volition are concerned in the production. When certain nerve cells are affected by the conditions of exist- ence the result is discomfort, irritation or pain, followed by a desire for relief, hence efforts are made to adjust the parts affected to their en- vironment. Needs and Efforts are the factors concerned in organic modifications, adverse ex- ternal stimuli being the conditions or occasions which call these forth. The chief centre of sen- sation and of consciousness adapts the organism as a whole to the conditions of existence by adopting modes of living suitable to the climate and the amount of energy expended. Thus the inhabitants of the colder regions feed on carbonised food, those in the tropics use only oxygenised food, while those living in the tem- perate regions partake of both kinds. So the local nerve centres, consciously to themselves, but unconsciously to the chief centre, modify themselves to the conditions under which they may be placed, as, for example, when animals or birds put on a thicker coat of hair, fur or INTRODUCTION xxv feathers in winter than in summer, or modify the lining of their stomachs to suit the particular kind of food provided for them. Both cells and organism possess the same power of adaptation. The struggle for existence is not confined to the organism as a whole, but is maintained in every part of it. Lewes, Professors Roux and Weissmann held that the cells of which the organism is composed are in constant warfare with each other, and that those that are best equipped for the struggle drive the others out of existence. According to Darwin, structural modifications are the result of variations. True ; but what are structural modifications except variations of structure ? The question is, How do these variations arise ? Either they are due to the conditions of existence, or to the nature of the organism, or to both combined. The con- ditions of existence cannot be a vera causa of organic changes, although they constitute an important indirect factor. I say indirect, for the environment is only the condition, or the occasion, not the cause, of modification. It is absurd to speak of a condition as a cause. It is the organism which modifies itself to the xxvi INTRODUCTION conditions, not the conditions which modify the organism. It is the power of adaptation which the organism possesses which is the real factor in organic modifications. If all sensation were concentrated in the brain, then all organic action would be voluntary, and every movement of the body would be under the control of the brain. In such a case the visceral and other vital and involuntary move- ments of the organism would be unintelligible. These latter movements are supposed to , be mechanical ; but what reason have we for believing that what we call mechanical move- ments are not controlled by sensation in the same way as voluntary movements are con- trolled ? When the presence of food in the mouth produces saliva, when the same food enters the stomach it produces gastric juice, is it not the contact of the food with the nerve cells that is the cause of these results, in other words, the sensation of touch ? Every organic change originates in the cells. The growth, direction or movement of the cells is conditioned by the resistance they meet with. Organic forms are the result of motion of the cells in the direction of the least resistance. Pressure INTRODUCTION xxvii on the cells in one direction diverts the motion in another direction. But a piece of dead mechanism would not move. It would not be sensitive ; . it would not adjust itself to pressure. If all life and all growth are cellular, and all structure is cellular differentiation, we are warranted in assuming that, according to the principle of division of labour, and the unity and continuity of nature, the cell exercises functions which constitute it the chief, if not the sole, factor in organic modifications. (3.) On the same principle I explain the phe- nomena of unconscious mental action. Uncon- scious action as I understand it is action which has not originated in, or been conducted to, the chief centre of sensation and of consciousness. It is obvious that there can * be no uncon- scious mental action if the brain be the sole seat of sensation, as consciousness is an in- variable accompaniment of sensation. Uncon- scious mental action, therefore, involves the existence of other centres of sensation, and the mental division of labour provided for by these centres enables us to understand the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of unconscious mental action. The psychical division of labour is xxviii INTRODUCTION thus capable of wide application. On this prin- ciple we can account for the origin of dreams, somnambulism, hypnotism, the spontaneous unreasoned inflow of ideas into consciousness, which we call inspiration, the reproduction and recollection of forgotten events and ideas, and various other mental phenomena. Briefly, I maintain that mind is a real sub- stance, and not a product, property or function of some other real or supposititious substance ; that sensation and consciousness are not the accompaniments of nerve action in the brain only, but are concurrent with all nerve action whatsoever ; that the brain is the chief but not the sole organ of sensation and of consciousness, or the exclusive medium of communication with the external world ; that the distribution of nerve centres, and their location and functions, provide for a division of labour, which leaves subordinate functions to subordinate centres, preserving the more important functions to the chief centre, whose operations alone are revealed in consciousness as ordinarily understood. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION PAGE The term Soul — What the soul really is — Method of inves- tigation — The brain not the sole seat of sensation — Nerves, nerve cells and their functions — A theory of reflex action — On organic modifications — The pheno- mena of unconscious mental action vii CHAPTER I WHAT IS LIFE ? Definitions of life — The theory of a Vital Principle— Physical and chemical theories of life — The relation of heredity to life — The prodigality of nature in providing for the perpetuation of races — True cause of heredity — The cell — The complexity of the tissue cell — Life not a product, a sum, or a condition — Definition of life . . i CHAPTER II REFLEX ACTION Reactions and their character — Ganglionic responses — The functions of the nervous system — Phenomena ex- hibited by decapitated animals — Cerebral responses — Mr. Herbert Spencer on conscious and unconscious reflex actions 30 xxx CONTENTS CHAPTER III CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES PAGE The term Conscious — Evolution of the nervous system — On the co-extension of mind and consciousness — Objections to this view — What is herein involved — Evidence in favour of unconscious mental states — The phenomena of alternate consciousness — Limita- tions of the Ego — Correspondence between the sub- centres and the hemispheres — The Unconscious ... 50 CHAPTER IV MIND AND MATTER The term Mind — Mind as the unextended — The relation- ship between mind and matter — Professor Bain's theory of this relationship — A Modus vendi — Is mind a function of brain ? 75 CHAPTER V TELEOLOGY Teleology a discarded doctrine — The argument stated — The evidences of design — How to discover the de- signer — The theory of Divine Intelligence — The sanguiferous system — The physical theory — The theory of natural selection — Variations, how they arise —Profitable and unprofitable variations — What be- . comes of the unprofitable — The hypothesis of slight variations — Relation of mind to body — Wants and efforts — Cellular modifications 95 CONTENTS xxxi CHAPTER VI ON INSTINCT PAGE Various definitions of instinct — Darwin's views on — Pri- mary and secondary instincts — On the absence of the maternal instinct in the cuckoo — Special instincts — The spex — Mimicry of other species, and of environ- ment — Instinct defined 142 CHAPTER VII TRANSFORMATION Mind in the concrete and in the abstract — Spencer's views on transformation — The conservation of matter, energy and mind — Our ignorance of mind and of matter — The prevalence of the belief in a future state of existence — Arguments from instinct, from the persistency of memory and from the organising power of mind . . 177 Appendix 207 THE SOUL CHAPTER I WHAT IS LIFE? S» «/? Definitions of life — The theory of a Vital Principle — Physical and chemical theories of life — The relation of heredity to life — The prodigality of nature in providing for the perpetua- tion of races — True cause of heredity — The cell — The complexity of the tissue cell — The germ cell — Life not a product, a sum, or a condition — Definition of life. ^Vha t is Lifej Many volumes have been written, and in- numerable answers have been given, in reply to this question, but so far scientific investi- gators have arrived at no settled agreement among themselves as to what it really is. The multifarious and divergent definitions may be grouped into two classes, namely, one which describes it as a function, a product or a property of the organism ; the other which declares it to be an internal force, the 1 B 2 THE SOUL primum mobile, which actuates it. In the one case Life is the result, the sum or expression of certain physical forces ; in the other it is the cause of organic phenomena. The former is the view held by the physicist, the latter by the vitalist. Lamarck, John Hunter, Dr. Abernethy and other physiologists identified Life with elec- tricity. Dr. John Brown, Dr. Fletcher and Dr. Carpenter maintained that Life is a pro- duct, or is the sum of the actions of organised beings. Huxley, on the other hand, insisted that Life or vitality is a property — a property of protoplasm ; and the properties of protoplasm, he explains, " result from the nature and disposition of its molecules " — a not very satisfactory explanation unless we know what protoplasm is, and also "the nature and disposition of its molecules." Johannes Mueller describes Life " as the influence of a force, existing before the parts, which are in fact formed by it during the development of the embryo," and this force he declares to be " rational and creative." Henle believed it to be " a non-material WHAT IS LIFE? 3 agent " associated with the organism, " pre- siding over the metabolism of the body, capable of reproducing the typical form with endless division without diminution of in- tensity." Much to the same effect are the views of Haeker, Dumas and Reil. Accord- ing to Bichat, Life is " the sum of the func- tions which resist death " — a truism, but wholly inadequate as a definition, as is also that of Lamarck, " that state of things which permits organic movements," and that of De Blainville, " the twofold internal movement of composition and decomposition, at once general and continuous." Mr. Herbert Spencer's definition is much more elaborate, but not more satisfactory. According to him Life is " the definite com- bination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive^ in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences " — a definition which would be applicable to many pieces of mechanism in motion. One might as well describe an eight-sided crystal as " an inorganic body which assumes the form of an octrahedron." To the elucidation of this definition Mr. Spencer devotes no less 4 THE SOUL than three chapters of his Principles of Biology. What idea does this definition convey to us ? What is it that distinguishes a dead organism from a living one ? Changes ? Many things change : everything changes. Inani- mate bodies, water, sky, the earth beneath our feet, all change, each according to its con- stitution and the force moving it. A dead organism also changes, and sometimes very rapidly. But while a living organism changes it also exhibits phenomena of a very special kind. It is extremely complex, and maintains that complexity ; it grows ; it assimilates and dis- similates matter ; is many functioned, and yet one whole, self-adjusting self-renewing and apparently self-conscious; it experiences pleasure and pain ; it reproduces other or- ganisms like itself. Obviously the difference between a living and a dead body consists in the nature of its constitution, and not in mere external manifestations. G. H. Lewes's definition of Life is much to the same effect as Spencer's. He admits the similarity, but claims priority in publication. Life, according to Lewes, is a series of definite and successive changes, both in structure and WHAT IS LIFE? 5 composition, which take place within an indi- vidual, without destroying its identity," and elsewhere as " the sum of the properties of matter in a state of organisation.'' Such defi- nitions are valueless. What are " changes " ? What is changed ? Of what do the sums and series consist ? Changes, activities, movements are merely indications, and not even essential indications, of life. Cataleptic patients have been known to show no slightest sign of change of any kind for days together, while fishes and worms and other cold blooded animals have been frozen for months without losing their vitality. 