THE 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS 
 
A STUDY 
 
 IN 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGY 
 OF ETHICS 
 
 BY 
 
 DAVID IRONS 
 
 M.A. (Sr ANDREWS) PH.D. (CORNELL); 
 
 ASSOCIATE-PROFESSOR OF BRYN MAWR COLLEGI 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 MCMIII 
 
 A 71 
 
 reserved 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 FROM the close relation which necessarily exists 
 between ethics and psychology, it is evident that a 
 systematic discussion of the psychology of conduct 
 must render invaluable aid in the solution of purely 
 ethical questions. It is true that psychology alone 
 cannot give a final decision on ethical problems, 
 but it is also true that the particular form which 
 these problems assume is in many cases determined 
 by the assumptions which are made in regard to 
 the psychological principles of action. These as- 
 sumptions, unfortunately, are too often accepted 
 without an adequate investigation of the facts, and 
 needless confusion is thus introduced into ethics. 
 It may be urged, perhaps, that ethics is not re- 
 sponsible for this state of affairs, since it must 
 build upon the basis which psychology supplies. 
 This principle, that the verdict of psychology must 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 be accepted in psychological matters, may be sound 
 in theory, but it cannot be put in practice at the 
 present time, since modern psychology has devoted 
 very little attention to the active side of human 
 nature. In these circumstances it seems im- 
 perative that students of ethics should undertake 
 an independent examination of that department of 
 psychology which concerns them most intimately. 
 The present inquiry into the psychological basis 
 of ethics has developed from a study of a class 
 of mental facts which has been much neglected 
 namely, those phenomena which are usually classed 
 together under the ambiguous term * emotion.' 
 The theory of emotion which is advanced in the 
 following pages was briefly stated in the January 
 number of ' Mind,' 1894, a ^ the close of an article 
 on " Professor James's Theory of Emotion." In 
 that article the final contention was that emotion 
 must be regarded as an ultimate mental fact which 
 can best be described as 'feeling-attitude.' This 
 view was elaborated in a series of papers which 
 appeared two years later in ' The Philosophical 
 Review.' Ultimately, this theory was found to lead 
 on inevitably to a general standpoint in regard to 
 the principles of human conduct. When this wider 
 question emerged, the inquiry as a whole assumed 
 the character of a study in the psychology of 
 ethics. 
 
PREFACE. Vil 
 
 The first half of the book covers the same ground 
 as the articles in ' The Philosophical Review.' The 
 criticism of current theories of emotion has been 
 revised, but has not been materially altered. The 
 chapters on " The Nature of Emotion " and " The 
 Primary Emotions " have been amended, enlarged, 
 and largely rewritten. The second half of the 
 book deals with the primary principles of action 
 and with the ethical significance of results attained 
 throughout. The discussion of the notion of Worth, 
 which appears in the concluding chapter, embodies 
 some of the results of an article on " Natural 
 Selection in Ethics" which was published in 1901 
 in ' The Philosophical Review.' 
 
 My obligations to different writers in ethics and 
 psychology have been acknowledged, as far as 
 possible, in the text. I desire, however, to ex- 
 press my special obligations to Professor James of 
 Harvard. In the actual preparation of this volume 
 I have received valuable criticisms and suggestions 
 from Mr Norman Smith of the University of 
 Glasgow. I am also indebted to Dr Albert Lefevre 
 of Cornell University for the assistance he has 
 rendered in reading the proofs. 
 
 D. I. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 I. THE NATURE OF EMOTION ... I 
 
 II. CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION . . 41 
 
 III. THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS .... 73 
 IV. THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY TENDENCIES 
 
 TO ACTION ICQ 
 
 V. THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY . 124 
 VI. THE IDEAL OF WORTH AS REGULATIVE 
 
 PRINCIPLE 146 
 
 INDEX 173 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THIS investigation is an attempt to ascertain the 
 general principles affecting human conduct. It is 
 undertaken in the hope that results will be attained 
 which will throw light on current ethical problems. 
 The present state of psychology seems to afford 
 sufficient justification for an inquiry of this sort. 
 The psychology of cognition has always obtained 
 more than its relative share of attention, and in 
 recent years the intellectualistic bias has received 
 support and encouragement from the spread of ex- 
 perimental psychology, since cognition lends itself 
 most readily to experimental treatment. This one- 
 sided development has profoundly influenced the 
 whole structure of the science. One evidence of 
 its influence is the general tendency towards Pre- 
 sentationism. The best example of this point of 
 view in its extreme form is Professor Munsterberg's 
 earlier position, as stated in Die Willenshandlung. 
 Miinsterberg assumes at the outset that the only 
 irreducible mental element is sensation, and that 
 sensation is characterised by quality, intensity, and 
 
Xll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 feeling-tone. Consequently pleasure-pain is simply 
 one property of sensation among others, and will is 
 a mere complex of sensations. The self is necessarily 
 excluded from psychology, since it is not an object 
 which can be presented. Presentationism is not 
 always carried to its logical conclusion in this 
 manner, and usually appears in a modified form. 
 Pleasure-pain is recognised as an ' element ' of mind 
 co-ordinate with sensation, though will and the self 
 are still looked upon as products of strictly meta- 
 physical speculation. Even when Presentationism 
 is explicitly disavowed, the intellectualistic bias 
 manifests itself in other ways. Those who maintain 
 that the will is an ultimate aspect of mind are apt to 
 identify it with attention ; those who assert that the 
 self is a necessary psychological postulate tend to 
 regard it mainly as the subject of knowledge. In 
 either case it is evident that the preoccupation with 
 cognition has brought the intellectual side of human 
 nature into undue prominence. 
 
 A tendency towards intellectualism is of course 
 compatible with a recognition of the existence of 
 other aspects of mind in addition to cognition. It 
 may show itself merely in the failure to investigate 
 fully the facts which pertain to the reactive side 
 of mind. At all events, whether intellectualism 
 is responsible for the result or not, these facts have 
 been neglected. The best proof of this assertion is 
 the commonly accepted doctrine that the tendencies 
 to seek pleasure and avoid pain are the only principles 
 of human conduct. The clearest and most un- 
 ambiguous expression of opinion on this subject 
 
INTRODUCTION. Kill 
 
 comes from Professor Ward: "Whatever be the 
 variety in the sources of pleasure, whatever be the 
 moral or conventional estimate of their worthiness, 
 if a given state of consciousness is pleasant we seek 
 to retain it, if painful to be rid of it. We prefer 
 greater pleasure before less, less pain before greater. 
 This is, in fact, the whole meaning of preference as 
 a psychological term." * This is the tabula rasa view 
 of mind applied to conation, as every student of 
 Condillac will recognise. The mind has no essential 
 conative character. So far as tendency to reaction 
 is concerned, it is at the beginning ' a sheet of white 
 paper.' It must be marked by hedonic experience 
 before action can take place, and its pleasures and 
 pains determine its activity absolutely. The tabula 
 rasa hypothesis has been found inconsistent with the 
 facts of cognition ; it can be shown to be at variance 
 with the phenomena of conduct. When we bear in 
 mind the wealth and variety of the facts which a 
 study of human conduct brings to light, we are forced 
 to the conclusion that the human being as such has 
 a very complex character which expresses itself in a 
 multitude of reactions. Human character is so com- 
 plex that the individual must gradually discover his 
 essential nature by observing the way in which he 
 reacts on different occasions. This would not be the 
 case if his tendencies were purely hedonic. 
 
 It is obvious that ethics, no less than psychology, 
 has been seriously handicapped by this inadequate 
 treatment of the principles of conduct. Ethical 
 writers have been forced to supply the deficiency by 
 
 1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, xx. p. 71. 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 their own efforts, and this is true of the utilitarians 
 as well as of their opponents. The work, however, 
 has necessarily been done in an unsystematic 
 manner, often indeed without a full appreciation of 
 its significance. The results, too, though usually 
 true to fact, have necessarily been at variance with 
 the results of psychology. This undesirable state of 
 affairs can be remedied only by a systematic inquiry 
 into the principles of conduct. In the following 
 pages an effort will be made to prepare the way 
 for such an investigation. 
 
 The general standpoint which will be adopted has 
 already been partially indicated. It may be well, 
 however, to give a more definite statement on this 
 subject in advance, though the full argument will of 
 course come later. The general point of view can 
 be summed up in the statement that man will 
 be regarded as an organic being, psychically as 
 well as physically. This means, in the first place, 
 that he is not a mere physical organism which is 
 somehow connected with a series of mental states. 
 Mental phenomena do not constitute a simple linear 
 series. As Fouillee maintains, " psychology re- 
 sembles biology, which considers each function of 
 the living being as conditioned by the totality of the 
 others, or the whole as reacting in each function, 
 thus forming a sort of vital circle." 1 In short, the 
 mind is an organism as well as the body. The con- 
 nection between mind and body, too, can best be 
 expressed by saying that the individual is a psycho- 
 physical organism. This seems to be the only work- 
 
 1 Psychologic des Idees-forces, p. xvi. 
 
INTRODUCTION. XV 
 
 ing hypothesis which does not do violence to the facts. 
 The term ' self,' if properly understood, may be 
 used to indicate the fact that the human being is in 
 some sense an organic whole. All the objections 
 which have been raised against the self could be 
 turned against the conception of organism as such. 
 
 In the second place, this point of view implies 
 that the human being is not only affected by stim- 
 ulus, but reacts in accordance with his nature, for 
 every organism has an inner character which ex- 
 presses itself in its reactions. Further, this char- 
 acter is complex, since there can be no organic 
 unity if there is no multiplicity of elements. Both 
 contentions can be substantiated. If we investigate 
 the phenomena of human conduct, we are forced to 
 admit that no single principle of action is adequate 
 to explain the facts. As Galton points out, " man's 
 character is exceedingly complex even in members 
 of the simplest and purest savage races." " Differ- 
 ent aspects of the multifarious character of man 
 respond to different calls from without, so that the 
 same individual, and much more the same race, may 
 behave very differently at different epochs. There 
 may have been no fundamental change of character, 
 but a different phase or mood of it may have been 
 evoked by special circumstances." l This character 
 in its essential features is the endowment of each 
 member of the race. It directly conditions certain 
 tendencies to action. These tendencies may be 
 called ' primary,' since they spring from the very 
 nature of the individual, and are independent of 
 
 1 Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 177. 
 
XVI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 everything else. They tend to assert themselves 
 as occasion offers, regardless of consequences, and 
 therefore without reference to hedonic results. They 
 manifest themselves whenever the proper stimulus 
 is present, and stimulus in this case is simply the 
 coincidence between external opportunity and inter- 
 nal bias. As compared with these impulses, the 
 tendencies to seek pleasure and avoid pain are 
 secondary, inasmuch as they presuppose, and are 
 determined by, hedonic experiences. The impulses 
 which are conditioned by the emotions may also 
 be classed as secondary. Emotions arise when 
 the agent becomes aware of the relation in which 
 objects stand to any of his tendencies. They 
 are peculiar reactions of feeling and have a special 
 influence on conduct. The neglect of the reactive 
 side of human nature is nowhere more conspicuous 
 than in the case of emotion. This mental fact is 
 almost universally assumed, without question or 
 inquiry, to be a mere complex, and its character- 
 istic function in the mechanism of human conduct 
 is thus overlooked. 
 
 From this standpoint, therefore, man is regarded 
 as an essentially active being, and the question 
 arises as to whether there is a consciousness of this 
 activity. Here introspection is the only possible 
 guide, for introspection alone can give a verdict in 
 regard to the ultimate qualitative distinctions be- 
 tween psychical phenomena. Now, in the pheno- 
 mena of effort, impulse, and desire, there seems to 
 be involved an ultimate fact of consciousness ir- 
 reducible to anything else, the fact of striving or 
 
INTRODUCTION. XV11 
 
 conation. Here we find an aspect of consciousness 
 which cannot be described in terms of cognition, 
 pleasure-pain, or emotion, and when we compare it 
 with those other aspects of consciousness the verdict 
 of introspection seems unmistakable. The conten- 
 tion that conation is not an ultimate fact proceeds 
 from the prejudice in favour of Presentationism 
 already referred to. The doctrine of Presentation- 
 ism, if carried out to its logical conclusion, leaves 
 no room for pleasure-pain any more than for cona- 
 tion, since the former, like the latter, cannot be 
 presented as an object. The mere existence of 
 pleasure-pain as a conscious fact proves that the 
 world as idea or as sensation does not coincide with 
 the knowable world. We must experience much 
 that cannot be presented as object if we are aware 
 of what is most intimately ourselves, and are con- 
 scious of ourselves as distinct from objects. There 
 is no valid reason, therefore, for rejecting the evi- 
 dence of introspection in favour of regarding cona- 
 tion as an ultimate fact of consciousness. 
 
 In the course of this preliminary statement we 
 have indicated that emotion also must be regarded 
 as an ultimate aspect of consciousness. In view of 
 the weight of authority against this position, the 
 arguments which support it must be set forth at 
 considerable length. We shall proceed at once to 
 this task for two reasons. In the first place, if 
 emotion is proved to be an ultimate aspect of mind 
 with a distinctive influence on action, the prevailing 
 theories in regard to the principles of human con- 
 duct will necessarily require modification. In the 
 
XV111 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 second place, when we come to deal with the con- 
 ditions under which the special emotions arise, we 
 shall find ourselves brought into contact with the 
 primary tendencies of the psychical organism. The 
 theory of emotion, in short, opens one of the best 
 avenues of approach to the general problem which 
 is the subject of this inquiry. 
 
A STUDY IN THE 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 
 
 WHILE most psychologists agree in maintaining 
 that emotion is not an ultimate aspect of mind, there 
 is no consensus of opinion as to its precise nature 
 and constitution. Emotion has been described as 
 organic sensation (Lange) ; pleasure-pain (Horwicz) ; 
 a fusion of feeling and organic sensation (Kiilpe) ; 
 pleasure-pain in association with the idea of its cause 
 (Hoffding) ; a mass of sensuous and representative 
 material with a predominant affective tone (Sully) ; 
 instinct-feeling (Marshall) ; a strong primary feeling 
 of pleasure or pain, accompanied by a change in 
 the course of ideas, and strengthened by the feelings 
 associated with the ideas called up (Wundt) ; rank 
 feeling of excitement (James 1 ) ; a complete psychosis 
 
 1 Psychological Review, I., v. p. 525. 
 A 
 
2 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 involving cognition, pleasure - pain, and conation 
 (Ward). This is sufficiently bewildering in itself, but 
 the confusion is still further increased by the fact that 
 many writers do not keep consistently to one point of 
 view. Bain starts with the position that emotions are 
 " secondary, derived, or complicated feelings." * It 
 appears later, however, that love, anger, and possibly 
 fear, are " original fountains of sentiment or feeling." 2 
 Then emotion is classed, along with intellect and 
 action, as one of the chief divisions of the mental 
 powers. 3 Finally, we find that particular emotions 
 are defined in terms of pleasure - pain or impulse. 4 
 Wundt, after expounding the theory already men- 
 tioned, comes to the conclusion that " the universal 
 animal impulses are the earliest forms of emotion." 5 
 Hoffding and others show the same tendency to 
 depart from their original position, and to identify 
 emotion more or less closely with conation. 6 
 
 The root of the trouble seems to be that emotion 
 is explained away before a serious effort is made 
 to ascertain with accuracy its real nature. In at- 
 tempting to rectify this omission, we must begin 
 with an examination of the fact as it appears in con- 
 sciousness. It is evident that direct observation 
 alone affords absolutely reliable information with 
 regard to the qualitative distinctions of psychical 
 states. The application of the introspective method 
 to emotion is not so hopeless an undertaking as one 
 
 1 The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed., p. 3. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 73. 3 Ibid., p. 95. 4 Ibid., pp. 142, 173, 177. 
 
 5 Menschen- und Thierseele (1892), pp. 421, 422 ; Eng. trans., 
 pp. 386, 387. 
 
 6 Psychology, English trans., p. 235. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 3 
 
 is accustomed to suppose. All emotions do not in- 
 volve commotion, and the less violent states can 
 be accurately observed. We can in a measure sup- 
 plement the results obtained by the use of this 
 method. If, for example, the phenomenon under 
 investigation not only seems fundamentally distinct 
 from other aspects of mind, but is found in addition 
 to have special conditions and effects, the testimony 
 of introspection gains in objective validity. 
 
 The simplest and most natural way of opening the 
 inquiry will be to take concrete instances. When 
 ill-feeling, for example, is aroused, into what constit- 
 uents can the total consciousness of the moment be 
 resolved? Under ordinary circumstances we can dis- 
 tinguish at once the cognition of the object, the pain 
 of the injury or series of injuries, the awareness of 
 certain organic disturbances, and an impulse towards 
 a definite course of action. But the statement that 
 we have this emotion is not equivalent to the asser- 
 tion that we are pained, know the cause, have various 
 organic sensations, and feel impelled to act in a par- 
 ticular manner. The emotion cannot be identified 
 with any one of these elements, or any combination of 
 them. It implies that, in consequence of his actions 
 with reference to us, we feel disposed towards some 
 one in a certain way, and that, as a result of this 
 feeling-attitude, actions of a special sort and these 
 alone appeal to us. The * plain man ' in describ- 
 ing his state of mind will say that he has ' ill- 
 feeling towards ' the object of his hate, ' feels as 
 if he could ' inflict on him all manner of harm. 
 Similarly, liking or affection for a person is not the 
 
4 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 idea of the object, the pleasure received, the ex- 
 pectation of future pleasure, the awareness of various 
 physical processes, or any combination of these. It 
 is a feeling in reference to the object which is de- 
 pendent on the intellectual attitude and conditions 
 the practical. 
 
 The observation of every emotional state will 
 yield the same result, and we seem to have here 
 a fact fundamentally distinct from the ultimate as- 
 pects of mind commonly recognised. The existence 
 and nature of this distinction will become more evi- 
 dent if we imagine an individual who is composed 
 psychically of cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, 
 and possesses no characteristics which cannot be 
 expressed in terms of these. Such a being, when 
 injured, might judge it advisable to retaliate, on 
 the ground that if he does not he may be attacked 
 again. Or, on general principles of abstract justice, 
 he might deem it right to act towards the offender 
 as the latter has acted towards him. But he would 
 have no intense ill-feeling towards the aggressor, 
 prompting him, apart from all deliberation and 
 calculation of consequences, to adopt a particular 
 line of conduct. His attitude would be similar to 
 that of the ideal judge in the act of sentencing a 
 criminal according to the general principles of law. 
 We might assume that he had inherited an instinct 
 of retaliation, or was so constituted as to take 
 pleasure in giving pain in return for injury. But 
 in neither case would his action be accompanied 
 by any malevolent feeling towards the object. He 
 might, of course, be moved to activity by the pain 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 5 
 
 involved, but in that case his action would be 
 directed to the immediate removal of the pain. It 
 cannot be asserted that he would invariably attain 
 this end by inflicting suffering on the aggressor, but 
 if he resorted to retaliation with this purpose in 
 view, he would proceed with the same lack of ill- 
 will which the hunter displays in killing an animal 
 to relieve the pain of hunger. It is scarcely neces- 
 sary to add that the presence of organic sensation 
 would make no essential difference in any of the 
 cases mentioned, for the awareness of certain 
 physical processes localised within the individual's 
 own body has nothing in common with a feeling 
 which relates the individual to an object. 
 
 As this imaginary individual would be destitute of 
 all malevolent feeling, he would likewise be incap- 
 able of affection or gratitude. If he were agreeably 
 affected by one of his fellows, he might cognise the 
 pleasure-giving agent as a deserving sort of being, 
 and return the favour from a sense of justice or 
 with a view to future benefits. His action, how- 
 ever, would not be prompted by any kindly feeling 
 towards the individual concerned. He would re- 
 gard the latter in a purely intellectual manner as a 
 series of sensations involving, according to all pro- 
 bability, a personality like himself a personality 
 which had been the means of causing him enjoy- 
 ment. On the other hand, he would turn on 
 himself the same cold cognitive gaze. His actions 
 would give him pleasure if they harmonised with 
 his interests or ideals, but there would be no 
 responsive feeling of self-satisfaction. 
 
6 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 It is evident that a being of this sort would lack 
 one of the springs of action which plays so large a 
 part in our life both directly and indirectly. Even 
 if he were supposed to be so constituted as to per- 
 form the actions to which emotions prompt, he 
 would never be driven along regardless of every- 
 thing, simply because one course alone seemed to 
 satisfy his feeling at the moment. Further, there 
 would always be this fundamental difference be- 
 tween him and the actual human being, that his 
 attitude to other persons and to things could only 
 be intellectual and practical. Since pleasure-pain 
 ends in the self and has no outward reference, 1 
 when he faced a person or situation he could only 
 cognise the facts in a certain way and act accord- 
 ingly. The nature of the cognitive attitude would 
 doubtless be influenced by the pleasure -pain re- 
 ceived, but it would still remain purely cognitive. 
 In short, our hypothetical individual would be 
 absolutely self-contained so far as his feelings were 
 concerned. In this aspect of his nature he would 
 be a mere atom, abstractly separated from his 
 fellows and the world in which he lives. 
 
 When we thus eliminate everything which cannot 
 be expressed in terms of cognition, pleasure - pain, 
 and conation, the distinctive character of emotion 
 comes prominently into view. I have used the term 
 ' feeling-attitude ' to indicate, not to define, this ap- 
 parently unique aspect of mind. The word ' feeling ' 
 expresses subjectivity and diffusedness. Emotion is 
 subjective in much the same sense as pleasure-pain. 
 
 1 Bradley, 'Mind,' 1888, p. 3; Hoffding, 'Psychology,' p. 234. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 7 
 
 It is a centrally-initiated reaction, however, while 
 the latter is pure subjectivity. Briefly, the one is 
 subjectivity as reaction ; the other is subjectivity as 
 receptivity. The word ' attitude ' is employed to 
 mark this distinction and to emphasise the fact that 
 emotion, in virtue of its character as reaction, has an 
 outward direction or objective reference. It might 
 be urged that the distinction between receptivity and 
 reaction does not hold in this case, for pleasure-pain 
 itself may in a sense be regarded as a reaction. 
 This simply means, however, that a psychical state 
 must express in some way the nature of the psychical 
 organism, and cannot be thrust, as it were, into the 
 mental life from an alien source. The fact is unde- 
 niable, but it does not do away with the distinction, 
 which holds in the case of every organism, between 
 being affected by something and reacting in reference 
 to an object. Using a spatial metaphor, we may say 
 that in the one case the line of direction is from the 
 object to the self, whereas in the other it is from the 
 self outwards to the object. This is the distinction 
 which is here indicated when we oppose receptivity 
 to reaction. 
 
 We may say, then, that emotion is the subjective V 
 response which appears when we react in view of a 
 situation instead of being merely affected by it. 
 This response, we must repeat, is not pure impulse 
 or tendency to act. It is a mood or state of feeling 
 in regard to the object, on account of which special 
 modes of conduct appeal to us with a force they do 
 not possess on other occasions. Impulses and voli- 
 tions arise in consequence, for particular motor ideas 
 
8 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 thus become dominant. These ideas gain this ascend- 
 ancy, however, simply because they are in harmony 
 with that phase of subjectivity which is prominent at 
 the time. No better proof of this could be desired 
 than the well-known fact that an action which cannot 
 be done in ' cold blood ' seems the only thing to do 
 when passion is aroused. 
 
 In order to establish this view more definitely, 
 it will be necessary to contrast emotion with the 
 other aspects of mind in turn. In this connection, 
 cognition can be treated briefly. A cognitive state 
 is not merely a subjective event with a place in 
 the series of psychical occurrences. It reports 
 the existence and nature of something, and thus 
 has a reference beyond itself. This reference is its 
 most prominent feature, and its factual nature as 
 a psychical event falls into the background. Emo- 
 tion, it is evident, has not the objective reference 
 which pertains to cognition. It possesses objective 
 reference in the sense that it has the outward direc- 
 tion which is characteristic of all reaction. More- 
 over, it is not so much an isolated activity as the 
 actual being of the individual in a certain phase 
 or aspect. For this reason its factual character 
 as a psychical state is obtruded on consciousness. 
 Naturally this awareness of subjectivity is not so 
 strong as in the case of pleasure-pain, for there is 
 an outward direction and a fixing of the attention on 
 some object. This consciousness is always present, 
 however, except in a few exceptional cases, and even 
 then the obliteration is but momentary. 
 
 This leads naturally to the discussion of the 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 9 
 
 contrast between emotion and pleasure-pain, for the 
 latter is also subjective in a special sense. It is pure 
 receptivity, however, and thus lacks that outward 
 direction which emotion as reaction possesses. In 
 itself it has no reference and no object; it is sub- 
 jectively subjective. It is mere result, an effect 
 coming from an object and ending in the self. 
 Emotion, on the contrary, is an attitude we adopt. 
 We are pleased or pained by something, and have 
 emotion towards something. This distinction is 
 embodied in the structure of language. 
 
 That emotion has an outward reference has 
 frequently been admitted, 1 but the significance of 
 the fact has not been fully recognised. This 
 characteristic is usually explained as an appearance 
 which results from a blending or association of 
 cognition with pleasure-pain. " A feeling of pleasure 
 or pain," Hoffding tells us, " naturally enters into 
 an association with the idea of that which played, 
 or appeared to play, a part in giving rise to the 
 pleasurable or painful feeling, with consequently its 
 real or apparent cause. Previous to such association 
 feeling has no direction or no object, is consequently 
 not feeling about or for something. . . . Pain 
 becomes, by association with the idea of its cause, 
 aversion (anger). . . . By a similar metamorphosis 
 the feeling of pleasure becomes delight and love. 
 The idea of that which has an essential connection 
 
 1 Cf. Hume, 'Treatise' (Selby - Bigge ed.), pp. 278, 329, 330; 
 Hoffding, 'Psychology,' p. 234; James, 'Principles of Psychology,' 
 " P- 3*35 Lehmann, ' Hauptgesetze des Gefuhlslebens,' pp. 19, 
 116, 117. 
 
10 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 with the feeling of pleasure blends with it and gives 
 it a certain direction." 1 It is not clear how an 
 association of pleasure-pain with the idea of its cause 
 in itself imparts to the former a characteristic which 
 is foreign to its intrinsic nature. And if these two 
 elements are supposed to unite more intimately and 
 blend into a total result, it is scarcely conceivable 
 that the complex whole thus produced should be a 
 feeling in reference to an object which, by hypo- 
 thesis, is an integral part of the complex itself. 
 Moreover, the very phraseology of the passage cited 
 indicates that antecedents or conditions have been 
 mistaken for constituents, and that it would be truer 
 to assert that, when the factors mentioned are 
 present, they condition or precede the appearance of 
 something entirely different. On this whole ques- 
 tion the evidence of introspection is unambiguous. 
 Pleasure-pain and cognition can be present together 
 while emotion is absent, for this is the state of 
 affairs when we are * hurt ' i.e., pained but not 
 angry at the conduct of a friend. On the other 
 hand, when emotion is present, it can be clearly dis- 
 tinguished from the hedonic effect and from the idea 
 of the object. The outward direction of emotion, 
 therefore, cannot be explained away merely as a 
 derived or secondary characteristic of pleasure-pain. 
 It is not an adventitious attribute casually attached 
 to a purely subjective state ; it is essential and 
 intrinsic. Hence feeling for an object is absolutely 
 distinct from the hedonic feeling conditioned by the 
 object. 
 
 1 Loc. cit. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. II 
 
 That emotion is a central reaction, and in this re- 
 spect different from pleasure-pain, is another position 
 which has been admitted l without a full apprecia- 
 tion of its consequences. As this position is of basal 
 importance, it will be well to indicate the arguments 
 in its favour. The mere fact that emotion has an ' 
 outward reference similar to that of desire, impulse, 
 and attention, is of itself conclusive. There are, 
 however, numerous subsidiary facts which add their 
 weight to this general argument. In the first place, 
 it is obvious that emotion is subject to that law 
 of activity which we call the principle of habit. 
 The more frequently an emotion is indulged in, the 
 smaller is the stimulus necessary to call it forth. 
 This general rule is liable to exceptions owing to 
 the complexity of conditions which may affect the 
 rise of any particular emotion, but the existence of 
 the general tendency seems undeniable. When we 
 say that a person is timorous, irascible, vindictive, 
 or affectionate, we mean that he has a certain emo- 
 tional habit, in virtue of which fear, anger, ill-feel- 
 ing, or affection, is readily aroused. Such habits 
 partly constitute and partly express the temperament 
 or disposition of the individual, and may be acquired 
 or inherited. Now pleasure-pain does not become 
 habitual in the sense that it becomes by repetition 
 more easily excited. It is true that it comes under 
 the influence of the principle of habituation, but 
 this is a very different thing, being a principle of 
 accommodation which implies a weakening in the 
 
 1 Sully, ' Human Mind,' ii. pp. 91, 93 ; Bain, 'Emotions and Will,' 
 p. 70. 
 
12 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 effect of stimuli that are frequently repeated. The 
 law of habit, however, is but one phase of a more 
 general principle affecting activity namely, inertia. 
 There is always a certain amount of inertia, varying 
 with circumstances, which must be overcome before 
 reaction takes place. That emotion is influenced 
 in this way is evident from those cases where a situ- 
 ation, hedonically effective and in itself emotionally 
 exciting, fails, for a time at least, to evoke any ap- 
 propriate response. Anger, for instance, may thus 
 be checked by inertia. The individual feels the 
 unpleasantness of the situation, recognises fully that 
 the circumstances are ' annoying,' but does not react 
 emotionally, because it is ' too much trouble to get 
 angry.' 
 
 It is significant also that emotions are affected 
 by general rules and considerations, and are there- 
 fore not absolutely determined by the particular 
 conditions actually realised at the moment. While 
 the actual circumstances may present all the neces- 
 sary conditions, an emotion may be inhibited, or at 
 all events appreciably affected, by a consideration 
 of the propriety of indulging it. Anger may be re- 
 strained or totally inhibited by a perception of the 
 consequences it might entail, or by the reflection 
 that it would in the circumstances be useless. Any 
 passion tends to subside if the agent feels that he 
 is making himself ridiculous, and the thought that a 
 passionate outburst would be vulgar may have a 
 distinctly restraining effect, not only on the mani- 
 festation of the emotion, but on the feeling itself. 
 On the other hand, no abstract reflections on the 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 13 
 
 uselessness of the infliction will get rid of the pain 
 of toothache if the nervous agitation continues. No 
 general considerations of the evil results of pain 
 will affect the disagreeable effect produced by an 
 ill-proportioned building, so long as the ugly object 
 remains within the field of vision. We can influ- 
 ence pleasure and pain only by dealing with their 
 conditions, whereas we can restrain emotion when 
 its normal conditions actually exist. Indeed, if 
 certain points of view have become habitual, certain 
 emotions may be habitually suppressed on all ordin- 
 ary occasions, and even passions of great intensity 
 may in time be sensibly affected by the habitual 
 ways of regarding things which have grown up in 
 cooler moments. It is scarcely necessary to point 
 out that a merely passive effect cannot be controlled 
 in this way, and that a reaction alone can be influ- 
 enced by a perception of its consequences and gen- 
 eral bearings. In view of these facts, it is important 
 to observe that we feel more responsible for emotion 
 than for pleasure-pain. We may be ashamed of 
 being afraid or of harbouring ill-feeling, but we are 
 never really ashamed of being pained. We justify, 
 excuse, or condemn our emotions, while we accept 
 our pleasures and pains as mere facts. This is 
 inexplicable save on the assumption that emotion 
 is reaction, for we can identify ourselves only with 
 our own activity, not with an effect imposed on us 
 from without. It is worthy of note in this connec- 
 tion that individual differences are much more 
 prominent in the emotional life than in hedonic 
 sensibility. The former is more susceptible to the 
 
14 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 influences of environment, education, and experience, 
 and thus tends to acquire a more and more indi- 
 vidualistic stamp as life goes on. Finally, attention 
 may be drawn to certain common phrases and 
 modes of speech which add the testimony of lan- 
 guage to the evidence already adduced. We talk 
 of * instinctive ' fear or dislike, 1 ' involuntary ' or 
 ' grudging ' admiration, ' unmotived ' hate, ' un- 
 bridled ' passion, ' outburst ' of emotion. This lan- 
 guage would be absurd if emotion were not a reac- 
 tion, and it is absurd if applied to pleasure -pain. 
 We cannot speak of an 'unmotived' pain, or an ' out- 
 burst ' of pleasure. We are justified in concluding, 
 therefore, that pleasure - pain is simply the way in 
 which things affect us, while emotion is the manner 
 in which we react. The former represents something 
 'given,' the latter is something 'done.' The one 
 expresses the relation in which objects and conditions 
 stand to us, the other is the attitude we adopt. 
 
