PRIVATE LIBRARY JESSE ANDERSON. Prirr... tyl*, ^ o ^<7 ' - (' . - *&&!&'. *rjr / ' ' s4 MENTAL SCIENCE METHODS OF MENTAL CULTURE, DESIGNED FOB THE USE OF NORMAL SCHOOLS, ACADEMIES, AND PRIVATE STUDENTS PREPARING TO BE .TEACHERS. EDWARD BROOKS, A. M.,Pn. D., LATB PRINCIPAL OP A STATE NORMAL SCHOOL OP PENNSYLVANIA, AND AUTHOR O NORMAL METHODS OP TEACHING, A NORMAL SERIES OP MATHEMATICS BTC. " Whatever that is which thinks, which understands, which wills, which acts, it is something celestial and divine; and, upon that account, must necessarily bi eternal." CICERO. LANCASTER, PA. : NORMAL PUBLISHING COMPANY. 1885. "... ... .;;.: PHILADELPHIA! BATHMSAL aOHOOL OF EiOOUTION AFD OSAWlt, BY THE AUTHOR OF THIS WORK. I. Normal Methods of Teaching, - - - - $1.75 II. Mental Science and Culture, - 1.75 III. The Philosophy of Arithmetic, .... 2.25 NORMAL PUBLISHING CO., LANCASTER, PA. I. The Normal Series of Arithmetics. 1. The Standard Series : A full course. Four books: New Primary. 22; Elementary, 45 ; New Mental, 35; New Written, 80. 2. The Union Series: a shorter course. Two books; Union Part I., 25; The Normal Union, 90. II . Normal Elementary Algebra, - - - * - $1.10 HI. Normal Geometry and Trigonometry, - - 1.10 IV. Normal Higher Arithmetic, - - - - 1,25 V. Keys containing Methods and Models. SOWER, POTTS & CO., PUBLISHERS, 630 MARKET STREET, P111LADELPHI i. Copies mailed on receipt of prices annexed, and introduced into schools/or one-third less. COPYRIGHT, 1882, BY EDWARD BROOKS. INQUIRER P. A P. OO., BTXREOTTPERS AND PRIJ.TMW, LANCASTER, PA. PREFACE. inDUCATION embraces the culture and instruction of the mind. This culture and instruction must be based on a knowledge of the nature of the mind and its activities. Such a knowledge is not only a necessity, but this necessity is now generally realized by educators and intelligent teachers. Never before in the history of education has there been so strong and wide a demand for works treating of the nature of the mind and its culture, as at the present time. With the view of meeting this demand, the present treatise is published. Origin. This treatise originated and grew up in the class-room. It is the result of many years' experience in the instruction of student-teachers in mental philosophy. Much of it was prepared and given to classes in written or printed notes for them to study and recite. These notes acquired a popularity outside of the school, and, by permission, were used in several other institutions. A demand was thus created for a text-book on the sub- ject, and to meet the demand these notes have been rewritten and expanded into a complete treatise. Extent. The work presents a complete outline of the subject of Mental Philosophy, embracing the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The treatment of the Intellect is especially full and detailed, as the teacher's work has mainly to do with the culture and training of this faculty. The Sensibilities and Will are discussed more briefly, but their treatment is comprehensive and complete. While aiming at conciseness and simplicity in the explanation of each topic, the object of the author has been to dis- cuss all the leading principles of the science, and thus present a complete treatment of the nature of the mind and the methods of cultivating it. The topics are so arranged that students who wish a shorter course can omit some of the less important points in the discussion ; and an outline is (3) 2210118 4 PREFACE. presented, indicating a twelve or fourteen weeks' course, which gives a con- nected view of the whole subject. (See page 10.) The Material. The subject of mental philosophy has been so thoroughly investigated that an author can hope to present but little that is new or original. The first object of a writer should be to state clearly the generally recognized views of the science, and this has been the primary aim in the present work ; it will thus be found to agree in the main with the best thinkers of modern times. The principal object has not been to be original in thought or expression, but to be clear, accurate, and concise. Nothing was put in because it was new, and nothing left out because it was old. I have aimed to produce a text-book which should contain, in a clear and practical form, the essential elements of mental science. I have not hesi- tated, however, to present such new views of the subject as my own think- ing has suggested. There will thus be found, in the treatment of nearly every topic, some new idea, or some new phase or clearer statement of an old one. Some of the points peculiar to this work are the regarding of the cognition of the sensation as an act of perception, the giving of four distinct elements to the memory, the spontaneity of recollection, the reduction of all the laws of memory to the one law of the relation of ideas, the distinct as- sumption and proof of two elements of the imagination, making it a com- bining and a creating power, the formal including of the several ideas of Space, Time, etc., under the Intuitions of the True, the treatment of the Lu- dicrous as a rational idea, etc. Special attention is also called to the brief but comprehensive treatment of the Will, and especially of the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will. Mental Culture. The most striking feature of the work is the formal presentation of Methods of Cultivating the Different Faculties. This feature especially distinguishes the work from every previous treatise that has fallen under the author's notice ; and, it is thought, will render it especially valu- able to the teacher and educator. To this part of the subject the author has devoted special labor, and having no previous treatment to guide him, his task was a difficult and embarrassing one. Much of what is given has been used in oral discussions in his teaching classes for many years, and in bis lectures at teachers' institutes in different parts of the State. As he was PKEFACE. O compelled by the limits of the yolume to be brief, the discussions presented are mere outlines of what could be written on the subject. It is proper to remark, also, that they do not come up to the author's ideal of what could be presented ; but they may serve to awaken an interest in the subject, and incite others to a fuller and more suggestive treatment of the culture of the mind. Nature of the System. The system of philosophy here presented is similar to that of the best English and American thinkers. In its general spirit it coincides with that of Sir William Hamilton, though it differs in many details from that illustrious author. It also agrees in spirit with much of the best German thinking on the subject of metaphysics. In its system of thought it is neither materialistic nor absolutely rationalistic, but aims to unite what is true in both of these schemes of philosophy. It holds that the mind is an entity distinct from matter and the author of thought, rather than that thought is a function of matter, as taught by the modern materi- alistic school of thinkers. It does not ignore, however, the physical basis of perception, and it therefore accepts one of the established facts of the materialistic school. But it rises above this school by assuming that the mind is an original source of truth, and that it can originate and compre- hend necessary and universal principles. It thus rises from the lowest facts of materialism to the highest facts of rationalistic philosophy. Relation to Religion. The relation of its teachings to religion is one of the striking features of the work. Beginning with the sensations in the nervous tissue, it traces ideas up through the senses into the realm of ab- stract and general truth, and finally up into the domain of supersensual ideas and truths, and here finds the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Here it reaches the conception of the Absolute and Infinite, and uniting these with the Good, it attains to the highest conception of the mind, that of GOD. Recognizing this idea in the soul as an immutable verity, and the elements of Faith, Love, and Obedience as associated with it, the work lays a philosophical foundation for the building up of that grand temple of belief found in the human soul, called Religion. This system of philos- ophy is therefore not only rational, but it is also religious. A Text-Book. The special merit of the work is that it is suitable for a 6 PREFACE. text-book upon the science. The aim has been to present the subject with simplicity and clearness, and so that it can be readily understood and recited by the student. The student of a science needs a book in which he can prepare a lesson for the recitation of the class-room, and most books on mental science are deficient in this respect. In studying a new science, many subjects must be committed, and a text-book should present the mat- ter in a form suitable for recitation. Every paragraph of this work has been written in view of the thought, How will this meet the demands of the recitation-room ? Thus prepared, it is hoped that one of its strongest claims on teachers and students will be its merit as a text-book. The value of the work in this respect has also been enhanced by the scholarly sugges- tions of Prof. E. Oram Lyte, who has kindly and with critical care read nearly all the* manuscript. In closing this preface, I desire to express the hope that the work may prove valuable to the young men and women of the country, in giving them clearer views of the dignity and power of the human mind and the necessity and nature of Its culture. In my own classes the study of mental science has been the source of high inspiration in thought and culture, and has contributed largely to the great success of my pupils as teachers and mem- bers of the other professions. Recalling the many happy hours spent in the class-room discussing the themes here treated, I take pleasure in dedi- cating this, my latest, and probably my last work, TO MY PUPILS IN MENTAL SCIENCE, with the sentiment they have often heard me express that / would rather live in the hearts of my pupil* than be honored in tong or story. EDWARD BROOKS. " STATE NORMAL SCHOOL, MilUrsville, Pa., Jan. 16, 1883. TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE. PREFACE , iii INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE . 13 CHAPTER II THE NATURE OF THE MIND. ... 23 CHAPTER III. THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND . . 30 CHAPTER IV. THE CULTURE OF THE MIND ... 36 MENTAL ATTRIBUTES. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Definition and Nature .... 43 Objects of Consciousness ... 46 Products of Consciousness . . 48 Unconscious Mental Modifica- tions 50 Development of Conscious Knowledge 52 CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Culture through Conscious Knowledge 55 Culture through Unconscious Knowledge 58 Culture of Philosophical Con- sciousness 61 Abnormal Consciousness ... 64 CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. Definition and Nature .... 66 Can we Do Anything without Attention? Number of Objects of Attention. 69 71 (7) PAOK. CHAPTER IV. THE CULTURE OF ATTENTION. Importance of Habits of At- tention 75 Methods of Cultivating Atten- tion 78 Securing Attention of Pupils . 79 THE INTELLECT. PERCEPTION. CHAPTER L THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. Definition and Nature .... 85 The Nervous Organism .... 87 The Perceptive Process .... 90 Remarks on the Process ... 94 Perception by the Different Senses 99 The Qualities of Bodies . . .110 CHAPTER IL THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION. Neglect of Culture 115 Importance of Culture .... 117 Differences of Perceptive Power 119 Time for Culture 120 Methods of Culture 121 Special Lessons' . . . . . . .125 THE MEMORY. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE MEMORY. Definition and Nature .... 127 Elements of Memory 128 Retention 129 Recollection 131 Representation 133 Recognition 136 CONTENTS. PAGE. Laws of Memory 140 Nature of the Laws . . . .140 Primary Laws ofaMernory . . 142 Secondary Laws of Memory . 145 The One Primary Law . . . 148 Remarks on the Memory . . .151 CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF THE MEMORY. Nature and Importance . . . 155 Methods of Culture 158 Application in Teaching . . .166 THE IMAGINATION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE IMAGINATION. Definition and Nature .... 169 Products of the Imagination .171 Forms of the Imagination . .173 Laws of the Imagination . . .174 Limits and Sphere 178 CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF THE IMAGINATION. Value of the Imagination . . . 188 Culture of the Imagination . . 192 . THE UNDERSTANDING. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE UNDER- STANDING 201 CHAPTER II. THB NATURE OF ABSTRACTION. Definition and Nature .... 204 Products of Abstraction . . . 205 Other Views of Abstraction. .207 CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF GENERALIZATION, OR CONCEPTION. Definition and Nature . . . .210 Process of Conception . . . .210 Remarks on the Process . . 212 Nature of the Concept . . . .214 Qualities of Concepts . . . .218 Unfolding Conceptions . . . .221 The Value of General Ideas . . 223 Existence of General Ideas . .223 Classification .... .225 MOB. CHAPTER IV. THE NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT. Definition and Nature .... 228 Nature of Judgments 231 Derived Judgments 234 Conversion of Judgments . . . 235 CHAPTER V. THE NATURE OF REASONING. Definition and Kinds 237 The Syllogism 241 Deductive Reasoning 249 Another Form of Deduction . 251 Mathematical Reasoning . . 252 Inductive Reasoning 255 Criteria of Induction. . . . 258 Tests of Causal Agency . . 260 Hypothesis and Theory .... 261 Analogy 266 Testimony 270 CHAPTER VI. CULTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING. Importance of Culture . . . .274 Neglect of Culture 276 Time for Culture 276 Culture of Abstraction ... . 277 CHAPTER VII. CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION . . 278 By Logical Analysis 279 By Logical Division 281 By Logical Definition .... 284 The Culture of Classification . 286 Importance of Classification. 287 Methods of Culture .... 288 CHAPTER VIII. THE CULTURE OF THE JUDGMENT. Importance of the Judgment . 291 Culture of the Judgment . . 293 CHAPTER IX. THE CULTURE OF REASONING. The Culture of Deduction . . 297 Study of Mathematics ... 297 Study of Language . . . .301 Study of Metaphysics . . . 303 Avoid Fallacies 306 The Culture of Induction . . . 309 Inductive Teaching . . . .310 Study of Natural Science . . 312 CONTENTS. 9 Inductive Thinking . . . .314 Ayoid Fallacies 316 INTUITION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OP INTUITION. Definition and Nature . . . .319 Existence of this Faculty . . . 320 Relation to Other Faculties . . 322 Products of Intuition .... 325 Primary Truths 325 Nature of Primary Truths . 325 Existence of Primary Truths. 325 Tests of Primary Truths . . 327 Remarks on Primary Truths. 328 Primary Ideas 330 CHAPTER II. THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. Space 331 Time 333 Identity 335 Cause 340 CHAPTER III. THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. Definition of the Beautiful . . 345 Subjective Theories ... .346 Objective Theories 347 The Sublime 353 The Ludicrous 358 Nature of the Ludicrous . . 360 Forms of the Ludicrous . . 363 The Power of Taste 367 CHAPTER IV. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. Nature of the Idea 371 Nature of the Right 373 Origin of the Idea 378 Nature of Conscience .... 383 CHAPTER V. THE CULTURE OF THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE 390 CHAPTER VI. THE CULTURE OF THE INTUITIONS OF BEAUTY. Value of Beauty 396 Culture of the Beautiful . . 399 PAGK. CHAPTER VII. THE CULTURE OF THE INTUITIONS OF THE RIGHT. Nature of Ethical Culture . . 405 Importance of Ethical Culture. 409 Principles of Ethical Culture . 412 Culture of the Different Duties. 417 Personal Duties 417 Duties to Others 421 Duties to God 424 THE SENSIBILITIES. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 433 436 436 438 439 440 442 Definition and Nature . . . The Simple Emotions . . . The Instinctive Emotions The Rational Emotions . . The Egoistic Emotions . . The ./Esthetic Emotions . The Ethical Emotions . . The Affections 444 The Benevolent Affections . 444 The Malevolent Affections . 447 The Desires 449 The Animal Desires .... 450 The Rational Desires . . . .451 CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF THE SENSIBIL ITIES. Importance of the Sensibilities. 455 Culture of the Emotions . . . 460 Culture of the Affections . . . 464 Culture of the Desires .... 468 THE WILL. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE WILL. Definition and Nature . Freedom of the Will . . 475 484 CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF THE WILL. Importance of the Will . . . .493 Culture of the Will 497 HIGHER SPIRITUAL CULTURE . . . 502 A FOURTEEN WEEKS' COURSE. This work presents the author's ideal of a complete professional course in Mental Science and Mental Culture. The following outline indicates a logically connected Shorter Course for students and teachers not having time to complete the entire work. The careful study of the parts indicated, in connection with the attentive reading of the chapters on the culture of different faculties, can be accomplished in about twelve or fourteen weeks. PAGK 13-22 30-35 NATURE OP MENTAL SCIENCE FACULTIES OP THE MIND . . CONSCIOUSNESS. Definition and Nature . . 43-46 Objects of Consciousness . 4648 Products of Consciousness. 4850 ATTENTION. Definition and Nature . . 66-69 Can we Do Anything with- out Attention? .... 69-71 Number of Objects of At- tention 71-74 PERCEPTION. Definition and Nature . . 85-87 The Nervous Organism . . 87-90 The Perceptive Process . . 90-94 MEMORY. Definition and Nature . . 127-128 Elements of Memory . . . 128-140 Laws of Memory 140-148 IMAGINATION. Definition and Nature . . 169-171 Products of the Imagina- tion 171-173 Forms of the Imagination . 173-174 Laws of the Imagination . 174178 Limits and Sphere of the Imagination 178-183 THE UNDERSTANDING .... 201-203 ABSTRACTION. Definition and Nature . . 204-205 Products of Abstraction . 205-207 Other Views of Abstraction 207-209 GENERALIZATION. Definition and Nature . 210 PAGK Process of Conception . . 210-214 Nature of the Concept . . 214-218 JUDGMENT. Definition and Nature . . 228-231 Nature of Judgments . . . 231-234 Derived Judgments . . . 234-235 Conversion of Judgments . 235-236 REASONING. Definition and Kinds . . . 237-241 The Syllogism 241-244 Deductive Reasoning . . . 249-252 Inductive Reasoning . . . 255-258 Hypothesis and Theory . . 261-265 Analogy 266-270 INTUITION. Definition and Nature . . 319-320 Existence of this Faculty. 320-322 Relation to Other Facul- ties 322-325 Products of Intuition . . 325-330 THE BEAUTIFUL 345-353 THE GOOD, OR RIGHT. Nature of the Idea .. . .371-373 Nature of the Right . . . 373-378 Origin of the Idea .... 378-383 THE SENSIBILITIES. Definition and Nature . . 433-436 The Simple Emotions . . 436-444 The Affections 444-449 The Desires 449-454 THE WILL. Definition and Nature . . 475-477 The Motive 477-179 The Choice 479-481 The Executive Volition .. 481-482 I. NATURE OP MENTAL SCIENCE, IL NATURE OF THE MIND. HI. FACULTIES OF THE MIND. IV. CULTURE OF THE MIND. MENTAL ^SCIENCE AND METHODS OF MENTAL CULTURE. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. MENTAL SCIENCE is the science of the human mind. It treats of the nature of the mind and the manner in which it operates. Its object is to ascertain the facts of mind and the laws which regulate its operations. The object of a text-book on Mental Science is to state these facts and laws in a clear, precise, and systematic manner. Mental Philosophy. The science of the mind is often pre- sented under the name of Mental Philosophy. The term philoso- phy, however, is a little broader in its signification than science. Strictly speaking, Philosophy is the science of the true; in its more general sense, however, it means the investigation and ex- planation of the laws and principles of a subject. The word is derived from philos, a lover, and sophia, wisdom, a philosopher being, literally, a lover of wisdom. The origin of the term is usually ascribed to Pythagoras, though Hamilton thinks it more natural to refer it to Socrates. Psychology. The technical name of the science of the mind is Psychology. Psychology may thus be denned as the science of the human mind. It has been divided into Empirical Psy- chology and Rational Psychology, according to the methods of attaining to the facts and principles of the science. The term is (13) 14 MENTAL SCIENCE. derived from psyche, the soul, and logos, a discourse, and thus means a discourse about the soul. It is interesting to notice that the relation of the term psyche in the Greek to a butterfly, car- ries with it the intimation of an early belief in the immortality of the human soul. Anthropology. The science^of Psychology stands intermedi- ate between two other sciences, Physiology and Anthropology. All of these sciences treat of man, but in different ways. Physi- ology treats of the human body ; Psychology treats of the human mind ; while Anthropology treats of the entire man as body and soul. Anthropology investigates man as a complex whole, shows the influence of climate, soil, and physical surroundings on the soul and body, the influence of the soul and body on each other, and endeavors to ascertain all those circumstances and principles which determine the condition and character of the individual and the race. Metaphysics. The term Metaphysics has been sometimes ap- plied to the science of the mind. This term, according to its ety- mological meaning, stands in contrast with the term Physics, or the science of matter. It has been used in a popular sense to include whatever is not embraced under Physics. In its narrower sense it may be defined as the science of abstract truth. The term is said to have originated with the disciples of Aristotle. Several of his works relating to the material world, were collected and published under the title of ra vatKa; subsequently other works treating of philosophical subjects were arranged under the title of TO, fisTcupvfftKa, indicating that they were to be read after the perusal of the other works. From this the term came to be used in the sense of embracing everything not included under Physics. OtJier BrancJies. The term Metaphysics, however, neither in its wider nor in its stricter sense, is properly used as the name of the science of the mind. There are many other branches besides mental science that may be included under the head of meta- physics. Thus, we have Logic, or the science of thought ; Ethics, THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 15 or the science of the Right; Esthetics, or the science of the Beautiful; Politics, or the science of government ; i Ontology, or the science of pure being, etc. These branches are very nearly coordinate with Psychology, the science of the mind, and may all be properly distinguished as metaphysical sciences. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE. In order to have a somewhat clear notion of the nature of mental science, it will be well to obtain a general idea of the nature of Science and the elements of which it is composed. Science may be denned as organized knowledge. It embraces the facts and truth* of a subject systematically ar- ranged and bound together into an organic unity by laws and principles. This statement gives a general idea of the nature of science, but the subject will be more clearly understood by notic- ing the character of the two general classes into which science is divided. Two Kinds of Science. There are two general classes of science, which may be distinguished as the Deductive and the In- ductive sciences. A Deductive science consists of three things : first, ideas, which lead to definitions ; second, self-evident truths called axioms; third, derived truths or theorems. Arithmetic, geometry, etc., are examples of a deductive science. An Induct- ive science embraces several distinct elements : first, facts and phenomena; second, the causes of these facts and phenomena; third, the laws which govern these facts and phenomena. Natural Philosophy is a good example of an inductive science. A few of these sciences, as botany, consist principally of facts and scientific classifications. Some sciences partake of the nature of both of these two general classes. These two classes of sciences are also distinguished as Rational and Empirical sciences. These terms indicate the origin of the elements of which they are composed. The Empirical sciences are those whose elements are derived from experience ; the Ra- tional sciences are those whose elements are derived from the rea- son. The terms Inductive and Deductive, as applied to these sciences, indicate the methods of their development, the former 16 MENTAL SCIENCE. being developed by inductive reasoning, and the latter by de- ductive reasoning. Nature of Elements. The elements of these sciences consist of ideas, thoughts, truths, facts, phenomena, causes, laws, etc. An Idea is a mental product which, when expressed in words, does not give a proposition; as, man, animal, triangle, polygon, etc. A 'Ihought is a mental product which, when expressed in words, gives a proposition ; as, a man is an animal, or a triangle is a polygon. A Truth is a true thought : a man is a quadruped is a thought, but not a truth. A Fact is a truth in the domain of experience ; as, the -sun shines, or the mind remembers. The term Truth is often limited to self-evident and derived truths. A Phenomenon is an appearance ; as, the twinkling of the stars : the statement of a phenomenon gives a fact ; as, the stars twinkle. A Cause is that which produces an event. A Law is the regular mode or order according to which something acts or takes place. Origin of Elements. In the deductive sciences the ideas are usually given by intuition as, the ideas of geometry, i. e., angle, triangle, circle, etc. The truths of the deductive sciences are of two kinds, axioms and theorems. The axioms are self-evident truths given also by the intuitive power, as, " all right angles are equal to one* another." The theorems are derived by deductive reasoning, as, " the sum of the angles of a plane triangle equals two right angles." In the inductive sciences the facts and phe- nomena are given by experience. The causes and laws are de- rived by inductive reasoning. The scientific classifications are given by generalization. In both classes of sciences the material is carefully classified and systematized. NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. Having noticed the general nature of science, we are prepared to see more clearly the nature of mental science. Such a general view will be of great value in the study and comprehension of the science. In order to pursue the study intelligently, we need to know the character of the knowledge we are acquiring, and the method of its development. We shall, therefore, present a brief statement, showing of what THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 17 knowledge the science is composed, and how this knowledge is obtained. Elements Embraced. The science of the mind embraces several distinct elements. First, we have the facts pertaining to the mind, including the various faculties and their operations. Second, we have the laws which govern these activities. Third, we have a statement of the causes of certain facts and phenomena of the mind. Fourth, we have hypotheses and theories to account for certain facts and phenomena of the mind not readily under- stood. Fifth, these activities are attended with certain products, the nature and origin of which are also to be explained. All these are to be systematically arranged and presented. Facts how Obtained. The facts of the mind, including its operations and products, are obtained by observation and experi- ence. The operations of the mind are revealed to us by con- sciousness. In order to study mental science, then, we must first notice carefully the operations of our own minds. We can also, to a certain extent, observe the workings of the minds of others, and thereby gain some facts relating to the science of the mind. The nature of the mind is also revealed by the expression of its products in language. We can therefore study mental philoso- phy by studying the products of mind embodied in the language and literature of a people. Language has been expressively de- fined as " concrete metaphysics." Laws how Obtained. The laws of the activity of the facul- ties are gained partly by experience and partly by an induction from the facts of experience. Some of the principles which govern the operations of the mind are revealed in consciousness or are given by intuition. Many of them are reached by a care- ful comparison of the facts and an induction of a general law from the particulars. The hypotheses and theories put forth to explain the facts are verified by reflection and reasoning. Some of the facts and laws, it is claimed, can be deduced from general a priori principles of the reason, but this is not so readily seen. Similar to Natural Science. In its development Mental 18 MENTAL SCIENCE. Science is similar to a natural science. In a natural science, as Natural Philosophy, \ve begin by the observation of facts ; we then seek for the causes of these facts and the laws which govern them. Thus, we observe the fad that certain bodies fall toward the earth; we then inquire after the cause, and find it to be the attraction of gravitation; we then ascertain the laws of falling bodies, and find that the distances are proportional to the squares of the times. So in mental philosophy we obtain facts by experience, and then search for the causes which produce and the laws which govern them. RELATION TO NATURAL SCIENCE. The nature of mental science may be better understood if we notice a little more closely its relation to the natural sciences, with which the student is sup- posed to be somewhat familiar when he enters upon the study of mental philosophy. There are several particulars in which these two sciences agree, and also several points of difference. Knowledge of Each. First, we know only the phenomena of each. We know matter by its properties, and mind by its activities. Of the essence or essential nature of matter, we know nothing ; and the same is true of our knowledge of mind. We know its operations and states, we are conscious that it perceives, remembers, imagines, reasons, that it loves, hates, desires, deter- mines; etc. ; but what it is in its essential nature, in its essence of this we are ignorant. Development the Same. The two sciences agree* also in the manner in which they are developed. They both consist of facts, the causes of the facts, and the laws which govern them. These facts, in both cases, are the result of experience. From the facts and phenomena we pass to their causes and laws. These are ob- tained by a careful induction from particulars, aided frequently by hypothesis and theory. All these elements are reduced to a system by the process of classification. How They Differ. While there is this general agreement in the manner of the development of the two sciences, there are also several differences. First, the facts in mental science are THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 19 given, not by an observation of things without, but by a con- sciousness of what takes place within the mind. The experience is one of reflection rather than of observation. Again, the in- quiry after causes is not so prominent in the science of mind as in that of matter. The reason for this seems to be that the fact is more nearly related to its cause, or rather they are revealed in a closer connection with each other. The law is less a matter of induction and more a matter of intuition or philosophical insight in mental science than in natural science. Not a Natural Science. The relation of the two classes of sciences is so close that some thinkers regard mental science as a natural science. For this they adduce two reasons : first, their methods of development are the same; and second, the mind belongs to the domain of nature. This view is not regarded as correct. The latter reason would make arithmetic and geometry natural sciences, since number and form belong to the natural world. Even though the methods of development are similar, the subject matter is so different that we are justified in regarding them as two different kinds of sciences. VALUE OP MENTAL SCIENCE. In entering upon a new study it is natural for the student to inquire in respect to its value and use. This is especially the case in so abstract a science as mental philosophy, a science also of which the general scholar has so little knowledge. We shall, therefore, devote a few paragraphs to showing the value of a knowledge of mental science. We preface these remarks by speaking of the neglect of the study, and the reasons for this neglect. The Study Neglected. The study of mental science has been widely neglected. This neglect is due to several causes. One of these causes lies in the nature of the science itself: it is abstract and difficult for the ordinary mind to understand. Second, the mind turns more naturally to the concrete and objective, to that which lies without and has form and color, than to the formless and intangible operations and products of the human spirit. Third, the study of the material world seems to promise more 20 MENTAL SCIENCE. practical results, as it deals with forces which serve man's conven- ience, and contribute to his comfort and material welfare. To build a railroad or invent a telegraph seems to be worth more to the world than to understand the laws of thought, or be able to discuss the freedom of the will. This is an age of action rather than of reflection ; and Ave must wait until " that period comes of golden affluence, and leisure, and elegant culture, that can at once appreciate and reward the higher efforts of philosophic investiga- tion." Valuable as a Discipline. The study of mental science is especially valuable for the discipline it affords to the mind. It trains the mind to habits of reflective thought, and cultivates that fine sense of discrimination so necessary to science. It does more to give breadth of mental grasp and philosophic poise of thought than any other branch of learning. As a disciplinary study it has no superior, even if it has an equal, among the sciences. The three great disciplinary studies of thought-power are, Mental Arithmetic, Geometry, and Mental Philosophy. Mental arith- metic trains the young mind to habits of rigid analysis ; geometry trains it to the logical forms of thought and expression ; mental science crowns the work, and cultivates the power to grasp abstract principles. The study, therefore, which we place highest on the list for the culture of thought-power, is mental science. Value to the Teacher. A knowledge of mental science is in- valuable to the teacher. The teacher's work is to develop and train the minds of his pupils ; and to do this aright, he must understand the nature of the mind he is to cultivate. As well might the farmer undertake to cultivate the soil without knowing anything of its nature, or the physician attempt to cure disease without knowing anything of the human system, as for the teacher to attempt to train the mind without understanding any- thing of its nature and activity. To be more specific, the teacher should understand the mind in order to select and adapt knowledge suitable to its capacities in different stages of its activity. That is, he should know the na- THE NATURE OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 21 ture of the mind in order to arrange a course of study suited to its development. Again, the teacher should understand the mind, since the principles of instruction have their basis in and are drawn from the nature of the mind. These principles are of three classes ; first, those pertaining to the culture of the mind ; second, those pertaining to the order hi which knowledge shall be presented; and, third, those pertaining to the methods of com- municating knowledge. The first of these, it is evident, are drawn immediately from the nature of the mind. The principles pertaining to the order of presenting knowledge have their origin in the mind, since knowledge originates in the mind and thus de- rives its character from the mind. The principles relating to the methods of imparting knowledge can also be shown to have an intimate relation to the nature of the mind. A knowledge of mental science thus lies at the very foundation of the teacher's work. No person is fully qualified to teach until he understands the nature of the mind. Much of the blundering in the methods of teaching is due to the ignorance of teachers in this respect. The cramming of our schools, which has produced so many cases of mental dyspepsia, is the result of this wide-spread ignorance of mental science. All the reforms of modern meth- ods of teaching are based upon a clearer view of the nature and functions of the mind of the learner; and we may expect our methods to continue to improve in the direct ratio of an increase of a knowledge of mental philosophy among teachers and edu- cators. Of General Value. A knowledge of the nature of the mind is of value in every vocation. It gives one a knowledge of human nature ; and such a knowledge is a key to success in every occu- pation depending upon the influencing of men. The physician who understands the mental peculiarities of his patients, and the relation of the mind to the bodily functions, can often do more for the cure of disease through mental influences than by the ad- ministering of medicines. The lawyer wins or loses his case, according as he knows how to influence the judgment and sensi- 22 MENTAL SCIENCE. bilities of judge and jury. The minister moves the hearts and wills of his congregation better when he understands the hidden springs of thought and emotion. The orator leads the opinions and arouses the passions of the people when he is familiar with the secret working of the faculties of the human soul. And so in every vocation where mind comes in contact with mind, the man who understands the law of human influence is usually the man of influence and success. CHAPTER H. THE NATURE OF THE MIND. MIND is that part of our nature which is called the -*- spirit, the soul, or the intelligence. It is that unseen power which constitutes us intelligent and rational beings, and thus dis- tinguishes us from the material world around us. Of its essen- tial nature nothing is known ; we study it only by its manifesta- tions, its activities and products. How to Define Mind. The mind can be defined only by its activities. In order to define the mind, therefore, we must ob- serve and determine its various forms of activity. These activi- ties, classified under a few general heads and predicated of the unseen something which manifests them, will give us a definition of mind. A careful analysis enables us to classify all the mental activities under three general heads ; thinking, feeling, and will- ing: we may therefore define the mind as tliat which thinks, feels, and wills. Other Names. The terms spirit and soul are generally re- garded as synonymous with mind. Some writers, however, dis- tinguish between the mind and the soul, regarding the mind merely as the power of thinking and knowing, or as a part of the soul, which is the entire spiritual nature. Some distinguish also between the soul and the spirit, regarding the soul as that which is or has been connected with a body, while the spirit is that which neither is now nor ever has been connected with a bodily form. In this treatise the term mind is used as embracing the whole spiritual being. Essence not Known. In the study of mental science no at- tempt is made to ascertain the essence, or essential nature of the (23) 24 MENTAL SCIENCE. mind. Indeed, of the essence or substance of which the mind is composed nothing can be known. Marivaux, says Dr. Brown, was once asked " What the soul ? " "I know nothing of it," he replied, " except that it is spiritual and immortal." " Well," said his friend, " let us ask Fontenelle ; perhaps he can tell us what it is." "Ask any one but Fontenelle," replied Marivaux, "for he has too much good sense to know anything more about it than we do." But though we cannot know mind in its essential attri- butes, we can know that it exists, and can understand its activi- ties and the forms and laws of its operations. Existence of Mind. The existence of mind is revealed by its activities. / know, therefore I am, is a fundamental principle of mental science. Descartes, a philosopher of the seventeenth century, based his philosophy upon the principle cogito, ergo mm, I think, therefore I am, and this has been accepted as a correct basis of belief by nearly all subsequent writers. The existence of mind is not however an inference from thinking, but is a fact involved in the very act of thought. The evidence of each per- son's own existence is self-consciousness : / know that I am is a final and ultimate judgment that authenticates my personal exis- tence. The mind knows its own existence ; and this knowledge is ultimate and final. Not a Result of Matter. This something which we call the mind is not a phenomenon of matter, like electricity or galvan- ism. It cannot be admitted that consciousness results from the combination or action of any number of chemical elements. It is a law of nature that a mechanical cause passes completely into a mechanical effect. It is, therefore, impossible to conceive of the conversion of material particles into so dissimilar a thing as human intelligence ; or of a blind force like gravity or electricity becoming conscious and intelligent. Even Huxley says, " How it is possible that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as any other ultimate fact of nature." The Mind Spiritual. The mind is said to be spiritual rather THE NATUEE OF THE MIND. 25 than material. It differs from matter in several particulars. Mind is self-active ; matter is not. The law of matter is that of inertia ; if it is moved at all, it is moved by some force extraneous to itself: the mind possesses the power of voluntary motion; it acts from within by an energy of its own. The movement of matter is caused ; mind is the cause of its own movements. Mat- ter has extension and form ; mind does not reveal itself as pos- sessing these elements. Matter has length, breadth, and thick- ness ; mind, so far as we know, possesses none of these attributes. ^Matter is known by the mind through the senses ;f mind is self- knowing; it knows itself. ] Matter reveals itself to us in its properties ; mind in its activities and capacities!^ \ Neither mind nor matter is known in its essence ; we know the properties of matter, and the activities of the mind.J' Not Universally Admitted. This distinction between mind and matter is not universally admitted. The disciples of the materialistic school of philosophy regard matter as the only one thing of which we have any positive knowledge ; and assert that we have no authority for predicating the distinct existence of mind and matter. They hold that the phenomenon of thinking is a function of matter, like extension and motion. Huxley says, " We have no knowledge of any thinking substance apart from an extended substance." He also remarks that " we shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat." Objections to this View. This view of the mind we be- lieve to be entirely erroneous. It involves the assumption that something which cannot know itself as existing (matter) gives rise to something which knows both itself and that which pro- duced it (mind) ; and yet this knowing something that asserts the existence of itself cannot authenticate its own existence, but can authenticate the existence of that which manifested it ! A more absurd paradox is not conceivable. The philosophy taught in this volume assumes the distinct and independent existence of an entity which we call THE MIND. 2 26 MENTAL SCIENCE. Mental Faculties. -Yhe mind reveals itself to us by its ac- tivities or its capacities for activity .1 These activities present themselves in different forms, which may be compared and readily distinguished. Each different form of activity or capacity for a form of activity constitutes what is called a faculty of the mind. These faculties can be clearly distinguished, and admit of being logically classified. A Mental Faculty. A Mental Faculty may be defined as a capacity for a distinct form of mental activity. It is the mind's power of doing something, of putting forth some energy, of man- ifesting itself in some particular manner. The number of distinct faculties, it is evident, must depend on the number of distinct forms of mental activity. A careful examination of the various ways in which the mind acts has enabled philosophers to enumer- ate different faculties and describe their operations. The Mind Simple. The mind, though possessing different faculties, is not to be regarded as complex. It is not made up of parts, but is rather single and one. It may act in various ways, and be regarded as consisting of various capacities, but it is the same one thing acting under different forms, or in different ways. The mind is a spiritual unity, having many powers, but one essence. To it may be applied, with especial propriety, the motto, E Pluribus Unum. A Correct Conception of Mind. Great care is needful to form a correct conception of the mind, which no definition or analysis can fully present. The mind is a spiritual unity, with many susceptibilities and capacities, but with oneness of person- ality. The mind is a self-conscious activity, and not a mere pass- ivity ; it is a pulsating centre of forces, all resting in the back- ground of the ego. The mind, as a centre of forces, stands related to the forces of the material and spiritual universe, and is acted upon through its susceptibilities by these forces. As a spiritual activity it takes the impressions derived from these forces, and works them up into the organic growth of itself, con- verts them into conscious knowledge, and uses these products as THE NATURE OF THE MIND. 27 means to set other forces into activity, and produce new results. Standing above nature, and independent of its surroundings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we may say, and transforms material influences into spiritual facts akin to its own nature. Related to the natural world, and apparently originating from it, it yet rises above this natural world, and with the crown of free- dom upon its brow, rules the natural obedient to its will. General Classification. The mind has been divided into three general classes of faculties : the faculties of knowing, feel- ing, and willing. These three classes of faculties have been called respectively, the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. Every capacity or power which the mind can exercise, is found to fall under one of these three heads. Every act of the soul is an act either of knowing, feeling, or willing an act of the Intellect, the Sensibilities, or the Will. Illustration. The relation of these three spheres of activity may be illustrated in a variety of ways. I read of the destitution and suffering of the people of a great city, and understand the means taken for their relief: this is an act of the intellect. I feel a deep sympathy with this suffering ; my heart is touched with pity, and I experience a strong desire to aid in relieving their distress : this is an act of the sensibilities. I desire to express my feelings of pity and follow my sense of duty, and resolve to aid them by sending a contribution or going personally to their relief: this is an act of the will. Relation of these Powers. The relation of these three classes of powers will indicate the correctness of this " tri-logical classi- fication." We can conceive of a being possessed of the power of cognition and yet void of all feeling of pain or pleasure, and of all power of desire or volition. On the other hand, we cannot conceive of a being possessed of feelings and desires without a knowledge of those feelings. So also we can conceive of a being possessed of knowledge and feeling, yet devoid of the faculty of volition and voluntary action. But we cannot conceive of the existence or exercise of a power of volition independently of al] 28 MENTAL SCIENCE. cognition of an object of thought or some feeling in relation to such a volition. Origin of this Division. This threefold division of the fac- ulties of the mind was first distinctly intimated by Kant. Aris- totle spoke of five classes of powers, though the Peripatetic school recognized two classes, the cognitive and the conative powers. The schoolmen ascribed to man three classes of powers ; the vegetative, the perceptive, and the rational. Modern writers on philosophy for many years divided the powers into two classes ; the Under- standing and the Will, or the speculative and the active powers. Gradually the feelings came to be distinguished as a separate men- tal state, coordinate with thought and will. The first formally to announce this threefold classification of the mind into Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will, was Prof. Upham. Gradually Developed. Prof. Upham presents a large num- ber of quotations to show that this division was gradually devel- oping in thoughtful minds. Among others, Lord Chesterfield says, in a letter to his son on the manner of conducting negotia- tions : " If you engage his heart, you have a fair chance for im- posing on his understanding, and determining his will" Even Shakspeare had made the division by the intuition of his marvel- ous genius, for he says, "It shows a will most incorrect to heaven, A heart unfortified, An understanding simple and unschooled." This classification is now universally accepted by those who make any formal division of the faculties, and it is the basis of the treatment in the present work. General Suggestions. In the study of the mind two gen- eral suggestions are made. -^First, the student should test the statements of the author by a reference to the action of his own mind. He must learn to look within, to bend the mind in upon itself, and notice and analyze his own mental operations. The test of a fact or theory should be his own consciousness, i Second, he should be careful not to think of his mind as separate from THE NATUKE OF THE MIND. 29 himself. The mind is one's self, not merely something belonging to one's self. VA-nd so in respect to our faculties ; we should not regard a faculty as a part of the mind, as a blade is a part of a knife, but rather as a form of the activity of the mind. UThe mind is single and one, a unity of substance with a variety of powers. >It is one and the same ego that perceives, remem- bers, reasons, etc. - Having now explained the general nature of the mind, with its three great classes of powers, we proceed to a detailed descrip- tion of these powers and the laws of their activity. The next chapter contains a complete outline of the subject, and may be called the alphabet of Mental Science. Any one who has thor- oughly mastered it, has implanted in his mind the germs of the entire subject of Mental Philosophy. CHAPTER III. THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND. MIND is that which thinks, feels, and wills. It is that JL immaterial principle which we call the soul, the spirit, or the intelligence. Of its essence or substance, nothing is known ; we know it only by its activities and its operations. The different forms of activity which it presents, indicate different mental powers, which are called Faculties of the mind. A Mental Faculty. A Mental Faculty is a capacity for a distinct form of mental activity. It is the mind's power of doing something, of putting forth some energy, of manifesting itself in some particular manner. The mind possesses as many faculties as there are distinct forms of mental activity. In order, there- fore, to ascertain the different faculties of the mind, we must notice carefully the various ways in which the mind acts. General Classification. The mind embraces three general classes of faculties; the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. Every capacity or power which the mind possesses falls under one of these three heads. Every mental act is an act of the In- tellect, the Sensibilities, or the Will. Every product of the mind is either an intellection, a feeling, or a volition. The Mind Triune. This three-fold division of the mind is the latest teaching of Psychology. All mental activity is embraced under the three heads, Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will. These are not to be considered as parts of a complex unit, but rather as forms of manifestation of the spiritual entity which we call The Mind. The mind is thus a tri-unity, one substance with a trinity of powers or capacities. The doctrine of the Trinity of the Mind is thus a fundamental fact of Psychology. TJie Intellect. The Intellect is the power by which we think (30) THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 31 and know. Its products are ideas and thoughts. An Idea is a mental product, which may be expressed in one or more words, not forming a proposition ; as, a man, an animal, etc. A Thought is a mental product consisting of the combination of two or more ideas, which when expressed in words, gives us a proposition ; as, a man is an animaL Our notions of the different figures of geometry, as angles, triangles, squares, etc., are ideas; while our conceptions of axioms and theorems are thoughts. The Sensibilities. The Sensibilities are the powers by which we feel. Their products are emotions, affections, and desires. An emotion is a simple feeling, as the emotion of joy, sorrow, etc. An affection is an emotion that goes out towards an object ; as love, hate', envy, etc. A desire is an emotion that goes out to an object with the wish of possession ; as the desire of wealth, fame, etc. The Will. The Will is the power of deciding or determining what to do and of putting forth volitions accordingly. It is the executive power of the mind, the power by which man becomes the conscious author of an intentional act. It is the motive power of the mind ; by it we put the other faculties into activity and control their action. The products of the Will are volitions and voluntary actions. It is in the domain of the Will that man becomes a moral and responsible being. The Intellect. The Intellect embraces several distinct facul- ties; Perception, Memory, Imagination, Understanding, and Intu- ition, or the Reason. This classification of the Intellect is now almost universally accepted, though writers occasionally differ in the terms they use to name the different powers. Perception. Perception is the power by which we. gain a knowledge of external objects through the senses. It is the faculty by which we gain a knowledge of objects and their quali- ties. Its products are ideas of external objects and of the quali- ties of objects. The products of perception are called percepts. The ideas which we possess of persons, places, things, etc., are mainly given by perception. Memory. Memory is the power by which we retain and recall 32 MENTAL SCIENCE. knowledge. It enables us to hold fast to the knowledge we have acquired, and also to recall it when we wish to use it. These two offices of the Memory are distinguished as Retention and Recollec- tion. By some writers these are regarded as separate faculties ; and others again discard the element of retention. Besides these, the memory also gives us a representation of that which it recalls, and recognizes it as something of our past experience. Imagination. Imagination is the power by which we form ideal conceptions. It is the power of forming mental images by uniting different parts of objects given by perception, and also of creating ideals of objects different from anything we have per- ceived. Thus, I can conceive of a flying horse by uniting my ideas of wings and a horse ; or I can imagine a landscape or a strain of music different from anything I have ever seen or heard. Im- agination is thus the power of ideal creation. Understanding. The Understanding is the power by which we compare objects of thought and derive abstract and general ideas and truths. It is the 'elaborative power of the mind ; it takes the materials furnished by the other faculties and works them up into new products. Its products are abstract and general ideas, truths, laws, causes, etc. Intuition. Intuition, or the Reason, is the power which gives us ideas and thoughts not furnished by the senses nor elaborated by the Understanding. Its products are called primary ideas and primary truths. The Primary Ideas are such as Space, Time, Cause, Identity, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The Primary Truths are all self-evident truths, as the axioms of math- ematics and logic. TJie Understanding. The Understand ir.jj embraces several distinct faculties or forms of mental activity. These are Abstrac- tion, Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning. This division is now almost universally adopted, and the sanio terms are employed by [nearly all modern writers. Abstraction. Abstraction is the power of forming abstract ideas. It is the power by which the mind draws a quality away THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 33 from its object, and makes of it a distinct object of thought. Ita products are abstract ideas, such as hardness, softness, color, etc. The naming of abstract ideas gives us abstract terms. The term Abstraction is derived from ab, from, and traho, I draw, and signi- fies a drawing from. Conception. Conception is the power of forming general ideas. By it we take several particular ideas, and unite their common properties, and thus form a general idea which embraces them all. The products of Conception are general ideas, or ideas of classes ; as horse, bird, man, etc. The naming of general ideas gives us common terms. This faculty is often called Generaliza- tion ; but the term Conception is more appropriate, and is the one generally adopted by logicians. The term Conception is derived from con, together, and capio, I take, and signifies a taking together. Judgment. Judgment is the power of perceiving the agree- ment or disagreement of two objects of thought. It is the power of comparison. It compares one object directly with another, and gives us a proposition. A proposition is a judgment expressed in words. Thus, a bird is an animal, is a judgment expressed. The term Judgment is applied to both the mental faculty and its product. Reasoning. Reasoning is the power of comparing two ideas through their relation to a third. It is a process of indirect or mediate comparison. It deals with three objects of thought, and requires three propositions. Thus, suppose I wish to compare A and B, and perceiving no relation between them, see that A equals C, and B equals C, and thus infer that A equals B ; such an inference is an act of reasoning. The Syllogism. The form in which reasoning is expressed is called a Syllogism. A Syllogism consists of three propositions so related that one is an inference from the other two. Two of these propositions are called the premises and the third the conclusion. Thus, in the above example the two propositions, " A equals C " and "B equals C," are the premises; and "A equals B" is the conclusion. 34 MENTAL SCIENCE. Inductive Reasoning. Reasoning is of two kinds; Inductive Reasoning and Deductive Reasoning. Inductive Reasoning is the process of deriving a general truth from particular truths. Thus, if I find that heat expands several metals, as zinc, iron, copper, etc. I may infer that heat will expand all metals. Such an inference of a general truth from the particular facts is called Induction. Inductive Reasoning proceeds upon the principle that what is true of the many is true of the whole. Deductive Reasoning. Deductive Reasoning is the process of deriving a particular truth from a general truth. Thus, from the general proposition that heat expands all metals, I may infer by Deduction that heat will expand any particular metal, as silver. Deduction proceeds upon the principle that wJiut is true of the whole is true of the parts. Other Forms of Activity. Besides the faculties now named, two other forms of mental activity or mental states are usually described by writers on mental science; namely, Consciousness and Attention. These are not regarded as specific faculties of the mind, but as conditions or accompaniments of these faculties. A term very frequently used in mental philosophy also is that of Conception, which also requires a few words of explanation. Consciousness. Consciousness is the power or attribute of the mind by which it knows its own states and actions. The term is derived from con, with, and scio, I know, and means a knowing with the mental acts or states. It is a kind of inner light by which one knows what is going on within his mind ; it is a revealer of the internal phenomena of thought, feeling, and will. Con- sciousness is regarded as an attribute of the mind, involved in the very idea of mind, and not as a distinct mental faculty. Attention. Attention is the power of directing the mind volun- tarily to any object of thought to the exclusion of others. It is the power of selecting one of several objects, and concentrating the mental energies upon it. Attention is not a distinct form of mental activity, but is involved in and underlies the activity of all the faculties. The voluntary operation of any of the mental THE FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 35 powers, as Perception, Memory, etc., carries with it an act of at- tention. The term is derived from ad, to, and tendo, I bend, which was probably suggested by the attitude of the body in listening attentively to a sound. Conception. The term Conception is often used in a general and popular sense, meaning that power which the mind has of making anything a distinct object of thought. In this sense it is intimately related to all the mental faculties. Thus I can con- ceive of a tree or a horse which I have seen, a landscape which I may not have seen, a proposition in geometry, a truth in natural philosophy, etc. Some writers have used the term in a more spe- cific sense, as the power of forming an exact transcript of a past perception. In Logic the term is restricted to the power of form- ing general ideas, as we have previously defined it. Hamilton's Classification. Sir Win. Hamilton, one of the most eminent philosophers of modern times, presents a classifica- tion of the intellect which has been much admired for its sim- plicity and the suggestive character of the terms used. He divides the Intellect into the Presentative, Conservative, Repro- ductive, Representative, Elaborative, and Regulative powers. The Presentative power is that which presents knowledge to the mind ; it corresponds to Perception. The Conservative power is that which retains or preserves knowledge in the mind ; it corres- ponds to the retentive element of the Memory. The Reproductive power is that which reproduces knowledge in the mind ; it corres- ponds to the recalling element of the Memory. The Representa- tive power is that which represents knowledge to the mind ; it corresponds to the Imagination. The Elaborative power is thai which works up or elaborates the knowledge attained by the other faculties ; it corresponds to the Understanding. The Regulative power is that which regulates the activities of the other faculties ; it corresponds to the Reason. CHAPTER IV. THE CULTURE OF THE MIND. SCIENCE OF EDUCATION treats of the developing of the -P- powers of man and the furnishing of his mind with know- ledge. The developing of the powers is called culture, and the furnishing of the mind with knowledge is called instruction. A formal treatment of the methods of cultivating the mind is called Methods of Culture; a formal treatment of the methods of in- structing the mind is called Methods of Instruction. Nature of Culture. Methods of Culture treats of the nature of the powers of man and how to develop them. It includes several branches, such as Physical Culture, Intellectual Cul- ture, jEsthetic Culture, Moral Culture, and Keligious Culture. The present work treats of the nature of the mind and the methods of cultivating it, and is entitled Mental Science and Mental Culture. Our purpose, therefore, is not only to describe the different faculties of the mind, but also to discuss the methods of cultivating them. Having given an idea of the general nature of the mind, we now present a few principles relating to its culture. These may be called the fundamental principles of mental culture. 1. The object of mental culture is the fullest development and highest activity of the faculties of the mind. The mind is developed by culture. Its powers are strengthened and made to act with vigor and skill by judicious training. Without such training the mind may either remain comparatively inert, or its activities may conflict with the normal laws of mental development and fail to produce the best fruits of culture and knowledge. In this respect the mind is like a field, and mental culture like the culture of the soil. Left to itself, a farm may be overrun with weeds and (36) THE CULTURE OF THE MIND. 37 briers, while if subjected to the careful culture of the husband- man, it will teem with golden harvests. So the mind, if left to itself, may waste its energies and acquire incorrect habits of activity ; while if subjected to the guiding hand of culture, it may develop in normal strength and vigor, and bring forth rich harvests of precious knowledge. 2. One of the primary conditions of mental culture is a well- organized and healthy brain. The mind acts largely, if not en- tirely, through or by means of the brain. In its first activities of sensation, the brain and nervous system are an essential condition and medium of mental activity. Impressions made upon the nerves are transmitted to the brain, and there emerge in conscious knowledge. Subsequently thought becomes abstract and seems to be independent of the brain; yet experience proves that the power of abstract thought depends for clearness and vigor upon the condition of the physical system. Indeed, it is not certain that genius and hereditary mental traits may not depend on some subtle organic peculiarity of tke brain. It is, therefore, an estab- lished fact, that for the best results in mental culture we must endeavor to secure the best condition of the brain and nervous system. " A sound mind in a sound body " is a maxim not to be forgotten in mental culture. 3. The mind is cultivated by the activity of its faculties. The mind is a spiritual activity and grows by its own inherent energies. Mental exercise is thus the law of mental develop- ment. As a muscle grows strong by use, so any faculty of the mind is developed by its proper use and exercise. An inactive mind, like an unused muscle, becomes weak and unskillful. Hang the arm in a sling and the muscle becomes flabby and loses its vigor and skill; let the mind remain inactive, and it acquires a mental flabbiness, that unfits it for any severe or pro- longed activity. An idle mind loses its tone and strength, like an unused muscle ; the mental powers go to rust through idleness and inaction. To develop the faculties of the mind and secure their highest activity and efficiency there must be a constant and 38 MENTAL SCIENCE. judicious exercise of these faculties. The object of culture is to stimulate and direct the activity of the mind. 4. The activity of the mind requires objective realities for it to act upon. The mind cannot act upon itself; there must be material for it to act upon. As a power to know, it demands an external world of knowledge to meet the wants of the internal knowing subject. There is such a world of knowledge suited to and cor- relating with every mental activity. The material world is seen to be an embodiment of thought, and the mind begins its activities with the objects of the material world. The mind itself has de- veloped knowledge by its powers of thought, which is also adapted to give culture to each faculty and capacity. This adaptation is manifest, since knowledge, as the product of one mind, must be suited to the different capacities of all minds. The mind begins its activity with the knowledge thus furnished ; it then passes to the creation of knowledge for itself, which affords it its highest and best activity. It is thus apparent that the culture of the mind requires objective realities? and that these realities are abundantly furnished. 5. Each faculty of the mind requires a culture adapted to itself. The mind possesses a variety of powers, and each one of these powers operates with different material, and has an activity peculiar to itself. Each power needs different materials for its activity ; what would be best for one faculty would not be the appropriate material for some other faculty. We need concrete objects for perception, facts for the memory, abstract truth for the judgment and the power of reasoning, beauty for the imagination, moral truth for the conscience, etc. Besides this difference of material, there is also a difference in the activity of the different faculties ; the memory operates in one way, the understanding in another, etc. Both of these things, the material and the methods of activity, are to be taken into consideration in the culture of the mind. Each faculty, therefore, requires, for its training and development, a culture peculiar to itself. 6. TJie culture of the mind should be adapted to the order of the THE CULTURE OF THE MIND. 39 development of its faculties. The different faculties do not develop simultaneously. Though all are active from the earliest dawn of intelligence, yet they are active in different degrees at different periods. Some faculties are much more active in childhood, and others need the maturity of years for their mature and full de- velopment. The natural order of their development should be understood and followed in culture. To endeavor to force all the faculties to equal activity in childhood would be a mistake injurious to the mind and subversive of the best results of culture. The true order of development should be carefully studied and distinctly understood, and the work of culture adapted thereto. 7. The culture of the mind should aim at a harmonious develop- ment of all the faculties. Man possesses a multiplicity of capacities and powers, all of which contribute to his well-being and his dignity. These powers are so related that they may be unfolded in very nearly equal proportions, and harmoniously blend in the final results of culture. For the attainment of a true ideal of education such a development is required. A perfectly developed manhood or womanhood implies the complete development of every capacity and every gift. The training of the mind, there- fore, should reach every power and unfold every capacity. The high aim of culture should be the full and harmonious develop- ment of all the faculties. 8. The culture of the mind should be modified by the different tastes and talents of a pupil. While all minds possess the same general powers, these powers are often possessed in different de- grees. There is often an unusual gift of some one power or combination of powers which gives us what we call genius. Tastes or dispositions for different activities or pursuits also vary. Such differences are not to be overlooked in mental culture. While we should aim to give a general development to all the faculties, we should not forget these special gifts. Genius should be recognized, and an opportunity given for its highest develop- ment and achievements. An unusual gift for poetry, or music, or mathematics, or natural science, should be carefully noticed, 40 MENTAL SCIENCE. and efforts made for its highest culture. It is these gifts which enrich science and art, and add to the sum of human knowledge ; 'and the progress of science and art demands that genius shall have the most abundant opportunities for its full and complete de- velopment. 9. The culture of the mind is not creative in its character; its object is to develop existing possibilities into realities. The mind possesses innate powers, which may be awakened into a natural activity. The design of culture is to aid nature in improving the powers she has given. No new power can be created by culture ; we can increase the activity of these powers, but cannot develop any new activities. Through these activities new ideas and thoughts may be developed, and the sum of human know- ledge increased ; but this is accomplished by a high activity of the natural powers with which the mind is endowed, and not by the culture of new powers. The profound philosopher uses the same faculties that the little child is developing in the games of the nursery. The object of culture is to arouse the powers which nature has given us into a normal activity, and to stimulate and guide them in their unfolding. 10. The ultimate end of culture is the attainment of the triune re- sults development, learning, and efficiency. The primary object of culture is the growth and development of the faculties. A correct culture, however, naturally leads to the acquisition of knowledge ; the man of cultured mind endeavors to enrich his memory with the truths of science and to become a learned man as well as a thinker. A second result of culture is thus seen to be the furnishing of the mind with knowledge. It is not enough, however, that the mind has well-developed powers and is richly furnished with knowledge. There should be the power to make use of this culture and knowledge. The educated man should be able to do as well as to think and know. A third result of culture is, therefore, the acquisition of skill in the use of the mind and of knowledge. In cultivating the mind, therefore, the aim should be to attain the three ends culture, knowledge, and efficiency. MEBTTAX, ATTEIBTJTES. QSTOT I. CONSCIOUSNESS. I. NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. II. CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. II. ATTENTION. I. NATURE OF ATTENTION. II. CULTURE OF ATTENTION. CHAPTER 1. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. /CONSCIOUSNESS is the power by which the mind kno^s its v>^ own states and actions. It is that attribute of the mind by which it is aware of whatever it feels or does. It is the self- knowing attribute of the soul ; the attribute by which it knows itself, its states, actions, and products. The mind has not only the power of knowing, but it has also the power of self-knowing, of knowing its own acts and states. Thus, when we perceive, or judge, or reason, we are aware of these mental actions. Not to be -aware of these actions would be not to perform them. So, also, the mind knows its own mental states or conditions. When it is joyous or sad, loving or- hating, sympathizing or repining, it is aware of these feelings, and could not have them unless it was conscious of them. This attribute of the mind by which it is aware of what takes place within itself, is now by all philosophers called consciousness. The Term Consciousness. The term consciousness is derived from con, with, and scio, I know, and means a knowing with. Consciousness is thus the power of knowing with the other cognitive acts of the mind. The term is related to conscience, and was formerly used almost exclusively to designate the moral sense. The first to employ this term in its present signification, in distinction from its ethical meaning, was Descartes. The early Greek writers, Plato and Aristotle, had no special term to express that attribute of the soul by which it knows its own states and operations. Locke discusses it under the head of Reflection. Various Definitions. The power of Consciousness has been variously defined by writers on Mental Philosophy. Wayland (43) 44 MENTAL SCIENCE. defines it as that condition of the mind in which it is cognizant of its own operations. Cousin says it is that function of the intelligence which gives us information of everything that takes place in the interior of our minds. Prof. Tappan makes it the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. Dr. Porter says it is the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states. .Difficulty of Defining. The difficulty of defining conscious- ness arises from the notion being so elementary that it cannot be resolved into any others more simple. It does not thus admit of a logical definition, although it may be illustrated and philosophi- cally analyzed. It is frequently described by analogies, some of which illustrate and others perhaps obscure the subject. It has been called " an inner light/' by means of which what passes in the mind is rendered visible. It has been called an "inner illumination," a "revealer of mental phenomena," and "the light of all our seeing." Dr. Hickok says : " The conception is not of a faculty, but of a light ; not of an action, but of an illumination ; not of a maker of phenomena, but of a revealer of them as already made." It has also been called the " inner sense " in distinction from the sense which perceives external objects. Consciousness not a Faculty. Consciousness is not re- garded as a faculty of the mind, but rather as an attribute necessary to its existence. It is not a distinct form of mental activity, but rather a characteristic of mind by which it is aware of these activities. It is a necessary attribute of the mind that it not only acts but knows that it acts. A machine works, but does not know that it works ; the mind not only works, but knows its wn workings. Such an attribute is implied in the very idea of mind. We cannot conceive of a being with powers to know and feel without the power of being conscious of such activities. Involved in Mental Activity. Consciousness is involved in and is essential to all mental activity. An act or state of my mind exists only as I am conscious of its existence. Thus to know is to know that I know ; to feel is to know that I feel ; to THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 45 mil is to know that I will. The knowing, the feeling, the willing, are possible only under the condition of their being known to me. If I did not know that I know, I would not know. If I did not know that I feel, I would not feel ; if I did not know that I will, I would not will. It is this power of knowing these acts and states that we mean by consciousness. The expressions, I know that I know, I know that I feel, I know that I will, may be translated into I am conscious that* I know, I am conscious that I feel, I am conscious that I will. Basis of Mental Activity. Consciousness lies at the basis of all mental activity. All the faculties rest hi it, and are of use to us only as their acts and products are revealed by it. It is, therefore, the source and root of all knowledge. It is an ultimate attribute of the soul: there is nothing below the consciousness upon which it rests. There is no sub-consciousness to reveal the revelations of consciousness. It is not necessary that we have some power by which we may know that we are conscious of a certain act, by which we may know that we "know we know," for that would involve us in the absurdity of a mental series ad infinitum. The revelations of consciousness must therefore be re- garded as final and ultimate. Kinds of Consciousness. Writers speak of two kinds of consciousness; the natural, or spontaneous, and the artificial, or reflective consciousness. They are also distinguished as the primary and secondary consciousness. Natural consciousness is the power which the mind naturally and necessarily possesses of knowing its own states and actions. Reflective consciousness is the natural consciousness exercised with intentional and persistent effort. It is consciousness applied to mental phenomena for the purpose of scientific investigation. It is what is called reflection, or an intentional bending of the mind inward to observe its mental operations. It is the result of a philosophical habit of mind, and may be called philosophical consciousness. This distinction is one of degree rather than of kind. The first form of consciousness is a gift of nature and the result of sponta- 4:6 MENTAL SCIENCE. neous development; the second form is an acquirement of art and the result of special effort. The former is employed by all men ; the latter is acquired by only a few. The natural precedes the reflective in order of time ; the reflective is a development of the natural consciousness. The reflective consciousness is closely related to the subjective phase of attention described in the next chapter. I. THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. As consciousness lies at the basis of all knowledge and reveals every mental act and state, it is evidently important to know precisely what is given by it. Any mistake here is fundamental, affecting all that follows and vitiating the entire system of psychology. The authority of con- sciousness is ultimate and its testimony final ; hence nothing must be rejected or omitted, which is found in consciousness. It is only necessary to establish the fact of the existence of any element in consciousness, not to show its possibility, in order to determine the facts of mental philosophy. Affords Actual Knowledge. Consciousness affords actual and not potential knowledge % Not what we may know or have known, but what we do at the present time know, is a fact of con- sciousness. Thus, a person is said to know that 2x4 are 8, though this proposition be not at the moment the object of his thought; but we cannot say that he is conscious of this truth unless it is actually present to his mind. We are conscious only of actual states, not possible ones ; we are conscious of what is now in the mind, and not of what may be or may have been there. Immediate Knotvledye. Consciousness affords immediate and not mediate kno ivledge. In an act of memory we are said to know a past occurrence. What we know, immediately, however, is the mental representation or idea of the past ; and we know the past occurrence itself, not immediately but mediately, through the mental modification which represents it. We are conscious of the representation as immediately known ; but we cannot be said to be conscious of the thing represented, which, if known at all, is known only through ite representation. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 47 Conscious of Mental States. Primarily, we are conscious of our own mental states and operations. When we perceive, we are conscious of perceiving; when we think, we are conscious of thinking; when we remember, will, love, hate, etc., we are con- scious of these mental acts and states. Not to be conscious of them would be to be conscious of nothing. Whether the mind knows itself or not, it must know its own acts and states. They come and go, they rise and fall like the waves of the ocean, each pressing forward and taking the place of the one that went before. Consciousness catches them as they rise, and knows them, at least for the passing moment. Conscious of Self. Secondly, I am conscious also of myself as the basis of these acts and states. I know these states and actions to be my own states and actions. This is the cognition of the self or ego, as the subject or background of these acts and states. The states and actions come and go; the self remains permanent and unchanged. Self-consciousness a Necessity.