y THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESENTED BY PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/analogyofreligiOObutlrich THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, TO THK CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. TO WBIOH ARE ADDED TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. By JOSEPH BUTLER, LL.D., LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. •*Ejus (Analogiz) haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est, ad aliquid simile, de quo non quaeritur, refeiat, ut incerta certis probet. — QuiNCT., Inst. Orat.^ i, i, c. 6. WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, COPIOUS NOTES, AND AN AMPLE INDEX. THE WHOLE EDITED BY Rev. JOSEPH CUMMINGS. U.D.. LL.D., FRBSIDENT OF WESI-EyAN ONIVKKSITY. NEW YORK : HUNT & EATON CINCINNATI : CRANSTON & CURTS Xy Vt^ Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, by NET.SON «fc PHILLIPS, In the Office o/ the Librarian of Congress at Washington. BTIIOO EDITOR'S PREFACE. T N preparing this edition of Butler's Analogy the -*■ Editor has endeavored to adapt it to Students, and to render, in a simple and concise form, the aid they need. The marginal titles, presenting the subjects of the paragraphs, and constituting an analysis of the sev- eral chapters, are an important part of his work. He has given much attention to the text, which, with a few corrections obviously necessary, is that of the second edition, prepared by the Right Rev. William Fitzgerald, D.D., Lord Bishop of Cork, Cloyne, and Ross, published in London in i860. Dr. Fitzgerald has given a collation of Butler's first edition of his work, which is a literary curiosity, and shows the singular pains he took with his style, in which he has commonly been censured for care- lessness. The Editor of this edition has taken the liberty to break up several long paragraphs into two or more, in order that their meaning may more readily be apprehended. The Index has been made very full and complete. ivi368l45 4 Editor's Preface. It will afford great help to those who may wish to understand the work, or make occasional references to the sentiments of the author. The Editor has taken from other editions, and from Dr, Chalmers, all the material he deemed of special value, and has added a few notes of his own. He was led to prepare this edition with special reference to the wants of Students in our higher in- stitutions of learning, but he hopes it will be found acceptable to Teachers, to Ministers, and to all others who desire a thorough acquaintance with this great work. The Biographical Sketch was written by Professor Henry Rogers, author of " The Eclipse of Faith," "The Supernatural Origin of the Bible," etc. It was prepared for the " Encyclopaedia Britannica." The same sketch is prefaced to the excellent edition prepared by Rev. J. T. Champlin, D.D. *^* AH the Notes except the Author's are inclosed in brackets. Dr. Fitzgerald is the author of the notes signed " F." MiDDLETOWN, May, 1875. SKETCH OF JOSEPH BUTLER. JOSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham— one of the most profound and original thinkers this or any other country ever produced — well deserves a place among the dii majores of English philosophy, with Bacon, Newton, and Locke. The following brief sketch will comprise an outline of his life and character, some remarks on the pecul- iarity of his genius, and an estimate of his principal writings. He was born at Wantage, in Berkshire, May i8, 1692. His father, Thomas Butler, had been a linen-draper in that town, but before the birth of Joseph, who was the youngest of a family of eight, had relinquished business. He continued to reside at Wantage, however, at a house called the Priory, which is still shown to the curious visitor. Young Butler received his first instructions from the Rev. Philip Barton, a clergyman, and master of the grammar school at Wantage. The father, who was n Presbyterian, was anxious that his son, who early gave indications of capacity, should dedicate himself to the ministry in his own communion, and sent him to a Dis- senting academy at Gloucester, then kept by Mr. Samuel Jones. " Jones," says Professor Fitzgerald with equal truth and justice, " was a man of no mean ability or eru- dition;" and adds, with honorable liberality, "could number among his scholars many names that might 6 Analogy of Religion. confer honor on any university in Christendom."* He instances among others Jeremiah Jones, the author of the excellent work on the Canon; Seeker, after- ward Archbishop of Canterbury ; and two of the most learned, acute, and candid apologists for Christianity England has produced — Nathaniel Lardner and Samuel Chandler. The academy was shortly afterward removed to Tewkesbury. While yet there Butler first displayed his extraordinary aptitude for metaphysical speculation in the letters he sent to Clarke on two supposed flaws in the reasoning of the recently published a priori demon- strations ; one respecting the proof of the Divine omni- presence^ and the other respecting the proof of the unity of the "necessarily existent Being." It is but just to Clarke to say that his opponent subsequently surren- dered both objections. Whether the capitulation be judged strictly the result of logical necessity will de- pend on the estimate formed of the value of Clarke's proof of the truths in question — truths which are hap- pily capable of being shown to be so, independently of any such a priori metaphysical demonstration. In this encounter, Butler showed his modesty not less than his prowess. He was so afraid of being discovered, that he employed his friend Seeker to convey his letters to the Gloucester post-office, and bring back the answers. About this time he began to entertain doubts of the propriety of adhering to his father's Presbyterian opin- ions, and, consequently, of entering the ministry of that communion ; doubts which at length terminated in his joining the Church of England. His father, seeing all opposition vain, at length consented to his repairing to * Life of Butler, prefixed to Professor Fitzgerald's very valuable edition of the Analogy, Dublin, 1849. The memoir is derived chiefly from Mr. Bartlett's more copious " Life ;" it is very carefully compiled, and is frequently cited in the present article. Sketch of Joseph Butler. 7 Oxford, where he was entered as a commoner of Onel College, March 17, 17 14. Here he early formed an inti- mate friendship with Mr. Edward Talbot, second son of the Bishop of Durham, a connection to which his future advancement was in a great degree owing. The exact period at which Butler took orders is not known, but it must have been before 1717, as by that date he was occasionally supplying Talbot's living, at Hendred, near Wantage. In 1718, at the age of twenty-six, he was nominated preacher at the Rolls, on the united recommendation of Talbot and Dr. Samuel Clarke. At this time the country was in a ferment. What is called the " Bangorian Controversy," and which origin- ated in a sermon of Bishop Hoadley, "On the Nature of Christ's Kingdom," (a discourse supposed to imperil "all ecclesiastical authority,") was then raging. One pamphlet which that voluminous controversy called forth has been attributed to Butler. "The external evidence, however, is," as Mr. Fitzgerald judges, "but slight ; and the internal, for the negative, at least equal- ly so." The writer says, " On the whole, I feel unable to arrive at any positive decision on the subject." Readers curious respecting it may consult Mr. Fitzger- ald's pages, where they will find a detail of the circum- stances which led to the publication of the pamphlet, and the evidence for and against its being attributed to Butler. In 1 72 1 Bishop Talbot presented Butler with the liv- ing of Haughton, near Dorkington, and Seeker (who had also relinquished nonconformity, and after some considerable fluctuations in his religious views had at length entered the Church) with that of Haughton-le- Spring. In 1725 the same liberal patron transferred Butler to the more lucrative benefice of Stanhope. He retained his situation of preacher at the Rolls till 8 Analogy of Religion. the following year, (1726,) and before quitting it, pub- lished the celebrated Fifteen Sermons delivered there ; among the most profound and original discourses which philosophical theologian ever gave to the world As these could have been but a portion of those he preached at the Rolls, it has often been asked what could become of the remainder? We agree with Mr. Fitzgerald in thinking that the substance of many was afterward worked into the Analogy. That many of them were equally important with the Fifteen may be inferred from Butler's declaration in the preface, that the selec- tion of these had been determined by " circumstances in a great measure accidental." At his death, Butler desired his manuscripts to be destroyed ; this he would hardly have done, had he not already rifled their chief treasures for his great work. Let us hope so, at all events; for it would be provoking to think that dis- courses of equal value with the Fifteen had been wan- tonly committed to the flames. After resigning his preachership at the Rolls, he re- tired to Stanhope, and gave himself up to study and the duties of a parish priest. All that could be gleaned of his habits and mode of life there has been preserved by the present Bishop of Exeter, his successor in the living of Stanhope eighty years after, and it is little enough. Tradition said that " Rector Butler rode a black pony, and always rode very fast ; that he was loved and re- spected by all his parishioners ; that he lived very retired, was very kind, and could not resist the importunities of common beggars, who, knowing his infirmity, pursued him so earnestly as sometimes to drive him back into his house as his only escape." The last fact the bishop reports doubtful ; but Butler's extreme benevolence is not so. In all probability, Butler in this seclusion was medi- tating and digesting that great work on which his fame. Sketch of Joseph Butler. 9 and what is better than fame, his usefulness, principally rests, the Analogy. " In a similar retirement," says Professor Fitzgerald, " The Ecclesiastical Polity of Hooker, The Intellectual System of Cudworth, and The Divine Legation of Warburton — records of genius * which posterity will not willingly let die * — were ripened into maturity." Queen Caroline once asked Arch- bishop Blackburne whether Butler was not "dead." " No," said he, "but he is buried.'' It was well for pos- terity that he was thus, for awhile, entombed. He remained in this meditative seclusion seven years At the end of this period, his friend Seeker, who thought Butler's health and spirits were failing under excess of solitude and study, succeeded in dragging him from his retreat. Lord Chancellor Talbot, at Seeker's solicita- tion, appointed him his chaplain in 1733, and in 1736 a prebendary of Rochester. In the same year. Queen Caroline, who thought her Court derived as much luster from philosophers and divines as from statesmen and courtiers — who had been the delighted spectator of the argumentative contests of Clarke and Berkeley, Hoadley and Sherlock — appointed Butler clerk of the closet, and commanded his " attendance every evening from seven till nine." It was in 1736 that the celebrated Analogy was pub- lished, and its great merits immediately attracted pub- lic attention. It was perpetually in the hands of his royal patroness, and passed through several editions before the author's death. Its greatest praise is that it has been almost universally read, and never answered. **I am not aware," says Mr. Fitzgerald, "that any of those whom it would have immediately concerned have ever attempted a regular reply to the Analogy; but particular parts of it have met with answers, and the whole, as a whole, has been sometimes unfavorably criticised." Of its merits, and precise position in rela- lo Analogy of Religion. tion " to those whom it immediately concerns," we shall speak presently. Some strange criticisms on its general character in Tholuck's Vermischte Scriften, showing a singular infe- licity in missing Butler's true ^^ stand-punkty' as Tho- luck's own countrymen would say, and rather unreason ably complaining of obscurity, considering the quality of German theologico-philosophical style in general, are well disposed of by Professor Fitzgerald. (Pp. 47-50.) About this time, Butler had some correspondence with Lord Kames, on the Evidences of Natural and Re- vealed Religion. Kames requested a personal interview, which Butler declined in a manner very characteristic of his modesty and caution. It was, " on the score of his natural diffidence and reserve, his being unaccus- tomed to oral controversy, and his fear that the cause of truth might thence suffer from the unskillfulness of its advocate." Hume was a kinsman of Lord Kames, and when pre- paring his treatise of Humafi Nature for the press, was recommended by Lord Kames to get Butler's judgment on it. " Your thoughts and mine," says Hume, " agree with respect to Dr. Butler, and I should be glad to be introduced to him." The interview, however, never took place, nor was Butler's judgment obtained. One cannot help speculating on the possible consequences Would it have made any difference } In the year 1737 Queen Caroline died, but on her death -bed recommended her favorite divine to her hus- band's care. In 1738 Butler was accordingly made Bishop of Bristol, in place of Dr. Gooch, who was translated to Norwich. This seems to have been a politic stroke of Walpole, " who probably thought," says Fitzgerald, " that the ascetic rector of Stanhope was too unworldly a person to care for the poverty of his preferment, 01 perceive the slight which it implied." In the reply Sketch of Joseph Butler. ii however, in which Butler expresses his sense of the honor conferred, he shows that he understood the posi- tion of matters very clearly. The hint he gave seems to have had its effect, for in 1740 the king nominated him to the vacant Deanery of St. Paul's, whereupon he resigned Stanhope, which he had hitherto held in com- mendam. The revenues of Bristol, the poorest see, did not exceed j[,\oo. A curious anecdote of Butler has been preserved by his domestic chaplain, Dr. Tucker, afterward Dean of Gloucester. He says : " His custom was, when at Bris- tol, to walk for hours in his garden in the darkest night which the time of year could afford, and I had fre- quently the honor to attend him. After walking some time, he would stop suddenly and ask the question, ' What security is there against the insanity of individ- uals? The physicians know of none, and as to divines we have no data, either from Scripture or from reason, to go upon in relation to this affair.' ' True, My Lord, no man has a lease of his understanding any more than of his life ; they are both in the hands of the Sovereign Disposer of all things.' He would then, take another turn, and again stop short : * Why might not whole com- munities and public bodies be seized with fits of insani- ty, as well as individuals } ' * My Lord, I have never considered the case, and can give no opinion concern- ing it.' ' Nothing but this principle, that they are lia- ble to insanity equally at least with private persons, can account for the major part of those transactions of which we read in history.* 1 thought little of that odd conceit of the bishop at that juncture ; but I own I could not avoid thinking of it a great deal since, and applying it to many ca.ses." In 1747, on the death of Archbishop Potter, it is said that the primacy was offered to Butler, who declined it, with the remark that " it is too late for me to try to 12 Analogy of Religion. support a falling Church." If he really said so it must have been in a moment of despondency, to which his constitutional melancholy often disposed him. No such feeling, at all events, prevented his accepting the bish- opric of Durham in 1750, on the death of Dr. Edward Chandler. About the time of his promotion to this dig- nity he was engaged in a design for consolidating and extending the Church of England in the American Col- onies. With this object he drew up a plan marked by his characteristic moderation and liberality ; the project, however, came to nothing. Soon after his translation to the see of Durham, But- ler delivered and published his charge on the Use and Importance of External Religion, which gave rise, in conjunction with his erection of a " white marble cross " over the communion table in his chapel at Bristol, and one or two other slight circumstances, to the ridiculous and malignant charge of popery ; a charge, as Mr. Fitz- gerald observes, " destitute of a shadow of positive evi- dence, and contradicted by the whole tenor of Butler's character, life, and writings." The revenues from his see were lavishly expended in the support of public and private charities,* while his own mode of life was most simple and unostentatious. Of the frugality of his table the following anecdote is proof: "A friend of mine, since deceased, told me," says the Rev. John Newton, " that when he was a young man he once dined with the late Dr. Butler, at that * Butler must have been of a naturally munificent as well as benev olent disposition. He was extremely fond, it appears, of planning and building; a passion not always very prudently indulged, or with- out danger, in early days, of involving him in difficulties ; from which, indeed, on one occasion Seeker's intervention saved him. He spent large sums in improving his various residences. It was probably in the indulgence of the love of ornamentation to which this passion led that the " marble cross," and other imprudent symbols which were so ridiculously adduced to support the charge of popery, orij^inated. Sketch of Joseph Butler. 13 time Bishop of Durham ; and, though the guest was a man of fortune, and the interview by appointment, the provision was no more than a joint of meat and a pudding. The bishop apologized for his plain fare by saying that it was his way of living ; * that he had long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no countenance from his example.' " No prelate ever owed less to politics for his elevation, or took less part in them. If he was not " wafted to his see of Durham," as Horace Walpole ludicrously said, " on a cloud of metaphysics," he certainly was not car- ried there by political intrigue or party maneuvers. He was never known to speak in the House of Peers, though constant in his attendance there. He had not long enjoyed his new dignity before symptoms of decay disclosed themselves. He repaired to Bath in 1752, in the hope of recovering his health, where he died, June 16, in the sixty-first year of his age. His face was thin and pale, but singularly expressive of placidity and benevolence. " His white hair," says Hutchinson,* " hung gracefully on his shoulders, and his whole figure was patriarchal." He was buried in the cathedral of Bristol, where two monuments have been erected to his memory. They record in suitable in- scriptions (one in Latin by his chaplain. Dr. Foster, and the other in English by the late Dr. Southey) his virtues and genius. Though epitaphs, they speak no more than simple truth. A singular anecdote is recorded of his last moments. As Mr. Fitzgerald observes, " it wants direct testimony," but is in itself neither uninstructive nor incredible, for a dying hour has often given strange vividness and in- tensity to truths neither previously unknown nor unin- fluential. It is generally given thus: "When Bishop ♦ History of Durham, vol. i, p. 578 ; cited in Fitzgerald's "Life." 14 Analogy of Religion. Butler lay on his death-bed, he called for his chaplain and said, * Though I have endeavored to avoid sin, and to please God to the utmost of my power ; yet, from the consciousness of perpetual infirmities, I am still afraid to die.' 'My Lord,' said the chaplain, 'you have for gotten that Jesus Christ is a Saviour.' ' True,' was the answer, * but how shall I know that he is a Saviour foi me? * * My Lord, it is written. Him that cometh unto me, I will in nowise cast out.' * True,' said the bishop, * and I am surprised that though I have read that Script- ure a thousand times over, I never felt its virtue till this moment; and now I die happy.' " The genius of Butler was almost equaLy distinguished by subtilty and comprehensiveness, though the latter quality was perhaps the most characteristic. In his juvenile correspondence with Clarke — already referred to — he displays an acuteness which, as Sir James Mack- intosh observes, "neither himself nor any other ever surpassed ;" an analytic skill, which, in earlier ages, might easily have gained him a rank with the most re- nowned of the schoolmen. But in his mature works, though they are every-where characterized by subtle thought, he manifests in combination with it qualities yet more valuable: patient comprehensiveness in the survey of complex evidence, a profound judgment and a most judicial calmness in computing its several ele- ments, and a singular constructive skill in combining the materials of argument into a consistent logical fabric. This " architectural power " of mind may be wholly or nearly wanting, where the mere analytic faculty may exist in much vigor. The latter may even be possessed in vicious excess, resulting in little more than the dis- integration of the subjects presented to its ingenuity. Synthetically to reconstruct the complex unity, when the task of analysis is completed, to assign the recipro- cal relations and law of subordination of its various Sketch of Joseph Butler. 15 parts, requires something more. Many can take a watch to pieces who would be sorely puzzled to put it together again. Butler possessed these powers of analysis and synthe- sis in remarkable equipoise. What is more, he could not only recombine, and present in symmetrical har- mony, the elements of a complex unity when capable of being subjected to an exact previous analysis — as in his remarkable sketch of the Moral Constitution of Man — but he had a wonderfully keen eye for detecting remote analogies and subtle relations where the elements are presented intermingled or in isolation, and insusceptible of being presented as a single object of contemplation previous to the attempt to combine them. This is the case with the celebrated Analogy. In the Sermons on Human Nature^ he comprehensively surveys that nature z.% z. system ox constitution; and after a careful analysis of its principles, affections, and passions, views these elements in combination, endeavors to reduce each of these to its place, assigns to them their relative impor- tance, and deduces from the whole the law of subordi- nation — which he finds in the Moral Supremacy of Con- science, as a key-stone to the arch — the ruling principle of the "Constitution." In the Analogy he gathers up and combines, from a wide survey of scattered and dis- jointed facts, those resemblances and relations on which the argument is founded, and works them into one of the most original and symmetrical logical creations to which human genius ever gave birth. The latter task was by far the more gigantic of the two? To recur to our previous illustration, Butler is here like one who puts a watch together without being permitted to take it to pieces — from the mere presentation of its disjointed fragments. In the former case he resembled the physi- ologist who has an entire animal to study and dissect; in the latter he resembled Cuvier, constructing out of i6 Analogy of Religion disjecta membra — a bone scattered here and there — an organized unity which man had never seen except in isolated fragments. All Butler's productions — even his briefest — display much of this " architectonic " quality of mind ; in all he not only evinces a keen analytic power in discerning the ** differences," (one phase of the philosophic genius, according to Bacon, and hardly the brightest,) but a still higher power of detecting the " analogies " and " resem- blances of things," and thus of showing their relation and subordination. These peculiarities make his writ- ings difficult ; but it makes them profound, and it gives them singular completeness. It is not difficult to assign the precise sphere in which Butler, with eminent gifts for abstract science in general, felt most at home. Facts show us, not only that there are peculiarities of mental structure which prompt men to the pursuit of some of the great objects of thought and speculation rather than others — peculiarities which cir- cumstances may determine and education modify ; but which neither circumstances nor education can do more than determine or modify; but that even in relation to the very same subject of speculation, there are minute and specific varieties of mind, which prompt men to ad- dict themselves rather to this part of it than to that. This was the case with Butler. Eminently fitted for the prosecution of metaphysical science in general, it is al- ways the philosophy of the moral nature of man to which he most naturally attaches himself, and on which he best loves to expatiate. Neither Bacon nor Pascal ever re- volved more deeply the phenomena of our moral nature, or contemplated its inconsistencies, its intricacies, its paradoxes, with a keener glance or more comprehensive survey, or drew from such survey reflections more orig- inal or instructive. As in reading Locke the young metaphysician is perpetually startled by the palpable Sketch of Joseph Butler. 17 apparition, in distinct, sharply defined outline, of facts of consciousness which he recognizes as having been par- tially and dimly present to his mind before — though too fugitive to fix, too vague to receive a name ; so in read- ing Butler he is continually surprised by the statement of moral facts and laws which he then first adequately recognizes as true, and sees in distinct vision face to face. It is not without reason that Sir James Mackin- tosh says of the sermons preached at the Rolls, " That in them Butler has taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predeces- sors, more satisfactorily established by him, more compre- hensively applied to particulars, more rationally connect- ed with each other, and therefore more worthy of the name of discovery^ than any with which we are acquainted." His special predilections for the sphere of speculation we have mentioned are strikingly indicated in his choice of iheg7'ound from which he proposes to survey the ques- tions of morals. " There are two ways," says he, in the preface to his three celebrated sermons on Human Na- ture, " in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution ; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspond- ent to this whole nature." As might be expected, from the tendencies of his mind, he selects his latter course. The powers of observation in Butler must have been, iu spite of his studious life and his remarkable habits of abstraction, not much inferior to his keen faculty of introspection, though this last was undoubtedly the main instrument by which he traced so profoundly the mysteries of our nature. There have doubtless been other men, far less profound, who have had a more quick and more vivid perception of the peculiarities 2 -i8 Analogy of Religion. of character which discriminate individuals, or small classes of men, (evincing after all, however, not so much a knowledge of man as a knowledge of men •) still the masterly manner in which Butler often sketch- es even these, shows that he must have been a very sagacious observer of those phenomena of human na- ture which presented themselves from without^ as well as of those which revealed themselves from within. In general, however, it is the characteristics of man^ the generic phenomena of our nature, in all their complex- ity and subtilty, that he best loves to investigate and exhibit. The spirit of his profound philosophy is mean- time worthy both of the Christian character and ample intellect of him who excogitated it. It is the very re- verse of that of the philosophical satirist or caricaturist; however severely just the foibles, the inconsistencies, the corruptions of our nature, it is a philosophy every- where compassionate, magnanimous, and philanthropic. Its tone, indeed, like that of the philosophy of Pascal, (though not shaded with the same deep melancholy,) is entirely modulated by a profound conviction of the frailty and ignorance of man, of the little we know com- pared with what is to be known, and of the duty of humility, modesty, and caution, in relation to all those great problems of the universe, which tempt and exer- cise man's ambitious speculations. His constant feeling amid the beautiful and original reasonings of the Anal- ogy^ is identical with that of Newton when, reverting at the close of life to his sublime discoveries, he declared he seemed only like a child who had been amusing him- self with picking up a few shells on the margin of (he ocean of universal truth, while the infinite still lay un- explored before him. In a word, it is the feeling, not only of Pascal and of Newton, but of all the profoundest speculators of our race, whose grandest lesson from all they learned was the vanishing ratio of man's knowledge Sketch of Joseph Butler. 19 to man's ignorance. Hence the immense value (if only as a discipline) of a careful study of Butler's writings to every youthful mind. They cannot but powerfully tend to check presumption, and teach modesty and self-distrust. The feebleness of Butler's imagination was singularly contrasted with the inventive and constructive qualities of his intellect, and the facility with which he detected and employed " analogies " in the way of argument. He is, indeed, almost unique in this respect. Other philosophic minds, (Bacon and Burke are illustrious ex- amples,) which have possessed similar aptitudes for " analogical " reasoning, have usually had quite suffi- cient of the kindred activity of imagination to employ " analogies " for the purpose of poetical illustration. If Butler possessed this faculty by nature in any tolerable measure, it must (as has been the case with some other great thinkers) have been repressed and absorbed by his habits of abstraction. His defect in this respect is, in some respects, to be regretted, since unquestionably the illustrations which imagination would have supplied to argument, and the graces it would have imparted to style, would have made his writings both more intelligi- ble and more attractive. It is said that once, and once only, " he courted the muses," having indited a solitary "acrostic to a fair cousin " who for the first and, as it seems, the only time, inspired him with the tender passion* But, as one of his biographers says, we have probably no great reason to lament the loss of this frag- ment of his poetry. Butler's composition is almost as destitute of wit as of the graces of imagination. Yet is he by no means without that dry sort of humor which often accompanies very vigorous logic, and, indeed, is in some instances inseparable from it ; for the neat detection of a sophism, or the sudden and unexpected explosion of a fallacy, 20 Analogy of Religion. produces much the same effect as: wit on those who are capable of enjoying close and cogent reasoning. There is also a kind of simple, grave, satirical pleasantry, with which he sometimes states and refutes an objection, by no means without its piquancy. As to the complaint of obscurity, which has been so often charged on Butler's style, it is difficult to see its justice in the sense in which it has usually been preferred. He is a difficult author, no doubt, but he is so from the close packing of his thoughts, and their immense gener- ality and comprehensiveness ; as also from what may be called the breadth of his march, and from occasional lateral excursions for the purpose of disposing of some objection which he does not formally mention, but which might harass his flank ; it certainly is not from inde- terminate language or (ordinarily) involved construction. All that is really required in the reader, capable of un- derstanding him at all, is to do just what he does with lyrical poetry, (if we may employ an old, and yet in this one point not inapt comparison ;) he must read suffi- ciently often to make all the transitions of thought fa- miliar, he must let the mind dwell with patience on each argument till its entire scope and bearing are properly appreciated. Nothing certainly is wanting in the method or arrangement of the thoughts, and the diction seems to us selected with the utmost care and precision. In- deed, as Professor Fitzgerald justly observes, a colla- tion of the first with the subsequent editions -of the Analogy (the variations are given in Mr. Fitzgerald's edition) will show, by the nature of the alterations, what pains Butler bestowed on a point on which he is errone- ously supposed to have been negligent. In subjects so abstruse, and involving so much generality of expression, the utmost difficulty must always be experienced in se- lecting language which conveys neithef more nor less than what is intended ; and this point Butler must have Sketch of Joseph Butler. 21 labored immensely, it may be added successfully, since he has at least produced works which have seldom giv- en rise to disputes as to his meaning. Though he may be difficult to be understood, few people complain of his being liable to be w/xunderstood. In short, it may be doubted whether any man of so comprehensive a mind, and dealing with such abstract subjects, ever con- densed the results of twenty years* meditations into so small a compass with so little obscurity. No doubt greater amplification would have made him more pleas- ing, but it may be questioned whether the perusal of his writings would have been so useful a discipline, and whether the truths he has delivered would have fixed themselves so indelibly as they now generally do in the minds of all who diligently study him. It is the result of the very activity of mind his writings stimulate and demand. But, at any rate, if precision in the use of language, and method and consecutiveness in the thoughts, are sufficient to rebut the charge of obscurity, Butler is not chargeable with the fault in the ordinary sense. We must never forget what Whately in his Rhetoric has so well illustrated — that perspicuity is a " relative quality." To the intelligent, or those who are willing to take sufficient pains to understand, Butler will not seem chargeable with obscurity. The diction is plain, downright Saxon-English, and the style, however homely, has, as the writer just mentioned observes, the great charm of transparent simplicity of purpose and unaffected earnestness. The immortal Analogy has probably done more to si- lence the objections of infidelity than any other ever written, from the earliest "apologies" downward. It not only most critically met the spirit of unbelief 'in the author's own day, but is equally adapted to meet that which chiefly prevails in all time. In every age some of the principal, perhaps the principal, objections to the 22 Analogy of Religion. Christian Revelation have been those which men's pre- conceptions of the Divine character and administration — of what God must be, and what God must do — have sug- gested against certain facts in the sacred history, or cer- tain doctrines it reveals. To show the objector then (supposing him to be a theist, as nine tenths of all such objectors have been) that the very same or similar dif* nculties are found in the structure of the universe and the divine administration of it, is to wrest every such weapon completely from his hands, if he be a fair rea- soner and remains a theist at all. He is bound by strict logical obligation either to show that the parallel diffi- culties do not exist, or to show how he can solve them, while ht cannot solve those of the Bible. In default of doing either of these things, he ought either to renounce all such objections to Christianity, or abandon theism al- together. It is true, therefore, that though Butler leaves the alternative of atheism open, he hardly leaves any oth- er alternative to nine tenths of the theists who have ob- jected to Christianity. It has been sometimes said, by way of reproach, that Butler does leave that door open ; that his work does not confute the atheist. The answer is, that it is not its ob- ject to confute atheism ; but it is equally true, that it does not diminish by one grain any of the arguments against it. It leaves the evidence for theism — every particle of it — just where it was. Butler merely avails himself of facts which exist, undeniably exist, (whether men be atheists or theists,) to neutralize a certain class of objections against Christianity. And, as the exhibi- tion of such facts as form -the pivot on which Butler's argument turns does not impugn the truth of theism, but leaves its conclusions, and the immense preponderance and convergence of evidence which establish them, just as they were, so it is equally true that Butler has suffi- ciently guarded his argument from any perversion; for Sketch of Joseph Butler. 23 example, in Part I, chap, vi, and Part II, chap. viii. He has also, with his accustomed acuteness and judgment, shown that, even on the principles of atheism itself, its confident assumption that, // its principles be granted, a future life, future happiness, future misery, is a dream — cannot be depended on; for since men have existed, they may again ; and if in a bad condition now, in a worse hereafter. It is not, on such an hypothesis, a whit more unaccountable that man's life should be re- newed or preserved, or perpetuated forever, than that it should have been originated at all. On this point he truly says, "That we are to live hereafter is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive, is; and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme that there can be no future state." It has been also alleged that the analogy only " shifts the difficulty from revealed to natural religion," and that " atheists might make use of the arguments, and have done so. The answer is, not only (as just said) that the arguments of Butler leave every particle of the evidence for theism just where it was, and that he has sufficient- ly guarded against all abuse of them ; but that tht/acfSj of which it is so foolishly said that the atheist migAi make ill use, had always been the very arguments which he /la^ used, and of which Butler only made a new and beneficial application. The objections with which he perplexes and baffles the deist, /le did not give to the atheist's armory; he took them from thence merely to make an unexpected and. more legitimate use of them. The atheist had never neglected such weapons, nor was likely to do so, previous to Butler's adroit application of them. The charge is ridiculous. As well might a man, who had wrested a stiletto from an assassin to defend himself, be accused of having put the weapon into tlic 24 Analogy of Religion. assassin's hands ! It was there before ; he merely wrest- ed it thence. It is just so with Butler. Further, we cannot but think that the conclusiveness of Butler's work as against its true object, The Deist, has often been underrated by many even of its genuine admirers. Thus Dr. Chalmers, for instance, who gives such glowing proofs of his admiration of the work, and expatiates in a congenial spirit on its merits, affirms that " those overrate the power of analogy who look to it for any very distinct or positive contribution to the Chris- tian argument. To repel objections, in fact, is the great service which analogy has rendered to the cause of Rev- elation, and it is the only service which we seek for at its hands."* This, abstractedly, is true; but in fact^ considering \\\^ position of the bulk of the objectors, that they have been invincibly persuaded of the truth of theism, and that their objections to Christianity have been exclusively or chiefly of the kind dealt with in the Analogy^ the work is much more than an argumentum ad hominemj it is not simply of negative value. To such objectors it logically establishes the truth of Christianity, or it forces them to recede from theism, which the bulk will not do. If a man says, " I am invincibly persuad- ed of the truth of proposition A, but I cannot receive proposition B, because objections a (i y are opposed to it; if these were removed, my objections would cease;" then, if you can show that a j3 y equally apply to the proposition A, his reception of which, he says, is based on invincible evidence, you do really compel such a man to believe that not only B may be true, but that it is true, unless he be willing (which few in the parallel case are) to abandon proposition A as well as B. This is precisely the condition in which the majority of deists have ever been, if we may judge from their writings. It is usually the a priori assumption, that certain facts * Prelections on Butler^ etc., p. 7. Sketch of Joseph Butler. 25 in the history of the Bible, or some portions of its doc- trine, are unworthy of the Deity, and incompatible with his character or administration, that has chiefly excited the incredulity of the deist ; far more than any dissatis- faction with the positive evidence which substantiates the Divine origin of Christianity. Neutralize these ob- jections by showing that they are equally applicable to what he declares he cannot relinquish — the doctrine of theism — and you show him, if he has a particle of logical sagacity, not only that Christianity may be true, but that it is so ; and his only escape is by relapsing into atheism, or resting his opposition on other objections of a very feeble character in comparison, and which, prob- ably, few would have ever been contented with alone ; for apart from these objections which Butler repels, the historical evidence of Christianity — the evidence on be- half of the integrity of its records, and the honesty and sincerity of its founders, showing that they could not have constructed such a system if they mouldy and would not, supposing them impostors, if they could — is stronger than that for any fact in history. In consequence of this position of the argument, But- ler's book, to large classes of objectors, though practi- cally an argumentum ad hofuinem^ not only proves Chris- tianity may be true, but in all logical fairness proves it is so. This he himself, with his usual judgment, points out. He says : " And objections, which are equally ap- plicable to both natural and revealed religion, are, properly speaking, answered by its being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be true'' The praise which Mackintosh bestowed on this great work is alike worthy of it and himself. " Butler's great work, though only a commentary on the singularly orig- inal and pregnant passage of Origen, which is so honestly prefixed to it as a motto, is, notwithstanding, the most original and profound work extant in any language oa 26 Analogy of Religion. the Philosophy of Religion.''* The favorite topics of the Sermons are, of course, largely insisted on in the Analogy: such as the ''ignorance of man;" the restric- tions which the limitations of his nature and his position in the universe should impose on his speculations ; hia subjection to "probability as the guide of life;" the folly and presumption of pronouncing, ^ priori^ on the character and conduct of the Divine Ruler from our contracted point of view, and our glimpses of but a very small segment of his universal plan. These topics Butler enforces with a power not less admirable than the sagacity with which he traces the analogies between the " Constitution and Course of Nature," and the dis- closures of " Divine Revelation." These last, of course, form the staple of the argument ; but to enforce the proper deductions from them the above favorite topics are absolutely essential. It has been sometimes, though erroneously, surmised that Butler was considerably indebted to preceding writers. That in the progress of the long deistical con- troversy many theologians should have caught glimpses of the same line of argument, is not wonderful. The constant iteration by the English deists of that same class of difficulties to which the Analogy replies, could not fail to lead to a partial perception of the powerful instrument it was reserved for Butler effectually to wield. It has been here as with almost every other great intel- lectual achievement of man ; many minds have been simultaneously engaged by the natural progress of events about the same subject of thought ; there have been "coming shadows" and "vague anticipations," perhaps * A far different and utterly inconsistent judgment in all respects is reported, in his " Life," to have fallen from him. But as Professor Fitzgerald shows, it is so strangely, and, indeed, amusingly contrary to the above, that it must have been founded on some mistake of something that must have been said in conversation. Sketch of Joseph Butler. 27 even simultaneous inventions or discoveries ; and then ensues much debate as to the true claimants. Thus it was in relation to the calculus, the analysis of water, the invention of the steam-engine, and the discovery of Neptune. In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that the merit of the systematic construction of the en- tire argument rests with Butler. Nor would it have much detracted from his merit, even if he had derived far larger fragments of the fabric from his contemporaries than we have any reason to believe he did. They would have been but single stones ; the architectural genius which brought them from their distant quarries and polished them, and wrought them into a massive evidence, was his alone. Professor Fitzgerald has truly remarked, that the work of Dr. James Foster against Tindal (an author Butler evidently has constantly in his eye) presents some curi- ous parallelisms with certain passages of the Analogy. We have ourselves noted in Conybeare's reply to the same infidel writer (published six years before the Analogy) other parallelisms not less striking. But it seems quite improbable that Butler should have derived aid from any such sources, since his work was being excogitated for many years before it was published ; nay, as we have seen, it may be conjectured that he largely transfused into it portions of the sermons delivered so long before at the Rolls, and of which a far greater number must have been preached than the fifteen he published ; so that perhaps, it is more near the truth to say that con- temporary writers had been indebted to him than he to them. The " pregnant sentence " from Origen, however, is not the only thing which may have suggested to Butler his great work. Berkeley, in a long passage of the " Minute Philosopher," cited by Mr. Fitzgerald, clearly 28 Analogy of Religion. lays down the principle on which such a woik as the Analogy might be constructed. The spirit of the Analogy is admirable. Though em- inently controversial in its origin and purpose ; and though the author must constantly have had the dcistical writers of the day in his eye, his work is calm and dig- nified, and divested of every trace of the controversial spirit. He does not even mention the names of the men whose opinions he is refuting ; and if their systems had been merely some new minerals or aerolites dropped upon the world from some unknown sphere, he could not have analyzed them with less of passion. Of Butler's ethical philosophy, as expounded especial- ly in the Sermons on Human Nature^ Sir James Mackin- tosh's remarks prefixea to this Encyclopaedia* super- sede further notice in the present brief article. But it may be remarked in general of the sermons preached at the Rolls, that though not so much read (if we except, perhaps, the three just mentioned) as the Analogy^ they are to the full as worthy of being read ; they deserve all that is so strikingly said of them in the Preliminary Dissertation. Some of them fill one with wonder at the sagacity with which the moral paradoxes in human na- ture are investigated and reconciled. Take, for exam- ple, the sermon on Balaam. The first feeling in many a mind on reading the history in the Old Testament is, that man could not so act in the given circumstances. We doubt if ever any man deeply pondered the sermon of Butler, in which he dwells on the equally unaccount- able phenomena of human conduct, less observed, in- deed, only because more observable, and questioned any longer man's powers of self-deception, even to such feats of folly and wickedness as are recorded of the prophet. The editions of Butler's writings, separately or alto- * Encyclopaedia Britannica. Sketch of Joseph Butler, 29 gether, have been numerous, and it is impossible within the limits of this article to specify them, still less to do justice to the literature which they have produced. His commentators have been many and most illustrious : seldom has a man who wrote so little engaged so many great minds to do him homage by becoming his expo- nents and annotators. It may be permitted, however, to mention with deserved honor the remarks of Sir James Mackintosh, prefixed to this Encyclopaedia ; the " Pre- lections " of Dr. Chalmers on the Analogy; the valuable " Essay " of Dr. Hampden on the " Philosophical Evi- dences of Christianity;" some beautiful applications of Butler's principle in Whately's " Essays on the Pecul- iarities of Christianity;" and the admiral^ edition of the Analogy by Professor Fitzgerald, which is enriched by many very acute and judicious notes, and by a copious and valuable index. ADVERTISEMENT PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION. IF the reader should meet here with any thing which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious ; but in the application of them : in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will observe several things which will appear to him of very little, if he can think things to l^ of little importance which are of any real weight at all upon such a subject as religion. How- ever, the proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together. It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discov- ered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were, by way of reprisals for its having so long inter- rupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much, at least, will be here found — not taken for granted, but proved — that any reasonable man who will thoroughly consider the matter may be as much assured as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so cleat a case that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the con- trary. And the practical consequence to be drawn from this is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it May, 1736. CONTENTS, Page Sketch OF Joseph Butler 5 Introduction 33 PART I. OF NATURAL RELIGION. Cbafter I. Of a Future Life 45 II. Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pun- ishments, AND particularly OF THE LAITER 69 III. Of THE Moral Government of God 84 IV. Of A State of Probation, as Implying Trial, Dif- ficulties, and Danger 113 V. Of a State of Probation, as Intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement 124 VI. Or THE Opinion of Necessity, Considered as In- FLUENaNG Practice 152 VII. Of the Government of God, Considered as a Scheme or Constitution, Imperfectly Compre- hended 171 Conclusion 184 32 Contents. PART II. OF REVEALED RELIGION Chaptkr Page I. Oe the Importance of Christianity 191 II. Of the Supposed Presumption against a Revela- tion, Considered as Miraculous 212 III. Of our Incapacity of Judging what were to be Expected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, FROM Analogy, that it must Contain Things Appearing Liable to Objections 222 IV. Of Christianity, Considered as a Scheme or Con- stitution, Imperfectly Comprehended 240 V. Of the Particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemp- tion of the World by him 249 VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation; AND of the Supposed Deficiency in the Proof OF IT 271 VII. Of the Particular Evidence for Christianity.. 292 VIII. Of the Objections which may be made against Arguing from the Analogy of Nature to Re- ligion 333 Conclusion 347 DISSERTATIONS. I. Of Personal Identity 357 II. Of the Nature of Virtue 365 Index 377 INTRODUCTION PROBABLE Evidence is essentially distinguished from Demonstrative by this, that it admits of de- grees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption. Difference be- We cannot, indeed, say a thing is probably SDeS^Jf^t-A true upon one very slight presumption for ^^^e Evidence. >^v^ it ; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against it ; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability appears from hence — that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's hav- ing observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow. But the observa- tion of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. 2. That which chiefly constitutes Probability is ex- pressed in the word likely^ that is, like some truth * or tnie event ; like it in itself, in its evidence, in Likeneas con- /. r -i. • J. 1 stltutes Proba- some more or fewer of its circumstances.f biiity. * Verisimile. f [" Like it in itself," seems to indicate the case in which we have ascertained the whole nature of the truth or known fact ; for example, ascertained the whole of the conditions upon which a given conse- 3 34 Analogy of Religion. For when we determine a thing to be probably true — suppose that an event has or will come to pass — it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event which we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless daily in- stances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass ; according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief that Illustrations. ,.,,...,. .„ a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be its certain destruc- tion. So, likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our expectations that others will act so and so in such cir- cumstances ; and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles ; — all these rely upon our having observed the like, to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say upon our having observed the like, either with re- spect to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince * who had always lived in a warm climate natu- rally concluded, in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's becoming hard, because he had al- ways observed it to be fluid and yielding ; — we, on the contrary, -from analogy, conclude that there is no pre- sumption at all against this; that it is supposable there quence takes place. This is the case of a strict induction. " Like in its evidence," when the same testimony or proof which we have fouud credible for >ome cases leads us to believe something else. " Like it in some more or fewer of its circumstances," refers to analogies, in the popular sense of the term, as before explained, — F.] * The story is told by Mr. Locke, in the chapter on Probability Essay on :he Human Understanding, book iv, chap, xv, § 5. Introduction. 35 may be frost in England any given day in January next probable that there will on some day of the month ; and that the« is a moral certainty, that is, ground for an expectation, without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. 3. Probable Evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be consid- ered as relative only to beings of limited probability the capacities. For nothing which is the possi- i^^uiaLn aiS ble object of knowledge, whether past, pres- ^^^^ ent, or future, can be probable to an Infinite Intelli- gence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely, as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false. But, to us, probability is the very guide of life. From these things it follows, that in questions of diffi- culty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of examination be, that there appears, upon the whole, any, even the lowest, presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater, this determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and, in matters of prac- tice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption, or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth.* For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what, upon the whole, appears according to the best of his judgment to be for his happiness, as what he cer- tainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of ;5reat consequence, a reasonable man will think it con [♦ This course is reasonable, but more is required in religion. Its evidence must be sufficient not only to show how its duties may be performed, and to indicate the pnidence of obedience, but strong enough to cause full belief in a reasonable mind. Belief is a condi- tion of salvation, and is involved in full submission to God.] 36 Analogy of Religion. cerns him to remark lower probabilities and presump- tions than these ; such as amount to no more than show- ing one side of a question to be as supposable alfd cred- ible as the other ; nay, such as but amount to much less even than this. For numberless instances might be men- tioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application, too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.* 4. It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability ; or Analogy of whence it proceeds, that likeness should be- S^t^thsStog get that presumption, opinion, and full con- objections. viction which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one ; or to guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of logic,! and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed, I shall not take upon me to say how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical reasoning can be reduced to general heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a system. But though so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them, this does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, toward determining our judg- ment, and our practice. Nor does it in any wise cease to, be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other cases, in which it is not easy to say whether it be, or be not, of any weight ; ♦ See part ii, chap. vi. \\ See Mills' System of Logic, hook iii, chap xx,] Introduction. 37 Qr instances of seeming analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. 5. Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* has with singular sagacity observed, that " he who be- lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from ^_, , ^ ^ Ongen'a r©- Him who is the Author of Nature, may well mark— its appU- . . , cation. expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature." And in a like way of reflection, it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon ac- count of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an analogy, or likeness, between that system of things and dispensation of Providence which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence which experi- ence, together with reason, informs us of, that is, the known course of nature, this is a presumption that they have both the same author and cause, at least so far as to answer objections against the former be- ing from God, drawn from any thing which is analog- ical or similar to what is in the latter, which is ac- knowledged to be from him ; for an author of nature is here supposed. ♦ Xp7 fiev Tol ye tov uira^ irapade^dfievov tov KTiaavrot ivv Kda/iot elvai TavTOi rdf ypa<^g ireTreladai, bri baa irepl TTjq KTiaeuq anavr^ rotf i^TjTovai TOV irepl avrtj^ "kdyov^ ravTa koI Trept tuv ygaijtiJv. Phi- local., p, 23, Ed. Cant. [This sagacious remark is, however, strange- ly misapplied by Origen to the establishment of one of his favorite theories — that there is a mystical meaning in every word, and ever letter, of Scripture. — F.] 38 Analogy of RELidioN. 6. Forming our notions of the constitution and gov- ernment of the world upon reasoning, without founda- tion for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Descartes vain— Analogy Forminof our notions upon reasoning? from prmciples which are certam, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathe- matics, without sufficient data,) is an error much akin to the former ; since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the ob- servation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known to others that are like them ; from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it; and, from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter. 7. This method, then, of concluding and determining being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we can- X,. :. not but act upon in the common pursuits of This method . . ^ . ... conclusive —ap- life; being evidently conclusive, in various plied to religion. , ' ^ - \, , j degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness , and having so great authority for its introduction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion, my design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed \ talcing for proved that there is an intelligent author of nature, and natural governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has been often proved, with accumulated evi- dence, from this argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract reasonings, from the most ancient tradition Introduction. 39 aiid testimony, and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatis- fied with the evidence of religion. 8. As there are some who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God's government upon hypothe- sis, so there are others who indulge them- tion^— their ro- selves m vam and idle speculations,* how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon supposition that things might, in imag- ining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a better model than what appears in the pres- ent disposition and conduct of them. Suppose, now, a person of such a turn of mind to go on with his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature as appearing to him the best — one shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human under- standing if one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, prob- ably would not be the very best, even according to his own notions of best ; whether he thought that to be so which afforded occasions and motives for the exer- cise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happiness; or that these two were neces- sarily connected, and ran up into one and the same plan. However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount of these emendations and imagin- ary improvements upon the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. And it seems there could be no stopping till we came to some such conclusions [■* In an illustration of these idle speculations, see Bayle's Response aux Questions Wtin Provincial. See also notes to the Articles Manichaeus, Ori{ieii, Paulicians, in Bayle's Critical Dictionary. Fitz- gerald supposes Butler had Bayle in mind in this passage.] 40 Analogy of Religion. as these : — That all creatures should at first* be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever be- ing; that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to do, (some indolent persons would perhaps think, nothing at all,) or certainly, that effectual care should be taken that they should, whether necessa- rily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect ; either by not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the right motive of ac- tion, in every instance, before their minds continually in so,strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it ; and that the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as ab- surd ; as an awkward, roundabout method of carrying things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. 9. Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been above intimat- for 8uch specu- ed is a full, direct, general answer to it, lations. This , Bhown In uttie namely, that we may see beforehand that we aflPalrs, etc. ... have not faculties for this kind of specula- tion. For though it be admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or deter- mine some ends to be absolutely in themselves prefera- ble to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or, if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely the best, and, consequently, that we must conclude the ultimate end designed in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence is the most virtue and happiness possible, yet we are far from being able to judge what particular [* That is, from birth, without the results of experience.] Introduction. 41 disposition of things would be most friendly and assist- ant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely nec- essary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it de- tached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are so fai from being able to judge of this that we are not judges what may be the necessary means of raising and con- ducting one person to the highest perfection and happi- ness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character to such as will consider what a practical proof is, because it is the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that virtue must be the happi- ness, and vice the misery, of every creature ; and that regularity, and order, and right, cannot but prevail final- ly, in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges what are the necessary means of accomplish- ing this end. 10. Let us, then, instead of that idle, and not very in- nocent, employment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our compare tho thoughts to what we experience to be the JSS^?ReB|.' conduct of nature with respect to intelli- '°°' gent creatures ; which may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. And let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature ; the acknowl- edged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what religion 42 Analogy of Religion. teaches us to believe and expect, and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much so; that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of Divine conduct. 11. The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts; m . . * some more, in others less exact. In some The extent o? , ' Auiiiogy— what few instances, perhaps, it may amount to a it shows. _ > r r > j real, practical proof, in others not so ; yet in these it is a confirmation of what, is proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and of revealed religion ; though not, perhaps, an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer, to the objections against the evidence of it ; for objections against a proof, and objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe, are different things. 12. Now the Divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, ^, , ^. contains in it, — That mankind is appointed What the Di- ,. . ^ / , . x , , vine Govern- to livc in a futurc State, (chap. 1 ;) that there every one shall be rewarded or punished (chap, ii;) rewarded or punished respectively for all that behavior here which we comprehend under the words virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil, (chap, iii ;) that our present life is a probation, a state of trial (chap, iv) and of discipline (chap, v) for that future one, notwithstanding the objections which men may fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being Introduction. 43 any such moral plan as this at all, (chap, vi ;) and what- ever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present, (chap, vii;) that this world be- ing in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and conse- quently of ruin, and the sense both of their conditior and duty being greatly corrupted among men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence, of the utmost importance, (part ii, chap, i,) proved by miracles, (chap, ii,) but containing in it many things ap- pearing to us strange, and not to have been expected, (chap, iii;) a dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things, (chap, iv,) carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world, (chap, v ;) yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest pos- sible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such par- ticular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit. Chap, vi, vii. 13. The design, then, of the following Treatise will be to show that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispen- The design of sation, including its scheme, its publication. Treatise. and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispehsation are analogous to what is expe- rienced in the constitution and course of nature or providence; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswer- able, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, (chap, viii,) notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which tliere 44 Analogy of Religion. may be for difference of opinion as to the particular de- gree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be looked for in the fol- lowing Treatise. And I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears — all our hopes and fears which are of any consideration — [ mean a Future Life, THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION PART I. OF NATURAL RELIGION. CHAPTER I. OF A FUTURE LIFE.* STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some con- cerning personal identity^ or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing Dig^cnities— now and hereafter, or in any two successive the question to . . 1 ^ considered. moments; which whoever thmks it worth while may see considered in the first Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But, without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, have upon us ; and whether it be not from thence probable that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and perception. 2, I. From our being born into the present world in [♦ Clialmers regards this chapter as the least satisfactory in the book, because it is infected with the obscure metaphysics of the age. He particularly alludes to what Butler says of the indivisibility of consciousness, and his argument based on this. The ailment is analyzed and severely criticised in Duke's Systematic Analysis of the Analogy, Appendix I. See also Whately's Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, page 63.] 46 Analogy of Religion. LPart I, the helpless, imperfect state of infancy, and having ar- ^ , , rived from thence to mature age, we find it The law of . change indicatea to be a general law of nature, in our own Rfliturelifft . , , , Species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and percep- tion, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffer- ing, in one period of their being greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and in maturity ; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change ; and birds and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them — these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here. But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present, in mature age, as it is possible to con- ceive any two states or degrees of life can be. There- fore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind with what we have already experienced.* * [I am not sure that this, at least at the present stage of the ar- gument, is a perfectly fair statement of the matter. For there is tMs essential difference between the state in which death appears to place us, and any state previously known by experience — that in the former we seem wholly deprived of any bodily organization. Previous expe- rience might, indeed, go the length of showing that a thinking being might continue the same, and retain the exercise of its living powers. under infinite varieties of organization. But this surely is a different thing from continuance without any organization whatever, nor capa- Chap. I.I Of a Future Life. 47 3. II. We know that we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness, and misery; for we are con- scious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and of ^h 1 suffering pain. Now, that we have these continuance in- . . 11- dicatee the same powers and capacities before death, is a pre- sumption that we shall retain them through and after death ; indeed, a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living pow- ers : because there is in every case a probability that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This is that kind* of pre- sumption or probability from analogy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will* con- tinue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for believing that any one sub- stance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer, the Self-existent Substance only excepted. Thus hie of being reached by the present proof, unless we take in some such additional considerations as Butler proceeds to allege after- ward. However, it is to be remembered that natural religion does not necessarily teach that we shall exist hereafter without any bodily organization, — for we may pass, at death, into a bodily organization, inappreciable by our present senses, for any thing we know to the contrary, — and revealed religion does expressly teach that, in at least one part of our future existence, we shall have a corporeal or- ganization. In effect, the ancient theistical philosophers, who held a future state of retribution, almost universally supposed the soul to pass into or retain some other body after its separation from the pres- ent ; either, as in the vulgar metempsychosis, passing into another gross body of the same kind, or retaining a certain ethereal vehicle of its own. — F.] ♦ T say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is that our substances will. 48 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would be no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each crea- ture's death ; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain after it : which shows the high probabili- ty that our living powers will continue after death, un- less there be some ground to think that death is their destruction.* For if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable that we shall survive it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction. 