LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Class 
 
MCDOWELL AND TYLER 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF BULL RUN 
 
 JAMES B. FRY, 
 
 RETIRED. 
 
 Assistant Adj t-General, with Rank of Colonel. 
 
 Brevet-Major-General U. S. A. 
 Adj t-Gen l to Gen l McDowell, from May to Nov., 61. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER, 
 
 1884, 
 
COPYRIGHT, D. VAN NOSTKAND, 18S4. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 AMEMOEIAL volume of the late General Daniel 
 Tyler contains an account by him of the Bull 
 Bun campaign of 1861. This account does great 
 wrong to the commanding General in that campaign. 
 The volume is edited by the distinguished author 
 Donald G. Mitchel. The title page says that "two 
 hundred copies of this volume have been privately 
 printed by Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, New Haven." 
 It is stated in the preface that " the volume opens 
 with a fragment of autobiography written at the in 
 stance of his esteemed friend Major-General George 
 W. Cullum, who proposed preparing from it his biog 
 raphy for the West Point Alumni Association. This 
 fact will explain its comparative reticence with respect 
 to his private lite, and its fullness in military and en 
 gineering details. It is believed that he had fully in 
 tended its completion, but the cares of business and 
 the infirmities of age unfortunately forbade. Yet his 
 friends will recognize in this fragment his straight 
 forwardness; his sturdy outspoken positiveness of 
 opinion ; his ever- active energy ; and they will not be 
 sorry to see, in this record of his, traces of his courage 
 in maintaining his own convictions of his directness 
 
 225759 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 of speech, and of his honest wrath at what he counted 
 (perhaps sometimes hastily) vaporous incompetence, 
 wherever encountered." 
 
 The contents of memorial volumes privately printed 
 are not, usually, proper subjects for criticism. But 
 this is an exception. De mortuis nil nisi bonum is 
 a worthy maxim ; but the living are entitled to some 
 thing. General Tyler wrote an account of the cam 
 paign of Bull Kun, and sent it to General Cullurn 
 for history. General Cullum has not published it, but 
 it has been printed, distributed, deposited in public 
 libraries, and reviewed in at least one newspaper. 
 The subject treated by General Tyler is public, his 
 toric and important. For the foregoing reasons it 
 has been deemed fair to subject his Autobiography to 
 examination by the records, notwithstanding he is 
 dead and his contribution to history appears in a memo 
 rial volume. When a man writing of those associated 
 with him in the defence of his country, makes defama 
 tory allegations which are contradicted by official re 
 ports and sworn statements his own among them, 
 recorded twenty years before dead or alive, his mis 
 takes should be pointed out. 
 
 J. B. F. 
 
 NEW YORK CITY, May, 1884. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 r PHE New York Evening Post some weeks 
 *- ago contained a communication entitled 
 "New Memoirs of the War of the Rebel 
 lion" "Reminiscences of a Gallant Soldier." 
 Under these striking captions a review was 
 given of what is called a memorial volume, 
 "in part an autobiography of the late Gen 
 eral Daniel Tyler." The printing of this 
 volume, it is said in the Post, "illustrates 
 and confirms the correctness of a remark often 
 made, that the true and full history of theWar of 
 the Rebellion cannot be written until sufficient 
 time has elapsed to allow the many diaries, 
 letters and private papers of the chief partici 
 pants in its stirring scenes to be made accessible, 
 consequent upon their death, to the gene 
 ral public. For this volume contains a new 
 and unpublished account of the first battle of 
 Bull Run, July 20, 1861" (should be 21), "and 
 of the preceding skirmish of Blackburn s Ford, 
 July 17" (should be 18), " written by the 
 subject of this memoir, who, it will be remem 
 bered, was in immediate command of the 
 troops engaged in the skirmish, and second 
 
6 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 in command under McDowell on the day of the 
 battle." It is due to McDowell, as well as to 
 history, that the account of Blackburn s Ford 
 and Bull Run here mentioned, written by 
 Tyler himself, under date of May 1, 1881, to 
 be used after his death, and now given to the 
 "general public" by his friends, should be 
 somewhat carefully considered. It is strange 
 that a man of Tyler s ability and experience 
 could, without referring to the records, write, 
 in his memoir, an account of military operations 
 which took place nearly twenty years before. 
 Feeling some apprehension in writing from 
 memory, he says : " This ends my recollections 
 of the battle of Bull Run, and of my official con 
 nection therewith Since it is now some twenty- 
 three" (it was not twenty) " years since this 
 unfortunate battle was fought, I may have 
 made some mistakes, although I think not ; 
 but before completing this memoir I purpose 
 to examine the official reports of that battle, 
 converse with such officers as were connected 
 with me in the contest, and correct any mis 
 takes or errors which may be contained in this 
 part of my memoirs." That he did not suc 
 ceed in correcting all the mistakes and errors, 
 if he made any examination at all, will appear 
 further on. 
 
MCDOWELL -HIS APPOINTMENT- 
 
 HIS ARMY-TYLER. 
 
 WHEN the year 1861 opened, McDowell, 
 forty -three years of age, and in the full 
 vigor of manhood, was a major in the Adjutant- 
 General s Department. His habits were unex 
 ceptionable, and he was blessed with good health 
 and great physical power. Schooled, as a youth, 
 in France, and graduated from the Military 
 Academy (1838), he was always a close student 
 of his profession, and was well informed upon 
 general subjects, but was without political 
 antecedents or acquaintances. He was one of 
 the most active soldiers of his day and gained 
 distinction in the Mexican War. Full of energy 
 and patriotism, when the crisis approached in 
 1861, he was positive in his opinions and clear 
 and forcible in the expression of them. He 
 insisted that all efforts to conciliate would fail, 
 that the Southern States, one after another, 
 would be dragged into secession, that war was 
 inevitable, and that it was the plain duty of the 
 
8 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 government to prepare for it with all possible 
 dispatch. He was on duty in Washington 
 inspecting the regular troops assembled there 
 prior to the inauguration of President Lincoln. 
 Highly esteemed by General Scott and gaining 
 the confidence and friendship of Secretary 
 Chase, it is not strange that McDowell was the 
 first junior officer to attract attention from that 
 administration which met rebellion at the thresh 
 old of the White House on the 4th of March, 
 1861. He was assigned to mustering and .organ 
 izing the militia of the district, and was in com 
 mand of the Capital during part of April and 
 May. The seventy-five thousand three-months 
 men called for by the President s proclamation 
 of the 15th of April were assembling at the Cap 
 ital, and it was necessary to have commanders 
 for them. McDowell was appointed Brigadier- 
 General in the regular army, May 14, 1861 . Prior 
 to that, Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, Inspector- 
 General, an officer in whom General Scott re 
 posed great confidence, was assigned to com 
 mand in Washington. Mansfield was McDow 
 ell s senior. He entered the army in 1822, and 
 held the grade of colonel, whereas McDowell 
 entered in 1838, and (prior to his selection 
 for brigadier) was only a major. Though he 
 thought highly of McDowell, General Scott 
 was not in favor of his sudden advancement to 
 the grade of brigadier -general, and was quite 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 9 
 
 unwilling that he should be put above Mans 
 field. As soon, therefore, as practicable after 
 the President promoted McDowell, General 
 Scott insisted that Mansfield should be promo 
 ted to the same grade with the same date (May 
 14 , thus preserving the military superiority 
 of the latter. The Secretary of War expressed 
 to McDowell a purpose to appoint him Major- 
 General, but McDowell was unwilling under 
 the circumstances to accept so high a grade. 
 
 After the troops had been thrown across the 
 Potomac by Mansfield during the night of May 
 23-4, General Scott was told that he must send 
 either Mansfield or McDowell there to com 
 mand. He did not wish to send either, but 
 was wholly unwilling to relieve Mansfield from 
 command in Washington. Hence he ordered 
 McDowell. But he advised McDowell to make 
 a personal request of the Secretary of War not 
 to be assigned to that command. McDowell 
 thought he could not do that. He had just 
 been appointed a General Officer, and he felt 
 bound to enter promptly and cheerfully upon 
 the first duty to which the government assigned 
 him. His refusal piqued General Scott, and 
 created, on his part, a coldness towards Mc 
 Dowell. 
 