-^Such a conception of self is a necessary element of an act of consciousness. Without the ego or self, the states and actions could not exist; and we cannot be conscious of the latter without a consciousness also of the former.) A mental state which is not experienced in connection with the idea of an individual self, is as impossible as a triangle without three angles, or a square without four sides. This con- sciousness of the ego is, however, denied by some philosophers, as Hume and Brown. Qthers again, as Stewart and Hamilton, who admit it, claim that it is not immediate and intuitive, but a de- rived and secondary knowledge. Consciousness of Self Immediate. This consciousness of the ego, we hold, is not the result of reflection, but is direct and immediate. We are not first conscious of the mental state and then forced to look around for something to which it may be re- ferred ; but what we know, we know belongs to the ego, to ourself. The experience of a mental state without the cognition of it as my own mental state is as inconceivable as a mind without faculties 48 MENTAL SCIENCE. or the memory without the power of remembering. The con- sciousness of the mental state is necessarily and inseparably asso- ciated with the consciousness of the self as experiencing it. Conscious of Products. Thirdly, we are also conscious of the result or product of these states and activities. I am conscious not only of the process of forming an idea, but also of the idea formed. I am aware not only of the act of judging, but of the thought obtained by the act of judgment. In an act of reasoning, I am conscious not only of the process of reasoning, but of the truth attained by the reasoning process. So in -an act of imagi- nation, I am conscious of the mental image formed as well as of the act of forming it. It is thus apparent that consciousness re- veals both the mental act and the mental product resulting from the act. Conscious of the Object. Sir William Hamilton goes a step further, and says that we are conscious of the object of a mental act as .well as the act and its product. Thus in perception we are conscious of the object which we perceive ; for, he asks, how can we know that a perception exists if we do not know what we per- ceive? How would I know I perceived a rose, if I was not con- scious of the rose ? " Annihilate the object, and you annihilate the operation; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation." II. PRODUCTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Having seen the general character of the products of consciousness, let us see what are its revelations in connection with each one of the various faculties. In Perception. In an act of perception we are conscious of two distinct elements, the subject perceiving and the object per- ceived. In every case of perception there is a clear apprehension of these two elements the self and the not-self, the ego and the non-ego. 'xThus in the perception of a tree, I am distinctly con- scious of the tree as seen and of myself as seeing it. Whether this was an original distinction or is one derived from experience, has been questioned. That we have made this distinction from our earliest recollections, we know; and it would thus seem to be THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 49 a primitive fact of our nature./' At any rate, it is a present fact of consciousness, and must be accepted as such. We never for a moment do imagine, nor can we imagine, ourselves and the object perceived to be one and the same. If the object of perception is merely an affection of the organism, as in smell and hearing, the affection perceived is cognized as distinct from the mind perceiv- ing it. In every act of perception, a self and a not-self are brought face to face, and are known as distinct from each other. In Memory. In memory we recall the object of thought and represent it by an image or a word, and recognize it as a fact of our previous experience. We are conscious of the act of recall- ing (when the recollection is not spontaneous), of the representa- tive object before the mind, and of its relation to our past exper- ience. This, however, is all that is revealed. There is no con- sciousness of anything outside of the mind itself. We may be conscious that the image before the mind bears some relation to an object without the mind; but the external object is not con- templated as present, and is itself not an object of consciousness. In memory, therefore, there is a consciousness of an image or some general product in the mind, of the fact of this having been retained, of the act by which it was restored, and of the recog- nition of it as a thing of our former experience. In Imagination. In an act of imagination we are conscious of the act of representation and of the product thus formed. We are conscious of the materials used in the formation or creation of this product, whether of sight or sound. We are also con- scious that the image produced is not a representation of any- thing real which we have before seen or heard, but that it is a mere creation of the mind. In memory we know that the mental product is a representative of something real ; in imagination we know that it is an ideal of the mind's own creation. In the Understanding. The same thing holds true in re- spect to the operations of the understanding. In this faculty we are conscious of the ideas and truths, the materials with which we work, of the acts by which we elaborate them into new pro- 50 MENTAL SCIENCE. ducts, and of the products which result from these operations. In judgment we are conscious of the act of comparing, of the objects of thought compared, and of the thought which results from the comparison. So in reasoning we are conscious of our premises, of the relation between them, and of the inference or truth derived from these relations. In Intuition. In an act of the intuitive power, we are con- scious of the ideas and thoughts to which it gives rise. We are conscious of the ideas of Space, Time, Cause, the True, the Beau- tiful, the Good, etc., and also of the belief that these have an existence outside and independent of our minds. We are also conscious of the infinitude of Time and Space, of the infinite chain of causation, of the logical necessity of a First Cause, etc. We are also conscious of the truths of intuition, as the axioms of geometry and logic, of the necessity and incontradictability of these truths, etc. In Sensibility and Will. So also in the domain of Sensibility and Will ; consciousness reveals all that pertains to the activity and results of these powers, to their processes and their products. We are conscious of each individual feeling, and when attention is directed to them, of the relations of these feelings, of their similarities and differences. In an effort of the will we are con- scious of a choice when one is made, and of the executive volition to carry out this choice into action. The Basis of Mental Science. It is thus seen that conscious- ness lies at the basis of all mental activities. It is also the found- ation of the study of mental philosophy. We know only what consciousness reveals, or what is properly to be inferred from these revelations. The test of a fact or phenomenon, in the study of mental science, is its revelation by consciousness. In other words, the mind must be studied in the light of consciousness. The student of mental philosophy must learn to bend the mind in upon itself to observe its own actions and products. He must test each fact and theory by his own experience. III. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL MODIFICATIONS. The doctrine of THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 51 latent modification of consciousness has been held by several phil- osophers of eminence, among whom we may name Leibnitz and Hamilton. Some writers object to the expression "latent modifi- cations" as being infelicitous; but it means to express that there are some affections of the mind of which we are unconscious. This doctrine may be shown to be true in respect to the activities of several of the faculties. In Perception. The senses are often affected by objects which do not rise into consciousness. Thus the greenness of the forest which we see is made up of parts of green of which we are not conscious. No single leaf perhaps is visible ; but the green- ness of the forest is made up of the greenness of these leaves. That is, the total impression of which we are conscious is made up of an infinitude of small impressions of which we are not con- scious. The same is true of the sound of the sea ; a single wave does not seem to affect the ear, while the combined sound of many waves is distinctly heard. Now, each wave must contribute its share in affecting the mind, or the whole could not be heard. In Memory. The same seems to be true in respect to the memory. We find one thought rising in consciousness imme- diately after another, but without any perceptible relation between them. In such cases Hamilton holds that the links which united them did not rise into consciousness : just as in a row of billiard balls touching one another, if the first ball is struck, the force is transmitted to the last ball, which flies off, while the other balls remain stationary. The intermediate balls represent the inter- mediate ideas in the chain of association which do not rise into consciousness in the case supposed. In Other Faculties. The mind may probably be affected in every faculty by modifications which do not rise into conscious- ness. These unconscious affections give a bias to the mind, and affect those acts and states of which it is conscious. There are, no doubt, thousands of unconscious influences operating upon the soul, that give a tinge of coloring to our thoughts and feel- ings, and help to shape our opinions and characters. 52 MENTAL SCIENCE. Slight Attention. Many instances cited of unconscious mod- ifications are, however, probably examples of slight attention. An object may make so slight an impression on the mind as not to be noticed at the time, and yet may be revived with great dis- tinctness. I write a letter to-day, and notice no error in my writing; to-morrow, after I have mailed it, I recall a misspelled word or a mistake in grammar. So some part of an object ob- served may escape my attention at the time, but afterward it occurs to the memory with great distinctness. These are not examples of latent modification of consciousness, but of slight attention. IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE. The revela- tions of consciousness are not fixed and unchangeable in their character. They differ at the different ages of each individual and at different ages of the world. New ideas and thoughts arise in the human mind, and the revelations of to-day are not identi- cal with the revelations of yesterday or to-morrow. There is a sig- nificance in this fact that leads us to give it a brief consideration. In ttie Individual Mind. The growth of conscious knowl- edge is attested by the experience of each individual mind. New ideas and truths rise gradually into consciousness. The influences of our surroundings make impressions on the mind or the nervous system of which at the time we are unconscious. These impress- ions are repeated and react upon one another ; and at last they emerge in consciousness in the form of an idea. A book read but once leaves only a vague impression of its thought and sentiment ; the book re-read, or other books read treating of the same sub- ject, may be the occasion of these vague impressions appearing in the form of definite ideas in consciousness. Many ideas or impressions seem to stop in the outer court of unconsciousness, accumulating there and acting upon each other and upon the soul ; they are at last lifted up into conscious cogni- tion as definite intellectual products. The mind, as it were, trans- mutes the impression on the nervous system into spiritual entities ; in other words, the living soul has a potency by which it can THE NATUKE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 53 transform its unconscious impressions into knowledge, and lift them up out of unconsciousness into the light of consciousness. The poet had a faint glimpse of this when he wrote : "All thought begins in feeling, wide In the great mass its base is hid, And, narrowing up to thought, stands glorified, A moveless pyramid." In the Universal Mind. This is true also of the universal as well as of the individual mind, as is attested by the experience of the race. In nearly every age some new truth or some new phase of an old truth has dawned upon the consciousness of humanity. At one time a nation believes in, or is indifferent to, the practice of human slavery ; in a few years there grows up in the consciousness of the nation such an abhorrence of the insti- tution that dealing in human chattels would be regarded as a crime of deepest dye. Governments are revolutionized and thrones drenched in blood through the development of a new idea of freedom or a clearer recognition of some old one. Even reli- gion has gradually developed new ideas in the consciousness of the world. A few centuries ago it was not thought to be wrong to persecute and punish for a difference of religious belief; but gradually the great idea of religious toleration has dawned upon the human soul, and the broad spirit of Christian fellowship en- folds in its embrace all who follow the teachings of the Master. Ideas Indicate an Objective Reality. The gradual devel- opment of ideas and opinions in the human mind indicates some corresponding objective reality. The cognitions of the qual- ities of color and sound have their counterparts in the objects of the natural world. The ideas and truths of mathematics are but conceptions of real relations of form and number. The great conceptions of Space, Time, Cause, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, have their objective realities in the universe around us. So the recognition of the rights of man, of the inalienable right of free- dom, of liberty of conscience, etc., are all the cognition of great 54 MENTAL SCIENCE. ideas or truths that no enlightened thought would now attempt to question or deny. The law is, that the gradual and universal development of some definite and intelligent belief indicates the actual existence of that which is believed. Our Religioiis Beliefs. This gradual development of ideas and thoughts in the human consciousness has a deep significance in respect to religious faith. The universal belief in Immortality and God, it would seem, must be accompanied by the correlative fact of their actual existence. The idea of God in the soul attests the idea of God in the universe. Influences have been at work through the ages to develop more and more clearly the grand ideas of God and Immortality ; and these influences must have come from and are a proof of an actuality of existence. Whether the idea of God was put into the mind by the Creator at the beginning, or has dawned slowly in the consciousness by the process of evolution, its present appearance there indicates an actual correlative existence apart from the mind conceiving it. As ideas of material things in the soul attest the existence of material things without the soul, so must ideas of spiritual things indicate and attest the existence of spiritual things. The spiritual can impress the soul and leave its traces there as well as the material ; and a recognition of this principle will enable one to meet modern skepticism upon its own ground and defeat it with its own weapons. CHAPTER H. THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. intimate relation of consciousness to the different facul- -*- ties of the mind renders it difficult to give a discussion of its culture without touching upon that of the other faculties. Its culture in its objective phase will be discussed under Attention; its culture in its subjective or reflective phase is appropriately considered here. The development of the mind is influenced by both our conscious knowledge and the unconscious modifications of the mind ; and the natural consciousness, as we have seen, may be developed into the reflective consciousness. We shall there- fore discuss the culture of consciousness, or of the mind in rela- tion to consciousness, under three heads: First, the culture through conscious knowledge ; second, the culture through un- conscious modifications ; and third, the culture of the reflective consciousness. I. CULTURE THROUGH CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE. The mind grows by its conscious modifications. Such modifications are its positive knowledge, and knowledge is the food of the mind Knowledge excites it to activity; it is the stimulus of mental action; and the mental powers are developed by activity. In knowledge the mind finds its nutriment, out of which, by assimi- lation, it gets its growth and development. Uses of Conscious Knoivledge. The first object of the teacher is to labor to give the mind a large share of conscious knowledge. The pupil should be led to acquire clear and definite ideas of things. Care is to be taken that the mind does not rest in vague and confused impressions. Observation should be clear and distinct, thought should be definite and complete, everything (55) 56 MENTAL SCIENCE. that is misty or nebulous should be removed from the pupil's mental products ; whatever he knows he should know with pre- cision and thoroughness. A thing is not to be regarded as known until it is fully and completely developed in consciousness. Knowledge Conscious by Attention. Knowledge is made conscious by continuance of attention. An inattentive view of any object gives one a vague idea of it, but fails to afford a dis- tinct and definite conception of the object. One or two points may be noticed, but the most of the parts of the object remain unnoticed, and have not affected us consciously. If, however, we look at the object with attention, every part of it makes a distinct impression on the mind, and a knowledge of the object and its parts becomes a matter of consciousness. We should, therefore, lead the pupil to attend closely to that which is presented to his mind, in order that the various impressions on the senses may emerge in consciousness and become a distinct cognition. The acquisition of such a habit of attention is one of the most import- ant elements of education. Knowledge Conscious by Analysis. The analytic consid- eration of things aids in the production of conscious knowledge. An object seen as a whole leaves a certain impression on the mind ; but though we may be conscious of its general appear- ance, we cannot bring its several parts distinctly into conscious- ness. The impression made by these parts has never risen into consciousness, and thus cannot be called up into consciousness. If, however, we analyze the object into its- parts, we shall thus gain a distinct idea of these parts, and they, as well as the object itself, will be a possession of conscious knowledge. We shall thus avoid the vague and confused notions we often have of objects, and make our ideas of them clear, definite, and precise. Analysis is thus one of the conditions of making impressions appear in consciousness, and thus of the production of distinct and definite ideas of things. Knowledge Conscious by Repetition. Impressions upon the mind may be made to arise in consciousness by repetition. A THE CULTURS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 57 slight impression may not arise into consciousness at all ; let the impression be repeated several times, and it will make its appear- ance in consciousness in the form of a distinct sensation or cog- nition. Thus, a person may speak to me when I am absorbed in some object of thought, and I may not hear him ; but if the same words are repeated several times, even in the same tone, I will become conscious of them. Repetition is thus a condition for an unconscious impression to rise into consciousness. Repetition i also a condition for the ready recall or reproduction of an idea in consciousness. Many ideas rise into consciousness, and then sink back into unconsciousness, and we are unable to call them up again. If the impression is repeated several times, the modifica- tion of mind which occurs causes the idea to rise spontaneously into consciousness, or enables us to recall it readily at our will. Repetition is, therefore, one of the important means of furnishing the mind with conscious knowledge. Knowledge Conscious by Interest. We may bring the unconscious into consciousness by arousing the interest of the mind. We grasp most clearly, and remember best, those things in which we feel the deepest interest, or which excite the mind the most. A thousand things impress the senses daily, which we are neither conscious of at the time nor remember afterwards. Many things we hear leave no impression on consciousness, but seem to " go in at one ear and out at the other." The things we do re- member are usually those in which we felt the deepest interest. Thus, a man on trial for his life will remember with minuteness the evidence, appearance of the witnesses, etc. Conscious by Subsequent Intercut. Even a subsequent interest in unconscious mental impressions will seem to enable us to revive them. Two men may be talking in a room in which I am engaged, and I hear and remember nothing that, was said. Their conversation may have made some impression on the brain, but not enough to occasion the formation of an idea which appears in consciousness. Subsequently there is a lawsuit, in which nty evidence in the matter is of value, and I endeavor to recall what 58 MENTAL SCIENCE. was said, and can, by effort, bring some things up into conscious- ness. My interest in the subject of conversation has caused an otherwise unconscious idea to rise into consciousness. Thus inter- est may take the place of repetition, and even do what repetition could not have done. Increase Conscious Knowledge. The teacher should labor to increase the conscious knowledge of the pupil. By conscious knowledge is meant that which we may at jany time bring before consciousness. In a certain sense, nearly all of our knowledge is potential rather than actual. "We can be conscious of certain ideas if we will to be, but actually we are conscious only of the idea or ideas which are at the present moment before the mind. Ideas rise up out of unconsciousness, and sink back again into unconsciousness ; and in a certain sense we know only that of which we are at any time conscious. The conscious part of our mind may be compared to that part of a wheel which touches a tangent, while the rest of the wheel may represent the uncon- scious part. Every part of the circumference of the wheel may be made to touch the tangent, but only one part ever does touch it at any one time. Mental culture endeavors to enlarge this knowledge that it may beooit-e conscious ; and also to facilitate the calling of the unconscious into consciousness. Carrying out the figure, we may say it aims to increase the size of the wheel, and also to facilitate its revolution at the command of the will. II. CULTURE THROUGH UNCONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE. The mind may be cultivated also through its unconscious modifica- tions, which for convenience we may call its unconscious knowl- edge. The mind is affected and moulded by impressions that do not rise into consciousness. These "unconscious influences are of vast importance in education, and should not be overlooked by the teacher and educator. A few remarks will be presented to indicate the value and use of this unconscious knowledge. The Unconscious in Perception. And first we remark that much of our knowledge, perhaps the most of it acquired in early life, is attained unconsciously. It is in this way that the child THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 59 icarns the fundamental facts of the world and of life. Our lives are object lessons, and the larger part of what we learn comes to the mind, we know not how or when. We see the relation of cbjscts in nature, and though we know nothing of the laws of perspective, yet when we look at a picture in which these laws are "violated we immediately detect the error. We learn music and dancing in an unconscious way v/ith ease ; if we should attempt to learn each note and step by rule, the task would be much more difficult. The child is unconscious of the way in which it learns to walk and talk, but it learns these arts much faster than if it could comprehend the rules and directions for the different acts. The Unconscious in Memory. The unconscious modifica- tions of the mind may be of value in memory. I may not be able to recall an object or a fact, and yet be able to recognize them if they are again brought before my mind. I may know a person so that I could recognize him if I met him, and yet be entirely un- able to describe him. We may be unahle to tell whether a friend has black hair or brown hair, or whether the eyes are blue or gray ; and yet our knowledge of his appearance is a real, practical knowledge to us, and we would immediately know it if any change had taken place in his looks. We meet a friend after several years' absence, and say, "How changed you are," but are unable to tell in what the change consists. It is said that a person, on being asked, could not tell whether his father wore a moustache. We have not a distinct recollection of most of the objects we see around us ; we are unable to describe the pictures in our room or the carpet on our floor, and yet how quickly we would notice a change in these objects. This unconscious knowledge is of real value to us, and should be taken an account of in education. The Unconscious in Thought. Our unconscious knowledge influences ard modifies our thinking. Our judgments and opin- ions are modified by the unconscious modifications of our minds. The impressions fro7K the circumstances and surroundings of early life, most of which never rise into consciousness, and v^hich 60 MENTAL SCIENCE. we may not be able to call up into consciousness, affect our ideas and thoughts, and mould our opinions. Indeed, it is probable that the subtle and intangible influences of which we are uncon- scious do more to -mould our mental characteristics than those influences of which we are conscious. As the peculiarities of the soil give a peculiar fragrance to the rose and flavor to the grape, so the unseen and unfelt influences that surround us in early years give color to our tastes and shape to our thoughts and ex- pressions. We may not remember one in a hundred of the refined sentiments we heard fall from the lips of cultured men and women, but they have all left an impress behind, and have touched our souls " to new issues." We have forgotten the inci- dents of the books we read, and cannot quote a dozen of their sentences, yet we think and write differently from what we should have done had we not read those works. Genius is partly due to early influences of which it is unconscious, as well as to natural gifts. These facts being admitted, the great advantage of the unconscious in the culture of thought will be readily appreciated. The Unconscious in Language. Language is learned at first as an unconscious acquisition. The majority of words are acquired unconsciously. Who taught us the meaning of such words as here, now, to be, to do, beauty, virtue, etc., we cannot tell ; and yet we use those words correctly. The delicate shades of meaning which we attach to words we learn, not from the diction- ary or from definitions, but mainly by our reading. Our best lessons in grammar are learned, not consciously from the text- books, but unconsciously from hearing or reading good English. So a foreign language is much more readily learned by hearing it spoken, or, after one gets a slight knowledge of grammar and a brief vocabulary, by reading some book in the language, until, as some one says, " we tumble into it rathe*- than learn it." TJie Unconscious in Opinion- Oiu - prejudices and opinions are largely moulded by the unconscious modifications of our minds. Our estimates of persons and books are often due to im- pressions which we cannot define, and which sre not definitely THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 61 cognized. We meet a stranger and are attracted or repelled by him, we cannot tell for what reason. The title of a book often, by some impression it makes upon the mind, which we never put into a proposition, leads us to read or neglect it. A writer says that he refused to read " Adam Bede" because the title seemed flat and insipid ; and this was also the experience of the author of this work. Indeed, we believe that many of the opinions of mankind are prejudices based upon influences and impressions that have never risen into a definite form in the consciousness. The significance of these facts cannot be overestimated, and they deserve the serious attention of the educator and teacher. The Unconscious in Character. The unconscious modifica- tions of the mind exercise an influence on the development of character. The refinement of a mother's words and manners, the upright life and unremembered expressions of a father, leave their impress upon the soul, and show themselves in our own actions and moral sentiment. The boy who is surrounded by vulgar companions may not remember a tithe of the vulgarity which he has seen or heard, but it has lowered his sense of refinement and soiled the purity of his imagination and taste. The boy or girl comes out of a home of culture and refinement with that subtle peculiarity of manner and expression which we call good breeding. Even the physical influences that surround us in early life help to mould or.r character and change our tastes. The spirit of beauty steals insenciblv into the soul and tunes it to heavenly aspirations : the grandeur of the mountains, or the sublimity of the wide-spreading ocojm, seems to give strength to thought and elevation to sentiment. The educator should appreciate the influence of these unconscious modifications upon the soul, and make use of them in the development of that highest product of education, a noble character. III. CULTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS. The nat- ural consciousness^ as we have seen, may be developed into the reflective or philosophical consciousness ; and such development 62 MENTAL SCIENCE. may be secured by proper culture. The time for such culture is not childhood or youth ; it is rather adapted to the mature mind. The young mind operates objectively rather than subjectively ; it is not until the mind begins to ripen in the process of thought that it begins to turn its gaze within and reflect upon the opera- tion of its own faculties. A few suggestions will be made in respect to this culture. Practice Reflection. The student should acquire the habit of reflection. He should be led to look in upon his own mental operations, and note the working of his own mind. This will be difficult at first, but practice will render it comparatively easy. He may notice the gi-owth of an idea of perception, trace the act of the mind in calling up anything out of unconsciousness into consciousness, analyze a judgment or process of reasoning, and watch the coming and developing of the ideals of the imagination. Should be Persistent. This attention to mental phenomena should be continuous and persistent. The mind should be held to -.the contemplation of any mental phenomenon until it is dis- tinctly observed. This presents a difficulty, since the mental act or state exists but for an instant ; it comes and is gone, and when we attempt to look at it, it is not there. We can, however, prac- tically prolong the act or state by repeating it. What we fail to notice at one view we should try to notice at another view ; what we faintly apprehend at first sight we may fix and confirm at a second observation. Past experience can be brought before the mind in an act of memory and reviewed. There is an advantage, too, in this, since the interest in the idea or thought at first may interfere with our examination, but when brought back by the memory, when the curiosity is satisfied and the feelings are calmed, we can give more energy to the contemplation of the idea or feeling itself. Should be Minute. We should cultivate the power of close and minute observation of the acts and states of the mind. In the power to do this we find the difference between the peasant and the philosopher. All persons possess the same natural con- THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 63 Bciousness which notices the broad facts of mental experience ; but the reflective consciousness detects many things that are not noticed by the ordinary natural consciousness. To cultivate this reflective consciousness we must learn to fix our attention upon the acts and states until the minute and occult phenomena are clearly perceived. Should be Comprehensive. We should cultivate the power of comprehensive observation of mental phenomena. Our view should embrace not merely a part, but all of the mental phenom- ena. No partiality of taste or natural bias of the mind should lead us to concentrate the attention upon one class of mental phe- nomena, to the neglect of another class. Neither should any pre- conceived opinions in respec to mental phenomena make us un- fair or partial in our examination. We want the entire truth, and not a mere partial or one-sided view of the facts, so that our inferences from them may be correct. Should Grasp Relations. We should aim to give conscious- ness the power of grasping the relations of mental phenomena. The comparison of ideas or objects of thought and the detection of relations is one of the earliest activities of the mind ; and con- sciousness should recognize these comparisons and relations. We must, in consciousness, place the facts of mind side by side, and grasp them in their relations. Consciousness must learn to cog- nize the mental processes by which the mind elaborates its knowl- edge. The mind perceives the similar and the dissimilar, it judges and reasons, it classifies its knowledge, and seeks for the causes and laws of things, and builds up the temples of scientific truth. The aim of the culture of consciousness is to enable it to become conscious of these processes, and the relations which they unfold. This is really the first great step in the culture of the reflective or philosophical consciousness. Sliould Grasp Laws and Causes. We should train the consciousness also to grasp the laws and causes of mental phe- nomena. The mind has its laws or fixed methods of operation, as well as matter ; and the higher philosophical consciousness aims 64 MENTAL SCIENCE. to grasp them. There are also causes of certain mental phenom- ena, as well ,as of material phenomena, and we should endeavor to acquire the power of a conscious insight into these causes. We should endeavor to interpret the facts and phenomena presented, to find the underlying principle that gives form to the facts, to reach down to the nature or essence of things, and seek to know them in their ultimate principles. Here the consciousness attains its most perfect development, and man becomes the philosopher. IV. ABNORMAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Occasionally we find an abnormal activity of consciousness which is both an injury to mental activity and a source of personal uuhappiness. It is the duty of education to recognize and attend to these unnatural conditions ot consciousness, and, so far as possible, to remove them. Dr. Porter has so clearly developed and happily expressed this subject that I can do no better than reproduce it in his own words. Among U/iildren. "The abnormal or the morbid self-con- sciousness is distinguished by any degree of attention to one's own psychical state which interferes with the normal use and development of the powers. Children are appointed by nature to an objective and, in one sense, an animal life. But, now and then, a child, through an unfortunate bias, or some ill-judged training, has learned to look inward upon itself with unnatural precocity. As a consequence, the subjective predominates over the objective, the tendency to reflect hinders the tendency to acquire, and that easy and spontaneous play of observation, memory, im- agination, wit, and invention, which is the strength and the charm of childhood, is excluded or hindered." Among Adults. " Among adults, frequent examples occur of a morbid or unnatural attention to the inner life. Hypochon- driacs, who are haunted by disturbing sensations which proceed from "bodily disease, till their attention is so absorbed in watching these sensations that it cannot respond to the objects that are fitted to amuse and incite to action, furnish one example. Men who have inherited or indulged a sensitive nature till it has become THE CULTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 65 their tyrant, who watch their feelings with a selfish exclusivenees or who pamper them with a dainty fastidiousness, like Rousseau, may become half insane through brooding over their own exag- gerated sufferings and wrongs." Self -Consciousness. "Another type of the abnormal con- sciousness is that which results from an egoistic thoughtfulness of one's appearance, manners, words, looks, actions, or achieve- ments, which shows itself in the countless forms of affectation that are displayed in manners, art, or literature. So common has this become in the artificial society of modern times that it has given a new sense to the words conscious and consciousness, with and without self as a prefix." To be conscious of one's self is to de- stroy that simplicity and naturalness of character and behavior which is attractive and admirable. Cure of Abnormal Consciousness. Much can be done by proper culture to cure the abnormal action of consciousness. The general suggestion is to interest the mind in things without itself. The attention should be led from the subjective to the objective. For this purpose the study of natural science, visiting objects of interest, a trip to a foreign country, will be of value. Anything that keeps the mind away from itself, and occupies it with exter- nal objects, will aid in curing this unnatural condition. Such culture, too, is of great importance ; many a case of permanent melancholy, or even insanity, might have been prevented by careful and judicious treatment. The tender and thoughtful cn*- panion of Cowper, by her care and the gentle occupations ia which she led him to engage, saved his mind from insanity, and thus gave us several of those exquisite productions of his rare poetical genius. CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. A TTENTION is the power of directing the mind to one ob- **- ject of thought to the exclusion of all others. It is the power of selecting one of several objects, and concentrating the mental energies upon it. The term is derived from ad, to, and tendo, I bend, meaning a bending to or towards, and was sug- gested probably by the attitude of the body in an act of close attention to an external object. Illustration. Thus, suppose I am standing at the window with my eyes open ; a hundred objects are mirrored upon the retina ; I select one of these objects and fix my mind upon it, to the ex- clusion of all others ; this is an act of attention. I sit in the porch on a summer evening ; a score of sounds are blending in the chambers of my ear ; I have a general impression of them all perhaps a distinct idea of none. I select one or more from the collection, and fix my thoughts upon these, withdrawing my mind from the others. This is also an act of attention. Subjective cvnd Objective. Attention may operate either objectively or subjectively. Thus we may fix our attention on an external object, as a bird on a tree, or upon any part or quality of the object, as the form or color. In this case the attention operates objectively. We may also fix our attention upon some operation or state of the mind, as a sensation, an emotion, or a volition, or upon any product of the mind, as an idea or a thought. This is the subjective phase of attention. In this latter form, attention is very nearly identical with what Locke calls Reflection. Relation to Consciousness. Attention appears to be closely (66) THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. 67 related to consciousness. It seems to be a directing of conscious- ness to the acts and states of the mind. Dr. Way land describes it as a sort of voluntary consciousness, a condition of the mind in which consciousness is excited and directed by an act of the will. This applies especially to the subjective phase of its opera- tions. Attention and consciousness are not, however, identical. At- tention is consciousness and something more ; it is consciousness voluntarily applied to some determined object; it is a sort of concentrated consciousness. Hamilton says : "Consciousness may be compared to a telescope; Attention is the pulling out and pressing in of the tubes in accommodating the focus to the eye." Positive and Negative. An act of attention involves both a positive and negative operation of the mind. It consists in turn- ing away from same things and in turning toward other things. The first act consists in excluding and refusing to consider some objects, a negative process; the second act consists in a volun- tary effort to consider others, a positive process. Negatively, we arrest or detain certain powers in their operations; positively, we direct or command other powers to put forth their operations. The negative element has been compared to the detent in machin- ery, which checks the wheels in rapid motion and gives opportu- nity for any desired change. The positive action may be com- pared to putting the belt upon the wheel to be turned, thus concentrating the power of the machinery upon it. The principal element, however, is the positive element. The mental effort is not so much to withdraw the mind from the many, as to concentrate it upon the few or the one. We make our choice of some one of the various objects claiming our atten- tion and fix the mind upon it, and the others by necessity retire from our thoughts. Relation to the Will. Attention is partly an operation of the will. It is an intentional mental effort, a designed directing of the mind to some object of thought, a voluntary concentration of consciousness. But though intimately related to the will, it ia 68 MENTAL SCIENCE. not identical with it. All will-power is not attention. It ia merely the will-effort that directs and concentrates the mental activity, or that voluntarily observes any faculty in its action. Not Absolute Control. Attention is not under the absolute control of the will. We are sometimes determined to an act of attention independently of the free volitions of the will. When absorbed in thought or study, a person may speak to us, or a clock may strike, without our being conscious of the sound ; but it is impossible to remain in this state of unconsciousness inten- tionally, and by a direct effort of the will. We cannot deter- minedly refuse to hear by voluntarily withholding our attention ; and we cannot open our eyes, and by an act of will arrest our minds from all perceptions of sight. We may close our eyes or stop our ears ; but cannot with our organs unobstructed, wholly refuse to see and hear. Involuntary Attention. Sometimes attention seems to act independently of the will. The mind is attracted by something without instead of being urged by something within. We often find ourselves looking, listening, thinking, etc., without any con- scious effort on our part, and without seeming to have willed it. We sit down to read, and in a few moments find ourselves dream- ing, or pursuing a rambling train of thought, unwilled and un- wished. We walk out in the spring-time, and find our minds attracted by a beautiful flower, the song of a bird, or the rippling of a rivulet, without any conscious effort of our own. Such facts, common to the experience of all, prove that the attention often acts independently of our free volition. Three Degrees. In view of these considerations, Sir Wm. Hamilton holds that attention is of three degrees or kinds. The first is a mere vital or irresistible act ; the second is an act deter- mined by desire, which, though voluntary, may be resisted ; the third is an act determined by deliberate volition. Not a Faculty. Attention is not regarded as a distinct faculty of the mind. It is not a distinct form of mental activity, but is involved in and underlies the activity of all the faculties. It is THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. 69 subsidiary to the different faculties, acts with them and in them, seeming to constitute an essential part of each mental activity. The voluntary operation of any of the mental powers, as percep- tion, memory, etc., carries with it an act of attention. Again, attention is not a power of knowing, but of directing that which may know. Of itself it originates nothing, teaches nothing, puts us in possession of no new ideas or truths, has no distinct field or province of its own. Yet without it the other faculties would be of little use to us. Attention doubles the efficiency of these faculties, giving them a power of which they would otherwise be destitute. Two QUESTIONS IN RESPECT TO ATTENTION. There are two interesting questions discussed by writers on men- tal philosophy which are entitled to a brief consideration. The first of these is, Can we do anything without attention ? The second is, Can we attend to more than one thing at the same time ? I/ CAN WE DO ANYTHING WITHOUT ATTENTION? The first question is, can we do anything without attention? We have learned to do many things with great facility, so that they often take place when our minds seem to be attending to something else. Do they really take place without any degree of attention, or is the attention so slight that we do not notice it ? Thus, I sit at a piano running over some familiar piece of music, and at the same time am engaged in conversation with a friend. My fingers seem to wander among the keys ad libitum; does each note or each movement of the fingers require an act of attention ? Or, if the piece is a difficult one, and I am giving general attention to it, is there a special act of attention in producing each note ? Actions Mechanical. Upon this question two distinctly op- posite views have been presented. Dr. Reid and others, especially students of physiology, hold that these and many similar acts are automatic and mechanical, and do not involve any mental activity, and thus no attention. The mind, they hold, " forms the general purpose to execute the given piece, but the particular movements 70 MENTAL SCIENCE. and muscular contractions requisite to produce the individual notes are, for the most part, involuntary." The motions follow one another as a matter of habit, and do not require a special volition or act of attention. As a proof of their position they cite the fact that we have no recollection of any acts of attention. Actions not Mechanical. Mr. Stewart and some other writ- ers take the other side of this question, holding that such actions, however rapid, do involve some mental activity, and consequently some attention. The attention and the volition, they say, are instantaneous, and make so slight an impression upon the mind that there is no recollection of it afterwards. The fact that we do not recollect the volitions is no proof that we did not exercise them. A piece of music can be played so slowly that we can observe the special act of attention and volition to each note and recall them afterwards. " The difference of the two cases," it is claimed, "lies in the rapidity of the movement, and not in the nature of the operation." Objection and Reply. The objection offered to this view is that it requires too great rapidity of mental action. Take a pub- lic speaker for instance, who speaks from one to two hundred words in a minute ; each word consists of four or five elementary sounds, and each elementary sound requires several muscular contractions. To attend to each would require two or three thousand acts of attention in a minute. Is it possible for the mind to act with such rapidity ? This objection, however, carries with it its own answer : for if the body can act with such rapidity, it is surely not impossible for the mind to do so. Actions not Automatic. To illustrate the rapidity of actions not automatic, but which require constant attention, Mr. Stewart cites the case of the equilibrist, who, while balancing himself on a slack-rope, balances a number of balls in various ways. Here the position changes every instant, and in order to keep himself and the objects from falling, every change must be noticed and the position adjusted accordingly. These movements cannot be tne result of an inseparable association of ideas, as in piano-play- THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. 71 ing, for they do not follow any regular order, and could not; if tried thousands of times. It is evident that in this case the per- former must pay close attention to every action ; for if the mind be diverted for a moment, the actor or his balls will fall. The Question Decided. It is not easy to decide this question, though I believe there is truth on both sides of it. It must be admitted that many actions are automatic and mechanical. There is a tendency for muscular movements, once associated, to be re- peated in the order of association. Many of the movements in speaking, walking, piano-playing, etc., are no doubt purely me- chanical. It can hardly be supposed that each muscular contrac- tion of the vocal organs, when we talk, receives a special act of attention. The doctrine of reflex nervous action leads to the same conclusion. It must also be admitted that there are mental acts which make so little impression upon consciousness that they are not subsequently remembered, and that some actions which seem to be automatic do really require an act of attention. Hamilton's Explanation. Sir William Hamilton presents an interesting explanation of the subject by the principle of latent agencies that is, by mental operations of which we are uncon- scious. In respect to our acquired habits and dexterities, as speaking, playing, etc., he holds that many of the mental activities do not rise into consciousness. He concedes to the mind a con- scious volition over the series, but denies to it a conscious and deliberate volition in regard to each separate movement in the series which it determines. At first and before the habit is acquired, every act is slow, and we are conscious of each mental action ; but at length the acts become secure and precise, the speed increases, the individual acts drop, one by one, out of conscious- ness, as we lose the leaves in retiring from a tree ; and at last we are aware only of the general state which results from these un- conscious operations. II. NUMBER OF OBJECTS OF ATTENTION. The second ques- tion is, can the mind attend to more than one object at the same time ? Thus, when I am playing the piano and, at the same time, 72 MENTAL SCIENCE. am engaged in conversation, do I attend to the playing and the talking at the same time, or does the mind pass from one to the other? And so when the equilibrist balances himself and a number of objects on different parts of his body, does he attend to more than one of these at any particular instant of time ? Negative View. Several philosophers answer this question in the negative. Dr. Brown holds that the mind cannot exist, at the same moment, in two different states that is, in two states in either of which it can exist separately. He would have us be- lieve that we cannot feel the sensations of fragrance and cold at the same time. The same doctrine is taught by Locke, at least by inference, in his inquiry whether the mind can have " different, nay inconsistent and opposite (as those of white and black must be) modifications at the same time." Stewart's View. Stewart distinctly teaches that we cannot attend to more than one object of thought at the same time. He says the mind passes with such rapidity from one object to another that it is unconscious of the transition, and seems to be attending to both objects at once. Thus in the case of vision, only one part of an object is at any one instant in the direct line of vision; but the eye passes so rapidly from point to point that we seem to see the entire surface at a glance. So in viewing a mathematical figure of many sides, we view each side by a separate act of atten- tion, till we have passed around the entire outline. He says there is a minimum visible, which is the smallest extension of color or shaded light by which the eye can be affected. He speaks also of a minimum audible in respect to hearing. In Comparing Objects. In comparing two objects, as A and B, it is held that the mind does not think of both objects at once ; that while I am thinking of A I have no thought of B, and while thinking of B I have no thought of A. In an act of comparison, the mind passes rapidly from one object to the other ; so rapidly that the same effect is produced as if both objects were actually before the mind at the same moment. Affirmative View. On the contrary, it is held by able THE NATURE OF ATTENTION. 78 thinkers, that we can attend to more than one thing at a time. Leibnitz, in answer to Locke's inquiry whether the mind can have inconsistent and opposite modifications at the same moment, holds that it can. Sir William Hamilton takes the same view. This view seems to be the correct one, as will appear from several considerations. Consciousness Affirms It. An appeal to consciousness seems to affirm this view. When I look at a small object, as a pin, it surely seems that I can see the head and shaft at the same iden- tical moment. So, in looking at my hand, I feel sure that I can see two or more of my fingers, or a finger and a thumb, at the same time. So when I listen to a duet, or even a four-part har- mony, I am conscious that I hear the tones blended, and not first one and then another. Indeed, could I have the sense of har- mony if I did not hear the tones at the same instant? I am conscious, also, as I sit in a room, that I can know, at any given instant, that there are several persons in the room with me ; and that when I look out of the window I can see more than one sin- gle object. Negative View Absurd. The negative view seems absurd in that it assumes too much. If I can see or hear only one thing at a time, what and how large is that one thing ? If I cannot see or hear two words at a time, then I cannot see or hear one word, for one word is made up of several letters or sounds. It follows, also, that I cannot see the whole of a letter, since a letter is made up of parts ! Again, when I look out on a wide-spreading land- scape, if I can see only the minimum visible, how long will it take me to see the entire landscape, which is so large as to contain the minimum visible a countless number of times ? In Comparing Objects. This view is necessary in order to explain the comparison of objects. An act of comparison, as Hamilton remarks, supposes that we are able to comprehend, in one individual consciousness, the different objects compared. Were I conscious of only one object at a time, I could never bring them into relation ; for when I was conscious of A I would 4 74 MENTAL SCIENCE. not be conscious of B, and when conscious of B I would be un- conscious of A. Thus no judgments could be formed, since the subject and predicate could not be united in thought ; and thought and language would be impossible. Number of Objects. Admitting that the mind can attend to more than one object at a time, the question arises, how many objects can it embrace at once? In respect to this question, some writers say that the mind can have a distinct notion of four objects, and others of six objects. Sir William Hamilton limits the number to six, and says it may be illustrated by throwing a dumber of marbles upon the floor, and grouping them in twos, in threes, in fours, etc. Number not Definite. It is to be doubted, however, whether the number of objects which can be embraced in a single act of attention can be definitely determined. Some minds will grasp more and some less ; and the grasp of the mind in this respect is largely due to practice and cultivation. Besides, too, it will depend somewhat upon the size of the objects. It should also be remarked that clearness of cognition will be at its maximum when the mind is concentrated on a single object : that is, the greater the number of objects among which the attention is dis- tributed, the feebler and less distinct will be its cognizance of each. The law is that distinctness of cognition is inversely pro- portional to the number of objects to which the mind attends. CHAPTER IV. THE CULTURE OF ATTENTION. HAVING explained the general nature of the power of at- tention, we now proceed to the discussion of the methods of its cultivation. We shall treat the subject under three gen- eral heads ; the importance of habits of attention, the methods of cultivating attention, and the way to secure the attention of pupils. I. IMPORTANCE OF HABITS OF ATTENTION. The importance of habits of attention cannot be overrated. The power of con- trolling one's own mental faculties, of directing them at will into whatever channel the occasion may demand, of excluding from the mind all irrelevant ideas, and concentrating the mind on the one object of thought, is a power of the highest value. It is in this that we find the principal difference between one mind and another in the realm of thought and knowledge. Mental power is, to a great extent, the power of attention. One of the principal elements of genius is strength of will to control the mind and command the mental energies. To all the Faculties. Attention is of great value to all the faculties. It is involved in and inseparably connected with the exercise of these faculties, giving them their direction and in- creasing their power. It conditions their activity, and is a meas- ure of their strength and attainments. Its value in relation to each one of the different faculties will be briefly noticed. To Perception. The power of perception is mainly due to the power of attention. In an act of perception we need not only the open senses, but also the attentive mind. Mere gazing is not sufficient ; we need the concentration of the mind in order to per- ceive. Too many persons have eyes and see not, ears and hear (75) 76 MENTAL SCIENCE. not, fingers that touch and yet communicate no knowledge. A large share of the perception of the world is inattentive and care- less. Attention, in relation to perception, is like a microscope to the eye. I look at a flower and perceive many things concerning it ; I place a microscope to my eye, and thus see points of interest I never dreamed of before. So attention seems to concentrate the rays of perceptive power, revealing thereby that which was pre- viously unperceived. In its relation to perception, attention may be called a mental microscope. To Memory. Attention gives power to the memory. It gives clearness of conception, which is a condition of remember- ing. That which the mind has clearly apprehended, which it has carefully discriminated from other things, it takes firm hold of, and thus retains it in its mental grasp. Continuous attention also enables us to fix the idea, to give permanence to the impres- 3ion. It acts like a kind of die which stamps the picture upon the tablet of memory. Without it, the greater part of what we hear or see would fade from the mind, as a shadow flits across the sum- mer landscape. Value to Thought. Attention is to a very great extent the source of thought-power. Attention is mental concentration, and there can be no profound thinking without mental concentration. Unless the mental energies are concentrated, the mind indulges in rambling thought, goes out " wool-gathering," and returns empty- handed. To think closely and effectively, we must possess the power of directing the mind toward and holding it upon a subject with persistent energy. Gives Penetrating Power. Attention gives penetrating power to the mind ; it is a kind of mental gimlet by which we bore our way into a hard problem or penetrate any subject difficult to investigate. Attention may also be compared to a sun-glass. I hold my hand or a piece of paper before a window, and the soft rays of the sunlight fall upon it with a pleasant glow and warmth. I place a sun-glass between my hand and the sun, and gather the - I THE CULTUKE OF ATTENTION. 77 rays into a focus so that I could burn a hole through an inch board. So attention seems to collect the scattered rays of thought into a focus, enabling one to penetrate the hardest subject of in- vestigation. Power of Concentration. The concentration of the mind in at- tention is like the massing of troops in a battle. A fortification is stormed and taken by the concentration of a battalion. Every hard problem is a fortress to be captured, and we must unite our mental forces to capture it. Attention enables us to collect and hurl our whole mental force against the citadels of truth, and by persevering effort, carry them, as it were, by storm. Attention may be regarded as the commander-in-chief of our mental powers. If we wish to conquer truth, to capture and hold neAV territory, or to occupy and appropriate that which is already taken, we must concentrate our mental forces, and, like a successful general, de- termine to fight it out on that line. Element of Thought-Power. Attention is thus one of the prin- cipal elements of thought-power. It has been defined by some writers as "force of intellect." Minds differ, perhaps, more in this quality than in any of the faculties. It is to this power, more than to any other, that the highest attainments in science and art are due. Newton attributed his success to the power of attention. Being asked one day how he made his great discovery of the law of gravitation, he replied, " By incessantly thinking about it." Element of Genius. Attention is one of the principal ele- ments of genius. This is the expressed opinion of a large num- ber of eminent scholars and thinkers. Sir William Hamilton says, " Genius is a higher capacity of attention." Helvetius de- fines genius as " nothing but continued attention." Buffon says, " Genius is only a protracted patience." Cuvier remarks, " In the exact sciences, at least, it is the patience of a sound intellect, when invincible, which constitutes genius." Lord Chesterfield observes that "the power of applying our attention, steady and undissipated, to a single object, is the sure mark of superior genius." 78 MENTAL SCIENCE. II. THE CULTIVATION OF ATTENTION. Having discussed the nature and importance of attention, we shall now consider the various ways in which it may be cultivated. The importance of this discussion is evident from the importance of the power of at- tention. By Exercise. The power of attention is cultivated by exer- cise. Exercise is the great law of culture, either in body or in mind. The arm grows strong by exercise and becomes weak from disuse; so the power of attention will be developed by regular and judicious action, and will be weakened by careless and heedless mental activity. To cultivate the power of atten- tion, therefore, we must give it judicious and habitual exercise. As the result of exercise, Caesar could write one dispatch and at the same time dictate four others, or he could dictate seven. Philidor, the great chess-player, could direct three games at the same time. I knew a lady who in a sewing circle would at the same time sew, tell funny stories, and dictate two or three pieces to different copyists, for the paper of a literary society. Practice Concentration. To cultivate attention we should practice the concentration of the mind upon whatever we may be doing. We should never do anything without attention ; nor should we usually divide the attention between several objects of thought. We should not allow the mind to wander, to flit about from one object to another like a butterfly flitting from flower to flower. Whatever we undertake to do, we should do with a will, we should concentrate the entire mental energies upon it until the work is completed. It is in this way that we may cultivate habits of attention. In Reading. We should always read with attention. Glanc- ing hastily and carelessly over books or newspapers tends to weaken the power of attention. Novel-reading, as often prac- ticed by young people, is especially injurious in this respect. Reading for the excitement of the story or merely to see how it terminates, without the object of relating or remembering the events, has a pernicious influence on the habit of attention. Every THE CULTURE OF ATTENTION. 79 young person should be careful to acquire the habit of reading with attention. In Study. We should study with attention. Pupils who repeat the words of the book while their thoughts are upon some- thing else, not only require much longer time to study their les- sons, but also injure their powers of attention. An hour or two of close application will accomplish more than many hours of desultory study. In learning a lesson, it is not how long we study, but how hard we study. Teachers should be careful to see that their pupils acquire the habit of studying with attention. In Mathematics. The study of mathematics is especially adapted to cultivate habits of attention. These studies require close and concentrated thought, and thus lead to a habit of fixed attention. In solving a problem, we must concentrate the mind upon it, and we thus acquire the power of mental concentration. Mental arithmetic is especially valuable in this respect : it is a sort of mental whetstone, sharpening the mind and giving it the power of penetrating and unfolding the complicated conditions that meet us in the problems of science and life. Among the school studies, mathematics ranks first for the training of the power of attention. Practical Exercises. A teacher of young pupils may employ various exercises to cultivate their attention. He may have them look at some object for a few moments, as a flower or a fly, and then require them to describe it. He may read sentences, short at first and then longer, and have pupils reproduce them orally or in writing. He may read long combinations of small numbers in addition and subtraction, and have the pupils repeat them and perform the operations. III. SECURING ATTENTION OF PUPILS. A teacher must learn to secure the attention of his pupils. No high success in the art of teaching is possible without it. "When every mind is intent upon what the teacher is explaining, it will be understood and remembered. When the minds of the pupils are inattentive and wandering, no permanent impression will be made; the words 80 MENTAL SCIENCE. will, as it were, pass in at one ear and out at the other. Let it be remembered, too, that when a teacher fails to secure the atten tion of his pupils, he fails in his vocation. Manner of Teaching. A teacher can secure the attention of his pupils by his manner of teaching. A few suggestions on this subject will be of practical value. 1. A teacher should be earnest in his work. A spirit of earnest- ness on the part of the teacher will kindle a flame of interest in the heart of the pupil ; and interest is the mother of attention. A teacher who shows no earnestness in communicating knowledge can expect none on the part of his pupils in acquiring knowledge. 2. A teacher should have a clear view of his subject. Clearness of conception leads to clearness of presentation ; and clearness of expression is a condition of attention. A hesitating and obscure statement wearies the mind and dissipates the attention. It needs the clear sunlight of truth from the teacher's mind to illumine and attract the mind of the pupil. 3. A teacher should not speak too fast. Rapidity of utterance distracts the attention. The mind, unable to follow the teacher, loses the relation of facts and thus becomes confused and wan- ders away from what is being presented. This caution is espec- ially important, since rapid talking is a common fault of teachers. 4. A teacher's voice should be properly modulated. The voice is the open sesame of the soul ; a sweetly-toned voice charms the ear and wins the attention. A teacher should speak with natural and artistic modulation. He should not speak too low, for that will require too much of an effort to listen ; nor too loud, for that confuses the mind and distracts the attention. 5. A teacher's position before his class should, as a rule, be a standing one. In this position a teacher naturally manifests more animation and interest in the subject. His attitude and gestures will attract the eye and do much to secure attention. Besides, he has a better command of his pupils and can check the tendency to a wandering mind. If a teacher who is seated rises before his class, he will find that he will instantly recall all wandering thoughts, and fix their minds on the subject. THE CULTURE OF ATTENTION". 81 6. A teacher should be interested in his instruction. This is the sine qua non of attention. Interest begets interest ; the flame of interest in the teacher's mind will kindle a flame of interest in the pupils' minds. Attention cannot be compelled, it must be enticed ; and the warmth and glow of the teacher's heart casts a glow of interest around a subject that makes it attractive to the pupil, and thus secures his attention. Method of Teaching. The teacher may do much to secure the attention of his pupils by his method of teaching. A few suggestions on this point will be of interest. 1. The teacher should, so far as possible, teach without the text- book. A book in the teacher's hand often seems to build a par- tition wall between the minds of the teacher and pupil. The constant reference to the book breaks the spirit of interest that should flow from one mind to another. Teaching without a book also inspires confidence in the teacher's ability, which is not an unimportant condition of attention. 2. The teacher should assign topics miscellaneously. If the pupils know the order of the topics or questions, they naturally allow the attention to wander so long as there is no danger of a question coming to them. When they understand that a question may fall anywhere, they keep wide awake, so as to be ready for it when it comes. 3. A teacher should, so far as possible, use the concrete method. This is especially necessary with young pupils. The mind follows the eye; and the attention is caught through the senses. What is seen is much more attractive than what is only heard or thought. Abstract subjects, even with older pupils, excite more interest when illustrations put them more clearly before the mind. 4. The teacher should vary his methods of teaching. Variety is " the spice of life" in the school-room as well as outside of it. The routine method soon loses its interest, and the mind becomes dull and weary. Vary the method and the mind is aroused with the novelty, and the attention led captive at will. 5. The teacher should not talk too much. Too much talking 82 MENTAL SCIENCE. wearies the mind and dissipates the attention. There should be frequent questions to awaken thought and allow the pupil to de- velop knowledge for himself. Such an exercise will do more to attract and hold the attention than the most eloquent discussions of the teacher. Anything that arouses mental activity will secure attention. 6. The teacher should often use the written method of recitation. In a large class, when the subjects are topical, so few can be called on that the attention of those not reciting naturally wanders. In such cases, the written recitation can be associated with the oral one, thus holding the attention of every pupil. Extent of Culture. This power has been cultivated in a high degree by almost every one whose name is associated with the progress of science. Sometimes the power has existed to such an extent that it has almost degenerated into a disease. Cases are on record where persons have become so absorbed in thought as to be oblivious to what was taking place around them. Plato tells us that Socrates, when upon a military expedition, was seen by the Athenian army to stand for a whole day and a night, com- pletely engrossed in the consideration of a single subject. When Syracuse was stormed by the Romans, Archimedes was so com- pletely absorbed in the solution of a geometrical problem that he was first aware of the enemy by receiving his death-wound as he was bending over and drawing a diagram in the sand. Joseph Scaliger, when a Protestant student in Paris, was so engrossed in the study of Homer that he became aware of the mas- sacre of St. Bartholomew, and of his own escape, only on the day after the catastrophe. Cardan, the illustrious philosopher and mathematician, while upon a journey, became so lost in thought that he forgot both his way and the object of his journey. To the question of his driver whither he should proceed, he made no answer, and when he came to himself at night-fall, he was surprised to find the carriage at a stand still directly under a gallows. The life of Sir Isaac Newton is full of striking incidents illustrating the complete concentration of the mind upon the objects of his study. THE INTELLECT. I. PERCEPTION. H. MEMORY. HI. IMAGINATION. IV. UNDERSTANDING. I. ABSTRACTION. II. CONCEPTION. III. JUDGMENT. IV. REASONING. V. INTUITION. I. INTUITIONS OF THE TRUB. II. INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL^ III. INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. PERCEPTION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OP PERCEPTION. PERCEPTION is that faculty of the mind by which we gain a knowledge of external objects through the senses. It is the power of cognizing external objects and their qualities. The term is derived from per, through, and capio, I take, and means to take or receive through the senses. It is sometimes applied to the act and the product of perception, as well as to the power of perceiving. Thus we say, my perception of the object was not very clear, or my perception was distinctly recalled. The Percept. The products of perception are properly called percepts. A Percept is a notion of some external object derived through any of the senses. In other words, a percept is that mental product which arises from the perception of an external object. A percept is, of course, an Idea, the first of the two classes of intellectual products. Thus, my idea of- my father, my mother, or of any particular object, is a percept. A percept is a particular idea, and embraces some particular form, color, size, etc. All proper nouns are the expression of percepts ; and, vice versa, the mental products corresponding to proper names are percepts. Ego and Non-Ego. Perception gives us an idea of an exter- nal object. This object is cognized as having an existence distinct from ourselves. In an act of perception, therefore, consciousness recognizes the existence of two distinct elements; ourselves as perceiving, and an object perceived. This distinction is universal, (85) 86 MENTAL SCIENCE. and tacitly accepted by all men under all circumstances, and is thus to be regarded as an accepted postulate of mental philosophy. These two elements are distinguished as the subjective and object- ive elements in perception, called also the me and the not-me, the ego and the non-ego. The Organism. The mind operates in an act of perception through or by means of a nervous organism endowed with sensi- bility, and capable of feeling impressions made upon it by the objects of the external world. This organism has its centre or origin principally in the head, in a form called the Brain. Im- pressions made upon the sentient organism by external objects are conveyed to the brain, and by some action of the mind become knowledge. The result of an impression of an object on the organism is a feeling which is called a Sensation. The act of knowledge arising from this sensation is called a Perception. The sentient organism is thus a connecting link between the mind and the objective world. The Senses. This nervous organism is arranged in different forms, capable of receiving different impressions. These different forms constitute what we call the Senses. There are five such distinct forms or senses, namely, Touch, Sight, Hearing, Taste, and Smell. Each one of these senses is the source of some par- ticular kind of knowledge of external objects. Conditions of Perception. The conditions of an act of per- ception, it is thus seen, are : 1. The existence of a mind to per- ceive; 2. The existence of an object to be perceived; 3. The existence of a nervous organism capable of sensation ; 4. Such a relation of the object to the organism that the former makes an impression on the latter. Given these four conditions, and an act of perception is possible ; remove any one of them, and no act of perception could take place. Divisions for Discussion. Having given this general intro- duction to the subject of Perception, we shall now discuss it in detail under the following heads : 1. The Nervous Organism ; 2. The Perceptive Process ; 3. Remarks on Perception ; 4. Percep- tion bv the Different -Senses ; 5. The Qualities of Bodies. THE NATUKE OF PERCEPTION. 87 I. THE NERVOUS ORGANISM. The first condition of Perception is the existence of a nervous organism called a Sensoriwn. Such an organism is the connect- ing link between matter and spirit ; it is the pathway tha't leads from matter to mind, the avenue by which the qualities of the external world can pass into or become known to consciousness. The Sensorium consists of the brain and spinal cord, the ganglia, and the nerves. The student of mental philosophy should have some knowledge of each of these. The Brain. The brain is an egg-shaped organ situated in the cranium, surrounded by membranes, and consisting of two parts, the Cerebrum and the Cerebellum. It is composed of two kinds of substance ; gray matter and white matter. The white matter consists of nerve-fibres supported in a delicate framework of con- nective tissue. The gray matter, in addition, contains a number of nerve-cells, or ganglionic corpuscles, some of them of consider- able size. These cells are wholly absent in the white matter. The white matter seems to be associated with motion, and the gray matter with sensation. The Cerebrum. The Cerebrum occupies the front and upper parts of the skull, and comprises about seven-eighths of the entire weight of the brain. It consits of a mass of white fibres covered with gray matter. It is arranged in wrinkles or folds, called con- volutions, which afford a large surface for the gray matter. The cerebrum is divided into two hemispheres, connected beneath by fibres of white matter. We thus have a double brain, as we have two eyes, two hands, etc. These two hemispheres seem to be independent in their operations, as one hemisphere has been almost entirely destroyed without apparent injury to the mental powers. The cerebrum is the seat of intelligence ; when it is re- moved from animals they pass into a state of apathy and stupor. The Cerebellum. The Cerebellum lies behind the cerebrum, in the back part of the head. Its structure is similar to the cere- brum, but instead of convolutions it has parallel ridges which let the gray matter down into the white, presenting a peculiar 88 MENTAL SCIENCE. appearance called the arbor-vitce, or tree of life. The cerebellum seems to be the centre of voluntary motion ; when it is injured or diseased, persons walk unsteadily as if intoxicated. Birds from which it has been removed lose control of their muscles. TJie Spinal Cord. The Spinal Cord begins at the brain in an expansion called the medulla oblongata, and passes down the cavity of the back-bone. It consists of the same tissue as the brain, but has the white fibres on the outside and the gray cells within. It is separated into halves by deep fissures, called the anterior and posterior fissures. Each half of the cord is divided longitudinally into three equal parts, the anterior, lateral, and posterior columns, by the lines of attachment of the roots of the spinal nerves. These nerves pass out of the spinal cord by aper- tures between the vertebrae, and then divide and subdivide and pass to the muscles and skin. The Nerves. The nerves are silvery threads composed, like the spinal cord, of white matter without and gray matter within. Those which carry an impulse to the brain or to any central organ, are called sensory or afferent nerves; those which carry away an impulse from an organ are called motor or efferent nerves. If a sensory nerve is cut, sensation in the part to which it goes is lost, while motion remains ; if the motor nerve is cut, motion is lost, but sensation remains. The structure of these two classes of nerves seem to be the same. The impulse which travels along them requires time for its passage, and is much slower than many other forces, even slower than sound. Classes of Nerves. The Nerves are of three classes ; the spinal, cranial, and sympathetic. The Spinal Nerves arise from the spinal cord by two roots ; the anterior root is the motor and the poster- ior is the sensory one. The anterior connects with the white matter of the cord ; the posterior connects with the gray matter, and has a small ganglion of its own at a little distance from the origin. The roots unite and are bound up in one sheath, though they preserve their special functions. If the anterior root is cut, vountary motion is lost and sensation remains ; if the posterior THE NATUJRE OF PERCEPTION. 89 root is cut, sensation is lost and voluntary movement remains. If both are cut, irritation of the anterior root below the point of division causes motion, while irritation of the posterior root above this point causes pain. The Cranial Nerves spring from the lower parts of the brain and the medulla oblongata. They go to the face, nose, ear, eye, tongue, larynx, lungs, stomach, etc. The Sympathetic System consists of a double chain of ganglia on each side of the spinal column, extending into the chest and abdomen. From these ganglia, delicate nerves run to the vital organs, the heart, lungs, stomach, etc., to the veins and arteries, and to the spinal and cranial nerves. Functions of the Nerves, The nerves serve to convey impres- sions and impulses to and from the central organs. One filament of each pair of nerves carries the sensation to the central organ, and the other filament carries the impulse from the central organ. If any point where they terminate is excited, one filament conveys the notice to the brain or ganglion, and the other brings an im- pulse back to the point where the sensation occurred. When an impression is made on any part of the body, the message flashes inward on the afferent nerve, and an answer is flashed outward to the place on the efferent nerve. This may be a matter of con- sciousness ; or it may occur without the knowledge of the mind. This power of involuntary nervous action is called the reflex action of the nervous system. Reflex Action. Reflex action is the power of converting afferent into efferent impulses, or of sending back or reflecting an impression of the nervous system. Thus, if a person whose legs are paralyzed by spinal injury and consequently immovable, be tickled on the soles of the feet, the legs will kick out convulsively. The impulse is reflected from the spinal cord. Winking at a flash of light or a threatened blow, is an example of reflex action, in which the afferent nerves are the optic and the efferent nerves the facial. When a bad smell causes a grimace, the reflex action conies through the facial nerves, the olfactory nerves being affer- 90 MENTAL SCIENCE. ent and carrying the impression to the brain. This power is pos- sessed by the gray matter and not by the white, and resides con- sequently in the ganglia, spinal cord, and brain. Importance of Reflex Action. The principle of reflex action is important in explaining several processes connected with the action of the mind. Many of the operations in complex mental activities are due to this principle. Actions which at first require attention and volition, by frequent repetition become in a manner part of our organization, and are performed without volition or even consciousness. The possibility of physical education is based upon the existence of this power, which the nervous system possesses, of organizing conscious actions into unconscious or reflex operations. The training of a gymnast, the practice of a dancer, the drill of a soldier, etc., are all founded upon this principle. The force of habit is illustrated by the story of the practical joker who, seeing a discharged veteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out "Attention," whereupon the man instantly brought his hands down to the soldier's position, and lost his mutton and potatoes in the gutter. Even the mind itself acquires habits by which it tends to reproduce often-repeated words and thoughts. Organs of Perception. The nervous tissue possesses the property of being sensitive to impressions of objects. It is ar- ranged into organs in different places, and adapted to different impressions and sensations. In some cases there is a complicated organ, as the eye and ear ; in other cases there is simply an ex- pansion of the nervous tissue. The several classes of nerves of sensation are those of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. All the knowledge we have of the qualities of bodies comes through the impressions made on these different nerves. Having given this explanation of the organism, we proceed to explain how the mind perceives through the different senses. II. THE PERCEPTIVE PROCESS. How does the mind perceive through the senses ? What is the method by which the immaterial spirit takes cognizance of the THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 91 objects of the material world ? This is one of the first and one of the most difficult inquiries of mental philosophy. In answer to this question, it may be briefly stated that external bodies make an impression on the nervous organism, producing sensations, and that perception is the result. How this occurs, how an impression on the sense appears as conscious knowledge in the mind, is a mystery which is perhaps beyond the power of human philosophy to unfold with complete satisfaction. Nature of the Subject. In order fully to appreciate the dis- cussion of the question, we should imagine ourselves without any knowledge of external objects whatever, and then try to trace our way out from the subjective world to the objective world; to bridge over the chasm -between the ego and the non-ego, and show how the immaterial spirit cognizes the material object. The ex- planation of this is what we call the procass of perception. Methods of Explanation. There have been many theories advanced to explain the process of perception. Most of the recent writers in this country have based their methods of explan- ation on that of Sir William Hamilton ; and at least the spirit of his method is the one adopted in the present work. The process is by nearly all modern writers divided into two distinct parts, Sensation and Perception. Perception is usually regarded as including two things ; the cognition of the organism, and the cognition of the external object. We shall, in describing the process, divide it into four distinct parts or steps: first, Simple Sensation ; second, the Distinct Cognition of the Sensation ; third the Cognition of the Sentient Organism ; fourth, the Cognition of the External Object. Simple Sensation. The first step in the process of percep- tion, or rather the condition of that process, is simple sensation. Something touches me, an impression is made on the nervous organism, that impression is transmitted to the brain, and I am conscious of a certain feeling which we call a sensation. This feel- ing belongs to the nervous organism as connected with the mind, and involves no act of the intellect. The nervous tissue is sensi- 92 MENTAL SCIENCE. live, and the feeling experienced is an affection of the nervous organism as connected with the mind. The process, so far, does not involve an act of perception, but is merely the condition of perception. Cognition of tlie Sensation. The mind is now aroused by this sensation, and the attention is directed to it. The sensation is cognized as an actual condition, as a real phenomenon, a some- thing that now is and which was not. As these phenomena are repeated, the mind distinguishes one sensation from another, which involves an act of memory and comparison. It also cognizes the length of the sensation in time, as in a sound, the position of the sensation in space, as in touch, its intensity, as in color, etc. I do not, however, know what produced the sensation, or whether anything produced it. I do not at first recognize it as* an affection of my bodily organism, or even know that I have a bodily organism. I am conscious of it only as a feeling, though a feeling distinct in time, place, and degree. The process is en- tirely within the mind, a purely subjective process. It is, how- ever, a cognition of the mind, and, therefore, an act of perception. This is really the first step in the process of perception. Cognition of the Organism. The second step in the process is the cognition of the organism. These sensations are exper- ienced in different places, and are thus cognized as apart from one another. Thus a pain in the head, a prick in the finger, a wound in the foot, are felt at different places. To experience sensations in different places is to cognize a difference of place or locality. This cognition of locality leads to the idea of outness and thus of extension. This outness or extension is limited by the position of the different sensations; I thus cognize an extended limited something as the seat of sensations. This extended something, limited by the locality of sensations, we call the sentient organism. The sentient organism thus passes under the eye of consciousness, and becomes an object of cognition, distinct from the mind per- ceiving it. It is to me an externality having extension, and also form as the limitation of extension. It is to me a non-ego, dis- tinct from the ego, which perceives it. THE NATUKE OF PERCEPTION. 