4. Now, though I think it must be acknowledged that prior fo the natural and moral proofs of a future life Two reasons commonly insisted upon, there would arise for fear. ^ general confused suspicion that in the great shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, that is, our living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet, even prior to those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason for this appre- hension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from t/ie reason of the things or from the analogy of Natwe, * Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoida- bly ambiguous; and may signify either the destrtiction of a living be- ing, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever per- ceiving or acting again at all; or the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers in the former sense to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. "'^^HA^. I.] Of K Future Life. 49 But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself; but „ , ^ ,^ . ' Not from the only some of its effects, such as the dissolu- reason of the . . thing. lion of flesh, skin, and bones. And these effects do in nowise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the dark upon what the exercise of our living powers de- pends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them- selves depend upon ; the powers themselves, as distin- *^*^ guished not only from their actual exercise, but also ^^ from the present capacity of exercising them ; and as op- posed to their destruction : for sleep, or however,* a swoon, shows us not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter, but shows also that they exist when there is no present capacity of exercising them ; or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as * well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since, then, we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their destruction : because their ex- istence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affect- ed by death ; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So that there is nothing more cer- tain than that the reason of the thing shows us no con- nection between death and the destruction of living agents. Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole anal- ogy of Nature to afford us even the slight- Not from anai- est presumption that animals ever lose their ogyo'^'^'-'ir*- living powers; much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death ; for we have no faculties wherewith * However, in the sense of any thing here said, to affirm that the whole apparatus of vision, ^ or of perception by any other of our senses, Perception not r r j j ^ 7 traceable to its can be traced through all its steps quite up Bource. .... . . . . to the living power of seeing, or perceiving ; but that so far as it can be traced by experimental ob- servations, so far it appears that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, with- out affording any shadow of appearance that they them- selves perceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of them, the living beings them- selves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent and what would otherwise be an unimagined, unknown power of perceiving * sensible objects in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them. 7. So, also, with regard to our power of moving or directing motion by will and choice : upon the destruc- tion of a limb, this active power remains, as it Power remaJns after the organs evidently scems, unlessened ; so as that the ^ living being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an arti- ficial leg, just as it can make use of a pole or a lever to reach toward itself, and to move things beyond the length and the power of its natural arm : and this last it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves ; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a ma- * That is, of imagining or conceiving. Chap. I.] Of a Future Life. 5; chine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts of it. 8. Thus a man determines that he will look at such an object through a microscope ; or, being lame, sup- pose, that he will walk to such a place with _, ^^ ^ ' ^ . Illustrations: a staff a week hence. His eyes and his the microscope, staff, etc feet no more determine in these cases than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in prac- tice, or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the mov- ers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with :* there is not any probability that they are any more ; nor, consequently, that we have any other kind * [" S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker ? That he cuts with his insiniments only, or with his hands also ? " "A. With his hands also," " S. Does he use his eyes also in making shoes ' " *'A. Yes." " S. The shoemaker, then, and harper are different from the hands and eyes they use ? " "A. It appears so." " S. Does a man then usf his whole body ? " "A. Certainly." " S. But he who uses, and that which he uses, are different ? " •M. Yes." " S. A man, then, is something different from his own body?'' - Plato, Alcil/i. P)im., p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. " It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind. Neither are we bodies ; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body. What ever is done by thy mind is done by thee." — Cioero, Tusc. Disput., I, 20, 46 and 22, 52. " The mind of each man is the man ; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger." — Cicero, de ^p., book vi, § 24.— Malcom.] 58 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. of relation to thei.i than what we may have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff, (I say, any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it;) nor, consequently, is there any probabili- ty that the alienation or dissolution of these instru- ments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent. 9. And thus our finding, that the dissolution of mat- ter in which living beings were most nearly interested is General con- ^^t their dissolution ; and that the destruc- ciusion. ^Jqj^ q|- several of the organs and instruments of perception, and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction ; shows demonstratively that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instru- ments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any. other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death. 10. But it is said, these observations are equally ap- plicable to brutes ; and it is thought an insuperable dif- , ficulty, that they should be immortal, and Objections rel- -" •' . ' ative to brutes, by consequcnce, capable of everlasting hap- piness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak ; but the thing intended by it is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For, first. Suppose the invidi- ous thing designed in such a manner of expression were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents ; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be en- dued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is Chap. I.J Of a Future Life. 59 against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age, for we can trace up our own existence to the same oiiginal with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and re- ligion should be placed in a condition of being in which they are altogether without the use of them for a con- siderable length of their duration, as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, sec- ondly, The natural immortality of brutes does not, in the least, imply that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the universe might re- quire that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all difficulties, as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparent- ly and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is won- derful they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is, then, absolute- ly nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetor- ically urged against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds : I say, the greatest part ; for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind : — * * [This objection caused great perplexity formerly, and led Des Cartes, in order to evade its force, to maintain that brutes are little more than machines — an opinion maintained by leading materialists of the present day. The immortality of brutes is discussed in Des Cartes on the Passions; Baxter on the Nature of the Soul ; Hume's Essays. Essay ix ; Search's Light of Nature ; Cheyne's Philosophical Principles; Wagstaffon the Immortality of Brutes; Edwards' Crit- ical and Philosophical Exercitations ; Watts' Essays, Essay ix ; Colli. bet's Inquiry; Locke on the Understanding, book ii, chap, ix 6q Analogy of Religion. [Part I. II. III. That as it is evident our /r^j-^/^/ powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not de- Keason mem- P^^^ upon our gross body, in the manner in ory, etc. depend which perception by our organs of sense as perception, does, SO they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner as to give ground to think that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present ipowers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation, or to give ground to conclude, even, that it will be so much as a suspen- sion of the former. Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other ; each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected, or appetites grat- ified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death is any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For though from our present constitution and condition of Power of re- being, our external organs of sense are nec- penSt ?/^" essary for conveying in ideas to our reflect- death. -j^g powers, as carriages and levers and scaffolds are in architecture ; yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most in- tense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which we know of, from that body which will Ditton on the Resurrection ; Willis' De Anima Bruta ; Bayle's Dic- tionary, under the articles Pereira and Rorarius ; Polignac's Anti- Lucretius.] Chap. I.] Of a Future Life. 6\ be dissolved by death. It does not appear, then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to our intellectual enjoyments or suff"erings : nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of the former by death will be the destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. 12. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our present intellectual pow- ers, and this affords a presumption, that Mortal diseas- those diseases will not destroy these present powerao? reK powers. Indeed, from the observations made ^**°' above,* it appears that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent.f And by the same reasoning it must appear, too, that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers ; but instances of their not affecting each other afford a presumption to the con- trary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things, indeed, greatly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as, for instance, drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep : and from hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found, by experience, the weakness of this way of judging. But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at present ; for in those diseases, persons, the moment before death, appear to ♦ Pages 52-54. f [Observe the distinction between the " living agent " or livinp powers and " reflecting powers."] 62 Analogy of Religion. [Part I, be in the highest vigor of life. They discover appre- hension, memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affection, sense of a character of shame and honor; and the highest mental enjoyments and suffer- ings, even to the last gasp; and these surely prove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what pretense is there for thinking that a progressive disease, when arrived to such a degree — I mean that degree which is mortal — will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, dur- ing its whole progress, quite up to that degree ? And if death, by diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is. 13. It is obvious that this general observation maybe carried on further : and there appears so little connec- ^ ^ tion between our bodily powers of sensa- Death may not . "^ ^ even suspend tion and our present powers of reflection, them. , , . ^ , , , that there is no reason to conclude that death, which destroys the former, does so much as sus- pend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt our contitiu- ing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. For suspension of reason, memory, and the affec- tions which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion of it. And our daily expe- riencing these powers to be exercised, without any as- sistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last ; these things afford a sensible apprehension that death may not, per- haps, be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies ;* so that our posthumous life, what- * There are three distinct questions relating to a future life here considered : Whether death be the destruction of living agents ? If not, Whether it be the destruction of \\\€\x present powers of reflec- Chap. IJ Of a Future Life. 63 ever there may be in it additional to our present, yet may not be entirely beginning anew, but going on. Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb, but a con- tinuation of both, with such and such great alterations. 14. Nay, for aught we know of ourselves — of our pres- ent life, and of death — death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a high- , . ,,- ° Death may in- er and more enlarged state of life, as our troduce ns to a , . , , -. ^ ^ . I • 1 •^- higher state. birth does ;* a state m which our capacities and sphere of perception and of action may be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our ex- ternal organs of sense renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation, so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is reason does not at all show us in what state death natu- rally leaves us. But were we sure that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers, yet the suspension of a power and the destruction of it are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in anywise argue from one to the Hon, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sen- sation ? and, if not. Whether it be the suspension or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers ? Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. * This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brahmins ; SofilCetv fikv yap St/ tov fjiv hddde filov, (if uv uK/irfv Kvo/xivuv elvar rdv di 'ddvarov, ytvtatv clf tov 6vrwf fSiov, Kal tov evAalfiova Toiq i^iXoa- o^oaa^. — Lib. xv, p, 1039. Ed. Amst., 1707. To which opinion, perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words; 'Qg vvv irepijaiveig, n&re IfiSpvov sk r^f yaoTpb^ tt)^ ywaiKo^ anv k^iXB^, ourwf kxiexeadai r^v &pav kv i Tb yfrvxapiAv aov tov iMrpov tovtov kKireaeirac. — Lib. ix, c. 3. 64 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. other ; or conclude, even to the lowest degree of probabil- ity, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to sus- pend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them. 15. These observations together may be sufficient to show how little presumption there is that death is the Analogy from destruction of liumau creatures. However, plants fanciful. ^^^^^ -^ ^^^ ghadow of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is — the supposed likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to af- ford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the present question ; because one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal and chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action ; and which is the only thing we are in- quiring about the continuance of. So that the destruc- tion of a vegetable is an event not similar, or analogous, to the destruction of a living agent. 16. But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de- lusive custom of substituting imagination in the room of , , experience, we would confine ourselves to The conclusion. r 7 what we do know and understand; if we would argue only from that, and from that form our ex- pectations, it would appear at first sight that as no proba- bility of living beings ever ceasing to be so, can be con- cluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of Nature ; because we can- not trace any living beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of per- ception and of action, and are living persons, what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we fore- see some accident or event which will endanger those Chap. I.] Of a Future Life. 65 capacities, or be likely to destroy us ; which death does in nowise appear to be. 17. And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the pres- The ftiture ent. And this new state may naturally be «tate natural, a social one. And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in propor- tion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad- vantages of that future natural state should not be be- stowed, as these of the present in some measure are, by the will of the society, but entirely by His more immedi- ate action upon whom the whole frame of nature depends, yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their be- ing distributed here by the instrumentality of men. And, indeed, though one were to allow any confused, undetermined sense which people please to put upon the word fiatural, it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible to imagine that no system or course of things can be so, but only what we see at present;* especially while the probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because this is reaJiy both admit- ting and denying, at once, a state of being different from the present to be natural. But the only distinct mean- ing of that word is, stated^ fixed^ or settled ; Moaning of since what is natural as much requires and "*'""^- presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so — that is, to effect it continually, or at stated times — as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. And from hence it must follow, that persons' notion of what is natural will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dispen- sations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity * See part ii, chap, ii, and part ii, chap. iii. 6 66 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. in supposing, that there may be beings in the universe whose capacities, and knowledge, and views may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural ; that is, analogous or conforma- ble to God's dealings with other parts of his creation ; as natural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it is here used : similar, stated, or uniform. 1 8. This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our Pr babie • ^^^^^^^^^7' seems to answer all the purposes denceofafiiture of religion, in like manner as a demonstra- life ss ©fltectivo as demonstra- tivc proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For that we are to live here- after is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is; and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme that there can be no fu- ture state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a state is a presumption against religion. And the foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a very consider- able degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, if believed, would greatly open and dis- pose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whole. NOTE. [As peculiar difficulty is often found in gaining a connected view of the whole argument in this important chapter, it seems advisable to subjoin an abstract of it. We must remember that there are three questions involved in the subject of this chapter : — Does death destroy the living agent we call ourself ? Does it destroy our powers of thinking, willing, etc. ? Does it destroy the evercise of those powers? Chap. IJ Of a Future Life. 6y Now the presumption in nature is always for the lontinuance of what we know to exist ; and, therefore, the antecedent presumption, in each of these three cases, is in favor of the negative. It is the same kind of presumption in each case, but it is much stronger in the two former than in the latter, because, though there are some appear- ances that might lead us to conjecture that death may interrupt the exercise of our living powers, there are none to favor the supposition of its destroying them or ourselves. We are bound, then, to presume that we shall continue through and after death in the enjoyment and exercise of our present living powers, unless something appears from the reason of the thing, or the analogy of nature, to make us think that death destroys us, or those powers, or, at least, the exercise of them. Now, nothing of this sort can be concluded directly, at least with respect to the two first questions, from the analogy of nature, because death removes a being wholly from our experience ; and, so far as any analogy can be drawn from other changes any way similar to death, we know that they do not destroy the living agent or its powers, even where (as in the case of sleep or a swoon) they suspend the exercise of those jKJwers. Any presumption from the nature of the thing must be founded upon the probability that we are discerptible, and that our substance is actually discerped by death, since all we know of death is the effect which it produces in dissipating the grosser parts of our bodies. Now, the absolute oneness of living agents cannot, indeed, be proved by actual observation, but it seems to follow as a consequence from what we know of the unity of consciousness ; and all that we observe falls as a consequence in with it, and, at any rate, certainly proves that our gross organized bodies are not ourselves ; whence it will follow, that we can have no reason to presume that what de- stroys them must needs destroy us. 1. For we see by experience that men lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Nay, it is probable that most men do, in their growth and decline from infancy to age, lose the whole frame of their body more than once, and yet remain the same ; whence it appears that, even though we are material, we cannot determine the bulk of the living agent, nor, consequently, conclude that it is affected by the dissolution of death. 2. Since the dissolution of systems of matter with which we are so nearly connected as our bodies, is not the destruction of ourselves, we can have no reason to think that we are any system of matter at all. 3. Since the loss of organs or limbs involves not the destruction of 68 Analogy of Religion. [Part I Ihe powers of perception or will, we must consider those limbs and organs merely as instruments ; and then the destruction of those in- struments will no more involve a presumption of the destruction of the powers they ministered to, than the destruction of any other in- struments of perception or motion, as an eye-glass or a walking-stick ; while the phenomena of dreaming show us that we have, in some cases, the power of receiving the impressions ordinarily conveyed by the organs of sense, without the aid of those organs. It is no objection to the previous arguments that they apply equal- ly to brutes as to men. 1. For, even if it were implied in the notion of their immortality, that brutes should hereafter become rational and moral agents, this is no more impossible than that a child should become such an agent, which we know, in fact, to be true. 2. The economy of the world may require the future as much as the present existence of brute natures, for any thing we know to the contrary. However, there are other arguments for a future life to be enjoyed by man, which do not hold equally for brutes. We exist, at present, in two different states, sensation and reflec- tion ; and though, for the exercise of our powers of sensation, we or- dinarily (except in the case of dreaming) require the instruments of bodily organs, we cannot perceive that our powers of reflection de- pend upon the body, even for their present exercise ; nay, the ob- serving that severe illness has uo tendency to impair them, even up to the point of death, makes it probable that death does not suspend their exercise. We can thus trace, to some extent, some of our living powers up to death, and find them unaff'ected by it ; and, with respect to oth- ers, it is not impossible that our present bodily organs, while they are the means of giving us one sort of sensations, may be the impedi- ment to receiving others ; or that the connection of the mind with the present body may be the limitation of its perceptivity to a nar- row sensorium, so that death may be a change analogous to biith, and introduce us to a higher state of being.— Fitzgerald] Chap. II.l Of the Government of God 69 CHAPTER II. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUN- ISHMENTS, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER. 'T^HAT which makes the question concerning a fu- "^X ture life to be of so great importance to us is, our capacity of happiness and misery. And The question that which makes the consideration of it to whereta'iinpm^ be of so great importance to us is, the sup- **°^ position of our happiness and misery hereafter depend- ing upon our actions here. Without this, indeed, curi- osity could not but sometimes bring a subject in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts ; espe- cially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take any further thought about hereafter than what should hap- pen thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no way depended upon our present behavior : whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to think it does, then there is reason also for the most active thought and solicitude to secure that interest ; to behave so as that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether there be ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a future life and interest than that presumptive one which the foregoing observations amount to. 2. Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and 70 Analogy of Religion. LPaki 1 a great part of what we suffer, is put in our oivn power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our ac- tions ; and we are endued by the Author of Here pleaeure ' . . , -^ and pain chiefly our nature with capacities of foreseeing in our power. ^ ,< , , • these consequences. We find by experience he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own care and attention to provide ourselves with, and to make use of that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved, and without which he has appointed they shall not be preserved at all. And in general, we foresee that the external things which are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed without exerting our- selves ill such and such manners ; but by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects in which our natural good consists ; or by this means God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in toler- able ease and quiet : or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, willfulness, or even negli- gence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely mis- erable ; that is, to do what they know beforehand will ren- der them so. They follow those ways the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies. 3. Why the Author of nature does not give his crea- WhyhasGod tures promiscuously such and such percep- thusordcred/ Wqxv^^ without regard to their behavior; why he does not make them happy without the instrumen- Chap. II. 1 Of the Government of God. 71 tality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves — is another matter.* Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with, (chap, vii;) * [Butler here hints at several possible solutions of the old athe- istical dilemma. God prevents not evil, either because he cannot, or because he will not. If he cannot, he is not Almighty : if he will not, he is not All-good. Butler shows us that neither conclusion can he safely drawn. The supposition that God cannot remove these evils does not necessarily imply any defect in power ; because, for any thing we know to the contrary, the removal of them might in- volve a contradiction, and not to be able to do what is self-contra- dictory and impossible in the notion of it, is plainly no limitation of power. The supposition that, though he can, he will not remove them, does not necessarily imply a defect of benevolence, even tak- ing benevolence io the sense of a simple desire of causing the great- est possible amount of happiness. Because it is possible that the happiness resulting from a good use made of a state of trial by free beings may, in the nature of it, be so much greater than what would result from any other method, as to make the sum of happiness so obtained, even when all the present incidental miseries have been deducted from it, lai^er than could be procured by providing against their contingency. Nor, even supposing that God's not choosing to remove the sources of these evils implied a defect of benevolence in the sense explained above, would it be certain that it implied a de- fect of benevolence, as it is a real perfection. For supreme benev- olence may not be a disposition simply to make beings happy, but to make good beings happy. — F.] [Some minds have great perplexity and trouble over the origin of evil and the permission of sin, and cannot see how they are recon- ciled with the Divine wisdom and goodness. God certainly did not will any sin and its consequent evil, but he did choose to create man. and in so doing to incur their liability. A voluntary being can sin, and while in the free exercise of his powers cannot be prevented by any external force from so doing. The only way God could" prevent sin would be to bind nature fast in fate and not leave free the human or any other will. The origin of evil involves no mystery in the Divine government, but is to be ascril)cd to the wickedness of voluntary beings, which God does all he consistently can to prevent. He has provided a remedy for sin, offered forgiveness to all, and provided a compensa 72 Analogy of Religion. LPakt 1. or less happiness, it may be, and upon the jvhole, would be produced by such a method of conduct than is by the present: or, perhaps. Divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce hap- piness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has given them ; to the relations which he has placed them in to each other ; and to that which they stand in to himself; that relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary;* and which is the most important one of all. Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for it§elf, as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end for which God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties : there may be some- what in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colors. But however this may be, it is certainly matter, of uni- versal experience, that the general method of Divine administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capaci- ties to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have such enjoyments ; if so and so, tion for those who suffer in consequence of others' folly and crime. All who will accept his favor may be saved. When we ask was it wise to permit evil, we ask was it wise to create free agents ; surely it will be admitted, that, on the whole, good will result to the universe and glory to God from the existence of aagelh and men Evil, in the sense of mistakes resulting from ignorance and imper- fection, is necessarily connected with a limited progressive being. We presume no one will claim it were better such being did not exist.] * [Our relation to God is necessary because we are his creatures l)ut our relation to other beings God might change. Chap. II.l Of the Government of God. 73 such sufferings; and giving us those enjoyments, and mak- ing us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our actions. 4. " But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature."* True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the objecUon-Aii general course of nature ; that is, not surely Sibed" to^ Se to the words or ideas, course of nature, but «>"rs«ofnat^ to Him who appointed it, and put things into it : or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy, called natural, (pp. 64, 65,) and which necessarily im- plies an operating agent. For when men find them- selves necessitated to confess an author of nature, or * The terms " nature " and course of nature are used in various senses. Some affirm that the frame of nature is a machine construct- ed so as to go on of itself, according to the fixed laws of its mecha- nism, so as to require no further act in the Deity but that which origi- nally created it. See Law's Notes on King's Origin of Evil, chap, v, § 5, sub. 4, note 75. This representation of the world as a^ great machine, going on without God's agency, as a clock goes without the assistance of the clock maker, is the notion of materialism, and excludes God's gov- ernment from the world. The believers of this theory regard the forces of nature as inhering in matter. Others, as does Dr. Clarke, regard the forces of nature as the immediate and continual operation of God or intermediate spirits upon matter. " The terms nature, and powers of nature, and course of nature, and the like, are nothing but empty words, and signify merely that a thing usually or frequently comes to pass. The raising the human body out of the dust of the earth, we call a miracle ; the generation of a human body in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason but because the power of God effects, one usually, the othei unusually. The sudden stoppage of the sun (or earth) we call a mir- acle, the continual motion of the sun (or earth) we call natural, for the very same reason only, of the one being usual and the other un usual. Did men rise usually out of the grave, as corn grows out of 3eed sown, we should certainly call that also natural ; and did the sun (or earth) constantly stand still, wc should then think that to be nat- ural, and its motion, at any time, would l)e miraculous.*' — Clarke's Controversy with Leibnitz, p. 351. Fifth Reply, 107-109, Modified from Fitzgerald's note 74 Analogy of Religion. LPart I. that God is the natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again, because his government is uniform ; they must not deny that he does all things at all, because he does them constantly ; because the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so or not ; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, every raan, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil, or ob- taining good : and if the natural course of things be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties of knowl- edge and experience are given us by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow our actions are his appointment, and our foresight of those consequences is a warning given us by him how we are to act. 5. "Is the pleasure, then, natufally accompanying every particular gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such Is pleasure a / . reason for grat- particular mstancc, and as a reward to us mention? ^^ , • ^ „ ^x • , ^r • • for so domg ? No, certainly. Nor is it to be said that our eyes were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular object to which they do or can extend ; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt but that our eyes were intended for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt but that the foreseen pleasures and pains be- longing to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in such and such manners.* 6. Now from this general observation, obvious to every one, that God has given us to understand he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence^^ * [Man has various faculties of mind and body whose office and design will be apparent on examination. The ultimate design of the exercise of their powers is not in any case mere animal gratification, but intellectual and moral improvement and happiness. The per- version of tliese powers is sin, and causes sliame and misery.] Chap. 1 1. J Of the Government of God. 75 of pur acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness o( our acting in another, and of our not acting at all ; and that we find the consequences, which we ^^^^^ were beforehand informed of, uniformly to God'a govem- ment of rewards follow ; we may learn that we are at present and punish- ,, , , . ... raents. actually under his government, m the strict- est and most proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he rewards and punishes us for our actions. An author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason as a matter of experience that we are thus under his government; under his government, in the same sense as we are under the government of civil magis- trates. Because the annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of gov- ernment. Whether the pleasure or pain which thus fol- lows upon our behavior be owing to the Author of na- ture's acting upon us every moment which we feel it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, without in- terposing at all, after they had passed them ; without a trial, and the formalities of an execution : if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself, we should be just in the same sense under their government then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule with which one foresees some persons will divert themselves, upon find- g,^j.yjg ^p, infl; lesser pains considered as instances of »tive to little ... . , rrii • -1 -I' pnins vam. divme punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general thing here intended, without denying all final causes. V(n final causes being 70 Analogy of Religion. [Part i. admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too, as instances of them. And if they are — if God annexes delight to some actions and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act so and so — then he not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be ap- pointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our actions, and con- sequently of our being under his government, as declar- ing, by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so he would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it whether it be greater or less. 7. Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author of nature is that of a master or governor, True notion of P^ior to the consideration of his moral attri- ^°^' butes. The fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or government over us at present, by rewarding and pun- ishing us for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words^, and even in the same sense as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who govern them. And thus the whole analogy of nature — the whole present course of things — most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter; nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing, for the whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that government over us which implies in it rewarding and punishing. Chap. II. J Of the Government of God. JJ 8. Bur, as divine punishment is what men chiefly ob- ject against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be proper to mention some circumstances in Analogy be- the natural course of punishments at pres- Sd^Murepun ent, which are analogous to what religion **^""®°*^ teaches us concerning a future state of punishment ; in- deed, so analogous, that as they add a further credibil- ity to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious appre- hension of it in those who will attend to them. It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and willfulness, as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. For the general thing here insisted upon is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the cir- cumstances of these natural punishments particularly deserving our attention are such as these: That often- times they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with much present pleasure ; for instance, sickness and untimely death is the consequence of in- temperance, though accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity : That these punishments are often much greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions of which they are the punishments or conse- quences : Thnt though we may imagine a constitution of nature in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to follow, would follow immediately upon such actions being done, or very soon after; we find, on the contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning them are forgotten ; so that the constitution y8 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. of nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort or degree of presumption of final impunity : That after such delay, these natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once — however, the chief misery often does • That as certainty of such distant misery following such actions is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions, they have seldom a distinct full expectation of its fol- lowing:* and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general, or may see, the credibility, that in- temperance, suppose, will bring after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments ; when yet the real probability often is, that they shall escape : but things notwithstand- ing take their destined course, and the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus also though youth may be al- Youthfdl o J J thoughtiessness leged as an excuse for rashness and folly, as no excuse. , . 1 1 i i i i 11 bemg naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate ; this does not hinder but that these conse- quences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted, even in that age, are often utter ruin : and men's success in the world, not only in the common sense of worldly suc- cess, but their real happiness and misery, depends in a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which they pass their youth ; which consequences they, for the most part, neglect to consider, and perhaps sel- dom can properly be said to believe beforehand. It requires also to be mentioned, that in numberless cases the natural course of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at certain times which we cannot procure when we will ; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed, the general course of nature is an example of this, if, * See part "i, chap. vi. Chap. II. I Of the Government of God. 79 during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life for want of those acquirements which they neglected the natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. In like manner, though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and char- acter, at least in good measure ; yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail at. all toward Real reforma- preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, SwaysTrevSnl infamy, naturally annexed to folly and ex- "'^ery. travagance, exceeding t/iat degree. There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things. It is, further, very much* to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,* not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often attended with consequences alto- gether as dreadful as any active misbehavior from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too ; and some of these punishments are capital, as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are final \ to him who incurs * Part ii, chap. vi. f The general consideration of a future state of punishment most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of tlicse reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future pun- ishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and description as the Scripture docs. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revela- tion, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinc- tion between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at the end 8o Analogy of Religion. [Part I them if considered only in his temporal capacity ; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove the offender out of the way of being further mischiev- ous, or as an example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind. 9. These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only now and then ; but they are things of These are es- every day's experience ; they proceed from sentiai analogies, general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the world, in the natural course of his prov- idence.* And they are so analogous to what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same words and man- ner of description. In the book of Proverbs, for in- stance. Wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most of this world ; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be determined, upon any principles of reason, wheth- er human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being before that distributive justice should, finally and effectually, take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished ; and he will take to him his great power, and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works. * [The paragraph of this chapter where the enumeration of these resemblances is given, presents us with one of the finest triumphs of the analogical argument, and in which its power as a weapon of de- fense appears to great advantage, cutting down, as with a scythe, a v/hole army of these objections, which are most frequent in the mouths of advei-sai-ies, being not only the most plausible in them- selves, but the most formidable in point of effect, from a certain tone of generous denunciation against all arbitrary and tyrannical will in which they are propcunded, and so as to associate the semblance of a protesting and moral indignancy with the infidel cause. — Chalmers.] Chap. IIJ Of the Government of God. 8i public places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide of human life. " How long, ' speaking to those who are passing through it, '*how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, ^nd the scomers delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowl- edge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my Spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you." But upon being neglected, "Because I have called and ye refused ; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded ; but ye have set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh ; when your fear cometh as a desolation, and your destruction rometh as a whirlwind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me." This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words : " For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord. . . . Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them." And the whole passage is so equally applicable to what we ex- perience in the present world concerning the conse- quences of men's actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was principally intended. 10. Indeed, when one has been recollecting the prop- er proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing, methinks, can give one so sensible Present nun- an apprehension of the latter, or representa- JjftS^'i^ o/Jie tion of it to the mind, as observing that ^^ure. after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and 82 Analogy of Religion. CPart I. warnings which people meet with in the ways of vice, and folly, and extravagance : warnings from their very nature; from the examples of others; from the lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves; from the instructions of wise and virtuous men ; after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed ; after the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have been delayed for a great while ; at length they break in irresistibly, like an armed force ; repent- ance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to aggra- vate their distress ; the case is become desperate ; and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is in fact the general constitution of nature. II. It is not in any sort meant, that according to what appears at present of the natural course of things, They meet Ob- ^^^^ ^re always uniformly punished in pro- fiu-e^punSi-^'^ portion to their misbehavior ; but that there ments. g^j-g ygj.y niany instances of misbehavior pun- ished in the several ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too, sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit ; and if thoroughly considered sufficient fully to answer all objections against the cred- ibility of a future state of punishments from any imagina- tions that the frailty of our nature and external tempta- tions almost annihilate the guilt of human vices : as well as objections of another sort ; from necessity ; from suppositions that the will of an infinite being cannot be contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of offense and provocation.* Such reflec- 12. Reflections of this kind are not with- ror°' et^to^r- out their terrors to serious persons, the most tent to repress fj.gg f^^^ enthusiasm, and of the greatest * See chap, iv and vi. Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 83 strength of mind ; but it is fit things be stated and con- sidered as they really are. And there is, in the present age,* a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of Atheism can justify, and which makes it quite necessary that men be reminded and, if possible, made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon the most skeptical principles For may it not be said of any person, upon his being bom into the world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being made an example of the woe- ful effects of vice and folly ; that he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice; or in some other course of ex- travagance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself in- famy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he had never been born. And is there any pretense of reason for people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analo- gous to this with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same God ? * [The age immediately following the corrupt reign of Charles II, For a vivid picture of the state of morals in his reign see Macaulay's History of England, vol. i, p. 140. — Champlin.] 84 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. ^ A CHAPTER III. of the moral government of god.* S the manifold appearance of design and of final causes in the constitution of the world prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the Final causes . , _ , _ , , . proTe an Intern- particular final causes of pleasure and pam, gentOoTomor. ,. ., , , . , distributed among his creatures, prove that they are under his government — what may be called, his • [The subject of the present chapter is as distinct from that of the former, as the generic idea of a government is distinct from the more particular idea of it as possessed of a certain character, or as being of a certain kind and species. If certain actions are followed up by pleasure and others by pain, and these are known beforehand, so that the agent can foresee the consequence of his doings, even as he would have done if under a proclaimed law, which told at the same time of its own rewards and its own penalties, these are enough of themselves to constitute a government having its regulations which are known, and its sanctions which are executed. So much for gov- ernment in the general ; but should it be found among these general phenomena, that those actions which are righteous were followed up by pleasure, and those actions which are wicked were followed up by pain, this would present us with a moral government enveloped, as it were, in the general and natural ; and it is to the manifestations of such a government in the course and constitution of nature that the author now addresses his observations. — Chalmers.] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive ar- gument. If in this world we have proofs that God is a moral gov- ernor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral govern- ment hereafter, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration, namely, that God must be unchangeable. The argument assumes a substantive form : because admitted facts as to this world, exhibiting the y&Tj principles on which God's government goes at present, com- pel us not only to suppose that the principles of God's government will remain, but to believe so. — Malcom.] Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 85 natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to when we speak of God's nat- ural government of the world. It implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exer- cises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter instances of final causes as really prove an intelligent governor of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before (chap, ii) distinctly treated of, as any other instances of final causes prove an intel- ligent tnaker of it. But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to de- termine any thing certainly concerning the moral char- acter of the Author of nature, considered in - . , . ^ , .Not this relation of governor ; does not ascertam rUy a moral gov his government to be moral, or prove that Ji^e is the righteous Judge of the world. . Moral govern- ment consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do ; but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked ; in rendering to men according to their ac- tions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. 2. Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevo- lence. This, considered as a principle of ood not sim- action, and infinite in degree, is a disposi- SSt^^hSSSS tion to produce the greatest possible happi- Ro^emor. ness, without regard to persons' behavior, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but be- nevolence conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted unless it can be proved ; for 86 Analogy of Religion. LPart I. we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. And whether it can be proved or not, is not the thing here to be inquired into ; but whether, in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous gov- ernment be not discernibly plan.ied out; which neces- sarily implies a righteous governor. There may possi- bly be in the creation beings to whom the Author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence ; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice : but he manifests him- self to us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained ; but he is, for he has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is, a governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations that his government is righteous or moral — clear to such as think the nature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person who casts a transient reflec- tion upon the subject.* This govern- 3- But it is particularly to be observed that, moral 'bu?^not the divinc government, which we experience perfect. oursclvcs undcr in the present state, taken * The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this Treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I chose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, (chap, vi,) as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature ; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter. Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. S/ alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral gov- ernment.* And yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree ; enough to give us the appre- hension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine administration be seen than can in the present life. And the design of this chapter is to inquire, how far this is the case ; how far, over and above the moral nature (Dissertation II) which God has given us, and our natu- ral notion of him, as righteous governor of those his creatures to whom he has given this nature, (chap, vi ;) I say how far, besides this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amid all the confusion and dis- order of it. 4. Now, one might mention here, what has Difflcuityofvhe , _ 1 • 1 r 1 • argument from been often urged with great force, that m the greater hap- 1 I • J .. • /• ^ • piness of virtue. general less uneasmess and more satisfaction are the natural consequences f of a virtuous than of a * [Butler seems here to indicate the distinction between religious and irreligious optimism. Irreligious optimism considers \\i& present state of things as absolutely the best. Religious optimism considers it as imperfect in itself, but necessary for bringing about that state which is absolutely the best possible. But this best possible must, as Bishop Hamilton (on the Attributes, p. 189) has very truly re- marked, be understood with reference to such beings as men ; not to mean the best possible scheme of created things, because no such scheme can be conceived. The difference between finite and infinite pe;fection must always be infinite, so that however excellent we may suppose any one scheme of created things, there will still remain the possibility of another more perfect, in infinitum. See on the general subject of the two schemes of optimism, Warburton's Reply to Cron- saz' Criticism on Pope, and Johnson's Review of Jenyn's Essay upon the Origin of Evil. — F.] ■f See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry Concerning Virtue, part ii. 88 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. vicious course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government established in nature ; an instance of it, collected from experience and present matter of fact. But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each among themselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate, with any exactness, of the overplus of hap- piness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, amid the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue, even with re- gard to those persons whose course of life, from their youth up, has been blameless ; and more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice, and have afterward reformed. For suppose an in- stance of the latter case ; a person with his passions in- flamed, his natural faculties of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving for their accustomed gratification, — who can say how long it might be before such a person would find more satisfaction in the rea- sonableness and present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it.^ Experience also shows, that men can, to a great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing them- selves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villainy, they can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his reformation ; so the infamy of them will be much more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is re- covered. Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of former vices ; yet it will be said, they are in part the consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world : but if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous admin- Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 89 istration may, beyond all question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after them. And, 5. I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral government over the world might be treated, if it did not appear whether he were, in a proper God naturaiiya sense, our governor at all; yet when it is °>o™i &o^e™o'"- certain matter of experience, that he does manifest him- self to us under the character of a governor, in the sense explained, (chap, ii,) it must deserve to be considered whether there be not reason to apprehend that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules of distribution, it is surely a question to be asked. What presumption is there against his finally rewarding and punishing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably or unreasonably, virtu- ously or viciously ? since rendering man happy or mis- erable by this rule certainly falls in, much more falls in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions by any other rule would appear much harder to be accounted for by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot, however, possibly be con- sidered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more than an expectation that a method of government al- ready begun shall be carried on — the method of reward- ing and punishing actions ; and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to us, at first sight, more natural than any other, the rule which we . call Distributive Justice. Nor, I ^ 6. II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran- ^?< A^ \ i^A--5uillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being the 90 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. natural consequences of prudent management of our- Pradence re- ^^^^^^ ^^^ °^^ affairs; and rashness, profli- dCTce*^nr£Se3l ^^^^ negligence, and willful folly, bringing after them many inconveniences and suffer- ings, these afford instances of a right constitution of nature: as the correction of children, for their own sakes and by way of example, when they run into dan- ger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education. And thus, that God governs the world by general fixed laws; that he has endued us with capacities of re- flecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of our behavior, plainly implies some sort of moral government ; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but follow that pru- dence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. 7. III. From the natural course of things, vicious ac- tions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mis- chievous to society; and besides punish- Society pun- ,,•„., , • ishes all vice aa ment actually inflicted upon this account, hurtftil. , . , , ^ , there is also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons whose crimes have rendered them ob- noxious to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of fear being itself often a very considerable punishment. The natural fear and apprehension of it, too, which restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It IS necessary to the very being of society that vices destructive of it should be punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which punish- ment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an in- stance of a kind of moral government, naturally estab- lished and actually taking place. And since the certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence, or the government of God^ though carried on by the in- * See Dissertation II. Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 91 strumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances as that they are unavoidably ac- countable for their behavior, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently beneficial to society. If it be objected that good actions, and such as are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and in other cases, and that objection r©i- ill and mischievous actions are often re- tehment'ofgoS warded, it may be answered distinctly, first, ^^^^^ ^^ that this is in no sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and there- fore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished ; and in the next place, that good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being hurt- ful to it.* So that it stands good, without any thing on the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature has as truly directed that vicious actions, con- sidered as mischievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives by food. 8. IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, ^i- sucA, * [These vicious actions are never rewarded because they are vicious, but though they are vicious ; and virtuous actions are sometimes pun^ ished, yet never as virtuous, or never because virtuous, but though virtuous. — Chalmers.] [Dr. Mandeville, in his " Fable of the Bees," alleges that private vices are often public benefits, and that luxury is necessary to the well-being of society. Others have maintained the same opinion. See this doctrine refuted in Browne on the Characteristics, Essay ''• § 5 ; Warburton's Divine Legation, book i, § 6 ; Berkeley's Mi- nute Philosopher, dialogue ii. See also Whately, and other writers, on Political Economy. — F.] 92 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. is actually rewarded, and vice, as such, punished ; which Natural vir- ^^^^^^ to afford an instance, or example, not t^®' as 8uci^ re- only of government, but of moral govern- and qualities dis- ment begun and established: moral in the Strictest sense, though not in that perfection of degree which religion teaches us to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to them, which we call virtuous or vicious. The gratification it- self of every natural passion must be attended with delight ; and acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment. An action, then, by which any natural passion is grati- fied or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it, though it be, per- haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus to say such an action or course of behavior procured such pleasure or advan- tage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different thing from saying that such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In one case, an action, abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its effect ; in the oth- er case — for it will appear that there are such cases — the morality of the action, the action under a moral consider- ation, that is, the virtuousness or viciousness of it, pro- duced the effect. Now I say virtue, as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous ; and vice, as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience, and even misery, to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate The immediate effects of virtue and vice m^^liS^^'l! upon the mind and temper are to be men- trate this. tioned as instances of it. Vice, as such, is naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not Chap. IIIJ Moral Government of God. 93 uncommonly with great disturbance and apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and in familiar speech, we call being vexed with one's self, and in matters of importance and in more serious language, remorse, is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a man's own, reflected upon by him- self as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, that is, vicious, in greater or less degrees; and this manifestly is a different feeling from that uneasiness which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding — but, however, he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for it ; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing? Thus, also, the disturbance and fear which often follow upon a man's having done an injury, arise from a sense of his being blameworthy ; otherwise there would, in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind open to the several grat- ifications of life, are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue ; to which must be added, the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of ^Aisohopesand ,.r ■ , , r ,, , ,. fears for tho fti- a better life m those who fully believe or ture. have any serious apprehension of religion;* because • [When one supposes he is about to die there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before for the stories which are told about Hades, that such as have prac- ticed wrong must there suffer punishment, although made light of for awhile, then torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence has a pleasant and good hope which wilJ support old age. — Plato, Repub., i, § 5. — Malcom.] 94 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satis- faction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no one can say how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction may be, or what, upon the whole, it may amount to. In the next place, comes in the consideration that all honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest Also t]\e di8- and good men, as such, and to discounte- position of good . . men toward the nance the vicious, as such, and do so in virtuous and the . , . . . , , , , vicious. some degree — nideed, m a considerable de- gree ; from which favor and discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. And though the generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not concerned, yet, let any one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored, and good offices will be done him from regard to his character, without remote views, occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world, as it hap- pens to come in their way. Public honors, too, and ad- vantages, are the natural consequences, are sometimes, at least, the consequences, in fact, of virtuous actions, of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of being virtuous. And some- times even death itself, often infamy and external incon- veniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bring- ing about revolutions which make a figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, men resent inju- ries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely un- der the notion of having received harm, but of having received wrong ; and they have this resentment in be- Chap. IIIJ Moral Government of God. 95 half of others, as well as of themselves. So, likewise, even the generality are, in some degree, grateful, and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such a one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the view that such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. To all this may be added two or three particular things, which many per- The rule of do sons will think frivolous ; but to me noth- gOTerameJt'^e'2- ing appears so which at all comes in toward **^^^®^- determining a question of such importance, as whether there be or be not a moral institution of government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly established and be- gun in nature. The particular things are these : that in domestic government, which is doubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished for falsehood,^ and injustice, and ill behavior, as such, and re- warded for the contrary; which are instances where ve- racity, and justice, and right behavior, as such, are natu- rally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more or less considerable in degree : that though civil govern- ment be supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, without re- spect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them very greatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice ; and that entire absence of all crime and guilt, in the moral sense, when plainly ap- pearing, will almost of course procure, and circum- stances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though by no means in all. 9. Upon the whole, then, besides the good thJ^OTiTSi^rnl and bad effects of virtue and vice upon men's JJ^^'of'^JJ^S*' own minds, the course of the world does, in «*<^ some measure, turn upon the approbation and disappro- bation of them, as such, in others. The sense of well 96 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. and ill doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, sharae, resentment, gratitude ;, all these, considered in them- selves and in their effects, do afford manifest real in- stances of virtue, as such, naturally favored, and of vice, as such, discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human life ; in every age, in every relation, in every general circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,* may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral government ; but that he has placed us in a condition which gives this nature^ as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does un avoidably operate, that is, influence mankind to act, so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice ; this is not the same, but a further ad- ditional proof of his moral government ; for it is an in- stance of it. The first is a proof that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually ; the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at present, in some degree. lo. If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises that virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, . as such, is punished, and this rule never in- Why virtue Is '..,,,.' - . rewarded and vcrtcd, it Will be found to proceed, m part, vice punished. . , • i /- -, i • ^r immediately from the moral nature itself which God has given us ; and also, in part, from his having given us, together with this nature, so great a power over each other's happiness and misery. For, j^rsf, it is certain that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice ; an effect arising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are so made that well-doing, as such, gives us satisfaction, at least, in some instances; ill-doing, as such, in none. And. ^econdlyy from our moral nature, joined with God's hav- * See Dissertation II. Chap. 1 1 1.1 Moral Government of God. 97 ing put our happiness and misery in many respects in each other's power, it cannot but be that vice, as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself de- testable; and the villain will by no means be able al- ways to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment which man- kind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the no- tion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice to answer this, because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as the ^^^^^^ ^^^ logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue con- mind contradic- . . ! , . . , , tory to virtue. sists in a regard to what is right and reason- able, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves : and there is surely no such thing as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me that there is any such thing at all,) but supposing there be, it is evidently monstrous ; as much so as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of perversion, then, being left out as merely imaginary, or, however, unnat- ural ; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and from our condition in the respects now described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored, as such, by others, upon some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here insisted upon is, not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus dis- tinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in some degree ; though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus distinguished, in some de- gree, is in a manner necessary ; it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human affairs. 