THOUGHT -CULTURE 
 
 or 
 
 Praxitical Mental Trainini 
 
 WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON
 
 THE 
 
 New Psychology Series 
 
 By WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON 
 
 IN the past few years a widespread mental and 
 spiritual awakening has taken place among the 
 people of this country. And this new awakening 
 has been very aptly called THE NEW PSYCHOL- 
 OGY MOVEMENT, because it has to do with the 
 development and expression of the mind, or soul, of 
 both the individual and the nation. 
 
 The New Psychology The Art of Logical 
 
 The Will Memory Thinking 
 
 Suggestion and Auto- Thought-Culture 
 
 Suggestion The Psychology of Sales- 
 
 The Subconscieus and manship 
 
 Superconscious Planes ~.. * ^ f e- 
 of Mind Expression 
 
 The Psychology of Sue ^^^^ ^"'^ Bo'^y 
 cess Human Nature 
 
 Although each bookstands alone as an authority on 
 the subject treated, yet one theme runs through the se- 
 ries, binding them together to make a complete whole. 
 
 The uniform postpaid price of each volume is $1.00 
 We iure making a special price of $10.00 for the entire set 
 
 THE PROGRESS COMPANY :: CHICAGO 
 
 \W.'-Z li-.i-is STOftH, POiT'.AND, OREQON, 
 2S4 OAK ST.
 
 THOUGHT-CULTURE 
 
 OR ^y 
 
 PRACTICAL MENTAL TRAINING 
 
 By WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON 
 
 L. N. FOWLER & COMPANY 
 
 7, Imperial Arcade. Ludgate Circus 
 
 London, E. C, England 
 
 1909 
 
 THE PROGRESS COMPANY 
 
 CHICAGO, ILL. 
 
 »?»>«ES BOOK STORE, PORTLAND, OREQON. 
 2 a* OAK ST.
 
 CopTRioHT, leio 
 
 By 
 T«E PROGRESS COMPANY 
 
 P. K Pettibonk & Co 
 
 Printers and Binders 
 
 Chicago
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I. The Power of Thought 9 
 
 II. The Nature of Thought 19 
 
 III. Phases of Thought 27 
 
 IV. Thought Culture 37 
 
 V. Attention 47 
 
 VI. Perception 57 
 
 VII. Representation 76 
 
 VIII. Abstraction 85 
 
 IX. Association of Ideas 95 
 
 X. Generalization 106 
 
 XI. Judgment 130 
 
 XII. Derived Judgments 138 
 
 XIII. Reasoning 152 
 
 XIV. Constructive Imagination 175
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE POWER OF THOUGHT 
 
 In other volumes of this series we have 
 considered the operations of the human mind 
 known as Will, Memory, etc. We now ap- 
 proach the consideration of those mental ac- 
 tivities which are concerned with the phenom- 
 ena of thought— those activities which we 
 generally speak of as the operation of the in- 
 tellect or reason. 
 
 What is thought? The answer is not an 
 easy one, although we use the term familiarly 
 almost every hour of our waking existence. 
 The dictionaries define the term ''Thought" 
 as follows; ''The act of thinking; the exer- 
 cise of the mind in any way except sense and 
 perception; serious consideration; delibera- 
 tion; reflection; the power or faculty of 
 thinking; the mental faculty of the mind; 
 etc." This drives us back upon the term, "to 
 think" which is defined as follows: "To oc- 
 cupy the mind on some subject; to have 
 ideas; to revolve ideas in the mind; to cogi- 
 
 9
 
 10 Thought Cultuke 
 
 tate; to reason; to exercise the power of 
 thought; to have a succession of ideas or 
 mental states; to perform any mental opera- 
 tion, whether of apprehension, judgment, or 
 illation; to judge; to form a conclusion, to 
 determine; etc." 
 
 Thought is an operation of the intellect. 
 The intellect is: *'that faculty of the human 
 soul or mind by which it receives or compre- 
 hends the ideas communicated to it by the 
 senses or by perception, or other means, as 
 distinguished from the power to feel and to 
 will ; the power or faculty to perceive objects 
 in their relations; the power to judge and 
 comprehend; also the capacity for higher 
 forms of knowledge as distinguished from 
 the power to perceive and imagine." 
 
 When we say what we ''think," we mean 
 that we exercise the faculties whereby we 
 compare and contrast certain things with 
 other things, observing and noting their 
 points of difference and agreement, then 
 classifying them in accordance with these 
 observed agreements and differences. In 
 thinking we tend to classify the multitude of 
 impressions received from the outside world.
 
 Power of Thought 11 
 
 arranging thousands of objects into one gen- 
 eral class, and other thousands into other gen- 
 eral classes, and then sub-dividing these 
 classes, until finally we have found mental 
 pigeon-holes for every conceivable idea or im- 
 pression. We then begin to make inferences 
 and deductions regarding these ideas or im- 
 pressions, working from the known to the 
 unknown, from particulars to generalities, or 
 from generalities to particulars, as the case 
 may be. 
 
 It is this faculty or power of thought— 
 this use of the intellect, that has brought man 
 to his present high position in the world of 
 living things. In his early days, man was a 
 much weaker animal than those with whom 
 he was brought into contact. The tigers, lions, 
 bears, mammoths, and other ferocious beasts 
 were much stronger, fiercer, and fleeter than 
 man, and he was placed in a position so lack- 
 ing of apparent equal chance of survival, 
 that an observer would have unhesitatingly 
 advanced the opinion that this weak, feeble, 
 slow animal must soon surely perish in the 
 struggle for existence, and that the ' ' survival 
 of the fittest ' ' would soon cause him to vanish
 
 12 Thought Culture 
 
 from the scene of the world's activities. And, 
 so it would have been had he possessed no 
 equipment other than those of the other ani- 
 mals; viz., strength, natural weapons and 
 speed. And yet man not only survived in 
 spite of these disadvantages, but he has actu- 
 ally conquered, mastered and enslaved these 
 other animals which seemed likely to work 
 his destruction. Why? How? 
 
 This feeble animal called man had within 
 him the elements of a new power— a power 
 manifested in but a slight degree in the other 
 animals. He possessed an intellect by which 
 he was able to deduce, compare, infer— rea- 
 son. 
 
 His lack of natural weapons he overcame 
 by borrowing the idea of the tooth and claw 
 of the other animals, imitating them in flint 
 and shaping them into spears ; borrowing the 
 trunk of the elephant and the paw of the tiger, 
 and reproducing their blow-striking qualities 
 in his wooden club. Not only this but he took 
 lessons from the supple limbs and branches 
 of the trees, and copied the principle in his 
 bow, in order to project its minature spear, 
 his arrow. He sheltered himself, his mate
 
 Power of Thought 13 
 
 and his young, from the fury of the storm, 
 first by caves and afterwards by rude houses, 
 built in inaccessible places, readied only by 
 means of crude ladders, bridges, or climbing 
 poles. He built doors for his habitations, to 
 protect himself from the attacks of these wild 
 enemies— he heaped stones at the mouth of his 
 caves to keep them out. He placed great 
 boulders on cliffs that he might topple them 
 down on the approaching foe. He learned to 
 hurl rocks with sure aim with his strong arm. 
 He copied the floating log, and built his first 
 rude rafts, and then evolved the hollowed 
 canoe. He used the skins of animals to keep 
 him warm— their tendons for his bowstrings. 
 He learned the advantages of cooperation 
 and combined effort, and thus formed the first 
 rudiments of society and social life. And 
 finally— man's first great discovery— he 
 found the art of fire making. 
 
 As a writer has said : ' ' For some hundreds 
 of years, upon the general plane of self-con- 
 sciousness, an ascent, to the human eye grad- 
 ual but from the point of view of cosmic 
 evolution rapid, has been made. In a race 
 large-brained, walking-erect, gregarious.
 
 14 Thought Culture 
 
 brutal, but king of all other brutes, man in 
 appearance but not in fact, was from the 
 highest simple-consciousness born the basic 
 human faculty, self-consciousness and its 
 twin, language. From these and what went 
 with these, through suffering, toil and war; 
 through bestiality, savagery, barbarism; 
 through slavery, greed, effort, through con- 
 quests infinite, through defeats overwhelm- 
 ing, through struggle unending ; through ages 
 of aimless semi-brutal existence, through sub- 
 sistence on berries and roots ; through the use 
 of the casually found stone or stick; through 
 life in deep forests, with nuts and seeds, and 
 on the shores of waters with mollusks, crusta- 
 ceans and fish for food; through that great- 
 est, perhaps, of human victories, the domesti- 
 cation and subjugation of fire; through the 
 invention and art of bow and arrow ; through 
 the training of animals and the breaking of 
 them to labor; through the long learning 
 which led to the cultivation of the soil; 
 through the adobe brick and the building of 
 houses therefrom; through the smelting of 
 metals and the slow birth of the arts which 
 rest upon these ; through the slow making of
 
 Power of Thought 15 
 
 alphabets and the evolution of the written 
 work; in short, through thousands of cen- 
 turies of human life, of human aspiration, 
 of human growth, sprang the world of men 
 and women as it stands before us and within 
 us today with all its achievements and pos- 
 sessions." 
 
 The great difference between thought as 
 we find it in man, and its forms among the 
 lower animals lies in what psychologists have 
 called ''progressive thought." The animals 
 advance but little in their thinking processes 
 but rest content with those of their ancestors 
 —their thought seems to have become set or 
 crystallized during the process of their evolu- 
 tion. The birds, mammals and the insects 
 vary but little in their mental processes from 
 their ancestors of many thousand years ago. 
 They build their nests, or dens, in almost pre- 
 cisely the same manner as did their progen- 
 itors in the stone-age. But man has slowly 
 but steadily progressed, in spite of temporary 
 set-backs and failures. He has endeavored 
 to progress and improve. Those tribes which 
 fell back in regard to mental progress and 
 advancement, have been left behind in the
 
 16 Thought Culture 
 
 race, and in many cases have become extinct. 
 The great natural law of the ' ' survival of the 
 fittest" has steadily operated in the life of 
 the race. The ''fittest" were those best 
 adapted to grapple with and overcome the 
 obstacles of their environment, and these 
 obstacles were best overcome by the use of 
 the intellect. Those tribes and those individ- 
 uals whose intellect was active, tended to sur- 
 vive where others perished, and consequently 
 they were able to transmit their intellectual 
 quality to their descendants. 
 
 Halleck says : ' ' Nature is constantly using 
 her power to kill off the thoughtless, or to 
 cripple them in life's race. She is determined 
 that only the fittest and the descendants of 
 the fittest shall survive. By the 'fittest' she 
 means those who have thought and whose an- 
 cestors have thought and profited thereby. 
 Geologists tell us that ages ago there lived in 
 England bears, tigers, elephants, lions and 
 many other powerful and fierce animals. 
 There was living contemporaneous with them 
 a much weaker animal, that had neither the 
 claws, the strength, nor the speed of the 
 tiger. In fact this human being was al-
 
 Power of Thought 17 
 
 most defenceless. Had a being from an- 
 other planet been asked to prophesy, he 
 would undoubtedly have said that this help- 
 less animal would be the first to be extermi- 
 nated. And yet every one of those fierce 
 creatures succumbed either to the change of 
 climate, or to man's inferior strength. The 
 reason was that man had one resource denied 
 to the animals— the power of progressive 
 thought. The land sank, the sea cut off Eng- 
 land from the mainland, the climate changed, 
 and even the strongest animals were helpless. 
 But man changed his clothing with the chang- 
 ing climate. He made fires ; he built a retreat 
 to keep off death by cold. He thought out 
 means to kill or to subdue the strongest ani- 
 mals. Had the lions, tigers or bears the power 
 of progressive thought, they could have com- 
 bined, and it would have been possible for 
 them to exterminate man before he reached 
 the civilized stage. . . . Man no longer 
 sleeps in caves. The smoke no longer fills his 
 home or finds its way out through the chinks 
 in the walls or a hole in the roof. In traveling, 
 he is no longer restricted to his feet or even 
 to horses. For all this improvement man is
 
 18 Thought Culture 
 
 indebted to thought. That has harnessed the 
 very vibrations of the ether to do his bid- 
 ding.** 
 
 And thus we see that man owes his present 
 place on earth to his Thought-Culture. And, 
 it certainly behooves us to closely consider 
 and study the methods and processes whereby 
 each and every man may cultivate and de- 
 velop the wondrous faculties of the mind 
 which are employed in the processes of 
 Thought. The faculties of the Mind, like the 
 muscles of the body, may be developed, trained 
 and cultivated. The process of such mental 
 development is called ''Thought-Culture," 
 and forms the subject of this book.
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 THE NATUEE OF THOUGHT 
 
 It was formerly considered necessary for all 
 books on the subject of thought to begin by 
 a recital of the metaphysical conceptions re- 
 garding the nature and "thingness" of Mind. 
 The student was led through many pages and 
 endless speculation regarding the metaphys- 
 ical theories regarding the origin and inner 
 nature of Mind which, so far from establish- 
 ing a fixed and definite explanation in his 
 mind, rather tended toward confusing him 
 and giving him the idea that psychology was 
 of necessity a speculative science lacking 
 the firm practical basis possessed by other 
 branches of science. In the end, in the words 
 of old Omar, he ' ' came out the door through 
 which he went. ' ' 
 
 But this tendency has been overcome of late 
 years, and writers on the subject pass by all 
 metaphysical conceptions regarding the na- 
 ture of Mind, and usually begin by plunging 
 at once into the real business of psychology— 
 
 19
 
 20 Thought Culture 
 
 the business of the practical study of the 
 mechanism and activities of the mind itself/ 
 As some writer has said, psychology has no 
 more concern with the solution of the eternal 
 riddle of * ' What is Mind ? ' ' than physics with 
 the twin-riddle of ''What is Matter?" Both 
 riddles, and their answers, belong to entirely 
 different branches and fields of thought than 
 those concerned with their laws of operation 
 and principles of activity. As Halleck says : 
 ''Psychology studies the phenomena of mind, 
 just as physics investigates those of matter." 
 And, likewise, just as the science of physics 
 holds true in spite of the varying and chang- 
 ing conceptions regarding the nature of mat- 
 ter, so does the science of psychology hold 
 true in spite of the varying and changing con- 
 ceptions regarding the nature of Mind. 
 
 Halleck has well said: "If a materialist 
 should hold that the mind was nothing but 
 the brain, and that the brain was a vast ag- 
 gregation of molecular sheep herding to- 
 gether in various ways, his hypothesis would 
 not change the fact that sensation must pre- 
 cede perception, memory and thought; nor 
 would the laws of the association of ideas be
 
 Nature of Thought 21 
 
 changed, nor would the fact that interest and 
 repetition aid memory cease to hold good. 
 The man who thought his mind was a collec- 
 tion of little cells would dream, imagine, think 
 and feel; so also would he who believed his 
 mind to be immaterial. It is very fortunate 
 that the same mental phenomena occur, no 
 matter what theory is adopted. Those who 
 like to study the puzzles as to what mind and 
 matter really are must go to metaphysics. 
 Should we ever find that salt, arsenic and all 
 things else are the same substance with a dif- 
 ferent molecular arrangement, we should still 
 not use them interchangeably. ' ' 
 
 For the purposes of the study of practical 
 psychology, we may as well lay aside, if even 
 for the moment, our pet metaphysical con- 
 ceptions and act as if we knew nothing of the 
 essential nature of Mind (and indeed Science 
 in truth does not know), and confine our- 
 selves to the phenomena and manifestations 
 of Mind which, after all, is the only way in 
 which and by which we can know anything at 
 all about it. As Brooks says : ' ' The mind can 
 be defined only by its activities and manifes- 
 tations. In order to obtain a definition of the
 
 22 Thought Culture 
 
 mind, therefore, we must observe and de- 
 termine its various forms of activity. These 
 activities, classified under a few general heads 
 and predicated of the unseen something which 
 manifests them, will give us a definition of 
 mind." 
 
 The act of consciousness determines the 
 existence of Mind in the person experiencing 
 it. No one can be conscious of thought and, 
 at the same time, deny the existence of mind 
 within himself. For the very act of denial, in 
 itself, is a manifestation of thought and con- 
 sequently an assertion of the existence of 
 mind. One may assert the axiom: ''I think, 
 therefore, I have a mind;" but he is denied 
 the privilege of arguing: '*I think, therefore, 
 I have no mind." The mind has an ultimate 
 and final knowledge of its own existence. 
 
 The older view of Mind is that it is a some- 
 thing higher than matter which it uses for its 
 manifestation. It was held to be unknowable 
 in itself and to be studied only through its 
 manifestations. It was supposed to involve 
 itself, to become involved, in some way in 
 matter and to there manifest itself in an in- 
 finitude of forms, degrees, and variations.
 
 Nature of Thought 23 
 
 The materialistic view, which arose into prom- 
 inence in the middle of the Nineteenth Cen- 
 tury, held, on the contrary, that Mind was 
 merely an activity or property of Matter— a 
 function of matter akin to extension and mo- 
 tion. Huxley, voicing this conception said: 
 * * We have no knowledge of any thinking sub- 
 stance apart from an extended substance. . . 
 We shall, sooner or later, arrive at a me- 
 chanical equivalent of consciousness, just as 
 we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of 
 heat." But, Huxley, himself, was afterwards 
 constrained to acknowledge that: "How it is 
 that anything so remarkable as a state of con- 
 sciousness comes about by the result of irritat- 
 ing nei^ous tissue, is just as unaccountable as 
 the appearance of the jinnee when Aladdin 
 rubbed his lamp." 
 
 The most advanced authorities of the day, 
 are inclined to the opinion that both Matter 
 and Mind are both differing aspects of some 
 one fundamental Something; or, as some of 
 the closest thinkers state it, both are probably 
 two apparently differing manifestations or 
 emanations of an Underlying Something 
 which, as Spencer says: ** transcends not only
 
 24 Thought Culture 
 
 our reason but also our imagination." The 
 study of philosophy and metaphysics serves 
 an important purpose in showing us how much 
 we do not know, and why we do not know- 
 also in showing us the fallacy of many things 
 we had thought we did know— but when it 
 comes to telling us the real ''why,'* actual 
 cause, or essential nature of anything, it is 
 largely a disappointment to those who seek 
 fundamental truths and ultimate reasons. It 
 is much more comfortable to ''abjure the 
 'Why' and seek the 'How' "—if we can. 
 
 Many psychologists classify the activities 
 of the mind into three general divisions ; viz., 
 (1) Thinking; (2) Willing; (3) Feeling. 
 These divisions, which result from what is 
 known as "the tri-logical classification," were 
 first distinctly enunciated by Upham although 
 Kant had intimated it very plainly. For many 
 years before the favored division was but two- 
 fold the line of division being between the cog- 
 nitive, or knowing, activities, and the conative, 
 or acting, activities, generally known as the 
 Understanding and the Will, respectively. It 
 took a long time before the authorities would 
 formally recognize the great field of the Feel-
 
 Nature of Thought 25 
 
 ings as forming a class by tliemselves and 
 ranking with the Understanding and the Will. 
 There are certain sub-divisions and shadings, 
 which we shall notice as we proceed, some of 
 which are more or less complex, and which 
 seem to shade into others. The student is cau- 
 tioned against conceiving of the mind as a 
 thing having several compartments or distinct 
 divisions. The classification does not indicate 
 this and is only intended as a convenience in 
 analyzing and studying the mental activities 
 and operations. The ''I" which feels, thinks 
 and acts is the same— one entity. 
 
 As Brooks well says: "The mind is a self- 
 conscious activity and not a mere passivity; 
 it is a centre of spiritual forces, all resting in 
 the background of the ego. As a centre of 
 forces, it stands related to the forces of the 
 material and spiritual universe and is acted 
 upon through its susceptibilities by those 
 forces. As a spiritual activity, it takes the im- 
 pressions derived from those forces, works 
 them up into the organic growth of itself, con- 
 verts them into conscious knowledge and uses 
 these products as means to set other forces 
 into activity and produce new results. Stand-
 
 26 Thought Culture 
 
 ing above nature and superior to its surround- 
 ings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we 
 may say, and transforms material influences 
 into spiritual facts akin to its own nature. 
 Related to tlie natural world and apparently 
 originating from it, it yet rises above this nat- 
 ural world and, with the crown of freedom 
 upon its brow, rules the natural obedient to its 
 will." 
 
 In this book, while we shall fully and un- 
 questionably recognize the "tri-logical classi- 
 fication" of the activities of the Mind into the 
 divisions of Thinking, Willing and Feeling, 
 respectively, nevertheless, we shall, for con- 
 venience, use the term "Thought" in its 
 broadest, widest and most general sense, 
 as: ''The power or faculty of thinking; the 
 mental faculty; the mind," rather than in its 
 narrower and particular sense of: ''the un- 
 derstanding or cognitive faculty of the 
 mind." Accordingly, we shall include the 
 cultivation of the mental activities known as 
 Attention, Perception, Imagination, etc., to- 
 gether with the strictly cognitive faculties, 
 under the general term of Thought-Culture.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PHASES OF THOUGHT 
 
 We have seen that the Mind is that some- 
 thing within us which Thinks, Feels and 
 Wills. There are various phases of these 
 three forms of activity. These phases have 
 often been called * ' the faculties of the mind, ' ' 
 although many authorities decry the use of 
 this term, holding that it gives an impression 
 of several parts or divisions of the mind, sep- 
 arate and distinct from each other, whereas 
 these phases are merely the several powers or 
 forms of activity of the Mind. Every mani- 
 festation of mental activity falls under one of 
 the three before-mentioned general forms, 
 i. e.. Thinking, Feeling and Willing, respect- 
 ively. Every manifestation of mental activity 
 is either that of the Intellect, the Feelings, or 
 the Will. Let us consider the first of these 
 three general forms of mental activity— the 
 Intellect. 
 
 The Intellect is defined as: ''That faculty 
 
 or phase of the human mind by which it re- 
 
 27
 
 28 Thought Culture 
 
 ceives or comprehends the ideas communi- 
 oated to it by the senses or by perception, or 
 oth-er means, as distinguished from the power 
 to feel and to will ; the power or faculty to per- 
 ceive objects in their relations; the power to 
 judge and comprehend; also the capacity for 
 higher forms of knowledge as distinguished 
 from the power to perceive and imagine.'* 
 The term itself is derived from the Latin term 
 intellectus, the primary meaning of which is 
 *'to choose between," which primary mean- 
 ing will give the true essential meaning of the 
 term in its present usage ; namely, the faculty 
 or phase of the mind by which we ''choose be- 
 tween" things or by which we decide. 
 
 The phase or faculty of Intellect concerns 
 itself with Thinking, in the particular and 
 narrower sense of that term. Its products are 
 thoughts, mental images and ideas. An idea 
 or oriental image is a mental conception of any- 
 thing, as for instance our conception which we 
 express by the terms, mkin, animal, house, etc. 
 Sometimes the word idea is used to express 
 merely the abstract or generalized conception 
 of the thing, as, for instance, Man in the sense 
 of "all men;" while mental image is used in
 
 Phases of Thought 29 
 
 tlie sense of the mental conception of some one 
 particular thing, as a, "a man;" it being held 
 that no mental image can be had of a generali- 
 zation. A thought is held to be a mental prod- 
 uct arising from a combination of two or more 
 ideas or mental images, as for instance: "A 
 horse is an animal ; " " a man is a biped ; ' ' etc. 
 
 The Intellect is held to embrace and include 
 a number of minor phases or faculties, such 
 as Perception, Understanding, Imagination, 
 Memory, Eeason and Intuition, which are ex- 
 plained as follows : 
 
 Perception is that faculty of the Mind which 
 interprets the material presented to it by the 
 senses. It is the power whereby we gain our 
 knowledge of the external world, as reported 
 to us by the channels of sense. Through Per- 
 ception we are able to form ideas and mental 
 images, which in turn lead to thoughts. The 
 objects of which we become conscious through 
 Perception are called percepts, which form the 
 bases of what we call concepts, or ideas. 
 