1 Following Henle, Dr. L. Beale defines life as " a power, force or property, of a special and peculiar kind, temporarily influencing matter and its ordinary forces, but entirely different from and in no way co-related with these." This is Vitalism pure and unadulterated. Dr. Beale proceeds to explain that this power, force or property (property of what ?) is not mind, " since life exists where brain and nerves, the instruments of mind, are not found." He thus evolves mind from life, not life from 1 Appendix A. 6 THE SOUL mind, while at the same time he seems to identify life with mind when he describes the latter as " a vital power of a particular form of bioplasm," and affirms that " the movements of this mental bioplasm " are communicated to the nerve mechanism, while further on he identifies this " mental bioplasm " with the Ego. 1 Huxley contemptuously describes the theory of a vital force as " illogical and unscientific." Why either the one or the other ? If living matter manifests properties not possessed by matter that is not living, a fact which no one disputes, how can it be illogical or unscientific to assume the existence of a special something to account for the existence of special pheno- mena ? I do not hold with the view that life is a special force, but confess I can see nothing either illogical or unscientific in assuming such an hypothesis. The theory held by Bichat, Cuvier, Lewes and physiologists generally, that life is the sum, aggregate or ensemble of the various properties of the organism, need not detain us long. According to this view, an organism is a systematic arrangement of parts capable of exercising peculiar functions, and life 1 Protoplasm of Matter and Life, pp. 313, 319. WHAT IS LIFE? 7 is the product of the assemblage of these and the association of these functions. In the first place, it assumes the existence of certain organic parts and functions, the sum total of which is said to produce life, while the origin of the separate parts and different functions is left unaccounted for. In the second place, it does not explain how the sum or aggregation of these produces the resultant life and the unity of life, as the mere aggregation of units will not necessarily differ from the individuals which compose the aggregation. The Physical Theory of Life Like Huxley and other physicists, G. H. Lewes contends that the ordinary physical forces are quite sufficient to account for the phenomena of life, proof of which he professes to discover in the fact that the fundamental properties of organised matter are recognisable in ordinary matter, and alleges that the only reason why the physicist has hitherto failed in forming a living body is because we have not yet acquired the requisite knowledge to make the proper adjustments and combinations. " If 8 THE SOUL we can decompose the organic into the inor- ganic, this shows that the elements of the one are the elements of the other ; and if we are not able to recompose the inorganic elements into organic matter (not at least in its more complex forms), may not this be due to the fact that we are ignorant of the proximate synthesis, ignorant of the precise way in which those elements are combined ? " He goes on to say, " I may have every individual part of a machine before me, but unless I know the proper posi- tion of each I cannot with the parts reconstruct the machine." The physicist thus admits that so far he has failed to solve the problem. Supposing, however, that Nature succeeded where science failed, and that all the diversified forms of life which we see around us are the products of physical adjustments and com- binations, then, it must be acknowledged, she has been eminently erratic in her mode of procedure. If life, like some chemical com- pound, is the result of such combinations, why so careful to preserve existing types ? This, surely, would have been a work of supereroga- tion. Nature has been far from niggardly in providing for their maintenance. Every care WHAT IS LIFE? 9 has been taken to prevent the possibility of failure in succession. If a branch of a fruit- bearing tree be partially barked, or a ligature tied tightly round it, or the roots severely pruned, or the tree in any way injured so as to endanger its life, that particular branch, or that individual tree, as if eager to provide for the continuation of the type, immediately puts forth fruit buds to an extent never before attempted. Nature often employs more than one mode of reproduction in order to ensure the succession in type. Numerous plants and animals reproduce themselves by two or more processes. Thus in many species the same plant is capable of propagating by seed, by buds, by tubers, and sometimes also by foliage, so that if from any cause a plant should fail to propagate by one process, there will still be other processes in reserve. This provision is also common in animals of the lower orders. The Protozoa, for example, propagate both sexually and asexually ; the Radiolaria by fission and by the detachment of the intercapsular sar- code ; the Amaeba, by fission and by the detach- ment of a pseudo- podon and by the production of masses of sarcode ; the Vorticella, by fission, io THE SOUL by emanation, by the breaking up of the nucleus and by endo-genesis division. Then, again, the fecundity of animals, especially those of the lower orders, is extraordinarily profuse. A single cod will in a single year produce a million of eggs ; a single aphid a quintillion in the same period. If not for the preservation of the type, why this extraordinary fecundity ? Why these provisions to ensure the succession of types if organisms can be manufactured, so to speak, by simple addition ad libitum and in infinite variety by mere combination ? One must assume that contrivances and adaptations of various kinds which now exist for the perpetuation of types are not resorted to unnecessarily. According to the physical theories referred to, there would have been no transmission of parental likenesses, and no fixity of type ; but only a chaos of unstable individualities, unrelated to each other and incapable of association. Heredity in Relation to Life Another difficulty, if we take the physicist's view of life, is Heredity. Haeckel seeks to WHAT IS LIFE? n account for the transmission of ancestral qualities by a molecular process which he calls the " perigenesis of the plastidules," which he describes as " a developing impulse," transferred from the ancestral cell, and which he conceives as assuming the form of " a branching wave motion." * Berthold, followed by Gautier and Giddes, on the other hand, adopts the chemical theory, and asserts that inheritance is to be explained on the basis that in the chemical processes carried on with- in the organism " the same substances and mixtures of substances are reproduced in quantity with regular periodicity." To all such theories Du Bois-Raymond's question is a sufficient reply. " How," he asks, "can a number of senseless carbonic, nitrogenic, oxygenetic and hydrogenetic atoms be otherwise than indifferent to where they are placed or how they are moved ? We 1 We must be careful not to take Haeckel too seriously. He is a past master in the coinage of phrases which often represent nothing but his own imaginings. His vocabulary, like Wise- mann's, forms an amazing collection. It includes cell souls and soul cells, tissue souls and nerve souk, psychical cells and will souls. His " plastitudes " he himself describes as purely " hypo- thetical." — The Riddle of the Universe, p. 122. 12 THE SOUL can in no way imagine how their mere inter- action can beget in them consciousness. " Some recent experiments on the influence of low temperatures on bacterial life, conducted by Sir James Crichton-Browne and Professor Dewar, would seem to dispose of the chemical theory of life. A typical series of bacteria were employed for this purpose which were first exposed to the temperature of liquid air for twenty-four hours — about 190 deg. C. — and in no instance was there any impairment of the vitality of the organisms. The organ- isms were again subjected to the same tem- perature for seven days with a like result. The same series of organisms were next sub- jected to the temperature of liquid hydrogen — about 250 deg. C. — a temperature at which molecular movement and the entire range of chemical and physical activities are supposed to cease, and far below that at which chemical action is known to take place, and yet the bacteria survived. These experiments, there- fore, go to show that life is not dependent on chemical reactions. 