 The enemy was at that time concentrating 
 south of the Potomac almost in sight of the 
 dome of the Capitol. McDowell s assignment 
 
10 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK. 
 
 not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his 
 command, but of the most conspicuous part, 
 that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of 
 McDowell arose in the army circles about the 
 headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield 
 himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept. 
 8, 1862, Secretary Chase made the entry, 
 " General Mansfield came in and talked very 
 earnestly. * * He spoke of Gen. Scott, said 
 he had not treated him well ; had placed 
 McDowell in command over the river last year, 
 superseding himself. * * He felt himself 
 wronged, but did his duty to the best of his 
 ability," etc. (Warden s "An account of the 
 private and public services of Salmon P. 
 Chase," p. 466.) 
 
 As the Union forces arrived in Washington 
 from the north they necessarily reported to 
 Mansfield, and became for the time a part of 
 his command. He attended diligently to the 
 duty of equipping and preparing the troops 
 for the field, but every officer and enlisted man 
 who was sent across the Potomac changed the 
 relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell 
 by reducing the command of the former arid 
 increasing that of the latter. In his testimony 
 before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt 
 hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command 
 he had divided in two and a portion sent over 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11 
 
 there. I got everything with great difficulty. 
 Some of my regiments came over very late ; 
 some of them not until the very day I was to 
 move the army." When he appealed to Mans 
 field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse 
 was they were not supplied with baggage wag 
 ons. When this was reported to the Quarter 
 master General, his answer was that he could 
 furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 10 ; seventh liDe from bottom, for " relieved 
 ead "relative." 
 
 Page 40 ; top line, for " latent" read "talent." 
 
 his wants partially supplied. He failed to 
 secure transportation to carry rations with 
 his army, and had to march trusting that 
 wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with 
 provisions and sent to follow him. 
 
 He met with much difficulty in getting officers 
 of experience to command divisions and bri 
 gades. His division commanders were, Briga 
 dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; 
 Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer 
 sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman 
 and Miles of the regular army. 
 
10 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his 
 command, but of the most conspicuous part, 
 that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of 
 McDowell arose in the army circles about the 
 headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield 
 himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept. 
 8, Ifi2. Secretary Chase made the entry, 
 " Gc -~~~o in an( j talked very 
 
 earn : * 
 
 he 
 Me 1 
 
 SUJ 
 
 wr< 
 
 ab: 
 
 pr 
 
 Chase," p. 4ou. ; 
 
 As the Union forces arrived in w a^^^ 
 from the north they necessarily reported to 
 Mansfield, and became for the time a part of 
 his command. He attended diligently to the 
 duty of equipping and preparing the troops 
 for the field, but every officer and enlisted man 
 who was sent across the Potomac changed the 
 relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell 
 by reducing the command of the former arid 
 increasing that of the latter. In his testimony 
 before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt 
 hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command 
 he had divided in two and a portion sent over 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11 
 
 there. I got everything with great difficulty. 
 Some of my regiments came over very late ; 
 some of them not until the very day I was to 
 move the army." When he appealed to Mans 
 field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse 
 was they were not supplied with baggage wag 
 ons. When this was reported to the Quarter 
 master General, his answer was that he could 
 furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did 
 not want it till the troops should move. The 
 result was, the troops which McDowell was to 
 lead had not all been sent to him by Mansfield 
 before the day fixed by General Scott for 
 McDowell s advance. Some of them did not 
 join until the Sunday before he advanced, and 
 some not until the very Tuesday on which 
 he marched to the front. It was only by 
 great exertion that he succeeded in having 
 his wants partially supplied. He failed to 
 secure transportation to carry rations with 
 his army, and had to march trusting that 
 wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with 
 provisions and sent to follow him. 
 
 He met with much difficulty in getting officers 
 of experience to command divisions and bri 
 gades. His division commanders were, Briga 
 dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; 
 Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer 
 sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman 
 and Miles of the regular army. 
 
MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 At that time Tyler was in Ms sixty-second 
 year, having been graduated at the U. S. 
 Military Academy in 1819, and appointed 2d 
 Lieutenant of Artillery. He remained in the 
 service as lieutenant until 1834, when he 
 resigned, dissatisfied at President Jackson s 
 refusal to appoint him captain in the new 
 ordnance corps. He was the veteran of Mc 
 Dowell s army in 1861 . The organization of that 
 army was: Tyler s (1st) Division, 4 brigades, 
 9,936 men, four batteries of artillery and a 
 squadron of cavalry ; Hunter s (2d) Division, 2 
 brigades, 2,648 men, two and a half batteries of 
 artillery, and 5 companies of cavalry ; Heintz- 
 leman s (3d) Division, 3 brigades, 9,777 men, 
 two batteries of artillery ; Miles (5th) Di 
 vision, 2 brigades, 6,207 men, three batteries of 
 artillery, and Runyon s (4th Reserve) Division, 
 5,752 men, not divided into brigades. Notwith 
 standing the fact that three of the division 
 commanders Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles 
 had spent their lives in the military service 
 which Tyler had left twenty-seven years before, 
 and were not greatly his juniors in years, 
 McDowell gave Tyler the first and largest 
 division, and entrusted him with the honor of 
 the advance in the movement upon the enemy. 
 This is evidence of what may be asserted as a 
 fact, that McDowell placed confidence in Tyler 
 and tfea.ted him with profound respect. It hap- 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 13 
 
 pened that in two instances during the cam 
 paign, Tyler s official action met with McDow 
 ell s disapproval. The first was in relation to 
 the engagement which Tyler brought on at 
 Mitchell s and Blackburn s fords, July 18 ; 
 and the second was the delay which occurred 
 in Tyler s advance in the early morning of 
 July 21. McDowell s official expressions con 
 cerning these occurrences, though not severe, 
 created a bitterness towards him, on Tyler s 
 part, which , though occasionally breaking out, 
 found full vent only through the agency of his 
 friends after his death, which occurred Novem 
 ber 30, 1882. 
 
 Tyler opens his account of the first Bull Run 
 by saying : u The first campaign of the War of 
 the Rebellion, was gotten~np by Gen. McDow 
 ell and his friends, and was intended to make 
 him the hero of a short war and of a campaign 
 begun and ended in the first battle of Bull 
 Run. All the accounts of that battle thus far 
 intended for history I refer to Mcolay s and 
 Prince de Joinville s" (does he mean Comte de 
 Paris?) "were either written or inspired by 
 General McDowell and his friends, intending, 
 so far as possible, to shield his military reputa 
 tion from the condemnation it so richly de 
 serves." It is not necessary to comment upon 
 
14 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 this extravagant assertion further than to say 
 that, if true, the man must have great merits 
 who can command so many and such able friends 
 and historians. Tyler continues : "McDowell 
 has been an expensive ornament to the military 
 service ; and his courtier-like services in the 
 salon have immeasurably exceeded his military 
 services in the field. Commencing at the head 
 of the army on the breaking out of the late war, 
 at the end he stood at the foot of the list in 
 the estimation of the army and the public." 
 This, no doubt, is a specimen of Tyler s writing 
 to which the editor of his memorial volume 
 refers as having Tyler s " impassioned ring." 
 The right name for it is slander. Having re 
 lieved himself of this spiteful tirade against a 
 distinguished officer, who was promoted to the 
 grade of Major-General long after the war was 
 over and the claims of its leaders had been 
 carefully weighed by the government and the 
 people, Tyler, with characteristic inconsistency, 
 closes this personal abuse by saying : " In my 
 account of the battle of Bull Run, I shall only 
 state what was personal to myself or the troops 
 under my command." In other words, having 
 said the worst I can of the man I hate, I shall 
 now proceed to be just, and shall speak only 
 of what is personal to myself and my com 
 mand. 
 The assertion that the Bull Run Campaign 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 15 
 