 Understanding is that faculty of the Mind 
 by the means of which we are able intelli- 
 gently to compare the objects presented to it 
 by Perception, and by which we separate them
 
 30 Thought Culture 
 
 into parts by analysis, or to combine them into 
 greater classes, or wholes, by synthesis. It 
 produces ideas, both abstract and general; 
 also concepts of truths, laws, principles, 
 causes, etc. There are several sub-phases of 
 Understanding, which are known as : Abstrac- 
 tion, Conception or Generalization, or Judg- 
 ment and Reasoning, respectively, which are 
 explained as follows: 
 
 Abstraction is that faculty of the Mind 
 which enables it to abstract, or draw off, and 
 consider apart from an object, a particular 
 quality or property of an object, thus making 
 of the quality or property a distinct object of 
 thought apart from the original object. Thus 
 are the abstract ideas of siveetness, color, 
 hardness, courage, beauty, etc., which we have 
 abstracted or draivn off from their original 
 associations, either for the purpose of putting 
 them out of sight and consideration, or else to 
 view and consider them by themselves. No 
 one ever tasted ''sweetness" although one 
 may have tasted sweet things; no one ever 
 saw ''red," although one may have seen red 
 things; no one ever saw, heard, tasted or felt 
 "courage" in another, although one may have
 
 Phases of Thought 31 
 
 seen courageous people. Abstract ideas are 
 merely the mental concei^tion of qualities or 
 properties divorced from tlieir associated ob- 
 jects by Abstraction. 
 
 Conception or Generalization is that faculty 
 of the Mind by which it forms and groups to- 
 gether several particular ideas in the form of 
 a general idea. By the processes of Concep- 
 tion we foiTB classes or generalizations from 
 particular ideas arising from our percepts. 
 First, we perceive things; then we compare 
 them with each other ; then we abstract their 
 particular qualities, which are not common 
 to the several objects; then we generalize 
 them according to their resemblances; then 
 we name the generalized concept. From these 
 combined processes we form a Concept, or 
 general idea of the class of things to which 
 the particular things belong. Thus from sub- 
 jecting a number of cows to this process, we 
 arrive at the general Concept of ' ' Cow. ' ' This 
 general Concept includes all the qualities and 
 properties common to all cows, while omitting 
 those which are not common to the class. Or, 
 we may form a concept of Napoleon Bona- 
 parte, by combining his several qualities and
 
 32 Thought Culture 
 
 properties and thus form a general idea of the 
 man. 
 
 Judgment is that faculty of the Mind where- 
 by we determine the agreement or disagree- 
 ment between two concepts, ideas, or objects 
 of thought, by comparing them with each 
 other. From this comparison arises the judg- 
 ment, which is expressed in the shape of a 
 logical 'proposition: ''The horse is an ani- 
 mal ; " or ' ' the horse is not a cow. ' ' Judgment 
 is also used in forming a concept, in the first 
 place, for we must compare qualities before 
 we can form a general idea. 
 
 Reasoning is that faculty of the Mind 
 whereby we compare two Judgments, one with 
 the other, and from the comparison deduce a 
 third Judgment. This is a form of indirect or 
 mediate comparison, whereas the Judgment is 
 a form of immediate or direct comparison. 
 From this process of Reasoning arises a re- 
 sult which is expressed in what is called a 
 Syllogism, as for instance: ''All dogs are ani- 
 mals; Carlo is a dog; therefore, Carlo is an 
 animal. ' ' Or expressed in symbols : " A equals 
 C ; and B equals C ; " therefore, ' ' A equals B. ' ' 
 Reasoning is of two kinds or classes ; viz.^ In-
 
 Phases of Thought 33 
 
 ductive and Deductive, respectively. We 
 have explained these forms of Reasoning in 
 detail in another volume of this series. 
 
 The Feelings are the mental faculties 
 whereby we experience emotions or feelings. 
 Feelings are the experiencing of the agreeable 
 or disagreeable nature of our mental states. 
 They can be defined only in their own terms. 
 If we have never experienced a feeling, we 
 cannot understand the words expressing it. 
 Feelings result in what are called emotion, af- 
 fection and desire. An emotion is the simple 
 feeling, such as joy, sorrow, etc. An affection 
 is an emotion reaching out toward another and 
 outside object, such as envy, jealousy, love, etc. 
 A desire is an emotion arising from the want 
 of some lacking quality or thing, and the in- 
 clination to possess it. 
 
 Memory is the faculty of the Mind whereby 
 we retain and reproduce, or consciously revive 
 any kind of past mental experience. It has 
 two sub-phases ; viz., Retention and Recollec- 
 tion, respectively. It manifests in the storing 
 away of mental images and ideas, and in the 
 reproduction of them at a later period of time.
 
 34 Thought Cultuke 
 
 and also of the recognition of them as objects 
 of past experience. 
 
 Imagination is the faculty of the Mind 
 whereby we represent (re-present) as a 
 mental image some previously experienced 
 idea7 concept or image. Its activities are 
 closely allied and blended with those of the 
 Memory. It has the power not only of repro- 
 ducing objects already perceived but also an- 
 other power of ideal creation whereby it 
 creates new combinations from the materials 
 of past experience. It is a faculty, the im- 
 portance of which is but little understood by 
 the majority of men. Inasmuch as the mental 
 image must always precede the material mani- 
 festation, the cultivation of the Imagination 
 becomes a matter of great importance and 
 worthy of the closest study. 
 
 Intuition is the faculty of the Mind whereby 
 it evolves what have been called Primary 
 Truths or Primary Ideas. By Primary Ideas 
 are meant the ideas of Space, Time, Cause, 
 Identity, etc. By Primary Truths are meant 
 the so-called ''Self-Evident Truths" of geom- 
 etry, miathematics and logic. Under the head 
 of Intuition are also sometimes included the
 
 Phases of Thought 35 
 
 activities of the Subconscious or Supercon- 
 soious regions of the mind, of which we have 
 spoken in detail in a volume under that name 
 of this series. Some authorities hold to the 
 older idea of *' Innate Ideas" by which is 
 meant that every hiunan being is born with the 
 knowledge of certain fundamental truths, un- 
 connected with any experience. Others hold 
 that these ideas are simply the result of the 
 experience of the race, transmitted to us as 
 *'germ ideas" which must grow by experience 
 and exercise. 
 
 That each and every faculty of the Mind 
 may be strengthened and developed by Cul- 
 ture and Exercise is now held to be a fact by 
 nearly every authority worthy of that name. 
 Just as the physical muscle may be cultivated 
 by the proper methods, so may the mental 
 faculties be strengthened and cultivated by 
 the appropriate methods and means. Inas- 
 much as the majority of the race are deficient 
 in the development of one or more of the lead- 
 ing mental faculties, it becomes a matter of 
 great interest and importance that all should 
 acquaint themselves with the means whereby
 
 36 Thought Culture 
 
 their deficiencies may be corrected and rem- 
 edied. We shall now proceed to the consid- 
 eration of Thought-Culture in general, and 
 then to the consideration of the culture of each 
 particular general faculty, in detail.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THOUGHT-CULTURE 
 
 Thought-Culture is based upon two general 
 scientific facts which may be stated as follows : 
 
 I. The brain centres of thought may be 
 developed by exercise. While we do not as- 
 sert that the brain and the mind are identical, 
 it is nevertheless a scientific truth that *'the 
 brain is the organ of the mind" and that one 
 of the first requisites for a good mind is a good 
 brain. It has been proven by experiment that 
 the brain-cells concerned in special mental ac- 
 tivities multiply in proportion to the active use 
 of the special faculties employed in the mental 
 operation. It has also been ascertained that 
 disuse of special faculties of the mind tends to 
 cause a process akin to atrophy in the brain- 
 cells concerned in the particular activity, so 
 that it becomes difficult to think clearly along 
 those particular lines after a long period of 
 disuse. Moreover, it is known that the educa- 
 tion and mental culture of a child is accom- 
 panied by an increase and development of the 
 
 37
 
 38 Thought Culture 
 
 brain-cells connected witli the particular fields 
 of thought in which the child is exercised. 
 
 There is a close analogy between the exer- 
 cise of the brain-cells and the exercise of the 
 muscles of the body. Both respond to reason- 
 able exercise ; both are injured by overwork ; 
 both degenerate by disuse. As Brooks says : 
 ''The mind grows by its own inherent ener- 
 gies. Mental exercise is thus the law of men- 
 tal development. As a muscle grows strong 
 by use, so any faculty of the mind is developed 
 by its proper use and exercise. An inactive 
 mind, like an unused muscle, becomes weak 
 and unskilful. Hang the arm in a sling and 
 the muscle becomes flabby and loses its vigor 
 and skill ; let the mind remain inactive and it 
 acquires a mental flabbiness that unfits it for 
 any severe or prolonged activity. An idle 
 mind loses its tone and strength like an un- 
 used muscle; the mental powers go to rust 
 through idleness and inaction. To develop 
 the faculties of the mind and secure their high- 
 est activity and efficiency, there must be a con- 
 stant and judicious exercise of these faculties. 
 The object of culture is to stimulate and direct 
 .the activity of the mind."
 
 Thought Culture 39 
 
 Experiments conducted by scientists upon 
 dogs liave shown that in the case of dogs spe- 
 cially trained to unusual mental activity, there 
 has been a corresponding increase of the num- 
 ber of active brain-cells in the particular parts 
 of the brain concerned with those mental ac- 
 tivities. Microscopic examination of the brain 
 tissues showed the greatest difference be- 
 tween the brain structure of the trained dogs 
 and untrained ones of the same brood. So 
 carefully were the experiments conducted that 
 it was possible to distinguish between the 
 dogs trained in one set of activities from those 
 trained in another. Biologists have demon- 
 strated the correctness of the brain-cell de- 
 velopment theory beyond reasonable doubt, 
 and ordinary human experience also adds its 
 testimony in its favor. 
 
 In view of the above, it will be seen that by 
 intelligent exercise and use any and all facul- 
 ties of the mind may be developed and culti- 
 vated, just as may any special muscle of the 
 body. And this exercise can come only from 
 actual use of the faculties themselves. De- 
 velopment must come from within and not 
 from without. No system of outward stimula-
 
 40 Thought Culture 
 
 tion will develop the faculties of the mind— 
 they may be cultivated only by an exercise in 
 their own particular field of work. The only 
 way to exercise any particular faculty of 
 thought is to think through that faculty. 
 
 II. Not only are the brain-cells developed 
 by exercise, but it also appears to be a fact 
 that the mind appears actually to be nourished 
 by knowledge of the outside world of things. 
 The raw material of thought is taken into the 
 mind and there is digested by the thought- 
 processes, and is afterward actually assimi- 
 lated by the mind in a manner strikingly sim- 
 ilar to the processes of the physical organs of 
 nutrition. A mind to be at its best must be 
 supplied with a normal amount of mental 
 nourishment. Lacking this, it tends to become 
 weak and inefficient. And, likewise, if its 
 owner is a mental glutton and furnishes too 
 much nourishment, particularly of a rich kind, 
 there is a tendency toward "mental dyspep- 
 sia" and indigestion— the mind, unable to as- 
 similate the mental food furnished it, is in- 
 clined to rebel. Moreover, if the mind be sup- 
 plied with mental food of only one kind— if the 
 mind is confined to one narrow field of thought
 
 Thought Culture 41 
 
 —it weakens and the mental processes become 
 impaired. In many ways is this curious anal- 
 ogy apparent. 
 
 Not only does the mind need development, 
 but it also needs intelligent cultivation. For 
 it may be developed by improper objects of 
 thought just as well as by the proper ones. A 
 rich field will grow tares and weeds as well as 
 good grain or fruit. Thought-culture should 
 not be confined to the development of a strong 
 and active mind, but should be also extended 
 to the cultivation of a luise and intelligent 
 mind. Strength and Wisdom should be com- 
 bined. Moreover there should be sought a 
 harmonious and normal development. A one- 
 sided mental development is apt to produce 
 a ' ' crank, ' ' while a development in unhealthy 
 mental fields will produce an abnormal thinker 
 tending dangerously near to the line of insan- 
 ity. Some ' ' one-idea ' ' men have great mental 
 power and development, but are nevertheless 
 unbalanced and impractical. And insane per- 
 sons often have strongly developed minds— 
 developed abnormally. 
 
 Some authorities, holding special theories 
 regarding the nature of mind, hold that
 
 42 Thought Culture 
 
 Thought-Culture is merely a training of tlie 
 faculties rather than a creation of new mental 
 power, inasmuch as the mind cannot be built 
 up from the outside. This is a curious com- 
 bination of truth and error. It is true that the 
 mind cannot be built up from outside material, 
 in the sense of creating neiv mind, but it is also 
 true that in every mind there is the potential- 
 ity of growth and development. Just as the 
 future oak is said to be in the acorn, so are the 
 potentialities of mind-growth in every mind 
 waiting for nourishment from outside and the 
 proper cultivation. Brooks has well stated 
 this, as follows: ''The culture of the mind is 
 not creative in its character ; its object is to de- 
 velop existing possibilities into realities. The 
 mind possesses innate powers which may be 
 awakened into a natural activity. The design 
 of culture is to aid nature in improving the 
 powers she has given. No new power can be 
 created by culture; we can increase the activ- 
 ity of these powers, but cannot develop any 
 new activities. Through these activities new 
 ideas and thoughts may be developed, and the 
 sum of human knowledge increased ; but this 
 is accomplished by a high activity of the nat-
 
 Thought Culture 43 
 
 nral powers witli wliieli the mind is endowed, 
 and not by the culture of new powers. The 
 profound philosopher uses the same faculties 
 that the little child is developing in the games 
 of the nursery. The object of culture is to 
 arouse the powers which nature has given us 
 into a normal activity and to stimulate and 
 guide them in their unfolding." 
 
 In connection with the objection above men- 
 tioned, it may be said that while the develop- 
 ment of the mind must come from within it- 
 self, rather than from without, nevertheless, 
 in order to develop, it must have the nourish- 
 ing material from the outside world in order 
 to grow. Just as the body can grow from 
 within only by the aid of nourishment from 
 outside, so the mind, while growing from 
 within, needs the material for thought which 
 can come only from without itself. Thought 
 requires ''things" upon which to exercise it- 
 self—and upon which it is nourished. With- 
 out these outside objects, it can have no exer- 
 cise and can receive no nourishment. Thought 
 consists in the perception, examination and 
 comparison of things, and the consequent 
 building up new combinations, arrangements
 
 44 Thought Culture 
 
 and syntheses. Therefore, the perceptive fac- 
 ulties are most necessary to Thought, and 
 their culture is most necessary in the general 
 work of Thought-Culture. 
 
 It must not be lost sight of that in Thought- 
 Culture there is necessary a variety of exer- 
 cises and forms of nourishment. What will 
 develop one faculty will exert but a faint ef- 
 fect upon others. Each needs its own particu- 
 lar kind of exercise— each its particular kind 
 of mental nourishment. While it is true that 
 there is a certain benefit gained by the entire 
 mind from an exercise of any of its parts, this 
 effect is but secondary in importance. A man 
 well developed mentally has been developed in 
 each faculty, each in its own way. The faculty 
 of perception requires objects of perception; 
 the faculty of unagination requires objects of 
 imagination; the faculty of reasoning re- 
 quires objects of reasoning; and so on, each 
 requiring objects of exercise and nourishment 
 of its own kind— in its own class. In some 
 persons some of the faculties are well devel- 
 oped while others are deficient. It follows 
 that in such a case the weak faculties should 
 be developed first, that they be brought up to
 
 Thought Culture 45 
 
 the general standard. Then a further general 
 development may be midertaken if desired. 
 Moreover, in general development, it will be 
 found that certain faculties will respond more 
 readily to the cultivation given, while others 
 will be slow to respond. In such cases wisdom 
 dictates that a greater degree of exercise and 
 nourishment be given to the slower and less 
 responsible faculties, while the more respon- 
 sive be given but a lighter development. In 
 Thought-Culture as in physical culture, the 
 less developed and slower responding parts 
 should be given special attention. 
 
 In the following chapters we shall point out 
 the methods and exercises calculated to de- 
 velop the several faculties of the mind to the 
 best advantage, in each case giving general 
 advice along the lines of the cultivation of the 
 particular faculty which will serve as general 
 instruction regarding its culture. The stu- 
 dent should carefully study the entire work 
 before he attempts to specialize in the devel- 
 opment of any particular faculty. The par- 
 ticular work may be aided by an acquaintance 
 with the entire field of Thought-Culture for
 
 46 Thought Culture 
 
 many of the faculties shade into eaeli other in 
 their activities and are always more or less 
 interdependent. For, be it remembered, the 
 mind is a ivhole, and not a mere aggregation 
 of many parts. To understand the parts, one 
 must study the whole— to understand the 
 whole, one must study the parts.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ATTENTION 
 
 Attention is not a faculty of the mind in the 
 same sense as perception, abstraction, judg- 
 ment, etc., but is rather in the nature of an act 
 of will concerned in the focusing of the con- 
 sciousness upon some object of thought pre- 
 sented or represented to the mind. In some 
 respects it bears a resemblance to Abstrac- 
 tion, inasmuch as it sets aside some particular 
 object for the consideration of the conscious- 
 ness, to the exclusion of other objects. Way- 
 land explains attention as a condition of mind 
 in which the consciousness is excited and di- 
 rected by an act of the will. Hamilton says : 
 ** Consciousness may be compared to a tele- 
 scope; Attention is the pulling out and press- 
 ing in of the tubes in accommodating the focus 
 of the eye;" and also that: "An act of atten- 
 tion, that is an act of concentration, seems 
 thus necessary to every exertion of conscious- 
 ness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is 
 requisite to every exertion of vision. . . . 
 
 47
 
 48 Thought Cultuke 
 
 Attention then is to consciousness what the 
 contraction of the pupil is to sight, or to the 
 eye of the mind what the microscope or tele- 
 scope is to the bodily eye. ... It consti- 
 tutes the better half of all intellectual power. " 
 
 Brodie says that: *'It is Attention, much 
 more than any difference in the abstract power 
 of reasoning, which constitutes the vast dif- 
 ference which exists between minds of differ- 
 ent individuals." Butler says: ''The most 
 important intellectual habit that I know of is 
 the habit of attending exclusively to the mat- 
 ter in hand. . . . It is commonly said that 
 genius cannot be infused by education, yet 
 this power of concentrated attention, which 
 belongs as a part of his gift to every great dis- 
 coverer, is unquestionably capable of almost 
 indefinite augmentation by resolute practice. ' ' 
 And Beattie says : ' ' The force wherewith any- 
 thing strikes the mind is generally in propor- 
 tion to the degree of attention bestowed upon 
 it." 
 
 Realizing the importance of attention, the 
 student will naturally wish to cultivate the 
 power of bestowing it when necessary. The 
 first role in the cultivation of the attention is
 
 Attention 49 
 
 that the student shall carefully acquire the 
 habit of thinking of or doing but one thing at 
 a time. This first rule may seem easy, but in 
 practice it will be found very difficult of ob- 
 servance, so careless are the majority of us in 
 our actions and thinking. Not only will the 
 trouble and care bestowed upon the acquiring 
 of this habit of thought and action be well re- 
 paid by the development of the attention, but 
 the student will also acquire a facility for ac- 
 complishing his tasks quickly and thoroughly. 
 As Kay says : ' ' There is nothing that contrib- 
 utes more to success in any pursuit than that 
 of having the attention concentrated on the 
 matter in hand ; and, on the contrary, nothing 
 is more detrimental than when doing one thing 
 to have the mind taken up with something 
 else." And as Granville says: '*A frequent 
 cause of failure in the faculty of attention is 
 striving to think of more than one thing at a 
 time." Kay also well says: ''If we would 
 possess the power of attention in a high de- 
 gree, we must cultivate the habit of attending 
 to what is directly before the mind, to the ex- 
 clusion of all else. All distracting thoughts 
 and feelings that tend to withdraw the mind
 
 50 Thought Culture 
 
 from what is immediately before it are there- 
 fore to be carefully avoided. This is a matter 
 of great importance, and of no little difficulty. 
 Frequently the mind, in place of being con- 
 centrated on what is immediately before it, is 
 thinking of something else— something, it may 
 be, that went before or that may come after, 
 or something quite alien to the subject." 
 
 The following principles of the application 
 of the attention have been stated by the au- 
 thorities : 
 
 I. The attention attaches more readily to 
 interesting than to uninteresting things. 
 
 II. The attention will decline in strengfh 
 unless there is a variation in the stimulus, 
 either by a change of object or the developing 
 of some new attribute in the object. 
 
 III. The attention, when tired by continu- 
 ous direction toward some unvarying object, 
 may be revived by directing it toward some 
 new object or in allowing it to be attracted and 
 held by some passing object. 
 
 IV. The attention manifests in a two-fold 
 activity; viz. (1) the concentration upon some 
 one object of thought; and (2) the shutting out 
 of outside objects. Thus, it has its positive and
 
 Attention 51 
 
 negative sides. Thus, when a man wishes to 
 give his undivided attention to one speaker in 
 a crowd of speaking individuals, he acts posi- 
 tively in focusing his consciousness upon the 
 selected individual, and negatively by refus- 
 ing to listen to the others. 
 
 V. The attention is not a faculty, but a 
 means of using any faculty with an increased 
 degree of efficiency. 
 
 VI. The degree of attention possessed by 
 an individual is an indication of his power of 
 using his intellect. Many authorities have 
 held that, in cases of genius, the power of con- 
 centrated attention is usually greatly devel- 
 oped. Brooks says : * ' Attention is one of the 
 principal elements of genius." Hamilton 
 says : ' ' G-enius is a higher capacity of atten- 
 tion." Helvetius says: '^ Genius is nothing 
 but protracted attention." Chesterfield says : 
 ' * The power of applying our attention, steady 
 and undissipated, to a single object is a sure 
 mark of superior genius." 
 
 The attention may be cultivated, just as 
 may be the various faculties of the mind, by 
 the two-fold method of Exercise and Nourish-
 
 52 Thought Culture 
 
 ment; that is, by using and employing it ac- 
 tively and by furnishing it with the proper 
 materials with which to feed its strength. The 
 way to exercise the attention is to use it fre- 
 quently in every-day life. If you are listening 
 to a man speaking, endeavor to give to him 
 your undivided attention, and, at the same 
 time, to shut out from your consciousness 
 every other object. In working, we should 
 endeavor to use the attention by concentrating 
 our interest upon the particular task before 
 us to the exclusion of all else. In reading, we 
 should endeavor to hold our minds closely to 
 the text instead of hastily glancing over the 
 page as so many do. 
 
 Those who wish to cultivate their attention 
 should take up some line of study in which it is 
 necessary to fasten the attention firmly for a 
 time. A half-hour's study in this way is worth 
 more than hours of careless reading so far as 
 the cultivation of the attention is concerned. 
 Mathematics is most valuable in the direction 
 of developing the power of attention. Gib- 
 bon says : ''After a rapid glance on the subject 
 and distribution of a new book, I suspend the 
 reading of it which I only resume after having
 
 Attention 53 
 
 myself examined tlie subject in all its 
 relations." 
 
 Some writers have held that the attention 
 may be developed by the practice of selecting 
 the voice of one person speaking among a 
 crowd of speakers, and deliberately shutting 
 out the other sounds, giving the whole atten- 
 tion to the particular speaker ; or, in the same 
 manner, selecting one singer in a church choir 
 or band of singers ; or one musical instrument 
 in an orchestra; or one piece of machinery 
 making sounds in a room filled with various 
 machines, etc. The practice of so doing is 
 held to strengthen one's powers of concentra- 
 tion and attention. 
 