1 1 Lecture before the Royal Institute of Great Britain by Dr. Allan Macfadyen. WHAT IS LIFE? 13 Professor Hering presents us with another theory of heredity. He regards memory as a function of organic matter, and the reproduc- tion of parental likenesses as the result of the " unconscious recollections of the past," the basis of which he professes to have discovered in the persistence of the "undulatory move- ments," which he supposes to be characteristic of molecules. But if the " undulatory move- ments " are an efficient cause, why increase our perplexity by adding the mental concept — the " unconscious recollection of the past " ? " Unconscious recollection," moreover, is an absurdity. That there may be unconscious registration of events, and unconscious repro- duction of these events, but not unconscious recollection, as recollection implies conscious- ness, is a view which is as old as Aristotle. We cannot recollect an event without being conscious of it as a prior experience. Haeckel also calls to his aid a similar factor, which he terms "organic memory." But memory is not a physical, but a mental, attribute, and we might as well speak of " organic mind " or "body mind," as of " organic memory." Either the physical theory is adequate, or it is not. If 1 4 THE SOUL adequate, there is no occasion for supplement- ing it by a new and incompatible factor ; if inadequate, it should be abandoned altogether. Indeed, the adoption of a concept of this nature is a flagrant abandonment of the physical theory. Moreover, the theory of organic memory is in this connection quite unten- able. Historically, we are able to trace a long series of likenesses from remote ancestors, and it is therefore assumed that the likenesses are causally connected with memory. But memory is a looking back, while the transmis- sion of type is a looking forward. We have therefore to reverse the position and trace the succession onwards from the primordial organism which left its impress on its posterity. Some physicists contend that heredity is due to the conditions of existence, as like conditions produce like effects. But if environment were a determining factor, how is it that we find organisms of a widely different character exist- ing side by side, each appropriating different materials from the same external medium, the vertebrata, for instance, assimilating the phos- phates, the mollusca the carbonate of lime, the articulata chetin, and each with these building WHAT IS LIFE? 15 a different edifice ? Obviously, th* assimila- tion of the material, and the consequent character of the structure, is determined by the nature of the organism, and not the organism by the nature of the external medium. No doubt the formative impulse is conditioned by the environment, but a condition is not a cause. The True Cause of Heredity The phenomenon of heredity may be accounted for by the simple process of cell- division. All life originates in the cell ; all reproduction takes place by the division of the cell. In cell division each half of the divided cell is exactly alike, and so the qualities of the original cell are necessarily transmitted to the cells produced by division. That which moves the cell to self-division, to the parting of half its substance for the benefit of posterity, we assume to be an impulse not of its own creating, which we may describe as a self- perpetuating instinct. This instinct may be observed in full vigour in annual plants, which die as soon as they have matured their seed, as 1 6 THE SOUL if they lived only for this purpose, and in many insects which die immediately they have con- summated the act which secures the perpetuation of their species. The Cell If we would understand what life is we must go back to the cell. The cell of a multicellular organism differs in no respect from a unicellular organism, except that the former leads a double life (in relation to itself and to other adjoin- ing cells), while the latter has an independent existence. That the cell possesses some degree of feeling can hardly be disputed ; if the feeling is pleasurable, there should exist the power of conserving or increasing it ; if painful, and it cannot be diminished or relieved, it must result in modifications either qualifying it to resist the suffering or causing it to sink under the burden. If it can feel, it must possess other mental powers if only in a rudimentary form. As Hegel said, "Everything is in sensation." Of course I shall be told that nothing so low down in the scale of life as a cell is capable WHAT IS LIFE? 17 of mental action, and I am aware that in hold- ing a contrary view there are high authorities against me. If it be contended that nerves and brain are necessary to mental functions, I reply that zoophytes and other infusory organisms possess neither nerve nor brain, and yet they display feeling, and even intelligence, in their movements. We might with equal reason assert that because certain animals have no special organs of sight or of hearing, that they are insensitive to light and sound, which would be incorrect, as every student of Binomics knows. That special organs of sense are advantageous no one will dispute, but the difference between these special organs and the general organ of touch (which includes them all) is one of degree only, not of kind. So it is with regard to nerves and brain. We have no grounds for asserting that such sensibility as unicellular organisms possess differs in any respect from that of animals of a higher grade except in degree. Place a polype in a glass of water along with a living infusorian, and the former, without any special organ of sense, somehow sees the latter, and thereupon raises a whirlpool with its tentacles c 1 8 THE SOUL in order to bring it within its grasp and devour it. Apparently the monad has the sensation of hunger, as it searches for food ; it has discrimination, as it selects the proper food it requires ; it has volition, as it seizes and devours the food it has selected. It is now acknowledged that nerve cells and nerve fibres are nothing more than protoplasm developed in a particular manner. Descartes held, what is now considered to be an extreme view, that all animals other than man were only a superior class of automata, eating without pleasure, dying without pain, desiring nothing, knowing nothing, and only simulating intelligence as the bee simulates a mathematician. " I desire," said .^escartes, " that you should consider that th^se functions in the machine naturally proceed frorrjSpr mere arrangements of its organ^f neitherenore nor less than the movemej^f of a 'clock or other automaton, from that of its weights and wheels ; so that, so far as these are concerned, it is not necessary to conceive any other vegetative or sensitive soul, or any other principle of motion or life, than the blood or the spirits agitated by the fire which burns continually in the heart, WHAT IS LIFE? 19 and which is in no wise essentially different from all the fires which exist in inanimate bodies." From the evolutionist's point of view, Huxley's reply to this is conclusive, namely, that the unity and continuity in nature forbid such a view, and the argument has equal force against those who contend that even the lowest organisms are incapable of mental action. The evolutionist cannot logically permit any break in the mental continuity between the monad and man. In the whole world of nature there is nothing so wonderful as the cell. It alone possesses life. A compound or multicellular organism is only an aggregation of living cells ; all else is dead or formed matter, the product of these cells. A monad, which is a unicellular organ- ism, has no visible structure, no organs of sense, of. locomotion or of prehension, not even an organ of digestion. It throws out processes from its body to seize its food, and, having secured it, forthwith wraps its body around it and digests it. But other cells have improved on the method of the monad, for they have associated themselves into compound organisms, and have constructed separate organs 2 o THE SOUL for the discharge of separate functions ; they have, in fact, established a system of division of labour whereby the work is more efficiently executed, and at less expense than if each cell performed the whole for itself. If an elementary body like a monad possess intelligence, we may well assume that this at- tribute will not be absent from these other cells which proceed to lay out their work in such a business-like manner. Are we to suppose that the cell has no share in the building up of its own organism ? That is the common belief. Those close observers of plant life, Kerner and Oliver, however, have no hesitation in stating that " the walls of plant cells themselves are the work of the protoplasts, and that it is not a mere phrase, but a literal fact, that the protoplasts build their abodes themselves, divide and adapt the interiors according to their requirements, store up the necessary supplies within them, and, most im- portant of all, provide the wherewithal needful for nutrition, for maintenance, and for re- production." * It is in the cell that the mys- teriously equipped and wonderfully complex human organism has its beginning. If we reject 1 The Natural History of Plants, p. 42. WHAT IS LIFE? 21 the physical theories of life, are we to fly to the other extreme and maintain that every step in the formation of this organism is due to an Omnipotent Power, or to what Lotze, with fine metaphysical flavour, calls the " interaction of the Absolute " ? Is it not more rational to assume that the cell has been endowed with the power to form its own organism ? The reader must bear in mind that the cell is not a simple homogeneous jelly speck, with a cell wall, or that it is a quiescent molecule of matter. On the contrary, it is a complicated mechanism and the centre of extraordinary activity. When protoplasm was first dis- covered it was believed to be nothing more than a simple homogeneous mass of jelly- like substance without any kind of structure, and it was fondly supposed that in this would be found the basis of life. Improvements in the microscope and more careful observation, however, led to the discovery that the contents of the cell consisted of other things besides protoplasm, and the attempt to solve the problem of life by chemical analysis and syn- thesis was accordingly abandoned. It was found that the cell, so far from consisting of 22 THE SOUL a simple homogeneous substance, possessed a most complex structure undreamed of by earlier observers. Inside the cell wall, long believed to be the most important part of the cell, there was discovered a mass of reticulated fibres, consisting of minute threads, and within the meshes of this a clear transparent fluid or protoplasm, together with granules called microsomes, small thread-like objects termed chromosomes, believed to be connected with the process of cell division and heredity, and two objects like double stars on each side of the nucleus, which displayed extra- ordinary activity. The nucleus also was found to be a much more complicated piece of mechanism than was formerly supposed, and is now regarded as a fundamental part of the cell. From experiments made on unicellular organisms it has been found that a cell deprived of its nucleus is incapable of assimi- lating its food or of reproduction. Within the nucleus there are also two small bodies called nucleoli, which perform certain vital functions, and a granular material called chromatine, which has the power of absorbing stains. Altogether the cell is now recognised WHAT IS LIFE? 23 as an organism of a very complex character, possessing all the physical properties of a multicellular body, such as irritability, sensi- tiveness, contraction, assimilation and dissimi- lation (metabolism), and reproduction. More- over, the contents of the cell are, under a powerful microscope, seen to be in a state of great activity. The protoplasm is in constant motion, now moving in one direction and now in another, swerving suddenly from left to right and from right to left, carrying along with it the granules, nucleus and other contents of the cell. The movements seem perfectly spontaneous, and are not the results of a jar, shock or stimulus from without, but are to be regarded as movements proper to the proto- plasm. Dr. Beale witnessed under a powerful microscope some minute amoebae, several less than 100,000th of an inch in diameter, in a state of most active movement, the alteration in form being very rapid, and the different tints in the different parts of the moving mass were most distinctly observed. 1 From all this one can conclude that in the lowest, as in the highest, forms of life, within the protoplastic 1 Protoplasm, p. 50. See Appendix B. 24 THE SOUL envelope, as without, there is present a forma- tive energy, which fashions the mechanism of the body, and maintains that mechanism in motion. What Life is Life is not a mechanism, nor the result of a mechanism. An organism may have every tissue intact, every organ perfect, and all its connections complete and in proper order, and yet it may be dead. 1 Nor is life a state, or the condition of an organism. Virchow held that it was a state of irritability : Lewes that it was 1 There may be said to be two modes of life, an actual and a potential. Actual life is manifested in plants and animals, potential life in seeds, which may live for an indefinite period if excluded from the disintegrating effects of the atmosphere by being enclosed in air-tight capsules. Fishes, frogs and worms, which have been frozen hard in solid ice, and have thereby been effectually excluded from the atmosphere, have in many instances been restored to actual life by careful thawing. Seeds and frozen animals may therefore be said to have potential life, which may become actual life under certain conditions. An elevated reservoir may in like manner possess potential power j it may drive a mill or a dynamo if the proper connections are made, but the reservoir, even with its connections, would not be of the slightest service without the force of gravitation ; and an organism, however perfect its mechanism, can never possess more than potential life unless it has a life-giving force. WHAT IS LIFE ? 