=5-7*? RUSSIAN FORE: IN THE EAST MILIVOY s. STAND YEVICH, < i (' , / .; , ' : ' id \ OAKLAND ANJ) SAX ; : ^NCTSCO LIBERTY Pt IVLISUING COMPANY RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST BY THE SAME AUTHOR. Omladina u Sadashnyosti. Veshtina Pisanya. Govorne Figure u Pesmama. (A prize essay). Prevodi u Srpskim Zabavnicima. (A prize essay). Tolstoy's Theory of Social Reform. (A Master's thesis). Russian Foreign Policy in the East. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST BY MILIVOY S. STANOYEVICH, ML. (University of California) OAKLAND AND SAN FRANCISCO LIBERTY PUBLISHING COMPANY 1916 , 1916 BY LIBERTY PUBLISHING CO. OAKLAND, CAL. PREFACE. Whoever has carefully considered the past and present of historical phenomena might certainly judge and conclude of the future political issues. To comprehend general Euro- pean politics, one should study the history of Eastern Europe, to wit, the history of Russia; and to undestand the Russian European history one must be intimate with Russian diplomatic activities in Asia, particularly in Far Asia. The aim of this condensed essay is to sketch Russian foreign policy in the East, from about the begining of the nineteenth century to the present time. The student of political questions who wish to grasp in extenso Russian and European politics, which, in recent tragic days is written, not by pen but by blood of our brothers and fathers, can not find sufficient data for his perusal in the following pa- ges. If such a student want to be informed of Russian internal and external policy from original sources and books more detailed and authoritative, he is advised to consult the documents and general works which are listed in the bibliography at the end of this monograph. I desire to acknowledge the invaluable aid for facts and ideas received from the writings of M. N. Pokrovskago. His illuminating book, Russkaya Istoriya s Drevnieyshih Vremen (Russian History from the oldest Times), and his brilliant articles in Istoriya Rossiyi v XI X Viekie (Histo- ry of Russia in the Nineteenth Century), offer mines of infor- mation, as well as a sympathetic interpretation of con- structive Russian politics. More particular gratitude has been richly merited by Dr. D. P. Barrows, Professor of Political Science in the University of California, and 333456 VI PREFACE Dr. Payson J. Treat, Professor of History in Stanford Uni- versity, for their acute observations and suggestions offered to me. Acknowledgments and sincere thanks are also due to Mr. Lewis Anderson, B.A., Miss Margaret Hodgen, B.L., and Dr. Frank F. Nalder, of the University of California, for their kind assistance efficiently rendered in the reading and revising of proof. M. S. S. Berkeley, California. February 14, 1916. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I Russia in the Near East. Three phases of Russia's expansion in the East Decadence of Tur- key Tsarigrad [Constantinople] the metropolis of the Orthodox Church Russian policy in the Near East from 1806 to 1812 The Alliance between Russia, France, and Great Britain for liberation of Greece under the Turkish domination, 1827 The Crimean War The Epoch of the Great Reforms The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria An- nexation of these two provinces Rivalry between Slavonic and Germanic powers in the Balkan Peninsula The Balkan Alliance of 1912 Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro declare war on Turkey The second Balkan War The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 Russia's failure in the Balkans Her gain in Asia. pp. 1-9. CHAPTER II Russia in the Middle East. Expansion of Russia toward the Arabian Sea Annexation of Khiva, Bokhara and Caucasus Russia's influence in Persia and Afghanistan Collision with Great Britain in the Middle East Germany's Drang nach Osten The Bagdad Railroad Russian and British spheres of interest in Persia Entente cordiole between the two powers in Afghanistan Criticism of the Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle Orient Renunciation of Russia from the Persian Gulf Russia and England prior to the Convention of 1907 Their policy after the Convention of 1907 Persia and Afghanistan at the beginning of the European War of 1914 Their neutrality. _ pp. 10-16. CHAPTER III Russia in the Far East. Relation of Russia to the Far East Muraviev-Amurski, governor of Eastern Siberia, 1847 Annexation of the Amur and Maritime Province Russian steamships in communication with Japan and U. S. of America Russian trade in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan Formation of the Russo-Chinese Bank Concessions in Manchuria Russian policy and the Boxer rising in China The Tsar protects "the Son of Heaven" A secret agreement between Russia and VIII CONTENTS China Japan and Russia in Manchuria Russia and Japan in Korea War between Russia and Japan. pp. 17-22. CHAPTER IV Russian Policy after the Japanese War. A parallel between the Japanese and Russians in fight Why did Japan succed? The treaty of peace Did Russia's policy fail in the Far East? General characteristic of her foreign politics Relation with Mongolia in the beginning of the twentieth century Russia the protector of the Mongolian peoples Her protection of the Slavonic peoples Turning from the Far to the Near East Liberation of the subjugated peoples from the Turkish yoke Why is Russia in war with the Huns and Teutons? pp. 22-27. APPENDIX Bibliography _ pp. 29-38. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST. CHAPTER I RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST. From the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the present time, the foreign policy of Russia in the East has passed through three important stages. These three stages or phases of expansion may be focused respectively on the Aegean Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Yellow Sea, or in other words, on the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far East. To secure the first outlet, Russian diplomats knew that the route lay through Constantinople and the Darda- nelles; to attain the second outlet, the way lead through Persia and Afghanistan; and to reach the third point, the route passed through Mongolia and Manchuria. The southward expansion toward the Mediterranean had sometimes a religious and idealistic aspect. Transcaucasian expansion had a commercial significance, and the eastward expansion a political aspect. Let us first consider the Russian foreign policy in the Near East. Since Russian expansion towards'the north was made impossible by the icy solitudes of Lapland, and westward by the frontiers of firmly established states such as the German and Austrian Empires, the only way open to Russia was in the direction of the south. The decadence of Turkey seemed to offer her a splendid opportunity for such purposes. 