 Draper says: "Although many images may 
 be simultaneously existing upon the retina, 
 the mind possesses the power of singling out 
 any one of them and fastening attention upon 
 it, just as among a number of musical instru- 
 ments simultaneously played, one, and that 
 perhaps the feeblest, may be selected and its 
 notes exclusively followed." And as Taylor 
 says: ''In a concert of several voices, the 
 voices being of nearly equal intensity, re- 
 garded merely as organic impressions on the
 
 54 Thought Culture 
 
 auditory nerve, we select one, and at will we 
 lift out and disjoin it from the general volume 
 of sound; we shut off the other voices— five, 
 ten and more— and follow this one alone. 
 When we have done so for a time, we freely 
 cast it off and take up another." Carpenter 
 says: "The more completely the mental en- 
 ergy can be brought into one focus and all dis- 
 tracting objects excluded, the more powerful 
 will be the volitional effort. " ' 
 
 Many authorities hold that the attention 
 may be best applied and exercised by analyz- 
 ing an object mentally, and then considering 
 its parts one by one by a process of abstrac- 
 tidn. Thus, as Kays says: ''An apple pre- 
 sents to us form, color, taste, smell, etc., and if 
 we would obtain a clear idea of any one of 
 these, we must contemplate it by itself and 
 compare it with other impressions of the same 
 kind we have previously experienced. So in 
 viewing a landscape, it is not enough to re- 
 gard it merely as a whole, but we must regard 
 each of its different parts individually by it- 
 self if we would obtain a clear idea of it. We 
 can only obtain a full and complete knowledge 
 of an object hy analyzing it and concentraiing
 
 Attention 55 
 
 the attention upon its different parts, one hy 
 one.'' Reid says : "It is not by the senses im- 
 mediately, but rather by the power of analyz- 
 ing and abstraction, that we get the most sim- 
 ple and the most distinct notions of objects of 
 sense." And, as Brown says : *'It is scarcely 
 possible to advance even a single step in in- 
 tellectual physics without the necessity of per- 
 forming some sort of analysis." In all pro- 
 cesses requiring analysis and examination of 
 parts, properties or qualities, the attention is 
 actively employed. Accordingly, it follows 
 that such exercises are best adapted to the 
 work of developing and cultivating the atten- 
 tion itself. Therefore, as a parting word we 
 may say: To develop and cultivate the power 
 of attention and concentration, (1) Analyse; 
 (2) Analyze; and (3) Analyze. Analyze 
 everything and everybody with ivhich or whom 
 you come in contact. There is no better or 
 shorter rule. 
 
 The student will also find that the various 
 directions and the advice which we shall give 
 in the succeeding chapters, regarding the cul- 
 tivation of the various faculties, are also 
 adapted to the development of the attention,
 
 56 Thought Culture 
 
 for the latter is brought into active play in 
 them. And, likewise, by developing the atten- 
 tion, one may practice the future exercises 
 with greater effect.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PERCEPTION 
 
 In preceding chapters we liave seen that in 
 the phase of mental activity in which the In- 
 tellect is concerned, the processes of which 
 are known as ''Thought" in the narrower 
 sense of the term, there are several stages or 
 steps involving the use of several faculties of 
 the mind. The first of these steps or stages is 
 called Perception. 
 
 Many persons confuse the idea of Sensation 
 and Perception, but there is a clear distinction 
 between them. Sensations arise from nerve 
 action— from the stimulation of nerve sub- 
 stance—which gives rise to a peculiar effect 
 upon the brain, which results in an elementary 
 form of consciousness. An authority says: 
 "Sensation is the peculiar property of the 
 nervous system in a state of activity, by which 
 impressions are conveyed to the brain or sen- 
 sorium. When an impression is made upon 
 any portion of the bodily surface by contact, 
 heat, electricity, light, or any other agent, the 
 
 57
 
 58 Thought Culture 
 
 mind is rendered conscious of this by sensa- 
 tion. In the process there are three stages- 
 reception of the impression at the end of the 
 sensory nerve, the conduction of it along the 
 nerve trunk to the sensorium, and the change 
 it excites in the sensorium itself, through 
 which is produced sensation. 
 
 Just why and how this nerve action is trans- 
 lated into consciousness of an elementary 
 kind, science is unable to explain. Our knowl- 
 edge is based in a great part, or entirely, upon 
 impressions which have been received over 
 the channel of the senses— sensations of sight, 
 hearing, tasting, smelling and touch. Many 
 authorities hold that all of the five senses are 
 modifications of the sense of touch, or feeling ; 
 as for instance, the impression upon the or- 
 gans of sight is really in the nature of a deli- 
 cate touch or feeling of the light-waves as 
 they come in contact with the nerves of vision, 
 etc. But, although sensations give us the 
 raw materials of thought, so to speak, they are 
 not knowledge in themselves. Knowledge 
 arises from the operation of Perception upon 
 this raw material of Sensation. 
 
 But yet. Sensation plays a most active part
 
 Perception 59 
 
 in the presentation of the raw material for the 
 Perceptive faculties, and must not be re- 
 garded as merely a physiological process. It 
 may be said to be the connecting link between 
 the physical and the mental activities. As 
 Ziehen says: ''It follows that the constitu- 
 tion of the nervous system is an essential fac- 
 tor in determining the quality of sensation. 
 This fact reveals the obvious error of former 
 centuries, first refuted by Locke, though still 
 shared by naive thought today, that the ob- 
 jects about us themselves are colored, warm, 
 cold, etc. As external to our consciousness, 
 we can only assume matter, vibrating with 
 molecular motion and permeated by vibrating 
 particles of ether. The nervous apparatus 
 selects only certain motions of matter or of 
 ether, which they transform into that form of 
 nerve excitation with which they are fa- 
 miliar. It is only this nerve excitation that we 
 perceive as red, warm or hard." 
 
 Passing from Sensation to Perception, we 
 see that the latter interprets the reports of 
 the former. Perception translates into con- 
 sciousness the impressions of Sensation. Per- 
 ception, acting through one or more of the
 
 60 Thought Culture 
 
 mental faculties, gives us our first hit of real 
 knowledge. Sensation may give us the im- 
 pression of a small moving thing— Perception 
 translates this into the thought of a cat. Sen- 
 sation is a mere /eeZm^— Perception is the 
 thought arising from that feeling. A Percept 
 is the product of Perception, or in other words, 
 our idea gained through Perception. The ma- 
 jority of our percepts are complex, being built 
 up from a number of minor percepts ; as for 
 instance, our percept of a peach is built up 
 from our minor percepts of the form, shape, 
 color, weight, degree of hardness, smell, taste, 
 etc., of the peach, each sense employed giving 
 minor percepts, the whole being combined in 
 the conscious as the whole percept of that par- 
 ticular peach. 
 
 Brooks says: "All knowledge does not 
 come directly from perception through the 
 senses, however. We have a knowledge of ex- 
 ternal objects, and we have a knowledge that 
 transcends this knowledge of external objects. 
 Perception is the immediate source of the first 
 kind of knowledge, and the indirect source of 
 the second kind of knowledge. This distinc- 
 tion is often expressed by the terms cause
 
 Perception 61 
 
 and occasion. Thus perception is said to be 
 the cause of our knowledge of objects, since it 
 is the immediate source of such knowledge. 
 Perception is also said to be the occasion of 
 the ideas and truths of intuition ; for, though 
 in a sense necessary to these ideas, it is not the 
 source of them. Perception also furnishes 
 the understanding with materials out of which 
 it derives ideas and truths beyond the field of 
 sense. As thus attaining a knowledge of ex- 
 ternal objects, affording material for the op- 
 erations of the understanding, and furnishing 
 the occasion for the activity of the intuitive 
 power, perception may he said to lie at the 
 basis of all knoivledge." 
 
 Perception is of course manifest in all per- 
 sons. But it varies greatly in degree and 
 power. Moreover, it may be developed and 
 cultivated to a great degree. As Perception 
 is an interpretation of the impression of the 
 senses, we often confuse the cultivation of 
 Perception with the development of the senses 
 themselves. Two persons of equally perfect 
 sense of sight may vary greatly in their degree 
 of Perception of sight impressions. One may 
 be a most careless observer, while the other
 
 62 Thought Culture 
 
 may be a very close observer and able to dis- 
 tinguish many points of interest and import- 
 ance in the object viewed which are not ap- 
 parent to the first observer. Cultivation of 
 Perception is cultivation of the mental back- 
 ground of the senses, rather than of the sense 
 organs themselves. The Perception accom- 
 panying each sense may be developed and cul- 
 tivated separately from that accompanying 
 the others. 
 
 The majority of persons are very careless 
 observers. They will see things without per- 
 ceiving the qualities, properties, character- 
 istics, or parts which together make up those 
 things. Two persons, possessed of equal de- 
 grees of eyesight, will walk through a forest. 
 Both of them will see trees. To one of them 
 there will be but trees perceived ; while to the 
 other there will be a perception of the differ- 
 ent species of trees, with their varying bark, 
 leaves, shape, etc. One perceives simply a 
 **pile of stone," which to the perception of 
 another will be recognized as granite, marble, 
 etc. Brooks says: ''Very few persons can 
 tell the difference between the number of legs 
 of a fly and of a spider; and I have known
 
 Perception 63 
 
 farmers' boys and girls who could not tell 
 whether the ears of a cow are in front of her 
 horns, above her horns, below her horns, or 
 behind her horns." Halleck says of a test in 
 a schoolroom: *' Fifteen pupils were sure 
 that they had seen cats climb trees and de- 
 scend them. There was a unanimity of opinion 
 that the cats went up head first. When asked 
 whether the cats came down head or tail first, 
 the majority were sure that the cats descended 
 as they were never known to do. Anyone who 
 had ever noticed the shape of the claws of any 
 beast of prey could have answered that ques- 
 tion without seeing an actual descent. Farm- 
 ers' boys, who have often seen cows and horses 
 lie down and rise, are seldom sure whether the 
 animals rise with their fore or hind feet first, 
 or whether the habit of the horse agrees with 
 that of the cow in this respect." 
 
 Brooks well says: "Modern education 
 tends to the neglect of the culture of the per- 
 ceptive powers. In ancient times people 
 studied nature much more than at present. 
 Being without books, they were compelled to 
 depend upon their eyes and ears for knowl- 
 edge; and this made their senses active,
 
 64 Thought Culture 
 
 searching and exact. At the present day, we 
 study books for a knowledge of external 
 things ; and we study them too much or too ex- 
 clusively, and thus neglect the cultivation of 
 the senses. We get our knowledge of the ma- 
 terial world second-hand, instead of fresh 
 from the open pages of the book of nature. Is 
 it not a great mistake to spend so much time in 
 school and yet not know the difference be- 
 tween the leaf of a beech and of an oak; or 
 not be able to distinguish between specimens 
 of marble, quartz, and granite? The neglect 
 of the culture of the perceptive powers is 
 shown by the scholars of the present time. 
 Very few educated men are good observers; 
 indeed, the most of them are sadly deficient 
 in this respect. . . . They were taught to 
 think and remember ; but were not taught to 
 use their eyes and ears. In modern education, 
 books are used too much like spectacles, and 
 the result is the blunting of the natural powers 
 of perception." 
 
 The first principle in the Cultivation of Per- 
 ception is the correct use of the Attention. 
 The intelligent control of voluntary attention 
 is a prerequisite to clear and distinct percep-
 
 Perception 65 
 
 tion. We have called your attention to this 
 matter in the preceding chapter. Halleck 
 says: *'A body may be imaged on the retina 
 without insuring perception. There must be 
 an effort to concentrate the attention upon the 
 many things which the world presents to our 
 senses. . . . Perception, to achieve satis- 
 factory results, must summon the will to its 
 aid to concentrate the attention. Only the 
 smallest part of what falls upon our senses 
 at any time is actually perceived. ' ' 
 
 The sense of sight is perhaps the one of the 
 greatest importance to us, and accordingly the 
 cultivation of Perception with regard to im- 
 pressions received through the eye is the most 
 important for the ordinary individual. As 
 Kay says : "To see clearly is a valuable aid 
 even to thinking clearly. In all our mental 
 operations we owe much to sight. To recol- 
 lect, to think, to imagine, is to see internally,— 
 to call up more or less visual images of things 
 before the mind. In order to understand a 
 thing it is generally necessary to see it, and 
 what a man has not seen he cannot properly 
 realize or image distinctly to his mind. . . . 
 It is by the habitual direction of our attention
 
 66 Thought Culture 
 
 to the effects produced upon our conscious- 
 ness by the impressions made upon the eye 
 and transmitted to the sensorium that our 
 sight, like our other senses, is trained." Bain 
 says: ''Cohering trains and aggregates of 
 the sensations of sight make more than any 
 other thing, perhaps more than all other things 
 put together, the material of thought, memory 
 and imagination. ' ' Vinet says : ' ' The child, 
 and perhaps the man as well, only knows well 
 what is shown him, and the image of things 
 is the true medium between their abstract idea 
 and his personal experience." This being 
 the case, advice concerning the Cultivation of 
 Perception must needs be directed mainly to 
 the cultivation of the perception of sight- 
 impressions. 
 
 Brooks says: "We should acquire the 
 habit of observi.i:ig with attention. Many per- 
 sons look at objects with a careless, inattentive 
 eye. We should guard against the habit of 
 careless looking. We should fix the mind 
 upon the object before us ; we should concen- 
 trate the attention upon that upon which we 
 are looking. Attention, in respect to Percep- 
 tion, has been compared to a burning glass;
 
 Perception" 67 
 
 hold the sun-glass between the snn and a 
 board and the concentrated rays will burn a 
 hole through the latter. So attention concen- 
 trates the rays of perceptive power and en- 
 ables the mind to penetrate below the surface 
 of things." 
 
 The best authorities agree in the idea that 
 the Perception may be best cultivated by ac- 
 quiring the habit of examining things in detail. 
 And, that this examination in detail is best 
 manifested by examining the parts going to 
 make up a complex thing, separately, rather 
 than examining the thing as a whole. Halleck 
 says regarding this point : ' ' To look at things 
 intelligently is the most difficult of all arts. 
 The first rule for the cultivation of accurate 
 perception is: Do not try to perceive the 
 whole of a complex object at once. Take the 
 human face for example. A man holding an 
 important position to which he had been 
 elected offended many people because he could 
 not remember faces, and hence failed to recog- 
 nize individuals the second time he met them. 
 His trouble was in looking at the countenance 
 as a whole. When he changed his method of 
 observation, and noticed carefully the nose,
 
 ^8 Thought Cultuke 
 
 mouth, eyes, chin and color of hair, he at once 
 began to find recognition easier. He was no 
 longer in danger of mistaking A for B, since 
 he remembered that the shape of B 's nose was 
 different, or the color of his hair at least three 
 shades lighter. This example shows that an- 
 other rule can be formulated: Pay careful 
 attention to details. ... To see an object 
 merely as an undiscriminated mass of some- 
 thing in a certain place is to do no more than 
 a donkey accomplishes as he trots along." 
 
 Brooks says regarding the same point : ' ' To 
 train the powers of observation we should 
 practice observing minutely. We should an- 
 alyze the objects which we look at into their 
 parts, and notice these parts. Objects present 
 themselves to us as wholes ; our definite knowl- 
 edge of them is gained by analysis, by separat- 
 ing them into the elements which compose 
 them. We should therefore give attention to 
 the details of whatever we are considering; 
 and thus cultivate the habit of observing with 
 minuteness. ... It is related of a teacher 
 that if, when hearing a class, some one rapped 
 at the door, he would look up as the visitor 
 entered and from a single glance could tell
 
 Perception 69 
 
 his appearance and dress, the kind of hat he 
 wore, kind of necktie, collar, vest, coat, shoes, 
 etc. The skillful banker, also, in counting 
 money with wondrous rapidity, will detect and 
 throw from his pile of bills the counterfeits 
 which, to the ordinary eye, seem to be without 
 spot or blemish. ' ' 
 
 One of the best methods of developing and 
 cultivating the faculty of Perception is to take 
 up some study in which the perceptive facul- 
 ties must be employed. Botany, physics, ge- 
 ology, natural history give splendid exercise 
 in Perception, providing the student engages 
 in actual experimental work, and actual obser- 
 vation, instead of confining himself to the text- 
 books. A careful scientific study and examin- 
 ation of any kind of objects, in a manner cal- 
 culated to bring out the various points of re- 
 semblance and difference, will do most to de- 
 velop the Perception. Training of this kind 
 will develop these powers to a high degree, in 
 the case of small children. , 
 
 Drawing is also a great help to the develop- 
 ment of Perception. In order to draw a thing 
 correctly we must of necessity examine it in 
 detail ; otherwise we will not be able to draw
 
 70 Thought Culture 
 
 it correctly. In fact, many authorities use the 
 test of drawing to prove the degree of atten- 
 tion and Perception that the student has be- 
 stowed upon an object which he has been 
 studying. Others place an object before the 
 pupil for a few minutes, and then withdraw 
 it, the pupil then being required to draw the 
 object roughly but with attention to its lead- 
 ing peculiarities and features. Then the ob- 
 ject is again placed before the pupil for study, 
 and he is then again required to draw from 
 memory the additional details he has noticed 
 in it. This process is repeated over and over 
 again, until the pupil has proved that he has 
 observed every possible detail of interest in 
 the object. This exercise has resulted in the 
 cultivation of a high degree of perception in 
 many students, and its simplicity should not 
 detract from its importance. Any person may 
 practice this exercise by himself; or, better 
 still, two or more students may combine and 
 endeavor to excel each other in friendly riv- 
 alry, each endeavoring to discover the great- 
 est number of details in the object considered. 
 So rapidly do students improve under this 
 exercise, that a daily record will show a steady
 
 Perception 71 
 
 advance. Simple exercises in drawing are 
 found in the reproduction, from memory, of 
 geography maps, leaves of trees, etc. 
 
 Similar exercises may be found in the prac- 
 tice of taking a hasty look at a person, animal 
 or building, and then endeavoring to repro- 
 duce in writing the particular points about the 
 person or thing observed. This exercise will 
 reveal rapid progress if persisted in. Or, it 
 may be varied by endeavoring to write out 
 the contents of a room through which one has 
 walked. 
 
 The majority of our readers remember the 
 familiar story of Houdin, who so cultivated 
 the faculty of Perception that he was able to 
 pass by a shop-window and afterward state 
 in detail every object in the window. He ac- 
 quired this power by gradual development, 
 beginning with the observation of a single 
 article in the window, then two, then three 
 and so on. Others have followed his method 
 with great success. Speaking of Houdin 's 
 wonderful Perception, Halleck says: ''A 
 wide-awake eagle would probably see more 
 of a thing at one glance than would a drowsy 
 lizard in a quarter of an hour. Extreme rapid-
 
 72 Thought Culture 
 
 ity of Perception, due to careful training, was 
 one of the factors enabling Houdin and his son 
 to astonish everybody and to amass a fortune. 
 He placed a domino before the boy, and in- 
 stead of allowing him to count the spots, re- 
 quired him to give the sum total at once. This 
 exercise was continued until each could give 
 instantaneously the sum of the spots on a 
 dozen dominoes. The sum was given just as 
 accurately as if five minutes had been con- 
 sumed in adding." Houdin, in his Memoirs 
 relating the above facts regarding his own 
 methods, states with due modesty, that many 
 women far excel him in this respect. He says : 
 **I can safely assert that a lady seeing an- 
 other pass at full speed in a carriage will have 
 had time to analyze her toilette from her bon- 
 net to her shoes, and be able to describe not 
 only the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but 
 also say if the lace be real or only machine 
 made. ' * 
 
 There are a number of games played by 
 children which tend to the cultivation of the 
 Perception, and which might well be adapted 
 for the use of older people. These games are 
 based on the general principle of the various
 
 Perception 73 
 
 participants taking a brief view of a number 
 of objects displayed in one's hand, on a table, 
 in a box, etc., and then stating what he or she 
 has seen. There will be noticed a wonderful 
 difference in the degree of Perception mani- 
 fested by the various participants. And, 
 equally interesting will be the degrees of prog- 
 ress noted after playing this game over sev- 
 eral times, allowing time for rest between the 
 series of games. It is a fact well known in 
 police circles that thieves often train boys in 
 this way, following this course by another in 
 which the lads are expected to take in the con- 
 tents of a room, the windows, locks, etc., at a 
 glance. They are then graduated into spies 
 looking out the details of the scenes of future 
 robberies. 
 
 In our volume of this series, devoted to the 
 consideration of the Memory, we have related 
 a number of exercises and methods, similar to 
 those given above, by which the Perception 
 may be cultivated. Perception plays a most 
 important place in memory, for upon the clear- 
 ness of the percepts depends to a great degree 
 the clearness of the impressions made upon 
 the memory. So close is the connection be-
 
 74 Thought Culture 
 
 tween Memory and Perception that the culti- 
 vation of one tends to develop tlie other. For 
 instance, the cultivation of the Memory neces- 
 sitates the sharpening of the Perception in the 
 direction of obtaining clear original impres- 
 sions ; while the cultivation of Perception nat- 
 urally develops the Memory by reason of the 
 fact that the latter is used in testing and prov- 
 ing the clearness and degree of Perception. 
 This being the case, those who find that the ex- 
 ercises and methods given above are too ar- 
 duous may substitute the simple exercise of 
 remembering as many details as possible of 
 things they see. This effort to impress the 
 memory will involuntarily bring into action 
 the perceptive faculties in the acquirement of 
 the original impressions, so that in the end 
 the Perception will be found to have devel- 
 oped. 
 
 Teachers and those having to do with chil- 
 dren should realize the great value of the cul- 
 tivation of Perception in the young, and thus 
 establishing valuable habits of observation 
 among them. The experience and culture thus 
 acquired will prove of great value in their 
 after life. As Brooks well says on this sub-
 
 Perception 75 
 
 ject : ' ' Teachers should appreciate the value 
 of the culture of the perceptive powers, and 
 endeavor to do something to afford this cul- 
 ture. Let it be remembered that by training 
 the powers of observation of pupils, we lead 
 them to acquire definite ideas of things, en- 
 able them to store their minds with fresh and 
 interesting knowledge, lay the foundation for 
 literary or business success, and thus do much 
 to enhance their happiness in life and add to 
 the sum of human knowledge. ' '
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 REPRESENTATION 
 
 Sensation and Perception, as considered in 
 the preceding chapter, are what are called by 
 psychologists ''Processes of Presentation." 
 By Presentation is meant the direct oif ering 
 to the consciousness of mental images or ob- 
 jects of thought. If there were no faculty of 
 the mind capable of retaining and re-present- 
 ing to the consciousness the impression or 
 record of Perception, we could never progress 
 in knowledge, for each percept would be new 
 each time it was presented and there would 
 be no recognition of it as having been previ- 
 ously perceived, nor would there be any power 
 to voluntarily recall any percept previously 
 acquired. In short, we would be without that 
 power of the mind called Memory. 
 
 But, fortunately for us as thinkers, we pos- 
 sess the power of Representation; that is, of 
 reproducing past perceptions and experiences 
 in the shape of mental images or pictures, "in 
 the mind's eye," so to speak, which relieves 
 
 76
 
 Representation 77 
 
 us of the necessity of directly and immedi- 
 ately perceiving an object each time we desire 
 or are required to think of it. The processes 
 whereby this becomes possible are called the 
 processes of Representation, for the reason 
 that by them past experiences of Perception 
 are re-presented to the consciousness. 
 
 The subject of Representation is closely 
 bound up with that of Memory. Strictly 
 speaking, Representation may be said to be 
 one phase of Memory; Association of Ideas 
 another; and the authorities prefer to treat 
 the whole subject under the general head of 
 Memory. We have written a work on ' ' Mem- 
 ory" which forms one of the volumes of the 
 present series, and we have no intention, or 
 desire, to repeat here the information given in 
 that work. But we must consider the subject 
 of Representation at this point in order to 
 maintain the logical unity of the present gen- 
 eral subject of Thought-Culture. The student 
 will also notice, of course, the close relation 
 between the processes of Representation and 
 those of the Imagination, which we shall con- 
 sider in other chapters of this work. 
 
 Memory has several phases, the usual classi-
 
 78 Thought Culture 
 
 fication of which is as follows: (1) Impres- 
 sion; (2) Retention; (3) Recollection; (4) 
 Representation, and (5) Recognition. Each 
 phase requires the operation of special mental 
 processes. Impression is the process whereby 
 the impressions of Perception are recorded or 
 stamped upon the subconscious field of men- 
 tality, as the impress of the die upon the wax. 
 Retention is the process whereby the subcon- 
 sciousness retains or holds the impressions 
 so received. Recollection is the process by 
 which the mind re-collects the impressions re- 
 tained in the subconsciousness, bringing them 
 again into consciousness as objects of knowl- 
 edge. Representation is the process whereby 
 the impressions so re-collected are pictured 
 or imaged in the mind. Recogniton is the 
 process whereby the mind recognizes the men- 
 tal image or picture so re-presented to it as 
 connected with its past experience. 
 