 If we turn now to the conditions of the two 
 phenomena we shall find that they are entirely 
 distinct, as might indeed be inferred from the results 
 already attained. Pleasure and pain depend upon 
 harmony and discord respectively. 2 Lehmann main- 
 tains that anything causes pain which is in conflict 
 
 1 It is the feeling itself, and not any action, which is here referred to 
 as instinctive. This can be shown to be a legitimate use of terms. 
 The feeling may arise instinctively in circumstances which render a 
 new line of action necessary. In such cases, of course, there can be 
 no instinctive action, and in other cases all action appropriate to the 
 emotion may be inhibited. 
 
 2 ' Harmony ' is taken in its widest sense to include all that is not 
 discordant. Cf. Bradley, ' Mind,' 1888, p. 7. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 15 
 
 with the conditions of mental or psychical existence, 
 and that the opposite holds in the case of pleasure. 1 
 This is true, but it does not cover all cases. Many 
 things affect us agreeably or disagreeably because they 
 harmonise or conflict with that aspect of our nature 
 which is for the time being in evidence. If we are 
 gloomy, gaiety displeases us ; and the same action 
 will cause pleasure or pain according as hate or 
 kindly feeling is dominant. As Shaftesbury puts it, 
 " the man in anger has a different happiness from 
 the man in love." 
 
 While mere discord and harmony are the con- 
 ditions of pleasure - pain, they do not determine 
 emotion. Whatever is at variance, even tempor- 
 arily, with the individual's nature causes pain ; but 
 anger does not appear until he feels that he is 
 injured i.e., unless he regards the occurrence as 
 antagonistic to his interests or wishes. If, as some- 
 times happens, the unpleasant result is not viewed 
 in this light, anger is not evoked. Similarly, while 
 any bodily disorder is painful, the sense of danger 
 must be present before fear is aroused. In like 
 manner, hate presupposes that the object of the 
 feelfng is cognised as a hostile personality, and ad- 
 miration implies the recognition of worth. A situa- 
 tion becomes emotionally effective, therefore, only if 
 it is viewed under a definite aspect which has a 
 general significance. The detail as such, while pos- 
 sessing hedonic potentialities, is irrelevant. The 
 concepts ' injury,' ' danger,' and so forth, need not 
 be present in clear cut and explicit form, but the 
 
 1 Die Hauptgesetze des Gefuhlslebens, pp. 150, 151. 
 
l6 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 isolation of aspects on which they depend is indis- 
 pensable. In other words, every emotion presupposes 
 a judgment by means of which the situation is 
 brought under a general category. This judgment 
 may sometimes seem to have the character of an 
 ' immediate feeling ' or ' intuitive perception,' but 
 it always involves an intellectual activity which 
 interprets the general character and significance of 
 the actual circumstances as presented to us. We do 
 not respond to the facts as mere particulars, as brute 
 existence devoid of meaning. If we do not interpret 
 we do not react emotionally. When we thus react 
 it is because we have interpreted the situation in a 
 certain way, as having such and such a character, 
 as a ' what ' and not a mere ' this.' At times we 
 may not clearly comprehend the reason why we 
 react as we do, but even then the existence of some 
 dim sense of the general character or significance of 
 things can be detected. Since a given situation 
 presents a number of aspects, a variety of emotions 
 is possible, even if one element of the situation is so 
 prominent in itself that a particular hedonic effect 
 is unalterably determined. A distressing spectacle 
 causes pain inevitably, but, while the disagreeable 
 effect persists, anger, pity, or contempt may arise 
 according to the point of view adopted. Similarly, 
 while defeat is and remains unpleasant, we may 
 admire our opponent if we attend to the skill dis- 
 played, or dislike him if he appears to us merely as 
 the cause of a disagreeable result. 
 
 That judgment is the determining condition is 
 further evident when it is observed that the emotion 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 17 
 
 can be directly influenced by a change or modifica- 
 tion of the intellectual point of view. If a terrified 
 individual can be fully convinced that there is no 
 danger, the emotion will vanish. It is true that 
 abnormal physical and mental conditions influence 
 the emotional life, but they do so only indirectly by 
 perverting the judgment. That intellectual inter- 
 pretation of the real is always necessary, is somewhat 
 obscured by the fact that emotion may apparently 
 take the form of a reflex response to presentation. 
 In a frequently recurring situation, where we are 
 accustomed to respond in a particular manner, any- 
 thing associated with the conditions of the emotion 
 may come to arouse the latter directly. Fear may 
 thus appear on a sign or signal, simultaneously with 
 the sense of danger. It is obvious, however, that 
 the stimulating presentation has power, not in 
 itself, but as a sign of the general meaning of the 
 given circumstances. Previous interpretations and 
 responses are therefore required to form the con- 
 nections which give the particular presentation a 
 borrowed power. Such cases are instances of habit, 
 and judgment is active in the formation of the habit. 
 The close relation between feeling-attitude and in- 
 tellectual regard is clearly indicated even on those 
 extreme occasions when the emotion bursts forth 
 without apparent provocation, and seems to be ex- 
 plicable only on the ground that a need was felt for 
 reacting in that way. For instance, as Bain points 
 out, "the irascible temper in a state of surcharge 
 does not need an actual offender"; "the tempera- 
 ment overflowing with tender emotion finds many 
 
 B 
 
i8 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 things to love." 1 In such cases, however, the 
 emotion creates its own object. More precisely, the 
 functional irritability acts on the cognitive activity 
 of judgment, and must so act before the functional 
 tendency can be realised. 
 
 This view does not exclude the possibility of a 
 conflict between ' reason ' and * passion.' Emotion 
 is dependent on a cognitive interpretation of the 
 facts, and will therefore be ' irrational ' if the 
 judgment is wrong. Moreover, if a false interpre- 
 tation has been persistently repeated, the resulting 
 emotional reaction will have acquired, through 
 repetition, a momentum of its own. For this 
 reason it may appear in opposition to the truer 
 insight which the individual has more recently 
 attained. Further, when it is once aroused, the 
 individual has committed himself to one point of 
 view, and the opposing judgment must contend with 
 this obstruction. The conflict between reason and 
 emotion, then, is ultimately a conflict between 
 inadequate knowledge and the deeper insight which 
 has been subsequently attained. 
 
 It can be maintained, therefore, that emotion 
 demands as its necessary condition a judgment in 
 reference to the situation, whereas pleasure-pain is 
 conditioned solely by the actual relations of discord 
 and harmony in which things stand to the self. This 
 statement, however, does not fully express the differ- 
 ence between the respective conditions of the two 
 phenomena. Even when the judgment is made and 
 the normal conditions are thus fulfilled, the emotion 
 
 1 Emotions and Will, pp. 189, 281. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. ig 
 
 * 
 
 may be restrained or inhibited by general considera- 
 tions which reach beyond the present case and bring 
 into play the general relations of the object to the 
 self and the wider bearings of the emotional reaction. 
 A situation may be recognised as ' irritating ' with- 
 out arousing anger, if a vivid perception of ultimate 
 consequences intervenes. This possibility of direct 
 control, when the normal conditions are present, has 
 been indicated in another connection, but it is 
 important to emphasise it here, since it illustrates in 
 a striking way the difference between pleasure-pain 
 and emotion in regard to their determining con- 
 ditions. The whole distinction can be summed up 
 in the statement, that the one is determined by 
 causes while the other is conditioned by reasons. 
 
 Since hedonic effect is determined by harmony 
 and discord, and since these can differ only in 
 degree, it is natural to suppose that pleasure and 
 pain have only quantitative differences. This is 
 the position which is most generally accepted by 
 psychologists at the present day. 1 On the other 
 hand, evidence can be adduced to prove that emotion 
 exhibits qualitative distinctions. In the first place, 
 there is the testimony of introspection, and in a 
 case like this, as Kiilpe maintains, it is to intro- 
 spection that the final appeal must be made. 2 So 
 far as direct observation is concerned, it may con- 
 fidently be asserted that fear, hate, contempt, are as 
 
 1 Cf. Ward, 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' xx. p. 71 ; Bradley, 'Mind,' 
 1888, p. 2; Sully, 'Human Mind,' ii. p. 7; Lehmann, ' Haupt. d. 
 Gefiihl.,' p. 124; Kiilpe, 'Grundriss d. Psy.,' p. 246. 
 
 a Grundriss, p. 333. 
 
2O PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 distinct from one another as blue, red, green. In 
 both cases the assertion of qualitative distinction 
 rests on the same basis, and has the same justifi- 
 cation. Further, while every pain may be set down 
 to discord, and every pleasure to harmony, the 
 primary emotions must be referred to conditions 
 that are in each case specifically distinct. The 
 recognition of worth, for instance, is entirely 
 different from the sense of injury, or the conscious- 
 ness of danger. What holds for the conditions is 
 true of the consequents. Again, while pleasures 
 and pains always prompt to activity of the same 
 sort, each primary emotion gives rise to a special 
 mode of behaviour. There is nothing in common 
 between the actions due to anger, fear, contempt, 
 admiration, hate, and affection. It is also note- 
 worthy that the different emotions are marked off 
 by special names, while the various pleasures and 
 pains are not thus distinguished from one another. 
 Ordinary language is not an infallible guide in 
 matters of detail, but when it presents us with a 
 broad general fact of this sort, its testimony cannot 
 be entirely ignored. It is scarcely necessary to add 
 that emotions cannot be classed simply as pleasur- 
 able or painful. No emotion has the same hedonic 
 character throughout. A certain degree of fear is 
 stimulating, and therefore pleasurable, and an out- 
 burst of rage may be distinctly agreeable. 1 " Blind 
 voluptuous rage," a phrase used by Keats, expresses 
 a possible fact and not a mere poetic fancy. Affec- 
 tion may be painful in the sense that it may be 
 
 1 Sully, 'Human Mind,' ii. pp. 94, 95. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 21 
 
 accompanied by greater pain than pleasure. 1 While 
 hate in its initial stages usually involves a large ele- 
 ment of pain, it may in the end become exclusively 
 pleasurable. The thought of revenge is pleasant, 
 especially when backed by the consciousness of 
 power, and the emotion heightens general activity, 
 and is therefore in itself a source of pleasure. 
 
 We may now consider the influence which pleas- 
 ure-pain and emotion exert on action. If a state of 
 consciousness is pleasant, we seek to retain it ; if 
 unpleasant, we seek to get rid of it. 2 An effect on 
 our own subjective condition is invariably the end 
 in view. When we act from pleasure or pain, we 
 act in reference to them. Can we apply this in the 
 case of emotion ? Is vengeance desired for the pur- 
 pose of putting an end to hate ? Can a parent be 
 said to make sacrifices for his children in order to 
 maintain his affection for them ? This seems rather 
 absurd, and the reason is not hard to find. We 
 have already pointed out that an emotion has no 
 constant hedonic character, and may be pleasurable 
 at one time and painful at another. Yet the action 
 which it prompts is always the same. This proves con- 
 clusively enough that emotion is a principle of action 
 entirely different from pleasure-pain in its mode of 
 operation. The distinction is specially prominent 
 when the two principles come into direct conflict. 
 Pity is thus at variance with the pain which is 
 
 1 Cf. Horwicz, ' Psychologische Analysen,' ii. pp. 448, 460. 
 
 2 Cf. Ward, 'Ency. Brit.,' xx. p. 71; Spencer, 'Principles of Psy- 
 chology,' i. p. 280; Hoffding, 'Psychology,' p. 274; Sidgwick, 'Meth- 
 ods of Ethics' (4th ed.), pp. 44, 45. 
 
22 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 always associated with it. The former directs 
 attention to the disagreeable object, as such, while 
 the latter impels us to banish the unpleasing spec- 
 tacle from consciousness as speedily as possible. 
 Moreover the intensity and range of emotion- 
 prompted actions are often out of all proportion to 
 the pleasure-pain involved. 1 The actions of hate 
 and affection alike usually bear no quantitative 
 relation to the amount of pleasure or pain received 
 or expected. 2 
 
 It is not difficult to ascertain the exact nature of 
 the distinction which thus obtrudes itself. Pleasure- 
 pain is purely subjective, concentrates attention on 
 itself, and naturally enough arouses activity dealing 
 with the hedonic condition of the agent. Emotion, 
 on the contrary, is an attitude or disposition to- 
 wards something, directs attention outward, and 
 therefore impels to action that has reference to an 
 object. When the agent is entirely under the influ- 
 ence of emotion, he acts as he feels disposed towards 
 the object, just because he is so disposed and for no 
 other reason. He is concerned with the object 
 alone ; the subject is in the background, the object 
 all in all. The malevolent passions are as ' dis- 
 interested ' as the others. We ' lose ourselves ' in 
 hate as in love. When hate is dominant the con- 
 duct of the individual is unselfish in precisely the 
 same sense as it is unselfish when he is impelled by 
 
 1 Sidgwick, 'Methods of Ethics,' p. 50. 
 
 2 This is partly due to the fact that these emotions are feelings in 
 reference to a permanent object, and may thus outlast the occurrence 
 which occasioned their arousal. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 23 
 
 the opposite emotion. He may know that he is 
 acting contrary to his own interests, but that does 
 not affect him so long as the passion retains its 
 power. In short, under the influence of emotion we 
 strive to satisfy or express a feeling towards an 
 object, whereas under the guidance of pleasure-pain 
 we seek to maintain or remove a subjective state 
 which falls absolutely within the limits of our own 
 individual being. 
 
 This characteristic of emotional action has been 
 indicated, more or less clearly, by different writers 
 on ethics and psychology. Shaftesbury contends 
 that interest does not govern the world, and that it 
 is hard to believe that nothing is done in pure 
 good-nature or kindness. 1 Hume, following Butler, ( 
 points out that even the selfish passions carry the 
 mind beyond the self directly to the object, and, 
 though the satisfaction of these passions gives en- 
 joyment, the prospect of pleasure is not the cause of 
 the passion since the former would not exist with- 
 out the latter. 2 Even egoistic hedonists like Gay 
 and Tucker do not question the fact that emotion- 
 prompted action is disinterested, though they seek 
 to account for the origin of this characteristic in con- 
 formity with their hedonistic principles. 3 Bain is 
 very explicit on this point. " When a burst of strong 
 emotion possesses the mind, . . . the usual course of 
 volition is manifestly here perverted and paralysed 
 
 1 Characteristics, i. pp. 115, 116. 
 
 2 Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, section i. note 2. 
 
 3 Gay's 'Preliminary Dissertation,' pp. xlvi. ff. ; Tucker's 'Light 
 of Nature,' ch. xxi. 
 
24 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 by some foreign influence." 1 This means that " the 
 passions urge us on apparently without regard either 
 to pleasure or pain." 2 In discussing the propriety 
 of arousing passion in the service of some noble end, 
 he says : "As regards the work to be done, nothing 
 could be more effectual ; as regards the happiness of 
 the agent, the immolation is often remorseless." 3 
 
 This distinguishing feature of emotion-prompted 
 activity seems to be intimately connected with the 
 intrinsic nature of emotion as such, and no valid 
 attempt has been made to explain it away as a 
 derivative or secondary result. The method adopted 
 by Gay and Tucker need not be criticised in detail, 
 since few psychologists would now maintain that 
 association, usually the friend of memory, could 
 cause a naturally selfish individual to forget him- 
 self. Bain's theory on the subject demands more 
 attention, since it represents one phase of a very 
 prevalent misconception. According to this writer 
 the non-hedonic character of emotional activity is 
 due to the fact that " an emotion persists in the 
 mind and dominates the course of the thoughts, not 
 because it is pleasurable or painful, but because it is 
 strong." " This is the aspect of emotion that we 
 express by the name ' excitement.' The nervous 
 pressure is accumulated in some one region of the 
 brain, in connection with one class of thoughts ; any 
 ideas belonging to that class will arise with facility, 
 others of an incompatible kind are kept back. . . . 
 In such a state the mind is no longer in its calm 
 centre ; the judgments and convictions are liable 
 
 1 Emotions and Will, p. 380. 2 Ibid., p. 383. 3 Ibid., p. 394. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 25 
 
 to perversion or bias." 1 There is "an undue or 
 morbid persistency of certain ideas in the mind," 
 and this intellectual obliquity expresses itself in 
 action. 2 In short, the whole phenomenon is a 
 consequence of the existence of fixed ideas whose 
 persistence is pathologically conditioned. Now, 
 emotions do tend to fix certain ideas in the mind, 
 but there is nothing inevitably pathological in the 
 process. In the first place, emotion is not always 
 accompanied by excitement and loss of equilibrium. 
 We may have a slight anxiety or irritation, ' cool ' 
 contempt, ' dry ' admiration, ' cold ' dislike, and 
 these affect conduct in precisely the same way as 
 the more violent states. Their influence, moreover, 
 may be of vital importance, for the efficiency of an 
 emotion does not depend on its strength alone, but is 
 conditioned more frequently by the absence of oppos- 
 ing or obstructing forces. A slight fear with regard 
 to the distant future may be a more potent factor in 
 conduct than a pervasive dread suddenly aroused by 
 an impending danger. Further, even intense emo- 
 tions are not necessarily accompanied by excitement. 
 An individual of strong character may have strong 
 emotions and yet retain his self-control. In such 
 cases, reflection is not excluded. The agent may 
 know that his emotion prompts him to act contrary 
 to his hedonic interests, and may, nevertheless, give 
 way to the impulse of feeling. Accordingly, when 
 he reflects in a calm hour, he may still justify his 
 conduct and approve it, even if he is suffering from 
 the consequences. In the second place, it must be 
 
 1 Emotions and Will, p. 381. 2 Ibid., p. 390. 
 
26 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 pointed out that the different emotions arise regu- 
 larly in connection with definite normal conditions. 
 We feel kindly disposed towards those who have 
 benefited us, are irritated by injury, admire worth 
 and scorn its opposite, and the feeling in each case 
 tends to influence conduct by fixing certain ideas in 
 the mind. Given the conditions, the result always 
 follows unless special counteracting forces come into 
 play. The conditions, too, are obviously normal. 
 Moreover, the connection between the different 
 emotions and the different conditions on which 
 they depend, seems, on the whole, admirably 
 adapted to the nature of the individual and 
 of his environment. That he should fear those 
 evils with which he cannot cope, pity those in 
 distress, love his friends and hate his enemies all 
 this seems to imply a species of adjustment to 
 physical and social environment rather than mere 
 loss of mental equilibrium. 
 
 The results obtained by this discussion of the 
 contrast between pleasure-pain and emotion may 
 now be briefly summarised. Both are essentially 
 subjective, but the former is an effect imposed on 
 the self, the latter is reaction. While the one is 
 mere result ending in the self, the other has out- 
 ward reference. The primary emotions are quali- 
 tatively distinct, whereas pleasures and pains differ 
 from one another in quantity alone. The two 
 phenomena are further distinguished by difference 
 in conditions and in effects on conduct. The 
 fundamental distinction beween the two is ex- 
 pressed in the fact that the more we are immersed 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 27 
 
 in pleasure or pain the more we lapse into mere 
 particularity; while emotion, in proportion to its 
 strength, binds us to the world of objects. For 
 this reason the two states are mutually antagon- 
 istic. The stronger the emotion is the less con- 
 scious do we become of pleasure and pain ; the 
 more we are absorbed in the hedonic effect the 
 weaker is the emotional reaction. 
 
 Emotion must now be contrasted with conation, in 
 order that the distinction between them may be de- 
 termined with precision. It will be necessary at the 
 outset to indicate briefly the nature and conditions 
 of the phenomena denoted by the term 'conation.' 
 When a tendency to action is realised immediately, 
 we may either be conscious of a sense of ease and 
 power, or simply become aware of the sensations 
 attending the completed activity. If, however, the 
 tendency is not at once actualised, an ' impulse ' to 
 action is felt i.e., a sense of striving. When an 
 obstruction or hindrance is distinctly perceptible, 
 the feeling of ' effort ' appears. This is essentially 
 the sense of striving plus the awareness of hin- 
 drance, and is accompanied by certain muscular 
 sensations. In physical effort, these muscular sen- 
 sations are organically related to the tendency, and 
 difficult to distinguish from the sense of striving 
 which its realisation involves. In the case of in- 
 tellectual effort, however, the situation is different. 
 The strain of attention produced in attempting to 
 solve a problem has only an adventitious connection 
 with the muscular sensations which usually attend 
 it, and is therefore easily distinguishable from them. 
 
28 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 When the obstacle to activity cannot be overcome 
 at the moment, desire emerges. Desire implies that 
 something, not yet in existence and not imme- 
 diately attainable, appeals to us as a thing to be 
 realised. It presupposes further a comparison 
 between the actual state of affairs and that which 
 exists in idea. The resulting consciousness of want 
 or deficiency, the sense of conflict between the ideal 
 and the real, is the characteristic feature of desire 
 as opposed to effort and impulse. Desire, however, 
 is not merely this awareness of deficiency or dis- 
 crepancy which arises when immediately successful 
 action is impossible ; it is also a striving to find 
 means to remedy this state of matters, for a con- 
 scious being necessarily strives to realise the end 
 which appeals to it unless this is distinctly recog- 
 nised to be altogether impossible. When the ideal 
 is felt to be absolutely unattainable, the striving to 
 find means ceases, and wish may take the place of 
 desire. This state implies a species of contradiction, 
 though one which is easily explicable. While it 
 presupposes the recognition of the impossibility of 
 realising the ideal, it also implies that this fact is 
 kept in the background. Just because the real is 
 so hostile to us, we neglect it as much as possible 
 and live in the ideal. Hence wish does not involve 
 that vivid sense of discrepancy so prominent in 
 desire, though it depends ultimately on the con- 
 sciousness that this discrepancy can never be re- 
 moved. Accordingly, wish gives rise to rudiment- 
 ary impulses totally at variance with the tacitly 
 recognised demands of the real. When the ab- 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 2Q 
 
 solute contradiction between real and ideal is kept 
 in the foreground, all striving or impulse vanishes. 
 Wish in the proper sense then gives way to mere 
 regret. In these circumstances, if we say " I wish 
 it were," we simply mean " I regret it is impossible." 
 It is with desire and impulse that emotion has 
 been frequently confounded, and we shall confine 
 our attention to these, partly on this account, and 
 partly because the argument which applies in their 
 case may easily be adapted so as to apply to the 
 other phenomena of conation. If we consider, first, 
 the evidence of introspection as to the distinction- 
 between desire and impulse, on the one hand, and 
 emotion on the other, the verdict seems clear and 
 unmistakable. Feeling - attitude, or the way in 
 which we feel towards some object, is fundamentally 
 different from that peculiar consciousness of striving 
 to do something which is called ' impulse.' It is 
 equally distinct from that conscious want and striv- 
 ing which is the essence of desire. The sense of 
 conflict between the real and the ideal, which is the 
 most characteristic feature of desire, is conspicu- 
 ously absent from emotion as such, since the latter 
 is, for the time being, the real self with which things 
 are felt to be in harmony or conflict. Thus, to take 
 a concrete instance, pity is not merely an impulse 
 or desire to do certain things ; it is primarily a 
 kindly feeling in reference to a person in distress. 
 This is clear when we compare the emotional im- 
 pulse or desire to alleviate suffering with the simi- 
 lar impulse or desire which sometimes springs from 
 policy or pure selfishness. 
 
30 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 Further, emotion is distinguished from impulse 
 and desire, not merely by the presence of ' feeling- 
 to wards,' but also by the nature of the object to 
 which it directly refers. While emotion and cona- 
 tion both have outward reference, the object in each 
 case is generically distinct. Whereas conation is 
 always a striving to realise what is not yet in ex- 
 istence, emotion is directed towards a person, thing, 
 or event, regarded as such, not as end to be realised. 
 The former refers to an ideal which we hope to make 
 real, while the latter is the feeling in reference to 
 some object which is regarded merely from the 
 point of view of existence. This is most obvious 
 when we compare desire and emotion, for in desire 
 the reference of conation is naturally brought into 
 distinct consciousness. In virtue of this difference, 
 the emotional attitude as such can be clearly dis- 
 tinguished from the impulses and desires which it 
 tends to foster. 
 
 This distinction in objective reference inevitably 
 entails a difference in conditions. Impulse and 
 desire, being strivings to realise what does not yet 
 exist, necessarily presuppose the conception of End 
 and certain motor ideas. On the other hand, since 
 emotion directly refers to existence as such, the 
 notions of means and end are not implied among 
 its essential conditions. This is well stated by 
 Hume in the following passage : " Though 'tis certain 
 that we never love any person wdthout desiring his 
 happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, 
 yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the 
 happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being pre- 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 3! 
 
 sented to the imagination. . . . The passions may 
 subsist a considerable time without our reflecting on 
 the happiness or misery of their objects." l In other 
 words, when an emotion is aroused, a special line of 
 conduct appeals to the agent with peculiar force, if he 
 thinks of it ; certain motor ideas are encouraged, if 
 they are suggested to the mind. The feeling-attitude 
 itself, of course, gives rise to an intellectual bias, 
 and in most cases the circumstances suggest definite 
 courses of action. As a rule, therefore, emotion at 
 once occasions impulses or desires, rudimentary or 
 otherwise. But, if for any reason the individual does 
 not think of ends or means, if these new conditions 
 are not realised, no active tendencies appear. The 
 agent may be temporarily immersed in the current 
 of feeling, may be ' lost ' in admiration, ' too terri- 
 fied to think.' This does not happen merely when, 
 as in the case of terror, the emotion is accompanied 
 by a species of intellectual paralysis. Any strong 
 emotion, when first aroused, tends to cause absorp- 
 tion in itself. This tendency is occasionally rein- 
 forced by the distinct pleasure which is sometimes 
 felt in emotional excitation as such, a pleasure which 
 inevitably encourages immersion in the mere feeling. 
 The ' luxury of pity,' and the attraction which sen- 
 sationalism in all its forms possesses, testify to the 
 existence of this delight in the stir of emotion as 
 such. The temporary dissociation between feeling- 
 attitude and practical tendency may also be effected 
 in other ways. There may be no immediate occa- 
 sion for action. The happiness of a friend, for 
 
 1 Treatise (Selby-Bigge ed.), pp, 367, 368. 
 
32 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 instance, may not be an urgent affair requiring in- 
 stant attention, and in this case surely one may 
 have kindly feeling without any definite desires or 
 impulses. The idea that something should be done 
 is not suggested ; consequently the striving to act is 
 likewise absent. Again, some deeply-rooted prin- 
 ciple of conduct, noble or base, may inhibit the 
 particular motor ideas which would naturally be 
 aroused. For instance, where expenditure of money 
 is the sole means of relieving distress, a parsimonious 
 individual may have a genuine emotion of pity with- 
 out any impulse, for the thought of parting with 
 money on such an occasion may never occur to him 
 at all, or make a tardy appearance after the emotion 
 has existed for some time. The application of all 
 this is obvious. Though emotion and impulse are 
 normally associated, yet even when they are present 
 together they can be distinguished by the fact that 
 they presuppose different conditions. Emotional 
 impulses do not arise until all the conditions neces- 
 sary to conscious striving are fulfilled that is, until 
 the conceptions of means and ends are presented 
 to the mind. If those conditions are not realised 
 the emotion may subsist without giving rise to any 
 tendency to act. Accordingly, while the conceptions 
 of means and end constitute a necessary condition 
 of desire and impulse, they are not essential to emo- 
 tion as such. They do not condition the appearance 
 of the emotion, and are not invariably present after 
 it is aroused. 
 
 The preceding discussion has also made clear the 
 exact relation between emotion and active tendency. 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 33 
 
 The close connection which exists follows necessarily 
 from the very nature of the former. The feeling in 
 reference to the object not only tends to make domi- 
 nant certain motor ideas when they are suggested, 
 but it also tends to form an intellectual bias favour- 
 able to the appearance of special practical concep- 
 tions. Circumstances or the action of opposing 
 forces, as we have seen, may prevent these tend- 
 encies from being realised, but the existence of the 
 tendencies as such seems indisputable. From this 
 point of view, new light can be thrown on the 
 distinction between emotion and the impulses and 
 desires which are connected with it ; for this state- 
 ment of the case makes clear that the emotion itself 
 is an important factor in the sum of conditions on 
 which the conative phenomena in question depend. 
 Indeed the emotion is the prior condition which 
 renders the others possible in the circumstances ; 
 for certain ends or motor ideas come to conscious- 
 ness and become dominant because a special feeling 
 in reference to some object exists at the time. The 
 resulting desires or impulses, therefore, are ultimately 
 conditioned by the emotion, and form its expression 
 in conduct. An action, externally similar to the 
 emotion-prompted activity, may imply impulses or 
 desires otherwise conditioned, but the spirit in which 
 the action is done is by no means the same. This 
 inward difference subtly manifests itself in the total 
 behaviour of the agent. An outsider is therefore 
 able to infer the spirit or motive which lies behind 
 the outward result, and this inference has a profound 
 influence on his attitude in the matter, whether he is 
 
 c 
 
34 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 directly concerned or is a mere spectator. We do 
 not admire an individual who alleviates distress from 
 interested motives, and the average man resents a 
 favour which is not rendered in a spirit of fellow- 
 feeling for him. The normal human being is too 
 proud to accept a benefit which is not conferred out 
 of pure kindness. That emotions express them- 
 selves in conduct, therefore, is a generally recognised 
 fact; it is the assumption on which we proceed in 
 ordinary life. 
 
 Other testimony can be adduced which proves the 
 impossibility of identifying an emotion with the con- 
 comitant desires or impulses, and at the same time 
 confirms the view that emotion is the condition of 
 the active tendencies in question. In the first place*, 
 a multiplicity of desires and impulses appears in con- 
 nection with any emotion which refers to a person or 
 relatively permanent object. Affection, for instance, 
 is associated with a long-continued series of actions 
 which implies a great variety of practical tendencies. 
 These tendencies include not only impulses but also 
 desires, for any obstructed impulse may give place to 
 a corresponding desire. In the second place, any 
 emotion may, under different circumstances, coexist 
 with widely different impulses, however transitory its 
 object may be at any one time. Fear may be as- 
 sociated with the tendency to run away, the impulse 
 to dissimulate, the desire to receive aid from others, 
 the impulse to ' give up,' according to the nature of 
 the occasion and of the individual. These facts can 
 only be explained on the assumption that the differ- 
 ent tendencies to action are the varying expressions 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 35 
 
 of one and the same feeling in reference to the ob- 
 ject. In themselves, however, they have another 
 significance which must also be emphasised. It is 
 evidently impossible to identify an emotion with the 
 particular desires and impulses associated with it at 
 any given time, if these vary at other times while the 
 emotion remains the same. 
 
 This argument may be met by the objection that 
 the varying impulses or desires spring from a general 
 desire which has a different expression in different 
 situations. To make the discussion concrete we 
 shall consider the view that desire for the happiness 
 of the object is the source of the various activities 
 and tendencies of affection. Obviously, if this desire 
 is not always coexistent with the emotion, the con- 
 tention falls to the ground. Now this desire implies 
 a speculative attitude of mind not always compatible 
 with emotion, likewise a power of abstraction and 
 synthesis not found under any circumstances except 
 at a high stage of intellectual development. This 
 speculative product, therefore, could not possibly 
 be present in every instance, and the assertion that 
 it is necessarily involved in the emotion is a glaring 
 illustration of the ' psychologist's fallacy.' The 
 various manifestations of affection have, as a matter 
 of fact, a general character, and can therefore be 
 brought under a general formula, but we cannot 
 infer that this abstraction as such necessarily exists 
 in the actual emotional state. As the result of a 
 reflection on activity, the formula presupposes the 
 existence of the activities reflected upon. Parti- 
 cular actions come first, afterwards comes the 
 
36 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 recognition of their general character. This is 
 nowhere more conspicuously evident than in the 
 case of emotion-prompted activity. A particular 
 action suggested by the circumstances appeals to 
 the agent because it harmonises with his feeling- 
 attitude at the moment. He feels inclined or im- 
 pelled to act in that way to satisfy the emotion in 
 existence. Other actions make a similar appeal on 
 different occasions when the same emotion is pres- 
 ent. Reflecting on these, he discovers that they 
 have a general character, make for one end. After 
 reflection has taken place, the emotion is no longer 
 the source of blind impulses. The agent knows the 
 general end to which he is impelled, and may desire 
 this end if no particular activities are suggested or 
 practicable in the circumstances. The desire for a 
 general end which thus arises cannot be regarded 
 as the source of all the particular impulses and 
 desires connected with the emotion, for it implies 
 reflection on different tendencies and activities, and 
 appears only when no definite action is possible. 
 Accordingly, even if it were true that all the activi- 
 ties connected with affection have the happiness of 
 the object as their end, these activities could not 
 be derived from a desire for this general end. It 
 must be pointed out, however, that the particular 
 generalisation here in question is wrong in point 
 of fact, or at all events inadequate. It would be 
 much truer to say that when affection exists one 
 individual acts on behalf of another acts, so far 
 as possible, as if the alter were the ego. This is 
 the only formula which includes all the particular 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 37 
 
 facts, and few would be tempted to maintain that 
 this wide and ultimate abstraction forms the basis 
 of a desire which is always present and conditions 
 all the activities associated with the emotion. This 
 whole argument has evidently a general bearing, 
 and can easily be adapted to similar cases. Conse- 
 quently, the conception of a general desire neces- 
 sarily present behind all the particular emotional 
 tendencies may be dismissed without scruple. Such 
 a desire may appear on occasion, but it presupposes 
 reflection on the particular actions or tendencies to 
 action, and these in turn presuppose the emotion. 
 