93 This cognition of the organism is aided, no doubt, by the sen- sation of the internal organs. The sensations of the muscles and viscera are felt in different places, and assist in limiting and filling out our idea of an extended sentient organism. Remarks on the Process. In this cognition we pass beyond sensation and the subjective phase of perception, to perception in its objective phase : it has been regarded by some writers as the first step of perception proper. It is an act of the mind midway be- tween the cognition of the sensation and the perception of the ex- ternal object. In it we reach the first objective non-ego as dis- tinct from the ego. It is thus seen that the consciousness of the sensation is not perception, but the condition of perception ; that the distinct cognition of the sensation as such is an act of per- ception in its subjective phase ; and that the cognition of the organism as distinct from the sentient mind is an act of per- ception in its first objective phase. Cognition of the Object. The process is still incomplete, for there is yet no conception of the external object. How, then, does the mind get out into the objective world and perceive the object itself? This is the most difficult part of the subject, and the point on which philosophers differ most widely. The follow- ing explanation seems to me to be simple and satisfactory : One Explanation. I am conscious of my bodily organism as extended. I touch some part of the organism, as my wrist, with my fingers, and find a double sensation, the feeling in my wrist as touched, and in my fingers as touching. I touch some other object, as a book, and find but one set of sensations, that in my fingers. Thus I cognize something different from my bodily organ- ism, something that gives a sensation, but which does not possess the capacity for sensations. This new something now becomes an object of attention. I pass my hand along it, and for a certain time experience a sensation which afterward ceases ; from this I perceive the object has a limitation in length. I then find its limitations in breadth and thickness in the same way, and thus cognize it as extended. I thus get a cognition of an extended something different from my organism that is, of an extended object. 94 MENTAL SCIENCE. Hamilton's Explanation. Sir William Hamilton explains the perception of an external object through the cognition of resist- ance to our locomotive energy. I am conscious of my bodily organism, and conscious that it is capable of movement in obed- ience to my volition. I am conscious of the effort to move my person or one of its members, and also conscious of being resisted in these movements. This new phenomenon, resistance, new be- comes an object of attention. To know that I am resisted is to know, by a necessary law of intelligence, that something resists ; and consciousness revealing nothing within the mind as resisting, we are compelled to attribute it to something external to the mind. To be conscious of resistance and know that it does not arise from the ego, is to know that it must arise from a non-ego, and, there- fore, that this non-ego exists. Thus the outer world passes under* the eye of consciousness, and becomes indirectly an object of per- ception. Steps not Distinct. In this analysis of the powers of percep- tion, we have regarded the act of perception as broken up into several distinct parts or steps. This division is, however, a logical rather than a physiological one. Chronologically, the act is one and indivisible ; the sensation and the perception are synchronous. We are not, in an act of perception, first conscious of a sensation, then of the bodily organism, and then of an external something as producing the sensation. Usually the three are immediately united in a single act of perception. The explanation given, it must be remembered, is that of the original process in learning to perceive, and not of our matured acts of perception. There may be sensation, of course, without the cognition of an external object ; but there can be no cognition of an external object with- out sensation. III. REMARKS ON THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION. The foregoing discussion will give one a general idea of the process by which the mind perceives objects through the senses. A few remarks upon the method described will afford a clearer THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 95 idea of some points involved in the process, and also answer some questions which naturally grow out of it. Sensation and Perception. Sensation and Perception are to be clearly discriminated. Sensation is simply the phenomenon of feeling as an affection of the organism. It is purely subject- ive, and is the immediate result of some impression on the organs of sense. Perception is the cognition of the feeling as a distinct phenomenon ; the cognition of the organism as affected and as an externality having extension ; and, also, the cognition of objects external to the organism. Sensation is thus the indispensable condition of perception. Some writers seem to regard the cogni- tion of " the sensation as such " as a mere sensation ; but since it involves a distinct act of mind, it is more than sensation, and must be considered as an act of perception. Relation of Sensation and Perception, The relation of Sensation and Perception is expressed by a law simple and uni- versal in its character. This law, as stated by Hamilton, is as follows : Perception and Sensation, though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other. That is, the stronger the sensation the weaker the perception, and vice versa. Thus, in sight, where perception is at its maximum, sensation is at its min- imum, for we are not conscious of any organic pleasure or pain from the impression of colors on the retina. In touch, where the sensation is distinctly felt, the perception is feeble. The same law holds in the relative operations of each sense, for the more intense the impression on any one sense, within certain limits, the less distinct the perception. Thus in. the sense of sight, if the im- pression be strong, we are dazzled or blinded, and while conscious of the sensation, perception is nearly or wholly lost. Nature of Sensation. The nature of sensation is not fully understood. Whether the modification of the organs of sense extends inward beyond the surface, is a question difficult to answer. Some have supposed that the impression is carried along the nerves to the brain either by vibrations in the substance of the nerve or by the " flow of animal spirits," or by some general 96 MENTAL SCIENCE. nervous agent, or by the influx of actual representative films or forms or species from without. These, however, are mere hypoth- eses, some of them utterly inconceivable, and none of them estab- lished by experiment. Some, again, suppose that the mind per- vades the entire sentient organism, or passes down from its presence-chamber in the brain to the place where the impression is made. Knowing nothing about it, however, we can assert nothing. Explanation Based on Touch. The explanation of the perceptive process here presented is based on the sense of touch. It does not attempt to explain how we perceive objects by the eye or ear. It assumes that our first perceptions of external objects come through the sense of touch, and that the other senses are instructed by the sense of touch. Thus in hearing, it is held that all that this sense gives us is the cognition of sound ; and that, having learned by touch that there is an external world, we learn by experience to refer the sound' to an external object. So, in respect to sight, it is held that the ideas of color and form, if sight gives form, are referred by experience to the objects which by touch we have learned exist around us. The same also is true with respect to smell and taste. This phase of the subject will be discussed more fully under the next general head. Direct and Indirect Perception. It is held by the advo- cates of this view that perception through touch, or muscular resistance, is a direct cognition of the external world, and that all other perception of external objects is indirect. Thus, when we hear a sound and refer it by experience to a passing carriage, we are said to perceive the carriage, not directly, but indirectly. So when we smell a fragrance and refer it to a rose or pink, we are said to perceive the rose or pink indirectly. Some of the cogni- tions of sight also are explained in the same way. Acquired Perceptions. These indirect perceptions are also called acquired perceptions. We acquire the power of using one pense in place of another, or of applying the knowledge which is given by one sense to something given by another sense. Thus, THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 97 when I hear a sound, I know it comes from a piano, a flute, or a person ; and the sound awakens the perception of the object. So when I see iron glowing in the furnace, I say it " looks hot ;" though heat is a perception of touch. These two classes of sense- perceptions are distinguished as original and acquired. An orig- inal perception is that which is given by a single sense when used alone ; an acquired perception is that which is given by using the knowledge afforded directly by one sense as the sign of know- ledge which we gain by some other sense. This is more fully discussed under the next general head Perception by the Differ- ent Senses. The Forming of Percepts. The product of Perception is called a percept. A percept may be defined as the idea we have of any particular object. Our ideas of objects are complex, being composed of different elements given by the different senses. Thus my idea of an orange embraces its form, color, weight, hard- ness and softness, fragrance, taste, etc., some elements being given by one sense and some by another. Each of these elements is called a simple percept ; and their union in a single idea which we call the orange is a complex percept. Some writers call the former a percept and the complex percept a thing ; but thing seems to refer to the external object rather than to our idea of it. It is thus thought to be better to call one a percept and the other a complex percept or simply a percept. Synthesis of the Elements. The synthesis of the different elements into one idea involves an act of the understanding and of intuition. The bringing of the elements together seems to be an act of the understanding ; the cognition of them as belonging to a substance, and the distinction of substance and attribute, in- volves an act of the intuitive power. An act of perception, ;:s is shown in the discussion of tho intuitive power, is thus com; by an act of intuition. The mental picture we form of the ol is given by ih-i representative element of the mind. Percept i;>r furnishes the materials ; representation makes the picture. Source of Knowledge. Perception is the source of our 5 98 MENTAL SCIENCE. knowledge of an external world. It is the power by which the immaterial spirit comes in contact, as it were, with the external world and knows it. We may, perhaps, conceive of a being so constituted as to be independent of sense, and yet as taking cog- nizance, in some mysterious manner, of objects external to itself; but not such a being is man. Whatever may be the power of the human mind, when separated from the body, to perceive external things, in the present life it can cognize matter only through the avenues of sense. The mind, seated in its presence-chamber, the brain, looks out upon the material world through the senses, the windows of the soul, and perceives that it has color, and form, and actual existence. Basis of All Knowledge. Perception lies at the basis of all knowledge. All mental activity begins in the senses. The outer world makes impressions on our sensesj and arouses the mind into activity. By this activity we gain a knowledge of the world without, and also originate knowledge different from that of the things of the material world. Without the power of sense-per- ception, it is to be doubted whether we could attain to any know- ledge whatever. All knowledge does not come directly from perception through the senses, however. We have a knowledge of external objects, and we have also knowledge that transcends this knowledge of external objects. Perception is the immediate source of the first kind of knowledge, and the indirect source of the second kind of knowledge. This Distinction Expressed. This distinction is often ex- pressed by the terms cause and occasion. Thus perception is said to be the cause of our knowledge of objects, since it is the imme- diate source of such knowledge. Perception is also said to be the occasion of the ideas and truths of intuition ; for, though in a sense necessary to these ideas, it is not the source of them. Per- ception also furnishes the understanding with materials out of which it derives ideas and truths beyond the sphere of sense. As thus attaining a knowledge of external objects, affording material for the operations of the understanding, and furnishing the occa- THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 99 sion for the activity of the .intuitive power, perception may be said to lie at the basis of all knowledge. IV. PERCEPTION BY TE:E DIFFERENT SENSES. The general charaeteristic of the nervous organism is its suscep- tibility to impressions. This general susceptibility is the basis of all sensations. There are five distinct modifications of the general structure or functions of the nervous organism, each of which gives us peculiar qualities of bodies. These five distinct modifi- cations form what we call the Senses. There are thus five senses, namely; Touch, Sight, Hearing, Smell and Taste. Touch is nearly identical with the general nervous susceptibility. While, however, there is a general susceptibility to -impressions all over the surface of the body, the sense of Touch is specially provided for in the fingers. The other senses have special organs supplied with particular nerves for the perception of special qualities of objects. Knowledge from Each Sense. The question now arises, What knowledge is given by the different senses ? The investi- gation of this subject is of great importance in determining the character of perception. The object is to discover the use and value of each one of the senses. What is given, for instance, in Hearing ? Do we hear an object, or do we hear the sound merely ? Can we tell, primarily, the distance and direction of the sounding body, or are these the result of experience and judgment? What is given in Sight? Do we perceive primarily only color, or can we see surface extension, or even trinal extension ? Can we per- ceive through the eye the relative distance of objects, or is that a matter of experience ? These and similar questions we now pro- ceed to consider. PERCEPTION BY TOUCH. The Organs of Touch are the fingers. These are endowed with a special sensitiveness to external im- pressions. When my fingers touch an object, I experience a feel- ing. This feeling is felt in the fingers at the place of contact. All that I cognize, however, is a mere feeling. It is purely sub- 100 MENTAL SCIENCE. jective, pertaining to the organism, and not to anything external to the organism. If repeated, I could distinguish it from former feelings ; but I would not know that it was in any way related to an' external object. In and of itself, it would not suggest the ex- istence of any external object. If I were motionless and had no other sense, it is a question whether I should ever be able, by pure touch alone, to gain a knowledge of external objects. The cognition of external objects is known by a comparison of the sensations produced in touching the organism and an external body. It is also determined by muscular resistance, as already explained. Both of these experiences are no doubt involved in this cognition of external objects. Either one might be able to furnish the cognition ; but in reality, no doubt, they combine to produce the result. PERCEPTION BY SMELL. The Organ of Smell is the Nose, the interior of which consists of convoluted plates, giving a large extent of surface in a small space. Over these bony plates is spread the olfactory nerve, which is covered by a mucous mem- brane. This nerve is susceptible to minute particles thrown off from bodies and borne through the air to the interior of the nose. Direct Perception. What we perceive in smell is merely the sensation of odor. The particles produce a sensation in the organ, and this is all that we primarily perceive. We do not know primarily what caused the sensation, or whether it was caused by anything objective to ourselves. It is purely a subjective phe- nomenon. If we had no other senses than smell, we could never know that the odor had any relation to an objective cause. Acquired Perception. By experience we learn to associate odors with external objects. We notice the presence of odors when certain objects are present, and thus learn to attribute the odor to the object which produced it. The perception of a fra- grance, as of a rose, in time will enable us to cognize the rose itself. This is an acquired knowledge, however, and not an act of pure perception. It is the result of judgment combining the sensation of perfume with some other perception. It is what is THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 10 called a derived or an indirect perception. It will oe noticed that we cannot learn to judge of the direction of an object by its odor, nor very accurately of its distance. PERCEPTION BY TASTE. The Organs of Taste consist of the Tongue, the Palate, and a portion of the Pharynx. On these organs ramify the filaments of the gustatory nerve, arranged in minute papillae. This nerve is susceptible to certain qualities of bodies called their savor. Direct Perception. What we perceive in taste, as in touch and smell, is merely a sensation. The savor of objects affects the nerve of taste in a certain way, and the result is a sensation. This sensation is the object of perception. We discriminate one flavor from another, and apply names to the different flavors, as bitter, sweet, spicy, pungent, acrid, etc. This is all that is directly given by taste. Acquired Perception. We afterward learn, by experience, to associate certain sensations of taste with certain objects, known by some of the other senses, and thus to cognize objects through their flavors. Thus I can, with my eyes shut, tell sugar, or tea, or coffee, by their flavor. This, however, is an acquired knowledge, and not the result of pure or direct perception. The cognition of an object through its flavor is called an acquired or an indi- rect perception. PERCEPTION BY HEARING. The Organ of Hearing is the Ear. The ear is a complicated organ, consisting of several parts. There is first an exterior expanded appendage, contracted into a small tube, across the end of which is stretched a membrane forming the head of the tympanum, or drum of the ear. In this drum there is a series of small bones whose office it is to transmit the vibrations of the membrane. Beyond the tympanum is the laby- rinth, a convoluted chamber containing a watery fluid in which the filaments of the auditory nerve are spread out. The external ear collects the vibrations of the air caused by sonorous bodies ; these are carried through the tube to the drum of the ear ; they are then transmitted by the series of small 102 MENTAL SCIENCE. bones, and thus reach the fluid, the vibrations of which affect the auditory nerve, and thence results the sensation of sound. Direct Perception. The sense of hearing gives us the idea of sound. This idea can come from no other sense. If we were born without the sense of hearing, we could never have the idea of sound. No description or illustration could convey this idea to the mind of a person who was deaf from infancy. Sound is a sensation, and the perception of sound is the cognition of a sensa- tion. Sound itself has no existence outside and distinct from my sensation of it. Strictly speaking, sound does not exist outside of myself; there may be air-waves, but not sound. Purely Subjective. This cognition is, therefore, purely sub- jective. Not only is it subjective, but primarily I have no idea that it has any relation to an object distinct from myself. I do not know, primarily, that this sensation is caused by an external object, or that it bears any relation to such an object. Indeed, frond hearing alone I would not know that there is anything ex- ternal to myself. When I say I hear a bell, a bird, a carriage, etc., I do not, strictly speaking, hear these objects, but rather the sound made by them ; and the cognition of the object through the sound is not direct perception, but a matter of inference or judg- ment. In a secondary sense, however, the word sound is applied to the air-waves as well as to the sensation. It is transferred from its primary or subjective meaning to a secondary or objective one. Distinguish Sounds. We perceive sounds in their peculiar- ities, and distinguish them according to their differences or quali- ties. Thus we distinguish them in volume, as loud and soft, with many degrees of the same. We also distinguish them as to pitch, from very low to very high, running through five or six octaves, with all their intermediate tones. We also notice their succes- sion, which gives us rhythmic measure, the first element of music, as in the drum, and in the metre of verse. When the difference of pitch is combined with time, we have melody ; and when sev- eral sounds are heard at the same time, we perceive harmony and discord. The complete cognition of some of these distinctions probably involves other faculties than pure perception, however. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 103 Acquired Perception. Having gained a knowledge of ex- ternal objects through some of the other senses, we begin to asso- ciate these sounds with objects, and thus learn to refer particular sounds to particular objects. We learn to give objectivity to our sensations of sound, and speak of them as belonging to objects, as the song of a robin, the roar of the wind, the voice of a friehd, etc. We thus, through the sense of hearing, come to have an indirect perception of the objects of the external world. We know that the car is passing, by its sound ; that a gun was fired, by its report, etc. Associated with Ideas. We learn also to associate these sounds with certain emotions, as the sigh with sorrow, the groan with pain, the laugh with joy, etc., and to regard the sound as the expression of the emotion. We go even further than this, and form sounds to represent our ideas and thoughts, and thus com- municate with our fellow-men by means of language. Sound thus becomes the medium of communication from one soul to another ; it is, as it were, a bridge on which thought and senti" ment travel from one mind and heart to another. The soul thus embodies its thought and feeling in sound ; the wealth of spoken language is one of the marvels of science and art. Judge of Direction We learn also to judge of the direction of sounding objects from us. Whether this is an original or an acquired power has been a question ; that is, whether a child knows primarily the direction of a sounding object, or acquires the power of judging its direction. It is, no doubt, an acquired power; for if sound was not originally cognized an objective, it could not have been cognized as having direction. How we judge of the direction of sounds is a mystery ; but it is supposed by some to be due to our having two ears, and to the ability of turning the head in different directions, though this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Judge of Distance We also learn to judge of the distance of objects from us by their sound. This is evidently due to the different degrees of intensity of the sound ; the degree being 104: MENTAL SCIEXCE. noticed by our having previously associated the sound with the object and being familiar with each. The ability to judge of dis- tance and direction may be cultivated to a high degree of accur- acy. Napoleon, it is said, was seldom mistaken with respect to the direction and distance of a cannonade. The Indian of our northwestern prairies, by applying his ear to the ground, will detect the approach of a body of cavalry at a distance beyond the reach of vision, and distinguish their tread from that of a herd of buffaloes. PERCEPTION BY SIGHT. The Organ of Sight is the Eye. It is a complicated organ, consisting of two humors and a lens through which the rays of light pass to the inner surface, the back part of which is covered with a fine network expansion of the optic nerve called the retina. At the centre of the retina is a small yellow spot which is especially sensitive to light, and is chiefly employed in direct vision. The rays of light coming from an object cross one another in their progress through the eye, and form an inverted image or picture of the object on the retina. The impression of this image or picture of the object is in some mysterious way the condition of our perception of the object. Conditions of Vision. The several conditions for an act of vision are ; first, an eye with its sensitive retina ; second, an object with a certain amount of light issuing from it; third, the power of adjusting the eye to more or less light by a change in the pupil ; fourth, muscular movements in adapting the eyes to the direction and distance of the objects perceived. These circum- stances enter into the act of perceiving, and assist in explaining the process. Understanding this, we proceed to explain what we perceive through the sense of sight primarily, and what are our acquired perceptions. Sight Gives Color. First, sight gives us the sensation and per- ception of color. This idea can be obtained by no other sense ; without sight we could never have any idea of color. This idea is originally purely subjective, like that of sound. There is, of course, some peculiarity of the external object that produces this THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 105 sensation ; but what that condition is, we do not know from sight. We, of course, refer our sensation of color to objects, but whether we did so at first or not, is a question. If we had no other sense than sight, it is a question whether we would ever know that color had any relation to anything beyond or outside of ourselves. The Sensation of Color. The sensation of color is due to the action on the retina of rays of light of a different wave-length. Thus, if a certain number of waves impinge on the retina in a unit of time, the sensation is red; if about twice the number in the same time, the sensation is violet; and the other colors of the spectrum originate in a similar manner. If two or more of the simple colors of the spectrum act' upon the same spot of the retina simultaneously, it may produce the sensation of a mixed color. Some suppose that there are three kinds of nerve fibres in the retina, the excitation of which gives the three primary colors, red, green, and violet. The sensations of the other colors are produced by the different degrees in which these fibres are brought into united activity. This knowledge is given by natural philosophy, however, and not by psychology. We are not conscious, in an act of perception, of any of these facts. Extension and Form. Sight, according to our present ex- perience, gives us the cognition of extension and form. Whether this is a direct or an acquired perception is, however, a question. Is the percept of color primarily perceived as extended ? Is there a visual image in the perception of color, which the mind per- ceives as distinct from and beyond the organ of sense ? In other words, do we, by the eye, primarily perceive the extension and form of objects ? This is a difficult question to decide, and one upon which philosophers are not agreed. We shall give argu- ments on both sides of the question, and endeavor to reach a cor- rect conclusion in respect to it. Color, and not Extension. It is supposed by some that color is merely a physiological affection of the nervous organism, like sound. We do not perceive sound as extended ; and the same has been supposed to be true of color. Both these sensations are pro- 5* 106 MENTAL SCIENCE. duced by the vibrations of a medium, one of air, the other of ether : the vibrations of air affect the auditory nerve and give the sensation of sound ; the vibrations of ether affect the optic nerve and give the sensation of color. Sound is not perceived as ex- tended; what reason have we to suppose that color is? These considerations seem to lead to the conclusion that we originally perceived color without the perception of extension. Several reasons, however, may be given in favor of the perception of color as extended. Portion of the Retina. In vision a certain portion of the retina in length and breadth is affected. The picture covers a certain part of the sensitive surface of the retina, and this seems to be a condition of perceiving surface extension. In objection to this, it may be said that the same thing may be asserted of taste and smell, in which there is no perception of extension. To this we reply that in those senses an indefinite portion of the surface is affected, while in sight the picture covers a distinct and definitely marked outline. In touch I can distinguish the shape of a small object placed on the palm of my hand, perceiving whether it is round or square ; and the blind detect the shape of the letters with the ends of their fingers. So it is thought, that the delicately organized retina is susceptible to the shape of the picture upon it, and perhaps even to the shades of color which indicate solidity. Reflection from Objects. Second, the fact that light comes to us reflected from external objects in straight lines is not without weight in determining this question. Extension, surface expan- sion, seems to be the necessary condition for color; and it is diffi- cult to conceive that what we know to be a condition for the existence of color, is not given along with the perception of color. In this respect, color is entirely different from sound. Color de- pends on the size of the object, on the amount of surface expan- sion ; sound has no such dependence. The size, so to speak, of a sound, is not measured by the size of the sounding body. Increase the size of a string, and it does not necessarily increase the size of the sound ; but the extent of color varies directly with the size of the object which affords the sensation. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 107 Color and Extension Inseparable. Third, the impossibility of our conceiving of color without having an idea of it as extended seems to be a conclusive argument. I conceive of sound, flavor, etc., without any notion of extension ; but what conception can I have of color without the conception of it as extended? Can I conceive of such a conception ? can I have such a conception ? Are we not thus forced to the conclusion that color is primarily conceived as extended ? In reply to this consideration, Dr. Brown says that it is a mere habit of association, and does not prove anything. If we had always seen color associated with convexity, we would not be able to separate our idea of color from convexity. This cannot be admitted, however. If we had never experienced color except as associated with convexity, it would be an easy matter to transfer the quality to a plane surface, or to a concave surface, or to any imaginable form, just as now we can give any color to any new form that we may see, or even to a new form that we may imagine. The arguments therefore seem to be in favor of sight giving us primarily extension and figure. Trinal Extension. Sight also at present seems to give us, not only surface extension, but also trinal extension. It is a ques- tion, however, whether this is an original or an acquired per- ception. Do we by the eye originally see objects as possessing thickness as well as length and breadth? This is also a question difficult to decide. We incline to the opinion that the perception of trinal extension is acquired by experience. Primarily we per- ceive objects as having only surface extension. The trunk of a tree, for instance, would seem merely like a ribbon of light; we should not know that it had solidity. How then, we inquire, is this perception acquired? Idea How Acquired. In looking at objects we notice a varia- tion of light and shade in their appearance. At first we would not understand what this variation of light and shade means. We know the forms of these objects by touch; we then learn the meaning of this variation of light and shade in respect to form; 108 MENTAL SCIENCE. and learning to interpret light and shade, we thus learn to cognize the form of objects through sight. It is as in a painting, where, though all the colors are on a flat surface, the variations of color make things appear as if they were solid. It is probable we are aided in the perception of the solidity of objects by the varying effort and angle under which the axes of the eyes are concentrated upon different parts of the object, the parts more remote requiring a different angle from those nearer. The sense of touch is thus the schoolmaster of the eye in respect to trinal extension, and the power of perceiving it through the eye is an acquired one. Perception of Distance. We also by the eye perceive the distance of objects from us and from one another. It is a ques- tion, however, whether this is an original or an acquired percep- tion. The majority of philosophers seem to regard it as an acquired perception. Those who hold this view maintain that all that we originally perceive is the sensation of color, and that we learn by experience to refer it to objects external to ourselves. The following arguments seem to favor this view. Distance an Acquired Perception. First, it is said that facts show that sight does not give distance. What we see at first seems to be in contact with the eye, and the belief that it is not, is acquired by experience. This is said to be shown in persons operated on for cataract and restored to sight. Dr. Cheselden says that the boy from whom he removed a cataract thought at first everything he saw touched his eyes. It is also said that per- sons released from a dungeon have no perception of the distances of objects. Second, it is also adduced in favor of this position that we are often mistaken in our judgment of distances. Mont Blanc, when it first dawns on the sight, seems only a mile or two away, while it may be really twelve or fifteen miles distant. As I sit in my room, I think I see a cow feeding in the meadow, and wondering why she does not change her position, I go to the window and find that what I took for a cow in the field is really a speck on the window pane. It has been supposed that such mistakes indicate that we do not primarily perceive objects as distant. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 109 Distance a Direct Perception. There are also some considera- tions on the other side of the question. First, the fact that we do now so clearly see objects as distant from us is regarded as a proof that we did originally so see them. Second, the little child seems to reach out for things, as a burning lamp, as soon as it begins to notice anything. It does not reach up to its eyes, as we might expect it to do, if the primary cognition was a mere affec- tion of the organism. Third, the young of animals, also, as soon as they are born, seem to see things as external to themselves, and govern themselves accordingly. The chicken runs for the mother hen, and the calf follows the cow with the eye, and goes in the direction in which she is seen. Fourth, the mistakes in judging of the exact distance of objects has no bearing on the question, as it is not the exaCT distance of objects, but the fact that they are perceived as beyond ourselves and at relative distances, with which we are concerned. Idea How Acquired. If we do not primarily perceive objects as distant from us, and as relatively distant from one another, then the power of doing so is evidently an acquired one. Slowly and by a process of education in which touch plays an important part, we learn to refer the visual sensation to external objects. The intensity of light varies with the distance of a body. This variation in the intensity of light is noticed and associated with the distances of objects learned by touch, and we thus learn to judge of their distance by sight. We are also aided in this per- ception of distance by the muscular changes which adapt the lines of vision of the two eyes to the object when near or more remote. These changes may be distinctly noticed by looking at objects nearer and more remote, and observing the movements of the eye. QUESTIONS ON SIGHT. There are several questions relating to sight which naturally arise in this connection. These questions will be briefly considered. Perception of One Object. The first question is, how do we gee objects as single with two eyes? Since there are two pictures, one on each retina, it is natural to suppose we should see objects 110 MENTAL SCIENCE. double. Several answers have been given to this question. Some think that only one eye is used in vision, the office of the second being to strengthen or reinforce the first. Others hold that the mind actually perceives two objects, but passes so rapidly from one to the other that the impression is made of seeing only one. Others again teach that the impressions are carried to a common point of meeting where they are fused into one. The correct explanation, probably, is that in looking at a single object with both eyes, the centres of the retinal images fall upon the centres of the " yellow spots " of the two eyes, or upon points similarly situated to these spots, and that this is the condition of single vision, probably so learned by experience as controlled by touch. To illustrate, hold two pencils in-line before the eye six or twelve inches apart ; now while we are looking at either one, the other will be seen double, for the reason that the retinal images are not in similar parts of the eye in relation to the line of vision. Perceiving Objects Erect. Why is it that we perceive objects as erect when the images are inverted on the retina? In explanation of this question, it must be remembered that we are not conscious of the visual image in perception, but of the lumi- nous object from which the rays proceed. These objects we have found to be in a certain position by touch ; hence we cognize them in that position through the visual sensation. Again, in running the eye over an object, as a tree, from base to top, we are not con- scious of the different images on the retina, but of the muscular movements necessary to bring the parts successively on the yellow spot of the retina. We go upward for the top of a tree ; hence we cognize the top of a tree as above rather than below. These facts seem to indicate the correct explanation. Objects naturally appear to the eye in the position we have found them by touch. V. THE QUALITIES OF BODIES. In Perception we cognize, not matter itself, but the qualities of matter. Though by a law of thought we are compelled to THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. Ill assume for matter a substantive existence, yet we know it only through those peculiarities or properties which are revealed to us by the senses. These qualities of matter are various, some being perceived through one sense and some through another. They may all, however, be embraced under two general classes which have been named Primary Qualities and Secondary Qualities. The Primary Qualities. The Primary Qualities of bodies are those which are necessary to the very existence of matter, or at least to our conception of it. They are inseparably connected with matter, so that we cannot in thought divest it of these quali- ties without destroying our conception of matter. Thus, if matter exists at all, it must have extension, size, figure, etc. We cannot think these attributes away from material things, and leave the things themselves existing. Criteria of Primary Qualities. The criteria by which we deter- mine the primary qualities of bodies may be briefly stated as follows : 1. They are essential to the existence of matter. That is, mat- ter could not exist without these qualities. 2. They are known a priori, and not from experience. That is, our knowledge of them is not given by perception; they are known by intuition to be the necessary conditions for material existence. 3. They are known as such or in themselves. That is, they are known to exist independently of any effect on the nervous organ- ism. Enumeration of Primary Qualities. The Primary Qualities are Extension, Figure, Size, Divisibility, Density, and Impenetrabil- ity. Several of these qualities are subordinate to or implied in extension. Besides these, since objects exist in space, they are susceptible of Situation and Motion, which are sometimes em- braced among the primary qualities. The Secondary Qualities. The Secondary Qualities are those which are not necessary to the existence of matter, but that are accidental or contingent. They are qualities which may 112 MENTAL SCIENCE. or may not be possessed by any object. We may, by an act of thought, divest a body of any one of these attributes without de- stroying the existence of the body. To take away a primary quality is to destroy the body ; to take away a secondary quality will not destroy the body, but merely change its nature. Thus a body may or may not be hard or soft, rough or smooth, have color or fragrance, etc. Criteria of Secondary Qualities.- The criteria of the secondary qualities may be briefly stated as follows: 1. They are accidental and not essential to the existence of matter. The quality can be removed and the object still exist. 2. They are known only through experience, or a posteriori. Our knowledge of them is given by perception, and not rnerelv occasioned by perception. 3. They are known only through the affection of the senses. We cognize them through the sensation which they produce by the impression on the organism. Enumeration of Secondary Qualities. The Secondary Qualities are Hardness or Softness, Roughness or Smoothness, Solidity or Fluidity, Color, Sound, Flavor, Odor, etc. These qualities, it is seen, have a relation to our senses, and are known only through sensation. Division of Secondary Qualities. The secondary qualities consist of two classes. There are some qualities which, though only known to us through the senses, have still an existence as qualities of external objects independent of our senses. Others are known, not as qualities of bodies, but only as affections of sense. Thus hardness, roughness, weight, etc., are qualities be- longing to the bodies themselves ; while color, flavor, sound, etc., are merely affections of the senses. The former qualities are perceived in the objects ; the latter are perceived only as sen- sations. The former are objective, belonging to the object; the latter aie subjective, belonging to the sentient organism. These two classes of qualities have been appropriately distinguished as mechanical and physiological. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION. 113 The Mechanical Qualities. The first class are qualities of bodies as occupying space. They may all be included under the general category of resistance, and are thus appropriately called the mechanical properties of matter. They are distinguished from the primary qualities in that they are perceived by an affection produced in the sentient organism, and also in that they are not essential to the existence of matter. They are distinguished fronj the physiological in that they have a real objective existence, in- dependent of the affection of the organism. Enumeration of Mechanical Qualities. The mechanical quali- ties are Heavy and Light, Hard and Soft, Solid and Fluid, Bough and Smooth, Corapressible and Incompressible, Resilient and Irresilient, etc. The Physiological Qualities. The second class of the secondary qualities are the qualities of bodies as related to our sentient organism. They relate to bodies only as capable of pro- ducing certain sensations in us. As properties of bodies, they are not directly perceived, but only inferred as the supposed causes of the various affections produced in us by external objects. What we directly perceive are only the subjective affections of our senti- ent organism. When I perceive the color, smell, or taste of an orange, all that I perceive is a certain affection of my own organ- ism. Enumeration of Physiological Qualities. These physiological qualities are Color, Sound, Flavor, Odor, Temperature, Tactual Sensations, and some other affections of a similar nature. Qualities Corresponding in Objects. What the peculiar properties in the objects are which are the exciting cause of these sensations is not known. My cognition does not extend to them; I only know the effect produced in my sentient organism. Thus in the perception of sound, what I perceive is the affection of my organism, and not any quality of the sounding body. It is true that we refer the effect produced to the object as the producing cause of it, but no one can suppose that the taste of an object, for instance, is the same as the quality of the object which gives rise 114 MENTAL SCIENCE. to the taste. Since, however, we have but one name for the sen- sation and its cause, the name of the sensation is often used to denote the quality in the object. The name of the sensation is thus transferred from the affection to the property in the object producing it. It is only in this popular sense, therefore, that we may be said to perceive these qualities of objects. CHAPTER II. THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION. T PAVING explained the general character of the perceptive -1 *- powers, we now proceed to discuss the methods of giving culture to these powers. We shall speak of the Neglect of Cul- ture, the Importance of this Culture, the Difference of Perceptive Power, the Time for Culture, and the Methods of Culture. I. NEGLECT OP CULTURE. The culture of the perceptive powers is largely neglected. The powers of observation in chil- dren are not trained as they should be ; and the neglect of child- flood is perpetuated in the habits of advancing years. In fact, hardly any faculty is more neglected in our systems of education than the faculty of observation ; certainly for no one of the facul- ties of children are less provisions made for culture and training. Poor Observers. The result of this neglect is that the people of the present day are poor observers. Indeed, we perceive dis- tinctly comparatively few of the facts and phenomena of the natural world around us. Nature spreads out her facts before us in rich profusion, but we close our eyes to them or turn away from them : she places them under our feet, and we stumble over them or tread them in the dust unobserved. Having eyes we see not and ears we hear not, the interesting facts with which nature has surrounded us. Indeed, in respect to our observation of the things of the natural world, it may be truly said of us as teachers, as Christ said of the Pharisees, that we are " blind guides." Examples of the lack of observational power are to be found among all classes of persons. How large a number of young people to-day cannot explain the difference between an oak and a beech, or distinguish between granite and marble. Very few (115) 116 MENTAL SCIENCE. persons can tell the difference between the number of legs of a fly and of a spider ; and I have known farmers' boys and girls who could not tell whether the ears of a cow are in front of her horns, above her horns, below her horns, or behind her horns! Modern Education. Modern education tends to the neglect of the culture of the perceptive powers. In ancient times peo- ple studied nature much more than at present. Being without books, they were compelled to depend upon their eyes and ears for knowledge ; and this made the senses active, searching, and exact. At the present day, we study books for a knowledge of external things ; and we study them too much or too exclusively, and thus neglect the cultivation of the senses. We get our knowl- edge of the material world second-hand, instead of fresh from the open pages of the book of nature. Is it not a great mistake to spend so much time in school and j r et not know the difference between the leaf of a beech and of an oak ; or not be able to dis- tinguish between specimens of marble, quartz, and granite ? The Educated. The neglect of the culture of the perceptive powers is shown by the scholars of the present times. Very few educated men are good observers ; indeed, the most of them are sadly deficient in this respect. This arises from the fact that their perceptive powers were not trained in youth. They Avere taught to think and remember ; but they were not taught to use their eyes and ears. In modern education, books are used too much like spectacles, and the result is a blunting of the natural powers of perception. In this respect, one is reminded of the French students in the time of Napoleon who, in order to escape being drafted into the army, used spectacles to make themselves near-sighted. Our scholars have become near-sighted, like these students, by the habit of looking at nature through the printed page. The Uneducated. As illustrative of the same fact, it may be remarked that the uneducated, as a rule, are better observers than the educated. Having to depend for knowledge largely upon their senses, they acquire the habit of accurate observation. They THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION. 117 may not always be able to read books, but they learn to read the open volume of nature with an accurate eye and a sympathetic heart. The untutored Indian will trace his way through the forest by the moss on the trees, pursue his escaped captive by the broken twigs or the displaced leaves, and learn the presence of his enemies or friends by the faintest film of smoke against the sky. Mrs. Gage tells of the old negress who predicted a storm on a fair morning by "the talking of the winds and waves over there," and of the drenching shower in which the young people were caught, who, thinking they knew better than an old colored woman, did not heed her advice to remain at home. II. IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE. The importance of the culture of the perceptive powers will hardly be questioned. Still, a few remarks on the subject may be of service in impressing the idea of its value on the mind of the teacher, and induce him to make some special provisions for such culture in the instruction of the school. Basis of Knowledge. Perception, we remark first, is the basis of common knowledge. The most of our ordinary knowl- edge consists of facts which are obtained through the senses. These facts constitute the fabric of our common thought and con- versation. We talk of persons, places, and things which we have noticed knowledge which we have derived through perception. Our powers of description depend largely upon our powers of observation, for in order to describe well we must observe mi- nutely and accurately. The man of large and accurate powers of observation is usually the man of interesting facts and incidents, and makes the congenial companion or entertaining talker. Basis of Science. Perception is also the basis of science, that is, of the physical sciences. These sciences begin in facts, and rise to their classification, the causes which produce them, and the laws which govern them. The facts of these sciences are given by perception ; thought takes these facts, and weaves them into the fabric of science. Thought is the architect in the domain of science: facts are the stones and bricks with which it works. 118 MENTAL SCIENCE. Thought takes this material and builds up the temple of knowl- edge, lofty, beautiful, and grand. The great scientist must be a close and accurate observer. Linnaeus must have studied the world of facts with the keenest perception to have been able to form his artificial system of classi- fication. Cuvier was as searching in his vision as he was far- reaching in his power of grand generalization. To classify the turtles of North America, Agassiz gave days and nights to the minutest dissections and comparisons. The most careful and thorough observations are required to reach the conclusions of modern physics and astronomy. The advance of modern science is largely due to the accuracy of the observer. Use in lAterature. Careful observation is of great value even in literature. Nearly all the great writers have been close observers of nature. Homer shows a sympathetic love of the natural world, and his pages glow with beauties drawn from his observation. Shakspeare must have read the fields around Strat- ford with a loving and searching eye for their beauties, for his verse breathes of the freshness of the field and the forest. The streams ripple through his lines, the flowers blush with beauty in his similes, and the moonlight falls asleep upon fragrant banks beneath the golden stars above, while " soft stillness and the night become the touches of sweet harmony." Chaucer, Cowper, Thomson, Burns, Scott, and Dickens, were all close observers of nature; and their pages are redolent with the breath of the ver- nal landscape. If England should be sunk beneath the sea, English scenery would still live in the pages of her immortal writers. Use to the Poet and Orator. The power of perception is of great value also to the poet and orator. This thought may be emphasized by the following quotation from Mr. Emerson : " The poet, the orator, bred in the woods, whose senses have been nurtured by their fair .and appeasing changes, year after year, without design or heed, shall not lose their lessons in the roar of cities and the broil of politics. Long hereafter, amid agitation THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION. 119 and terror in national councils, these solemn images shall re- appear in their morning lustre, as fit symbols for the language of the tour. At the call of a noble sentiment, again the woods wave, the pines murmur, the river rolls and shines, and the cattle low upon the mountains, putting the spells of persuasion, the keys of power, into his hands." Facts of Interest. We should cultivate the perceptive pow- ers for the interest of the facts which they afford us. The objects of the material world are full of interest and beauty. Nature presents herself as a book to be read ; the " Book of Nature" is no unmeaning metaphor. It contains many a vivid page as inter- esting to us as a romance. In the spring-time, it is a volume bound in green and gold ; in summer it presents many a gorgeous page to our raptured vision ; while the sere and yellow leaves of autumn and the snowy pages of winter teach a never-to-be-for- gotten lesson. It is a book too that can always be read with interest by those who have learned its alphabet. How full of interest is Nature's stony book, whose pages are the everlasting rocks ! How delightful is Nature's starry book, whose pages are glittering with the jewels of the sky! The Book of Nature is no poetic fiction. Longfellow, in Lia tribute to Agassiz, says, "Then Nature, the old nurse, took The boy upon her knee, Saying, ' Here is a story book Thy Father hath written for thee !' " And he read from out the book many a tale of divine wisdom which we may now read in his translation of the divine symbols. The interest of this grand old volume may be seen in every department of nature; in the shining crystals, the blooming flowers, the buzzing insects, etc. ; and it is the teacher's duty to open the eyes of the pupils to the interesting pages of this book, and teach them to read the beautiful lesson there recorded. III. DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTIVE POWER. There is a marked difference in the perceptive powers of different indi- 120 MENTAL SCIENCE. viduals, as in the other powers of the mind. Some persons are much closer observers than others. Two persons will look at the same object, and one can tell you many things in respect to it that escaped the notice of the other. This difference appears in many facts, and is strikingly illustrated in the finding of four- leaved clovers. There are persons who have never been able to find a single specimen of clover with four leaves, while others will go out in the yard and cull them by the handful. Difference Due to Nature. Much of this difference in per- ceptive power is due to nature; minds naturally differ in the power of observation as in their other faculties. There seem to be two distinct classes of minds the perceptive mind and the reflective mind. The perceptive mind operates objectively; the reflective mind seems to bend inward and act subjectively. One is attracted by objects and is interested in things ; the other lingers among its ideas and is most interested in thoughts. Difference Due to Culture. Much of this difference, how- ever, is due to culture. The senses become sharpened by use. This is illustrated by men who are proficient in natural* science. Hugh Miller could stand by the rocky pages of his native Scot- land, and read them as accurately as we can read a book. Agas- siz would bring a grasshopper before his class and point out scores of interesting things about it, holding the attention of his audience as if he were reading from the pages of a romance. The same fact is also illustrated by the description of various things in which a person has had some interest. Thus girls will describe articles of dress much more minutely than boys ; while the latter excel in describing such objects as horses. A trained detective becomes Argus-eyed in the routine of his profession. IV. THE TIME FOR CULTURE. Youth is the time for the culture of the perceptive powers. In youth all the senses are un usually active. Life seems, as it were, to begin in the senses. Children desire to see, to hear, to feel, to handle, to examine. This activity of the senses is generally known as curiosity ; and children are often criticised for their curiosity. Parents often THE CULTURE OF PEECEPTION. 121 misunderstand this spirit, and regard it as mischief. It is not mischief, however, in any bad sense; it is merely the desire for knowledge. Little children tumble things upside down, rum- mage in bureau drawers, and do many other things annoying to their parents ; but it should be remembered that this is done in the pursuit of knowledge. The child is acquiring its educa- tion, and is learning faster than when it goes to school or college. Duty of Teachers. Parents and teachers should gratify this curiosity in children. It is the voice of nature and should be heeded. Teachers could often sit at the feet of nature and learn lessons of her in the education of the young. Children are often kept in school, studying the dry pages of text-books, when they should be out conning the more attractive pages on which the hand of nature has written her countless lessons of interest and beauty. The ability to read the book of nature correctly is worth more to many persons than the power to peruse the pages of a school reader. A most valuable part of education consists in that training which gives the power of wresting from nature her stores of knowledge. The power to acquire for ourselves, as well as to understand and remember what has been acquired, is one of the grand ends of culture. V. METHODS OF CULTURE. Having spoken of the import- ance and neglect of the culture of the perceptive powers, we shall now give a few directions in respect to the methods by which these powers may be cultivated. The subject is a broad one, and would require a volume to give it adequate develop- ment. Only a few general statements can be made in this place. Cultivated by Exercise. The perceptive powers can be cul- tivated by exercise. Exercise is the great law of culture. This law is universal; all development comes from exercise. The law applies to both body and mind. The arm of the laborer and the leg of the pedestrian become strong by use. Neglect exercise and we lose power, either mental or physical. Put the arm in a sling, and it becomes weak ; let the mind be inactive, and it be- comes imbecile and incapable of exertion. 6 122 MENTAL SCIENCE. Illustration. To train the perceptive powers, therefore, they must be exercised. By exercise the eye of the sailor perceives a vessel in the far distant horizon which a landsman can hardly see with a spy-glass. A watchmaker can detect a slight injury to the delicate works of the watch, while another would be un- able to see anything wrong with it. Persons whose business it is to test the qualities of teas by tasting them become so skillful that they can distinguish hundreds of varieties. It is said that the tasters of liquors become so expert that they can tell where the grapes grew out of which the wines or brandies were made. The reading of the blind with their raised letters also illustrates what a delicacy can be acquired by the sense of touch. Should be Judicious. This exercise should be judicious in kind and quantity. The objects observed should be adapted to the age and capacity of the pupils. They should be such as to attract the attention and please and interest the mind. The mind should not be overtaxed nor wearied in the work; too much exercise may blunt the senses instead of improving them. By using the fingers with lack of care, the blind may impair the delicacy of the finger-tips in reading the raised letters. The tasters of liquors must be temperate men to preserve that nice sense by which they distinguish the fine shades of difference be- tween the varioxis brands of the importers. Observe with Attention. We should acquire the habit of observing with attention. Many persons look at objects with a careless, inattentive eye. We should guard against the habit of careless looking. We should fix the mind upon the object before us; we should concentrate the attention upon that at which we are looking. Attention, in respect to perception, has been com- pared to a burning-glass : hold the sun-glass between the sun and a board, and the concentrated rays will burn a hole through the latter. So attention concentrates the rays of perceptive power and enables the mind to penetrate below the surface of things. Illustration. The difference between attentive and inatten- tive observation is readily illustrated by the habits of indi- THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION. 123 viduals. People observe with most attention those things in which they have the most interest. Some people coming from church, can tell you the text, the divisions of the sermon, and are able to repeat a portion of the discourse. Others can tell you who were at church, what dress or bonnet Mrs. Smith wore, and who had on something in the newest style or fashion. The story of the lost camel and the dervish, found in many of our school readers, presents a striking illustration of attentive ob- servation. Observe Minutely. To train the powers of observation we should practice observing minutely. We should analyze the ob- jects which we look at into their parts, and notice these parts. Objects present themselves to us as wholes ; our definite knowl- edge of them is gained by analysis, by separating them into the elements which compose them. We should therefore give atten- tion to the details of whatever we are considering; and thus cul- tivate the habit of observing with minuteness. Illustration. A few illustrations of minute observation may serve to impress what is meant. We all recognize the faces of our friends ; but how few of us can describe them. Some per- sons, however, after meeting a man but a single time, will tell the color of the hair, the color of the eyes, the side on which the hair is parted, the peculiarities of mouth, nose, cheek, etc., describing each feature and peculiarity with minuteness. The same is true in respect to the dress of ladies and gentlemen. It is related of a teacher that if, when hearing a class, some one rapped at the door, he would look up as the visitor entered and from a single glance could tell his appearance and dress, the kind of hat he wore, kind of neck-tie, collar, vest, coat, shoes, etc. The skillful banker, also, in counting money with wondrous rapidity, will detect and throw from his pile of bills the counterfeits which, to the ordinary eye, seem to be without spot or blemish. Object Lessons. The perceptive powers are cultivated by means of Object Lessons. The design of object lessons is twofold, culture and knowledge. The primary object, however, is the 124: MENTAL SCIENCE. culture of the senses. The method of imparting this culture is to teach, not with books, but with the real objects, with things which pupils can see and handle for themselves. We should require pupils to discover facts for themselves. There should be an "observation class" in every school. In this way pupils may be taught to observe the facts of nature and acquire the power of quick and accurate perception. By Draiviiiff. The art of Drawing is well adapted to give culture to the perceptive powers. This art requires us to look closely at objects, to examine them in detail, and to acquire dis- tinct and definite ideas of them. Thus, let a person who has not had any practice in drawing attempt to outline a state or country of which he thinks he has a very correct idea, and he will realize how much more closely he must examine it than he has done in the ordinary study of geography. So, in drawing a leaf of the maple or oak or beech, one will be surprised at the increased accuracy of observation required. The study of drawing is there- fore adapted to train to habits of close and minute observation. By Natural Hisfo //. The study of Natural History will also give culture to the power of perception. This is evident from the nature of these sciences. They deal with facts, and in study- ing them we must observe these facts for ourselves. To become skilled in these sciences it is necessary to examine closely plants, animals, and minerals, to become familiar with their form, color, structure, peculiarities, etc. This gives constant exercise to the perceptive faculties, and secures the habit of careful and attentive observation. In proof of the value of these studies, we find that naturalists are close and minute observers. Agassiz, as already stated, would take a grasshopper and discourse for hours on the beauties and wonders of its structure and habits; and Hugh Miller could read the history of creation in the hieroglyphics of nature found in the Old Red Sandstone of Scotland. Formulas for Observation. The perceptive powers, when naturally poor, may be aided by a formula for observation. By a formula for observation is meant a systematic outline or ar- THE CULTURE OF PERCEPTION". 125 rangement of things which are worth observing. Such a formula would be, of great value to one who does not observe closely. It suggests to him what he should look at, and examine carefully, and will enable him to remember what he has seen. A formula similar to the following is suggested for a traveller: f f 1. Land and Water. 2 1. Physical Features. ^ ' Formula for a Traveller. L4. Minerals. "1. Looks. 2. Language. 3. Dress. 2. The People. 4. Manners. 5. Morals. 6. Education. .7. Employment. {1. Dwellings. 2. Churches. o. school-nouses. 4. Public Buildings. SPECIAL, LESSONS. In our schools there should be special lessons arranged to give culture to all the senses. Such lessons come appropriately under the head of Object Lessons. Every public school should be furnished with objects suitable to give such instruction and culture ; and teachers should not neglect so important a duty. Sense of Touch. The sense of touch should be trained so as to detect the texture of cloth, the quality of flour, the shape of objects, etc. Great skill can be obtained in this way. The ex- perienced merchant can tell the quality of goods by his delicate touch, and the miller knows the quality of his flour by feeling it. The sense of muscular resistance, in estimating the weigh of ob- jects, should also be cultivated. With a little practice, the weight of books, chairs, and other objects, even to the fraction of tin ounce, can be determined by "hefting them." Sense of Siff Jit. The sense of sight should also receive care- ful training. First the pupil should be trained to distinguish all the primary and secondary colors; and afterwards he should be drilled on their different shades and tints. Exercises in the 126 MENTAL SCIENCE. harmony of colors, and their application to dress, the furnishing of rooms, etc., would be of great value to the student. Much may be done in this way to sharpen the eye and increase the delicacy and accuracy of vision. The teacher should find out all who are color-blind, either partly or totally, and make an effort to remedy this defect. The weight of objects, horses, cattle, and even of persons, can be told within a few pounds by the sight when it is properly trained. Sense of Hearing. The sense of hearing should also receive training. The pupil should be exercised upon the sounds of the musical scale until the various skips can be readily told. The practice of naming the notes struck on the organ or piano is also a good drill. Pupils should be encouraged to listen to the songs of birds, so that they can distinguish one from another and de- scribe them. Every bird of the forest or meadow should be known by its song. The noises of insects also afford a good sub- ject for the exercise of hearing. Every person should be familiar with a large list of words which indicate the various sounds, and have clear ideas of the differences of these sounds. Smell and Taste. It might be well also to give some culture to the goosser senses of smell and taste. It would be well if each person was familiar with the principal odors so that he could de- tect and name them. In some kinds of business, such skill is in- valuable. A refined sensibility in respect to perfumes is also of value in cultivated society. The ability to detect different flavors is also not unworthy of some general culture. In certain kinds of business, as the selection of teas, it becomes a necessity. Conclusion.