 As we have stated, we have considered the 
 general subject of Memory in another volume 
 of this series and, therefore, shall not attempt 
 to enter into a discussion of its general sub- 
 ject at this place. We shall, accordingly, limit
 
 Kepresentation 79 
 
 ourselves here to a brief consideration of the 
 phase of Representation and its cultivation. 
 
 Representation, of course, depends upon 
 the preceding phases of Memory known as 
 Impression, Retention and Recollection. Un- 
 less the Impression is clear; unless the Reten- 
 tion is normal, there can be no Representation. 
 And unless one recollects there can be no Rep- 
 resentation. Recollection (which is really a 
 re-collection of percepts) must precede Rep- 
 resentation in the shape of mental images or 
 pictures. Recollection re-collects the mental 
 materials out of which the image is to be con- 
 structed. But, as Brooks says : ''Itisnotto 
 be assumed that knowledge is retained as a 
 picture ; but that it is recreated in the form of 
 a picture or some other mental product when 
 it is recalled." The process is analogous to 
 the transmutation of the sound-waves enter- 
 ing the receiver of a telephone, into electrical- 
 waves which are transmitted to the receiver, 
 where they are in turn re-transmuted to 
 sound-waves which enter the ear of the 
 listener. It will be seen at once that there is 
 the closest possible relation between the proc- 
 esses of Representation and those of Memory
 
 80 Thought Culture 
 
 —in fact, it is quite difficult to draw a clear 
 line of division between them. Some make the 
 distinction that Representation furnishes us 
 with an exact reproduction of the past ; while 
 Imagination combines our mental images into 
 new products. That is, Representation merely 
 reproduces; while Imagination creates by 
 forming new combinations ; or Representation 
 deals with a reproduction of the Actual ; while 
 Imagination deals with the Ideal. 
 
 Wundt speaking of this difficult distinc- 
 tion says: "Psychologists are accustomed 
 to define memory images as ideas which ex- 
 actly reproduce some previous perception, 
 and fancy images as ideas consisting of a com- 
 bination of elements taken from a whole num- 
 ber of perceptions. Now memory images in 
 the sense of this definition simply do not exist. 
 . . . Try, for instance, to draw from mem- 
 ory some landscape picture which you have 
 only once seen, and then compare your copy 
 with the original. You will expect to find 
 plenty of mistakes and omissions; but you 
 will also invariably find that you have put in 
 a great deal which was not in the original, but
 
 Representation 81 
 
 which comes from landscape pictures which 
 you have seen somewhere else." 
 
 While we generally speak of Representa- 
 tion picturing the recollected percepts, still, 
 we must not make the mistake of supposing 
 that it is concerned with, or limited to, only 
 mental pictures. We are able to represent 
 not only visual percepts but also sounds, 
 smells, tastes or feelings, often so vividly that 
 they appear as almost actually existent. We 
 may also even represent, symbolically the 
 processes of reasoning, mathematical opera- 
 tions, etc. In short nearly, if not all experi- 
 ences which are possible in Presentation are 
 also possible in Representation. 
 
 The phase of Representation, in the proc- 
 esses of Memory, is of course subject to the 
 general laws of the Cultivation of Memory 
 which we have stated in detail in our previous 
 volume on that subject. But there are some 
 special points of development and cultivation 
 which may be considered briefly in this place. 
 In the first place the importance of Attention 
 and clear Perception, as necessary precedents 
 for clear Representation, may be emphasized. 
 In order to form clear mental images of a
 
 82 Thought Culture 
 
 thing we must have perceived it clearly in the 
 first place. The advice regarding the use of 
 the Attention and Perception given in preced- 
 ing chapters need not be repeated here, but 
 special attention should be directed toward 
 them in connection with the processes of Eep- 
 resentation. If we wish to cultivate the Eep- 
 resentative faculties, we must begin by culti- 
 vating the Presentative faculties. 
 
 Then again we must remember what we 
 have said elsewhere about the facts of de- 
 velopment through (1) Use; and (2) Nourish- 
 ment, in all mental faculties. We must begin 
 to use the faculties of Representation in order 
 to exercise them. We must give them nour- 
 ishment in the shape of objects of mental food. 
 That is to say we must furnish these faculties 
 with materials with which they may grow and 
 develop, and with exercise in order to 
 strengthen the mental-muscle and also to give 
 the faculties the opportunity to "acquire the 
 knack." The exercises and methods recom- 
 mended in our chapter on Perception will fur- 
 nish good material for the Representative 
 faculties ' growing requirements. By perceiv- 
 ing the details of things, one is able to repro-
 
 Representation 83 
 
 duce clear mental images of them. In studying 
 an object, always carry in your mind the fact 
 that you wish to reproduce it in your mind 
 later. In fact, if you have the opportunity, 
 let your mind ''repeat it to itself" as soon as 
 possible after the actual occurrence and ex- 
 perience. Just as you often murmur to your- 
 self, or else write down, the name of a person 
 or place which you have just heard, in order 
 that you may recollect it the better thereafter, 
 so it will be well for you to ''mentally repeat" 
 to yourself the experiences upon which you 
 wish to exercise your Representative facul- 
 ties. 
 
 As to the matter of development and culti- 
 vation by Use, we would advise that you begin 
 gradually to train your mind to reproduce the 
 experiences of the day or week or month, at 
 intervals, until you feel that you are develop- 
 ing a new power in that direction. Tonight, 
 if you try you will find that you can reproduce 
 but a very small part of today's happenings 
 with any degree of clearness. How clearly 
 can you image the places you have been, the 
 appearances of the people you have met, the 
 various details of persons and things which
 
 84 Thought Culture 
 
 you perceived during the experiences of the 
 day? Not very clearly, we dare say. Try 
 again, and you will find that you will be able 
 to add new details. Keep it up until you feel 
 tired or think that you have exhausted all the 
 possibilities of the task. Tomorrow, try it 
 again, and you will find that the second day's 
 experiences are more clearly reproduced in 
 your mind. Each day should find you a little 
 more advanced, until you get to a place where 
 the normal degree of power is attained, when 
 the advance will be slower. 
 
 Then, at the end of the week, review its ex- 
 periences. Do the same the following week. 
 At the end of the month, take a hasty mental 
 trip over the month's experiences. And so 
 on. Exercise, in moderation, along these lines 
 will work wonders for you. Not only will it 
 develop the Representation, but your powers 
 of observation and your general memory will 
 be found to be improved. And, moreover, in 
 *' chewing the mental cud" you will think of 
 many things of interest and importance in con- 
 nection with your work, etc., and your general 
 mental efficiency will be increased for the fac- 
 ulties of the mind are interdependent and 
 share benefits with each other.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ABSTRACTION 
 
 As we have seen, the first stage or step in 
 the process of Thought is that called Percep- 
 tion, which we have considered in the preced- 
 ing chapter. Perception, as we have seen, is 
 the process by which we gain our first knowl- 
 edge of the external world as reported to us by 
 the channels of sense. The Perceptive facul- 
 ties interpret the material which is presented 
 to us by the senses. Following upon Percep- 
 tion we find the processes resulting from the 
 exercise of the group of faculties which are 
 classified under the general head of Under- 
 standing. 
 
 Understanding is the faculty, or faculties, 
 of the mind by means of which we intelligently 
 examine and compare the various percepts, 
 either separating them by analysis, or else 
 combining them by synthesis, or both, and 
 thus securing our general ideas, principles, 
 laws, classes, etc. There are several sub- 
 phases of Understanding which are known to 
 
 85
 
 86 Thought Culture 
 
 psychologists and logicians as: (1) Abstrac- 
 tion; (2) Conception or Generalization; (3) 
 Judgment, and (4) Reasoning, respectively. 
 In this chapter we shall consider the first of 
 these sub-phases or steps of Understanding, 
 which is known as *' Abstraction." 
 
 Abstraction is that faculty of the mind by 
 which we abstract or "draw off," and then 
 consider apart, the particular qualities, prop- 
 erties, or attributes of an object, and thus are 
 able to consider them as "things" or objects 
 of thought In order to form concepts or gen- 
 eral ideas, from our percepts or particular 
 ideas, we must consider and examine two com- 
 mon points or qualities which go to make up 
 differences and resemblances. The special 
 examination or consideration of these com- 
 mon points or qualities result in the exercise 
 of Abstraction. In the process of Abstraction 
 we mentally "draw away" a quality of an 
 object and then consider it as a distinct object 
 of thought. Thus in considering a flower we 
 may abstract its qualities of fragrance, color, 
 shape, etc., and think of these as things inde- 
 pendent of the flower itself from which they 
 were derived. We think of redness, fragrance,
 
 Abstraction 87 
 
 etc., not only in connection with the particular 
 flower but as general qualities. Thus the qual- 
 ities of redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, 
 etc., lead us to the abstract terms, red, siveet, 
 hard, soft, etc. In the same way courage, 
 cowardice, virtue, vice, love, hate, etc., are 
 abstract terms. No one ever saw one of these 
 things— they are known only in connection 
 with objects, or else as ''abstract terms" in 
 the processes of Thought. They may be 
 known as qualities, and expressed as predi- 
 cates ; or they may be considered as abstract 
 things and expressed as nouns. 
 
 In the general process of Abstraction we 
 first draw off and set aside all the qualities 
 which are not common to the general class 
 under consideration, for the concept or gen- 
 eral idea must comprise only the qualities 
 common to its class. Thus in the case of the 
 general idea of horse, size and color must be 
 abstracted as non-essentials, for horses are of 
 various colors and sizes. But on the other 
 hand, there are certain qualities which are 
 common to all horses, and these must be ab- 
 stracted and used in making up the concept or 
 general idea.
 
 88 Thought Culture 
 
 So, you see, in general Abstraction we form 
 two classes: (1) the unlike and not-general 
 qualities; and (2) the like or common quali- 
 ties. As Halleck says: *'In the process of 
 Abstraction, we draw our attention away from 
 a mass of confusing details, unimportant at 
 the time, and attend only to qualities co mm on 
 to the class. Abstraction is little else than 
 centering the power of attention on some qual- 
 ities to the exclusion of others. . . . While 
 we are forming concepts, we abstract or draw 
 off certain qualities, either to leave them out 
 of view or to consider them by themselves. 
 Our dictionaries contain such words as pur- 
 ity, whiteness, sweetness, industry, courage, 
 etc. No one ever touched, tasted, smelled, 
 heard, or saw purity or courage. We do not, 
 therefore, gain our knowledge of these 
 through the senses. We have seen pure per- 
 sons, pure snow, pure honey; we have 
 breathed pure air, tasted pure coffee. From 
 all these different objects we have abstracted 
 the only like quality, the quality of being pure. 
 We then say we have an idea of purity, and 
 that idea is an abstract one. It exists only in 
 the mind which formed it. No one ever saw
 
 Abstraction 89 
 
 ivhiteness. He may have seen white clouds, 
 snow, cloth, blossoms, houses, paper, horses, 
 but he never saw ivhiteness by itself. He sim- 
 ply abstracted that quality from various white 
 objects." 
 
 In Abstraction we may either (1) abstract 
 a quality and set it aside and apart from the 
 other qualities under consideration, as being 
 non-essential and not necessary; or we may 
 (2) abstract a quality and hold it in the mind 
 as essential and necessary for the concept 
 which we are forming. Likewise, we may ab- 
 stract (1) all the qualities of an object except 
 one, and set them aside that we may consider 
 the one quality by itself; or we may (2) ab- 
 stract the one particular quality and consider 
 it to the exclusion of all its associated quali- 
 ties. In all of these aspects we have the same 
 underlying process of considering a quality 
 apart from its object, and apart from its as- 
 sociated qualities. The mind more commonly 
 operates in the direction of abstracting one 
 quality and viewing it apart from object and 
 associated qualities. 
 
 The importance of correct powers of Ab- 
 straction is seen when we realize that all con-
 
 90 Thought Culture 
 
 cepts or general ideas are but combinations of 
 abstract qualities or ideas. As Halleck says : 
 * * The difference between an abstract idea and 
 a concept is that a concept may consist of a 
 bundle of abstract ideas. If the class contains 
 more than one common quality, so must the 
 concept ; it must contain as many of these ab- 
 stracted qualities as are common to the class. 
 The concept of the class ivhale would embody 
 a large number of such qualities. ' ' As Brooks 
 says : * ' If we could not abstract, we could not 
 generalize, for abstraction is a condition of 
 generalization." The last-mentioned author- 
 ity also cleverly states the idea as follows: 
 ''The products of Abstraction are abstract 
 ideas, that is, ideas of qualities in the abstract. 
 Such ideas are called Abstracts. Thus my idea 
 of some particular color, or hardness, or soft- 
 ness, is an abstract. Abstract ideas have been 
 wittily called 'the ghosts of departed quali- 
 ties.' They may more appropriately be re- 
 garded as the spirits of which the objects from 
 which they are derived are the bodies. In 
 other words, they are, figuratively speaking, 
 'the disembodied spirits of material things.' " 
 The cultivation of the faculty of Abstrac-
 
 Absthaction 91 
 
 tion depends very materially, in the first place, 
 upon the exercise of Attention and Percep- 
 tion. Mill holds that Abstraction is primarily 
 a result of Attention. Others hold that it is 
 merely the mental process by which the at- 
 tention is directed exclusively to the consider- 
 ation of one of several qualities, properties, 
 attributes, parts, etc. Hamilton says: *' At- 
 tention and Abstraction then are only the 
 same process viewed in different relations. 
 They are, as it were, the positive and negative 
 poles of the same act." The cultivation of At- 
 tention is really a part of the process of the 
 cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction. Un- 
 less the Attention be directed toward the ob- 
 ject and its qualities we will be unable to per- 
 ceive, set aside, and separately consider the 
 abstract quality contained within it. In this 
 process, as indeed in all other mental proc- 
 esses. Attention is a prerequisite. Therefore, 
 here, as in many other places, we say to 
 you ; * * Begin by cultivating Attention. ' ' 
 
 Moreover, the cultivation of the faculty of 
 Abstraction depends materially upon the cul- 
 tivation of Perception. Not only must we 
 sense the existence of the various qualities in
 
 92 Thought Culture 
 
 an object, but we must also perceive them in 
 consciousness, just as we perceive the object 
 itself. In fact, the perception of the object is 
 merely a perception of its various qualities, 
 attributes and properties, for the object itself 
 is merely a composite of these abstract things, 
 at least so far as its perception in conscious- 
 ness is concerned. Try to think of a horse, 
 without considering its qualities, attributes 
 and properties, and the result is merely an 
 abstract /i-orse— something which belongs to 
 the realm of unreality. Try to think of a rose 
 without considering its color, odor, shape, size, 
 response to touch, etc., and you have simply 
 an ideal rose which when analyzed is seen to 
 be a nothing. Take away the qualities, prop- 
 erties and attributes of anything, and you 
 have left merely a name, or else a transcen- 
 dental, idealistic, something apart from our 
 world of sense knowledge. Thus it follows 
 that in order to knoiv the qualities of a thing 
 in order to classify it, or to form a general idea 
 of it, we must use the Perception in order to 
 interpret or translate the sense-impressions 
 we have received regarding them. Conse- 
 quently the greater our power of Perception
 
 Abstraction 93 
 
 the greater must be the possibility of our 
 power of Abstraction. 
 
 Beyond the cultivation, use and exercise of 
 the Attention and the Perception, there are 
 but few practical methods for cultivating the 
 faculty of Abstraction. Of course, exercise 
 of the faculty will develop it ; and the furnish- 
 ing of material for its activities will give it 
 the "nourishment" of which we have spoken 
 elsewhere. Practice in distinguishing the 
 various qualities, attributes and properties 
 of objects will give a valuable training to the 
 faculty. 
 
 Let the student take any object and en- 
 deavor to analyze it into its abstract qualities, 
 etc. Let him try to discover qualities hidden 
 from first sight. Let him make a list of these 
 qualities, and write them down; then try to 
 add to the list. Two or more students engag- 
 ing in a friendly rivalry will stimulate the ef- 
 forts of each other. In children the exercise 
 may be treated as a game. Analysis of objects 
 into their component qualities, attributes and 
 qualities — the effort to extract as many ad- 
 jectives applicable to the object— this is the 
 first step. The second step consists in trans-
 
 94 Thought Culture 
 
 forming these adjectives into their corre- 
 sponding nouns. As for instance, in a rose 
 we perceive the qualities wliich we call ''red- 
 ness," "fragrance," etc. "We speak of the 
 rose as being *'red" or "fragrant"— then we 
 think of "redness," or "fragrance" as ab- 
 stract qualities, or things, which we express 
 as nouns. Exercise and practice along these 
 lines will tend to cultivate the faculty of Ab- 
 straction. By knowing qualities, we know the 
 things possessing them.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 
 
 Having formed general ideas, or Concepts, 
 it is important that we associate them with 
 other general ideas. In order to fully under- 
 stand a general idea we must know its associa- 
 tions and relations. The greater the known 
 associations or relations of an idea, the 
 greater is our degree of understanding of that 
 idea. If we simply know many thousands of 
 separated general ideas, without also know- 
 ing their associations and relations, we are in 
 almost as difficult a position as if we merely 
 knew thousands of individual percepts with- 
 out being able to classify them in general con- 
 cepts. It is necessary to develop the faculty 
 of associating ideas into groups, according to 
 their relations, just as we group particular 
 ideas in classes. The difference, however, is 
 that these group-ideas do not form classes of 
 a genus, but depend solely upon associations 
 of several kinds, as we shall see in a moment. 
 
 Halleck says : ' ' All ideas have certain defiii- 
 
 95
 
 96 Thought Culture 
 
 ite associations with other ideas, and they 
 come up in groups. There is always an asso- 
 ciation between our ideas, although there are 
 cases when we cannot trace it. . . . Even 
 when we find no association between our ideas, 
 we may be sure that it exists. . . . An idea, 
 then, never appears in consciousness unless 
 there is a definite reason why this idea should 
 appear in preference to others." Brooks 
 says : * ' One idea or feeling in the mind calls up 
 some other idea or feeling with which it is in 
 some way related. Our ideas seem, as it were, 
 to be tied together by the invisible thread of 
 association, so that as one comes out of un- 
 consciousness, it draws another with it. 
 Thoughts seem to exist somewhat in clusters 
 like the grapes of a bunch, so that in bringing 
 out one, we bring the entire cluster with it. 
 The law of association is thus the tie, the 
 thread, the golden link by which our thoughts 
 are united in an act of reproduction." 
 
 The majority of writers confine their con- 
 sideration of Association of Ideas to its rela- 
 tion to Memory. It is true that the Laws of 
 Association play an important part in Mem- 
 ory Culture, but Association of Ideas also
 
 Association of Ideas 97 
 
 form an important part of the general sub- 
 ject of Thought-Culture, and especially in the 
 phase of the latter devoted to the develop- 
 ment of the Understanding. The best author- 
 ities agree upon this idea and state it posi- 
 tively. Ribot says: ''The most fundamental 
 law which regulates psychological phenomena 
 is the Law of Association. In its comprehen- 
 sive character it is comparable to the law of 
 attraction in the physical world." Mill says : 
 ''That which the law of gravitation is to as- 
 tronomy, that which the elementary proper- 
 ties of the tissues are to physiology, the Law 
 of Association of Ideas is to psychology." 
 
 There are two general principles, or laws, 
 operative in the processes of Association of 
 Ideas, known as (1) Association by Contigu- 
 ity; and (2) Association by Similarity, re- 
 spectively. 
 
 Association by Contiguity manifests par- 
 ticularly in the processes of memory. In its 
 two phases of (1) Contiguity of Time; and 
 (2) Contiguity of Space, respectively, it 
 brings together before the field of conscious- 
 ness ideas associated with each by reason of 
 their time or space relations. Thus, if we re-
 
 98 Thought Culture 
 
 member a certain thing, we find it easy to re- 
 member things which occurred immediately 
 before, or immediately after that particular 
 thing. Verbal memory depends largely upon 
 the contigTiity of time, as for instance, our 
 ability to repeat a poem, or passage from a 
 book, if we can recall the first words thereof. 
 Children often possess this form of memory 
 to a surprising degree ; and adults with only 
 a limited degree of understanding may repeat 
 freely long extracts from speeches they have 
 heard, or even arbitrary jumbles of words. 
 Visual memory depends largely upon conti- 
 guity of space, as for instance our ability to 
 recall the details of scenes, when starting 
 from a given point. In both of these forms of 
 association by contiguity the mental opera- 
 tion is akin to that of unwinding a ball of yarn, 
 the ideas, thus associated in the sequence of 
 time or place, following each other into the 
 field of consciousness. Association by Conti- 
 guity, while important in itself, properly be- 
 longs to the general subject of Memory, and 
 as we have considered it in the volume of this 
 series devoted to the last mentioned subject, 
 we shall not speak of it further here.
 
 Association of Ideas 99 
 
 Association by Similarity, however, posses- 
 ses a special interest to students of the partic- 
 ular subject of the culture of the Understand- 
 ing. If we were compelled to rely upon the 
 association of contiguity for our understand- 
 ing of things, we would understand a thing 
 merely in its relations to that which went be- 
 fore or came after it ; or by the things which 
 were near it in space— we would have to un- 
 wind the mental ball of time and space rela- 
 tions in order to bring into consciousness the 
 associated relations of anything. The Asso- 
 ciation of Similarity, however, remedies this 
 defect, and gives us a higher and broader asso- 
 ciation. Speaking of Association of Similar- 
 ity, Kay says: "It is of the utmost impor- 
 tance to us in forming a judgment of things, 
 or in determining upon a particular line of 
 conduct, to be able to bring together before 
 the mind a number of instances of a similar 
 kind, recent or long past, which may aid us in 
 coming to a right determination. Thus, we 
 may judge of the nature or quality of an arti- 
 cle, and obtain light and leading in regard to 
 any subject that may be before us. In this 
 way we arrange and classify and reason by
 
 100 Thought Culture 
 
 induction. This is knoivn as rational or philo- 
 sophical association." 
 
 Halleck says: ''An eminent philosopher 
 has said that man is completely at the mercy 
 of the association of his ideas. Every new ob- 
 ject is seen in the light of its associated ideas. 
 . . . It is not the business of the psycholo- 
 gist to state what power the association of 
 ideas ought to have. It is for him to ascertain 
 what power it does have. When we think of 
 the bigotry of past ages, of the stake for the 
 martyr and the stoning of witches, we can 
 realize the force of Prof. Ziehen's statement: 
 ' We cannot think as we ivill, but we must think 
 as just those associations which happen to be 
 present prescribe.' While this is not literally 
 true, it may serve to emphasize a deflecting 
 factor which is usually underestimated. ' ' 
 
 Locke says : ' ' The connection in our minds 
 of ideas, in themselves loose and independent 
 of one another, has such an influence, and is 
 of so great force, to set us awry in our actions, 
 as well moral as natural, passions, reason- 
 ings, and notions themselves, that, perhaps, 
 there is not any one thing that deserves more 
 to be looked after." Stewart says: ''The
 
 Association of Ideas 101 
 
 bulk of mankind, being but little accustomed 
 to reflect and to generalize, associate their 
 ideas chiefly according to their more obvious 
 relations, and above all to the casual relations 
 arising from contiguity in time and place; 
 whereas, in the mind of a philosopher ideas 
 are commonly associated according to those 
 relations which are brought to light in conse- 
 quence of particular efforts of attention, such 
 as the relations of cause and effect, or of 
 premises and conclusion. Hence, it must nec- 
 essarily happen that when he has occasion to 
 apply to use his acquired knowledge, time and 
 reflection will be requisite to enable him to 
 recollect it. ' ' 
 
 This Association by Similarity, or the 
 ''rational and philosophical association of 
 ideas," may be developed and cultivated by a 
 little care and work. The first principle is 
 that of learning the true relations of an idea 
 —its various logical associations. Perhaps 
 the easiest and best method is that adopted 
 and practiced by Socrates, the old Greek 
 philosopher, often called ''the Socratic 
 method"— the Method of Questioning. By 
 questioning oneself, or others, regarding a
 
 102 Thought Culture 
 
 thing, the mind of the person answering tends 
 to unfold its stores of information, and to 
 make new and true associations. Kays says : 
 ''Socrates, Plato, and others among the an- 
 cients and some moderns, have been masters 
 of this art. The principle of asking questions 
 and obtaining answers to them may be said 
 to characterize all intellectual effort. . . . 
 The great thing is to ask the right questions, 
 and to obtain the right answers." Meikle- 
 john says : ' ' This art of questioning possessed 
 by Dr. Hodgson was something wonderful and 
 unique, and was to the minds of most of his 
 pupils a truly obstetric art. He told them little 
 or nothing, but showed them how to find out 
 for themselves. 'The Socratic method,' he 
 said, 'is the true one, especially with the 
 young.' " 
 
 But this questioning must be done logically, 
 and orderly, and not in a haphazard way. As 
 Fitch says : "In proposing questions it is very 
 necessary to keep in view the importance of 
 arranging them in the exact order in which 
 the subject would naturally develop itself in 
 the mind of a logical and systematic thinker." 
 "A number of systems have been formulated
 
 Association of Ideas 103 
 
 by different writers on tlie subject, all of 
 which have much merit. The following Sys- 
 tem of Analysis, designed for the use of stu- 
 dents desiring to acquire correct associations, 
 was given in the volume of this series, en- 
 titled * ' Memory, ' ' and is reproduced here be- 
 cause it is peculiarly adapted to the culti- 
 vation and development of the faculty of dis- 
 covering and forming correct associations 
 and relations between ideas: 
 
 SYSTEM OF ANALYSIS 
 
 When you wish to discover what you really 
 know regarding a thing, ask yourself the fol- 
 lowing questions about it, examining each 
 point in detail, and endeavoring to bring be- 
 fore the mind your full knotvledge regarding 
 that particular point. Fill in the deficiencies 
 by reading some good work of reference, an 
 encyclopedia for instance; or consulting a 
 good dictionary, or both : 
 
 I. Where did it come from, or orig- 
 inate I 
 II. What caused it? 
 III. What history or record has it?
 
 104 Thought Culture 
 
 IV. What are its attributes, qualities 
 
 or characteristics? 
 V. What things can I most readily as- 
 sociate with it? What is it most 
 like? 
 