 In conclusion, attention may be directed to two 
 considerations which support the position here 
 adopted in reference to the relation between emotion 
 and desire or impulse. In the first place, there is a 
 certain analogy between the conative relationships of 
 pleasure-pain and those of emotion. It is impossible 
 to assert that pain is merely the impulse to apply a 
 particular remedy or the desire to find relief in some 
 way or other, and it is equally impossible to main- 
 tain that fear is just the impulse to run away or 
 the desire to escape. The feeling-attitude, like the 
 hedonic feeling, stands out against the tendencies 
 to action essentially connected with it. In the 
 second place, it may be pointed out that emotions 
 differ in quality, while impulses or desires vary in 
 intensity alone. The evidence of introspection and 
 the testimony of language alike corroborate this 
 assertion. It is true that desire and aversion are 
 sometimes used as correlative terms ; but aversion is 
 not a qualitatively distinct species of desire. It is 
 
38 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 mainly an emotional state which may include dislike 
 or repugnance or both. So far as it is simply the 
 desire to avoid or negate an object, it is not different 
 from any other desire. 
 
 The main points of the general argument in regard 
 to conation may now be briefly summarised. Emo- 
 tion cannot be identified with desire or impulse 
 because it is feeling-in-reference-to the object, and 
 as such is introspectively distinct from the sense of 
 striving or of want. This difference is accentuated 
 by the fact that emotion refers to objects as existing, 
 while the conscious conative tendencies are directed 
 to an end to be realised. Consequently the latter 
 always presuppose the conceptions of means or ends, 
 whereas this is not the case with emotion. Indeed 
 the feeling - attitude may exist for a time without 
 corresponding impulses or desires, if the idea of 
 something to be done is not suggested to the mind. 
 When the desires and impulses in question do arise, 
 they are conditioned by the emotion and constitute 
 its expression in conduct. The same feeling in 
 reference to the object necessarily expresses itself 
 very differently in different circumstances, and is 
 therefore easily distinguishable from the varying 
 phases of its manifestation e.g., from the particular 
 desires or impulses. Nor can emotion be identified 
 with a general desire, for the latter presupposes 
 reflection on particular activities which in turn 
 presuppose the emotion. While our argument has 
 explicit reference only to impulse and desire, its 
 application to the other phenomena of conation is 
 obvious. Wish, for instance, so far as it is a fact 
 
THE NATURE OF EMOTION. 39 
 
 of will, is distinguished from desire by secondary 
 characteristics alone, while effort stands in the same 
 relation to impulse. The conclusion to which all 
 this points is that emotion is an aspect of conscious- 
 ness fundamentally distinct from conation. This 
 position does not imply that emotion and will are 
 regarded as distinct ' things,' more or less exter- 
 nally related. On the contrary, we have emphasised 
 the essential and necessary connection between emo- 
 tion and tendency to act. Indeed, one of the main 
 objects of this volume is to show that emotion is an 
 important factor influencing human conduct. When 
 emotion fails to issue in impulse, effort, or desire, 
 special counteracting circumstances will be found at 
 work. In short, the distinction here maintained is 
 a distinction between aspects of consciousness. Emo- 
 tion, like pleasure-pain, cannot be abstractly separ- 
 ated from conation nor abstractly identified with it. 
 The final result of this whole discussion regarding 
 the nature of emotion is now evident. Emotion 
 is not only introspectively distinct from cognition, 
 pleasure-pain, and conation, but has, in addition to 
 its unique character as a conscious fact, definite 
 conditions of its own and other features absolutely 
 peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, unanalysable and 
 irreducible, and must be regarded as an ultimate and 
 primary aspect of mind. This conclusion would 
 appear more plausible if the term ' emotion ' were 
 less misleading. The word suggests too easily mere 
 * commotion,' and inevitably tends to give rise 
 to the preconception that emotions have no place 
 in the regular economy of the mind, and no appli- 
 
40 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 cation to the ordinary affairs of life. This prejudice 
 can be fully dispelled only by careful observation 
 of the particular states which the term denotes. 
 Accurate investigation will disclose the fact that 
 emotions permeate the mental life in the same way 
 as pleasures and pains. Slight anxieties, evanescent 
 irritations, momentary dislikes and repugnances, for 
 example, will be found unobtrusively present and 
 effective on numberless occasions in ordinary life. 
 Any statement in regard to the nature of emotion, 
 therefore, should be tested by reference to the par- 
 ticular states which the term ' emotion ' denotes. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 
 
 THE argument of the previous chapter would be 
 incomplete if it were not supplemented by a critical 
 examination of the various methods by which modern 
 psychologists have attempted to explain away the 
 distinguishing characteristics of emotional states as 
 such. This chapter accordingly will be devoted to a 
 criticism of the typical theories at present in vogue. 
 After discussing the identification of emotion with 
 pleasure-pain, and the view that emotion is a mere 
 result or accompaniment of tendencies to act, we 
 shall take up the James- Lange theory in its various 
 forms. We shall then deal with the contention that 
 excitement is emotion, or, at all events, an essential 
 element of it ; and, finally, consider the hypothesis 
 that emotion is explicable in terms of pleasure-pain 
 and cognition. It is not possible to classify the 
 various theories in a perfectly systematic way, on ac- 
 count of the complex interrelation which frequently 
 exists, but under the heads we have given, the dif- 
 ferent hypotheses can be arranged conveniently 
 enough for purposes of exposition, and with a rough 
 approximation to accuracy. 
 
42 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 Horwicz has worked out in great detail the theory 
 that emotion is pleasure-pain as such, and may there- 
 fore be taken as the representative of this point of 
 view. According to this writer, the pleasures and 
 pains of sense, ' moral ' feelings (hate, love, pride, 
 gratitude, contempt, &c.), aesthetic, intellectual, and 
 religious feelings, differ from one another only in 
 degree of complexity. The higher feelings develop 
 out of the sense pleasures and pains, 1 though the 
 latter are themselves not altogether simple. 2 The 
 primary feelings differ qualitatively from one another. 3 
 They combine to form new feelings, and each com- 
 plex thus formed is a unity which possesses a char- 
 acter peculiar to itself. 4 The lower combinations 
 in turn enter as constituents into higher complexes, 
 and the latter again are synthetic unities with specific 
 qualities of their own. If this account of the matter 
 be correct, it is obvious that there must be an inde- 
 finite number of possible combinations. It might, 
 however, be maintained (i) that pleasure-pain admits 
 of quantitative distinctions alone, and consequently 
 that there is no multiplicity of qualitatively different 
 elements capable of forming a large number of new 
 combinations, (2) that in point of fact there is no in- 
 definite diversity of concrete ' feelings ' such as our 
 author postulates. Further, the testimony of lan- 
 guage seems directly opposed to the view adopted 
 by Horwicz. If ordinary pleasures and pains are 
 complexes of distinct elements, and emotions are 
 combinations of such complexes, it is not clear why 
 
 1 Psychologische Analysen, ii. 2, p. 4. 2 Ibid., pp. 7, 467. 
 
 8 Ibid., pp. 4, 22. 4 Ibid., pp. 368, 467. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 43 
 
 the various emotional states should be referred to by 
 different names, while the particular hedonic states 
 are not thus favoured. On this theory, moreover, 
 one would naturally expect a great number of com- 
 plexes at the emotional level, while there is only 
 a strictly limited number of distinctive terms to 
 be distributed among the different combinations. 
 The main difficulty of the position, however, has 
 been brought to light in the author's treatment of 
 love. He describes this state as a highly organised 
 complex which is formed by the combination of all 
 the feelings excited by the person who is the object 
 of the emotion. 1 Despite the qualitative differences 
 of its components, this complex constitutes a unitary 
 feeling with a unique character, and has always the 
 same hedonic colouring, although its elements may 
 vary in this respect. The quality of the constituents 
 makes no difference, nor their character as pleasures 
 or pains. 2 Leaving out of consideration the first 
 assertion, let us direct attention to the second. 
 Horwicz maintains that so long as the feelings aroused 
 by the object of the emotion are strong, it is in- 
 different whether they be pleasures or pains. In- 
 tense pains as well as strong pleasures lead to love, 3 
 and yet the emotion is a strong pleasure. 4 In short, 
 love is a strong pleasure, and it may be produced by 
 a combination of pleasures and pains, or may be 
 mainly, if not wholly, a synthesis of pains. Horwicz 
 says emphatically that the highest pleasure may be 
 felt when the elements entering into the complex 
 
 1 Psychologische Analysen, p. 459. 2 Ibid., p. 460. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 448. 4 Ibid., p. 454. 
 
44 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 consist of pain pure and simple. 1 The contention 
 becomes still more paradoxical when we learn that, 
 though the intense pleasure which constitutes love 
 may arise from pure pain, it is unthinkable that the 
 strong pain which is called ' hate ' should result 
 from pure pleasure. 2 This statement shows that the 
 author has felt the need of finding some distinction 
 between love and hate ; but even if the assertion 
 could be accepted, it would in certain cases be 
 absolutely impossible to say why the resultant should 
 be love and not hate, for the former like the latter 
 may be a synthesis of pains. This position, however, 
 does not call for detailed criticism ; it is the reductio 
 ad absurdum of the pleasure-pain theory of emotion. 
 Moreover, it cannot be regarded as a gratuitous 
 eccentricity on the part of a particular writer, for, 
 if emotion be taken to be the sum of the pleasure- 
 pain elements which are present at the moment, this 
 is the view which must be adopted since the elements 
 in question vary with circumstances. It is also in- 
 teresting to note that the identification of emotion 
 with pleasure -pain becomes still more paradoxical 
 if qualitative distinctions are attributed to pleasure- 
 pain. 
 
 Mr H. R. Marshall may be taken as an exponent 
 of the view that emotion is a mere concomitant of 
 tendencies to action. This writer maintains that 
 " each and every physical reaction must have its 
 coincident in mentality," consequently that "all 
 instinctive reactions must have their coincident in- 
 
 1 Psychologische Analysen, p. 460. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 448. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 45 
 
 stinct feelings." 1 These ' instinct feelings ' appar- 
 ently are independent of any general organic dis- 
 turbance. They constitute the states we call emo- 
 tions when they are the correlates of " relatively 
 fixed combinations of instinctive activities." 2 The 
 activities which are accompanied by emotion must 
 obviously be differentiated from ordinary reflexes. 
 Accordingly, Mr Marshall asserts that "they are 
 only occasionally recurrent, and when recurring 
 must in general be immediate in reaction, and hence 
 forceful, if they are to be valuable to us." 3 Emo- 
 tions are in their very nature dependent on " irregu- 
 larity of recurrence and forcibleness of reaction." 4 
 
 In criticism of this general position, attention may 
 be directed first to Mr Marshall's statement of the 
 circumstances under which it is possible for instinctive 
 actions to be accompanied by strong instinct-feelings. 
 It may well be that instinctive activities must be forc- 
 ible and infrequent if they are to be prominent in 
 consciousness, but this would simply go to prove that 
 emotion is not a mere concomitant of instinctive 
 activity. The results previously attained render this 
 obvious, for it has been shown (i) that all emotions 
 are not forcible ; (2) that those which are intense are 
 not necessarily accompanied by forcible activities ; 
 (3) that, when the less intense states are taken into 
 account, emotions cannot be described as " only 
 occasionally recurrent." More vital objections are 
 suggested by the contention that the reactions which 
 emotions accompany are relatively fixed and definite. 
 
 1 Mind, 1895, P- l %3- 2 Instinct and Reason, p. 101. 
 
 3 Loc. cit. 4 Mind, 1895, PP- 184, 185. 
 
46 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 Mr Marshall is forced to make this assertion since 
 the fixity and definiteness of the particular emotions 
 could not be explained on any other supposition. 
 It is clear, however, that the reactions with which 
 emotions are ' correlated ' do not always possess 
 the characteristics here attributed to them. Hate, 
 for example, may be associated with entirely differ- 
 ent actions at different times, and it would be im- 
 possible to point out any fixed reactions which this 
 feeling always ' accompanies.' This implies that 
 the actions need not be instinctive at all. Some- 
 times emotion-prompted actions are instinctive, par- 
 ticularly when anger and fear are present, but even 
 in the case of these emotions it is absurd to say that 
 this is always true. The reactions of fear vary, not 
 only with the object, but also with the individual. 
 The fear of criticism does not accompany the same 
 activities as the fear of death ; it may itself in differ- 
 ent minds coexist with totally distinct tendencies to 
 act. It may be true that we have more instincts 
 than we wot of, but it can scarcely be affirmed 
 that different human beings have a multiplicity of 
 different instincts. Nor can it be maintained that 
 emotion is, at all events, invariably the correlate of 
 a general instinct revenge, for example. Such an 
 * instinct,' manifesting itself in diverse forms, could 
 not be composed of the fixed elements which Mr 
 Marshall finds it necessary to postulate. A general 
 disposition of this sort, moreover, is not an instinct 
 in the strict meaning of the word. It is really a 
 frame of mind in which certain courses of action 
 appeal to us with unusual force, and is thus a 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 47 
 
 phenomenon which must be connected with emotion 
 itself. This leads up to the fundamental objection 
 that emotion is a very potent factor in conduct, and 
 cannot be regarded as a mere concomitant of in- 
 stinctive activity. Many so - called ' instincts ' will 
 be found to presuppose the influence of emotion. 
 That the latter is really the condition and not the 
 mere concomitant of the activities usually asso- 
 ciated with it, is evident from the fact that the emo- 
 tion may remain even when these activities are 
 inhibited by counteracting forces. This is intelli- 
 gible if emotion is a condition of these actions, 
 but somewhat difficult to understand if it is their 
 mere accompaniment. 
 
 If the theory of concomitance be true, it is neces- 
 sary to assume that the feelings of fear, anger, hate, 
 &c., in themselves as feelings, make no difference, 
 and are mere results without issue. It is incredible, 
 however, that our feelings in reference to an object 
 should have no direct influence on our behaviour in 
 regard to the object. Moreover, these feelings arise 
 only on occasions which have significance for the 
 individual, and it would be strange if they them- 
 selves should be without significance. Emotions 
 are of course intimately connected with the agent's 
 basal tendencies to action. This is simply an ex- 
 ample, however, of the complex interrelation be- 
 tween mental phenomena which results from the 
 organic nature of psychical life ; it does not prove 
 that emotions are mere concomitants which possess 
 no influence over conduct in their own right. For 
 instance, if a tendency is obstructed through the 
 
48 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 instrumentality of another self-conscious agent, this 
 may cause that agent to be regarded as a hostile 
 personality, and in that case ill-feeling will arise. 
 But the emotion is not a mere awareness of ob- 
 structed tendency or any bare concomitant of 
 thwarted activity ; it is a feeling in reference to 
 the antagonistic person which turns our attention 
 in a new direction, and, unless restrained, gives 
 rise to a new mode of action. 
 
 We may now proceed to consider the general 
 point of view with which the names of James and 
 Lange are so intimately associated. Although this 
 theory has been thoroughly discussed by different 
 critics, it cannot be briefly dismissed in this general 
 survey. It is vitally important to determine the 
 exact relation between emotion and organic dis- 
 turbance, and this can best be accomplished by 
 a careful examination of the James -Lange hypo- 
 thesis. At present it is impossible to criticise fully 
 the different forms which the theory has assumed in 
 different hands, and in any case it is not always 
 easy to know precisely where its various adherents 
 stand. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a 
 more or less general discussion of the following 
 contentions : (i) that emotion is organic sensation ; l 
 (2) that it is caused by the physical disturbance ; (3) 
 
 1 This phrase will be employed in place of the ambiguous expression 
 'feeling of bodily change.' There seems little doubt that some 
 writers at least have identified emotion with organic sensation. Leh- 
 mann, Ribot, and others have interpreted James in this way, and 
 Lange uses the word Wahrnehmung. In any case it is better to dis- 
 cuss this view by itself, and then determine whether the addition of 
 pleasure-pain makes any difference. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 49 
 
 that it is composed of organic sensation and pleas- 
 ure-pain. 
 
 Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether 
 emotion is merely organic sensation. No one cares 
 to deny that, when a strong emotion is aroused, 
 the awareness of various organic disturbances is 
 often a prominent feature in the total consciousness 
 of the moment. The only question can be whether 
 this by itself is able to impart the peculiar emotional 
 tone to the mental state. Those who answer this 
 question in the affirmative reduce emotion to a form 
 of cognition, and it is not obvious how organic sen- 
 sation can be both cognition and emotion at the 
 same time. The sensations involved in organic 
 disturbance are of the same order as the ordinary 
 sensations connected with physical existence, and 
 seem as little emotional. The statement that A 
 hates B is not equivalent to the assertion that A is 
 aware of certain changes in his own body. A's cog- 
 nition of his own physical condition has nothing in 
 common with that feeling towards B which is the 
 characteristic feature of his consciousness at the 
 time, nor does it explain why A feels impelled to 
 injure B regardless of all consequences to himself. 
 Organic sensations are necessarily referred to the self, 
 and are thus at variance with the objective reference 
 of emotion and the objective nature of emotional 
 activity. Indeed the whole question of the relation 
 between emotion and conation is a peculiarly diffi- 
 cult one from the James-Lange point of view. The 
 supporters of this theory frequently deny that there 
 is any connection between emotion and action, 
 
 D 
 
5O PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 The former, they declare, is simply the reflex in con- 
 sciousness of activities otherwise originated. This 
 is doubtless the logical result of the whole position, 
 and in itself, as we have seen, constitutes a vital 
 objection to the hypothesis which renders it neces- 
 sary. In addition to all this, it may be pointed out 
 that emotion is a reaction, and therefore a single 
 pulse of consciousness which cannot possibly be 
 analysed into a multiplicity of organic sensations, 
 occupying at different times the focus of con- 
 sciousness and localised at different parts of the 
 body. 
 
 These objections follow for the most part from the 
 results already attained, but other criticisms might 
 be made which do not imply any special theory. In 
 the first place, emotion may arise when the amount 
 of organic sensation is so small that it approaches 
 the vanishing point. This is proved by the fact 
 that a person may be almost entirely anaesthetic 
 and yet manifest the usual emotions. Two cases 
 of this description are on record : one cited by 
 Professor James, the other by Dr Worcester. 1 
 When anaesthesia is accompanied by emotional 
 apathy, it is evident from the instances brought 
 forward that the general mental condition is so 
 affected that objects either are not perceived 
 at all, or, if perceived, have no significance. In 
 these circumstances it is not wonderful that emo- 
 tion disappears, for an individual who was not 
 anaesthetic would be equally apathetic if he were 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, ii. pp. 455, 456 ; Monist, 1892-93, pp. 
 293, 294. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 51 
 
 in a similar psychical condition. 1 It may be that, 
 in the case of those who have not been anaesthetic 
 from birth, ' reproduced organic sensations ' play 
 a part, but these cannot well be identified with the 
 vivid living emotion. In normal life, too, emotion 
 is often strong when the bodily sensations are com- 
 paratively weak and unimportant. The amount of 
 physical disturbance which accompanies self-satis- 
 faction, admiration, and contempt, is no index of 
 the strength of the feelings themselves. Many emo- 
 tions which move us most profoundly are attended 
 by slight organic excitement, for the bodily changes 
 usually vary in extent and intensity with the prac- 
 tical demands of the situation. The organic per- 
 turbation tends to become very strong when im- 
 mediate action of great importance to the agent is 
 necessary ; it is not so prominent when there is no 
 sudden demand for prompt activity. The difference 
 between anger and hate in this respect is very 
 instructive. It is interesting to observe that the 
 advocates of the view under discussion lay most 
 stress on emotions arising under circumstances 
 which render immediate activity necessary. 
 
 On the other hand, a large number of organic 
 sensations may be present without affecting the 
 emotional life in any way. An athlete who engages 
 in a contest without sufficient preparation, is usually 
 in a position to cognise a complicated series of 
 physical changes trembling, respiratory disturb- 
 ances, heart-throbbing, and visceral changes gener- 
 ally. Yet these seem emotionally non- significant, 
 
 1 Cf. Mind, 1895, pp. 96, 97. 
 
52 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 for they remain the same whether he is glad, sad, 
 angry, envious, or simply too fatigued to care for any- 
 thing. In such cases, we are told, the ' emotional 
 diffusive wave ' is not complete that is, certain 
 organic sensations are lacking. The emotional wave, 
 however, does not seem to have a wide or well- 
 defined range of diffusion in such states as admiration 
 or contempt, and it is not clear that the awareness 
 of so much organic change should be irrelevant while 
 the addition of so much more should make all the 
 difference. 
 
 Other objections come to light when we inquire 
 into the causes of the bodily changes which are 
 indiscriminately massed together under the ambig- 
 uous and misleading phrase ' emotional expression.' 
 These physical processes may be divided into two 
 classes : (i) those which originally served some 
 purpose or had some connection with psychical con- 
 ditions ; (2) those which are due to the fact that 
 energy has been aroused and must find an outlet. 
 The second class comprises all those phenomena 
 which can be explained by the principle which 
 Darwin called "the direct action of the nervous 
 system." Darwin, as Ward remarks, 1 does not seem 
 to have fully appreciated the range of this principle ; 
 but even in his treatment of the subject one cannot 
 fail to be impressed with its importance. It has 
 been emphasised by Spencer, James, Wundt, Kiilpe, 
 Sergi, Mosso, and others, and the tendency of late 
 years has been to lay greater stress upon it. There 
 can be little doubt that by extending the scope of 
 
 1 Ency. Brit., xx. p. 72, note. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 53 
 
 this principle, we can attain a more adequate concep- 
 tion of the nature and origin of ' emotional expres- 
 sion ' in general. It seems much better, for instance, 
 to regard the respiratory changes in anger and fear 
 as the results of actually present stimuli, than to 
 accept Spencer's view that they are organic remi- 
 niscences of ancestral combat or flight. 
 
 The principle has been formulated by Darwin as 
 follows : " When the sensorium is strongly excited, 
 nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted 
 in certain directions, depending on the connection of 
 the nerve-cells and partly on habit." 1 Whenever 
 emotion is accompanied by strong bodily agitation, 
 therefore, it will be found that nerve-force is liberated 
 in greater quantities than can be used up in action. 
 The excess must find an outlet ; hence it spreads 
 through the body, causing a marked organic dis- 
 turbance. In this way we can account for trembling, 
 laughing, weeping and other glandular changes, 
 respiratory disturbances, and visceral changes in 
 general. The only elements in emotional ' expres- 
 sion,' in fact, which cannot be thus explained are 
 some purposive movements, and a few others which 
 have for various reasons become associated with 
 particular emotions. These are all habitual actions, 
 however, and add but little to the sum of organic 
 sensation. It is evident, therefore, that the physical 
 excitement which is mechanically determined is the 
 all -important factor for those who maintain that 
 emotion is organic sensation. 2 Indeed, it is the 
 
 1 Expression of the Emotions, pp. 29, 66. 
 
 2 Cf. James, ' Psychology,' ii. p. 465. 
 
54 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 source of practically the whole mass of organic 
 sensation into which emotion is analysed ; and this 
 has important consequences, as we shall proceed 
 to show. 
 
 In the first place, this organic perturbation is due 
 entirely to the circumstance that more energy has 
 been liberated than can be usefully employed. One 
 obvious result is that, if emotion is the feeling of this 
 disturbance, it is a purely fortuitous and unmean- 
 ing phenomenon. Professor Dewey is aware of the 
 danger here, and refuses to admit, with James, that 
 a large number of organic changes may be simply 
 " mechanical outpourings through the easiest drain- 
 age channels." 1 He finds it "more or less intoler- 
 able" that the bodily changes should be wholly 
 accidental. Our emotions are "too relevant and 
 important in our lives to be in the main the ' feel ' 
 of bodily attitudes that have themselves no mean- 
 ing." 2 He accordingly asserts that the " easiest 
 path " is determined by habits which, upon the 
 whole, were evolved as useful. He means by this, 
 apparently, that emotional ' expression ' is consti- 
 tuted by actions which were once useful, and by 
 discharges which are " disturbances, defects, and 
 alienations of adjusted movements." 3 The greater 
 part of the bodily changes will certainly come under 
 the latter head, and emotion can scarcely be any 
 more relevant or important if it is mainly the 
 ' feel ' of organic processes which represent dis- 
 
 1 Psychology, ii. p. 482. 
 
 2 Psychological Review, 1894, p. 563. 
 
 3 Ibid., pp. 561, 569. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 55 
 
 turbances, defects, and alienations of teleological 
 adjustments. Those who identify emotion with 
 organic sensation, therefore, must regard it as a 
 fortuitous and purposeless ebullition which has no 
 legitimate place in our psychical nature. They can 
 look forward to the time when things will be so 
 arranged that no more energy is liberated than is 
 necessary for action. In that happy era, men will 
 no longer love their friends or hate their enemies, 
 and will attach but a dim historical significance 
 to such words as ' fear,' ' admiration,' and ' con- 
 tempt.' Or, at all events, if nervous energy is 
 ever meted out on strictly economic principles, 
 emotions must become so pale and cold that they 
 scarcely deserve the name. 
 
 Another result may be deduced from the fact that 
 nearly all the physical changes which accompany 
 emotion are caused by the spread of excess energy 
 through the body. Since the process is under 
 mechanical law, a given amount of energy spread- 
 ing through a given organism will produce certain 
 effects, irrespective of the nature of the situation 
 which is instrumental in liberating this force. 
 There is simply so much energy which is under 
 a mechanical necessity to find an outlet. That 
 the special character of the occasion has no influ- 
 ence in determining the actual channels of discharge, 
 becomes still more obvious when we remember that 
 the whole process is necessary just because there 
 is an excess of energy over and above what is 
 required for action appropriate to the special cir- 
 cumstances. The bodily changes in question de- 
 
56 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 pend entirely upon the amount of stimulus and the 
 constitution or momentary condition of the par- 
 ticular organism. As the organism is continually 
 changing its condition, and as the situation in which 
 an emotion arises does not always have the same 
 stimulating power, the same emotion may have 
 different expressions at different times, and differ- 
 ent emotions may have fundamentally the same 
 expression. No one denies the first part of this 
 contention, 1 and the second can be substantiated. 
 Trembling, changes in the blood-supply, respiratory 
 disturbances, palpitation of the heart, glandular 
 affections, may accompany different emotions which 
 are equally violent. 2 A few habitual actions alone 
 are peculiar to particular emotions, and these would 
 form but a slight ground of distinction between one 
 emotion and another. We may conclude, therefore, 
 that emotion cannot be the sum of the organic 
 sensations aroused by the bodily disturbance, for 
 this view does not seem to harmonise with intro- 
 spective results, or with what we know about 
 emotion and the origin of the organic excitement. 
 In discussing this hypothesis, we have incidentally 
 obtained results which may be used against the 
 second contention, that the physical disturbance 
 is the cause of the emotion. While the general 
 physical condition of the individual indirectly affects 
 his emotional life, the physical changes accom- 
 
 1 Cf. Lange, ' Ueber Gemiithsbewegungen,' pp. 74, 75. 
 
 2 Lange finds the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between the 
 ' expression ' of anger and that of joy (' Gemiithsbewegungen ' pp. 28 ff.) 
 He finally asserts a distinction which Wundt rightly maintains does not 
 exist ('Phil. Stud.,' vi. p. 351). 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 57 
 
 panying emotion cannot act as causes, since they 
 may be practically identical in the case of different 
 emotions, and widely different in different instances 
 of the same emotion. Even if they remained rela- 
 tively constant in each case, a further objection 
 could be made. Everything depends on the way in 
 which the situation is viewed. Each emotion implies 
 that the circumstances are felt to have a particular 
 significance, and is fully explained thereby. The 
 sense of danger, for example, is a good and sufficient 
 reason for being afraid ; it is not possible to assume 
 anything else or anything more, for this alone is able 
 to render the origin of the emotion intelligible. 
 
 In the light of these results, the theory that emo- 
 tion is organic sensation plus pleasure-pain 1 can be 
 briefly dismissed. The arguments which prove that 
 organic sensation is not emotion, show at the same 
 time that it cannot be a constituent. That the 
 addition of pleasure-pain would in any case make no 
 difference is evident from previous results. It may 
 be well, however, to make this point explicit. In 
 the first place, the hedonic character of the total 
 state may vary while the emotion remains the same. 
 Hate may be accompanied by more pain than 
 pleasure, or may be predominantly pleasurable, but 
 the tendency to action is the same in each case, and 
 this proves the identity of the emotion. In the 
 second place, it is not necessary that there should 
 be any pleasure-pain at all. The only thing that is 
 indispensable is that the situation should be felt to 
 have a definite significance, and when an emotion 
 
 1 Cf. Baldwin, ' Psych. Rev.,' 1894, pp. 610 ff. 
 
58 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 takes the form ot a reflex response to presentation, 
 it may arise before the hedonic effect has time to 
 make its appearance in consciousness. It is true 
 that at times pleasure-pain is the fact which leads 
 us to attribute a specific significance to the circum- 
 stances, while at other times it is the aspect of the 
 situation which is regarded as significant. On these 
 occasions, however, it is involved in, or pertinent to, 
 the conditions of the emotion, and is not a con- 
 stituent. Under those circumstances alone is it ever 
 in any sense relevant to the emotion. On the other 
 hand, it is undeniable that the aspect of the situation 
 which affects us most strongly in the way of pleasure- 
 pain, may be totally irrelevant so far as the emo- 
 tional reaction is concerned. A person may feel 
 defeat most keenly, and yet admire the opponent 
 who inflicted it, instead of harbouring any ill-feeling. 
 Pleasure-pain, therefore, like organic sensation, can- 
 not be a constituent of emotion. It is only occasion- 
 ally relevant, and then it appears as a factor involved 
 in the conditions by which the feeling - attitude is 
 determined. Accordingly, emotion is not reducible 
 to pleasure-pain and organic sensation. 
 
 It is desirable, however, to mention the special 
 form which Kiilpe has given to the theory. This 
 psychologist defines emotion as a " fusion of feelings 
 and organic sensations." l " Fusion occurs when 
 the constituent qualities are thrust more or less into 
 the background by the total impression which results 
 from the connection." 2 This implies that ' fusion ' 
 
 1 Psychologic, pp. 331-3335 Titchener's trans., pp. 320-322. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 21, 22 ; Trans., p. 21. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 5g 
 
 must not be taken as a kind of psycho-chemical 
 process ; and Kiilpe further insists that it must always 
 be possible, by direct or indirect means, to analyse 
 the total impression into its component elements. 1 
 There is undoubtedly a process of the kind here 
 described, but emotion cannot be a ' fusion ' of the 
 elements indicated, since these, as we have seen, 
 cannot figure as constituents in any sense. Nor does 
 it seem possible to account for emotion as a fusion 
 or blending of any elements whatever. We cannot 
 directly analyse feeling-attitude into anything else, 
 and all the indirect evidence corroborates the intro- 
 spective result. Emotion has special conditions and 
 a characteristic effect on conduct ; it is a reaction, 
 and consequently a unity. Hence it cannot be a 
 blending of non-emotional elements. 
 
 The theory that emotion is mere disturbance or 
 excitement now claims our attention. The Her- 
 bartians seem to adopt this view explicitly, 2 but 
 writers of all shades of opinion tend to favour the 
 same position. Thus Professor James tells us that 
 he " took for granted, without discussion, that the 
 word ' emotion ' meant the rank feeling of excite- 
 ment, and that the special emotions were names of 
 special feelings of excitement and not of mild feelings 
 which might remain when the excitement was re- 
 moved." 3 It is important, therefore, to determine 
 whether excitement is the essential attribute of emo : 
 
 1 Psychologic, p. 285 ; Trans., p. 277. 
 
 2 Waitz, ' Psychologic, 'pp. 478, 479; Nahlowsky, 'Das Gefiihlsleben,' 
 pp. 244 ff. ; Volkmann, ' Psychologic,' ii. p. 389. 
 
 3 Psych. Rev., 1894, p. 525. 
 
6O PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 tion. This question is not a mere verbal one, for 
 the term ' emotion ' has already been applied to 
 certain mental states, and it is a question of fact to 
 decide whether these consist essentially of commotion 
 or excitement. 
 