- In conclusion it is suggested that teachers should appreciate the value of the culture of the perceptive powers, and endeavor to do something to afford this culture. Let it be remembered that by training the powers of observation of pupils we lead them to acquire definite ideas of things, enable them to store their minds with fresh and interesting knowledge, lay the foundation for literary or business success, and thus do much to enhance their happiness in life and add to the sum of human knowledge. THE MEMORY. CHAPTER L THE NATURE OF THE MEMORY. THE MEMORY is that faculty of the mind by which we retain and recall knowledge. It is the power by which we are en- abled to hold fast to our mental acquisitions and recall them to mind when we wish to use them. The power of holding knowl- edge is called Retention ; the power of reproducing knowledge ia called Recollection. The Term Memory. The term Memory is derived from the Latin memor, mindful. It is used by some writers as identical with retention ; thus they speak of a strong memory and a tardy recollection. This distinction in the use of the term, however, is not correct; the term memory is properly used to embrace the entire faculty of retaining and recalling. Elements of Memory. As thus denned, the Memory seems to embrace but two elements ; those of retention and recollection. There are, however, two other elements which enter into an act of memory; namely, representation and recognition. The mind not only retains and recalls knowledge, but it presents it in the form of pictures and recognizes it as a part of its past experi- ence. There are thus four elements hi the faculty of Memory ; Retention, Recollection, Representation, and Recognition. Elements Distinguished. These four elements, though usually united in a complete act of the memory, are both logic- ally and psychologically distinguished. It is one act or power of the mind to retain knowledge, another to call it up out of un- (127) 128 MENTAL SCIENCE. consciousness, another to hold it in the mind in the form of vivid pictures, and still another to recognize the object pictured as a matter of previous experience. The closest relation seems to exist between recollection and representation ; indeed, it may be asked whether what is recalled is not necessarily represented. It is manifest, however, that the capacity or energy to recall is not identical with the power by which we represent what is re- called. All the four elements, though intimately related, pre- sent distinct mental acts and indicate distinct mental capacities or energies. Different Views of Memory. Some writers treat the entire subject under the head of Kepresentation, regarding retention and recollection, not as elements of the faculty of Memory, but merely as conditions of representation. These writers usually regard the representative element as performing two offices the representing of both the old and the new and thus as embrac- ing the memory and the imagination. Others, holding the same general view, ignore retention even as a condition of recollection or representation. Others, again, seem to regard mental repro- duction as the principal element in the faculty, and refer to repre- sentation and recognition as merely incidental to it. The correct view seems to be to give each one" of the four elements a distinct place in the faculty. Hamilton's Vieiv. Sir William Hamilton regards the first three elements as so entirely distinct that he treats them as dis- tinct faculties, naming them the Conservative, the Reproductive, and the Representative powers. The fourth element, that of recognition, seems to have escaped his notice, as he does not dis- cuss it nor refer to it. Under the Representative power, he in- cludes the power of forming exact transcripts of past experience, and also the power of representing the new, or the Imagination. THE ELEMENTS OF MEMORY. The Memory, as we have explained, embraces four distinct elements Retention, Recollection, Representation, and Recogni- THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 129 tion. We now proceed to discuss each one of these elements in detail. I. RETENTION. Retention is the power by which we retain knowledge. It holds fast to that which we have acquired, and prevents its escaping from the mind. It is a conservative ele- ment; it conserves or preserves knowledge, not in but out of consciousness. Sir William Hamilton calls it the Conservative power of the mind, and treats ft as a distinct faculty, coordinate with Perception, Recollection, etc. To What Compared. The element of retention may be com- pared to a mental storehouse in which we store away our knowl- edge until we wish to- use it. It has also been compared to a treasury in which we place our ideas and thoughts for preserva- tion. The ancient writers compared it to a tablet on which characters were stamped or engraved. Gassendi likens it to a piece of cloth or paper which is capable of receiving numerous folds, a~nd retains those longest in which it has been oftenest laid. These comparisons, however, are merely illustrations of the faculty, and do not philosophically explain it. Method of Retaining. How knowledge is retained in the mind, it is difficult, if not impossible, to explain. Yet that it should not be retained, is equally difficult to understand. Ham- ilton says that "the problem most difficult of solution is not how a mental activity endures, but how it vanishes." It may be said that our ideas are not retained in the sense in which a hook re- tains a hat or coat ready to be taken down when wanted. We are not to conceive the mind to be a convenient receptacle in which all manner of thoughts and feelings may be stored away, like guns in an armory, or old clothes in the clothes-press. What we mean by the mind being retentive is the power by which it pre- vents knowledge from vanishing away so that it may reproduce what it has once known. Objections to Retention. Some authors discard the element of retention, considering the memory merely as a reproducing power. The reason for this view is that whatever energy the 6* 130 MENTAL SCIENCE. mind possesses in respect to retaining knowledge, it exercises, not in but out of consciousness. Even Sir William Hamilton, who raises the element into the importance of a distinct faculty, says, " Retention is a condition of representation ; and it is only by an extension of the term that it can be called a faculty, that is, an active power." " It is more a passive resistance than an energy, and ought, therefore, perhaps to receive rather the appellation of a capacity." Dr. Porter says that the doctrine of a retentive faculty is purely figurative. Reasons for Retention. Notwithstanding these views, there seem to be good reasons for regarding the mind as possessing the power to retain knowledge, and thus as embracing an element of retention. In favor of this view several considerations will be presented. First, the phenomenon of retention is natural, on the ground of the self-energy of the mind. The possibility of the conservation of the activities of the mind is involved in the conception of the power of self-activity. Second, the power to retain is implied in the power to recall. If there were no power to hold knowledge, how could there be any reproduction of knowledge? If nothing were retained in the mind, there would be nothing to recall. I cannot recall that which was never in the mind. Third, the power to retain is implied in the common expression "commit to memory." We commit our ideas and thoughts to something that takes charge of and preserves them. Fourth, consciousness shows that the operation of trying to fix a thing in the mind and the recalling of it are quite different. The effort to commit is not the same as the effort to recall. In one case we seem to work from without inward ; in the other from within outward. Fifth, this distinction is sustained by many eminent philosophers. Plato considered the memory merely as the faculty of conservation. Aristotle distinguished memory as the faculty of reproduction. Sir William Hamilton regards it as a distinct faculty coordinate with recollection. And many of those philosophers who discard it in their formal state- THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 131 ments, unconsciously acknowledge its existence by the use of such expressions as a "tenacious memory," etc. Hamilton's Argument. Hamilton's argument in favor of retention will be briefly stated. We are conscious of certain cognitions as acquired, and we are conscious of these cognitions as resuscitated. That in the interval, when out of conscious- ness, these cognitions do continue to subsist, is an hypothesis which we are not only warranted but necessitated to establish. The sphere of our conscious modification is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion. Thus in sight we may not be conscious of all the minute parts of an ob- ject, but these together make up the object of vision. In hear- ing, the noise of each wave may not be heard, but the sum of these unheard noises makes up the murmur of the sea of which we are conscious. Thus there are latent modifications of con- sciousness of which we are unconscious. Physiological Explanations. Some of the older writers endeavored to explain the phenomena of retention by various physiological hypotheses, as for example, the hypotheses of per- manent material impressions on the brain, or of permanent dis- position in the nervous fibres to repeat the same oscillatory movements, or of particular organs for the different functions of memory, or of particular parts of the brain as repositories of the various classes of ideas, or of a particular fibre as the instrument of every several notion. But all these suppositions are useless, and show an ignorance of the true nature of the mind. The act of retention is a psychical and not a physiological one, and is due to the inherent energy of the self-active spirit. II. RECOLLECTION. Recollection is the power by which we recall knowledge. It brings knowledge, which has been lying dormant in the mind, into consciousness, and enables us to re- know what we have previously experienced. Hamilton calls, it, a resuscitative power; it resuscitates or brings to life that which seems to lie buried in unconsciousness. Knowledge lies. sleeping, as it were, in the tomb of unconsciousness ; Recollection awakens it and calls it forth into life. 132 MENTAL SCIENCE. Illustration. The action of the Recollection can be readily il- lustrated. Thus a word, a strain of music, the face of a friend, which I do not now think of, may be recalled to mind so that I have a vivid conception of them. The word Niagara is spoken, and lo, before my mind rises a picture of the grand cataract the rushing torrent, the deep plunge of water, the deafening roar, the cloud of mist rising out of and hanging over the abyss, and the graceful rainbow crowning all with its glorious arch of beauty. Relation to Retention. The relation of the two elements, Retention and Recollection, may be readily seen. Retention holds knowledge; Recollection brings it forth out of unconscious- ness into consciousness. Retention may be compared to a store- house in which knowledge is placed for safe-keeping ; and Recol- lection to an errand-boy that is sent in to bring out what is needed. Retention may be likened to a well in which are pre- served the streams of knowledge which flow therein ; and Recol- lection to the bucket which is let down to bring up the knowl- edge as we wish to use it. The former is a condition for the latter; the latter is the complement of the former. Unequal 'in Degree. Retention and Recollection seldom exist in equal degrees in the same mind. This difference is due partly to nature and partly to culture. Some minds are quick and ready; what they know seems to be always at the surface, or, as we say, " on the end of the tongue." Other minds are slow to recall what they know, and usually reproduce the past with conscious effort. The ready memory is often not very tenacious, while the slow memory is usually strong in its hold on its facts. The pupil that commits a lesson readily may forget it in a day or two; the student who acquires with labor often retains much longer. "Easy come, easy go," we often find to be as true of knowledge as of money. The study of facts, committing of verbal lessons, frequent use of knowledge in conversation all these tend to increase the readiness of the memory. The neglect of facts, lack of conversation, the study of principles, etc., tend to produce tardiness of the memory. THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 133 Voluntary and Involuntary. Recollection operates both involuntarily and voluntarily. One thought may succeed another without any voluntary purpose on the part of the person ; every one is familiar with the train of thought in which ideas and images seem to chase one another through the mind. Our thoughts may also be called out of unconsciousness by a direct and intentional effort of the will. The former is called invol- untary or spontaneous recollection ; the latter has been called by some writers reminiscence, or recollection proper. Possibility of Recalling. The possibility of voluntary re- collection has been questioned. How can we, it is asked, seek in the memory for, or try to recall, that of which we have no re- collection ? Does not the fact that we will to recall anything imply that we have already remembered what we wish to remem- ber? This has been regarded as a philosophical puzzle; but it is so only to the philosopher who rejects the element of retention. The simple fact is that we are conscious of having acquired some- thing which is not now in consciousness, but which we are trying to recall out of unconsciousness into consciousness. Thus, suppose I have for the moment forgotten a name, and try to recall it ; the effort to recall implies that I am conscious that I have retained the name and believe that I can recall it. III. REPRESENTATION. In an act of memory we not only retain and recall, but there is also a representation of that which we recall. The object or event stands out before the mind in the form of an image or picture, or in some mental product, corres- ponding to the original experience. The power that thus repre- sents knowledge is called the representative element of the memory. Illustration. To illustrate this element, suppose I recall my boyhood's home. I see it as clearly in my " mind's eye " as I did when a boy with the eye of sense. It stands before my mind as a picture, its yard, garden, orchard, and fields, the old barn witli its hay-mow, stables, etc. I see it all again as distinctly as if I were at the spot looking upon it, father, mother, sister, brother, 134 MENTAL SCIENCE. the companions of my youth, and the sports of childhood, all these pass before my mental vision like the pictures in a pano- rama. Relation to Recollection. The act of representation, though closely related to, is distinct from the act of recollection. The one is a drawing out process, a recalling something out of uncon- sciousness into consciousness ; the other is a representation of that which is recalled. Recollection is a condition of representation ; we must first recall before we can represent. That which is represented was first retained by the conservative energy of the mind ; it was then recalled out of consciousness by the reproduc- tive power; the elements thus recalled are constructed into a picture or into some form corresponding to the original cognition. It is not assumed that knowledge is retained as a picture, and re- stored as a picture ; but that it is recreated in the form of a pic- ture or some other mental product when it is recalled. Relation to Imagination. The representative element gives us an exact transcript of the past. In this respect it differs from Imagination, which combines our mental images of the past into new products. Sir Wm. Hamilton regards the representative element in memory and imagination as the same power differently applied. He treats it as a distinct faculty with the two offices, that of representing the actual and also the ideal. The latter, in connection with comparison, he regards as the power which writers call the Imagination. The truth is, the memory and the imagination both employ a representative element; one repre- sents the actual, the other the ideal. Not Restricted to Pictures. The representative element in memory is not restricted to the representation of pictures. It em- braces the entire domain of mental activity. The products of all the senses, indeed every product of the mind, may be recalled and represented. Thus, we can conceive of a sound, as well as an object of sight. The music we have heard comes floating through the mind as distinctly as if we were at present listening to it. We may also conceive of a feeling, a flavor, a perfume, etc., which THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 135 have been objects of past experience. We may also recall and represent an abstract or general idea, a thought, a process of reasoning, etc. Every mental product that may be retained and recalled, may be represented, that is, may be re-conceived. Every conception which the mind forms of a past experience or former mental product is regarded as due to the representative element of the memory. The Object of Representation. What is the object given in the act of representation ? What is the nature of that which is represented ? A general remark has already been made on this subject ; but to give a clear and definite conception of it, we shall consider the matter somewhat in detail. A Mental Object. The object given in representation is a men- tal object. It is not a real object which we remember, but some- thing of the mind's own creation. It is thus a mental and not a material object that is the product of the representative power. It is a product of the mind, and has a psychological, but not a material existence ; it exists in and for the soul alone. As such, it is not only a product of the mind, but an object for the mind to contemplate and recognize. A New Object. The object given in representation is a new object. It is not an old experience repeated, but a new represen- tatioiTof an old experience. The mental object given in represen- tation is neither a material object nor an old percept of an object ; but a new mental product of a transcript more or less exact of the object or percept. It is a re-creation or re-production of some- thing we have experienced before; but not the same identical experience. Experience of Sense. The representative power may operate in the domain of each one of the senses. Its most vivid conceptions are those of sight, where the product is in the form of a picture with distinct outline, color, etc. But it may also represent a sound, as the note of a bird, the voice of a friend, or a remem- bered strain of music. It can also represent a flavor, a fragrance, the sensation of warmth or cold, etc. Though the primary idea 136' MENTAL SCIENCE. of representation is that of images, yet in a larger sense the re- membered product of every sense is a representation. Other Products. The representative power operates in the do- main of the understanding also. Our ideas and thoughts are not only recalled, but are also held up before the mind in distinct conceptions. In the larger sense of the term, both abstract and general ideas are represented; so also are truths, judgments, trains of reasoning, etc., which may be recalled to mind. In the same sense, the higher intuitive ideas and truths, the emotions and volitions, are held before the mind by this element of the memory. As we have before stated, every product of the mind, every object of consciousness that is recalled, may be represented in a form corresponding to the primary experience. An Intellectual Object. The mental object in representation is an intellectual object. Whatever is recalled and represented is thus recreated by an act of the intellect whether it be an idea, an emo- tion, or a volition. We can recall and represent an act of the intellect, or of the sensibilities, or of the will; each of these is an experience originally known by consciousness, and as such may be recalled and represented to the mind ; but in this representa- tion there is an intellectual act; and the representation before the mind of the emotion or volition is itself an intellectual product. The product of representation is thus intellectual in its nature. A feeling or volition is converted into a product of the intellect in the act of its being recalled and represented. IV. RECOGNITION. The three elements of the memory now considered, provide for the retaining, the recalling, and the repre- senting of past experience. An act of memory is not completed, however, until the image, or mental product, recalled and repre- sented, is recognized as pertaining to our past experience. The mind not only recalls and represents its products ; but it knows them as transcripts or representations of some former act or affec- tion of consciousness. It recognizes them as things or representa- tions of things it has known before ; and this act of recognition completes an act of memory. THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 137 An Act of Knowledge. The act of recognition is an act of knowledge; it is a knowing of the mental object represented. Indeed, there is a kind of dual act of knowing. That which is recalled and represented is known, not only in itself as a mental product, but also in relation to my experience at some previous time. I know the thing that is before my mind, and know it also as a something of previous cognition. Thus, in recalling a per- son or a tree, I not only know them as objects, but know them also as objects previously perceived by me. The same is true of a mental act or a feeling. I cognize them as replaced in thought, and I also cognize them as a previous experience of conscious- ness. Importance of Recognition. The importance of this act of recognition will be readily seen. Without it we could not distin- guish between the products of memory and imagination. Images of my previous perceptions may arise out of the background of the past, picture after picture may be represented on the mental canvas ; how am I to know whether they are products of memory or creations of the imagination ? Only as I recognize them as facts of past experience. The landscape before my mind is recognized as one which I previously saw : it is a product of memory. The ideal image before my mind is not recognized as a fact of my past eyperience; it is a product of imagination. The act of recognition is thus the crowning act of memory. Indeed, it is pot merr.o'ry in its full and complete sense until the object recalled is teftogaized and receives the stamp of previous experience. A Subjective Element. The element of recognition adds the element of self to the mental object. It links the subjective ele- ment to the objective. Besides the cognition of a mental image or product, there is the cognition of ourselves as related to it in time and place. We not only know the object as recalled, but we know ourselves as perceiving that of which it is a copy, and the circumstances under which it was originally perceived. All the circumstances may not be known ; but usually several of them are distinctly recalled, and we know ourselves as making the original cognition in these circumstances. 18 MENTAL SCIENCE. Operates With Objects. The element of recognition operates with respect to a new percept of an old object, as well as with a recalled representation of it. Thus a thing seen or heard the second time is recognized as having been seen or heard before. The man I meet to-day I recognize as the man I met yesterday ; and the melody I hear to-day is known to be the same that I heard a week ago at the opera. A repeated perception of an object is thus recognized, as well as a mental representation of the perception of the object. Varies in Certainty. This recognition may be more or less distinct and positive. Our knowledge in memory may vary from the most distinct and positive cognition to the vaguest and most uncertain impressions. All the circumstances may stand out clearly before the mind the time when, the place where, the events just before and after, the adjacent and surrounding objects; or these things may be only partly remembered, and confusion and uncertainty exist in the mind. This uncertainty may be so great that we may sometimes distrust our own recollections. Uncertainty May Diminish. This uncertainty may often be reduced to a less degree, or even changed to certainty. This may be done by a review of and meditation upon the circum- stances. We try to recall some of the details, we search among the circumstances, we meditate upon the subject, and thus try to "refresh our memory." We may even reason about the matter, bringing our judgment to bear in aiding the memory. The ob- ject which was first vaguely recalled, now begins to stand out distinctly and vividly before the mind. A moment ago we thought it was so and so ; now we are positive that it was. All doubt has vanished, and we are as confident in our recognition as we are in the truth of an axiom. We may thus often pass from a condition of doubt in respect to the revelations of the memory, to one of entire certainty. Recognition Not Comparison. The recognition of a mental product is not an act of comparison. At first thought it may eeem as if we compared the mental product given in representa- THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 139 tion with some previous product of the mind. This, however, is not possible. There is only one object in consciousness in an act of memory ; and thus there is nothing with which to compare it. In order for a comparison to be made, there must be at least two objects in the mind. It might seem possible to compare a present material object with our recollection of it; but even in the mere perception of an object the recognition is immediate. In an act of memory the recognition is an act of knowledge direct and im- mediate, and not the result of comparison. Element of Belief. The element of recognition is attended with belief. We believe what we recognize as a fact of previous experience to be so. Dr. Reid says, " This belief, which we have from distinct memory, we account real knowledge, no less certain than if it was grounded on demonstration ; no man, in his wits, calls it in question, or will hear any argument against it. The testimony of witnesses in cases of life and death depends upon it, and all the knowledge of mankind of past events is built on this foundation. There are cases in which a man's memory is less distinct and determinate, and where he is ready to allow that it may have failed him ; but this does not in the least weaken its credit, when it is perfectly distinct." The Importance of Memory. On this subject Dr. Haven makes the following judicious remarks: "The importance of memory as a power of the mind, is shown by the simple fact, that, but for it, there could be no consciousness of continued existence, none of personal identity, for memory is our only voucher for the fact that we existed at all at any previous moment. Without this faculty, each separate instant of life would be a new existence, isolated, disconnected with aught before or after; nay, there would, in that case, scarcely be any consciousness of even the present existence, for we are conscious only as we are cognizant of change, says Hamilton, and there is involved in it the idea of the latest past along with the present. / Memory then is essential to all intelligent mental action, whether intellectual, sensational, or voluntarv. The ancients seem to have been aware of- this, when 140 MENTAL SCIENCE. they gave it the name ^w?//? (from ^v^oj-, /Ltvao^ai'), appellations of the mind itself, as being, in fact, the chief characteristic faculty of the mind." THE LAWS OF MEMORY. Having explained the elements which enter into an act of mem- ory, we are now prepared to consider the laws by which the mem- ory operates. These laws pertain particularly to the operation of the first two elements, Retention and Recollection. I. NATURE OF THE LAWS. By. the Laws of Memory, we mean the regular mode or order according to which the memory operates. The thoughts which we retain and recall are not re- tained and recalled by chance. The memory is not a lawless activity, doing its work in a hap-hazard sort of way. There is a reabon why one thing is remembered rather than another, and this system or order by which the faculty operates is what we mean by the Laws of Memory. We shall first speak of the Laws of Recollection. Law of Association. -All the laws of recollection are em- braced under the principle of the Association of Ideas. Nearly every idea or thought that arises in the mind is connected, directly or indirectly, with some previous idea or thought. The relation may be immediate or remote ; but some connection there usually is between a mental product now present to the mind, and some mental product which preceded it. This mental product previously in the mind is supposed to be the cause or occasion of the idea or thought now present to the mind. The fact that one idea or thought thus tends to awaken some other idea or thought, implies a law of mental activity, which has been called the Law of Association. Basis of Recollection. This law of association is the basis of mental reproduction. One idea or feeling in the mind calls up some other idea or feeling with which it is in some way related. Our ideas seem, as it were, to be tied together by the invisible thread of association, so that as one comes up out of unconscious- ness, it draws another with it. Thoughts seem to exist somewhat THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 141 in clusters like the grapes of a bunch, so that in bringing out one, we bring the entire cluster with it. This fact explains Avhat we mean by a "train of thought;" one thought after another conies before the mind like the cars of a railroad train, each being united or coupled to its fellow by the tie of association. The law of association is thus the tie, the thread, the golden links, by which our thoughts are united in an act of reproduction. Source of All Recollection. Whether all mental reproduc- tion is in accordance with this law is a question. In other words, it is a question whether purely spontaneous memory is possible ; memory independent of the law of association. Does any idea or thought ever occur to the mind not suggested by some previous idea or thought? Writers on mental science usually teach us that spontaneous memory is not possible. An eminent writer says, " Every thought which occurs to the mind is connected with and suggested by something which preceded it." Another writer says, " What is recalled at any moment .... is always recalled by means of the cognitions and feelings which the soul possessed the moment previous." Recollection Spontaneous. This view is not regarded as correct. Reproduction without the law of association is believed to be possible. The memory may act with pure spontaneity, and something arise out of unconsciousness that was not suggested by some previous idea or thought. Further, it is here maintained that not only is this true of spontaneous memory, but that we can, by a direct effort of the will, revive some past experience, independently of the law of association. The mind usually acts in accordance with the law of association; but it is not a slave to this law. The mind is a free spirit, and can snap the chain of association, turn the current of thought into a new channel, or start a new train of thought at its will. The Term Suggestion. The term suggestion is preferred by some writers to that of association. It is claimed that the phrase " association of ideas " implies that the ideas have previously co- existed in the mind, and that the one recalls the other on account 142 MENTAL SCIENCE. of that previous coexistence. Such a previous association is not always a fact; one idea will suggest another with which it has never been previously associated. An object seen for the first time will remind me of some other object, though the two could never, by the supposition, have been previously associated. It is thus held that one idea suggests another by virtue of some law of the mind, and that the proper expression is the law of suggestion rather than the law of association. Association Preferred. It must be admitted that thoughts excite or recall one another without a previous association. But in such cases there will be found some relation between them ; and the term association is used to express this relation, and does not mean to assert invariably a previous association. The most of our thoughts, however, do occur through the principle of pre- vious association ; and this seems to be the underlying principle of all reminiscence. Besides this, the expression "laAV of associa- tion" has become established by the usage of philosophers, and it would need much stronger objections than the one stated to set it aside. Law of Relation of Ideas. This general principle or law of association is based on the broader principle of relation ; and it would probably be most accurate to say that the memory operates by the principle of the relation of ideas. The principal relations concerned in an act of recollection are the following ; Similarity, Contrast, Cause and Effect, Contiguity in Time and Place. These four relations are usually known as the Primary Laws of Memory. II. PRIMARY LAWS OF MEMORY. The Primary Laws of Memory are those which act or tend to act universally with all persons. They are especially the laws of reproduction, though they also aid in the retaining of knowledge. These laws have been usually regarded as four; namely, Similarity, Contrast, Cause and Effect, Contiguity in Time and Place. A brief dis- cussion of each of these laws will be presented. Law of Similarity. It is a law of the memory that similar THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 143 objects of thought tend to recall one another. This law is often expressed, " like reminds us of like." Illustrations of the law will occur to every mind. Thus a person I meet on the street reminds me of a similar person I may have met years before ; a farm-house reminds me of the home of my childhood ; one tune recalls to mind a tune similar to it ; the landscape near my home calls to mind a similar landscape that I saw in a foreign tour, etc. So sounds will suggest similar sounds, colors similar colors, tastes similar tastes, etc. Similarity not Complete. In these cases it is not necessary that the similarity be complete. A single point of resemblance is sufficient to awaken the conception of objects in other respects quite dissimilar. A person with blue eyes may remind me of another person with blue eyes, while in other respects they may be entirely unlike each other. A single feature of a landscape, a tree, a rock, or a grove will bring before the mind the pic- ture of another landscape widely different in all other respects. "An article of dress," as Haven says, "peculiar to the Eliza- bethan age, or to the court of Louis XIV., reminds us of the lordly dames and courtiers, or gallant warriors, of those periods." Law of Contrast. It is a law of the memory, that dissimilar objects of thought tend to recall one another. Thus cold re- minds us of heat, light of darkness, joy of sorrow, sickness of health, the splendor of wealth of the wretchedness of poverty, etc. On the same principle, the giant reminds us of the dwarf and the dwarf of the giant, the white man of the negro and the negro of the white man. The greater the extremes, the more efficiently the law operates ; as a very long nose reminds us of a very short one, a very dark complexion of a very light one, a very slender person of a very stout one, a very homely person of a very beauti- ful one. Cause and Effect. It is a law of the memory that things re- lated as cause and effect suggest one another. This law operates in both directions ; that is, the cause may suggest the effect and the effect the cause. Thus the knife will remind us of the wound 144 MENTAL SCIENCE. made by it, and the wound will remind us of the knife. Fire makes us think of heat and heat of fire ; slavery suggests the civil war and the civil war, slavery ; taxes recall the war of the Revo- lution and the Revolution, taxes. Even a cup of tea may awaken the memory of the struggles of our forefathers in their overthrow of the power of the mother country. What the Law Embraces. This law embraces all relations similar to cause and effect, including secondary causes, occasions, accompanying circumstances, etc. Thus attending a theatre may remind one of the death of Lincoln ; the stubbornness of King George, of the speech of Patrick Henry, etc. It also embraces such relations as means and ends, as a machine and its use or the end to be attained by it. Thus a cannon reminds one of war ; a locomotive, of a moving train of cars ; a mill-stone, of a barrel of flour or a loaf of bread. Contiguity in Time and Place. It is a law of the mem- ory, that things associated in time and place suggest one another. Thus Waterloo suggests Napoleon and Wellington, Runnymede reminds us of King John and the Barons, the Sistine Chapel re- calls Michael Angelo and his immortal frescoes, the Vatican reminds one of Raphael and the Transfiguration. This law is especially operative in historical facts: thus Oxford reminds us of the burning of Latimer and Ridley ; Faneuil Hall, of Otis and Warren ; Philadelphia, of Independence Hall and the Declaration of Independence, etc. Laws WorJc Together. These four laws of memory may operate together in producing any train of thought. One link of the chain may be given by one law, another by another law, and some links may be supplied by more than one law. Sometimes it is difficult to tell what law was operative in bringing to mind any particular fact or event; and sometimes it would seem as if the thought arose spontaneously without any one of the laws. No Invariable Relations. These laws do not act with a fixed and invariable uniformity, that is, there is no fixed and invariable relation between the objects of our recollections. The THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 145 same laws of association do not give rise to the same train of thought starting from the same initial point at different times. Starting at any point, one series of recollections may rise at one time, another at another time, and still another series at some other time. There is thus no fixed and invariable order to our thoughts, except when a certain order has been established by committing a series of objects, as in learning an oration or a poem. III. THE SECONDARY LAWS. The Secondary Laws are usu- ally regarded as principles which modify the action of the Prim- ary Laws. The primary laws explain the tendency of certain classes of objects to recur to the mind ; the secondary laws ac- count for one object in any of these classes rather than another. This relation of the secondary laws to the primary laws will be better understood by regarding them as laws of retention, as the others are laws of recollection. The Primary Laws are thus re- garded as laws of recollection, and the Secondary Laws as laws of retention. Enumeration of the Laws. The principal of the Secondary Laws are as follows : 1. Continuance of Attention ; 2. Frequency of Repetition ; 3. Vividness of Feeling ; 4. Recentness of Acquisi- tion ; 5. Exclusiveness of Association ; 6. Natural Mental Differ- ences ; 7. State of the Mind ; 8. State of the Body ; 9. Profes- sional Habits. All of these laws seem to be conditions of acquisition and retention, and as such modify the action of the primary laws, accounting for one conception rather than another in a train of recollections. 1. Continuance of Attention. The continuance of the at- tention upon any object of thought tends to fix it permanently in ' the memory. The longer I look at anything, the clearer is my conception of it ; and clearness of conception is a condition of retention. Continuance of attention seems to deepen the impres- sion of the object on the mind, as the continued pressure of the die on a tablet makes a deep and permanent impression on it. 2. Frequency of Repetition. Frequency of repetition alsc 7 146 MENTAL SCIENCE. tends to fix an object of thought in the memory. A paragraph read over once makes some impression on the mind ; read several times it becomes a permanent possession. A stanza of poetry is committed by repeating it over and over. The lecturer must re- view his oration or lecture occasionally or it will slip from his memory. The man who tells his anecdotes or repeats his pet quotations frequently, has them at his tongue's end. In the same way, frequent reviews of the lessons of the school-room tend to make the acquisition permanent. 3. Vividness of Feeling. Vividness of feeling exerts a strong influence on retention. The event which excites the deep- est emotion, whether of joy or sorrow, makes the deepest impres- sion on the mind and is the longest remembered. The earliest recollections of childhood are those which awakened the liveliest feelings of happiness or sorrow ; as the gift of a toy, the loss of a pet, etc. The poem or essay or historical incident which touched our hearts most deeply is most easily committed and retained. A man in circumstances of danger will remember the most trifling incidents that occurred. The criminal on trial for his life has been known to retain the most vivid remembrance of the words of the witnesses, the appearance of those present in the court- room, etc. 4. Recentness of Acquisition. Recentness of acquisition has also a modifying influence on the memory. The lesson learned to-day is clearer in the mind than the lesson of yesterday. The poem committed a year ago is not so easily recalled as the one recently learned, unless it has been frequently reviewed. The lapse of time seems to weaken the impression on the mind, and sometimes the object, once distinctly known, seems to fade entirely out of the memory. 5. Exclusiveness of Association. Exclusiveness of associa- tion is also a condition of retaining and recollecting. The song which we heard sung by only one person, is, when heard again, much more likely to bring to mind that person, than if it had been associated with several other singers. The bond of union is THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 147 relatively, if not absolutely stronger when there* is only one thread of association, than when there are several. This law seems to be more intimately connected with the primary laws, than the rest of the laws of retention, as it is a circumstance of the several laws of association. 6. Natural Mental Differences. Natural differences of mind cannot be overlooked in considering the power of retention and recollection. Minds differ absolutely and relatively in re spect to the power of memory. Some memories are much stronger than others for almost every object of thought; some retain one class of objects, as names, dates, etc., better than another, even when the general power seems no greater. Tastes differ also, and this accounts for some of the differences in the memories of different persons. 7. State of Mind. The condition of the mind at the time of acquisition has much to do with the tenacity of the memory. Sometimes the mind is clear and bright, and we commit with great ease and readiness ; at other times the mind seems dull and sluggish, and we retain with labor and recall with effort. In grief, mental exhaustion, or pre-occupation, the passing events make a very slight impression on the mind and are not usually retained. 8. State of Body. The state of the body has also a strong influence on the memory. Some days we can commit a lesson much more readily than at other times; and, in some conditions of the body, our thoughts and words flow very slowly and we recall with effort some of the most familiar facts. A slight derangement of any of the bodily functions, or even the condition of the atmosphere, will sometimes seem to affect the memory. When wearied with physical exercise, the memory operates with diminished vigor; when the body feels strong and vigorous, the memory retains and recalls with the greatest readiness. .9. Professional Habits. Professional and business habits determine largely what we commit and recall. The physician remembers matters pertaining to disease and surgical operations; 148 MENTAL SCIENCE. and the lawyer has his mind stored with the incidents and plead- ings of celebrated trials. The sailor can talk of storms and ship- wrecks; the hunter of thrilling incidents of the forest; the politi- cian remembers the political history of his times and the records of public men and parties. The memory of each person is largely determined by the business he follows an4 the habit of mind created thereby. IV. THE OXE PRIMARY LAW. Attempts have been made by various writers on philosophy to reduce the several primary laws to one general principle which shall embrace them all. This subject is of sufficient interest to call for a brief discussion. The one principle which seems to lie at the basis of all these laws is that of the relation of ideas, and may be called the Law of Re- lation. The Laiv of Relation. The several primary laws of mem- ory may all be embraced under the one general principle of relation. This general law may be stated formally as follows : It is a law of the memory that related objects of thought tend to recall one another. A more subjective statement of the law is, It is a law of the mind that it naturally tends to think of related objects of thought. Still another statement of the law is, One mental state tends to reproduce some related mental state. Basis of the Law. The reason for this law is found in the natural constitution of the mind. One of the fundamental acts of the mind is comparison, or the conception of relations. All mental activity tends to related thought ; our knowledge of things is largely a conception of relations. All mental action is in accordance with this law of the relation of ideas ; you cannot conceive of thinking, or of knowledge as the product of thought, without the idea of relations. Relations tend to system ; and the mind is thus not chaotic in its operations, but systematic and orderly. This activity in the sphere of related thought operates not only in the reproduction of the old, but also in the evolution of the new. This systematic method of recalling things according to some relations between them, is what we mean by the law of THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 149 memory; and the statement given explains the nature of and reason for the law. The Various Relations. The most prominent relations of objects are those named in the Primary Laws, similarity, con- trast, cause and effect, and contiguity in time and place. The memory operates by other relations also, as that of whole and parts, means and ends, etc. ; but these may be regarded as em- braced under the four laws already considered. Thus the law of whole and parts may be embraced under that of contiguity ; and means and ends under cause and effect. Applies to all Relations. The law applies not only to things logically related, but also to things actually related or associated in the mind. It embraces the association of continuity and conse- cution, that is, things associated in the same instant of time or in consecutive instants. Thus the words of a sentence, a series of sounds, the letters of the alphabet, etc., suggest one another be- cause they have been actually related in repetition. When there is a relation of thought as well as of juxtaposition, the series is much more readily recalled, as the words of a sentence are much more easily reproduced in their natural order than if the same words were thrown together by chance. Applies to feelings. This law also explains how a feeling can suggest an object, or an object a feeling. The two have been conjoined in an actual experience, and the recurrence of the one tends to recall to mind the other. Thus the feeling with which I read a poem or hear a fine piece of music, when it recurs, tends to bring to mind the poem or the music ; so a feeling of disgust associated with an object, when renewed, may recall the object. In each of these cases, too, the object will tend to reawaken the original feeling. For the same reason, also, two objects which have been associated with the same feeling may recall one another, through the common link of this similar emotion. Law of Redintegration. Hamilton and some other writers embraced the several primary laws under a general principle, ;which he calls the law of redintegration. The principle may be 150 MENTAL SCIENCE. stated thus : Objects that have been previously united as parts of the same mental state tend to recall one another. A law quite similar to this had been previously announced by Aristotle, which Hamilton states as follows : " Thoughts which have at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of coexistence, or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to repro- duce each other" This is the principle of prior coexistence and immediate consecution. Application of This Laiv. This principle of prior coexist- ence or redintegration, applies readily to the law of contiguity, if indeed it be not another expression of the same law. The law of cause and effect is also readily comprehended under this prin- ciple, since things related as cause and effect are usually united in some previous mental state. In endeavoring to bring the law of similars under this principle, it is assumed that the single feature in any object, as A, which reminds us of some other object, as B, containing that feature, does so because this common feature was previously united in the conception B with the rest of B ; so that when I see A, I fix my attention on this common feature and then complete my conception by thinking of the rest of B, and thus of the whole of B. In applying the law to opposites, it is assumed that they are complements of each other, that neithe^r is complete without the other, as we cannot have the idea of long without the idea of short, and they are thus parts of a larger whole, and the one recalls the other by the completion of the entire sphere of thought of which each is a part. Principle of Emotions. The application of this law of co- existence or redintegration to similars and opposites is evidently not very satisfactory. Dr. Brown endeavors to explain it by the influence of sensations and emotions. Thus one object recalls a similar object with which it has never coexisted by the fact that both have coexisted with the same or a similar emotion. So opposites reproduce each other ' by the common feeling with which each was experienced; as a person with a long nose re- minds one of a person with a short nose, on account of the com- THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 151 mon feeling of surprise or wonder each awakens. In this case, the tie or link was a common emotion. Prof. Mahan carries out this idea of Dr. Brown's, and makes the common emotion the sole ground or law of association. Law of Similar Action. Dr. Porter, in his attempt to re- duce the several laws to one comprehensive principle, announces the following law : " The mind tends to act again in a manner similar to any in which it has acted before" A simpler statement of the same principle is, One mental state tends to reproduce some similar mental state. This law will not, however, explain all the cases of the phenomena of mental reproduction. It fails in its application to opposites, and is not clear in its application to all the cases of the other primary laws. The same is true of Hamil- ton's law of Redintegration and also the law of Aristotle. The one principle, simple and comprehensive, which seems to cover all the cases, is that of the relation of ideas, as has been previously explained. The simple law is that one mental state tends to repro- duce some related mental state. III. REMARKS ON THE MEMORY. There are several questions of a general character, usually dis- cussed by writers on the memory, to which attention is appropri- ately called in this place. Among these are the relation of memory to intellectual strength, the failure of memory, the mem- ory of the aged, and effects of disease on the memory. Strong Memory and Weak Mind. The question has often btfen asked whether the power of memory may be regarded as a test of intellectual ability. In reply to this question, we remark first, that a strong memory is often found in connection with weak mental powers in other respects. Persons deficient in the powers of judgment and reasoning will often be found to possess- an unusual talent for retaining words and facts. Thus " Blind Tom," who is regarded as almost an idiot, can reproduce a piece of music, heard for the first time, with great accuracy; and it is said that he can tell the name of nearly' every hotel at which he has 152 MENTAL SCIENCE. ever stopped, and also the names of the landlords. Many other instances, equally remarkable, can be cited. Strong Mind and Memory. It is also true that persons with unusually vigorous minds are often endowed with a remark- able gift of memory. Thus it is said of Pascal, who possessed intellectual powers of the highest order, that he forgot nothing that he had ever read or thought. Leibnitz and Euler were not less celebrated for their intelligence than for their memory ; and both could repeat the whole of the ^neid. Ben Jonson, the dramatist, could repeat all that he had ever written, and whole books that he had read. Napoleon Bonaparte, Themistocles, and Dugald Stewart, are also mentioned as remarkable examples of the power of memory accompanying great strength of intellect. No Fixed Relation. The relation of the memory to intellect- ual strength is thus not fixed and invariable ; and the power of memory cannot be regarded as a measure of intellectual ability. A weak mind in other respects may have a strong memory. Such cases are so frequent that it gives rise to the belief that a strong memory indicates a deficiency in some other power of the mind. This is not regarded as correct, however, since men of good intel- lectual abilities often manifest unusual power of memory. The rule is that the strength of memory is proportioned to the general strength of mind, though it is a rule subject to many and striking exceptions. Failure of Memory. Failure of memory usually accompan- ies the failure of the other mental powers. A decline of mental vigor is usually first manifested by a deficiency of the memory. In advancing years, there is often a difficulty in recalling proper names and dates, and sometimes even words in general. Emerson was perhaps one of the most notable examples of this ; his conver- sation for the last two or three years of liis life was embarrassing and painful on account of his failure to recall names. The mem- ory of old people often partly fails, while the mind, in other re- spects, seems to retain its full vigor. Cause of Failure. The cause of the decline of memory may THE NATURE OF MEMORY. 153 be twofold. First, it is probably due in part to some change in the condition of the brain itself; the memory seems to be espe- cially dependent on the condition of the brain. Second, it is partly due to some change in the conditions of remembering. There is less vividness of conception ; the senses are not so sensitive and active as they were in early years, and thus the impression made on the mind is not so deep and permanent. There is also a lack of interest in the things about us on account of their loss of novelty. The events taking place belong to a new generation and have lost their interest, and the impression is thus slight and transient. On account of this loss of interest, also, they are not so often reverted to, there is no desire to dwell upon them ; hence they lack frequency of coexistence, which is one of the conditions of retention. Memory of the Aged. With old persons the remembrance of the past is usually vivid and distinct. Unobservant of passing events, the old man dwells with pleasure on the past. He re- members the events and incidents of his early life, the sports and companions of his childhood, the triumphs of his young man- hood, the achievements of his vigorous prime of life, etc. All these come crowding upon his memory; he lives his life over again in his recollections, and finds his highest happiness in re- calling and relating the incidents of his early years. Effects of Disease. The memory is often affected by disease. Sometimes after a sickness, the knowledge of a certain class of objects, or of certain persons, or of a particular language, or of a certain class of words of a language, as substantives, is lost to the mind. In other cases a certain portion of the life is obliterated from the memory. Cases of injury to the brain have been fol- lowed by the loss of a language, or of the names of objects, while the names of adjectives were easily remembered. Dr. Abercrom- bie mentions a surgeon who so far recovered from a fall as to give directions in respect to his treatment, but for several days lost all idea of having a wife and children. One of the most remarkable cases is that of Mr. Tennent, who, on recovering from a trance, 154 MENTAL SCIENCE. had !ost all the knowledge acquired during his past life, and was obliged to begin his studies at the alphabet, and yet whose knowl- edge suddenly returned to him a few months afterward. Disease Excites Memory. Sometimes disease produces the opposite effect, by bringing back to the mind things long since forgotten. Persons in severe sickness or at the point of death, have been known to converse in a language which they had not spoken since youth. Coleridge tells of a German servant-girl, who in her sickness repeated passages of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew which she had heard her master repeat as he walked in his study. Dr. Rush mentions the case of an Italian in Kew York, who in the beginning of his sickness spoke English, in the middle of it French, and on the day of his death only Italian. A clergyman of Philadelphia relates that it was not unusual for the Germans and Swedes of his congregation, when near death, to speak and pray in their native languages, which they may not have heard for fifty years. Inference Drawn. Some have inferred from these facts that all knowledge is indestructible; that whatever we have known may at some time be brought back to mind. Coleridge and others have derived from them the doctrine of future retribution. Whatever may be thought of these inferences, it is certain that the fact that our past lives may be recalled, and the tendency of the mind to revert to the scenes -and incidents of our early life, suggests to us the importance of a well-spent life. A mind stored with pleasant recollections " will cast a cheerful radiance over the past, brighten the uncertain iuture in those hours of gloom and despondency when the shadows lengthen upon the path of our earthly pilgrimage, and life is drawing to a close." CHAPTER H. THE CULTURE OF THE MEMORY. T PAVING explained the nature of the memory, we shall now - proceed to the consideration of its cirlture. This subject can be conveniently discussed under two general heads, The Nature and Importance of the Culture of the Memory, and the Methods of Cultivating the Memory. I. NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE. Under this head we shall consider the following topics: 1. Importance of the Cul- ture of the Memory ; 2. Neglect of the Culture of the Memory ; 3. Differences of the Power of Memory ; 4. Time for the Culture of the Memory. Importance of Culture. The importance of a good memory is universally acknowledged. It is of great value in every de- partment of life, in business, in study, in science, in every avocation or profession. The man who can carry the details of his business in his memory finds it not only a great convenience, but an economy of time and labor. In the study of history, literature, the languages, etc., a retentive memory is invaluable ; indeed, no profound attainments can be made in these depart- ments without it. In natural history it is also indispensable ; the naturalist must carry in his memory an accumulation of details in order to recognize the objects already described, to form his classification, or to discover new objects not yet observed or described. Neglect of Culture. There has been a tendency, in modern times, to neglect the culture of the memory. The ordinary scholar of to-day is not so remarkable for his memory as the in- telligent man in ancient times. The multiplication of books (155) 156 MENTAT SCIEXCE. tends to diminish the use and thus the power of memory. For- merly, the ability to repeat from memory the contents of entire manuscripts was a valuable accomplishment, and many men were able to do it ; to-day men depend on finding the knowledge they may wish to use in books, rather than on holding it in their mem- ories. The reading of a large number of books also tends to weaken the power of memory ; the mind is spread over so large a surface that it does not grasp anything with sufficient distinctness to make a permanent impression. Neglect in Modern Education. Modern education tends some- what to the neglect of the culture of the power of memory. The old schoolmasters gave lessons that required the activity of the memory ; the modern teacher takes more especial pains to culti- vate the understanding. Formerly the test of excellence at school was the amount acquired; now the test is largely the power of reasoning. Memory studies have given place to thought studies; pupils are thus taught to rely on their reason, and to value the culture of thought power more than the acquisition of knowledge. Though this may be an improvement over the old method, the fact is evident that there is a tendency in modern education to neglect the culture of the memory. Differences of Memory. In the culture of the memory, it should be remembered that there are great differences in the natural power of this faculty. Minds differ more strikingly in this respect than in any other faculty ; or at least the differences are more apparent than in the other faculties. They differ, too, both in respect to general power and special objects. Some per- sons remember anything better than other persons ; some remem- ber one class of objects, as dates and names, while there is no superiority in general power. Cause of the Difference. This difference is due partly to nature and partly to culture. Some persons can tell the day of the month or week of nearly every prominent event of their lives, without making any special effort to remember them. Such manifestations of the power of memory as that of Euler, Pascal, THE CULTURE OF THE MEMORY. 157 etc., are due to t an unusual natural gift of this capacity. Natural differences of taste create a difference in the power of the memory, as we remember those things best in which we feel the liveliest interest. The difference is due sometimes also to culture. Edu- cation often determines the taste, and thus affects the retentive poAver of the memory. If early associations have directed the mind in the study of language, history, etc., the person will naturally excel in the acquirement of these branches. Instances of Remarkable Memory. Historians and writers on mental philosophy mention some remarkable examples of the power of memory. Cyrus, it is said, knew the names of all his officers Pliny says, of all his soldiers. Themistocles could name every one of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens. Hortensius, after sitting all day at an auction, could at night recall every article sold, the purchaser, and the price. Dr. AVallis, while in bed in the dark, extracted the square root of a number of fifty- three places to twenty-seven terms, and repeated the result twenty days afterwards. Euler, blind from early life, carried in his memory a table of the first six powers of the series of natural numbers up to one hundred. Two of his pupils, in calculating a converging series, found, on reaching the seventeenth term, that their results differed by a unit at the fiftieth figure ; and to decide the question he made the calculation mentally, and his result was found to be correct. Hamilton tells us that Muretus saw at Padua a young Corsi- can who could repeat thirty -six thousand names, in the order in which they were given to him, or repeat them in the reverse order, or begin at any point in the list and repeat both ways. The celebrated Magliabecchi, librarian of the Duke of Tuscany, it is said, could name all the authors who had written upon any subject, giving the name of the book, the words, and often the page. A gentleman of Florence, to test his memory, lent him a manuscript to read, and afterward, pretending to have lost it, re- quested him to endeavor to recall it, which he did with great exactness. It is also stated that upon being asked by the Gran 1 158 MENTAL SCIENCE. Duke if he could procure for him a copy of a certain book, he replied, "No, sir, it is impossible; there is but one in the world; that is in the Grand Seignior's library at Constantinople, and is the seventh book, on the seventh shelf, on the right hand as you go in." Time for Culture. The special time for the culture of the memory is youth. The habits of the mind are then formed ; and the power of memory depends largely upon mental habits, upon the habits of attention, concentration, systematic thought, etc. Careless habits of reading, study, and observation manifest them- selves in impaired powers of retention. The mental dissipation of novel and newspaper reading exercises a pernicious influence on the memory; and young people should be carefully guarded against acquiring them. This training of the memory should be continued through life. The tendency of advancing years is to lead to forgetfulness. The habit of conversation and an occasional review of one's knowledge will keep the acquisitions somewhat fresh and make them more easily recalled. The daily practice of systematic reading and study, with frequent reviews of what is read, will aid in preserv- ing the memory comparatively strong into good old age. II. METHODS OF CULTURE. Under methods of cultivating the memory, we shall present the various methods of increasing the power of the memory, and show their application to the several studies which depend more particularly on this faculty. By Exercise. The faculty of memory, like every other faculty of the mind, is cultivated by exercise. This exercise should be judicious in kind and quantity. The things to be re- membered should be adapted to the age and mental ability of the pupil. There should be facts for the young mind and principu-.- for the older mind. Care should be taken also that the mind is not overtaxed; for, like an overstrained muscle, the mind may be weakened by excessive labor. Cramming weakens the mem- ory, as physical cramming weakens the stomach. Students who have been overtaxed with their studies, often find that the THE CULTURE OF THE MEMORY. 159 memory seems to fail; and only absolute rest for a time will restore the vigor of the faculty. Grasp Clearly. The pupil must be trained to grasp the subjects of thought clearly. Clear conception is the fundamental condition of tenacious retention. The mind thus gets the object within its grasp, obtains a firm hold of it, and is enabled to keep it in its possession. That which is only partly cognized, or which is, as it were, merely touched by the mental fingers, soon slips away. The lessson which has been completely mastered, is retained with comparative ease; the lesson which was only half learned, soon vanishes. How to Grasp Clearly. To give distinct ideas to the mind, objects and illustrations are of value, especially to the young. The concrete method of teaching is thus adapted to the training of the memory. The writing out of what we wish to remember will also aid in clearness of mental conception. The eye will aid the ear, and the mind will be doubly impressed by the use of both senses. The oral expression of what we wish to remember, is a good test of clearness of conception ; and aids also in giving those clear and definite ideas of a subject which are readily retained. Continued Attention. The habit of continuity of attention must also be acquired. The longer the mind dwells upon an object, the more deeply it seems to be impressed on the memory. Attention, in relation to the memory, seems to operate like the die upon a waxen tablet ; the longer the pressure is continued, the deeper and more permanent the character becomes. The mind that flits from one thing to another, seldom has a clear and distinct remembrance of anything; the concentrated energy of the mind on a few objects of thought makes them a permanent possession. Gives Clear Conceptions. Attention to objects of thought affords clear conceptions of things, which is one of the fundu- mental conditions of a good memory. Attention gives the mind distinct and well-marked mental pictures of objects, and clear 160 MENTAL SCIENCE. and adequate ideas of the more abstract subjects of thought; and without clearness and definiteness knowledge soon vanishes. A careless and inattentive mind becomes a sort of dim, cracked looking-glass, reflecting things in all kinds of blurred and crooked fashions, so that what it does remember will lack accuracy. One of the first rules, therefore, for the cultivation of the memory, is to give due attention to things. Vividness of Feeling* The feelings exercise a strong influ- ence upon the memory. The more vivid the feeling in respect to any object or event, the longer it will be remembered. The in- cidents of childhood that gave us the highest joy or deepest sorrow, as a visit, a new toy, the loss of a pet or a parent, are never forgotten. The event that occurred during excitement is flashed deep into the memory in all its details, and is a perma- nent possession. The railroad accident or the storm at sea im- presses the most trivial and unimportant events indelibly on our memory. Value in Education. This principle should be employed in giving culture to the memory of students. There should be an effort to awaken interest in what is to be remembered. A listless habit of mind will acquire few permanent impressions ; ideas that come into the mind when we are in an apathetic state, make no permanent lodgment there. We should, therefore, endeavor to awaken a lively interest in that- which is the subject of study. Lessons should be made attractive, the minds of pupils should be made to glow with a feeling of interest in their studies, a deep feeling of earnestness should be aroused, and every means possi- ble made use of to cultivate a desire to know and a fondness for acquisition. " Love, in fact, is the parent of memory." By Repetition. Frequent repetition is one of the means of strengthening the memory. Repetition, as already explained, is one of the conditions of acquisition and retention. A lesson, an oration, or a poem, is fixed in the memory by frequently repeating it. Repetition seems to impress the idea, as the repeated pressure of the die on the tablet deepens the characters impressed. The THE CULTURE OF THE MEMOEY. 16] mind tends to repeat a mental state or series of mental states in which it has often been found. Repetition Intelligent. This repetition should be intelligent and attentive; not the mere mechanical repeating of words with a wandering mind. "Learning by heart" is often a mere learning by sense or sound, and not by the mind. The parrot-like repeti- tion of words may impair rather than strengthen the memory. The mind must accompany the word, if we wish to acquire quickly and permanently. In repeating a poem "learned by rote," when brought to a stand-still, we often have to go back over a stanza, till we fall in with " the swing of the rhythm and are carried over the sticking place." Knowledge Reviewed. Knowledge should thus be frequently reviewed. The recitation of a lesson impresses the subject more deeply than when it is not recited. Frequent reviews are also valuable in this respect ; a constant review of the leading facts and principles of a study should be kept up, in connection with the lesson in advance. A habit of reviewing one's knowledge occasionally, after leaving school, should be adopted. The history should be thought over, the poem repeated, and the books re- read, if we would keep our knowledge fresh and accurate. State of Mind and Body. To acquire and retain well, the body and mind should be in a healthy condition. Coleridge says that the requisites of a good memory are sound logic, a 1 healthy digestion, and a quiet conscience. The first refers to the condition of the intellect, the second to the condition of the body, and the third to the condition of the moral nature; and all of these are concerned in and affect the memory. When the mind is depressed or its free activity interfered with, the power of mem- ory is weakened ; when the intellect works clearly and with vigor, the memory will be strong and ready. So also when the body is suffering with disease or pain, the attention will be distracted and things make but a slight impression on the memory ; but when there is that exuberance of feeling which flows from good health, the mind seizes with vigor and holds with tenacity what- 162 MENTAL SCIENCE. ever is presented to it. A disturbed conscience also produces that disquiet that distracts the attention and impairs the power of memory ; while a clear and quiet conscience gives that calm and peaceful condition of the mind that is conducive to the best efforts of the memory. By Association. To train the memory, we should accustom it to habits of systematic and related thought. Such an associa- tion is the foundation of a good memory. Without this, the memory is like a chest of drawers full of tossed and tumbled articles, where the right one is hard to find. With it, it is like the wise business man who has boxes, and drawers, and compart- ments, and pigeon-holes for his different papers, a place for everything and everything in its place, where he can lay his hand upon what he needs whenever it is wanted. The three laws of association, especially useful in cultivating the memory, are those of similarity, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect. The memory operates spontaneously according to these laws ; but we should endeavor, by a special effort, to associate our knowledge by the natural laws of acquisition and retention. Law of Similarity. Knowledge should be associated by the law of similarity. This is one of the simplest of the primary laws of memory, and one which controls the earliest activity of the mind. The aim of the student and teacher should be to aid nature in the action of this law, so that it may become a fixed habit of the mind. The principle may be applied in remember- ing a great variety of objects. Words similarly spelled or pro- nounced may be grouped together, similar words in different languages may be compared, cities of nearly the same popula- tion and states and counties of nearly the same size may be associated, and attention called to historic events occurring on the same day or during the same year. The habit of associating similar things will enable one to remember many facts that would otherwise slip away from the memory. Time and Place. The law of contiguity in time and pJace can also be employed in strengthening the memory. This THE CULTUKE OF THE MEMORY. 163 law applies especially to the remembering of the facts of history. Events occurring at the same time, or on some given day, or dur- ing some particular period, may be linked together by the tie of time. Thus we can easily remember, that Adams and Jefferson died on the same Fourth of July, 1826 ; that Lee retreated from Gettysburg and Vicksburg fell on the Fourth of July, 1863 ; that the battle of Pittsburg Landing and the capture of Island Num- ber Ten occurred on the same day, etc. So also events occurring at the same place, or in the same city or country, may be so associated that they will recall one another. Eras and Epochs. So also the events and persons of an age or era may be readily remembered by being associated. The Eliza- bethan era will readily give, not only the approximate date of the time of Elizabeth, but also of Mary Queen of Scots, Raleigh, Sidney, Shakspeare, the Spanish Armada, etc. Associating the Augustan age with the beginning of the Christian era, we can readily remember when Antony, Cleopatra, Cicero, Virgil, etc., lived. Remembering that Socrates was the teacher of Plato, Plato of Aristotle, and Aristotle of Alexander, by remembering the date of either one we can approximate the dates of the others with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes. Cause and Effect. The law of cause and effect, including means to ends, should be used to aid and strengthen the memory. This law will be found especially valuable in remembering the facts of history which bear this relation. To relate the Revolu- tion and the facts which led to it as the cause, will aid in fixing these events in the mind. The Protectorate of Cromwell and the revolution which led to it are best remembered in their connection of cause and effect. The events associated with the battles of Solferino and Magenta are better understood and more easily re- tained when read in their relation to a United Italy. The habit of linking historic facts in this way will greatly facilitate the study of history. Classifying Knowledge. The memory can be aided by the careful classification of knowledge. The habit of writing 164 MENTAL SCIENCE. outlines of the subjects studied or read, gives systematic arrange- ment to facts and principles, which greatly facilitates the power of acquisition. It gives a bird's eye view of the entire subject, enables us to see the relation of the parts, and impresses the mind both on account of a clearer conception of the subject and a view of the relations. Kinds of Outlines. These outlines may be either logical or topical. Many subjects will admit of a logical relation of the parts, so that one part is seen to be contained in and to grow out of another part. Some subjects will admit of only a topical re- lation of facts, but even a topical connecting of facts increases the clearness of view and enables the eye to aid the thought in fixing the impression. Special Artifices. There are some special artifices which have been found useful in remembering a certain class of objects or words. The two most convenient and practical are those of verse and key-words. Thus the number of days of the month is most conveniently remembered by the couplet, "Thirty days hath September, etc." The couplet, " To be easy all night, Let your supper be light," serves to impress a law of health that many people are apt to forget. An arrangement of the kings of England in verses similar to the following, probably assists the memory of the youthful learner : "First William the Norman, then William his son, Henry, Stephen, and Henry, then Richard and John. Next Henry the third, Edwards one, two, and three ; And again after Richard, three Henrys we see," etc. Use of Key-Words. Key-words are often valuable in remem- bering a series of abstract terms. Thus the word vibgyor gives the order of the colors of the spectrum, and also the formation of the secondary colors from the primary, and thus also the com- plementary colors. The term Die will give the order of the three styles of Grecian architecture, the Doric, Ionic, and Corin- thian, and aid in remembering them by the relative order of or- namentation. The term Tisp I have found valuable in fixing the THE CULTURE OF THE MEMORY. 165 four kinds of dissyllabic feet, the Trochee, Iambus, Spondee, and Pyrrhic ; and also the term Daat, for the principal trisyllabic feet, suggesting by the order of the letters the name of each. Use of Sentences. A list of names in their order can be re- membered by a sentence, the initials of whose words correspond with the initials of the series to be remembered. Thus young persons studying history can fix the names and order of the presidents of the United States by the following sentence : " Will a jolly man make a jolly visitor? Honor the person that finds pleasure by losing jolly guests having great ancestors." A still better sentence is the following : " Washington and Jefferson made many a joke ; Van Buren had trouble plenty to find poor bank-notes. Let Johnson go home greatly agitated." The sen- tence, " I seize a sieve," will enable one to remember the order of the e and i in the two words seize and sieve. Systems of Mnemonics. Systems of Mnemonics have been invented from time to time, and recommended by various persons. They consist in some arrangement for making an artificial associ- ation between something used as a key and that which is to be remembered. To illustrate, suppose we commit a series of objects, numbering them from one to one hundred. Suppose number one is a pump, number two a bear, number three a goose, etc. Now to apply this to the kings of England, we might associate James I. with the pump, Charles I. with the bear, Charles II. with the goose, etc. The association might be impressed by a humorous relation; as, "James pumps water on a bear which swallows Charles I. while Charles II. rides away on a goose." Value of Mnemonics. In favor of such a system it may be said that wonderful feats may be performed by it in the remem- bering of abstract terms and dates. But the disadvantages are greater than the advantages. It trains the mind to an artificial relation, and thus weakens its power by neglecting to cultivate the natural method of association. The kings of England, for instance, should be remembered by their actual relation to one another and to historic events. The mere recollection of their 166 MENTAL SCIENCE. names is of little value to the student. Besides, unless we are in constant use of the system, the key itself will vanish from the memory, and then everything goes with it. III. APPLICATION IN TEACHING. All of the principles to which we have called attention will be found of great value to the student and teacher. A few suggestions for the applica- tion of these principles in the work of instruction will be of in- terest to teachers. The Alphabet. In teaching the alphabet, the letters may be associated with forms that are similar to them ; as the letter O with a ring or hoop, the letter A with a harrow, the letter X with a saw-horse, etc. Letters that are similar may be compared and those that are dissimilar contrasted. Teachers and writers of primers have found it useful to associate letters with words ; as " A for an Apple, B for a Book, C for some Candy, and D for a Duke." Such illustrations attract the attention, awaken an in- terest, and connect by the thread of association, all of which are means of remembering. In Orthography. The law of association can be employed in the study of orthography. Words of similar orthography should be associated ; as, fast, quick, and fast, to abstain from food. Words of similar pronunciation and unlike orthography may be associated, the correct spelling being impressed by the contrast ; as, choir and quire, there and their, vein, vain, and vane. Words whose orthography it is difficult to remember may be associated with other words similarly spelled. Thus, to remem- ber whether the i or e comes first in piece, it may be associated with pie in the expression " a piece of pie." A lady remembered that there were two e's together in agreeable by being told to associate it with the fact that there were two agreeable gentlemen present when she asked the question. The word Alice is a key to the relative position of i and e, in such words as conceive and believe, when preceded by I or by c; from which we can remember that e precedes i after the sound of s, and i precedes e after all other consonants. Some such artifices of association are especially THE CULTUKE OF THE MEMOEY. 167 valuable in those peculiar cases in which .we are confused in the spelling of particular words. In Geograpliy. The principle of association is especially valuable in the study of geography. In this way the size of states, the population of cities, etc., can be associated and readily retained. Thus take Pennsylvania, 46,000 square miles, for a standard ; and we have approximately, New York=Pennsylva- nia ; Louisiana=Pennsylvania ; Nevada=2 times Pennsylvania ; Texas=5 times Pennsylvania; England=H times Pennsylvania ; Scotland f of Pennsylvania ; Irelaud=f of Pennsylvania ; France=4? times Pennsylvania; Switzerland^^ of Pennsylva- nia ; Denmark=;l of Pennsylvania ; etc. Or again: England=Alabama (50,000); Scotland=Maine (30,000) ; Ireland=Indiana (33,000) ; Cuba^Tennessee (42,000); France=4 times Alabama (50,000) ; Brazil=United States= Sahara Desert, etc. Taking Philadelphia as a standard, we may remember that the population of the following cities is about the same: Berlin, Vienna, Liverpool, St. Petersburg, Calcutta. Outlines of Subjects. The classification of geographical facts by an outline is also of special value in learning geography. It enables us to classify our knowledge, which is a condition of re- membering it. An outline will also suggest facts which otherwise would not be recalled. It is especially valuable with classes in the recitation, enabling them to obtain their knowledge from any book, and to recall what might otherwise have slipped the memory. In History. These principles are especially applicable in studying and teaching history. History is purely a memory study ; and whatever we may do to aid the memory will enhance our knowledge of history. The memory can be aided in the study of history by associating the facts in accordance with two of the primary laws of memory, those of cause and effect and contiguity in time and place. Cause and Effect. First, facts should be associated, so far as possible, by the law of cause and effect. The mind naturally associates the events of history with the causes which produced 168 MENTAL SCIENCE. them, and also looEs forward from the facts to the results which flow from them ; and such an association tends to fix the events permanently in the memory. Thus, we may see the relation of the corruptions of the people of Home and the dissensions of the rulers to the fall of the Roman Empire ; the preaching of Peter the Hermit to the Crusades ; the extravagance and corruption of the French rulers to the French Revolution ; the French Revolu- tion to the wealth of the French people; the persecution of the Puritans to the settlement of New England ; the settlement and annexation of Texas to the Mexican war ; etc. Same Time or Place. Second, facts occurring at the same time or place may be remembered by associating them together. Thus Hannibal and Scipio, the two great opposing generals, died the same year, 183 B. C. ; the fall of Greece and Carthage occurred on the same year, 146 B. C. ; Francis I. and Henry VIII. both died in 1547 ; Charles V. and Mary Tudor both died in 1558 ; the fall of Granada and discovery of America occurred in 1492 ; the battles of New Orleans and Waterloo were fought in 1815. So also we may associate events occurring an exact number of centuries apart; as Mexico conquered by the Spaniards in 1521 and her independence secured in 1821 ; or Bacon's Rebellion in 1676, and the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Eras and Epoclis. Third, there should be a classification of facts into epochs or eras. In every country there are great lead- ing events which stand as historic centres or nuclei around which revolve the minor events. Fixing the time of the principal or central events, we have a key to the dates of the facts related to them and growing out of them. Thus, the Age of Pericles, the Age of Augustus, the Age of Elizabeth, the Crusades, the Refor- mation, etc., coordinate events and persons in a way to be easily remembered. In the history of the United States, such divisions as discoveries, settlements, the French and Indian war, the Revo- lution, the Civil War, etc., will serve to group the events of the country in a way to facilitate their acquisition and retention. THE IMAGINATION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF THE IMAGINATION. THE IMAGINATION is the faculty by which we form ideal conceptions. It is the power of forming mental images by uniting different parts of objects given by perception, and also of creating ideals of objects different from anything we have per- ceived. Thus, I can conceive of a flying horse by uniting my ideas of wings and a horse ; or I can imagine a landscape or a strain of music different from anything I have ever seen or heard. Imagination may thus be defined as the power of ideal creation. Origin of Term. The term Imagination is derived from imago, an image. The etymology of the term indicates that its office is the formation of images ; and this was the primary idea of the faculty, as the simplest products of imagination are images, or pictures of objects. But it is not restricted to mere picture making, for it can conceive of ideals in every department of men- tal activity. Thus it can conceive of a sound or a feeling as well as a statue or a landscape. The Representative Element. The Imagination consists of two elements; a power which represents and a power which determines what to represent. The representative element of the imagination is regarded as the same as the representative element of the memory, but differently applied. In the memory, the images are formed according to the real and actual ; in the imagi- nation they are formed according to the ideal and possible. The representative power in the memory gives an exact transcript of 8 (169) 170 MENTAL SCIENCE. some previous cognition; the imagination rises above the office of a mere copyist, and originates and represents new products. But in both cases.the representative element seems to be the same power working under different circumstances. In the former case, memory determines what it represents ; in the latter case a creative power of the mind uses it to body forth new ideals. Relation to Memory. The faculty of imagination is closely related to the memory, though there is an essential difference between them. In an act of memory there is first a conservation or retention of knowledge ; second, a recalling or reproduction of past experience ; third, a picturing or representation of what is recalled out of unconsciousness ; and fourth, a recognition of what is recalled and represented as something of past experience. The materials of the representation are supplied by the recollection of what has been previously experienced and preserved in the mind. Retention and recollection lie back of and determine the represen- tation. In imagination the power of ideal creation lies back of and determines the representation. We represent, not what we have retained and recalled, but what the mind itself originates. In memory the representation is regarded as one of the elements of memory; 'so in imagination we may regard the representation, as well as the power which determines the representation, as an element of imagination. Illustration of Each. To illustrate, I think of the home of my boyhood. It is pictured before my mind as if I were a boy again beholding it. I see the house, the garden, the barn, the orchard, just as they were when I was a lad at home. It is a picture of memory; the materials being supplied by recollection, and the image formed by the representative element. In imagination I can tear down the old homestead and build a new one, enlarge the barn, plant a new orchard, etc., and thus cause a picture of a new and more beautiful home to stand distinctly before my mind. This is a picture of the imagination. The materials may be supplied partly by the memory and partly by the creative power of the mind ; but they are all united into a single product by the plastic power of Imagination. THE NATURE OF THE IMAGINATION. 171 I. THE PRODUCTS OF IMAGINATION. The products of the imagination are twofold ; New Combinations and New Creations. By New Combinations we mean the combination of past percep- tions into new forms, so that though the product may be new as a whole, the parts of which it is composed may be old. By New Creations we mean mental products in which not only the ideal as a whole, but each of its parts, shall be new. These difference" actually exist in the products of the imagination, and need a name ; and it seems proper to distinguish them as New Combina- tions and New Creations. New Combinations. The imagination has the power of com- bining old perceptions into new forms, giving us products which as wholes are not found in nature. Thus it may combine differ- ent parts of actual landscapes, forming an ideal landscape such as we have never seen. Or, it may unite the ideas of a horse and wings, giving the conception of a flying horse. Pegasus, the flying horse of Grecian mythology, is a product of the imagina- tion. A mountain of gold, a land flowing with milk and honey, are also examples of ideals consisting of a combination of old conceptions. New Creations. The imagination can also form ideals which are not composed of previous perceptions, but which, though similar to, are different from and superior to our percep tions. Thus it can form an ideal landscape in which none of the parts are copies of any landscape we have seen, but which is in every respect an original product. It can imagine strains of music not found in nature or in the works of any musician. It can form ideals of beauty that are different from and superior to anything found in nature. Such products may be properly called new creations. Difference Illustrated. This difference may be illustrated in the fine arts of painting, sculpture, music, poetry, etc. Thus an artist may paint a picture in which the grove, the river, the meadow, the moss-covered bridge, etc., are copies of things he has sketched from nature ; or he can paint a picture in which these 172 MENTAL SCIENCE. features, as well as the whole picture, are ideals, so that not one object in the painting is a copy of anything he has seen. The sculptor can unite in a statue lips, forehead, nose, head, neck, etc., each feature being a copy of what he may have seen in different persons ; or he can give us a statue in which every feature as well as the whole figure is his ideal of beauty. If we examine some pieces of music we shall find that though new as a whole, they are made up of old strains borrowed from different authors ; but when Beethoven composed, there came welling up from the depths of his wonderful imagination, melodies and harmonies never heard before by human ear. The former are mostly new combina- tions of the old ; the latter are new creations. The Elements Associated. These two elements are often associated in the same production. Thus one portion of a work may be merely a combination of old percepts, while other portions are pure ideal creations. Much of the work of imagination con- sists in improving on or idealizing nature. Many portraits are not exact copies of the face, but are touched up by the fancy of the artist towards an ideal of perfection which the real face merely suggests. Even in the description of a real object or an actual landscape, imagination supplies many missing links, and gives a vividness and glow to the picture that pure memory can- not afford. In many of our so-called pictures of memory, the memory is not sufficiently exact to supply all the details, and these are filled out by the imagination. Fact and fancy are thus often united both in our recollections and in our imaginations. Important Distinction. This distinction between new com- binations and new creations is a very important one, and if clearly understood will prevent the mistakes and misunderstand- ings that have occurred among writers on this subject. The test of a new combination is that the parts are percepts, an exact image of something previously experienced : the test of a new creation is that no element is a percept, an exact transcript of any previous experience. My mental picture of a horse, for ex- ample, may be an exact transcript of some horse I have seen ; if THE NATUKE OF THE IMAGINATION. 