25 a state of sensitiveness or sensibility. But a state, not being a force, can effect nothing. An organism may even be insensitive, and yet be alive, as in the case of syncope and suspended animation ; and it may be sensitive and yet not alive, as a dead body will exhibit sensitiveness when an electric battery is applied to it. The difference between a living body and a dead body is not that the one is sensitive and the other insensitive, but that the former resists decay and the latter does not. Bichat's defini- tion of life, as " the sum of the functions which resist death," is good as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough, for what are those functions he refers to which resist death ? Life is the resultant of a process, or rather of two processes. There is a process which results in decay, and there is another process which resists decay, and life may be said to be the resultant of these two processes. Exposure to the oxygen of the atmosphere will disintegrate any organism, living or dead : the living organ- ism resists disintegration, and the dead organism offers no resistance. Oxidation and nutrition are the two processes that are constantly in operation in every living body. Oxidation is 26 THE SOUL waste and decay ; nutrition counteracts the effects of this waste and arrests decomposition. Reference has already been made to the theory of a vital principle. If by this is meant an entity which is neither physical nor mental in its character, I must demur to the theory. I believe that vital phenomena may be accounted for without having recourse to an unknown principle or entity such as this is. Aristotle went even further than the vitalist in his en- deavour to account for the phenomena in question, for having assumed that there were three kinds of life — a vegetative, animal and mental — he provided each with an independent soul. The well-known canon, that it is un- desirable to multiply causes unnecessarily, is especially applicable in this case. We want but one theory of life, which will embrace all vital phenomena, but one cause which will account for all modes of life. I shall here endeavour to indicate such a cause. We may conceive of a mind of a low order, semi-conscious, without perception, and with no other attributes except Appetency and Will. Such a mind we may suppose to belong to the lowest orders of the vegetative and animal WHAT IS LIFE ? 27 kingdom. Grant this much, and we may proceed to indicate the relations of such a mind to life. In every being there exists an impulse to withstand aggression, to fight against adverse circumstances, to strive to provide for unsatisfied wants — in a word, to resist extinction. This vis resistendi is mind in its embryotic or rudi- mentary stage. We assume that there are orders and degrees of mental capacity as there are orders and degrees of corporeal complexity and efficiency. In plants we have the simplest of all organic structures — a mere series of cells ; in man a most complex system of tissues and organs. In plants we have intelligence of the lowest order, in man of the highest. To resist disintegration some kind of force is obviously necessary. No action is possible without efFort. No being can live by simply doing nothing, for inertion is death. It is impulse that turns the plant to the sunlight and sends its roots long distances in search of moisture. It is the same impulse which compels man to provide for his material, social and mental wants at an ever increasing ratio. It is this conservative force which the older physiologists recognised as vis 28 THE SOUL medkatr'iX) which was supposed to play such an important part in maintaining the integrity of the organism, and it is this same impulse which has now become familiar to us as the " struggle for existence." I consider that it is this impulse which produces the phenomena which we call life. In a future chapter I will endeavour to show how this impulse operates in organic modifications or the origination of species. If, as biologists assure us, all life is in the cell, that the cell is the only part of our organism that is alive, it is vain to look for life else- where than in the cell. What, then, is it that animates the cell ? I believe it to be this pri- mordial impulse I have described. It may ^ 33 Ganglionic Responses On what principle do we concede psychical action to the cerebrum and deny it to the ganglion ? What evidence is there to justify an artificial severance of the nervous system, which is and acts as one whole, into two parts so differendy endowed ? The distinction can- not be defended. The mechanism is the same in both cases. In both there is a nerve centre, in both there are afferent and efferent nerves, and in both there is a nervous arc or circle, and the ganglion responds to an impression apparently in the same manner as the cerebrum responds to any stimulus which reaches it. In the latter case it is admitted that there is, first, the sensation, then perception, and lastly voli- tion. Have we any reason to believe that the same process does not take place when the ganglion responds directly to a stimulus with- out reference to the cerebrum ? That the response is prompt and almost instantaneous in the latter case only shows that the mecha- nism is in good working order, and that the distance traversed is shorter. That we are 34 THE SOUL conscious of the brain process, and that we are not conscious of the ganglion process, does not affect the question in the least, as, for aught we know, the ganglion may have a conscious- ness of its own. Consciousness is a purely personal matter. An individual cannot be conscious of another individual's consciousness. Consciousness is not a faculty, it is the cog- nition of an individual's feelings or experi- ences. I am that of which I am conscious, no more and no less. My feelings, or rather my knowledge of my feelings, constitute myself. The simplest nervous system is that of the ascidian, which consists of a single ganglion, with nerve fibres branching out from it in several directions. (Fig. i.) These nerves or fibres are either afferent or efferent (some authorities maintain that each nerve is both afferent and efferent), and they vary considerably in number. Now, suppose a stimulus is conveyed from some outpost on the periphery of the organism to a gan- glion or nerve cell from which fibres radiate, the ganglion has to determine — first, the quarter from which the stimulus has come ; REFLEX ACTION 35 secondly, the nature and urgency of the stimulus ; thirdly, the character of the response required of it ; and, lastly, through which nerve or channel it will send that response. In the case of an animal with a complicated nervous system, such as a vertebrate, it will Fig. i. — Nervous System of the Ascidian. (a) Mouth i (b) The Vent ; (c) Ganglion ; (d) Nerves. also have to be decided whether the matter is of sufficient importance to require to be re- ferred to the cerebrum. The fact that there are usually several nerves connected with even a single ganglion renders the process a most complicated one. The response involves even a greater amount of intelligence than that of an operator at a central telegraph station, who has only to receive a message from one out station and forward it to another without 36 THE SOUL requiring to understand its meaning. The simplest ganglionic reflex action would, there- fore, seem to involve the exercise of mental faculties. Even the reaction of the muscles of the back of the mouth to a stimulus is not effected without discrimination and will. Touch the back of your mouth with a feather, and a convulsive contraction of the gullet is the result, probably followed by vomiting ; but the same nerve centre responds in a totally different fashion if the stimulus comes from the pressure of food. The nerve centre dis- tinguishes ; and what makes distinctions except intelligence ? Even such so-called reflex actions as sneezing or coughing are caused by excita- tions in the respiratory organs, and are really intelligent efforts to expel substances from the air passages. There is, indeed, direct evidence to show that ganglionic reaction is not different in kind from cerebral reaction. The well-known experi- ments on decapitated frogs and other animals is usually cited as conclusive evidence in favour of physical reaction. But they prove the very opposite. If the foot of a decapi- tated frog be pinched, the frog will withdraw REFLEX ACTION 37 its foot, or it will endeavour to remove itself from the source of irritation. If acetic acid be applied to the inner part of the thigh, the foot on the opposite side will wipe it away ; and, if that foot be cut off, the same movement will be made by the other foot. Hundreds of experiments of this character have been made on decapitated animals with similar results. But they all demonstrate the opposite of what they were intended to prove. The cerebrum is assumed to be the sole organ of psychical activity, and any action, therefore, on the part of the decapitated animal must, it is supposed, be of a purely physical character. But that is begging the whole question. Let us look at the facts. It is beyond a doubt that in the case quoted the foot felt the pinch, and the foot is consequently withdrawn ; that the thigh felt the pain caused by the acetic acid, and an endeavour is made to wipe it off, first by one foot, and, when that is cut off, then by the other. Here we have exhibited feeling, perception and volition, all distinctly psychical phenomena. In such cases there could, of course, have been no cerebral action, as the cerebrum had been removed, but there was undoubtedly psychical 38 THE SOUL action : the stimulus was carried along an afferent nerve to a ganglionic centre, and from thence along an efferent nerve to the muscles, thus producing the effects we have described. The true test of a psychical action is its teleological content — aim, and adjustment of means to ends to attain that aim. A pur- posive action must be regarded as a psychical action, and all so-called reflex actions are purposive. 