 " was gotten up by General McDowell and his 
 friends," is true only in the sense that the peo 
 pie of the North are the friends referred to. In 
 a more restricted sense, it would show that 
 Tyler misunderstood or misrepresented the sen 
 timent of the time. To suppose that a young 
 general, without military prestige, without po 
 litical antecedents having never even voted or 
 attended a political meeting, never written or 
 made a speech on a political question in his life 
 unknown to the country, unacquainted even 
 with the President or any of his cabinet before 
 the commencement of the war, should have 
 stirred up the public press, inflamed the pub 
 lic mind to force the government to order 
 an advance into Virginia, is to give an insig 
 nificant source to a great movement. Mc 
 Dowell had no such commanding power as to 
 have a campaign set on foot for his special 
 benefit. He was simply an instrument used 
 for purposes which had their origin quite out 
 of his sphere and beyond the reach of his mod 
 erate influence. This campaign resulted logi 
 cally from acts in the history of the country 
 which can be attributed to no one person, to no 
 one party. It was the resultant of great politi 
 cal and social forces which had many of them 
 moved the nation years before the outbreak 
 of the rebellion. 
 There was an unmistakable public demand 
 
16 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 for the advance upon Manassas in July, 1861. 
 Even General Scott, who held out against it for 
 a time, was at last forced to yield. Nothing 
 but blindness or malice can explain the charge 
 that the campaign was gotten up by McDowell 
 and his friends for the purpose of making a 
 hero of him. The assertion is unjust to the 
 Northern masses, who, impatient under the 
 wickedness and insolence of the outbreak, de 
 manded an immediate clash of arms in vindica 
 tion of outraged loyalty/ The responsibility 
 for publishing such a charge rests with Tyler s 
 biographers. 
 
 THE ADVANCE. 
 
 Tyler says : 
 
 " In the order directing the movement of the 
 army I was instructed to concentrate my com 
 mand at or near Vienna on the night of the 
 15th." * 
 
 He should have said on the 16th. 
 
 This mistake as to date is not a slip of the pen. 
 It is carried out through his narrative. He says 
 he was engaged at Blackburn s Ford the 17th ; 
 and it is a salient point in his narrative, dis 
 cussed further on, that "it was the delay of 
 three days succeeding the affair at Blackburn s 
 Ford that lost the battle of Bull Run." To 
 get these three days, he counted back from 
 the well-known 21st of July, and made the 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 17 
 
 affair at Blackburn s Ford come off on the 17th, 
 instead of the 18th, 
 
 This error of dates is of no other conse 
 quence, in the present connection, than to give 
 one of several instances of Tyler s defective 
 memory in dealing with questions of the cam 
 paign. 
 
 Another is found in his statement of the 
 orders under which he marched from Vienna. 
 On this point his latest statement is that 
 he was "to move at early dawn in the direc 
 tion of Centre vill e, ma Flint Hill School- 
 house." In his testimony in 1862 (Committee 
 on Conduct of the War, pp. 198-199), he says : 
 u My line of march was by Vienna to Flint 
 Hill, and from thence I had authority from 
 General McDowell to take either route by Fair 
 fax Court-house, or the route by Germantown, 
 as my judgment should indicate." 
 
 The order given him will be found on page 
 304, Rebellion Records. It is as follows : 
 
 1. u Brigadier- General Tyler will direct his 
 march so as to intercept the enemy s communi 
 cation between Fairfax Court-house and Cen- 
 treville, moving to the right or left of German- 
 town, as he may find most practicable. 
 
 "On reaching Centreville turnpike he will 
 direct the march of his leading brigade either 
 upon Centreville or Fairfax Court-house as the 
 indication of the enemy may require. The 
 
18 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 Second Brigade will move on the road in the 
 direction not taken by the First. The rear 
 brigades will be disposed of by the Division 
 Commander as circumstances may require. 
 
 " Should he deem it best a brigade may be 
 senfc on Fairfax Court-house direct from Flint 
 
 It will be noticed that he was to direct his 
 march so as "to intercept the enemy* s com 
 munication" between Fairfax Court-house and 
 Centreville. To do this he was to go either to 
 the right or left of Germantown not to Fair 
 fax Court-house as he might see fit. 
 
 The discretionary authority for him to send 
 one of the rear brigades direct on Fairfax 
 Court-house from Flint Hill has been converted 
 in his mind into authority for him to go there 
 himself which would have been inconsistent 
 with the object of his movement, to intercept 
 the enemy s communication between the Court 
 house and Centreville. He omits all reference 
 to this prime object of his march, and it may 
 be added, he failed to accomplish it, and has 
 never in his reports or letters explained this 
 failure. 
 
 Apparently not appreciating the importance 
 of the part assigned him, Tyler says : 
 
 " I moved quietly on towards Centreville, 
 arriving in sight of that place about four 
 o clock in the afternoon." 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 19 
 
 The enemy, too, bears witness to the quiet 
 ness of the movement. Captain Del-Kemper, 
 commanding their rearguard, says (p. 439, Re 
 bellion Records): "The enemy seemed not 
 disposed to press us closely, and we reached 
 Centreville without incident worthy of note 
 about 12 M.," and General Bonham says (p. 
 450, Rebellion Records): "The column thus 
 fell back in perfect order to Centreville. The 
 enemy not venturing to attack my rear 
 guard." 
 
 In his testimony before the Committee on 
 the Conduct of the War, Tyler, speaking of 
 his march from Vienna, says : 
 
 u We continued our march until about four 
 o clock in the evening, and then bivouacked 
 for the night. I think that was the first mis 
 fortune of our movement. I think, if we had 
 gone on to Centreville that night, we should 
 have been in much better condition the next 
 day." 
 
 This failure to go to Centreville was not the 
 first misfortune of our movement. An earlier 
 one, just pointed out, was Tyler s quiet march 
 and failure to intercept the enemy s communi 
 cation. 
 
 Tyler says he was ordered by McDowell to 
 halt and bivouac between Germantown and 
 Centreville. But he omits to say that Tie had 
 reported to McDowell that his troops could go 
 
20 
 
 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 no further. McDowell reported this fact at the 
 time (July 17) to Army Headquarters (see p. 
 305, Rebellion Records). He there stated to 
 General Scott" I " (McDowell) " endeavored 
 to pursue beyond Centreville, but the men 
 were too much exhausted to do so." 
 
 Whatever there was of misfortune in our not 
 going to Centreville that night was due mainly 
 to Tyler s representations of the condition of 
 his troops. 
 
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 21 
 
 BLACKBURN S FOED. 
 
 Tyler says : 
 
 "On the night of the 16th [17th] a small 
 movement of troops could be seen at Centre- 
 ville ; but nothing, in my opinion intimating 
 that there was to be any great resistance at 
 that point, and at daybreak on the morning of 
 the 17fch [18th] it appeared to me that Centre- 
 ville had been abandoned by the rebel troops, 
 which was found to be the case, for Schenck s 
 brigade leading, marched that morning into 
 Centreville and occupied it without tiring of a 
 gun." 
 
 According to both Tyler s own report (p. 310, 
 Rebellion Records) and Richardson s testi 
 mony before the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the W ar, p. 19, it was not Schenck s, but Rich 
 ardson s, brigade that led the march into Cen 
 treville. Tyler says: " My division moved 
 from its encampment at 7 A.M. At 9 A.M. 
 Richardson s brigade reached Centreville and 
 found that the enemy had retreated the night 
 before." * 
 
 Richardson says : * * " then on the morn 
 ing of the 18th my brigade took the lead." 
 ***** 
 
 Tyler continues his narrative, saying : 
 u I reported the condition of things to Gen. 
 McDowell about 7 A.M., and asked for instruc- 
 
22 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 tions ; but up to 11 o clock A.M. I heard noth 
 ing from the commander of the army." 
 
 On p. 312, Rebellion Records, will be found 
 a copy of the order given Tyler, in writing, the 
 morning of the 18th. It is as follows : 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH 
 EASTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 "Between Germantown and Centremlle, 
 
 " July 18, 1861. 8.15A.M. 
 " GENERAL : 
 
 "I have information which leads me to be 
 lieve you will find no force at Centreville, and 
 will meet with no resistance in getting there. 
 
 " Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to 
 Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement, 
 but keep up the impression that we are moving 
 on Manassas. 
 
 1 go to Heintzleman s to arrange about the 
 plan we have talked over. 
 