7 98 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 11. It IS not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules than only the personal merit ness and misery and demerit of characters. They may some- are distributed. . , ,, ., , , ^ -^ ,. • times be distributed by way of mere disci- pline. There may be the wisest and best reasons why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution, perhaps, must follow ; and also why our happiness and misery should be put in each other's power, in the degree which they are. And these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such ; so they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, but to the rendering persons pros- perous though wicked, afflicted though righteous; and, which is worse, to the rewarding some actions^ though vicious, and punishing other actions^ though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the yi^- Natnraiiy dis- conduct of Providencc, plainly declaring it- *^°*®^ self for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For, our being so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and dis- countenanced, rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an intuitive proof of the intent of nature that it should be so ; otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because vir- tuous actions are sometimes punished and vicious ac- tions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are done, by means of some natural passion, yet this may be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such passion, implanted in us for other, and those very- good, purposes. And indeed these other and good pur- poses, even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 12. We have then a declaration, in some degree of Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 99 present effect, from Him who is supreme in nature, \^hich side he is of, or what part he takes; a ood declares declaration for virtue and against vice. So ^°^ "^^^^ far, therefore, as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he is concerned, so far he is on the side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it ; and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret sat- isfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat further. And, 13. V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary ten- dencies of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in nature, and This hope con- so afford an instance of somewhat moral in Su^^ndeSJa the essential constitution of it. There is, of virtue. in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance, good and bad men would be much more re- warded and punished as such, were it not that justice is often artificially eluded, that characters are not known, and many who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes. These tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. But it may require more particu- larly to be considered, that power in a society^ by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power not under the direction of it ; in like manner as power, by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior, strength to that of men ; and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that of mankind : but reason gives us the advantage and supe- riority over them, and thus man is the acknowledged icx) Analogy of Religion. [Part I. governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superior- ity considered by any as accidental ; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet, perhaps, difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has tlie like tendency. 14, To obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis- tinctly how the case stands with regard to reason, which ^ ^ , is so readily acknowledged to have this ad- Tendencyofrea- •' ° son to triumph vanta^eous tendency. Suppose, then, two over brute force. , ^ ^ , , , • or three men of the best and most miproved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts of prey ; would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal combat ? Power, then, though joined with reason, and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some pro- portion to the other. Again, put the imaginary case, that rational and irrational creatures were of a like ex- ternal shape and manner; it is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries and to form a union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects, upon great disadvantage, though united they might be vastly superior ; since union is of such efficacy that ten men, united, might be able to accom- plish what ten thousand of the same natural strength and understanding, wholly ununited, could not. In this case, then, brute force might more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union among -the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts ; a number of men, who, by the regulations of civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really suffi- cient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve them- Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. loi selves in security from them ; yet a conjuncture of acci- dents might give such advantage to the irrational animals as that they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole species of rational ones. Length of lime, then, proper scope and opportunities for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute force. Further still : there are many instances of brutes suc- ceeding in attempts which they could not have under- taken had not their irrational nature ren- „ ^ . Supposea tn- dered them incapable of foreseeing the dan- nmph of brutes. ° . Inverted order. ger of such attempts, or the fury of passion hindered their attending to it; and there are instances of reason and real prudence preventing men's undertak- ing what, it hath appeared afterward, they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. And in certain con- junctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, rnay have their advantages. So that rational animals have not necessarily the superiority over irrational ones ; but how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently pos- sible that in some globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other, while the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of things. For every one would consider it as inverted ; since reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force, notwith- standing the possibility it may not prevail, and the ne- cessity which there is of many concurrent circumstances to render it prevalent. Now I say, virtue in a society has a like virtue'to'^^ipe! tendency to procure superiority and addi- ■^<*''**y' <*'«• tional power, whether this power be considered as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining I02 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. other advantages. And it has this tendency, by render- ing public good an object and end to every member of the society : by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in or- der to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it ; by uniting a society within itself, and so increasing its strength, and, which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benev- olence, or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is — nobody knows what. 15. And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations of Providence, to be in any sort analogous to what appears ; or that both together make cv throughout up One uniform scheme, the two parts of the universe. , which, the part which we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous to each other ; then there must be a like natural tendency in the de- rived power, throughout the universe, under the direc- tion of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction ; as there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force. But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually produce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concurrences are necessary as are to the prevalence of reason. There must be some proportion between the natural power or force which is, and that which is not, under the direction of virtue : there must be suffi- cient length of time ; for the complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual : there must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities for the vir- tuous to join together, to exert themselves against law- less force, and to reap the fruit of their united labors. Chap. IIIJ Moral Government of God. 103 Now indeed it is to be hoped that the disproportion be- tween the good and the bad, even here on earth, is not so great, but that the former have natural ninderances power sufficient to their prevailing to a con- ^^x^JJ^g^^ siderable degree, if circumstances would permit this power to be united. For much less, very much less, power, under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater, not under the direction of it.* However, good men over the face of the earth cannot unite ; as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters. And the known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects. The natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is hindered from being carried into effect in the present state, but these hinderances maybe removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the Christian allu- * With reference to this point Fitzgerald quotes a forcible passage from Coleridge : " Often have I reflected with awe on the great and disproportionate power which an individual of no extraordinary tal- ents or attainments may exert by merely throwing off all restraint of conscience. ... It is not vice, as vice, which is thus mighty, but sys- tematic vice. The abandonment of all principle of right enables the soul to choose and act upon a principle of wrong, and to subordinate to this one principle all the various vices of human nature. For it b a mournful truth, that as devastation is incomparably an easier work than production, so may all its means and instruments be more easily arranged into a scheme and system." (Friend, i, 158 159 ; Pickering, 1837.) As soon as it is understood that bad men make no profession of vir- tue, and have thrown off all the restraints of conscience, their power declines. There is an intensity and continuity of effort in great wickedness, rarely manifested by most men who are esteemed as good, in the usual sense of the word. Moreover, the results of wickedness are more striking and directly manifest to the senses than the influence of virtue, which is often more quiet and unobserved, though more abiding and really more powerful. 104 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. sion, is militant here, and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often overborne ; but it may com- bat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail com- pletely, and enjoy its consequent rewards in some future states.* Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may be scenes in eternity lasting enough, and in every other way adapted to afford it a sufficient sphere of action, and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress toward a future one, as childhood is toward mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, among all who are endued with it and known to each other; so as that by it a good man cannot but recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous beings throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. And one might add, that suppose all this advanta- geous tendency of virtue to become effect among one or more orders of creatures, in any distant scenes and peri- ods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God ; this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of exam- ple, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan of * [This is an instance of Butler's care to avoid assuming more than his premises will warrant. He is arguing here on the foot of reason alone ; and, as he had before observed that mere reason could not show that probation would terminate with this life, so he speaks here of the supposition (consistent with such a state of knowledge) of its passing through some state or states of militancy hereafter. — F.l Chap. IIIJ Moral Government of God. 105 Providence were enlarged, in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged our views with re- spect to the material world, representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. However, they are not to be taken as intended for a literal delin- eation of what is in fact the particular ^ ^ Theae are sup- scheme of the universe, which cannot be positions- what , . , ... . . thoyshow. known without revelation ; for suppositions are not to be looked on as true because not incredible, but they are mentioned to show that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and advantages is no objection against its having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly show this ; for they show that these hinderances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive how they may be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue. And all these advan- tageous tendencies of it are to be considered as decla- rations of God in its favor. This, however, is taking a pretty large compass ; though it is certain that as the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it. 16. But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and we shall see this happy tendency of virtue by imagining an instance not so vast and remote ; by ^ ... . ^ The trinmph supposing a kingdom or society of men upon of virtue in a .'^.°,. . ^ . ^ ^ perfect state. It, perfectly virtuous, tor a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may be given a sit- uation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such a state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of the greatest capacity would, of course, all along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they would share it among themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him to io6 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. which his genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. Public de- terminations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be un- known among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine treachery ; these, on one hand, would be found mere childish folly and weakness when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other, allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general influence which such a king- dom would have over the face of the earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire; not by means of lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it through- out a course of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch, in another sense than any mortal has yet been, and the eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that all people^ nations^ and lans'uasres should serve him. And though, in- NosuchBtate, . ^, . , , ^ , ^ , yet a tendency deed, our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the im- possibility, without some miraculous interposition, that Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 107 a number of men here on earth should unite in one so- ciety or government, in the fear of God and universal practice of virtue, and that such a government should con- tinue so united for a succession of ages ; yet, admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out And thus, for instance, the wonderful power and pros- perity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scripture would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is predicted of them ; that the " people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever;" were we to un- derstand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass in the present known course of nature ; but suppose them to come to pass, and then the dominion and pre- eminence promised must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree. 17. Consider now the general system of religion ; that the government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ; that virtue and right shall finally Tendency of have the advantage, and prevail over fraud foJt"moraf ^- and lawless force — over the deceits as well «™ment as the violence of wickedness — under the conduct of one supreme governor ; and from the observations above made it will appear that God has, by our rea- son, given us to see a peculiar connection in the sev- eral parts of this scheme, and a tendency toward the completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue; which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of little importance, I desire him to consider what he would think if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies, or if virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones. 18. But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural effects, and these natural tendencies of io8 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed _ way as here at present upon earth ; virtue thingsuow and sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed: hereaftermaygo . . • , i • on in the same vice sometmies punished, sometmies sue- inixod wflv cessful.* The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's perfect moral government over the world, or the truth of religion, but to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature to con- firm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known, and that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us without any apparent re- gard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were there nothing else, concerning this matter, discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground, from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear that men would be rewarded or pun- ished hereafter according to their deserts ; which, how- ever, it is to be remarked, implies that even then there would be no ground, from appearances, to think that vice, upon the whole, would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the usual known ar- guments for it ; which are, I think, plainly unanswerable, and would be so though there were no additioral con- firmation of them from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirmation of them. For, Godnotindif- ig. First, They show that the Author of forent to virtue . . , . „ . , . and vice. nature IS not indifferent to virtue and vice They amount to a declaration from him, determinate, * [The objection is taken from Hume. Compare D. Stewart, Act- ive Powers, vol. ii, pp. 226, etc. Archbishop Whately's Essays on Peculiarities of Christian Religion, note, Essay I, § 6. — F.l Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. log and not to be evaded, in favor of one and against the other; such a declaration as there is nothing to be set over against, or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine, from the course of nature only, whether it were most probable that the righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt but that he would determine the probability to be that the former would. The course of nature, then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real practi- cal proof of the obligations of religion. 20. Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the Future diswb whole, have his deserts, this distributive SSSeiukiod^ justice will not be a thing different in kind, 'e^ent in degree, but only in degree, from what we experience in his present government. It will be that in effect, toward which we now see a tendency. It will be no more than the comple- tion of that moral government, X^a^ principles and begin- ning of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, dis- cernible in the present constitution and course of nature. And from hence it follows, 21. Thirdly, That as under the natural government of God our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery which we do experi- Expectation of ence at present, gives just ground to hope Sd'Jf p^n^jj for and to fear higher degrees and other ™«°'»- kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state admitted ; so, under his moral government, our experi- ence that virtue and vice are, in the manners above- mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear that they maybe rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this alone is not sufficient ground to think that they actually I ro • Analogy of Religion. [Part I, will he rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rathei than in a lower : but then, 22. Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For ^. . these tendencies are essential, and founded This expectation . , ' . —how strength- m the nature of things: whereas, the hin- enecL , .... „ derances to their beccming effect are, m numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punish- ments of virtue and vice which arise directly out of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the ac- cidental hinderances of them will. And if these hinder- ances do* not remain, those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on much further toward the per- fection of moral government, that is, the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect ; but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at all but by revelation. 23. Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral govern- ment implied in God's natural government, (page 89 ;) Recapitniation. virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society, (page 90,) and rewarded and punished directly as vir- tue and vice, (page 91, etc.) The notion, then, of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natu- ral ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitu- tion and course of nature ; and the execution of this scheme is actually begun in the instances here men- tioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of natare for virtue, and against vice ; they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter, and also ground to hope and to fear that they may be re- warded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. hi religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is carried on further by observing that there are natural tendencies, and in innumerable cases only artificial hin- derances, to this moral scheme being carried on much further toward perfection than it is at present, (page 99, etc.) The notion, then, of a moral scheme of gov- ernment much more perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious but a natural notion ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as intima- tions, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much greater rewards and punish- ments to follow virtue and vice than do at present. And, indeed, every natural tendency, which is to con- tinue, but which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental causes, aff'ords a presumption that such tendency will, some time or other, become effect:* a presumption in degree proportionable to the length of the duration through which such tendency will con- tinue. And from these things together arises a real presumption that the moral scheme of government es- tablished in nature shall be carried on much further * [The Archbishop of Dublin (Pol. Econ., lect. ix) has pointed out the ambiguity of the word tendency, which has been the occasion of much confusion of thought. Tendency toward a result sometimes (and strictly) only means the existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded, would produce the result. But commonly it is used to imply the existence of such a state of things as makes it likely that the result will actually be produced, that is, in Butler's language, that the hinderances to its operation are accidental ; such as do not act steadily and uniformly against the cause, as such, but only occasion- ally, and in consequence of its connection with other things with which it may or may not be united. There is the clear presumption in favor of continuance (noticed by Butler, part i, chap, i) for the tendency which we see steadily and uniformly operating, while there is nothing like the same presumption for the continuance of those causes of hinderances which are not permanent in their action, nor aniform in their nature. — F.] 112 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. toward perfection hereafter, and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But from these things, joined with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a prac- tical proof * that it will be completed; a proof from fact, and therefore a distinct one, from that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations — the fitness and unfitness of actions. * See this proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi. 4 Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 113 CHAPTER IV. OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.* THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of probation for a future one, com- prehends under it several particular things Difference be- distinct from each other. But the first and S^S^^T- most common meaning of it seems to be, that ®™™«°'- our future interest is now depending, and depending upon ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunities * [It might be, and often is, indeed, made an objection to the re- ligious system, that our way to the everlasting blessedness which it proposes should be beset with so many lures which tempt us aside from the prosecution of it ; and, on the other hand, that so many hardships and difficulties should be attendant on our steadfast perse- verance in that way. The thing complained of is, that our great and ultimate good should have been made of such difficult attainment, insomuch that the frail powers of humanity, either for the achieve- ment of what is good or the resistance of what is evil, are so greatly overtasked, as in the great majority of instances to be overborne. Now in this chapter we are presented with a complete and conclusive analogy, which, if it do not establish the reality of our religious trial, at least serves to vindicate it against the exceptions which we have just enumerated. Whatever doubt we may stand in regarding those doctrines which respect the future and the unseen, there can be no quarreling with present and actually observed facts. If the doctrine be, that the way to our eternal good is a way of labor and self-denial, it is in perfect analogy with the fact that this is the way to our tem- poral good also. It is quite palpable that often many toils must be undergone, and many temptations resisted, ere we can secure the most highly-prized advantages of the life that now is ; and the conclusion i-S not that similar toils and temptations must, but that they may be^ the precursors and the preparatives of our happiness in another state of being. — Chalmers.] 1 14 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. here for that good and bad behavior which God will re- ward and punish hereafter ; together >vith temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in great measure, the same with saying that we are under the moral government of God, and to give an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account, and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to what is wrong, otherwise there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment or discrimination. But there is this difference, that the wordi probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or dif- ficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words moral government . A state of probation, then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, difficulties, and dan- ^ger, may require to be considered distinctly by itself. 2. And as the moral government of God, which re- ligion teaches us, implies that we are in a state of trial This is ft state with regard to a future world; so also his tare anS^he natural government over us implies that we present world. ^^.g -^ ^ g^^j-g ^f |.^-^i^ -^^ ^^^ j-j^g SCnsC, with regard to the present world. Natural government, by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God here meant (chap, ii) consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions and pain to oth- ers, which are in our power to do or forbear, and in giv- ing us notice of such appointment beforehand. This necessarily implies that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have temptations to any course of action which will probably occasion them greater tem- por^-l inconvenience and uneasiness than satisfaction, so far their temporal interest is in danger from themselves, or they are in a state of trial with respect to it. Now Chap. IVJ Of a State of Trial. 115 people often blame others, and even themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal con- impHedinour cerns. And we find many are greatly want- <*°^'^''®'- ing to themselves, and miss of that natural happiness which they might have obtained in the present life ; perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, and into ex- treme distress and misery, not through incapacity of knowing better, and doing better for themselves, which would be nothing to the present purpose, but through their own fault. And these things necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or hap- piness. Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards which young people run upon their setting out in the world — hazards from other causes than merely their ignorance and unavoidable ac- cidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being con- trary to men's worldly interest or good, temptations to these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present and our future interest. Thus in our natural or temporal capacity we are in a state of trial, that is, of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like, to our moral and religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one who thinks it worth while more distinctly to consider what it is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe how mankind behave under it. 3. And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these capacities, must be somewhat either in our ex- ternal circumstances or in our nature. For, Thlstrislorlp- on the one hand, persons may be betrayed i"tS"t'"S' into wrong behavior upon surprise, or over- *°*^ come upon any other very singular and extraordinary ex- ternal occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : in which Ii6 Analogy of Religion. [Part 1. cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of these persons, would impute it to such particular ex- ternal circumstances. And on the other hand, men who have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in excess, will seek oppor- tunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions. And the account of this last case is, that par- ticular passions are no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle of virtue and religion, but often draw contrary ways to one as well as to the other; and so such particular passions are as much temptations to act imprudently with regard to our worldly interest as to act viciously.* However, as when we say, men are misled by external circum- Both unite In Stances of temptation, it cannot but be un- ^^^ derstood that there is somewhat within them- selves to render those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them ; so, when we say they are misled by passions, it is always supposed that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means for gratifying them. And therefore temptations from with- in and from without coincide, and mutually imply each other. Now the several external objects of the appe- tites, passions, and affections being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emo- tions suitable to their nature, not only in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously ; this as real- * See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d ed., 205, etc. Prcf., p. 25, etc. Semi., p. 21, etc. Chap. IV.j Of a State of Trial. 117 ly puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good as their future, and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one as the other ; that is, we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by the very same passions excited by the very same means. Thus mankind having a temporal inter- est depending upon themselves, and a prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions inor- dinately excited, whether by means of example or by any other external circumstance, toward such objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temp- tations dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less, that is, to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratification. This is a de- scription of our state of trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word future for temporal^ and virtue ioi prudence^ and it will be just as proper a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity, so analo- gous are they to each other.* 4. If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capacities, we go on to observe further how man- kind behave under it, we shall find there are „. „ similar reck- some who have so little sense of it that they lessness with . refereuco to the scarce look beyond the passing day ; they present and fu- are so taken up with present gratifications as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in ♦ [If because of these things we must give up the God of religion, we should give up the God of nature also. If we persist in our ob- jection not>* ithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude cither that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous deity, or that there is no deity at all. — Chalmers.] ii8 Analogy of Religion. [Part 1 their worldly concerns as much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the like passions against their better judgment, and feeble resolutions, too, of acting better. And there are men. and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life ; and who, in open defiance of evefy thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion. Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes and have the same effect upon men's behavior, are evidently analogous and of the same kind. 5. It may be added, that as the difficulties and dan- gers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are similar diffi- greatly increased, and one is ready to think, ff educSr i^ a manner wholly made by the ill behavior ^^- of others ; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious ; by general bad example ; by the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds ; and in very many parts of the world, by religion's being corrupted into suoersti- tions which indulge men in their vices ; so in like man- ner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased by a foolish education, and after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and carelessness of others whom we have intercourse with, and by mistaken notions, very Chap. IVJ Of a State of Trial. 119 generally prevalent and taken up from common opinion, concerning temporal happiness and wherein it consists. And persons, by their own negligence and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, and by habits of indul- gence become less qualified to go through them; and one irregularity after another embarrasses things to such a degree that they know not whereabout they are, and often makes the path of conduct so intricate and per- plexed that it is difficult to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of life, youth; wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in religion ; this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right behav- ior in mature age ; that is, puts us into a more disad- vantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. 6. We are an inferior part of the creation of God : there are natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation, (part ii, chap, v ;) and we cer- our unftvom- tainly are in a condition which does not seem, ^Slo^'^cmn^ by any means, the most advantageous we p'*^'"** could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral capacity, for securing either our present or future inter- est. However, this condition, low and careful and un- certain as it is, does not afford any just ground of com- plaint. For as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction by a moderate degree of care; so likewise with regard to religion, there is no tpore required than what they are well able to do, and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves if they neglect.* And for persons to have that put upon them ♦ This is an unsatisfactory statement, but judging of sentiments that are incorrect, or expressions imperfectly guarded, it is only just to take into consideration the well-known views of the author. But- I20 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally consider as an equitable thing, supposing it done by proper authority. Nor have we any more rea- son to Complain of it, with regard to the Author of na- ture, than of his not having given us other advantages belonging to other orders of creatures. 7. But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered Trial credible Credible by its being throughout uniform, ^^^ta'botiTSn- and of a piece with the general conduct of Providence toward us, in all other respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if man- kind, considered in their natural capacity as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves from their birth to their death in a settled state of security and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their own, or if they ler did not reject the doctrine of the fall of man. The criticism of Chalmers on this passage seems to us harsh when he says of Butler, " We fear that he here makes the first, though not the only, exhibi- tion which occurs in the work of his meager and moderate theology. There seems no adequate view in the passage of man's total inability for what is spiritually and acceptably good ; for by the very analogy which he institutes, the doctrine of any special help to that obedience which qualifies for heaven is kept out of sight. . . . There is no ac- count made here of that peculiar helplessness which obtains in matters of religion, and does not obtain in the matters of ordinary prudence, yet a helplessness which forms no excuse, lying as it does in the resolute, and, by man himself, unconquerable aversion of his will to God and holiness." That the argument, properly used, is good, Chalmers ad- mits when he says, " There is nothing in this (helplessness) to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievements of this volume, and with which perhaps, it were well if both its authoi and its readers would agree to be satisfied. The analogy lies here, that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experi- ence and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain to blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, and in conformity with the declaration that he who seeketh findeth, most certainly make it good." Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. I2i were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and distress by carelessness or the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful appearances of things ; were this our natural condition, then it might seem strange, and be some pre- sumption against the truth of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our behavior, and re- quiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. For it might be alleged, " What you say is our condi- tion in one respect is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, our condition is in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our hands with- out any solicitude of ours, and why should not our fu- ture interest, if we have any such, be so too?" But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the vol- untary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course of behavior far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a com- mon decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it ; since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial and at- tention being necessary to secure our higher interest is removed. Had we not experience, it might, perhaps, speciously be urged that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an infinite Being, when every thing which is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and tnisery, is now already certain in his foreknowledge. And, indeed, why any thing of hazard and ^^y ^^ „q danger should be put upon such frail creat- '° danK»? ures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in spec- ulation ; and cannot but be so till we know the whole, or, however, much more, of the case. But still the consti- 122 Analogy of Religion. LPart I tution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and in many circumstances a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various miseries of life which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this; which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined by it. 8. These observations are an answer to the objections against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying What this chap- temptations, and real danger of miscarrying ter shows. ^^^^^ regard to our general interest, under the moral government of God ; and they show, that if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the general analogy of Prov- idence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest, under the government of God which we experience here upon earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our ac- quisition ; in such sort, as that we are in danger of miss- ing it, by means of temptations to neglect or act contrary to it ; and without attention and self-denial, must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible, that this may be our case with respect to that chief and final good which religion proposes to us. NOTE. To the forcible reasoning of this chapter, many will object that the difference between temporal and eternal things is so vast the cases are not analogous. It cannot be denied, for it is a matter of open and daily observation, that loss, misery, and punishment follow neglect and misconduct here : but the doctrine is resisted and rcented as an in- Chap. IVJ Of a State of Trial. 123 credible outrage, that a ruined eternity should follow from the same causes. But the analogy is complete in kind, and the difference be- tween the two hardships is only in degree. This difference of degree of suffering can form no basis for an objection unless it can be shown that similar results should not follow from similar causes in the .wo states of being. The principle would seem plain, that if there is in justice in the one case there is injustice in the other. "What would be wrong on a great scale is wrong on a small one. Many seem ready to acquiesce in the operation of an unjust principle in smaller mat- ters which they would regard as intolerable in things of higher mo- ment. But he that is unjust in that which is least is unjust in much. The admission that the divine government is unjust in what may seem to be little and temporary matters would impeach the righteous- ness of God and destroy all reverence for his character. It would be well for those who are ready to claim that the good- ness manifested to man is a compensation for what they admit is an injustice to the lower orders of animals, in their suffering and de- struction, to remember the consequences to which their principles would lead. The admission of this doctrine might force on our attention the uncomfortable suggestion that our happiness, present and future, may be sacrificed, and as a compensation there may be increased blessed- ness given to beings far higher and nobler than we. Once admit in- justice in any part of the divine government, and there is no conceiv- able limit to the extent to which it may be carried. There is no injustice in the dependence on each other of different orders of beings, or in any part of God's government. We know but parts of his ways and but little of his universe, but all the analogies of nature as well as the teachings of his Word assure us he has done all things well. He is just and holy in all his ways, and there is no unrighteousness in him. Consult Chalmers. 124. Analogy of Religion. LPart 1 CHAPTER V. OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT* FROM the consideration of our being in a probation- state of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally Probation de- arises the question, how we came to be firovii/nt ^'ui placcd in it. But such a general inquiry as virtue. |.]^jg ^ould be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For though some of these difficulties would be lessened by observing that all wickedness is volun- tary, as is implied in its very notion, and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects, yet when we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter ; the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition out of which so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties not only to find out, but even to understand, the whole account of this ; or, though we should be supposed capable of under- standing it, yet, whether it would be of service oi prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say. But as our present condition can in nowise be shown * [The present chapter stands in the same relation to the one pre- ceding it, which that on the moral does to that on the natural gov- ernment of God. It still treats of probation, but of probation with a particular end — even that of schooling men in the practice, so a.s to confirm them in the habits, of virtue. — Chalmkrs.] Chap. V.J Of a State of Moral Discipline. 12$ inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God, so religion teaches us we were placed in it that we might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state, which is to follow it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned, yet is a more satisfactory an- swer to another, which is of real and of the utmost im- portance to us to have answered — the inquiry, What is our business here ? The known end, then, why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty is, our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness. 1. Now the beginning of life, considered as an educa- tion for mature age in the present world, appears plainly at first sight, analogous to this our trial for ° ' ° . . Probation of a future one ; the former being, in our tem- youth, its anal- poral capacity, what the latter is in our re- ligious capacity. But some observations common to both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force of the analogy between them ; and the credibility which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 2. I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular way of life, to which the nature, the ca- pacities temper, and qualifications of each Man's adapta- species are as necessary as their external enJand^to^X circumstances. Both come into the notion ^^^estato. of such state, or particular way of life, and are constitu- ent parts of it. Change a man's capacities or character to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life and human happiness; as incapa- ble as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where he had no sphere of action, nor 126 Analogy of Rp:ligiOx\. I Part I any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affec- tions of any sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it.* Our nature corre- sponds to our external condition. Without this corre- spondence there would be no possibility of any such thing as human life and human happiness : which life and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature and condition jointly ; meaning by human life, not liv- ing in the literal sense, but the whole complex notion commonly understood by those words. So that without determining what will be the employment and happi- ness, the particular life, of good men hereafter, there must be some determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifications, without which persons can- not but be utterly incapable of it ; in like manner as there must be some without which men would be inca- pable of their present state of life. Now, 3. II. The constitution of human creatures, and in- deed, of all creatures which come under Adaptation ac- , . quired through our notice, IS such, as that they are ca- pable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which they were once wholly un- qualified. In imagination, we may indeed conceive of creatures, as incapable of having any of their fac- ulties naturally enlarged, or as being unable natural- ly to acquire any new qualifications ; but the faculties of every species known to us are made for enlargement, for acquirements of experience and habits. We find ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us, * [All things are double one against another : and He hath made nothing imperfect. One thing establisheth the good of another : and who shall be filled with beholding his glory ! — Ecclus. xlii, 24, 25J Chap. v.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 127 but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is the power of habits. But nei- ther the perception of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits, though absolutely necessary to the forming of them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particu- lar how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any par- ticular kind of action proceeding from being accustomed to it. And aptness to recollect practical observations of service in our conduct is plainly habit in many cases. There are habits of perception and habits of action. An instance of the former is our constant and even in- voluntary readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to sub- stitute judgment in the room of sensation, impercepti- bly to ourselves. And it seems as if all other associa- tions of ideas, not naturally connected, might be called passive habits, as properly as our readiness in under- standing languages upon sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active habits. For distinctness, we may consider habits as belonging to the body or the mind, and the latter will HRbiuofbody be explained by the former. Under the '^'^°»*°^- former are comprehended all bodily activities or mo- tions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use ; under the latter, general habits of life and con- duct, such as those of obedience and submission to au- thority, or to any particular person ; those of veracity. 128 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. justice, and charity; those of attention, industry, self- government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the former. And in like manner, as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles ; that is, by carrying them into act, or acting upon them — the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any external course of action otherwise than as it pro- ceeds from these principles ; because it is only these inward principles exerted which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So, likewise, habits of attention, industry, self-government are in the same manner acquired by exercise ; and hab- its of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in out- ward act or in thought and intention, that is, inward act ; for such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do well are properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of it which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, there- fore, may and will contribute toward forming good hab- its. But going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it — this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible, that is, form a habit of insen- sibility to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly ; being accustomed to danger begets intrepidity, that is, lessens fear; to distress, les- sens the passion of pity ; to instances of others' mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension of our own. Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 129 And from these two observations together, that prac- tical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow as active hawts weaker by being repeated upon us, it must ^^q £pref- follow that active habits may be gradually «io°«&ro>^ ^-eak forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and excitements themselves are, by proportion- able degrees, growing less sensible ; that is, are contin- ually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this ; for active principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution ; and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it ; but let a man set him- self to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed per- sons, and he cannot but-grow less and less sensibly af- fected with the various miseries of life with which he must become acquainted ; when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a passion but as a prac- tical principle of action, will strengthen ; and while he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will ac- quire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So also, at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men ; that is, to forming I habit of acting with a constant view to if. 130 Analogy of Religions. [Part I. And this seems again further to show, that passive im- pressions made upon our minds by admonition, experi- ence, example, though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, toward forming active Active habits ■' " ' . ° formed by exer- habits, yet can have this efficacy no other- tion. . ; -^ , . , . / Wise than by mducmg us to such a course of action ; and that it is not being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits ; only it must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous ac- tion. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the na- ture of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once equivalent to habits,* that is, what is wrought by use and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is. not what may be possible, but what is in fact the ap- pointment of nature, which is, that active habits are to be formed by exercise. Their progress may be so grad- ual as to be imperceptible in its steps ; it may be hard to explain the faculty by which we are capable of hab- its, throughout its several parts, and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind ; and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in general, that our na- ture is formed to yield in some such manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain experience. Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of ac- tion, we get an aptness to go on — a facility, readiness^ Newcharacter ^^1^ oftcn pleasure in it. The inclinations formed by habit, ^^^[q}^ rendered us averse to it grow weaker ; the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen ; the reasons for it offer themselves of course * [In some of the miracles there seems to have been effects pro- duced at once, equivalent to habits, as in the gift of tongues ; and as pointed out by Dr. Drought (in Dean Graves' Works) in the miracle by which the blind man was enabled to use the sight \\'hich had been miraculously given to him. — F.] Chap. V.J Of a State of Moral Discipline. 131 to our thoughts upon all occasions ; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of ac- tion to which we have been accustomed. And practical principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in them- selves, by exercise, as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles ; which by being accustomed to sub- mit, do so habitually and of course. And thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed ; and many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. 4. III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these capacities of improving by experi- ence, acquired knowledge, and habits, had improvement they not been necessary, and intended to necesS^ry^ffthe be made use of. And accordingly we find e^StlmatS them so necessary, and so much intended, tyo^oi^po^'era. that without them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end for which we were made, con- sidered in our temporal capacity only ; the employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life. Nature does in nowise qiialify us wholly, much less at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength are not only arrived to gradually, but are also very much owing to the con- tinued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is con- ceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted with astonishment, and appre- hension, and curiosity, and suspense ; nor can one guess how long it would be before he would be familiarized to himself, and the objects about him, enough even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned, too, wheth- er the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before 132 Analogy of Religion. [Part I: experience. And it seems that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them- selves with an impetuosity which would render society insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which is learned would render a man as incapable of society as want of language would ; or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- ments of life would render him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably in many more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left by nature an unformed, unfinished crea- ture, utterly deficient and unqualified, before the ac- quirement of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that mature state of life which was the end of his creation, considering him as related only to this world, 5. But then, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those deficiencies by acquired knowledge, ex- ^:,^u A A. perience, and habits ; so, likewise, we are Childhood fk- ^ . ' ' ' vorabie to im- placed m a condition in infancy, childhood, provement. ,»,-._ and youth, fitted for it; fitted for our ac- quiring those qualifications of all sorts which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have a future part ; and learning somewhat or other necessary to the performance of it. The subor- dinations to which they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government in common behavior abroad and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority. What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with numberless little Chap. V.J Of a State of Moral Discipline. 133 rules of action and conduct which we could not live without, and which are learned so insensibly and so per- fectly as to be mistaken, perhaps, for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular busi- ness, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of educatior\ in the theory and practice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of course, so part re- quires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry which the station of so many absolutely requires they would be greatly unqualified for in maturity; as those in other stations would be for any other sorts of application, if both were not accustomed to them in their youth. And according as persons behave themselves, in the general education which all go through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular employments, their character is formed, and made appear; they recommend them- selves more or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in the society of mankind.* • [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor, (which is often the chief effect,) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone is not only put to an im- proper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is but a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again ; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, or enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite. Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims, and the evil may spread disaster over our whole fu- ture. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose an occasional indulgence or impropriety may be compatible with gen- eral welfare and improvement. — Malcom,] 134 Analogy of Religion. [Part I 6. The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important opportunity which nature puts into our The probation hands, and which, when lost, is not to be goa^^tothSr recovered. And our being placed ixi a state oie future. ^^ discipline, throughout this life, for anoth- er world, is a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind as our being placed in a state of dis- cipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condi- tion in both respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature. And if we are not able at all to discern how, or in what way, the present life could be our preparation for Ignorance of another, this would be no objection against j^rntop^bt the credibility of its being so. For we do ^°^- not discern how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body, nor could have any thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises to which they are so much addicted contribute to their health and growth ; nor, on the oth- er, of the necessity which there is for their being re- strained in them ; nor are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of discipline which, nevertheless, they must be made to go through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we not able, then, to discover in what respects the present life could form us for a future one, yet nothing would be more supposable than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy of providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said, even though we should not take in the consideration of God's moral government over the world. But, 7. IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state, and then we may dis- Chap. v.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 135 tinctly see how, and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation for it; since we want^ Howthemode and are capable of^ improvement in that char- ™'*yi>e^o^- acter by moral and religious habits ; and the present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement ; in like manner, as we have already observed, how and in what respects infancy, childhood, and youth are a necessary preparation, and a natural state of discipline, for ma- ture age, 8. Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter ; but, if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, Active virtues we must suppose, according to the Script- *" * '^^^'^ "*^- ure account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiv- ing, though there be no analogy for it, that this com- munity will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible, government of God. Nor is our ig- norance, what will be the employments of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what partic- ular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, among the members of it with regard to each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind or character which is formed by the daily practice of those particu- lar virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at least must be owned in general, that as the government established in the universe is moral, the character of vir- tue and piety must, in some way or other, be the condi- tion of our happiness, or the qualification for it. 9. Now from what is above observed concerning our natural power of habits, it is easy to see that we are capable of moral improvement by discipline. And how 136 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. greatly we want it, need not be proved lo any one who „, . ^ ^. is acquainted with the great wickedness of Virtuous habita ^ ° a guard against mankind, or even with those imperfections OTor. I'll . which the best are conscious of. But it is not, perhaps, distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for discipline to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, ib to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right, and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits for a security against this danger.* For, together with the general principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various affections toward particular external objects. These affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral principle as to the occa- sions on which they may be gratified ; as to the times, de- grees, and manner, in which the objects of them may be pursued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither excite them nor prevent their being excited. On the * [It is from this point of view that Aristotle determines our' aoa ijnxTei (rbre irapa pvaiv kyytvovrac ai aperai, aX?M 7rEVKdai fiev ^/lu de^aadai avraq, TeTieLovfievotg 6e Sia tov kdov^. — Ethic. Nicorn., iii, i. " In order to understand this, it is to be observed that virtue may be considered either as the quality of an action or as the quality of a per- son. Considered as the quality of an action, it consists, even accord- ing to Aristotle, in the reasonable moderation of the affection from which the action proceeds, whether this moderation be habitual tc the person or not. Considered as the quality of the person, it con- sists in the habit of this reasonable moderation, in its having become the customary and usual disposition of the mind. ... If a single action was sufficien* to stamp the character of any virtue upon the person who performed it, the most worthless of mankind might lay claim to all the virtues ; since there is no man who has not, upon some occasions, acted with prudence, justice, temperance, and forti- tude." — Smith's Moral Sent., part vi. sec. 2. — F.] Chap.V.1 Of a State of Moral Discipline. 137 contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all con- sideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For the natural ob- jects of affection continue so ; the necessaries, conven- iences, and pleasures of life remain naturally desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently ; nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means, but may be obtained by them, such affection, though its being excited, and its contin- uing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is nat- ural and necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such un- lawful means, and therefore must be conceived as put- ting them in some danger of it. Now what is the general security against this danger — against their actually deviating from right,'* . , , . , *=*, °. Virtuous hab- As the danger is, so, also, must the security its a security be from within, from the practical principle ^^"^ *** of virtue.* And the strengthening or improving this principle, considered as practical or as a principle of ac- tion, will lessen the danger or increase the security against it. And this moral principle is capable of im- * It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sens^ of interest is meant a speculative conviction or belief that such and such indul- gence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging them- selves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And, it is evident, this reasonable self-love wants to be im- proved as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curi- osity, shame, love of imitation — by any thing, even indolence — es- pecially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the 138 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. provement, by proper discipline and exercise ; by recol- lecting the practical impressions which example and experience have made upon us ; and, instead of follow- ing humor and mere inclination, by continually attend- ing to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less matters, and accus- toming ourselves always to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action ; and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under divine gov- ernment, be our final interest. Thus ihe principle of virtue, improved into a habit, '^ of which improvefnent we are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension or particular affections. This way of putting the matter supposes par- ticular affections to remain in a future state, which it is scarce possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we clearly see that acquired habits of virtue and self-gov- ernment may be necessary for the regulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to speak only in general, the thing really comes to the same. For habits of virtue thus acquired by discipline are improvement in virtue ; and improve- ment in virtue must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the universe be moral. 10. From these things we may observe, and it will end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interested - ness and self-love ; and so little cause is there for moralists to dis- claim this principle. (See pp. it6, 117.) * [We do not understand that under the economy of grace the law of habit has been repealed, or any other indeed of those laws of our mental nature on which Butler proceeds in the reasoning of this chapter. Whatever the pretensions and expedients of the Gospel might be for the perfecting of our meetness for heaven, they super- sede not the efficacy of that process under which, by reason of use, the senses are exercised to discern between good and evil. — Chalmers.] Chap. v.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 139 further show this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline, how it comes to pass that creat- ures made upright, fall ; and that those who How upright preserve their uprightness, by so doing raise ^®^^ *^ themselves to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more than that an event's actually happen- ing is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happen- ing. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for v/hich such propensions were necessary ; sup- pose them endued with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative perception of it ; and that all these several principles, both natural and moral, form- ing an inward constitution of mind, were in the most exact proportion possible ; that is, in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their intended state of life ; such creatures would be made upright, or finitely per- fect. Now particular propensions, from their very na- ture, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it then they must be conceived to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever — yet some tendency — to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency in some one particular propension may be The mode n increased, by the greater frequency of occa- ^"^^^^^^^ sions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency, and may increase it further, till, pecul- iar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual de- 140 ■ Analogy of Religion. LPart I. viation from it : a danger necessarily arising frcmi the very nature of propension, and which therefore could not have been prevented though it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in which such a degree of attention would keep him steady; but if he would not attend in this de- gree, any one of a thousand objects catching his eye might lead him out of it. Now it is impossible to say how much even the first full overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution, unsettle the adjust- ments, and alter the proportions which formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted. But repetition of irregularities would produce habits : and thus the constitution would be spoiled, and creatures made upright become corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to their repeated irreg- ularities in occasional acts. But, on the contrary, these „ ^ ^ creatures might have improved and raised How such be- , , . ings might rise themselves to a higher and more secure to a higher state. r • i i i i • i state of Virtue by the contrary behavior, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature, and thus withstanding that un- avoidable danger of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus pre- serving their integrity for some time their danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course ; and their secur- ity against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise ; both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.* * Butler's statement how creatures made upright fall, and how they are restored to righteousness, has been severely criticised. In it, Chahners says, we see the meagerness of his Christianity. It is alleged that in this chaptei man's fall is represented as gradual, like Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Disc ipline. 