173 BO, it is a picture of memory. It may be unlike any one horse, but composed of parts of different horses I have seen ; it is then a new combination. It may be not only new as a whole, but no part of it may be an exact transcript of any horse I have seen ; it is then a new creation. Imagination is thus seen to be more than a power to combine old perceptions, as some have erroneously taught. II. FORMS OF IMAGINATION. Imagination may act in different ways, and give us products which differ in respect to their har- mony, dignity, etc. These differences enable us to distinguish several distinct forms of the imaginative faculty. These forms may be embraced under three general classes ; those of Phantasy, Fancy, and Imagination proper. The Phantasy. The imagination can combine the parts of objects in entire disregard of the laws of harmony and unity, giving us products such as never occur in nature. Thus it may place the chimney of a house upon the hump of a camel, the head of a donkey on the neck of a man, or the head of a man on the shoulders of a horse. These products are grotesque or fantastic; and this form of imagination has been called Phantasy. This is the form which gives us the caricatures in illustrations and de- scriptions, and is the source of the various forms of wit and humor. The Fancy. The imagination can unite objects or ideas under the more natural laws of association in forms attractive to the feelings and approved by the taste, yet without the higher ends of ideal creation. This form of the imagination has been called Fancy. It gives us many of the images of literature which claim our admiration, but which lack the unity, dignity, and per- fection of the products of the higher imagination. Many of our poets deal largely with images of the fancy. Longfellow's com- parison of the moon to a school-boy's paper kite is a mere fancy. The imagination of children and young poets inclines to the fanciful. Shakspeare's earlier writings partake more of the fancy than his later productions. 174 MENTAL SCIENCE. Imagination Proper. When this faculty combines and creates according to the higher laws of thought and taste, embody- ing pure, lofty, and noble products in ideal forms, we have the Imagination proper. This is the artistic power of the mind, the power that gives us poetry, eloquence, music, sculpture, architect- ure, etc. Here we find the power of genius, the gift divine which gave immortality to Shakspeare and Milton, to Raphael and Michael Angelo, to Demosthenes and Cicero. Out of this form of the imagination have arisen the great poems and fictions, the great paintings and statues, all those works of art which command the admiration of the world, and crown their authors with the chaplet of an undying fame. I. THE LAWS OP THE IMAGINATION. Having given a general idea of the imagination, we shall now consider some of the circumstances or laws of its activity. These circumstances or laws, we shall find, are quite similar to those which we have already discussed under the memory. This simi- larity is not a matter of surprise, since they are both representative powers, and seem to involve the activity of a common representa- tive element. Imagination Involuntary. First, we remark that many of the products of imagination are entirely involuntary. They arise of themselves, without any effort of the will, uncalled for and unwished. We often sit in a meditative or half-dreaming mood, when thoughts, memory, and imagination all seem to operate involuntarily. In a " train of thought," so-called, which seems to move forward without an act of volition, much of it will be purely imaginary, past thoughts, new ideas and fancies, all seem to be blended together. The day-dreams of childhood and youth are usually not the result of an intentional effort of the mind ; the fancy builds its air-castles sometimes almost against the protest of the judgment. Some minds are so constituted that the imagination is constantly excited to activity by what they see and hear; every object of nature seems to suggest an image THE NATURE OF THE IMAGINATION. 175 or an analogy. This is the poetic mind described by Longfellow : " His thoughts were twin-born ; the thought itself, and its figura- tive resemblance in the outer world. Thus, through the quiet, still waters of his soul each image floated double, 'swan and shadow.' " Imagination Voluntary. The imagination is also volun- tary, as well as involuntary. Though images and figures often spring up involuntarily in the mind, yet they may also be produced by a direct effort of the will. We may build our air-castles, con- struct our figures, produce our imaginary incidents, or create an image of beauty, intentionally. Thus in writing, a person may hold himself down to a plain statement of facts and principles, or he may adorn his composition with the light of fancy. The essayist can adapt his style to his subject, being simple or orna- mental at his will. The orator often relieves the monotony of a dry statement or abstract argument by a brilliant metaphor, a flash of wit, or a sparkling analogy. The eloquent peroration often glows with the figures and feelings that the speaker calls up out of the depths of a vivid imagination. Principle of Suggestion. The imagination operates in ac- cordance with the law of association and suggestion. Many of our fancies are suggested by sensible objects or by other images or fancies. The principle of analogy is usually operative in the forming of the images of the imagination. As the real images of the memory suggest one another, so do they suggest the unreal or ideal images of the imagination. One image calls out another image, one fancy another fancy, one strain of music another strain, one poetic thought another, etc. It is in this way that many of the figures of poetry arise. The freshness of morning suggests childhood and youth, and we say, "Youth is the morn- ing of life ;" the delicate whiteness of the lily reminds us of purity of character, and 'we say, "She is pure as a lily;" the oak re- minds us of endurance, and we say, " He stood like the oak on the mountain ;" the lion becomes the type of courage, and we say, " He is the lion of the tribe of Judah." 176 MENTAL SCIENCE. Often Spontaneous. Though the law of association is usu- ally operative in an act of the imagination, yet it may operate with spontaneity. Many of our imaginings are not only involun- tary, but are purely spontaneous ; that is, they are not suggested by any ideas or objects. In other words, they are not a part of a train of associated ideas and images, but arise in the mind with pure spontaneity. It is not necessary, as some have taught, that every act of the imagination should have been determined by some antecedent act of the mind. The mind has the power of creating an image of beauty, a picture of a landscape, or a stanza of poetry, unsuggested and at its own will, without its being con- ditioned by something immediately preceding it in the mind. In this respect it is like the memory, which, though often controlled by the laws of association, may also act independently of them. It is thus manifest that the imagination is not bound down to an inexorable law of antecedence and consequence in its operations, but is a free and spontaneous activity. Ambiguity of Suggestion. Care must be used in employing the term suggestion in respect to mental products, or it will lead us into a serious error in regard to the mind's operations. This error consists in conceiving of the mind as a passive instrument operated upon by idEASONING is the process of comparing two objects of -* ** thought through their relation to a third. Thus, suppose I wish to compare the two objects, A and B, and see no relation between these objects, but perceive a relation between each of them and some third object, C ; I can then infer a relation be- tween A and B which I did not immediately see. That is, if A equals C and B equals C, I can then infer that A equals B. Such an inference is a process of reasoning. Indirect Comparison. Reasoning is thus a process of indi- rect or mediate comparison; it compares two objects, not directly but indirectly, through their common relation to a third object- Thus in the illustration given, it will be seen that A and B are not compared directly with each other, but indirectly, through their common relation to C. The thought goes first from A to C, then from B to C, and then from A to B ; or, in other words, it goes over from A to B by passing through C. C is thus said to mediate between A and B, and the process is one of mediate rather than immediate comparison. Three Objects of Thought. A process of reasoning, it is seen, embraces three ideas or objects of thought, and requires three judgments or propositions. Thus in the argument, "all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal," the three terms are men, mortal, and Socrates. This is the funda- mental form or principle of reasoning. The simplest movement in the reasoning process is the comparing of two objects through their relation to a third. A Comparison of Relations. Looking at the process more (237) 238 MENTAL SCIENCE. closely, it will be seen that an inference in reasoning involves a comparison of relations. We infer the relation of two objects from their relations to a third object. We must thus grasp in the mind two relations ; and from the comparison of these two relations we infer a third relation. The two relations from which we infer a third, are judgments; hence reasoning may also be defined as the process of deriving one judgment from two other judgments. We compare the two given judgments, and from this comparison derive the third judgment. This constitutes a single step in reasoning, and an argument so expressed is called a Syllogism. Relation to Judgment. From the explanation of Reason- ing, the relation of reasoning and judgment is very readily seen. Judgment is a process of direct or immediate comparison ; reason- ing is a process of indirect or mediate comparison. Judgment deals with only two objects of thought- reasoning deals with three objects of thought. Judgment vemploys only one proposition; reasoning employs three propositions. Judgment compares only objects of thought or ideas; reasoning may be regarded as com- paring judgments as well as ideas. One infers from a comparison of objects or ideas; the other infers from a comparison of re- lations. Stewart's View. Mr. Stewart, in comparing judgment and reasoning, says : " Judgments may be compared to blocks of stone lying upon the ground, upon any one of which a person may elevate himself a slight distance from the ground ; while reason- ing may be compared to these same blocks piled up into a grand staircase leading to some lofty tower." This makes reasoning a simple combination of judgments, the last step of the series being just the same as any of the previous steps. Objection to Stewart. This view overlooks the very essence of reasoning, which consists in deriving a new judgment from the relations expressed in the previous judgments. The third judg- ment, derived from the other two, involves a process of thought quite different from that of the two judgments upon which the THE NATUKE OF REASONING. 239 inference is founded. To carry out the figure of the staircase, the third judgment, or inference, should be indicated by placing one block, the conclusion, on two other blocks, the premises ; and thus all the way to the top, as high as we may build. Other Views of Reasoning. Writers on mental science have not all been so clear on the nature of reasoning as could be desired. One view makes the process to consist purely of analysis. Mr. Haven, who adopts this view, illustrates it as follows: We take the concept man, and by analysis perceive that it contains the attribute of mortality, and thus affirm the judgment, "Man is mortal." But the term man also expresses a general as well as a complex notion ; and resolving the general notion into its individual elements, and taking out one of them, as Socrates, we state the proposition " Socrates is a man." Then, on the principle that what is true of a class is true of each indi- vidual of the class, it follows that mortality, which was predicated of the class, may be predicated of Socrates. The affirmation that "Socrates is mortal" is virtually implied in the proposition "All men are mortal." The process is merely one of analysis. Brown's Illustration Dr. Brown illustrates this view by re- ferring to the germ contained in the bulb of a plant. As by analysis we may find in the bulb of a plant germ within germ, until we are stopped by reason of the imperfection of our instru- ments ; so in the discovery of truth by reasoning, we are limited only by the analytic power of the thinker. There may be races of beings, he thinks, whose senses would enable them to perceive the ultimate embryo in the plant; and there may be created powers of a higher order who can see in one comprehensive thought all the truths of which mankind, by successive analyses, are enabled to discover only a few. Objection to the View. It is sufficient to remark that this view of reasoning, though possessing some truth, is entirely in- adequate for the full explanation of the subject. It would ex- clude mathematical reasoning altogether, and would render mean- ingless many of the rules of logic. It is difficult to . see how a 240 MENTAL SCIENCE. science of logic could be constructed on Brown's view of the subject. The simplest and best conception of reasoning is that of the comparison of two objects through their relation to a third ; and this will include every form of mediate reasoning. KINDS OF REASONING. There are two kinds of reasoning, called Deductive Reasoning and Inductive Reasoning. We shall define and illustrate each, and show the kind of truth to which each is adapted. Deductive Reasoning. Deductive Reasoning is the process of deriving a particular truth from a general truth. Thus, from the general truth that " all metals are expanded by heat," I can infer the particular truth that any particular metal, as iron, will be expanded by heat. The reasoning of geometry is deductive reasoning. The formal statement in deductive reasoning is as follows : All metals are expanded by heat ; Iron is a metal ; Hence, Iron is expanded by heat. Inductive Reasoning. Inductive Reasoning is the process of deriving a general truth from particular truths. Thus, from the particular truths that "heat will expand iron," "heat will expand zinc," etc., I can infer that " heat will expand all metals." Whenever we derive a general truth from particular truths we reason by induction. The reasoning of natural philosophy is mainly inductive reasoning. The formal statement in inductive reasoning is as follows: Iron, zinc, etc., are expanded by heat ; Iron, zinc, etc., are all the metals ; Hence, all metals are expanded by heat. Relation of Induction and Deduction. These two meth- ods of reasoning are the reverse of each other. One goes from particulars to generals ; the other from generals to particulars. One is a process of analysis ; the other is a process of synthesis. One rises from facts to laws; the other descends from laws to facts. Each is independent of the other, and each is a valid and essential method of inference. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 241 Kinds of Truth. These two methods of reasoning are adapted to two different kinds of truth. These kinds of truth are distinguished as necessary and contingent truths. " All right angles are equal to one another," and "a straight line is the shortest distance from one point to another," are examples of necessary truths. "Heat expands all metals," and "the planets move in elliptical orbits," are examples of contingent truths, How they Differ. These two classes of truths differ not in their certainty, but in their necessity. The contingent truth may be just as certain as the necessary truth. Thus," All horned ani- mals ruminate," " The sun will rise to-morrow," etc., are just as certain as that " Four times three are twelve," or " The whole is greater than any of its parts." You can conceive of the opposite of one without an absurdity ; but of the opposite of the other you cannot conceive. The one is eternal and necessary, subject to no contingency, to no possibility of the opposite ; the other is of the nature of an event taking place in time, subject to the possibility of change, and may be supposed to be different from what it is without any absurdity. Reasoning Adapted to Truth. These two classes of truths admit of two different kinds of reasoning. Deductive reasoning is usually applied to necessary truth; and inductive reasoning to contingent truth. The proof of necessary truths is usually called a demonstration, and the reasoning demonstrative reasoning; the proof of contingent truths is often called probable reasoning. It may be remarked, however, that we can apply inductive reasoning to necessary truth, though it is seldom done ; and that we also often use demonstrative reasoning in contingent truth ; though each has a sphere which seems more appropriate to its own nature. THE SYLLOGISM. Eeasoning, as now denned, is the process of deriving one judgment from two other judgments. The form in which a pro- cess of reasoning is naturally expressed, is called a Syllogism. All reasoning can be and naturally is expressed in the form of 11 242 MENTAL SCIENCE. the syllogism. It applies to both inductive and deductive reasoning, and is the form in which these processes are presented. Its importance as an instrument of thought requires that it re- ceive special notice. Definition. A Syllogism is an argument so expressed that the conclusion necessarily follows from the form of the statement. Or, it may be defined as a combination of three judgments, in which one of them is a necessary inference from the other two. Thus, when we say all A is B, and all B is C, it inevitably follows that all A is C. So when I affirm the two propositions, " All men are mortal," " Socrates is a man," it necessarily follows that " Socrates is mortal." The term syllogism is derived from a Greek word signifying a reckoning all together, or reasoning. The Three Parts. A syllogism, it is thus seen, consists of three propositions, two of which state the grounds of the argu- ment, and the third states the inference which flows from the other two. The two propositions from which the third is derived are called the premises, from prae, before, and mitto, I send ; the inference is called the conclusion. Thus, in the example above, " All men are mortal" and " Socrates is a man," are the premises, and " Socrates is mortal " is the conclusion. Tlie Terms. Each of these propositions, it is seen, contains two terms, the subject and the predicate; and the three propositions contain only three terms. One of these terms is found in both premises, and is called the middle term; the other two terms are called the extremes; both of the extremes are found in the con- clusion. The subject of the conclusion is called the minor term, and the predicate of the conclusion is called the major term. Thus, in the syllogism given, Socrates is the minor term, mortal is the major term, and man is the middle term. Th# Premises. The Premises are named from the term which they contain. The premise containing the major term is called the major premise ; the premise containing the minor term is called the minor premise. The major premise compares the major term with the middle term ; the minor premise compares THE NATUKE OF KEASONING. 243 the minor term with the middle term. In the form of the syllo- gism given, which may be regarded as the fundamental or typical form, the major term is the predicate of the major premise, the minor term is the subject of the minor premise, and the middle term is the subject of the major and the predicate of the minor premise. Reason for the Names. The middle term is so called be- cause it stands intermediate between the other two in the com- parison. The minor term is so called because it is usually smaller in extension than the other extreme ; the major term is so called because it is usually greater in extension than the minor term. Thus, in the syllogism given, Socrates includes but one person, while the class of mortals includes many persons. The terms are conveniently represented by the letters S, M, and P, S represent- ing the minor term, or subject of the conclusion, P representing the major term, or predicate of the conclusion, and M represent- ing the middle term. The general form of the syllogism is thus "M is P; S is M; hence S is P." Order of Premises. In the typical form of the syllogism, given above, the minor premise follows the major premise. The order of the premises is, however, not fixed and invariable. Either the major or the minor premise may be'stated first. From Aristotle to Boethius, 470 A. D., the minor premise was placed first; since that time most writers on logic have placed the major premise first. The former has been called the synthetic, the latter the analytic form. Order of Conclusion. The order of the premises and con- clusion may also vary. Thus, instead of stating the premises first and the conclusion last, we may invert this order and place the conclusion first and the premises afterward. Thus " Caesar was a tyrant, for he was a conqueror, and all conquerors are tyrants." This form is not only valid, but is regarded by some as the more natural of the two, and the one most frequently used in ordinary speech. Hamilton distinguishes the two forms as analytic and synthetic, calling the form just given the analytic form. 244 MENTAL SCIENCE. Order of Terms. The order of the terms in the premises is also variable. The middle term may be the subject or predicate of either premise, and the other terms will vary accordingly. This variation of the position of the terms in the premises gives what are called the figures of the syllogism. There are four pos- sible arrangements, and hence there are four figures. Figures of the Syllogism. The first figure is that in which the middle term is the subject of the major and predicate of the minor premise ; as, " M is P ; S is M ; hence S is P." The second figure is that in which the middle term is the predicate of both premises ; as, " P is M ; S is M ; hence S is P." The third figure is that in which the middle term is the subject of both premises; as, "M is P; M is S; hence S is P." The fourth figure is that in which the middle term is the predicate of the major premise and subject of the minor premise; as, "P is M; M isS; hence Sis P." The fourth figure was not recognized by Aristotle. It is sup- posed to have been introduced by Galen about the second century ; it was unnoticed, however, until near the beginning of the thir- teenth century. Hamilton discards it, calling it a "logical caprice." Still it is a possible theoretical form ; and a syllogism may be stated in that form without any violation of the laws of thought. Unftgured Syllogisms. When the three terms are equal in quantity, the change of figure does not affect the conclusion. Thus, in the syllogism, "C equals B, A equals C, hence A equals B," the conclusion will not be affected by any change in the figure. These terms may be made equal by the explicit quanti- fication of the predicate. Thus suppose we have the following syllogism : All men are some mortals ; All poets are some men ; .'.All poets are some mortals. Here, since the terms in each premise are exactly equal in quantity, no change will take place in the conclusion by any change in the figure of the syllogism. Thus we may have, THE NATURE OF REASONING. 245 Some mortals are all men ; Some men are all poets ; .'.Some mortals are all poets. This form of the syllogism was introduced by Hamilton, and called by him the Unfigured Syllogism. Laws of the Syllogism. The following rules or canons apply to the syllogism, and govern the mind in drawing its con- clusion. 1. Affirmative Premises. If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion is affirmative. In other words, if the major and minor terms both agree with the same middle term, they will agree with each other. This is evident from the axiom that " Things which agree with the same thing agree with each other." This is the law of affirmative conclusions. We must be sure that we have the same middle term, for a conclusion is not always possible from two affirmative premises. 2. Negative Premises. If both premises are negative, there is no conclusion. This is evident from the fact that if both terms disa- gree with the same middle term, they may or may not agree with each other. There is no ground for a conclusion. Thus from " A bird is not a horse ; a robin is not a horse," nothing can be inferred. 3. -Negative Conclusion. If one of the premises is negative, the conclusion is negative. This is evident from the fact that if one term agrees and another disagrees with a third term, they must disagree with each other. Thus from " A man is not a bird ; a poet is a man," we infer that " A poet is not a bird.' 4. Middle Term Unequivocal. The middle term must be une- quivocal. That is, it must be used in the same sense in both premises, or else we may really compare the minor term with one thing and the major with another thing, and thus have no ground for a conclusion. Thus, " Feathers are light ; light is contrary to darkness ; therefore, feathers are contrary to darkness " is an invalid syllogism. Here the' term "light" is used in two distinct senses. In such cases, we really have four terms, and the form has been called a " logical quadruped." 246 MENTAL SCIENCE. 5. Middle Term Distributed. The middle term must be dis- tributed in at least one of the premises. Otherwise the major term may be compared with one part of the middle term, and the minor term with another part ; and there will thus be actually no common middle term, and consequently no ground for an inference. Thus, from "Men are bipeds," and "Robins are bipeds," no inference can be drawn, since the part of the class of bipeds that agrees with " men " is not the part which agrees with "robins." The same is true of "Black is a color; white is a color; hence, black is white." Let the student remember that the subject of a particular and the predicate of an affirmative are undistributed, and that the subject of the universal and the predi- cate of a negative are distributed. 6. Distribution of Conclusion. No term must be distributed in the conclusion that was not distributed in the premises. This would be speaking of more in the conclusion than we have grounds for in the premises. Thus, in " All birds are bipeds ; no man is a bird ; hence, no man is a biped," the conclusion is invalid, since the term biped is distributed in the conclusion, being the predi- cate of a negative proposition, and it is not distributed in the premise. From " All men are bipeds, some men are poets," the conclusion must be " Some poets are bipeds," since " poets " was not distributed in the premise, being the predicate of an affirma- tive proposition. 7. Particular Premises. From two particular premises no conclu- sion can be drawn. For, if both premises were I, no term would be distributed, and hence the middle term would be undistributed, and there would be no conclusion (Prin. 4). If both premises were O, there would be two negative premises, and thus no con- clusion (Prin. 2). If one premise were I and the other O, the middle term, to be distributed, must be the predicate of O. The conclusion, if there is any, will be negative (Prin. 3), and its predicate will be distributed ; hence there must be two terms dis- tributed in the premises ; and this is impossible, when they are 1 and O. Hence from two particular premises there is no con- clusion. THE NATUKE OF REASONING. 247 8. Particular Conclusion. If one premise is particular, the con- clusion is particular. To prove this we shall show that a univer- sal conclusion must be drawn from universal premises. If the uni- versal conclusion is A, then first, both premises are affirmative, as is evident from Principles 2 and 3 ; second, the subject of the conclusion must be the subject of one premise in order to be dis- tributed, since the predicate of an affirmative is not distributed, and that premise must be universal ; third, for the same reason the middle term must be the subject of the other premise in order to be distributed, and that premise must be universal. Hence both of the premises must be universal for a universal affirmative con- clusion. If the universal conclusion be E, then both of its terms are distributed, and the middle term must be distributed, and this requires three terms to be distributed in the premises. This re- quires both premises to be universal and one of them negative, or both negative and one of them universal. But from two nega- tives we can draw no conclusion ; therefore the premises must both be universal. Therefore, since a universal conclusion re- quires two universal premises, if one premise is particular, the conclusion, if any, cannot be universal, and hence must be partic- ular. NOTE. These several principles enable us to dispose of any cases of syllogism that may be presented, and to dispense with the com- plicated methods of reduction, as taught by the old logicians. Incomplete Syllogism. In ordinary thought and expression we seldom use the complete syllogistic form. One premise is often omitted, being supplied mentally by the speaker and hearer. A syllogism with one premise unexpressed is called an Enthymeme, from en and thymos, meaning in the mind. Thus in the following : "The Americans are a free people, . .They are happy," the major premise "All free people are happy," is unexpressed. In the following: 248 MENTAL SCIENCE. "Poets are imaginative, . .Bryant was imaginative," the minor premise, " Bryant was a poet," is unexpressed. An enthymeme, like a complete syllogism, often expresses the conclusion with because, or then, or some similar term ; as, "Mr. Smith is happy, because he is virtuous." "Aldebaran is a star; therefore it shines by its own light." The incomplete syllogism is used in ordinary speech because the full form makes our argument or conversation seem stiff and pedantic. One of the judgments is omitted because it is so obvious, both to the speaker and to the hearer, that it would be waste of time to propound it. The full form can be readily com- pleted when it is needed to test the correctness of the conclusion. Complex Syllogism. Sometimes several syllogisms are united in an abridged form, so that a conclusion may be drawn from their combination. Such a complex syllogism is called the Sorites or chain-syllogism. The Common Sorites. The ordinary sorites consists of a number of syllogisms in the first figure, so combined that the predicate of the first premise becomes the subject of the next premise, and so on until, in the conclusion, the predicate of the last premise is predicated of the subject of the first. Thus, "The Hindoos are Asiatics; The Asiatics are men ; Men are rational animals ; or, Rational animals have body and spirit ; . .The Hindoos have body and spirit." A is B ; Bis C; CisD; D isE; . '.AisE. Goclenian Sorites. This order may be reversed so that the subject of one premise becomes the predicate of the following premise, and in the conclusion the predicate of the first premise is predicated of the subject of the last premise. Thus, ' ' Rational animals have body and spirit, f D is E ; Men are rational animals, C is D ; Asiatics are men, or, ! B is C ; The Hindoos are Asiatics, A is B ; . .The Hindoos have body and spirit." I . ' . A is E. This is called the Goclenian Sorites. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 249 Two Forms Compared. The first form is known as the Aris- totelian Sorites ; the latter is called the Goclenian Sorites, having been invented by Goclenius. In the former we go from the terms of least extension to the terms of greatest extension ; in the latter we begin with the term of greatest extension and proceed to the least. The former has been called the ascending, and the latter the descending form. The two forms may be compared by plac- ing them side by side, as below. ASCENDING SORITES. DESCENDING SORITES. " Caius is a man ; All sentient beings seek happi- All men are finite beings ; ness ; All finite beings are sentient ; All finite beings are sentient ; All sentient beings seek happi- All men are finite beings ; ness ; Caius is a man ; . ' .Caius seeks happiness." . * .Caius seeks happiness. DEDUCTIVE REASONING. DEDUCTIVE REASONING is the process of deriving a particular truth from a general truth. Thus, from the proposition that " All metals are expanded by heat," we may derive the particular truth that any one metal, as zinc, is expanded by heat. Stated in the formal manner of the syllogism, we have the following: "All metals are expanded by heat; iron is a metal; hence, iron is expanded by heat." A deductive argument stated in the syllo- gistic form gives us the deductive syllogism. An Analytic Process. Deduction is an analytic process. It analyzes a universal truth into the particulars which are em- braced in it, and affirms of the particular what is true of the universal. Thus the truth that " All men are mortal " is seen to contain the particular truth, "Socrates is mortal," and by the deductive process, this particular truth is taken out of the general truth. Deduction is therefore an inference from the whole to its parts, that is, an analytic process. A Descending Process. Deduction is a descending process. The general is regarded as higher than the particular ; hence to 11* 250 MENTAL SCIENCE. go from the general to the particular is to descend. Deduction descends from higher truths to lower truths, from laws to facts, from causes to phenomena, etc. Given the law, we can by de- duction descend to the facts that fall under the law, even if we have never before seen the facts ; and so from the cause we may pass down to observed and even unknown phenomena. Origin of General Truths. The general truths from which we reason to particulars are derived from several distinct sources. Some of them are intuitive, as the axioms of mathematics and logic. Some of them are derived from induction, as in the example " Heat expands all metals." Some of them are merely hypothetical, as in the investigation of the physical sciences. Many of the hypotheses and theories of the physical sciences are used as general truths for deductive reasoning ; as the theory of gravitation, the theory of light, etc. Reasoning from the theory of universal gravitation, Leverrier discovered the position of a new planet in the heavens, before it had been observed by human eye. Basis of Deduction. The basis of deductive reasoning is the axiomatic truth that "Whatever is true of the whole is true of the parts," or " Whatever is true of the general is true of the particular." This principle gives validity to the deductive inference. It is our authority for this inference. If the question arises," How do we know that the conclusion is true?" we answer we know that it is so from the self-evident proposition that " Whatever is true of the whole is true of the parts." The prin- ciple may be illustrated by the syllogism " All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, etc. " Another Statement. The principle may also be stated that "Whatever may be affirmed or denied of the whole, may be affirmed or denied of the parts." Hamilton expresses it thus : " What belongs, or does not belong, to the containing whole, be- longs, or does not belong, to each of the contained parts." Aris- totle's statement of the law is equivalent to the following : " What- ever can be predicated affirmatively or negatively of any class or THE NATURE OF EEASONING. 251 term distributed, can be predicated in like manner of all and singular the classes or individuals contained under it." This is the celebrated Dictum of Aristotle. Origin of the Basis. This principle is a self-evident and necessary truth. It is not derived from reasoning, but lies back of and conditions all reasoning. The proposition is the product of the intuitive power. I. ANOTHER FORM OF DEDUCTION. There is another form of deductive reasoning in which the major premise does not con- tain the conclusion. Thus, " B equals C, and A equals C, hence A equals B." Here it will be seen that the major premise, " B equals C," does not contain the conclusion, "A equals B," and thus we do not go from generals to particulars. It is also seen that the law of inference in this syllogism is not that already given, " Whatever is true of the whole is true of the parts." The law of inference is the axiomatic truth, that " Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." TJie Concepts Equal. The peculiarity of this reasoning is that the concepts expressed by the terms compared are not of different extent. The three terms are precisely equal, and thus there is no subordination of the propositions. This reasoning is that which prevails in mathematics. Thus, x = y, and y = 4, hence x = 4. Or in geometry, the triangle AB C= the square ABCD, and the triangle LMN ' = the square ABCD; hence the triangle ABC '= the triangle LMN. Reduced to Previous Form. Some writers endeavor to re- solve this into the form in which the law of inference is used as the major premise. Thus, "Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other ; A and B are equal to the same thing, C ; hence A and B are equal to each other." Objection to This. If this be insisted upon, we should insist with equal propriety upon placing the ordinary deductive syllo- gism in a similar form. Thus, we should reason, '* Whatever is true of the general is true of the particular; It is true of the general that all men are mortal ; Hence it is true of the particular that Socrates is mortal." 252 MENTAL SCIENCE. This would be very awkward and is unnecessary ; and so we maintain that the syllogism, " A = B ; B = C ; hence A = C," is in its proper and normal form. And thus the axiom, " Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another," may be regarded as a law of inference in the one case, just as the law from the general to the particular applies in the other case. NOTE. To avoid this difficulty, I have sometimes thought it might be well to distinguish three kinds of reasoning : Deduction, which passes from generals to particulars ; Induction, which passes from particulars to generals ; and Conduction, which passes from thing to thing of the same rank. Each of these forms, when presented in a syllogism, would have its special law of inference and they would rank as coordinates. Each can be reduced to the deductive form, and if either one is so reduced, all of them should be. It would thus seem that there are three kinds of reasoning, or only one kind. This, however, would be a radical departure from the accepted theory of logic. It is probably better to include this latter form under De- duction, and retain the syllogism in the usual form in accordance with the explanation I have given. II. MATHEMATICAL SEASONING. The form of deduction which we have just considered is that found in mathematics, and is thus called mathematical reasoning. This is of so much impor- tance, being the principal and most extensive application of de- ductive reasoning, that it demands a few words of explanation. Mediate Comparison. Mathematical reasoning is a process of mediate comparison. It is one of the finest illustrations of the reasoning process in which two things are compared through their relation to a third. The simplest form of it is " A equals B, but B equals C ; hence A equals C." Here it is assumed that we see no direct relation between A and C, but infer their equality by comparing each with B. A good example of this is seen in the demonstration of the square on the hypothenuse, where a square and a rectangle are proved equal to each other because they are equal to the double of equal triangles. Kinds of Mathematical Reasoning. There are two dis- tinct methods of reasoning in mathematics, the Direct and the Indirect. By the Direct Method, one quantity is compared with THE NATURE OF REASONING. 253 another through their common relation to a third, or by a reference to the definitions and axioms, or to some principle previously proved. In geometry, one quantity is sometimes proved equal to another by superposition. By the Indirect Method we may suppose the given proposi- tion not to be true, and then show that such a supposition leads to an absurdity; or we make a number of suppositions, one of which must be true, and then show that all but the one we wish to establish are false. This method is called the method of the reduetio ad absurdum. It is frequently used to prove the converse of a proposition when there is no good direct method. Errors in Mathematical Reasoning. There are two errors of reasoning to which young persons are liable. The first is called Reasoning in a Circle; the second is Begging the Question. "We reason in a circle when, in demonstrating a truth, we employ a second truth which cannot be proved without the aid of the first. We are said to beg the question when, in order to establish a proposition, we employ the proposition itself. MatJiematical Reasoning Identical. It has been held by Leibnitz and others that mathematical reasoning is merely a comparison of identicals, that it is nothing more than a = a; in other words, that it is merely a statement that a thing is equiva- lent to itself. This opinion is erroneous, and shows an incorrect conception of the subject of reasoning. Even in so simple a proposition as 3x2 = 6, the two quantities are not identical, though they are equal in value : 3 X 2 expresses one conception of quantity, " 2 taken 3 times," and 6 expresses another con- ception, " six units." So also in 3x4= 2 X 6, we have two entirely different conceptions of quantity; and we only know they are equal by their common relation to 12. Thus 3x4 = 12, and 2 X 6 = 12, hence 3x4=2x6. In geometry we can prove two dissimilar figures, as a triangle and a square, equal to one another, since both are equal to some common quantity. The same thing also holds in algebra. Force of Mathematical Reasoning. The question of the 254 MENTAL SCIENCE. force and irresistible cogency of mathematical reasoning has often been discussed. Some philosophers hold that it is merely on account of the pains taken to define the terms employed, and the strict adherence to these definitions. Stewart ascribes the force of mathematical reasoning to the fact that the principles from which it sets out that is, its definitions are purely hypo- thetical, involving no admixture of facts; and that by simply reasoning upon these hypotheses, the conclusions follow inevit- ably. It is held that the same thing would be true of any other science, if we could frame our definitions to suit ourselves instead of being obliged to proceed upon facts as our data. The truths of mathematics " are necessary in no other sense than that certain definitions being assumed, certain suppositions made, then certain other things follow." Objection to this View. This is an incorrect view of the subject, and illustrates the liability of the pure metaphysician to error, when he deals with mathematical subjects. The definitions of mathematics are not in any sense hypothetical, but describe definite ideas, and express certain truths as propositions. An hypothesis can be supposed to be other than it is ; but a mathe- matical definition, as of a circle, is seen to state a truth that cannot be supposed to be other than it is. If the points of the circumference, for instance, were unequally distant from the centre, it would not be a circle. The Correct View. The real reason for the certainty of mathematical reasoning may be stated as follows : First, its ideas are definite, necessary, and exact conceptions of quantity. Second, its definitions, as the description of these ideas, are nec- essary, exact, and indisputable truths. Third, the axioms from which we derive conclusions by comparison, are all self-evident and necessary truths. Comparing these exact ideas by the nec- essary laws of inference, the result must be absolutely true. Or, stated in another way, using these definitions and axioms as the premises of a syllogism, the conclusion follows inevitably. There is no place or opportunity for error to creep in to mar or vitiate our derived truths. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 255 Applied to Inductive Sciences. Mathematical reasoning may be employed in the inductive sciences ; indeed, some of their greatest achievements have been obtained through mathematics. By it Newton demonstrated the truth of the theory of gravitation ; by it Leverrier discovered a new planet in the heavens ; by it the exact time of an eclipse of the sun or moon is predicted centuries before it comes to pass. Mathematics is the instrument by which the engineer tunnels our mountains, bridges our rivers, constructs our aqueducts, erects our factories and makes them musical with the busy hum of spindles. Take away the results of the reason- ing of mathematics, and there would go with it nearly all the material achievements which give convenience and glory to modern civilization. INDUCTIVE REASONING. INDUCTIVE REASONING is the process of deriving a general truth from particular truths. It is the process of inferring a general law from particular facts. Thus, suppose that I ob- serve that heat expands iron, and zinc, and copper, etc.; from these facts I can infer that "Heat will expand all metals." Such an inference is an argument by induction. In the same manner, by observing that many men die, I can infer that " All men are mortal." This process of inferring a general truth from partic- ular facts is called Induction. Unknown from the Known. Induction is thus the process of inferring the unknown from the known. Thus, in the example given, from what I know of iron, copper, zinc, etc., I infer that which I have not observed in other metals. It is a conclusion from something observed to something not observed ; from some- thing within to something beyond my sphere of actual experience. In other words, it is a process of thought from the known to the unknown. A Synthetic Process. Induction is also a synthetic process. It combines special facts and finds the general law which com- prehends them all. Thus the law that heat expands all metala 256 MENTAL SCIENCE. comprehends all the particular facts of heat expanding each par- ticular metal. The particular facts are united by the mind into the general law; the general law embraces the particular facts and binds them together into a unity of principle and thought. Induction is thus a process of thought from the parts to the whole a synthetic process. An Ascending Process. Induction may also be regarded as an ascending process : it rises from particular facts to general truths. The general truth is conceived as standing above the particular truths out of which it is formed. We go up the ladder of thought in ascending from the particular to the general ; and the facts may be regarded as the rounds of the ladder. Relation to Deduction. The relation of induction to de- duction will be clearly seen. Induction and Deduction are the converse, the opposites of each other. Deduction derives a par- ticular truth from a general truth ; Induction derives a general truth from particular truths. This antithesis appears in every particular. Deduction goes from generals to particulars; In- duction goes from particulars to generals. Deduction is an analytic process ; Induction is a synthetic process. Deduction is a descending process it goes from the higher truth to the lower truth ; Induction is an ascending process it goes from the lower truth to the higher. They differ also in that Deduction may be applied to necessary truths, while Induction is mainly restricted to contingent truths. Kinds of Induction. There are two kinds of inductive reasoning, which may be distinguished as Logical Induction and Practical Induction. Logical Induction assumes that we know all the particulars in inferring a general truth. This, however, in practice, is usually impossible. We cannot know all the facts, so we assume that the facts known represent those which are not known, and employ the principle that "What is true of the many is true of the whole." This is the inductive inference that is of real, practical use to us. The former is called logical, because the inference carries with it a logical necessity, .without the pos- THE ^ NATURE OF REASONING. 257 sibility of exception. The latter gives us a conclusion not nec- essarily true, but which we usually accept as true. Logical in- duction is called by some writers induction by simple enumeration. Basis of Induction. The basis of induction is the propo- sition that what is true of the many is true of the whole. Esser, an eminent logician, states it thus, " That which belongs or does not belong to many things of the same kind, belongs or does not belong to all things of the same kind." This proposition is founded on our faith in the uniformity of nature : take away this belief, and all reasoning by induction falls. The basis of induction is thus often stated to be man's faith in the uniformity of nature. In- duction has been compared to a ladder upon which we ascend from facts to laws. This ladder cannot stand unless it has some- thing to rest upon ; and this something is our faith in the con- stancy of nature's laws. Origin of Basis. The basis of induction our faith in the uniformity of nature's laws is said to be intuitive. It seems to be a law of our intelligence, something growing out of the consti- tution of the mind. Whenever we have uniformly observed that a number of different objects of the same class possess a common attribute, we are, by a law of our nature, disposed to conclude that this attribute is possessed by all the objects of this class. This principle of extending our inferences beyond the limits of experience is universal, and manifests itself at the earliest age of intellectual development. It may not always be expressed in a definite proposition, but it is tacitly assumed and acted upon by all men. It has, therefore, been regarded as a natural principle of our intelligence. The intuitive origin of this principle is held by many of the German and Scotch metaphysicians, and also by Cousin and others of the French thinkers. Many modern thinkers, however, maintain that it is itself an inductive truth, a truth learned from experience and observation ; and that it is by no means among the first, but among the latest of our inductions. In reply to this view, we remark that the mind manifests a belief in this principle 258 MENTAL SCIENCE. at a very early age ; and that if we assume this principle to be an induction, it takes away our basis of inductive reasoning. Limits of Belief. This principle must be employed with certain limitations. To infer universally that what is true of the many is true of the whole, will lead us into error. " Many of the books in my library have green covers, there/ore all have," would be evidently an incorrect inference. "Many dogs bark, therefore all dogs bark," is contradicted by a species of dog found in Greenland. The people of Siam, who know nothing of ice, might infer that water can never be in any other than a liquid state ; or the inhabitants of Central Africa, who have never seen a white man, might infer that all men are black. The error in the first and second cases consists in not noticing the exceptions ; in the third and fourth it seems to be in not limiting the law to " similar circumstances." I. CRITERIA OF INDUCTION. Since mistakes may be fre- quently made in the application of the principle of inductive reasoning, the question arises how to apply the principle cor-- rcctly ; that is, when we are warranted in taking some instances as samples of the whole class. This leads us to the establishment of certain laws or rules called the Criteria of Induction. Simple Enumeration. The first criterion for the application of the law is that of complete enumeration. If each one of the particulars has the property under consideration, then it is con- clusive that all have it. Thus, if it is seen that May, June, July, and August, which are the months of the greatest growth, are the only months that do not contain the letter r, then the conclusion is certain that " the months without the letter r are the months of greatest growth." If the astronomer finds, by actual observa- tion, that each of the planets moves in an elliptical orbit, then it is absolutely certain that all the planets move in elliptical orbits. This is what Bacon calls Induction by Simple Enumeration. It has also been called Empirical Induction, because it does not go beyond actual experience. Hamilton calls it Logical Induction, because it is the only induction which is necessitated by the laws THE NATURE OF REASONING. 259 of thought. It is, however, entirely unimportant in the discovery of truth, as it does not reach beyond the sphere of experience. For progress in thought, we need an induction that transcends experience, and enables us to step beyond the known into the sphere of the unknown, and infer what we have not yet seen. A Causal Agency. The second criterion is the perception of a causal agency or some other uniform concomitant which tends to secure a uniform result among all the similar cases. Thus, by observation astronomers found that eclipses followed one another in regular order ; they could then, by induction, infer that they would repeat in this order, and thus foretell an eclipse ; but when the true theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies was discovered, the cause of this regularity became known, and the predictions of eclipses became much more certain. So also when we observe that several planets revolve in elliptical orbits, we may infer that all planets revolve in elliptical orbits; but when we add to this the principle that their motions are produced by the action of centrifugal and centripetal forces, the product of whose joint action is an elliptical orbit, the conclusion that all planets move in elliptical orbits becomes almost indisputable. The cause gives a stamp of certainty that does not accompany the mere multiplicity of cases, on account of the principle that like causes produce like effects. Causes Difficult to Discover. Causes are not always readily ascertained ; indeed there is often very great difficulty in deter- mining the causes of facts and phenomena. These difficulties arise from several sources, a few of which we mention. First, the cause is occult, not a thing of sense, and the fact that acts as a cause is not perceived in that relation to other facts. Second, causes seldom or never act simply ; in most cases any given fact is the result of several causes all working to the same end. Third, causes sometimes interfere and counteract or modify one another's influence. Fourth, the same result may sometimes be produced by different causes. Fifth, things apparently related as cause and effect may both be effects of the same cause. 260 MENTAL SCIENCE. II. TESTS OF CAUSAL AGENCY. This difficulty in determining the cause of facts and phenomena leads to the investigation of tests by which we may ascertain the causal agency in any par- ticular case and thus be able to make an inductive inference. These several tests as given by Mill and now accepted by nearly all subsequent writers, are as follows : the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, the Method of Residues, and the Method of Concomitant Variations. Metliod of Agreement. The Method of Agreement, as stated by Atwater, is, If, whenever a given object or agency is present, without counteracting forces, a given effect is produced, there is strong evidence that the object or agency is the cause of the effect. Thus, if in every application of a given degree of heat water boils, iron ex- pands, and clay hardens, we may infer that heat is the cause of these effects; and we are authorized to draw the inductive inference that whenever the cause is applied the effect will follow. We must remember, however, that the same effect may be pro- duced by different causes ; as the sensation of heat may arise from a fire, or warm weather, or a fever, or excessive clothing ; but it is usually easy to determine which one of the several causes actually produced the effect. Method of Difference. The Method of Difference is, If when the supposed cause is present the effect is present, and wlien the supposed cause is absent the effect is wanting, there being in neither case any other agents present to effect the result, ^ve may reasonably infer that the supposed cause is the real one. Thus, we have a double proof that sound is the result of vibrations of air produced by a resonant body, if, on the one hand, whenever sound is heard such vibrations are found ; and whenever such vibrations appear sound is given forth ; and if, on the other hand, a bell or sonorous body yields no sound when struck in an exhausted receiver. So also it proves " that the contact of moisture is the cause of the de- composition of animal matter, if, whenever the latter occurs moisture is present ; if dryness checks or arrests it ; and if salt, which prevents it, acts by detaching the water from the meats which it preserves." THE NATURE OF REASONING. 261 Method of Residues. The Method of Residues, or Residual Variations, is, When in any phenomena we find a result remain' ing after the effects of all known causes are estimated, we may attribute it to a residual agent not yet reckoned. Thus, it was found that the velocity of sound as derived by experiment differed from the velocity as determined by the calculation of the motion of air waves. This residual velocity was a perplexing fact, until the happy thought came to La Place that it might arise from the heat developed by the motion of the air-waves. The result of such a residual cause was calculated, and found to furnish a com- plete explanation of the variation, and thus established the sup- position of La Place. Concomitant Variations. The Method of Concomitant Variations is, When a variation in a given antecedent is ac- companied by a variation of a given consequent, they are in some manner related as cause and effect. Thus, it was proved by Pascal that the column of mercury in the Torricellian tube was counter- poised by a column of -air, by ascertaining that when the instru- ment was carried up a mountain the height of the column of mercury diminished in proportion as the height of the column of air above it was diminished. Now, as Atwater remarks, whenever either of these criteria is found, free from conflicting evidence, and especially when several of them concur, the evidence is clear that the cases ob- served are fair representatives of the whole class, and warrant a valid universal inductive conclusion. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. In Inductive Reasoning, we cannot always reach the general truth, especially when it is a cause or a law, by a mere synthesis of the facts and phenomena. In such cases, the mind frames a supposition or conjecture, which is received as provisionally true and tested by the facts. Sometimes this supposition is made from a few facts, and other facts are searched for and collected to test its correctness. Such a supposition or conjecture is called an 262 MENTAL SCIENCE. Hypothesis or a Theory. "We shall devote a few words to the explanation of each. An Hypothesis. An Hypothesis may be defined as a suppo- sition or conjecture to account for facts and phenomena. It is a judgment which is held to be possibly, not certainly, true; and whose truth is to be tested by the facts. Such a conjecture may apply either to the cause of facts, as the movement in elliptical orbits, or to the law which governs facts, as the law of " equal areas in equal times." A Theory. A Theory is an accepted explanation of facts and phenomena. It may thus be defined as a verified hypothesis. When an hypothesis is shown to explain all the facts that are known, these facts being varied and extensive, it is said to be verified, and becomes a theory. Thus we have the theory of uni- versal gravitation, the Copernican theory of the solar system, the undulatory theory of light, etc., all of which were originally mere hypotheses. Tlie Term, Used Loosely. This is the manner in which the term is usually employed in the inductive philosophy; though it must be admitted that it is not always used in this strict sense. Discarded hypotheses are often referred to as theories; and that which is actually a theory is sometimes called an hypothesis. Thus writers speak of the phlogistic and antiphlogistic theories, the theory of caloric, etc., hypotheses which were never verified and are now discarded. The term theory is also used in mathe- matics in a different sense, meaning the principles of the subject in distinction from the practice of it. Probability of Hypotheses. The probability of an hypoth- esis is in proportion to the number of facts and phenomena it will explain. The larger the number of facts and phenomena that it will satisfactorily account for, the greater our faith in the correct- ness of our supposition. Thus the larger the number of the phenomena of light which the "undulatory hypothesis" will ex- plain, the greater the probability of its being a correct suppo- sition. If there is more than one hypothesis in respect to the THE NATURE OF REASONING. 263 facts under consideration, that one which accounts for the greatest number of facts is the most probable. Thus, when it was seen that the supposition that light was caused by undulations accounted for more facts than the hypothesis of corpuscles, the first supposition became the more probable. Verification of Hypotheses. In order to verify an hypoth- esis, it must be shown that it will account for all the facts and phenomena. If these facts are numerous and varied, and the sub- ject is so thoroughly investigated that it is quite certain that no important class of facts has been overlooked, the supposition is regarded as true, and the hypothesis is said to be verified. Thus, the hypothesis of the " daily rotation " of the earth on its axis to account for the succession of day and night is accepted as abso- lutely true. This is the view taken by Dr. Whewell and many other thinkers in respect to the verification of an hypothesis. Another View. Some writers, however, as Mill and his school, maintain that in order to verify an hypothesis, we must show not only that it explains all the facts and phenomena, but that there is no other possible hypothesis which will account for them. According to this, the "undulatory hypothesis" of light has not been verified, since it has never been shown that the phe- nomena of light could not be accounted for by some other suppo- sition. The former view of verification is regarded as the correct one. By the latter view, it is evident that an hypothesis could never be verified. Origin of Hypotheses. The hypotheses of science originate in what is called anticipation. They are not the result of a mere synthesis of facts, for no combination of facts can give the law or cause. We do not see the law ; we see the facts, and the mind thinks the law. By the power of anticipation, the mind often leaps from a few facts to the cause which produces them or the law which governs them. Many hypotheses were but a happy intuition of the mind. They were the result of what La Place calls "a great guess," or of Avhat Plato so beautifully designates as "a sacred suspicion of truth." The forming of hypotheses re- 264: MENTAL SCIENCE. quires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophic imagination, that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form, or sees the law standing behind the fact. Value of Hypotheses. The value of hypotheses to science can hardly be overstated. Nearly all the great truths of the physical sciences were once merely hypotheses. The idea of the identity of lightning and electricity lay in Franklin's mind as a mere supposition until he proved it by means of his silken kite. The Copernican theory of the solar system was a mere hypothesis, until it was verified by the observations of astronomers. Kepler made and rejected twenty suppositions in regard to the shape of the earth's orbit before he discovered the true one. Newton's theory of universal gravitation was a mere hypothesis when it first occurred to his mind as he sat in the garden and saw the apple fall, and was accepted as true only when, failing at first, he at last demonstrated its correctness. Use of Wrong Hypotheses. Even incorrect hypotheses may be of use in scientific research, since they may lead to more correct suppositions. The supposition of the circular motions of the heavenly bodies around the earth as a centre, which led to the conception of epicycles, etc., and at last to the true theory, is an illustration of this. So the "theory of phlogiston" in chemistry, made many facts intelligible, before the true one of " oxidation " superseded it. And so, as Thomson says, "with the theory that ' Nature abhors a vacuum/ which served to bring together many cognate facts not previously considered as related." Even an incorrect conception of this kind has its place in science, so long as it is applicable to the facts ; when facts occur which it cannot explain, we either correct it or replace it by a new one. The pathway of science, some one remarks, is strewn with the remains of discarded hypotheses. "To try wrong guesses," says Dr. Whewell, " is with most persons the only way to hit upon right ones." Application of Hypotheses. This subject is of so much im- portance as illustrating those mental operations that belong to THE NATUEE OF REASONING. * 265 science and practical life that I add a few more illustrations, quoting from Thomson's Laws of Thought: "The system of anatomy which has immortalized the name of Oken, is the conse- quence of a flash of anticipation which glanced through his mind when he picked up in a chance walk the skull of a deer, bleached and disintegrated by the weather, and exclaimed, after a glance, 'It is part of a vertebral column!' When Newton saw the apple fall, the anticipatory question flashed through his mind, 'Why do not the heavenly bodies fall like this apple?' In neither case had accident any important share; Newton and Oken were prepared by the deepest previous study to seize upon the unimportant fact offered to them, and show how important it might become; and if the apple and the deer-skull had been wanting, some other falling body, or some other skull, would have touched the string so ready to vibrate. But in each case there was a great step of anticipation ; Oken thought he saw the type of the whole skeleton in the single vertebra, whilst Newton con- ceived at once that the whole universe was full of bodies tending to fall." " The discovery of Goethe, which did for the vegetable kingdom what Oken did for the animal, that the parts of a plant are to be regarded as metamorphosed leaves, is an apparent exception to the necessity of discipline for invention, since it was the discovery of a poet in a region to which he seemed to have paid no especial or laborious attention. But Goethe was himself most anxious to rest the basis of this discovery upon his observation rather than his imagination, and doubtless with good reason." "As with other great discoveries, hints had been given already, though not pursued, both of Goethe's and Oken's principles. Goethe left his to be followed up by others, and but for his great fame, perhaps his name would never have been connected with it. Oken had amassed all the materials necessary for the establishment of his theory ; he was able at once to discover and conquer the new ter- ritory." 12 266 * , MENTAL SCIENCE. ANALOGY. ANALOGY is that process of thought by which we infer that if two things resemble each other in one or more particulars, they will resemble each other in some other particular. The term analogy is derived from ana and logos, and means, literally, ac- cording to proportion. Illustration. To illustrate analogy, suppose that two objects, A and B, are observed to agree in one or more qualities, and we find a quality in A that we have not observed in B ; we infer, by analogy, that B also possesses that attribute. Newton observed that the diamond possessed a high degree of refractive power compared with its density ; ' he knew this to be true of some bodies which were combustible; hence he inferred by analogy, that the diamond contained a combustible element. He made the same inference also in respect to water, and in both cases his inference was correct. Law of Analogy. Analogy thus infers from the partial similarity of two or more things their total similarity. The prin- ciple of inference is, when one thing resembles another in known particulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown. Another state- ment of the principle is, if two things agree in several particulars, they will also agree in other particulars. Thus, suppose the attri- butes a, b, c, d, and e are found in A, and part of them, as a, b, and c are found in B ; then by analogy we would infer that the other attributes, d and e, are found in B. Application of tfie Principle. This principle is in constant application in ordinary life and in science. A physician, in visiting a patient, says, this disease corresponds in several par- ticulars with typhoid fever, hence it will correspond in all par- ticulars, and is typhoid fever. So, when the geologist discovers a fossil animal with large, strong, blunt claws, he infers that it procured its food by scratching or burrowing in the earth. It was by analogy that Dr. Buckland constructed an animal from a few fossil bones, and, when subsequently the bones of the entire animal were discovered, his construction was found to be correct. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 267 Relation to Induction. The reasoning by Analogy is closely related to that of Induction. They agree in this, that they both proceed from the known to the unknown, from something within to something beyond the sphere of observation. They differ, however, in an important respect.- Induction infers from the particular to the general, and analogy infers from one particular to another particular. Analogy infers more in respect to an object than we have observed ; Induction infers more in respect to a class than we have observed. Thua,in analogy, having observed that the Earth and Venus are alike in many particulars, we infer that Venus is inhabited because the Earth is. By induction, having observed that the Earth, Venus, Mars, and several of the planets, revolve in elliptical orbits, we infer that all of the planets revolve in such orbits. The Law of Each. The law of induction is that "what is true of many is true of all ; " the law of analogy is " things that have some things in common have other things in common." In induction the inference is that of a unity in plurality ; in analogy, the inference is that of a plurality in unity. In the former it is a law of the one in many; in the latter it is the law of the many in one. Induction proceeds on the principle, one in many, there- fore one in all; analogy proceeds on the principle, many in one, therefore all in one. Thus, if the attribute a is found in A, B, C, D, etc., and A, B, C, D, etc., belong to the class Q, then by in- duction we infer that the attribute a belongs to the class Q. While by analogy we infer that if a, b, c, d, and e are found in A, and a, b, and c are in B, d and e will be found in B. Probability of Analogy. The probability of analogy de- pends on the number of observed resemblances. Every similarity which is noticed between two objects increases the probability that the two objects resemble each other in some other property. When the two resemble each other in all respects, there is no longer any doubt that a property found in one object is also found in the other. In comparing two objects, the differences as well as the similarities must be taken into consideration. These 268 MENTAL SCIENCE. come into competition in our judgment, and must be weighed against one another, and the inference be given on the side which has the most weight. To illustrate, suppose the observed resem- blances between two objects are to the observed differences as four to one; then we conclude that the probability is four to one that the objects will agree in some property observed in one object and not in the other. That is, there are four chances out of five of such agreement. Illustration of Probability. The trite example of the proof of the inhabitability of the moon is a good illustration of this principle of probability of analogy. The moon resembles the earth in figure, motion, opacity, relation to the sun, etc.; but the earth is inhabited, therefore it is probable that the moon re- sembles the earth in this respect, and is also inhabited. But there are points of dissimilarity which create a counter-probability that the moon is not inhabited. The moon is thought to have no atmosphere or water ; but air and water are necessary to life on the earth ; hence life cannot exist in the moon unless under different circumstances from what it exists in the earth. Now the greater the number of resemblances between the two planets in other re- spects, the less is it probable that they differ in the mode of sus- taining life; so that the resemblances noted do themselves become presumptions against the moon being inhabited ; and the greater the number of resemblances the less the probability of the moon being inhabited. Use of Analogy. Analogy is of value in the discovery of new facts, as in discovering the combustible element of water and the diamond. By analogy Franklin was led to make the experi- ment with his kite that proved the identity of electricity and lightning. Analogy also aids induction in the discovery of laws and causes. It often suggests the hypotheses which induction afterwards proves to be true. It frequently points out the road to experiment and induction, and thus pioneers the way to the discovery of truth. The fall of the apple, by analogy, suggested to Newton the idea of the moon falling towards the earth, which resulted in the discovery of the great law of gravitation. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 269 Argument Deceptive. The argument from analogy is plausible, but often deceptive. Thus to infer that since American swans are white the Australian swan is white, gives a false con- clusion, for it is really black. So to infer that because John Smith has a red nose and is a drunkard, that Henry Jones who also has a red nose is also a drunkard, would be a dangerous inference. The common argument, since animals and nations both grow from infancy, and animals die, therefore nations will also decay, is as delusive as it is plausible. Conclusions of this kind, drawn from analogy, are frequently fallacious. Mandeville uses the following argument against popular education : " If the horse knew enough, he would soon throw his rider." He intends to imply two pairs of related terms ; thus, " As the horse is to the rider, so are the people to their rulers ; " which is of course a fallacy, since the relations are not similar. To be Used WitJi Caution. The inference from analogy, like that from induction, should be used with caution. Its con- clusion must not be regarded as certain, but merely as reaching a high degree of probability. The inference from a part to a part, no more than from a part to the whole, is attended with any rational necessity. To attain certainty, we must show that the principles which lie at the root of the process are either necessary laws of thought or necessary laws of nature ; both of which are impossible. Hence analogy can pretend to only a high degree of probability. It may even reach a large degree of certainty, but it never reaches necessity. We must, therefore, be careful not to accept any inference from analogy as true until it is proved to be true by actual observation and experiment, or by such an application of induction as to remove all reasonable doubt. Influence on Literature. Analogy, in its popular sense of similarity, exercises an influence on language and literature. In many cases, visible or tangible things lend their names to invis- ible and spiritual things, from some analogy more or less striking. Thus we speak of a dear statement, a lofty idea, a deep thought, 270 MENTAL SCIENCE. in which the adjectives applied to immaterial things are drawn from the analogies of the material world. So also the figures of rhetoric, the simile, the metaphor, personification, etc. are derived from the analogies perceived between different things. Poetry, wit, and even the most dignified orations, abound in figures and illustrations drawn from the similitudes of nature. TESTIMONY. The materials used in inductive reasoning are obtained in two ways ; by Experience and by Testimony. Experience has reference to the knowledge we gain for ourselves by perception ; and includes ordinary observation and experiment. Observation is the perception of nature in her ordinary or usual relations. By experiment man puts nature into new or different relations, and observes the result. The other source of facts is Testimony, which we shall now discuss. Definition of Testitnony. By Testimony, in philosophy, is meant the statement to one of the experience of another. It im- plies and is usually restricted to the communication of facts not observed by the person to whom they are stated. Such a state- ment may be made either orally or in writing ; we may thus have two kinds of testimony ; oral and written. These statements may be true or untrue; they may be worthy or unworthy of belief; and consequently the conclusions drawn from them may be true or. false. It is thus necessary to investigate the credibility of testimony, and determine the warrants of our belief in it. Testimony Probable. Testimony is in itself probable. It is natural for the normally constituted mind to state what is true ; a statement to deceive is contrary to the natural working of the human intellect and the moral nature. It is also natural for us to believe what is stated to us. As children we confide in the statements of parents and companions ; and it is only as we grow older and find ourselves deceived, that we begin to be suspicious and grow wary and cautious in accepting a statement as true. A belief in testimony is also reasonable, since man's observations THE NATURE OF REASONING. 271 are usually reliable and his moral intentions trustworthy. There is usually some strong motive required to induce a man to testify to a falsehood. Character of Witness. The credibility of testimony depends somewhat on the character of the witness. It is natural to place more confidence in the testimony of a man of known veracity than in the statements of one of known falsity. The credibility of testimony, however, is not determined entirely by the character of the witness. A bad man may tell the truth ; a man of good reputation may tell a falsehood. Still it is reasonable to place more confidence in the testimony of a man of good reputation than in that of a person whose character is questionable. Conditions of Belief. There are certain conditions which limit or modify our belief in testimony. These conditions may all be embraced under two distinct classes: first, those which relate to the testimony itself; and second, those which relate to the person giving the testimony. Both of these conditions are necessary for the credibility of testimony; and if either one is wanting, the testimony is to that extent weakened. First Condition. In respect to the character of the testimony, the first requirement is, that it must not contradict the laws of thought, nor the immutable laws of nature. Thus, if one should testify that he had seen a part greater than a whole, or had demonstrated the inequality of two right angles, we should not accept his testimony as true. So if any one testified that he knew a man who thought with his toes and walked with, his eyes, we are authorized to refuse to believe his testimony. A second re- quirement is that respecting the character of the narrative, the condition being that it should be explicit, comparatively full, and self-consistent. The concurrence of the testimony of several wit- nesses is also a condition of belief. Second Condition. The second general condition of credibility, that in respect to the person, regards his competency and veracity, or honesty. The ability or competency of a witness depends upon his power to correctly observe facts, and also to correctly report 272 MENTAL SCIENCE. them. Any lack of ability in observing or reporting facts weakens the credibility of his testimony. Weakness of eyesight or hardness of hearing would affect the credibility of a man's testimony in respect to what he had seen or heard. The veracity of a witness implies his desire and intention to report correctly. It includes both the character of the person and the motive which governs him in his testimony. Any evidence of a lack of veracity evidently impairs the credibility of the testimony. These two conditions, ability and veracity, do not imply one another, for it not unfrequently happens that where the honesty is greatest, the competency is least, and vice versa. Strength of Proof. A concurrence of these two classes of conditions constitutes the strength of testimony. In any case of testimony, if we know the witness to be a person of good character, that there is no motive for deception, that the statement is full, explicit, and consistent, and if it coincides with the statement of other witnesses, then, by a law of our nature, we are compelled to believe what is testified to. Such a belief is entirely natural, and almost inevitable. Indeed, it has been shown that "it is always possible to assign a number of independent witnesses so great, that the falsity of their concurrent testimony shall be mathematically more improbable, and so more incredible, than the truth of their statement be it what it may." Testimony Weakened. The probability of testimony is weakened in proportion as the above conditions do not fully co-exist. If l!nere is but a single witness, or if a number are not of good character, or if there be some motive for deception, or if they be not entirely agreed as to the principal facts of the case, or the narrative be inconsistent or contradictory, or the statement vague and hesitating, in so far as several or all of these con- ditions co-exist, the testimony would be weakened. It is held, however, that we may always suppose a case so strong that the falsity of the witnesses would be a greater miracle than the truth of their testimony. This is claimed to be true with respect to the testimony of the witnesses to our Saviour's miracles. THE NATURE OF REASONING. 273 Witness May be Mistaken. In testing testimony, the possi- bility of a witness being mistaken in his observation, or in some inference connected with the observation, is to be taken into con- sideration. That is, the appearance may have been just such as is described, but there may have been some illusion of the senses. Thus an oar in the water looks as if it were bent, but the person is mistaken who affirms that it is bent. So one who should testify that he saw a ball of fire or an angelic form hovering in the air, might suppose he saw them, but be mistaken ; the appear- ance may have been as described, while there was neither a ball of fire nor an angel. The witness may report correctly the ap- pearance, but be mistaken in respect to what it was that he heard or saw. This must be determined by the rules of common sense which guide us in the ordinary affairs of life, aided, in some cases, by such scientific principles as may be applicable to the subjects of testimony. With these to guide us, we can usually satisfy our- selves in respect to the facts of testimony upon which we are to base our inferences. 12* CHAPTER VI. THE CULTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING. THE UNDERSTANDING, like the other faculties, can be culti- vated, and we now proceed to discuss the culture of this faculty. In this discussion we shall first speak in general of the importance of such culture, and then explain the methods of cul- ture in each one of the specific forms of the faculty. I. THE IMPORTANCE OP CULTURE. The culture of the under- standing touches the highest interests of mankind. No faculty contributes more to the happiness and well-being of man, or does more for the progress of society and civilization. The under- standing is the faculty of thought, and man as a thinker occupies the highest position of honor and usefulness. By the power of thought man becomes the master of the world. It is the attribute of creative thought that crowns him with the prerogative of authority, enabling him to enslave the forces of nature and use them for his comfort and happiness. For Man's Excellence. The understanding should be culti- vated for the perfection of our intellectual nature. The power of thought is the highest activity of the intellect. The man of thought is the man of dignity and power; the thinkers of the world are the men whom the world delights to honor. The great philosopher is enthroned in the memory of mankind, and his achievements live with the ages. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Locke, are the names around which the world twines its brightest laurels. The discoveries of Copernicus, Newton, Kepler, and La Place, will stand as monuments to their memory when marble columns and tablets of brass have mouldered to dust. The power of thought should therefore be cultivated for its own intrinsic excellence. (274) THE CULTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING. 275 For the Progress of Science. The understanding should be cultivated for the progress of science. Science is itself an object worthy of our attention ; the temples of science are as beautiful as the Parthenon and more enduring than the Pyramids. Science is also a means of progress and development to the race; the progress of civilization is largely due to the development of the truths of science. This development is the result of thought. It was the profound thinkers of antiquity that laid the foundation of philosophy and mathematics. It was the profound thinkers of the last few centuries that gave such far-reaching application to mathematical and astronomical science. It is to the great thinkers of the world that we owe the almost marvellous theories and discoveries of modern science. It is thus evident that the culture of thought-power will aid in the progress of science. For the Progress of Truth. We need the culture of the understanding for the progress of truth. Science itself is a body of truth ; but there is truth also outside of the sciences, the truths of morality and politics, of social liih and religion. Much of this truth, that has not yet been organized into science, possesses a dignity and is of value in itself, and thus merits our best efforts for its comprehension and development. Truth is also a blessing to mankind in its influence upon his condition and well-being, and thus has further claims upon us for its discovery and dis- semination. Truth is the herald of social and national progress : it is the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night, to lead the march of events towards the promise of a brighter future. These truths are reached by the power of thought ; and the understanding, which gives this power of thought, should therefore be carefully developed. Man should be a truth-lover, a truth-seeker, and a truth-finder ; and the object of education should be to develop this taste and ability, and make him both a lover of thought and a thinker. For Success in lAfe. The faculty of the understanding should be cultivated also for the advantage it brings to us per- sonally. No faculty contributes more to high success in life than 276 MENTAL SCIENCE. the power of thought. The man of good judgment, the man that can think clearly and comprehensively, the man that can pene- trate the future and foresee the coming event, this man will usually be successful in the business affairs of life. The great business men, the celebrated merchants, speculators, and railroad presidents, are usually men of great thought-power. The great general plans his campaign with judgment and foresight, and wins his battles by intellectual combinations, quite as much as by the valor of his soldiers. Other things being equal, the man of best thought-power will be the most successful in the business of life. II. NEGLECT OF CULTURE. The culture of the understanding has been very generally neglected in our methods of teaching. The object of teachers seems to have been to fill the memory with the facts and truths of a subject, rather than to develop the power by which these truths were obtained. They have failed to de- velop the power of original thought and investigation. Even in teaching thought-studies, the memory has been brought into activity more than the understanding. The mind has too often been regarded as a capacity to be filled, rather than an activity to be developed. Teachers have aimed to put knowledge into the mind, as we pour water into a vessel, or shovel coal into e coal- bin ; while the power that originates knowledge, that works up ideas and thoughts into laws and principles, has been neglected. One reason why the so-called "self-educated men" often show more thought-power than those who have been trained in our schools, is that, following the bent of their own minds, they have developed the power of original thought. III. TIME FOR CULTURE. The culture of the understanding should begin early in life. While perception and memory seem to be more active in youth, the understanding is also active at an early age. The inquiry after the causes of facts and phenomena, and the drawing of conclusions from experience, indicate an early activity of these powers of thought. The faculty of judgment, by which comparisons are made, is active from the earliest dawn of THE CULTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING. 277 consciousness; and the power of reasoning also awakens very early. Young persons should therefore be taught so as to give activity to the powers of thought. Adapted to the Age. This culture should be carefully adapted to the age and development of the pupils. Children should be taught to compare objects, to inquire for causes, and to see the relation of things to one another. Inductive reasoning should precede deductive; causes should be presented before laws and principles ; and deductive thought and the generalizations of science should be introduced as the mind becomes prepared for them. IV. DIVISIONS FOR DISCUSSION. The discussion of the culture of the understanding is conveniently presented under the follow- ing general heads : the Culture of Generalization and Classifica- tion, the Culture of the Judgment, and the Culture of Reasoning. For the Culture of Abstraction but little can be directly done by the teacher; and we shall therefore give no formal discussion of it, but merely make a few suggestions in the closing paragraph of the present chapter. V. CULTURE OF ABSTRACTION. The power of Abstraction operates spontaneously at a very early age. The mind soon learns to draw qualities away from the objects in which they are perceived, and to regard them as distinct objects of thought. There is but little need of special exercises to cultivate this power. A few lessons to lead pupils to abstract the various qualities from objects might be given. A careful drill on the qualities as expressed in objects will be sufficient to give the power of conceiving them independently of objects. Care should be taken, however, not to keep the mind on the concrete too long. To hold the mind down to tangible objects when it is pre- pared for abstract thought, would be to enfeeble its powers and dwarf its growth. Something can be done also by the teacher to cultivate a taste for abstract thought; and such culture is highly recommended. CHAPTER VII. THE CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION. ENERALIZATION, or Conception, is a spontaneous activity of the mind, and in its simpler and ordinary forms de- velops naturally with the growth of the other faculties. Some- thing may be done by the teacher, however, to lead the student to general ideas and the use of general terms. Special lessons may be given to lead the minds of children from the particular to the general, from percepts to concepts. Individual objects may be presented to the senses, and the mind be gradually led to the formation of general notions embracing these objects. In Different Studies. This culture may be given in several of the school-room studies. In geography, individual rivers may be grouped together into river-systems, particular mountains into mountain-chains, etc. In teaching definitions, which are usually the description of general notions, the pupil may be led from particular examples to the general idea ; indeed, a clear and definite idea of the general notion is only possible as we have distinct and definite ideas of particulars. In teaching gram- mar, lessons should be given on particular words as the names of objects, from which the pupil can be led to the general definition of a noun as the name of an object ; and the same method should be pursued with the other parts of speech. Studies presented in this manner will aid the mind in developing the power of gen eralization. JHore Direct Culture. Besides this general culture of con- ception afforded incidentally by experience and the studies of the school, there are some special exercises that may be employed for this culture. These exercises may be included under three gen- (278) THE CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION. 279 eral heads; Logical Analysis, Logical Division, and Logical Defi- nition. I. BY LOGICAL ANALYSIS. By Logical Analysis is meant the examination and minute observation of the concept and the attri- butes which it embraces. It aids us in attaining to the several qualities of conception ; namely, clearness, distinctness, and adequacy. A few remarks on the formation of conceptions and the use of logical analysis will be appropriate. Form Real Notions. We should be careful to form actual and definite general notions, and not be satisfied merely with general terms. The general notion must be preserved by a word ; but there is a tendency to use words without a definite conception of their meaning. We often suppose we have in our minds the ideas of things, when we really have only a word which we use vaguely and blindly. Many of our general terms are mere hollow forms, without any content of meaning. What we need is to fill the mould with ideas, so that it will be no longer an empty form, but a solid content. This reality of conceptions may be ob- tained by a careful and exhaustive analysis of our general notions. Form, Clear Conceptions. We should aim, first of all, to give the quality of clearness to our conceptions. The tendency is to use terms without their creating in the mind the ideas for which they stand. General terms are often used like the algebraic symbols, which stand for quantities without our think- ing of any particular quantity until the result is obtained. In using such words as virtue, liberty, religion, church, etc., we often do not think of what is contained in them ; but pass them on as a banker hands out bills, without thinking of the gold and silver they stand for, or the articles they would purchase. We can avoid the evil consequences of this habit by frequently referring to these words, and allowing them to awaken the full conception for which they are the symbols. Special efforts to analyze con- cepts into their marks are also necessary for the reality and clear- ness of our conceptions. , Form Distinct Conceptions. There should be special pains 280 MENTAL SCIENCE. taken to cultivate distinctness of conception. By distinctness of conception, as previously explained, is meant the cognition of the marks or attributes of a concept. The tendency is to rest satisfied with merely clearness of conception, and we thus fail to attain distinctness in our general notions. This error is seen even in our perceptions; how many of us can point out the marks of the handwriting which we could identify under oath, or even de- scribe the face of a friend with whom we are familiar ? In the cognition of our conceptions we are still more liable to indistinct- ness; indistinct perceptions lead to the habit of indistinct con- ceptions. We can correct this error by increasing the distinct- ness of our perceptions. Our conceptions will also become dis- tinct by a careful analysis of their marks, and a comparison with other concepts ; and special efforts should be made for the attain- ment of this quality. Form Adequate Conceptions. We should also aim to make our conceptions adequate. That is, we should endeavor not only to know the marks of our conceptions, but also to know the marks of the marks. Adequacy refers also to the number and relative importance of the marks. A concept may be perfectly clear and distinct, and still be a very inadequate representation of the class of things for which it stands, as it may connote but two or three of the many attributes, and those of trifling importance. Thus we may have a clear and distinct concept of man as " a two- legged animal without feathers," but it is inadequate, as it omits the crowning mark of rationality. Concepts may be made ade- quate by a careful analysis of their marks, and a comparison of them with other marks or attributes. Accurate perception will also aid us in this work, as the concrete is the basis of the abstract and general. The examination of the meaning of words in the dictionary, tracing the definition of the terms employed in any given definition, will also be found a useful exercise in attaining to the attribute of adequacy. Use of Notatiye Conceptions. We may enlarge or deepen the significance of concepts by reaching their marks through the THE CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION. 281 notative meaning of terms. To most persons, all terms are merely symbolical, suggesting none of the attributes of the concept. Thus, such words as education, faculty, philosophy, oligarchy, etc., are to most minds merely symbolical ; while to the scholar who understands their origin, they suggest certain leading marks of the concept for which they stand. A careful attention to the structure of words will often suggest some of the marks of the concept. The study of the ancient languages or of etymology is found valuable in this respect. Thus, a knowledge of the ety- mology of such words as perception, conception, abstraction, re- ligion, synthesis, analysis, etc., will immediately suggest to the mind the marks of the concepts for which they stand. It must be remembered, however, that the etymology of the word will not always give a correct notion of the marks of the concept, on account of changes in the meaning of the term since its intro- duction into the language ; as, lunacy, heathen, subtraction, etc. Increase the Meaning of Concepts. We can thus increase the meaning of our concepts by study and experience. General terms have not the same significance to different minds ; they are much richer in meaning to some minds than to others. The term home, for instance, has but little significance to one who has never experienced its influence ; but to those who have enjoyed its blessings, it is filled with the rich experience of a mother's love, or father's care, and a thousand hallowed memories. A large experience thus deepens and broadens the significance of our general terms. Some authors seem to load their words with a marvellous fullness and richness of meaning, resulting from profound study and reflection. They have, as it were, poured into the verbal form a richness and beauty from their souls, that seem to irradiate their words with a light almost divine. By study and reflection we can increase and enrich the meaning of our own words, add force and influence to our expression, and beautify and strengthen our mother tongue. II. BY LOGICAL DIVISION. The careful logical division of concepts aids in giving clearness and distinctness to our con- . 282 MENTAL SCIENCE. ceptions. A distinct view of the subordinate conceptions con- tained in any given concept widens and deepens our idea of that concept. As Atwater well remarks, "The thorough logical division of any subject, thus defining the sphere and the objects it includes, greatly assists the clear, thorough, and facile dis- ^cussion of it. It also aids invention. The most sterile mind will find something to say on a subject well mapped out. Indeed, so to map it out, is to say something important." The logical division of our concepts will thus aid us in gaining clear con- ceptions of them, and also give breadth and depth to our general notions. Rules for Logical Division. In making these logical divisions, the student must be careful, to observe the following rules: RULE I. In logical division there should be but one principle of division. Thus it would be incorrect to divide mankind into Europeans, Americans, Pagans, and Christians, since the first division is according to locality and the second according to re- ligion. So also it would be wrong to divide the books of a library into poetry, history t Latin, French, morocco, and cloth. The violation of this rule leads to what is called " cross-divisions," in which the same object would be embraced under two or more classes. Unobserved cross-divisions are a fruitful source of per- plexity and confusion, and care should be taken to avoid them. RULE II. In logical division the members should exclude one another. This rule flows from the previous one; and a violation of the former leads to a violation of the latter. Thus to divide lines into straight, curved, circular, and elliptical, or ideas into particular, general, abstract, and concrete, would violate this rule, as some of the divisions are included in others. The preacher who proposed to prove a certain doctrine by reason, revelation, and St. Paul, fell into this error, forgetting that reve- lation included the testimony of Paul. A violation of this rule offends the careful thinker, and confuses the minds of those who may not notice the error. Carelessness in this respect reminds THE CULTUEE OF GENERALIZATION. 283 one of the Chinese, who are said to divide the race into first Chinese, then men, and then women. RULE III. In logical division, the division "should be complete. That is, it should include all the species; or, in other words, the sum of the species should be exactly equal to the genus divided. This rule is violated by leaving out any of the parts of a genus, as when we divide actions into good and bad, and omit those which are indifferent. So also when a subdivision is coordinated with a division; as to divide bipeds into men and robins, rather than into men and birds. The rule is also violated by dividing a member too far; as to divide polygons into triangles, quadrilat- erals, parallelograms, squares, etc. The parts named should be of the same rank with one another, and the sum of all should exactly equal the concept divided. RULE IV. Logical division should proceed from proximate genera to proximate species. There should be no leaping from one rank to a remote rank in the series of higher and lower con- ceptions, but a stepping from one to the next lower. Thus to divide animals into horses, robins, salmon, etc., without previously dividing them into mammals, birds, and fishes, would be a viola- tion of this rule. We should become utterly confused in botany if we were to begin to arrange the vegetable kingdom under roses, lilies, oaks, and lichens. Naturalists have a regular system of classification so that they can pass step by step from the highest class to the lowest. Thus in Botany the vegetable king- dom is divided into the Phaenogamia and Cryptogamia, which are divided and subdivided until we come to the lowest species. In Zoology the animal kingdom is divided into four great branches, Vertebrates, Articulates, Mollusks, and Radiates; from which we proceed by successive divisions to species and individuals. These divisions are the type of that logical ac- curacy with which we should endeavor to divide any subject which we may be discussing. Use of These Rules. These rules are a necessity to scientific thought, and are invaluable to all clear thinking. To those who 284 MENTAL SCIENCE. desire to attain to clearness and distinctness of conceptions, prac- tice in logical division is indispensable. The writing of logical outlines in the different studies is of great value in the cultivation of the power to make clear distinctions and obtain a logical grasp of any subject. III. BY LOGICAL DEFINITION. Exercises in logical defi- nition are also valuable in unfolding our conceptions. Logical definition, including both the genus and the specific difference, gives clearness, definiteness, and adequacy to our conceptions. It separates a conception from all other conceptions by fixing upon and presenting the essential and distinctive property or properties of the conception defined. The value of exercises in logical definition is thus readily apparent. The distinct explication of the marks of concepts is of fundamental importance in accurate thought and discourse, and this is given in logical definition. Rules for Logical Definition. In logical definition, the following rules are to be observed : RULE I. A logical definition should unfold the essence of tlie notion defined. That is, it should be by genus and differentia. The concept defined should first be put into the next higher class and then distinguished from other species of that class. Thus in defining man, we must first say he is an animal, and then dis- tinguish him from other animals by the attribute of rationality, saying, " Man is a rational animal." Should be Essential Attributes. The definition must embrace essential and not accidental attributes ; and to discover these re- quires rigid analysis and careful discrimination. The statement of differences that are not essential will give a definition that may be logical in form but worthless in thought. The old Platonic definition, "Man is a two-legged animal without feathers," was easily shown by Diogenes to be worthless by presenting a plucked chicken as Plato's man. The uneducated man often sees only the accidental attributes ; the disciplined mind seeks for the dis- tinguishing marks, and is not satisfied until it has found them. Such a habit leads to definite and adequate notions of our gen- eral ideas. THE CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION. 285 RULE II. A logical definition should be adequate. That is, it should have precisely the same extension as the thing denned. If the definition includes more than the notion defined, it is too broad ; if it includes less, it is too narrow. Thus, the definition, "Man is an animal," is too broad ; while the definition, "A poly- gon is a triangle," is too narrow. So " Grammar is the science of language," is too broad ; and " A triangle is a figure having three rectilinear sides," is too narrow. The test of an adequate definition is that it may be simply converted ; thus, " A man is a rational animal," becomes, when converted, "A rational animal is man." An inadequate definition will not admit of simple conversion. RULE III. A logical definition should be by affirmatives and not by negatives. That is, it should not state what a concept is not, but what it is ; for it does not give us a notion of what a thing is by stating what it is not. To define man as not an angel or not a brute, does not give us either a distinct or a clear idea of man. The definition of parallel lines as " lines which do not meet," or of a straight line as " one that does not change its direc- tion," is not satisfactory to the clear thinker. Negative words are, however, found in the language, and are sometimes useful in expressing shades of thought, and require a negative definition; as, unholy, insincere, etc. RULE IV. A logical definition should be perspicuous. That is, it should not be expressed in vague, ambiguous, or senseless language. Care should be taken not to employ figurative ex- pressions in definitions. "Tropes and figures," says Krug, "are logical hieroglyphics ; they do not indicate the thing itself, but only something similar." Thus to say, " Truth is the grand scope of all existence," or " Logic is the light-house of the understand- ing," or " The Divine nature is a circle whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere," may do as rhetorical expressions, but have no value as definitions. RULE V. A logical definition should not be tautological. That is, it should not contain the name of the thing to be defined. 286 MENTAL SCIENCE. Neither must we use a derivative or synonym or correlative of the term, which cannot be explained except through the term to be defined. Thus, such definitions as " Life is the vital force," or " Law is a lawful command," are of no value ; for the definition uses the very word we wish to define. This fault is called defin- ing in a circle, since such a definition returns upon itself. Thus, when we define light as "that which illuminates," and "that which illuminates" as light, we are defining in a circle. The error is one to be carefully guarded against, as we are liable to fall into it unawares. We can hardly ridicule the boy who said " ratio is proportion," and then " proportion is ratio," when we remember that lexicographers have defined a plank as "a thick board " and a board as a " thin plank." RULE VI. A logical definition should be precise. That is, it should be free from surplus attributes or words. Thus, to define a triangle as "a polygon with three sides and three angles" is incorrect, as either the " three angles " or the " three sides " are superfluous in the definition. "So also to say that a parallelogram is " a quadrilateral having its opposite sides parallel and equal" though it is true, is not only superfluous but misleading, since it implies that there could be such a figure without having its opposite sides equal. Conclusion. By careful attention to these rules of logical definition and logical division, and an application of them to the subjects we are studying, combined with a frequent logical analysis of our general notions, we can attain to a clear and dis- tinct use of general terms, and cultivate the power of conception to a full and comprehensive activity. THE CULTURE OF CLASSIFICATION. Classification is the application of the power of generalization. A.S found in the sciences, classification may be defined as scientific generalization. This power of classification should receive careful attention in the education of the young. A few remarks will be made on the subject under the two heads; Importance of Classi- fication and Methods of Cultivating this Power. THE CULTUEE OF GENERALIZATION. 287 I. IMPORTANCE OF CLASSIFICATION. The power of classifica- tion is of great value to mankind in every department of life, and in every occupation and profession. To impress the importance of its culture we shall notice briefly its value in common life, in study, and in science. In Common Life. Classification is of value in the common affairs of life. It gives system to man's actions, and is thus an economy of labor and time. The mechanic who has a place for everything and everything in its place, will do more work in a day than one who is deficient in system. The farmer who sys- tematizes his work will raise better crops and receive a larger return from them, than one who takes things loose and easy. The merchant who has a methodical arrangement of his goods, or the business man who keeps his papers properly classified, will expedite business and accomplish more than the man who lacks system. Even the good housewife knows the importance of hav- ing her duties properly systematized, if she would dispatch her work and relieve herself somewhat from its annoyances. To tJie Student. The power of classification is invaluable to the student. A careful classification of any branch of study will give one a clearer view of the subject, and enable him more easily to retain it. Historical events, to be easily remembered, must be arranged in proper order, or grouped around some lead- ing central events on which they depend. The study of history by historical epochs, gives a view of events in their relations which makes it much easier to carry them in the memory. The same is true, to a greater or less extent, in every branch of study. A text-book properly classified will give one a much clearer idea of the subject than one which lacks this system. The easy dis- cussion of any question is dependent on the same law of classifi- cation. The speaker must have his subject arranged under ap- propriate headings if he wishes to recall the different points readily, and discuss them in their proper order. Value in Science. The power of classification is of especial value in science. Science has been defined as systematized knowl- 288 MENTAL SCIENCE. edge; there can be no science without classification. In h.oth the inductive and the deductive sciences, there must be an orderly arrangement of the subject-matter; while in one branch of the former, that of Natural History, classification is the leading feature. Thus the science of Botany consists of the arrangement of plants into species, genera, orders, etc., and the same is true in Zoology and Mineralogy. These sciences assume that the objects of the three kingdoms were created after great pattern ideas, differentiated all the way down from the broadest classes to the species and individuals ; and the object of these sciences is to find these ideas and classify accordingly. In order to become a naturalist, therefore, we must have the power of classification well developed. II. METHODS OF CULTURE. Admitting the importance of the power of classification, the question arises, how may this power be cultivated? In answer to this question, a few suggestions for its culture will now be presented. Classify Objects. To train the powers of classification of young pupils, they may have lessons in the classification of objects. The arrangement of color-cards under the heads of the different primary colors, or the arrangement of tints under the common color of which they are varieties, is an excellent exercise for young people. We may also give them a number of pebbles, and require them to class them in respect to size, also in respect to color, also in respect to form, etc. We may also give them a collection of flowers, and require them to arrange them into classes with respect to color, the forms of the leaves, the forms of the petals, the number of stamens, etc. A large number of such exercises may be arranged with profit to young learners. Classify Studies. Pupils may be required to classify the subject-matter of their 'different studies. In geography a geo- graphical outline may be given, and the pupils be required to collate their knowledge from different sources, and recite it under the different headings. In history the facts may be grouped to- gether into periods and epochs, and learned and recited in such THE CULTURE OF GENERALIZATION. 289 connection. A similar method may be employed in several of the branches of school study. A habit of thus arranging knowl- edge will be found almost invaluable in general reading; and such practice gives culture to the power of classification. Write Outlines. Pupils should be required to write outlines of the studies they are pursuing. Such outlines may be either logical or topical ; some branches, as mathematics and grammar, will admit of logical outlines; others, such as geography and history, of only topical outlines. The lesson of each recitation may be outlined on paper or on the blackboard ; and occasionally several previous lessons may be included in the daily outline. It will often be best to let the pupil outline the subject for himself; and then, after he has the benefit of this exercise, the teacher may present a more complete or logical outline for the pupils to copy and use. In some subjects, the recitation may be conducted in accordance with a carefully prepared outline of the subject pre- viously presented to the pupils. In completing a study, the pupil should be able to give a general outline of the entire subject. Such a drill will train the pupil to systematic habits of thought and study, and give the power of a comprehensive grasp of sub- jects. Study Classiflcatory Sciences. The study of the classifica- tory sciences is best adapted to give culture to the power of classification. The classificatory studies are the several branches of Natural History; Botany, Zoology, and Mineralogy. The main object of these sciences is to arrange objects into species, genera, orders, etc.; and they afford the best examples of logical classification. Indeed, they may be said to exhibit the per- fection of classification; no other science, except mathematics, can approach them in the beauty and exactness of their general- izations. The study of the sciences gives a continual drill in systematic classification ; and trains the mind to habits of vigorous and systematic thought. Study tlie Principles of Classification. The student should be required to notice and study the principles of classification in 13 290 MENTAL SCIENCE. these sciences. There should be an intelligent grasp of, the relations expressed in these classifications. The student of botany should not only know in what class a flower is fouHd, but he should also see why it is found there. He should see the relation of the different classes to one another, and to the higher classes of which they are coordinate parts. In other words, he should not only understand the science itself, but also the philosophy of the science. He should grasp the law by which it is developed, and see how he might himself develop the science if all knowl- edge of it were lost. Such a training, though usually neglected 'in teaching the sciences, is regarded as of vast importance in se- curing the proper culture from their study. The Beauty of Classification. Efforts should be made to lead the pupil to appreciate the beauty of the scientific classifica- tion of natural history. Some of these divisions and relations manifest a wide comprehension of facts and a grand generalization of thought. Cuvier's division of the animal kingdom into the four great departments, Agassiz's law of classifying the fishes in respect to the form of their scales, and the similar grasp of essen- tial similarities and differences exhibited in the vegetable king- dom, fill the mind with wonder and admiration of both the laws involved and the minds that discovered them. The pupil who is led to appreciate these things will study them with a new interest, and obtain a discipline that can not otherwise be given. Classification of the Sciences. The advanced student may be led to study the problem of the classification of the sciences. This is an old problem, and has engaged the attention of the great thinkers of nearly every age. Among those who have at- tempted to solve it we may mention Bacon, Locke, D'Alembert, and Comte. Though no one has given a classification entirely satisfactory to the scientific world, many of those presented are ingenious and show a wide grasp of principles ; and their exami- nation will be of real value to the student. An attempt to solve the problem for himself, will also be of interest and afford culture tc the power of classification. CHAPTER VIII. THE CULTURE OF THE JUDGMENT. JUDGMENT demands attention in this work of mental .-*- culture. The power of Judgment operates spontaneously in every mind, though in different degrees ; but much can be done to stimulate it to activity, and to direct and increase its power. We shall present a few thoughts on the subject under the two heads, Importance of its Culture, and Methods of Culture. I. IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDGMENT. The power of judgment is of great value to man in respect to the activities of the mind and its products. It is involved in or accompanies every act of the intellect, and thus lies at the foundation of all intellectual ac- tivity. It operates directly in every act of the understanding; and even aids the other faculties of the mind in completing their activities and products. Its relation to each one of the faculties will be briefly noticed. Value to Perception, Judgment aids the faculty of per- ception. The first step or act of perception is the discrimination of sensations ; and discrimination is a work of judgment. The cognition of the organism and the external object also involve distinctions requiring the action of this faculty. In forming our perceptions of objects, we distinguish the different qualities given by the sense or by different senses, and these qualities we unite to form our complex notion of the object. The distinction between the ego and the non-ego also involves an act of judgment, for to distinguish is to compare or judge. Value to Memory. Judgment is also of great value to the memory. The memory operates by the laws of association. As- sociation implies comparison ; we must compare in order to asso- (291) 292 MENTAL SCIENCE. ciate. We could not know things as similar or in contrast, or as contiguous in time and place, unless there was an act of judgment to perceive these relations. Judgment thus aids the mind in re- membering ; other things being equal, the clearer our perceptions of the relation of objects of thought, the better will they be re- membered. The culture of the judgment thus directly affects the power of the memory. Basis of Thought. Judgment, as has already been seen, lies at the basis of all thinking. All thought-knowledge involves an act of the judgment. Even in abstraction, there is a comparison of the elements in order that we may distinguish the quality which we abstract. A concept is formed by uniting common at- tributes ; and there must be a comparison in order to discover these common attributes. Each premise of a syllogism is a judg- ment ; and the derived proposition is also in the form of a judg- ment. Every act of the understanding, therefore, involves the element of comparison, or an act of judgment ; and we may thus say that the judgment lies at the basis of all thought-knowledge. Basis of Science. Judgment lies at the basis of all the sciences. The materials of the sciences are given by perception and intuition : perception gives us ideas and facts, and intuition ideas and intuitive truths. Both the facts of perception and the axioms of intuition are expressed as propositions ; and a propo- sition is a judgment expressed. These sciences are developed by generalization and reasoning; and judgment is involved in both generalization and reasoning. Every principle or law of science is stated in the form of a judgment. The activity of judgment is thus concerned in the foundation of the sciences, and runs through the entire superstructure. No scientific thought would be possible without the faculty of judgment. Basis of Poetry. Judgment is also the basis of poetry. Every poetical figure involves an act of comparison. The simile, " As unto the bow the cord is, So unto the man is woman," in- volves a direct judgment; and the metaphor, "Your voiceless lips, O flowers, are living preachers," is an assumed one. So in THE CULTURE OF THE JUDGMENT. 293 personification, there is a perception of relations, or w.e could not ascribe the attributes of one thing to another. In a selection like the following, the element of comparison may be seen running like a golden thread through every line : "The bridegroom sea Is toying with the shore, his wedded bride, And, in the fullness of his marriage joy, He decorates her tawny brow with shells, Retires a space, to see how fair she looks, Then proud runs up to kiss her." And so all through imaginative literature, the principle of comparison gives it its life and spirit, and imparts those attributes of beauty that touch the imagination and thrill the heart. II. METHODS OP CULTIVATING THE JUDGMENT. The judg- ment, like every other faculty, acts spontaneously, and is de- veloped naturally by its own activity. Still it will admit of some special training ; and a few suggestions are presented in respect to such culture. These suggestions apply especially to the cul- ture of the judgment of young pupils. Exercises in Comparison. Special lessons may be given to children in comparing objects. They may have exercises in comparing objects in respect to size, color, weight, etc. They may also be required to compare their ideas and form propo- sitions ; the construction of sentences about objects is an exercise of judgment. Some of the most practical exercises, however, are the comparison of the forms, colors, lengths, surfaces, volumes, and weights of objects. Compare Forms. Among the earliest lessons for children are those on geometrical forms. They should first have distinct ideas of the standard forms ; and then be required to compare the forms of objects with these standard forms. Thus after obtaining the idea of a triangle, circle, ellipse, cylinder, etc., they may be led to see that some objects are triangular, circular, cylindrical, elliptical, etc. They should be taught the typical forms of leaves, and then be required to name the forms of leaves presented to them. 294 MENTAL SCIENCE. Comparq Colors. Lessons should be given to young pupils in the comparison of colors. Ideas of the standard colors should be presented, and pupils should then be required to judge of the color of objects presented to them. For such an exercise, small color cards may be used ; worsteds, silks, etc., are also prepared for such lessons. A drill of this kind will enable a pupil to dis- tinguish a large number of shades and varieties of color with great accuracy, a knowledge which may be of practical value in many of the vocations of life. Compare Lengths. The judgment may be trained by the comparison of the length of objects. After giving an idea of the different units of length, these may be applied in judging of the lengths of different objects. Thus pupils may be required to tell the length and breadth of a room in feet, the height of the ceiling, the height of a man or a horse or a tree, the distance in yards or rods between two places, etc. They should also be given the units of surface, the square inch, square foot, square yard, etc., and be required to judge of the area of floors, the number of square yards in the walls of a room, the number of acres in a field, etc. The same may be done in respect to the measures of volume. Compare Weights. The judgment can be cultivated by the comparison of weights. We should first give an idea of the standard weights, ounce, pound, etc. Then the student should be required to "heft" some object, as a book, and give its weight in ounces, or some larger object, as a chair, and give its weight in pounds. There should also be an exercise in learning to judge of the weight of objects by sight. With practice one can learn to judge within a few pounds of the weight of a person or an animal. A drover will approximate very closely to the weight of a horse or an ox by looking at it. Study of Mathematics. One of the best exercises for the culture of the judgment is the study of mathematics. In mathe- matical reasoning, every step involves a comparison; and the solution of a problem or demonstration of a theorem is thus a THE CULTURE OF THE JUDGMENT. 295 constant exercise to the judgment. Mental arithmetic is espe- cially useful in this respect to the youthful mind. Its relations are precise and definite, and each step in the process follows so naturally from the previous step or some fixed relation, that it is a constant pleasure to the student, and gives delightful as well as useful exercise to the judgment. Geometry also, with the classic precision of its relations, gives a classic finish to the acts of judg- ment. Compare for Literary Figures. Pupils should have exer- cises also in comparing for literary figures. They should be re- quired to construct original similes, metaphors, personifications, etc. In order to do this, they should notice the poetical figures of literature, and try to imitate them. It will be well to have them study and imitate such figures as Horace Smith's " Your voiceless lips, O flowers, are living preachers, Each cup a pulpit, and each leaf a book," or Shakespeare's oft-quoted lines, "But, look, the Morn, in russet mantle clad, Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill," or Longfellow's expressive figure, " The tidal wave of deeper souls Into our inmost being rolls." The pupil who sees the analpgies in these similes, metaphors, and personifications, can begin to create original figures for him- self, and thus cultivate both his judgment and his taste for literary composition. Games of SJeill. There are certain games of skill that are useful in cultivating the power of judgment. One of the best of these, for young persons, is that of draughts, or checkers. I have noticed a real growth in mental power by children who became interested in this game. For older minds, chess affords a de- lightful and most valuable exercise for the judgment. The solving of riddles, the guessing of conundrums, etc., also give pleasant and profitable exercise to the judgment of young people. Indeed, such exercises will do much more for the development 296 MENTAL SCIENCE. of thought-power than much of the dull, dry, rote-teaching of our schools has done. TJie Habit of Judgment. It should be one of the leading objects of the culture of young people to lead them to acquire a habit of forming judgments. They should not only be led to see things, but to have opinions about things. They should be trained to see things in their relations, and to put these relations into definite propositions. Their ideas of objects should be worked up into thoughts concerning the objects. Those methods of teaching are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind that notices the similitudes and diversities of objects, and en- deavors to read the thoughts which they embody and of which they are the symbols. An Exercise in Opposition. The application of the rules of Opposition of Judgments in deriving judgments from given judgments, is a valuable exercise to this faculty. Thus : 1. Illustrate the law of unwersals and particulars with the judg- ments, "All men are mortal," "Some men are angels." 2. Illustrate contraries with "All robins are birds," etc. 3. Illustrate subcontraries with "Some men are poets," etc. 4. Illustrate contradictories with "All men are bipeds," etc. Anotlier Exercise in Opposition. The following is an in- teresting and practical exercise in the opposition of judgments : 1. If "All A is B" is true ; show what follows for E, I, and O. 2. If " All A is B " is false ; show what follows for E, I, and O. 3. If " No A is B " is true ; show what follows for A, I, and O. 4. If " No A is B " is false ; show what follows for A, I, and O. 5. If "Some A is B " is true ; show what follows for A, E, and O. 6. If " Some A is B" is false ; show what follows for A, E, and O. 7. If " Some A is not B " is true ; show what follows for A, E, and I. 8. If " Some A is not B " is false ; show what follows for A, E, and I. ^An Exercise in Conversion. The following is an interest- ing and practical exercise in the Conversion of Judgments : 1. All men are rational. 5. Some men are virtuous. 2. Some men are poets. 6. No brute is responsible. 3. No men are quadrupeds. 7. Some men are not responsible. 4. Some minerals are stones. 8. All triangles are polygons. CHAPTER IX. THE CULTURE OP REASONING. TZ)EASONING is the last and the highest operation of the A.* Understanding. There are two distinct forms of reasoning; Deductive Reasoning and Inductive Reasoning. Each of these two forms of reasoning may be cultivated by appropriate exercise. We shall therefore discuss the culture of reasoning under the two distinct heads ; the Culture of Deductive Reasoning, and the Cul- ture of Inductive Reasoning. I. THE CULTURE OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING. Deductive Reasoning, as already defined, is the process of de- riving a particular truth from a general truth. It is a form of mental activity which operates early in the mind of the child ; and is to be trained by appropriate exercises. Many of the branches of the school course are especially adapted to give exer- cise and culture to this power. The teacher should understand the relation of these studies to the mind, that he may give this culture consciously and intelligently. Some of the exercises and studies particularly suited to the culture of deductive reasoning, will therefore be mentioned. I. STUDY or MATHEMATICS. The study, par excellence, for the culture of deductive reasoning, is mathematics. The several branches of mathematics present the purest examples of deductive reasoning ; they are therefore pre-eminently fitted to give training to the power of deductive thought. They are also adapted to every stage of intellectual development, since they range from the simplest processes of mental arithmetic to the profoundest gen- eralizations of calculus. The pupil should, at an early age, begin 13* (297) 298 MENTAL SCIENCE. the simple analyses of arithmetic ; from this he should pass to the more concise and abstract reasoning of algebra, which, in its first steps, is similar to the reasoning of arithmetic. Following the elements of algebra, or in connection with it, he should take up the science of geometry, in which he will become acquainted with the more formal methods of syllogistic reasoning. Mental Arithmetic. Mental arithmetic is especially adapted to give culture to the reasoning power of the young mind. By mental arithmetic, we mean not the mere working of problems without slate or pencil, but that system of arithmetical analysis which is found developed in a good work on the subject. Mental arithmetic is a system of practical logic in its simplest form; every step is a judgment direct or indirect, and the entire subject is permeated with the spirit of logic. Its processes are purely analytic, and it thus trains the mind to the most rigid analysis. Every truth is bound to some other truth by the thread of related thought; and the mind of the pupil acquires the habit of follow- ing a chain of logically-connected judgments until it reaches a satisfactory conclusion. To give exercise to the reasoning powers of the child, mental arithmetic may be placed at the head of the list of studies of the primary school. Sharpens the Mind. Mental arithmetic sharpens and strength- ens the powers of thought. The system of rigid analysis gives point and penetrating power to the mind, and enables it to pierce a subject to its core and discover its elements. In this respect, mental arithmetic is a sort of mental whetstone, which gives edge and keenness to the mind. Old Robert Eecorde called his work on arithmetic the " Whetstone of Witte ;" had he lived until the era of mental arithmetic, he would have seen the full meaning of his words, for the method of analysis found in mental arithmetic is indeed a whetstone of wit, a sharpener of the mental faculties. Mental arithmetic is a system of mental gymnastics ; through it the mind grows strong and tough, taking hold of difficulties with a will, laughing at obstacles, and rejoicing in the investigation of the intricate and profound. THE CULTURE OF REASONING-. 299 Study of Written Arithmetic. The study of written arith- metic leads the mind to a higher plane of deductive thought. While the reasoning in mental arithmetic is purely analytic, the reasoning of written arithmetic is more synthetic and demon- strative in its nature. Thus many subjects which in mental arithmetic are treated by pure analysis, in written arithmetic are treated by demonstration. In mental arithmetic we treat all the various cases of Fractions by analysis ; while in written arithmetic we may first establish a few general principles, and then derive all the rules for the several cases by deduction from these prin- ciples. Many subjects in written arithmetic are purely deductive and demonstrative in their nature, as Proportion, Progression, Evolution, etc. The study of written arithmetic thus lifts the mind up into a higher plane of deductive thought, and gives a culture adapted to the advancing maturity of the mind. When properly taught, not as a collection of rules for arbitrary results, but as a system of logical processes, it affords the mind a delight- ful and valuable exercise in deductive thought. Study of Algebra. Algebra is also a valuable study in train- ing the power of deductive reasoning. In its elementary ideas and processes, it has its origin in arithmetic, and flows out of it; and its spirit and methods are essentially deductive. Its methods of calculation are analytic and demonstrative ; and it rises into the sphere of generalization, which gives a breadth and reach of mind that we cannot acquire in arithmetic. This spirit of gen- eralization lies at the basis of the science, and has given us the profound thinkers in astronomy and physics, such as Newton and La Place. The interpretation of these general formulas, as ap- plied to particular cases, so valuable in the investigations of the physical sciences, is also an excellent exercise for the development of the thought-powers of the student. Study of Geometry. In giving discipline to the power of reasoning, geometry has been placed high in the list of thought studies. Geometry is purely a deductive science. It begins with definite ideas expressed in strictly logical definitions, has its 300 MENTAL SCIENCE. fundamental truths or axioms given by intuition, and with these as a basis, proceeds by th,e logic of deduction to derive all the other truths of the science. It is regarded as the most perfect model of a deductive science, and is the type and model of all science. Invaluable Discipline. As a study for the discipline of the power of thought, geometry is invaluable. It is the perfection of logic, and excels in training the mind to logical habits of thinking. In this respect it is superior to the study of logic itself, for it is logic embodied in the science of tangible form. While logic makes us familiar with the principles of reasoning, geometry trains the mind to the habit of reasoning. No study is better adapted to make close and accurate thinkers. Euclid has done more to develop the logical faculty of the world than any book ever written. It has been the inspiring influence of scien- tific thought for ages, and is one of the corner-stones of modern civilization. A Test of Power. Geometry not only gives mental power, but is' a test of mental power. The boy who cannot readily master his geometry will never attain to much in the domain of thought. He may have a fine poetic sense that will make a writer or an orator ; but he can never reach any eminence in scientific thought or philosophic opinion. All the great geniuses in the realm of science, as far as known, had fine mathematical abilities. So valuable is geometry as a discipline that many lawyers and preachers review their geometry every year in order to keep the mind drilled to logical habits of thinking. Subjects for Original Thought. In these branches of mathematics, the student should have problems and theorems for original thought. Problems for solution are usually given in arithmetic and algebra; in geometry, however, the practice has been to present only theorems demonstrated in the text-book, but no undemonstrated theorems to train the student to reason inde- pendently of the text-book. This is regarded as a serious defect in the methods of teaching geometry. There should be a large THE CULTUKE OF REASONING. 301 number of theorems for original thought; and the student should be required to discover the demonstrations for himself. In this way he may be able not nnlv, as Cyril said of the girl-students, to " hunt old trails," but also "to invent" processes of reasoning for himself. He will become an original thinker in the domain of quantity, and acquire that acuteness of insight and independence of thought that characterize the profound thinker. II. STUDY OF LANGUAGE. The study of language is adapted to give culture to the power of thought. This is apparent from the fact that language is the expression of thought. Language is the mirror of the mind; in it are revealed the processes of thought; and looking in this mirror, the mind may become familiar with its own workings and imitate the methods which it perceives. Besides this, the ordinary methods of teaching lan- guage are largely deductive in their character, and the mind is thus trained to deductive processes in its study. The value of a few of the branches in this respect will be briefly noticed. Study of Grammar. The study of grammar, if properly presented as a thought-study, and not as a thing to cram into the memory, affords a valuable exercise in deductive thinking. With the young pupil, the principles should be reached induc- tively ; but having attained these principles, the study is mainly deductive in its character. The application of the rules and principles to actual expression is a process of deduction. The correction of false syntax is purely deductive in its character ; we reason from the principle to the special case that we are correct- ing. So with parsing and analysis; they are purely deductive processes, and are valuable in training the mind to reason from general principles to particulars. They are valuable as means of culture also from the fact that they can be so constantly used, affording a daily drill in practical forms of logical thought and expression. Many of the distinctions of grammar, also, are re- tined and subtle, requiring a searching analysis and a philosophic insight into the subject, which cannot fail to afford a most admir- able discipline. For the culture of the power of deductive 302 MENTAL SCIENCE. reasoning, we should therefore give high rank to the study of grammar, a rank next to arithmetic on the list of the common school branches. Study of Rhetoric. The study of rhetoric is also adapted to give culture to the faculty of deductive thought. Many of the principles of rhetoric, including the laws of taste, are the result of intuition ; and their application to the criticism and con- struction of discourse, is a deductive exercise. In the application of the principles that may have been reached by induction, the mind of the student passes from the general principle to partic- ulars, and is thus proceeding deductively. The process of in- vention, which most writers include in the subject of rhetoric, gives direct exercise to this power ; for the evolution of thought on any subject, usually proceeds from generals to particulars, rather than in the opposite direction. In the unfolding of any subject, we usually think in the light of general principles and intuitions of the higher reason. Though we may discover induc- tively, we present our discoveries in the reverse order of their origin; and the invention of discourse is usually a movement of thought from generals to particulars. Study of Latin and Greek. Even the study of Latin and Greek, though it may not be generally acknowledged, is valuable for the training of the mind in deductive processes. The rules of construction are fixed in the memory as general principles, and the language is interpreted in the light of these principles. The general forms for number, case, and tense are learned, and then applied to the particular words of the text in determining their relation and dependence. Besides, the nice sense of discrimination cultivated by the comparison and selection of words in making the translation, not only exercises the judgment, but exercises it under the control of general principles of taste; and the process is thus closely related to deductive reasoning. The study, too, cultivates those habits of accuracy and definiteness that are so valuable in mental discipline, and which the deductive sciences are especially adapted to afford. THE CULTURE OF REASONING. 303 III. STUDY OF THE METAPHYSICAL, SCIENCES. The power of deductive thought receives some of its highest culture from the study of those branches which may be called the metaphysical sciences. These branches are Psychology, Logic, Ethics, 2Es- thetics, Political Economy, International Law, Natural and Re- vealed Theology, etc. These sciences deal with principles and their application, and are thus deductive in their character. They discuss the profoundest questions of human thought and human life, and lift the mind into that plane of truth by which its survey is broad and comprehensive, and from which it can look down with intelligence upon the facts that have their source in and flow from these principles. Study of Psychology' Among the first in the list for the culture of this higher thought, we place Psychology, the science of the human mind. Though some of its principles seem to be derived by a generalization of particulars, yet in its spirit and methods it is deductive. It trains the mind to habits of reflective thought, and enables it to grasp abstract and general principles. It cultivates that nice sense of discrimination so necessary to scientific investigation, and gives the power of penetrative and philosophic insight. It trains the mind to seize upon the recon- dite and elusive objects of thought and feeling, and to trace its way along those spiritual paths that lead to the deeper mysteries of nature. By it we not only reach truths, but we go on to search for the source and beginning of truth ; and, grasping fun- damental principles, we are enabled to follow them to their grand- est conclusions. In the study of the human mind we reach the type of the Divine mind, and thus rise from the study of the natural to that of the spiritual. Here we attain the grand conceptions of Space, Time, Cause, and Identity, and those grander conceptions, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Here we meet with the grandest facts and problems of the human soul, the moral nature, the freedom of the will, and human accountability ; and from these we naturally rise to the contemplation of Immortality, God, and Heaven. 304 MENTAL SCIENCE. Study of Logic. The study of Logic will aid in the develop- ment of the power of deductive reasoning. It does this first by showing the method by which we reason. To know how we reason, to see the laws which govern the reasoning process, to analyze the syllogism and see its conformity to the laws of thought, is not only an exercise of reasoning, but gives that knowl- edge of the process that will be both a stimulus and a guide to thought. No one can trace the principles and processes of thought without receiving thereby an impetus to thought. In the second place, the study of logic is probably even more val- uable because it gives practice in deductive thinking. This, per- haps, is its principal value, since the mind reasons instinctively without knowing how it reasons. One can think without the knowledge of the science of thinking, just as one can use lan- guage correctly without a knowledge of grammar; yet as the study of grammar improves one's speech, so the study of logic cannot but improve one's thought. Application of Logic. The application of the principles of logic to practical exercises affords an excellent means of training the power of thought. These exercises may consist of pointing out the principles in processes of reasoning, and also of correcting errors in the forms of reasoning. The former is like parsing and analysis in grammar ; the latter is like the correction of false syntax : and as these exercises in grammar cultivate the power of using correct language, so will the corresponding exercises in logic train the mind to accurate habits of thought. We recommend, therefore, extensive practice in what is called "logical praxis," or the ap- plication of the laws and principles of the science to thought as expressed in language. Correction of Fallacies. This practice in the correction of errors of reasoning will be found of especial value in the culture of this faculty. It should embrace the correction of the forms of reason- ing, and the pointing out of the fallacies in arguments. It should also include the detection of such errors as lie in the matter of reasoning ; as, begging the question, reasoning in a circle, etc. A THE CULTUEE OF REASONING. 305 drill in the analysis of arguments for the detection and correction of such errors will make the mind familiar with the correct pro- cesses, and teach it to be careful to avoid those errors into which even practiced thinkers are liable to fall. Heading Argumentative Discourses. The reading of ar- gumentative discourses is also recommended for this culture. Such discourses usually deal with general principles and their application, and are thus deductive in their nature. They are, too, the productions of the great thinkers; and the mind will learn to think by following the trains of thought of these superior minds. The reading of such productions as Calhoun's discourses on government, Webster's defense of the Constitution, Mill on the principles of civil government, Woolsey on international law, etc., will give breadth and philosophical grasp to the mind and lift it up to the plane of high and commanding mental activity. To commune with the great thinkers is to have our minds il- lumined by the light of those rare souls whose thoughts mould their own and coming ages. Heading Philosophy. The careful reading of philosophy will be found valuable in this thought -culture. However the philosophers may have reached their principles, their presenta- tions of truth are mainly deductive in spirit and in form. They think and speak in the light of fundamental principles ; and fill- ing the soul with grand conceptions of truth, they inspire us to make our deductions from such principles. The lofty discussions of Plato, the keen analysis of Aristotle, the transcendental phil- osophy of the German thinkers, and the practical speculations of the thinkers of England, all lift the soul into an atmosphere of pure thought from which it may draw inspiration for its own speculations. Heading Philosophic Essayists. The philosophic essayists, also, like Carlyle and Emerson, though not, properly speaking, philosophers, are full of suggestive thought. They are like the seers of old, rare prophetic souls who have an insight into truths. They seem to catch glimpses of the new stars of truth that are to 306 MENTAL SCIENCE. sliine in the heavens before they are revealed to the common mind ; and they give to our minds some of the afflatus of their own spirits. They have a wonderful power to stimulate to think- ing. Emerson, for instance, not only gives you thoughts, but sets the mind to thinking for itself; he, as it were, inoculates the mind with his thought so that it breaks out into thoughts of its own. By Deductive Thinking. Besides the culture afforded by study and reading, the power of deductive thought is cultivated by deductive thinking. The application of general principles to the facts and business of life is an exercise of deductive thought ; and such a consideration of practical questions trains to habits of deductive reasoning. All men, in every avocation and profession, are continually reasoning from general rules or maxims, and are thus exercising and cultivating the power of deductive thinking. IV. AVOID FALLACIES. In order to improve in deductive thinking, care should be taken to avoid those errors in reasoning known as fallacies. The principal fallacies of deduction may be embraced under two classes; first, those of an unwarranted as- sumption of premises, and second, those of an irrelevant conclusion. The principal fallacy of the first class is that known as Begging the Question ; the principal one of the second class is Arguing to the Wrong Point. The former includes Reasoning in a Circle; the latter includes a variety of forms, such as Shifting Ground, Asking Questions, Part Proof, Argumentum ad Populum, etc. Begging the Question. The fallacy of Begging the Question, called petitio principii, consists in the unwarrantable assumption of the thing to be proved, or the assumption of that by which it is to be proved, without proving it. Thus to assume without proof that a protective tariff will be of advantage to the country, or to argue that protection will promote public wealth without ghowing it, is to beg the question. So to assume that the Bible is divine without proving it, or to argue that it is worthy of belief because it is inspired, without proving its inspiration, is a fallacy of this kind. The usual form of this fallacy, and the most de- ceptive, is that of reasoning in a circle. THE CULTURE OF REASONING. 307 Reasoning in a, Circle. The fallacy of Reasoning in a Circle, called argumentum in drculo, is one in which the conclusion is virtually used in order to prove the premise. Thus, to argue that a party is good because it advocates good measures, and that certain measures are good because they are advocated by so excellent a party, is to reason in a circle. So when persons argue that their church is the true one, because it was established by God, and then argue that since it is the true church, it must have been founded by God, they fall into this fallacy. To argue that " the will is determined by the strongest motive " and define the strongest motive as that which influences the will, is to re- volve in a circle of thought and prove nothing. Plato commits this error when he argues the immortality of the soul from its simplicity, and afterwards attempts to prove its simplicity from its immortality. It needs care to avoid this error, for it is sur- prising how easily one falls into it. Fallacy of Shifting Ground. This fallacy consists in pre- tending to prove one thing, and in really proving or deciding upon another merely associated with it. Thus it is a common de- fence of criminals to allege that they were insane, and to attempt to prove this by showing that they acted very unreasonably. So to try to convince a jury that a man is guilty of a certain crime by dwelling upon the enormity of the offence, is also a fallacy of this class. Bacon is charged with treachery to his friend the Earl of Essex; and the writer dwells powerfully upon the evil of in- gratitude in a great man, instead of proving the alleged facts. Fallacy of Questions. The fallacy of Questions consists in asking two or more closely related questions, applying the answer of one to the other. This is a low trick sometimes employed by lawyers in the examination of witnesses, with the view of puzzling them or turning their answers to a wrong account. Thus, "You were swayed by the love of money in the transaction ? " (meaning exclusively), to which the witness answers "Yes" (meaning in part). Another question follows : " In being swayed by money you acted selfishly in the transaction ? " The utilitarian puts to 308 MENTAL SCIENCE us the questions: "You deny that virtue consists in utility?" " Yes." " Then you deny that utility is a good thing." A ques- tion is often double, so that either a " yes " or a " no " will lead to a fallacious inference; in which case the fallacy will be avoided by answering each part separately. Fallacy of Part Proof. The fallacy of proving part of the question often misleads the judgment of men. Thus, if a man is charged with murder, it is a fallacy to attempt to prove the charge by merely showing that he killed a man. So also it is a fallacy to conclude that a man is a liar because he is proved to have made a misstatement, which may have been entirely unintentional. Argumentum ad Populum. The argumentum ad populwn is that in which there is an appeal to public opinion, or to passion and prejudice rather than to reason. It does not prove anything, but may lead the judgment or actions of the people, and is there- fore a fallacy. Such an argument is not improper when the con- clusion arrived at is believed to be a correct one ; but it is illegiti- mate when the conclusion is wrong in itself, or when he who urges it does so hypocritically. Considered as an argument, it is always a fallacy, and should be used with great care and an upright con- science. Argumentum ad Verecundiam. The argumentum ad vere- cundiam consists in an appeal to the feeling of reverence for cer- tain persons or objects, as to antiquity, the opinions of ancestors, etc., instead of proving the point at issue. Thus the scholastics employed the maxim, "It is foolish to affirm that Aristotle erred ;" and in the same manner the conservative argues against any improvement in society or the state by referring to the opin- ions of the fathers of the republic. The argument may be used to prevent any rash disturbance of the social order ; but it is in every case a fallacy. Argumentum ad Ignorantiam. The argument called ad ignorantiam is addressed to the ignorance of men. It consists in assuming that a certain position is correct, because an adversary cannot show the contrary. Thus some would have us believe in THE CULTURE OF REASONING. 309 animal magnetism or spiritualism, because we cannot explain their phenomena. To argue that there is no material world because we cannot explain how the mind knows it to exist, is the cele- brated fallacy of Hume in philosophy. The fact that we cannot find a needle in a haystack is no proof that it is not there. Argumentum ad Hominem, The argument called ad hominem is an appeal to the practice, principles, or professions of an opponent to confirm our position or to overthrow his. This argument is good against an opponent, and may silence him ; but it may not be good against the views which he advocates. As soon as he renounces such opinions or practices, the argument ceases to be of value against him. Christ often used this method to silence the cavils of the Jews, as in Matt. xxii. 41-45. This fal- lacy is especially objectionable when we take advantage of premises which those with whom we argue allow, but which we ourselves do not believe. It is legitimate only when we wish to make our opponents doubt their premises by seeing the conse- quences to which they lead, or to silence an unreasonable and cavilling adversary. In Conclusion. In conclusion we remark that care to avoid these fallacies, combined with the reading of works of philosophy, the study of the metaphysical sciences, the study of logic and the deductive sciences, the proper study of mathematics and language, and the practice of deductive thought, will train the mind to clear, broad, and comprehensive deductive reasoning. II. CULTURE OF INDUCTIVE REASONING. Inductive Reasoning is the process of deriving a general truth from particular truths. It is one of the earliest forms of thinking manifested by the young mind; and is developed by appropriate exercise and training. This exercise and training may be given in four different ways ; by the inductive teaching of several of the elementary branches of study; by the formal study of the material sciences; by original investigations in these sciences; and by being careful to avoid the fallacies of induction. 310 MENTAL SCIENCE. I. INDUCTIVE METHOD OF TEACHING. The power of inductive reasoning may be cultivated by the inductive method of teaching several of the elementary branches. The inductive method of teaching is that form of teaching which passes from particulars to generals. By it the pupil may be led from particular ideas to general ideas, or from particular truths to general truths. The former gives culture to generalization, which is in the spirit of in- ductive thought ; the latter requires inductive reasoning on the part of the pupil, which gives direct culture to inductive thinking. The principal of the school branches for the inductive method, are Object Lessons, Geography, Grammar, and Arithmetic. In Object Lessons, Object Lessons deal with objects and their properties, and these constitute the foundation of the induc- tive sciences. A system of object lessons is especially adapted to train the power of observation, which lies at the basis of the de- velopment of the inductive sciences. An object lesson requires a pupil to analyze an object into its parts, to look at its details ; and thus leads him to acquire the habit of close, accurate, and analytical perception. The pupil may also be led to classify objects, which is a stage -of inductive science. He may also be 1 (1 to inquire after the causes of certain facts and appearances of the objects, which is induction proper. A system of object lessons, in the hands of an intelligent teacher, may thus lead a pupil in the first steps of inductive thought and science. In Teaching Geography. Geography is a natural science and is developed inductively; and when properly taught, gives exercise in inductive thought. In this branch, a pupil should first see particular examples of the different divisions of land and water, continents, capes, peninsulas, islands, oceans, gulfs, bays, etc., and from these be led up to the general notion of them and their definitions. So also the particular rivers and moun- tains should be first presented, and the pupil be led to unite them into river-systems and mountain-chains, thus proceeding from the particular to the general. So far as geography treats of causes and laws, they should follow the facts which depend upon THE CULTURE OF REASONING. 311 them. Taught in this way, geography cultivates inductive think- ing; taught, however, by the ordinary method of definition and description, very little thought is awakened, and what there is, is in the spirit of deduction rather than induction. In Teaching Arithmetic. Even arithmetic, which is a deductive science, may be so taught as to train the faculty of inductive thought. The earliest instruction in arithmetic should be presented concretely and inductively. The mind should pro- ceed from objects to numbers, from ideas of processes to their formal statement, from the analysis of particular examples to the general rules, from the use of a principle in some special case that gives rise to it, to its formal announcement in a general proposition. Thus the pupil may be made familiar with the pro- cess of uniting and separating numbers before he learns to call it addition and subtraction ; he may analyze special examples in the different cases of fractions, and then derive a rule from the steps of the analysis; and this is inductive in its character. So, in common divisor, common multiple, evolution, etc., the prin- ciple may be first presented in the special case of a problem being solved, from which the mind may be led to its formal statement. Subsequently, the principles may be demonstrated by deductive processes, and the rules derived from general principles. In Teaching Algebra. Some culture of inductive thought may be given, even in the study of algebra. We may pass from the particular solutions of arithmetic to the more general so- lutions with algebraic symbols. The transition from figures to letters, from numerical exponents to literal exponents, and the generalization of particular processes, are all in the spirit of in- ductive thought. Some of the methods of operation and general formulas may also be obtained by inductive methods of reasoning. Newton discovered his celebrated "binomial formula" by in- duction ; he left no deductive demonstration of it and probably never discovered one. Format's formula for prime numbers, 2" 1 + 1, when m is a term in the series 1, 2, 4, 8, etc., which Euler showed is incorrect when m equals 32, was derived by m- 812 MENTAL SCIENCE. duction. The method of "mathematical induction," often used in algebra, is more deductive in its nature than inductive, and does not afford culture to inductive reasoning ; and most of the reasoning of algebra trains to deductive rather than inductive thought. In Teaching Grrammar. Grammar is largely a deductive science, but its elements may be taught inductively ; and when thus taught, will give culture to inductive reasoning. Thus, we may first present individual examples of nouns, and then lead to the general idea of a noun and to its definition ; and so with all the parts of speech. So also we may lead the pupil to discover the properties of number, case, etc., from language, and to derive the rules of inflection from individual cases of inflection. The rules of syntax may also be first presented in special cases, and the mind be led to grasp the general from the particular. Such teaching is in the spirit of induction, and trains to inductive habits of thought. Other school studies may be presented in a like manner, and when so taught do something for the culture of inductive reasoning. II. THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES. Besides the method of in- ductive teaching, there are several school studies that give special culture to inductive thought. These are the branches which be- long to the inductive sciences ; and if studied in accordance with their spirit, give direct culture to the power of inductive reason- ing. Among these branches are Physiology, Natural Philosophy, Astronomy, Chemistry, and Natural History. A few remarks on each of these studies will show their use in affording the cul- ture we are considering. Study of Physiology. The science of physiology treats mainly of facts. There are few general principles reached, and the inquiry for causes is somewhat limited. The study of this branch trains the pupil to close observation ; he is taught to dis- sect, to observe, and to gather facts. This does not require in- ductive reasoning, but it is the first stage of the inductive sciences, and thus imparts somewhat of the spirit of these sciences. The THE CULTUKE OF REASONING. 313 functions of the different organs lie in the sphere of cause and effect, and when laws are reached, they are reached inductively ; and the ascertaining of these laws and causes gives direct culture to inductive thought. Study of Natural Philosophy. Natural philosophy is one of the finest types of a purely inductive science, as geometry is of a deductive science. It treats of facts and phenomena, with their laws and causes. When studied according to its own genius, as it should be, it is one of the very best studies for the training of inductive thought. It requires the observation of facts and phenomena, and also experiment to ascertain facts not presented by things in their usual relations. From these the student passes to the inquiry after the causes of facts and phenomena, and the laws which control them. Thus, from the facts of falling bodies, it rises to the cause, attraction of gravitation, and from this to the law that the distances are proportional to the squares of the times. Studied in this manner, it gives admirable culture to in- ductive thought ; while taught, as it so often is, by the definitions and discussions of the text-book, it not only gives no culture to induction, but is almost useless as a matter of discipline. Study of Astronomy. The science of astronomy is also in- ductive in its character. It begins with the facts and phenomena of the heavenly bodies, and proceeds to ascertain the causes which produce the various phenomena and the laws which govern them. The study should begin with the observation of the sun, moon, and stars themselves ; or with the observation of the facts. From these the student should be led to the inquiry after the causes which produce these facts and phenomena, and the laws by which these causes operate. These causes are so recondite in their nature, and require such a breadth of thought, that the student cannot be led to them, but is obliged to accept them as already discovered. So also he must learn the laws as deter- mined by the great minds who have discovered them, rather than discover them himself. This is the deductive method rather than the inductive, and trains to deductive methods of thinking. Be- 14 314: MENTAL SCIENCE. sides, mathematics enters very largely, almost entirely, into the development of these higher investigations, which makes the reasoning strictly deductive, and cultivates that form of reasoning. Study of Cliemistry. Chemistry is mainly a science of ex- periment, as physiology is of observation. The student is re- quired to become familiar with the different elements, their properties, their equivalents of combination, the results of such combination, the methods of analysis of compounds, the tests for and detection of substances, etc. There is but little theory, or investigation of causes or laws. Most of the theories are already prepared for us, and the student has only to learn them and attain skill in their application. The prominence of experiment in the study, and the necessity of drawing inferences from facts, however, render it an excellent study for the culture of the method of inductive investigation. Natural History. The three branches of natural history, Botany, Zoology, and Mineralogy, treat mainly of facts and their classification. These train the mind to the close observation of facts and to generalizations from these facts, but not to inductive reasoning. Generalization, however, the passing from particular objects to general ideas, though not inductive reasoning, is in the spirit of induction ; and the study of these branches is thus of value in the culture of inductive thought. Besides, there are a few general principles reached in these branches, and now and then an inquiry after a cause; and these afford a more direct culture of inductive thought. III. INDUCTIVE THINKING. Besides the culture afforded by the inductive teaching of several of the school studies and the formal study of several of the inductive sciences, a course in in- ductive investigation is indispensable for the high culture of the power of inductive thought. In fact, more can be done for the culture of inductive reasoning outside of books than in connection with them, for books, as a rule, announce the results of induction rather than take the mind through the process of induction. This method can be applied to every department of nature and THE CULTURE OF REASONING. 