2 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST Diplomats from|the Neva dreamed of the Black Sea, Marmo- ra Sea, and Aegean Sea, becoming Russian lakes. And since Russia as the chief political representative of the Greek Church feels that there exists an historic connection bet- ween her and the former Eastern Roman Empire, she has always coveted the restoration of Constantinople as the metropolis of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and as the capital of her great empire. She longed for centuries to free that city, Tsarigrad (Tsar's City) from the yoke of the infidel, and to replace the crescent by the cross on the dome of St. Sophia. But, as the facts show, it was in this direction that her diplomacy, after some brilliant successes, found itself most completely deceived. During the Russo-Turkish War in 1804 under Tsar Alexander I, Russian armies were victorious, and after the war they occupied the Turkish Danubian principalities .of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria. Occupation of these provinces lasted from 1806 to 1812. The rupture with Napoleon compelled the Tsar to sign the Peace of Bucharest by which of all his conquests he retained only a bit of Rumanian territory, Bessarabia, and two Danubian towns, Ismail and Kilia on the mouths of the Danube. The Ru- manians and Bulgarians fell again under the Turkish yoke, and Serbia, which won her independence with her own forces (18041812), was left to herself. Such a state of affairs in the Near East remained throughout the Napoleonic wars in Europe. (St. Stanoyevich, Istoriya Srpskoga Naroda.) The second intervention of Russia in the Near East oecur- ed on the occasion of the Greek Revolution. In July 1827, Russia, France, and Great Britain, entered into concerted action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the three powers totally annihilated the Turkish and Egyp- tian fleets October 20, 1827, at Navarino, under Admiral Codrington. This decisive naval battle precipitated the Russo-Turkish War of 18281829, and weakened the resistance of Turkey against Russia. At that time the RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 3 French army continued to operate in the Morea to insure Greek independence, while the Russian Tsar Nicholas I took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Near Eastern Question. His European army again conquered the Danu- bian principalities, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople. In Asia his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. By the Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, the autonomy of Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, was guaranteed, but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe, except the isles of the Danubian delta. She also reserved for herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open way through the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. In Asia she secured a real territorial compensation by the acquisition of the northern part of Caucasia. The result of the Peace of Adrianople was to make Russia supreme at Constantinople. Later, in 1833, a new treaty was concluded between the ultan and the Tsar, the Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi, which constituted a defensive and offensive alliance between the two powers, and established virtually a Russian protectorate over Turkey. Friendly relations between the two emperors lasted until 1852. In this year Russian prestige at the Porte began to decrease and the influence of England, France, and Austria to increase. Nicholas I sent his minister, Alexander Sergievich Menshikov, on a special mission to Constantinople, to obtain reparation in the form of a treaty which should guarantee the rights of the Orthodox Church in Palestine, and confirm the protectorate of Russia over all Ottoman Christians, established by the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople. The Sultan opposed, and his resistance, supported by England and France, led Russia to the third intervention in the Near East, i.e., to the Crimean War. This war was terminated by the taking of Sevastopol (1855) and the Trea- ty of Paris (1856). By that important document Russia reluctantly consented to a strict limitation of her arma- ments in the Black Sea, to withdrawal from the mouths of 4 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST the Danube, by the retrocession of Bessarabia, and finally to a renunciation of all special rights of intervention between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. Tsar Nicholas did not live to experience this humiliation, as he died of grief before this treaty. His successor was Alexander II. The first decade of Alexander's reign is commonly known as the Epoka Velikih Reform, and may be described as a violent reaction against the political and intellectual stagnation of the preceding period. In respect of external policy, the reign of Alexander II differed widely from that of Nicholas I. The Eastern Colossus no longer inspired ad- miration and fear in Europe. Until the country had completely recovered from the exhaustion of the Crimean War the government remained in the background of European politics; the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Prince Gorchakov, graphically described its at- titude in the famous declaration: "La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille." ( Russia is not sulking, she is collecting herself ) . However, during this recovery Russia suc- ceded in 1871 to secure the suppression of article two of the Treaty of Paris, which limited her military power in the Black Sea. Had the Tsar been satisfied with this success, which enabled him to rebuild Sevastopol and construct a Black Sea fleet, his reign might have been a peaceful and prosperous one. But he tried to recover the remainder of what had been lost by the Crimean War, the province of Bessarabia, and the predominant influence in Turkey. To effect this, he embarked on the Turkish War of 1877 , and so began the fourth intervention of Russia in the Near East. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877, ended in severe dis- appointment for Russia. Though the campaign enabled her to recover Bessarabia, it did not increase her prestige in the Balkans. Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria, were increased territorially by this war, and completely liberated, but Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself in Europe, because Austria-Hungary, Germany, and RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 5 England, modified her preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, at the Congress of Berlin, in favor of Turkey. Tsar Alexan- der II was especially irritated by the fact that the two powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his victories found means to slice off a share for themselves. Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria occupied Bosnia - Herzegovina, and by a separate treaty England secured the island of Cyprus, as well as a controlling situation in Anatolia. After thirty years of occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the annexation of these two provinces by Austria-Hungary followed in 1908. Serbia and Montenegro protested to sig- natory powers. Sir Edward Grey declared that annexation violated and nullified the Treaty of Berlin. He arranged for a new European congress or conference to be held for the revision of the treaty. Baron Aehrenthal, Austrian foreign minister, refused the proposition, and consented to pay Turkey an indemnity of 65,000,000 francs. These negotiations took place in January and February 1909, and the protocol embodying the above terms between the two countries was signed on February 26. It was approved by Turkey on April 5, after a debate of nine hours in the Turkish chamber. Russia, weakened by the Japanese War and absorbed by constitutional reforms, was not at this time able to encourage Serbian and Montenegrin warlike agitations against Austria. She urged them to moderate their aspirations and to prepare for better times. The aggressive foreign policy of Austria now opened the eyes not only of the Balkan states, but also of Russia. Armaments and preparations for war began immediately after the annexation. In the work of restoring its military power the government was supported by the Duma. In this manner Russia counterbalanced the Austrian and German militarism which had been enormous- ly strengthened after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 6 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST Rivalry between Slavonic and Germanic powers for political preponderance in the Balkans, especially between Russia and Austria, was not new in European history. It existed even before the reign of Catherine II, and Joseph II of Austria. Russia strove to force her way to the great midland sea and obtain a footing in the world markets to which that commercial route leads. This egress from the dreary region of frost and ice to the lands of sunshine and fertility was ever felt as a prime necessity of national life. It is clear that for political and economic reasons, and notably for racial motives, Russia could never allow Constantinople to fall into the hands of any European power, nor could she allow the Balkans to fall under the ascendancy of Austria-Hungary or Germany. Austria-Hungary for her- self spoke in very much the same strain. In a leading Vien- na paper, one which usually reflects with fair accuracy the opinions of Ballplatz diplomacy, appeared on No- vember 5, 1908, an article which stated Austrian policy avowedly and frankly: "The thing is urgent, and we must be resolute. We cannot halt in the path marked out for us without incurring the most serious peril. We cannot return the sword to the scabbard until we have established on a secure basis our absolute supremacy in the Balkans, and crushed in those lands the influence of every other power. To accomplish this is essential. But we can only achieve this on condition that we border on Turkey, on the longest possible front. Especially must we establish ourselves on the border of Macedonia. The sine qua non for this is disappearance of Serbia and Montenegro; a conflict must be forced, and that speedily, on these countries. Ruthless selfishness is the only course that pays in politics. Ethical considerations should not affect the attainment of a political aim; to reach our aim no means must be despised." (Quoted by H. J. Darnton-Fraser in The Westminster Review, February, 1909.) It was obvious that Austria desired either to take Con- stantinople, or to prevent Russia from doing so. The acute tension in diplomatic relations between these two Dower RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST powers continued for several years. In 1912 Russia succeded in forming a Balkan League against Turkey. She favored a union of the Balkan Slavs with Greece, which would give her access to the southeastern ports in Aegean Sea. Austria opposed such a policy and desired to preserve the status quo, by which she hoped eventually to gain more Slavonic territory and to be united with her own Slavic dominions in a Trialism. This was a dream of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his militaristic party. Russian policy in accord with the Triple Entente triumphed in the Balkan War. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, increased territorially. Serbia captured Drach (Durazzo) on the Ad- riatic Sea, and insisted on retaining this seaport with a small strip of the adjacent coast , in order to have an outlet, "a little window," on the Adriatic. Russia and other powers of the Triple Entente actively sympathized with the Serbian claims; Austria and the Triple Alliance again opposed, especially Austria which had economic and political interests in Albania and did not desire to encounter Serbian compe- tition there. She insisted that new Albania, since, it manifestly could not remain Turkish, should be formed into an autonomous principality under her political -protectorate. The state of European alliances caused Germany to champion the policy of Austria-Hungary, and brought France and Great Britain to the support of Russia. Only the earnest endeavors of all the foreign chancellories of Europe succeded in effecting a compromise of these conflicting purposes and thus temporarily preventing a general war. In 1913 there came the conflict between Bulgaria and her former allies, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, in consequence of the partition of territory gained in European Turkey. Austria without hesitation encouraged Bulga- ria in her demands, while the Russian Tsar telegraphed to the rulers of Southern Slavs to find some method to avoid a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as arbitra- 8 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST tor under the Balkan Treaty of 1912, and warned them that he would hold that state responsible which appealed to force. "The state which begins war will be responsible to the Slavonic cause"-- he said. In Vienna it was looked upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship of Russia over the Balkan states. The Austrian and German press insisted again that Balkan Slavs were of age and could take care of themselves; if not, it was for Europe, not for Oriental Russia, to control them. (Cf. Die Gegenwart, Berlin, March 8, 1913. ) The well-meant action of Russia in intervening in Balkan affairs had an effect opposite to that hoped for. The political horizon grew darker and darker, not only in the Balkans, but in all Europe. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, at the close of the second Balkan War, was concluded without much regard .to the nationalities of the people in the dis- tributed territories, and still less regard for the political and economic interests of the individual states. By Aus- trian intervention Skadar (Skutari) was taken from Mon- tenegro and ceded to Albania, a state which Austria had just created. Serbia in particular, cut off for many years from the Adriatic and Aegean Sea, felt now that she had a wonderful opportunity to secure Drach, or some other seaport which would give her territorial and commercial access to the Mediterranean. But her desires were frus- trated and her political, economic, and national aspirations brought to naught. When we glance generally over Russia's foreign policy for a hundred years, from Alexander I in 1815, to Ni- cholas II in 1915, it is easy to see that all interventions, all the wars undertaken in the Near East, have ended in very meagre results. Four great wars against Turkey have brought Russia only a strip of Rumanian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Rumanian bit of land in the delta of the Danube. Even this last morsel, acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1878 RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 9 at the cost of 200,000 men lost in a terrible war. Russia, whose fleets have twice at Navarino in 1827, and at Sevastopol in 1854 annihilated the naval power of Tur- key, did not secure even an island in the Aegean Sea. In regard to satisfaction of a moral character, the Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stambul, nor to pray in St. Sophia. As to gratitude upon the part of the liberated Balkan peoples, Matushka ( Dear-Mother ) was always rewarded with a series of disillusionments, which rewards mostly came from Bulgaria. The real gain for Russia in the Near East, as has been said, was slight as far as expansion was concerned. For a hundred years this powerful Northern Empire did not obtain one foot of territory in the Balkan Peninsula. But in the direction of the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, Tur- kestan, Siberia, Mongolia, Manchuria, and China she made a real gain. Russia secured there an enormous increase of territory, and an aggrandizement of influence greater than what one might deem that she ever will have in the Balkans when a new day dawns after the present European Walpurgis night of slaughter. CHAPTER II RUSSIA^IN THE MIDDLE EAST. For a few parcels of territory in the West, conquered with tremendous difficulty, what bloody wars has Russia not endured? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice; the Baltic, closed by the Sound and the Belts; the Black Sea closed by the Dardanelles; and the Mediterranean itself, with Gibraltar and Suez Canal, -- are not available, and not sufficient for the needs of the expansion of a mighty continental empire. In Asia, on the contrary, by way of Persia, the Tigris, and the Persian Gulf, Russia is able to open her way to the Arabian Sea. Bismarck once spoke in. disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. But when young Emperor Nicholas II ascended the throne, he and his minis- ters took matters more seriously. In 1893 a Russian publi- cist, Prince Ukhtomski, issued a book ( Puteshestvie na Vostok Naslednika Tsesarevichd), in which he stated with pride that the time had come for the Russians to have some definite idea regarding the heritage that the Genghis Khans and the Tamerlanes have left them. " Asia! we have been part of it at all times," he said; "we have lived its life and shared its in- terests; our geographical position irrevocably destines us to be the head of the rudimentary powers of the Orient". The opinion of Prince Ukhtomski revealed a new element in Russian foreign policy. Gradually, step by step, town by town, and district by district, Russia won her influence in numerous khanates, amirates, satrapies, and other Asiatic provinces. She annexed Khiva in 1872, Bokhara in 1873, RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11 and Caucasus in 1878. She won political and commercial influence in Turkey, Afghanistan, and Persia. By these Russian successes in Asia, England was greaty alarmed. At every forward movement of the Muscovites, the Britons protested, or endeavored to secure guarantees against a new advance, or tried to gain for themselves some new strategic point that would strengthen their position. In 1885 the belief was general that a war was about to ensue between "the Whale and the Elephant". But three years later, Great Britain agreed to the Russian occupation of Merv, Penjdeh, and Kushk. The Russians now were within one hundred miles of Herat "the Key of the Indies". The question of the settlement of the boundaries was scarcely disposed of, when another problem arose concerning the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs, a moun- tainous region of Central Asia lying on the northwest border of India. With the Bam-Dunya ("the Roof of the World") the platau of Pamirs commands both Afghanistan and Cash- mere, those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan. The region was broken up into petty khanates over which the khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the amir of Afghanistan, the client of the English, laid claim to sovereignty. Non of them had recognized until then the value of the territory. In the summer of 1891 a Russian scientific mission accompanied by six hundred soldiers, made its appearance in Pamir, and aroused, by its presence there, protests of the English. At the approach of winter, the Russians withdrew; but the following summer they again appeared there, under the command of Colonel Ya- nov. They contended that they had been insulted by the Af- ghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat of Somatash, after which they fell back and took up their position at Kalabar on the Oxus. This clash of arms was succeded by a diplomatic controversy. It was not until 1895, after a keen discussion between the two great powers, each contending for its own client, that they reached an ag- 12 R USSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST reement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of Shugnan and Rushan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan, a narrow strip of territory, about twenty miles wide, which now forms " a buffer state" between Russia and Bri- tish India. In 1899 England occupied in Arabia the island of Perim in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea and establish a coaling station in her maritime route. Russia, in the same year, endeavored to obtain from the imam the grant of a coaling station on his coast. From this arose new com- plaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England, especially when Russia established herself on the coast, and at the very capital of the emperor of Abyssinia. The English began staidly to alternate between doubting and believing that these expansions of Russia by way of the Caucasus, by way of Turkestan, and by way of the Pa- mirs, were all directed towards one goal, to possess "the ri- ches of the Indies." Some English jingoists declared that the conquest of all the Levant was worthless for Russia, if it would not open the road to India. Russian diplomacy denied such innuendos. "We do not desire India, but must get down to the Persian Gulf"-- contended Novoe Vremya (April 28, 1901), a leading conservative Russian paper. In truth, what Russia desired was not a road to India, but a road to the Arabian Sea, and to reach that point the route lay through the Persian Gulf. She accepted the theory that in Asia there is room enough for two powers," if they find a modus operandi to move there in parallel lines without colliding. The modus operandi between the two rivals was not found until Germany compelled them to find it. The German plan for the Bagdad railroad was regarded for many years as an impracticable enterprise. But when a part of it was opened between Constantinople and P>egli in Central Turkey, and when Germany was preparing to continue the railway con- RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 