 " Very respectfully, &c., 
 
 "IRVIN MCDOWELL, 
 
 "Brigadier General. 
 " Brigadier General Tyler" 
 
 The receipt of this order is not denied. It 
 was carried to Tyler by McDowell s senior aid- 
 de-camp, Major afterwards General Wads- 
 worth (see pp. 46-47, "Report of Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War"). McDowell s 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 23 
 
 headquarters, when that order was written, 
 were not far from Tyler s, both being between 
 Germantown and Centreville. It is hardly 
 possible he did not receive it before eleven 
 o clock. 
 
 The route over which Tyler moved on the 
 18th of July, was the direct road from Centre 
 ville to Manassas Junction. That road crossed 
 Bull Run at MitclieW s Ford not Blackburn s 
 Foil though a road branching off to Tyler s 
 left crossed the Eun at Blackburn s Ford, a 
 short distance below Mitchell s Ford, and led 
 on thence, though not so directly, to Manassas 
 Junction. 
 
 Tyler s attack covered both fords, but his 
 artillery was directed mainly against Mitchell s 
 Ford. These fords were in supporting distance 
 of each other, and the passage of either could 
 be effected only by overcoming all the resist 
 ance at both as well as the reserve in their rear. 
 The article in the "Post " says : " No one can 
 arise from the perusal of Tyler s account with 
 out feeling satisfied that the great blunder of 
 that unfortunate campaign was, the almost 
 unaccountable failure of McDowell to allow 
 Gen. Tyler immediately to follow up the affair 
 at Blackburn s Ford as the latter desired." 
 
 Immediately after writing the order of 8.15 
 A.M. to Tyler, McDowell went to the extreme 
 left for the purpose alluded to in the note. 
 
24 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 The note contains all the orders given by Mc 
 Dowell to Tyler on the 18th, till after the 
 latter had, of his own motion, passed through 
 Centre ville and gone down to Bull Run, brought 
 on an engagement and been repulsed. That af 
 fair, from beginning to end, was Tyler s, brought 
 on, continued and ended by him in McDowell s 
 absence ; and all of Tyler s acts in relation to 
 it, were either against McDowell s orders or 
 without his knowledge. The claim that Tyler 
 desired to follow up the affair at Blackburn s 
 Ford, but was not allowed by McDowell to do 
 so, is without foundation. Tyler s report (p. 
 311) written (July 27, 61), shortly after the 
 affair, when the facts were fresh in his mem 
 ory, refutes the claim and shows that lie or 
 dered the withdrawal, and that he had no 
 desire to follow up the affair. On the contrary, 
 it shows a purpose to exculpate himself for 
 having made the attack, and to throw the 
 responsibility on his brigade commander, Rich 
 ardson. He says : u The moment Ayres opened 
 his fire, the enemy replied with volleys which 
 showed that the whole bottom was filled with 
 troops, and that he had batteries established 
 in different positions to sweep the approaches." 
 * # This attack on Captain Ayres accom 
 plished the object I desired, as it showed that 
 the enemy was in force and disclosed the posi 
 tion of his batteries ; and Jiad I been at hand tlie 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 25 
 
 movement would have ended here" * * " Hav 
 ing satisfied myself that the enemy was in 
 force and also as to the position of his batteries, 
 / ordered Colonel Richardson to witJidraw It Is 
 brigade." * * That is Tyler s official state 
 ment made at the time, of his object in going to 
 Blackburn s Ford, of what he found there, of 
 his withdrawal, and of his reasons for with 
 drawing. His sole and entire responsibility is 
 fully confessed in his testimony, 1862, before 
 Committee on Conduct of the War, pages 199, 
 200. He says: " As soon as /found out the 
 condition of things 7 sent back for Ayres bat 
 tery * * and had it brought and put into 
 position 7 then took Richardson s 
 
 brigade and filed it down there to see what there 
 was in the bottom. * * I sent some skir 
 mishers into the woods. * * 7 saw an open 
 ing where we could have a chance to get in a 
 couple of pieces of artillery, and /ordered Cap 
 tain Ayres" * * The substance of Tyler s 
 own report and testimony is that lie directed 
 everything. The conclusion from all the facts 
 is unavoidable that it was Beauregard, not 
 McDowell, who prevented him from going on. 
 Richardson says (p. 313), after the disastrous 
 repulse of the 12th N. Y. Volunteers : U I now 
 reported to General Tyler, and proposed to him 
 to make a charge with the three remaining 
 regiments for the purpose of carrying the 
 
26 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 enemy s position. The General replied that the 
 enemy were in large force and strongly fortified, 
 and a further attack was unnecessary." In 
 addition to the foregoing official reports, Tyler 
 made a sworn statement on this subject. In his 
 testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War (p. 200), given January 20, 1862, he 
 says further: 4 1 ordered Captain Ayres to take a 
 couple of howitzers and go into that opening 
 and throw some canister shot into the woods. 
 The very moment he came into battery, it ap 
 peared to me that there were five thousand 
 muskets h red at once. It appears by Beaure- 
 gard s report he had seventeen regiments in 
 front there. Having satisfied myself that the 
 enemy was in force and also as to the position of 
 his batteries, / ordered Colonel Richardson to 
 withdraw his brigade, which was skillfully, 
 though unwillingly accomplished." 
 
 And now, some twenty years after these oc 
 currences, and in the face of his own testimony 
 and official reports, Tyler, apparently having 
 learned nothing and forgotten much of what he 
 knew concerning them, says (p. 54, Memoirs) : 
 " From what I knew then and ascertained 
 afterwards, I think my four brigades could 
 have whipped Beauregard before sundown." 
 * "When the skirmish commenced at 
 Blackburn s Ford, Beauregard was surprised, 
 and at that time he could not before sunset have 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 
 
 concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field." 
 Fortunately he gives his reason for this extrav- 
 gant afterthought. It is, that < the entire South 
 Carolina contingent of Beauregard s army was 
 down in the Occoquan region; its mission was to 
 protect the route of Fredericksburg, and it was 
 a kind of independent command under its South 
 Carolina general, and not within striking dis 
 tance for a battle on the seventeenth" (eight 
 eenth it ought to be). This is an unaccount 
 able error. It shows in what dense ignorance 
 of the campaign Tyler lived and died. The 
 Records of the Rebellion, Vol. II., hereinbefore 
 referred to, published some time before Tyler s 
 death, contain the reports of Generals Beaure- 
 gard, Longstreet, Bonham and their subordin 
 ates (pp. 440 to 458). They prove that the South 
 Carolina contingent, which Tyler says was a 
 kind of independent command under its South 
 Carolina general, and could not be brought 
 within striking distance, was actually in Ms 
 immediate front! that the 2d, 3d, 7th and 8th 
 South Carolina regiments under Gen. Bonham 
 was the force upon which Tyler s artillery com 
 menced the attack. The other South Carolina 
 regiment was in D. R. Jones brigade at the 
 next ford, a short distance below. " The South 
 Carolina contingent" was not only in front of 
 Tyler on the 18th, but four regiments of it un 
 der Gen. Bonham had been in his immediate 
 
28 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 front at Fairfax Court House when the latter 
 was at Fall s Church. It was these South 
 Carolina troops Tyler was expected to intercept 
 on his first day s march ; and, strange as it may 
 appear in the ligh t of Tyler s latest assertion that 
 "the entire South Carolina contingent was 
 down in the Occoquan region," lie was told at 
 the time he arrived at Centreville that they 
 were in his front. In his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, Janu 
 ary 20, 1862, p. 199, Tyler says: "On arriving 
 at Centreville I found that the enemy had 
 evacuated their fortifications and that Cox s 
 division, as I was told by their people, had 
 passed over Stonebridge, and Bonham, with 
 the South Carolina and Georgia troops, had 
 passed down by Blackburn s Ford" It is 
 not necessary to pile up evidence on this point. 
 I was McDowell s Adjutant-General in that 
 campaign. After he had gone to the left of his 
 line on the morning of the 18th, I went to the 
 front and arrived at Tyler s advanced position, 
 overlooking Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords, 
 just before he sent Ay res forward into the skirt 
 of woods along the Run. Desiring to learn all 
 I could about the enemy, I accompanied the 
 cavalry under Brackett which went as support 
 for Ayres guns. When the enemy opened 
 upon us it seemed to me, as it did to Tyler, 
 that "there were five thousand muskets fired 
 
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 29 
 
 at once." Ayres saw instantly that his com 
 mand could not exist long in such musketry 
 fire, and without waiting for orders he promptly 
 limbered up; and Brackett,who had dismounted 
 his men, remounted them and all went at full 
 speed across the open bottom-land to the high 
 ground in rear whence Ty]er had sent them. I 
 am quite certain that no one present thought at 
 the time that Beauregard could not concentrate 
 1,500 men, that Tyler with his four brigades 
 could whip him before sundown, or even that 
 all of McDowell s army, if concentrated for the 
 effort, could go to Manassas junction by way of 
 Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords. 
 