 VI. What is it good for— how may it be 
 used— what can I do with it? 
 
 VII. What does it prove— what can be 
 
 deduced from it? 
 VIII. What are its natural results— what 
 happens because of it? 
 
 IX. What is its future; and its natural 
 or probable end or finish? 
 X. What do I think of it, on the whole 
 —what are my general impres- 
 sions regarding it? 
 
 XI. What do I know about it, in the way 
 
 of general information? 
 
 XII. What have I heard about it, and 
 
 from whom, and when? 
 The following ''Query Table," from the 
 same volume, may be found useful in the same 
 direction. It is simpler and less complicated 
 than the system given above. It has well been 
 called a "Magic Key of Knowledge," and it 
 opens many a mental door :
 
 Association of Ideas 105 
 
 » 
 
 QUEflY TABLE 
 
 Ask yourself the following questions re- 
 garding the thing under consideration. It 
 will draw out many bits of information and 
 associated knowledge in your mind : 
 I. .What? IV. WhenI 
 
 11. Whence? V,. How? 
 
 III. Where? VI. Why? 
 
 VII. Whither? 
 
 Eemember, always, that the greater the 
 number of associated and related ideas that 
 you are able to group around a concept, the 
 richer, fuller and truer does that concept be- 
 come to you. The concept is a general idea, 
 and its attributes of "generality" depend 
 upon the associated facts and ideas related to 
 it. The greater the number of the view points 
 from which a concept may be examined and 
 considered, the greater is the degree of knowl- 
 edge concerning that concept. It is held that 
 everything in the universe is related to every 
 other thing, so that if we knew all the asso- 
 ciated ideas and facts concerning a thing, we 
 would not only know that particular thing ab- 
 solutely, but would, besides, know everything 
 in the universe. The chain of Association is 
 infinite in extent.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 GENEEALIZATION 
 
 We have seen that Sensation is translated 
 or interpreted into Perception ; and that from 
 the Percepts so created we may ' * draw off, ' ' 
 or separate, various qualities, attributes and 
 properties by the analytical process we call 
 Abstraction. Abstraction, we have seen, thus 
 constitutes the first step in the process of what 
 is called Understanding. The second step is 
 called Generalization or Conception. 
 
 Generalization, or Conception, is that fac- 
 ulty of the mind by which we are able to com- 
 bine and group together several particular 
 ideas into one general idea. Thus when we 
 find a number of particular objects possessing 
 the same general qualities, attributes or prop- 
 erties, we proceed to classify them by the 
 process of Generalization. For instance, in a 
 number of animals possessing certain general 
 and common qualities we form a concept of a 
 class comprising those particular animals. 
 Thus in the concept of cow, we include all cows 
 
 106
 
 Generalization 107 
 
 —we know them to be cows because of their 
 possession of certain general class qualities 
 which we include in our concept of coiv. The 
 particular cows may vary greatly in size, 
 color and general appearance, but they pos- 
 sess the common general qualities which we 
 group together in our general concept of cow. 
 Likewise by reason of certain common and 
 general qualities we include in our concept of 
 ''Man," all men, black, white, brown, red or 
 yellow, of all races and degrees of physical 
 and mental development. From this generic 
 concept we may make race concepts, dividing 
 men into Indians, Caucasians, Malays, Ne- 
 groes, Mongolians, etc. These concepts in turn 
 may be divided into sub-races. These sub-divi- 
 sions result from an analysis of the great con- 
 cept. The great concept is built up by synthe- 
 sis from the individuals, through the sub-di- 
 visions of minor concepts. Or, again, we may 
 form a concept of ''Napoleon Bonaparte" 
 from the various qualities and characteristics 
 which went to make up that celebrated man. 
 The product of Generalization or Concep- 
 tion is called a Concept. A Concept is ex- 
 pressed in a word, or words, called ' ' A Term. ' '
 
 108 Thought Culture 
 
 A Concept is more than a mere word— it is a 
 general idea. And a Term is more than a 
 mere word— it is the expression of a general 
 idea. 
 
 A Concept is built up from the processes of 
 Perception, Abstraction, Comparison and 
 Generalization. We must first perceive ; then 
 analyze or abstract qualities; then compare 
 qualities ; then synthesize or classify accord- 
 ing to the result of the comparison of quali- 
 ties. By perceiving and comparing the quali- 
 ties of various individual things, we notice 
 their points of resemblance and difference— 
 the points wherein they agree or disagTee— 
 wherein they are alike or unlike. Eliminating 
 by abstraction the points in which they differ 
 and are unlike ; and, again by abstraction, re- 
 taining in consideration the points in which 
 they resemble and are alike; we are able to 
 group, arrange or classify these ''alike 
 things" into a class-idea large enough to em- 
 brace them all. This class-idea is what is 
 known as a General Idea or a Concept. This 
 Concept we give a general name, which is 
 called a Term. In grammar our particular 
 ideas arising from Percepts are usually de-
 
 GENERALlziATION 109 
 
 noted by proper nouns— our general ideas 
 arising from Concepts are usually denoted 
 by common nouns. Thus ' ' John Smith ' ' ( par- 
 ticular; proper noun) and ''Man" (general; 
 common noun). Or "horse" (general; com- 
 mon), and ''Dobbin" (particular; proper). 
 
 It will be seen readily that there must be 
 lower and higher concepts. Every class con- 
 tains within itself lower classes. And every 
 class is, itself, but a lower class in a higher 
 one. Thus the high concept of ' ' animal ' ' may 
 be analyzed into "mammal," which in turn 
 is found to contain "horse," which in turn 
 may be sub-divided into special kinds of 
 horses. The concept "plant" may be sub- 
 divided many times before the concept ' ' rose" 
 is obtained, and the latter is capable of sub- 
 division into varieties and sub-varieties, until 
 at last a particular flower is reached. Jevons 
 says; "We classify things together whenever 
 we observe that they are like each other in any 
 respect and, therefore, think of them together. 
 ... In classifying a collection of objects, 
 we do not merely put together into groups 
 those which resemble each other, but we also 
 divide each class into smaller ones in which
 
 110 Thought Culture 
 
 the resemblance is more complete. Thus the 
 class of white substances may be divided into 
 those which are solid and those which are 
 fluid, so that we get the two minor classes of 
 solid-white, and fluid-white substances. It is 
 desirable to have names by which to show that 
 one class is contained in another and, accord- 
 ingly, we call the class which is divided into 
 two or more smaller ones, the Genus; and the 
 smaller ones into which it is divided, the 
 Species/' 
 
 Every Genus is a Species of the ciass next 
 higher than itself; and every Species is a 
 Genus of the classes lower than itself. Thus 
 it would seem that the extension in either di- 
 rection would be infinite. But, for the pur- 
 poses of finite thought, the authorities teach 
 that there must be a Highest Genus, which 
 cannot be the Species of a higher class, and 
 which is called the Summum Genus. The 
 Sumrymm Genus is expressed by terms such 
 as the following: "Being;" ''Existence;" 
 ''The Absolute;" "Something;" "Thing;" 
 ' ' The Ultimate Reality, ' ' or some similar term 
 denoting the state of being ultimate. Like- 
 wise, at the lowest end of the scale we find
 
 Generalization 111 
 
 what are called the Lowest Species, or Infima 
 Species. The Infima Species are always in- 
 dividuals. Thus we have the individual at one 
 end of the scale; and The Absolute at the 
 other. Beyond these limits the mind of man 
 cannot travel. 
 
 There has been much confusion in making 
 classifications and some ingenious plans have 
 been evolved for simplifying the process. 
 That of Jevons is perhaps the simplest, when 
 understood. This authority says: "All these 
 difficulties are avoided in the perfect logical 
 method of dividing each Genus into tivo Spe- 
 cies, and not more than tivo, so that one species 
 possesses a particular quality, and the other 
 does not. Thus if I divide dwelling-houses 
 into those which are made of brick and those 
 which are not made of brick, I am perfectly 
 safe and nobody can find fault with me. . . . 
 Suppose, for instance, that I divide dwelling- 
 houses as below: 
 
 Dwelling-House 
 
 \ r 
 
 Brick Stone Earth Iron Wood 
 
 ' ' The evident objection will at once be made, 
 that houses may be built of other materials
 
 112 Thought Culture 
 
 than those here specified. In Australia, 
 houses are sometimes made of the bark of 
 gum-trees; the Esquimaux live in snow 
 houses; tents may be considered as canvas 
 houses, and it is easy to conceive of houses 
 made of terra-cotta, paper, straw, etc. All 
 logical difficulties will, however, be avoided if 
 I never make more than two species at each 
 step, in the following way :— 
 
 Dwelling-House 
 
 Brick Not-Brick 
 
 Stone Not-Stone 
 
 Wooden Not-Wooden 
 
 Iron Not-Iron 
 
 ''It is quite certain that I must in this di- 
 vision have left a place for every possible kind 
 of house ; for if a house is not made of brick, 
 nor stone, nor wood, nor iron, it yet comes un- 
 der the species at the right hand, which is not- 
 iron, not-wooden, not-stone, and not-brick.
 
 Generalization 113 
 
 . . . This manner of classifying things may 
 seem to be inconvenient, but it is in reality the 
 only logical way. ' ' 
 
 The student will see that the process of 
 Classification is two-fold. The first is by 
 Analysis, in which the Genus is divided into 
 Species by reason of differences. The second 
 is by Synthesis, in which individuals are 
 grouped into Species, and Species into the 
 Genus, by reason of resemblances. Moreover, 
 in building up general classes, which is known 
 as Generalization, we must first analyze the 
 individual in order to ascertain its qualities, 
 attributes and properties, and then synthesize 
 the individual with other individuals posses- 
 sing like qualities, properties or attributes. 
 
 Brooks says of Generalization: ''The mind 
 now takes the materials that have been fur- 
 nished and fashioned by comparison and 
 analysis and unites them into one single men- 
 tal product, giving us the general notion or 
 concept. The mind, as it were, brings to- 
 gether these several attributes into a bunch or 
 package and then ties a mental string around 
 it, as we would bunch a lot of roses or cigars. 
 . . . Generalization is an ascending process.
 
 114 Thought Culture 
 
 The broader concept is regarded as higher 
 than the narrower concept ; a concept is con- 
 sidered as higher than percept; a general 
 idea stands above a particular idea. We thus 
 go up from particulars to generals ; from per- 
 cepts to concepts; from lower concepts to 
 higher concepts. Beginning down with par- 
 ticular objects, we rise from them to the gen- 
 eral idea of their class. Having formed a 
 number of lower classes, we compare them as 
 we did individuals and generalize them into 
 higher classes. We perform the same process 
 with these higher classes and thus proceed un- 
 til we are at last arrested in the highest class, 
 that of Being. Having reached the pinnacle 
 of Generalization, we may descend the ladder 
 by reversing the process through which we 
 ascend. ' ' 
 
 A Concept, then, is seen to be a general idea. 
 It is a general thought that embraces all the 
 individuals of its own class and has in it all 
 that is common to its own class, while it re- 
 sembles no particular individual of its class 
 in all respects. Thus, a concept of animal con- 
 tains within itself the minor concepts of all 
 animals and the animal-quality of all animals
 
 Generalization 115 
 
 —yet it differs from the percept of any one 
 particular animal and the minor concepts of 
 minor classes of animals. Consequently a 
 concejot or general idea cannot be imaged or 
 mentally pictured. We may picture a percept 
 of any particular thing, but we cannot picture 
 a general idea or concept because the latter 
 does not partake of the particular qualities of 
 any of its class, but embraces all the general 
 qualities of the class. Try to picture the gen- 
 eral idea, or concept, of Man. You will find 
 that any attempt to do so will result in the 
 production of merely a man—&ovae particular 
 man. If you give the picture dark hair, it will 
 fail to include the light-haired men; if you 
 give it white skin, it will slight the darker- 
 skinned races. If you picture a stout man, 
 the thin ones are neglected. And so on in 
 every feature. It is impossible to form a cor- 
 rect general class picture unless we include 
 every individual in it. The best we can do is 
 to form a sort of composite image, which at 
 the best is in the nature of a sjanbol repre- 
 sentative of the class— an ideal image to make 
 easier the idea of the general class or term. 
 From the above we may see the fundamen-
 
 116 Thought Culture 
 
 tal differences between a Percept and a Con- 
 cept. The Percept is the mental image of a 
 real object— a particular thing. The Concept 
 is merely a general idea, or general notion, of 
 the common attributes of a class of objects or 
 things. A Percept arises directly from sense- 
 impressions, while a Concept is, in a sense, a 
 pure thought— an abstract thing— a mental 
 creation— an ideal. 
 
 A Concrete Concept is a concept embodying 
 the common qualities of a class of objects, as 
 for instance, the concrete concept of lion, in 
 which the general class qualities of all lions 
 are embodied. An Abstract Concept is a con- 
 cept embodying merely some one quality gen- 
 erally diffused, as for instance, the quality of 
 fierceness in the general class of lions. Rose 
 is a concrete concept; red, or redness, is an 
 abstract concept. It will aid you in remember- 
 ing this distinction to memorize Jevons' rule: 
 "A Concrete Term is the name of a Thing; an 
 Abstract Term is the name of a Quality of a 
 
 Thing." 
 
 A Concrete Concept, including all the par- 
 ticular individuals of a class, must also con- 
 tain all the common qualities of those Individ-
 
 Generalization 117 
 
 uals. Thus, such a concept is composed of the 
 ideas of the particular individuals and of their 
 common qualities, in combination and union. 
 From this arises the distinctive terms known 
 as the content, extension and intension of con- 
 cepts, respectively. 
 
 The content of a concept is oil that it in- 
 cludes—its full meaning. The extension of a 
 concept depends upon its quantity aspect— it 
 is its property of including numbers of indi- 
 vidual objects within its content. The inten- 
 sion of a concept depends upon its quality as- 
 pect—it is its property of including class or 
 common qualities, properties or attributes 
 within its content. 
 
 Thus, the extension of the concept horse 
 covers all individual horses; while its inten- 
 sion includes all qualities, attributes, and 
 properties common to all horses— class quali- 
 ties possessed by all horses in common, and 
 which qualities, etc., make the particular ani- 
 mals horses, as distinguished from other ani- 
 mals. 
 
 It follows that the larger the number of par- 
 ticular objects in a class, the smaller must be 
 the number of general class qualities— quali-
 
 118 Thought Culture 
 
 ties common to all in the class. And, that the 
 larger the nmnber of common class qualities, 
 the smaller must be the number of individuals 
 in the class. As the logicians express it, *Hhe 
 greater the extension, the less the intension; 
 the greater the intension, the loss the exten- 
 sion." Thus, animal is narrow in intension, 
 but very broad in extension; for while there 
 are many animals there are but very few qual- 
 ities common to all animals. And, horse is 
 narrower in extension, but broader in inten- 
 sion; for while there are comparatively few 
 horses, the qualities common to all horses are 
 greater. 
 
 The cultivation of the faculty of Generali- 
 zation, or Conception, of course, depends 
 largely upon exercise and material, as does 
 the cultivation of every mental faculty, as we 
 have seen. But there are certain rules, meth- 
 ods and ideas which may be used to advantage 
 in developing this faculty in the direction of 
 clear and capable work. This faculty is de- 
 veloped by all of the general processes of 
 thought, for it forms an important part of all 
 thought. But the logical processes known as 
 Analysis and Synthesis give to this faculty
 
 Generalization 119 
 
 exercise and employment particularly adapted 
 to its development and cultivation. Let us 
 briefly consider these processes. 
 
 Logical Analysis is the process by which we 
 examine and unfold the meaning of Terms. A 
 Term, you remember, is the verbal expression 
 of a Concept. In such analysis we endeavor 
 to unfold and discover the quality -aspect and 
 the quantity -aspect of the content of the con- 
 cept. We seek, thereby, to discover the par- 
 ticular general idea expressed ; the number of 
 particular individuals included therein; and 
 the properties of the class or generalization. 
 Analysis depends upon division and separa- 
 tion. Development in the process of Logical 
 Analysis tends toward clearness, distinctness, 
 and exactness in thought and expression. 
 Logical Analysis has two aspects or phases, 
 as follows: (1) Division, or the separation of 
 a concept according to its extension, as for in- 
 stance the analysis of a genus into its various 
 species; and (2) Partition, or the separation 
 of a concept into its component qualities, prop- 
 erties and attributes, as for instance, the anal- 
 ysis of the concept iron into its several qual-
 
 120 Thought Culture 
 
 ities of color, weight, hardness, malleability, 
 tenacity, utility, etc. 
 
 There are certain rules of Division which 
 should be observed, the following being a sim- 
 ple statement of the same : 
 
 I. The division should he governed hy a uni- 
 form principle. For instance it would be il- 
 logical to first divide men into Caucasians, 
 Mongolians, etc., and then further sub-divide 
 them into Christians, Pagans, etc., for the first 
 division would be according to the principle of 
 race, and the second according to the principle 
 of religion. Observing the rule of the ''uni- 
 form principle ' ' we may divide men into races, 
 and sub-races, and so on, without regard to 
 religion ; and we may likewise divide men ac- 
 cording to their respective religions, and then 
 into minor denominations and sects, without 
 regard to race or nationality. The above rule 
 is frequently violated by careless thinkers and 
 speakers. 
 
 II. The division should he complete and 
 exhaustive. For instance, the analysis of a 
 genus should extend to every known species 
 of it, upon the principle that the genus is 
 merely the sum of its several species. A text-
 
 Generalization 121 
 
 book illustration of a violation of this rule is 
 given in the case of the concept actions, when 
 divided into good-actions and bad-actions, but 
 omitting the very important species of indif- 
 ferent-actions. Carelessness in observance 
 of this rule leads to fallacious reasoning and 
 cloudy thinking. 
 
 III. The division shoidd be in logical se- 
 quence. It is illogical to skip or pass over in- 
 termediate divisions, as for instance, when we 
 divide animals into horses, trout and swal- 
 lows, omitting the intermediate division into 
 mammals, fish and birds. The more perfect 
 the sequence, the clearer the analysis and the 
 thought resulting therefrom. 
 
 IV. The division should be exclusive. 
 That is, the various species divided from a 
 genus, should be reciprocally exclusive— 
 should exclude one another. Thus to divide 
 mankind into male, men and ivomen, would be 
 illogical, because the class male includes men. 
 The division should be either: "male and fe- 
 male;" or else: ''men, women, boys, girls." 
 
 The exercise of Division along these lines, 
 and according to these rules, will tend to im- 
 prove one's powers of conception and analy-
 
 122 Thought Culture 
 
 sis. Any class of objects— any general con- 
 cept—may be used for practice. A trial will 
 show you the great powers of unf oldment con- 
 tained within this simple process. It tends to 
 broaden and widen one 's conception of almost 
 any class of objects. 
 
 There are also several rules for Partition 
 which should be observed, as follows : 
 
 I. The partition should be complete and 
 exhaustive. That is, it should unfold the full 
 meaning of the term or concept, so far as is 
 concerned its several general qualities, prop- 
 erties and attributes. But this applies only 
 to the qualities, properties and attributes 
 which are common to the class or concept, and 
 not to the minor qualities which belong solely 
 to the various sub-divisions composing the 
 class ; nor to the accidental or individual qual- 
 ities belonging to the separate individuals in 
 any sub-class. The qualities should be essen- 
 tial and not accidental— geneval, not particu- 
 lar. A famous violation of this rule was had 
 in the case of the ancient Platonic definition 
 of ''Man" as: "A two-legged animal without 
 feathers," which Diogenes rendered absurd 
 by offering a plucked chicken as a "man" ac-
 
 Generalization 123 
 
 cording to the definition. Clearness in 
 thought requires the recognition of the dis- 
 tinction between the general qualities and the 
 individual, particular or accidental qualities. 
 Red-hair is an accidental quality of a particu- 
 lar man and not a general quality of the class 
 man. 
 
 11. The partition should consider the qual- 
 ities, properties and attributes, according to 
 the classification of logical division. That is, 
 the various qualities, properties and attri- 
 butes should be considered in the form of 
 genus and species, as in Division. In this 
 classification, the rules of Division apply. 
 
 It will be seen that there is a close relation- 
 ship existing between Partition and Defini- 
 tion. Definition is really a statement of the 
 various qualities, attributes, and properties of 
 a concept, either stated in particular or else 
 in concepts of other and larger classes. There 
 is perhaps no better exercise for the cultiva- 
 tion of clear thought and conception than Defi- 
 nition. In order to define, one must exercise 
 his power of analysis to a considerable extent. 
 Brooks says: ''Exercises in logical definition 
 are valuable in unfolding our conception.
 
 124 Thought Culture 
 
 Logical definition, including both the genns 
 and the specific difference, gives clearness, 
 definiteness and adequacy to our conceptions. 
 It separates a conception from all other con- 
 ceptions by fixing upon and presenting the es- 
 sential and distinctive property or properties 
 of the conception defined. The value of exer- 
 cises in logical definition is thus readily 
 apparent. ' ' 
 
 If the student will select some familiar term 
 and endeavor to define it correctly, writing 
 down the result, and will then compare the 
 latter with the definition given in some stand- 
 ard dictionary, he will see a new light regard- 
 ing logical definition. Practice in definition, 
 conducted along these lines, will cultivate the 
 powers of analysis and conception and will, 
 at the same time, tend toward the acquiring of 
 correct and scientific methods of thought and 
 clear expression. 
 
 Hyslop gives the following excellent Rules 
 of Logical Definition, which should be fol- 
 lowed by the student in his exercises : 
 
 "I. A definition should state the essential 
 attributes of the species defined. 
 
 ' ' II. A definition must not contain the name
 
 Generalization 125 
 
 or word defined. Otherwise the definition is 
 called a circulus in definiendo (defining in a 
 circle). 
 
 ' * III. The definition must be exactly equiva- 
 lent to the species defined. 
 
 '*IV. A definition should not be expressed 
 in obscure, figurative or ambiguous language. 
 
 *'V. A definition must not be negative 
 when it can be affirmative." 
 