13 struction with a terminus at Persian Gulf, England realised that the German Drang nach Osten was not illusion but fact* The basis for Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle East was now found. Russia, not being at the zenith of her milita- ry and political effectiveness, condescended to an arrange- ment by which the situation in Persia and Afghanistan was cleared up. By this arrangement Great Britain consented to seek no political or commercial concessions north of a line connecting Kasrishirin, Ispahan, Yezd, Tabbas, and Khaf, with the junction of the Russian, Persian, and Afghan fron- tiers. Russia gave to Great Britain a like understanding in respect of the territory south of a line extending from the Afghan frontier to Birjand, Kirman, and Bander Abbas- The region between these two lines was to be regarded as a neutral zone in which either country might obtain conces- sions. It is of interest to note how Russia admitted the Bri- tish sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf, renouncing her claims in that part of Persia which she had coveted for so many decades. In Afghanistan the British and Russians reached an entente cordiale by which England was to exercise her influence in that amirate only in a pacific sense, viz., never to permit Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia. England also engaged neither to occupy nor to annex, in contravention of that treaty, any portion of Afgha- nistan, nor to interfere in the internal administration of the country. The statesmen of Russia, on their part, declared that they recognized Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they agreed to conduct all their political relations with Afghanistan only through the intermediary of the British Government. In commercial relations the two governments affirmed their adherence to the principle of equal opportunity, and they agreed that any facilities which might have been, or should hereafter be, obtained for British and British-Indian trade, should be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders, 14 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST This agreement, which was confessedly drawn up for the sake of a solid and lasting peace between the two em- pires concerned, evoked a mixture of sullen criticisms in the English and Russian press. It was said that certain stipulations of this convention did more harm than good to the British interests in the Middle Orient. Some English politicians objected that Russia obtained in Persia, for her sphere of influence, about two-thirds of the country, with its richest and largest towns, including Teheran the capital; that she had become indisputable master of the centres of trade, of the oldest and best routes in Persia; that in Afghanistan she had a free hand to let her officers confer with Afghan officers in " non-political" matters; and finally, that her appointed commercial agents in the amir's country would not promote or safeguard English interests in the matter of trrade. In Russia the compact was criticized only by warm-water publicists of the forward policy, who alleged that the Eng- lish had no sincere intention in concluding such an agreement. It was England, they asserted, that had blocked the way of Russian efforts to reach the ocean; it was England that thwarted Russia's aim in the Crimean War to go to the Mediterranean. TheA! averred it was Lord G. Curzon's firm Persian policy that arrested Russia's outflow to- wards a seaport on the Persian Gulf, which necessarily and properly was her right. The first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, according to these contestants, was the death blow to the Russian Pacific open-water projects. Said convention does not grant Russia any outlook towards the Persian Gulf, the summum desiderium of her foreign policy in the Middle East, because she conceded to give up of her rail- road proposed from Meshed to Bander Abbas. There are other similar arguments pro and con this con- vention, but whatever they may be, the fact remains that the two signatory powers were not compelled either by threatening diplomatic complications to appeal to a peace RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 arbitration tribunal or by force of arms to sign a treaty of peace. They voluntarily and with earnest solicitude on both sides entered into the compact, to remove certain prejudice, mistrust, and resentment for injuries inflicted on each other in previous times. The Russian public in general, regarded England prior to this time as perfide Albion with whom it was not worthy to make any alliance or treaty. In the eyes of the English, Russia was considered as a semi-civilized nation ruled by autocrats and aristo- crats, which was known in Weltpolitik by her quick forget- fulness of given promises, and which is wholly built upon warfare and conquest. Such misunderstandings between the two powers had really existed for many decades, and these were removed by that agreement. To Persia, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was more benevolent than some critics supposed. If the rivalry between England and Russia had remained as acute as it was in earlier times, Persia, with her constant troubles and her inefficiency for self-government, would have been plunged into civil war and finally become dismembered like an Asiatic Poland. At the beginning of the European War in 1914, and lat- terly in 1915, both Persia and Afghanistan were advised by Turks and Germans to take arms and overthrow the Russian and British protectorate. German and Austrian agents, taking advantage of their diplomatic immunity, attempted to convince Persia and Afghanistan that if they wished to preserve their national existence when the Euro- pean gigantic strife of nations ends, they must not remain neutral. "If England and Russia issue victorious in this war, then Persia and Afghanistan will be wiped off the map, and their national existence finished for ever" - wrote the Turkish paper Tanine of Constantinople. The British and Russian representatives complained that these Austro- German and Turkish agitations clashed with the rights of Russia and England as protecting powers of Persia and Af- 16 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST ghanistan. Precautionary measures against foreign in- trigues were taken immediately. Russia and Great Britain warned the Persian shah (" the King of Kings") and the Afghan amir that any act of hostility towards the British or Russian Empire might mean the end of independence of their respective countries. Fortunately for the shah and his people, all these foreign instigations failed of success, and Persia declined in 1914 and 1915 to join officially either belligerent party. CHAPTER III RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST. In relation to the Far East, the contact of the Rus- sians with the Asiatic peoples has existed more than two hundred years, especially with China. From the annexation of the Kamchatka Peninsula, the position of Russia in the Far East continually grew stronger. In 1847 the Russian Government appointed for governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Count