 Foreseeing the bad effect Tyler s repulse 
 would have upon the troops, and wishing to 
 avert the depression which he knew would fol 
 low from Tyler s having been driven back, Mc 
 Dowell, when he learned of the affair after it was 
 all over, gave Tyler verbal orders to reoccupy 
 the high ground where his command had been 
 engaged. But Tyler, from misunderstanding the 
 orders, or from lack of disposition to do any 
 thing more there, did not carry out the verbal 
 orders, and just after midnight (18th-19th) 
 McDowell gave him written orders as follows 
 (p. 306, Records of the Rebellion) : 
 
30 MCDOWELL AND TYLEE. 
 
 " HEADQUARTERS, ETC., 
 " Centrevitte, 
 
 "July 19, 1861. 12.30 A.M. 
 "BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLER, 
 
 Commanding 1st Division: 
 "There seems to be a misunderstanding on 
 your part of the order issued for a brigade of 
 your division to be posted in observation on 
 the road leading to the place where your com 
 mand was engaged yesterday, July 18. It was 
 intended that the movement should have been 
 made long before this. The train of subsistence 
 came up long ago. I have given no order or in 
 struction of a change in this matter. I thought 
 that the brigade was posted as desired until 
 just now, when Major Brown, who is just re 
 turned from your headquarters, informs me 
 that no action under these orders has been 
 taken. Give orders which will cause the brig 
 ade to be there, where the previous instructions 
 indicated, by dawn this morning. 
 
 " Very respectfully, 
 
 "IllVIN MCDOWELL." 
 
 As to Beauregard having been surprised by 
 Tyler, there is abundant proof to the contrary. 
 He was kept informed of what passed in 
 Washington, knew of our advance, knew the 
 organization and composition of McDowell s 
 army, etc. In his report of August, 1861, p. 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 31 
 
 440, he says: " Opportunely informed of the 
 determination of the enemy to advance on 
 Manassas, my advance brigades, on the night 
 of the 1 6th of July, were made aware of the 
 impending movement." In his report of July 
 17, to Jefferson Davis, he says, p. 339 : "I 
 have fallen back on the line of Bull Run, and 
 will make a stand at MitcheW s Ford?" His 
 special orders, No. 100, from Manassas Junc 
 tion, dated July 8, p. 447, 448, show the steps 
 he took ten days before to meet the very at 
 tack by which Tyler claims he was surprised. 
 Beauregard s report, p. 440, says, on the morn 
 ing of the 18th of July (the day when Tyler 
 attacked Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords): 
 " My troops resting on Bull Run, from Stone 
 Bridge to Union Mills, a distance of about 
 eight miles, were posted as follows," and he 
 proceeds to specify the forces of artillery, in 
 fantry and cavalry, stationed at six of the 
 crossings of the stream, and the reserves held 
 to support the troops at Mitchell s, Black 
 burn s and McLean s fords, which a bend in 
 the river enabled him to place about equidis 
 tant from all. His own headquarters were near 
 the Reserve. He says further: " On the 
 morning of the 18th, finding the enemy was as 
 suming a threatening attitude, in addition to 
 the regiments whose positions have already 
 been stated, I ordered up from Gamp Pickens, 
 
MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective 
 men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana 
 Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro 
 lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night 
 before en route for Winchester, I had halted 
 in view of the existing necessities of the ser 
 vice." The foregoing extracts show that Beau- 
 regard knew when and by what routes we were 
 coming ; that to meet us, he had posted his 
 whole army behind Bull Eun, his Reserves 
 and his own headquarters near the places 
 which Tyler attacked. Yet years after comes 
 a statement from Tyler, that at that time 
 Beauregard could not, before sunset, have 
 concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field, 
 that he had surprised him, and that he with 
 his four brigades could have whipped Beaure 
 gard before sundown. Tyler s command con 
 sisted of four brigades fifteen regiments of 
 infantry, four batteries of artillery some of 
 the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them 
 rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective 
 force for duty of over 10,000 men an army 
 in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s 
 order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted, 
 he says: U I go to Heintzleman s to arrange 
 about the plan of moving against the enemy s 
 right," which plan as the note says, he had 
 talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been 
 acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33 
 
 would be, Tyler could no longer have been in 
 the advance. But being in advance at the 
 time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears 
 to have resolved, practically, to take the di 
 rection of the campaign into his own hands. 
 So he moved against Longstreet at Black- 
 
 EEBATA. 
 
 Page 33 : Eighth line from top, for North Carol] 
 read South Carolina. 
 
 tnoughts. Out of reach of his commanding 
 officer, he found as he claims, a state of things 
 which warranted him in assuming the respon 
 sibility of a different course from the one or 
 dered. He had all the advantages of position 
 a commanding bank on his side, skirted with 
 timber and having open ground beyond. He 
 says that the enemy was surprised, could not 
 have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the 
 field before sunset, and that he could have 
 whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be 
 fore sundown. Then, in the name of every 
 thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ? 
 According to his own account he had the whole 
 field to himself. No superior authority near. 
 
32 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective 
 men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana 
 Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro 
 lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night 
 before en route for Winchester, I had halted 
 in view of the existing necessities of the ser 
 vice " mr " . , , , . 
 
 rega 
 com 
 who 
 and 
 whi< 
 a si 
 Bea 
 con< 
 
 that ne naci surprised mm, ana tnar ne witn 
 his four brigades could have whipped Beaure- 
 gard before sundown. Tyler s command con 
 sisted of four brigades iifteen regiments of 
 infantry, four batteries of artillery some of 
 the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them 
 rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective 
 force for duty of over 10,000 men an army 
 in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s 
 order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted, 
 he says: "I go to Heintzleman s to arrange 
 about the plan of moving against the enemy s 
 right," which plan as the note says, he had 
 talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been 
 acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33 
 
 would be, Tyler could no longer have been in 
 the advance. But being in advance at the 
 time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears 
 to have resolved, practically, to take the di 
 rection of the campaign into his own hands. 
 So he moved against Longs treet at Black 
 burn s Ford, and what he forgot, against Bon- 
 ham and the North Carolina troops at Mitchell s 
 Ford. 
 
 Having refuted Tyler s claims concerning 
 facts and circumstances attending his a.ttack 
 on the 18th, let us see how he would appear 
 if the case had been as he states it in his 
 memoirs, and whether it is not doing him a 
 kindness to prove the error of his after 
 thoughts. Out of reach of his commanding 
 officer, he found as he claims, a state of things 
 which warranted him in assuming the respon 
 sibility of a different course from the one or 
 dered. He had all the advantages of position 
 a commanding bank on his side, skirted with 
 timber and having open ground beyond. He 
 says that the enemy was surprised, could not 
 have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the 
 field before sunset, and that he could have 
 whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be 
 fore sundown. Then, in the name of every 
 thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ? 
 According to his own account he had the whole 
 field to himself. No superior authority near. 
 
34 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 He had incurred the responsibility of opening 
 an engagement against orders. Yet at the 
 head of some ten thousand effective men of all 
 arms, without using one-quarter of them, he al 
 lowed himself to be repulsed, defeated, driven 
 back, leaving his dead and prisoners, and be 
 tween one and two hundred stand of arms in 
 the hands of the enemy (p. 447). McDowell, 
 as already stated, was far away, knew nothing 
 of the affair, and did not reach the ground un 
 til he met the troops returning to Centreville 
 ridge late in the afternoon, when it was all 
 over. If Tyler attacked at all, he should have 
 done so in force and held his ground, and thus 
 enabled McDowell to determine whether or 
 not to follow up the blow with the whole 
 army. 
 