 Excitement appears whenever the mental equi- 
 poise is seriously disturbed. In such circumstances 
 voluntary attention becomes difficult or impossible, 
 the ideational train is affected, and ill-directed or 
 random movements take the place of co-ordinated 
 activities. The ordered whole no longer exists and 
 the parts assert their independence. In a sense 
 there is excitement when the stimulus is sufficient 
 to heighten general activity but not strong enough 
 to destroy co-ordination. No one, however, would 
 identify emotion with excitement of this sort, and 
 we shall, therefore, adopt the narrower definition 
 of the term. Any excessive stimulus, especially if 
 sudden, tends to destroy mental equilibrium, and 
 thus, in greater or less degree, to reduce the psychi- 
 cal system to its component parts. Mental excite- 
 ment is therefore conditioned in much the same 
 way as the organic perturbation which constitutes 
 so large a part of emotional ' expression.' It must 
 be noted, however, that although the stimulating 
 power of the situation affects mind and body at the 
 same time, the amount of disturbance is not always 
 the same in both cases. The physical excitement 
 is practically uncontrollable, while the psychical 
 disturbance can to a certain extent be repressed. 
 Hence the former may be strong while the latter 
 is weak. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 6l 
 
 It is intelligible, therefore, that excitement should 
 accompany great fear, sudden anger, and intense 
 joy. Obviously, however, it is not an essential feat- 
 ure or necessary concomitant of emotion as such. 
 Fear may act simply as a healthy stimulus to the 
 normal activities appropriate to the occasion. Hate 
 may be very intense while the general mental^con- 
 dition is free from excitement. This species of hate 
 is the most effective in conduct, for the absence of 
 commotion renders possible coherence of thought 
 and activity. A person who is apparently ' cold- 
 blooded,' may thus be powerfully influenced by 
 emotion. From the nature of the case, moreover, 
 certain emotions are habitually dissociated from all 
 excitement. Contempt, for instance, implies that 
 the object of the feeling may be entirely disre- 
 garded ; hence, when it is free from all admixture 
 with anger, it may be strong and yet coexist with 
 absolute mental serenity. Further, if excitement 
 reaches a certain pitch, it tends to weaken emo- 
 tion, and, when it gets beyond all bounds, emotion 
 tends to disappear. Much commotion means little 
 or no emotion. Rage may thus pass into sheer 
 psychical turmoil, and in extreme terror there would 
 be much more real fear if coherent intellectual ac- 
 tivity were possible. Finally, it is to be observed 
 that emotion is not the only state accompanied by 
 excitement. Pure pleasure-pain also, when exces- 
 sive, has this concomitant. 
 
 Excitement is therefore a merely fortuitous and 
 occasional accompaniment of the states we call 
 emotions. It depends mainly on the relation be- 
 
62 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 tween strength of stimulus and the varying stimulus- 
 capacity of the individual. If it be regarded as an 
 essential characteristic, and used as a criterion, the 
 most arbitrary distinctions must be made. We 
 must separate the stronger and weaker forms of the 
 same emotion, and oppose strong feelings accom- 
 panied by commotion to the same feelings equally 
 strong but calm and concentrated. We must assert 
 that anger, fear, and hate are only occasionally 
 emotions, though they have at all times the same 
 conditions and effects, and manifest the same char- 
 acter as conscious facts. 
 
 The belief that excitement is an essential attribute 
 of emotion is the source of many misconceptions. 
 The James-Lange theory loses much of its plausi- 
 bility when it is recognised that many mild feelings 
 have the essential characteristics of emotion, and 
 that an emotion may be strong without involving 
 violent agitation. The prejudice that all emotions 
 are strong and that strength and violence are 
 synonymous, also accounts for the prevalent tend- 
 ency to overlook the function of emotion, for 
 excitement of course is simply disturbance of co- 
 ordinated activity. It is evident, too, that it is 
 scarcely possible to detect the true emotional quale 
 when attention is directed exclusively to states of 
 excitement. The feeling-attitude is there concealed 
 under a mass of concomitants, and, in any case, the 
 commotion renders introspection almost impossible. 
 
 The origin of the common opinion that emotion is 
 explicable in terms of pleasure -pain and cognition 
 can be easily understood. Since emotion is a sub- 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 63 
 
 jective state it is naturally confused with pleasure- 
 pain, especially if the ambiguous term ' feeling ' is 
 used without any qualification ; and, when it is 
 observed that the former has an objective reference 
 which the latter lacks, the cognitive element is 
 added to account for this fact. This position must 
 imply either that the mere co-presence of the ele- 
 ments is all that is necessary, or that some process 
 of blending or fusion comes into play. But the 
 mere coexistence of pleasure -pain and cognition 
 cannot constitute emotion, for hedonic effect has no 
 outward reference at all, and cognition has objective 
 reference in a totally different sense from emotion. 
 And if some process of blending or fusion be in- 
 voked, the case is not altered. Since chemical 
 fusion cannot be implied, it must be possible to 
 distinguish the constituents in the total impression. 
 This cannot be done, and all that we know about 
 the conditions and effects of the alleged result 
 proves that it cannot be a complex of any de- 
 scription. It has also been shown that pleasure- 
 pain cannot be a constituent, and that the cognitive 
 element cannot explain objective reference if it is 
 a factor within the total result. If the object thus 
 disappears in the total impression, the latter cannot 
 be a feeling for the object. Reference to an object 
 is essential, and for that reason the cognition of the 
 object must not blend. Hence, even if pleasure- 
 pain could act as a constituent, the presentative 
 element, so far as it is idea or perception of object, 
 could not be the other factor. 
 
 On this theory, the differences between the various 
 
64 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 emotions are no less inexplicable than the char- 
 acteristic features of emotion as such. Professor 
 Sully maintains that "each of the well-marked 
 species of emotion has its characteristic group of 
 [physical] reactions. . . . Thus fear is differentiated 
 from other emotive states in general, as well as from 
 other varieties of disagreeable feeling, by its peculiar 
 organic resonance, including such familiar effects as 
 that disturbance of the heart's action known as pal- 
 pitation, tremor of muscles, pallor, certain altera- 
 tions in the secretions." l This implies that emo- 
 tions derive their specific character from the organic 
 sensations which accompany them. We have seen, 
 however, that the bodily changes mentioned by 
 Sully are not peculiar to fear, and that no emotion 
 is accompanied by a characteristic organic reso- 
 nance. The physical changes which are definitely 
 associated with particular emotions are habitual 
 actions which give rise to little organic sensation. 
 Moreover, no appreciable organic perturbation is 
 observable in the case of the weaker emotional 
 states. It is evident, therefore, that the facts can- 
 not be explained in this way. 
 
 Lehmann seeks another solution of the difficulty. 
 He asserfs'that bodily pain, fear, anger, hate, &c., are 
 all painful feelings, and that the differences between 
 them arise solely from the fact that the pain is in 
 each case bound up with different ideas. Similarly, 
 the distinctions which exist between the pleasurable 
 feelings hope, aesthetic enjoyment, joy, love, &c. 
 are due to the differences in the ideas with which 
 
 1 Human Mind, ii, p. 67. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 65 
 
 the hedonic effect is connected. 1 The obvious objec- N 
 tion here is that the same emotion may arise under 
 very different circumstances, and may thus be asso- 
 ciated with very different ideas. Lehmann notices 
 this difficulty, but bids us observe (i) that the cir- 
 cumstances always have an essentially similar char- 
 acter, (2) that the feeling in each case has a peculiar 
 stamp in consequence of the differences which co- 
 exist with that similarity. 2 The second statement 
 will not bear examination. If an individual be re- 
 garded as a hostile personality, his individual char- 
 acteristics and peculiarities do not affect the quality 
 of the ill-feeling which is aroused, though they may 
 affect its intensity. And, as a variety of emotions is 
 usually possible in a given situation, on account of 
 the variety of aspects which it presents, a mass of 
 detail must be totally irrelevant to any particular 
 emotion which actually appears. On the other 
 hand, the first statement is as undeniably true as 
 the second is demonstrably false. The situations in 
 which we are afraid have all an ' essentially similar 
 character ' ; they may all be described as ' danger- 
 ous.' It is to be observed, however, that as soon 
 as this aspect is recognised, the emotion appears 
 without any more ado unless counteracted by forces 
 external to it. This recognition, therefore, is all 
 that is necessary, and since by itself it is not the 
 emotion, it must be the determining condition. 
 
 1 Die Haupt. d. Gef., pp. 17, 18. Later on, the author makes state- 
 ments inconsistent with this, but, as he reverts to the view of Sully 
 already discussed, the complication may be disregarded. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 19. 
 
 E 
 
66 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 Thus a cognitive element does give character to 
 the special emotions, but it evidently acts as 
 a condition, not as a constituent. Accordingly, 
 whether we consider the specific qualities of the 
 different emotions or the emotional quale as such, 
 we must come to the conclusion that emotion is not 
 a combination of pleasure-pain and cognition. 
 
 In addition to the foregoing criticism it seems 
 necessary to discuss in some detail the special form 
 of this theory which is adopted by Sully and others. 
 Sully defines emotion as " a mass or aggregate of 
 sensuous and representative material having a 
 strongly marked and predominant concomitant of 
 feeling or affective tone." 1 This seems to be in 
 the main the position of Bain and Spencer, and 
 probably represents a common opinion. We have 
 already pointed out the difficulties involved in the 
 conception of emotion as a combination of pleasure- 
 pain and cognition, and we shall confine ourselves 
 here to a criticism of the contention that emotion 
 is a ' mass.' 
 
 In the first place, no cognitive mass is necessary. 
 The simple conception ' danger ' is all that is in- 
 dispensable for the appearance of fear, and the 
 other emotions are dependent on other conceptions 
 equally non- massive. Moreover, emotion in pro- 
 portion to its strength fixes attention on one object 
 and on one class of motor ideas. The individual 
 who is thoroughly afraid can think only of the 
 danger and the means of escape, while in intense 
 fear the idea of the terrible object may dominate 
 
 1 Human Mind, ii. p. 57. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 67 
 
 consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. 
 Hate and affection, when they are living realities 
 and not mere potentialities, contract the circle of 
 consciousness in a similar way. When a person is 
 brooding over an injury, his mind may be filled with 
 a multitude of ideas, but in these circumstances 
 anger is weak or merely potential, and when it 
 becomes real and strong the crowd of ideas is 
 summarily dispersed. Emotion, in short, is not 
 in its origin dependent on a mass of ideas and 
 sensations, and while it exists it is hostile to this 
 mass in proportion to its intensity. 
 
 In the second place, a hedonic mass is not always 
 present. No feelings of pleasure or pain are neces- 
 sarily involved in the conditions of the emotion, and 
 sometimes as a matter of fact emotion succeeds 
 cognition before the hedonic potentialities of the 
 situation can be realised. Sometimes, too, from 
 the nature of the case the pleasure-pain is so weak 
 that its presence is rather inferred than felt. One 
 may have strong contempt for an inefficient person 
 merely because he is inefficient. Probably there is 
 a species of aesthetic pain in these circumstances, 
 but it is not a conscious factor of any importance, 
 especially if the emotion is strong. Indeed, under 
 any conditions, a strong emotion tends to weaken 
 pleasure -pain by directing attention to an object 
 and thus forcing the mere subjectivity of the self 
 into the background. Even if all the pleasures and 
 pains which might possibly be aroused did make 
 themselves felt, they would conflict, and thus to 
 some extent neutralise one another. The causes of 
 
68 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 hate are per se painful, but the sthenic effect of the 
 emotion and the thought of vengeance are pleasur- 
 able. Emotion cannot be compared in this respect 
 to a dominant mood ,which determines a dominant 
 feeling-tone. In such cases, only those ideas that 
 involve a particular hedonic character tend to arise, 
 and sensations and perceptions which are accom- 
 panied by the opposite hedonic effect are thrust out 
 of consciousness by force of attention, or are viewed 
 in such a way that the feeling-tone is minimised or 
 altered. When we are melancholy our minds are 
 rilled with dismal thoughts, and the joys and 
 pleasures of the world seem ' hollow ' and * unreal.' 
 On the other hand, in a jjoyous mood, we see the 
 best side of everything and slur over the rest. It 
 cannot be said that this happens in the case of 
 emotion. That an individual is smarting under a 
 series of injuries does not diminish the pleasure he 
 experiences in planning schemes of revenge, or 
 render him less ready to entertain such thoughts. 
 For this reason the hedonic character of emotion 
 varies with circumstances ; the dominant feeling- 
 tone, which is a feature of every ' mood,' is con- 
 spicuous by its absence. 
 
 Difficulties would still present themselves, how- 
 ever, even if a mass of hedonic and cognitive 
 material did in all instances exist. Each emotion 
 has a definite quality, and this is inexplicable on 
 the assumption that it is a heterogeneous mass of 
 pleasures, pains, ideas, sensations, percepts. More- 
 over, the mass is not a fixed quantity with definite 
 constituents in each case. The ideas and percep- 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 69 
 
 tions differ with circumstances, and the organic 
 sensations and feelings of pleasure-pain are equally 
 variable. The advocates of the ' mass ' theory ought 
 to explain how it comes about that we apply the 
 term * hate ' to a large quantity of pain, a small 
 amount of pleasure, and one set of ideas and sensa- 
 tions, while we also use the word to designate a 
 large amount of pleasure, a small amount of pain, 
 and another set of ideas and sensations. If they 
 assert that amid the diversity there is a unity, they 
 are unquestionably right, but they will find that on 
 their hypothesis the unity in no sense forms a mass. 
 If it be maintained that the emotion differs with the 
 diversity of the alleged constituents, it must be urged 
 that if this were true the diversity would swamp the 
 unity, and there would be very little justification for 
 the application of a common name in the different 
 cases. 
 
 The view under discussion derives some plausi- 
 bility from the fact that emotions, when strong, 
 are felt to possess a characteristic which might be 
 termed ' massiveness.' They are never local, iso- 
 lated, or partial activities ; they are the reactions of 
 the individual as such, ways in which he is disposed 
 towards something. Accordingly, when they are 
 prominent in consciousness, they are felt as dif- 
 fused. This massiveness, however, is not the result 
 of addition ; it follows from the fact that emotions 
 are ' total ' states, reactions of the individual as a 
 whole. 
 
 Professor Rehmke's theory is an interesting varia- \ / 
 tion of the generah standpoint represented by Leh- 
 
70 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 mann and Sully. According to this author, while 
 ' feeling ' in the narrow sense indicates mere abstract 
 pleasantness or unpleasantness, in a wider sense the 
 term applies to such states as fear, anger, love, and 
 hate, which are momentary unities of three elements, 
 namely, pleasure-pain, a determining cognitive fac- 
 tor, and certain organic sensations dependent on the 
 intellectual element. Every complex feeling thus 
 constituted has certain bodily consequences. These 
 are called its ' expression,' and must be sharply 
 distinguished from the physical element, which is 
 necessarily connected with the cognitive condition, 
 and is a constituent of the feeling itself. The ' ex- 
 pression ' is not the cause of the emotion, therefore, 
 and it is equally erroneous to maintain that all the 
 physical changes are the effects of the emotion. 
 The true position is one which mediates between 
 these two extremes. 1 It is not necessary to discuss 
 this view in detail, however, for the general objec- 
 tions to which it is liable have already been indicated. 
 Wundt's theory is hard to classify, but it may 
 for convenience be treated here. This psychologist 
 maintains that emotion is a complex state consisting 
 of a primary feeling of pleasure or pain, which causes 
 an inhibition or stimulation of ideational activity, 
 and is in turn modified by the feelings thereby orig- 
 inated. Emotion is thus partly the effect of the 
 primary feeling on ideational activity, and partly 
 the effect of this change on the original feeling. 2 
 It is not merely a strong pleasure or pain, nor is it 
 
 1 Zur Lehre vom Gemilth, pp. 56 ff. 
 
 2 Phil. Stud., vi. p. 360; Grundziige der phys. Psy., 1887, ii. p. 405. 
 
CURRENT THEORIES OF EMOTION. 71 
 
 a feeling or succession of feelings caused by the idea- 
 tional change ; it is a complex state composed of the 
 hedonic and ideational elements. 1 Towards the close 
 of his exposition, however, Wundt makes an elabo- 
 rate attempt to prove that certain impulses are the 
 earliest forms of emotion. 2 This is rather signifi- 
 cant, for if his original description were correct there 
 would be little temptation to identify emotion with 
 impulse. 
 
 This hypothesis is really a statement of the cir- 
 cumstances which occasionally precede the appear- 
 ance of emotion. Sometimes there is a sudden 
 shock which inhibits all ideational activity ; some- 
 times anger, hate, &c., do not arise until we have 
 brooded over what has occurred. It cannot be 
 maintained, however, that emotion is always ushered 
 in by a shock, particularly if it be remembered that 
 all emotions are not violent. It has also been shown 
 that no crowd of ideas is necessary. These alleged 
 constituents are therefore not even invariable ante- 
 cedents. The ' primary feeling ' can equally be dis- 
 pensed with ; it may succeed the emotion, or may 
 be so weak that its presence is barely discernible. 
 The secondary feelings cannot always be relied upon 
 to strengthen the initial feeling of pleasure-pain, for 
 they may conflict with it and thus have a minimising 
 or neutralising effect. Finally, it is to be noted that 
 a complex of elements loosely conjoined cannot 
 possess the unitary character which is a feature of 
 every emotion. 
 
 1 Menschen- und Thierseele (1892), p. 405 ; Eng. trans., p. 372. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 421, 422 ; Trans., pp. 386, 387. 
 
72 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 A review of the theories which have just been 
 discussed, discloses the fact that emotion is not 
 usually identified with pure cognition, pleasure-pain, 
 or conation. Psychologists, almost without excep- 
 tion, admit that the phenomenon in question differs in 
 some respects from any of the other aspects of mind 
 in isolation from the rest. The numerous hypotheses 
 which have been employed to explain away this 
 difference can be reduced to a few simple elements. 
 That the addition of cognition to pleasure - pain 
 accounts for the objective reference of emotion ; that 
 multiplicity of elements constitutes felt diffusedness ; 
 that emotion is a mere reflex in consciousness of 
 activities otherwise originated, or a mere result of 
 over-stimulation these are the contentions or tacit 
 assumptions which are continually appearing, either 
 separately or in varying combinations. Since there 
 seems to be good reason for rejecting all these 
 positions as equally untenable, it can be maintained 
 that the difference between emotion and the other 
 aspects of mind has not been successfully explained 
 away. The general result of this critical investiga- 
 tion, therefore, harmonises with the conclusion which 
 was reached in the previous chapter. 
 
73 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS, AND THEIR INFLUENCE 
 ON CONDUCT. 
 
 FROM the point of view now attained emotion must 
 be regarded as an ultimate aspect of mind with a' 
 distinctive influence on conduct. At this stage, 
 therefore, it is important to determine definitely 
 the manner in which emotion functions as a prin- 
 ciple of activity. In order to do this, it is neces- 
 sary to ascertain the qualitatively distinct forms 
 which feeling-attitude assumes, for, though all emo- 
 tional impulses and tendencies have the same 
 general character, each primary emotion has a 
 specifically distinct manifestation in conduct. Our 
 precise object will therefore be an attempt to dis- 
 cover these primary forms and to determine their 
 influence on action. The two inquiries, however, 
 throw light on each other and cannot well be 
 separated. 
 
 From this statement of the problem it is evident 
 that the term ' primary ' has here a qualitative, 
 and not a temporal significance. By ' primary emo- 
 tions ' we mean those which are qualitatively dis- 
 
74 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 tinct, not those which are first in point of time. 
 We are dealing with the psychological individual as 
 now constituted, and in any case temporal priority 
 seems irrelevant to the present subject of inquiry. 
 The fact that anger is prior to admiration does 
 not decide whether the two emotions are qualita- 
 tively the same or different. The latter question 
 must be settled mainly by introspection. Temporal 
 priority would have significance only if it could be 
 asserted that the emotions which are first in the 
 field necessarily constitute the material out of which 
 the others are compounded. There is, however, not 
 a particle of evidence in favour of this view. On 
 the other hand, good ground for rejecting it can be 
 found if we investigate the determining conditions of 
 those emotions which are slow to appear in the indi- 
 vidual or in the race. Admiration, for instance, is 
 conditioned by the sense of worth, and therefore 
 presupposes self-consciousness and a high degree of 
 intellectual development. It is not present at the 
 dawn of mental life simply because the conditions 
 on which it depends do not exist. It is present 
 later on whenever worth is recognised, whether or 
 not more primitive emotions are simultaneously 
 aroused. Consequently it cannot be a mere fusion 
 of other emotions. What holds in this case is valid 
 in others, and it is thus clear that temporal priority 
 has no bearing on qualitative difference. In seeking 
 to ascertain the primary emotions, therefore, we 
 must rely mainly on direct observation, though sub- 
 sidiary aid is not altogether lacking. 
 
 For the purposes of exposition, the phenomena 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 75 
 
 under investigation will be arranged under the fol- 
 lowing heads: (i) joy and grief; (2) anger and 
 fear; (3) kindly feeling and its opposite; (4) the 
 self-feelings ; (5) admiration and scorn, respect and 
 contempt ; (6) feelings of repugnance ; (7) intel- 
 lectual, aesthetic, ethical, and religious feelings. 
 The results of the inquiry must at present be some- 
 what tentative. Emotions blend with one another 
 and are associated more or less intimately with 
 intellectual and hedonic accompaniments. Conse- 
 quently analysis, though always possible, is not 
 always easy. The ambiguity of language is a 
 further source of difficulty. This is natural in the 
 circumstances, for, while language is usually accu- 
 rate in respect to broad general facts, it is neces- 
 sarily misleading in matters of detail which involve 
 subtle distinctions. 
 
 The first states to be examined, therefore, are joy 
 and grief. The prominent element in joy is the 
 agreeable sense of advantageous transition. In 
 addition to this, however, there is another factor 
 to which the term ' satisfaction ' may be applied. 
 As w r e shall show later on, satisfaction is a reaction, 
 a feeling in reference to an object. Usually it occu- 
 pies a subordinate place, but it gains in relative 
 importance when joy is calm and profound. Grief 
 is more distinctively emotional than joy, for its chief 
 feature is the feeling-attitude which may be called 
 ' dissatisfaction.' l More specifically, it is unavailing 
 dissatisfaction with a state of affairs which cannot 
 
 1 Although ' dissatisfaction ' has associations which tend to narrow its 
 meaning, it is the best term available. 
 
76 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 be remedied. Grief is thus distinguished from pure 
 dissatisfaction, not merely by the intensity of its 
 hedonic accompaniment, but also by the feeling of 
 powerlessness which it necessarily involves. Since 
 it is primarily a reaction, it is distinct from sheer 
 misery. The latter is the hedonic state which 
 appears when the unpleasantness attending dis- 
 advantageous transition inhibits emotional reac- 
 tion. Grief must also be differentiated from 
 sorrow and sadness. In sorrow there is little 
 or no dissatisfaction, and the salient feature is 
 regret i.e., retrospective wish referring to some 
 painful event in the past. Sadness is the diffused 
 but subdued unpleasantness which results when 
 the individual is predisposed to see the dark 
 side of everything. Melancholy is simply sadness 
 in a more permanent form. It may be accom- 
 panied by emotion, but is not itself a peculiar 
 feeling-attitude. 
 
 Since satisfaction and its opposite are present 
 in joy and grief respectively, it is necessary to 
 discuss them at this stage. Dissatisfaction seems 
 to be unquestionably emotional. It cannot be 
 identified with pain as such for several reasons. 
 It has always an outward reference, since it cannot 
 exist without an object to which it is directed. 
 It is never caused by the mere presence of the 
 discordant, but invariably depends on an intellectual 
 condition namely, the recognition of the fact that 
 some object is not what we should like it to be. 
 This explains why it does not always appear when 
 we are pained, and may arise when we are agreeably 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 77 
 
 affected ; for the immediate influence of an object 
 and 'its ultimate effects may widely diverge, and 
 that which is conditioned by cognition is not neces- 
 sarily determined by the immediately present. Even 
 when we are dissatisfied with an object because it is 
 unpleasant, we can detect the presence of a feeling- 
 attitude towards the object in addition to the mere 
 hedonic effect. This is substantiated by the fact 
 that dissatisfaction does not arouse action for the 
 removal of itself, but gives rise to activities affecting 
 an object. In short, dissatisfaction can be proved 
 to be a reaction, and is therefore distinct from pain. 
 On the other hand, it cannot be analysed into mere 
 intellectual or practical attitude, and we are forced 
 to conclude that it is a feeling-attitude. In regard 
 to satisfaction the case may seem to be less clear. 
 Nevertheless, all that has been said in reference 
 to dissatisfaction applies, mutatis mutandis, to its 
 opposite ; and though the latter can have only 
 a negative effect on conduct, still a negative in- 
 fluence implies a positive function, and one that 
 may be very important. Hence satisfaction also 
 must be placed among the emotions. 
 
 It is not difficult to ascertain the modes of be- 
 haviour which are characteristic of dissatisfaction 
 and its counterpart. The one prompts to action 
 that will produce some desirable change in the 
 discordant ; the other inhibits all activity in refer- 
 ence to its object. It is not so easy to define the 
 conditions of the two emotions with accuracy and 
 brevity. We may say, however, that the feelings 
 in question are evoked by anything which is re- 
 
78 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 garded as discordant or the reverse if it is viewed 
 simply as bare fact and not as cause. The actual 
 effects or causal possibilities of the object doubtless 
 affect our judgment in reference to the existential 
 character of the fact, but, if the causal aspect be 
 dominant, other emotions will appear in place of 
 satisfaction or dissatisfaction. For instance, an 
 object which is cognised simply as discordant causes 
 dissatisfaction, but it will arouse anger or fear 
 if attention be directed to the events which may 
 issue from it. Accordingly, satisfaction and dis- 
 satisfaction refer most frequently to inanimate 
 things or to a state of affairs, for in these cases 
 the connection between actuality and causal activity 
 is felt to be external or remote. 
 
 Anger is evidently a feeling in reference to an 
 object. It is not a necessary result of pain, for it is 
 possible to be pained without being angry. Indeed 
 pain by itself can never be the condition of the 
 emotion. When it is asserted that the individual is 
 angry because he is pained, the true statement of 
 the case is that he is angry because he objects to 
 being pained. If for any reason he acquiesces in the 
 unpleasant result, no anger follows. Similarly, any 
 thwarting of activity or desire is apt to occasion 
 irascibility, since every agent is prone to regard 
 interference with his activities as objectionable. If, 
 however, the obstruction is viewed as a mere fact 
 which has a definite place in the order of things, 
 anger is not excited. In short, the primary condition 
 of this emotion is the actual or threatened occur- 
 rence of something which is felt as objectionable. 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 79 
 
 Rebellion against what has happened or may happen 
 is the characteristic of anger, and this presupposes 
 that the event appears as objectionable. The state- 
 ment that anger is dependent on the sense of injury 
 is a convenient form of expression, which is strictly 
 accurate, however, only if the term * injury ' be taken 
 in an unusually wide sense. It is true that the con- 
 dition which anger involves is not always explicitly 
 present, for the emotion may become a habitual 
 response to certain stimuli. It must be remembered, 
 however, that the condition is presupposed in the 
 formation of the habit. What the individual finds 
 ' objectionable ' depends upon the range of his in- 
 terests. It is absolutely incorrect to say that pain- 
 ful events alone come under this category. Anything 
 which is contrary to the agent's basal tendencies or 
 regulative ideals is opposed to what he is interested 
 in, and, if viewed in that light, furnishes occasion for 
 anger. A person may be irritated by an occur- 
 rence, solely because it is at variance with his ideals. 
 Of course, the conflict thus involved has hedonic 
 potentialities, but it would be ridiculous to assert 
 that the conflict is objectionable only on account of 
 its actual or possible unpleasantness. As a matter 
 of fact, the emotion may be out of all proportion to 
 the hedonic effect, for an event which is by no 
 means excessively painful may yet be excessively 
 irritating. 
 
 Anger must be sharply distinguished from ill- 
 feeling in all its forms. As conscious states the 
 emotions are absolutely distinct, and there is a 
 corresponding divergence in their conditions and 
 
80 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 in the character of the objects to which they refer. 
 Anger depends solely on the cognition of the fact 
 that something objectionable has occurred or may 
 occur, while ill-feeling presupposes that some indi- 
 vidual is regarded as the cause of objectionable 
 effects. In the one case, attention need not pass 
 beyond the event ; in the other, it must be directed 
 to the cause. Hence ill-feeling refers to an agent, 
 while the object of anger is something that happens. 
 The person is the object of hate ; what he has done 
 is the object of anger. When anger is apparently 
 directed to the stupidity, shallowness, or any other 
 quality of the individual, it will be found that its 
 object is really the occurrence of results which are 
 directly or indirectly involved in the individual's 
 actual or possible behaviour. One who is easily 
 roused to anger is not necessarily prone to ill-feeling 
 or hate. Indeed a ' good heart ' and a choleric 
 disposition are frequently associated. Naturally 
 enough the feeling in reference to the event is often 
 accompanied by the feeling towards the agent, and 
 this frequent blending of anger and ill-feeling tends 
 to obscure their qualitative difference. There are 
 certain occasions, however, when anger is separated 
 from this concomitant, and in these cases its true 
 nature comes to light. When, for instance, we are 
 angry with our own mistakes we are simply angry at 
 what has happened. Again, when the cause of injury 
 is an individual for whom we have a strong friend- 
 ship, ill-feeling will probably be inhibited. We may 
 be angry at the behaviour of a friend without any 
 trace of malevolent feeling towards him. In such 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 8l 
 
 circumstances we have merely a feeling in reference 
 to what has occurred. 
 
 The distinction between the conditions and objects 
 of the two emotions enables us to understand other 
 differences which exist between them. Anger is 
 usually less enduring than ill-feeling, for an event 
 is transitory in its very nature, while an agent is 
 relatively permanent. Anger, too, is frequently, 
 though not necessarily, accompanied by excitement, 
 since an event comes into direct relation with us 
 and must if possible be dealt with at once. It is 
 more rarely suppressed than ill-feeling, for an occur- 
 rence as such is a single thing which stands out 
 alone, while an agent is the sum of a past and the 
 promise of a future. The event thus frequently 
 causes immediate anger on occasions when ill-feel- 
 ing is checked by the remembrance of our past 
 relations with the agent. Moreover, the occur- 
 rence may be one that ought not to be ignored, 
 while, at the same time, the agent's general nature 
 may nevertheless be such that his other actions 
 outweigh or neutralise the particular instance in 
 question. Accordingly, even where it is not pos- 
 sible to overlook the single event, it may be both 
 possible and right to ignore its connection with the 
 agent, so far as our feeling-attitude towards him is 
 concerned. 
 
 It is now possible to ascertain the influence of 
 anger on conduct. The emotion being a feeling in 
 reference to an event which is felt as objectionable, it 
 is natural to suppose that it prompts to action which 
 prevents the occurrence of the event or guards against 
 
 F 
 
82 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 its recurrence. This is what we find if we do not 
 confound anger with ill-feeling. It is obviously inac- 
 curate to maintain that retaliation is the mode of 
 behaviour by which anger always manifests itself, 
 for we may be angry with what we ourselves have 
 done, and, when others are the offenders, less drastic 
 measures may be found more suitable. Anger is 
 satisfied when the individual has taken steps to 
 ward off, prevent the recurrence of, or nullify any 
 event which he views as objectionable. Since it is 
 not ill-feeling towards the agent, it does not imply 
 delight in suffering as such. 
 
 So far we have been dealing with anger per se, and 
 we may now examine several more or less complex 
 states in which this emotion is closely associated 
 with various concomitants. Rage is anger accom- 
 panied by excitement. Wrath is anger transfused 
 with the sense of power. Irritation arises when the 
 expression of the emotion is restrained, either by 
 something purely external or by some internal 
 check. It is differentiated from anger voluntarily 
 repressed in that it always involves a sense of re- 
 straint. Irritation passes into exasperation when the 
 emotion becomes so strong that the inhibition is 
 overcome. Indignation is not simply ' altruistic ' 
 anger, since anger is the same whether it be felt on 
 our own account or on behalf of others. As the 
 name itself indicates, indignation is called forth by 
 occurrences which presuppose unworthiness on the 
 part of some agent. Accordingly, it contains anger 
 in reference to the event and scorn of the unworthi- 
 ness therein evinced, the former being the predomi- 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 83 
 
 nant element. It is a blending of anger and scorn. 1 
 This explains why it is almost invariably ' altruistic,' 
 for scorn rarely applies to the self. Resentment is a 
 more or less passive state in which anger is checked 
 by self-respect or by the sense of powerlessness. Its 
 salient feature is a feeling of injury, and though 
 anger is present in an incipient stage at least, the 
 total state is more cognitive and hedonic than 
 emotional. 
 