141 Thus, then, vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution or character ; and may improve it to such a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle, and consequently should allow that such creatures as have been above supposed would forever remain defectible ; yet their danger of actually deviat- ing from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified against what remains of it; if that may be called danger against which there is an adequate effectual security. But still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to proceed from them. And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures with- the departure, by slight variations, from a straight line, and that in his recovery from his lost condition nothing more is required than a strenuous, earnest exertion to change his course, to break the power of old habits and form new ones. In the Scripture the fall of man is represented as sudden and complete. By a single act man passed into a state of ruin. His recovery by his own effort is impossible. Gracious ability must be imparted by the Holy Spirit. This is ever and freely offered, and under its influence, not gradually, but by one act, man becomes reconciled to God and justified through the merit of Christ. In the day man ate the forbidden fruit he " died," but in the mo- ment he believed on Christ he passed from death into life and justi- fication. The statement of Butler might have been better guarded against misapprehension, but we do not see that it contradicts the Bible doctrine. On any theory the first act must have been sudden, and Butler says it is impossible to tell how much disorder and evil might result from it ; what he says about the formation and power of habit cannot be denied. The fall and consequent depravity is not the lowest condition possible to man, nor is the stale of justification the highest. There are degrees of guilt and goodness that undci m.in's4'>rcumstances o^- of experience, that human kind is thus constituted : none against the conclusion; because it is immediate, and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he should^ but from its appearing that he has told us he will. And this he hath certainly told us in the promise and threatening which, it hath been observed, the notion of ♦ However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intel- ligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult bis own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as incon- ceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him to discern an ab- stract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior to it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not, therefore, ap- pear, that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth as thus founded. i64 Analogy of Religion. [Part I a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some de- gree even verified, by other facts ; by the natural ten- dencies of virtue and of vice, (page 99 ;) and by this, that God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to society, and also vicious actions as such, in the strictest sense, (page 90, e\c.) So that the general proof of religion is unanswer- ably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. 8. It must likewise be observed further, that natural religion hath, besides this, an external evi- Does not affect ° i.,i , ■ r external evi- dcncc, which the doctrme of necessity, if it could be true, would not aff'ect. For sup- pose a person, by the observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will, upon the whole, deal with every one according to his works ; I say, suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind, it would be natural for such a one to be in- quisitive, what was the history of this system of doc- trine ; at what time, and in what manner, it came first into the world ; and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it ; then, though its evi- dence from reason would remain, there would be no ad- ditional probability of its truth from the account of its discovery. But instead of this being the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth : J^t'rsf That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer addi- Chap. VIJ Of the Opinion of Necessity 165 tions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries of which we have any certain information relating to this matter. Secondly^ That it is certain his- torical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received in the first ages. And, Thirdly^ That as there is no hint or intimation in history that this system was first reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, as an- cient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this alternative — either that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps, from hence alone be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in the sec- ond part (chap, ii) of this Treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the beginning of the world as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones; a skeptic could not, I think, give any account which would appear more probable, even to liimself, of the early pretenses to revelation, than by supposing some real original one from whence they were copied. And the third thing above-mentioned, that there is express historical or traditional evidence, as an- •cient as history, of the system of religion being taught mankind by revelation ; this must be admitted as some 1 66 Analogy of Religion [Part I. degree of real proof that it was so taught. For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact against which there is no pre- sumption ? And this proof is mentioned here, because it has its weight, to show that religion came into the world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration whether the revela- tion itself be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable. 9. But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which Proofe liable to ^.re Only general, that as speculative reason neglect. j^^y |^g neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This, indeed, proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception ; against their being intended by nature to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to be- have, and what we are to expect, in consequence of our behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are lia- ble, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious ad- monition to us to be upon our guard with respect to what is of such consequence as our determinations con- cerning virtue and religion ; and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honor, or im- aginations of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for :he only moral rule. (Dissertation ii.) 10. The foregoing observations, drawn from the na* ture of the thing and the history of religion, amount, Chap. VIJ Of the Opinion of Necessity. 167 when taken together, tc a real practical proofof it notto be confuted ; such a proof as, considering the Necessitymakea infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend and punSh- would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, ™«°teai«urd. to influence the actions of men who act upon thought and reflection ; if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said : " There are many probabilities which cannot, indeed, be confuted; that is, shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be over- balanced by greater probabilities on the other side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occa- sion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such argu- ments at all, but leaving them just as they are. (Pages 33, 42.) Now the method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punish- ing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, must go upon supposition that we are free, and not necessary agents.* And it is incredible, that the author of nature should govern us upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter; especially that he will do it under the notion that they are of good or ill desert." Here, then, the matter is brought to a point. And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded : that the whole constitution and course of things, the whole analogy of providence shows, beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this rea- soning is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom, indeed, clearly shows where — in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow * See note at the end of this chapter. [68 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most ^ ^ certain. For it is fact that God does gov- Thls reasoning ° erroneous— how em even brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the natural course of things. And men are rewarded and punished for their actions ; punished for actions mischievous to society as being so ; punished for vicious actions as such, by the natural instrumentality of each other ; under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the re- wards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be considered as natural, that is, from the author of nature : these rewards and punishments, be- ing naturally* annexed to actions considered as imply- ing good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert — these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert, as such. So that if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus rewarded and punished, then men are not nec- essary, but free ; since it is matter of fact that they are thus rewarded and punished. But if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of neces- sary agents being thus rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt with. II. From the whole, therefore, it must follow that a necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the author of nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal govern- ment, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to ex- * Sermon viii at the Rolls. Chap. VIJ Of the Opinion of Necessiiy. 169 press this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows opinion of ne- us, that the opinion of necessity, considered «^8'^'^^®- as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the sup- position above-mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed. From these things, likewise, we may learn in what sense to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive The sense in of all religion. First, In a practical sense; ^^to^^Sl that by this notion atheistical men pretend *°°' to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And secondly. In the strictest sense ; that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be under- stood, as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion ; for upon this supposition it demonstrably is so. [NOTE.— See page 1 67.] [We must carefully distinguish between the religious and the irre- ligious necessitarians. The question between the maintainers of free will and the religious necessitarians is this : When I blame [or com- mend] myself for an action, is there necessarily involved in this moral judgment the consciousness that, under all the circumstances preced- ing the act of volition, I might have w///f^ otherwise ? The religious necessitarian holds the negative • the maintainer of free will, the af- firmative ; and the irreligious fatalists so far agree wilh the latter. They say that the sense or persuasion of liberty is requisi'e to consti- tute the sense of responsibility for the past, — requisite as a ground of hope or purpose for the future ; that, without it, there would be no room for remorse for what we have done, or forethought for what we should do. But then they maintain, also, that this feeling is delusive ; that it may be demonstrated to be a mistake ; and that, consequently 170 Analogy OF Religion. [Part I. here is a conflict between the rational and the moral principles of our nature. Such a scheme is essentially skeptical, representing the im- mediate judgments of the mind as contradictory of each other. It represents the mind as pronouncing certain volitions, when viewed under a speculative aspect, to fall under the law of cause and effect; and yet, pronouncing the same volitions, when viewed under a prac- tical aspect, to be exempt from it. Now, upon such a scheme, as there is a direct conflict between the independent decisions of our own consciousness, it seems clear that we have no more right to pronounce the moral judgment delusive than the rational. Each would be brought equally into doubt if this statement were correct. But, even upon this statement the obliga- tions of morality will remain. I know not, suppose, which judgment is true and which delusive ; but still it is not, and cannot be a matter of indifference which of the two I practically follow ; because, if I act in disregard of the moral consciousness, I am, by the very hy- pothesis, self-condemned. The moral faculty is the practical faculty ; and, when the question is. What is to be done ? I am in the sphere of action, not of speculation. Reason, in her province, may refuse to reg- ister the decree, but she does not, for she cannot, superinduce a con- trary practical obligation. The doctrine of necessity, in its religious form, takes this expres- sion : — that moral acts of the will are determined by their motives (meaning by motive all that is the result of temper, organization, ed- ucation, and outward circumstances) as certainly as physical conse- quences are by their antecedents ; but that the acts which proceed from certain classes of motives are approved or condemned by the moral faculty, as being the results of certain motives, without the im- plied intervention of any such consciousness of freedom as the main- tainers of the liberty of the will suppose. — F.] Chap. VIL] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 171 CHAPTER VII. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPRE- HENDED. THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion, and to ^^ . ° . . ... Thelnoompre- the several particular things contained in it, hensibuityofthe divine govem- considered as so many matters of fact ; and ment an answer ... . , . , , . ^^■, ■-,- toobjecUona. likewise that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity ; yet still, ob- jections may be insisted upon against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine government, implied in the notion of religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted, to which objections analogy can be no direct answer.* For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not immediately ♦ [It is obvious that the direct way of showing a certain course of conduct to be wise or good is to show the precise relations which render it so ; the goodness of the ends and the suitability of the means. The indirect way is to show that there may be such relations, though we do not see them, coupled with the proof that such a course of conduct is the conduct of one whom we have good reason, on othci grounds, to believe wise and good. Indeed, there have not been wanting persons who have chosen to represent Butler's argument, throughout this analogy, as tending to overthrow the whole proof of God's attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness, by establishing the matter of fact of our being under a government no way consistent with such attributes. The object of the present chapter is to obviate such a misrepresentation Compare throughout, part ii, chap, viii. — F.] 172 Analogy of Religion. [Part I prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or direct- ly, than show such and such things to be true or credible considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it cred- ible that this government must be a scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a num- ber of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness ; and likewise that it must be a scheme so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all objec- tions against the justice and goodness of it ; then analogy is, remotely, of great service in answering those objec- tions, both by suggesting the answer and showing it to be a credible one. 2. Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, firsts Upon supposition that God exer- cises a moral government over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests, and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly^ A more distinct observa- tion of some particular things contained in God's scheme of natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral gov- ernment, will further show how little weight is to be laid upon these objections. I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral gov- ernment over the world, the analogy of his natural gov- Naiiirai gov- cmment suggests and makes it credible that c^'^reheSbS" his moral government must be a scheme Bcheme. quite beyond our comprehension : and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 173 renders it highly credible, that upon supposition of a moral government it must be a scheme — for the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears to be^o — to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts cor- respond to each other and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model of a civil consti- tution and government. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own species. And whole species are, we find, variously related to other species upon this earth. Nor do we know how much further these kinds of relations may extend. And as there is not any action, or natural event, which we are acquaint- ed with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. There seems, indeed, nothing, from whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, ac- tions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other. But, as it is obvious that all events have future unknown consequences, so, if we trace any, as far as we can go, into what is connected! with it, we shall find that if such event were not con- nected with somewhat further in nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing whatever ; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By this most astonishing connection — these reciprocal corresponden- cies and mutual relations — every thing which we see in the course of nature is actually brought about. And things, seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other 174 Analogy jf Religion. [Part I. things of the greatest importance ; so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other. The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme, — so incompre- hensible that a man must really in the literal sense know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his ignorance in it, — this immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so too.* Indeed, the natural and moral consti- tution and government of the world are so connected as to make up together but one scheme : and it is highly probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that one should be analogous, or similar to, the other : that therefore every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself and its imme- diate object; may have some reference to other parts ff* [Maimonides makes use of the following similitude : " Suppose one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born, to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father, nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species, and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether, when thus in the womb, we did not eat and drink and breathe, as we now do, and is answered, No. Then he denies it and offers demonstration that it w mid noi be so. For,' says he, ' If either of us cease to breathe our life is gone ; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months ? So if we cease to eat and drink we die, and how could the child live so for months ?' And thus he satisfies himself that it is impossible that man should come into existence in such a manner." — Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae, p. 434. Ix>ndon : 1663. Fitzgerald's ed., p. 181.] Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 175 of God's moral administration, and to a general moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole of it. Thus for example : the determined length of time, and the degrees and ways in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its progress ; the times appointed for the execution of justice ; the ap- pointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the manners of their distribution ; all particular instances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of them, may have such respects to each other as to make up altogether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; a scheme, or system, which is as properly one as the natural world is, and of the like kind. And supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that we are not competent judges of this scheme from the small parts of it which come within our view in the present life, and therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men.* 3. This our ignorance, and the conse- ourignorance quences here drawn from it, are universally an answer to ob- acknowledged upon other occasions ; and ♦ [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great histor- ical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator from the unmean- ing strip of foreground derive any conrception of the figures yet con- cealed? Much less is he able to criticise their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist. The small fragment of a tree, or a flower, or animal, or building may seem quite unmean. ing, and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fit- ness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God's dominions withir. our survey is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe and its interminable duration, as an atom compared to a planet or a man's age to eternity. — Malcom.] [Chalmers has an able note on this subject, using a different illus- tration taken from Leibnitz.] 1/6 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. though scarce denied, yet are universally forgot when persons come to argue against religion. And it is not, perhaps, easy even for the most reasonable men always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts it may not be useless to go on a little further, in order to show more distinctly how just an answer our ignorance is to objec- tions against the scheme of providence. Suppose, then, TM ^ X. ^ person boldly to assert that the thincrs Illustrations. ^ * . . ^ ■^ . .. , ^ complained of — the origm and continuance of evil — might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions, (pages 178, 179;) interpositions so guard- ed and circumstanced as would preclude all mischief arising from them ; or, if this were impracticable, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection; since more good might have been produced without any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and good- ness ; because these would have occasioned no irregu- larities. And further than this, it is presumed, the ob- jections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious ; that were these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government, and the consequence drawn from it, would hold in great measure, enough to vindicate religion against all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding; for at the most they would infer nothing more than that it might have been better. But, indeed, they are mere arbitrary assertions ; no man being sufficiently acquaint- ed with the possibilities of things to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 177 most palpable self-contradictions, which not every one by any means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps any one at first sight suspect. From these things it is easy to see distinctly how our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of providence. If a man contemplating any one provi- dential dispensation which had no relation to any others, should object that he discerned in it a disregard to jus- tice, or a deficiency of goodness, nothing would be less an answer to such objection than our ignorance in other parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things no way related to what he was contemplating. But when we know not but the parts objected against may be relative to other parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us, then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer ; because some unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is ob- jected against just and good ; nay, good in the highest practical degree. 4. II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such objections will further appear, by a more distinct obser- vation of some particular things contained Argument from in the natural government of God, the like sp^c'ai things. to which may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral government. First. As in the scheme of the natural world no end appears to be accomplished without means, so we find that means very undesirable often conduce Means essential to bring about ends in such a measure desir- *°®°<^- able, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where such means are con- ducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shows us that they are thus conducive. Experi- ence also shows many means to be conducive and nec- 12 178 Analogy of Reliqion. [Part I, essary fo accomplish ends, which means, before experi- ence, we should have thought would have had even a contrary tendency. Now from these observations relat- ing to the natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to it, arises a great credibility that the putting our misery in each other's power to the de- gree it is, and making men liable to vice to the degree we are, and in general, that those things which are ob- jected against the moral scheme of providence may be, upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and pro- ductive of an overbalance of happiness; that is, the things objected against may be means by which an over- balance of good will, in the end, be found produced. And from the same observations it appears to be no pre- sumption against this that we do not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those things which we call irregularities may not be so at all, because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. And it may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished. After these observations it may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from ^ , a-^y of them, that though the constitution of 81n and mis- •' r ^ amotinthem- our nature, from whence we are capable of ves beneftciaL . . Vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial *^o it, (that is, it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself ab- stained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted,) yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is Chap. VII. I A Scheme Incomprehensible. 179 most clearly conceivable that the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever ; yet it would be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. But, 5. Secondly, The natural government of the world is carried on by general laws. For this there „ ^ , ^ *^ . Natural govern- may be wise and good reasons : the wisest ment and gen- and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature ; by our being made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that the laws by which the world is governed are general. For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them : now this foresight could not be at all, were not the government of the world car- ried on by general laws. And though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single case may be at length found to have been provided for even by these ; yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things, as we see it is absolutely impos- sible in civil government. But then we are ready to think that the constitution of nature remaining as it is, and the course gpedai inter- of things being permitted to go on, in other STvn7atSS respects, as it does, there might be interpo- ^^^ ^^^ i8o Analogy of Religion. [Part I. sitions to prevent irregularities, though they could not have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. And there would indeed be reason to wish — which, by the way, is very different from a right to claim — that all irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it is plain they would have some visible and immediate bad effects ; for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general laws. And further, it is certain they would have distant effects, and very great ones, too, by means of the wonderful connections be- fore-mentioned. (Page 173, etc.) So that we cannot so much as guess what would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad result might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was occasion for them ; but this again is talking quite at random, and in the dark. (Pages 175, 176.) Upon the whole, then, we see wise reasons why the course of the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by this means ; and, for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe that all irregularities could be rem- edied as they arise, or could have been precluded by general laws. We find that interpositions would pro- duce evil and prevent good ; and for aught we know, they would produce greater evil than they would prevent, and prevent greater good than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient ; and going further seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. 6. But it may be said, " that after all, these supposed Chap VII.l A Scheme Incomprehensible. i8i impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquaint- ed with; and we must judge of religion, as our ignorance of other things, by what we do know, and dJte^epJSJfSi look upon the rest as nothing ; or however, ^^^°- that the answers here given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it, since their stress lies so very mucl^ upon our ignoiance." But, 7. Firsts Though total ignorance, in any matter, does indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it and objections against it, yet partial ig- norance does not For we may in any degree be con- vinced that a person is of such a character, and conse- quently will pursue such ends, though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper way of acting in order the most effectually to obtain those ends ; and in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance, though the proof that such ends were intend- ed might not at all be invalidated by it.* Thus the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of * [The concluding observations of this chapter are all-important for the vindication of Butler's whole argument. They show most satisfactorily how our ignorance may invalidate the objections against, and yet not invalidate the proof of, the thing. The essence of the reasoning here lies in the distinction between our knowledge of God's will and our knowledge of his ways. We have positive proof of his moral character, in virtue of which he wills both the righteousness and the happiness of his creatures ; and yet may be utterly in the dark as to the most effectual ways or methods of procedure by which these objects can be most fully accomplished. We may know the end, and yet not know the best means of bringing it about. A total ignorance would place both the objections and the proof alike beyond our reach, but a partial ignorance may not. God's wisdom may be learned by its vestiges within the limits of a mere handbreadth, as in the construction of an eye ; yet, after having learned this, we may fail in oui judgment of the subserviency of things that go out and far from view, whether widely in space or distantly in time. And so 1 82 Analogy of Religion. [Pari- I. God, and consequently, that his government is moral, and that every one upon the whole shall receive accord- ing to his deserts; a proof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not competent judges what is the proper way of acting, in order the most ef- fectually to accomplish this end. (Pages 40, 41.) There- fore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the conduct of providence in permitting irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it ; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it. 8. Secondly^ Suppose unknown impossibilities and un- known relations might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against it, and that in consequence of this the proof of it were doubtful, yet still, let the assertion be despised or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observ- ing or violating them. For these obligations arise im- mediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate with- out being self-condemned. And they would be certain, too, from considerations of interest. For though it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is, however, credible that they may have those consequences which religion teaches us they will; and this credibility is a certain * obligation, in point of withm the homestead of one's own conscience may we read the lesson of a righteous God, and yet be wholly unable to pronounce on the tendency or effect of those measures which enter into the policy of his universal government. — Chalmers.] ♦ Page 35, and part ii, chap. vi. Chap. VII.J A Scheme Incomprehensible. 183 prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But, 9. Thirdly^ The answers above given to the objec- tions against religion cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For upon the supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude that this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a thousand particular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends which we should have thought they had no ten- dency at all to accomplish ; nay, ends which, before ex- perience, we should have thought such parts were contra- dictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And there- fore all these analogies show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is delusive; be- cause they show it is not at all incredible that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness, and even to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it ;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. 10. Lastly^ From the observations now made, it is easy to see that the answers above given to the objections against providence, though in a general way of speaking they may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from some- what which analogy shows us concerning it. For anal- ogy shows us positively that our ignorance in the possi- bilities of things, and the various relations in nature, ren- ders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclu- sions in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon ♦ Sermons at the Rolls, page 312, 2d edit. 184 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And therefore to take these things into the account is to judge by experience and what we do know; and it is not judging so to take no notice of them. CONCLUSION. THE observations of the last chapter lead us to con- sider this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident that the course of things which comes within our view is connected with somewhat past, present, and future, beyond it. (Pages 172, 173.) So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible; in- comprehensible, in a manner, equally with respect to what has been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and con- ception, (part ii, chap, ii,) as any thing in that of relig- ion. For will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to continue as it is, without than with an intelligent author and governor of it ? or, admitting an intelligent govern- or of it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral ? Indeed, without an intelligent author Crai'. VI I. J Conclusion. 185 and governor of nature no account at all can be given how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on as it is ; nor any of its general end and design without a moral governor of it. That there is an intelligent author of nature, and natural governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally known and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent author of nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character. (Page 160.) Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good ; so we can scarce in imagination conceive what it can be otherwise. However, in conse- quence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible that creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this ; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet at least whither we are going, and what the mysterious scheme in the midst of which we find ourselves will at length come out and pro- duce ; a scheme in which it is certain we are highly in- terested, and in which we may be interested even beyond conception. For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude that we shall cease to be at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange in our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue so ; unless there be i86 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. some positive ground, and there is none from reason oi analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persua- sion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would surely be little reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed, it can have no other ground than some such imagina- tion, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Experience, too, most clear- ly shows us the folly of concluding from the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there are remarkable instances of their not affect- ing each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all reason we are to go upon is, that our living nature will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable, to form an institution of life, or to act upon any other supposition. Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears; since we see the constitution of nature is such as to admit of misery as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree ; and since we cannot but know what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing further, that our future interest depends upon our present behavior; for we see our present interest doth ; and that the hap- piness and misery which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow till long after the actions are done to which they are respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely that the author of nature, in giving happi- ness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not ; yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he has given us plainly leads us at once, and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must. Chap. VII.l Conclusion. 187 be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happi- ness, and to bad actions misery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well and punish those who do evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the woild, it has been observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied in that natural government of God which we experience ourselves under ; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and pun- ished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but also as virtuous and vicious ; and that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads toward, is prevented for a time from taking place, it is by obstacles which the state of this world unhappi- ly throws in its way, and which therefore are in their nature temporary. Now as these things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are observable on the side of virtue, so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral scheme of government, then, is visibly established, and in some degree carried into ex- ecution; and this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an apprehension that it will be carried on further toward perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior, notwithstanding the difficul- ty which this may occasion of securing it, and the dan- ger of losing it ; just in the same manner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend upon our behavior, notwithstanding the like dif- ficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution. i88 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves, with our own conduct and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of things which is ow- ing to men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust, to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run our- selves into misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good which religion lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the char- acter of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualifica- tion for a future state of security and happiness, under the moral government of God ; in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for every par- ticular condition of life, under his natural government ; and that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that character. Now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible by observing, that we are plainly made for improve- ment of all kinds ; that it is a general appointment of providence that we cultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves habits of action, in order to be- come fit for what we were wholly unfit for before ; that in particular, childhood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age, and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral discipline. And whereas objections are urged against the whole notion of moral government and a probation- state, from the opinion of necessity, it has been shown that God has given us the evidence, as it were, of expe- Chap. VII.l Conclusion. 189 rience, that all objections against religion on this head are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural gov- ernment, suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections against the equity and goodness of his moral government, and in general he has exemplified to us the latter by the former. These things, which, it is to be remembered, are mat- ters of fact, ought in all common sense to awaken man- kind, to induce them to consider in earnest their condi- tion, and what they have to do. It is absurd — absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind — for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life, or even in that immoral thoughtlessness which far the greatest part of them are fallen into.' And the credibility of religion, arising from experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to en- gage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt, (part ii, chap, vi,) of a righteous administration established in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it ; especially when we consider how very questionable it is whether any thing at all can be gained by vice, (page 87 ;) how un- questionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are at the best ; and how soon they must be parted with at the longest. For in the deliber- ations of reason concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case ; so inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest, so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignifi- cant as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in themselves, and in comparison with the importance of religion, they quite disappear and are lost. Mere pas- sion, indeed, may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as an excuse for a vicious course of life. And how sorry 190 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. an excuse it is will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated to govern them ; and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones, too, from temporal re- gards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion, then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things ; for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God, under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge ; a nature, and con- science, and apprehension given us by him ; and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel ; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men* PART 11. OF REVEALED RELIGION. ^ CHAPTER I. OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. SOME persons, upon pretense of the sufficiency of the light of nature,* avowedly reject all revelation as, in its very notion, incredible, and what „ , - . . A 1 ••,■,- • ■ Rejecters of rev- must be fictitious. And, indeed, it is certain elation, why . . , - , , . , , , unreasonable. no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as to ren- der one not wanting and useless. But no man in serious- ness and simplicity of mind can possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the heathen world be- fore revelation, and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it, particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition • but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the gen erality could : if they could, there is no sort of probabil- ity that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing admonition to remind them of it, ♦ [This is the main argument of Tindal's famous book, " Chris- tianity as Old as the Creation ; or, the Gospel a Republication of the Law of Nature," first published in 4to., London, 1730. — F.] 192 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. and inculcate it upon them.* And further still, were they as much disposed to attend to religion as the bet- ter sort of men are, yet even upon this supposition, there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages naight be afforded by them. So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random. f Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being in any respect better. 2. There are other persons, not to be ranked with ♦ [See an excellent statement of the argument here glanced at in Leland's "Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation shown from the State of Religion in the Ancient Heathen World," etc.] f [It may be doubted whether Christian apologists are called upon to demonstrate elaborately the .necessity of revelation, prior to the consideration of its truth, as matter of fact. Paley disposes of this whole question in a single sentence, by simply saying, " I deem it unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because I have met with no serious person who thinks that even under the Christian revelation, we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous." Dr. Chalmers, on this topic, re- marks, " Possessed as we are, of such competent proofs on the credi- bility of this said revelation, are we to suspend the determination of it, till the previous question of its necessity has been settled and set by? Are we to forego the consideration of the evidences which lie patent before us on the field of observation till we take up a matter, not so much, let it be noticed, of palpable fact as of recondite prin- ciple ? The necessity of revelation involves in it topics that stand related both to God and to eternity — to the hidden counsels of the One, to the fathomless unknown, and by us, undiscoverable, of the other. The truth of revelation depends on credentials which lie on an open platform, or certain tangible things within the circle of our perceptions, which have been addressed to human eyes, which have been heard by human ears. It is not sound dialectics to suspend the second of these topics on the first of them." — Dr. Crooks.] Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 193 these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were overlooking, revelation, as of Those who n^- small importance provided natural religion toT^natiS^^'re^ be kept to. With little regard either to the "^**°- evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth, " the only design of it," say they, " must be to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce ihe practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice of these things were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication of Christianity; but whether they are be- lieved and practiced, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great matter."* This way of considering revelation, though it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly considered with regard to the persons who seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of it will like- wise further show the extravagance of the former opin- ion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of Christianity cannot be an improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility of it. * Invenis multos — propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi prsecepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullum rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nuUo adul- terio contaminor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod repre- hendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. — Aug. in Psal., xxxL You find many who refuse to become Christians because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a new life. We ought to live well, says one. What will Christ teach me — to live well ? I do live well ; what need have I of Christ ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I covet no man's goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so may make me a Christian. 18 194 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 3. Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those things which are commanded in ^ Christianity, it is evident at first sight that Obedience not . /' . '^ an Indifferent it cannot m anvwise be an indifferent mat- matter. ter whether we obey or disobey those com- mands ; unless we are certainly assured that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this ; for our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case, since the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite reasons for things with which we are not acquainted. But the importance of Christianity will more distinct- ly appear by considering it more distinctly : first, as a republication and external institution of natural or essen- tial religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and virtue ; and secondly, as containing an account of a dis- pensation of things not discoverable by reason, in con- sequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. 4. I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. Christianity im- It instructs mankind in the moral system of puSStton* ^of the world : that it is the work of an infinite- natural religion, jy perfect Being, and under his government ; that virtue is his law; and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all according to their works, in a future state. And which is very material, it teaches natural, religion in its genuine sim- plicity, free from those superstitions with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. Chap. I,] Importance of Christianity. 195 Revelation is further an authoritative publication of natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of it. Indeed, the miracles .™. ^ . , ' What mirados and prophecies recorded in Scripture were and prophecy \ , . , , . . prove. mtended to prove a particular dispensation of providence — the redemption of the world by the Messiah ; but this does not hinder but that they may also prove God's general providence over the world as our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it, because this character of the author of nature is necessarily connected with, and implied in, that par- ticular revealed dispensation of things : it is likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that, indeed, natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture revelation as it would have been had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it. 5. But it may possibly be disputed how far miracles can prove natural religion ; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it, considered practical effect as a matter of speculation : but considered mJ^r^^ThJ as a practical thing there can be none. For t^^^^i-'e^c- suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, and to declare he was commissioned by God so to do ; suppose him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no human foresight could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ; feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; would not this give additional credibility to his teach- ing — a credibility beyond what that of a common man would have, and be an authoritative publication of the law of nature, that is, a new proof of it ? It would be a practical one of the strongest kind, perhaps, which 196 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. human creatures are capable of having given them. The law of Moses, then, and the gospel of Christ, are author- itative publications of the religion of nature : they afford a proof of God's general providence, as moral governor of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations of providence toward sinful creatures, revealed in the law and the gospel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. 6. To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most improved capacity, who had never ^ ^ «, x_ heard of revelation, convinced upon the Further illustra- . .' . ^ tion of its prac- whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the tical effects. world, that it was under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect being, but ready to question whether he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties ; suppose him brought, by this sus- picion, into great danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost every one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least, of these things ; and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation, with regard to religion, as na- ture alone ever placed any man in. What a confirma- tion now must it be to such a person all at once to find, that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind in the name of that infinite Being whom he had, from principles of reason, believed in; and that the publish- ers of the revelation proved their commission from him by making it appear that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature. Nor must it, by any means, be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light by the gospel.* The great * [For even though natural religion might teach some efficacy to be in repentance, it could not certainly teach the efficacy of it in the Christian sense, that is, its efficacy wholly to cancel the punishment Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 197 doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only -confirmed in the gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a degree of light to which that of nature is but darkness. 7. Further: As Christianity served these ends and purposes when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself; so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages by means of the set- Design of the tlement of a visible Church;* of a society ^"e Church, distinguished from common ones and from the rest of the world by peculiar religious institutions, by an insti- tuted method of instruction, and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity in order to their introduc- ing it into the world ; a visible Church was established, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and the prophets, Christ and his apostles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their contemporaries, the benefits of their instructions would have reached but to a small part of mankind. Christianity must have been, in a of sin, and restore us absolutely to God's favor. And though natural religion might show us much danger in wickedness, it could not show tts, certainly, the great danger resulting from our probation being terminated forever by death, and the everlasting punishment which will then ensue. — F.] * [In his sermon before the Society for the Propagation of the Gos- pel Butler says : " Christianity was left with Christians to be trans- mitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left with mankind in general. There was, however, this difference, that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruc- tion and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christians into visible Churches, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel." But- ler goes on to show that however corrupt the Churches may have be- come they were the repositories of fhe written oracles of God, and along with their errors carried their refutation,] 198 Analogy of Religion. [Part II, great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this appears to have been one reason why a vis- ible Church was instituted ; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the world, of the duty which we owe our Maker; to call men continually both by ex- ample and instruction to attend to it, and by the form of religion ever before their eyes remind them of the reality ; to be the repository of the oracles of God ; to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of the world — the light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural re- ligion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid be- fore mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts as a matter of infinite importance. A visible Church has also a further tendency to pro- mote natural religion as being an instituted The Church an °, . . ° , agency for edu- method of education, origmally mtended to cation. , r T J 1 be of more peculiar advantage to those who would conform to it. For one end of the institution was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as instruc- tion ; by a general regular discipline, and public exer- cises of religion, fke body of Christy as the Scripture speaks, should be edified^ that is, trained up in piety and virtue, for a higher and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial ; tending, in the nature of the thing, to answer, and in some degree actually an- swering, those ends; it is to be remembered that the v^ery notion of it implies positive institutions, for the vis- ibility of the Church consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in general is most obvious; since, without ti em, these advantages Chap. I.j Importance of Christianity. t<^ could not be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness to insist upon knowing the reasons why such particular ones were fixed upon, rather than others. The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very slow in apprehending : and yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain, obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advan- tageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now among us : that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice } 8. The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, and from the supposition of ^^. ^ ^ ■^ ' . ^^ Objection from Its havmg had but little good influence, the perversion ? , , ^ , ' ofChristlwiity. however mnocently they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any prin- ciples but such as lead to downright atheism ; because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of theism, must have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may, indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good eff"ects of Christianity have not been small ; nor its supposed ill effects any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps, too, the things themselves done have been aggravated; and if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretense ; and the same evils in the main would have been done upon some other pretense. How- ever, great and shocking as the corruptions Natural religion and abuses of it have really been, they can- p®'^®''^- not be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon prin- ciples of theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle that the dispensations of Providence are not to be 200 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies ; not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind did their part : that part which is justly put and left upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other : " He that is unjust, let him be unjust still ; and he that is holy, let him be holy still." Rev. xxii, ii. The light of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority : both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences of each ; and after this leave them at full liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. Every moment's experience shows that this is God's general rule of government.* 9. To return, then ; Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature ; being moreover an authoritative Christian obu- promulgation of it, with new light, and other fmpOTtenS^^f circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapt- Christianity. g^ ^^ ^^ie wants of mankind ; these things fully show its importance. And it is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their pro- fession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of relig- ion. For it is the very scheme of the gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, contribute toward contin- * [It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say that since Christianity is a remedial system, designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be liable to the same perversions. Because, i. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the de- fects of nature, but of an unnatural state of ruin into which man- kind were brought by the fall, And, 2. It is remedial of the defects of nature in a great degree by its giving additional advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is, without destroying man's free agency ; which would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue. — Fitzgerald.] Chap. I.l Importance of Christianity. 201 uingand carrying it on ; all by uniting in the public pro- fession, and external practice of Christianity ; some by instructing, by having the oversight, and taking care of this religious community — the Church of God. Now tills further shows the importance of Christianity, and, \\hich is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a prac- tical sense, or the high obligations we are under to take it into our most serious consideration ; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it de- spitefully — which I am not now speaking of — but in dis-" regarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its subservi- ency to natural religion. But, 10. II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view, as containing an account of a dispensation of things not at all discoverable by reason, in ° /. i • • • Important aa consequence of which several distmct pre- presenting new cepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God's general providence, as right- eous governor and Judge of the world, but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of provi- dence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recov- ery and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation being made, we are commanded to be baptizedy not only in the name of the Father^ but also of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; and other obligations of duty unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed Now the importance of these duties may be judged of by observing that they arise, not from pos- itive command merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons 202 Analogy of Religion. [Part II in the gospel dispensation, or from the relations which we are there informed they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the relation which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty which we are under to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of these three respects being admitted, that God is the governor of the world, upon the evidence of reason ; that Christ is the Mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evi- dence of revelation, the truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no more a ques- tion why it should be commanded that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems to require to be more fully stated.* II. Let it be remembered, then, that religion comes under the twofold consideration of internal Religion as in- ternal and ex- and external ; for the latter is as real a part of ternal. . . . ■, r -..t religion, of true religion, as the former. Now when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence of natural relig- ion may be said to consist in religious regards to Go^l the Father Almighty ; and the essence of revealed religion as distinguished from natural,. to consist in religious regards to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of these Divine persons respectively, arises from the re- s])ective relations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason oi revelation, makes no alteration in the case ; because the * See " The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sac- raments," etc., and Colliber on Revealed Religion, as there quoted. Chap. I.l Importance of Christianity. 203 duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world: the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not, then, the duty of religious regards to both these di- vine persons as immediately arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations, as the inward good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common rela- tions between us and them ? But it will be asked, " What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising not merely from command in Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to us ? " I answer. The religious regards of reverence, honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what ex- ternal manner this inward worship is to be expressed is a matter of pure revealed command ; as perhaps the ex- ternal manner in which God the Father is to be wor- shiped may be more so than we are ready to think ; but the worship — the internal worship itself — to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed command than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation ; for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of these obligations, as it shows us the mean ing of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. 12. If this account of the Christian religion be just those persons wno can speak lightly of it, mohJ impor as of little consequence, provided natural re- ^uy*' ovel-'^'' ligion be kept to, plainly forget that Chris- ^°^^' tianity, even what is peculiarly so called as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, 204 Analogy of Religion. [Part II even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord be- ing made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this ob- ligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget that revelation is to be considered as in- forming us of somewhat new in the state of mankind and in the government of the world ; as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real, (though before revelation we could be under no obliga- tions from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason to think but that neglect of behaving suit- ably to them will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other : the ignorance being supposed equally unavoida- ble, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 13. If, therefore, Christ be indeed the Mediator be- tween God and man ; that is, if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and Peril of neglect. ' our God, no one can say what may follow not only the obstinate, but the careless, disregard to him in those high relations. Nay, no one can say what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural consequence. (Pages 64, 65, etc.) For as the natural consequences of vice in this life are doubt- less to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by God; so likewise, for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future life may be in a like way, or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice, (chap v;) of men's violating or disregarding the rela- Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 205 tions which God has placed them in here, and made known to them. Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and so are unfit for that state which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qual ified for that state ; all which is implied in the express, though figurative, declaration^ " Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God :" supposing this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter whether or not he makes use of the means expressly commanded by God for obtaining this divine assistance ? especially since the whole anal- ogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect any ben- efits without making use of the appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us noth- ing of the particular, immediate means, of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must learn either from experience or revelation. And experience the present case does not admit of. The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Chris- tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is un- speakable irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence till it be posi- tively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth. The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being mistaken. 14. First, Hence we may clearly see where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral 2o6 Analogy of Religion. [Part II in religion. M.oxdX precepts are precepts the reasons of Distinction be- which we See ; positive precepts are pre- M^^^tsMd^ib- cepts the reasons of which we do not see.* ligations. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela- tion, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty, either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as much a positive duty as that we be baptized in the name of the Son ; because both arise equally from revealed command ; though the rela- tion which we stand in to God the Father is made known to us by reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dis- pensation of the gospel admitted, gratitude as immedi- ately becomes due to Christ from his being the volun- tary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father from his being the fountain of all good ; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, * This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, con- sidered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have some- what of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in others respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. (See p. 195, etc., and p. 207.) [It should be further added, to prevent misconceptions, that a pre- cept may be positive, even though it have a ground or reason visible to us, if that reason do not, of itself, constitute the thing required an absolute duty. There are, for instance, visible reasons for the pro- priety of such an initiative rite as Christian baptism, and yet baptism is only a positive institution, because those reasons are not sufficient of themselves to make the observance of such a rite an absolute duty.— F.] Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 207 the second by reason. Hence, also, we may see, and for distinctness' sake it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold consideration : They are either institutions founded on i.atural religion, as baptism in the name of the Father ; though this has also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name of God as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ ; or they are external institutions founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. 15. Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and what is positive in religion, ap- , - , ,. - Moral duties pears the ground of that peculiar preference superior to posi- which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former. The reason of positive institutions in general is very obvious, though we should not see the reason why such particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of caviling at words will at- tend to the thing itself, may clearly see that positive in- stitutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands ; since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care, then, is to be taken, when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further than as they are different; no further than as the former are posi- tive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with ; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case» without such external command. Unless this caution be observed we shall run into endless confusion. 16. Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority; that in cer- tain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both ; that 2o8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. the former is moral, that is, a precept of which we see If the two con- ^^^ reasons, and that they hold in the par- ftict, the moral ticular case before us ; but that the latter is to be obeyed. . . positive, that is, a precept of which we do not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our obliga- tions are to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for this preference and none against it. JFurther, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Chris- tianity enjoins, are means to a moral end ; and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this mat- ter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to prac tice than may be thought at first sight. And therefore, in a more practical, though more lay way of consideration, and taking the words moral law and positive institutions in the popular sense ; I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed com- mand as positive institutions are ; for the Scripture en- joins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts ; interwoven into our very na- ture. And this is a plain intimation of the author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. 17. But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question as some persons seem The question to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to ?SoX''nTim: determine it. For, first, Though mankind portant. have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites by way of equiv- alent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and conse- quently without determining which is to have the prefer- ence, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions Chap. IJ Importance of Christianity. 