 The truth is, there was a surprise at Black 
 burn s Ford on the 18th of July, 1861, but it 
 was Tyler, not Beauregard, who was surprised. 
 Twenty years after, in the bitterness and 
 blindness of ill-will towards his Commanding 
 General, and apparently in ignorance of what 
 he ought to have known and what he might 
 have learned from the records, especially his 
 own contributions to them, if he did not know 
 his friends are left to choose between admitting 
 that, in his own judgment and against orders, 
 he went unwittingly against the center of Beau- 
 regard s entire army ; or that with a fine army 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 35 
 
 of Ms own, he submitted to a defeat at the 
 hands of part of the enemy s forces. That he 
 was defeated is certain. 
 
 The consequences of that defeat were seri 
 ous. The effect was plainly seen. The feeling 
 was universal that things had gone against us. 
 The 12th New York Volunteers were paralyzed 
 by the shock, and the depressing effect of the 
 repulse was not confined to them ; the whole 
 army felt it. The 4th Pennsylvania Infantry, 
 and the 8th New York battery, their terms 
 having expired, went home as the battle of the 
 21st was about to begin. The troops began the 
 advance from the Potomac, with a dread of 
 being sent against "masked batteries." They 
 felt that their fears on this point were now re- 
 alizedj and they were so in fact, for they had 
 been sent against "masked batteries." The 
 possibility of making a front attack was thus 
 destroyed by Tyler himself. He reported soon 
 after the affair that he found the place "was 
 strongly fortified, and the enemy in large force," 
 p. 313. McDowell said in his report, p. 308 : " If 
 it were needed, the experience of the 18th in 
 stant shows we cannot, with this description 
 of force, attempt to carry batteries such as now 
 before us;" and Beauregard, p. 447, says: 
 " The effect of this day s conflict was to sat 
 isfy the enemy he could not force a passage 
 across Bull Run in the face of our troops, and 
 
36 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK. 
 
 led him into the flank movement of the 21st of 
 July, and the battle of Manassas." 
 
 As a matter of fact, there were no works im 
 mediately at Blackburrts Ford. The belief at 
 the time, however, was that it was strongly 
 fortified, as Tyler thought, and it will be seen 
 from the reports of General Bonham s officers 
 that the adjoining position at Mitchell s Ford 
 was fortified, and had been for some time. 
 
 The purport of our reports and reconnais 
 sances at the time was to the effect that of 
 all the crossings over Bull Run, within our 
 reach, including the Stone Ridge said to be 
 mined the first unfortified one was the Sud- 
 ley Spring Ford, where we crossed July 21 
 (p. 330, Report of Barnard, Chief of Engineers, 
 of McDowell s army). 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BULL KUIs T , JULY 21, 1861. 
 
 The task of whipping Beauregard s army, 
 which Tyler, in the face of his failure, boasts 
 he could have performed with four brigades 
 on the 18th, was not undertaken by McDowell 
 until the 21st, and then he was defeated. 
 
 The Evening Post, quoting Tyler, says : " It 
 was the delay of three days succeeding the af 
 fair at Blackburn s Ford that lost the battle of 
 Bull Run ; and for what purpose this delay 
 occurred no proper explanation has been or 
 can be made." 
 
BULL KUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 37 
 
 It may be repeated here that the delay was 
 from the evening of the 18th till 2 o clock on 
 the morning of the 21st two instead of three 
 days. When before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, January 20, 1862, Tyler 
 was asked what " caused the disaster of 
 that day?" July 21. He, under oath said, 
 u Want of discipline and instruction in the 
 troops." " Were there any other more proxi 
 mate causes than that ?" asked the Committee. 
 Here was an opportunity, if not an invitation, 
 for Tyler to assert his u three" days delay at 
 Centre ville, if that had been in his mind as a 
 cause, but he did not give delay as a cause ; 
 on the contrary, he gave as the "more proxi 
 mate 1 cause " want of instruction and pro 
 fessional knowledge among the officers, tlie 
 company and regimental officers" During 
 these " three" days Tyler asserts " there were 
 no movements made to ascertain the force or 
 position of the enemy, and the army had its full 
 provision of seven days when it started from 
 Washington, and was in no way in want of sup 
 plies of any kind." 
 
 The consequences of the two days delay at 
 Centreville, the causes of the delay, and the 
 responsibility for that delay, are important and 
 independent questions. 
 
 Johnson s army, over eight thousand strong, 
 
38 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 joined Beauregard between the night of Thurs 
 day, the 18th, and the evening of Sunday, the 
 21st. His leading brigade under Jackson arrived 
 on the 19th. Bee s brigade and Johnston in 
 person arrived on the 20th, and the remain 
 der reached the field on the 21st, in time to 
 take part in the action. General Scott, who 
 controlled both McDowell and Patterson, was 
 responsible for this change in the relative 
 strength of the contending armies. The cam 
 paign he required McDowell to make was 
 based upon the condition that Johnston should 
 not join Beauregard without having Patterson 
 on his heels. McDowell would not have been 
 justified in conducting his operations upon the 
 assumption that the condition upon which the 
 campaign was predicated by the General-in- 
 Chief, was going to be violated. Nor did he 
 know, until the 21st, during the battle, though 
 he suspected it, that Johnston s forces had 
 joined Beauregard. It must be admitted that 
 it would have been better for McDowell if he 
 could have executed on the 19th or 20th the 
 plan of battle he acted upon on the 21st, and 
 still better, perhaps, if he could have done so 
 before Tyler s fiasco on the 18th. But that 
 was not possible. Neither the preparation of 
 his plan nor the state of his supplies permitted 
 it. He did not form the plan, nor did he have 
 the information upon which to base it, until 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 39 
 
 the 20th. He did not learn until the night of 
 the 18th that the enemy was going to defend 
 the line of Bull Kun. If the state of his sup 
 plies had permitted, he might have attempted 
 to force that line by a direct attack on the 19th 
 or 20th, as Tyler did on the 18th, but such an 
 enterprise would have given no fair promise, 
 and Tyler destroyed all possibility of its success 
 by his disastrous failure on the 18th. Under 
 all the circumstances a flank movement, instead 
 of a direct attack, was an essential part of any 
 plan which might be adopted. McDowell s 
 first intention was to turn the enemy s right, 
 but that intention had to be abandoned on 
 the 18th. , Tyler says that between the 18th 
 and 21st, "there were no movements made to 
 ascertain the force or position of the enemy." 
 Let the truth of what was done speak for 
 itself. In his report, p. 330, Barnard, the Ch ief 
 Engineer, says: fc At my interview with the 
 Commanding General that evening, he informed 
 me that he had convinced himself that the 
 nature of the country to the left, or southard 
 of Manassas, was unfit for the operations of 
 a large army. I told him I would endeavor 
 the next day to obtain such information as 
 would enable him to decide on his further 
 movement." No one deserves censure for the 
 time which was consumed in obtaining that 
 information. No army during the war had 
 
40 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 such an array of military engineering latent as 
 McDowell had at that time. Barnard was the 
 Chief, and under him were Woodbury, Wright, 
 B. S. Alexander, A. W. Whipple, Abbott, 
 Putnam, Prime, Houston, Snyder and O Rorke, 
 of the Engineer Corps of the regular army. 
 Their ability and zeal are beyond dispute. 
 They devoted themselves to the examinations 
 and reconnaissances for a proper plan of at 
 tack. In seeking a route to the right, Barnard 
 reports, p. 830 : " I, on the 19th, followed up 
 the valley of Cub Run, until we reached a 
 point west of 10 North, and about four miles 
 in an air line from Centreville, near which we 
 struck a road, which we believed to lead fco the 
 fords" (near Sudley Springs). " Following it 
 for a short distance, we encountered the ene 
 my s patrols. As we were most anxious to 
 avoid attracting the enemy s attention to our 
 designs in this quarter, we did not care to pur 
 sue the reconnaissance farther. We had seen 
 enough to convince us of the perfect practi 
 cability of the route. To make more certain of 
 the fords, however, Captain Woodbury pro 
 posed to return at night (that was the night 
 of 19th), and with a few Michigan woodsmen 
 from Colonel Sherman s brigade, to endeavor 
 to find them. On returning to camp it was 
 determined to send Captain Wright and Lieut. 
 Snyder, engineers, with Captain Woodbury. 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 41 
 
 At the same time the Commanding General 
 directed Captain AVhipple, Topographical En 
 gineer, and Lieut. Prime, engineer, to make a 
 night reconnaissance of the Run between 
 Warrenton bridge and Blackburn s Ford. 
 Both these night expeditions failed. It was 
 found the enemy occupied the woods too 
 strongly on our side of the run to permit the 
 reconnaissances to be accomplished. It was 
 not our policy to drive in his pickets until we 
 were in motion to attack. On laying before 
 you the information obtained, the Command 
 ing General believed himself justified in adopt 
 ing the following plan of attack, which was 
 decided upon on tlie 20^," that is, after the 
 reconnaissances of the night of the 19th. 
 