 Fear is the feeling in reference to what is regarded 
 as ' dangerous.' In other words, it is the emotion 
 which arises when the individual knows or suspects 
 that he cannot cope with some evil which threatens 
 himself or those with whom he is in sympathy. 
 When self - distrust is not present, an impending 
 evil occasions anger instead of fear. Anything 
 which increases self-distrust increases the tendency 
 to fear. A surprisingly insignificant evil will cause 
 the emotion if self-confidence is seriously shaken 
 by recent failures, general mental depression, or 
 physical weakness. This emotion is probably more 
 easily excited than any other. The mere possibility 
 of evil may be sufficient even when the powerlessness 
 to cope with it is itself a mere possibility. An un- 
 known or unaccountable object tends to inspire fear 
 because it may work harm, and we obviously cannot 
 be sure that we are able to defend ourselves. The 
 dread which attaches to the supernatural can be 
 
 1 When scorn is inhibited, a sense of the unworthiness displayed 
 may be the sole concomitant of anger. This state is also called 
 ' indignation,' but it is evidently an abbreviation of the normal 
 form. 
 
84 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 accounted for in this way. The fear of darkness 
 has a more positive basis, for, while the possibility 
 of evil is a mere suggestion of the fancy, the feeling 
 of self-distrust has some justification. It is evident, 
 therefore, that fear may frequently seem unaccount- 
 able. We may not know why we distrust ourselves 
 or what in particular we are afraid of. There is 
 always present, however, the consciousness that an 
 evil is possible which possibly we cannot cope with. 
 This constitutes the conception of ' danger ' and the 
 determining condition of fear. What requires ex- 
 planation is that possibilities affect us so much, and 
 that we are so keenly alive to their existence. 
 These facts are intelligible, however, if we suppose 
 that the experience of the individual and of the race 
 has taught that in matters of importance it is better 
 to err on the safe side. 
 
 From what has been said, it follows that fear, like 
 anger, is a feeling in reference to an occurrence or 
 event. When it seems to have an individual for its 
 object, closer observation will discover that it really 
 refers to the effect which the agent may cause. 
 The range of particular objects which may excite 
 the emotion is coextensive with the scope of our 
 interests. It would be wrong, therefore, to main- 
 tain that fear is aroused merely by occurrences 
 which affect self-preservation, for it is not true that 
 the individual is interested solely in keeping himself 
 alive. Both anger and fear give rise to activity 
 which may be described as ' self - protective,' if 
 * self ' be taken to cover everything in which the 
 agent is interested ; but while the former disposes 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 85 
 
 the individual to confront an evil directly, the latter 
 impels him to protect himself by avoiding what he 
 is not able to resist. Open defiance is the expression 
 of anger in conduct, whereas ' the discretion which 
 is the better part of valour' springs from fear. 
 When fear is described as a pathological pheno- 
 menon, it is evident that the emotion as such is 
 confounded with terror. The latter only appears, 
 however, when the stimulus is too great for the 
 stimulus capacity of the individual. It is unques- 
 tionably pathological, therefore, but it is largely 
 the mere result of excessive stimulation, and only 
 partially an emotion. Indeed extreme * terror' arises 
 on occasions which can usually be described as " too 
 fearful for the feel of fear." Normal fear is not 
 accompanied by general lack of ordination or by 
 inhibition, and its influence on action can scarcely 
 be disputed. Even slight fears which are barely 
 perceptible may have most important results. The 
 practical efficiency of an emotion depends not 
 merely on its strength, but mainly on the fact that 
 it appears at the ' psychological moment ' when 
 everything is in its favour. 
 
 The complex states into which fear enters as one 
 element may now be briefly examined. Dread is 
 calm and concentrated fear permeated with awe. 
 Consternation is a blending of fear with astonish- 
 ment or amazement. Anxiety is strain and oscillation 
 of attention accompanied by uneasiness and inter- 
 mittent fear. It presupposes that the chances for 
 and against some event of importance cannot be 
 determined with certainty. Attention passes con- 
 
86 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 tinually from one possible issue to the other, though 
 the adverse alternative always occupies a prominent 
 place. Apprehension is a species of tentative fear. 
 It implies that, while an undesirable event seems 
 probable, the remaining element of uncertainty pre- 
 vents the emotion from obtaining a firm footing. 
 Alarm is surprise followed by fear or anxiety. 
 Misgiving is sudden self-distrust, usually attended by 
 some degree of fear. 
 
 Since hope is frequently, though erroneously, 
 regarded as the direct counterpart of fear, it is 
 necessary to deal with it at this stage. It is defined 
 by Descartes as "a disposition of the soul to 
 persuade itself that the thing which it desires will 
 come to pass." l Sometimes this is all that the 
 word signifies, but there is also a definite mental 
 state to which the name is frequently attached. 
 This may be described as a condition of expectancy, 
 but not of direct expectation, in which we await 
 some issue with the pleasurable but uneasy conscious- 
 ness that the wished-for result is a possibility. The 
 desired event is not regarded as certain, but the 
 possibility that it may happen is uppermost in the 
 mind. The favourable alternative usually gains this 
 predominance, apart from all calculation of chances 
 or effort of attention, on account of the unwillingness 
 to face the possibility of evil. Still, the fact that 
 the desirable result is not assured, is necessarily 
 recognised, and hope thus involves an element of 
 uncertainty and a tendency to alternate with sadness 
 or fear. Hope is, therefore, not a peculiar feeling in 
 
 1 (Euvres, Cousin's ed., iv. p. 177. 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 87 
 
 reference to an object; in itself it is simply expectancy 
 together with uncertain pleasure. 
 
 The so-called ' fear ' which is the direct counter- 
 part of hope is totally different from real fear ; it is 
 a state of expectancy in which the individual looks 
 forward to the future with the unpleasing conscious- 
 ness that some undesirable event is possible. Hope 
 alternates with genuine fear, however, more frequently 
 than with its correlate, and this is inevitable in the 
 nature of things. Since hope refers to some doubtful 
 issue beyond our power, when the evil possibility 
 is prominent, the conditions of fear are complete, 
 namely, threatened evil and sense of powerlessness. 
 But hope and genuine fear do not correspond, 
 although the former frequently gives place to the 
 latter. They do not belong to the same order of 
 mental facts, as the preceding analysis has made 
 manifest. 
 
 Disappointment appears when an event happens 
 which is contrary to our hopes. It is simply a 
 disagreeable sense of the conflict between the wished- 
 for and the actual. Despair is conditioned by the 
 conviction that some evil is unavoidable; it is 
 analysable into the hedonic effect and practical 
 attitude which are hereby occasioned. Fear is not 
 an element, for it disappears with the extinction of 
 hope. The behaviour which is characteristic of 
 despair as such is passive expectancy without 
 acquiescence or submission. On further reflection, 
 this may give place either to resignation or to a 
 reckless activity which implies as little hope of result 
 as fear of consequences. 
 
88 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 In hate, ill-feeling, and dislike there is a feeling 
 towards the agent which, for want of a more con- 
 venient general term, may be called 'ill-feeling.' 
 The necessary conditions of this emotion are present 
 whenever the object is regarded as the source of 
 effects which are felt as objectionable. The effects 
 in question may be actual or possible, directly or 
 indirectly due to the agent, and may affect ourselves 
 or those in whom we are interested. What a given 
 individual finds objectionable is dependent on his 
 nature and on circumstances. A person may be 
 disliked on account of his virtues or for the bene- 
 fits he has conferred. Ill-feeling, therefore, is not 
 always aroused by malignant actions or possibilities; 
 the object may be the source of results which for 
 other reasons are classed as objectionable. It must 
 be noticed, however, that ill-feeling, like any other 
 reaction, does not always appear when its condi- 
 tions are present. It may be inhibited on specific 
 occasions by other emotions, or by the influence 
 which considerations of prudence or justice gradually 
 acquire. As mental evolution progresses, the range 
 of the emotion becomes more and more restricted. 
 Thus ill-feeling comes to be regarded as uncalled for, 
 if the objectionable occurrence does not presuppose 
 intention on the part of the agent. It is felt in these 
 circumstances that the connection between the cause 
 and the effect may be ignored, since the relation is 
 in a sense accidental and does not imply active 
 hostility. It is partly for this reason that ill-feeling 
 towards inanimate things tends to disappear. 
 
 Ill-feeling, therefore, presupposes that an agent is 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 
 
 antagonistic to us in virtue of his character, or 
 hostile by his actions. Accordingly the emotion 
 always incites to activities which imply that the 
 object is absolutely excluded from the social self and 
 placed beyond the pale of sympathy. The tendency 
 to action may frequently be nullified by counter- 
 acting forces. In that case, however, the emotion 
 may still exercise an important negative influence on 
 conduct by excluding kindly feeling with the impulses 
 which belong to it. While anger leads the individual 
 to confront an event, ill-feeling puts him in opposi- 
 tion to the centre of activity from which the event 
 has issued. The value of this duality in emotional 
 attitude is obvious. An actual or threatened occur- 
 rence must usually be dealt with at once and by 
 itself, but as a rule it is advantageous to turn to the 
 agent also. Hence it is important that there should 
 be, in addition to the feeling in reference to the 
 event, a direct feeling towards the agent. Ill-feeling, 
 therefore, is not in itself an anomalous or pathological 
 phenomenon. Its effect on conduct, particularly in 
 its negative aspect, may well prove useful in the life 
 of the individual and of the race. 
 
 The various states in which ill-feeling appears, can 
 now be distinguished from one another. ' Dislike ' 
 is difficult to analyse, for the term is very ambiguous. 
 At times the word seems to denote a slight degree 
 of repugnance ; at other times it indicates merely a 
 dim sense of antagonism, due to the fact that the 
 object suggests objectionable potentialities in a vague 
 and indefinite way. Usually, however, dislike signi- 
 fies the mild emotion which is called forth when the 
 
go PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 objectionable events associated with the object are 
 not of vital importance. We speak, it is true, of 
 ' intense dislike,' but the phrase refers to a state in 
 which the sense of antagonism is strong while the 
 amount of ill-feeling is small. Hate is ill-feeling in 
 its most concentrated and permanent form. Though 
 it may be aroused on insufficient provocation, it 
 really presupposes that the object is regarded as 
 essentially and continuously hostile or noxious. 
 This explains why the intensity and duration of 
 hate are independent of the amount of injury actu- 
 ally received. 
 
 In this connection, the more complex states known 
 as 'envy' and ' jealousy' may be analysed. The 
 word ' envy ' sometimes signifies the mere desire or 
 wish to raise ourselves to the level of another who 
 has made us aware of our relative inferiority. Oc- 
 casionally the term implies irritation on account of 
 the superiority of some one, together with an un- 
 pleasant though unavowed sense of inferiority. Usu- 
 ally, however, ' envy ' designates a more sinister 
 state which contains the pain of inferiority, irrita- 
 tion, and a large amount of ill-feeling towards the 
 individual who affects us disagreeably by the mere 
 fact of his superiority. In such circumstances there 
 is no desire directed primarily to the attainment of 
 the envied good. The prominent factors in the 
 total state are ill-feeling and pain ; consequently, the 
 objects most strongly desired are the injury of the 
 objectionable individual and the removal of the pain. 
 Both ends may be attained at once, for the indi- 
 vidual is injured and the pain relieved if the good 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. QI 
 
 in question is destroyed, its existence denied, or its 
 value lessened in the eyes of others. Accordingly 
 the pain and the emotion generally combine their 
 forces, as it were, and produce one strong desire to 
 bring the envied person down from the level he has 
 attained. Envy and jealousy are frequently classed 
 together, but the latter is differentiated from the 
 former by the absence of the consciousness of in- 
 feriority. * Jealousy ' usually denotes a complex 
 state which includes (i) fear that the desire to attain 
 or retain some highly valued good will be thwarted 
 through the instrumentality of another person, (2) 
 ill-feeling towards the rival, (3) intermittent irri- 
 tation. Sometimes the word is used to indicate 
 a permanent condition of excessive and irritable 
 watchfulness in regard to the individual's own in- 
 terests. Jealousy always springs from some estimate 
 of what is due to the self, and consequently stands 
 on a higher plane than envy. 
 
 The opposite of ill-feeling is the emotion which 
 appears as the common element in pity, gratitude, 
 liking, affection. This emotion can best be described 
 as kindly-feeling or fellow-feeling. It is aroused by 
 any person whose actions or nature stand in a har- 
 monious relation to the needs or tendencies of the 
 self. We may say, therefore, that kindly feeling 
 depends upon the sense of community with others. 
 It is conditioned, however, not merely by community 
 of interest in the narrow sense, but also by com- 
 munity of nature. Any being who is recognised as 
 akin to us tends to arouse kindly feeling on that 
 account alone. This is primarily a result of the fact 
 
92 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 that no individual can fully realise his powers in 
 isolation from his fellows. To be himself he must 
 live with others. In himself he is incomplete, and 
 consequently has a natural tendency to self-com- 
 pletion. Moreover, there is no arbitrary limit to the 
 scope of this tendency, for the self as a whole is 
 enriched in proportion as the social self is extended. 
 Any fellow-being, therefore, by his very nature is 
 fitted to harmonise with one of the most basal 
 tendencies of the self. It is evident, then, that 
 kindly feeling is capable of being more spontaneous 
 than its opposite. A fellow-being does not arouse 
 ill-feeling until his actions or specific character 
 definitely breaks the tie of community at certain 
 points. The connection, however, can never be 
 completely severed, and kindly feeling may therefore 
 make its presence felt, even when the actual or pos- 
 sible behaviour of the object would naturally tend to 
 arouse the contrary emotion. In these circumstances 
 the feeling-attitude is clearly determined by the mere 
 sense of community of nature, since it manifests 
 itself in direct opposition to the actions or individual 
 character of the object. 
 
 It may be urged that ill-feeling also can be in a 
 measure spontaneous. This is not its natural char- 
 acter, however, and if an individual seems to adopt 
 a general attitude of hostility to his fellows, special 
 reasons can always be assigned to explain the fact. 
 Moreover, ill-feeling can never be spontaneous to the 
 same extent as its opposite. Though useful and 
 legitimate on certain occasions, it is manifestly 
 detrimental to the individual if it is habitual and 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 93 
 
 indiscriminate. It is a species of surgical remedy 
 which is misplaced unless there is a special call for 
 it. Further, though it may at times be distinctly 
 pleasurable, it presupposes discord and is as a rule 
 attended with unpleasantness. Still more important 
 is the fact that it involves contraction of the self, 
 and therefore cannot be carried to any extreme with- 
 out violating the conditions of healthy existence. 
 On the other hand, kindly feeling towards our fel- 
 lows as such is fostered and encouraged by its essen- 
 tial nature and incidental results. Kindness begets 
 kindness, or at all events tends to disarm hostility. 
 It implies harmony, and is in consequence primarily 
 pleasurable. It also involves normal and healthy 
 expansion of the self. 
 
 As a general rule, therefore, we have a fellow- 
 feeling for our fellows, and are kindly disposed 
 towards them, until they declare themselves to be 
 hostile or noxious. It is evident that one who is 
 absorbed in self or is reared in a hostile environ- 
 ment will rarely manifest this spontaneous good- 
 feeling, but the limitations and exceptions which 
 must be made do not invalidate the general rule. 
 Indeed the truth of the latter must be assumed to 
 account for the existence of many facts that would 
 otherwise be wholly unintelligible. No human being 
 is an atom so impenetrable that he is incapable 
 of compassion for a fellow-being in distress. Even 
 the most selfish mortal may be pained by a great 
 calamity which affects some remote section of the 
 human community, and may be roused to indigna- 
 tion by injustice which does not in any degree 
 
94 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 concern himself or his immediate associates. But 
 the good or ill which befalls others gives rise to 
 sympathetic pleasure, pain, or emotion, only if we 
 feel kindly disposed towards them, for kindly feeling 
 expands the self, and in proportion to its intensity 
 makes us identify our interests with those of others. 
 The facts in question prove, therefore, that we are 
 capable of kindly feeling towards our fellows irre- 
 spective of everything except that they are our 
 fellow-beings. This latent fellow-feeling naturally 
 becomes prominent when our fellows are in need of 
 help and sympathy. 
 
 The activities and tendencies which are condi- 
 tioned by this emotion must now be considered. 
 Kindly feeling, as we have seen, is determined by 
 the relation in which objects stand to the desires 
 and tendencies of the self. It is necessary, therefore, 
 to distinguish carefully between the emotional ten- 
 dencies as such and the concomitant tendencies 
 which are involved in the conditions of the emotion. 
 The feeling-attitude is a separate fact which has its 
 own influence on conduct, and this must be discov- 
 ered by observation. If the emotion be considered 
 by itself, apart from its concomitants, it will be found 
 to incite to activity on behalf of the individual who 
 inspires it. Schopenhauer maintains that pity ab- 
 olishes the distinction between ego and non-ego, 1 
 and this is true of kindly feeling in general. So far 
 as tendency to act is concerned, the distinction 
 between self and not-self is abolished. Of course, 
 the emotional tendency may not be realised in action, 
 
 1 Werke, iv. p. 209. 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 95 
 
 but even when the feeling-attitude does not produce 
 any positive result, it yet has a negative influence 
 which is by no means unimportant. 
 
 The different states into which kindly feeling 
 enters may be discussed at this stage. It is evident 
 that spontaneous kindly feeling for our fellows forms 
 the basis of pity. The constituent elements of pity 
 are kindly feeling and sympathetic pain or sadness. 
 The former conditions the latter, for, if we were not 
 kindly disposed towards our fellows, their suffering 
 would cause no sympathetic suffering in us. The 
 kindly feeling is not aroused because we ourselves 
 suffer ; we suffer because we have the kindly feeling. 
 In the case of gratitude, liking, and affection, the 
 individuality of the object is the main factor which 
 determines the rise of the emotion. Gratitude is 
 kindly feeling towards one who has of his own 
 accord done something for the individual's advantage 
 which could not be demanded as a right. The con- 
 sciousness of the fact that disinterested kindness has 
 been freely offered, unites with the emotional ele- 
 ment to give character to the total state. Liking 
 involves kindly feeling towards some person who 
 stands in a definitely advantageous, but not intimate, 
 relation to the self. As a concrete state it is dis- 
 tinguished from ordinary kindly feeling by the rela- 
 tive strength of the hedonic accompaniment. Affec- 
 tion in all its forms is the counterpart of hate. It 
 is aroused by any individual who is intimately 
 associated with the special nature and interests of 
 the self. The particular circumstances under which 
 affection may originate do not alter the essential 
 
96 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 character of the emotional element as such, though 
 they may affect the nature of the concomitants with 
 which the emotion is combined. 
 
 It is evident from what has been said that kindly 
 feeling in general is the sole source of all sympathetic 
 pleasure - pain or sympathetic concern for others. 
 This emotion, therefore, accounts for all the facts 
 which are vaguely classed under the general term 
 ' sympathy.' A reference to the statements already 
 made in regard to the conditions of the emotion will 
 show in what sense ' sympathy ' can be regarded as 
 an ultimate fact. 
 
 Pride, Humility, and Shame are the chief forms of 
 the so-called ' feelings of self.' Like so many other 
 terms in this connection, ' pride ' means many things. 
 At times it denotes that sense of personal dignity 
 which presupposes that the individual feels there is 
 something owing to himself, a mode of behaviour 
 which alone is worthy of him. This fact is not in 
 itself emotional. It is primarily an ideal of worth 
 which implies that certain things must be demanded 
 or done for their own sake. Shame is the correlate 
 of this species of pride. It is merely the sense of 
 unworthiness which manifests itself when the agent 
 fails to realise his ideal of worth, and is degraded in 
 his own eyes. ' Pride ' also designates the natural 
 inclination towards a high or exaggerated estimate 
 of self in comparison with others. This bias is a 
 result of the tendency of every individual to assert 
 himself and make his being effective in some way. 
 The tendency to self-assertion makes power im- 
 portant and superiority desirable. Power and superi- 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 97 
 
 ority are therefore objects of strong desire; the 
 wish is father to the thought, and illusion is almost 
 inevitable. The craving for self-assertion, the con- 
 comitant pleasure in power, and the desire for supe- 
 riority are also included under the protean term 
 ' pride.' It is clear, however, that no feeling towards 
 self is connected with this basal tendency or its 
 manifestations unless self-satisfaction is aroused. 
 Vanity is an indirect derivation of the self-assertive 
 tendency. It is primarily desire for the approbation 
 of others that is, desire for external recognition of 
 personal merit. Humility is a consciousness of 
 relative inferiority along with acquiescence in that 
 state of affairs, and must therefore be distinguished 
 from self- dissatisfaction. It is evident, therefore, 
 that the * self-feelings,' though they may be accom- 
 panied by emotion, do not constitute any specific 
 feeling - attitude. This seems inevitable when we 
 remember that the self must take its place as one 
 object among others before we can have any feeling 
 in regard to it. 
 
 Admiration and scorn are the peculiar emotional 
 \rbactions which are conditioned by the recognition 
 of worth or unworthiness respectively. They neces- 
 sarily refer to some object which is considered as in 
 some sense a real source of events ; for that which 
 simply contains or transmits what it receives from 
 without may have positive or negative value, but 
 cannot be described as worthy or unworthy. Scorn 
 and admiration are true ' aesthetic ' emotions. We 
 admire an individual solely because his actions 
 manifest intrinsic worth according to our standards 
 
 G 
 
98 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 of worth. The involuntary admiration which an 
 opponent sometimes evokes, proves that the practical 
 relations of the object to the self are altogether 
 irrelevant. The modes of behaviour directly due to 
 these emotions regulate our action in reference to 
 the object, but are not so important as the indirect 
 results. Admiration and scorn concentrate attention 
 on concrete ideals and deterrent examples, and ac- 
 cordingly have a marked reflexive effect on conduct. 
 Scorn is frequently accompanied by anger, and 
 also by that feeling of superiority which is called 
 ' pride.' The connection between scorn and this 
 element of ' pride ' is so natural that it tends to 
 obscure the true nature of the emotion. Admiration 
 may be associated with humility, though the relation 
 between the two is not so close as that which exists 
 between scorn and pride. The most frequent con- 
 comitant of this emotion is wonder, since admiration 
 is most readily excited by an object which exhibits 
 worth in an extraordinary degree, and accordingly 
 often refers to something which we do not fully 
 comprehend. Indeed, the term sometimes signifies 
 merely wonder and pleasure, or wonder, pleasure, 
 and satisfaction. This is true of the so-called ' ad- 
 miration ' of the beautiful or the inanimate, unless 
 there is an implied reference to the worth of some 
 agent. The real emotion of worth, however, can be 
 sharply differentiated from wonder and satisfaction. 
 Admiration is not necessarily accompanied by won- 
 der, nor is the latter always associated with the 
 former. Wonder may be aroused by extraordinary 
 unworthiness as well as by unusual worth. It is 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 99 
 
 caused by anything which is not fully intelligible, and 
 has no necessary relation to worth or its opposite. 
 In regard to satisfaction, the distinction is not less 
 clear, for here again the idea of worth is not directly 
 involved. It is evident, too, that ' to admire ' and 
 ' to be satisfied with ' are entirely different mental 
 states with different expressions in conduct. 
 
 Respect and contempt, though apparently related 
 to admiration and scorn, are yet qualitatively dif- 
 ferent, and must be classed as primary emotions. 
 They are distinctive feelings in reference to an object, 
 and present many characteristics peculiar to them- 
 selves. They are conditioned by the recognition of 
 effectiveness and inefficiency respectively, and have 
 no direct connection with ideals of worth. They 
 presuppose the tendency to self-assertion. Effective- 
 ness and its opposite must be objects of interest in 
 order to arouse emotion, and they would have no 
 interest or significance for a being devoid of the 
 craving for effective manifestation of himself. On 
 the other hand, admiration and scorn presuppose 
 another element of our nature, namely, the sense of 
 personal dignity. If we did not have the feeling 
 that a special mode of behaviour was alone worthy 
 of us, we should not possess any ideal of worth by 
 which worthiness or unworthiness could be recog- 
 nised in others. 
 
 Other considerations can be brought forward to 
 emphasise the distinction here indicated. Admira- 
 tion is usually associated with respect, since the 
 realisation of an ideal necessarily demands effective- 
 ness ; but it is possible to respect an individual when 
 
100 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 admiration in the true sense is out of the question. 
 Scorn and contempt are more frequently at variance 
 for obvious reasons. Unworthiness need not imply 
 inefficiency ; its most notable manifestations indeed 
 presuppose the opposite. The most intense scorn 
 is aroused by effective villainy, and therefore appears 
 in circumstances where contempt would be ridicul- 
 ous. If scorn and respect are but rarely associated 
 in such cases, this is due to the greater interest 
 which the aspect of worth normally possesses. Re- 
 spect is possible, however, for it is conceivable that 
 the sheer force or power displayed may rivet the 
 attention. The distinction between scorn and con- 
 tempt can be further accentuated. Contempt may 
 be good-natured or tolerant, if inefficiency is united 
 with good intentions or is more or less excusable. 
 Scorn, on the contrary, is in its very nature in- 
 tolerant. Again, what is beneath contempt is 
 beneath notice ; what is beyond scorn is repulsive. 
 Finally, attention may be directed to the modes of 
 behaviour which are characteristic of respect and 
 contempt on the one hand, and admiration and 
 scorn on the other. Respect leads one to treat the 
 object as a factor that must be reckoned with in 
 practical relations; contempt manifests itself by 
 total disregard for the object as a force. On the 
 contrary, the actions and tendencies in which ad- 
 miration expresses itself imply that the individual 
 who exhibits worth is to be honoured on account of 
 his intrinsic nature. The manifestations of scorn 
 imply that unworthiness is to be despised in and 
 for itself. In view of all the facts, therefore, it seems 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. IOI 
 
 legitimate to infer that respect and contempt are 
 primary emotions specifically distinct from admira- 
 tion and scorn. 
 
 Disgust, aversion, abhorrence, detestation, horror, 
 are all emotions of repugnance. They are feelings 
 in reference to some object which is regarded as 
 repulsive, and give rise to actions of withdrawal or 
 avoidance. The object is not an event, but a person 
 or thing considered in itself, and not as a cause. 
 If we think of the events which may issue from the 
 repulsive object, anger, fear, or ill-feeling may appear 
 according to circumstances and the point of view 
 adopted. The repulsive is not the hostile, as such, 
 or the merely harmful. It is the unnatural, that 
 which is against nature. In other words, it is that 
 which is directly opposed to the essential fitness of 
 things. This is evident in the case of the morally 
 repulsive. The undue prominence of the animal 
 nature, desires which lead to misuse of functions, 
 desires of any kind raised to an unnatural degree, all 
 arouse the emotion of repugnance. The same prin- 
 ciple is at work where merely physical objects are 
 concerned. Objects of this kind are natural in their 
 proper place ; but they may be misplaced, and this 
 is the rationale of all physical repugnance. While 
 actions of rejection or avoidance in regard to certain 
 objects may be developed as instincts at a low stage 
 of mental development, the emotion of repugnance 
 depends upon a sense of what is * natural ' and the 
 reverse. An object cannot possibly appear as repul- 
 sive unless it is viewed in its relation to some system 
 or order, however dimly that may be conceived. 
 
102 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 The emotions of repugnance are sometimes deter- 
 mined by judgments which are biassed by mere cus- 
 tom or convention ; but, in the last resort, all judg- 
 ments in regard to the repulsive imply a reference to 
 the basal tendencies and ideals of the individual. 
 
 From this standpoint the repulsive can be differ- 
 entiated from the unworthy, as well as from the 
 harmful or hostile. The line actually drawn between 
 the unworthy and the unnatural must be a shifting 
 one on certain occasions. It may be a question 
 whether one point of view will be adopted or the 
 other, and scorn at times may alternate with disgust. 
 But this does not destroy the essential difference 
 between the two points of view. The unworthy 
 object stands on the same plane of being as the 
 judging individual, for unworthiness does not imply 
 perversion of nature, and all judgments of worth 
 apply only to responsible agents. On the other 
 hand, the repulsive object is relegated to an entire- 
 ly distinct level of existence. For this reason an 
 inanimate thing may be repugnant as well as a real 
 agent. Accordingly, ' repulsiveness ' and ' unworthi- 
 ness ' are concepts which differ in content and 
 extent, though their application to fact may vary in 
 certain cases. 
 
 The emotion of repugnance, as we have seen, 
 leads to actions of avoidance. Its characteristic 
 manifestations in conduct imply that the object 
 falls outside the sphere of legitimate activity. Its 
 influence on action therefore is distinct from that of 
 dissatisfaction or of fear. Against this statement 
 the objection may be urged that the repulsive as 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. IO3 
 
 such can ' attract.' This is true in one sense and 
 in particular instances. If the object is strikingly 
 repulsive, it is unusual and difficult to understand ; 
 hence it has the fascination which always attaches 
 to the novel and incomprehensible. Where the 
 susceptibility to repugnance is relatively weak, this 
 species of attraction is apt to be very prominent. 
 That the repugnant can attract in this manner is 
 simply one instance of the numerous conflicts which 
 necessarily spring from the complexity of human 
 nature. 
 
 The different forms which the emotion assumes 
 must now be briefly noted. Disgust is primarily 
 repugnance to the physically repulsive, and is there- 
 fore accompanied by actual or reproduced organic 
 sensations. In ' moral ' disgust these sensations 
 are suggested by analogy. Aversion, as ordinarily 
 understood, is not merely the practical attitude of 
 repugnance, but also the corresponding feeling- 
 attitude at a certain degree of intensity. Detestation 
 is repugnance accompanied by intermittent ill-feeling. 
 Abhorrence is intense repugnance. Horror is aroused 
 when the object is repulsive in an extraordinary 
 degree. It involves general organic and mental 
 disturbance, and in this respect resembles terror. 
 The apparent similarity between the two emotions 
 is increased by the fact that in both cases the 
 emotional element as such is overshadowed by the 
 concomitant excitement. Moreover, horror is often 
 accompanied by the feeling of powerlessness, and it 
 is natural that it should at times be attended by an 
 element of fear. 
 
v 
 
 104 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 The intellectual feelings which require most careful 
 treatment are surprise, astonishment, and wonder. 
 Surprise is conditioned by the appearance of the 
 unexpected, and is thereby differentiated from the 
 mere feeling of novelty. An unexpected occur- 
 rence causes an abrupt stoppage in the intellectual 
 activity of the moment ; it also produces a more 
 or less violent disturbance of previous adjustments, 
 since it is not merely new but contrary to expecta- 
 tion. The sense of disturbance is therefore the 
 characteristic element in surprise. Another con- 
 stituent is the awareness of the fact that the un- 
 expected has happened, and at times an element 
 of bewilderment may also be present. Astonishment 
 is excited, not by the unexpected as such, but by the 
 utterly unaccountable. Astonishment may follow 
 surprise, for the unexpected may turn out to be, 
 for the time at least, absolutely unaccountable. The 
 former, however, does not necessarily imply any pre- 
 vious expectation; hence it is not always preceded 
 by the shock of surprise and may develop gradually. 
 It is the state of mind in which we feel that some- 
 thing is totally beyond our comprehension, and in 
 which the recalcitrant element so dominates con- 
 sciousness that no effort is made to render it 
 intelligible. Wonder arises on the presentation of 
 something that we do not fully understand, but 
 which does not seem in itself unaccountable or un- 
 intelligible. The object is partly or vaguely under- 
 stood, or, at all events, is felt to have intelligible 
 relations to what we already know. Hence the 
 characteristic feature of wonder is a vague groping 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 105 
 
 more imaginative than ratiocinative ; and behind 
 this dim questioning stands as a background the 
 consciousness of the present obscurity of the ob- 
 ject. Wonder is closely allied to curiosity and 
 yet distinguishable from it. The sense of present 
 ignorance is implicit in curiosity rather than explicit, 
 while in wonder it influences the mind to such an 
 extent that indolent imaginative conjectures take 
 the place of active and definite inquiries. In short, 
 curiosity is the desire to know definitely, while 
 wonder is an abiding sense of ignorance united 
 with vague imaginative questioning. Wonder thus 
 remains in the region of the dim and mysterious, 
 and, while it may give place to active curiosity, the 
 transition is often prevented by indolence or by the 
 charm which vagueness and shadow sometimes 
 possess. The relation between wonder and admira- 
 tion has already been indicated. It is clear that 
 surprise, astonishment, wonder, and curiosity are 
 not feelings in reference to an object. Curiosity is 
 merely intellectual desire, and wonder is primarily 
 intellectual. The chief elements in surprise and 
 astonishment are disturbance and inhibition, and 
 the other factors are intellectual. These states may 
 be succeeded or accompanied by emotion, but in 
 themselves are not emotional. The other so-called 
 ' intellectual emotions,' such as the pain of logical 
 contradiction and the pleasure of discovering identity 
 in difference, are purely h'edonic and need not be 
 ^discussed. 
 