209 of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion; as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general teaor of Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God without moral virtue. Secondly^ Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter and never upon the former; which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And further, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit. of Christianity appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prev- alent folly, our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts, when the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners ; and also when they censured his disciples iox plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authorita- tive determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general, / will have mercy, and not sacri- fice. (Matt, ix, 13, and xii, 7.) The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thfng insisted upon, though I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But tliat the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. For had it, in the latter case, been said only that God pre- ferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reasoning, most justly might we have argued that he preferred mercy likewise to the 14 2IO Analogy of Religion. [Part TI. observance of other ritual institutions, and in general, moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determina- tion would have been general, though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the gospel, it is much stronger ; for the sense, and the very literal words of our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison between positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought that justice is to give place to them. It is re- markable, too, that as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are introduced on both the fore- mentioned occasions, with a declaration that the Phari- sees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very remarkable ; for since it is scarce possible for the most ignorant person not to understand the lit- eral sense of the passage in the prophet, (Hosea vi,) and since understanding the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless, (Matt, xii, 7,) it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Phari- sees had not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of religion consists ; that it consists in moral piety and virtue as distinguished from forms and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage in the gospel. But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater importance than the Both important. , . , , . , . Other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all ; it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves how great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of divine appointment ; that our obliga- tions to obey all God's commands whatever, are abso- Chap. I.J Importance of Christianity. 211 lute and indispensable ; and that commands merely pos- itive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them; an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense. To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the ac- count now given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the Script- ures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation real- ly is, instead of determining beforehand from reason what the scheme of it must be. (Chap, iii.) Indeed, if in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one.* But it is not any degree of a pre- sumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover, (pages 213, 214,) or a precept which the law of nature does not oblige to. * [This sentiment must be received with caution and applied with care. It has often been used for evil purposes by those unfriendly to religion. Christianity cannot contradict any truths but the results of imperfect investigations in science or natural religion must not hasti- ly be assumed as true. Hitherto time has greatly modified or en- tirely removed what at first seemed to be formidable objections. The presumption is in favor of the received teachings of Christianity, and they must not be set aside for every hypothesis that opposers may wantonly and presumptuously set forth.] 212 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. ^ CHAPTER II. OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVE- LATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the obligation which we are un- der seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility; the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general ; which shall be the subject of this chapter; and the ob- jections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some following ones. (Chapters iii-vi.) For it seems the most natural method to remove these prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence. (Chap, vii.) It is, I think, commonly supposed that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles ; so that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to con- vince us of other events or matters of fact. Indeed, the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very insignificant by many persons ; yet as it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices, how- ever needless the consideration of it be, upon its own account. Nopresmnption 2. I. I find no appearance of a presump- Si^fciemfTf tion, from the analogy of nature, against the Christianity. general scheme of Christianity, that God Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 213 created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, that is, render to every one according to his works ; and that good men are under the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are or are not to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or, however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this gener.al scheme of Christianity, it must be either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme upon either of these accounts. 3. First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience. For „ , 1 , r . None, because suppose one who never heard of revelation, not discovered _ , . , , , . , t>y reason. of the most improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion, such a one could not but be sensi- ble that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe which he was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible that there must be innumerable things in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at pres- ent carrying on, and in what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant, (pages 174, 176,) and which could not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imag- ination. And doubtless that part of it which is open to our view is but as a point in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity past and future ; in comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts of the boundless universe : nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And 214 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them ; because it is certain there are in- numerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of Script- ure now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike , the known course of nature. For there is None, because unlike known no presumption at all, from analogy, that the course of nature. ^ *■ . . . wAo/e course of thmgs, or divme government, naturally unknown to us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that which is known ; and therefore no pe- culiar presumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in a great degree unlike one another, and there- fore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature ; as will appear in the following part of this treatise. The notion of a miracle,* considered as a proof of a divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible miracles :t the incarna- tion of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot * [For a beautiful development of the idea of a miracle the reader is referred to Mr. Trench's work on the Miracles, preliminary essay.] f [Papists have claimed transubstantiation as an invisible miracle. But in the case of an invisible miracle the circumstauces exclude ex- amination, while transubstantiation invites and is favorable to exam- ination. It is claimed to be public and constant, yet it cannot be discovered to be a miracle. " It supposes the woiking of a second miracle to make the first invisible."] Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 215 be alleged as a proof of such a mission, but require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revela- tion itself, too, is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it ; and the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I have been ob- serving here is, that, whether we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence not discovera- ble without revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous ; and whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be called so or not, the foregoing observations seem entirely to show, that there is no presumption against it, from the analogy of nature. 4. II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations which we should now call miraculous ; particularly, none against a revelation at the „ t^ . . ° No presumption begmnmg of the world: nothing of such against a mirac- ° . ... ulous revelation presumption agamst it as is supposed to be at the i,eginning ' ,. , J • , 1 . , of the world. implied or expressed in the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature ; and implies somewhat different fr^m it, con- sidered as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; or, if there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is upon the first peopling of worlds. And there- fore the question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a common ques- tion of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power exerted totally different from the present course of nature. Now, whether this power, thu? 2i6 Analogy of Religion. FPart II. wholly different from the present course of nature, for we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous j whether this power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giv- ing him a revelation, is a question of the same kind as whether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a par- ticular degree and manner or not. Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name, the case will not be different ; since it must be acknowledged that such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged that our Saviour spent some years in a course of working miracles ; there is no more presumption worth mentioning, against his having exerted this miraculous power in a certain degree great- er, than in a certain degree less ; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this, than in another, manner.* * [This observation applies with great force against the modern rationalistic attempts to explain away some of our Saviour's miracles into natural events, as long as it is confessed that he wrought real miracles, or that his mission was really miraculous. Such explana- tions are really more improbable than the common ones which sup- pose a miracle, because there is no general improbability in supposing that a person endowed with the power of working miracles exerted it upon a particular occasion ; whereas there is an improbability in sup- posing that an unusual natural event occurred ; and when this system of interpretation is carried on, and applied to a great number of cases, the improbability of a whole series of strange natural e\ ents taking place unaccountably one after the other, amounts, I think, to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles ; because every thing that is improbable in the physical strangeness of miracles applies to such a series of odd events, while we are deprived of the means of accounting for them by supposing an extraordinary interposition of the Deity. A romance made up wholly of natural occurrences which happen sometimes, but very rarely, is just as in- credible as a romance made up of stories about genii and enchanters, and things wholly supernatural. The improbability of both, with respect to physical strangeness, is just the same. " Some infidels," Ch. IIJ Presumption against a Revelation. 217 It is evident, then, that there can be no peculiar pre- sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation when man was first placed upon the earth. Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or tradition that religion was first reasoned out ; but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed, the state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply that this was the original of it among mankind. And these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar au- thority of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirma- tion of natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this treatise, (page 164, etc.,) so likewise, it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent revelation. 5. III. But still it maybe objected, that there is some peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly agamst revelation, course of nature after the settlement and during the contin- uance of a course of nature. Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be called an argument from analogy, for or against revela- tion considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be says the Archbishop of Dublin, " have labored to prove, concerning tofne OTu of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result ot an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances ; next they en- deavor to prove the same concerning another, and so on ; and thence infer that all of them, occurring as a series, might have been so. They might argue, in like manner, that because it is not very im- probable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hun- dred times running." — Logic, l>ook iii, § 11. — F.] 2i8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world, seemingly in like circum- stances with our own, is no more than a parallel case ; and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed whether such world had one, or not ; such a proof, being drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More particularly : 6. First of all, There is a very strong presumption ^ ^ against common speculative truths, and Presumption ° . ^ . against common agamst the most Ordinary facts, before the facts— Cesar. ^ . ^ , ,.,"'.' proof of them ; which yet is overcome by almost any proof.* There is a presumption of millions * [Mr. Mill (Logic, chap, xxiv, § 5) has pointed out a mistake into which writers against Hume's Essay on Miracles have fallen, in con- founding the improbability that an event will occur, with the improb- ability it has occurred — improbability before the fact and improba- bility after it. La Place, differing widely from these writers on religious subjects, has sanctioned the same error in his Essay on Probabilities. The presumption against a miracle cannot be estimated by com- paring with the presumption of a previously conceived story, but with the presumption against the truth of a story already refuted, which relates to events not miraculous. "Many events are altogether improbable to us befoie we are in- formed of their happening, which are not in the least incredible when we are informed of them, because not contrary to any, even approxi- mate, induction." Suppose a thousand numbers to be put in a box, and that it is pro posed to draw out the number 87. Now there are nine hundred and ninety-nine chances to one against drawing that or any other given number. But if any person of common veracity tells you he drew out a number which proved to be 87, you at once believe him, for as some number was drawn, it was as likely to be this as any other. Butler can hardly be said to have fallen into the error noticed by Mr. Mill. He says, " There is a very strong presumption against com- mon speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof , which yet is overcome by almost any proof." In the view of improbability above taken, " the proof of Christian- Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 219 to one against the story of Cesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so cir- cumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts ; every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single common fact. And from hence it appears, that the question of importance as to the matter before us is, concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of mill- ions to one against the most common facts, what can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar.' It cannot be estimated, and is as noth- ing.* The only material question is, whether there be ity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong. There are many pre- dictions, for instance, that Christ should be bom at a certain time and place, and under very particular circumstances. The probabilities against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite, yet they hap- pened exactly as foretold."] * [Butler supposes, in the first instance, a series of events to have come gratuitously into one's mind ; and, after stating the almost in- finite number of chances against its being true, supposes, in the second instance, these very events to be deponed to by a credible witness. Now, that both the first and the second of these things should happen in coincidence together were the strongest possible unlikelihood ; and Butler says truly, that the presumption against a miracle is a small presumption additional to this ; for, in fact, this were itself a miracle. The proper way of estimating the strength of the presumption against, or of the proof that would be necessary for the establishment of a miracle, is to bring it into comparison, not with the presumption against the truth of a previously conceived story, but with the pre- sumption against the truth of an already reported story that related to events which were not miraculous. There will be found in this case a difference very much greater than the small additional pre- sumption which Butler speaks of; and so, however striking or orig inal his observation may be, there seems nothing in it which can guide us into a right track for the solution of the difficulty that since his time has so exercised the skill of controversialists. — Chalmers.] 220 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. any such presumption against miracles as to render them in any sort incredible ? 7. Secondly^ If we leave out the consideration of relig- ion, we are in such total darkness upon what causes, Aside from re- occasions, reasons, or circumstances the SSSof^lSi present course of nature depends, that there **"' does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or six thousand years may have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or cir- cumstances from whence miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a presump- tion, beyond all comparison greater, against \}^^ particu- lar common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in general ; before any evidence of either. 8. But, thirdly^ Take in the consideration of religion, ' or the moral system of the world, and then we see dis- T> «^ ^ ^ tinct particular reasons for miracles ; to af- ReUgion affords ^ . . . , ' reasons for mir- ford mankind instruction additional to that acles. of nature, and to attest the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to the supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things that there should be miraculous interpositions. 9. Then, lastly^ Miracles must not be compared to common natural events ; or to events which, though Miracles not uncommon, are similar to what we daily ex- with^ common^ pcriencc ; but to the extraordinary phenom- events. enaof nature. And then the comparison will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption against such uncommon appearances, sup- pose, as comets, and against there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar presumption against miracles more than against other extraordinary things, he must consider Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 221 what, upon first hearing, would be the presumption against the last-mentioned appearances and powers to a person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and an- nual course of nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter which we every day see. 10. Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no such presumption against miracles as to render them in anywise incredible ; that on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credi- bility to the history of them, in cases where those rea- sons hold ; and that it is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished- from other extraordinary phenomena; though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence in order to determine a question which without such inquiries we see (page 217, etc.) is of no importance. 222 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. CHAPTER III. OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION ; AND THE CREDIBIL- ITY. FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.* BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme Obections t ^^ ^^ 5 against the whole manner in which it Christianity it- is put and left with the world, as well as Belt \ . , ' agamst several particular relations in Script- ure : objections drawn from the deficiencies of revela- tion ; from things in it appearing to men foolishness^ (i Cor. i, 28;) from its containing matters of oifense which have led, and it must have been foreseen would * [The object of this chapter is to prove the likelihood, in the gen- eral, of a revelation being liable to objections, or at least that its be- ing so forms no proper ground for the rejection of it. This reduces us to the consideration of its proofs, as the only relevant inquiry that we have to do with. Doubtless every objection against these proofs must be entertained, and satisfactorily disposed of. But this is differ- ent from objections against the subject-matter of a revelation. These form what are here called its internal improbabilities, much insisted on by Deists ; but all proceeding on the competency of the human understanding to decide upon a topic which is here shown to be much t(to high for it, we being no more judges beforehand of what a reve- lation ought to be, either in the way it ought to be conducted or what it should contain, than we are judges anterior to experience of what ought to be the course of nature. The alleged imperfections and anomalies in the methods by which Christianity distributed and gave forth her lessons, are most effectually met by the analogous imperfec- tions and anomalies, if such they must be called, as contrary to all the likelihoods of previous expectation, that might be observed in the pfts and teaching of nature. — Chalmers.] Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 223 lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness ; from its not being universal ; and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not being so convinc- ing and satisfactory as it might have been ; for this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its truth. (Chap, vi.) It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several particulars comprehended under the objec- tions here referred to, they being so various according to the different fancies of men. There are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture that it is not composed by rul^^ of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through the rash- ness of interpreters, but very much also on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language in which they are left us. 2. Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered in the following chapters. But my design at present is, to observe in general, with re- spect to this whole way of arguing, that such objections upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly ^''^^^^^ credible, beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree ; and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet ob- jections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous; almost all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is, in- deed, the only faculty we have wherewith to judge con- 224 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. cerning any thing, even revelation itself; or be misun- derstood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false from internal characters. For it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions ; and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any supposed rev- elation incredible. Yet still the observation above is, 1 think, true beyond doubt, that objections against Chris- tianity, as distinguished from objections against its evi- dence, are frivolous. To make out this is the general design of the present chapter. And with regard to the ivhole of it, I cannot but particularly wish that the proofs might be attentled to, rather than the assertions caviled at upon account of any unacceptable consequences, whether real or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For after all, that which is true must be admit- ted ; though it should show us the shortness of our fac- ulties, and that we are in nowise judges of many things of which we are apt to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable men ; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection with such, against the justness of the following observations : — 3. As God governs the world, and instructs his crea- tures, according to certain laws or rules in the known course of nature, known by reason together with expe- Being incom rience ; so the Scripture informs us of a fh?SaS'di8! scheme of divine providence additional to more^Bro?the ^his. It relates that God has, by revelation, revealed, instructed men in things concerning his gov- ernment which they could not otherwise have known, and reminded them of things which they might other- wise know ; and attested the truth of the whole by mir- acles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are both from God — if they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of providence Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 225 —our being incompetent judges of one must render it credible tha<- we may be incompetent judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, the acknowledged con- stitution and course of nature is found to be greatly dif- ferent from what, before experience, would have been expected ; and such as, men fancy, there lie great ob- jections against : this renders it beforehand highly cred- ible that they may find the revealed dispensation, like- wise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed before- hand; and liable, in appearance, to great objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the de- grees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on. Thus suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest luustration— manner possible, by common known laws ; SSSm^kwsf and that upon some exigencies he should ^^• suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a different manner: if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand by what common rules the government should or would be carried on, it could not be expected that the same person would be a competent judge in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be sus- pended or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, there is no rea- son to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against the former, doubtless it is highly supposable he might think, also, that he had objections against the latter. And tRus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand that we should fall into as great in pretending to judge, in like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more 15 226 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear of objections than that the former should. 4. These observations relating to the whole of Chris- tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges beforehand by what This analogy , , • , , 1 , applied to in- laws or rulcs, in what degree or by what '^ **"' means, it were to have been expected that God would naturally instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and ex- perience, we are in no sort judges by what methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand what degree or kind of natu- ral information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience ; nor how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether natu- ral knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his af- fording one ; or how far, or in what way, he would in- terpose miraculously to qualify them to whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it ; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live ; and to secure its be- ing transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful, (see chap, vi;) or whether all Chap. III.J Of Credibility of Revelation. 227 who should have any degree of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same : or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge whether it were to have been expected that the revelation should have been committed to writ- ing, or left to be handed down, and consequently cor- rupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are per- mitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will. 5. But it may be said, " that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, and ^^. . ° . Objection to an thus secured agamst danger of corruption, unwritten reve- would not have answered its purpose." I ask, what purpose 7 It would not have answered all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the same degree ; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these were the pur- poses of God, and best fell in with his general govern- ment, we could not at all have determined beforehand. Now since it has been shown that we have no princi- ples of reason upon which to judge, beforehand, how it were to be expected revelation should have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in any of the fore-mentioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object afterward, as to any of them, against its being left in one way rather than another; for this would be to object against things upon account of their being different from expectations, which have been shown to be without reason. 6. And thus we see that the only question concern- ing the truth of Christianity is, whether The only qncs- it be a real revelation ; not whether it be gSslLtliy' 'a attended with every circumstance which we "^^ reveiationf should have looked for : and concerning the authoritv 228 Analogy of Religion. [P.art II of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so pro- mulgated, as weak men are apt to fancy a book coil- taining a divine revelation should. And, therefore, neither obscurity nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable in de- gree than they are, could overthrow the authority of the Scripture ; unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, had promised, that the book, containing the divine rev- elation, should be secure from those things. Nor, in- deed, can any objections overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are no objections against the morality of it, (page 217, etc.,) but such as can show that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it allowed that the proof of any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed ; yet while any proof of them remains, revelation will stand upon much the same footing it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence upon our behavior. 7. From the foregoing observations, too, it will follow, and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation Modes of ar- will find it worth remarking, that there are laT to&p": several ways of arguing, which, though just ^^' with regard to other writings, are not appli- cable to Scripture ; at least not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture, for if it had it would have been expressed more plainly, or Chai*. III.l Or Credibility of Revelation. 229 have been represented under a more apt figure or hiero- glyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very evident ; that in Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were to have been expected, what is the true sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. 'I'he only question is, what appearance there is that this is the sense? and scarce at all, how much more de- terminately or accurately it might have been expressed or figured ? 8. " But is it not self-evident, that internal improba- bilities of all kinds weaken external proba- objection, in- ble proof.? " Doubtless. But to what prac- griXntx' tical purpose can this be alleged here, when *^''"*^ ^^^''^• it has been proved before, (page 217, etc.,) that real in- ternal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certain- ty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony ? and when it now has been made appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering.? as will further appear from what follows. For though from the observations above made it is manifest that we are not in any sort competent judges what supernatural instruction were to have been ex- pected ; and though it is self-evident that the objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous ; yet it may be proper to go one step further, and observe that if men will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the Scriptures by preconceived expectations, the analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it ib' highly credible they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections against it, how- ever really unexceptionable ; for so, prior to experience, they would think they had, against the cir- similar objec cumstances, and degrees, and the whole scripture Hn.i manner of that instruction, which is afforded im^mre*! 230 Analogy of Religion. LPart II. by tlie ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain observation, it would be rejected as incredible, in many iastances of it, only upon account of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances of It. For instance : would it not have been thought highly improbable that men should have been so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the gen- eral laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and rev- olutions of the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned than in astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way of information, would it be said, is that of invention^ by means of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many things upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend ; that a man should by this faculty be made acquainted with a thing in an instant, when per- haps he is thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years. So, likewise, the imperfections attending the only method by which nature enables and directs us to com- municate our thoughts to each other are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence ; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by it. And to mention but one instance more, that brutes without reason should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior fore- sight ; whether it be their own, indeed, is another ques- tion. From these things it is highly credible before- Chap. IIIJ Of Credibility of Revelation. 231 hand, that upon supposition God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections against the credibility of. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater than the analogy of nature would be- forehand, — not perhaps give ground to expect, for this analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation upon, — but no more nor greater than analogy would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that there might seem to lie against reve- lation. 9. By applying these general observations to a partic- ular objection, it will be more distinctly seen how they are applicable to others of the like kind ; and, indeed, to almost all objections against Christianity as distin- guished from objections against its evidence. It appears from Scripture, that as it was not unusual objection to in the apostolic age for persons, upon their SSS*"tS^£ conversion to Christianity, to be endued o«i«''iy"8e. with miraculous gifts ; so, some of those persons exer- cised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner; and this is made an objection against their be- ing really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight. For, consider a person en- dued with any of these gifts, for instance, that of tongues ; it is to be supposed that he had the same power over this miraculous gift as he would have had over it had it been the effect of habit, of study, and use, as it ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner he did any other ; either regularly and upon prop- er occasions only, or irregularly and upon improper ones ; according to his sense of decency, and his character of 232 Analogy of Religion. LPart II prudence.* Where, then, is the objection -* Why if this miraculous power was indeed given to tl e world to propagate Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they should have been continually restrained and directed in the exercise of it ; that is, that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner or higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably evident that we are not judges in what degrees and manner it were to have been expected he should miraculously inter- pose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great influence, conferred only on per- sons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor is the instruc- tion and admonition naturally afforded us for the con- duct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it ; but * [Warburton, as quoted by Fitzgerald, points out the distinction between such supernatural endowments as the gift of tongues and oth- ers. " The power of healing or working miracles is, during the whole course of its operation, one continual arrest or diversion of the gen- eral laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fitting that this power should be given occasionally. But the speaking 7vith tongues, when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural power ; just as the free and perfect use of the members of the body, after they have been restored by miracles to the exercise of their nat- ural functions. Indeed, to have lost the gift of tongues after this temporary use of it would imply another miracle ; for it must have been by actual deprivation, unless we suppose the apostles were ir- rational organs through which divine sounds were conveyed. ... In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle ; and in speaking strange tongues, as the persons on whom the miracle is performed."] Chap. III.] Of CREDiBiLfXY of Revelation. 233 often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction. 10. One might go on to add, that there is a great re- semblance between the light of nature and of revelation in several other respects.* Practical Chris- other analogies tianity, or that faith and behavior which ren- SSr^"an?5t ders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvi- *°"' ous thing; like the common rules of conduct, with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the apostle calls ''^ going on unto perfec- tion,^' and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought and careful consideration. The hinderances too, of natural and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet under- stood, so, if it ever comes to be understood before the ^''restitution of all things,'' and without miraculous inter- positions, it must be in the same way as natural knowl- edge is come at, by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons at- tending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations scat- tered up and down it, which are overlooked and disre- garded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made; by thought- * [This passage marks the essential difference between the Protest- ant and Roman notions of developments. The Protestant are : i. Not developments of the faith, but of the wisdom, of the gospel ; whereas the Roman are developments of mere necessary articles of faith 2. The Protestant developments are arrived at by the free examina- tion of Scripture with all the helps of learning and reason ; whereas the Roman are principally drawn from tradition, and were elaborated in ages when the study of the original languages having been gener- ally abandoned, and sound principles of criticism but little known, the Church was destitute of adequate means for developing the sense of the sacred writings. — Fi tzokkalo.] 234 Analog V of Religion. [Part II. ful men's tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book which has been so long in the possession of man- kind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries in nat- ural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind several tliousand years before. And possibly it might be in- tended, that events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 11. It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a objttction. Nat- material rcspcct ; for that natural knowledge oMittie tap^o^r- is of little or no consequence. But I have ^'*""'- been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more common, restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest conse- quence to the ease and convenience of life. But sup- pose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from the whole constitution and course of nature; which shows that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out an analogy full to the point before us. 12. But it may be objected still further, and more Objection from generally— " The Scripture represents the %^oI V^' world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity Christianity. ^^ g^^ expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails ; in particular, to sup- ply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then, that so many ages should have been let pass before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so general impor Chap. III. J Of Credibility- of Revelation. 235 tance, was made known to mankind ? and then thai it should be made known to so small a part of them ? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very defi- cient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions ; in short, lie open to all the like objections, a? the light of nature itself .i*' (Chap, vi.) Without determining how far this in fact is so, I an- swer ; it is by no means incredible that it might be so, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases; for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural rem- edies, (Chap. V.) But remedies existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages ; are known but to few now ; probably many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Cir- cumstances seem often to make them very improper where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best remedies, too, when unskillful- ly, much more if dishonestly, applied, may produce new diseases ; and with the rightest application, the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not at all effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly : and the application of them, and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so disagreeable, that some will not submit to them ; and satisfy them- selves with the excuse that if they would, it is not cer- tain whether it would be successful. And many per- sons, who labor under diseases, for which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be al- ways, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the reme- 236 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. dies which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude that they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude that there could be no occasion for them ; that is, that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has pro- vided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, that the prin- ciples upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious. 13. And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not that reason is no judge of what is The province offered to US as being of divine revelation, of reason. Yov this would be to infer that we are una- ble to judge of any thing because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought, to judge not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evi- dence, of revelation. First. It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture ; that is, not whether it con- tains things different from what we should have expect- ed from a wise, just, and good Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated, but whether it con- tains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness ; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Script- ure, excepting such objections as are formed upon sup- positions which would equally conclude that the consti- tution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness ; which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to par- ticular persons, requiring actions which would be im- moral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 237 it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really have been, so : which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to im-- mutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit of treachery, in- gratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case, or of the action, in any of these in- stances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which re- quire only the doing an external action; for instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God : when this grant is revoked, they cease to, have any right at all in either; and when this revoca- tion is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without com- mand would be immoraf, must make an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require not vicious ac- tions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts ; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offenses; that is, from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against revelation, but against the whole notion of re- ligion as a trial : and against the general constitution of nature. 238 Analogy of Religion.^ [Part II, Secondly. Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence ; which shall be the subject of a following chapter. (Chap, vii.) 14. But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question upon which the truth of Christian- Weneedcon- ity depends, is scarce at all, what objections lions "agatost*' there are against its scheme, since there are proof. none against the morality of it ; but what ob- jections there are against its evidence : or, what proof there remains of it, after due allowa?ices made for the objections against that proof : because it has been shown, that the objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objec- tions against its evidence, are frivolous. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the gen- eral constitution of nature, experience shows not to be conclusive : and such, I think, is the whole way of ob- jecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolv- able into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think that the Author of nature would not act as we experience he does ; or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of object- ing will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further shown,* by distinct, particular, and full anal- ogies, in the constitution and course of nature. But it is to be remembered, that as frivolous as objec- tions of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with it- self, and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from * Chap, iv, latter part ; and v, vi. Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 239 them, and so of its truth ; because we are competent judges what might have been expected- from enthusiasm and political views.* * [In aiding that a revelation cannot have come from perfect wisdom, because there are in it things which seem to us foolishness we are arguing in the dark. But in arguing that it cannot have come from human fraud or enthusiasm we are dealing with matters which we may perfectly understand, because coming within the sphere of our daily experience. See the latter argument admirably pressed in the Archbishop of Dublin's Essay on the Peculiarities of the Chris- tian Religion, and on the Omissions of Scripture. — F.l 240 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. CHAPTER IV. OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CON- STITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. I T hath been now shown* that the analogy of nature renders it highly credible, beforehand, that suppos- ^u. -^ . u i^g 3. revelation to be made, it must contain Objections to be ° , ' expected. How many things very different from what we answered. i i i , -, , should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections ; and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather, precludes them. But it may be alleged that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very un- satisfactory way of obviating them ; because it doth not show at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and good ; much less that it is credible they are so. It will, therefore, be proper to show this distinctly, by applying to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer above f given to the like objections against the constitution of nature ; before we consider the particular analogies in the latter to the particular things objected against in the former. Now that which affords a sufificient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the consti- tution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; a scheme, in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which is carried on by general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also to be •* In the foregoing chapter. f Part i, chap, vii, to which this all along refers. Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 241 credible, that those things which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness ; nay, may be instances of them : and even that the con- stitution and government of nature may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity, then, be a scheme, and of the like kind, it is evident the like ob- jections against it must admit of the like answer. And, 2. I. Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our compre- hension. The moral government of God is ^^^ ^ .. ^, ° . . Christianity be exercised by gradually conductmg thmgs yond our com _ , . . , ° , prehension. SO, in the course of his providence, that every one, at length, and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of provi- dence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been car- rying on from the time the world came into its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah ; who is " to gather to- gether in one the children of God that are scattered abroad," (John xi, 52,) and establish "an everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness." 2 Pet. iii, 13. And in order to it, after various manifestations of things relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages ; — (for " the Spirit of Christ, which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them which have preached the gospel; which things the angels desire to look into," (i Pet. i, II, 12:) — after various dispensations, looking forward and preparatory to this final salvation, " in the fullness of time," when Infinite Wisdom thought fit, He, 16 242 Analogy of Religion. LPart II. " being in the form of God, made himself of no reputa- tion, and took upon him the form of" a servant, and was made in the likeness of men ; and being found in fash- ion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth ; and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Phil, ii, 6-11. Parts, likewise, of this economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good men ; the invisible government which Christ at present exer- cises over his Church ; that which he himself refers to in these words, " In my Father's house are many mansions — I go to prepare a place for you," (John xiv, 2 ;) and his future return to "judge the world in right- eousness," and completely re-establish the kingdom of God. " For the Father judgeth no man ; but hath com- mitted all judgment unto the Son ; that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father." John V, 22, 23. "All power is given unto him in heaven and in earth." Matt, xxviii, 18. "And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also him- self be subject unto him, that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." i Cor. xv, 25-28. Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system or scheme of things is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this " great mystery of godliness," (i Tim. iii, 16,) but what imme Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 243 diately runs up into something which shows us our ig- norance in it, as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the pur poses of judging and objecting, we know^ as little of it as of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against the per- fection of one as against the perfection of the other. (Page 172, etc.) 3. II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispen- sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish ends. And Means used to the observation of this furnishes us with the *«««'"P"«^^«nd«- same answer to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like kind against the constitution of nature. It shows the credibility, that the things objected against, how foolish (i Cor. i) soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of ac- complishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension. (Page 178.) 4. III. The credibility that the Christian dispensa- tion may have been, all along, carried on by general laws, (pages 179, 180,) no less than the A8ton&tnre,»o course of nature, may require to be more SriSd'^S^ by distinctly made out. Consider, then, upon ^*'°*™' '*'^'- what ground it is we say, that the whole common course of nature is carried on according to general foreordained laws. We know, indeed, several of the general laws of matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of liv- ing agents is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestiknce, become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws, by which 244 Analogy of Religion. 'Part II.. persons born into the world at such a time and place, are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws, by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the result of general laws and may be reduced into them. It is, then, but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can trace up the natural course of things before us to gen- eral laws. And it is only from analogy that we con- clude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them ; only from our seeing that part is so. It is from our finding that the course of nature, in some re- spects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we con- clude this of the rest. And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to con- clude yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and cred- ible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God's miraculous interpositions may have been all along, in like manner, hy general Xd^v^^s, of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be exerted at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons rather than others ; that the affairs of the world- being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should just at such a point have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions ; that these interpositions should be exactly in such de- grees and respects only : all this may have been by gen- eral laws. These laws are unknown, indeed, to us ; but no more unknown than the Uws from whence it is that some die as soon as they are born and others live to ex- Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 245 treme old age ; that one man is so superior to anothei in understanding ; with innumerable more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all ; though it is taken for granted they are as much reducible to general ones as gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations of Providence and mirac- ulous interpositions be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the course of nature, made known by reason and experience ; there is no more rea- son to expect that every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these general laws of miraculous inter- positions than that every exigence in nature should, by the general laws of nature ; yet there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions should be by general laws ; and that these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. 5. Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficien- cies and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known, and of such The scheme a certain particular kind in other respects, chn" tianfty ?m- Now we see no more reason why the frame rtoo(T%he*^ki- and course of nature should be such a ^'^'■^"<^«- scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible that the lat- ter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it is manifest that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature; so the credibility that it may have been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of nature, has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is before- hand credible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity as in nature ; that is, that Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered 246 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. by these observations concerning Christianity ; as the like objections against the frame of nature are answered by the like observations concerning the frame of nature. 6. The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of fact, (page 222, etc.,) having in general been obviated in the preceding chapter; and the same con- sidered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it having been obviated in this ; the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to show that the principal objec- tions, in particular against Christianity, may be answered by particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it togeth- er, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, " that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the Objection, God necessity of a long series of intricate means Sompeiiedtouse ^^ Order to accomplish his ends, the recov- to8?A?htepr ery and salvation of the world ; in like sort P®^- as men, for want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends directly, are forced to go round-about ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now every thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objec- tion against the truth of Christianity. For according to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed, it is certain there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension ; but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses we take merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are Chap. IV.J Of Christianity as a Scheme. 247 considered by the Author of nature, under the single notion of means and ends ; so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his re- gard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurd- ity in our very manner of conception concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory, arising from our ex- tremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natu- ral world, and government of it, is a scheme or system ; not a fixed, but a progressive one ; a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a great length of time before the ends they tend to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this ; and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners and character by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only suc- cessive, as it must be of necessity, but one state of our life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation for another ; and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one : infancy to childhood ; child- hood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men are impa- tient, and for precipitating things; but the Author of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations ; accomplishing his natural ends by slow, successive steps.* * [*• We shall find that all the great developments of the moral be- ing have resulted in the advantage of society, and that all the great developments of the social condition have raised the character of humanity. The movement takes its peculiar character from which- ever of the two facts predominates and lends its luster. " Sometimes, long intervals of time, a thousand transformations and obstacles, occur before the second fact is developed, and comes as it were to complete the civilization which the first had commenced 248 Analogy of Religion [Part II. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which from the nature of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the very same man- ner as in the dispensation of Christianity, making one thing subservient to another ; this to somewhat further ; and so on, through a progressive series of means which extend both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance as any part of the Christian dispensation. But close observation convinces us of the bond which unites them. The ways of Providence are not confined within narrow limits ; he hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the principle that he yesterday laid down ; he will draw it out in the lapse of ages, when the hour is come ; and even according to our reasoning, logic is not the less sure because it is slow. Providence is unconcerned as to time ; his march (if I may be allowed the simile) is like that of the fabulous deities of Homer through space ; he takes a step, and ages have elapsed. How long a time, how many events, before the regen- eration of the moral man by Christianity exercised its great and le- gitimate influence upon the regeneration of the social state ! It has succeeded, however ; who can at this day gai:nisay it ? " — Guizot's Lectures on Civilization in Europe^ Lecture I.] Chap. VJ Appointment of a Mediator. 249 CHAPTER V. OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY ,* THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMP- TION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. THERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Chris- tianity which has been more objected against than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it.* For, I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of The analogy of '' a Mediator behveen God and manr (i Tim. ff^wSrS ii, 5.) For we find all living creatures are *^^***o'"- brought into the world, and their life in infancy is pre- served, by the instrumentality of others ; and every sat- isfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. And how far his invisible govern- * [Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes when they judge of the divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus ; it would be contrary to his wisdom or his justice, etc. But while they make these peremptory assertions, they show themselves to be unac- quainted with the fundamental rules of their own science and with the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and then, from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus might they learn " the invisible things of God from those which are clearly seen," the things which are not accomplished from those which are. — Powell's Use and Abuse of Philosophy, quoted by Nfalcom.] 250 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. ment be, or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposition that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether as credible as the contrary. There is, then, no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a me diator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensa- tion; since we find by experience that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us, the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection here referred to is urged, not against media- tion in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all. 2. II. As we must suppose that the world is under the proper moral government of God, or in a state of relig- Punishmentwiu iou, before wc Can enter into consideration naturai^^coEfse* of the revealed doctrine concerning the re- quence. dcmption of it by Christ ; so that supposi- tion is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, im- plies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But as it is not in any sort to be supposed that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons for which it is fit future punish- ments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent misery should follow vice ; and as we are altogether in the dark how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what means ; there is no ab- surdity in supposing, it may follow in a way analogous to that, in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present ; poverty, sickness, infamy, untime- ly death by diseases, death from the hands of civil jus- Chap. V.l Appointment of a Mediator. 251 tice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punish- ment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence, from God's original constitution of the world ; from the nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us ; or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a preci- pice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down ; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, sup- pose ; in the way of natural consequence of this, with- out help, perishes.* 3. Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the fu- ture punishments of wickedness may be in the way of * There is a clear distinction between right and wrong, and inno- cence and guilt. Right and wrong depend on unchangeable rela- tions, and consequent obligations : while innocence and guilt depend on conscious and avoidable violations of God's law. Obedience to God's laws, whether intentional or not, whether rendered by a Chris- tian or an infidel, brings naturally a degree of favor and benefit, just as cases of disobedience cause evil and suffering. Whether rashly and foolishly or ignorantly a man approaches a precipice and falls over, he will suffer and perhaps lose his life. If he takes poison intention- ally or ignorantly he will suffer and die. This natural relation between obedience or disobedience of law and consequences, good or evil, is readily perceived in ordinary life ; but the same natural connection exists between willful sin and pun- ishment, present and future. In no sense is this punishment merely arbitrary, which in any individual case the Divine will might suspend or remove. The principles of the Divine government that connect happiness with virtue and misery with vice were established before the existence of the sinner, and are as unchangeable as the character of Jehovah. God could as readily send a sinless archangel to perdition as free an unrepenting sinner from the consequences of sin and raise him to heaven. Both are impossible. In this view we can see how God consistently, with tenderness and earnestness, entreats man to turn from his evil way, and yet when he refuses leaves him to the consequences of guilt. In Christ the law is satisfied and made honorable, and in the ap- pointed way man may be saved, but God cannot save him otherwise, 252 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. natural consequence ; as if this were taking the execu- . , mv tion of justice out of the hands of God and Objection. Then . . ■', nature, not God, giving it to nature. But they should re- oxecutes justice. , , , . member that when thmgs come to pass ac- cording to the course of nature, this does not hindei them from being his doing who is the God of nature ; and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice which are known to be natural; and which must be called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must be admitted that the future punishment of wick- edness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it comes, for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punish- ments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there were a diff"erence, it is allowable in the present case to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or ac- cording to some general laws of government already established in the universe. 4. III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in Naturaiescape the constitution of nature, or appointments pShiSr^of of Providence : the provision which is made ^°®- that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions should not always actually follow ; or that such bad consequences as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented, should in certain degrees be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine that the world might have been so constituted as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 253 we find the Author of nature permits it. Bui then he has provided reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect reme- dies for it, after some pains and difficulties ; reliefs and remedies even for that evil which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and which, in the course of nature, would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not rejected; by another's coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great deal themselves toward preventing the bad consequences of their follies ; and more may be done by themselves, together with the assistance of others, their fellow-creatures; which assistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, it should tws naturally have been no more in human power to have Sve^to^thelS- prevented that naturally consequent misery, *'*"* in any instance, than it is in all ; no one can say wheth- er such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good. But that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our fol- lies; this may be called mercy, or compassion, in the original constitution of the world ; compassion as dis- tinguished from goodness in general. And the whole known constitution and course of things affording us in- stances of such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of nature to hope, that, however ruinous the 254 ' Analogy of Religion. [Part II. natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God's government over the universe, yet provis- ion might be made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following ; at least from following universally and in all cases. 5. Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubt- Presumption ful. The generality of mankind are so far rap^yet^imd ^^om having that awful sense of things, forhopa which the present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension, or thought at all, about this matter, any way; and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us ob- serve, what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the conse- quences of irregular and disorderly behavior ; even of such rashness, willfulness, neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in propor- tion as the irregularity is so. And there is no compari- son between these irregularities and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; if there be any thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God which mankind have in fact introduced ; to blaspheme the sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his authority ; to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. Add that the effects of vice, in the present world, are often ex- treme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death : and upon putting all this together it will appear, that as no one can say in what degree fatal the unprevented con- sequences of vice may be, according to the general rule Chap. VJ Appointment of a Mediator. 255 of Divine government ; so it is by no means intuitively certain how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal consequences pre- vented. Yet, 6. IV. There seems no probability that any thing we could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent we can in no them ; prevent their following, or being inflict- JeL ^SS- ed. But one would think, at least, it were im- q'^«°<**- possible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted; and therefore cannot know whether any thing we could do would make such an alteration as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are, nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented ; and therefore can in no sort say whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy of na- ture, or providence. For though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon in this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary as- sertion, without any kind of evidence urged by way of objection against a doctrine the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then: people rum their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases up- on themselves by excess; they incur the penalties ot civil laws, and surely civil government is natural ; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the natural conse- 256 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. quences of them ? On the contrary, men's natural abil- ities of helping themselves are often impaired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several accounts and in different ways: assistance which they would have had no occasion for had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced them- selves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery and retrieving their affairs. Now since this is our case, con- siderirg ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the' natu- ral government of God, which, however, has a great deal moral in it ; why is it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more general and future interest depending ? If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnox- ious to the future punishment which God has annexed to vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the time to come, may be — not useless, God forbid — but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment, or to put us in the condition which we should have been in had we preserved our innocence.