Nicholas Muraviev, who later was named, in reward for his services, Muraviev- Amurski. When Muraviev took this position he set himself to develop and strengthen the eastern colonies. He knew that his new province would have no future if it was not secured by the chief river and the richest region, that is, the Amur and Manchuria. In 1848 Russia sent an expedition of exploration to the Far East, but all this expedition perished without the escape of a single man to tell the story. Two years afterwards Captain Nevelski with his explo- rers discovered the island Sakhalin, occupied the mouth of the Amur, and gave a proclamation to the native Chinese mandarins that all this region belonged to "the White Tsar" at Petersburg. They protested and demanded that nego- tiations should be entered upon with their emperor. Gover- nor Muraviev declined the proposition because "Peking was two far away, and Chinese diplomacy too slow." He continued to act as if the country was already a Russian province, and strengthened his position by building along the river the forts Aleksandrovsk, Khabarovsk, and Ni- kolaevsk. 18 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST During the Crimean War the Anglo-French fleet blockaded the Russian Pacific coast, and destroyed a part of the military establishments there. This blockade, by threate- ning to starve out the colony, only hastened a decision on the part of Muraviev, who had need of Manchuria to furnish food for his colonists. In 1857 Admiral Putiatin dropped anchor in the Pechili Gulf, and proposed to the emperor of China, in consideration of Russia's armed inter- vention in the Taiping insurrection, the cession of Manchu- ria. China's only reply was a vigorous protest against this Russian encroachment. War seemed imminent between the two empires. Happily for the Russian eagle, just at that time came the Anglo-French expedition and the march of the allies upon Peking. The Russians profited by this event to complete the annexation of the coveted province. The Tsar sent a fleet into the Chinese waters, and the Celestials did not relish having a third European power to deal with. By the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin of 1858, they granted to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur, and all the territory between this river and the Pacific Ocean. In the southern part the Russians built a fort- ress and a city with a prophetic name Vladivostok (Do- minator of the East). The acquired lands formed two provinces, Amurskaya Oblast (the Amur Province) west of the Amur, and Primorskaya Oblast (the Maritime Province) east of that river. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, China ceded to Russia the region adjacent to the lakes Balkhash and Issik-kul. The boundary line between Manchuria and Siberia was readjusted, and the Russians were granted the right to trade in all parts of the empire. Fifteen years after- wards Russia obtained from Japan the abandonment of the latter's rights over Sakhalin, in exchange for the North Kurile Islands. For nearly thirty years the boundary between China and Russia remained as agreed upon in the treaties of 1858 and 1860; but already the commercial and political activity of the Russians was overstepping it. They had established RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 19 themselves in large numbers in towns of Chinese Manchuria, in Kiakhta, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar. The navigation of the Ussuri and Sungari rivers fell wholty into their hands. The steamships of the Amur Company put Russia in rapid communication with Japan and San Francisco. Scientific missions traversed China in all directions. At Peking the Russian colony acquired a continually greater importance; the ambassador of the Tsar wielded more influence at court than the representatives of any other European power. His open-handed liberality won him the favor of the courtiers, mandarins, and the generals. In all the sea and rivers* ports the colonies of Russian merchants multiplied, and these seemed to live on better terms with the native population than the traders of other foreign nations. In 1881 Russia secured great economic concessions and privileges in the provinces bordering on Siberia and Tur- kestan. By the Hi Treaty Russia and China agreed that no tariff was to be imposed by either of them, unless trade attains "such development as to necessitate its establish- ment." Free trade, according to this treaty, was to be main- tained between all Chinese and Russian subjects in the principal towns and trading areas of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. Also, the treaty confirmed that Russian subjects had the right to settle and to acquire houses, for the pur- pose of carrying on trade in all trading places on either side of the Tianshan ranges and in the country outside the great Chinese Wail. By the convention of June, 1895, China contracted with Russia, through the intermediary of the Russo - Chinese Bank at Petersburg, and under the direction of Count Ukhtomski, a loan of four hundred million francs at four per cent., payable in thirty-six years. On August 27, 1896 this same bank made another agreement with the Chinese Government (the Treaty of St. Petersburg). This treaty gave the Eastern Chinese Railroad Company the right to carry the Siberian railway through Chinese Manchuria 20 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST and the Liaotung Peninsula, with a terminus at Talienwan and Port Arthur. Another purpose of the loan was to develop coal, iron, and gold mines in the territory traversed by the road. The stock of the company was held only by Chinese and Russians. A special clause authorized the Tsar to station in Manchuria both infantry and cavalry for the protection of the railroad, which at the end of twenty-five years was to revert to China, in case she desired it after having fulfilled all her obligations. Having secured the right to construct this line of railway, Count Cassini had little difficulty in inducing the Government of Peking to allow certain deviations of the road so as to bring it into touch with Tsitsihar, Kharbin, and Vladivostok. This matter was hardly settled between China and Rus- sia, before some other differences arose between China and Germany. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries had been murdered by the Chinese ruffians in the province of Shantung. Such an outrageous act now gave a plausible pretext for the German Government to occupy the harbor of Kiaochow. For Russia this was a most unwelcome in- cident. She had intended Kiaochow for her own purposes, and had already made an agreement with the authorities in Peking that the harbor might be used freely by her fleet. The Cabinet of Petersburg hastened to demand, therefore, as an offset for the loss of Kiaochow, a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan. The Chinese Government granted the demands, and the Russians now had free hand to use Port Arthur not merely as railroad station but as a place d'armes. From the Korean Government they obtained a lease of the port of Masampo on the southeastern coast of Korea, and other concessions in this province. The Russian grandiose scheme in the Far East was very carefully laid, and for a time it was favored by many cir- cumstances. In 1900 the Boxer rising in China and the troubles in the town of Blagovieshchensk, justified Russia in sending a large force into Manchuria, to protect her own RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 21 interests and at the same time the territorial integrity of the Celestial Empire against the inordinate demands of the western powers for compensations and guarantees. When the Boxer riots were silenced General Nicholas Grodekov telegraphed to his government of " consolidating the great enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia's dominions, and making of that river an internal waterway and not a frontier stream." His proposition was accepted as it concerned the right bank of the Amur. "The Son of Hea- ven" was assured that whatever might come to pass in Manchuria " no part of China should be annexed to Russia". Moreover, Russian diplomats in Peking made with the Chinese Government a secret agreement (1900) by which Russia undertook to protect China from foreign invasion^ and to dismantle all forts and defenses not occupied by the Russians. Niuchwang and other places, according to that agreement, were to be restored to the Chinese administraton when the Russian Government was satisfied that the pacification of the province was complete. The existence of such an agreement was denied by Count Lamsdorf, the Russian foreign minister, to both the British and Japanese ambassadors at Petersburg. But in spite of Count Lamsdorf's disavowal, this clandestine agreement with China on one hand, and the Russian general policy in Manchuria, on the other, excited suspicion in Japan and Great Britain. The hostility of the Japanese was stirred up on political grounds, while the English were jealous to see such a mighty rival as Russia in the Far East. For that reason, both powers, Japan and England, astonishing the world, signed in January, 1902, a treaty for maintaining the status quo and general peace in the extreme Orient. The trea- ty provided that the integrity of China and Korea must be respected, and the policy of open door for commerce and in- dustry in China and Korea should be granted to all nations. One of the first effects of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to strengthen the hands of the peace party in Russia, 22 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST resulting in a new treaty with China (March 26, 1902), pledging the Russians to withdraw from Manchuria. The evacuation was begun shortly afterwards and continued during the winter. But in the spring of 1903, this process stopped. The Japanese now felt that it was high time to intervene. Accordingly, in July, 1903, they addressed an inquiry to Count Lamsdorf, asking whether he was disposed to reopen the negotiations on the Manchurian and Korean questions. The Russian Government vouchsafed a reply in which it was stated that Russia was willing to recognize the preponderating commercial interest of Japan in Korea, as well as her right to advise and assist that country in civil administration. Japan was further to be at liberty to send troops for this purpose to "the Hermit Kingdom'' after giving notice to Russia. Both powers were to agree not to use the territory of this kingdom for strategic purposes^ and not to erect any fortifications on the coast calculated to impair the freedom of the straits of Korea. The question of Manchuria was not brought into this scheme, because the Russian Government regarded this province to be outside of the Japanese sphere of interest. The answer did not sa- tisfy Baron Kamura, the Japanese minister of foreign af- fairs. After six months of dilatory wranglings, diplomacy had exhausted itself. The war began on February 8, 1904, without any formal declaration. CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR. A great deal of nonsense has been written and accepted as true concerning the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Through- out the course of this terrific conflict, the Japanese took the best of care to put their own view of the case before the world. "The wonderful heroism," "the marvellous strategical and tactical skill," "the perfect medical and transport arrangements of the Japanese forces," and other set phrases received more than a fair share of praise. This was due to the perspicuous industry of the Japanese publi- city agencies. Those who believe in such laurea verba forget that Japan had advantage of Russia in being better prepared for the war; she was equipped with a full war-chest, a ve- teran army and navy. In the meantime the Russians fought under the dispiriting conditions of having a well-trained enemy in the far front and nearly all the European powers behind. Austria, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain intrigued secretely against Russia, especially Austria and Germany. Furthermore, in internal policy the vast Slavonic Empire was threatened by a revolutionary movement. The Russian Government was hampered at every turn by dis- orders. Nevertheless, in the battlefield the Russians put up an extraordinary fight, so that before a year and half had passed their adversaries were completely exhausted. The Japanese now unofficially suggested to the President of the United States of America that he intervene as mediator. President Roosevelt accepted the suggestion, and his mediation worked successfully. The treaty of peace between 24 RUSSIAN POLI Y AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR Russia and Japan was concluded September 5, 1905, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Since the close of this unfortunate war the position of Russia, however, was not doomed either in Asia or in Europe. Russian policy in the Far East was generally more successful than in the Near East. The great secret of this success lay on the method employed in Russian dealings with the Asiatic peoples. Prof. Reinsch observes in his suggestive book, World Politics, that the Russians have an insinuating manner and great tact in diplomatic inter- course. In their Oriental political system they know how to use that splendor and concentrated majesty which impress the Oriental mind far more than do the simple business methods of the Britons. The Russian diplomats understand very well how to use the amour-propre of their adversaries. They know when to use force, and when to soothe up with gracious audiences, Lucullan banquets, and blandishments. Withal, the policy of Russia is persistently opportune and constant. The changes in ministry of foreign affairs are not so frequent as in France, England, and United States of America. From 1815 to 1882 Russia had only two ministers for foreign affairs, Nesselrode and Gorchakov; and since the latter date there have been only six, De Giers, Lobanov, Muraviev, Lamsdorf, Izvolsky, and Sazonov. This per- manency in the foreign office ensures continuity of the same political views and consistence in realizing them. Russia secured in Asia lands and influence among Oriental nations only by