 Logical Synthesis is the exact opposite of 
 Logical Analysis. In the latter we strive to 
 separate and take apart; in the former we 
 strive to bind together and combine the par- 
 ticulars into the general. Beginning with in- 
 dividual things and comparing them with each 
 other according to observed points of resem- 
 blance, we proceed to group them into species 
 or narrow classes. These classes, or species, 
 we then combine with similar ones, into a 
 larger class or genus ; and then, according to 
 the same process, into broader classes as we 
 have shown in the first part of this chapter. 
 
 The process of Synthesis is calculated to 
 develop and cultivate the mind in several di- 
 rections and exercises along these lines will 
 give a new habit and sense of orderly arrange-
 
 126 Thought Culture 
 
 ment, which will be most useful to the student 
 in his every-day life. Halleck says : ' ' When- 
 ever a person is comparing a specimen to see 
 whether it may be put in the same class with 
 other specimens, he is thinking. Comparison 
 is an absolutely essential factor of thought, 
 and classification demands comparison. The 
 man who has not properly classified the myr- 
 iad individual objects with which he has to 
 deal, must advance like a cripple. He, only, 
 can travel with seven-league boots, who has 
 thought out the relations existing between 
 these stray individuals and put them into their 
 proper classes. In a minute a business man 
 may put his hand on any one of ten thousand 
 letters if they are properly classified. In the 
 same way, the student of history, sociology or 
 any other branch, can, if he studies the sub- 
 jects aright, have all his knowledge classified 
 and speedily available for use. ... In this 
 way, we may make our knowledge of the world 
 more minutely exact. We cannot classify 
 without seeing things under a new aspect." 
 
 The study of Natural History, in any or all 
 of its branches, will do much to cultivate the 
 power of Classification. But one may prac-
 
 Generalization 127 
 
 tice classification with the objects around him 
 in his every-day life. Arranging things men- 
 tally, into small classes, and these into larger, 
 one will soon be able to form a logical connec- 
 tion between particular ideas and general 
 ideas; particular objects and general classes. 
 The practice of classification gives to the mind 
 a constructive turn— a *' building-up " tend- 
 ency, which is most desirable in these days of 
 construction and development. Regarding 
 some of the pitfalls of classification, Jevons 
 says: 
 
 *'In classifying things, we must take great 
 care not to be misled by outward resemblances. 
 Things may seem to be very much like each 
 other which are not so. Whales, porpoises, 
 seals and several other animals live in the sea 
 exactly like fish; they have a similar shape 
 and are usually classed among fish. People 
 are said to go whale-fishing. Yet these ani- 
 mals are not really fish at all, but are much 
 more like dogs and horses and other quadru- 
 peds than they are like fish. They cannot live 
 entirely under water and breathe the air con- 
 tained in the water like fish, but they have to 
 come up to the surface at intervals to take
 
 128 Thought Culture 
 
 breath. Similarly, we must not class bats 
 with birds because they fly about, although 
 they have what would be called wings ; these 
 wings are not like those of birds and in truth 
 bats are much more like rats and mice than 
 they are like birds. Botanists used at one 
 time to classify plants according to their size, 
 as trees, shrubs or herbs, but we now know 
 that a great tree is often more similar in its 
 character to a tiny herb than it is to other 
 great trees. A daisy has little resemblance 
 to a great Scotch thistle ; yet the botanist re- 
 gards them as very similar. The lofty grow- 
 ing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugar- 
 cane also belongs to the same class with wheat 
 andoa?ts." 
 
 Remember that analysis of a genus into its 
 component species is accomplished by a sep- 
 aration according to differences; and species 
 are built up by synthesis into a genus because 
 of resemblances. The same is true regarding 
 individual and species, building up in accord- 
 ance to points of resemblance, while analysis 
 or separation is according to points of differ- 
 ence. 
 
 The use of a good dictionary will be advan-
 
 Generalization 129 
 
 tageous to the student in developing the power 
 of Generalization or Conception. Starting 
 with a species, he may build up to higher and 
 still higher classes by consulting the diction- 
 ary; likewise, starting with a large class, he 
 may work down to the several species compos- 
 ing it. An encyclopedia, of course, is still 
 better for the purpose in many cases. Re- 
 member that Generalization is a prime requis- 
 ite for clear, logical thinking. Moreover, it 
 is a great developer of Thought.
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 JUDGMENT 
 
 We have seen that in the several mental 
 processes which are grouped together under 
 the general head of Understanding, the stage 
 or step of Abstraction is first ; following which 
 is the second step or phase, called Generaliza- 
 tion or Conception. The third step or phase 
 is that which is called Judgment. In the exer- 
 cise of the faculty of Judginent, we determine 
 the agreement or disagreement between two 
 concepts, ideas, or objects of thought, by com- 
 paring them one with another. From this 
 process of comparison arises the Judgment, 
 which is expressed in the shape of a logical 
 Proposition. A certain form of Judgment 
 must be used, however, in the actual forma- 
 tion of a Concept, for we must first comiDare 
 qualities, and make a judgment thereon, in 
 order to form a general idea. In this place, 
 however, we shall confine ourselves to the con- 
 sideration of the faculty of Judgment in the 
 
 130
 
 Judgment 131 
 
 strictly logical usage of the term, as previous- 
 ly stated. 
 
 We have seen that the expression of a con- 
 cept is called a Term, which is the name of 
 the concept. In the same way when we com- 
 pare two tenns (expressions of concepts) and 
 pass Judgment thereon, the expression of 
 that Judgment is called a Proposition. In 
 every Judgment and Propositon there must 
 be two Terms or Concepts, connected by a 
 little word "is" or "are," or some form of 
 the verb "to be," in the present tense indic- 
 ative. This connecting word is called the 
 Copula. For instance, we may compare the 
 two terms horse and animal, as follows: "A 
 horse is an animal," the word is being the 
 Copula or sjTnbol of the affirmative Judg- 
 ment, which connects the two terms. In the 
 same way we may form a negative Judgment 
 as follows: "A horse is not a cow." In a 
 Proposition, the term of which something is 
 affirmed is called the Subject; and the term 
 expressing that ivhich is affirmed of the sub- 
 ject is called the Predicate. 
 
 Besides the distinction between affirmative 
 Judgments, or Propositions, there is a dis-
 
 132 Thought Culture 
 
 tinction arising from quantity, which sepa- 
 rates them into the respective classes of par- 
 ticular and universal. Thus, ' ' all horses are 
 animals," is a universal Judgment; while 
 **some horses are black" is a particular Judg- 
 ment. Thus all Judgments must be either af- 
 firmative or negative ; and also either particu- 
 lar or universal. This gives us four possible 
 classes of Judgments, as follows, and illus- 
 trated symbolically: 
 
 1. Universal Affirmative, as ''All A is B." 
 
 2. Universal Negative, as ' ' No A is B. " 
 
 3. Particular Affirmative, as "Some A is 
 
 B." 
 
 4. Particular Negative, as ''Some A is not 
 
 B." 
 The Term or Judgment is said to be ^^dis- 
 tributed" (that is, extended universally) 
 when it is used in its fullest sense, in which 
 it is used in the sense of "each and every" of 
 its kind or class. Thus in the proposition 
 "Horses are animals" the meaning is that 
 *'each and every" horse is an animal— in this 
 case the subject is "distributed" or made 
 universal. But the predicate is not "distrib- 
 uted" or made universal, but remains partic-
 
 Judgment 133 
 
 Tilar or restricted and implies merely ''some." 
 For the proposition does not mean that the 
 class ''horses" includes all animals. For we 
 may say that : ' ' Some animals are not horses. ' ' 
 So you see we have several instances in which 
 the "distribution" varies, both as regards the 
 subject and also the predicate. The rule ot 
 logic apiDlying in this case is as follows : 
 
 1. In universal propositions, the subject is 
 
 distributed. 
 
 2. In particular propositions, the subject is 
 
 not distributed. 
 
 3. In negative propositions, the predicate 
 
 is distributed. 
 
 4. In affirmative propositions, the predicate 
 
 is not distributed. 
 
 A little time devoted to the analysis and un- 
 derstanding of the above rules will repay the 
 student for his trouble, inasmuch as it will 
 train his mind in the direction of logical dis- 
 tinction and judgment. The importance of 
 these rules will appear later. 
 
 Halleck says: ''Judgment is the power 
 revolutionizing the world. The revolution is 
 slow because nature's forces are so complex, 
 so hard to be reduced to their simplest forms,
 
 134 Thought Culture 
 
 and so disguised and neutralized by the pres- 
 ence of other forces. The progress of the next 
 hundred years will join many concepts, which 
 now seem to have no common qualities. If 
 the vast amount of energy latent in the sun- 
 beams, in the rays of the stars, in the winds, 
 in the rising and falling of the tides, is treas- 
 ured up and applied to human purposes, it 
 will be a fresh triumph for judgment. This 
 world is rolling around in a universe of en- 
 ergy, of which judgment has as yet harnessed 
 only the smallest appreciable fraction. For- 
 tunately, judgment is ever working and 
 silently comparing things that, to past ages, 
 have seemed dissimilar; and it is constantly 
 abstracting and leaving out of the field of view 
 those qualities which have simply served to 
 obscure the point at issue." Brooks says: 
 "The power of judgment is of great value to 
 its products. It is involved in or accompanies 
 every act of the intellect, and thus lies at the 
 foundation of all intellectual activity. It op- 
 erates directly in every act of the understand- 
 ing; and even aids the other faculties of the 
 mind in completing their activities and 
 products."
 
 Judgment 135 
 
 The best method of cultivating the power 
 of Judgment is the exercise of the faculty in 
 the direction of making comparisons, of 
 weighing differences and resemblances, and 
 in generally training the mind along the lines 
 of Logical Thinking. Another volume of this 
 series is devoted to the latter subject, and 
 should aid the student who wishes to cultivate 
 the habit of logical and scientific thought. 
 The study of mathematics is calculated to 
 develop the faculty of Judgment, because it 
 necessitates the use of the powers of compar- 
 ison and decision. Mental arithmetic, espe- 
 cially, will tend to strengthen, and exercise 
 this faculty of the mind. 
 
 Geometry and Logic will give the very best 
 exercise along these lines to those who care 
 to devote the time, attention and work to the 
 task. Games, such as chess, and checkers or 
 draughts, tend to develop the powers of Judg- 
 ment. The study of the definitions of words 
 in a good dictionary will also tend to give ex- 
 cellent exercise along the same lines. The ex- 
 ercises given in this book for the cultivation 
 and development of the several faculties, will 
 tend to develop this particular faculty in a
 
 136 Thought Culture 
 
 general way, for the exercise of Judgment is 
 required at each step of the way, and in each 
 exercise. 
 
 Brooks says : "It should be one of the lead- 
 ing objects of the culture of young people to 
 lead them to acquire the habit of forming 
 judgments. They should not only be led to see 
 things, but to have opinions about things. 
 They should be trained to see things in their 
 relations, and to put these relations into def- 
 inite propositions. Their ideas of objects 
 should be worked up into thoughts concern- 
 ing the objects. Those methods of teaching 
 are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit 
 of mind that notices the similitudes and diver- 
 sities of objects, and endeavors to read the 
 thoughts which they embody and of which they 
 are the symbols." 
 
 The exercises given at the close of the next 
 chapter, entitled "Derived Judgments," will 
 give to the mind a decided trend in the direc- 
 tion of logical judgment. We heartily recom- 
 mend them to the student. 
 
 The student will find that he will tend to 
 acquire the habit of clear logical comparison 
 and judgment, if he will memorize and apply
 
 Judgment 137 
 
 in his thinking the following excellent Primary 
 Rules of Thought, stated by Jevons : 
 
 ''I. Law of Identity: The same quality or 
 thing is always the same quality or thing, no 
 matter how different the conditions in which 
 it occurs. 
 
 * ' 11. Law of Contradiction : Nothing can at 
 the same time and place both be and not be. 
 
 * ' III. Law of Excluded Middle : Everything 
 must either be, or not be; there is no other 
 alternative or middle course." 
 
 Jevons says of these laws: "Students are 
 seldom able to see at first their full meaning 
 and importance. All arguments may be ex- 
 plained when these self-evident laws are 
 granted; and it is not too much to say that 
 the whole of logic will he plain to those who 
 will constantly use these laws as their key."
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 DERIVED JUDGMENTS 
 
 As we have seen, a Judgment is obtained by 
 comparing two objects of thought according 
 to their agreement or difference. The next 
 higher step, that of logical Reasoning, con- 
 sists of the comparing of two ideas through 
 their relation to a third. This form of reason- 
 ing is called mediate, because it is effected 
 through the medium of the third idea. There 
 is, however, a certain process of Understand- 
 ing which comes in between this mediate rea- 
 soning on the one hand, and the formation of 
 a plain judgment on the other. Some authori- 
 ties treat it as a form of reasoning, calling it 
 Immediate Reasoning or Immediate Infer- 
 ence, while others treat it as a higher form 
 of Judgment, calling it Derived Judgment. 
 We shall follow the latter classification, as 
 best adapted for the particular purposes of 
 this book. 
 
 The fundamental principle of Derived 
 Judgment is that ordinary Judgments are 
 
 138
 
 Derived Judgments 139 
 
 often so related to each other that one Judg- 
 ment may be derived directly and immediately 
 from another. The two particular forms of 
 the general method of Derived Judgment are 
 known as those of (1) Opposition; and (2) 
 Conversion ; respectively. 
 
 In order to more clearly understand the 
 logical processes involved in Derived Judg- 
 ment, we should acquaint ourselves with the 
 general relations of Judgments, and with the 
 symbolic letters used by logicians as a means 
 of simplifying the processes of thought. Logi- 
 cians denote each of the four classes of Judg- 
 ments or Propositions by a certain letter, the 
 first four vowels— A, E, I and 0, being used 
 for the purpose. It has been found very con- 
 venient to use these symbols in denoting the 
 various forms of Propositions and Judg- 
 ments. The following table should be memor- 
 ized for this purpose : 
 
 Universal Affirmative, symbolized by ** A." 
 Universal Negative, symbolized by *'E." 
 Particular Affirmative, symbolized by "I." 
 Particular Negative, symbolized by "0.'* 
 It will be seen that these four forms of 
 Judgments bear certain relations to each
 
 140 
 
 Thought Culture 
 
 other, from wliich arises what is called oppo- 
 sition. This may be better understood by ref- 
 erence to the following table called the Square 
 of Opposition : 
 
 CONTRARIES 
 
 E 
 
 Thus, A and E are contraries ; I and are 
 sub-contraries ; A and I, and also E and are 
 subalterns; A and 0, and also E and I are 
 contradictories. 
 
 The following will give a symbolic table of 
 each of the four Judgments or Propositions 
 with the logical symbols attached : 
 
 (A) ''All A is B." 
 
 (E) ''No A is B."
 
 Derived Judgments 141 
 
 (I) '^Some AisB." 
 (0) "Some A is not B." 
 The following are the rules governing and 
 expressing the relations above indicated : 
 
 I. Of the Contradictories: One must be 
 true, and the other must he false. As for 
 instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (0) "Some 
 A is not B ; " cannot both be true at the same 
 time. Neither can (E) "No A is B;" and (I) 
 ' * Some A is B ; " both be true at the same time. 
 They are contradictory by nature,— and if one 
 is true, the other must be false ; if one is false, 
 the other must be true. 
 
 II. Of the Contraries : // one is true the 
 other must be false; but, both may be false. 
 As for instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (E) 
 " No A is B ; " cannot both be true at the same 
 time. If one is true the other must be false. 
 But, both may be false, as we may see when 
 we find we may state that (I) '^Some A is B." 
 So while these two propositions are contrary, 
 they are not contradictory. While, if one of 
 them is true the other must be false, it does 
 not follow that if one is false the other must 
 be true, for both may be false, leaving the 
 truth to be found in a third proposition.
 
 142 Thought Culture 
 
 III. Of the Subcontraries : If one is false 
 the other must be true; hut both may be true. 
 As for instance, (I) ''Some A is B;" and (0) 
 ''Some A is not B;" may both be true, for 
 they do not contradict each other. But one 
 or the other must be true— they can not both 
 be false. 
 
 IV. Of the Subalterns : If the Universal 
 {A or E) be true the Particular {I or 0) 
 must be true. As for instance, if (A) "All A 
 is B" is true, then (I) "Some A is B" must 
 also be true ; also, if ( E ) " No A is B " is true, 
 then "Some A is not B" must also be true. 
 The Universal carries the particular within 
 its truth and meaning. But ; If the Universal 
 is false, the particular may be true or it may 
 be false. As for instance (A) "All A is B" 
 may be false, and yet (I) "Some A is B" may 
 be either true or false, without being deter- 
 mined by the (A) proposition. And, likewise, 
 (E) "No A is B" may be false without de- 
 termining the truth or falsity of (0) "Some 
 A is not B." 
 
 But: // the Particular be false, the Uni- 
 versal also must be false. As for instance, 
 if (I) "Some A is B" is false, then it must
 
 Derived Judgments 143 
 
 follow that (A) ^'AIl A is B" must also be 
 false; or if (0) ''Some A is not B" is false, 
 then (E) "No A is B" must also be false. 
 But : The Particular may he true, without ren- 
 dering the Universal true. As for instance: 
 (I) ''Some A is B" may be true without mak- 
 ing true (A) "^?/ AisB;"or (0) "Some A 
 is not B" may be true without making true 
 (E)"NoAisB." 
 
 The above rules may be worked out not only 
 with the symbols, as "All A is B," but also 
 with any Judgments or Propositions, such as 
 "All horses are animals;" "All men are 
 mortal;" "Some men are artists;" etc. The 
 principle involved is identical in each and 
 every case. The "All A is B" symbology is 
 merely adopted for simplicity, and for the 
 purpose of rendering the logical process akin 
 to that of mathematics. The letters play the 
 same part that the numerals or figures do in 
 arithmetic or the a, h, c; x, y, z, in algebra. 
 Thinking in symbols tends toward clearness 
 of thought and reasoning. 
 
 Exercise : Let the student apply the prin- 
 ciples of Opposition by using any of the above 
 judgments mentioned in the preceding para-
 
 144 Thought Culture 
 
 graph, in the direction of erecting a Square of 
 Opposition of them, after having attached 
 the symbolic letters A, E, I and 0, to the ap- 
 propriate foiTus of the propositions. 
 
 Then let him work out the following prob- 
 lems from the Tables and Square given in this 
 chapter. 
 
 1. If '* A" is true; show what follows for E, 
 I and 0. Also what follows if ''A" be false. 
 
 2. If ' * E " is true ; show what follows for A, 
 I and 0. Also what follows if E" be false, 
 
 3. If ' ' I " is true ; show what follows for A, 
 E and 0. Also what follows if E " be false. 
 
 4. If ' * " is true ; show what follows for A, 
 E and I. Also what happens if * ' " be false. 
 
 CONVERSION OF JUDGMENTS 
 
 Judgments are capable of the process of 
 Conversion, or the change of place of subject 
 and predicate. Hyslop says: ''Conversion 
 is the transposition of subject and predicate, 
 or the process of immediate inference by 
 which we can infer from a given preposition 
 another having the predicate of the original 
 for its subject, and the subject of the original 
 for its predicate." The process of convert- 
 ing a proposition seems simple at first thought
 
 Derived Judgments 145 
 
 but a little consideration will show that there 
 are many difficul ties in the way. For instance, 
 while it is a true judgment that **A11 horses 
 are animals,^ ^ it is not a correct Derived Judg- 
 ment or Inference that *'A11 animals are 
 horses. The same is true of the possible con- 
 version of the judgment ''AH biscuit is 
 bread" into that of ''All bread is biscuit." 
 There are certain rules to be observed in Con- 
 version, as we shall see in a moment. 
 
 The Subject of a judgment is, of course, the 
 term of which something is affirmed ; and the 
 Predicate is the term expressing that ivhich is 
 affirmed of the Subject. The Predicate is 
 really an expression of an attribute of the 
 Subject. Thus when we say *'A11 horses are 
 animals" we express the idea that all horses 
 possess the attribute of " animality ; " or when 
 we say that "Some men are artists," we ex- 
 press the idea that some men possess the at- 
 tributes or qualities included in the concept 
 "artist." In Conversion, the original judg- 
 ment is called the Convertend; and the new 
 form of judgment, resulting from the conver- 
 sion, is called the Converse. Remember these 
 terms, please.
 
 146 Thought Culture 
 
 The two Rules of Conversion, stated in 
 simple form, are as follows : 
 
 I. Do not change the quality of a judgment. 
 The quality of the converse must remain the 
 same as that of the convertend. 
 
 II. Do not distribute an undistributed 
 term. No term must be distributed in the con- 
 verse which is not distributed in the con- 
 vertend. 
 
 The reason of these rules is that it would 
 be contrary to truth and logic to give to a 
 converted judgment a higher degree of qual- 
 ity and quantity than is found in the original 
 judgment. To do so would be to attempt to 
 make ''twice 2" more than ''2 plus 2." 
 
 There are three methods or kinds of Con- 
 version, as follows: (1) Simple Conversion; 
 (2) Limited Conversion; and (3) Conversion 
 by Contraposition. 
 
 In Simple Conversion, there is no change in 
 either quality or quantity. For instance, by 
 Simple Conversion we may convert a propo- 
 sition by changing the places of its subject and 
 predicate, respectively. But as Jevons says: 
 *'It does not follow that the new one will al- 
 ways be true if the old one was t.rue. Some-
 
 Derived Judgments 147 
 
 times this is the case, and sometimes it is not. 
 If I say, 'some churches are wooden-build- 
 ings, ' I may turn it around and get ' some 
 wooden-buildings are churches;' the meaning 
 is exactly the same as before. This kind of 
 change is called Simple Conversion, because 
 we need do nothing but simply change the sub- 
 -^ects and predicates in order to get a new 
 proposition. We see that the Particular Af- 
 firmative proposition can be simply converted. 
 Such is the case also with the Universal Nega- 
 tive proposition. 'No large flowers are green 
 things' may be converted simply into 'no 
 green things are large flowers.' " 
 
 In Limited Conversion, the quantity is 
 changed from Universal to Particular. Of this, 
 Jevons continues: "But it is a more trouble- 
 some matter, however, to convert a Universal 
 Affirmative proposition. The statement that 
 'all jelly fish are animals,' is true; but, if we 
 convert it, getting 'all animals are jelly fish,' 
 the result is absurd. This is because the pred- 
 icate of a universal proposition is really par- 
 ticular. We do not mean that jelly fish are 
 'air the animals which exist, but only 'some' 
 of the animals. The proposition ought really
 
 148 Thought Culture 
 
 to be 'all jelly fish are S07ne animals,' and if 
 we converted this simply, we should get, ' some 
 animals are all jelly fish. ' But we almost al- 
 ways leave out the little adjectives some and 
 all when they would occur in the predicate, 
 so that the proposition, when converted, be- 
 comes 'some animals are jelly fish.' This 
 kind of change is called Limited Conversion, 
 and we see that a Universal Affirmative prop- 
 osition, when so converted, gives a Particular 
 Affirmative one." 
 
 In Conversion by Contraposition, there is 
 a change in the position of the negative copula, 
 which shifts the expression of the quality. 
 As for instance, in the Particular Negative 
 ''Some animals are not horses," we cannot 
 say "Some horses are not animals," for that 
 would be a violation of the rule that "no term 
 must be distributed in the converse which is 
 not distributed in the convertend," for as 
 we have seen in the preceding chapter: "In 
 Particular propositions the subject is not dis- 
 tributed." And in the original proposition, 
 or convertend, "animals" is the subject of a 
 Particular proposition. Avoiding this, and 
 proceeding by Conversion by Contraposition,
 
 Derived Judgments 149 
 
 we convert the Convertend (0) into a Partic- 
 ular Affirmative (I), saying: ''Some animals 
 are not-horses;" or ''Some animals are 
 things not horses;" and then proceeding by 
 Simple Conversion we get the converse, 
 "Some things not horses are animals," or 
 "Some not-horses are animals." 
 
 The following gives the application of the 
 ai^propriate form of Conversion to each of 
 the several four kind of Judgments or Propo- 
 sitions : ''^ 
 
 (A) Universal Affirmative: This form of 
 proposition is converted by Limited Conver- 
 sion. The predicate not being distributed in 
 the convertend, it cannot be distributed in the 
 converse, by saying "all." ("In affirmative 
 propositions the predicate is not distrib- 
 uted. ") Thus by this form of Conversion, we 
 convert "All horses are animals" into "Some 
 animals are horses." The Universal Affirm- 
 ative (A) is converted by limitation into a 
 Particular Affirmative (I). 
 