 On the 20th, McDowell issued orders for the 
 advance to begin at half -past two on the morn 
 ing of the 21st. It was not possible for him to 
 form that plan or act upon it any sooner than 
 he did. No critic, to this day, I believe, not 
 even Tyler, has claimed that the plan was not 
 good. What the result would have been of 
 acting earlier upon a worse plan, no one can 
 say with any certainty. 
 
 Tyler says : " The army had its full provis 
 ion for seven days when it started from Wash 
 ington, and was in no way in want of supplies 
 of any kind" on the 18th. The Record con 
 tradicts him. The troops marched from the 
 
42 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 Potomac on the 16th with tliree days rations 
 in their haversacks. Wagons were to follow 
 the next day containing Jive days rations, but 
 they met with difficulties and delay. Some of 
 them arrived in time to distribute supplies to 
 divisions on the evening of the 18th, others not 
 until the 19th. The three days rations with 
 which the troops began the advance on the 
 16th ought to have lasted until the afternoon 
 of the 19th, but, on account of the inexperi 
 ence of the men, they were exhausted on the 
 18th. The reports of the Chief Commissary, 
 Clarke and his subordinates explain this mat 
 ter, p. 336 to 344, Rebellion Records. Lieut. 
 Hawkins, in charge of one of the three supply 
 trains, says, p. 343, that on his arrival " there 
 was immediate necessity for the distribution of 
 the rations ; " and the officer in charge of an 
 other of the trains, Lieut. Curtis, p. 340, says 
 of his distribution on the 19th : "I found the 
 men in almost a starving condition." Heintzle- 
 man and others confirm this, and Schenck s 
 report, (p. 360) shows that his brigade of 
 Tyler s division was unfed on the 21st. 
 
 An advance of the army beyond Centreville 
 was not practicable until the supply trains 
 came up and their contents were distributed. 
 The distribution was completed to divisions on 
 the 19th, and on the 20th McDowell ordered, p. 
 325: "The commanders of divisions will give 
 
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 43 
 
 the necessary orders that an equal distribution 
 of subsistence stores on hand be made immedi 
 ately to the different companies in their re 
 spective commands, so that they shall be pro 
 vided for the same number of days, and that 
 the same be cooked and put in the haversacks 
 of the men. The subsistence stores now in the 
 possession of each division, with the fresh beef 
 that can be drawn from the commissary, must 
 last to include the 23d instant." 
 
 This was the first campaign of the war. The 
 troops were not soldiers, but civilians in uni 
 form ; most of them in service only for three 
 months. Giving due weight to all the circum 
 stances, there was no culpable delay at Centre- 
 ville, and the time spent there between the 
 evening of the 18th and 2 o clock on the morn 
 ing of the 21st, was necessary to replenish the 
 exhausted haversacks of the men and to gain 
 information upon which to form a proper plan 
 of battle. 
 
 The enemy was strongly posted along Bull 
 Run, his right at Union Mills, and his left 
 at the " Stonebridge," where the Warrenton 
 turnpike crosses the stream. His line was 
 eight miles long. Centreville, around which 
 McDowell s army was concentrated, was nearly 
 opposite the center of Beauregard s line, and 
 only about three or four miles from it. 
 
44 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 There was no misunderstanding as to the 
 plan of battle. The parts of the different di 
 visions were clearly set forth in McDowell s 
 general order No. 22 of July 20, p. 226, and ex 
 planations were given in detail at a conference 
 on the evening of the 20th, at which division and 
 brigade commanders were present. 
 
 After explaining the situation and the object 
 to be accomplished, the order says : u The First 
 Division (General Tyler), with the exception of 
 Richardson s brigade, will move at 2.30 A.M. 
 precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike, to 
 threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not 
 open fire until full daybreak. 
 
 "The Second Division (Hunter s) will move 
 from its camp at 2 A.M. precisely, and led by 
 Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after 
 passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass 
 the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at 
 Sudley Springs, and then turning down to the 
 left, descend the stream and clear away the 
 enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and 
 bridge. It will then bear off to the right to 
 make room for the succeeding division, 
 
 "The Third Division (Heintzleman s) will 
 march at 2.30 A.M. and follow the road taken 
 by the Second Division (Hunter s), but will 
 cross at the lower ford after it has been turned 
 as above, and then going to the left, take place 
 between the stream and the Second Division. 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 45 
 
 "The Fifth Division (Miles ) will take posi 
 tion on the Centreville Heights (Richardson s 
 brigade will, for the time, form part of this di 
 vision and will continue in its present position). 
 One brigade will be in the village and one near 
 the present station of Richardson s brigade. 
 This division will threaten Blackburn s Ford, 
 and will remain in reserve at Centreville. 
 
 " These movements may lead to the gravest 
 results, and commanders of divisions should 
 bear in mind the immense consequences in 
 volved." 
 
 When this order was issued Sherman s and 
 Schenck s brigades of Tyler s division were in 
 camp in advance of Centreville, on the Warren- 
 ton turnpike, which led directly to the enemy s 
 left at the Stone-Bridge, about two and a half 
 miles away. Keyes brigade of Tyler s di 
 vision was just in rear of Centreville, a mile 
 behind Sherman ; behind him, Hunter s divis 
 ion, on his left, Miles division, and in rear 
 of Miles, Heintzleman s division. It was only 
 about a mile from the camps of Sherman and 
 Schenck to the point where Hunter and 
 Heintzleman were to leave the turnpike and 
 take the country road to the right. Order 
 ing Tyler, who occupied the turnpike (over a 
 part of which all in turn had to move) to march 
 at "2.30 A.M. precisely" McDowell s object 
 was to have him clear the pike as far as the 
 
46 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 turn off, so as not to delay Hunter and Heintzle- 
 mann. That was fully understood at the con 
 ference held on the night of the 20th. Tyler 
 had to move Sherman s and Schenck s brigades 
 one mile along the pike to accomplish the ob 
 ject of opening the roads to the following divis 
 ions. Yet, without any opposition from the 
 enemy, his advance was so slow as to hold 
 Hunter and Heintzleman some four hours on 
 the mile or two of the turnpike between their 
 camps and the road on which they were to 
 turn off for the flank march. There is abund 
 ant proof of this fact in the official reports 
 printed in Records of the Rebellion, and in the 
 testimony before the Committee on the Con 
 duct of the War, and the Committee itself con- 
 iirms the assertion in its report It is not 
 necessary to cite any other witness than 
 Tyler himself. While not frankly admit 
 ting the delay, he was not able before the 
 Committee to deny or disprove it. He said, 
 p. 202 : 
 
 Q. " Were the rest of the divisions delayed 
 by your movement ? 
 
 A. "They were not/ more than absolutely 
 necessary, under the circumstances." 
 
 Q. "What time did your movement com 
 mence 2" 
 
 A. " At half-past two o clock/ 
 
 Q. " You were to advance, how f ar 2 " 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 47 
 
 A. "To the Stone-Bridge, about two and a 
 half miles." 
 
 Q. u At what time did the portion of the 
 division under your command reach Stone- 
 bridge?" 
 
 A. "It reached there by six o clock, per 
 haps a quarter before six." 
 
 By this testimony from Tyler himself, he, 
 with no opposition from the enemy, and no 
 obstruction in the way, was about three hours 
 and a half marching two miles and a half over 
 a good turnpike. 
 