her peaceful persistency, not by belicose means. Russian policy in Far Assia showed that great conquests can be achieved not only by the land battles and sea fights, by brag proclamations, and oratorical heroics, but rather by silence and prudence. Of like opinion is Prof. James Mavor. In his Economic History of Russia, the English scholar assumes that Central Asia and the Far East contain imense possibilities for Rus- sia. At the present time she has privileges and concessions to RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 25 exploit the mining industries and construct the railroads in Manchuria and all Mongolia. According to Prof. Ma- vor, the latter has already become in reality her prote- gee under the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of 1912. China now controls solely the external relations of that province. All internal administration is left to the local khans, whose chief spiritual ruler is the khutuktu (saint) ; and this " saint" is simply a vassal of the Slav Tsar. Though preocupied with political and civilizing mission in the Far Orient, Russia did not abandon her liberating mission in Central and Southeastern Europe. When in May, 1912, Mr. S. Sazonov made a speech in the Duma, he declared, amongst other statements, in the reverse of Prince Ukhtomski's opinion, that Russia is not an Asiatic, but a European power. "Our State was put together not on the banks of the Black Irtish, but on the Dnieper and the Moskva" he asserted. This diplomatic usus loquendi translated into plain language signifies that expan- sion in Asia should not constitute the one sole aim of the foreign policy of Russia, for she has to protect, not only 3,000,000 of Mongols from unremittng Chinese raids, but she has also to protect 50,000,000 of her minor brethren, the Slavonic peoples under the domination of Austro- Germans. Situated upon the outskirts of Europe, in the debatable region between the West and East, she is the conecting link between Occidental civilization and Oriental barbarism. The double eagle of Russia is the symbol that connects the Slavonic fragments in a racial bond which will spell in future peaceful progress and not war. The aims of this empire, whether in the Near, Mid- dle, or Far East, are nowadays mainly cultural. They are commercial and political only in so far as the geographical situation of Russia makes it incumbent on her statesmen to maintain her territorial integrity, and to provide for the normal expansion of her industrial and agricultural output. From 1908 onwards, Russian statesmen concentrated their attention and energies on everything relating to the 26 RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR Slavonic affairs, and gave their diplomatic support to all the Balkan Slavs. They encouraged the Panslavonic societies in Moskva and Petrograd to help the Western and Southern Slavs when these needed such help. The formation of the Balkan League of 1912 was their deed. And, as it is known, the Balkan League was not created for conquests of new territories, for subjection of other peoples, for national or international brigandage and booty. The Balkan Slavs made this union, with the assistance of their sister country, Russia, for the defense of their own soil, for liberation of their kinsmen, the subjugated ray as, who were under the brutal Asiatic oppressor the red Sultan! For six hundred years Turkish janissaries plundered, persecuted, and mas- sacred the Christian population in the Balkan Peninsula. No European state had raised its voice against these Mu- sulman carnivals of crime. The only state sympathising with the sufferers was the Empire of the Tsars. Russ shed his blood on more than one occasion for the rescue of his underling brother from a galling yoke. And, as already noted in the first chapter, he secured nothing for himself, but only fought to assuage the downtrodden and humiliated peoples; he fought for justice and humanity. In the Far Orient Russia had many diplomatic adven- tures; most of them were successful, but a few very dis- astrous. The debdcle occasioned by the Japanese War marked a decisive moment in her contemporary history. As a prominent Slavic economist, M. A. Finn-Yenotaevski, remarked in his work, Sovremennoe Khoziaystvo Rossiyi (The Modern Economy of Russia), for the last eight or ten years "the eyes of the Muscovite eagle were turned from the East towards the West, and above all from the Far East to the Near East." Austria's systematic provocations in the Balkans, and her insolent attacks on Serbia and Croatia, together with German commercial competition in the Levant, forced Russia to recoil from the Far Orient, in RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 27 order to prevent further encroachments of the Teutons, and their " Pressing towards the East." If 35,000,000 of the Western Slavs (the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), and 15,000,000 of Southern Slavs (the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes) enslaved at present time, would be delivered after this bloody European Armageddon they should be grateful not merely to the Matushka-Rossiya, but even to their foes. Their eternal enemies hastened the solution of the old Eastern Question. By the declaration of war to Serbia and Russia in 1914, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey, unconsciously made an ample contribution to the liberation of the Slavonic Laocoon who has wrestled for centuries with the Hun and Teuton serpents. APPENDIX. BIBLIOGRAPHY (Utilized documents and works). The literature of Russian history and politics is practi- cally inexhaustible. The following bibliography is limited to those documents and works which have direct bearing on the subject as outlined in this essay, thereby avoiding the confusion that results when there is an overhelming mass of material to be examined. For the spirit of the Rus- sian politics the student must consult all kinds of politi- cal literature, the blue, white, green, red, yellow, and orange books; the Russian year books; diplomatic cores- pondence; pamphlets; magazine articles, and even the newspapers. These are, of course, too numerous and too fluctuating in character to be catalogued. Herewith we list only the most important sources and treatises. CHAPTER I A) Official Documents. Traite d* armistice entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe Slobosia, le 24 aotit, 1807. ("Recueil de Principaux Traites," par Geo. Fred, de Martens, pp. 689692, t. VIII. Gottingue, 1835). Convention d 'armistice entre la Turquie et la Serbie, signe a Brakni, le 17 ao&t 1808. (Idem, "Nouveau Recueil de Traites," p. 88, t. I. Gottingue, 1817). Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe Bucharest, le 28 mai 1812. (Ibidem, pp. 397405, t. III. Gottingue, 1818). 30 APPENDIX Treaty for the Settlement of Greece, between Great Britain, France, and Russia, with an additional and secret Article. July 6, 1827. French and English text. (Ibidem, pp. 282-290, t. VI. Gottingue, 1829). Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane. signe a Adrianople, le 14 septembre 1829. ( Ibidem, pp. 143-155, tome VIII. Gottingue, 1831). Traitt