 The aesthetic, moral, and religious feelings do not 
 pall for extended notice. It can easily be proved 
 
106 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 that there is no special aesthetic emotion. A beauti- 
 ful object excites pleasure and satisfaction directly, 
 and by its associations gives rise to other hedonic 
 and emotional states. The direct factor evidently 
 does not involve any peculiar feeling-attitude towards 
 the beautiful object ; and, as might be expected, the 
 same holds true of the indirect element. The feeling 
 of the sublime may be analysed into pleasure-pain 
 and awe. The latter is simply the impression pro- 
 duced by an agent of overwhelming power. It is 
 not a feeling in reference to an object, but a way 
 in which the self is affected. The feeling connected 
 with the ludicrous is purely hedonic. In the case 
 of the moral feelings the absence of any special moral 
 emotion is still more marked. The moral emotions 
 are nothing more than the ordinary emotions arising 
 under specified conditions. The religious sentiment 
 is obviously a complex, the constituent elements of 
 which differ with the individual and with circum- 
 stances. It may include joy, fear, affection, humility, 
 and awe. At the present stage of development 
 the most distinctively religious feeling is probably 
 reverence, and this may be analysed into affection 
 and humility. 
 
 The primary emotions, therefore, seem to be the 
 following: satisfaction, dissatisfaction; anger; fear; 
 ill-feeling and its opposite ; repugnance ; scorn, ad- 
 miration ; respect, contempt. Each of these states 
 is qualitatively distinct from the others, arises under 
 special conditions, and has a characteristic function. 
 
 As factors in conduct these emotions regulate the 
 behaviour of the individual in regard to the varying 
 
THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS. 107 
 
 phases of the world of things, persons, and events, 
 which constitutes his environment. Dissatisfac- 
 tion incites to activities which are designed to bring 
 about a change in some aspect of reality which is 
 not in harmony with the agent's desires or wishes. 
 Satisfaction, on the contrary, inhibits all activity 
 in reference to its object. Anger arouses active 
 rebellion against an objectionable event. Fear 
 causes the individual to avoid a threatened evil 
 against which the success of direct opposition seems 
 doubtful. Repugnance leads one to avoid some 
 person or thing, not because the object in question 
 is a source of danger, but because it is unnatural. 
 It is the warning voice, not of prudence, but of our 
 nature as such. The actions due to kindly feeling 
 presuppose that the distinction between ego and 
 alter is transcended. This emotion accounts for all 
 sympathetic feeling or activity, and renders possible 
 the existence of a real community of persons. It is, 
 therefore, one of the most important factors in 
 conduct. Ill-feeling prompts to actions which imply 
 that the self is contracted by the exclusion of certain 
 fellow -beings from the scope of sympathy. Its 
 function seems to be a defensive one, and its range 
 is essentially much narrower than that of its 
 correlative. Contempt leads the individual to treat 
 the object of the emotion as a negligible quantity in 
 the universe of conduct. Respect has the opposite 
 effect. Admiration and scorn affect our personal 
 attitude towards the persons who inspire the feelings. 
 Indirectly, they exercise an obvious and important 
 influence. 
 
I08 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 All these emotional tendencies to action are 
 distinct from the hedonic impulses. Whatever be 
 the conditions under which an emotion arises, it 
 prompts to activity apart from all consideration of 
 hedonic consequences. Moreover, in dealing with 
 the conditions of the different primary emotions, we 
 have come in contact with principles of activity 
 which are demonstrably not hedonic and are 
 evidently more basal than the emotions to which 
 they give occasion. The emotional life, indeed, 
 cannot be fully understood unless we recognise the 
 existence of tendencies to action distinct from those 
 which spring from emotion or pleasure-pain. The 
 truth of this assertion has already become obvious 
 on more than one occasion, but the further proof 
 and development of the general point of view must 
 form the subject of a new chapter. 
 
log 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY TENDENCIES 
 TO ACTION. 
 
 AN inquiry into the conditions of the primary emo- 
 tions brings to light, as we have seen, the existence 
 of principles of activity which are not hedonic and 
 are more fundamental than the impulses which spring 
 from emotion. This can be shown to be a natural 
 and necessary outcome of a thorough investigation 
 of the nature of emotion. Feeling-attitude is deter- 
 mined explicitly and exclusively by the recognition of 
 the importance or significance of certain aspects of 
 reality. Since objects derive importance and sig- 
 nificance from our interests, it may be said that no 
 emotional reaction takes place unless the situation 
 possesses interest of some sort. The particular 
 concepts (injury, danger, repulsiveness, &c.) which 
 condition the different emotions indicate the dif- 
 ferent ways in which objects are significant. In 
 dealing concretely with the various emotions it is 
 necessary to examine these concepts and the cases 
 to which they are applied. This examination of the 
 particular occasions which elicit emotional response 
 
110 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 inevitably throws light on the range of human 
 interests. Further observation of the same concrete 
 cases enables us to gain an insight into the source of 
 the interests in question. It then becomes evident 
 that the primary interests are dependent on primary 
 principles of activity. Moreover, we must carry our 
 inquiries to this stage if we wish to understand the 
 true place which the emotional life occupies in the 
 economy of the mind. 
 
 The nature of the problem which here forces itself 
 on our attention now becomes evident. That prob- 
 lem is essentially identical with the question in 
 regard to the nature and source of human interests. 
 In view of what has been said, however, the best 
 method of approaching the subject is equally evident. 
 The theory of emotion not only necessitates an 
 inquiry into the nature of human interests, but also 
 furnishes a direct method of reaching the root of the 
 matter. Feeling-attitude being always conditioned 
 by some aspect of reality which stands in a signifi- 
 cant relation to our interests, if we ascertain the cir- 
 cumstances which are, as a matter of fact, emotion- 
 ally stimulating, we shall find actual cases by means 
 of which the range of interest and its sources can be 
 determined in a concrete way. This is the method 
 of approach which we shall proceed to employ. 
 
 When the problem is thus placed on a concrete 
 footing, it is clear, in the first place, that the hedonic 
 relations of things do not always account for the 
 significance which objects possess. It cannot be 
 asserted that emotions are always determined by the 
 relations in which objects stand to pleasure -pain. 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. Ill 
 
 In other words, interest and hedonic value are not 
 synonymous. The very existence of such emotions 
 as admiration and respect proves this conclusively. 
 Admiration is excited by the mere fact that a fellow- 
 being realises in some way our ideal of worth. It is 
 absolutely independent of hedonic considerations. 
 The person is admired because he is what he is, apart 
 from and even despite his hedonic relations to the 
 self or to other individuals. Similarly, respect is 
 evoked by efficiency as such. Whether this efficiency 
 has pleasant or unpleasant results for ourselves or 
 others, is absolutely irrelevant. Yet efficiency and 
 the realisation of worth have significance since they 
 arouse emotion. They must therefore appeal to 
 some other interest than pleasure-pain. What holds 
 true without exception in the case of admiration and 
 respect can be shown to be true in most instances 
 where other emotional reactions are concerned. 
 Anger and fear, for example, are excited by events 
 which involve injury or evil, that is, by events which 
 are antagonistic to our interests. If pleasure-pain 
 were the sole object of interest, evil or injury would 
 be identical with pain. That this is not true can be 
 proved by reference to the facts. An object which 
 awakens superstitious dread is feared because it is 
 altogether unusual and totally unaccountable. Since 
 its relations to the self are absolutely uncertain, it 
 obviously may inflict some injury against which no 
 defence is possible. It is therefore judged to be a 
 source of danger, and its possible actions become the 
 object of fear. The peculiar intensity of the dread 
 thus occasioned is due to the fact that the very 
 
112 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 nature of the possible evil, like everything else con- 
 nected with the object, is absolutely undefined. The 
 emotion would never attain abnormal proportions if 
 there were no dire uncertainty in regard to the kind 
 of evil to be expected. This uncertainty clearly 
 would not exist if pain and evil were identical. 
 Again, death is not feared merely because it is re- 
 garded as painful or because life is pleasant. A 
 painless death may be dreaded by one who finds the 
 present life a hedonic failure, and who at the same 
 time is not troubled by any thoughts about a future 
 existence. Even when death appears as a painful 
 event, the fear is apt to be out of all proportion 
 to the pain anticipated. In regard to anger the 
 case is not less clear. When an ambitious person 
 is enraged by the failure of some undertaking, it is 
 absurd to say that he is thinking solely of the 
 hedonic consequences which his want of success has 
 involved. He has set his heart on success ; hence 
 failure in itself is a pronounced evil, since it is 
 opposed to the dominant interest of the moment. 
 Other instances readily suggest themselves to prove 
 that events which are not intensely painful may 
 nevertheless be profoundly exasperating. If we turn 
 to other emotional reactions, further evidence can be 
 obtained in regard to the main point here at issue. 
 To avoid unnecessary amplification, however, we 
 shall content ourselves by referring, in conclusion, 
 to the evidence furnished by the emotion of pity. 
 In this case the emotional reaction is directly at 
 variance with the hedonic aspect of the situation 
 which is most prominent. Any fellow-being in dis- 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. 113 
 
 tress may arouse pity, despite the fact that in the 
 circumstances the object is necessarily a source of 
 pain. This seems to prove that interest in objects is 
 not determined exclusively by hedonic relations. 
 
 It can be maintained, therefore, that persons, 
 things, and events may be significant in relation to 
 interests which have no reference to pleasure-pain. 
 If we now continue our examination of concrete 
 cases we shall gain an insight into the nature and 
 source of those interests which are not hedonic. 
 This will enable us, later on, to define the range of 
 human interests with more accuracy of detail. 
 
 The realisation of worth on the part of our fellows 
 is significant enough to arouse a special emotion. 
 If, however, the individual himself had no natural 
 tendency to realise an ideal of worth, he would have 
 no interest in reference to which the worth of his 
 fellows would have significance. If, on the other 
 hand, the individual has a natural impulse to act 
 in this way, a certain mode of behaviour possesses 
 intrinsic interest and is therefore significant when 
 it is exhibited by others. In the same way, the 
 efficiency of others would not arouse respect unless 
 the agent had a direct and personal interest in 
 efficiency as such. This particular interest can be 
 explained only if we suppose that each individual 
 has a natural tendency to make his existence effective 
 in some way. The influence of this self-assertive 
 tendency can be detected in connection with other 
 emotional reactions. Since every agent has a 
 natural impulse to express himself in effective action, 
 he is keenly interested in the success of anything 
 
 H 
 
114 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 which he undertakes. Success in itself is desirable ; 
 failure in itself is an evil. This accounts for the fact 
 that anger may be aroused by failure as such apart 
 from all consideration of hedonic consequences. It 
 also explains the fear and anxiety which are apt to 
 attend ambition. Another principle of activity is 
 presupposed by the interest which attaches to every- 
 thing connected with the maintenance of life. The 
 existence of such an interest is fully established by 
 the fact that fear is aroused by any event which 
 threatens the continuance of life. The facts cannot 
 be fully explained unless by reference to * the will to 
 live.' If the individual had no natural impulse to 
 maintain his own being, the interest which belongs 
 to everything connected with self-preservation could 
 not be explained. 
 
 It is evident, then, that the phenomena of the 
 emotional life prove the existence of tendencies to 
 action which are not hedonic. These tendencies 
 account for interests which the hedonic relations of 
 things do not explain. In themselves, therefore, 
 they must obviously be distinct from hedonic im- 
 pulses. On the other hand, they are more funda- 
 mental than the emotions connected with them, for 
 they lend that interest to objects without which the 
 emotional reactions would not take place. They 
 must be regarded as primary or basal principles of ac- 
 tivity, since they cannot be explained by reference to 
 other psychical facts, and seem to proceed directly 
 from the nature of the psycho-physical organism. 
 
 It may still be urged, however, that these primary 
 tendencies are simply impulses directed towards 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. 115 
 
 particular pleasures. The reply to this objection 
 will carry us to another stage of the argument by 
 opening up the whole question of the relation be- 
 tween pleasure-pain and primary impulse. That 
 the objection is not valid can be proved, apart from 
 all reference to the argument already used, by direct 
 observation of the mental states concerned. The 
 self-assertive tendency, for example, is an impulse 
 to act in a particular manner, not a desire for a 
 purely subjective feeling. The tendency to realise 
 ideals of worth is a still more striking instance. It 
 is explicitly an impulse to act in a manner worthy 
 of the self without regard to anything else. When 
 accurately observed, the primary tendencies exhibit 
 themselves definitely and exclusively as impulses to 
 act in special ways. As such, they are sharply differ- 
 entiated from desires for subjective gratification. 
 Further, the pleasures which are supposed to condi- 
 tion those tendencies are themselves conditioned by 
 the latter. If there were no tendency, and therefore 
 no desire, for effective manifestation of the self, 
 success in this respect would not be pleasant. The 
 attainment of success is pleasant because it is desired ; 
 it is not desired because it is pleasant. The obstruc- 
 tion of the tendency involves pain ; its realisation 
 causes pleasure. The tendency must first exist, and 
 struggle independently towards the realisation of its 
 own end, before the hedonic effect can come into 
 existence. It cannot, therefore, be merely a desire 
 conditioned by the pleasure-pain which it incidentally 
 occasions. This argument in its essential features 
 has been used by Butler and others, and need not be 
 
Il6 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 further emphasised in this connection. Enough has 
 been said to show that the tendencies which have 
 been described as ' primary,' are not merely hedonic 
 impulses. 
 
 The point of view attained in the previous para- 
 graph has implications which must now be devel- 
 oped. The principle has been established that im- 
 pulses which are not hedonic cause hedonic results. 
 Pleasure arises if any impulse or desire attains its 
 end, whatever that end may be ; pain ensues if any 
 tendency to action is restrained, unduly repressed, or 
 obstructed. It has been proved that there are im- 
 pulses towards ends which have no hedonic interest. 
 These impulses, therefore, must occasion hedonic 
 consequences. When we proceed to ascertain how 
 far this principle applies, we find that it explains the 
 appearance of all hedonic phenomena. The physical 
 pleasures and pains are conditioned by the success or 
 failure of physical functions, and the latter are directly 
 determined by the structure of the physical organism. 
 Similarly, the purely intellectual pleasures and pains 
 presuppose a tendency whose primary end is the 
 exercise of cognitive activity. They would vanish 
 if the attainment of knowledge as such were not an 
 object of endeavour. ^Esthetic pleasure is likewise 
 conditioned by the fact that natural tendencies to 
 action find perfectly free and unimpeded expression. 
 It is indeed a contradiction to assert that objects or 
 ends are intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant. The 
 hedonic aspect of things is always explicable by 
 reference to something else. It is an effect, and the 
 nature of its cause depends upon the nature of the 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. 117 
 
 being concerned. Since man is essentially an active 
 being, his pleasures and pains are determined by 
 reference to those tendencies to activity which spring 
 directly from his nature and are primarily impulses 
 towards definite kinds of action. The dependence 
 is direct and unmediated, hence pleasure-pain must 
 be regarded as conditioned exclusively by the success 
 or failure of those primary impulses. 
 
 In harmony with this general conclusion is the 
 fact that the impulses to seek pleasure and avoid 
 pain can be satisfied only by means of the satisfaction 
 of other impulses. Particular pleasures or pains are 
 bound up with the fortunes of particular tendencies, 
 and cannot be attained or avoided except through 
 the intervention of these tendencies. 1 The hedonic 
 impulses supply additional motives for the realisation 
 of objective purposes, and are wholly subservient to 
 this end. That they naturally play a subordinate 
 part is tacitly admitted by the hedonists themselves. 
 ' The paradox of hedonism ' is that pleasure will 
 not be attained if it is made the direct end of action. 
 This simply means that the hedonic desires have 
 a purely subsidiary place and function, and cannot 
 be raised to the rank of primary impulses. The 
 individual who attempts to make pleasure the ulti- 
 mate end of action, attempts to alter the relative 
 
 1 This supplies an answer to the objection which might be urged 
 against the assertion that hedonic phenomena are all conditioned by 
 impulses which are not hedonic. The objection is that the desires to 
 attain pleasure and avoid pain themselves occasion hedonic consequences. 
 It is clear, however, that the success or failure of hedonic tendencies 
 cannot be separated from the success or failure of the underlying 
 impulses. 
 
Il8 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 importance of the different impulses of his nature. 
 But natural arrangements have the power of nature 
 behind them, as the ' paradox of hedonism ' proves. 
 
 The position which must be assigned to pleasure- 
 pain has now been indicated. Hedonic phenomena 
 are the results of tendencies which are not directed 
 to hedonic ends. They occupy a secondary place, 
 and play a subordinate part. Obviously, therefore, 
 the non-hedonic interests are primary in importance 
 as well as in position. These interests, as we have 
 seen in particular cases, indicate the existence of 
 primary tendencies to activity. A general conclu- 
 sion in regard to the nature and source of human 
 interests is before us, and it may now be stated in 
 general terms. 
 
 The individual with which psychology deals is 
 primarily an active being, and therefore tends to 
 act without regard to any extrinsic consequences. 
 His activity necessarily takes definite directions since 
 he has a definite nature or character. In other 
 words, he has primary tendencies of a special sort ; 
 he desires to do certain things or attain certain ends. 
 These ends constitute his primary interests. Ex- 
 ternal objects acquire interest through their relation 
 to the ends which are in themselves desired. Pleasure 
 and pain are incidental results which appear in con- 
 nection with the realisation of the primary tendencies. 
 They possess an interest of their own, and thus a 
 special influence on action ; but the latter, like the 
 former, is secondary and subsidiary. If the indi- 
 vidual had no primary tendencies he would desire 
 nothing, be interested in nothing. Under such con- 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. IIQ 
 
 ditions no external object would be more important 
 or significant than another. In such circumstances 
 nothing would arouse pleasure or cause pain. Even 
 purely intellectual interests would vanish, for they 
 imply intellectual desires and tendencies. Indeed 
 an individual thus constituted would have no synthe- 
 sised knowledge of any description, since he would 
 possess no cognitive interest, direct or indirect. So 
 far as he was concerned, attention would be purely 
 involuntary i.e., determined solely by the variations 
 in objective conditions. Systematised knowledge, 
 however, presupposes voluntary attention, and this 
 in turn implies selection and synthesis in accordance 
 with subjective interest. Voluntary selection and 
 synthesis, again, have no raison d'etre if one thing is 
 not more interesting or significant than another, and 
 no object can have interest or significance if there 
 are no purposes to be served, no practical or purely 
 intellectual ends to be attained. 
 
 In various ways, therefore, the existence of primary 
 tendencies can be established. From the concrete 
 phenomena of emotion and pleasure-pain, as well as 
 from more general considerations in regard to the 
 nature of human interests, the same conclusion fol- 
 lows. In order to complete the argument, however, 
 it is necessary to criticise briefly the common doc- 
 trine that pleasure -pain is the source and end of 
 all activity. 
 
 It is manifest that beings constructed on the 
 simple hedonistic plan would exhibit but slight 
 differences of character. Diversity of character 
 depends upon diversity of dominant interests, and 
 
120 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 therefore of reactions. By hypothesis, however, 
 these individuals would have only one tendency to 
 action, and in consequence would all conduct them- 
 selves in the same way in the same circumstances 
 if their stores of energy and of knowledge were the 
 same. Concrete human beings are obviously more 
 complex than this. So complex are the springs of 
 action, that the individual must gradually learn by 
 experience the existence of the basal impulses which 
 mould human conduct. This process would of 
 course not be necessary if all activity obeyed one 
 principle. Individual variations render the whole 
 matter still more complicated. While the same 
 basal tendencies are common to all members of the 
 race, their relative strength varies in different cases. 
 The result is that different individuals have different 
 dominant interests, and therefore react differently in 
 the same circumstances. These individual variations 
 also must be learned by experience. Each person 
 has to observe the constitution of his special nature 
 and may be surprised by the character or intensity 
 of his reaction to certain stimuli. This surprise 
 would be inexplicable if all his activities were deter- 
 mined by one tendency which was directly condi- 
 tioned by quantity of pleasure-pain. 
 
 Again, if we adopt the hedonistic theory of 
 conation, the actual phenomena of conduct become 
 wholly mysterious. From the point of view of this 
 theory it seems necessary to admit that all men are 
 more or less guilty of seeking particular pleasures, 
 to the exclusion of others which are more easily 
 obtained and are not inferior when judged by purely 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. 121 
 
 hedonic standards. No amount of insight or cir- 
 cumspection seems to alter the fact. The en- 
 lightened hedonist is as much to blame as the most 
 ignorant and misguided of his opponents. The 
 impulses towards certain pleasures seem stronger 
 than the impulses towards others, and no hedonic 
 reason can be assigned which explains the difference. 
 The doctrine that pleasures admit of qualitative 
 distinctions was used by Mill to remove this unde- 
 niable difficulty. The doctrine is now generally 
 admitted to be false, and the difficulty remains 
 insoluble. On the other hand, if we assume that 
 the hedonic impulses are not the only springs of 
 action, everything becomes clear. The pleasures 
 which are connected with certain activities can then 
 be regarded as the effects of these activities and not 
 as their cause. The facts which are inexplicable on 
 the hedonistic theory prove in the most direct way 
 the truth of this assumption. 
 
 The doctrine that pleasure-pain is the alpha and 
 omega of all activity is thus at variance with the 
 phenomena of conduct. The full consequences of 
 this theory are usually obscured by the fact that 
 other principles of activity are introduced under the 
 head of * instincts.' By means of this ambiguous 
 term, many of the manifestations of primary needs 
 and functions are surreptitiously introduced. The 
 real implications of the pleasure-pain theory, how- 
 ever, are brought to light most clearly when the his- 
 torical affiliations of the position are realised. This 
 doctrine is an integral part of the general view of 
 mind originated by Locke and rigorously developed 
 
122 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 by Condillac. It is the tabula rasa theory applied 
 to conation. The individual is supposed to be some- 
 how affected pleasurably or painfully. He tends 
 to avoid pain and seek pleasure. As a cognitive 
 being, he infers the future from the past, and comes 
 to act in accordance with ideas of pleasure and pain. 
 All activity is directed by hedonic experience, and 
 this is the whole secret of human conduct. Now 
 the tabula rasa doctrine has been generally abandoned 
 as untenable in the realm of cognition. It is recog- 
 nised that knowledge would be impossible if definite 
 intellectual tendencies did not exist. These tendencies 
 spring directly from the nature of the mind, are 
 independent of hedonic considerations, and condition 
 intellectual pleasure and pain. It would be strange 
 if no other primary tendencies existed, and it can be 
 shown that the purely intellectual interests are not 
 coextensive with the primary human interests in 
 general. In short, the pleasure -pain theory of 
 action is an inconsistent survival of the old sensa- 
 tionalism which treated mind as a passive thing, 
 and naturally reduced all activity to a necessary 
 consequence of a passively received effect. 
 
 Apart from everything else, it seems more consistent 
 with the place of psychology in the scale of the 
 sciences to regard the mental life of the individual 
 as in some sense an organic whole, with a complex 
 nature of its own which is expressed, not in one 
 mode of activity, but in a multiplicity of reactions. 
 On this view the psychical life has a character of its 
 own as complex as the physical, and man is a 
 psycho -physical organism, not a mere physical 
 
PRIMARY TENDENCIES TO ACTION. 123 
 
 organism associated with a dependent and character- 
 less mental concomitant. This standpoint neces- 
 sarily leads to the recognition of basal tendencies, 
 for it implies the existence of an organised struc- 
 ture expressing itself in a complexity of reactions. 
 Adopting this point of view for the reasons already 
 assigned, we shall now attempt to indicate some of 
 the more important principles of activity. 
 
I2 4 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 
 
 THE first principle to be noted is the tendency of 
 function to realise itself. This simply means that 
 man is essentially an active being, has a natural 
 tendency to activity, and necessarily acts in the 
 direction prescribed by his powers and capacities. 
 He must act in some way, and necessarily acts in 
 accordance with the constitution of his nature. 
 Activity is pleasant because there is a basal ten- 
 dency to act. In its primary manifestations, there- 
 fore, it is not determined or influenced by pleasure, 
 and is desired for its own sake. Consequently func- 
 tions tend to be realised without forethought of any 
 description, since the exercise of function is action in 
 the concrete. In harmony with this is the fact that 
 a special opportunity for the employment of a par- 
 ticular function is in itself a special temptation to act 
 in that direction. If action is suppressed, ' uneasi- 
 ness' manifests itself. This is not mere pain or 
 consciousness of want ; it is function in a nascent 
 stage of excitation. ' Uneasiness ' may appear, 
 without external provocation, if a function has been 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 125 
 
 unduly restrained. Repression of function, however, 
 cannot be maintained for a length of time without 
 affecting the general economy of the organism. 
 
 The functions which are physically determined 
 include the exercise of all the physical powers, what- 
 ever they may be. In addition to these are various 
 capacities which are essentially psychical. Mere 
 curiosity, or the desire to know irrespective of the 
 ulterior significance of what is known, points to the 
 existence of cognitive powers and the innate ten- 
 dency to use them. A higher phase of intellectual 
 capacity manifests itself in the desire to systematise 
 our explicit judgments about reality. Distinct from 
 either of these is the faculty which mediates be- 
 tween the theoretical and the practical. It deals 
 with the application of general rules to particular 
 cases, the adaptation of means to ends. All the 
 special capacities which individuals exhibit, involve 
 the exercise of functions in specialised directions or 
 in particular combinations, and therefore come under 
 the general rule. The various emotions are also 
 functional reactions, but they are not primary. They 
 are mediated in a double sense, inasmuch as they 
 presuppose the recognition of the relation in which 
 objects stand to our interests in general. 
 
 In connection with the tendency of function to 
 manifest itself without consideration of conse- 
 quences, the influence of a limitative principle must 
 be emphasised. The individual tends to realise his 
 functions because he is an active being, but there is 
 a limit to his activity since there is a limit to the 
 amount of energy at his disposal. After expenditure 
 
126 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 of energy comes the necessity for accumulation. 
 Consequently, along with the tendency to expend 
 energy there is a natural tendency to retain or 
 economise it. For convenience this may be termed 
 the principle of ' inertia.' The existence of this 
 modifying factor is shown by the inclination to 
 follow the path of least resistance an inclination 
 which accounts for the formation of habits, and is 
 largely responsible for the phenomena of unconscious 
 imitation. It is easier to tread a beaten path than 
 to strike out a new one, easier to do what others are 
 doing than to judge and initiate for oneself. Hence 
 the agent tends unconsciously to repeat his own 
 actions, and to follow the lead of others. It is the 
 same general tendency which raises ready doubt as 
 to the advantages or morality of any departure from 
 tradition or custom. Innovation always involves 
 increased expenditure of energy, and, though change 
 might mean economy in the long-run, it is easier at 
 any moment to let things be. The strength of the 
 limitative principle varies with age, circumstances, 
 and disposition, but a being with limited energy is 
 never totally free from the tendency to economy. 
 Hence our whole existence is a ceaseless conflict 
 and compromise between activity and inertia. They 
 wax and wane alternately, for expenditure or ac- 
 cumulation must always be succeeded by its oppo- 
 site. In our most strenuous moments we take the 
 easiest path to our end ; after arduous labour comes 
 the desire for rest. But rest is not absolute repose. 
 The need of activity pursues the active being, and he 
 must play in some form or another in his moments 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 127 
 
 of ease. That is, he must compromise between 
 activity and inertia, for play in its natural and spon- 
 taneous form is simply activity expressing itself in 
 the easiest way. 
 
 From this point of view many facts can be ren- 
 dered intelligible. Ease of movement is aesthetically 
 pleasing, because it is a combination of efficiency 
 and economy. Activity is not always more pleasant 
 in proportion as it increases in intensity, since ex- 
 penditure may outrun accumulation. The varying 
 strength of the limitative principle accounts for the 
 further fact that the point beyond which activity 
 becomes excessive is not fixed. This in turn ex- 
 plains why relative passivity and strenuous activity 
 are alike pleasant at different times. The general 
 oscillation observable in conscious processes also 
 finds its explanation in the existence of a varying 
 limit to the natural tendency towards activity. One 
 instance of this rhythmical movement is specially 
 noteworthy on account of the consequences it in- 
 volves. The individual is continually oscillating 
 between a state of self-concentration and a state of 
 decentralisation or relaxedness, for concentration 
 implies an expenditure of energy which cannot 
 always be kept up. In the condition of decen- 
 tralisation, the individual's actions conform to the 
 ideo- motor type. An idea is immediately realised, 
 without any consideration of consequences, simply 
 because it is suggested to the mind. It seems to 
 arouse activity by its mere presence. Here, as else- 
 where, however, the idea has no impulsive power of 
 its own. It evokes activity because it falls in line 
 
128 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 with some tendency ; it aids and abets but does not 
 originate. The immediacy of the response is due to 
 the absence of central control. Usually any ten- 
 dency is restrained or inhibited by an awareness of 
 its relation to the agent's dominant interests, that is, 
 by a consciousness of its place in some system of 
 tendencies. Self -concentration being absent, no 
 check or hindrance exists, and the action takes place 
 at once. The individual is reduced to his component 
 elements, and the parts function separately. The 
 agent is a mere bundle of tendencies which are 
 realised as occasion offers, without reflection or cal- 
 culation. While actions may approximate to the 
 ideo-motor type for other reasons, pure ideo-motor 
 activity implies decentralisation. The significance 
 of the whole phenomenon is that it points to the 
 existence of. a number of tendencies which have an 
 impulsive power of their own apart from everything 
 else. Manifestly these tendencies, if left to them- 
 selves, conflict with one another. This does not prove 
 that the individual's nature is a chaos into which 
 order cannot be introduced. System is not impos- 
 sible, for in any organic synthesis the parts possess 
 an independent character of their own, though they 
 are subordinated to the whole. Moreover, system is 
 not only possible but natural, since there is, as we 
 shall find, a natural principle of synthesis. If self- 
 concentration does not exist, however, this principle 
 cannot be effective, and concentration is not always 
 possible on account of the limitation of energy. The 
 recognition of the presence of a limitative principle, 
 therefore, helps us to understand why temporary 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 
 
 chaos can emerge despite the natural tendency to 
 order and system. 
 
 The principle of inertia gives activity a bias in 
 the direction of the customary, for it is hostile to all 
 innovation. It is directly opposed, however, by a 
 tendency which springs from a basal need of the 
 organism, and is expressed in the desire for change. 
 When a function has been continuously exercised 
 for a length of time, the desire for variation of ac- 
 tivity makes itself felt, a desire which has no reference 
 to the relation between expenditure and accumula- 
 tion of energy. After intellectual labour, or the 
 employment of any of the higher functions, the 
 need of giving scope to other functions is apt to be 
 distinctly perceptible. In consequence of this, all 
 natural tendencies come to be realised and the 
 balance of the organism is preserved. Here change 
 appears as mere variety, but the need of change also 
 shows itself in the tendency to seek or welcome the 
 absolutely new. The existence of this tendency can 
 be proved by a great diversity of facts. The vagaries 
 of fashion, the desire for travel, the unpleasantness 
 of monotony, the charm of imaginative literature, 
 the disinterested interest excited by inventions and 
 discoveries, are all inexplicable unless there is a dis- 
 tinct desire for novelty as such. In all creative 
 activity, again, this desire plays an important part. 
 While it is impossible by fiat of will to originate 
 anything in art, science, or practical life, yet the 
 mind can be set to work in one direction, and the 
 result, if novel, can be seized upon and preserved in 
 objective form. The desire for novelty, if excessive, 
 
 I 
 
I3O PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 leads to mere instability, and in the case of indi- 
 viduals with a narrow range of interests it may 
 produce very undesirable results. When subordi- 
 nated to higher interests, however, it is a prin- 
 ciple of development, an element of consciousness 
 which is an important factor in the evolution of the 
 race. 
 
 Hitherto the relation of the individual to his 
 fellows has not come into distinct prominence, but 
 attention must now be directed to a basal tendency 
 which springs from the essential incompleteness of 
 isolated individual existence. This tendency is ex- 
 pressed in sociability, or the desire of associating 
 with others. That sociability is the direct outcome 
 of a primary need is evident from the fact that arti- 
 ficial isolation takes rank as one of the greatest 
 possible evils. To quote from Professor James : 
 " Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a 
 mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilised 
 countries to adopt. To one long pent-up on a desert 
 island, the sight of a human footprint or a human 
 form in the distance would be the most tumultuously 
 exciting of experiences." 1 Sociability cannot be ex- 
 plained solely on the ground that association with 
 others makes life easier and safer. The tendency 
 has a more ultimate origin. An individual cannot 
 fully realise his capacities in isolation. He misses 
 his true vocation in life if the aid and stimulus of his 
 fellows is lacking. He is not self-sufficient, and ac- 
 cordingly has a tendency to complete himself by 
 association with his kind. 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 430. 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 13! 
 
 In the lower stages of mental development this 
 primary social inclination leads to mere gregarious- 
 ness. At higher levels, however, discrimination 
 enters, and the selection of definite associates takes 
 place. Friendship and affection are the specialised 
 forms of fellow-feeling which mark the more intimate 
 relationship ; they are feelings in reference to those 
 members of the community who are fitted to satisfy 
 more fully than others the need of self-completion. 
 As such they are sharply differentiated from the 
 basal need which occasions them. They form a 
 new tie between individuals, and abolish the dis- 
 tinction between alter and ego. The difference 
 between sociability and general fellow - feeling is 
 equally obvious. There is of course the intrinsic 
 difference between a feeling - attitude and a mere 
 tendency to act. Further, though the two are in 
 this case intimately associated, the emotion may be 
 inhibited by counteracting forces. Sociability may 
 thus exist by itself, in isolation from the natural 
 emotional response. A selfish person, for instance, 
 may show little kindly feeling towards his associates 
 and yet manifest sociability in a marked degree. 
 