1 Cerebral Responses We are not warranted in affirming that the ganglia of the cerebrum are in any respect different in their structure, composition or function from the ganglia in other parts of the organism. It is possible that the former, being in close contact with each other, and being the centre of communication with the ganglia in all parts of the organism, may thus be able the more effectually to co-operate for the discharge of more complex psychical func- tions than the latter ; but the mere massing or aggregation of ganglia in the cerebrum 1 See Appendix C. REFLEX ACTION 39 cannot alter their character or their function. Multiplication of like units leaves them units still. A man in John o' Groats in no respect differs from the man in London ; but the latter has special advantages in being in closer associa- tion with his fellows, and in being in constant communication with all sections of the com- munity. All ganglia alike receive and respond to stimuli, and, as I maintain, in the same manner, so that we cannot affirm of one set of ganglia that its action is automatic and of the other that it is psychical and conscious. The cerebral responses are just as much automatic as are the ganglionic. Indeed, physiologists speak of the reflex action of the brain and of mental automatism as freely as they do of the reflex action of a ganglion, and with quite as much reason. Spencer's Theory of Consciousness Reflex action is the basis of Mr. Herbert Spencer's system of Psychology. In his opinion all forms of psychical activity have been de- veloped from reflex action. According to him we have first single reactions; then compound ; then 4 o THE SOUL more compound ; then instinct steps in, which consists of reflexes still more compounded ; and, last of all, reflexes of an order still more com- pounded and complicated, resulting in mental activity. This is how he explains the genesis of consciousness : — " In reflex action of the earliest kind, a single stimulus at the periphery of an afferent nerve sends a wave of molecular change to a nerve centre, whence, through ready made channels, the wave instantly escapes in a more or less augmented form along an efferent nerve and excites some organ or organs . . . and such fully established reflex action, not delayed a moment in its course, is unconscious. A compound action that is fully established ... is also unconscious — the passage through the central plexus not occupying the time which cousciousness implies. But com- pound reflex action, in which the co-operating stimuli produce the combined motive impulses only after a pause, caused by the incompleteness of the permea- bility of the central plexus, may be presumed to have some accompanying consciousness. Each compound reflex action, accompanied at first by consciousness, but made by perpetual repetition automatic and un- conscious, becomes a step towards reflex action still more compound. These, during their stage of partial establishment, imply consciousness that is somewhat more complex and varied than the earlier consciousness which has been lost in automatic action." l 1 Psychology, vol. i. pp. 559, 560. REFLEX ACTION 41 Here a single reflex action is described as unconscious ; a compound reflex action is also unconscious, but it may be accompanied by con- sciousness under certain specified conditions ; that is to say, if " the molecular wave of change " in its passage through the central plexus is delayed owing to the incomplete- ness of the impermeability of the plexus, the process may be assumed to be accompanied by consciousness. Elsewhere Mr. Spencer defines reflex action as " the sequence of a single con- traction upon a single irritation." 1 It would appear from this that he regards reflex action as a purely physiological process. A compound reflex action may therefore be described as a multiple contraction upon a multiple irritation. There would be no difference in kind between a single reflex action and a compound reflex action. Add bricks to bricks and the result is bricks. A house is made of bricks ; but the intention, the will and the skill which their construction evidences, point to the introduc- tion of another and entirely different factor, which is not in the bricks, but which uses them for its purpose. Why, then, should ?, vol. i. p. 427. 42 THE SOUL it be assumed that a compound reflex action may be accompanied by consciousness and a single reflex action not be so accompanied ? Because of the " pause " in- the passage from the central plexus to the periphery, says Mr. Spencer. But why should consciousness be conditioned by a " pause " ? There is here no self-evident connection between the con- dition and the resultant ; nor is it obvious how consciousness comes on the scene at all. When there is a " pause," owing to the organic connections not being fully established, he tells us that reflexes are accompanied by consciousness, and when these connections are fully established, and there is no longer a " pause," that consciousness disappears. There is here no continuity of the conscious life. Consciousness begins with a " pause," and it ends with the absence of a " pause." No doubt the organic connections are necessary. When fully established they facilitate the trans- mission of messages between the end organs and the nerve centres, and, vice versd, between the nerve centres and the end organs. But their establishment, or disestablishment, should not involve the existence of consciousness. REFLEX ACTION 43 To me it appears that consciousness manifests itself only when the nerve centres respond to the message transmitted by the end organs, and not before.- Mr. Spencer also supposes that this curiously acquired consciousness may at last be lost, as compound reflexes by per- petual repetition again become unconscious, and thus we are brought back to where we started from — minus a Psychology. It seems to me that the principle of unity and uniformity in nature demands that every nerve centre should be recognised as an organ of psychical activity, that what holds good of one ganglion, wherever situated, should hold good of all, whether single or in masses. Some animals have only one ganglion ; some have more than one, and others have large aggrega- tions of them. Quality, not quantity, should be the criterion. A single ganglion in one animal may be as indispensable to that animal as a million of them may be to another animal ; and so one ganglion at the periphery of an animal should be as necessary to the locality over which it presides as a mass of ganglia to a wider area in the same organism. It is admitted by physiologists that the sensory 44 THE SOUL ganglia, which form nearly the entire Encepha- lon of fishes, are homologous with the Cephalic ganglia of Vertebrates, and as such are the organ of consciousness ; l and it would therefore be correct to assume that the single ganglion with which many animals are alone furnished is also homologous with the Cephalic ganglia ; and if the sensory ganglia are, in one case, the organ of consciousness, may we not also assume that all ganglia subserve the same purpose ? The fact that a ganglion often acts without reference to the cerebrum does not support the view that its action has no psychical content. The ganglia outside the cerebrum have a more limited range of functions than those which are massed within it ; but that has no bearing on the question at issue. That the functions of a provincial council are limited to matters within its own province, while those of the central government embrace the whole community, does not constitute a difference in kind, but only in degree. Like the provincial council, the outside ganglia act on their own initiative in purely local affairs, only communicating with the cerebrum on matters of vital interest to the 1 Carpenter's Comparative Physiology, p. 691. REFLEX ACTION 45 organism ; while on the other hand, the cere- brum, being in communication with all the ganglia, is in a position to determine what is good for the whole, and to act accordingly. The arms of the cuttle fish are provided with numerous contractile suckers, and each individual sucker has its own ganglion. In consequence of this arrangement, every individual sucker may be made to contract of its own will, and attach itself to any substance without com- municating with the supreme centre ; and this action will take place when the arm to which the sucker is attached is separated from the body. If mental activity is invariably associated with molecular motion in the ganglia of the brain, we are justified in assuming that it is also associated with the action of the ganglia else- where. In reflex action so-called an excitation is followed by a response ; so it is in conscious action. In reflex action an afferent nerve moves a ganglion or nerve centre, and the nerve centre responds through its efferent or' motor nerve, forming what is called an arc or circle, pre- cisely the same process takes place in conscious action, only that the circle is wider, the excita- tion being transmitted from the periphery to 46 THE SOUL the central hemispheres, and thence back to the periphery, while in so-called reflex action the distance is much shorter. If, therefore, the ganglia in the hemispheres are in no respect dif- ferent in constitution from the ganglia elsewhere, and their mode of responding to excitations is the same, why should we imagine that their functions are so widely different ? Why intrude so foreign a conception merely to satisfy precon- ceived theories ? There is nothing in any re- corded observations to support them. If there is any analogy between a nerve cell (which is merely a more sensitive cell than the tissue cell) and the social unit, we must assume that the former, like the latter, actively partici- pates in the maintenance of the organic com- munity. Physiologists draw a line of demarca- tion between the central and other ganglia ; such movements as reflex action, the muscular contraction of the heart, the peristaltic move- ments of the intestinal canal, which are not controlled by the conscious will (the Ego), they say, have no psychical content — are, in fact, the result of physical or chemical agencies. But we cannot divide the organic forces in this fashion and unwarrantably assert that this part REFLEX ACTION 47 is controlled by will and that other part by- physical and chemical forces. We might with equal propriety divide the social unity into two classes, and one we may describe as men, the other as marionettes. If, however, we adopt this classification, and divide all organic movements into either voluntary and conscious, or involuntary and unconscious, we have to ask, What is that power which produces involuntary movements ? To will to move one's arm is a voluntary and con- scious act, but one cannot will the peristaltic movements of the intestinal canal. The latter movements Sir James Paget ascribes to what he calls " rhythmical nutrition," x which is just as good an explanation of the phenomena as any I have met with. To assert that they are due to reflex action does not help us in the least, for we still want to know what causes reflex action ; and the further assertion that " the ganglionic cells have an independent power of action " 2 has no meaning, unless we are to understand by this statement that such cells have the power of action possessed 1 Croonian Lecture before the Royal Society, 1857. 2 Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, pp. 136, 145. 48 THE SOUL by Cephalic cells, which is what we contend for. It may be objected, however, that if there were two or more centres of psychical activity in the same body, there would be two or more separate and independent powers, which is absurd. There may be two or more separate, but certainly not independent, powers. There are subordinate nerve centres, and there is a supreme nerve centre, just as there are local centres and a supreme centre in the social organism. 