 (E) Universal Negative: This form of 
 proposition is converted by Simple Conver- 
 sion. In a Universal Negative both terms are 
 distributed. ("In universal propositions, the
 
 150 Thought Culture 
 
 subject is distributed ; " ' * In negative propo- 
 sitions, the predicate is distributed.") So 
 we may say ''No cows are liorses," and then 
 convert the proposition into *'No horses are 
 cows." We simjDly convert one Universal 
 Negative (E) into another Universal Nega- 
 tive (E). 
 
 (I) Particular Affirmative: This form of 
 proposition is converted by Simple Conver- 
 sion. For neither term is distributed in a 
 Particular Affirmative^ ("In particular prop- 
 ositions, the subject is not distributed. In af- 
 firmative propositions, the predicate is not 
 distributed.") And neither term being dis- 
 tributed in the convertend, it must not be dis- 
 tributed in the converse. So from ''Some 
 horses are males" we may by Simple Con- 
 version derive ' ' Some males are horses. ' ' We 
 simply convert one Particular Affirmative (I), 
 into another Particular Affirmative (I). ■ 
 
 (0) Particular Negative: This form of 
 proposition is converted by Contraposition or 
 Negation. We have given examples and il- 
 lustrations in the paragraph describing Con- 
 version by Contraposition. The Particular 
 Negative (I) is converted by contraposition
 
 Derived Judgments 151 
 
 into a Particular Affirmative (I) which is then 
 simply converted into another Particular Af- 
 firmative (I). 
 
 There are several minor processes or meth- 
 ods of deriving judgments from each other, 
 or of making immediate inferences, but the 
 above will give the student a very fair idea 
 of the minor or more complete methods. 
 
 Exercise : The following will give the stu- 
 dent good practice and exercise in the methods 
 of Conversion. It affords a valuable mental 
 drill, and tends to develop the logical facul- 
 ties, particularly that of Judgment. The stu- 
 dent should convert the following proposi- 
 tions, according to the rules and examples 
 given in this chapter : 
 
 1 All men are reasoning beings. 
 
 2. Some men are blacksmiths. 
 
 3. No men are quadrupeds, 
 
 4. Some birds are sparrows. 
 
 5. Some horses are vicious. 
 
 6. No brute is rational. 
 
 7. Some men are not sane. 
 
 8. All biscuit is bread. 
 
 9. Some bread is biscuit. 
 10. Not all bread is biscuit.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 REASONING 
 
 In the preceding chapters we have seen that 
 in the group of mental processes involved in 
 the general process of Understanding, there 
 are several stages or steps, three of which we 
 have considered in turn, namely: (1) Ab- 
 straction; (2) Generalization or Conception ; 
 (3) Judgment. The fourth step, or stage, and 
 the one which we are now about to consider, 
 is that called Reasoning. 
 
 Reasoning is that faculty of the mind where- 
 by we compare two Judgments, one with the 
 other, and from which comparison we are en- 
 abled to form a third judgment. It is a form 
 of indirect or mediate comparison, whereas, 
 the ordinary Judgment is a form of immediate 
 or direct comparison. As, when we form a 
 Judgment, we compare two concepts and de- 
 cide upon their agreement or difference; so 
 in Reasoning we compare two Judgments and 
 from the comparison we draw or produce a 
 new Judgment. Thus, we may reason that the 
 
 152
 
 Reasoning 153 
 
 particular dog ''Carlo" is an animal, by the 
 following process : 
 
 (1) All dogs are animals; (2) Carlo is a 
 dog; therefore, (3) Carlo is an animal. Or, 
 in the same way, we may reason that a whale 
 is not a fish, as follows : 
 
 (1) All fish are cold-blooded animals; (2) 
 A whale is not a cold-blooded animal ; there- 
 fore, (3) A whale is not a fish. 
 
 In the above processes it will be seen that 
 the third and final Judgment is derived from a 
 comparison of the first two Judgments. 
 Brooks states the process as follows: ''Look- 
 ing at the process more closely, it will be seen 
 that in inference in Reasoning involves a 
 comparison of relations. We infer the rela- 
 tion of two objects from their relation to a 
 third object. We must thus grasp in the mind 
 two relations and from the comparison of 
 these two relations we infer a third relation. 
 The two relations from which we infer a third, 
 are judgments ; hence, Reasoning may also be 
 defined as the process of deriving one judg- 
 ment from two other judgments. We com- 
 pare the two given judgments and from this 
 comparison derive the third judgment. This
 
 154 Thought Culture 
 
 constitutes a single step in Reasoning, and an 
 argument so expressed is called a Syllogism." 
 
 The Syllogism consists of three proposi- 
 tions, the first two of which express the 
 grounds or basis of the argument and are 
 called the premdses; the third expresses the 
 inference derived from a comparison of the 
 other two and is called the conclusion. We 
 shall not enter into a technical consideration 
 of the Syllogism in this book, as the subject is 
 considered in detail in the volume of this series 
 devoted to the subject of ''Logic." Our con- 
 cern here is to point out the natural process 
 and course of Reasoning, rather than to con- 
 sider the technical features of the process. 
 
 Reasoning is divided into two general 
 
 * 
 
 classes, known respectively as (1) Inductive 
 Reasoning ; (2) Deductive Reasoning. 
 
 Inductive Reasoning is the process of arriv- 
 ing at a general truth, law or principle from a 
 consideration of many particular facts and 
 truths. Thus, if we find that a certain thing is 
 true of a great number of particular objects, 
 we may infer that the same thing is true of all 
 objects of this particular kind. In one of the 
 examples given above, one of the judgments
 
 Reasoning 155 
 
 was that "all fish are cold-blooded animals," 
 which general truth was arrived at by Induc- 
 tive Reasoning based upon the examination of 
 a great number of fish, and from thence as- 
 suming that all fish are true to this general law 
 of truth. 
 
 Deductive Reasoning is the reverse of In- 
 ductive Reasoning, and is a process of arriv- 
 ing at a particular truth from the assumption 
 of a general truth. Thus, from the assump- 
 tion that ''all fish are cold-blooded animals," 
 we, by Deductive Reasoning, arrive at the con- 
 clusion that the particular fish before us must 
 be cold-blooded. 
 
 Inductive Reasoning proceeds upon the 
 basic principle that ' ' What is true of the many 
 is true of the whole," while Deductive Reason- 
 ing proceeds upon the basic principle that 
 "What is true of the ivhole is true of its 
 parts." 
 
 Regarding the principle of Inductive Rea- 
 soning, Halleck says: ''Man has to find out 
 through his own experience, or that of others, 
 the major premises from which he argues or 
 draws his conclusions. By induction, we ex- 
 amine what seems to us a sufficient number of
 
 156 Thought Culture 
 
 individual cases. We then conclude that the 
 rest of these cases, which we have not exam- 
 ined, will obey the same general law. The 
 judgment 'All men are mortal' was reached 
 by induction. It was observed that all past 
 generations of men had died, and this fact 
 warranted the conclusion that all men living 
 will die. We make that assertion as boldly as 
 if we had seen them all die. The premise, * All 
 cows chew the cud,' was laid down after a cer- 
 tain number of cows had been examined. If 
 we were to see a cow twenty years hence, we 
 should expect to find that she chewed the cud. 
 It was noticed by astronomers that, after a 
 certain number of days, the earth regularly 
 returned to the same position in its orbit, the 
 sun rose in the same place, and the day was of 
 the same length. Hence, the length of the year 
 and of each succeeding day was determined, 
 and the almanac maker now infers that the 
 same will be true of future years. He tells us 
 that the sun on the first of next December will 
 rise at a given time, although he cannot throw 
 himself into the future to verify the con- 
 clusion." 
 Brooks says regarding this principle : ' ' This
 
 Reasoning 157 
 
 proposition is founded on our faith in the uni- 
 formity of nature ; take away this belief, and 
 all reasoning by induction fails. The basis of 
 induction is thus often stated to be man's faith 
 in the uniformity of nature. Induction has 
 been compared to a ladder upon which we as- 
 cend from facts to laws. This ladder cannot 
 stand unless it has something to rest upon; 
 and this something is our faith in the con- 
 stancy of nature's laws." 
 
 There are two general ways of obtaining 
 our basis for the process of Inductive Reason- 
 ing. One of these is called Perfect Induction 
 and the other Imperfect Induction. Perfect 
 Induction is possible only when we have had 
 the opportunity of examining every particular 
 object or thing of which the general idea is 
 expressed. For instance, if we could examine 
 every fish in the universe we would have the 
 basis of Perfect Induction for asserting the 
 general truth that *'all fishes are cold- 
 blooded." But this is practically impossible 
 in the great majority of cases, and so we must 
 fall back upon more or less Imperfect Induc- 
 tion. We must assume the general law from 
 the fact that it is seen to exist in a very great
 
 158 Thought Culture 
 
 number of particular cases ; upon the princi- 
 ple that "What is true of the many is true of 
 the whole. ' ' As Halleck says regarding this : 
 ' ' Whenever we make a statement such as, ' All 
 men are mortal,' without having tested each 
 individual case or, in other words, without 
 having seen every man die, we are reasoning 
 from imperfect induction. Every time a man 
 buys a piece of beef, a bushel of potatoes or a 
 loaf of bread, he is basing his action on infer- 
 ence from imperfect induction. He believes 
 that beef, potatoes and bread will prove nutri- 
 tious food, although he has not actually tested 
 those special edibles before purchasing them. 
 They have hitherto been found to be nutritious 
 on trial and he argues that the same will prove 
 true of those special instances. Whenever 
 a man takes stock in a new national bank, a 
 manufactory or a bridge, he is arguing from 
 past cases that this special investment will 
 prove profitable. We instinctively believe in 
 the uniformity of nature; if we did not we 
 should not consult our almanacs. If sufficient 
 heat will cause phosphorus to burn to-day, we 
 conclude that the same result will follow to- 
 morrow if the circumstances are the same."
 
 Reasoning 159 
 
 But, it will be seen, much care must be exer- 
 cised in making observations, experiments and 
 comparisons, and in making generalizations. 
 The following general principles will give the 
 views of the authorities regarding this : 
 
 Atwater gives the two general rules : 
 
 Rule of Agreement: "If, whenever a given 
 . object or agency is present, without counter- 
 acting forces, a given effect is produced, there 
 is a strong evidence that the object or agency 
 is the cause of the effect. ' ' 
 
 Rule of Disagreement: *'If when the sup- 
 posed cause is present the effect is present, 
 and when the supposed cause is absent the ef- 
 fect is wanting, there being in neither case any 
 other agents present to effect the result, we 
 may reasonably infer that the supposed cause 
 is the real one." 
 
 Rule of Residue: "When in any phenomena 
 we tind a result remaining after the effects of 
 all known causes are estimated, we may attrib- 
 ute it to a residual agent not yet reckoned. ' ' 
 
 Rule of Concomitant Variations: "When a 
 variation in a given antecedent is accompan- 
 ied by a variation of a given consequent, they
 
 160 Thought Culture 
 
 are in some manner related as cause and 
 effect." 
 
 Atwater says, of the above rules, that 
 "whenever either of these criteria is found, 
 free from conflicting evidence, and especially 
 when several of them concur, the evidence is 
 clear that the cases observed are fair repre- 
 sentatives of the whole class, and warrant a 
 valid universal inductive conclusion. ' ' 
 
 We now come to what is known as Hypothe- 
 sis or Theory, which is an assumed gen- 
 eral principle— a conjecture or supposition 
 founded upon observed and tested facts. 
 Some authorities use the term ''theory" in the 
 sense of "a verified hypothesis," but the two 
 terms are employed loosely and the usage 
 varies with different authorities. What is 
 known as "the probability of a hypothesis" 
 is the proportion of the number of facts it will 
 explain. The greater the number of facts it 
 will explain, the greater is its "probability." 
 A Hypothesis is said to be "verified" when 
 it will account for all the facts which are prop- 
 erly to be referred to it. Some very critical 
 authorities hold that verification should also 
 depend upon there being no other possible
 
 Reasoning 161 
 
 hypotheses which will account for the facts, 
 but this is generally considered an extreme 
 position. 
 
 A Hypothesis is the result of a peculiar 
 mental process which seems to act in the direc- 
 tion of making a sudden anticipatory leap to- 
 ward a theory, after the mind has been satu- 
 rated with a great body of particular facts. 
 Some have spoken of the process as almost 
 intuitive and, indeed, the testimony of many 
 discoverers of great natural laws would lead 
 us to believe that the Subconscious region of 
 the mind most active in making what La Place 
 has called ''the great guess" of discovery 
 of principle. As Brooks says: ''The forming 
 of hypotheses requires a suggestive mind, a 
 lively fancy, a philosophic imagination, that 
 catches a glimpse of the idea through the 
 form, or sees the law standing behind the 
 fact." 
 
 Thomson says: "The system of anatomy 
 which has immortalized the name of Oken, is 
 the consequence of a flash of anticipation 
 which glanced through his mind when he 
 picked up in a chance walk the skull of a deer, 
 bleached and disintegrated by the weather.
 
 162 Thought Culture 
 
 and exclaimed, after a glance, ' It is part of a 
 vertebral column.' When Newton saw the 
 apple fall, the anticipatory question flashed 
 through his mind, 'Why do not the heavenly 
 bodies fall like this apple?' In neither case 
 had accident any important share; Newton 
 and Oken were prepared by the deepest pre- 
 vious study to seize upon the unimportant fact 
 offered to them, and show how important it 
 might become ; and if the apple and the deer- 
 skull had been wanting, some other falling 
 body, or some other skull, would have touched 
 the string so ready to vibrate. But in each 
 case there was a great step of anticipation ; 
 Oken thought he saw the type of the whole 
 skeleton in a single vertebra, whilst Newton 
 conceived at once that the whole universe was 
 full of bodies tending to fall." 
 
 Passing from the consideration of Inductive 
 Reasoning to that of Deductive Reasoning we 
 find ourselves confronted with an entirely op- 
 posite condition. As Brooks says: ''The two 
 methods of reasoning are the reverse of each 
 other. One goes from particulars to generals ; 
 the other from generals to particulars. One is 
 a process of analysis ; the other is a process of
 
 Reasoning 163 
 
 synthesis. One rises from facts to laws ; the 
 other descends from laws to facts. Each is 
 independent of the other ; and each is a valid 
 and essential method of inference." 
 
 Deductive Reasoning is, as we have seen, de- 
 pendent upon the process of deriving a par- 
 ticular truth from a general law, principle or 
 truth, upon the fundamental axiom that: 
 ''What is true of the whole is true of its 
 parts." It is an analytical process, just as 
 Inductive Reasoning is synthetical. It is a 
 descending process, just as Inductive Reason- 
 ing is ascending. 
 
 Halleck says of Deductive Reasoning: ''Af- 
 ter induction has classified certain phenomena 
 and thus given us a major premise, we pro- 
 ceed deductively to apply the inference to any 
 new specimen that can be shown to belong to 
 that class. Induction hands over to deduction 
 a ready-made major premise, e. g. 'All scorp- 
 ions are dangerous,' Deduction takes this as 
 a fact, making no inquiry about its truth. 
 When a new object is presented, say a possible 
 scorpion, the only troublesome step is to de- 
 cide whether the object is really a scorpion. 
 This may be a severe task on judgment. The
 
 164 Thought Culture 
 
 average inhabitant of the temperate zone 
 would probably not care to risk a hundred dol- 
 lars on his ability to distinguish a scorpion 
 from a centipede, or from twenty or thirty 
 other creatures bearing some resemblance to 
 a scorpion. Here there must be accurately 
 formed concepts and sound judgment must be 
 used in comparing them. As soon as we de- 
 cide that the object is really a scorpion, we 
 complete the deduction in this way:— MZ^ 
 scorpions are dangerous; this creature is a 
 scorpion; this creature is dangerous.' The 
 reasoning of early life must be necessarily in- 
 ductive. The mind is then forming general 
 conclusions from the examination of individ- 
 ual phenomena. Only after general laws have 
 been laid down, after objects have been clas- 
 sified, after major premises have been formed, 
 can deduction be employed." 
 
 What is called Reasoning hy Analogy is 
 really but a higher degree of Generalization. 
 It is based upon the idea that if two or more 
 things resemble each other in many particu- 
 lars, they are apt to resemble each other in 
 other particulars. Some have expressed the 
 principle as follows : ' ' Things that have some
 
 Reasoning 165 
 
 things in common have other things in com- 
 mon." Or as Jevons states it: *'The rule 
 for reasoning by analog}^ is that if two or more 
 things resemble each other in many points, 
 they will jorobably resemble each other also in 
 more points." 
 
 This form of reasoning, while quite common 
 and quite convenient, is also very dangerous. 
 It affords many opportunities for making 
 false inferences. As Jevons says: ''In many 
 cases Reasoning by Analogy is found to be a 
 very uncertain guide. In some cases unfortu- 
 nate mistakes are committed. Children are 
 sometimes killed by gathering and eating poi- 
 sonous berries, wrongly inferring that they 
 can be eaten, because other berries, of a some- 
 what similar appearance, have been found 
 agreeable and harmless. Poisonous toad- 
 stools are occasionally mistaken for mush- 
 rooms, especially by people not accustomed to 
 gather them. . . . There is no way in which 
 we can really assure ourselves that we are 
 arguing safely by analogy. The only rule that 
 can be given is this, that the more things re- 
 semble each other, the more likely is it that 
 they are the same in other respects, especially
 
 166 Thought Culture 
 
 in points closely connected ivith those ob- 
 served." 
 
 Halleck says: ''In argmnent or reasoning 
 we are much aided by the hahit of searching 
 for hidden resemblances. We may here use 
 the term analogy in the narrower sense as a re- 
 semblance of ratios. There is analogical re- 
 lation between autumnal frosts and vegetation 
 on the one hand, and death and human life on 
 the other. Frosts stand in the same relation 
 to vegetation that death does to life. The de- 
 tection of such a relation cultivates thought. 
 If we are to succeed in argument, we must de- 
 velop what some call a sixth sense for the de- 
 tection of such relations. . . . Many false 
 analogies are manufactured and it is excel- 
 lent thought training to expose them. The 
 majority of people think so little that they 
 swallow false analogies just as newly-fledged 
 robins swallow small stones dropped into their 
 open mouths. . . . The study of poetry may 
 be made very serviceable in detecting anal- 
 ogies and cultivating the reasoning powers. 
 When the poet brings clearly to mind the 
 change due to death, using as an illustration 
 the caterpillar body transformed into the but-
 
 Reasoning 167 
 
 terfl}^ spirit, moving with winged ease over 
 flowing meadows, lie is cultivating our appre- 
 hension of relations, none the less valuable 
 because they are beautiful. " 
 
 There are certain studies which tend to de- 
 velop the power or faculty of Inductive Rea- 
 soning. Any study which leads the mind to 
 consider classification and general principles, 
 laws or truth, will tend to develop the faculty 
 of deduction. Physics, Chemistry, Astron- 
 omy, Biology and Natural History are partic- 
 ularly adapted to develop the mind in this par- 
 ticular direction. Moreover, the mind should 
 be directed to an inquiry into the causes of 
 things. Facts and phenomena should be ob- 
 served and an attempt should be made not 
 only to classify them, but also to discover gen- 
 eral principles moving them. Tentative or 
 provisional hypotheses should be erected and 
 then the facts re-examined in order to see 
 whether they support the hypotheses or the- 
 ory. Study of the processes whereby the great 
 scientific theories were erected, and the proofs 
 then adduced in support of them, will give the 
 mind the habit of thinking along the lines of 
 logical induction. The question ever in the
 
 168 Thought Cultuke 
 
 mind in Inductive Reasoning is '"Why?" The 
 dominant idea in Inductive Reasoning is the 
 Search for Causes. 
 
 In regard to the pitfalls of Inductive Rea- 
 soning—the fallacies, so-called, Hyslop says: 
 *'It is not easy to indicate the inductive fal- 
 lacies, if it be even possible, in the formal 
 process of induction. ... It is certain, how- 
 ever, that in respect to the subject-matter of 
 the conclusion in inductive reasoning there are 
 some very definite limitations upon the right- 
 to transcend the premises. We cannot infer 
 anything we please from any premises we 
 please. We must conform to certain definite 
 rules or principles. Any violation of them 
 will be a fallacy. These rules are the same as 
 those for material fallacies in deduction, so 
 that the fallacies of induction, whether they 
 are ever formal or not, are at least material ; 
 that is they occur whenever equivocation and 
 presumption are committed. There are, then, 
 two simple rules which should not be violated. 
 (1) The subject-matter in the conclusion 
 should be of the same general kind as in the 
 premises. (2) The facts constituting thi^
 
 Reasoning 169 
 
 premises must be accepted and must not be 
 fictitious. ' ' 
 
 One may develop his faculty or power of 
 Deductive Reasoning by pursuing certain lines 
 of study. The study of Mathematics, partic- 
 ularly in its branch of Mental Arithmetic is 
 especially valuable in this direction. Algebra 
 and Geometry have long been known to exer- 
 cise an influence over the mind which gives to 
 it a logical trend and cast. The processes in- 
 volved in Geometry are akin to those em- 
 ployed in Logical reasoning, and must neces- 
 sarily train the mind in this special direction. 
 As Brooks says: "So valuable is geometry as 
 a discipline that many lawyers and others re- 
 view their geometry every year in order to 
 keep the mind drilled to logical habits of think- 
 ing." The study of Grammar, Rhetoric and 
 the Languages, are also valuable in the culture 
 and development of the faculty of Deductive 
 Reasoning. The study of Psychology and 
 Philosophy have value in this connection. The 
 study of Law is very valuable in creating logi- 
 cal habits of thinking deductively. 
 
 But in the study of Logic we have possibly 
 the best exercise in the development and cul-
 
 170 Thought Culture 
 
 ture of this particular faculty. As Brooks 
 well says : * ' The study of Logic will aid in the 
 development of the power of deductive reason- 
 ing. It does this first by showing the method 
 by which we reason. To know how we reason, 
 to see the laws which govern the reasoning 
 process, to analyze the syllogism and see its 
 conformity to the laws of thought, is not only 
 an exercise of reasoning, but gives that knowl- 
 edge of the process that will be both a stimulus 
 and a guide to thought. No one can trace the 
 principles and processes of thought without 
 receiving thereby an impetus to thought. In 
 the second place, the study of logic is probably 
 even more valuable because it gives practice 
 in deductive thinking. This, perhaps, is its 
 principal value, since the mind reasons in- 
 stinctively ivithout knowing hoiv it reasons. 
 One can think without the knowledge of the 
 science of thinking, just as one can use 
 language correctly without a knowledge of 
 grammar; yet as the study of grammar im- 
 proves one's speech, so the study of logic can- 
 not but improve one's thought." 
 
 The study of the common fallacies, such as 
 ^'Begging the Question," ''Reasoning in a
 
 Keasoning 171 
 
 Circle," etc., is particularly important to the 
 student, for when one realizes that such fal- 
 lacies exist, and is able to detect and recognize 
 them, he will avoid their use in framing his 
 own arguments, and will be able to expose 
 them when they appear in the arguments of 
 others. 
 
 The fallacy of ''Begging the Question" con- 
 sists in assmning as a proven fact something 
 that has not been proven, or is not accepted as 
 proven by the other party to the argument. It 
 is a common trick in debate. The fact assumed 
 may be either the particular point to be 
 proved, or the premise necessary to prove it. 
 Hyslop gives the following illustration of this 
 fallacy: "Good institutions should he united; 
 Church and State are good institutions ; there- 
 fore, Church and State should be united." 
 The above syllogism seems reasonable at first 
 thought, but analysis will show that the major 
 premise ''Good institutions should be united" 
 is a mere assumption without proof. Destroy 
 this premise and the whole reasoning fails. 
 