* And though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet * [Mr. Newman notices a distinction between the facts of revela- tion and its principles, and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with the latter than the former. " The revealed facts are special and singular from the nature of the case, but the re. vealed principles are common to all the works of God ; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the principles discussed in them will be the same, and form a connecting link between them. In this identity of principle lies the analogy of natural and revealed religion in Butler's sense of the word. The incar- nation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature ; the doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in nature." — Essay on Developments, quoted by Malcom.] Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 257 it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what ° ' , . Reformation is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, gives no hope of to suppose that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad conse- quences of having done evil, or all the punishment an- nexed to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the effi- cacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what man- kind had rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recov- er what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon in oppo- sition to Christianity ; yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this no- tion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind. Upon the whole, then; had the laws, the general laws, of God's government been permitted to operate without any interposition in our behalf, the future pun- ishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have followed, not- withstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it. Now, 7. V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms every doubting fear which could enter into the pardontaught heart of man concerning the future unpre- ^y™^eJ**^on. vented consequence of wickedness ; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin ; (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, yet it is in nowise contrary to it;) teaches us, too, that the rules of divine govemment are such as not to admit of pardon immediately and di- rectly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it : but then teaches at the same time, what nature might 17 258 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. justly have hoped, that the moral government of the uni- verse was not so rigid, but that there was room for an in- terposition to avert the fatal consequence of vice ; which, therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Reve- lation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's more general government, no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, are com- passionate, (page 252, etc.,) as well as good, in the more general notion of goodness ; and that he hath mercifully provided that there should be an interposition to pre- vent the destruction of human kind, whatever that de- struction unprevented would have been. " God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that who- soever believeth," not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, " that whosoever believeth in him should not perish," (John iii, 16;) gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the world as he affords particu- lar persons the friendly assistance of their fellow- crea- tures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies ; in the same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God " loved us, and gave himself for us," with a love which he him self compares to that of human friendship ; though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He inter- posed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners which God had appointed should otherwise have been execut- ed upon them : or in such a manner, as to prevent thai punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had t not been for such interposition.* * It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory read- er, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said in Chap. VJ Appointment of a Mediator. 259 If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, I atn persuaded, will entirely remove that ap- objection, is pearance. For were we to suppose the J^ Kfb^S constitution of things to be such as that the ^^*®^ whole creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat which God had appointed should be in order to prevent that ruin ; even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But still it may be thought that this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries and the extreme wickedness of the world ; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and endeavor to amend ; but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupi this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemp- tion, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted witl it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here ; questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rash- ness, contrary ways. For instance : Whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government ? And, had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses, in his prayer,* asserts repentance was not appointed ? The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous • and neither of them can properly be answered without going upon that infinitely ausurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps, the very inquiry, What 7vould have followed if God had not done as he has ? may have in it some very great impropriety ; and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conception of things. • The Pny«r of Mknasses Ib one of the spocryphal books of the Old Testament M hich next precedes " Maoosbees.'' 26o Analogy of Religion. LPart II. with age : that heathen moralists thought the present state to be a state of punishment ; and what might be added, that the earth, our habitation, has the appear- ance of being a ruin ; whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this being the fact; how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct conception of, the occa- sions and circumstances of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout, and particularly analogous to what we see, in the daily course of natural providence ; as the recovery of the world, by the interposition of Christ, has been shown to be so in general. 8. VI. The particular manner in which Christ inter- posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as .T ^^ . .. Mediator, in the largest sense, behueen God llowChnstin- , ° ' . tciposes as a and man^ is thus represented to us in the Scripture : " He is the light of the world ;" * the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense : he is a propitiatory sacrifice ;t the " Lamb of God;"t and as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High-priest. § And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand, in the Old Testa- ment, under the same characters of a priest, and an ex- piatory victim. II And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle, on the contrary, affirms, that * John i, and viii, 12. f Rom. iii, 25, and v, II ; I Cor. v, 7 ; Eph. v, 2 ; i John ii, 2 Matt, xxvi, 28. X John i, 29, 36, and throughout the Book of Revelation. § Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. I Isa liii ; Dan. ix, 24 ; Psa. ex, 4- Chap. V.J Appointment of a Mediator. 261 " the law was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things," (Heb. x, i ;) and that the " priests that offer gifts according to the ^aw — serve un- to the example and shadow of heavenly things as Moses WIS admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see," saith he, " that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount," (Heb. viii, 4, 5 ;) that is, the Levitical priest- hood was a shadow of the priesthood of Cfiiist, in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was accord- ing to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the orig- inals : of the former of which, the Levitical priesthood was a type ; and of the latter, the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final atonement to be made by. the blood of Christ ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and determinate than the following passage : *' It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore, when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering " — that is, of bulls and of goats — " thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me — Lo, I come to do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." Heb. x, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. And to add one passage more of the like kind : '* Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin;" that is, with- out bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it ; without having our iniquities again laid upon him, without being any more a ^in-offering : — * Unto them that look for him shall he appear the sec- ond time, without sin unto salvation." Heb. ix, 28. Noi do the inspired writers at all confine themselves to this 262 Analogy of Religion. LPart II. manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for us additional to, and beyond mere instruction^ example, and government, in great variety of expression : " That Jesus should die for that nation," the Jews, " and not for that nation only, but that also," plainly by the effi- cacy of his death, " he should gathei together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad:"* that " he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust :" f that "he gave his life — himself — a ransom:" J that "we are bought — bought with a price :"§ that "he redeemed us with his blood : redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us:" || that "he is our ad- vocate, intercessor, and propitiation:"!^ that "he was made perfect (or consummate) through sufferings ; and being thus made perfect, he became the author of salva- tion :"** that " God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, by the death of his Son by the cross ; not imputing their trespasses unto them:" ft and, lastly, that " through death he destroyed him that had the power of death." H Christ, then, having thus " humbled himself, and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross, God also hath highly exalted him, and giv- en him a name which is above every name ; hath given all things into his hands; hath committed all judgment unto him ; that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father." §§ For, "worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, * John xi, 51, 52. f I Pet. iii, 18. X Matt. XX, 28 ; Mark x, 45 ; I Tim. ii, 6. § 2 Pet. ii, I ; Rev. xiv, 4 ; i Cor. vi, 20. I I Pet. i, 19 ; Rev. v, g ; Gal. iii, 13. •| Heb. vii, 25 ; i John ii, I, 2. ** I[eb. ii, 10 ; v, 9. ff 2 Cor. V, 19 ; Rom. v, lo ; Eph. ii, 16. Xt Heb. ii, 14. See also a remarkable passage In the book of Job, xxxiii, 24. §§ Phil, ii, 8, 9 ; John iii, 35, and v. 22, 23. Chap. VJ Appointment of a Mediator. 263 and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing! And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever." Rev. v, 12, 13. 9 These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief parts of Christ's office, as mediator between God and man, so far, I mean., as the nature of this his office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads. First. He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet : "that Prophet that should come into the Christ aa a world," (John vi, 14,) to declare the divine ^^p'^®^ will. He published anew the law of nature which men- had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught man- kind — taught us authoritatively — to " live soberly, right- eously, and godly, in this present world," in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of testimony. (Page 195.) He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be worshiped, the efficacy of repentance, and the re- wards and punishments of a future life. Thus he was a prophet, in a sense in which no other ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect '* example, that we should follow his steps." 10. Secondly. He has a "kingdom, which is not of this world." He founded a Church, to be to Christ as a mankind a standing memorial of religion ^^^* and invitation to it; which he promised to be with al- ways, even to the end. He exercises an invisible gov- ernment over it, himself, and by his Spint ; over that part of it which is militant here on eartii, a government of discipline, " for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of his brxlv ; till we all come in the unity of the 264 Analogy of Religion. [Part II faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the full- ness of Christ." (Eph. iv, 12, 13.) Of this Church, all persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For these he is gone to pre- pare a place y and will come again to receive them unto him- self ^ that where he is^ there they may be also ; and reign with him for ever and ever, (John xiv, 2, 3 ; Rev. iii, 21, and xi, 15;) and likewise "to take vengeance on them that know not God and obey not his gospel." 2 Thess. i, 8. Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objec- tions but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. 11. Lastly. Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacri- christ a& a ficc, and made atonement for the sins of the ^^'^^ world; which is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most other nations, from tradition, whose original probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated both occasionally and at the returns of stated times, and made up great part of the external religion of man- kind. " But now once in the end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." Heb. ix, 26. And this sacrifice was in the highest de- gree, and with the most extensive influence, of that effi- cacy for obtaining pardon of sin which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and with regard to some persons. 12. How, and in what particular way, it had this effi- How Christ's cacy, there are not wanting persons who Sf te nSfSl have endeavored to explain ; but I do not plained. ^^^ ^\^^^ tj^g Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the Chap. V.] Appointmevt of a Mediator. 265 manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made, that is, pardon to be obtained by sacrinces. And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this mat- ter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left some- what in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be. if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for want of further informa- tion, unless he can show his claim to it. Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized ; others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his in- struction, example, and government of the Church. Whereas, the doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- dered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal lifej not only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; but moreover, that he put them into this capacity of salva- tion by what he did and suffered for them ; put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon which it is offered on our part, without disputing how it was procured on his. For, 13, VII. Since we neither know by what means pun- ishment in a future state would have followed wicked- ness in this ; nor in what manner it would objections have been inflicted, had it not been pre- gSSaSlb- vented; nor all the reasons why its inflic- *°^- tion would have been needful ; nor the particular na- ture of that state of happiness which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples; and since we are ignorant 266 Analogy of Religion. [Part 1 1. how far any thing which we could do would, alone and of Itself, have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary to obtain those ends ; to pre- vent that future punishment, and bring mankind to the final happiness of their nature. And for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of which it consists : of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine Providence in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that to object against the expediency or useful- ness of particular things revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than this absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any partic- ular part of Christ's mediatorial office revealed in Script- ure till it can be shown positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreasonable. 14. And there is one objection made against the sat- isfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive r.^. ^ r. . kind : that the doctrine of his being appoint Objection. God , o rtr represented as ed to suffer for the sins of the world repre- causing the in- y^ ^ i • • itc Qocent to sutFer sents God as bemg mdmerent whether he with the guilty. . , , , . , punished the mnocent or the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all such objections, and (though it is most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against God's Chap. V ■ Appointment of a Mediator. 267 M hole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence, in the government of the world, that is, against the whole scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion, as against Christianity. For the world is a constitution, or system, whose parts have a mutual reference to each other ; and there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us in various ways to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same abjection as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely great- er importance of that appointment of Christianity which is objected against, does not hinder, but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural providence than against Christianity ; because under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others ; whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The world's being under the righteous government of God does indeed imply that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his personal de- serts: and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine gov- ernment. But during the progress, and for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolute- ly necessary Men, by their follies, run themselves into extreme distress ; into difficulties which would be abso- lutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands by the law of na- ture that we afford them this assistance, in many cases 268 Analogy of Religion. [Part II, where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another ; and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and laws of nature, which come under our notice : and be- ing familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So tnat the reason of their insisting upon objections of tne foregoing kind against the satisfaction of Christ is either that they do not consider God's settled and uniform ap- pointments as his appointments at all, or else they for- get that vicarious punishment is a providential appoint- ment of every day's experience : and then, from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of nature, or divine government over the world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption — its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures from sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is, I think, plainly unanswerable : though I am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the case. But without taking this into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, that this objection is not an objection against Christian- ity, but against the whole general constitution of nature And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, or, considering it as it is, an objection against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment can- not be necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be so ; though he must own that the nature of the case is such as renders him incapable Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 269 of judging whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be necessary though it were so. 15. It is indeed a matter of great patience to reason- able men to find people arguing in this manner, object- ing against the credibility of such particular objectionB things revealed in Scripture, that they do ^Sra^cea°nS not see the necessity or expediency of them. *o"*^^®- For though it is highly right, and the most pious exer- cise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations; yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue, from our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is yet greater when they are urged, as usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous, or like, to those natural dispensations of Providence which are matter of experience. Let reason be kept to ; and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripfture, in the name of God, be given up ; but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the neces- sity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reason- ing ; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not actively con- cerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 16. 'Lastly. That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole analogy of nature, should teach us not to ex- pect to have the like information concern- Equal infoma ing the Divine conduct as concerning our the" DTvtae^ con- own duty. God instructs us by experi- Jjf^ no't'^u>''be ence, (for it is not reason, but experience, «*p®«^*^ which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in such and such manners ; and by this he directs us how we are to behave 270 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural providence which we are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to rev- elation. The doctrine of a Mediator between God and man, against which it is objected that the expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done on God's part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of this gracious dispen- sation, is another subject, in which none can complain for want of information. The constitution of the world and God's natural government over it is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first, he has given men all things pertaining to life ; and under the other, all things pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts of Chris- tianity ; though if there were, surely a Divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fafct is, that the rea- sons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of him, this part of the religion of the gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us. (Page 201, etc.) Chap. VI. J Revelation not Universal. 271 K CHAPTER VI. OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION ; AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT. IT has been thought by some persons, that if the evi- dence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against it; because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evi- dence. And the objection against revelation, from its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of great weight. Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing the suppositions on which they are founded, which are really such as these : — that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our particular ad- vantage ; and also, that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all : suppositions which we find contradicted, not by a few instances in God's natural government of the world, but by the general analogy of mature together. 2. Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be put upon -vf© act on considering what that evidence, indeed, is, den^^' inljjr. which they act upon with regard to their t*nt matters, temporal interests. For it is not only extremely diffi- 272 Analogy of Religion. [Part II, cult, but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health ; any of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained, what they most eagerly desired. Numberless, too, are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even probably disappoint the best concerted schemes ; and strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but which seem over- balanced by reasons on the other side ; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little probability of it. Lastly. Every one observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearance of things ; and this danger must be greatly increased if there be a strong bias within, sup- pose from indulged passion, to favor the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists ; what are the most probable means of attaining it ; and whether those means will eventually be successful. And numberless instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding ; and to make such provision for themselves as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain, acknowl- edged probability is, that they never shall. 3. Then those who think the objection against reve- AnaiogyBhows lation, from its light not being universal, to veSty fs'^^i be of weight, should observe that the Author objection. Qf nature, in numberless instances, bestows Chap, vr.f Revelation not Universal. 273 that upon some which he does not upon others^ who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed, he appears to bestow all his gifts, with the most promiscuous varie- t-y, among creatures of the same species : health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all external advan- tages. And as there are not any two men found of ex- actly like shape and features, so, it is probable, there are not any two of an exactly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world ; and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural government. As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal, and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world, at different times, so likewise, at different times, both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived dur- ing the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their religion than those had, who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period and the coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than what we have now. They had also a strong pre- sumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater force in way of argument than many think, of which we have very little remaining ; I mean, the pre- sumptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic history and the state of the world, and of ("Ihristianity. 18 2/4 Analogy of Religion. LPart II. And further : if we were to suppose the evidence which some have of religion to amount to little more than seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life ; others, to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty and others severally, to have all the intermediate de- grees of religious light and evidence which lie between these two — if we put the case, that for the present it was intended revelation should be no more than a small light in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwith- standing it, with ignorance and darkness ; that certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really partook of it should not discern from whence it originally came ; that some, in a nearer situation to it, should have its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted; and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet, that even to these it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place : all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct of providence in the distri- bution of its other blessings. If the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at all from the Scripture ; as many ages and countries in the hea- then world : that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to their con- sideration ; and the ancient Persians and modern Mo- hammedans may possibly be instances of people in a situ- ation somewhat like to this : that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 275 of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of some thoughtful men in most of those nations who call them- selves Christian ; and lastly^ that others have had Chris- tianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and Churches of civil and of Christian liberty ; but, however, that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regu- late their life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it ; I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation in their moral and religious capacity, there would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty — in all these varieties and supposed disadvantages of some in com- parison of others, respecting religion — but may be par- alleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensa- tions of providence at present, and considering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity. 4. Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really keep in mind au to be judged that every one shall be dealt equitably with ; SXtfwie'dffe instead of forgetting this, or explaining it *°^»^"'*y- away, after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this vari- ous economy of providence, would be lost, if we would keep in mind that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be required of any one than what might have been equitably expected of him, from the zj^ Analogy of Religion. [Part II. circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might have been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances : that is, in Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted "according to what he had, not according to what he had not." 2 Cor. viii, 12. This, however, doth not by any means imply that all persons condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence's designing to place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people, in matters of othei knowledge, should not endeavor to learn, or should not be instructed. 5. It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which dis- , posed the Author of nature to make differ- Divereity in ^ knowledge not ent kmds and orders of creatures, disposed more unreason- , . , .,.,,., able than in ca- him also to placc crcatures of like kinds pacitiea. . ,.„ . . - , , in different situations; and that the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of dif- ferent moral capacities, disposed him also to place crea- tures of like moral capacities in different religious situ- ations : and even the same creatures, in different periods of their being. And the account or reason of this, is also most probably the account why the constitution of things is such as that creatures of moral natures or ca- pacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to mature age. 6. What, in particular, is the account or reason of The reason of th-csc things, wc must be greatly in the dark these things is -^ i ^i. ^ i t^^i that of oar ig- wcrc it Only that we know so very little even foThem""^"*'''* of our own case. Our present state may Chap. VI. ] Revelation not Universal. 277 possibly be the consequence of somewhat past, which we are wholly ignorant of; as it has a reference to some- what to come, of which we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety : and so complicated a one as this world, very great variety. So that were revela- tion universal, yet from men's different capacities of un- derstanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their different educations, and other external circum- stances, and from their difference of temper and bodily constitution ; their religious situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind, are placed in this condition of igno- rance, must be supposed also the true account of our further ignorance in not knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. But the following practical reflections may deserve the seri- ous consideration of those persons who think the cir- cumstances of mankind, or their own, in the fore-men- tioned respects, a ground of complaint. First. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the religious sense : as it gives scope for a ° , . . ° ^ This want of virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect, of their %ht a part of ,. . . . to » our trial. understanding, m examining or not examin- ing into that evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given why we may not be in a state of moral pro- bation with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obe- 2/8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. dient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus con- vinced, set him about an examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts; and that in the latter state, his examination would be with an impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, propor- tionable to what his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance, when of- fered to men's consideration, is, before a distinct con- viction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and disso- luteness as neglect of religious practice after such con- viction ; so active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper as is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference ; that a convic- tion of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to premises : this as much constitutes religious probation — as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior — as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. 8. Secondly. It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so much attended to, that if, upon considera- Doubtftii evi- tion of religion, the evidence of it should ilra'^^inmS pro" sccm to any persons doubtful, in the highest bation. supposable degree ; even this doubtful evi- dence will, however, put them into a general state of proba- tion^ in the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt whether such a person had not done nim the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person ; no one who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence could possi- bly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to such persons, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 279 it is as just to say that certainty and doubt are the same as to say the situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or pru- dence, as he would be were he certain he had received no favor from such person, or that he no way depended upon him And thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men should be little more than that they are given to see the system of Christian- ity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible, this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical ap- prehension that it may be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise, for religious suspense and de- liberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true, does as really lay men under obligations as a full con- viction that it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the important subject ; to preserve at- tentively upon their minds a general implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may be had, from whatever side it comes, and induce them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness, for this the very nature of the case for- bids; and to treat with highest reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, depends. This behavior, and an active en- deavor to maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons who complain of the doubtfulness of religion ; is what they are under the most proper obligations to; and such behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to im- prove in them, that character which the practice of all 28o Analogy of Religion. LPart II the several duties of religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of and has a tendency to improve in others ; others, I say, to whom God has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in general that whoever will weigh the matter thor- oughly, may see there is not near so much difference as is commonly imagined between what ought in reason to be the rule of life to those persons who are fully con- vinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations will be in various degrees; but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 9. It is to be observed, further, that from a character of understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, „ , -. .V some persons have it in their power to do ReUgious doubt . _ , *^, , , *^ doea not lessen mfinitely more harm or good by settmg an responsibiUty. / a A ^^ example of profaneness and avowed disre- gard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness, than they can do by acting well or ill in all the common in- tercourses among mankind ; and consequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior which they may easily foresee is of such importance, and in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong ; even admit- ting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. 10. The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just and true, is that doubting necessarily Doubtimpiies implies some degree of evidence for that of evidence. which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced which should accidentally come Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 281 into his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. And though, in the case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say that we had no evidence at all for either side ; yet that situation of things which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will hap- pen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is such evidence on both sides of a question (In- troduction) as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed, in all these cases there is no more evi- dence on the one side than on the other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for either than for the truth of a number of facts which come into one's thoughts at random. And thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evi- dence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty high- er still. Any one who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many in- termediate degrees as there are between that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these de- grees of evidence with any sort of exactness, yet in pro- portion as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an imperfection in the moral character not to be influenced in practice by a lowei degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in the understanding not to discern it. And as, in all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as :he higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of understanding ; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in practice by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and hon- esty. And as in proportion to defects in the under- standing, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evi- 282 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. dence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases ; so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these things it must follow, ♦ that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obliga- tions before-mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behavior. II. Thirdly. The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of complaint than the Difficulties "^ . ° . . In evidence no external circumstauccs of temptation which more a cause of ,.„,.. complaint than Others are placed in, or than difficulties in in practice. . - . _ _ ., . . - the practice of it after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improv- ing state of discipline (part i, chap, v) than it would be otherwise ; as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive ex- ercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appear- ing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any consideration at all ; and therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle seri- ously to consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for but for such temptation. And the sip- posed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might see : and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, Chap. VIJ Revelation not Universal. 283 that these hopes are uncertain : in like manner as the common temptation tc many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity ; that is the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruir, On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful ; and in practicing conscientiously all virtue, though under some uncertainty whether the govern- ment in the universe may not possibly be such as that vice may escape with impunity. And in general, temp- tation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong, and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such, and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and im- provement of virtue, as well as probation of it, in the other senses of that word. (Part i, chap, iv, and page 150.) So that the very same account is to be given why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner as to require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps pain- ful exercise of their understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances as that the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains; or why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allurements should be per- mitted to afford matter of temptation to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds, as why others should be exercised with the latter in such very 284 Analogy of Religion. [Pari II high degrees as some have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 12. Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence Speculative dif- ^^ religion is involved may make even the ficuitiesto some principal part of some persons' trial. For the chief trial. , , • . as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to injustice or unre- strained pleasure ; or to live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses ; so there are other per- sons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who not only see, but have a general practical feeling that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not being the objects of sense ; and who, from their natural constitution of body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small temp- tations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course of life. Now when these latter per- sons have a distinct, full conviction of the truth of relig- ion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the prac- tice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant violence to their own minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to crea- tures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give some fur- ther manifestation (page 151) what is their moral char- acter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious situa- tions in which men are placed, what constitutes — what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes— the probation, in all Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 285 senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved ; and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circum- stances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief diffi- culty, with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it is known, for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the contrary, but to some the principal ex- ercise is recollection, and being upon their guard against deceits — the deceits, suppose, of those about them — against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is attention, in order to inform them- selves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act. 13. But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition that men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their neglects or prejudices ; it ^. . , , ° ° ^ ^ . ' Dissatiafaction must be added, on the other hand, m all the feuit of the 1 11 ^ f objector. common reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires should be added, that such dis- satisfaction possibly may be owing to those — possibly may be men's own fault. For, If there are any persons who never set themselves heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion ; if there are any who secretly wish it may not prove true, and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to them ; these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider thi? subject usually in the way of mirth and sport ; if they 286 Analogy of Religion. LP art II. attend to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real things intend- ed by them, (for signs often can be no more than inad- equately expressive of the things signified,) or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth, why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeking that evidence which really is seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding in matters of common specula- tion and practice which more fair and attentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness or from the grosser vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, ad- minister occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to im- pair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, care- lessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things ; and they may^ in like manner, and perhaps in some further provi- dential manner, with respect to moral and religious sub- jects ; may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture* does de * Dan. xii, lo. See also Isa. xxix, 13, 14 ; Matt, vi, 23, and xi 25, and xiii, II, 12 ; John iii, 19, and v, 44 ; I Cor. ii, 14, and ? Cor iv, 4 ; 2 Tim. iii, 13 ; and that affectionate, as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these, and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis essct Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 287 clare, that every one shall not understand. And it makes no difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass; whether the evidence of Christianity was, orig- inally and with design, put and left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it, and that honest-minded persons should, or whether it comes to pass by any other means. 14. Further : the general proof of natural religion and of Christianity does, I think, lie level to p^of levei to common men: even those the greatest part «>™"on™e"- of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing, for themselves and their families, the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life ; those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of ask- ing after proof or attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced, upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world ; and they feel themselves to be of a moral na- ture, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity Lydius ad quern ingenia sanabilia explorarentur . De Ver,, R. C, lib. 2, toward the end. [We give the passage from e things we perceive by our senses, and by demonstration ; but only so far as is sufficient to procure the belief, and persuade a man of the thing, who is not obstinately bent against it : So that the gospel is, as it were, a touchstone, to try men's honest dispositions by." — Dr. Crooks.] 288 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing com- pletions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and maybe run up into difficulties; which, however, persons who aie capable, not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable also of seeing through ; that is, not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature ; but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot be the business .of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from the nature of it re- quires some knowledge as well as time and attention to see how the evidence comes out upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for grant- ed they are of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received them, or by often retailing of them come to see, or fancy they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves for such an exami- nation, with a competent degree of knowledge, or will not give that time and attention to the subject which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such infor- mation ; in this case they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error ; in the same way as they must with regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them. 15. But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a Chap. VIJ Revelation not Universal. 289 servant, he would take care that they should always bear the certain marks who they came from, ob. The ev<- and that their sense should be always plain, J^^aL'^as the so as that there should be no possible doubt, master^^toaMrv* if he could help it, concerning the author- *°'' ity or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is the governor of the world; and particu- larly, that he does not afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experi- ence abundantly shows. However, there is a full an- swer to this objection, from the very nature of religion. For the reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done ; that is, he regards only the external ev;nt, or the thing's being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole of moral- ity and religion, consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action ; that is, only to desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not al- ways give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus that we should act virtuously in such given circum- stances ; not that we should be brought to act so by his changing of our circumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be con- sidered only as conditional — that if we act so and so, we 19 290 Analogy of Religion. [Part TI. shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished ; of which conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole con- stitution of it aifords most certain instances. 16. Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation : Probation im- and the Credibility of our being at all in K ttS^'tttags s"^^ ^ state being admitted, there seems no objected to. peculiar difficulty in supposing our proba- tion to be, just as it is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems no pretense, from the reason of the things to say that the trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of miscar- riage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty ; and since the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in practice ; men's moral probation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impar- tial consideration, and afterward whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we find by experience^ is frequently our probation, (pages 77, 282, etc.,) in our temporal capacity. For the information which we want, with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means al- ways given us of course, without any care of our own And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret prejudici^s ; and also to the deceit of others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetu- ally doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 291 and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and ventur- ing upon extravagant courses, because it is doubtful what will be the consequences, are often naturally, that is, providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct oc- casioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. 17. Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to mpny good men. But if the persons for whose sake they are ^ ^ _, '■ ^ We acton evi- made think so ; persons who object as above, denceiowerthan , , «. ,1 1 1- • 1 probable. and throw off all regard to religion under pretense of want of evidence ; I desire them to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion, and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of skepticism does in all reason require } It ought to be forced upon the reflec- tion of these persons that our nature and condition nec- essarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable ; to guard not only against what we ful- ly believe will, but also against what we think it sup- posable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credibie that possibly we may succeed in them. 292 Analogy of Religion. LPart II CHAPTER VII. OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.* '' I ^HE presumptions against revelation, and objections ^ J. against the general scheme of Christianity, and Proof aside Particular things relating to it, being re- and" r™hec^^* moved, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we have for the truth of it : chiefly in order to see what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections against it ; or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain, natural rule of judgment and of action in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before us. Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the * [At the place where we now find ourselves, Butler makes a transi- tion in his argument : he passes from the subject-matter of Christian- ity to its evidence. He has hitherto been employed in removing the objections against Christianity itself by the argument of analogy, and by the same engine he now proceeds to remove the objections that may be leveled against the proof of it. The two objects are altogeth- er distinct. ... In the discharge of this second service, he is not called upon to propound very fully, or in the way of positive vindi- cation, the evid( nces of Christianity. He adverts to them ; he states what they are ; he even renders a passing homage to their authority and force ; but his proper task is to do by them what he had before done by the subject-matter of revelation, that is, clear away the ob- jections, not now against the doctrine of Christianity, but against the proof of it, and that by showing that the similar or analogous objec- tions in other cases are not admitted to have the validity which, in the case of the evangelical story, the opj onents of the gospel would fain allow to them. — Chalmers.] Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 293 head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs ; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but al- ways to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art — a re- sult from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall, therefore, yfrj/, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appear- ing completion of prophecy, and consider what anal- ogy suggests in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And secondly^ I shall endeavor to give 5ome account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument : this being the kind of proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty concerning common facts alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially ques- tions relating to conduct. 2. Firsts I shall make some observations upon the di- rect proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections alleged ^**^**'' against it. I. Now the following observations, relating to the his torical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, appear to be of great weight. I. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings 294 Analogy of Religion. [Part II of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same histor- ical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles as of the common matters related in them.* This in- deed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other his torians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim ; though they had interspersed mir- acles in their works, at proper distances, and upon prop- er occasions. These might have animated a dull rela- tion, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account would naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be given why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in plain, unadorned narratives; and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same footing of historical evidence. Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an ac count of miracles fully sufficient to prove Scripture quot- ... jd from age to the truth of Christianity, are quoted as gen- uine, from the age in which they are said to be written down to the present: and no other parts * [This was clearly observed and distinctly stated by Lord Boling- broke: "The miracles in the Bible are not like those in Livy, de- tached pieces that do not disturb the civil history, which goes on very well without them. But the miracles of the Jewish historian are in- timately connected with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole history is founded in them ; it con- sists of little else ; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of nothing." — Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, vol. iii, p. 279. The state of the case seems to be, that the gravity, distinctness, and good sense of the Scripture histories, in relating civil affairs, prove those narratives not to be mythical, that is, not to be the product of imagination. And the intimate connection of the miraculous with the natural facts, proves that the former are not merely introduced for the sake of ornament. — F.] Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianity. 295 of them, material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And as common history, when called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged ; and as fhe common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed ; 30 likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general. For the establish- ment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of these religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events, of which no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and di- rect account of this history, how it came to be written, and to be received in the world as a true history, is, that 't really is so; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now though an account not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be and often is, the true account of a matter ; yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to his- torical evidence, prove nothing but that historical evi- dence is not demonstrative. 3. Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that the Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history till some- scripture nis- what positive be alleged sufficient to invali- Jniuediiutav^- date it. But no man will deny the conse- '***^' quence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none ; 296 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. even though the evidence now mentioned for its author- ity were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, if there be any; or general incredibility in the things related, or incon- sistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is that it is an authentic history, it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. And the following observations, in support of these, and co- incident with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. 4. 2. The epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epis- tolary writing, and moreover from several of them being Evidence from written, not to particular persons, but to inSendentand Churches, Carry in them evidences of their peculiar. being genuine beyond what can be, in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at large.* This evidence, joined with that which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact or of criticism. I szy^ particular pretence for deny- ing it J because any single fact of such a kind and such antiquity may have general doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human affairs and human testi- mony. There is also to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians, from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Ro- manus, in an epistle of his own to that Church.f Now these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached * [The argument here hinted at is forcibly presented in Paley's admirable work, " Horae Paulinse." See also Blunt's " Undesigned Coincidences both of the Old and New Testaments."] f Clem. Rom., Ep. I, ch. xlvii. Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 297 from all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight ; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in general, and the institution of the communion in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly togetlier with them, but alone from Christ himself; whom he declares, likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.* So that the tes- timony of St. Paul is to be considered as detached from that of the rest of the apostles. And he declares turther that he was endued with a power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to this very people ; speaks of frequent and great varie- ty of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very Churches to which he was writing; which he was reprov- ing for several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers : he mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of re- proof to those who had them, for their indecent use of them ; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In short, he speaks to these Churches of these miraculous powers in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing which was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing in the world. f And this, as hath been observed by several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 5. 3 It is an acknowledged historical fact that Chris- tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be re- ceived, upon the allegation, that is, as un- _ ' * ^ ^ , " ' ' Christianity believers would speak, upon the pretense of avowedly found- , , 1 • 1 1 1 , ed on mlroclea, miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it in such an age ; and that it was actually received by ♦ Gal. i ; i Cor. xi, 23, etc. ; i Cor. xv, 8. f Rom. XV, 19 ; I Cor. xii, 8-28, etc., and chap, xiii, i, 2, 8, and the whole xivth chap. ; 2 Cor. xii, 12, 13 : Gal. iii, 2, 5. 298 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean that this does not appear to be the case with regard to any other. For surely it will not be supposed to lie upon any person to prove, by positive historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Moham- medanism was first received in the world upon the foot- ing of supposed miracles,* that is, public ones; for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretense to it must necessarily imply some pretense of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institu- tions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be con- firmed by miracles, after those institutions had obtained are not to the purpose ; so, were there what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to be attested by miracles, these would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power in their hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude ; and political interests are blended with religious claims and religious distinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the particular evidence of miracles — this is quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed by any fair adveisary * See the Koran, chap, xiii and xvii. [The infidel says, unless a sign be sent down unto him from his Lord, we will not believe ; thou art a preacher only. — Sale's Ti-ans., p. 20X, ed. 4to. " Nothing hindered us from sending thee with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with imposture."] Chap. VII.J Ev.dence for Christianity. 299 that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the circum- stances of it, is peculiar to the Christian religion. How- ever, the fact itself is allowed, that Chris- , . , , . - - , In this peculiar. tianity obtamed, that is, was professed to be received, in the world, upon the belief of miracles, im- mediately in the age in which it is said those miracles were wrought : or that this is what its first converts would have alleged as the reason for their embracing It Now certainly it is not to be supposed that such num- bers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their country, in which they had been educated ; separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemni- ties, to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them much more than any thing of that sort among us ; and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many in- conveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a great degree, even from the very first, and before 'the empire engaged in form against them : it cannot be supposed that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them ; that as, by becoming ^, . . , , , , , , , , Firetoonverte Christians, they declared to the world they beUeved mira were satisfied of the truth of those miracles, so this declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those mira- cles as if they had put it in writing, and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts which they had capacity and full opportu- 300 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. uity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, though it is of the same kind ; and it would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages : that this fact is acknowledged to have been believed, by great numbers of tlie age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the histo- rian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged too; and their backwardness even to believe, and great- er still to practice, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and authority were against Christianity in the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter : * I sa) presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof, alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the things men- tioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by it- self; and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest. 6. Upon the whole : as there is large historical evi- dence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles * [Arnobius, one of the earliest Christian writers, says : " Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, deceitful, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never saw? And that when they might have lived in peace and comfort they chose gratui tous hatred and obloquy ? " ■ The rejection of Christianity by so many in the first ages was the result of the continual action of personal hereditary prejudice and depravity capable of resisting any supposable evidence. But the reception of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail the acceptance by others. — Malcom.] Chap. VII.l Rvidknce for Christianity. 301 wrought in attestation of Chri'stianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject, it lies upon unbeliev- ers to show why this evidence is not to be ,. - ^, . ' . . • T ,1 • 1 Burden of proof credited. This way of speaking is, I think, with onbeiiev- just, and what persons who write in de- fense of religion naturally fall into. Yet in a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, nol whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections; but whether there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient in reason to destroy the credit of it ? However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing that there are. They allege that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Chris- ^,. ^ , . , . Objections tians did, and are ready to give up their founded on en- lives for the most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear to what purpose this objection is brought. For every one, surely, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts, or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts in attestation of which they exposed themselves to sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts ; for they were such as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not (;f equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the apostles and their contempo- raries, had, however, full opportunity to inform them- selves whether they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. 302 Analogy of Religion. [Part II 7. But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evi- dence of testimony, even for facts, in matters relating to Enthmiasm ^^^^S^^^ 5 some secm to think it totally and wreakens evi- absolutely destroys the evidence of testi- dence. -^ .... . , • -, •■ , mony upon this subject. And, mdeed, the po\yers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are very wonderful in particular in- stances. But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar sus- picion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest ; such testimony is evi- dence of the strongest kind we can have for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by con- trary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm : for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be ex- pected that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be ; an account so strange, that the generality of man- kind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it ; it cannot, I say, be expected, that such account will be admitted of such evidence, when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that people real- ly saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely, and with full assurance, that they did see and hear. Granting, then, that enthusiasm is not (strictly speak- The objection ing) an absurd, but a possible account of suppoaos the *=•; . . . -r ^ ^i ^ ^i. things attested such testimony. It is manifest that the very incredible, hence . _ . , of no force. mention of it goes upon the previous suppo- sition that the things so attested are incredible, and CiiAr.VIIJ Evidence FOR Christianity. 303 therefore need not be considered till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered after the con- trary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a rev- elation in general, or in such a one as the Christian in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarl} liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prej- udices almost without number, and without name, ro- mance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, the party spirit, custom, little competi- tions, unaccountable likings and dislikings ; these influ- ence men strongly in common matters. And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding. 8. It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that though it should be proved seiMeoeption that the apostles and first Christians could S^birSTSe not, in some respects, be deceived them- *po**i®*' selves, and in other respects cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us ; because they might still in part, that is, in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters. And I must confess, I think the matter of fact con- tained in this observation upon mankind is not to be denied ; and that somewhat very much akin to it, is often supposed in Scripture, as a very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been ex- pected, that persons capable of applying this observa- 304 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. tion, as applied in the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed character in instances where religion was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endowed with rea- son, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with verac- ity, or a regard to truth in what they say : but from many occasions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and biased, and deceived themselves, and capable of intend- ing to deceive others, in every different degree ; inso- much that, as we are all liable to be deceived by preju- dice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set agoing. And others, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent ; and this assent, a natural principle of action. 9. It is objected further, that, however it has hap- pened, the fact is, that mankind have in different ages Delusions from been Strangely deluded with pretenses to auegedmiracies. j^iracles and woudcrs. But it is by no means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be, deceived by these pretenses than by others. It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles which are on all hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose that there were even the like historical evidence for these to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in nowise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of the lat- ter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianity. 305 world who, in common cases, would conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence neither confuted nor overbalanced ? To argue that because there is, if there were, like evidence from testimony for miracles acknowledged false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other. 10. Upon the whole, then, the general observation that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equiv- alent to enthusiasm in common matters, and be weakened vet . 1,1 not destroyed. in both from negligence ; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others ; this does, indeed, weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will appear to different men to weaken the evi- dence of testimony in different degrees ; in degrees pro- portionable to the observations they have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weakness, and negligence, and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case but a proof, or probability, that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular rase. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human 20 306 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. actions require that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evi- dence, indolently to say, that there are so many princi- ples from whence men are liable to be deceived them- selyes, and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe And it is surprising persons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes, they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which they speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is, on such a subject, a very material one.