1 In like manner, we may assume there are local psychical centres, as we know there is a supreme psychical centre. Almost all physiologists now admit that there is in all organisms, except the lowest, at least one other great centre besides the cerebrum, namely, the spinal cord. Maudsley held that the spinal cord exercises volition ; Vulpian, that its action is systematic, adaptive and intelligent in every instance ; while Greisinger, Prochaska, Nasse, Carus, SchifF, Legallois, Landry, Lay- cock, Carpenter and Lewes maintained that the actions of the spinal cord are of the same order as those of the cerebrum. If it were necessary 1 Appendix D. REFLEX ACTION 49 one might take, seriatim, the other sub-centres between the cerebrum and the spinal cord, and show how each of these has its own psychical functions, and thence proceed to exhibit the psychical functions of the ganglia elsewhere. But, once admit that there are more centres than one, and the objection falls to the ground ; and if more than one, where are we to stop ? How are we to draw a line between a ganglion in the cerebrum, another in the spinal cord, and a third at the periphery ? CHAPTER III CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES The term Conscious — Evolution of the nervous system — On the co-extension of mind and consciousness — Objections to this view — What is herein involved — Evidence in favour of unconscious mental states — The phenomena of alternate consciousness — Limitations of the Ego — Corres- pondence between the sub-centres and the hemispheres — The Unconscious. Strictly speaking the term consciousness can be applied only to our own individual feelings and experiences, not to the feelings and ex- periences of others. I may say I am conscious that I entertain no ill feeling towards a certain person, but not that I am conscious that a certain person has no ill feeling towards me. Consciousness is a wholly personal matter. The term is used to indicate the state of the knowing subject, the conscious self, the Ego. Hence it is inaccurate and often misleading to use it to denote psychical activity generally, 50 CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 51 or as a synonym for mind, as is often done. But we have to retrace our steps. All organisms consist either of a single cell, or of an aggregation of cells, and all multicellular organisms begin life as a single cell, which divides and redivides, and so multiplies into a coherent mass of cells forming a compound organism. All the cells in this compound organism having orignated in a single germ cell, and been propagated by division, would, in the first instance, be exactly alike in composition, structure and disposition, and would therefore have a common ideal, and would work for a common end. But as the structure developed a division of labour would take place, different cells would exercise different functions, and eliminate different material: from their environ- ment for the building up of the organism. Thus, modifications in the composition and in the character of the cells would, in course of time, arise, and so a cell which produces muscle tissue would differ from a cell producing fat or bone or nerve tissue. Cells would also assume different shapes according to the position which they occupied in the tissue, owing to the presence or absence of strain or pressure on 5*2 THE SOUL the parts. Some cells would also be called upon to perform higher functions than others in the cell community, and these being endowed with higher capacities, there would arise a hierarchy of cells. In this hierarchy the nerve cell occupies the place of honour. But something more than the formation of various kinds of tissue and organs would still be required. The organs have to be adjusted one to another, and to the organism as a whole, so that each part may promptly co-operate with every other part for a given end. In an organism in which no rapid movements are necessary, as in a plant which is rooted in the ground, there would indeed be reciprocal dependence of parts, but each individual cell would act on the adjoining cells only, and there would be no necessity for a nervous system ; so also a unicellular organism floating in its watery element has no call for exertion, as its food is brought within reach ; and for the same reason free moving animals, when they become parasites, lose the use. of their sensory and locomotive • organs, as these are no longer required in their struggle for life. It is different with animals which have to search CONSCIOUS .AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 53 for their food and protect themselves from their enemies. Keen sight, hearing and scent then become necessary, along with a capacity for rapid movement, either for offence or defence. Under such conditions a nervous system becomes indispensable, in order that each part may instantly communicate and co-operate with every other part. Hence, also, the more active the life, the higher the nervous organisation required. The Nervous System A nervous system may consist of a single ganglion, with its attached fibres, or of groups or centres of ganglia, with their associated fibres, which serve as means of communication between the various parts of the organic struc- ture over which they preside. These centres are generally classified into two main divisions, called respectively the Cerebro-spinal and the Sympathetic systems. The other ganglia are not included in this classification. The Cerebro- spinal, or, as I shall here call it, the Cerebral system, consists of the cerebral hemispheres, which are situated in the cavity of the skull at 54 THE SOUL the apex of the spinal column. Below the cerebral hemispheres there are sub-centres con- sisting of the Medulla Oblongata, the Corpora Striata, the Thalami Optici and the Cerebellum ; and below these again the Spinal marrow. It is not necessary to discuss here what precisely are the functions of the sub-centres, nor is it yet accurately known what these are. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that they are connected and co-operate with both the cerebral hemispheres above and the spinal marrow below. The Sympathetic system is situated in the front of the spine, in the thoracic and abdominal cavities from which radiate a series of trunks and branches of nerves to the muscular wall of the intestinal canal, the various glandular organs, the heart and the great blood vessels, the organs of reproduction and other viscera. The sympathetic system is not entirely distinct from the cerebral, as it is connected by means of fibres and fibrils at several points, which provides for a limited amount of com- munication and co-operation between the two systems ; but, as Kolliker has pointed out, the sympathetic generally acts quite independently of the cerebral system, and Kirke, Landois and CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 55 Bastian take a similar view. Outside of these two systems there are smaller nerve centres, or ganglia, which, owing to their being dispersed over the organism, can hardly be called a system, but are nevertheless very important. First in order of time come the ganglia, singly or in pairs ; next the sympathetic system, and last of all, but first in importance, the cerebral system. It would appear, therefore, that in the course of time nerve centres which were once supreme have had to take a lower position. Composition and Structure of Nerve Cells It was at one time believed that essential differences existed between the various ganglia, more especially between those of the sympa- thetic and of the cerebral systems, but Jacubo- witsch and Virchow have demonstrated that there are no differences whatever. Yet, though the ganglia in the hemispheres are of the same composition and structure as are those in other parts of the organism, it may be noted that they exist in larger masses, and are more closely packed in the brain than in any other part of 56 THE SOUL the organism, and this concentration of ganglia in the hemispheres may possibly have some relation to the high functions exercised by this centre. Like the cellular system, the nervous system is composed of innumerable units, and each unit, whether isolated or in masses, may be described as a centre of force, and each con- tributes its quotum of energy towards the main- tenance of the organism. As in the body politic, there are individuals and aggregations of individuals, local, provincial, and general councils with corresponding functions, so in the organic community there are ganglia whose functions are local, others which have a wider sphere of operations, and others again which have a still higher jurisdiction, to which, on occasion, all the other ganglia, local or provin- cial, make their appeal, and only such appeals which come before this high court are revealed to consciousness. This high court of appeal is the cerebral hemispheres. So much for the physiology of the nervous systems ; let us now turn to the psychological side of the subject. Every nerve cell is not only a centre of neural force, but is also a centre of mental activity, and wherever there CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 57 is the greatest concentration of ganglia, as in the hemispheres, there also is the greatest con- centration of this activity. Not that neural processes and mental processes are identical, or that a neural act may be transformed into a mental act, or the converse. The neural element remains neural and the mental element continues to be mental to the last. Mental and Conscious States James Mill has laid down the general prin- ciple that " consciousness is the widest word in our vocabulary, and embraces everything that mind embraces." ' Much to the same effect is the view taken by Hamilton. " Mind is to be understood," he says, "as the subject of the various internal phenomena of which we are conscious. Consciousness is to the mind what extension is to matter. We cannot conceive of mind without consciousness, or a body without extension." 2 This is the view generally held by metaphysicians. On the other hand, modern psychologists are 1 Analysis of the Human Mind, p. 227. 2 Led. Meta.y chap. ix. 58 THE SOUL almost unanimously of opinion that conscious- ness is not coextensive with mental activity. Beginning with the " obscure ideas " of Lieb- nitz and the " unconscious sensations " of Kant, the general trend of thought has been all in this direction. Maudsley, perhaps, more than any writer of recent times, has emphatically pro- nounced in favour of this view. " The brain," he says, " not only receives impressions uncon- sciously, registers impressions without the co- operation of consciousness, elaborates material unconsciously, calls latent powers into activity without consciousness, but it responds also as an organ of organic life to the internal stimuli, which it receives unconsciously from the body." G. H. Lewes pertinently remarks — " That we can have thoughts and not be conscious of them, perform actions and not be conscious of them, are facts which prove that a theory of mind which is limited to conscious states must be very imperfect, unless the meaning of the term Conscious be extended so as to include unconscious states." l In this connection another question arises. Can we properly speak of a psychical state as 1 Problems of Life and Mind, p. 144. CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 59 unconscious, or of an unconscious state that is not a psychical state ? I think not. A psy- chical state is a conscious state ; a psychical act is a conscious act. We cannot feel without being conscious of feeling. It is the conscious- ness of feeling that is the feeling ; without the consciousness the feeling could not exist. It is the same with other mental activities. We cannot discriminate, desire, or will without being conscious of discriminating, desiring, and willing. There can be no mental state without the consciousness of that state ; no mental act without the consciousness of that act. It is through my consciousness that . I know that I exist, that I know I think, that I know I have mental states, that I know I perform mental acts. Any acts unconsciously performed are not my acts, or acts for which I am responsible. As Cousin says, " To think, without knowing that we think, is as if we should not think." So says Reid : " No man can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think without being conscious that he thinks." Here, however, I distinguish between acts per- formed by me and