315 society. The business man, as well as the professional man, the merchant, the doctor, the statesman, every one who wishes to reach the laws and causes which are operating in his own depart- ment of labor, may use this faculty in passing from facts to their causes and laws. Order of Investigation. For this investigation the several steps or stages are as follows : First, they must seek for facts and phenomena. These are to be gained by observation, experiment, and testimony. Second, they are to ascertain the causes of these facts and the laws which govern them. They will be aided in this by hypothesis and theory. These hypotheses are often reached by anticipation, and are carefully verified. A few remarks on each one of these subjects will make a little clearer what is here meant. Inquiry for Facts. Every man should be a good observer ; he should see what is going on around him ; he should be a fact- gatherer. He should observe the facts both of nature and human nature. He should notice what is going on in society, the changes in thought and institutions, the progress in art and in- vention, and the fluctuations in public sentiment and political parties. As a business man, he should observe the facts of trade, the growing demand for new articles of commerce, the relation of supply to demand of any one article, etc. As such he becomes a man of intelligence, and has the material with which to form his inductive inferences; and this will enable him to make his life a practical success in the business and professional world. Experiment for Facts. Another method of gaining facts is that of experiment, which is practicable in many departments of life. If a man is engaged in farming or some similar avoca- tion, he can supplement his observation by experiments. He can cross his strawberries or grapes, try the effects of different soils on his apples or pears, experiment with different methods of feed- ing his cattle, test the efficiency of new fertilizers, etc. As a merchant, he can try the popularity of a new line of goods ; as a manufacturer, test some new article for the household, etc. In 316 MENTAL SCIENCE. this way, he will not only gain valuable information, but give culture to the power which obtains material for inductive reason- ing. Inquire for Causes. The mind should accustom itself to the inquiry after the causes of things. Every fact and phe- nomenon is the result of some agency ; and the mind should acquire the habit of trying to see the cause which stands behind the fact and gives rise to it. We thus rise from facts into the domain of philosophy ; and learn to previse and predict the future. The facts as caused become themselves the cause of other facts, and the man who can foresee and foretell their result, becomes a prac- tical prophet among his fellow-men. By this grasp of the future, fortunes are made, political success is assured, the tide of public thought is anticipated, and the possessor of this power raised to positions of honor and influence. The successful men of the day in business, are those who, with a broad grasp of cause and effect, could anticipate the coming events and be prepared to take ad- vantage of them. Use of Hypotheses. In thus ascertaining the causes, it will often be necessary to use hypotheses. These hypotheses are not a combination of all the facts, but the mind leaps, by a kind of inspiration, from a few facts to the cause which explains or pro- duces them. To do this we need to cultivate a lively fancy, a quickness of suggestion, a philosophic foresight that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form, or sees the law or cause standing back of the fact. Care must be used to verify these flashes of fancy or bright suggestions. No hypothesis should be accepted as true until the facts are so numerous that there can be no doubt of its being proved. If facts are found that it will not account for, another supposition must be made, and so on, until one is obtained that will account for the facts. Remember Whewell's maxim that " to try wrong guesses is with most persons the only way to hit upon right ones." IV. CARE TO AVOID FALLACIES. In these investigations, great care should be taken to avoid those illusive inferences THE CULTUEE OF REASONING. 317 called fallacies, into which men are liable to fall. The most im- portant of these are those relating to the ascertaining of the causes of facts. Mistakes are also made in obtaining the facts, which have been called fallacies of observation. A few remarks will be made on each of these two classes of fallacies, -fallacies of observation and fallacies of inference. Fallacies of Observation. We should be cautious, in obtain- ing our facts, to avoid the fallacies of observation. These are of several classes, the most important of which are the following: first, inexact observation, or the careless observation of facts; second, partial observation, or gaining an incomplete knowledge of facts ; third, the neglect of exceptions and contradictory facts ; fourth, the assumption of facts which are not facts ; fifth, the mix- ing of illegitimate inferences with the facts. Special care should be taken to avoid all -of these fallacies, as any mistake in observa- tion will vitiate the general conclusions which we derive from them. Mistaking the Cause. The fallacy of mistaking the cause, called non causa pro causa, is that in which something not a cause is assumed to be a cause. Thus Newton fell into this error when he explained the phenomena of light by the supposition of corpuscles. So the supposition that heat is a fluid, so long taught in natural philosophy, was a fallacy of this kind. There are several forms of this fallacy, the principal of which we shall mention. Antecedent for the Cause. This fallacy, called post hoc, ergo propter hoc, consists in mistaking a mere antecedent for a cause. Thus, if we infer that because an eclipse of the moon is followed by a heavy rain, that the former is the cause of the latter, it will be a fallacy of mistaking the antecedent for the cause. In ancient times, people who noticed that a remarkable meteor in the sky was followed by some national calamity, or a conjunction of planets was followed by a royal marriage with far-reaching political consequences, superstitiously concluded that the events were related as cause and effect. So to infer, because a country 318 MENTAL SCIENCE. flourished under one administration and suffered from a financial panic under another administration, that the administration was the cause of the result, is to be guilty of this fallacy. Taking the Sign for the Cause. The fallacy of mistaking the sign for the cause is a common one with untrained thinkers. Thus a physician who, on seeing pimples on the face, attempts to remove them by an application, instead of endeavoring to remove the cause, falls into this error. A statesman, who contents him- self with punishing the crimes which proceed from ignorance, without trying to remove the moral causes from which crime springs, is guilty of this fallacy. Buckle falls into this error by tracing all progress in civilization to intellectual activity, for- getting that the intellectual activity of Europe was due to moral causes, and was thus only a sign or effect of the real cause. Fallacy of Analogy. The fallacy of analogy, called non tale pro tali, consists in assuming a resemblance where there is no re- semblance. Thus to assume that because the wheat crop is unusually large, we shall have a fine corn crop ; or because the season is favorable to peaches, apples will be abundant, is to fall into this error. The trite argument against Christianity, that because all other religions are a delusion, Christianity must be a delusion, is a fallacy of this kind, which should not delude any one with ordinary reasoning powers. It is a fallacy also to carry an analogy too far; as to infer from the parable of the praying of the importunate woman that God resembles the unjust judge. INTUITION. CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OP INTUITION. TNTUITION", or the REASON, is that power of the mind which - gives us ideas and truths not furnish'ed by the senses, nor elaborated by the understanding. Its products are called primary ideas and primary truths. The Primary Ideas are those of Space, Time, Cause, Identity, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, etc. The Primary Truths are all self-evident and necessary truths, as the axioms of mathematics and logic. Names of the Fower. This power is called Intuitive, be- cause the products spring up immediately in the mind upon the presentation of the proper occasion. The ideas are not the pro- ducts of sensation and perception, but arise in the mind on the occasion of sensible experience. Its truths are not derived by a process of reasoning, but arise spontaneously in the mind when the subjects to which they relate are contemplated. Hamilton calls it the Regulative Power, because it regulates and controls the activity of the other faculties. Dr. Hickok and some others, following the example of Kant, call it the Reason, a term not inappropriate, since it is the power or element of the mind which seems to stamp it with rationality. In Wliat Sense a Faculty. The power of intuition is not to be regarded as a faculty, in the same sense as the other activities of the mind. It is not so much an activity as a spontaneity, for its products arise spontaneously in the mind on the proper occa- sion without any special effort or action. From this fact Ham- (319) 320 MENTAL SCIENCE. ilton speaks of it as the complement of certain fundamental laws, though it is doubtful whether this characterizes it properly. It seems to correspond to what was known to the Greek philosophy as the nous (vour), the intelligence. The Scotch philosophers have used the term common sense to name this power ; but this term is also objectionable. Kant called it the Reason, and this term has been quite largely adopted, though it is liable to become con- founded with reasoning. Several other terms have been sug- gested, but none seems more suitable than Intuition. Nature of the Faculty. Intuition or the Reason is an intu- itive source of knowledge. It has an eye for truth which tran- scends the truths of sense and reasoning. Perception derives its ideas through the senses ; Intuition is the source of its own ideas. Reasoning obtains its conclusions from premises; Intuition ob- tains its truths from itself. It is thus a centre and source of knowing; a source and originator of knowledge. It also fur- nishes the laws by which each of the other faculties mature and complete their products; perception, memory, and reasoning de- pend for their results on the Reason. Besides this, it looks around and through the operations of the other faculties of know- ing, and comprehends their activities and products. Moreover, it not only comprehends the activities of the other faculties, but comprehends its own activities and products. The faith in Reason is itself an intuition of the Reason. This statement of a true conception of the Reason will be more clearly seen as the subject is further discussed. I. EXISTENCE OF THIS FACULTY. The existence of such a faculty, though it has been questioned, is apparent from an ex- amination of the source of its products. All of our ideas whose origin we have explained, are of three classes; percepts, abstracts, and concepts. These ideas have their primary source in per- ception, abstraction and generalization depending on perception for the materials out of which they form ideas. If now we find that we have ideas not given by either of these three faculties, it is reasonable to infer that there must be some other faculty as the THE NATURE OF INTUITION. 321 source of these ideas. Let us notice the origin of our so-called Primary Ideas. Ideas not from Perception. We remark first that these primary ideas are not given by perception. A percept has color or form, hardness or softness, or some one of the qualities of ma- terial things. A Primary Idea, as the idea of Space, has neither color, nor form, nor hardness, nor softness, nor any one of the qualities of matter ; hence it is not a percept, or the product of perception. The same may be shown of Time, Cause, Identity, etc. Since they are not given by perception, they cannot be given by abstraction, since abstraction is the power of drawing a quality away from an object and making of it a distinct object of thought. If we do not perceive space, time, cause, etc., as qualities of bodies, we shall have no such ideas to draw away from objects. Not by Generalization. These ideas are not concepts, the products of generalization. In forming a general idea, we first perceive the qualities of objects, then abstract the qualities which are common, and then unite these common attributes into a general notion. Now, if we have no perception of these intuitive ideas as qualities of objects, we cannot abstract and unite such qualities into general notions. Besides this, the general notion ia always equal to the sum of the common qualities united; the general idea equals the sum of the particulars and can never transcend this sum. Now, if our idea of space were made up of all the particular spaces which we may have experienced, it could be no larger than the sum of these particulars. But in reality our idea of space infinitely transcends the sum of all possibly ex- perienced spaces. If we should put together all the spaces which we have seen occupied by matter, the result would fall far short of our idea of space. Not by Judgment or Reasoning. These intuitive ideas cannot be given by judgment and reasoning, since their office is to give us truths and not ideas. In a similar manner, we could show that none of these ideas Time, Cause, Identity, the Beau- 14* 322 MENTAL SCIENCE. tiful, etc. can be given by any of the faculties we have previously described. Hence there must be some other faculty which gives these ideas, and that faculty we call Intuition or the Reason. A similar argument can be given in respect to the origin of the intuitive truths. Existence Generally Admitted. The existence of such a faculty is now generally admitted by philosophers. Nearly all the great thinkers acknowledge that it is impossible to resolve all our knowledge into the product of experience. It is largely ad- mitted that a certain complement of cognitions must be allowed as having their origin in the nature of the thinking principle it- self. In the analysis of knowledge, it is seen that the mind itself supplies some of the elements ; and there must be an attribute or faculty of the mind to supply them. There is a general agree- ment, also, as to the manner in which the ideas and truths of the faculty are formed. Existence Questioned. There is a certain class of thinkers, however, of whom Hobbes is a representative, who deny the ex- istence of such a faculty. These thinkers endeavor to trace all of our ideas to sense as their ultimate source. Nearly all the thinkers known as scientists, belong to this school. Locke is claimed on both sides of the question. He states that all of our ideas arise from two sources, sensation and reflection; but he is not entirely clear in his explanation of the origin of those ideas which we call intuitive. It is thought by many, however, that he meant to teach that they are not derived from sense, but that they originate in the mind. II. RELATION TO OTHER FACULTIES. Intuition is intimately related to all the faculties of the mind. It seems to overlie and condition the activities of all the other faculties. It furnishes the laws by which they operate, and often adds elements to their products necessary for their completeness. This relation to the other faculties will be briefly pointed out. To Perception. Through the senses the perceptive power at- tains the idea of qualities. These qualities are necessarily con- THE NATURE OF INTUITION. 323 ceived as belonging to something which we call substance, and this conception is furnished, not by perception, but by intuition. The perception of bodies as extended involves the idea of space ; and this idea is furnished by the intuitive power. So in the per- ception of events ; they are conceived to be united by the thread of time, which is also an intuitive idea. The cognition of an ex- ternal world, as was explained under perception, involves an in- tuitive belief that resistance implies something which resists, a truth furnished by intuition. To the Memory. Memory is also aided by intuition in com- pleting its action. The memory, as previously explained, retains, recalls, represents, and recognizes. The element of recognition is an intuitive act, and is supposed to be due to intuition. It is not a result of comparison, for there is nothing with which to compare the representative object ; and even if there were, some power would be needed to pronounce upon the result of the com- parison and recognize the similarity or identity. The act of recognition is immediate and intuitive, and is an act of the Reason. To the Imagination. The imagination is also regulated in its action by the Reason. The products of this faculty are limited by the conditions of Space and Time, which are intuitive ideas. The principles of Beauty, after which the imagination forms its ideals, are also provided by the power of intuition. The ideals of beauty, those patterns of grace and excellence, that give shape to our imaginings, are largely due to this element of the mind. The highest flights of imagination are, as it were, inspired by and informed with a rational idea, which comes from this higher element of our rational nature. To the Judgment. The operation of intuition may also be noticed in an act of judgment. Judgment compares two objects of thought, and, perceiving their agreement or disagreement, unites them in a proposition. The truth of a proposition, how- ever, is not seen by the judgment, but by a power higher than the judgment. The validity of a predication of one thing of 324 MENTAL SCIENCE. another is perceived and tested by some power which gives the law of judgments. Even the ideas of similarity and difference are the products of intuition. The laws of derived judgments, as in the inferences of Opposition, are furnished by the reason. It is thus seen that intuition or reason regulates the acts of compar- ison in the exercise of the judgment. To Reasoning. Intuition also regulates the activity of the reasoning power. It furnishes all the laws of inference, those fundamental principles which control the reasoning process. Thus the simplest form of reasoning, as "A = B, but B = C, hence A = C," depends on the axiomatic truth that "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other;" and this axiom is an intuitive truth. So the principle of deduction that " What is true of the whole is true of the parts," is furnished the reasoning faculty by a faculty which does not reason, namely, intuition. The cognition of the conclusiveness of the result is also an act of that power of reason that stands above the faculty of reasoning. The Highest Faculty. Intuition is thus the highest power of the mind ; it stands at the head of and gives dignity and excel- lence to all the faculties. It is the crowning attribute of the intellect, the keystone of the spiritual arch, the overarching dome of the temple of the mind. It is in intuition that man be- comes a rational and immortal being. Here arise the idea of duty, the cognition of obligation, and the belief in the infinite and absolute. Here faith has its origin ; here hope appears to illumine the mind ; and here glow those "primal duties" which "shine aloft like stars." As the blue sky arches over the earth dotted with golden stars, so arching over all the other faculties of the soul is the power of intuition, bright with the stars of faith in immortality j God, and heaven. Here appear those revelations of heavenly truth that have come to the world, trembling on the poet's lips or glowing in the seraphic fire of prophetic utterance. The revelation of divine truth in the Bible and by the Eternal Word, enter human consciousness through this overarching power of the Keason. THE NATUKE OF INTUITION. 325 III. THE PRODUCTS or INTUITION. The Products of the Intuitive power are Primary Ideas and Primary Truths. An Idea, as has already been stated, is a mental product, which when expressed in words, does not give a proposition. A Primary Idea is one that is not given by the senses nor derived from other ideas. Primary ideas are notions which lie back of and condition all other ideas. Such ideas are Space, Time, Cause, Identity, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, etc. PEIMAEY TRUTHS. I. NATURE OP PRIMARY TRUTHS. A truth is a true thought ; that is, it is a mental predication which is true. A Primary Truth is a truth which lies back of and conditions all other truths. It is the source of other truths ; from it other truths are derived ; while it is derived from and depends on no other truth. As examples of primary truths, we mention the axioms of mathe- matics and logic. Thus, " The whole is greater than any of its parts," and " Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," are examples of primary truths. Relation to Primary Ideas. Every primary truth involves at least one primary idea; as "All bodies must occupy space," and " Every event must have a cause." Here Space and Cause, in these two truths, are primary ideas. As to which precedes in its appearance in the mind, the idea or the truth, there seems to be some difference of opinion among philosophers. Some main- tain that the truth, as a law of thought, appears in consciousness, and that the idea is derived from the truth. This, however, is contrary to the usual order of the origin of ideas and thoughts; and it seems more reasonable to suppose that the thought follows the idea. Thus it would seem that we must first have the idea of a cause, before we can think the thought that " every event has a cause." II. EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY TRUTHS. There is a certain class of thinkers who deny the existence of primary truths; we shall, therefore, endeavor to show that the mind does actually 326 MENTAL SCIENCE. possess these truths. Under the Understanding it was seen that truths are given by two faculties, judgment and reasoning. These are the only faculties considered previously to intuition, that give us truths. A judgment in the domain of sense is called a particular truth, as " Heat expands iron." From a synthesis of particular truths we reach, by induction, a general truth; as '* Heat expands all metals." By deductive reasoning we reach a derived, or deductive truth ; as " The sum of the angles of a tri- angle equals two right angles." By a comparison of ideas formed by abstraction and generalization we may also obtain truths, as " Man is an animal." Truths Not Derived. Now if we examine our knowledge further, we shall find some truths in the mind that are not judg- ments from sense, nor the comparison of abstracts or concepts, nor the result of either inductive or deductive reasoning. These truths lie back of and condition both judgment and reasoning, and thus control and regulate all thought. Take them away, and neither reasoning nor science is longer possible for want of a beginning or foundation. If we begin at some truth derived by reasoning and trace it backward towards its source, we shall at last arrive at a truth which depends on no other truth for its proof, but carries its evidence in itself. Such truths have some origin ; they are not given by reasoning, for they are the basis of reasoning ; they are not given by judgment in percepts, abstracts, or concepts, for they are independent of any of these notions. Such truths arise spontaneously in the mind ; they are the pro- ducts of the power of intuition. Existence Admitted. The existence of these first truths is admitted by a large class of philosophers. They have been desig- nated, however, by quite a number of different appellations. Many writers, from Cicero downward, including Bacon, Des- cartes, Leibnitz, etc., called them instinctive beliefs. Kant and his disciples termed them a priori or transcendental principles, as they are prior to experience and transcend the knowledge fur- nished by the senses. Several of the Scotch writers have called THE NATUEE OF INTUITION. 327 them principles of common sense, though Stewart uses the expres- sion fundamental laws of human belief. III. TESTS OF PRIMARY TRUTHS. Attempts have been made by different philosophers to determine certain criteria by which we may recognize primary truths and distinguish them from all other truths. The tests which are regarded as the most satis- factory are, Self-evidence, Universality, Necessity, and Sim- plicity. Self-evidence. The first test of a primary truth is that it is self-evident. A primary truth does not admit of any proof; it carries its own evidence in itself. Thus the truth, " Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," is seen to be true, by all who can comprehend it, as soon as it is uttered. When it is stated that " the moon revolves around the earth," we say, Yes, that may be so, but how do you know it is so ? If true, it is a truth which demands proof before it can be accepted. But no one asks or needs to ask for the proof of an intuitive truth. No proof is possible, and a thousand demonstrations, if they were possible, would add no force to our conviction of its certainty. Primary truths carry within themselves their own vouchers for our confidence and acceptance. Universality. The second test of a primary truth is that it is universal. By this is meant that it is active in the minds of all mankind. It may not always be so clearly developed as to be presented in a formal proposition, but it is instinctively present and controls their action. In reflective minds these truths are distinctly formulated ; and other minds immediately yield assent to them when they are enunciated and clearly grasped. There is a spontaneous conviction in the minds of all men of these truths. They operate practically in the minds of all, whether they are acknowledged formally or not. Nay more, even the skeptic, who may deny these principles in his philosophy, acts upon them in individual cases just as implicitly as the philosopher who admits them and defends them. Necessity. A third test of primary truths is that they are 328 MENTAL SCIENCE. necessary truths. They are not only true, but they must be true; it is impossible for them to be untrue. We cannot conceive them to be untrue without an absurdity. The opposite of them is false and cannot be true. Thus the truth, " Space is necessary for the existence of material things," is not only true, but it is necessarily true ; and the opposite, " Space is not necessary to the existence of matter," is false and nothing can make it true. We cannot conceive that Deity himself could make a primary truth untrue; that is, that he could make the sum of three and two equal to seven, or the " whole less than a part." Simplicity. Another test of a primary truth is its simplicity. If a truth can be resolved into some more fundamental truth which contains it or from which it may be derived, it is not a primitive truth. Thus the truth that " The sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles," though it is a necessary truth, is not a primary truth, as it will admit of derivation. A truth to be primary must not only be necessary and universal, but it must also be a fundamental truth. This test is expressed by the term simplicity. To these several tests Hamilton adds that of Incomprehensibility, by which he means that we compre- hend that the thing is, but not how or why it is. IV. REMARKS ON PRIMARY TRUTHS. No author has at- tempted to give a full list of primary truths; indeed such an enumeration would be very difficult if not impossible. They in- clude all the axioms of mathematics, of both number and form. They include also all the self-evident truths of logic, as " The ex- tension and intension of concepts are inversely proportional ;" and the laws of inference, as " What belongs to the class belongs to each individual of the class." Other sciences also furnish ex- amples of self-evident truths. Trutfis Arise from Ideas. Each intuitive idea gives rise to a number of intuitive truths. For instance, from the idea of Space we may derive a number of intuitive truths or principles ; as, "All bodies occupy space," "All bodies are contained in space," " No body can exist without space," " Space is necessary THE NATUKE OF INTUITION. 329 to the existence of material things," " All motion is in space," " All motion is from one part of space to another," " A body in passing from one part of space to another, must pass through the whole intermediate space," etc. So also from the notion of Time arise several truths ; as, " Every event must be in time," " Time is necessary to events," " The mind requires time for its exist- ence," etc. The idea of Identity gives us such propositions as " A = A, " " A is not not- A, " " A thing cannot be and not be at the same time," " I am the same person I was yesterday," etc. So also we have the moral axioms, arising from the idea of the Eight ; as, " To tell the truth is right, " " To utter falsehood is wrong," etc. These Truths not Contingent. There are those who en- deavor to resolve these truths iato contingent truths, the result of experience and generalization. To this attempt we reply that no observation of particular cases and generalization thereon, could have produced the irresistible belief we have in first truths. Each observation is contingent, and any number of observed con- tingencies will never impose upon us the feeling of necessity, of an inability to think the opposite. We have always seen a stone fall to the ground when thrown in the air, but we find no diffi- culty in conceiving of the possibility of one or all stones gravitat- ing from the earth ; we cannot however conceive the possibility of this or any other event happening without a cause. Nor, as Hamilton remarks, can the necessity of so thinking be derived from a custom of so thinking; for a custom, however general, cannot give the stamp of necessity. Intuitive Truths Certain. The doctrine here taught main- tains the absolute certainty of primary truths. It maintains that they are absolutely different from contingent truths, that they con- tain no element of uncertainty or contingency. An inductive truth may be true without a single exception ; but we can always imagine the possibility of an exception, and are always prepared to admit an exception if it be pointed out. With respect to a primary truth, not only do we expect no exception, but we hold 330 MENTAL SCIENCE. that there can be no exception. From their very nature we know that no exceptions are possible ; and if it were announced that an exception had been discovered, we would riot believe it, for we know that such a thing is impossible. Nay, to show the absolute character of the ground upon which we stand, it is held that Deity himself cannot make an exception to these truths, for they are as eternal as God himself. This is the broad and funda- mental distinction between the philosophy here taught and the materialistic, contingent, doubting philosophy, so called, of the modern school of scientists. V. PRIMARY IDEAS. The Primary Ideas, as already stated, are Space, Time, Cause, Identity, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, or the Right. These ideas may be embraced under three general classes; the intuitive ideas of Science, the in- tuitive ideas of ^Esthetics, and the intuitive ideas of Ethics. The intuitive ideas of science are those of Space, Time, Cause, Identity, etc. ; the intuitive ideas of aesthetics are those of Beauty, Sublimity, and the Ludicrous; the intuitive ideas of ethics are those of the Right, the Ought, and Merit or Demerit. Each of these three classes of ideas will be treated under separate chapters. Using the word true in a particular sense, the ideas of science may be called the intuitive ideas, of the True. Using the term beautiful in its generic sense as including all aesthetic ideas, and we have the three classes of intuitive ideas, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. CHAPTER H. THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. THE IDEAS of Intuition, as previously stated, may be divided into three distinct classes ; the intuitions of the True, the in- tuitions of the Beautiful, and the intuitions of the Right. These three classes of ideas will be treated under three distinct chapters. The intuitions of the True embrace four great ideas ; Space, Time, Identity, and Cause. These may also be called the intuitive ideas of science. There are other ideas belonging to this general division ; but these are all that we shall discuss here. I. SPACE. SPACE may be defined as the condition of material existence. Every material body possesses the elements of extension, and ex- tension is possible only in space. No material things could exist without space ; and we can thus define space as the condition or postulate of material existence. Space an Idea. Space, subjectively considered, is an idea of the mind. It has no form, nor color, nor any of the attributes of a percept; and yet it is a clearly defined notion, as distinct and definite as that of an object. We know what we mean by the word space, though we may not be able to define it satis- factorily. We have also a definite notion of the meaning of the proposition, "Space is necessary for the existence of objects." There is therefore a definite notion corresponding to the word Space. Origin of the Idea. The idea of space is not a percept; it has neither color, form, hardness, nor any of the other attributes of a percept, and hence is not a product of perception. It is not an abstract, for it is not a notion of a quality drawn from an (331) 332 MENTAL SCIENCE. object; hence it is not given by abstraction. It is not a concept, the combination of special spaces, for the idea of space infinitely transcends the sum of all experienced spaces. Space is therefore an intuition. It is an idea that springs up in the mind on the occasion of sensible experience. Though it is not an idea given by sense, sense furnishes the occasion for its development in the mind. From the fact that it springs up in the mind in con- nection with sensible experience, and yet is seen to be necessary to the objects of sensible experience, it has been said to be logi- cally prior to experience and chronologically subsequent to expe- rience. Not a Mere Idea. Space is not a mere idea of the mind ; it exists independently of the mind. If there were no minds to conceive of space, space would still have existence. Were this not so, then if all minds should be blotted out of existence, there would be no space. Matter would still exist, worlds would still continue to move on as now, but exist and move in what? Not in space, we reply, for that ceased to exist with the last mind, if space be an idea. The absurdity of the conclusion shows the in- correctness of the premise that space is a mere idea. Indeed, if we make space a mere idea, we shall make matter a mere idea also, a conclusion to which Hume and some other thinkers have come. Space a Reality. Space, we therefore say, is more than a mere idea ; it is a reality. Matter exists, can exist only in some- thing, and that something the condition of its existence is space. Space, therefore, is a real existence. We may not be able to define it any better than the school-boy who said, " Space is a great, big, infinite nothing;" but we are sure of its reality. Even if there were no matter, there would be space. In that case, the idea might not occur to the mind; but space would exist just the same as it does at present. Even if all matter and mind should "be blotted out of being, space would still be what it is now." Nay more, so real is the existence of space that we cannot conceive of any power by which it could be destroyed. THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. 333 Other Views. Several distinct views have obtained in respect to the subject of space. Kant and his school make it a mere conception, a form which the mind imposes upon matter; having no external reality, but merely a subjective existence. Some writers " have resolved space and time into the qualities of the one infinite and absolute Being, the divine mind." Dr. Samuel Clarke regards space and time as attributes, properties, or modes of an eternal substance. Sir Isaac Newton seems to have held that the existence of God always and everywhere constitutes space and time. ' Elements of Space. As an objective reality, space has several distinct elements. First, space is continuous ; it cannot be broken into parts which can be separated from one another ; it extends from one point to another, and is continuous in all directions. Second, space has three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth; in other words, it is susceptible of these three measurements. Third, space is quantitative; it admits of definite measurement, and is estimated as the how much. Fourth, it gives rise to figures, and thus to the science of form, or geometry. Fifth, it is without limit in every direction, in other words, it is infinite. II. TIME. TIME may be defined as the condition of being regarded as in action or motion. It is the condition of the succession of events, as Space is the condition of the extension of matter. Time is that which is required in order that something should take place, as Space is that which is necessary in order that something material should exist. In other words, Time is the condition of events as Space is the condition of forms. Relation to Space. The relations of Time and Space are thus clearly seen. Extension occurs in space; succession occurs in time. As extension is possible only in space, so succession is possible only in time. Time is necessary to succession, as space is necessary to extension. Space is the place of material forms ; time is the place of successive events. Space gives us the question 334 MENTAL SCIENCE. where; and time gives us the question when. As space is in- volved in and given along with extension, so time is involved in and given along with succession. Time an Idea. Time, subjectively considered, is an idea. This idea is clear and definite; we know what we mean by the word time, and by any proposition involving the word. Yet this idea has no form, nor color, nor any of the elements of a percept. Neither is it like an abstract, a quality drawn from an object ; nor like a concept, the aggregate of the common qualities of a class of objects. The mind forms no mental image of time, yet it has a distinct cognition of it which it discriminates from all other cognitions. Origin of Idea. The idea of time, as of space, is an intuition. It is an idea that springs up in the mind on the occasion of sen- sible experience. We see objects in motion; motion involves a change of place ; change of place requires a succession of different places ; succession is involved in time, and is the occasion of the idea arising in the mind. The mind gives birth to the idea upon the presentation of succession as the occasion. So the succession of cognitions the succession of different ideas, thoughts, and feel- ings, as different states of consciousness also furnishes the occa- sion for the development of the idea of time. Were there no experience of events as successive, there would be no idea of time; though the fact of time is necessary to this succession, since there could be no succession without time. In view of this re- lation, as Cousin remarks, time is said to be logically antecedent to experience, and chronologically subsequent to experience. Time a Reality. Time is not a mere idea of the mind ; it has an existence independently of the mind's cognition of it. It is the ground 01 movement, change, indeed of all continuous ex- istence, and must therefore itself have an existence. If there were no such thing as time, there could be no succession, nor change, nor any continued existence. Indeed, there could be no existence of either mind or matter ; for existence implies a continuity of time : t f i exist is to be from one moment to another. Time is thus even THE INTUITION'S OF THE TRUE. 335 less purely subjective than space ; for if we should assume that both space and matter are mere conceptions of the mind, yet even to these very conceptions time is necessary. Time Not a Mere Relation. Some writers, as Dr. Brown, define time to be merely the relation of one event to another as prior and subsequent. If this view were correct, then it would follow that if there were no events there would be no time, since there would be no relation of events. Such a supposition, with its inference, shows the incorrectness of the theory. Time does not depend on the occurrence of events, but the occurrence of events depends on time. Time would still exist if all events should cease ; but were time to be destroyed no succession of events would be possible. We can in thought destroy all events except that of thought, and thus all relation of events ; but we cannot, by any possibility of thought, destroy the existence of time. Time is, therefore, not the relation of events as prior and subsequent, but the necessary condition for such a relation. Time a Relative Idea. Time, in its popular sense, as a measured portion of duration, involves the idea of relation. Our idea of any portion of time is modified by the conception of the relation of past events to one another. In other words, we seem to measure it by the cognition of our present state of conscious- ness in its relation to some former state ; by the relation of the present me to some former me. Hence, if the mind withdraws itself for awhile from passing events, it loses the idea of time. This is noticed in sleep, when the time of falling asleep and awaking seems to be almost the same moment. The same thing occurs when the mind is absorbed in some object of study, and is thus abstracted from passing events. Elements of Time. As an objective reality, time possesses several attributes of interest to this discussion. First, time is continuous; it does not consist of parts separate from one another like the different objects of matter. Second, time has one dimen- sion, and only one; it is regarded as having length and may be represented by a line, one of the elements of space. Third, 336 MENTAL SCIENCE. time is also quantitative; it admits of definite measurement and computation. Fourth, time gives rise to, or is closely associated with number, the basis of the science of arithmetic. Fifth, time is without limit in either direction, as past or future, and is thus infinite. III. IDENTITY. IDENTITY is another of our intuitive ideas. To define this idea, or state explicitly hi what identity consists, is difficult, if not im- possible. Approximately we may say, Identity is sameness, one- ness, etc. Whatever marks off or distinguishes an object from all other similar or dissimilar objects, whatever constitutes its indi- viduality, in that consists its identity. Or, negatively, we may say, Identity is non-diversity, non-otherness, etc. It will aid us in getting a clear idea of what identity is, by noticing what it is not. Not Similarity. And first we remark that identity is not similarity; similar things are not identical. Thus two drops of water out of the same spring, of the same size, color, quality, etc., so closely resembling each other that no acuteness of sense or delicacy of instruments could detect any difference between them, are not identical. By the very supposition, they are not the same thing, but different things. To say that two things exactly similar are identical, would be to say that two things are only one. Similarity Not Implied. Similarity is not only not identity, but it is not even implied in identity. An object may preserve its identity and lose its resemblance to its former self. The spherical india-rubber ball that rests on my hand, is identical with the same ball flattened by the pressure of my other hand, though there is no resemblance in shape between them. The knife opened and shut is the same knife, though quite different in appearance. Not Sameness of Composition. Second, identity is not sameness of composition. If we take a bar of wood or iron and divide it into several equal parts of the same size and shape, so that we could not distinguish between them, these parts would THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. 337 not be identical. Even though they are composed of precisely the same chemical elements in the same proportion, we could not predicate identity of them. Nay more, if we take equal and pre- cisely similar parts of any one element, as oxygen, these parts are different parts and not the same parts. Any consideration that would make two parts identical, would make any number of parts identical, so that we should have the paradox of each part being itself and each of the others. We remark also, that sameness of composition is not necessary to identity, as in the human body, which is constantly changing. Oi-if/in of the Idea. The idea of identity is an intuitive cog- nition of the reason. Given the fitting occasion, and the idea rises spontaneously in the mind. The occasion for the idea is comparison ; the comparing of one thing with another, and of a thing with itself, or of different cognitions of the same object. The idea of identity is thus probably preceded by that of simi- larity and diversity. We see objects that are similar and dis- similar, and then begin to compare an object with itself, or dif- ferent cognitions of the object at different times, and there arises in the mind the idea of identity. An Idea of Relation. The idea of identity, like many others of our ideas, is related to its opposite, diversity. Thus the idea of long implies its opposite short, the idea of large implies its 'opposite small, straight that of crooked, etc.; so the idea of identity stands related to the idea of diversity. To affirm identity is to deny diversity ; and to deny diversity is to affirm identity. It does not follow from this that there cannot be identity without diversity ; but that there can be no idea of the one without the logical necessity of the other. If there were but one thing in ex- istence, there would then be identity but no diversity ; but no condition can be imagined in which there could be diversity with- out identity. A Possible Plurality. In the idea of identity, there is im- plied a possible plurality of objects. In order to predicate iden- tity, there must be a plurality of cognitions of the object. I look 15 338 MENTAL SCIENCE. at the tree to-day and I declare that it is the same tree that I saw yesterday. Here are two cognitions, the cognition of to-day and the cognition of yesterday ; and the question arises, are there two objects corresponding to these two cognitions, or is there but one object? The answer that there is only one object, gives us the condition of identity. In the conception of identity, we have an immediate and irresistible conclusion, that the object of these several cognitions is one and the same object. Elements Involved. In affirming identity, it is thus seen that there are several things implied, logically if not consciously, to the mind in forming the idea. First, there is implied a real plurality of cognitions ; second, a possible plurality of objects ; third, a question whether there is a real plurality of objects cor- responding to the plurality of cognitions; fourth, a conviction and decision that there is but one object corresponding to the several cognitions ; from which conviction emerges the clear and definite notion of identity. Application of Identity. The idea of identity may be ap- plied to three distinct classes of objects ; namely, Spiritual Ex- istences, Organic Material Existences, and Inorganic Matter. The completeness of identity varies somewhat in these three classes of existences. It will be noticed that the identity of spiritual existences is much more complete than of the other ex- istences. Spiritual Identity. The identity of spiritual existences con- sists in their continuity of existence. So long as the spirit con- tinues to exist, it is the same spirit and not another. Should the spirit cease to exist, its identity would cease also, since there would be nothing of which to predicate identity. If another spirit were created in its place, put in the same body and en- dowed with the same conscious experience of the past, and with all the thoughts and feelings of the first, it would not be identical with the former; for, by the supposition, it is not the same spirit but another spirit. Personal Identity. By personal identity we mean that of THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. 339 the spiritual nature rather than that of the body. The basis or evidence of personal identity is consciousness. We are conscious to-day of the same series of past experiences as we were yester- day ; the same past stretches out before our minds ; and we thus know intuitively that the conscious self of to-day is identical with the conscious self of yesterday. Haven holds that conscious- ness is the evidence of identity ; but perhaps it would be more correct to say it is the source of the belief of personal identity. Consciousness is not exactly the evidence, but it furnishes the oc- casion upon which the reason knows our personal identity. Locke's View. Locke held that identity consists in conscious- ness. His error is seen in the inference that if consciousness were in any way interrupted, as in sleep or fainting, personal identity would cease. Moreover, if we should become unconscious of some event of our lives, we would not be identical now with our- selves at that period. Dr. Reed illustrates this point by the sup- position of a person who when a boy was whipped for robbing an orchard ; when a soldier, took a standard from the enemy and at that time remembers the whipping ; and who afterward became a military commander, and remembers taking the standard but not the whipping. Now it follows, from Locke's view, that the soldier is identical with the boy and the general with the soldier, but the general is not identical with the boy, because not con- scious of the same things ; that is, a is b and b is c, but a is not c! Organic World. Identity, in the organic world, consists in the continuity of the life principle under the same general structure and organization. It is not in the body alone, nor in the particles of matter of which the body is composed ; but in those particles of matter permeated with and united into the same general structure by the mysterious principle of life. In this case, the identity is no longer complete, since the form and size of the animal or plant changes year by year, and even the parti- cles of which they are composed are continually changing. It is only in a modified and partial sense that we can predicate iden- tity of an object of the animal or vegetable world. Yet the term 340 MENTAL SCIENCE. is so used ; as we say, this is the same tree under which I played when a boy ; and this old man, now tottering and feeble, is the same person that was so full of strength and agility a few years before. Inorganic World. Identity, in the inorganic world, consists of sameness of structure and material. For perfect identity, there must be no loss of material nor any change in structure or constitution. Strictly speaking, there can be no such identity, as matter is continually changing ; so that, in respect to the or- ganic world, the term identity is used in a secondary and popular sense. When we speak of the same mountain or river, we do not mean that they are absolutely the same, but that they are the same numerical unity, and not some other one of a series. How many changes are needed to destroy the identity of an object, and just where the application of the term ceases, it may be diffi- cult to determine ; as in the oft-quoted puzzle of the knife with successive blades and handles, or the ship whose original planks, ropes, sails, etc., had been replaced by successive repairs. IV. CAUSE. A CAUSE may be defined as that which produces an event. An event is that which now is, but was not ; or it is that which begins to be or occur. The coming into being of a new object or fact, and also any change in an existing object, as the ripen- ing of an apple or the fading of a flower, are regarded as events. All these things are immediately referred, for their existence, to some influence which we call their cause. The idea of a cause, therefore, is that upon which some consequence depends, or with- out which some event would not occur. Nature of Events. The term event, from e, out, and venio, I come, signifies literally that which comes out or appears. It is that which comes out or appears as the result of the operation of some agency. It embraces the phenomena of the material world, as the twinkling of a star, the changing of the moon, etc. Under the same head are included also states and conditions more or THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. o-il less permanent ; as the attractive influence of matter, the equi- librium of forces, weight of bodies, conditions of fluidity and so- lidity, etc. Our ideas, feelings, purposes, volitions, etc., are also regarded as events in the spiritual world. Events are often com- plex, consisting of a combination of several simpler events, each of which has a distinct cause. Cause and Effect. A cause has sometimes been defined as that which produces an effect. The term effect, however, seems rto contain in itself the idea of cause, at least by implication, and may be defined as a "caused event." The definition would thus seem somewhat tautological, being equivalent to saying, "a cause is that which produces a caused event." It is thus better to de- fine a cause as that which produces an event. The terms cause and effect are the antitheses of each other, and are so used in philosophy. Other Views of Cause. There are some philosophers, of whom Hume and Mill are the representatives, who deny that we have any real idea of cause. Hume defines cause as merely the relation of things as " constantly precedent " and " constantly subsequent." He would say " a cause is a constantly precedent and an effect is a constantly subsequent event." Mill teaches the same doctrine, holding that the "invariable antecedent is termed the cause, and the invariable consequent the effect." Objections to This View. In objection to this view it may be said that there is more than the mere relation of antecedent and consequent, however invariable, in the idea of cause. There is the notion that one thing depends on another for its existence, or for its existence in the form in which it is presented to us. Thus a storm is invariably preceded by a change in the barom- eter, yet no one thinks of this change as being the cause of the storm. The sun and the day invariably accompany each other around the globe, but no one ever thinks of the day being the cause of the sun or its light. The stars are constantly associated, one moving before another, but we never hear any one say that one star is the cause of another star. Invariability of association, and the relation of cause and effect, are two very different things. 842 MENTAL SCIENCE. Origin of the Idea. The idea of cause is the product of in- tuition. Given an example of things related as cause and effect, and there immediately arises in the mind the idea of cause. Thus, suppose I see a fire and wax near it, and notice the melting of the wax ; there immediately arises in my mind the notion that the fire is the cause of the melting. Or even given an event un- associated with its cause, and the mind naturally and intuitively inquires for its origin or cause, showing that the idea is native to the mind. If I saw the wax melting, even without seeing the fire, I should think there was some cause for the change. Other Vie^vs of the Origin. It is supposed by some that the idea is given by sensation and perception. This, however, is impossible. The idea of cause is not a percept, for it has no color, form, etc. We cannot see, or feel, or hear cause ; all that we see is the two objects, one in the vicinity of the other, and the changing form of the latter. The idea of cause springs up spon- taneously in the mind, and is the product of the intuitive power. Result of Association. Neither is the idea the result of as- sociation, however invariable, as Hume and Mill teach. The diameter and circumference of a circle have been invariably con- nected with each other in our experience, but neither is thought of as the cause of the other. Neither is it the result of anteced- ence and consequence, however often repeated ; for though sum- mer invariably precedes autumn, we never think of one as the cause of the other. The idea of cause is not identical with in- variability of antecedence and consequence, and could not have originated in that way. Laiv of Causation. The idea of cause leads to the law of causation. This law is that every event must have a cause. This is a universal proposition, and is regarded as a first truth. It is a self-evident proposition, carrying with it its own evidence. It is a necessary truth ; we see that it not only is true, but that it cannot be untrue; no one ever expects to find an example in which it is not true. It is a universal truth; all men accept it ae true, and act upon it even before they have formally stated it THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. 343 to their minds. The little child, as well as the philosopher, makes inquiries in respect to the causes of things. By it we in- terpret the facts around us, run back into the past for a solution of enigmas, and predict the future from the influences we see around us. It is found in the thought of every people, in the structure of every language, and controls the actions of the world. Origin of the Laiv. The law of causation is not the result of observation, for no one ever saw every event and every cause. It is not an induction from particular cases of cause and effect presented by experience or consciousness, for no combination of particular cases can give the irresistible belief that every event must have a cause. Induction can give only contingent truths, and the law is not a contingent truth which may be true and which we are willing to believe until we can find an exception to it. The law is not only known to be true, but it is known to be true without the possibility of an exception to it. Neither can it be, as has been claimed, the result of our expectation founded upon a customary experience, for the customary can never reach the certainty of the necessary. It cannot, therefore, be a general- ization from facts in any way, for no multiplication of cases will stamp that which is contingent with the seal of necessity and uni- versality. No combination of observed contingencies w r ill trans- form themselves into a necessity. Given by Intuition. The law of causation is the product of intuition. It is to be regarded as a primary truth given by the reason. Given sensible experience as an occasion, and this truth springs up in the mind, and is known as self-evident and immu- table. It is not merely a law of thought which we impose upon our observation of phenomena, but is seen to be a correct cog- nition of the actual relation of the facts and phenomena of the universe. It is one of the grand conceptions of that rational nature which stands above and regulates the activities of all the other faculties of the mind. Nature of Cause. The idea of cause is more complicated 344 MENTAL SCIENCE. than at first sight appears. First, we notice a distinction between the cause of an event and the condition of the cause producing the event. A hammer strikes a stone and fractures it ; if it were not for the brittleness of the stone, the effect would not be pro- duced; hence the brittleness of the stone is a condition of the event. These conditions are often regarded as a part of the com- plex cause. Thus Mill says, " The real cause is the whole of the antecedents (or conditions), and we have, philosophically speak- ing, no right to give the name of cause to one of them exclusively of the others." And Hamilton says, "Every effect is only pro- duced by the concurrence of at least two causes (and by cause, be it observed, I mean everything without which the effect could not be realized)." While there is much truth in these remarks, it seems to us that we can distinguish between a cause and a con- dition. Cause Often Complex. The cause of an effect is, however, often complex, involving several distinct elements, each of which may be regarded as a cause. Aristotle and the schoolmen divided causes into four classes; efficient, material, formal, and final causes. To illustrate, a completed work implies four things ; an agent by whom it is done, the material of which it is formed, the plan or idea after which it is fashioned, and the end for which it was formed. Thus, in the production of a statue, there must- be an artist, a block of marble, an ideal or plan in the mind of the artist, and a motive for the execution of the work. These four elements correspond to the four causes; efficient, material, formal, and final. Among these four causes, Aristotle seems to have regarded the final cause as the highest. The discussion of this subject is of the deepest interest; it is a discussion, however, which the limits of this work preclude. Other Ideas. There are several other ideas of the Reason that are regarded as intuitions of the True, as Number, Equality, Being, Substance, Infinity, etc., but the four previously named are all that our limits will allow us to discuss. CHAPTER III. THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. THE BEAUTIFUL is one of the most interesting ideas of the Reason. It is also not only an idea, but is regarded as having an objective existence, and as thus being an element of the objective world. It is this element that gives rise to the arts of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, etc., which we distinguish as the Fine Arts. Its laws have been investigated, and efforts have been made to develop a science of the Beautiful. The science of the Beautiful is known as ^Esthetics. Definition. No definition of Beauty has yet been given which has been universally accepted as satisfactory. The ele- ment of Beauty is so delicate, its manifestations are so various, and its spirit is so coy and elusive, that it is difficult, if not im- possible, to discover in what the Beautiful consists. It is not difficult to name a property of a single object which makes it beautiful ; but to point out what one quality there is common to a beautiful flower, statue, strain of music, and line of poetry, has been found to task the powers of the wisest philosophers. It is the aim of philosophy, however, to find the one element in dif- ferent objects that renders them beautiful, such a discovery being necessary for the solution of the aesthetic problem. Theories of Beauty. The various theories of the beautiful may be reduced to two general classes : first, those which regard beauty as subjective, having its source and existence in the mind ; and second, those which regard it as objective, having a real ex- istence in or in connection with objects. The principal subjective theories are those of Sensation, Association, and Symbolism. The principal objective theories are those of Utility, Order and 15* (345) 346 MENTAL SCIENCE. Proportion, Unity and Variety, and Expression, or the Spiritual Theory. Some philosophers hold that " the source of beauty is not to be sought in any single quality, but in a circle of effects ;" and they attempt to point out the different circumstances and peculiarities which give rise to the emotion of beauty. I. THE SUBJECTIVE THEORIES. The subjective theories make beauty consist, not in the object, but in ourselves as perceiving the object. Its seat and source is within us, and not without us. Beauty is not any quality of the object, but only a feeling which springs up in our minds, and which we learn to associate with the object. Each of the three principal subjective theories will be briefly noticed. Theory of Sensation. Many writers on philosophy make beauty a mere sensation. Objects awaken certain feelings; these feelings are peculiarly agreeable, and we come to distinguish them from other feelings by the term beautiful. Mackenzie de- fines beauty as " a certain degree of a certain species of pleasur- able effect impressed upon the mind." Alexander Bain remarks that " the aesthetic emotions are a class of pleasant feelings sought to be gratified by the compositions of fine art." Many other writers speak of beauty as a feeling, and seem to teach that beauty has no existence except as a sensation or an emotion. They point out the characteristics of objects which give rise to the feel- ing, but regard them, not as elements of beauty, but merely as the circumstances which produce the feeling of beauty. Theory of Association. Several writers make beauty con- sist in the association of idea and feeling with the external object. Matter and mind are so related that certain peculiarities of the former awaken certain feelings in the latter. These feelings, which we distinguish by the term beautiful, we begin to transfer to and associate with the objects, and thus acquire the habit of speaking of the objects as beautiful. Thus Lord Jeffrey says that " beauty is the reflection of our own inward sensations," and that objects are called beautiful "merely because they all possess the power of recalling or reflecting these emotions." THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 347 TJieory of Symbolism. Another theory is that the beauty of objects consists in their being the sign or symbol of pleasing ideas or emotions. It is held that beauty is not in the object, but that the sensible appearance may, from association with or some occult relation to sensations or affections, become the sign of them, suggesting them to the mind. Thus the violet is the symbol of modesty, the lily of purity, the wild rose of simplicity, the oak of strength, the willow of sorrow and affliction, and this power of symbolizing these ideas and feelings constitutes their beauty. This theory was held and very fully developed by Alison, and it was also the view of Reid, and several of the Ger- man philosophers. It makes beauty subjective, having its origin in mind rather than existing in matter. Objection to Tliese Theories. All these theories, in making beauty subjective, make it purely relative. They assume that beauty has no existence in itself, either in mind or in matter, but grows out of their relation to each other. Beauty is a mere phenomenon resulting from the contact of mind and matter, just as the spark which flies from the smitten steel arises from the contact of the two, and is not to be regarded as the property of .either. Beauty has no existence except as a resultant, as the spark has no existence when the two elements are not in that contact which elicits it. These theories destroy the actual ex- istence of beauty in the objects of nature and art. If beauty has its source in the mind, then when the mind is withdrawn from an object, it is no longer beautiful. A sunset is beautiful when seen, and not beautiful when not seen. The same object is beautiful to one person who is looking at it, and not beautiful to another person who does not see it, that is, an object is beautiful and not beautiful at the same time ! The conclusion to which this theory leads shows its incorrectness. II. OBJECTIVE THEORIES. There is another class of theories with respect to the beautiful that regard it as having an inde- pendent objective existence distinct from the mind perceiving or enjoying it. These are called the objective theories of beauty. 348 MENTAL SCIENCE. The principal of these objective theories are those of Utility, Order and Proportion, Unity and Variety, and the Spiritual Theory. Theory of Utility. It has been held by some writers that the fundamental principle of beauty is utility. We perceive in the object an adaptation of parts to accomplish some practical purpose, and are thus pleased with it. Thus a watch is an object of beauty because the parts are so arranged as to obtain the end of keeping time. When this principle of utility conduces in some way to our own personal welfare, the emotion is deeper and the beauty is enhanced. This theory was held by Galen, Mar- montel, and apparently by Hume. Reasons for the Theory. It may be urged in favor of this theory that the perception of utility in an object heightens our appreciation of it. Many objects to which we were indifferent, when their use or adaptation to some beneficial purpose becomes known to us, are at once clothed with an interest and robed with an attraction for us. A story with a moral whose influence tends to purify the taste and improve the character, awakens a deeper interest and commands more admiration than one without such an element. Besides, the contemplation of beautiful objects re- fines the taste and elevates the sentiments, and is thus useful ; and inverting this fact, it may be inferred that the useful is the beau- tiful. Objections to the Theory. The useful is, however, not the beau- tiful. Were this so, the most useful things would be the most beautiful, and this is far from being true. The water in a canal is more useful than the same water dashing down the mountain side in a silvery cascade, but it is far less beautiful. Many things very useful possess no element of beauty. Thus, to use Burke's illustration, the wedge-like snout of the swine, with its tough car- tilage for rooting and digging, is very useful, but no one would become very enthusiastic in praise of its beauty. Further, the emotion of beauty and the feeling of pleasure ex- cited by the useful, are entirely dissimilar. One is pure admir- THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 349 ation, connected, it may be, with our selfish nature ; the other is a gentle, peaceful feeling, with a character purely its own. Con- sciousness reveals a difference, in both the cognition and the feel- ing of beauty and utility ; and its decisions are final. Again, to say that beauty consists in utility, because the beautiful may be of advantage to us, is to invert the true relation, and affirm that the cause consists in the effect. Order and Proportion. Another theory places the element of beauty in order and proportion. By order is meant the ar- rangement of the parts of an object; by proportion is meant the relation of the several parts to one another. The theory holds that the secret principle of beauty consists in the arrangement of the parts of a composite body in"brder and proportion. A flower is beautiful because its sepals, petals, etc., are all orderly and symmetrical ; and the same thing gives attraction to the human face. To put the branches of a tree all on one side, or the eye of a man in the back of his head, or his ears at his heels, would destroy the order and proportion, and thus destroy the beauty of these objects. This was the theory of Augustine, and seems to be very nearly the theory held by Aristotle. Reasons for the Theory. In favor of the theory, it may be said that all objects which are beautiful, seem to possess this element of order and proportion; and all objects which lack it are de- ficient in beauty. A work of art lacking order and proportion in the arrangement of its parts, so far lacks the element of beauty. Several writers, as Hogarth and Kames, seem to resolve order and proportion into fitness or propriety, the proportion of the parts being determined by the purpose of the whole. Thus, in the contemplation of any object that pleases us, our admiration is increased when we discover a fitness in its parts in relation to themselves and the whole; and whenever there is a perception of unfitness or want of propriety, there is a diminution of beauty. Objections to the Theory. That this principle enters into many beautiful objects must be admitted ; that it is the essence of beauty is doubted. If beauty consisted in order and proportion. 