 Another form of fallacy, quite common,' is 
 that called "Reasoning in a Circle," which 
 consists in assuming as proof of a proposition
 
 172 Thought Culture 
 
 the proposition itself, as for instance, ''This 
 man is a rascal, because he is a rogue; he is a 
 rogue, because he is a rascaV^ "We see 
 through glass, because it is. transparent.'* 
 "The child is dumb, because it has lost the 
 power of speech." "He is untruthful, because 
 he is a liar." ' ' The weather is warm, because 
 it is summer; it is smnmer, because the 
 weather is warm." 
 
 These and other fallacies may be detected 
 by a knowledge of Logic, and the perception 
 and detection of them strengthens one in his 
 faculty of Deductive Reasoning. The study 
 of the Laws of the Syllogism, in Logic, will 
 give to one a certain habitual sense of stating 
 the terms of his argument according to these 
 laws, which when acquired will be a long step 
 in the direction of logical thinking, and the cul- 
 ture of the faculties of deductive reasoning. 
 
 In concluding this chapter, we wish to call 
 your attention to a fact often overlooked by 
 the majority of people. Halleck well ex- 
 presses it as follows : ' ' Belief is a mental state 
 which might as well be classed under emotion 
 as under thinking, for it combines both ele- 
 ments. Belief is a part inference from the
 
 Reasoning 173 
 
 known to the unknown, and part feeling and 
 emotion. ' ' Others have gone so far as to say 
 that the majority of people employ their in- 
 tellects merely to prove to themselves and oth- 
 ers that which they feel to he true, or wish to 
 he true, rather than to ascertain what is actu- 
 ally true by logical methods. Others have said 
 that "men do not require arguments to con- 
 vince them ; they want only excuses to justify 
 them in their feelings, desires or actions." 
 Cynical though this may seem, there is suffici- 
 ent truth in it to warn one to guard against 
 the tendency. 
 
 Jevons says, regarding the question of the 
 culture of logical processes of thought : "Mon- 
 sieur Jourdain, an amusing person in one of 
 Moliere's plays, expressed much surprise on 
 learning that he had been talking prose for 
 more than forty years without knowing it. 
 Ninety-nine people out of a hundred might be 
 equally surprised on hearing that they had 
 long been converting propositions, syllogiz- 
 ing, falling into paralogisms, framing hy- 
 potheses and making classifications with gen- 
 era and species. If asked if they were logi- 
 cians, they would probably answer. No. They
 
 174 Thought Cultuee 
 
 would be partly right; for I believe that a 
 large number even of educated persons have 
 no clear idea of what logic is. Yet, in a certain 
 way, every one must have been a logician since 
 he began to speak. It may be asked:— If we 
 cannot help being logicians, why do we need 
 logic books at all? The answer is that there 
 are logicians, and logicians. All persons are 
 logicians in some manner or degree; but un- 
 fortunately many people are bad ones and 
 suffer harm in consequence. It is just the 
 same in other matters. Even if we do not 
 know the meaning of the name, we are all 
 athletes in some manner or degree. No one 
 can climb a tree or get over a gate without be- 
 ing more or less an athlete. Nevertheless, 
 he who wishes to do these actions really well, 
 to have a strong muscular frame and thereby 
 to secure good health and personal safety, 
 as far as possible, should learn athletic 
 exercises."
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION" 
 
 From the standpoint of the old psychology, 
 a chapter bearing the above title would be con- 
 sidered quite out of place in a book on 
 Thought-Culture, the Imagination being con- 
 sidered as outside the realm of practical 
 psychology, and as belonging entirely to the 
 idealistic phase of mental activities. The pop- 
 ular idea concerning the Imagination also is 
 opposed to the ' ' practical ' ' side of its use. In 
 the public mind the Imagination is regarded 
 as something connected with idle dreaming 
 and fanciful mental imaging. Imagination 
 is considered as almost synonomous with 
 ''Fancy." 
 
 But the New Psychology sees beyond this 
 negative phase of the Imagination and recog- 
 nizes the positive side which is essentially con- 
 structive when backed up with a determined 
 will. It recognizes that while the Imagination 
 is by its very nature idealistic, yet these ideals 
 may be made real— these subjective pictures 
 
 175
 
 176 ' Thought Culture 
 
 may be materialized objectively. The positive 
 phase of the Imagination manifests in plan- 
 ning, designing, projecting, mapping out, and 
 in general in erecting the mental framework 
 which is afterward clothed with the material 
 structure of actual accomplishment. And, ac- 
 cordingly, it has seemed to us that a chapter 
 on ''Constructive Imagination" might well 
 conclude this book on Thought-Culture. 
 
 Halleck says : " It was once thought that the 
 imagination should be repressed, not culti- 
 vated, that it was in the human mind like 
 weeds in a garden. . . In this age there is no 
 mental power that stands more in need of cul- 
 tivation than the imagination. So practical 
 are its results that a man without it cannot 
 possibly be a good plumber. He must image 
 short cuts for placing his pipe. The image of 
 the direction to take to elude an obstacle must 
 precede the actual laying of the pipe. If he 
 fixes it before traversing the way with his 
 imagination, he frequently gets into trouble 
 and has to tear down his work. Some one has 
 said that the more imagination a blacksmith 
 has, the better will he shoe a horse. Every 
 time he strikes the red-hot iron, he makes it
 
 Constructive Imagination 177 
 
 approximate to the image in his mind. Nor is 
 this image a literal copy of the horse's foot. 
 If there is a depression in that, the imagina- 
 tion must build out a corresponding elevation 
 in the image, and the blows must make the iron 
 fit the image." 
 
 Brodie says : '' Physical investigation, more 
 than anything else, helps to teach us the actual 
 value and right use of the imagination— of 
 that wondrous faculty, which, when left to 
 ramble uncontrolled, leads us astray into a 
 wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land 
 of mists and shadows; but which, properly 
 controlled by experience and reflection, be- 
 comes the noblest attribute of man, the source 
 of poetic genius, the instrument of discovery 
 in science, without the aid of which Newton 
 would never have invented fluxions nor Davy 
 have decomposed the earths and alkalies, 
 nor would Columbus have found another 
 continent. 
 
 The Imagination is more than Memory, for 
 the latter merely reproduces the impressions 
 made upon it, while the Imagination gathers 
 up the material of impression and weaves new 
 fabrics from them or builds new structures
 
 178 Thought Culture 
 
 from their separated units. As Tyndall well 
 said : ''Philosophers may be right in affirming 
 that we cannot transcend experience ; but we 
 can at all events carry it a long way from its 
 origin. We can also magnify, diminish, qual- 
 ify and combine experiences, so as to render 
 them fit for purposes entirely new. "We are 
 gifted with the power of imagination and by 
 this power we can lighten the darkness which 
 surrounds the world of the senses. There are 
 tories, even in science, who regard imagina- 
 tion as a faculty to be feared and avoided 
 rather than employed. But bounded and con- 
 ditioned by eooperant reason, imagination be- 
 comes the mightiest instrument of the physi- 
 cal discoverer. Newton's passage from a fall- 
 ing apple to a falling moon was, at the outset, 
 a leap of the imagination. ' ' 
 
 Brooks says: ''The imagination is a crea- 
 tive as well as a combining power. . . . The 
 Imagination can combine objects of sense into 
 new forms, but it can do more than this. The 
 objects of sense are, in most cases, merely the 
 materials with which it works. The imagina- 
 tion is a plastic power, moulding the things of 
 sense into new forms to express its ideals ; and
 
 Constructive Imagination 179 
 
 it is these ideals that constitute the real prod- 
 ucts of the imagination. The objects of the 
 material world are to it like clay in the hands 
 of the potter; it shapes them into forms ac- 
 cording to its own ideals of grace and beauty. 
 . . . He, who sees no more than a mere com- 
 bination in these creations of the imagination, 
 misses the essential element and elevates into 
 significance that which is merely incidental." 
 Imagination, in some degree or phase, must 
 come before voluntary physical action and 
 conscious material creation. Everything that 
 has been created by the hand of man has first 
 been created in the mind of man by the exer- 
 cise of the Imagination. Everything that man 
 has wrought has first existed in his mind as an 
 ideal, before his hands, or the hands of others, 
 wrought it into material reality. As Maudsley 
 says: ''It is certain that in order to execute 
 consciously a voluntary act we must have in 
 the mind a conception of the aim and purpose 
 of the act. ' ' Kay says :" It is as serving to 
 guide and direct our various activities that 
 mental images derive their chief value and im- 
 portance. In anything that we purpose or in- 
 tend to do, we must first of all have an idea
 
 180 Thought Culture 
 
 or image of it in the mind, and the more clear 
 and correct the image, the more accurately 
 and efficiently will the purpose be carried out. 
 We cannot exert an act of volition without 
 having in the mind an idea or image of what 
 we will to effect." 
 
 Upon the importance of a scientific use of 
 the Imagination in every-day life, the best au- 
 thorities agree. Maudsley says: ''We cannot 
 do an act voluntarily unless we know what we 
 are going to do, and we cannot know exactly 
 what we are going to do until we have taught 
 ourselves to do it. ' ' Bain says : ' ' By aiming at 
 a new construction, we must clearly conceive 
 what is aimed at. Where we have a very dis- 
 tinct and intelligible model before us, we are 
 in a fair way to succeed ; in proportion as the 
 ideal is dim and wavering we stagger and mis- 
 carry.'* Kay says: "A clear and accurate 
 idea of what we wish to do, and how it is to be 
 effected, is of the utmost value and importance 
 in all the affairs of life. A man's conduct 
 naturally shapes itself according to the ideas 
 in his mind, and nothing contributes more to 
 his success in life than having a high ideal and 
 keeping it constantly in view. Where such is
 
 Constructive Imagination 181 
 
 the case one can hardly fail in attaining it. 
 Numerous unexpected circumstances will be 
 found to conspire to bring it about, and even 
 what seemed at first hostile may be converted 
 into means for its furtherance ; while by hav- 
 ing it constantly before the mind he will be 
 ever ready to take advantage of any favoring 
 circumstances that may present themselves." 
 Simpson says: "A passionate desire and an 
 unwearied will can perform impossibilities, or 
 what seem to be such, to the cold and feeble. ' ' 
 Lytton says: ^' Dream, youth, dream man- 
 fully and nobly, and thy dreams shall be 
 prophets." Foster says: "It is wonderful 
 how even the casualities of life seem to bow to 
 a spirit that will not bow to them, and yield to 
 subserve a design which they may, in their 
 first apparent tendency, threaten to frustrate. 
 When a firm decisive spirit is recognized it is 
 curious to see how space clears around a man 
 and leaves him room and freedom." Tanner 
 says : ' ' To believe firmly is almost tantamount 
 , in the end to accomplishment." Maudsley 
 says: ''Aspirations are often prophecies, the 
 harbingers of what a man shall be in a con- 
 dition to perform." Macaulay says: *'It is
 
 182 Thought Culture 
 
 related of Warren Hastings that when only 
 seven years old there arose in his mind a 
 scheme which through all the turns of his 
 eventful life was never abandoned." Kay 
 says : ' ' When one is engaged in seeking for a 
 thing, if he keep the image of it clearly before 
 the mind, he will be very likely to find it, and 
 that too, probably, where it would otherwise 
 have escaped his notice." Burroughs says: 
 * * No one ever found the walking fern who did 
 not have the walking fern in his mind. A per- 
 son whose eye is full of Indian relics picks 
 them up in every field he walks through. They 
 are quickly recognized because the eye has 
 been commissioned to find them." 
 
 Constructive Imagination differs from the 
 phases of the faculty of Imagination which are 
 akin to "Fancy," in a number of ways, the 
 chief points of difference being as follows : 
 
 The Constructive Imagination is always ex- 
 ercised in the pursuance of a definite intent 
 and purpose. The person so using the faculty 
 starts out with the idea of accomplishing cer- 
 tain purposes, and with the direct intent of 
 thinking and planning in that particular di- 
 rection. The fanciful phase of the Imagina-
 
 Constructive Imagination 183 
 
 tion, on the contrary, starts with no definite 
 intent or purpose, but proceeds along the line 
 of mere idle phantasy or day-dreaming. 
 
 The Constructive Imagination selects its 
 material. The person using the faculty in this 
 manner abstracts from his general stock of 
 mental images and impressions those particu- 
 lar materials which fit in with his general in- 
 tent and purpose. Instead of allowing his 
 imagination to wander around the entire field 
 of memory, or representation, he deliberately 
 and voluntarily selects and sets apart only 
 such objects as seem to be conducive to his 
 general design or plan, and which are logically 
 associated with the same. 
 
 The Constructive Imagination operates 
 upon the lines of logical thought. One so 
 using the faculty subjects his mental images, 
 or ideas, to his thinking faculties, and pro- 
 ceeds with his imaginative constructive work 
 along the lines of Logical Thought. He goes 
 through the processes of Abstraction, Gen- 
 eralization or Conception, Judgment and the 
 higher phases of Reasoning, in connection 
 with his general work of Constructive Imagi- 
 nation. Instead of having the objects of
 
 184 Thought Culture 
 
 thought before him in material form, he has 
 them represented to his mind in ideal form, 
 and he works upon his material in that shape. 
 
 The Constructive Imagination is voluntary 
 — under the control and direction of the will. 
 Instead of being in the nature of a dream de- 
 pending not upon the will or reason, it is di- 
 rectly controlled not only by reason but also 
 by the will. 
 
 The Constructive Imagination, like every 
 other faculty of the mind, may be developed 
 and cultivated by Use and Nourishment. It 
 must be exercised in order to develop its men- 
 tal muscle ; and it must be supplied with nour- 
 ishment upon which it may grow. Drawing^ 
 Composing, Designing and Planning along 
 any line is calculated to give to this faculty the 
 exercise that it requires. The reading of the 
 right kind of literature is also likely to lead the 
 faculty into activity by inspiring it with ideals 
 and inciting it by example. 
 
 The mind should be supplied with the 
 proper material for the exercise of this fac- 
 ulty. As Halleck says: "Since the imagina- 
 tion has not the miraculous power necessary 
 to create something out of nothing, the first
 
 Constructive Imagination 185 
 
 essential thing is to get the proper percep- 
 tional material in proper quantity. If a child 
 has enough blocks, he can build a castle or a 
 l^alace. Give him but three blocks, and his 
 power of combination is painfully limited. 
 Some persons wonder why their imaginative 
 power is no greater, when they have only a few 
 accurate ideas. ' ' It thus follows that the ac- 
 tive use of the Perceptive faculties will result 
 in storing away a quantity of material, which, 
 when represented or reproduced by the Mem- 
 ory, will give to the Constructive Imagination 
 the material it requires with which to build. 
 The greater the general knowledge of the per- 
 son, the greater will be his store of material 
 for this use. This knowledge need not neces- 
 sarily be acquired at first hand from personal 
 observation, but may also be in the nature of 
 information acquired from the experience of 
 others and known through their conversation, 
 writings, etc. 
 
 The necessity of forming clear concepts is 
 very apparent when we come to exercise the 
 Constructive Imaginative. Unless we have 
 clear-cut ideas of the various things concerned 
 with the subject before us, we cannot focus the
 
 186 Thought Culture 
 
 imagination clearly upon its task. The gen- 
 eral ideas should be clearly understood and 
 the classification should be intelligent. Par- 
 ticular things should be clearly seen in 'Hhe 
 mind's eye;" that is, the power of visualiza- 
 tion or forming mental images should be cul- 
 tivated in this connection. One may improve 
 this particular faculty by either writing a de- 
 scription of scenes or particular things we 
 have seen, or else by verbally describing them 
 to others. As Halleck says : "An attempt at a 
 clear-cut oral description of something to an- 
 other person will often impress ourselves and 
 him with the fact that our mental images are 
 hazy, and that the first step toward better de- 
 scription consists in improving them. " 
 
 Tyndall has aptly stated the importance of 
 visualizing one's ideas and particular con- 
 cepts, as follows : * ' How, for example, are we 
 to lay hold of the physical basis of light since, 
 like that of life itself, it lies entirely without 
 the domain of the senses ? . . . Bring your 
 imaginations once more into play and figure 
 a series of sound-waves passing through air. 
 Follow them up to their origin, and what do 
 you there find? A definite, tangible, vibrating
 
 Constructive Imagination 187 
 
 body. It may be the vocal chords of a human 
 being, it may be an organ-pipe, or it may be a 
 stretched string. Follow in the same manner 
 a train of ether waves to their source, remem- 
 bering at the same time that your ether is mat- 
 ter, dense, elastic and capable of motions sub- 
 ject to and determined by mechanical laws. 
 What then do you expect to find as the source 
 of a series of ether waves"? Ask your imagi- 
 nation if it will accept a vibrating multiple 
 proportion— a numerical ratio in a state of 
 oscillation? I do not think it will. You can- 
 not crown the edifice by this abstraction. The 
 scientific imagination which is here authori- 
 tative, demands as the origin and cause of a 
 series of ether waves a particle of vibrating 
 matter quite as definite, though it may be 
 excessively minute, as that which gives origin 
 to a musical sound. Such a particle we name 
 an atom or a molecule. I thinl<L the seeking in- 
 tellect, when focused so as to give definition 
 without penumbral haze, is sure to realize this 
 image at the last." 
 
 By repeatedly exercising the faculty of 
 Imagination upon a particular idea, we aQci 
 power and clearness to that idea. This is but
 
 188 Thought Culture 
 
 another example of the familar psychological 
 principle expressed by Carpenter as follows : 
 ''The continued concentration of attention 
 ■upon a certain idea gives it a dominant 
 power. ' ' Kay says : * * Clearness and accuracy 
 of image is only to be obtained by repeatedly 
 having it in the mind, or by repeated action of 
 the faculty. Each repeated act of any of the 
 faculties renders the mental image of it more 
 clear and accurate than the preceding, and in 
 proportion to the clearness and accuracy of 
 the image will the act itself be performed eas- 
 ily, readily, skillfully. The course to be pur- 
 sued, the point to be gained, the amount of 
 effort to be put forth, become more and more 
 clear to the mind. It is only from what we 
 have done that we are able to judge what we 
 can do, and understand how it is to be effected. 
 When our ideas or conceptions of what we can 
 do are not based on experience, they become 
 fruitful sources of error." 
 
 Galton says: ''There is no doubt as to the 
 utility of the visualizing faculty where it is 
 duly subordinated to the higher intellectual 
 operations. A visual image is the most per- 
 fect form of mental representation wherever
 
 Constructive Imagination 189 
 
 the shape, position and relation of objects in 
 space are concerned. It is of importance in 
 every handicraft and profession where design 
 is required. The best workmen are those who 
 visualize the whole of what they propose to do 
 before they take a tool in their hands. ' ' 
 
 Kay says : ' ^ If we bear in mind that every 
 sensation or idea must form an image in the 
 mind before it can be perceived or understood, 
 and that every act of volition is preceded by 
 its image, it will be seen that images play an 
 important part in all our mental operations. 
 According to the nature of the ideas or images 
 which he entertains will be the character and 
 conduct of the man. The man tenacious of 
 purpose is the man who holds tenaciously cer- 
 tain ideas ; the flighty man is he who cannot 
 keep one idea before him for any length of 
 time, but constantly flits from one to another ; 
 the insane man is he who entertains insane 
 ideas often, it may be, on only one or two sub- 
 jects. We may distinguish two great classes 
 of individuals according to the prevailing 
 character of their images. There are those 
 in whose mind sensory images predominate, 
 and those whose images are chiefly such as
 
 190 Thought Culture 
 
 tend to action. Those of the former class are 
 observant, often thoughtful, men of judgment 
 and, it may be, of learning; but if they have 
 not also the active faculty in due force, they 
 will fail in giving forth or in turning to proper 
 account their knowledge or learning, and in- 
 stances of this kind are by no means uncom- 
 mon. The man, on the other hand, who has 
 ever in his mind images of things to be done, 
 is the man of action and enterprise. If he is 
 not also an observant and thoughtful man, if 
 his mind is backward in forming images of 
 what is presented to it from without, he will 
 be constantly liable to make mistakes. ' ' 
 
 Galton says of the faculty of visualization : 
 ''Our bookish and wordy education tends to 
 repress this valuable gift of nature. A fac- 
 ulty that is of importance in all technical and 
 artistic occupations, that gives accuracy to 
 our perceptions and justness to our generali- 
 zations, is starved by lazy disuse, instead of 
 being cultivated judiciously in such a way as 
 will, on the whole, bring the best return. I be- 
 lieve that a serious study of the best method 
 of developing and using this faculty without 
 prejudice to the practice of abstract thought in
 
 Constructive Imagination 191 
 
 sjTubols, is one of the many pressing desider- 
 ata in the yet unformed science of education." 
 This consideration of the faculty of, and 
 culture of, the Imagination, may appro^Dri- 
 ately be concluded by the following quotation 
 from Prof. Halleck, which shows the danger 
 of misuse and abuse of this important faculty. 
 The aforesaid well-known authority says: 
 ''From its very nature, the imagination is 
 peculiarly liable to abuse. The common prac- 
 tices of day-dreaming or castle-building are 
 both morally and physically unhealthful. We 
 reach actual success in life by slow, weary 
 steps. The day-dreamer attains eminence 
 with one bound. He is without trouble a vic- 
 torious general on a vast battlefield, an orator 
 swaying thousands, a millionaire with every 
 amusement at his command, a learned man 
 confounding the wisest, a president, an em- 
 peror or a czar. After reveling in these imag- 
 inative sweets, the dry bread of actual toil 
 becomes exceedingly distasteful. It is so 
 much easier to live in regions where every- 
 thing comes at the magic wand of fancy. Not 
 infrequently these castle-builders abandon ef- 
 fort in an actual world. Success comes too
 
 192 Thought Cultuke 
 
 slow for tliem. They become speculators or 
 gamblers, and in spite of all their grand 
 castles, gradually sink into utter nonentities 
 in the world of action. . . . The young 
 should never allow themselves to build any 
 imaginative castle, unless they are willing by 
 hard effort to try to make that castle a reality. 
 They must be willing to take off their coats, 
 go into the quarries of life, chisel out the 
 blocks of the stone, and build them with much 
 toil into the castle walls. If castle-building 
 is merely the formation of an ideal, which we 
 show by our effort that we are determined to 
 attain, then all will be well." 
 
 It will be seen that, in reality, the Cultiva- 
 tion of the Imagination is rather the training 
 and intelligent direction of that faculty, in- 
 stead of the development of its power. The 
 majority of people have the faculty of Imagi- 
 , nation well developed, but to them it is largely 
 an untrained, fanciful self-willed faculty. Cul- 
 tivation is needed in the direction of bringing 
 it under the guidance of the reason, and con- 
 trol by the will. Thought-Culture in general 
 will do much for the Imagination, for the very 
 processes employed in the development and
 
 Constructive Imagination 193 
 
 cultivation of the various other faculties of 
 the mind will also tend to bring the Imagina- 
 tion into subjection and under control, instead 
 of allowing it to remain the wild, fanciful irre- 
 sponsible faculty that it is in the majority of 
 cases. Use the faculty of Imagination as a 
 faculty of Thought, instead of a thing of 
 Fancy. Attach it to the Intellect instead of to 
 the Emotions. Harness it up with the other 
 faculties of Thought, and your chariot of Un- 
 derstanding and Attainment will reach the 
 goal far sooner than under the old arrange- 
 ment. Establish harmony between Intellect 
 and Imagination, and you largely increase the 
 power and achievements of both. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 THE 
 
 Pathway of Roses 
 
 By CHRISTIAN D. LARSON 
 
 WHO would so live that the dreams of the night 
 shall rise with the morning but shall not de- 
 part with the setting sun — it is to men and 
 women such as these that we recommend THE 
 PATHWAY OF ROSES. 
 
 The thinking world of today is being filled with a 
 phase of thought that has exceptional value. True, 
 some of it is in a somewhat chaotic condition, but 
 most of it is rich, containing within itself the very 
 life of that truth that is making the world free. But 
 in the finding of this truth, and in the application of 
 its principles, where are we to begin? What are we 
 to do first? And after we have begun, and find our- 
 selves in the midst of a life so large, so immense and 
 so marvelous that it will require eternity to live it all, 
 what are the great essentials that we should ever 
 remember and apply? What are the great centers of 
 life about which we may build a greater and a greater 
 life? These are questions that thousands are asking 
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 Beautifully and substantially bound in silk cloth 
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