acts performed on my behalf, between the consciousness of which the cerebral 60 THE SOUL hemispheres are the organs, and that conscious- ness of which the sub-centres are the organs. The question of the coextension or non-coexten- sion of consciousness with mental activity is a fundamental one. If it can be proved that mental action can be carried on in the absence of consciousness, we shall have to reconstruct our whole system of psychology. Those who hold with J. S. Mill and others that uncon- scious action is a neural and not a mental process may consistently maintain with the elder Mill and metaphysicians generally that consciousness embraces all that mind embraces. In this case there can be no unconscious mental activity. On the other hand, those who hold that mental operations may be carried on without our being conscious of them are in a different position. They cannot maintain the doctrine of unconscious mental activity while they hold that the brain is the sole organ of sensation, for sensation and mental activity cannot be disso- ciated. Unconscious mental activity is only conceivable on the assumption that there are other organs of sensation besides the brain. If we restrict consciousness to the cerebral hemispheres (which I here assume to be the CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 61 organ of the central consciousness), we must ignore all the evidence in favour of uncon- scious mental activity, which evidence, in my opinion, is overwhelming. The phenomena of dreams, anaesthesia, somnambulism, hypnotism and delirium cannot be explained on any other hypothesis. The single fact of alternate con- sciousness demonstrates the existence of mental activity apart from consciousness. Take, for example, the case (a very common one) men- tioned by Abercrombie : — " A boy, at the age of four, fractured his skull, for which he underwent an operation of trepanning. He was at the time of the operation in a state of perfect stupor, and, after his recovery, retained no recollection either of the accident or of the operatic n. At the age of fifteen, however, during the delirium of fever, he gave his mother an account of the operation, and of the persons who were present at it, with a correct description of their dress, and other minute particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it before ; and no means are known by which he could have acquired the circumstances which he mentioned." l Here we have two distinct conscious states or personalities, each unknown to the other. In his normal state the boy knew nothing 1 Intellectual Powers, p. 149. 6z THE SOUL about the accident or the subsequent operation ; in his abnormal or unconscious state he was fully cognisant of everything which occurred. The evidence of mental activity is quite as strong in the one case as in the other ; and the patient's powers of observation were apparently as acute, and his memory as retentive, in the unconscious as in the conscious state. In the somnambulic and hypnotic states the same phenomena occur. When in these states, the subject knows nothing of what happened to him when in his normal or waking state, and when in his normal state he has no knowledge of what passed while in the somnambulic state. He is really two personalities. Sometimes, indeed, there are more than two personalities. Thus Bertrand's patient sometimes passed into three different states besides the normal one. When in the normal state she knew nothing of what occurred in her somnambulic state. When in the latter state, however, she recollected events which occurred to her in the two other somnambulic states ; but in this respect the case is an exceptional one, for as a rule there is an absolute severance of the personalities in each state. Shornbeck describes the case of CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 63 another female somnambulist who had four distinct states or personalities, each with its own life history and memory. 1 In all such cases the patients showed as much intelligence in the abnormal as in the normal state. It would appear that these alterations of personalities are due to certain changes in the psychical condition of the subject of them. In delirium, for instance, if the fever is low, the patient represents one personality ; if high, another, and if still higher, a third. Hamilton mentions the case of an Italian gentleman who died in New York of yellow fever, who spoke English in the early stage of the fever, French in the middle, and Italian on the day of his death. In somnambulism the change of per- sonality appears to be due to the depth of the trance, as in a light trance there is one per- sonality, and in a more profound trance there is another. The phenomena are explicable on the theory of the reconstruction of mental centres. When the normal consciousness is from some cause inactive, a reconstruction may 1 Schubert's Gesch der Seele II., p. 205-207. Du Prcl in his Philosophy of Mysticism has collected a large number of similar cases. See also Griesinger's Mental Pathology, and Professor James's Principles of Psychology. 64 THE SOUL take place, new alliances may be formed, some of the subordinate centres may come into greater prominence, and a new co-ordination of mental forces forming a new centre may create what appears to us a new personality, or Ego. Or we may suppose these alterna- tions of personalities are due to breaches of memory. We know our personal identity from day to day because we remember what we were yesterday and feel that we are the same to-day. A man gets a blow on the head in the street, and he wanders about unable to tell the police who he is, his name, or place of abode. A lunatic generally considers that he is somebody other than he is. We have seen that there are two great nervous systems, the cerebral and the sympa- thetic, and that there are other nerve centres outside of these systems. The Ego does not operate throughout the whole organism, but only within the area covered by the cerebral system ; and, except in a very indirect way, it exercises no influence on the movements of the heart, or of respiration or of the viscera, which are controlled by the sympathetic system. But even in its own domain the Ego is not CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 65 the supreme autocrat he is supposed to be. He can do nothing without the assistance of his subordinates. He may will to act, but he cannot execute. I will to write this sentence, but I do not know how to proceed about it. For the performance of this simple act there must be a molecular movement in the cerebral hemispheres, another in the cerebellum, another along the spinal marrow, another along the nerves of the arm and fingers, to be followed at length by the contraction of the muscles of these organs. The Ego knows nothing about these various physiological processes, any more than it is cognisant of those other processes on which the life of the organism depends from moment to moment. In the one case, as in the other, the Ego is at the mercy of the sub- ordinate mental centres who direct and control the necessary movements. May we therefore not conceive that new conditions may arise necessitating new groupings of the mental centres, that may result in apparently new personalities ? l 1 As we descend lower in the scale of animal life this process is common enough. In the Annelids each ganglion corresponds to a segment of the body. Each of these segments is a complete animal, the whole animal being formed of several elementary F 66 THE SOUL Correspondence between the Sub-centres and the Hemispheres If the cerebrum be the sole seat of conscious- ness, then conscious states are not co-extensive with mental states ; on the other hand, if there are other centres of consciousness, as 1 maintain there are, if each nerve centre is also the seat (or preferably the organ) of consciousness, then consciousness may still be co-extensive with mental states. Psychical action is pre-eminently manifested in the cerebral hemispheres, and this action is conscious ; but psychical action is also, as we have seen, manifested in the subordinate nerve centres, and this also must be assumed to be conscious, not to the cerebral hemispheres, however, as the organ of the Ego, but to the nerve centres elsewhere, each nerve centre having a consciousness of its own. Introspection confirms the view here set forth. Mind has been described as a series of states animals placed one after the other. Thus when an animal is deprived of its head (its Ego), it immediately evolves another head out of the next segment, and if that again is destroyed, out of the segment following. CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 67 of consciousness, and consciousness again as a stream of sensations or thoughts. When walking in the open fields, or in the streets, or sitting at our own fireside, we are conscious of an inflow of thoughts. We are also conscious that this inflow is not the result of our volition, or of any effort on our part, while the thoughts them- selves are often so disconnected as to lead one to suppose that they emanate from different sources. This is the testimony of conscious- ness, and we have no reason to question its truth. No doubt the action of external objects has ordinarily a good deal to do with this ; but the stream flows on just the same when the mind is not influenced by sense impressions as when it is. When the organs of sense are inactive, as during sleep, we find the same process in operation. In dreams, when the senses are closed, we have the same experience. Whence this inflow of thoughts ? May we hazard the explanation that, as the central and subordinate nerve centres are organically con- nected, and the central consciousness being in sympathy with the consciousness of the subordi- nate centres, this inflow may have its source in the latter, which merges into the Egoistic 68 THE SOUL Consciousness when it reaches the cerebral hemispheres ? This hypothesis also helps to explain the phenomena of mysticism. The mystic believes that by cutting himself off from sense-con- sciousness and by subduing his will he is able to hold communion with the Divine Spirit. Jacob Bohme declares : "I do not know how it happens to me that, without having the impelling will, I do not even know what I should write. For when I write the Spirit dictates it to me in great, wonderful knowledge, that I often do not know whether I am in my spirit in this world, and rejoice exceedingly, since then the constant and certain knowledge is given to me, and the more I seek the more I find." This is clearly a delusion on the part of the mystic. He imagines his soul to be in communion with God, whereas it is only in \ communion with itself, and the communications I which he receives are only the result of the/ interaction between his central consciousness and the lower centres. We are now able to explain certain mental phenomena which have hitherto puzzled Psy- chologists. There is an immense accumulation CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 69 of facts showing that ideas, memories and suggestions, quite unsought for by us, are presented to our minds in our waking state and in dreams. We find ideas arranged for us that we have in vain tried to put in order ; problems are solved which baffled all previous attempts at solution ; events are suddenly brought to our recollection after many fruitless attempts to recall them. It would seem as if there were a spirit within us, like the Daimon of Socrates, which prompts us, offers sugges- tions to us, and moulds our opinions for us without any efforts of our own. The phe- nomena may be accounted for by supposing that the sub-centres and the ganglia distributed throughout the organism are in correspondence