* II. And over against all these objections, is to be set the importance of Christianity, as what must have en- The importance gaged the attention of its first converts, so pLvSS?^^ as to have rendered them less liable to be aeiusions. deceived from carelessness than they would in common matters; and, likewise, the strong obliga- tions to veracity which their religion laid them under : so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not be deceived themselves, nor would de- ceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very WhatunbeUev- easy ; yet they are necessary, and necessary ore must admit ^^ ^^ repeated, in order to connect a dis- course, and distinctly to lay before the view of the read- er what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing obser- vations is, I think, beyond all doubt this : that unbe- lievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for Christianity, that is, the proof of miracles wrought to attest it. to be of real weight and very considerable ; though tney cannot allow it to be sufficient to convince • See the foregoing chapter. Chap. VI I. J Evidence for Christianity. 307 them of the reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit this, so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would in fact admit it ; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of the matter : in like manner as persons, in many cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true ; cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony, or things which they think, whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering ; and it has been fully proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or in any part of it. 12. II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy I shall only make some few gen- prophocy-ob- eral observations, which are suggested by the SvaiSate^^us* analogy of nature ; that is, by the acknowl- ^"^^^ edged natural rules of judging in common matters con- cerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. I. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does not in any degree invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of those other parts which are understood. For the case is evidently the same as if those parts which are not un- derstood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be com- monly attended to or not, it is so evident that one can scarce bring one's self to set down an instance in com- mon matters to exemplify it. However, suppose a writ- ing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain words at length, and that in th '^ part one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts; it would never come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he under- stood the whole, perhaps he might find that those facts were not in reality known by the latter. Indeed, both in this example, and the thing intended to be exempli 3o8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. fied by it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt whether one understood .the literal meaning of such a part ; but this comes under another consideration. For the same reason, though a man should be incapa- ble, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge, whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same reason, also, though by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction that such parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise from that general completion of them which is made out : as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. 13. 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof that it was intend- ™. » v« ed of them; as the rules by which we natu- The applicabll- ' . •'. ity of a series rally judge and determine, in common cases of prophecies Is ,; , 1 • •,, rr>, . proof of intend- parallel to this, Will show. This observa- ed application. . ^ , . , , tion I make m answer to the common ob- jection against the application of the prophecies, that considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear that they were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by Christians ; and therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. Chap. VII. J Evidence for Christianity 309 Now there are two kinds of writing which bear a great resemblance tc prophecy, with respect to the matter before us; the mythological and the satirical, where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured that he understood what an author in- tended by a fable or parable, related without any appli- cation or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capa- ble of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured that such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And agreeably to the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs or in the story of such per- sons, to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such application, and in proportion to the number of partic- ular things capable of it. And thus if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him ; these things are in themselves a proof that the prophetic history was intended of him, and of those events : in proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of particular prophecies ca- pable of it. And though in all just way of considera- tion, the appearing completion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine their meaning; yet it is to be remembered further, that the anciert Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, in much the same manner as Chris- tians do row; and that the primitive Christians inter- 3IO Analogy of Religion. IPartIL preted the prophecies respecting the state of the Church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. And from these things it may be made to appear, 14. 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such predictions, and Mistakes as ' . : . to the meaning not thosc at all which Christians allege to cf prophecy do . ^ t • 1 rot weaken Its be completions 01 those predictions ; or that such and such prophecies are capable of be- ing applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them — that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that one knew the whole of what he in- tended in it, one should be assured or satisfied to such a degree, that one knew the whole meaning of that book; for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have com- piled a book of memoirs which he received from anoth- er of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties, it would in nowise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler; for the original memoirs, that is, the author of them, might have, and there would be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures and the things contained in them can have no other or further meaning than those persons thought or had who first recited or wrote them, is evidently saying that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, that is, that they are not inspired; which Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 311 is absurd, while the authority of these books is under examination, that is, till you have determined they are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that they are inspired, but that they may have some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. And upon this sup- position, it is supposable also that this further meaning may be fulfilled. Now events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning from that in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them ; this affords, in a manner, the same proof that this different sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did ; because there is no pre- sumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the ap- parent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, that is, in any real sense of the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed; for though I think it clear that the prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they did, and in what sense they understood them. 15. Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves who endeavor to prove that the prophetic history is applicable to events Fumiiment of the age in which it was written, or of JJXStoVwt ages before it. Indeed, to have proved this ***"' before there was any appearance of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might 312 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. have prevented the expectation of any such further com- pletion. Thus, could Porphyry have shown that some principal parts of the Book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Chris- tians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events which happened before or about the age of An- tiochus Epiphanes ; this might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of it. And un- less there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence concerning that book more than is come down to us, such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself; con- sidering the authority which our Saviour has given to the Book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this pas- sage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- phyry, appears to be applicable also to events which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate that the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were alone and by it- self of any moment in verifying the prophetic history ; but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. And thus, upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evi- dently must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the world and of the Church; applicable in such a degree * It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For Jerome on the place says : " Duas posteriores bestias — in uno Macedonum regno ponit." And as to the ten kings : " Decern reges enumerat, qui, fuerunt scevissimi ; ipsosque rages non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonise, Syrise, Asiae, et ^gypti ; sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem." And in this way of in- terpretation, any thing may be made of any thing. Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 313 as to imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any other application ; though I know no pretense for saying the general turn of them is capable of any other. 16. These observations are, I think, just, and the evi- dence referred to in them real ; though there may be people who will not accept of such imper- Defects in char feet information from Scripture. Some, too, ^ower **Jr e*5i- have not integrity and regard enough to truth °®°^- to attend to evidence which keeps the mind in doubt, per- haps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from what they expected. And it plainly requires a de- gree of modesty and fairness beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real appearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and willfulness of the gen- erality, to determine at once, with a decisive air, there is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that abso- lute contempt and scorn with which this evidence is treated in the world I do not mention. For what, in- deed, can be said to persons who are weak enough in their understandings to think this any presumption against it ; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject.? 17. I shall now. Secondly^ Endeavor to give some ac- count of the general argument for the truth of Christian ity, consisting both of the direct and cii- ' . , . , . , , , . General arsru- cumstantial evidence, considered as making ment Reasons ,' , , ^ ^ for stating It up one argument. Indeed, to state and ex- amine this argument fully would be a work much be- yond the compass of this whole treatise ; nor is so much 314 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined ; evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and in this man- ner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to do it also : firsts be- cause it seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revela- tion is, not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are after- ward to be joined together ; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other, and united into one view ; and, in the next place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be ac- knowledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider them together; in- stead of that cursory thought of them to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought of things, as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice. i8. The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into, is this : that over and above our rea- Tiio point to son and affections, which God has given us be proved. ^^^ ^^ information of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an account of himself and his moral govern- ment over the world, implying a future state of rewards Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 315 and punishments; that is, hath revealed the system of natural religion ; for natural religion may be externally (page 194, etc.) revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind, their fellow-creatures — that God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral system; together with an account of a particular dis- pensation of providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the per- fection and final happiness of their nature. 19. This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is noth- ing but the history of events before they The revelation come to pass ; doctrines, also, are matters '*^'^*®'^*' • of fact; and precepts come under the same notion. And the general design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account of the world in this one single view — as God's world; by which it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from it. It be- gins with an account of God's creation of the world, in order to ascertain and distinguish from all others who is the object of our worship by what he has done; in order to ascertain who he is concerning whose provi dence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this sa- cred book all along treats; the Maker and Proprietoi of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, that is, no beings at all ; or else part of that creation, the historical relation of which is here given. And St. John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins his gospel with an account of our ii6 Analogy of Religion. [Part II Saviour's pre existence, and that " all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made," (John i, 3 ;) agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that "God created all things by Jesus Christ." Eph. iii, 9. This being premised, the Scripture, taker together, seems to profess to contain a kind of at abridgment of the history of the world in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general account of the con- dition of religion and its professors during the continu- ance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness which it every-where supposes the world to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation, indeed, considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be sup- posed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness which all places equally aspire to be; can- not, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall be affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly^ and in great variety of expression; "The times of tne restitution of all things," (Acts iii, 21 ;) when " the mys- tery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets," (Rev. x, 7 ;) when " the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be de- stroyed : and the kingdom shall not be left to other peo- ple," (Dan. ii, 44,) as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but "judgment shall be given to the saints," Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. ^ 317 (Dan. vii, 22,) and "they shall reign," (RSv. xxii, 5 ;") " and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whoje heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High." Dan. vii, 27. 20. Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how great a length of time the whole relation lakes up, near six thousand years of which The length oi aie past : and how great a variety of things it Sf tSpkaSi^ treats of; the natural and moral system or ***• history of the world, including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and evi- dently written in a rude and unlearned age ; and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives the largest scope for criti- cism ; and for confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true ; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true. For could any com- mon relation, of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be proposed to the examination of the world ; that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfac- tion of reasonable men ; this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. And, indeed, it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the probability^ that if it were false it might be shown to be so ; and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing which have been clearly obviated. (Chap, ii, iii, etc.) Nor does it at all appear that any set of men who believe natural religion 3i8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. are of th^ opinion that Christianity has been thus con- futed. But to proceed : — 21. Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains a clironological account of the Its contents begimiingof it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins ; and carried on as much further as to make up a continued thread of history of the length of between three and four thousand years. It contains an account of God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his often interposing miraculously in their affairs; giving them the promise, and, long after, the possession, of a partic- ular country; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in bpposi- tion to the idols which the rest of the world worshiped, and obey his commands, and threatening them with un- exampled punishments if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry ; insomuch, that this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that " God would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other;" but that "when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have compassion upon them, and gather them, from all the nations whither he had scattered them ; that Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salva- tion, and not be ashamed or confounded, world without end." And as some of those promises are conditional, others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed, that the time should come when " the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever; that though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them : that he would bring again the captivity of his Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 319 people Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their land ; that the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation for- ever."* It foretells that God would raise them up a particular person, in whom all his promises should final- ly be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in such a manner as raised a general expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his coming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation but from the prophecies; which expectation, therefore, must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their mean- ing. It seems, moreover, to foretell that this person should be rejected by that nation to whom he had been so long promised, and though he was so much desired by them.f And it expressly foretells, that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and even that the comple- tion of the scheme contained in this book, and then be- gun and in its progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account : " It is a light thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth. ' And, "In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it — for out of Zion shall go forth the law, ♦ Deut. xxviii, 64 ; xxx, 2, 3 ; Isa. xlv, 17 ; Ix, 21 ; Jer. xxx, 11 ; xlvi, 28 ; Amos ix, 15 ; Jer. xxxi, 36. t Isa. viii, 14, 15 ; xlix, 5 ; liii ; Mai. i, 10, ii, and iii. 320 Analogy of Religion. [Part I.I. and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he shall lit terly abolish."* The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah was expected a person rose up in this nation claiming to be that Mes- siah, to be the person whom all the prophets referred to, and in whom they should center ; that he spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works, and endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion which he commissioned them to publish , that, invested with this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest countries, and set- tled and established his religion in the world ; to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this religion among mankind. 22. Let us now suppose a person, utterly ignorant of history, to have all this related to him out of the Script- ure. Or, suppose, such a one, having the ted to a candid Scripture put into his hands, to remark these inquirer. .... , . , , , . , thmgs m It, not knowmg but that the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts bf it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention ; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the reve- lation here related was real or a fiction ? And instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts, and then to unite them into one view. Let him first be told, in how great a degree the pro- fession and establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God to be worshiped, that virtue is his * I«a. xljx, 6 ; ii ; xi ; Ivi, 7 ; Mai. i, ii. To which must be add- ed the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testa- ment, and very many in the Old, which describe what shall he the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. Chap. VTT.I Evidence for Christianity. 321 law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; Truths origi- ^ J J J nated by revela- ih how very great a degree, I say, the pro- tion. itsimpor- ^ . . , ,. , ' . , tanoe and au- fession and establishment of this moral sys- thority. tem in the world is owing to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book ; the establish ment of this moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture. (Page 274.) Let him be told also what num- ber of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of what impor- tance religion is to mankind. And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed rev- elation's obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, considered to- gether as one event, is the most conspicuous and im- portant event in the story of mankind : that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously examined into ; and that before such examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule is an offense against natural piety. But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from reason ; any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements is destroyed by a man's knowing, 01 thinking, that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his thoughts but for that math- ematician. 25. Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place, informed of the acknowl- itg antiquity, edged antiquity of the first parts of this JSnSSc^ book ; and that its chronology, its account '**'*• of the time when the earth and the several parts of it 21 322 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. were fir t peopled with human creatures is no way con- tradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the world, collected from common his- torians, from the state of the earth, and from the late in- vention of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture con tains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed, by profane his- tory, as much as there would be reason to expect upon supposition of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole history itself to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as done in any age, not con- formable to the manners of that age ; nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added, also, that mere genealo- gies, bare narratives of the number of years which per- sons called by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presump- tion of veracity : and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry some- what of the like presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in the Chap. VII.J Evidence for Christianity. 323 naked way they are told, may appear strange,xespecially to persons of other manners, temper, education; but there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full as strange.* There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for; but there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture than what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity ; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative. Now, that a history claiming to commence from the creation, and extending in one continued series through so great a length of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors ; many * [See this thought presented in a most agreeable and lively form in the Archbishop of Dublin's '* Historic Doubts " concerning Napo- leon Bonaparte. Compare the following conversation given in Bos- well's Life of Johnson, (ann. 1763 :) *' Talking of those who deny the truth of Christianity, he said, ' It is always easy to be on the negative side. ... I deny that Canada is taken, and I can support my denial by pretty good arguments. The French are a much more numerous people than we, and it is not likely that they would allow us to take it.* ' But the ministry have assured us, in all the formality of a Ga- zette, that it is taken.' 'Very true. But the ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for our money.' ' But the fact is confirmed by thousands of men who were at the taking of it.' 'Aye, but these men have still more interest in deceiving us. They don't want that you should think the French have beat them, but that they have beat the French, Now, suppose you should go over and find that it really is taken ; that would only satisfy yourself? for when you come back we will not believe you. We will say yox^ have been bribed.'" — F.] 324 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. of these writing of the same times, and confirming the ^riith of customs and events which are incidentally, as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this cred- ibility of the common Scripture history gives some cred- ibility to its miraculous history : especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one relation. 24. Let it then be more particularly observed to this , ^ person, that it is an acknowledged matter Antiquity of the ^ ' ... . . , ? , . Jews whose re- of fact, which IS mdced implied in the fore- ligion preserved . . , their national goiHg oDservation, that there was such a na- 6X18 t6n CC tion as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven : that natural religion, though with rites addi- tional, yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world ; and that their very being, as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, the God of the uni- verse. For suppose, in their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there would have remained no bond of union to keep them a distinct people. And while they were under their own kings in their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole govern- ment. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshiped the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And this, so remarkable an establishment and preservation of natural religion among them, seems to add some peculiar credi bility to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets; because these miracles are a full, sat- isfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 25. Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of his- Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianitv. 325 tory, be acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above-men- ^, , , ' * ^ Messiah came, tioned, expected the Messiah : that he was and. ^cording ' ^ /■ 1 J to proph<>«y,8uf- rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold fered and tri- umphed. he should, by the body of the people, under the direction of their rulers : that in the course of a very few years he was believed on, and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles, (page 297, etc.,) of which miracles we also have strong historical evi- dence ; (by which I mean here no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity, (page 305, etc. ;) that this religion approv- ing itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its sys- tem, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require to be believed upon the mere au- thority of its Author ; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from it, and then became the religion of the world : that in the mean time, the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried away captive and dis- persed through the most distant countries, in which state of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a numerous people, united among themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law ; and every-where looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to 326 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. express, but in the words of tht prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it came to pass : " Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb and a by-word, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead thee." Deut. xxviii, 37. 26. The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the The Jews pre- Confirmation which this event appears to KT^p^Jie^ give to the truth of revelation, may be This a miracle, thought to be answered by their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from the means of in- corporating with the people in whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pre- tend to account for ? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies ; or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of providence of a peculiar na- ture toward that people formerly ? No. It is only the event itself which is offered to be thus accounted for ; which single event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous; but that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus, the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at Bethlehem with a long foregoing series of prophecy, and other coincidences, is doubtless miracu- lous — the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted : though the event itself, his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way ; of which, however, no one can be certain. 27. And at several of these events seem, in some degree, expressly tc have verified the prophetic history already ; so likewise, they may be considered further, as having a Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianitv. 327 peculiar aspect toward the full completion of it ; as af- fording some presumption that the whole of The past fuimi- it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Sy°iendera^the Thus, that the Jews have been so wonder- ^^t"-* P«>i*We. fully preserved in their long and wide dispersion ; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come; that natural religion came forth from Judea, and spread in the degree it has done over the world, be- fore lost in idolatry ; which, together with some other things, have distinguished that very place, in like man- ner as the people of it are distinguished : that this great change of religion over the earth was brought about un- der the profession and acknowledgment that Jesus was the promised Messiah : things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men toward the full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of the Messiah ; and the future state of the world under this sacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument by a person upon his first being in- formed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give it some additional credibility, have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it. Indeed, it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity from that part of the prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the Church from the establishment of Christian- ity to the present time. But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who 328 Analogy of Religicn. [Part II. have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as de- terminately conclusive. 28. Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first to recollect the passages above-mentioned out of Eecapitniation. Scripture without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view : that the profession and estab- lishment of natural religion in the world is greatly ow- ing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it contains ; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common history are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God in a distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to ap- pear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claim- ing to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by this nation but received by the Gentiles, not upon the evi- dence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world ; that in the meantime the Jewish polity was ut- terly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that, notwithstanding this, they have re- mained a distinct and numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day ; which not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies concern- ing them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknowl- edged truths, let the person we have been supposing idd, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow Chap. VII.l Evidence for Christianity. 329 it or not, the obvious appearances which there are of the state of the world, in other respects besides what re- lates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before-mentioned out of the Scripture, and sen ously compared with them ; the joint view of both to- gether must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate, reasonable person ; of much greater, indeed, upon having them first laid before him than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for that purpose. 29. All these things, and the several particulars con- tained under them, require to be distinctly These pointa and most thoroughly examined into; that dS^^consideK the weight of each may be judged of, upon ^^°' such examination, and such conclusion drawn as re- sults from their united force. But this has not been at- tempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collateral things * here mentioned, and there are several- others of the like sort ; that all this together, which, being fact, must be acknowledged by ... , . , \- Necessary oi>n- unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of cessions of un- believers, somewhat more than human in this matter; evidence much more important than careless men, who have been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine ; and, indeed, abur.dantly suffi- cient to act upon. And these things, I appiehend, must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say that the historical evidence of miracles, wrought in ♦ All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of proph- ecy See pages 292, 293. 330 Analogy of Religion. [Pai^t II. attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really wrought, they can- not deny that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies and events is by ac- cident : but there are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above- mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful people ; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus ; but no one who is serious can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished in nature from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases, indeed, it seems to require the truest judgment to de- termine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evi- dence ; but it is very often altogether as convincing as that which is the most express and direct. 30. This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons to set down Force of the ,.,,,•, , r proof from the every thmg which they thmk may be of any combination of ,., „. ^ ^ . . . these considera- real weight at all in proof of It, and partic- ularly the many seeming completions of prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by the nat ural rules by which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be sup- posed upon considering them separately, at different times, how strong soever the proof might before appear to them upon such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 331 Dut multiply it,* Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down what he thought made for the contrary side. But, then, it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a con • .^deration thought very material, when we deliberate not concerning events, but concerning conduct in oui temporal affairs. To be influenced by this considera- tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prejudice as any thing whatever. And like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways in diff"er- ent men. For some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order to gain theii assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing which reason niore requires to be taken into the account, than the importance of it. For suppose it doubtful what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner; still, that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequcuces, and taking the other might be attended with the cp"eatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason of the highest moment toward determining how we are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of * [If the thing to be proved have in it an apparent character of truth, this constitutes an improbability of its falsehood. If it have another character of truth, this constitutes another improbability of its falsehood. If this were a complete statement of the argument to be drawn from the coexistence of the two characters of truth, the second improbability would only require to be added to the first to give the value of the whole. But in reality the argument is much stronger. For the improbability that they should simultaneously exist in the thing under examination, and yet that thing be false, is evidently different from the sum of the improbabilities that each separately should exist in it if false. — F.] 332 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particu- lar thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Chris- tianity lies,) then is the truth of it proved ; in like man ner as if, in any common case, numerous events ac- knowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together, could not in reason be supposed to have happened unless the disputed one were true. It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack Christian- ity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view. 31. However, lastly^ as it has been made appear that there is no presumption against a revelation as miracu- lous; that the general scheme of Christian- Christian evi- . ' ... dence cannot be ity, and the prmcipal parts of It, are con- destroyed . , , , ^ . ^ . . formable to the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible ; so the account now given of the positive evidence for it shows that this evidence is such as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. Chap. VIII.J Objections against Analogy. 333 ^ CHAPTER VIII. OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RE- LIGION. IF every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least superseded. But since this is not to be expected ; for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against ; since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to objections which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are such as these : — 2. " That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in rev- elation by saying that there are the same in natural re- ligion ; when what is wanting is to clear . , ' , ^ , , . Five objections. both of them, of these their common, as well as other their respective difficulties : but that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits ; and a strange way of vindi- cating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show that the like 334 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. objections lie against natural providence ; a way of an- swering objections against religion, without so much as pretending to make out that the system of it, or the particular things in it objecfted against, are reasonable — especially, perhaps, some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections; that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it tan be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state : and that it must be unaccounta- ble ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be pre- vailed with to forego their present interests and pleas- ures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence." Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly; and to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men by themselves. And even those who are serious and considerate cannot always readily dis- entangle, and at once clearly see through, the perplexities in which subjects themselves are involved : and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons the following re- ply to each part of this objection severally may be of some assistance, as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others. 3. First. The thing wanted, that is, what men require, is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least Answer to the foJ* any thing we know to the contrary, it S'th^tteTf may be, the same as requiring to compre- S^Vff^'is hend the Divine nature, and the whole plan wanted. q{ Providence from everlasting to everlast- ing. But it hath always been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing to argue from natural relig- Chap. VIIIJ Objections against Analogy. 335 ion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduc- tion and inference in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases as even the most eminent have .'' to act upon conjecture and guess where the life of man is concerned } Undoubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. 4. Further : since it is as unreasonable as it is com- mon to urge objections against revelation which are of equal weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confuted against reveia- - . , . , , tlon as strong themselves, deal unfairly with others in against natural ... , , . , religion. making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence ; it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as much leveled against natural religion as against re- vealed. And objections which are equally applicable to both, are, properly speaking, answered by its being shown that they are so, provided the former be admit- ted to be true. And without taking in the considera- tion how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government; so the ob- jections against the system of Christianity and the evi- dence of it are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural 336 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. religion. However, the reader, upon review, may see that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former ; that there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world : and Christianity is vindicated, not from its anal- ogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature. < 5. Secondly. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as being what, there is reason to think, is commanded by the Answer to sec- . ■' ond objection as Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, to men's having , 1 1 • as little reason be our happmcss Under his government. for worldly pur- _ _ . . . • -i 1 1 1 suits as reug- Now if men can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to theii advantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and endeav- oring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessa- ries and conveniences of it ; then there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to secure the inter- est it proposes to us. And if the interest which religion proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole tem- poral interest, then there must be proportionably great- er reason for endeavoring to secure one than the other : since, by the supposition the probability of our secur- ing one is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. But the chief and proper force of the argument re- Chap. VIIIJ Objections against Analogy. 337 ferred to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said that the proof of religion is involved in such in- extricable difficulties as to render it doubt- „ , ,^ Force of the ful; and that it cannot be supposed, that, if objection, aod , , , , r 1 , r 1 would not give It were true, it would be left upon doubtful doubtful evi evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these dif- ficulties and objections taken together, are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion ; which argument would stand thus: If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is : therefore, that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force in proportion to the weight of such objections ; but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation that from the natural constitution and course of things we must, in our tem- poral concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of alike kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument ; because it shows, that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author of nature to ap- point we should act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to ap- point we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us similar to what is said to be in- credible. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct, the an- swer is equally just and conclusive ; whether the parallel be made out by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 6. Thirdly. The design of this treatise is not to vindi- cate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men ; it is not to justify his providence, but to show 22 338 Analogy of Religion. [Part II what belongs tc us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may al Answer to third length run Up into each other, yet observa- She^deofviS tions may immediately tend to make out the j^Sfndg^- latter, which do not appear, by any imme- Ss'SnTuM^ diate connection, to the purpose of the ®^- former ; which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, first, It is not necessary we should justify the dis- pensations of Providence against objections any further than to show that the things objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which, tak- en alone, would be unjust; yet it has been shown unan- swerably, that if we could take in the reference which these things may have to other things present, past, and to come ; to the whole scheme, which the things object- ed against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections drawn from such things are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. Hence it appears, secondly. That objections against the divine justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed by showing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence; but those objections being supposed, and shown not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are further shown to be credible from their conformity to the constitution of nature; for in- stance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation that he does re- Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 339 ward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. And I add, thirdly, It would be of weight, even though those objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down, and religion imply- ing several facts ; for instance again, the fact last men tioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter ; the observation that his present meth- od of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible : whatever objec- tions men may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy ; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as itnprobable, for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust^ can be urged from necessity ; since this no- tion as much destroys injustice as it does justice. Then, fourthly. Though objections against the reason- ableness of the system of religion cannot, indeed, be answered without entering into consideration of its rea- sonableness, yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may : Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact; and the truth, the probable truth, of facts, may be shown without considera- tion of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though in some cases and respects it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give proof of the reasonable- ness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particu- lar dispensation of Providence which comes into the system of religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly a per- son of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the further he will advance toward that perfection of religion which St. John (i John iv, 18) speaks of. But the general obliga- tions of religion are fully made out, by proving the rea- sonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, maybe shown, though no more 340 Analogy of Religion. lPart II. could be proved than that the system of it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary; and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this. And from hence, fifthly, It is easy to see that though the analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objec- tions against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion, yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections ; which is to show, that the things objected against are incredible. 7. Fourthly. It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far, indeed, from it : but so would any natural Answer to fourth objection institution of life appear, if reduced into a that the argu- . , • • -, t ment is unsatis- systcm, together With Its evidence. Leav- factory. Thisis . ... . , ,. . , , true in ordinarjr ing religion out of the casc, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains; and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And were all such con- troversies settled, which perhaps in speculation would be found involved in great difficulties ; and were it de- termined, upon the evidence of reason, as nature has de- termined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved ; yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its sat- isfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, in future contingencies and acci- dents, so as to render it at all certain what is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the suc- cess of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper sense of the word ; that is, what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a muchhiglier degree. Indeed, the Chap. VIIIJ Objections against Analogy 341 unsatisfactory nature of the evidence with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interest of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion, then, being admitted real, those who object against it as not satisfactory, that is, as not being what they wish it, plainly forget ^he objection the very condition of our being : for satis- overlooks the na- ■' . . ° ture of our be- faction, in this sense, does not belong to ing, also of re- such a creature as man. And, which is more material, they forget also the very nature of religion. For religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exer- cise, in such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak ; or as warning a man of any danger, presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself as that he will endeavor to avoid it. And, therefore, the question is not at all, Whether the evi- dence of religion be satisfactory : but, whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes ? Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how far soever it is from being satisfactory as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other; and, indeed, it answers the pur- poses of the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as overbearing as is required. One might add further, that whether the motives or the evi- dence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning here by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good ; this need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in common matters. But the practi- 342 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. cal question in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us which is the guide and judge of conduct, (see Dissertati .;n ii,) determine that course of action to be prudent? Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly deter- mines an action to be prudent ; but evidence, almost infi- nitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too, even in the conduct of every day. 8. Fifthly. As to the objection concerning the influ ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or may . nj^^ iiot be expected to have upon men, I ob- Answer to fifth ^ ... objection that serve, as above, that religion being intended such evidence ... . . will not Influ- for a trial and exercise of the morality of ence practice. , , . . , . /. every person s character who is a subject of it ; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it ; to object that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the pur- pose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ; but, what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own con- cern ; the personal concern of each man in particular. And how little regard the generality have to it, experi- ence indeed does too fully show. But religion, consid- ered as a probation, has had its ends upon all persons to whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice ; for by this means they have been put into a state of probation, let them behave as they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of re- ligion being laid before men, the designs of Providence ire carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, Chap. VII IJ Objections against Analogy. 343 but likewise with regard to those who will not, be influ- enced by it. However, lastly^ the objection here re- ferred to allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be if it were likely to have a greater influence. 9. And further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon the princi- Theauthorhaa pies of others,* not my own ; and have JKjieJSfoS* omitted what I think true, and of the utmost ®^ importance, because by others thought unintelligible or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe ; and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe — the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever : which I apprehend as certainly to deter- mine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and false- hood necessarily determine the Divine judgment. In- deed, the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored to avoid it ; and, in order to avoid it have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a man- ner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it; but the general argument here pursued does not at all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and * By arguing upon tht principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwith- standing them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding, or even though, that opinion were admitted to be true. 344 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view than merely as a question of fact ; and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. And even natural religion is properly a matter of fact For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is so ; and this proposition contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the proof of it ; whereas it is here treat- ed of only as a matter of fact. To explain this : that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth ; but that they appear so to our mind is only a matter of fact. And this last must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, who would not have admitted the former ; but pretend- ed to doubt, whether there were any such thing as truth ; or whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. So, likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independ- ent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral government over the world which religion teaches, that is, finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act right or wrong ; this assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, without exception, was reward- ed and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong which God has implanted in the nature of every man ; this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the very same difficulties might be raised as are now concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness : and we should have a proof, even the certahi Chap. VIIIJ Objections against Analogy. 345 one of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those questions : and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were determined. And thus God, having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and which naturally ap- proves some actions as right and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong and of ill desert ; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former, and pun- ish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I have not indeed proved with the force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral fitness ; but without them, have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of nature ; a proof easily caviled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but impos- sible, I think, to be evaded or answered. And thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness ; which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse rea- sonings as every thing may. 10. Hence, therefore, may be observed distinctly what is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion, upon the proof arising Force of tiua out of the two last-mentioned principles, an *'^®*"^®- additional proof and a confirmation of it : to such as do not admit those principles an original proof of it, (pages 161, etc.,) and a confirmation of that proof. Those who believe will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar man- ner strengthened : those who do not believe, will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christian- ity false ; the plain, undoubted credibility of it ; and, I liope, a good deal more. 346 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. And thus, though some, perhaps, may seriously think that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied to show the argument from it in a disadvantage- ous light ; yet there can be no question but that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, im plying in it numerous facts ; analogy, being a confirma- tion of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. Part IIJ Conclusion. 347 CONCLUSION. WHATEVER account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as ^ . , . / ... The Incredible religion, it would, before experience, be in- disregard of re- UgioD. credible that there should be the like disre- gard in those who have had the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them ; because this moral system car- ries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions to convince an unprejudiced understanding that there is a God who made and governs the world, and will judge it in right- eousness ; though they may be necessary to answer ab- struse difficulties when once such are raised; when the very meaning of those words which express most intelli- gibly the general doctrine of religion is pretended to be uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itself is ob- scured by the intricacies of speculation. But to an un- prejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitive- ly manifest, that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity must be his laws to creatures whom he has made social, and placed in society. 2. Indeed, the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but requires ex- ... Immoral tem- ternal proof in order to its being received, per of mind im- Yet inattention, among us, to revealed relig- ion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral 34^ Analogy of Religion. [Part II. temper of mind as inattention to natural religion ; be- cause, when both are laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature For revelation claims to be the voice of God ; and our obli gation to attend to his voice is surely moral in all cases. And as it is insisted that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it ; so it offers itself to us with manifest obvious appearances of having some- thing more than human in it, and, therefore, in all rea- son, requires to have its claims most seriously examined into. 3. It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner soever afforded us, is equally from God ; « ,._. V, ^^ y^t a miraculous revelation has a peculiar Eeli^onhasthe •' . ^ highest claims tendency, from the first principles of our na- to attention. '' , • , . ture, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe : and this is a peculiar obliga- tion, to attend to what claims to be so with such appear- ances of truth. It is, therefore, most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to em- brace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us, then, suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Chris- tianity, has been seriously inquired into by all reasona- ble men among us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity And all of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary free- dom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God's moral government over the world • they renounce his protection, and defy his justice : they ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Au- thor of it ; and take all occasions to manifest a scorn Part 11.1 Conclusion. 349 and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion; which they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they in- tend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. 4. Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think prin- ciples of reason, and otherwise they are not „ - , . , . . 1 1 • • Rejecters have to be argued with; it is, really, mconceiva- no jnst notion of , , , , , , , . . , 11'** evidence. ble that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all ; nor do they pretend this. They are far, indeed, from having a just notion of its evidence ; but they would not say its evidence was nothing if they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or history. So that their manner of treating it must proceed either from such kind of objections against all religion as have been answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections and difficulties supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it must nave been more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overbearing ; that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left than it is. Now this is not imagining they soe the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is being fortified against the 350 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity, or somewhat which appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false : fortified against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon them Or lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christian- ity; their behavior seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubt- ing is in a manner the same thin^ as being certain against it. 5. To these persons, and to this state of opinion con- cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For TUs treatiBe all the general objections against the moral ^&^ 'S system of nature having been obviated, it is capitulation. ghown that there is not any peculiar pre- sumption at all against Christianity, either considered as not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered ; nor any worth mentioning against it as mi- raculous, if any at all ; none, certainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown that upon supposi- tion of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear liable to great objections, and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great de- gree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very utmost importance : but it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty of reason, which is " the candle of the Lord within us;" though it can afford no light where it does not shine ; nor judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of being first answered in the view of objections against Chris- tianity as a matter of fact, are in the next place consid- ered as urged more immediately against the wisdom,, justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation PartII.J Conclusion. 351 And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as par- tial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration and knowledge of their rela- tions to other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness by their reference to other things beyond our view; because Christianity is a scheme as much above our compre- hension as that of nature ; and like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be carried on by gen- eral laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which our observation shows us. For to like objections the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel cases. The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery ; it were to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once, and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of persons and things ; one dispensation preparatory to an- other, this to a further one, and so on through an in- definite number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished ; a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty 352 Analogy of Religion, IPart II power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revela- tion to be highly unreasonable, and is a satisfactory an- swer to 'them, when urged as objections against the credibility that the great scheme of Providence in the T'^demption of the world may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between God and man ; this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, that is, the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence, The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our re- demption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances ; inferred, that human nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and in conse- quence of this degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the world, these ap- pearances must have kept up the tradition and con- firmed the belief of it. And as it was the general opin- ion, under the light of nature, that repentance and leformation alone, and by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it ; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion ; so every day's ex- perience shows us that reformation is not, in any sort sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and mis- eries which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may be ground to think that the punish- ments which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be prevented; that provision may have been even originally made that they should Part 1 1. J Conclusion. 353 be prevented, by some means or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we have daily in- stances of such mercy, in the general conduct of nature ; compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness, and consequently, in ruin, " God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son," to save it ; and, " he being made perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him." John iii, 16 ; Heb. v, 9. Indeed, neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world which the Scripture teaches us it was : but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular means would be of the efficacy which .experience shows they are, in numberless instances. And therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience; so that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which it is there represented to be ; this is no kind or degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy. Further : the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the • Sermon vi, at tlie Rolls. 23 354 Analogy of Religion. [Part II former; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety. both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals at different times, is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of Providence, in other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity, that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act, in common matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God has afforded to some no more than doubt- ful evidence of religion, the same account may be given of it as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible, (page 284,) surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault, it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt ; and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under ob- ligations as demonstrative evidence. 6. The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible; nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dispensation of things more different from the experi- enced constitution and course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. And if so, the only question which remains is. What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity ? This too, in general, has been considered and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, there- fore, what is to be deducted from that evidence upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections after what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them ; and then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this, upon the most skeptical principles one can argue upon, (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles;) and Part II.] Conclusion. 355 upon such consideration it will be obvious that immor- ality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated in persons who have been made The agOTavated — ,, ... , , , immorality. acquamted with Christianity, whether they believe it or not ; because the moral system of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind upon seeing it proposed. In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed that there is a middle between a full satis- faction of the truth of it and a satisfaction Tho middle of the contrary. The middle state of mind 8**^ of mind, between these two consists in a serious apprehension that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far toward speculative infidelity as any skeptic can at all be supposed to go who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence are fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some who have very little at- tended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention, and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Chris- tianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obli- gations of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of their life; a regard, not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. Lastly^ it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard to Chris- etc.,\SSon?OT lianity, are absolutely without excuse. For 356 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth ; and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth. DISSERTATIONS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. Dissertation I. — Of Personal Identity. WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can possi- bly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity, or same- ness of person, which is implied in the notion of our liv- ing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties, yet it may be proper a little to consider them. Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity con- sists, the answer should be the same as if it were asked, wherein consists similitude or equality ; that all attempts to define, would but perplex it. Yet there is no diffi- culty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as. upon two * In the first copy of these Papers I had inserted the two folUiw- ing Dissertations into the chapters. Of a Future Life, and Of the Moral Government of God ; with which they are closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight it seemed more proper to place them by themselves. 358 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. I. triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of equality ; so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal ; so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of per- sonal identity, but also shows us the identity of our- selves in those two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past ; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by re- flecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self. But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed, none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth which it presupposes. This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence, that to be endued with consciousness, is insepara- ble from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. Foi this might be expressed inaccurately thus — that con- sciousness makes personality ; and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel Is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet Diss. IJ Personal Identity. 