 On the principle that " nature implants contrary 
 impulses to act on many classes of things," James 
 seems to regard sociability and shyness as contrary 
 1 instincts.' The two phenomena, however, do not 
 stand on the same level. Even a very shy person 
 would not flourish under solitary confinement on a 
 desert island or elsewhere. Unlike sociability, shy- 
 ness is not a primary impulse corresponding to a 
 basal need. It springs from a self-distrust which 
 
132 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 proceeds in large measure from an undue conscious- 
 ness of the self in its particularity. There are no 
 exceptions to the rule that association with others 
 is a primal necessity. An individual who came 
 into the world with a constitutional aversion to all 
 human society would be a monstrosity. Sociability 
 is conditioned by the requirements of individual 
 existence as such, and from the nature of the case 
 it can have no direct opposite. 
 
 A different class of primary impulses now demands 
 consideration. Every individual strives to preserve 
 his existence, and also to express it or make it 
 effective in some way. In other words, every one 
 has an impulse towards self-preservation, and a 
 tendency to self-assertion. In both cases, capacities 
 and functions are employed in the service of a 
 definite end, and for this reason these springs of 
 action are not so unmediated as the others which 
 have been mentioned. They are primary in the 
 sense that they are ' blind ' impulses, which are inde- 
 pendent of cognition and hedonic experience, and 
 cannot be destroyed by reflection. It is true that a 
 conscious being, when under the influence of either 
 of those impulses, knows what he is doing, but it is 
 not so easy for him to explain why he is doing it. 
 The direction taken by his activity is clear, but why 
 he is carried along in that direction is the thing to be 
 explained. The only reason which can be assigned 
 for the impulse in either case is the agent's intrinsic 
 nature. The individual is so constituted that he is 
 impelled to act as he does. The evolutionist can 
 perhaps account for the existence of the natural bias 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 133 
 
 in one direction or the other. He can assert that the 
 immediacy and universality of the self-preservation 
 tendency is an obvious outcome of natural selection, 
 since any being devoid of this primary impulse would 
 speedily perish in the struggle for life. The state- 
 ment is not so plausible in regard to self-assertion, 
 for this tendency may endanger the existence of 
 individuals and communities alike. Such questions, 
 however, do not concern us at present. All that is 
 necessary is to indicate in what sense these tendencies 
 are basal principles of activity. 
 
 The impulse to self-preservation has already been 
 mentioned in another connection and can be briefly 
 dismissed. It is evidently prior to, and independ- 
 ent of, reflection or hedonic calculation. Death is 
 regarded as an evil solely because there is a strong 
 desire to live. For the same reason the ' right ' to 
 existence is claimed as something natural and in- 
 alienable. While every being clings to life instinc- 
 tively, the influence of this tendency may be counter- 
 acted by contrary impulses. This does not happen 
 without conflict, however, and courage or resolution 
 is required to conquer the impulse to self-preserva- 
 tion even when life is in other respects undesirable. 
 
 Self-assertion in any strict sense of the term is a 
 distinctively human impulse, since it presupposes a 
 consciousness of self as opposed to not-self. Every- 
 thing in the universe, as a matter of fact, affects 
 other things, but a self-conscious being has a distinct 
 desire to be an influence of some sort. He is not 
 content merely to be and continue to exist, but 
 desires to do or achieve something, make some 
 
134 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 effective manifestation of his presence in the world. 
 The ' primitive credulity ' in regard to personal im- 
 portance, which is often called pride, is the best 
 proof of the existence and strength of this tendency. 
 The individual has a strong desire to be a force 
 or influence, and is therefore liable to believe more 
 than the facts warrant despite the shocks of much 
 disturbing experience. Other evidence is not lack- 
 ing. The constructive tendency, so well described 
 by James, is a direct outcome of the primary impulse 
 to self-assertion. " Constructiveness is as genuine 
 and irresistible an instinct in man as in the bee 
 or the beaver. Whatever things are plastic to his 
 hands, those things he must remodel into shapes of 
 his own, and the result of the remodelling, however 
 useless it may be, gives him more pleasure than 
 the original thing. . . . Clothes, weapons, tools, 
 habitations, and works of art are the result of the 
 discoveries to which the plastic instinct leads, each 
 individual starting where his forerunners left off and 
 tradition preserving all that once is gained. Cloth- 
 ing, where not necessitated by cold, is nothing but 
 an attempt to remodel the human body itself an 
 attempt still better shown in the various tattooings, 
 tooth-filings, scarrings, and other mutilations that 
 are practised by savage tribes." 1 The destructive 
 tendency so prominent in the early stages of life has 
 the same source as its opposite, though it necessarily 
 is not allowed the same scope. Destructiveness is 
 merely a simple and easy form of self-manifesta- 
 tion. A self-assertive being naturally has a distinct 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, ii. p. 426. 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 135 
 
 pleasure in the sense of power as such, since power 
 is capacity for self-expression. He is loath to accept 
 defeat, and therefore perseveres under adverse cir- 
 cumstances, striving to carry out what he has under- 
 taken simply because he is committed to it. The 
 spirit which makes difficulties an incentive instead 
 of a check has the same origin. Efficiency and 
 inefficiency, as exhibited by others, are necessarily 
 objects of special interest and arouse special emo- 
 tions. On the other hand, the agent cannot fail to 
 be affected by the opinions of his fellows in regard 
 to his own effectiveness. It is on this account that 
 fame attracts, since fame is the community's recog- 
 nition of successful achievement, and is more perma- 
 nent than the individual himself. For the same 
 reason nothing is more galling than social disregard. 
 To avoid this, notoriety may be sought, if no 
 other form of social recognition is attainable. 
 Indeed, if self-assertion is a dominant passion, 
 a person may court hatred to escape indifference, 
 and choose infamy rather than oblivion. Unreg- 
 ulated and excessive self-assertion shows itself in 
 many other ways. Impatience of all restraint, the 
 pride which will not acknowledge error or accept 
 suggestion from others, the tendency to boastful- 
 ness, the delight in inspiring fear, jealous ill-feeling 
 towards a rival, envious ill-will towards a superior, 
 are cases in point. A more sinister instance is the 
 pleasure of ' disinterested ' cruelty. This is primarily 
 pleasure in self-assertion over other sentient beings, 
 and presupposes that the self-assertive tendency is 
 absolutely uncorrected and unrestrained. 
 
136 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 It is clear that the impulse toward self-manifesta- 
 tion is a tendency which can take many different 
 directions. It appears as the ambition to accomplish 
 something which will extort permanent social recog- 
 nition. It is present also in the desire for domination 
 over others, the desire for power in the narrow 
 sense. In these cases it substitutes a struggle for 
 pre-eminence in place of the struggle for mere 
 existence. In another aspect it is the ' property 
 instinct,' the tendency to establish control over 
 things and bring them under the dominion of the self. 
 It manifests itself more directly in the constructive 
 and destructive tendencies. These impulses spring 
 from the mere desire to express in objective form the 
 inward capacities of the self. In all its aspects this 
 primary tendency is a desire for objects not for 
 pleasure. Power over others, for instance, is sought 
 for its own sake; it is pleasant because it is desirable; 
 it is desired because there is a tendency in that 
 direction. The pleasures associated with it are by 
 no means equal in amount to the other pleasures 
 which are sacrificed on its account. 
 
 In the preceding discussion many principles of 
 action often called ' instincts ' have been explained 
 by reference to the basal tendencies which spring 
 from the nature of man as an active self-conscious 
 being. The term ' instinct ' is very ambiguous and 
 has led to much confusion. If Bain's statement be 
 accepted and instinct is defined as " the untaught 
 ability to perform actions of all kinds," 1 it is not 
 essentially different from any realisation of function. 
 
 1 Senses and Intellect, p. 246. 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 137 
 
 If we follow James and take instinct as " the faculty 
 of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends 
 without foresight of the ends," 1 it is clear that this 
 faculty will disappear with the development of re- 
 flection. If we interpret James's definition less 
 literally, however, and assert that instinct is an im- 
 pulse which is not determined by the bare cognition 
 of the end to which it is directed, then all our pri- 
 mary tendencies at least are and remain instinctive. 
 In other words, though we may acquire a knowledge 
 of the ends really attained by means of our natural 
 impulses, yet these impulses existed prior to this 
 knowledge and remain after it is acquired. The self- 
 conscious being may come to know explicitly and 
 fully what he is doing when he is under the influence 
 of any primary impulse, but the tendency itself is 
 directly conditioned by his nature and has no other 
 explanation. This must be the case if man has a 
 definite constitution, psychical as well as physical, 
 for this must express itself in his reactions to stimuli. 
 Evolution can explain why our natural impulses ac- 
 quire a certain bias, why one function is used more 
 than others or employed in reference to a limited 
 class of objects, why functions are grouped to produce 
 certain results, since all this is explicable by reference 
 to the environment. This brings us to another 
 meaning of the term instinct, for those specialisa- 
 tions of function are frequently, though not always 
 explicitly, indicated when the phrase ' instinctive 
 action ' is employed. Instincts in this narrow sense 
 are to be explained in terms of function and environ- 
 
 1 Psychology, ii. p. 383. 
 
138 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 ment. There seems no reason why definite impulses 
 of this description should not be inherited. If, how- 
 ever, they are mere survivals of past relations with 
 past conditions of life, they must tend to disappear 
 as reflection makes its influence felt. Reflective 
 cognition will bring to light the conflict between the 
 past and the present, and thus arouse contrary 
 impulses which are more fitted to the conditions 
 which actually exist. (Reflection makes the whole 
 self, with all its interests, effective at any moment, 1 
 and accordingly ensures the dominance of what is 
 really most interesting and important to the agent. 
 Several modes of activity which seem mere survivals 
 will be found to derive assistance and support from 
 impulses which are essential to man as such. The 
 ' hunting instinct,' for example, may be partly a 
 survival, but it is at all events aided and encouraged 
 by the self-assertive tendency, which is by no means 
 a historical relic. 
 
 In connection with the general standpoint here 
 outlined, it is necessary to discuss the whole ques- 
 tion of the influence of knowledge on the basal 
 principles of action and their specialised forms. As 
 already indicated, the presence of cognition does 
 not make any essential alteration in the character 
 of primary impulses. It cannot directly restrain or 
 inhibit any tendency to activity, for it does not 
 create any impulse. It throws light on the existence 
 and connection of objects, and is therefore an in- 
 valuable ally though it can put no forces of its own 
 into the field. Ideas in themselves have no impul- 
 
 1 Cf. Schopenhauer, 'World as Will and Idea,' i. p. 112. 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 139 
 
 sive power, and would be wholly without influence 
 if they were not the guides and friends of tendencies 
 to activity. The way in which ideas become * fixed ' 
 shows this very clearly. A fixed idea is the con- 
 ception of something which the individual desires 
 more than anything else, and what he desires de- 
 pends on his essential nature and the impulses 
 thereby conditioned. If it be urged that knowledge 
 renders possible action for ends in place of a tergo 
 propulsion, it must be admitted that a conscious 
 being acts in view of ends which at first exist only 
 as ideas in his mind. But this merely implies that 
 he knows what he wants, and consciously strives to 
 realise his dominant tendencies. It is true that 
 self -consciousness is the presupposition of certain 
 primary impulses, but these activities are not deter- 
 mined by the mere awareness of self as opposed to 
 not-self. We are apt to be misled here because we 
 take it for granted that anything which is recognised 
 as pertaining to the self must have a special interest. 
 If, however, there were no tendencies to maintain 
 and assert individual existence or to realise ideals of 
 worth, there would be little special interest in what 
 concerns the ego as distinguished from the non-ego. 
 The greater vividness of pleasure-pain in the one 
 case would remain the only basis for superiority of 
 interest, and even this tends to disappear in a sym- 
 pathetic being. This is not the only instance where 
 the influence of primary tendencies is confounded 
 with that of mere cognition. There is much truth 
 in Hume's statement on this subject. " Reason 
 exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion. 
 
14 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, 
 which operates with the same calmness and tran- 
 quillity, is confounded with reason by all those 
 who judge of things from the first view and appear- 
 ance. Now 'tis certain there are certain calm 
 desires and tendencies, which, though they be real 
 passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and 
 are more known by their effects than by the imme- 
 diate feeling or sensation. . . . When any of these 
 passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the 
 soul, they are very readily taken for the determina- 
 tions of reason, and are supposed to proceed from 
 the same faculty with that which judges of truth 
 and falsehood." 1 In other words, an action may 
 seem to the agent to be in harmony with the 
 universal, objective, and necessary principles of 
 reason, when it is merely in harmony with some 
 primary tendency too strong to admit of opposition 
 and too ultimate to be easily detected. 
 
 It can be asserted, indeed, that an action is 
 never judged to be ' reasonable ' on purely cognitive 
 axioms or principles. 'Reasonable' and 'rational' 
 are by no means synonymous. This is true even of 
 actions which would be regarded as reasonable by 
 an impartial and competent outsider. A judgment 
 of this sort necessarily involves a criterion, but this 
 criterion is not intellectual. As we shall see later, 
 conduct is judged in reference to a standard of 
 worth, not in accordance with a standard of truth. 
 The criterion is consistency with self, not self- 
 consistency. A mere criterion, however, is not 
 
 1 Treatise, Selby-Bigge ed., p. 417. 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 141 
 
 sufficient ; it is never reasonable to act in any given 
 way if there is not a capacity or tendency to act 
 in that way. The agent, therefore, must have a 
 natural tendency to realise the end which appeals 
 to him as worthy of himself. On any other supposi- 
 tion our judgments on conduct would be very un- 
 reasonable. An action, then, is regarded as objec- 
 tively reasonable if it is in harmony with the 
 impulse to do what is worthy of the self. All that 
 cognition does, is to make the regulative tendency 
 effective, by showing what particular impulses are in 
 harmony with it on particular occasions. 
 
 We mistake our position in the universe if we 
 imagine that we can stand outside the course of 
 events as impartial spectators, and decide on purely 
 cognitive grounds in regard to our mode of conduct. 
 The human being is in the universe, and is a definite 
 part of the whole. This means that he has a definite 
 nature which directly impels him to act in certain 
 ways. Cognition guides, but does not create, tenden- 
 cies to action. It seems tolerably clear that, if the 
 individual had no specific tendencies to begin with, 
 he could not create them by means of cognition or 
 in any other way. 
 
 The true relation between cognition and the 
 ultimate principles of conduct does not become 
 manifest, however, until we remember that know- 
 ledge in the strict sense of the word implies volun- 
 tary attention, and therefore selective synthesis in 
 accordance with subjective interest. Subjective 
 interests, again, presuppose tendencies to action. 
 Voluntary attention is always conditioned by our 
 
142 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 interests, whatever they may be, and our basal 
 tendencies determine our basal interests. This does 
 not imply that knowledge is always systematised for 
 employment in the service of practical ends. There 
 are purely intellectual tendencies and interests which 
 may determine the direction of attention, and thus 
 determine the content of knowledge. These state- 
 ments seem paradoxical only if we fail to distinguish 
 cognition from the cognitive activity, and identify 
 knowledge with knowing. The cognitive activity itself 
 is a primary function in operation, and as such may 
 be self-determined. Knowledge may be sought for 
 the sake of knowing ; truth may be desired on its 
 own account. But knowledge may also be systema- 
 tised in view of ethical, aesthetic, or practical purposes, 
 for cognitive activity is determined by the dominant 
 interest of the moment. The content of our know- 
 ledge, therefore, is stamped with the character of our 
 interests, and thus bears the imprint of all our basal 
 tendencies to activity. Knowledge and activity thus 
 stand in a relation of interaction. What we know 
 influences what we do, but our tendencies to act 
 determine the content of our knowledge. The 
 unique position of knowledge is a result of the 
 essential nature of the cognitive function, and must 
 simply be recognised as an ultimate fact. 
 
 Knowledge as content, therefore, is not an inde- 
 pendent factor capable of changing the character of 
 basal tendencies. It presupposes a primary function 
 which may be self-determined or subordinated to 
 interests which are not purely intellectual. On the 
 other hand, the indirect effect of knowledge, however 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 143 
 
 acquired, is necessarily of vital importance. Know- 
 ledge affects the further exercise of the cognitive 
 function itself. The latter is self-illuminating as 
 well as a guiding light to others. The influence of 
 cognition on the other basal tendencies is too obvious 
 to require special emphasis. If the agent is aware 
 of the ultimate consequences of a particular im- 
 pulse on any given occasion, he knows when these 
 are at variance with something which on the whole 
 he is more desirous of obtaining. In this manner a 
 contrary impulse is aroused, and the more important 
 interest is made effective despite the waywardness of 
 momentary impulse. The following quotation from 
 Professor James's ' Psychology ' gives in the main the 
 final result of this whole argument in regard to the 
 influence of cognition. The terminology is some- 
 what different, but the point of view is essentially 
 the same. " Reason per se can inhibit no impulses; 
 the only thing which can neutralise an impulse is an 
 impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make 
 an inference which will excite the imagination so as 
 to let loose the impulse the other way ; and thus, 
 though the animal richest in reason might be also 
 the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he 
 would never seem the fatal automaton which a merely 
 instinctive animal would be." l 
 
 In reviewing all the principles of activity which 
 have now been explicitly discussed, we find that 
 the human being has various primary tendencies and 
 is also determined to activity by emotion and by 
 pleasure - pain. There is here a multiplicity of 
 
 1 Vol. ii.[p. 393. 
 
144 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 diverse impulses and DO principle of unity. The 
 different tendencies assert themselves, regardless of 
 the others, as opportunity arises. If left to them- 
 selves, they are in perpetual opposition to one 
 another. Self-assertion, if unrestrained, will con- 
 flict with the impulses of fellow-feeling, and will 
 frequently be at variance with the desire to avoid 
 pain and seek pleasure. It may also conflict with 
 the tendency to realise those functions which do not 
 produce immediate and striking results. The hedonic 
 impulse can obviously be in opposition to the tendency 
 to function in certain ways, to avenge injury, or to 
 aid the distressed. These conflicts may occur at the 
 moment or make themselves felt after the action is 
 over. The mere presence of cognition does not 
 produce harmony. On the contrary, it precipitates 
 strife before action takes place, for it enables the 
 cognitive being to foresee conflicts and thus bring 
 all the contending forces into the field. Consequently, 
 if man were endowed only with the tendencies 
 already mentioned, no system of conduct would be 
 possible. Each individual would be resolved into a 
 multiplicity of warring elements. Every tendency 
 would assert itself as far as possible, and the limit to 
 its range would be decided by the arbitrament of 
 battle. System is impossible unless there is an all- 
 inclusive end with which all the particular forces of 
 the organism can be harmonised, and by reference to 
 which their proper scope can be determined. This 
 ultimate end or object, which includes all proximate 
 ends, must have intrinsic worth; otherwise the 
 tendencies to particular objects could not be regu- 
 
THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES OF ACTIVITY. 145 
 
 lated in accordance with it. Regulation implies 
 limitation or subordination, and is possible only if 
 there is a distinction between better and worse. If 
 one tendency is as good as another, there is no reason 
 for subordinating one to another. There must also 
 be an impulse to realise this supreme end, else all 
 subordination would remain purely theoretical. Now 
 all our judgments in regard to human conduct imply 
 that the regulation of natural impulses is possible. 
 We shall proceed therefore to test the validity of this 
 presupposition. A separate chapter, however, must 
 be devoted to this investigation. 
 
146 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE IDEAL OF WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 
 
 SINCE all regulation of natural tendencies would be 
 impossible without an ideal of worth, we must first 
 ascertain whether there is any such ideal. The 
 examination of the primary emotions has already 
 thrown light on this subject. Admiration and scorn 
 are emotions excited by worth as realised by others. 
 A person is admired because he is intrinsically better 
 in some respect than his fellows. A rival, or even 
 an enemy, may receive the tribute of involuntary 
 admiration. This implies not only that an ideal 
 of worth exists, but also that it influences action. 
 If we had no tendency to act according to our 
 standards of worth, no desire to strive for the better 
 and avoid the worse, we should have no vivid in- 
 terest in the realisation of worth on the part of 
 others. It is true that our admiration of our fellows 
 has an influence on our own actions and arouses a 
 desire to imitate what others have done, but this 
 is due to the fact that it quickens our sense of 
 what is worthy of ourselves, by suggesting higher 
 possibilities or by reminding us of ideals which had 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 147 
 
 been neglected. It is also true that we are much 
 more careful to avoid a course of action if its 
 adoption by others has called forth scorn in us, 
 but this likewise presupposes the existence of a 
 tendency to do what seems worthy and to avoid the 
 opposite. 
 
 Evidence of a more direct nature is indicated by 
 Mill in that striking passage where he emphasises 
 the influence of the sense of personal dignity. 
 " Few human creatures would consent to be changed 
 into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the 
 fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent 
 human being would consent to be a fool, no in- 
 structed person would be an ignoramus, no person 
 of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, 
 even though they should be persuaded that the fool, 
 the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his 
 lot than they are with theirs. They would not 
 resign what they possess more than he, for the 
 most complete satisfaction of all the desires which 
 they have in common with him. ... A being of 
 higher faculties requires more to make him happy, 
 is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is 
 certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of 
 an inferior type ; but in spite of these liabilities, he 
 can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be 
 a lower grade of existence. We may give what ex- 
 planation we please of this unwillingness, . . . but 
 its most appropriate appellation is a sense of 
 dignity which all human beings possess in one 
 form or other, and in some, though by no means 
 in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and 
 
148 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 which is so essential a part of the happiness of those 
 in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts 
 with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an 
 object of desire to them." l 
 
 This implies that the individual feels there is a 
 mode of life which alone is worthy of him, an ideal 
 whose realisation is something he owes to himself. 
 The sense of personal dignity is therefore the basal 
 fact on which the emotions of worth depend. It 
 is evidently distinct from any estimate of actual 
 personal merit ; it is the presence in conscious- 
 ness of an ideal of worth which is felt as bind- 
 ing on the individual. It is expressed in the 
 feeling that there is something owing to ourselves 
 since we are what we are. It thus bears within 
 itself the sense of worth and the feeling of obliga- 
 tion. The two aspects are indeed inseparable. 
 That which has intrinsic worth for an individual 
 and that which he feels internally obliged to realise, 
 are one and the same thing. 
 
 No elaborate proof of the existence of this basal 
 principle is necessary, for without it the facts of 
 life would not be explicable. The agent who feels 
 that there is a mode of conduct which he owes it 
 to himself to adopt, necessarily recognises that he 
 has a definite part to play in the universe. He 
 cannot contentedly remain at the mercy of natural 
 impulses, or direct his energies to any object in- 
 differently. There is an end for him to strive for, 
 whether momentary inclination points in that direc- 
 tion or not. He has duties as opposed to inclina- 
 
 1 Utilitarianism, ch. ii. 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 149 
 
 tions, and the good for him is not synonymous 
 with the merely pleasant. From this proceeds the 
 shame which is degradation in his own eyes, and 
 the self-deception by which he sometimes attempts 
 to avoid self-condemnation. The distinction between 
 duty and inclination, the existence of shame and 
 self-deception, are facts which admit of only one 
 interpretation. The facts themselves cannot be 
 questioned. It is undeniable that man has a con- 
 ception of duty, strives to act in accordance with 
 it, and may notably succeed. It is equally certain 
 that failure does not absolve him from effort, since 
 the shame which attends failure precludes contented 
 acquiescence in defeat. All this would be unintelli- 
 gible if the human being did not possess an ideal 
 of worth involving supreme obligation. The feeling 
 of shame itself affords conclusive evidence, for it 
 implies that the agent must justify his conduct to 
 himself, and may be self-condemned. He may be 
 unpleasantly affected by the condemnation of his 
 fellows, but shame does not appear if the inward 
 tribunal fails to sanction the social verdict. 
 
 The sense of worth makes its presence felt over 
 the whole range of human conduct. Nothing is too 
 unimportant to escape its influence. It can be 
 traced in the instinct of propriety, the sense of 
 'good form,' and the minor social conventions, as 
 well as in the higher realms of moral duty. No 
 self-conscious being can throw off its yoke. If it 
 does not take the form of conscience, it asserts 
 itself as the obligation of ' honour,' and where 
 honour seems unknown it manifests itself as a 
 
150 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 lingering remnant of self-respect. There are some 
 things which the most depraved will not do, come 
 what may; even the most abandoned can be in- 
 sulted by the imputation that they are capable of 
 certain actions. The scope of the principle is not 
 to be judged merely by its direct manifestations in 
 action. Where it is ineffective in conduct it makes 
 itself felt in the feelings of shame and self-condemna- 
 tion. The existence and influence of the sense of 
 personal dignity have been frequently emphasised, 
 but no one has stated the case more vividly than 
 Stevenson, and we cannot do better than close this 
 argument in his words. " If I could show you these 
 men and women, all the world over, in every stage 
 of history, under every abuse of error, under every 
 circumstance of failure, without hope, without help, 
 without thanks, still obscurely fighting the lost 
 fight of virtue, still clinging, in the brothel or on 
 the scaffold, to some rag of honour, the poor jewel 
 of their souls ! They may seek to escape and yet 
 they cannot ; it is not alone their privilege and 
 their glory, but their doom ; they are condemned to 
 some nobility ; all their lives long, the desire of 
 good is at their heels, the implacable hunter." * 
 
 It can be shown that this ideal of worth has the 
 characteristics of a supreme regulative principle, for 
 it furnishes an all-inclusive end, a universal criterion, 
 and a supreme motive. The conception of a mode 
 of life which is worthy of the self, determines both 
 rights and duties. It defines an end to which all 
 activities can be directed, and by reference to which 
 
 1 Pulvis et Umbra. 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 151 
 
 every action can be judged. The impulse towards 
 the end thus constituted occupies a unique position. 
 The human being is not merely inclined to live up 
 to his standards of worth, but feels obliged to do 
 so. This sense of obligation is effective in conduct 
 whenever he is master of himself. The facts of life 
 substantiate this assertion, for, despite the existence 
 of evil and baseness, the fact stands firm that every 
 one shrinks from deliberate self-degradation. 
 
 Why, then, it may be asked, is the ideal of worth 
 not always effective ? The answer is simple. Self- 
 consciousness is one condition without which the 
 sense of worth could not exist. If the agent is not 
 capable of distinguishing himself from other things, 
 he cannot have the conception of something which 
 is worthy of him. But the individual and the race 
 alike gradually attain to distinct self-consciousness, 
 and, when they come into conscious possession of 
 themselves, they find an actually existent nature 
 already developed. A conflict inevitably arises, at 
 more points than one, between the self as it is and 
 that ideal of what is worthy of the self which arises 
 when the stage of self - consciousness is reached. 
 Some tendencies to act are developed so strongly 
 that it is difficult to restrain them. Such impulses 
 have an indirect, as well as a direct, influence. The 
 desires they condition tend to obscure the judgment, 
 for it is a well-known principle that the human being 
 is prone to believe what he wishes to believe. 
 Frequently, too, when not strong enough to have 
 this effect, they are strong enough to render moment- 
 ary self-deception possible. The original bias of the 
 
152 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 individual's nature finds another ally in the limita- 
 tion of his energy which is inseparable from the 
 limitations of his being. Self-consciousness, when 
 once attained, is not maintained uninterruptedly. It 
 is often potential rather than actual since it involves 
 a distinct effort of self-concentration, and therefore 
 requires an amount of energy which is not always 
 available. The self-conscious being is continually 
 relapsing more or less into a condition of decentral- 
 isation, in which his particular tendencies are more 
 or less uncontrolled and assert themselves in their 
 natural strength if opportunity offers. The same 
 principle accounts for the formation of many un- 
 desirable habits during the individual's own lifetime, 
 when he is, potentially at least, master of his own 
 destiny. For lack of effective self-concentration at 
 the critical moment, he acts * without thinking ' ; the 
 action, once performed, tends to repeat itself under 
 similar external and internal conditions, until the 
 agent suddenly becomes aware of the existence of a 
 firmly established habit. It must also be pointed 
 out that many conflicts between the real and ideal 
 arise from the fact that man is a progressive being. 
 The content of his ideal of worth is perpetually 
 developing; the scope of his duties is always in 
 process of enlargement. Consequently there is a 
 continual struggle between habits which have grown 
 up under one conception of worth and the new 
 activities rendered necessary by a new and more 
 adequate appreciation of what is worthy of the self. 
 
 In spite of all this, it would be wrong to describe 
 ' the fight of virtue ' as a hopeless struggle. All the 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 153 
 
 individual's tendencies have not been developed in 
 such a way as to form obstacles to the realisation 
 of his ideal. Even against those impulses which 
 oppose his aspirations he is not without resource. 
 However blinded he may be when an excessively 
 strong tendency is aroused, there comes a time 
 when he is master of himself. In such moments he 
 sees things as they are, and can establish the true 
 conception in his mind. This will bring the unruly 
 tendency into direct conflict with the impulse to 
 realise the ideal of worth. And if the success of 
 direct opposition is doubtful, other means can be 
 employed. Temptation can often be deliberately 
 avoided. Opposing particular tendencies can be 
 strengthened by giving them frequent opportunities 
 for exercise, since habit can be made a friend as well 
 as a foe. In this way the ideal of worth finds allies in 
 the actual nature of the individual. It must also be 
 noted that the struggle is not perpetual because 
 it involves perpetual defeat. A conquered tendency 
 will continue to assert itself until restraint becomes 
 firmly fixed through habit. Further, every stage 
 which is successfully attained becomes a point of de- 
 parture, since new aspirations are continually arising 
 with every advance. 
 
 It is in virtue of this conflict that the ideal of worth 
 appears, not only as attractive, but also as authorita- 
 tive. It is attractive because it represents what the 
 individual fain would be. Its realisation would follow 
 as a matter of course if no recalcitrant elements 
 existed in the individual's own nature. Duty and 
 inclination would then be indistinguishable, while the 
 
154 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 opposition between ' ought ' and ' is ' would be con- 
 verted into a temporary difference between the future 
 and the present. As things are, however, the elements 
 of authority and attractiveness are both present, for 
 what the conscious being as such most desires to be 
 is thwarted by what he actually is. This duality of 
 aspect is expressed in the peculiar signification of 
 the terms * ought ' and ' obligation.' ' I ought ' does 
 not signify ' I must ' ; nor, on the other hand, does 
 it simply mean ' I am inclined.' Similarly, ' obliga- 
 tion ' is not synonymous with compulsion or with 
 mere inclination. The feeling of obligation indicates 
 that the agent is impelled by his actual nature in one 
 direction while his ideal of worth attracts him in 
 another. It also represents the fact that the conflict 
 is not between forces which stand on the same level ; 
 it implies that the ideal of worth has a natural 
 superiority over the actual self as it happens to 
 exist. 
 
 It is necessary to use the terms ' ought ' and * obli- 
 gation ' in this connection, for they alone are adequate 
 to define the peculiar influence which the ideal of 
 worth exerts. This shows that we are dealing with 
 the moral impulse as such. No further proof is 
 necessary, since the obligation to realise what has 
 worth is evidently moral obligation. It is equally 
 clear that the struggle of the individual against 
 himself is the moral struggle. To this he is called 
 by his very nature, and for this reason he cannot 
 abandon the conflict even if ill-success may seem to 
 attend his efforts. That the struggle, though per- 
 petual, is not hopeless or without effect, will be clearer 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 155 
 
 when we realise more fully the implications of the 
 ideal of worth. To this inquiry we must now turn. 
 As we have already observed, the sense of worth 
 could not exist without self-consciousness. It does 
 not follow from this, however, that the former is a 
 direct and necessary result of the awareness of 
 self as distinguished from everything else. Air is 
 essential to life, but this does not prove that life is 
 air or directly involved in air. Mere cognition deals 
 with matters of fact ; by itself it can only distinguish 
 between the true and the false. It determines 
 whether a thing is what it seems to be, whether the 
 connections of a fact with other facts are correctly 
 or erroneously interpreted. Its function is to inter- 
 pret the actual ; beyond this it cannot go. A purely 
 cognitive being, therefore, even if it were aware of 
 itself as opposed to other existences, would view all 
 actions with impartial eye. Whether good or bad, 
 they are so many facts with a definite place in the 
 system of things, and to determine this place correctly 
 is the sole aim of cognitive endeavour. Such a being 
 would have no more interest in its own conduct than 
 in the behaviour of others. Its only concern would 
 be that its own actions should be attributed to itself. 
 It would be displeased in the same manner and 
 degree if its good actions or its bad actions were 
 falsely attributed to others. In short, a merely 
 cognitive being would be concerned only with the 
 distinction between truth and falsehood, and from 
 the standpoint of truth one fact is not better or 
 worse than another. For the purposes of knowledge 
 all facts are equally good if they are properly ar- 
 
156 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 ranged in the system of things. Accordingly, though 
 an ideal of worth is impossible without self-conscious- 
 ness, the complete fact has other implications which 
 remain to be determined. 
 