350 MENTAL SCIENCE. then the more of this element we find in an object the greater its beauty; but this is not always so. There is as much order and proportion in a sunflower as in a rose or lily ; but no one will claim that their beauty is the same. Two specimens of archi- tecture, two statues or paintings, may be equal in order and pro- portion, and differ widely in the degree of beauty. There seems to be some subtle, invisible element that lies below and is different from order and proportion, that gives to an object that mysterious element which we call beauty. Unity and Variety. Another theory of beauty is that of unity and variety. It holds that the beautiful consists in a number of parts or attributes arranged in accordance with some definite idea or principle. Unity alone is not beautiful, as a single tone in music or the same color in a painting; but unite variety with it and we have beauty. Variety alone is not beau- tiful, as in the disarranged parts of a picture or a series of dis- connected notes in music ; but give us unity with it and the beautiful appears. The manifold, united by some principle into a unity of thought or design, produces the beautiful. In a picture or a poem, there is found a variety of parts or incidents arranged about some leading plan or idea, and this is supposed to give it its beauty. This theory was distinctly announced by Hutcheson, and has been accepted by several subsequent writers. Hegel teaches that the form in which beauty manifests itself is the " unity of the manifold." Another statement of the theory is that beauty consists in unity of law and variety of expression. Reasons for the Theory. In favor of this theory it may be said that objects which we call beautiful possess this element. It is especially apparent among the geometrical figures. Among the plane figures, the regular polygon is more beautiful than the ir- regular polygon, because there is more of unity in the variety ; and the circle is more beautiful than the regular polygon, since in it there is perfect unity of law and perfect variety of expression. The same holds good among the solid bodies, the sphere, possess- ing perfect unity in variety, being the most beautiful. In a THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 351 painting, while there must be variety of object and color, in order to please, they must all be arranged with reference to some lead- ing thought or purpose. So in music, while there must be variety of tones, there must also be a unity of idea or sentiment running all through the piece in order to gratify the taste and give real enjoyment. Hogarth's line of beauty and line of grace both illustrate and serve to authenticate this theory. Objections to the Theory. It may be objected to this theory, first, that not everything which possesses unity and variety is beautiful ; and also that the beauty of objects is not always pro- portional to the amount of unity and variety in them. Second, a few objects are regarded as beautiful which do not possess variety, as a single color, say blue or orange. Third, a few objects are regarded as beautiful which do not possess unity, as a gorgeous sunset, in which the golden tints are not grouped ac- cording to any one idea or plan. It must be acknowledged, how- ever, that the objections are not very strong, and that there are many good reasons for regarding unity and variety as the law of the expression of beauty, if not its fundamental principle. The Spiritual Theory. Another theory makes beauty to consist in the manifestation or expression of the invisible spiritual element under sensible forms. There are two distinct elements in the world, the visible and the invisible, the form and the idea, matter and spirit. Beauty consists not in matter alone, nor in spirit alone, but in the union of these elements in such a way that the latter expresses the former. When these are united in such a manner that the material manifests the spiritual, the form ex- presses the idea, the visible reveals the invisible, our own spir- itual nature meeting itself in what it sees, is touched and thrilled, and the soul recognizes itself as standing in the presence of the beautiful. Dr. Hickok says the beautiful consists of the dead form " quickened by the presence of an inner spirit," of the empty figure filled " with a beating heart and a glowing soul." Origin of the Theory. This theory was first suggested by Plato and has been adopted by many subsequent writers. Hegel re- 352 MENTAL SCIENCE. gards beauty as the shining of the idea through a sensuous medium. Ruskin's typical beauty consists of qualities of objects typifying a divine attribute. There is Infinity, the type of the divine incomprehensibility; Unity, the type of the divine com- prehensibility ; Repose, the type of the divine permanence; Symmetry, the type of the divine justice; Purity, the type of the divine energy; Moderation, the type of government by law. In Inorganic Forms. According to this theory, the beauty of objects of the inorganic world consists in their manifesting some spiritual principle or some element relating to the mind. In the regular forms of the crystal we see the idea of law and order ; the regularity of the angles suggests the mathematical thought of him who formed it; and the beautiful gem, flashing with liquid light, seems to be a shrine of grace, delicacy, refinement, and purity, and is admirable to us as it discloses these hidden charms to our admiring souls. In Organic Forms. The beauty of the organic world, vege- table and animal, consists in the revelation of some thought or sentiment that pervades them and shines out from them. Thus the violet expresses the idea of modesty, the lily of purity, the oak of majesty ; and it is such an idea or sentiment shining out from them that gives them their beauty. So in the animal kingdom, the dove expresses affection, the horse strength and agility, the eagle soaring ambition, the tiger grace united with power, the lion dignity and courage; and it is the expression of these elements that gives beauty. Man crowns the sphere of or- ganic beauty because he manifests most fully all the various forms of thought and feeling. Beauty in Man. Man is a complex being, consisting of soul and body. In man's body we have the marvellous expression of the Creator's thought ; and he is himself, in his spiritual nature, a centre and source of thought. As an organic being, he has or- ganic beauty of the highest order ; but no mere flush and fullness of physical life can account for the beauty of the human race. It is the soul life shining out through the form and features and THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 353 actions that gives man his highest beauty. Through the complex and varied organ, the human face, and through thought, feeling, and action, which constitute human conduct and evince human character, we find the highest manifestation of a spiritual ele- ment ; and it is this which places man at the head of all beautiful objects. Of all visible objects, the human face stands first in the productions of art ; and the grandest products of genius are those that pertain to human conduct and character. The highest form of beauty in man is where the three-fold powers of thought, feeling, and will are blended into one grand purpose in life. It is not truth merely latent in thought, but truth patent in char- acter ; it is truth passing down from the intellect into the heart, and through the heart into the will, and all uniting in that grand spiritual product called character, that crowns man with the diadem of highest earthly beauty. MeniarJcs on the Theory. The spiritual theory is the most elevated of all the theories of the beautiful. It is distinctly held by many of the profoundest thinkers in philosophy ; and the highest thought of philosophy and art tends toward this doctrine. That it contains much truth must be admitted ; whether it con- tains the whole truth is a question. It cannot be forgotten that the beauty of flowers, as of the violet or rose, is perceived long before there is any idea of the conception which they express, and that the beauty of animals is not in proportion to their in- telligence, or else the monkey would be far more beautifu-1 than the gazelle. As the result of the highest philosophy, however, we may say that beauty consists in the expression of the spiritual under the form of the sensible; and that the form in which it usually presents itself is that of unity and variety. II. THE SUBLIME. I. THE NATURE OF SUBLIMITY. The Sublime is an intuitive idea closely related to that of beauty, and is usually treated under the Beautiful. In an enlarged sense of the term, the Beautiful includes both beauty proper and sublimity. In popular language. MENTAL SCIENCE. however, we distinguish between the beautiful and the sublime. They are both embraced under the head of aesthetic ideas. Idea and Emotion. The sublime embraces both an idea and an emotion ; and the same term is used to name them both. The emotion of sublimity is deep and serious in its nature ; in it the mind is agitated, awed, subdued, and elevated. The feeling of sublimity, like that of beauty, is more prominent than the idea; and some writers have thus regarded sublimity as an emotion rather than an idea. This, however, is an error; as there must be some cognition of sublimity in an object, or there would be no feeling awakened by it. It is easier to describe the feeling than to discover what attribute is contained in the object that awakens the feeling; and thus the idea and attribute are often overlooked in the discussion. Theories of Sublimity The nature of sublimity, like that of beauty, is difficult of explanation. It is easy to point out attributes and peculiarities of different objects that give rise to the emotion of sublimity ; but it is not easy to discover what one element is contained in objects that renders them sublime. One class of thinkers hold that there is no one element, or at least that no one element can be discovered in objects; the highest philosophy, however, has ever sought to discover the one fun- damental principle of sublimity amid the variety of sublime objects. The two explanations that are most satisfactory are those founded on the two principal theories of beauty ; the spir- itual theory and the theory of unity and variety. The Spiritual Theory. The spiritual theory makes the beautiful and sublime both consist in the manifestation of the invisible or spiritual element in the visible and material. It dis- tinguishes them by the relative proportion of these two elements in the object. In the beautiful, the visible and the invisible, the finite and the infinite, are harmoniously blended. In the sublime the spiritual element predominates, the harmony is disturbed, the sensible is overborne by the supersensible, and our spirits are agitated by the presence, in an unwonted degree, of the higher THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 355 element of our being. The feeling raised by one is calm and peaceful ; the other awes and subdues the soul. Dr. Hickok says, " When the disclosed sentiment is that of a superhuman spirit, and we stand awestruck in the presence of an angel or a divinity, the beauty rises proportionally and elevates itself to the sublime" Unity and Variety . The nature of the sublime may also be explained by the theory of unity and variety. In a sublime object, the unity and variety are enlarged and intensified. They seem to be transcending the limits of the understanding, so that the mind is unable to estimate or fully grasp the object. As long as the unity and variety are measurable, the mind remains quiet and composed ; but when it is sensible that these are escap- ing it, are overwhelming it, that it is in the midst of the immeas- urable and the infinite, the object ceases to be beautiful, and becomes sublime. Thus a lake or a river is beautiful, for we seem to be able to grasp their magnitude ; but the ocean, stretch- ing far away until the mind falters and is bewildered in the pur- suit, is sublime. The Correct Conception. This last explanation hints at the true nature of sublimity. The fundamental element of sublimity seems to be that of infinity, or an approximation to infinitude. Whatever passes beyond the bounds of the finite, or awakens the cognition of the infinite, that is to us sublime. The idea of space unlimited in every direction, of time without beginning or end, of a first cause uncaused, of the immeasurable extent of creation, all these make the soul swell with the sentiment of sublimity. So anything that approximates to these ideas, or that awakens the idea of the infinite, tends to awaken a similar feel- ing in the mind, and is thus regarded as sublime. II. ELEMENTS OF SUBLIMITY. This element of infinity, or the N approximation of the infinite, manifests itself in a variety of ways. It appears in Form, in the element of Vastness ; in Force, in the element of Power ; in Sounds, in the element of Loudness. The principal elements of the sublime are thus Vastness, Power, and 356 MENTAL SCIENCE. Loudness. All of these may approximate to the infinite, or sug- gest the infinite to the mind, and are thus elements of sublimity. Vastness. Extension far beyond the ordinary limits suggests to the mind the idea of infinity, and gives that expansion to the soul which awakens the emotion of sublimity. The wide-spread- ing ocean, the liquid depths of the overarching sky, the abyss of space filled with countless worlds, endless numbers and eternal duration all these are sublime objects. Extension in a vertical direction is more sublime than the same extension in a horizontal direction; Mont Blanc, with its snowy brow in the heavens, is more sublime than if the same extent of rock and snow were stretched out on the surface of the earth. The reason for this is that extent upward exceeds our accustomed measures of altitude more than the same extent would exceed our measure of hori- zontal distance, and thus approximates more nearly to infinity. Obscurity. Obscurity is also an element of the sublime. This is due to the indistinctness of outline, rendering it impossi- ble for us to limit the size of the object, and thus the size is ex- aggerated and is suggestive of the idea of infinitude. For this reason, objects at night, when their forms, clothed with shadow, merge in the darkness and are not grasped by the mind, seem larger than they do by day, and thus more sublime. There is also sometimes an element of awe and terror associated with them that adds to the element of sublimity. The description of a spirit appearing in the silence and darkness of night, as given in Job, is a fine example of sublimity. Great Power. Vast power is also an element of sublimity, as it is suggestive of infinite power. The ordinary forces of nature or art do not possess the element of sublimity ; but when we notice forces that largely transcend these ordinary forces, the idea and emotion of sublimity are awakened. Thus a thunder- storm, the rushing cataract, the heaving earthquake, the belchiug volcano, a storm at sea, cause the soul to swell with the feelings of sublimity. The presence of great power accounts for the feel- ing of sublimity awakened by some of the animals, as the lion, THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 357 the ponderous elephant, the war-horse with his neck clothed with thunder. Among the works of art, we have the vast engine with its noiseless motions, the rushing, thundering locomotive, and the majestic steamer ploughing the billows of the deep. The de- scription of the war-horse in the book of Job is a fine example of this element in literature. Great Loudness. An unusual loudness in sound gives rise to the idea and emotion of sublimity, on account of its suggesting infinite vastness or power. Thus the deep bass of the organ, the crashing of thunder, the roar of the cataract, the booming of cannon, the roar of a multitude of voices, are examples of the sublime in sound. John's description in Revelation of the voices in heaven, " And I heard as it were the voice of a great multi- tude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluia; for the Lord God Omnipotent reigiieth," is a fine example of the sublime in sound. Grandeur and Sublimity. Some writers distinguish be- tween grandeur and sublimity; the difference, however, is not generic, but merely one of degree. Grandeur is a lower form, or less degree of sublimity. It is, as it were, a transition point between the beautiful and the sublime. The peacefully flowing river- is beautiful ; as it gathers impulse and purpose and rushes on in rapids, it is grand ; when shivered and Avild with motion it leaps the cataract in eager masses, it is sublime. "A character shaped upon truth is beautiful; standing upon truth amid the violence of enemies, is grand; adhering to truth amid the de- rision of friends and in defiance of the rack and fagot, is sub- lime." The Sublime and Beautiful. The sublime and beautiful, when associated in nature and art, make the deepest impressions on the mind. A Swiss valley nestling among the hills, with a silvery stream winding through it, is beautiful; the snow-clad mountains that, serene and majestic, tower heavenward and bathe their brows in the blue ether above, are sublime ; and the two united, as at Chamouni, form such a combination of blended 358 MENTAL SCIENCE. oeauty and sublimity as moves the soul with deepest feelings of pleasure. Niagara is both beautiful and sublime. The emer- ald hue of the flowing river, the roar of the plunging water, the mist rising in fleecy clouds toward the zenith, the rainbow arch quivering in the rising mist and crowning the scene with a diadem of color, both thrill and awe the human soul. In such a combination, the beauty tempers and adorns the sublimity ; and the sublimity dignifies and ennobles the beauty. This is illus- trated in the sunrise flashing along the summit of the Alps, in the eloquent orations of Chatham and Webster, in the great epics of Homer and Milton, and in the grand oratorios of Handel and the sublime symphonies of Beethoven. Moral Sublimity. There is also an element of sublimity in human actions and character. Actions which in greatness and nobility far transcend those to which we are accustomed, awaken the idea and emotion of sublimity. Newton's discovery of the law of gravity, La Place's comprehension of all the laws of me- chanics in a single equation, Napoleon's victories over the Aus- trians, are examples of intellectual sublimity. Brutus trampling on his natural affections and condemning his sons to death, Vir- ginius stabbing his own daughter to save her honor, Regulus refusing to break his promise and going back to be put to death by the Carthaginians, Socrates calmly discussing philosophy dur- ing the closing hours of his life, are examples of the sublime in character. The sublimest scene of all is the death of Jesus on Calvary, with the dying utterances, " Father, forgive them," and " It is finished." Truly could Rousseau say that " Socrates died like a hero ; but Jesus Christ like a God." III. THE LUDICROUS. I. NATURE OF THE IDEA. The Ludicrous is closely related to the Beautiful. A general notion of their relation is expressed when we say that they are in a certain sense the opposite of each other- Thus, the leading idea of the beautiful is harmony and propor- tion ; while the leading element of the ludicrous is disproportion THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 859 and a lack of harmony. The one pleases on account of the har- monious relation of the several parts ; the other pleases on ac- count of some incongruity in the parts related. As ideas they are both embraced under the general head of aesthetic conceptions. The Ludicrous an Idea. It has been customary to regard the ludicrous merely as an emotion, and not as an idea. This, however, we regard as an error. Whenever we look at certain objects, we are aware of an agreeable feeling which manifests itself in smiles or laughter. This feeling we call the emotion of the ludicrous. As the basis of this feeling, there must have been some conception, some cognition of an element in the object, which awakened the emotion. Without a cognition of the ludicrous, there could be no feeling of the ludicrous ; we there- fore maintain that the ludicrous is an idea, as well as an emotion, and should be treated under the Intellect rather than the Sensi- bilities. A national Idea. This idea of the ludicrous is a rational idea ; it is, like the beautiful and sublime, a cognition of our higher intuitive power. As in the case of the other rational ideas, the brute shows no conception of it ; no animal except man ever laughs at the incongruous or manifests any enjoyment of it. The idiot and the uncultivated savage have very little apprecia- tion of this element ; and the uncultured person less than the cul- tured. The higher the scale of civilization and culture, the more sensitive is the mind to this idea of the ludicrous. It is thus a rational idea, an idea that belongs to our higher intellectual nature, and has its place along with the ideas of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The Emotion. The idea of the ludicrous is always accom- panied with an emotion of the ludicrous. This emotion is a species of joy or gladness, a pleasurable excitement of feeling that manifests itself in a joyousness of heart and a smiling face. It wreathes the face with smiles, causes the** eyes to sparkle with delight, and often breaks out into that strong physical expression 360 MENTAL SCIENCE. which we call laughter. The emotion is often so strong as to conceal or eclipse the idea, so that many writers overlook the conception and treat the ludicrous merely as an emotion. Origin of the Idea. The idea of the ludicrous, as has al- ready been stated, is intuitive, it is a product of the reason. It arises in the mind on- the occasion of sensible experience. I look at an object or listen to a story ; I see the object and hear the words ; but by the eye of intuition I perceive some peculiarity which awakens an emotion that expresses itself in a smile or a laugh. The -physical eye does not see it, the ear does not hear it ; but, as with the Bight and the Beautiful, there is an immediate perception by the Reason of some element which gives rise to this peculiar feeling of gladness and buoyancy of spirit. II. NATURE OF THE LUDICROUS. The nature of the ludicrous, like that of the beautiful and right, is a subject that has puzzled philosophy. The question is, what is that one principle that per- vades all objects, which awakens the idea and emotion of the ludicrous ? A few of the different theories will be presented. Theory of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded Comedy, which is the expression of the ludicrous, as an illustration of worthless characters in relation to what is mean, when it is not so to a painful degree. Quintilian thinks that "A saying that causes laughter is generally based on false reasoning (some play of words), has always something low in it ; . . .is never honorable to the subject." Campbell mentions " that laughter is associated with the perception of oddity, and not necessarily with degrada- tion or contempt." Kant makes the ridiculous arise from the suddftn collapse of a long-raised and highly-wrought expectation. Theory of Hobbes. The celebrated theory of Hobbes is that " Laughter is a sudden glory arising from the sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others or with our own formerly." In other words, as Bain remarks, it is an expression of "the pleasurable feeling of superior power." The person who laughs is for the time supposed to be superior to that at which he laughs. Thus we laugh at THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 361 some defect of body, mind, or manner ; some blunder, or awkward- ness, or lack of sharpness or courage, etc., feeling above and looking down upon the person who exhibits them. In reply to this theory, it is sufficient to say that we do not always laugh at what is inferior to us, that we often laugh at what is not inferior to us, and that the proud and haughty, who most look down on inferiors, do not laugh most. The True Tlieory. The essential element of the ludicrous seems to me to be the incongruous. Whatever the object may be at which we laugh, it will always be found to contain the ele- ment of incongruity. For example, a face awry, a fly on the end of one's nose, an awkward attitude, a pompous manner, a big hat on a small person, big words in describing little things, a pig in a church, an old deacon nodding during the sermon, all such things contain an element of incongruity, and are, for this reason, laughable. Should we see a perfumed dandy, tripping along Broadway, suddenly slip and fall sprawling into the mud, we should laugh ; a dandy floundering in the mud is certainly an incongruous spectacle. Incongruity the Element. This element of incongruity is often accompanied with some accessories that increase the in- fluence of a humorous object ; but whatever else is wanting, this element of the incongruous must always be present. No object is humorous without it ; and every object that is humorous pos- sesses it. In nature or art, in objects or ideas, whatever causes us to laugh, will be found to lack some congruity or harmony or relation among the parts. Not everything that is incongruous is ludicrous, however, for there may be some other element that counteracts the natural effect of the incongruous, such as pity, fright, etc. In these cases the greater emotion overpowers the lighter and destroys the effect of the incongruous. But all things which awaken an emotion of the ludicrous will be found to contain this element of disproportion and incongruity. Incongruity in Conditions. This element of incongruity is seen in a variety of objects. One form is that of the incon- 16 362 MENTAL SCIENCE. gruity of conditions. Thus the incongruity between the inten- tional condition of the dandy and his actual condition in the mud, is a source of the mirthful feeling. A person who prides himself on his knowledge and is pompous in its display, becomes an object of laughter when he makes a blunder. A lady who puts on fine airs and pretends to polite accomplishments makes herself very ridiculous when her manners are coarse and her language unrefined and ungrammatical. The ignorant servant girl imitating the airs and manners of her mistress is a subject for laughter. Similar and Dissimilar. The incongruous manifests itself when amid the diversity there is an apparent similarity. Thus the humor in a pun is occasioned by the diversity of thought combined with the similarity of sound. This is seen also in the example of the Irish girl, who, when she brought a glass of water in her hand, was told by her master to bring things on a waiter, and next day brought in his boots on a waiter. This was John- son's idea of wit, when he defined it as "a kind of concordia diseors, a combination of dissimilar images." Campbell also ex- pressed this same idea in his "strange assemblage of related images." The humorous is thus a similarity in dissimilarity, or a dissimilarity in similarity ; it is a kind of discordant harmony, a disagreeing agreement, an appropriate impropriety, etc. Design and Execution. The incongruous frequently mani- fests itself in the incongruity between purpose and execution. The person who aims at great nicety of speech and misses the mark, is naturally laughed at. The lady who, trying to make a show of her fine clothes, gets some of her garments awry, becomes an example of the ridiculous. Biddy's bringing in the boots on the waiter is the more laughable, because she thought she was doing what her master ordered. The little insect on the lady's hat which gave occasion to the poem, "0 wad some power the giftie gie us," was much more ludicrous to the poet on account of the fine clothes and fashionable bonnet of Miss Jenny, than if it had been on " some poor body." THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 363 Element of Surprise, The element of surprise increases the effect of the ludicrous. The unexpectedness of the joke makes it more effective than if we knew what was coming. That which flashes on the mind, which comes with a little shock to it, pro- duces the deeper effect. The quick repartee, the flash of a sudden witticism, the bubbling up of a humorous expression, these are the most pleasing to us. The tardy repartee, the witticism that is studied out, are much less effective than the quick and spon- taneous flash of wit. The knowledge that Sheridan had studied out and prepared his wit would have largely detracted from its effect. Wit is like champagne, lively, fresh, and sparkling, which loses its flavor and life when brought to the air. Surprise is not an essential element of the ludicrous, however ; for all things which surprise us are not funny. We are sur- prised at the loss of a friend, but it is not at all humorous. The sudden fall of a window by which we are sitting makes us jump, but does not make us laugh. My friend laughs at me because I jump, for he sees the incongruity between my fright and the in- significance of the cause. Element of Novelty. The element of novelty increases the effect of the ludicrous. The unexpectedness of a joke or a humorous remark causes it to produce a deeper impression on the mind. Familiarity with a witticism makes it lose its flavor; a humorous story repeated several times loses its freshness and zest, and at last becomes stale and intolerable. Wit and humor do not depend on novelty, however. The new is not necessarily funny. A new object, a new book, a new picture, etc., do not awaken feelings of mirthfulness. Novelty is merely an added element to the humorous, as it is to beauty, though it is more essential to humor than it is to beauty. III. FORMS OP THE LUDICROUS. The ludicrous manifests itself in various forms. It is found in both objects and ideas; and in either case the incongruous relation may be accidental or inten- tional. Certain forms of the accidental grouping of objects or ideas constitute what is called the blunder or bull. The in con- 364 MENTAL SCIENCE. gruous relation of ideas gives us the two distinct forms, called wit and humor. Ludicrous in Objects. The incongruous relation of objects is often amusing. A very long nose, a grimace, some odd ar- rangement of the hair, some disarrangement of the dress, etc., will excite laughter. This may be the result of accident, as with the dandy slipping into the mud, and the lady with the insect on her bonnet. Objects may also be brought into incongruous relations intentionally, giving us two forms of the ludicrous. Thus a person may imitate the peculiarities and oddities of some indi- vidual, giving rise to what is called buffoonery; or he may play off his joke at his own expense for the amusement of others, in which case we have the clown. The Blunder. The accidental grouping of incongruous ideas gives us what is called the blunder or bull. This is the special form known as Irish wit. Its characteristic is that there is some inconsistency between the thing said and done and the thing meant. There is an apparent congruity in the things related, but a real incongruity. Swift gives a good illustration of this form of humor in the story of the people who, becoming angry at a banker, threatened to burn the notes of his bank, not thinking that it would make them poorer and him richer. A story is told of an Irishman whose face was blackened before being wakened to start on his early journey, and who reaching the next hotel looked in the glass and seeing his plight, exclaimed, "Shure they 've waked the wrong man and left me ten miles behind." Two Irishmen, walking on the road leading from Newburgh, came upon an old milestone, when one of them, supposing it to be a tombstone, said, " Tread lightly, Jamie, the dead rest here ; he was twenty-seven years old, and his name was Miles, from Newburgh." Wendell Phillips gives a good example of this kind of humor when, in showing that we have borrowed our jokes from the ancients, he says that "the Irish bulls are mostly Greek." Wit and Humor. Two forms of the humorous in ideas, THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 365 often contrasted, are those of wit and humor. It is difficult to state clearly the distinction between them, though the difference is easily appreciated. "Wit is bright and sparkling; humor is .soft, gentle, and glowing. Wit has an air of smartness and sharpness; humor is modest and kindly in its nature. The former may be compared to the quick spark of the Leyden jar ; the latter to the soft, gentle current of the galvanic battery. Wit is sometimes bitter and malevolent ; humor is always kindly and good-natured. Thackeray, one of the greatest humorists, defines humor to be " a compound of wit and love." " The best humor," he says, " is that which contains the most humanity, that which is flavored throughout with tenderness and kindness." In a literary production, wit should come in only by flashes, while humor may be continued for a long time with enjoyment. As a literary quality, humor is much higher than wit; and, it may be added, is much more rare. The Pun. A form of wit in which dissimilar ideas are re- lated by means of similar words is called the pun. The pun is thus a play upon words ; and is entitled the wit of words. The effect of a pun depends upon the contrast between the two ideas related under cover of a common or similar word; the greater the incongruity between these ideas, the more ludicrous the effect and the more perfect the pun. One of the best puns in the language, perhaps, is that of Hood's in " Faithless Nelly Gray," in which he says, when she died : "They went and told the sexton, And the sexton tolled the bell." The pun is regarded as an inferior kind of wit ; yet a good pun is sometimes very effective. Satire and Sarcasm. Similar to the incongruity of the ideas of words, is the incongruity between the thought expressed and intended, where one thing is said and another thing is meant. This includes the bull, in which the incongruity is accidental, and two other forms, satire and sarcasm, in which the incongruity is intentional. Satire is that form in which, under the guise of 366 MENTAL SCIENCE. apparent praise, are hidden the arrows of ridicule and criticism. In sarcasm the censure is stronger and more bitter, and the form is more direct and less hidden. Satire pierces Avith a polished rapier ; sarcasm cuts with a rough-edged sword. Burlesque. When the incongruity consists in the debasing of what is great and noble, by representing it as mean and con- temptible, we have what is called burlesque. Butler's Hudibras thus ridicules the Puritans of the days of Cromwell ; and Don Quixote is a burlesque on the days of chivalry. The term bur- lesque is also applied to a ludicrous imitation or caricature of some elevated composition. A humorous imitation or application of a poem is called a parody. The Mock-Heroic. When the incongruity consists in ele- vating low and trivial subjects into a dignity by high-sounding epithets, we have what is known as the mock-heroic. It is so called because it burlesques the heroic by imitating the manners or actions of heroes. Pope's "Rape of the Lock" is a good specimen of the mock-heroic. Some parts of Irving's " Knicker- bocker's History of New York " present an excellent example of this form of the humorous. Relation of the ^Esthetic Elements. Having discussed the nature of the three aesthetic elements the beautiful, the sublime, and the ludicrous we are prepared to notice a little more defi- nitely their relation to one another. In beauty there is a har- mony of relations; in sublimity there is a suggestion of the infinite ; in the ludicrous the harmony becomes distorted and the relation is that of the incongruous. In the beautiful, the spiritual and material are harmoniously blended; in the sublime, this harmony is broken by the predominance of the spiritual ; in the humorous, the harmony is also destroyed by the loss of the spiritual element and the predominance of the material. In beauty, there is unity and variety of expression ; in sublimity, the variety is lost in the suggestion of infinity ; in humor, the unity us lost, and the variety exists in disproportion and incongruity. THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 367 IY. THE POWER OF TASTE. The power of the mind which has to do with the element of beauty has received the special name of Taste. This term is so widely used by writers that it will be appropriate to inquire just what we mean by it. Taste has been variously defined by dif- ferent authors ; some making it a mere sensation, some an intel- lectual perception, and others uniting both of these elements in their definition. Thus Blair defines it as " a power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and art." McDermot re- gards it as "the power of discriminating those qualities" in objects which excite in us pleasant emotions. Alison defines it as "that faculty of the mind by which we perceive and enjoy what- ever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature or art." Difficulty of Defining. This variety in the definitions given by different writers on the subject, indicates that it is difficult to determine what is meant by Taste. As we find the term used in literature and philosophy, it is not easy to ascertain just what elements of the mind it is designed to embrace. The difficulty is not in understanding the action of the mind in respect to aesthetic ideas ; but in deciding how many of these actions or states shall be included in the term taste. The question is thus not a purely psychological one, but partly a philological question. The object of this discussion is to ascertain what mental elements are prop- erly included in this word. The Mental Elements. The elements of the mind exercised in the aesthetic attributes of objects are two-fold; an intellectual and an emotional element. First, there is a perception of the sesthetic element ; this is an act of the reason. Second, there is a feeling awakened by this perception ; this is an act of the sensi- bilities. The emotional element is often so strong as to lead us to overlook the intellectual element. Some hold that the emo- tional element precedes and is the basis of the idea ; they say we first experience the emotion of the beautiful, and this emotion leads us to think there is an idea of beauty and a quality in objects called beauty which produces the emotion. This, how- 368 MENTAL SCIEXCE. ever, we regard as incorrect ; the idea is the basis of the feeling, and not the feeling of the idea. The action of the mind, which we have explained above, applies to the element of the sublime and the ludicrous, as well as the beautiful, all of which are aesthetic ideas. What is Taste ? Which of these elements should be included in the term taste f Is taste entirely intellectual, or entirely emo- tional, or is it a combination of these two elements? The correct view, we think, is that taste includes both of these elements; it is both intellectual and emotional in its nature. When we speak of a person's taste, we mean both the power to perceive the beautiful and the power to enjoy the beautiful. A person of good taste is one who can both see and appreciate the aesthetic elements in nature and art. We may thus define taste to be that power by which we perceive and enjoy the (esthetic elements in the objects of nature and art. Under the aesthetic elements, as already explained, we include the beautiful, the sublime, and the ludi- crous. iTsing the word beautiful in its generic sense, as including these three elements, we have the following definition : Taste is that power of the mind by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful in nature and art. Taste Not a Faculty. It is thus seen that taste is not a faculty, but rather a combination of the action of two faculties, or two distinct forms of mental activity. It is thus properly called a power, a term which we use in a more popular sense than the term faculty. A faculty implies a distinct form of mental activity, and is thus simple in its operation. A power may be the combination of distinct operations of two or more faculties. Element of Judgment. It will be noticed that we have not included the element of judgment under the term taste. There seems to be sufficient reason for this. A person manifests his taste by the judgments he expresses on the works of art; but the judgment is not his taste. Taste lies back of and conditions his judgment. Correct judgments show good taste; incorrect judg- ments manifest bad taste. The taste seems to be the subjective THE INTUITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 369 condition of mind which perceives and enjoys, rather than the affirmation or expression of these conditions. Our judgments re- flect our opinions, but are not a part of that condition of the mind which gives rise to and shapes our opinions. Taste is the mental condition or action which directs and moulds our judg- ments of objects of beauty, and does not include the faculty of judgment. Relation of the Elements. The two elements, perception and appreciation, do not always exist in equal proportions. There may be acute sensibilities without a very clear perception of the beautiful, and there will then be intense delight over the beauties that are perceived, but a lack of delicate perception of beauty. Without this perception, many of the objects of art are not regarded as beautiful. The soul may stand in the presence of a statue of Canova or Thorwaldsen, and be unable to see the beauties which it expresses. The cataract of Niagara, which awakens feelings of sublimity in most minds, may seem to some dull soul merely a good place to wash sheep. The simple melody may awaken feelings of beauty in the heart of the peasant who can see no beauty in the sublime choruses of Handel, or the heavenly sonatas of Beethoven. Application of Taste. The power of taste, it is evident, ap- plies to all the aesthetic ideas. The principal sesthetic ideas are the Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Ludicrous ; and all of these are matters of taste. It has been customary to define taste as ap- plied to the beautiful and sublime, omitting the humorous and the witty. This is evidently an error; and one that should be corrected. It needs as much taste to perceive and enjoy the humorous as the beautiful ; and a little better taste would keep some things that are flat and vulgar out of literature. Taste is the sesthetic power, and embraces all of the sesthetic ideas and emotions. Special attention is called to this point as it is new, and one that should be emphasized. Standard of Taste. Man is gifted with a native taste for the beautiful ; he can see and appreciate the divine element of 370 MENTAL SCIENCE. beauty, which the Creator has embodied in the world around him. The divine element in man meets and recognizes a divine element in nature, and comprehends and enjoys it. This natural endowment of taste is cultivated by the contemplation of the works of nature and art, and by a study of the principles or laws of beauty. When thus cultivated, each man becomes a critic of art, and can sit in criticism on the works of the artist. Personal peculiarities of taste allow of slight differences or preferences in art; but there will be a large general agreement among all persons of cultivated minds. If at any time, through personal idiosyncrasies, there seems to be opposition of taste, we appeal to the standard of the opinion of the majority of cultivated persons. CHAPTER IV. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD, OK RIGHT. THE GOOD, or the Right, is the crowning idea of the human soul. The three great rational ideas of the mind are the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. These three ideas rank in an ascending series, the Good or the Right standing at the sum- mit. We shall now enter upon the explanation of this highest and grandest idea. The discussion will include three things; The Nature of the Idea, the Nature of the Right, and the Origin of the Idea. I. NATURE OF THE IDEA. The idea of the Right is a cog- nition in relation to the actions of rational beings. As soon as we contemplate certain actions of a person, we immediately per- ceive that they contain an ethical element ; and we pronounce the act right or wrong accordingly. The action may be actual or contemplated ; it may pertain to the present, past, or future ; it may be the act of a peasant, a warrior, or an emperor. In every case it must be the act of a rational being, for we never apply the idea of right and wrong to the action of a brute animal, or an inanimate object of nature. The Idea Universal. This idea of the Right is universal. That it is so, is attested by the experience and productions of the race. All men make moral distinctions, calling one thing right and another wrong. No people have been found, however sunk in ignorance and moral degradation, that do not make moral dis- tinctions. The languages of all civilized and even of uncivilized peoples, abound in words expressing these distinctions. The lit- erature of the world is filled with incidents and expressions based on this conception ; indeed, the idea of the Right is the inspiring principle of poetry, fiction, and oratory. (871) - 372 MENTAL SCIENCE. Importance of the Idea. The idea of the Right is the most important conception of the human mind. By means of it, society is organized and held together. It is the basis of national life, and the foundation of law and government. Take this idea out of society, and man would sink below the condition of bar- barism j take th,is idea out of national life, and the state would become but a herd of wild animals. It builds our alms-houses, erects our public schools, rears our churches, gives inspiration and beauty to our literature, and in fact is the foundation of everything that gives excellence and dignity to the human race. The Idea of Obligation. There are two ideas that accom- pany or grow out of the idea of the Right ; these are the ideas of obligation and of merit and demerit. The idea of obligation grows immediately out of the idea of the Right. As soon as we have cognized an action as right, we immediately have the cog- nition that it ought to be done ; as soon as we have cognized an action as wrong, there arises the idea that it ought not to be done. These two ideas are what we call the ideas of obligation; they are the ideas of the ought and the ought not. They pertain to our own actions and also to the actions of others. We know we ought to do what we think is right, and ought not to do what we think is wrong. We know also that another ought to do what he thinks is right, and ought not to do what he thinks is wrong. Merit and Demerit. Following the doing or not doing of an act, comes the idea of merit or demerit. When we do what we think is right or refrain from doing what we think is wrong, there arises in our mind the idea of merit. When we do what we know to be wrong, or refrain from doing what we think to be right, there arises the idea of demerit. This idea also pertains to both ourselves and others in relation to moral actions. We condemn ourselves for the neglect or violation of a moral duty ; we censure others for doing wrong or for failing to do right. The entire code of social order and government is based upon this idea. The Ethical Idea Complex. It will thus be seen that the THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 373 ethical idea is a complex one. It embraces three conceptions ; the right and wrong, the obligation to do the right and not do the wrong, and the merit or demerit of the doer of the actions. The ethical idea is thus a triune conception, a " three in one." In this respect, the idea of the Right differs from that of Beauty, Space, Time, or any other of the rational ideas. The Right a Reality. The Right is not merely an idea ; it is also a reality. There is a real right in actions, corresponding to our idea of the right. An action is not right or wrong merely because we think it to be so ; we think it to be right or wrong because it is so. The right and wrong are realities ; they are essential attributes of voluntary actions. They are verities too that are eternal and fixed in their nature; they cannot be changed or annihilated. No one can make the right wrong, or the wrong right. To cheat and lie are ever wrong, have always been wrong, and will always be wrong. The time has never been, the time will never be, when it will be noble to lie and cheat ; and when to tell the truth and be honest will be wrong. Right and wrong are eternal and immutable verities. Origin of the Idea. The idea of the right is the product of the intuition. It is not a conception put into the mind from without ; it is not a development from sensations of the agreeable and disagreeable, nor a product of our selfish instincts. It comes welling up from the depths of the soul when the proper occasion is presented. Given an example of the action of one rational being towards another, and there arises immediately in the mind the idea of the Tightness or wrongness of this action. The physical eye sees the action ; but by the eye of intuition we per- ceive r.n ethical element in the action by which we pronounce it a right or a wrong action. II. NATURE OF THE RIGHT. The question in what the right consists, what it is that makes a thing right, has often been dis- cussed. This is a difficult question, and one upon which writers widely differ. The principal theories in respect to the question are, Highest Happiness, Utility, Legal Enactment, Divine Law, the Divine Nature, and the Eternal Nature of Things. 374 MENTAL SCIENCE. Highest Happiness. It has been held by some writers that the ground of the right is in its securing the highest happiness of the individual. Any action which contributes to the highest happiness of a person is right, and it is so merely because it does thus contribute to his happiness. Anything which detracts from man's happiness is wrong, and it is so merely because it dimin- ishes his enjoyment. Happiness, or the welfare of the individual, is the test of moral actions, and determines all the moral quality that they possess. This theory in different forms was held by Paley and others. Objection. The objection to this view is that it makes virtue and happiness identical, and thus contradicts the consciousness of mankind. Every one distinguishes between that which gives pleasure, and that which is right. Men often do the right be- cause it is right, even at the sacrifice of happiness. Further, the theory takes away all absolute quality of the right. If that which gives happiness is right, the right becomes as variable as our tastes for enjoyment. If lying and cheating would contribute to the pleasure or welfare of a person, according to this theory lying and cheating would be right, and truth and honesty would be wrong. Theory of Utility. Several thinkers incline to the theory that the essence of the right is found in the principle of utility. That which is best adapted to the welfare of man is right, and is so because it is best adapted to his welfare. It is not mere hap- piness, for that which leads to enjoyment may be of real disad- vantage ; but that which, all things considered, will secure the best interests of the individual and the race. Taking a broad view of the world, it has been seen that some things will aid the progress of the race, and lift it up into a higher civilization ; such things are pronounced to be right, and are so because they accomplish this result. The opposite things are wrong, and are so because they retard the progress of the race. Thus utility or expediency is the ground and essence of the right. This seems to be the view of Mill and some other writers. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 375 Objection. It is admitted that the right secures the best in- terests of the individual and the race. But to give this as the source of the right is to invert the true relation of cause and effect, calling the effect the cause. The true relation is that cer- tain actions secure the best interests of the race because they are right, and not that they are right because they accomplish this object. Again, as applied to the individual, this theory makes duty and self-interest identical, and this contradicts human con- sciousness. It would also make the right variable, for the best interests of two individuals under different circumstances might seem to be secured by different or even opposite actions. So in respect to the community, we cannot always know what will se- cure the best interests of society and the state, and thus we could not determine what is right or wrong. Besides, it contradicts consciousness, for we do not thus stop to reason about the matter, but decide instantly whether a thing is right or wrong. Legal Enactment. The ground of right has also been placed in legal enactments. The law requires certain actions; these we regard as right : the law prohibits certain actions ; these we regard as wrong. The civil authority is ultimate ; man can- not go back of the law ; his only duty is to obey. The law makes the right and wrong of things, and is the ultimate ethical principle. This view was held by Hobbes and by some of the ancient sophists. Objection. This theory destroys all fixedness in the standard of right. By it the right varies as the law varies. The law commands one thing to-day, and another thing to-morrow ; so one thing is right to-day, and another thing to-morrow. Laws have changed from age to age, so the right must have also changed. By this theory, also, all laws are right, and no law can be wrong, so that we could never sit in judgment upon a law. While a statute is before a legislature for its action, it may be pronounced wrong ; but as soon as it is voted upon and becomes a law, it immediately becomes right ! By this theory it also follows that all laws are equally right. The laws of Draco are as good as 376 MENTAL SCIENCE. those of Solon or Lycurgus ; the edicts of Nero are as excellent as those of Constantine ! The boundary line of a country is the boundary of right and wrong; step over the line that divides two countries, and you change right to wrong and wrong to right ! The Will of God. Some excellent thinkers place the right in the revealed will of God. What God wills is the ultimate right, and is so because he wills it. What is contrary to his will is wrong, and is wrong because it is contrary to his will. This view was held by Descartes and others. Paley regarded it as the rule of right, though not the ground of right. Objections. There are apparent objections to this theory. If the right originates in the will of God, and was not right before he willed it, then if we suppose his will to change, we must sup- pose the right to change. Further, had there been no revelation of his will, then there would have been no right and wrong. And if there was any mistake or misunderstanding as to the rev- elation of his will, right and wrong would not be the same. Again, we could not say of the law of God that it is good, for to say that his statutes are just and true, would be merely to say that his statutes are his statutes. Again, it would prevent us from attributing to Deity any moral character. " Holy, holy, holy, Lord God," "just and true are thy ways," would have no meaning to us except that his actions are true to his will. The Nature of God. It is held by some writers that the right lies in the nature and character of God. God is, and the right is because God is as he is. The wrong is that which is con- trary to the nature of God. This view was held by Dr. Chal- mers and by some other writers. Objections. To this view several objections have been pre- sented. First, it is said, if God had been other than he is, the right would be other than it is. Second, if right and wrong de- pend on the nature of God, then if we could suppose God to change, the right and wrong would also change ; and thus virtue would become vice and vice would become virtue. Third, by THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 377 this theory it is a mere meaningless tautology to apply the terms holy, righteous, etc., to God, as they are a part of his nature, and have their existence only in his nature. Of course, it must be admitted that it is as easy to conceive of right and wrong chang- ing, as to conceive of God changing, or being other than he is. Nature of Things. This theory holds that right and wrong exist in the very nature of things. They are self-existent, inde- pendent, and immutable. They have no origin ; they are as eternal as God himself. Were it possible for God to cease to exist, right and wrong would still exist; were it possible for God to change, right and wrong would still be unchanged. Deity does not make them, and he has no power to change them. Law does not produce the right, but all good laws are in accordance with the right. The act is not right because it secures happiness, but it secures happiness because it is right. The right is right be- cause it is right ; we cannot get back of the right and find any- thing that makes it right. Objections. To this theory objections have also been made. Dr. Gregory says that " This view is at once contrary to the true conception of God and the constitution of things. It originates in the attempt to understand the ' Almighty unto perfection,' and to measure completely this universal system with the yardstick of man's reason. According to this hypothesis, there is some- thing back of God which shapes all his . course in spite of him- self a modern fate. The Deity becomes a mere figure-head in the universe. . . . God is at least as eternal and immutable as morality. There is no notion of things except that which God has constituted." Tlie Correct Theory. It is probably correct to say that right and wrong are ultimate principles. It is impossible to separate them from the nature of God, since he is also eternal and immutable. They have their source in the nature of God and the nature of things; or they are co-existent with God and the universe. We cannot conceive either God or the right to change ; they are both eternal and immutable ; neither was be- 378 MENTAL SCIENCE. fore the other ; neither was created, and neither can be destroyed. The right is thus wrapped up, as it were, in the nature of God and the universe. Logically it is distinct from the character and actions of God, so that we may sit in judgment upon his laws and predicate holiness of his nature and actions. We can thus see a meaning in the expressions " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" and "The law of the Lord is perfect." III. ORIGIN or THE IDEA. Another question extensively dis- cussed by philosophers is that of the origin of the idea of the right. Whence comes this idea? how does it originate in the mind? To this question many different answers have been given. The question is closely related to that of the nature of the right, and by some writers has been confounded with it, though there is an essential difference between them. The one is what makes a thing right; the other is how do we come by the idea of the right. Some of the principal theories of the origin of the idea will be stated. Education. It is held by some writers that the idea of the right is the product of education. The theory holds that origi- nally man had no idea of the right, that he is not competent to develop such an idea, but that it is put into his mind by the pro- cess of education. He is taught to call . some things right and other things wrong, and thus learns to make moral distinctions. This view seems to be. held by Paley, Locke, and some other thinkers. Objections. To this view it may be objected, first, that educa- tion will not account for the origin of the idea. Education merely gives shape and development to the idea already in the mind. Secondly, education in respect to the right presupposes the idea already existing, for where did the educators receive the idea which they impart ? Besides, if these ideas are the result of education, it follows that our moral distinctions have no fixed character, but vary with our education, and that we could be educated to believe the right to be wrong and the wrong to be right, which we maintain is not possible. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 379 Legal Enactment. It is held by some thinkers that the ideas of the right are the result of legal enactment. This theory assumes that man naturally has no ideas of right or wrong, and that he is incapable of making these moral distinctions. He comes in contact with law, either human or divine, becomes familiar with its commands and restrictions, and learns to think some things right and other things wrong. In this way the idea of the right is developed in his mind, and he learns to make moral distinctions. This is the theory of Hobbes. Objections. The objections to this theory are about the same as those which apply to the theory of education. First, law pre- supposes the idea of the right in the lawgiver, and hence does not account for its origin. Besides, this theory would make our ideas of the right vary as the laws of a country vary. If the law re- quired the opposite of what it now requires, that opposite we wouM regard as right and the present right as wrong ! We have only to step across the boundaries of a country to change our ideas of right and wrong ! The absurdity of the conclusion seems to be a sufficient refutation of the doctrine. If we refer the idea to divine law, we remove the question from philosophy and hand it over to theology, which is not in the correct spirit of philosophy. Still, we believe that man can judge of the right- ness of divine law ; and the Bible represents God as treating man as if he had this power. Theory of Association. The theory of association assumes also that man's mind is morally a blank, and that the moral nature is developed from sensations or feelings. Some of our feelings are pleasant and become associated with the acts which produced them ; and such acts we call good. Some of our feel- ings are unpleasant, and these become associated with actions that produce them; and we learn to call such actions bad or wrong. Thus, suppose a man does something to me to make me feel happy, and I say " good feeling." Associating this with the person, I say " good person that caused good feeling ; " and pass- ing from the person to the action, I say "good action of good 380 MENTAL SCIENCE. person that caused good feeling." In the same way we may ac- count for the idea of the bad or wrong, associating the bad feel- ing first with the actor and then with his act. In both cases, the feeling is transferred to and associated with the actor and his action ; and we thus learn to make moral distinctions independ- ently of our feelings. This is in principle the view of Hume, Mill, and others of the sensational school. Objections. There are several objections to this ingenious theory. First, the theory of association overthrows the inherent distinctions of right and wrong, and makes virtue and vice the creations of the sensibilities, the products of the feelings. Second, it contradicts the order of psychological operations, in which we have first the cognition and then the feeling. Third, it makes morality merely relative, having no absolute existence, but a variable affair as our feelings may vary. Fourth, it also contra- dicts the facts of consciousness and experience, as we often find ourselves and others making moral distinctions before there is time for the complicated process of transferring our feelings. Besides, our ideas of the right and our feelings of pleasure are often the reverse of one another ; and this could not be if the idea of the right were a transfer of feeling. Theory of Sympathy. Another theory is that the. idea of right and wrong originates from the principle of sympathy. Sympathy is a spontaneous activity of the sensibilities. Sym- pathy with the feelings of an actor, and also with the feelings of one towards whom the act is performed, leads us to approve or disapprove the act. Sympathy with the gratitude of one who has received a favor leads us to regard the benefaction as right; sympathy with the resentment of one who has been wronged leads us to regard the act as wrong and the actor as worthy of punishment. Sympathy with the feelings of others in respect to our own actions, or of an imagined spectator of them, gives rise to self-approval or condemnation,*and the sense of duty. The summary of these sentiments and the judgments derived from them gives the rules of morality. This is the celebrated theory of Adam Smith. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 381 Objections. The objections to this theory are the same as to that of association. First, it makes right and wrong merely relative, depending on the feelings of others and on our feelings of sympathy, both of which are changeable, and thus may change our ideas of right and wrong. Second, it gives no imperative character to the moral cognition ; it carries with it no idea of moral obligation. Third, the view is not sustained by conscious- ness; we are not conscious of deriving our moral ideas in this manner; we are conscious of making moral distinctions inde- pendent of and even contrary to our sympathies. We sympathize with a criminal, but know that it is right to punish him. Theory of Bain. Alexander Bain, one of the most distin- guished philosophers of the sensational school, derives the idea of the Right from the two principles, Sympathy and Prudence, or Self-love. The objection to the element of sympathy has already been stated in the reply to the views of Adam Smith. To the element of self-love, or highest happiness, it may be objected that it would make the right and wrong variable, as what affords happiness to one person does not always give happiness to another. Besides, we are conscious that what brings most happi- ness is not always right. A thief knows that it is wrong to steal, and yet his booty gives him pleasure so long as the law does not arrest and punish him. Again, a good man frequently sacrifices his desire of happiness to his sense of duty. Men suffer and die for the right ; not because suffering and death give them pleasure, but because they are true to their principles or their faith. If it be said that a Christian is willing to suffer here in order to secure future happiness, we reply that an infidel, who has no belief in the future, may stand true to his sense of duty against all the promptings of self-interest. It seems a shallow philosophy to re- solve our convictions of duty into our desires for happiness. A Moral Sense. Some writers hold that man has a moral sense by which he perceives the right and wrong. As we have the sense of sight by which we perceive color, and the sense of hearing by which we perceive sound, so we have a sense whose 382 MENTAL SCIENCE. office it is to perceive moral distinctions or ethical qualities in actions. This theory was suggested by Shaftesbury, and de- veloped by Hutcheson. Objections. There are serious objections to this theory. First, the term " moral sense " is ambiguous. If it means a sense like sight and hearing, then it is positively absurd, for there is no such organ of sense in the body, like the eye or ear, for moral perceptions. Second, if it means some function of the sensibilities, a susceptibility of the emotional nature by which we feel the right and wrong, it is also incorrect; for this would make morality a mere sentiment, a mere subjective affection, similar to sound and color, which are mere sensations. Third, it would make morality merely relative, and not a real quality of actions. Right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, would lie merely in our feelings, and have no objective and independent existence. If by moral sense, we mean a power by which the mind cognizes right and wrong, then the view is not incorrect, though the term " moral sense " is inappropriate. TJie Correct View. The correct view of the origin of the idea is that which we have already presented. The idea of the right is an intuition ; it is the product of the reason. It springs up spontaneously in the mind on the contemplation of moral actions. We find ourselves, from earliest childhood, making moral judgments; and a moral judgment involves an ethical idea. This idea must precede and be the basis of a moral judg- ment. This is the opinion of Kant, Coleridge, and the most of our modern thinkers, except those of materialistic views. Idea Modified. The idea of the right is modified by all the influences which are referred to in the other theories. Thus education, law, association, sympathy, etc., all modify these ideas and the application of them. Perhaps, too, the principle of heredity, recently introduced into the question by the theory of evolution, should also be taken into account as a modifying influence. But this modification is quite a different matter from the origination of the idea, and cannot account for the existence THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 383 of the original cognition of the right. To modify and shape an idea already existing is quite a different thing from the origina- tion of this idea. The THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE. ie moral nature of man is usually treated under the term Conscience, and we now proceed to inquire what is meant by Conscience. The term conscience has been used in various senses by different writers. Some make conscience entirely intel- lectual, others purely emotional, and others again partly intel- lectual and partly emotional. In order to determine precisely what is meant by conscience, we shall call attention to the ele- ments involved in the moral sense. A careful analysis will show that there are two elements, an intellectual and an emotional element. Intellectual Element. In contemplating the actions of rational beings, several cognitions arise in the mind. First, there is the cognition of the Tightness or wrongness of the act. This cognition of the right is immediately followed by another cog- nition, that of obligation ; we realize that we ought to do the act which we cognize as right, and ought not to do the act which we cognize as wrong. This is the idea of obligation, the idea of the ought and the ought not. This idea of obligation is immediately followed by a third cognition, that of merit or demerit, merit in doing the right and demerit in doing the wrong. The doer of the right is regarded as virtuous, and is approved ; the doer of the wrong is regarded as sinful, and is condemned. Here are three distinct and allied cognitions with respect to a moral action, each attended by a corresponding judgment. Emotional Element. Each one of these three cognitions is attended with an act of the sensibilities. The pure cognitions of the right and wrong are accompanied by a slight feeling of pleasure or its opposite. The cognition of obligation to do or not to do is immediately followed by a strong feeling of obligation to do or not tx, do. The idea of merit or demerit attaching to 384 MENTAL SCIENCE. the actor awakens two deep and kindred feelings. First, we have a feeling of complacency when we have done right, and a feeling of remorse when we have done wrong. Second, we have a feeling of approval of the right actions of another, and a feeling of dis- approval of his wrong actions. Relation of these Elements. Both of these elements, the intellectual and emotional, are involved in what we call our moral sense. There are three distinct cognitions; and each of these is attended with the corresponding emotion. The feeling growing out of the cognition of right and wrong is not very prominent as compared with the other feelings, and need not be particularly noticed. The feelings growing out of the second and third cognitions are deep and moving, and so strong some- times as to conceal or eclipse the cognitions, so that these elements are often spoken of as mere feelings. The second and third cog- nitions apply both to ourselves and to others, are both subjective and objective, and the corresponding emotions refer also to our- selves and to others. IVliat is Conscience? Now, what is Conscience? Having seen the elements embraced in the moral sense, we inquire how many of these are included in what we call conscience. Is con- science purely intellectual, is it purely emotional, or is it partly intellectual and partly emotional ? If intellectual and emotional, does conscience perceive the right ? or does it begin its operations after the cognition of the right and wrong, and include only the two cognitions of obligation and merit or demerit, with the cor- responding emotions ? In other words, is the office of cognizing the right included in conscience, or does its office begin after this cognition? Answer of the Question. Upon these questions philosophy seems not to be quite settled. Locke says, " Conscience is merely our judgment of the moral rectitude or turpitude of our actions." St. Augustine says, " It is a particular manner of feeling which corresponds to the goodness of moral actions." Dr. Crombie saya that the office of conscience is " to approve of our own conduct THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 385, .when we do what we believe to be right, and to censure us when we commit whatever we judge to be wrong." Rev. Joseph Cook seems to restrict the action of conscience to the motive, defining it as "the power which determines the moral qualities of a motive." He says, "Conscience is the perception of right or wrong in motives, and a feeling that the right ought and the wrong ought not to be chosen by the will." The Correct View. Among so many different and conflict- ing views, it is a difficult and delicate matter to decide. One thing, I think, is clear ; the power of conscience is partly intel- lectual and partly emotional. Another point seems evident, that one of the most prominent elements is that of the ought and the ought not, and the corresponding ideas of merit and demerit. These ideas are accompanied by their corresponding feelings, which seem also to be elements of conscience. If this is so, would it not be best to leave the cognition of the right by the reason outside of the sphere embraced by the term conscience ? Espe- cially so, also, since we so often see men equally conscientious in the discharge of their duty, who take such different vie^YS of what is right. This is the decision to which a very careful considera- tion of the subject has led me. Definition of Conscience. Conscience is the power by which we know and feel that we ought to do what we think to be right, and ought not to do what we think to be wrong. It also cognizes merit and demerit, feels satisfaction for virtuous conduct and re- morse for guilt in respect to our own actions, and approves or disapproves the actions of others. By this view conscience cog- nizes the ought and the ought not and the merit and demerit of actions. It also feels the ought and ought not, and experiences the emotions corresponding with the ideas of merit and demerit, with respect both to ourselves and to others. Nature of this View. In this view of conscience the element omitted is that of the cognition or apprehension of the rightnesa of any given action. This cognition is left to the reason, where it actually belongs ; as it is a rational cognition, whether we 17 386 MENTAL SCIE]S T CE. bring it under the conscience or not. This view of conscience removes several difficulties that have been inseparably connected with its use and philosophical discussion. If any one teaching or studying this work, thinks it would be better to include the ele- ment of the cognition of the right in the conscience, the definition can easily be modified so as to embrace it. Nature of Ethics. This view of conscience gives it a distinct and definite place in the science of Ethics. The science of ethics is in some respects similar to that of geometry. In geometry we have first an intuitive idea of extension ; then the intuitions of special forms of extention, as a line, a circle, etc. ; then we have intuitive truths called axioms; and then, by reasoning from these intuitive truths, we reach the conclusions or theorems of the sci- ence. So in ethics we have a similar combination of ideas and truths. First, we have the general idea of the right. Second, we have an idea of particular forms of the right; as, veracity, honesty, etc. Third, we have certain axiomatic principles, as " to tell the truth is right," " to cheat is wrong," etc., which may be called moral axioms. From these as a basis we can derive other truths, and thus build up the science of ethics. Of course the demonstrations and applications of the principles of right are much more difficult than the reasoning of geometry, because the right is often so complex as involved in the circumstances. Relation of Conscience. This perception of the right and the unfolding of the science by judgment and reasoning do not belong to conscience; they are acts of the reason and understand- ing. Following these conceptions and axioms and demonstra- tions comes the action of conscience. Knowing what is right, conscience urges us to do the right and to avoid the wrong. The conscientious man is not one who has the clearest apprehension of the right or who can reason best in respect to it ; but one who is most anxious to follow the dictates of his judgment and to do what he believes to be right. The ignorant man who has very narrow ideas of duty, the bigot who can see only one path of rec- titude these may be as truly conscientious as the most enlight- ened and broadest-minded Christian. THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 387 diversity of Moral Judgments. This view of conscience accounts satisfactorily for the diversity of moral judgments. This diversity may result from any one of several causes. Men may not see the action under the same circumstances or relations, and thus not be in the condition to make the same cognition in respect to its ethical quality. Or, they may not reason in the same way, and thus make a different application of the funda mental principles of right and wrong, and hence reach different conclusions. In both cases they may be equally conscientious in respect to doing what they think to be right, or in avoiding what they think to be wrong. The difference is not in their consciences, but in their perception of the right. Extent of this Difference. These differences in the percep- tion or cognition of what is right are often very marked. Thus what one approves another often condemns. The Spartans taught their boys that it was right to steal, provided they were not de- tected in it. The savage seems to think it is right to scalp his enemy, and even roast and eat him. The very crimes of one people may be the religious rites of another people. These dif- ferences, however, are easily accounted for. In many cases, cer- tain acts are mere habits, done without any thought of right or wrong. In other cases, a misconception of one duty overshadows another duty, as in the case of sacrificing human lives to the gods. Believing such sacrifices commanded, the heathen surren- der a lower duty to a higher one. The idea of the right is often so involved in circumstances that it is difficult to obtain a clear notion of it, and to see the act in its own light and judge it ac- cordingly. A. General Uniformity. The difference in the perception of the right, however, is not so great as may appear at first thought. There is really a general uniformity in the moral per- ceptions of mankind. In the cognition of the fundamental prin- ciples of right and wrong, and the application of those principles to the ordinary actions of mankind, there is very little disagree- ment. All people agree that to tell the truth is right, and to lie 388 MENTAL SCIENCE. is wrong ; that honesty is right, and fraud is wrong ; that d^eds of kindness are right, and murder is wrong. They may differ in the application of these principles, as they do in the application of other principles ; and the occasion for difference is greater here than in most other subjects, as the right is involved in more complicated circumstances than any other idea or attribute. The Relation of Motive. For the actions of each individual, the motive determines the right. If we do what we conscien- tiously think to be right, that to us is right or, at least, we are innocent of doing wrong. This makes a distinction known as the absolute and the relative right. According to this distinction, a person may do an act which is contrary to the absolute prin- ciples of right, and yet not be guilty of doing wrong. The act may be relatively right to him, though absolutely wrong. Thus a man may tell that which is absolutely false, and yet, supposing it to be true and designing to tell the truth, it is not a falsehood to him. He is not guilty of deception, but is only mistaken. So a man may take the life of another by accident, and though he has actually broken the law which says " Thou shalt not kill," he is not guilty of murder. This distinction, that the motive decides the moral quality of an action, is acknowledged by nearly every class of thinkers ; though it is a principle that must be applied with caution, as it may lead to dangerous conclusions in ethics. Is Conscience a Safe Guide ? The question, Is conscience a safe guide? should be answered according to our conception of conscience, and our idea of a safe guide. If we take the view of conscience, that it begins with the cognition of obligation, and does not include the cognition of the right itself, then it is always a safe and a correct guide. If conscience is regarded as a power that perceives the right, then it is not always a correct guide, for men often err in their moral perceptions and judgments. If in the expression a "safe guide" we do not mean a correct guide, then we may say that even according to this latter view of con- science, it is a safe guides. The man who follows his conscience is usually in the path of duty. Indeed, it would be a strange THE INTUITIONS OF THE GOOD. 389 rule of morals to advise that a man should not follow his con- science. A Correct Conscience. The conscientious man should be careful to see that his idea of right is correct. A man is often responsible for his mistakes in moral judgment. Paul, who thought he ought to do many things contrary to Jesus of Naz- areth, is a notable example of a conscientious man who did what he afterward believed to be wrong. His error lay, not in follow- ing his conscience, but in not examining the teachings of Christ more carefully, and forming a correct judgment in respect to His doctrine. A conscientious man is thus often responsible for his erroneous opinions of duty. He has neglected to investigate the matter as he should have done ; and should be held respon- sible for this neglect, and for the error in his moral perceptions flowing from it. So also is the man responsible who confounds his conscience with his feelings, and does what he thinks is right, which is really what he feels is agreeable. The conscientious man should be as careful in determining what is right as he is in following the right after he decides what it is. Conscience thus applies to the forming of moral judgments, as well as to doing moral actions. CHAPTER V. CULTURE OF THE INTUITIONS OF THE TRUE. REASON, or Intuitive Power, is the crowning element of J- the human mind. ^Here we rise into the sphere of ration- ality, and conceive of man as a centre and source of eternal and necessary truth.^ From the depths of the spiritual nature come welling up ideas and thoughts which glow, like the pearls of the ocean, with an immortal radiance. The reason arches over the other faculties of the mind, as the blue sky arches over the earth; and in it shine the golden stars of eternal and heaven-born truth,) Difficult of Culture. This faculty is not only higher than all the other faculties of the mind, but its training and culture are more difficult. The other faculties are developed by exercise ; this faculty is not under the control of the will, like judgment or memory, and is therefore not so readily brought into exercise. The intuitive faculty is not so much an activity as a spontaneity ; and it is thus developed naturally by its own spontaneous evo- lution of ideas and truths. The most we can do for its culture is to furnish the occasion for the cognition of truth, and by such cognitions its eye becomes brighter and its vision clearer and stronger. It Can be Cultured. The faculty of Reason, though spon- taneous in its actions, will however admit of culture. It begins its operations early in life; though there is a vast difference be- tween the intuitions of childhood and of manhood. The cognition of truth 07 the adult mind is much clearer and higher than that of the child mind. There is also a large difference between the intuitive cognitions of the ignorant, uncultured savage, and of the ( 390) THE CULTURE OF THE TRUE. T91 refined and culture,! philosopher. The study and attainment of truth, the grasp of philosophical principles, and the refinements of thought and feeling of a civilized life, have given the occasions by which the insight of the reason into truth is much deeper, and its grasp of intuitive ideas much broader. Methods of Culture. The manner of giving culture to this faculty is intimated in this statement, f The eye of intuition grows clear with the development of the human mind; hence all mental development tends to develop the reason^ It evolves its ideas and truths on the presentation of suitable occasions ; hence the occasions for its activity should be frequently presented. The familiarity with truth of all kinds, by its refining and elevat- ing influence on the soul, gives deeper insight into the funda- mental principles of truth ; therefore all philosophic and thought culture will tend to give culture to the reason. Divisions for Culture. All the products of the reason may be embraced under three general heads, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The products under each one of these heads are of two classes, ideas and thoughts. Each intuitive truth involves one or more intuitive ideas, and grows out of these ideas: the idea is the basis of the truth, and gives rise to it. We shall therefore restrict the discussion mainly to the development of these ideas, as the truths will naturally follow the ideas. The culture of the intuitive power thus naturally divides itself into three general divisions ; the culture of the Intuitions of the True, the culture of the Intuitions of the Beautiful, and the culture of the Intuitions of the Good. Though shrinking from the attempt to give any discussion of the cultivation of this divine faculty, which needs the pen of inspiration to treat it properly, I shall present a few suggestions for its culture under the three heads named. In this chapter I shall treat briefly of the culture of the Intuitions of the True. Intuitions of tlie True. The ideas of the True are those of Space, Time, Number, Identity, Cause, Infinity, etc. These ideas spring up early in the mind on the presentation of suitable occa- 392 MENTAL SCIENCE. sions, and but little direct effort need be made for theJr culture. Clearer and more definite conceptions of these ideas will be ob- tained, however, by their frequent contemplation and an attempt to analyze or define them. The general principle for their de- velopment is that suitable occasions be presented for the reason to unfold them. Questions by the teacher on their nature will aid the pupil in a fuller and clearer development of these ideas and a better comprehension of their nature. Intuition of Space. The intuition of Space arises early in the mind. The first perception of it is in the concrete; that is, in connection with material objects occupying space. Through touch we cognize an extended body capable of resistance, and through the eye we see an extended and colored surface. The idea of space, however, is not given by the sense, but by the eye of intuition, that lies back of and works with the eye of sense. The perception of space in objects is merely the occasion by which the general idea of space is unfolded from the mind. The early appearance of the idea in the mind suggests the early study of geometry by the child. The study of geometrical figures will accustom the mind to pass from the conception of occupied to unoccupied or pure space, and will enable it to conceive of the possible forms, of space. Questions on the nature of space, on the truths that arise out of the conception, and on its importance, will also be appropriate. Intuition of Time. The intuition of Time is also early de- veloped in the mind. Its basis is the successive experiences of consciousness in the succession of events. We perceive events as before and after ; and though we have no sense-perception of time, the idea arises spontaneously in the mind through the ex- perience. Time is necessary in the conception of events as suc- cessive; hence the idea first appears in the concrete, associated with events. We can, however, think of the time as different from the event which occurred in time, and thus attain to the true or abstract notion of time. The element of time in the con- crete event is given, not by sense, but by intuition; we see the THE CULTURE OF THE TRUE. 393 event as external, and the mind supplies the element of time. Subsequently intuition lifts up the idea out of all sense connec- tion, and thinks of it as the grand condition of events, without beginning or end. A few examples and questions may aid this development; but nature takes care of herself in this higher activity of the soul. It will be suitable, however, to lead the pupil to a clearer appreciation of the infinitude of time, a cog- nition incomprehensible, but necessary and uneontradictable. Intuition of Number. The intuition of Number is also an early conception of the mind. The mind sees the objects through, the sense; and in connection with this sense-experience thers springs up in the mind the idea of the one and the many, of unily and plurality. All the different numbers are thus the products of intuition. These ideas arise first in the concrete ; we begin by numbering objects. The mind then withdraws this idea from ite idea of objects, and thus number in the abstract becomes a dis- tinct cognition of the soul. The only suggestion for the culture of intuition in this respect is to furnish the occasion for the operation of the intuitive power. The grasp of numbers can, of course, be largely increased by practice and study ; and the study of the science of numbers gives increased breadth and clearness to our numerical cognitions. Intuition of Cause. The intuition of Cause also makes an early appearance in the mind. The little child's questions, What makes this? and What makes that? show that it very soon perceives the relation of cause and effect. The idea is not the result of philosophy, for it is as strong among savages as among civilized men. As previously shown, it is not merely the perception of antecedence and consequence, for no number of such relations, however invariable, will give the idea of cause. The idea springs up native in the mind on the perception of change or the appearance of an event. As soon as we see some change take place or something come into being, we immediately look for the cause which produced the change or effected the re- sult. Thus sensible experience is the occasion of the origin of 17* 394 MENTAL SCIENCE. the idea ; and therefore, in order to develop it, suitable occasions must be presented to the mind. The study of a branch like natural philosophy will tend to increase our grasp upon the r.otion of causation, and enable us to distinguish between the several kinds of cause. The mind may also be led along the chain of causation, until it reaches the idea of a First Cause and the logical necessity of its existence. Intuition of Identity. The intuition of Identity is not so easily developed in the mind, at least as a definite and clear cog- nition. It arises from the perception and comparison of objects. It is preceded, I think, by the ideas of difference and similarity ; and from these the mind gradually passes to the notion of same- ness or identity. From the identity of objects it passes to the conception of personal identity, or the sameness of the spirit. The mind has before it at every wakening moment, a cognition of a present self, and in the exercise of memory, a past self; and it knows that these belong to the same one self. Though the idea is slowly developed, the mind unconsciously acts in the light of it before it is clearly cognized as an idea. We do not mistake ourselves for some other person, nor confound our parents with the people around them ; the idea is thus potentially active in us, regulating our conduct, even before it is distinctly apprehended as a cognition. All that can be done for its development is to supply the conditions for its appearance in the mind. Other Intuitive Ideas. There are other intuitive cognitions, as Equality, Power, Substance, Being, Whole and Parts, which we have not space to consider. These are developed in a manner similar to those already discussed. The presentation of suitable occasions, and the asking of appropriate questions, will enable the reason to unfold these ideas which are the condition and source of all thought and experience. Intuitive Truths. The Intuitive Truths are too numerous to mention in detail. They accompany every one of the intuitive ideas, some giving more and others less of these truths. The most numerous are those of number and space; and the student THE CULTURE OF THE TRUE. 395 gets culture in the development of these truths by the study of arithmetic and geometry. In mathematics we have two classes of intuitive truths, called axioms ; those which pertain to quantity in general, and those which belong to specific forms of quantity. Of the former class we may Kane " Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each otiiei.' Under the second class we name "Only similar numbers can be added;' Teller, belongs to arithmetic ; and " All right angles are equal," which belongs to geometry. In the development of these sciences each new re- lation or conception of quantity is attended with some new truth of intuition. These truths are developed in the mind by the presentation of the proper occasion ; and when they are somewhat recondite, their appearance may be aided by suitable illustra- tions. Stiidy of Science. The cognition of the True is developed by the study of science. Science discovers truth ; but intuition per- ceives the truth of its principles. Judgment gives a proposition ; the truth of the proposition is seen by the reason. The under- standing draws a conclusion from premises; intuition sees the truth of the derived proposition. So all science tends to brighten and quicken the perception of the true. Man grows in the ap- preciation of truth by the study of science. His soul, accustomed to the true, becomes wedded to truth ; his affections go out towards truth ; he builds his altars to the honor of truth, and becomes himself a worshipper of the divine attribute of truth. Familiar with the truths of science, his soul goes out in yearnings after the .source of truth; and he thus rises in his conceptions from the natural to the uper.uatural, from the truths of science to Him \vho is the essence and embodiment of infinite truth, and is thus, in its highest serse, THE CHAPTER VI. THE CULTURE OF THE INTUITIONS OF BEAUTY. BEAUTIFUL is a divine attribute revealed to the higher -- reason. The intuition of the reason in the sphere of the Beautiful, are of three principal classes ; the Beautiful proper, the Sublime, and the Ludicrous. Each of these three classes of ideas is developed by the presentation of objects containing the aesthetic element. A few remarks on the culture will be made, showing the value of the beautiful or the value of aesthetic culture, and methods of giving this culture. The subject may be appropriately entitled The Culture of Taste. I. VALUE OF BEAUTY. This idea of beauty is of so much value to mankind that a brief consideration of the influence of the beautiful will give significance to the discussion of its culture, and tend to make teachers more careful to afford this culture to their pupils. The facts and truths of science are not the only things valuable in education, though this seems to be the popular belief. The mind grows in the appreciation of truth by feeding upon the true ; but the soul has other appetites than those for truth. Beauty is food for the spiritual nature as well as truth ; and the mind develops in its communion with the spirit of beauty. Art is an educating influence as well as science ; and some of the richest products of the soul spring from the culture of the fine arts and the element of beauty which they embody. Refines the Mind. Beauty refines and elevates the mind. The element of beauty breathes of the spirit of refinement. As the sunlight comes beaming out of the depths of the pure blue heavens, and illuminates the world, so the spirit of beauty carries with it purity and refinement. The mind that is susceptible to ( C9 1 ] < t ' far i (, i ' f J^s . I *4f* **%& ^ I' * ft/In i & . > .' . ' . f ^4 ' ' / -\0 { \'{rt-*-* , ,<^ e ^ v ~*^ i # .u/Tt-- 5 frcJZ^tl f * ' " ^^ ' ' W University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. . oaiScwwa* JUH 3 1997