359 present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions or had those feelings. The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity ; because the word same^ when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know whether any one par- ticle of the present tree be the same with any one parti- cle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree, in the proper phil- osophic sense of the word same ; it being evidently a contradiction in terms to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no one of their properties, is the same : no part of their substance by the supposition ; no one of their properties, because it is allowed that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And, therefore, when we say the identity, or sameness, of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not, the word same^ when applied to life and to organiza- tion, cannot possibly be understood to signify what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense, then, the life, and the or- ganization, and the plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and philosophical mannejr of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be $6o Analogy of Religion. [Diss. I. the same with that with which it hath, indeed, nothing the same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when applied to persons. The identity of these, there- fore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words. Whether it^ that is, the same self or person, be the same identical substance ? And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, a thinkings intelligent being, etc., and personal identity, the sameness of a rational being* The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same substance ; which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, is said to be this : that the consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive moments, is not the same individual action,] that is, not the same consciousness, but different successive con- sciousnesses. Now, it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceiv- able that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now which it was when he contemplated it formerly ; yet in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And thus, though the suc- cessive consciousnesses which we have of our own exist- ence are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object ; of the same person; self, or living agent. The person of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person ; and therefore is one and the same. * Locke's Works, vol. i, page 146. f Locke, pages 146, 147. Diss. I.] Personal Identity. 361 Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions which he has made relating to it.* But some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others, whose notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:f *' That personality is not a permanent,^but a transient thing; that it lives and dies, begins and ends, continu- ally: that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment : that our substance is, indeed, continually changing ; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose ; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes personality ; which consciousness being suc- cessive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it." And from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon our- selves to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow : since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for it ; to which an- other self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow : for if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons, the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person of to-morrow than in what will befall any other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just rep- resentation of the opinion we are speaking of; because ♦ Locke, page 152. f See an answer to Dr. Clarke's third defense of his letter to Mr. Dodwell, 2d edition, pages 44, 56, etc. 362 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. I. tnose who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And, indeed, they do use the words identity and same person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside: since, if they were,' there must be, I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, consistently with themselves, mean that the per- son is really the same. For it is self-evident that the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they ex- pressly assert, that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think, it appears they do not, mean that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense : in such a sense only as they assert ; for this they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confuta- tion of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the following things : — First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction which necessarily, and every moment, rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon our- selves : when we reflect upon what is past, and look for- ward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of that living agent which each man calls him- self for another, or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion that though he should live to- morrow he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act with re- spect to a future life upon this notion, that personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it with respect to the present. Here, then, is a notion equally applica- ble to religion and to our temporal concerns ; and every Diss. IJ Personal Identity. 363 one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity cf it in the latter case. If, therefore, any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart. Secondly. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or qual- ity, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same during the whole time of their exist- ence. Consider, then, a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive : this living being must have done, and suffered, and enjoyed, what it has done, and suffered, and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another,) as really as it does, and suffers, and enjoys what it does, and suffers, and en- joys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoy- ments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or for- getting; since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And sup- pose this being endued with limited powers of knowl- edge and memory, there is no more difficulty in con- ceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of re- membering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoy- ments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know, or remember, or forget, any thing else. Thirdly. Every person is conscious that he is now the same person or self he was as far back as his remem- brance reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a pa.st action of his own, he is just as certain of the per- son who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely 364 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. I. assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, person or self, must either be a substance or the property of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance; then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a sub- stance, still consciousness that he is the same property, is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would be ; since the same property cannot be trans- ferred from one substance to another. But, though we are thus certain that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it.? And this question may be asked at the end of any demon- stration whatever ; because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or, indeed, whether intuitive perception, can. Here, then, we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to at- tempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove than by other percep- tions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no other- wise be proved than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves. Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 365 Dissertation II. — Of the Nature of Virtue. That which renders beings capable of moral govern- ment is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are im- pressed and actuated by various instincts and propen- sions ; so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought : and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous, and of good-desert, and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill-desert. That we have this moral approving and dis- approving * faculty is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. It ap- pears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the appro- bation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the words right and wrongs odious and amiable^ base and worthyy with many others of like signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters ; from the many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since it cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from our * This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made use of as seeming the most full, and the least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, 6oh ifxaa- TiKrj and iiroioKifiaariKri, upon a double account ; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other fac ulties or natural principles of action : in the very same manner, as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood ; and, at the same time, is attended with a conscious- ness, upon rejection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. • Arr., Eplot., lib. I, cap. 1. 366 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. II. natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good and in- tending it; from the like distinction, every one makes between injury and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind ; and between injury and just pun- ishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the con sideration of human laws. It is manifest, great part of common language, and of common behavior over the world, is formed upon sup- position of such a moral faculty ; whether called con- science, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both.* Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty, or prac- tical discerning power within us, approves, and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public ; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon mankind ; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being manifest, then, in general, that we have such a * [Butler's meaning appears to be, that, if it be referred to the un derstanding. it differs from other acts of the understanding in partak ing of the nature of feeling ; and that, if it be referred to the heart or feelings, it must be allowed to partake of the nature of perception. Compare the language of Adam Smith, in describing the system of Hutcheson. '* This sentiment being of a peculiar nature, distinct from every other, and the effect of a particular power of perception^ they give it a particular name, and call it a moral sense." — Part vi, chap, iii, page 356. — F.] Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue 367 faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to re- mark some things, more distinctly concerning it. First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty is actions,* comprehending under that name act- ive or practical principles ; those principles from which men ^vould act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does not appear that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distin- guished from events; or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they are ; and they are the object, and the only one, of the approv- ing and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behav- ior, abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment, as speculative truth and false- hood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such consequences, indeed, is always included ; for it is part of the action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have ex- actly the same sense of the action as if they did. In like manner, we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil which per- sons of such characters have it actually in their powei to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or, for having impressions made upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power ; but only for v;hat we do or would have done had it been in our power ; or for what we leave undone which we might hive done, or would have left undone though we could have done it. Secondly. Our sense or discernment of actions, as ♦ o\)St ri /tpenj koI xaKia — kv nelaei, aXXa hepyeia. M. Anton., lib. Q, 16. — Viriutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Offic, lib. i, c. 6 368 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. II morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern- ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be diffi- cult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it ; but every one sp<;aks of such actions as deservin]^ punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended that they have ab- solutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved that a man who, by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other people's coming near him the infection should spread ; no one would say, he deserved this treatment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always sup- poses guilt ; and if one be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises our compassion toward him; and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are informed that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty, our com- passion exceedingly lessens, and, in many instances, our indignation wholly subsides. Now, what produces this effect, is the conception of that in the sufferer which we call ill desert. Upon considering, then, or viewing to- gether, our notion of vice and that of misery, there re- sults a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing ; but being most unquestionably natural, it great- ly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away. It may be observed, further, concerning our percep- tion of good and of ill desert, that the former is very Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 369 weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent ; since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common in- stances. And on the other hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. For vice, in human creatures, consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle, though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; but possibly he had it in a degree which would have rendered him proof against common temptations. Thirdly. Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest de- gree vicious. And this determination must arise from such comparison, and be the result of it ; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other na- tures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as con- sist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understand- ing ; though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same : as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capa- ble not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. Now, this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the 24 370 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. II. action vicious ; and the want of tvhich in the other, ren- ders the same action innocent or less vicious; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining an action to be vicious And hence arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable^ disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. Fourthly. It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them selves miserable without reason, than to make other people so ; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a rea- sonable endeavor to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in our language; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and blamable : since in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and oth- ers. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether diff*erent from mere desire of our own, or of their happi- ness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of perception, is satisfaction or uneasiness ; whereas the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon, is our condition ; in the other, our conduct. It is true, indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruel- ty ; I suppose, because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less neces- sary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglect Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtle. 371 ing our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injur- ing others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard ; and also, because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punishment more imme- diately and constantly than injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would be inflict- ed upon it by others had they the same sensible indig- nation against it as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natu- ral object of compassion, the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be willfully, excites in us some pity for them ; and this, of course, lessens our displeasure against them. But still it is matter of expe- rience, that we are formed so, as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In in- stances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly, when persons come to poverty and distress by a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly do not regard such people as alike objects of compassion with those who are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice : meaning hy folly, somewhat quite diff"erent from mere incapacity ; a thoughtless want of that reganl and attention to our own happiness which we had capacity for. And this the word properly includes, and as it seems, in its usual acceptation ; for we scarce apply it lo brute creatures. However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very willingly give him u]) ^ho word? 372 Analogy of Religion. IDiss. II virtue and vice as not applicable to prudence and folly; but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent ac- tions, and disapproves imprudent ones ; I say, prudent and imprudent actions diS such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. And ])y the way, this observation may help to determine what justness there is in that objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish. Fifthly. Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it ; it may be proper to observe that benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character, or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indiffer- ent to every thing but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove injus- tice and falsehood upon any other account than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each of them; though nothing, indeed, would be more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other; yet such en- deavor would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefac- tor, abstracted from all consideration of distant conse quences : as that examples of gratitude and the cultiva- tion of friendship would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which Diss. II.j The Nature of Virtue. 373 the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it ; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow; yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, further, were treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious than as fore- seen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to socie- ty; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice as the whole foreseen inconvenience likely to be brought upon others by it would amount to, such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all, because it would be no more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another's in equal degrees. The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injus- tice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration which con- duct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery. And therefore, were the Author of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral character merely that of benevolence ; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposi- tion, indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above- mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, un- provoked violence, and injustice, must be, that he fore- saw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness than forming us with a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence, to some preferably to others, virtue, ab- stracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good which they may appear likely to produce. Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral fac- ulty the natural object of which is actions ; moral gov- 374 Analogy of Religion. Diss. II. eminent must consist in rendering them happy and un- happy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action inter- woven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty ;* in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing. I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished merit have, I think, ex- pressed themselves in a manner which may occasion some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state ; and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it ; than which mistakes none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of perse- cution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state ; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might easily be carried on ; but I forbear. The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has directed ; that is, in- deed, in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice, I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeav- oring, in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed endeav- ors proceed almost always from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed, perhaps, in great measure from persons themselves. And though it * Part i, chap, vi, page 167. Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 375 is our business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease* convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion, of our fellow-creatures ; yet from our short '.-lews, it is greatly uncertain whether this endeavor will, in partic- ular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole ; since so many and distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our duty, is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side ; and also, that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally understood, cannot be falsehood, and in general that there can be no de- signed falsehood without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he fore- sees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee that the words and actions of men in different ranks and employments, and of dif- ferent educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other; and it cannot but be so, while they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even though they considered it with great attention. INDEX. Abstract Reasoning, I Analogy, May mislead, page 159. I To De applied to practical subjects with great caution, 159. May be, with propriety, ioined with the observation of facts, 87. From the opinion of necessity, feUa- cious, 167, 159. Abstract Truths and matter of flwt, how distin- guished, »14. Accidental Events of which we know not the laws, so termed, 244. Action, This world a theater of; 150. As distinguished fh)m the thing done, the chief objeet of religion, 289. Actions, Meaning of the term iu moral quea- tion^86& PleMore and pain the consequences of oar, 69, 70. To be distinguished from theh- moral quality, as virtuous or vicious, 9i^ The provision made that all their bad consequences should not always tually follow, 262. Will and design constitute their nature as such, 867. Distinguished from events, 86S. What, exercise the principle of virtue, 146. Outward and inward, 128. Aflbctions, Patticular, form part of our inward frame, 186. In what respects subject, of right, to conscience, 186. Necessarily excited by the preeence of their objecta, 187. Need reetnint, 187. 8eePaMi(m«. Affliction, The proper discipline fur resignation, 148.1457 Butler's, a work demanded by the times in which it was written, page 21. Force of the argument in the, 22. Topics embraced in the, 42. The objection against, as being ansatis- fectory, answered, 340, 841. Upon what principles the argument in IS conducted, 842, 843. In general, a just and conclusive mode of reasoning, 86, 87. Origen's remark upon, 37. May reasonably be admitted to deter- mine our judgment, 35. Lays us under an obligation to regard it in practice, 85. Requires the cases compared to be ap- parently similar in the respects which are the ground of inference, 64, 217. Plan of the, examined in this treatise, 42,48. What is assumed in this, 38. Can directly only show things credible as matters of fact, 164. Yet suggests an answer to objections against the goodness and wisdom of the Divine conduct, 172. Whether it would be lilcely to Influence men's practice, 345. This unlikelihood, thoujjh granted, no decisive objection against its use, 842. Design of; not to justify God's provi- dence, but to show our duties, 887. When a|)pli('d to religion, superior to hypothesis and speculation, 87-89. Affords no ground for believing that death will destroy our living pow- ers, 49. Confirms the proof of the indiscerptl- bility of living agents, 62. Of the case of brutes no objection. 68 60i Of vegetables, 64. Gives credibility to the doctrine of fu- ture rewanls and pim!s)iment», 76. Answers objections against future pun Ishmentfl, 77-81. Between our state of trial in our teiu poral and religious capacities, 114. In respect of the sources of danger, 116, 116. In respect of men's beuavior under It, 117, 118. In respect of difficulties mcreased by outward circumstances, US, 119. 378 Inlex. Analogy,— continued. Force of, in answering objections, and raising a positive presumption, page 122. Suggests that this life is a preparation for another, 124-184. Although we saw not how, 184. Leads us to expect that the future state will be a communiiy, 135. May subsist between limitations of pos- sible perfectibility in moral character, and powers bodily and intellectual, m. Of the waste of seeds, as answering the objection, that the present state is not, to many, a discipUne in virtue, 146 Between the speculative reason and the moral understanding, 166. Argument from, not affected by the scheme of necessity, 162-172. Answers objections against the wisdom and goodness of God's government, indirectly, 171. Between God's natural and his moral government, as to their vastness and incomjirehensibleness, 172, 174. Between the natural and the moral world, as regards means and ends, 177, 178. What objections it cannot answer di rectly, 171. AfFoi-ds no argument against the gen eral scheme of Christianity, 212. No presumption from, against a reve lation at the beginning of the world, considered as miraculous, 215-217. Supposed presumptions against raira cles answered, 217-221. Shows ol)jection gainst Christianity it- self, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, to be frivolous, 22»-226. Makes it probable that, if we judge of Christianity by preconceived expec- tations, we shall find many things seeming liable to objections, 225, 226. Between natural information and in- spiration, 226, 227. More particularly between the limita- tions and hinderanccs of natural in- formation and the instruction afford- ed us by revelation, 230, 283. Between the use of miraculous gifts and the use of the gifts of memory eloquence, etc., 231, 232. Makes it credible that the Scripture contains truths as yet undiscovered, 238. Between Christianity, as a remedial system, and the natural remedies for disease, 236, 286. Answers objections against the wisdom of the means used by Christianity, 243. Makes it credible that the Christian dispensation may have been all along carried on by general laws, 2"" Analogy, —continued . Answers objections against Christian- ity, as being a slowly operating and complicated scheme, page 246, 247. Removes all presumption against the general notion of a Mediator, 249. Makes it aupposable that future pun- ishment may follow vice by way of natural consequence, 250. Shows that we liave no reason to be- lieve that repentance alone will pre vent future punishment, 255, 256, Answers the objection that the death of Christ represents God as indiffer ent whether he punishes the inno- cent or the guilty, 266-270. Shows that we cannot expect to have the like information concerning God's conduct as concerning our own duty, 269, 270. Answers objections from the wan^ of universality in revelation and the doubtfulness of its evidence, 271,272. Of a prince sending directions t » his servants, whether applicable to God, 289. Between prophecy and satirical and mythologic writing, 809, 310. Between a prophet and a compilei of memou's, 810. Objections against arguing fi»m the analogy of nature to religion, 888- 346. See Objections. Antiquity Of religion, as one of its evidences, 164, Antoninus, M. Quoted, 63, 867 n. Aristotle, Quoted, 186, n. Arnobius, Quoted, 800 n. Atonement, Our ignorance of the manner in which the ancients understood it to be made, 265. See Sacrifice. Attention, Moral, how exercised and disciplined by the circumstances of our trial, 143. Necessary when we consider Christi- anity, 314. Anguistine, Quoted, 198, n. Author of Nature, Eadstence of, assumed in this treatise. S8. Rtveals himself to as as a righteous Governor, 86. Is deliberate in his operations, 246, 247 Index. 379 Bayle, P., Probably referred to by Batler^ 88, n Quoted, pa^e 60, n. Behavior, Of men in their present state of trial, 117, 118. Benevolence, Absolute, defined: whether it Is the only character of God, 85. God's, toward us, how limited, 86. The want of It, not the whole of virtue arid Tlce, 372, 873. Active principle of, the most excellent of all virtuous principles, 875. True, implies a regard to justice and veracity, 101, 102. Berkeley, Bishop, Quoted, 91 n, 15S n. Body, Our present, relation oi^ to us not nec- essary to thinking, 52. Bodies. Our organized, may be presumed to be no part of ourselves, 62. Made up of organs and instruments of perception and motion, 55-58. BosweU, His life of Johnson quoted, 828 n. Brahmins, Their notion of death, 68, n. Brown, Dr. John, 91, n. Brute Force, Natural tendency of reason to prevail over, 99-102. Brutes, Question of their natural Immortality argued, 58, 59. Instinct of, superior in some things to the reason of men, 280. Have no reflex sense of actions, as dis- ttngnished from events, 280. Oato, Quoted, 61. Certainty, Moral, hl«heet degree of probable evi- dence, 88. What it means, 86. Chalmers, Dr., Quoted. 84,91, 118, 117, 120, 124, 188, 181. 219, 222, 292. Chance, la reality do such tUo* m, 244. Changes, Which we ha>e ah-eady undergone afford a presumption in favor of a future existence, page 45, 50-68. The, which various creatures may un- dergo without destruction, 46, 46. Character, What is meant by, 160 n. Our capability of forming a new, 181 Of virtue and piety, a necessary quail fication for a ftiture state, 184. Our capacity of improvement therein, 135-142. Our moral, to be manifested to the cre- ation by means of a state of trial, 160 Childhood, A state of discipline for mature age, 182. Christ, Our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, 204. The scriptural representation of his in- terposition as M ediator, 260-262. His prophetical, regal, and priestly of- fices, 26:3, 264. His sacrifice not an allusion to the Mo- saic sacrifices, 264. Ground of the effic \cy of his sacrifice not oxi)l!iined in .cripture, 264. Objection against the death of, ass pro- pitiatory sacrifice, 266-270. Sufferings of, voluntary, 267. Christians, Primitive, their conversion and zeal, as proving the reality of the Scripture miracles, 299, 800. Christianity, Not, if it be fh>m God, of small Impor- tance, 194. A republication of natural religion, and with what circumstances of advan- tage, 194-201. Has brought life and Immortality to light, 196. Preserves the knowledge of religion for all ages, by means of a visible Church, 197. Good efiects of, not smaU, and alleged ill effects do not pTOj)erly belong to it, 199. Contains an account of a dispensation not discoverable by reason, carried on by the Son and Spirit, 201. Enjoins, ir. consequence, new duties, not otherwise to be ascertained, 201, 202. No presumption against the general scheme of, whether considered mir- aculous or not, 212-216. None, be- cause It is not discoverable by reason or ex|>ori('nce, 21.S, 216. None, be- cause it is unlike the known course of nature. 214. 216. 38o Index. Christianity, — continued. Objections against, as distinguished from objections against Its evidence, frivolous, page 228. True question concerning is, whether it be a real revelation, not whether it is such a one as we might have ex- pected, 227. What objections against, would be va- lid, 228. Practical part of, plain and obvious, 233. Objections against, from the long delay of its publication to the world, 234. Objections against the goodness and windom of, not valid, ^. 245. See Revelation^ R&tealed Religion. Cliristiaii Dispensation, The, may appear natural to some be- ings in the universe, 66. OUurch, The visible, design of the institution of, 19T, 198. The caiTylng out of its design implies positive institutions, 198. Men are bound to become members of the, 200. Circumstantial evidences of Christian- ity, 292, 314. Often as convincing as direct testimo- ny, 830. Coincidence of natural and revealed re- Ugion, 224, 2=33. Coincidences of Scripture, 296. Cicero, Quoted, 67. Clarke, Dr. Samuel, His " Demonstration," 154 n. Coleridge, Quoted, 98 n, 103 n. Collins, Anthony, Quoted, 51 n. Comparison, In what we are apt to be misled by a comparison of things of greater or less impoi-tance, 210. What, the ground of our moral percep- tions and ill desert, 869. Compassion, Evidence of, in the original constitution of the world, 252. Unhappiness the natural object o^ 870. Conscience, What proof It aflFords of God's moral government, 92, 9S. How it appears that we have the fecnl- ty so called, 365, 866. Includes both a sentiment of the un- derstanding and a perception of the heart, 866. Has for its object actions, 366, 367. Conscioxisness, Indivisibility ol^ a proof of the indivisi • bility of the conscious being, p&ge 51. Does not constitute personal identity, but ascertains it to ourselves, SMs 359. The doubt on this subject shown to be groundless, 859. Contemplation Of the theory of virtue may harden the heart, 128. Continuance Of all things, natural presumption in favor of, 47. Correspondence Between our nature and our condition necessary to life and happiness, 125. Creation, Scripture begins with the, in order to ascertain for us the true object of our worship, 815. Creature, Notion of an upright and finitely per- fect one, 187. In what way such a one may fall, 139. Credibility Of a truth or matter of fact, distin- guished from the wisdom and good- ness of it, 171. Crooks, G. R., Quoted, 192 n. Dangers, Implied in our state of probation foi a future life, 118. Perception of, a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution, 129. Daniel, The book o^ referred to, 812. Had probably greater external evidence formerly than what has come down to us, 312. Death, Known to us only in some cf its effects, 49. Not likely, from any thing we know, to destroy living agents, 48. Noi ttiefr present powers of reflection, 60, 61. Nor even to suspend the xe ercise of those powers, 62-64. Like our birth, may put us into a more enlarged state of life, 68. Notion of the Brahmins concerning. 63 n. Definitions Sometimes sei-ve only to perplex, 857. Degradation, Marks of our being in a stato ot 119, 120. Index. 381 Demonstration, As disUogaisbed from probable evi- dence, page 88. Descartes, An example of those thinkers who would frame a world upon liypoth- esis, 8S. Desert, €k)od and ill, th« perception o£ de- fined. 868. Deetruction Of living powers, what it means, 48 n. Different Degrees of evidence in religious mat- tt^rs consistent with Justice, 274. Difference Of men's situations in religious mat- ters, to be accounted for in the same manner as their diflferent situations in other respects, 276. Would not be prevented, though reve- lation were universal, 277. Difficulties • As to tlie evidence of religion, are anal- ogous to those attending the practice of it, 282. These may be the principal part of some persons' trial, 2S4. In religion, unreasonable to expect to have thorn all cleared, 340-842. Discipline, Effect ot, to improve the principle of vhtue in us, 188. Needed by upright creatures, 186-140. Indispensably necessary for corrupt creatures, 142. This world peculiarly fit to be a place ot, for our moral improvement, 142- 14Si Diseases Of the boearance8 of a, in nature, 119. Our condition resulting from the, does not afford just matter of complaint, 119. The Christian dispensation grounded upon the supposition of a, 257. The scriptural account of it analogous and conformable to what we see and experience, 260. Falseb t>od. The several kinds of it, page 304. Whether the use of certain forms of speech is, 375. FataUst, The, His scheme of the world stated, 158. Shown, liy pertinent examples, to be absurd in practice, 156-159. His objection to the justice of punish- ments refuted, 160. Religious and irreligious fataliste (Lis tinguished, 169, 170. Fate. See N'ecessity. Fear and Hope, Legitimate moral motives, 147. Of future punishment and reward, can- not be got rid of by greater part of the world, 94. Final Causes, The notion of, does not always implv that the end designed is answered, 146. , The pleasures and pains attending our actions, instances of, 76. The proof from, of the existence oi God, not destroyed by the schemes of necessity, 164, 155. Fitness, Moral, Whether, and in what jsense, it deter mines the will of God, 168 n. The proof of religion from, not in- sisted on in this treatise, 168, 343. And unfitness of actions, in what sense understood, 869, 870. Fitzgerald, Professor, Quoted, 88, 37, 46, 71, 87, 104, 108, 111, 130, 136, 158, 169, 171, 191, 196, 206, 216, 283, 239, 294, 823, 366. FoUy, Defined and shown to be akm to vice, 370, 371. Of mankind, as to present and future interests compared, 116, 117. Future State, A, will probably be a social one, 65, 135. Question of, why so important to us, 69. Three questions rt lative to, considered, 62 n. Demonstration at, not of itnelf a prooj of religion, 66. Yet implied in re- ligion, 66. Security of the g< od in, may be de rived from the habits formed in a state of probation, 148. This Uf' 9 state of discipline for, p 1 ch. V Index 383 Pntnre Reward& and FTinish- ments, Will differ only in degree from those of our present state, page 109. Ab conceived by natural reason, and as specially described in Scripture. 80 n. Future Pmushmentfl, G«neral consideration of, belongs to natural religion, 110. Doctrine of; shown by analogy to be altogether credible. 77-81. May follow vice, by way of natural consequence, 250. Refonnjition and repentance alone In- suflBcient to prevent them, 2&6, See runuhmenU. General Laws, The manifest wisdom of carrying on the natural government of the world by means o^ 179. Interruptions of, would produce evil and prevent good, 180. Credible that the Christian dispensation may have been, all along, carried on bv. 24^-245. Mbracles may proceed from, 244. Only from analogy that we conclude the whole course of nature to be car- ried on by, 244. Gifts, Superior, not always bestowed on per- sons of prudence and decency, 281, God, True Idea oi; that of a governor, 76. His e.xistence: Why taken for granted in this treatise, Sa Hi« existence: Not disproved by the scheme of fatalism, 153, 154. His existence: In what sense necessa- ry, 154. Hl8 will: How determined, 163 n. His will may be considered as absolute or conditional, 270. Resignation to his will, an essential part of virtue. 148, 149. What temper of mind in us corre- sponds to his sovereignty, 149. His ciaracter, what is meant by, as applied to him, 160. Hto goodness: .May seek to make only the good happy, 72. His goodness shown by experience to be DO good ground for expecting him to make us happy all at once, 160. Does not give us the same information ooDoerning his conduct as concernlnir otur duty, 269. 270. Dictates of conacienoe concerning, the Uws of; 182. Onr dattes to God the Father: to the Bm, Is omitted In this treatise, 848, 844. hopUed in the constitution of the world, and our condition therein, 15S. Doctrine oi; shows where the fiillacy UeH in the scheme of necessity, when reduced to practice, 167. Lift, Our preMoL a probation for a future one. As Implying trial and danger, limi22. As intended for moral dis- cipline. 125-150. For the manlfesU- tion of cliaraeter, 150. Bee FiUurt Life. 26 Likeness, Various species oi; defined, page 88 n. Living Powers, Twofold sense of the phrase, 48 n. Our, not likely to be destroyed bv death, 4S-64. ' ' Their not being exercised, does nrt imply their non-existence, 49. Locke, Quotation from his chapter on Proba- bility, 84. His notion of personal identity exam- ined, 860, 86r ' ^^ Locomotive Powers, to what they properly belong, Mo hammedanism Was not received In the world on the footing of public miracles, 298. Maimonides, Quoted, 174 n. Manasses, Prayer of, quoted, 269 n. Mandeville, Dr., Quoted, 91 n. Man, An Inferior part of creation, 119. Capable of improvement, 185. Connected wltn present, past, and fu- ture, 184. Dealt with as if free. 158. Has a moral nature, 96. His foil not accounted for by his bee agency, '"" Knows nothing fully, 174. " ■ lifled for new states. May become quail 126. Not a competent Judge of the schemes of God, 175. Eequires moral culture, 185. Accepted according to what he hath, 276. His circumstances no ground of com- plaint, 277. His obligation to study the Scriptuies, 211,290. Must bo renewed, 205. Martyrs, The primitive : their sufi'erlngB a testi- mony to the truth of the Christian miracles, 299, 80U. Matter, Indlscerptibllltj of Its elementary par- ticles by any natural power, 58. Our being affected by, does not prove It to be part of ourselves, 68 See Body. 386 Index. Matter of Pact, The system of religion viewed as, irre- spective of all specu.ation, page 161. Distinguished from abstract ti-uth, 811. Objections to Christianity as, answered. Part II, chap. lii. Means and Ends, Events are related to each other as, 177. Our incompetency, prior to experience, to judge of either, 178. No presimiption against the wisdom of the means used by Christianity, 243. The objection that they are complicat- ed, and of slow operation, answered, Mediator, No presumption firom the course of na- ture against the general notion of a, 249. Scripture view of his office, 260-264. Christian doctrine of, in what respect most objected to, 266. This objection answered, 267-270. See Sacrifiee. Microscopes and G-Iasses, Our organs of perception compared with, 55, 65. MiU, J. S., Quoted, 218 n. Miracles Prove the system of natural religion as well as the revealed, 195, 196. No presumption against, at the begin- ning of the world, 215, 216. The incarnation of Christ an invisible mkacle, 214. No argument from analogy against, after the settlement of the course of nature, 217. No greater presumption against, than against ordinary fects before proo^ 219. Occasions may arise for, in the coarse of ages, 220. The moral system of the world gives distinct reasons for, 220. Must be compared with the extraordi- nary phenomena of nature, 220. May be subject to general laws, 244, 245. The Christian, are recorded in books of authentic, genuine history, 293-296. The reali^ and truth of, affirmed in the epistles of St. Paul, 296, 297. Oliristianity first preached and received upon the allegation of, 297-300. Mohammedan and Popish not parallel, 298, 299. Scripture history gives the same evi- dence for, as for common facts, 298. Truth of them, accounts for the his- tory, 295. How referred to in St. Paul's epistles, 397. Miracles, — coiitinued. What proof of their reality from the conversion and zeal of the first Chris- tians, page 299. Miraculous Gifts, tn the apostolic age; the objection from their disorderly exercise an- swered, 281, 232. What events, seemingly natural, may be so esteemed, 826. Mistakes Of transcribers of Scripture: no more than were to have been expected In books of such antiquity, 823. Moral Action, whether the nature of, can be altered by a command, 237. Duties, arise from revealed relations, as weU as from those made known by reason, 206. Faculty, our: its dictates the laws oi God, hi a sense including sanctions, 162. Hence, aflbrds a proof of religion not to be invalidated by fatalism, 162. See Conscience. Government. See Government. Evil, voluntary in its very notion, 124. Our inability to account for, 124. Part of religion, why preferred in Scripture to the positive, 208-211. Precepts. See Positi/oe. Understanding, our, Uable to be im- paired and perverted, 166. Morality, Of Scripture, reason competent to judge of, 236, 287. Of actions, depends chiefly on the in- tention of the agent, 865, 366. Partly, also, on a comparison of his in- tentions with his nature and capaci- ties, 367. Motion, Supposed iadivlsible, compared with consciousness, 51. Mysteries To be expected, if we judge from ox perience, in such a scheme as Chria tianity, 224, 248. As great in nature as in Christianity, 244, 245, 266-270. Nature, Light of, insufficient, 191. Teachings of; as to a future state, and the efficacy of repentance, 79 n, 254- 257. Course of; implies an operating agent, 78,252. No presumption against revealed relig- ion, from its being unlike the, 218, 214. Index. 387 N atore, — continued . How ascertained to be by general laws, pages 248, 244. Is not a fixed, but a progresaiTe scheme, 66. Our ignorance of the causes, etc., on which it depends 220. We know not what is the, upon the first peopling of worlds, 215. As a source of oar trial, 115, 116. Natural, - Trne sense of the term, 65. Our notion of what is, may be enlarged by a greater knowledge of the works and the providence of God, 65. God's natural government probably subservient to his moral, 174. Religion, Christianity a republication, and an external institution, of, 194- 200. See Oovemment— Religion. Necessary Existence of God, In what sense to be understood, 154. Necessity, Opinion of, Butler's mode of consider- ing, 152. Does not exclude deliberation and choice, 154. Does not destroy the proof of an intelli- gent author and governor of nature, 156. Supposed reconcilable with the coarse of^ture, is reconcilable also with the »ystem of religion, 155-160. Does not destroy the j>roof of religion, 161-164. However true in speculatiou, yet shown by experience to be false in practice, The attributes of veracity, benevolence, and justice In God, reconcilable with 160. The conclusion fW>m, that it is incred- ible that God should reward and pun- ish a^ fiUlacioos, 166, 168. In what sense deetractive of religion, and in what sense not, 169. Negligence No more excusable in matters of re- vealed, than of natural relitcion, 200. I«on« source of oar dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, 286, "^ST. Newman, Quoted, 256 n. Dbjeotions, Against a proof, and against the thing to be proved, different, 49, How ftu- analogy answers both, in the case of religion, 42. Against the wisdom and goodness of things, not directly answered by anal- ogy. "1. Objections, — continued. Against the scheme of Christianity, as distinguished from its evidence, gen- erally frivolous, pagos 212, 222-22T. What would be valid, 228. Drawn from ignorance, when pecnlisr- ly absurd, 269. What qualifications requisite for the due considering, 288. May be seen through, though not cleared up, 288. Againsc the whole way of reasoning fi:t)m analogy of nature to religion, considered. Part II, chap. viii. 1. That it does not clear up dlfflcul ties, 834. 2. That it does not show the evi- dence of religion not to be doubt- ful, S86-888. 8. That it does not vindicate God's character, 838. 4. That it is not satisfactory, 840. 6. That it is not likely to have influ- ence, 342. Against our natural immortality from the case of brutes, 58. From that of vegetables, 64. Aganst the credibility of fhturo punish* ments, 77. Against the final triumph of virtue, 108. Against this world's being a state of tri^ how answered by analogy, 122. A state of discipline in virtue, from ignorance of the mode, 134. From its proving, in fact, a discipline in vice, 145. From its being a discipline in self-love, 147. No practical, fi-om the scheme of neces- sity, against religion, 152, 168. Against the scheme of Providence, gen erally mere arbitrary assertions, 176. Drawn ftom seeming irregularities in the moral world, answered by the analogy of the natural, 177. Against the dispensations of Provi- dence, how far we are concerned to answer them, 888. Against Christianity, fh)m the suffi- ciency of the light of nature, 191, 192. Agahist its proof, from the supposed incredibility of miracles, 212-220. Why the matter of Christianity must appear liable to. Part II, chap. ili. From the unequal distribution of relig- ious knowledge, 226. From its complex contrivances and slow development, 284. From supposed immorality of some of Its precepts, 286. From its disappointing sntldpatlonA, From tno abuse of miraouloas gifts, 281. From its being perverted, and having little influence, 1». From its mysteriousness, 241, 269. From lU want of universality, «7»-27«l 388 Index. Objections, — continued. From supposed deficiency of proolj pages 2S0-291. Against the Scripture doctrine of a Me- diator, Part II, chap. v. Against Christ's sacrifice, as involving an unjust punishment of the inno- cent for the guilty, 266. This objection, if of force, would hold more strongly against the course of nature. Why? 26T. 'Against the particular evidence for ChrLitianity, Part II, chap. vii. Against the evidence for miracles, 299- 804. From enthusiasm, 801-303. From the mixture of enthusiasm and knavery, 803. From stories of false miracles, 304, 305. To the evidence of prophecy, 296-313. From the obscurity of some parts of prophecy, 807. From the application of particular prophecies not appearing when con- sidered each distinctly, 308, 809. From the supposition that the proph- ets intended something else, 810-812. Against Christianity offered in conver- sation, what advantage they have, 332. Obligations Of duty, arising from the supposable- ness or credibility of religion, 182, 278, 279. Our, to the Son and Holy Spirit, from what they arise, 202, 203. Obscurities Ln the Scriptures, no valid objection against them, 228, 229, Optimism, Keligious and irreligious, distinguished, 87 n. Origen, His observation relative to the Script- ures and nature, 87. Passions, As making part of our state of trial, 116. Are excited toward particular objects, whether we will or no, 186. Bare excitement of, not criminal, 187. Yet always dangerous, 137. The principle of virtue the intended security against this danger, 137. How the fall may be accounted for from them, 139. Supposable that they may remain In a future state, 138. Are often inconsistent with reasonable self-love, as well as with virtue and religion, 116. Passive Impressions Grow weaker by repetition, 128. Were intended to lead to the formation of active, practical habits, 128, 130. Paul, Saint. His testimony: to bo oonsidered as de- tached from that of the rest of the apostles, page 297. His epistles: evidence of their genu- ineness, 296. A distinct proof of Christianity to be derived from them, 296. Perception, Our organs of sense merely the instru- ments of, 55. Our power of, in dreams, without the organs of sense, 56. Ridiculous to dispute the truth of our perceptions, 864. Perfect Creatures described, 139. May be im- proved by habits of virtue, 140. Moral government, what is, 86. Perfection Of religion, what, 889. Of moral government, 85. Person Defined, 60. Sameness of, independently of all con- sideration of consciousness, 857. Personality, Whether constituted by consciousness, Plato Quoted, 57. 93. Pleasure and pain The consequence of our own actions, 70. The annexing of, to our actions, the proper notion" of government, 75. Pleasure, attending the gratification of our passions, whether and how far intended to put us upon gratifying them, 74. Attached to actions when a reward, 85,98. Whether our pleasures overbalance our pains, 840. See Happinesa. Porphyry. His objections to the book of Daniel, 812, 813. Positive Institutions Implied in the notion of a vLsiblc Church, 197. Are founded on natural religion, as well as on revealed, 207, 208. au general, have the nature of moral commands, 207. Mankind prone to place the whole of religion in the observance of, with- out regard to moral, precepts, 208. Great presumption to make light of; 210. Index. 389 Positive —CO ntinu cd . Precepts, wherein different from moral, paee 206. In what cases tbey must yield to moral, 207, 208. Duties, distinguished from moral, 206. And moral duties should be compared no further than as they are different, 207. Christ's decision upon the relation be- tween them, 209, 210 Powers May be improved by exercise, 127. May be overtasked, 145. May exist and not be exercised, 49. No reason for suppoamg that death will destroy them, 50. Practice, By what e\idence matters of, are de- termined, 886, 837, 840-342. In matters of; their importance is al- ways to be considered. 36, 831. In matters of, less proof than convinces judgment should influence behavior, 85, 278, 279, 291. Precepts, None in Scripture, contrary to immu- table morality, 237. Prejudices, Several sorts of^ 803. May hinder us from being rightly In- formed upon moral and reli/i^ioua sub- jects, 286, 286. Arising from contempt and scorn, weak- ness of yielding to them, 813. Present existence Affords a presumption of continuance, 47. Presumption, A slight, does not beget that degree of conviction, implied in calling a thing proljably true, 88. The slightest possible, of the nature of probability, 88. That death will destroy u^ 50. Tliat it will suspend our existence, 62. Presumptuousness UnjuBtiflAble, 88. Priest, Christ described as our, 2C3, 264. Probable evidence Defined and distinguished from demon- stration, 88.' Foundation of, 88. RelatlTe to finite beings only, 85. M«a, of neoMsity, Influenced and gov- araed by, both in .speculation and In pnctioe, 8S, M. Probable prooth, being added together, multiply the erldenoe, 880. Probation, The peculiar, of persons of a reflective cast of mind, page 284. Implied in religion, 290. Religion, considered as a probation, has had its end on all persons to whom It has been proposed, with evidence suf- ficient to influence practice, 842. See Trial. Prophecy, The primary design of the prophecies recorded in Scripture. 195. How they confii-m natural religion, 195. Proof of foresight from the completion of intelligible i)arts of prophecy, not invalidated by the obscurity of others, 807. The proof of foresight made out by a general completion of, 307, 808. The applicability of a long scries o^ to certain events, a proof that it was In- tended of them, 308, 809. The analogy, in this respect, between prophecy and satirical and mytholog- ical composition, 809, 810. How particular prophecies wore inter- preted by the ancient Jews and the primitive Christians, 809. Proof from, not destroyed bv showing that the prophets applied them to other events than we do, or that we do not apply them to right ones, 81C, 811. Of the future condition of the Jews, confirmed by their past and present history, 826, 327. The qualifications requisite to t-ike the force of the argument from, 827. Conformity between the prophecies and the events, not accidental, 330. Prophet, A, compared with a compiler of mem- oirs received from another person, 810. Christ a, in what sense, 268. Providence, Never hasty, 24S n. Objections to, useless. The course of, jirogressive^ 248. See God. Prudence, Meaning of the word, 870. When a course of action may be called prudent, .542. And impnidcnee. akin to virtue and vice, 90, 869, 870. Public spirit. The true notion of, 101. Punishment, The proper notion of. 76. Natural, circuinstanj-e.i in, analogous to what religion temihes of future 77-81. 390 Index. Punishment — continued Of vice, as folly, page 89. As mischiev- ous to society, 90, 91. Of vice, as sucli^ 91-94. Of virtuous persons, and of virtuous actions, by society explained, 91. Wliy, in tlie natural course of things, punishment does not always reach the vicious, 98. Ascribed, In Scripture, to God's Justice, 252. Future. See Future Punishment. V'caricus, instances of, in the daily course of Providence, 267. As the method of our redemption ; the objection against, answered, 266-269. What is meant by deserving punish- ment, 36S, 869. Reason, Can, and ought to judge of the meaning, tlie evidence, and the morality of Scripture, 236, 237. Natural tendency of, to prevail over brute force, 99, 100. Inability of, to determine for us wheth- er the future punishment of sin could be prevented, 254, 255. Hopes and fears of, confirmed by rev- elation. 257, 25S. A very incompetent judge of the con- duciveness of means to ends, 177. Could not have discovered the scheme of Christianity, 203. No presumption against the scheme of Christianity on this account, 213. An incompetent judge of what was to be expected in revelation, 222, 228. Incompetent to judge beforehand, how revelations should have been left in the world, 226-228. Fouy of objections to Christianity, upon supposed principles of reason, 349. Reasoning, Upon the principles of others, what it Abstruse, when necessary in matters of religion, 857. Uj-on the course of nature, Avithout at- tending to known facts, apt to be fal- lacious, 87. See Abstract. Redemption, Scripture doctrine of, stated, 260-265. Illustrated by the analogy of natural remedicH, 252. Agreeable to our natural notions, our holies and our fears, 256-258. The manner of its efficacy not made known, nor discoverable by reason, etc., 265. Rashness of seeking to explain it far- ther than Scripture has done, 265. Bee Mediator, Puavishmeut, tkicrU Jlce. Reflection, Our present powers of^ not likely tc be destroyed or suspended by des th. pages 60, 61. Does not depend upon our bodily pow- ers of sensation, 62. May be improved by death, 63. Reformation Does not always preclude punishment, Regard Due to the Son and Holy Sphit, 202. Due to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, 203. Relations, Of the several species and Individuals in the natural world, impossible for us to say how far they extend, 173, 174. The revealed relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit to us, 201. Duties arising from, strictly moral, 202, 203. Religion, The whole of, consists in action, 288. A practical thing, 836. Wherein it consists, 836. External and internal, 202. Essence of natural religion, 202. Kevealed, 202. Whereinthe general spirit of, consists, 210. The perception of, what, 339. The stress of, where laid by Scriiiture, 209. In what view considered by Butler, 340. How religion presupposes integrity in those who embrace it, 341. If founded in God's moral character, 161. Implies a future state, 66. Would not be proved by even a demon- strative proof of one, why, (qIo. Implies God's government by rewards and punishments, 76. Implies God's perfect moral govern- ment, 108. Proper proof of, in this view. 109-112. Collateral and practical proof, 108-11'i. Teaches our being in a state of pro- bation, 113. As a matter of fact, proof of, 161. Obligations not destroyed by the opin- ion of necessity, 162. Proper motives to, 189, 190. Affords distinct particular reasons for miracles. 220. Degrees of knowledge of religion dlf ferent among different men, 272-274. Why its evidence may have been left doubtful, 28^287. Such doubtfulness does not destroy its obligation, 278. Its importance, 189. Index. 391 Religion — eoutinued. Impugned on sapposed principles of reason, page 848. Origin of, according to hisUiry and tra- dition, 165-217. Gener.1l trutli of, proved by a dilemma from its state in the first ages of the world, 166. Stote of; in the heathen world, 191. Apparently uncorrupted in the first ages, I60. yatural, the system of, what, 42, 48, 164,820. Not the only object of our regard, 193. Hiis external evidences, 166. Whether it could have been reasoned out, 191, 821. Taught by Christianity In Its purity, 194, 195. How confirmed by the miracles and prophecies reconied in Scripture, 195. Ilow promoted by the settlement of a visible Church, 197, 19a General proof o£ level to common men, 287. The obligations of, as included by Chris- tianity, lie obvious to all apprehen- sions, 854. What it teaches of a future life, and what not, 79, 80 n. Of the efficacy of repentance. 255. The profession and establisimient o^ how much owing to Scripture, 820. Even in countries not acknowledging the authority of Scripture, 821. Proof ot, from reason, not destroyed hereby, 821. Analogy o^ properly u.sed to remove objections to revealed, 834, 885. Uevealed, See Revelation. Rbligious knowledge.* See Knowledge— Analogy. Remedies, Some diseast-a are, 179. Analogy between natural, and Chris- tianity, as a remedial provision for us, 585, 236. The provision of, an instance of com- pas-sion in the original constitution of the world, 353. Repentance, Its insufficiency to expiate guilt argued from analogy, 257. Argued also from the general sense of mankind, 267. Its efficacy, whence derived, 244. Resignation To G<>d'B will an essential part of vir' toe, 147. AlOic lions, the proper discipline for, 149. Prosperity ana imagination may give occasion for, 14^. Revelation, The particular scheme of the universe cannot b(> known without, 106. Revelation — continaed. Would not have been given if the light of n.iture rendered it superfluous, page 191. Manifestly not superfluous, 192. The great service it renders to natural religion, 194-199. Republishes and confirms natural re- ligion in its purity, 194-196. Supplies new means for its preservation, 197-199. If really given, cannot be safely neglect ed, 194. Itself, in what sense miraculous, 215. At the beginning of the world, whether miraculous, 215. No presumption from analogy against such a, 215, Primitive, bow far the belief of pure re- ligion in the first age of the world favors the notion of one, 165. Historical and traditionary evidence of; as ancient as history, 165, 217. The early pretenses of false, probably imply a true one, 165. Supposed presumption against, as mi- raculous, considered. Part II, cbap. ii. We are incompetent judges of .what were to be expected in a, Part II, chap. iii. What reason can judge of in a revelation, Discovers new relations, and conse- quently imposes new duties, 201-20:3. Probable origin of sacrifices, 264. Revealed religion (The Christian) a fit subject of analog- ical reasoning, 88. What is implied in the scheme of, 42, 48, 204, 205, 212, 241. 242, May be considered as wholly historical, 815. Summary of, under that view, 815-817. Internal, as distinguished from natural, wherein the essence of, consists, 198. No presumption against its general scheme lh>m the analogy of nature, 212. A particular scheme under the general plan of Providence, 241. Consists of various parts, and is carried on through a length of time, 241. Supposes mankind in a state of degrar datton, 284, 250, 259. The help of tlid'Holy Spirit necessary to renew our nature, 2o6. Bepentance naturallv insufficient to present alt the bad consequences of sin, 204, 205, 257-259. Its dispensation, whether carried on by general laws, 243, 244. Mav appear natural to some beings, 65. Evidence ot See Evidence. Objections to. See Ohjecti'mn. Analogy of, t4» natural, and the oon- Btitution and course of A luilogy. 392 Index, Rewards and punisluneiits, According to the natural constitution of things, correspond to virtue and vice, page 98. Though not equally distributed now, yet, in all probability, will be hereafter, 102. Hope of reward, a legitimate motive to obedience, 147. See Punishment. Ridicule, How, obstructs men's seeing the evi- dence of religion, 285. Though applied to show the argument from analogy in a disadvantageous light, yet cannot invalidate it, T5, 846. Roman Empire, Plainly, was divided into about ten parts, 812. Bearing of that circumstance on the prophecy of Daniel, 312. Rome, Babylon, and Greece, How noticed in prophecy, 816. SaciJ^'ifices, Propitiatory, what the general preva- lence of, shows us, 25T. How they originated among the Jews, and other ancient nations, 264. The death of Christ a proper sacrifice. Its fefficacy, 264. Manner of its cflScacy not explained, 265. Objections against it on tiiis gi-ound highly absurd, 265, 266. Bee Mediator. Skepticism Will not justify a presumptuous fear lessness with regard to what may be hereafter, 82. Implies a general state of probation, in the moral and religious sense, 278, 279 The immorality and UTeligion of skep- tics utterly ine.xcusable, 318. How far toward speculative infidelity a skeptic can go, who has had true Christianity, with its proper evidence laid before him, and has considered them, 855. See Doubting. Scorn Of religion, to what owing, 348-356. Qreat weakness to be influenced by it, 818. Parts of the prophetical writings, why treated with, 223. Scripture Considered in an historical view, 315. How distinguished, by its design, from all other books, 315. Why it begins with an account of the creation of the world, 815, 316. Scripture, — continued. In what view, contains an abridgment of the history of the world, page 816. With what its notices terminate, 816, 817. Considering the variety and extent of its matter, its not being confuted fiom reason, history, or intemalinconsist- ency, is a strong prebumption of its truth, 817. Summary of its contents, 318-820. Antiquity of its first part, 821. Its chronology confirmed by the natural and civil history ot the world, 821. Its common history as much confirmed as we could expect by profane history, 822. Has internal appearance of credibility, 322, 823. No more appearances of strangeness, or mistakes of transcribers in Scripture, than in other writings of like antiq- uitjr, 323. Credibility of the common history of Scripture, how it gives credibility to the miraculous, 293, 824. Not always to be interpreted on the same rules as a common book, why ? 211, 310, 811. Its relations of miracles not easily ac- counted for on the supposition of their falsehood, 293, 294. The truth of them, the obvious and di- rect account of their composition and reception, 294. The profession and establishment of nat- ural religion, how far owing to, 320. Some precepts of^ matters of oflPense, why? 237. The province of reason to judge of its morality antf evidence, 286-288. May contain things not yet discovered, 288. The ordinary means of discovering its meaning, 233. The duty of searching, 211. When we may determine the seeming meaning, not the true one, 202. Its authority, the only question con- cerning, 227. See Analogy — Hintory — Inspiration —St. PauPa Epistles— PropJieey- ~ Revelation. Self, Invisible, 50. Its sameness does not depend on the sameness of the body 52, 58. Self-denial, The fact that it is necessary for our present happiness, makes it credible that it may be likewise necessary for our future, 115, 116, 120-122. Necessity of, argued from the nature of particular afi'ections, 139. Productive of resignation to God's will, 147. Index. 393 BeU-love, Reasonable, is cyincideut with virtue, page 13T n. Is dally Been to be overmatched by pas- sion, 116, 13T n. No cause for its being disclaimed by moralists as a motive, 188 n. H as need to be approved and disciplined, 137 n, 148. Shaftesbury, Lord, Ilia '.vTitings referred to, 87. iimplloity, Of a living agent, argument to prove, M. Sin, Why not kept out of the world, 179. Son of Ood The gift of the, to the worid, 268. Sorrow Cannot of itself restore abased benefits, 265. Soul, A simple substance, 51. Not destroyed with the body, 48. Not naturally inmiortal, 50. Brutes, souls o^ 58. Speaking with tongues, 231. Bpecial interpositions of Providence, 179, 180. Speculative dlfflcultiea similar to external temputions, 2S2. The chief trial of some, 284-286. Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, 825. Stages of existence, 46. Standing ministry, what for, 197. State of probation, chap. iv. State of discipline and improvement, chap. V. Strangeness of some Scripture events, 828. Stupidity of tho martyrs, if insincere, 299. Submissive temper necessary, 149. Subordinations exceedingly ben^cial, 182. SabaonienceB in nature, 174. Sabterrifloooe, the world a system oi; 247. SaeccM, temporal, always uncertain, 840. SaffeiingB may be avoided, 70. Not neeeaaary to the cultivation of vir- tue. 118. Sufferings of Christ vindicate God's law, page VJ67. Sufferings of the early Christians, 299. Sufflciency of light of nature pretended, 191. Sumoiary of JeAvish history, 818. Of the historical evidence of Scripture, 823. Supernatunil instructions necessary from the first, 21& Temptations, Implied in the idea of a state of proba- tion, 114. Sources of our, 115-117. Those of our temporal and of our re lif^ous trial compared, 115-122. A means of disciplining the moral prin- ciple, 143. 144. Virtuous habits the proper security against, 136, 187. The supposition of them lessens, in cer- tain cases, the perception of ill-deeert, Tendency, Ambiguity of the word. 111 n. Tendencies of virtue will probably here* after become effect. 111. Testimony, When only It can be destroyed, 806. See EcUIence, Evidence of Christian- Trial, Our, in our temporal, compared with that in our religious capacity, 115- 118. Proceeds In both from the same causes, and has the same effect upon behav- ior. Ill, 118. DlfBculties of, increased by misbehav- ior of others, 118. Also by our own errors and follies, 119. £quitableness of our present state of, vindicated, 118, 119. Not possible for us to understand all tho reasons of our being pl.-vced In, 124. Eni ct, our improvement in virtue and piety, as a qualification for a future state, 125. May also be Intended for the manifes- tation of our characters to the rest of the creation, 151. Tho present state of the evidence of rellgior^ may be part of some men's trial, 276-2S7. Anline in, 145. I^inished as imprudent, 89. As hurt- ful, 90. As vice, 92-97. Whether ever rewarded as such, 92-98. How the ai)pearance of it is brought about, 98. The pleasures of it scarce worth tak ing into account, 189. Passion a sorry excuse for it, 189. Natural bad consequences of, to be es teemed judicial punishments hiflicted by God, 204, Private, may be public benefits, and yet upon the whole it were more bene- ficial that men would refrain from them, 179. Hinderances of its complete punish- ment accidental, 99-109. Must be the misery of every creature. 41. Considwations showing its enormity, 25:3. Vicious Actions never rewarded by society &« cause they are vicious, 91. Persons, prosperity of, reconciled with moral government, »8. Vicioxisness Of the world fits it for a stite of triaJ to good men, page 146, Virtue, Possibility o€ exceptions to ie happi ness of, 88. Social advantages of, a proof of an ep tablished moral government, 94. Conditions necessary to its complete triumph over vice, 100, 101. Its natural tendencies hindered in our present state, 108. May be more ad- vantageously situated hereafter, 104. A bond of union among all endured with it, 104. Happy elTects of, set forth in the in- stance of a perfectly virtuous king- dom, 105, 106. Habit of, not formed by merely think- ing and talking of virtue, 128. And piety a necessary qualification for a future state, 185. Our capa- city of improvement therein, by moral and religious habits, 135. Ne- cessity of improvement argued, 186- 142. Habit of, the security against the undue operation of particular afiiections, 187- 141. There is a universally acknowledj?ed standard of; 367. Corresponds to our notion of good de- sert, 868. Common instances of, do not raise a strong perception of good desert, and why, 869. Prudence a part of, 871, 872. Does not consist entirely in benevo- lence, 872, 873. Virtuous Actions never punished by society be- cause they are virtuous, 91. Persons, afflictions of, how reconciled with moral government, 98. Beings need virtuous habits, 142. Habits a security, 188. How formed, 128. Improve virtue, 138. Neces- sary in a future state, 185. Virtue and Vice Are, in the natural course of things, re- warded and punished, as ftuch, 91. As qualities of actions, eftects of, on men's minds, 92, 94, 96. Tendency of, to produce their effecte in a greater degree than they do at present, 99-108. Overbalance of happiness or misery no the standard of, 373, 374. Voice of nature is for virtue, 99. Warburton, Bishop, Quoted, 91 n, 232 ii. Waste of seedB, 146. Index. 395 Waterland, Dr., Quoted, page 202 n. Wliately, Archbishop, Qaoted, 217 n. Wickedness, May produce some benefits, 179. Volantory, 124 Will and Character, Explained, 160 n. May be aflarmed of the Author of Na- ture, notwithstanding the scheme of necessity, 160. World, The present, fit t > be a state of disci- pline for morai" impi-ovement, pages 142-145. A theater for the manifestation of per- sons' characters, 150. Natural, Intended to be subordinate to the moral, 174. History of, how viewed in Scripture, 315. Governed by fixed la^':8, 90. Wickedness of, 269. Youth. The great importance of right direc- tion in, 78, 182, 188. Its beneficial subordinations, 182. GENERAL LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA— BERKELEY RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewedjbooks are subject to immediate recall. .s:^^ .^^t^'S NOV 6 135411® l5lan'6l0lS UBRARYUSE MOV 10 «82 REC'D i-i-> NOV 1 19li2 18Maf'65BG IN STACKS MAR 4 1955 REC'D Lt) MAR2 6'65-dpM LD 21-lOOm-l, '54(1887816)476 UJ C.\JCC^^J