 In this further inquiry a clue is furnished by the 
 reflection that, while an individual's ideal is his ideal 
 and appeals to him on that account, it is not arbi- 
 trarily adopted by him. The notion of worth is an 
 integral element in his constitution, and he cannot 
 escape from its influence. Its content, moreover, 
 has a necessary and direct reference to his capacities, 
 for what is worthy of any given agent must be 
 dependent on what he is. It is determined, how- 
 ever, not by his actual nature but by his essential 
 nature. In other words, it derives its character not 
 from what he actually is, but from what he is capable 
 of becoming. This is implied in all our judgments 
 on conduct, as Butler has pointed out in a passage 
 which is well worth quoting. " Every one has a 
 different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, 
 or child, and by one of mature and common under- 
 standing ; though the action of both, including the 
 intention, which is part of the action, be the same ; 
 as it may be since idiots and madmen, as well as 
 children, are capable not only of doing mischief but 
 also of intending it. Now this difference must arise 
 from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities 
 of one, which renders the action vicious ; and the 
 want of which, in the other, renders the same action 
 innocent or less vicious ; and this plainly supposes a 
 comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between 
 the action and capacities of the agent, previous to 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 157 
 
 our determining an action to be vicious. And hence 
 arises a proper application of the epithets, incon- 
 gruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions 
 which our moral faculty determines to be vicious." x 
 It is interesting to notice that the same point of 
 view appears in the evolutionist doctrine that the 
 individual should act in accordance with the idea of 
 his kind or his type. 2 
 
 It is manifest, therefore, that the self-conscious 
 being has an ideal of worth, and that the content of 
 this ideal is necessarily determined by his nature. 
 This points to the conclusion that he is not at the 
 mercy of a variety of particular impulses, and, on the 
 other hand, that he is not permitted to excogitate an 
 arbitrary end or capriciously choose a rule of con- 
 duct. In other words, the notion of worth implies 
 that there is a definite law and order in the realm of 
 self-conscious beings ; the obligation of worth cor- 
 responds to law in the physical world. This regula- 
 tive principle is different from a merely physical law, 
 for self-conscious beings are different from mere 
 things. The form which the law assumes is modified 
 by the medium in which it appears. It acts through 
 the feeling of internal obligation, not by external com- 
 pulsion. It is expressed in the consciousness that 
 something is owing to ourselves because it is worthy 
 of us. Hence the form of the law is : Do this or be' 
 unworthy in your own eyes. From this alternative 
 
 1 Dissertation on Virtue, section iii. 
 
 2 Cf. Alexander, ' Moral Order and Progress,' p. 236 ; Leslie Stephen, 
 'Science of Ethics,' p. 397 ; Strauss, * The Old Faith and the New,' ii. 
 P- Si- 
 
158 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 at all events there is no escape, and this internal 
 principle has thus an inflexibility of its own though 
 not the same inflexibility as that which characterises 
 a natural law. Moral or internal obligation there- 
 fore is simply the form which law assumes in the 
 world of persons as opposed to mere things. It can 
 justly be called a law of the universe acting from 
 within as a conscious force, for it impels the con- 
 scious being to systematise his conduct in accordance 
 with his place in the system of things. This be- 
 comes more evident when we ascertain definitely 
 what the law commands. 
 
 The definite modes of behaviour which are worthy 
 of the individual and binding on him, must, as we 
 have seen, be determined by his capacities. Now 
 that which is distinctively the endowment of a par- 
 ticular being, that which he alone possesses or pos- 
 sesses in a special degree, must evidently be that 
 which he feels specially called upon to develop, for 
 what he owes to himself above everything is depend- 
 ent on what he distinctively is. Since man as man 
 has capacities which are distinctive in kind or 
 degree, we may say that the supreme duty of each 
 human being must be to realise his human capa- 
 cities in the degree and manner prescribed by his 
 distinctive nature. That this is implicitly or ex- 
 plicitly recognised to be the content of the moral 
 law, can be proved by a reference to the facts of 
 life. Our notions of decency and refinement, for 
 instance, are determined by the feeling that the 
 purely animal functions are strictly subordinate, 
 and should therefore be kept in the background. 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 159 
 
 All lack of decency or refinement is constituted by 
 a failure to perceive this principle or to act upon it. 
 For the same general reason that the animal side 
 is subordinate, the debauchee is condemned even if 
 he keeps within the limits of decency and is refined 
 in his vices. He is condemned because the animal 
 elements in him have usurped the place of the 
 distinctive human capacities. Moral disapproval also 
 falls upon the man who allows unusual talents to 
 remain latent. He may be conscientious in many 
 relations of life, but it is felt that he has failed to 
 accomplish what he was specially called upon to 
 do in virtue of his distinctive nature. 
 
 The supreme end, therefore, so far as yet defined, 
 is the realisation by the individual of his distinctive 
 capacities. Each human being, however, is not an 
 isolated particular. Consequently, though the end 
 must always be personal in the sense that it appeals 
 to the individual as such, it is not and cannot be 
 selfish. It has been shown that the social emotions 
 are integral elements of the nature of every in- 
 dividual, and form a tie which binds him to his 
 fellows. As a result of this, he does not have duties 
 to himself and separate duties to others in addition. 
 His duties to his fellows constitute a part of his 
 duties to himself. In both cases, too, he must have 
 the same end in view, since what is of supreme 
 worth for him and for his fellows must be essentially 
 the same. As sympathy develops, therefore, the 
 supreme end for each individual must be the realisa- 
 tion of human capacities in general. To this object 
 he must direct all his energies ; by this must all 
 
l6o PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 his impulses be judged. The moral end of course 
 need not be explicitly present in consciousness in 
 its ultimate form. It is active in conduct long be- 
 fore its full implications are definitely realised. 
 That the end is social, that the individual is neces- 
 sarily interested in the realisation of the capacities 
 of others, can be established by a reference to the 
 more immediate ends which men deem worthy. It 
 is now recognised, for instance, that no class of the 
 community should be in actual or virtual slavery 
 to another, since this is inconsistent with the re- 
 alisation of the higher capacities of the individuals 
 who are kept in subjection. Hence freedom for all 
 members of the community is regarded as a worthy 
 object of endeavour. Similarly it is felt that the 
 aid and stimulus of education should be given to 
 all. This may be defended on utilitarian grounds, 
 but the real source of the feeling is deeper. In a 
 word, it is recognised that each individual should 
 treat others as ends, not as mere means. This 
 principle has a positive as well as a negative 
 significance ; it applies to all social relations ; it 
 determines concrete social ends which every one 
 can further in some degree. 
 
 Man cannot be abstractly separated from his 
 environment as a whole, however, any more than 
 he can be isolated from his fellows. The particular 
 actions which are necessary for the realisation of 
 the supreme end cannot be independent of the 
 definite circumstances which exist at any given 
 time. External circumstances define what is con- 
 cretely possible or urgent. This does not imply 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. l6l 
 
 that general rules of conduct are impossible, for 
 similar situations are constantly recurring. Particu- 
 lar cases, however, are not always identical in all 
 important respects, and the diversity which coexists 
 with the similarity may at times make a great differ- 
 ence in conduct. To cling to general rules regardless 
 of the nature of the particular occasion is not moral- 
 ity but pedantry. It springs from inertia or from 
 incapacity to make the necessary modifications. 
 Moreover, it is inevitable from the complexity of 
 the environment that general rules must frequently 
 conflict with one another. In such cases the only 
 resource is to consider how the supreme end can 
 best be realised in the circumstances. General 
 moral rules are not absolutely valid. They derive 
 all their authority from the supreme end, and are 
 simply convenient formulae which are derived by 
 abstraction from the concrete. Having no authority 
 of their own, they may be set aside if the particu- 
 larity of concrete cases cannot be neglected as un- 
 essential from the point of view of the end. There 
 is and can be but one absolute in morality namely, 
 the obligation to realise the supreme end as can 
 best be done in the circumstances. This does not 
 shake the inflexibility of the moral law, but makes 
 it a force in the concrete world. The content 
 of the moral end, therefore, is determined by the 
 distinctive nature of the individual and of his envi- 
 ronment. In other words, what the moral law com- 
 mands is that each individual should play his part 
 as it is defined by his place in the whole. 
 
 The full significance of moral obligation now 
 
 L 
 
162 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 becomes apparent. That the universe is in some 
 sense a cosmos, is a necessary presupposition of 
 science and philosophy alike. Everything in the 
 universe, therefore, must be impelled or compelled to 
 perform its proper function in the whole, and cannot 
 with impunity fail in this respect. Otherwise the 
 universe would be a mere aggregate and not a 
 cosmos, for the very conception of an ordered 
 system implies that the different members do not act 
 for themselves arbitrarily or in isolation, but play 
 their part as determined by their place in the system. 
 The moral law, therefore, is the manifestation in 
 consciousness of the principle of order which 
 necessarily exists in the cosmos. The form which 
 this supreme principle here assumes, is appropriate 
 to the level of existence at which it appears. 
 
 From this point of view it is clear that the moral 
 struggle, though perpetual, is not hopeless or barren 
 of results. The moral law is the law of man's being, 
 and impels the individual to do what falls to his 
 share in virtue of his place in the system of things. 
 Morality, in the true sense, is action in accordance 
 with the nature of the individual, for by his nature 
 he is a definite part of the whole. In short, moral 
 action is healthy action. The individual must 
 therefore be moral to some extent, must in some 
 measure conform to the conditions of his being, if he 
 is to lead a relatively healthy existence. In literal 
 truth, life is not worth living, if morality as thus 
 interpreted is not realised in a greater or less degree. 
 This is generally recognised, since no one would if 
 he could sink to the level of a mere animal. Every 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 163 
 
 human being strives to lead a distinctively human 
 life, and must to some extent succeed. 
 
 That the ethical struggle is necessarily perpetual 
 is manifest when we remember that man is in the 
 universe and that the universe is not static. There 
 must be ethical as well as organic evolution. The 
 moral law does not change its essential character, 
 but individuals become more moral, progress towards 
 a more perfect realisation of the moral law. It is 
 necessary to investigate the principles on which 
 moral evolution proceeds, since there is a certain 
 analogy between the process of ethical development 
 and the process of natural selection in the region of 
 life, and the analogy has been mistaken for essential 
 identity. This inquiry, moreover, will furnish fresh 
 evidence in favour of the general position here 
 maintained. 
 
 In the moral realm we find something similar 
 to the fact of variation in the organic world. Great 
 ethical examples and teachers may be regarded as 
 striking instances of moral variation. By some new 
 combination of qualities, they introduce something 
 new into the moral world, and when we attempt to 
 explain this we are forced back, directly or through 
 the intervening conditions, to the fact of variation, 
 which simply means that the universe is not dead or 
 static, but js the manifestation of an essentially 
 active or productive principle. If variations were 
 not possible here as in life, ethical customs and 
 institutions would petrify, habit would rule the world, 
 and morality would become static. Along with 
 variation there is selection. The form of selection 
 
164 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 which here prevails is not natural selection, and 
 has nothing to do with biological survival. When a 
 variation appears which throws new light upon the 
 range and content of the moral law, the more 
 adequate ideal of worth necessarily appeals to moral 
 individuals. It is selected and survives inasmuch 
 as it passes into the lives of individuals. It is 
 selected, not for any ulterior reason, but solely 
 because it seems to be a higher ideal. This adoption 
 of the more adequate expression of the moral ideal 
 necessarily leads to a struggle. The new cannot be 
 adopted without effort by a being whose actual 
 nature has developed under the influence of old 
 ideals and of forces which are absolutely non-ideal. 
 This is expressed, by those who will be biological at 
 all hazards, in the statement that the struggle for 
 survival is no longer a struggle between individuals 
 but between ideals. The essential nature of the 
 whole process is thereby obscured. Ideals apart 
 from individuals are mere abstractions ; in them- 
 selves they do not struggle, in themselves they do 
 not survive. The struggle is a struggle within the 
 individual, by the individual, and its sole object is the 
 realisation of the more adequate ideal in the indi- 
 vidual's own conduct. 
 
 This contention can be further substantiated by 
 an argument drawn from the very nature of evolution 
 itself. Evolution is not a law in the strict sense of 
 the word ; it is a result of laws and presupposes laws. 
 The form it assumes in the case of any given class 
 of phenomena must be determined by the special 
 laws which there prevail. Natural selection, for 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 165 
 
 instance, presupposes life and the laws of life. It is 
 incapable of acting where life does not exist; it ceases 
 to apply when we pass, from mere life and the 
 struggle for existence, to personality and the struggle 
 for ideals of worth. From the essential nature of 
 evolution, therefore, moral evolution must be different 
 from any form of organic evolution. 
 
 The whole history of civilisation shows, on the 
 plane of objective fact, the workings of the prin- 
 ciple of distinctively moral selection. Amid all the 
 struggle and conflict of nations, and the rise and fall 
 of empires, we find that the higher ethical ideals 
 tend to maintain themselves against the lower, just 
 because they harmonise better with human concep- 
 tions of worth. A vanquished nation may conquer 
 its conquerors if its civilisation is higher. In this 
 way the ethically better constantly tends to be 
 preserved. Here the natural selection doctrine is 
 reversed : might is not right, but right is might. 
 In a real and literal sense, that which has the right to 
 survive possesses de facto the might. 
 
 In the light of this discussion of the notion of 
 worth and the internal obligation implied therein, 
 we can determine in what sense man is free. The 
 individual is not free if he acts under external com- 
 pulsion, or is carried away by any of his particular 
 impulses regardless of everything else. He is free if 
 he can do what he most desires to do, if he can be 
 what he fain would be. This is the only intelligible 
 meaning which can be attached to the term ' freedom.' 
 Now the ideal of worth appeals to the individual as 
 desirable in the highest degree. It represents what 
 
l66 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 he, in virtue of his essential nature, must desire 
 above all else. Accordingly, if the human being can 
 realise his ideals of worth to any extent, he is free to 
 that extent. It has been shown, however, that the 
 obligation which worth involves is effective in con- 
 duct. Consequently, in establishing the internal 
 nature, paramount place, and practical influence of 
 the obligation to realise the ideal of worth, we have 
 established the possibility of human freedom. In 
 other words, morality is freedom, for moral obliga- 
 tion is internal obligation and springs from the sense 
 of worth. That we are morally obliged to act in a cer- 
 tain manner does not mean that Providence, or the 
 powers that be, will punish us if we fail, or that some 
 superior being has implanted in us a sense of duty 
 which is an external restraint on our nature, a foreign 
 tyrant that is within us but not of us. Morality is 
 the free expression of our true nature. The moral 
 being, qua moral, is alone free from external restraint 
 as well as from the domination of his actual character 
 as it happens to have developed. Only a moral 
 being can have the consciousness that he is actually 
 or potentially free. The presence of the ethical 
 impulse implies that the agent is called upon, by his 
 nature, to regulate his particular impulses. In con- 
 sequence of this he feels that he is not determined by 
 the actual bias of his character or by any of the 
 particular tendencies which are thereby conditioned. 
 Freedom in this sense is not at variance with the 
 order of things, seeing that the moral being feels 
 obliged to play his part as determined by his place in 
 the system. While an individual can do what he 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 167 
 
 most desires to do, he does not create any of his 
 desires by an arbitrary fiat of will. This, again, is 
 no real limitation of human freedom, for, if the 
 human being had no natural desires or interests, he 
 could not well create them, and in any case a reason- 
 able person is satisfied if he can do what he desires 
 to do. 
 
 From the same general standpoint it is possible 
 to define the relation between virtue and happiness. 
 Since the individual feels obliged to act in a manner 
 which is worthy of himself, he cannot be permanently 
 satisfied unless this end is attained or in process 
 of attainment. Here as elsewhere success is ac- 
 companied by pleasure, but it is also attended by 
 a peculiarly deep and permanent feeling of satis- 
 faction. This pleasure and satisfaction together con- 
 stitute happiness. Mere pleasure appears when any 
 tendency is realised, whether the supreme end is 
 thereby furthered or ignored ; happiness comes only 
 when the individual is leading the life which is dis- 
 tinctively his, or is striving to do so. The effort 
 itself is a source of happiness, for it is never wholly 
 without influence in favour of the ultimate attain- 
 ment of the end. The human being can therefore 
 be happy under very unfavourable hedonic conditions 
 and unhappy when pleasures abound. We might 
 say that pleasures of a certain kind alone satisfy the 
 moral being, but this would be inaccurate. The 
 facts imply that pleasure as such does not satisfy, for 
 pleasures differ in quantity alone, and there is no 
 intrinsic difference between one pleasure and another. 
 It is the nature of the action which brings content- 
 
l68 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 ment, and the pleasure is the mere sign of successful 
 achievement. 
 
 On the other hand, it would be wrong to assert 
 that the hedonic aspect of things must be totally 
 disregarded. The impulses to seek pleasure and 
 avoid pain are particular tendencies which have 
 their place and function when regulated in accordance 
 with the ideal of worth. On many occasions it may 
 be necessary to disregard them since more important 
 matters may be at stake, but on many other occa- 
 sions the supreme end demands that they should 
 not be ignored. This is specially clear in the case of 
 pain. Frequently pain is the sign and result of con- 
 ditions which are a barrier to the attainment of the 
 end. Lack of physical health, for instance, is a 
 serious obstacle to self-realisation, and the presence 
 of much physical pain is the sign of this physical 
 defect. In order to remove physical pain effectively, 
 the conditions of health must be restored. So far as 
 this is accomplished, the agent becomes to that 
 extent a more efficient factor in the moral com- 
 munity. Accordingly it is often a moral duty to- 
 avoid pain or remove it, since pain is frequently 
 antagonistic to the supreme end. What is true of 
 pain is true mutatis mutandis of pleasure. The exact 
 place which is to be assigned to these hedonic 
 tendencies becomes apparent when we remember 
 that, as integral parts of our nature, they must be 
 regulated but not suppressed. They must be 
 regulated because they are particular tendencies 
 among others, and are not paramount over others. 
 The attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 169 
 
 pain do not constitute the end which appeals to 
 human beings as worthy of their distinctive nature. 
 We do not justify our conduct to ourselves on hedonic 
 principles, for it can hardly be asserted that we 
 are overwhelmed with shame whenever we choose 
 the less pleasant course in preference to the more 
 pleasant. Pleasure and pain are judged worthy or 
 unworthy by reference to something else. On the 
 other hand, these impulses are not to be suppressed, 
 since the moral being is not required to attempt the 
 impossible. His duty is to regulate his particular 
 tendencies in accordance with his ideal of worth ; 
 he is not called upon to alter the essential con- 
 stitution of his being. 
 
 The supreme end, therefore, does not require the 
 absolute suppression of the hedonic tendencies. 
 Further, every action which is in harmony with 
 the end is accompanied by that pleasure and satis- 
 faction which constitute what is called ' happiness.' 
 The pleasure which the fulfilment of duty brings 
 with it is not necessarily greater in amount than 
 the pleasure which would otherwise be attained. 
 Happiness is not dependent on mere amount of 
 pleasure. It has been urged that duty should not, 
 ultimately at least, involve any sacrifice of pleasure, 
 that the complete coincidence of duty and pleasure l 
 is an ethical postulate. In other words, morality 
 has no justification unless duty and pleasure are 
 somehow essentially connected. This contention, 
 however, implies that the vital distinction between 
 
 1 ' Happiness ' is the term usually employed in this connection, but 
 as thus used it is evidently indistinguishable from pleasure as such. 
 
170 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 happiness and mere pleasure is overlooked. It also 
 implies misunderstanding of the essential nature of 
 morality. As the universe is constituted, there are 
 no conditions which must be fulfilled to render 
 moral action obligatory. Morality is unconditional 
 in a double sense. It is not a matter of choice, 
 for man is an integral part of an ordered system, 
 and moral obligation is in consequence an essential 
 element in his nature. It is not dependent on ex- 
 trinsic results ; the moral end is desired for its own 
 sake. The end which the individual feels obliged 
 to realise, is the end which appeals to him in virtue 
 of its intrinsic nature. Being what it is, it appeals 
 to him because he is what he is. This signifies 
 that the moral end is not dependent in any sense 
 on the connection between duty and pleasure, for 
 the moral end is not the attainment of pleasure, 
 and hedonic results as such are therefore extrinsic 
 to it. There is no room for the particular ethical 
 postulate here in question ; there is no place for any 
 ethical postulate. 
 
 It cannot even be asserted that the coincidence 
 between duty and pleasure is a metaphysical pos- 
 tulate based on the rationality of the universe. 
 Morality is rational if the end sought by the indi- 
 vidual is in harmony with the universe. On any 
 other terms, of course, moral effort would be vain 
 and irrational. It has been shown, however, that 
 moral obligation is a manifestation of the prin- 
 ciple of order in the universe. Accordingly there is 
 neither metaphysical nor ethical justification for the 
 demand that the moral agent should receive full 
 
WORTH AS REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE. 171 
 
 hedonic compensation for his efforts. The discre- 
 pancy between virtue and amount of pleasure is 
 not a vital fact either for ethics or for meta- 
 physics. The human being is content if he can 
 realise the end which is worthy of his capacities. 
 He may sacrifice pleasure in doing this, but he 
 gains happiness. 
 
 The general results of this inquiry into the prin- 
 ciples of human conduct may now be briefly 
 summarised. The psychical individual as such has 
 a definite character which expresses itself in a 
 multiplicity of primary reactions. These reactions 
 are directly conditioned by the constitution of his 
 nature ; are not determined by pleasure-pain ; and 
 are themselves the sources of hedonic results. They 
 also give significance to persons, things, and events. 
 When this significance is recognised, a peculiar 
 reaction of feeling takes place which is called 
 'emotion.' The various emotions are different 
 feelings in reference to different objects, and give 
 rise to special impulses. All these particular ten- 
 dencies assert themselves as opportunity offers, and 
 if left to themselves are perpetually at variance with 
 one another. The psychical individual, however, is 
 an organic being, and there is a principle of syn- 
 thesis in his nature. He has an ideal of worth, and 
 feels obliged to act in accordance with it. What the 
 individual regards as worthy of himself is the realisa- 
 tion of his distinctive nature. All his particular im- 
 pulses must be brought into the service of this end, 
 and regulated according to its demands. In other 
 words, there is an all-inclusive end for the organism 
 
172 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 as a whole, and this end has a necessary reference 
 to the essential nature of the organism. Man is 
 of necessity a moral being, for the moral impulse 
 is simply the effort to systematise all particular 
 tendencies by reference to an end which possesses 
 intrinsic worth. The moral impulse in turn con- 
 ditions pleasure-pain and affects the emotional life. 
 Finally, it must be recognised that each psychical 
 organism is not self-contained, but is part of a wider 
 whole. The content of moral obligation, therefore, 
 is defined by the distinctive nature of the individual 
 and of his environment, that is, by his place in the 
 system of things. The moral law is thus an ex- 
 pression of the fact that man is an organic part of 
 an organic whole. 
 
 OF THF 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Action, influence of emotion on, 
 21, 22, 40; influence of pleasure- 
 pain on, 21. 
 
 Admiration, 97 ; wonder and, 105. 
 
 /Esthetic feeling, 105. 
 
 Anaesthesia, cases of, 50. 
 
 Anger, 12, 6 1, 78. 
 
 Anxiety, 85. 
 
 Association, as explanation of ob- 
 jective reference of emotion, 9. 
 
 Astonishment, 104. 
 
 Attention, its relation to interest 
 and primary tendency, 142. 
 
 Aversion, 37, 103. 
 
 Bain, the nature of emotion, 2, 23. 
 Butler, disinterested action, 23. 
 
 Cognition, emotion and, 8 ; ex- 
 planation of objective reference 
 of emotion by means of, 9, 63. 
 
 Conation, tabula rasa view of mind 
 applied to, xiii ; complexity of 
 the phenomena of, xv ; as ulti- 
 mate fact of consciousness, xvi ; 
 analysis of phenomena of, 27 ; 
 objective reference of, 30 ; the 
 James-Lange point of view on 
 the relation between emotion 
 and, 49. 
 
 Conditions, of emotion, 10, 12, 14, 
 58; of pleasure-pain, 14; of 
 impulse and desire, 30. 
 
 Constructive tendency, 134. 
 
 Contempt, 51, 61, 99. 
 
 Cruelty, disinterested, relation of 
 self-assertion to, 135. 
 
 Darwin, expression of the emotions, 
 
 52- 
 
 Desire, nature of, 28, 35. 
 Despair, 87. 
 
 Destructive tendency, 134. 
 Dewey, expression of the emotions, 
 
 54- 
 
 Disgust, 103. 
 Disinterested, nature of emotional 
 
 impulses, 22 ; action, 23. 
 Dislike, 89. 
 Dissatisfaction, 76. 
 Duty, authoritative element of, 
 
 153. 
 
 Effort, nature of, 27. 
 
 Emotion, theories in regard to, 
 2 ; cognition and, 8 ; objective 
 reference of, 8, 9 ; pleasure-pain 
 and, 9, 57 ; habit and, II ; as 
 influenced by general considera- 
 tions, 12; conditions of, 14; 
 
174 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 judgment as implied in, 15 ; 
 and reason, conflict between, 
 1 8 ; qualitative distinctions of, 
 19; as factor in conduct, 21; 
 as distinguished from conation, 
 27 ; as ultimate fact, 39 ; Hor- 
 wicz, identification of pleasure- 
 pain with, 42 ; regarded as 
 concomitant of tendencies to 
 action, 44; the James -Lange 
 theory of, 48 ; expression of, 
 52 ; regarded as explicable in 
 terms of pleasure - pain and 
 cognition, 62 ; as distinguished 
 from mood, 68. 
 
 End, conception of, implied in 
 impulse and desire, 30. 
 
 Envy, 90, 135. 
 
 Ethics and Psychology, conflict 
 between, xiv. 
 
 Excitement, as explanation of the 
 disinterested nature of emotion- 
 prompted action, 24 ; identifica- 
 tion of emotion with, 59. 
 
 Expression of emotions, 52. 
 
 Fear, influence on action, 34, 46 ; 
 expression of, 53 ; its relation to 
 excitement, 61 ; nature and con- 
 ditions of, 83. 
 
 Feeling-attitude, meaning of term, 
 6. 
 
 Fixed ideas, 139. 
 
 Freedom, 165. 
 
 Friendship and sociability, 131. 
 
 Function, tendency of, to realise 
 itself, 124. 
 
 Fusion, Kiilpe's theory of, as ap- 
 plied to emotion, 58. 
 
 Grief, 75. 
 
 Habit, emotion and, II, 17; as 
 involved in emotional expres- 
 sion, 53, 56 ; its relation to 
 inertia, 126. 
 
 Habituation, principle of, II. 
 
 Happiness, relation between virtue 
 and, 167, 
 
 Hate, hedonic accompaniment of, 
 21, 57 ; and anger, distinction 
 between, 51, 79 ; its conditions 
 and influence on conduct, 90. 
 
 Hedonism, paradox of, 117. 
 
 Hedonistic theory of conation, xiii, 
 119. 
 
 Herbartian theory of emotion, 59. 
 
 Hoffding, relation between emotion 
 and impulse, 2 ; objective refe'r- 
 ence of emotion, 9. 
 
 Hope, 86. 
 
 Horwicz, identification of emotion 
 with pleasure-pain, 42. 
 
 Horror, 103. 
 
 Hume, disinterested action, 23 ; 
 relation between emotion and 
 impulse, 30 ; reason and desire, 
 140, 
 
 Ideo-motor action, 127. 
 
 Ill-feeling, analysis of, 3 ; its re- 
 lation to basal tendencies, 48 ; 
 as distinct from anger, 79 ; 
 nature and conditions of, 88. 
 
 Imitation, 126. 
 
 Impulse, nature of, 27, 37. 
 
 Indignation, 82. 
 
 Inertia, principle of, 125, 127. 
 
 Instinct, Marshall's view of relation 
 between emotion and, 45 ; nature 
 of, 136. 
 
 Intellectualism, influence of, xi. 
 
 Interest, nature of, no. 
 
 Jealousy, 90, 135. 
 
 >y> 75- 
 
 Judgment as implied in emotional 
 reaction, 15. 
 
 Kindly-feeling, 91. 
 
 Knowledge, its relation to primary 
 
 interests, 119; its influence on 
 
 action, 138. 
 Kiilpe, theory of emotion, 58. 
 
 Lehmann, explanation of quali- 
 tative differences of different 
 emotions, 64. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 175 
 
 Mechanical explanation of emo- 
 tional expressions, 54. 
 
 Mood, emotion and, 68. 
 
 Moral evolution, principles of, 
 163. 
 
 Moral obligation, its relation to 
 ideal of worth, 148 ; its signi- 
 ficance, 161 ; freedom implied 
 in, 165. 
 
 Miinsterberg, the doctrine of Pre- 
 sentationism, xi. 
 
 Natural selection in Ethics, criti- 
 cism of, 163. 
 Novelty, desire for, 129. 
 
 Objective reference, of emotion, 8, 
 
 9, 63 ; of conation, 30. 
 Organic sensation, emotion as, 48. 
 Organism, concept of, as applied 
 
 to Psychology, xiv ; as applied 
 
 to Ethics, 172. 
 Ought, analysis of the meaning of 
 
 the term, 154. 
 
 Passion and Reason, conflict be- 
 tween, 18. 
 
 Pity, 16, 21, 29, 31, 93- 
 
 Pleasure in emotional excitation as 
 such, 31. 
 
 Pleasure - pain, contrast between 
 emotion and, 9 ; conditions of, 
 14 ; its identification with emo- 
 tion, 42 ; not a constituent part 
 of emotion, 57 ; its dependence 
 on primary tendencies, 115 ; 
 function of, 168. 
 
 Power, desire for, 96, 135. 
 
 Presentationism, xi, xvii. 
 
 Pride, 96. 
 
 Primary emotions, enumeration 
 of, 1 06 ; influence on conduct, 
 107. 
 
 Primary tendencies, existence of, 
 xv ; as conditions of emotion, 
 109 ; as conditions of pleasure- 
 pain, 115; as conditions of 
 interest, 118 ; their influence on 
 knowledge, 138. 
 
 Psychology, and Ethics, conflict 
 between, xiv ; concept of organ- 
 ism as applied to, xiv-xvi. 
 
 Qualitative differences, of different 
 emotions, 19, 64; absent in 
 pleasure - pain, 19 ; absent in 
 desire and impulse, 37. 
 
 Rational and reasonable, distinc- 
 tion between, 140. 
 
 Reaction, as distinguished from 
 receptivity, 7 ; emotion as, II. 
 
 Reason, conflict between passion 
 and, 18 ; its relation to impulse, 
 
 143- 
 Regulative principle, ideal of worth 
 
 as, 150. 
 
 Rehmke, theory of emotion, 69. 
 Repugnance, emotion of, 101. 
 Respect, emotion of, 99. 
 
 Satisfaction, emotion of, 75. 
 Scorn, emotion of, 97. 
 Self-assertion, tendency to, 96, 99, 
 
 113, 133- 
 
 Self-concentration, 127. 
 
 Self-consciousness, its influence on 
 action, 139 ; relation between 
 ideal of worth and, 151. 
 
 Self-preservation, 132. 
 
 Shaftesbury, 15, 23. 
 
 Shame, feeling of, 96, 149. 
 
 Sociability as primary tendency, 
 130. 
 
 Social nature of moral end, 1 59. 
 
 Spencer, theory of emotional ex- 
 pression, 53. 
 
 Sully, theory of emotion, 64, 66. 
 
 Surprise, analysis of, 104. 
 
 Sympathy, its emotional basis, 96. 
 
 Tabula rasa view of mind applied 
 to conation, xiii, 122. 
 
 Tendencies to action, relation be- 
 tween emotion and, 7, 32, 44, 
 108. See Primary tendencies. 
 
 Terror, distinction between fear 
 and, 85. 
 
i 7 6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Tucker, the disinterested nature 
 of emotion - prompted activity, 
 23- 
 
 Virtue and happiness, relation 
 between, 167. 
 
 Ward, hedonistic theory of cona"- 
 tion, xiii ; criticism of Darwin's 
 view of emotional expression, 
 52. 
 
 Wish, analysis of, 28. 
 
 Wonder, analysis of, 104. 
 
 Worth, emotion of, 97 ; function 
 of ideal of, 144, 150; existence 
 of ideal of, 146 ; relation be- 
 tween moral obligation and ideal 
 of, 148, 154; implications of 
 ideal of, 155. 
 
 Wundt, relation between emotion 
 and impulse, 2 ; theory of emo- 
 tion, 70. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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