with the cerebral hemispheres and co-operate with them — not a very improbable hypothesis when we consider that all these sub-centres and ganglia are structurally connected with the brain, and more especially if we bear in mind that there is no difference in the composition and functions of the ganglia whether in the hemispheres, the sub-centres or elsewhere. The Ego may be compared to the head of a State who is prompted by his Ministers, and who 7 o THE SOUL receives communications, protests, remonstrances and suggestions from his subjects in all parts of his dominions. It is to this enlarged view of the human mind that Wundt refers when he says : " The unconscious soul, like a benevolent stranger, works and makes provision for our benefit, pouring out the mature fruits into our laps " ; and of which Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks when he says — " Our definite ideas are stepping-stones ; how we get from the one to the other we do not know ; some- thing carries us, we do not take the step. A creating and informing spirit, which is with us and not of us, is recognised everywhere in real and in storied life. . . . It comes to the least of us as a voice that will be heard ; it tells us what we must believe ; it frames our sentences j it lends a sudden gleam of sense or elegance to the dullest of us all ; we wonder at ourselves, or rather not at ourselves, but at the divine visitor who chooses our brain for his dwelling place, and invests our naked thought with the purple of the Kings of speech and of song." 1 Sir Benjamin Brodie thus records his own experience of similar phenomena : — " It seems to me that on some occasions a still more remarkable process takes place in the mind, which is 1 Mechanism of Thought and Morals, p. 59. CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 71 even more independent of volition than that of which we are speaking, as if there were in the mind a principle of order which operates without our being at the time conscious of it. It has often happened to me to have been occupied by a particular subject of inquiry ; to have accumulated a store of facts connected with it, and to have been able to proceed no further. Then, after an interval of time, without any addition to my stock of knowledge, I have found the obscurity and confusion in which the subject was originally enveloped to have cleared away ; the facts seemed all to have settled themselves in their right places, and their mutual relations to have become apparent, although I have not been sensible of having made any distinct effort for that purpose." * Dr. Gregory (as quoted by Abercrombie) mentions that thoughts, which sometimes occurred to him in dreams, and even the par- ticular expressions in which they were conveyed, appeared to him afterwards, when awake, so just in point of reasoning and illustration, and so good in point of language, that he has used them in his college lectures and in his written lucubrations ; and Condorcet relates that when engaged in some profound and obscure cal- culations he was often obliged to leave them in an uncompleted state and retire to rest, and 1 Psychological Inquiries, vol. i. p. 20. 7 2 THE SOUL that the remaining steps and the conclusion of his calculations had more than once presented themselves in his dreams. The same phenomena is manifested in memory. Very often we cannot recall a familiar word, name, idea or event ; so have to wait for it ; perhaps think of something else, and what we are in quest of will come to us spontaneously. Referring to this, Miss Cobbe says : — " The more this phenomenon is studied, the more I think the observer of his own mental processes will be obliged to concede that, so far as his own conscious self is concerned, the research is made absolutely without him. He has neither pain nor pleasure, nor sense of labour, in the task, any more than if it were performed by some one else ; and his conscious self is all the time suffering, enjoy- ing or labouring on totally different grounds." ! Such phenomena as these are quite inexplicable on the supposition that the cerebral hemispheres are the sole organs of mental activity, but in- telligible enough if we assume there are sub- ordinate centres of psychical activity co-operating with the supreme centre. 1 Macmillans Magazine , Nov. 1870, p. 25. CONSCIOUS AND,' UNCONSCIOUS STATES .ND, UN< We conclude, therefore, that each psychical centre has a consciousness of its own, and that this consciousness is related to the supreme consciousness (the Ego), as the subordinate nerve centres are related to the supreme nerve centre (the cerebral hemispheres). The relation- ship would be similar to that which subsists in the social organism. In the psychical as in the social organism the springs of action are from below, not from above. Every unit counts, and the majority rule, the consensus of thought being the communal consciousness. Hamilton's assertion that " What we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of" is only partially true, for the brain is itself the chief centre of consciousness, to which the subcentres or ganglia are only the contributaries. The term " unconscious " is now much in vogue, and is often used in a vague and in- definite sense, as signifying a state of nescience, the unknown, or unrevealed ; or it is personified as the Unknown or the Unknowable of Spencer, or as the Unconscious or the metaphysical World-Substance of Hartmann. The use of the term in any such metaphorical sense is to 74 THE SOUL be deprecated. The term unconscious should signify only that which is unknown to the supreme centre, the cerebral hemispheres, the Ego, but which may nevertheless be cognisant to the subordinate nerve centres. CHAPTER IV MIND AND MATTER The term Mind — Mind as the unextended — The relationship between mind and matter — Professor Bain's theory of this relationship — Modus 2 95 X 581, and 413 x 4*5- 229 230 APPENDIX He was then asked to give the factors of 36,083, but he immediately replied that it had none, which is really the case, this being a prime number. Other numbers being proposed to him indiscriminately, he always succeeded in giving the correct factors, except in the case of prime numbers, which he generally discovered almost as soon as proposed. The number 4,294,967,297, which is 2 32 -f- 1, having been given him, he discovered (as Euler had previously done) that it is not the prime number which Fermat had supposed it to be, but that it is the product of the factors 6,700,417 X 641. The solution of this problem was only given after the lapse of some weeks ; but the method he took to obtain it clearly showed that he had not derived his information from any extraneous source." Zerah Colburn, as well as George Bidder, another youthful prodigy, lost this power in after-years. Baily remarked that Euler, the mathematician, had, in addi- tion to an extraordinary memory for numbers, also a kind of "divining power," by which he perceived almost at a glance the factors of which his formula? were composed, and promptly gave the result. APPENDIX M (*4P J 75) Speaking of that faculty of the mind from which we infer like events from like causes, Hume says : — " It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be in- dependent of all laboured deductions of the under- standing. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us knowledge of muscles and nerves by which they are actuated, so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects." — Philosophic IP r orks y vol. iv. p. 20. *3* APPENDIX N {Page 204) That there is often direct communication between mind and mind at a distance is within the experience of almost every one who takes an intelligent interest in his own states of consciousness. How often in every- day life have we a mental presentation of the presence of an individual before we have either seen or heard him and had no expectation of meeting him ? Such occurrences are common enough, but they are usually put down as mere coincidences. To the close ob- server, however, the explanation is not satisfactory, as the phenomenon occurs too often to be accounted for in this off-hand manner. Many a time I have been sitting in my room in my office, Which is on the first floor, and my mind fully occupied with the work before me, when suddenly it flashed into my consciousness that a certain person was on his way upstairs to see me, and presently that identical person makes his ap- pearance. I have no recollection of ever having been deceived by such premonitions, and therefore cannot believe in the coincidence theory. I had the same experience out-of-doors. I might be walking in the street, not looking at anybody, with my mind fully 232 APPENDIX 233 occupied, and certainly not thinking or the individual who was first mentally and then physically to be pre- sented to me. But it was only a few persons who foreshadowed their presence to me in this fashion. I had a distracting experience with one gentleman, an eminent judge. I do not think he ever failed to fore- shadow his presence to me if I happened to be within a hundred yards of him. Occasionally I met him in the most out-of-the-way places and in unlooked-for situations, and always saw him in person immediately after the mental presentation of him. I had also a singular experience with another gentleman of my acquaintance. I had arrived at Rotterdam, an entire stranger to the place, on a certain evening after dark, and next morning I took a stroll along the street in which my hotel was situated, never expecting to see anybody that I knew, when suddenly I had a pre- sentiment that my friend Mr. B was somewhere near. I was surprised, and also annoyed, not that I would not have been pleased to meet my friend, but because I thought that here at length was a case in which my presentiment was at fault, for I had said good-bye to Mr. B in Melbourne only a few weeks before, and he never hinted that he had any intention of going abroad. I stopped instantly and looked up and down the street, but could see no one like my friend, and was about to pass on when I saw a person on the opposite side of the street with his back towards me looking into a shop window. It was my friend, sure enough. He explained to me that after I left he had suddenly determined to take a holiday, and came to Rotterdam without knowing I was there. On another occasion, when in London, 234 APPENDIX I was myself the object of a similar presentiment. I had stepped into a shop in the Strand, where five years before I had purchased a certain article. The man in attendance was leaning over- the counter reading a newspaper when I entered, and on seeing me expressed the utmost astonishment. He informed me that he had a moment before I entered been thinking of me. How he came to think of me he said he could not understand, but that he said he recollected me as having purchased the article referred to five years before. I have no reason to believe that my experience in this respect differs from that of other people. On the contrary ,^ I am of opinion that it is a very common kind of experience — so common, indeed, that it has been embodied in a proverb. When two persons begin to speak of a third person who is absent, but presently appears, we say, " Here is the man himself," " Speak of the devil, etc." There is a French proverb which embodies the same experience. THE END PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECC'LES. fij RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT TO— +• 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. Books may be Renewed by calling 642-3405. DUE AS STAMPED BELOW SEP 13 1987 with nrcr amp 9 fi 1Q£ 7 rUlu ulJli rtUu 6 I3v t FORM NO. DD6, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY, CA 94720 U.C l meicYUB »" Hi cS""W I