 The Committee, however, went a little fur 
 ther, and asked, pp. 202, 203 : 
 
 Q. "At what time did the rear of your di 
 vision I do not mean to include Keyes brig 
 ade, but the rear of that which was with you 
 that morning pass the point where Hunter 
 and Heintzleman turned off to the right ? " 
 
 A. " We passed there before four o clock." 
 
 Q. "Or in two hours after you started ? " 
 
 A. "Yes, Sir!" 
 
 The point from which the part of his division 
 here mentioned (Sherman s and Schenck s brig 
 ades) marched, and the point where Hunter and 
 Heintzleman turned off, was one mile. Tyler 
 marched that distance in two hours, and yet he 
 went to his grave with a grievance because 
 McDowell said in his report, p. 318: "There 
 was delay in the First Division getting out of 
 
48 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 its camp on the road, and the other divisions 
 were, in consequence, between two and three 
 hours behind the time appointed a great mis 
 fortune, as events turned out," and because 
 further, that in his testimony, McDowell, p. 
 42, refused to retract this part of his report, 
 and said: "General Tyler has written me a 
 letter complaining that my report does him in 
 justice, and asking me to set him right in ref 
 erence to this matter of delay. Under the cir 
 cumstances, I did not feel that I could make 
 any change." 
 
 In view of Tyler s abuse and criticism of 
 McDowell, the commander, it is proper to look 
 for a moment at the part played in that battle 
 by Tyler himself, McDowell s second in com 
 mand, as well as his critic. He says, with his 
 division alone, he could have whipped Beaure- 
 gard s entire army before sundown on the 18th, 
 if McDowell had not prevented. That boast 
 has been disposed of. Certainly McDowell 
 did not prevent him from fighting on the 
 21st. What help did he give toward whip 
 ping Beauregard on that day ? It has already 
 been shown that he employed the three and 
 a half hours between 2.30 and 6 A.M. in 
 marching two and a half miles to the vicinity 
 of the Stone bridge on the Warren ton turn 
 pike. It was under cover of the demonstration 
 he was to make at that point that Hunter and 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 
 
 49 
 
 Heintzelman were to effect their flank march 
 and turn the enemy s left. 
 
 POSITION OF TYLER FROM 6 A.M. UNTIL ABOUT 12 M. ON 21ST. 
 
 The rebel position at Stone-Bridge was de 
 fended by General Evans. Tyler s report, 
 written six days after the battle, when every 
 thing was comparatively fresh in his mind, and 
 when he was not making an attack on his 
 commander and the plan of battle, says (pp. 
 348, 349, Rebellion Records) : 
 
 "* * Soon after getting into position we 
 discovered that the enemy had a heavy bat- 
 
50 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 tery, with infantry in support, commanding 
 both the road and bridge approaches, on which 
 both Ayres and Carlisle, at different times, tried 
 the effect of their guns without success, and a 
 careful examination of the banks of Bull-Run 
 satisfying me that they were impracticable for 
 purpose of artillery, these batteries had to re 
 main comparatively useless until such time as 
 Hunter s column might clear the approach by 
 a movement on the opposite bank. During 
 this period of waiting the 80-pounder was 
 occasionally used with considerable effect 
 against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which 
 could be seen from time to time moving in the 
 direction of Hunter s column and out of the 
 range of ordinary guns." 
 
 Twenty years later this condition of affairs 
 had changed in Tyler s mind. In his mem 
 oir, traducing McDowell, he says : 
 
 " The enemy had a force guarding the bridge, 
 but not so strong that a passage could not have 
 been forced at any moment. He had a battery 
 of light guns there in the early part of the day, 
 but they were soon driven off by Ayres battery 
 and the heavy eigh teen-pounder gun com 
 manded by Lieutenant Lyford." 
 
 So we see that the " heavy " battery and sup 
 ports on which, according to Tyler, in 1862. 
 Ayres and Carlisle fired in vain, and finally 
 ceased firing, became by the same authority, in 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 51 
 
 1881, " a light battery, which was soon driven 
 off by our tire!" and, that, the waiting for 
 Hunter s column to clear the opposite bank 
 was not necessary, as we could have "forced 
 the passage at any moment ! " 
 
 In this instance the latest statement is the 
 correct one. The truth is the Stone-Bridge was 
 defended by a fractional brigade consisting of 
 a regiment and a battalion of infantry, a squad 
 ron of cavalry, and two pieces of light artil 
 lery. 
 
 Tyler s demonstration was so feeble that 
 Evans was not long deceived by it. The latter 
 says in his report, p. 559 : It was not later than 
 eight o clock " when I perceived that it was. not 
 the intention of the enemy to attack me in my 
 present position, but had commenced his move 
 ment to turn my left flank. I at once decided to 
 quit my position and to meet him in his flank 
 movement, leaving the skirmishers of the 
 Fpurth Regiment of S. C. Volunteers, sup 
 ported by the reserve of two companies to keep 
 him engaged. I sent word to Colonel Phil. St. 
 George Cocke that I had abandoned my posi 
 tion at the bridge and was advancing to attack 
 the enemy at the crossing of the Warrenton 
 turnpike and the Manassas road. Observing 
 carefully the movements of the enemy, * I was 
 
 *The enemy here referred to is Hunter s, not Tyler s division. 
 
52 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 able to form my line of attack directly in his 
 front, covered by a grove of woods, by 9 o clock 
 a. m." It thus appears that the division which 
 on the 18th could have whipped Beauregard s 
 aimy before sundown, was confronted before 8 
 a. m. on the 21st by some fifteen companies of 
 infantry, two of cavalry, and two of artillery, 
 and after 8 d clock was held in check " till about 
 noon" p 369 by the skirmishers of the 4th 
 S. C. Volunteers, supported by two companies 
 of that regiment, four companies in all. This, 
 in the face of orders to Tyler from McDowell, 
 the delivery of which is proved by the records, 
 to " press forward the attack" and in the face, 
 too, of his duty in the matter, as admitted in 
 his memoirs, p. 57, where he says, that when 
 Hunter and Heintzelman had "attacked and 
 forced the enemy to the vicinity of Stone 
 Bridge, " I " was to force the passage of Bull 
 Run at that point and attack the enemy in 
 flank." It does not appear, nor does Tyler 
 claim that he did press the attack in response to 
 McDowell s orders. In fact Tyler, under oath, 
 denied, but subsequently admitted, that he had 
 received those orders. His testimony is as fol 
 lows : January 20, 1 862, before the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War " I did not see 
 General McDowell on the field, and I did not 
 receive any order from him during that day, p. 
 201. * * * 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 53 
 
 I received no orders from General McDowell 
 after I left him Saturday night," p. 203. 
 
 "Question: Did you receive from General 
 McDowell, through his aid, Mr. Kingsbury, 
 orders to make a more rapid advance ? 
 
 " Answer : No, Sir ! I did not, p. 206. 
 
 January 22d, General Daniel Tyler, re-ex 
 amined. " The witness said : I made one mis 
 take in my testimony when before the Commit 
 tee on Monday last. I then stated that I 
 received no orders from General McDowell dur 
 ing the day of the battle of Bull- Run. That 
 was an error. I did receive an order from him 
 about 11 o clock in the morning to press the 
 attack." 
 
 He says, "about 11 o clock." If the exact 
 time could be ascertained it would be found 
 that it was before eleven o clock. But be that 
 as it may, the order was to press forward Jtis 
 attack!" The how and the where were abso 
 lutely at Tyler s discretion. He could app]y 
 his troops as he judged best ; and if the enemy 
 could be driven off and the passage be forced 
 at any moment, as he would seem to intimate 
 should have been done, there was nothing to 
 keep him from doing it. The simple, emphatic, 
 but general order about 11 A. M., was to "press 
 forward Ms attack" Under this order, and in 
 the exercise of his discretion, Tyler did not 
 attempt to force the passage of the bridge, 
 
54 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 which was then defended by only four com 
 panies. 
 
 Let us see what Tyler did with his division in 
 this affair. Sherman says in his official report, 
 pp. 368-9 after reaching his position near the 
 Stone-Bridge 6 A. M. : "here the brigade was 
 deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and 
 remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. 
 The enemy remained very quiet," &c., " There 
 we remained till we heard the musketry fire 
 across Bull- Run, showing that the head of 
 Colonel Hunter s column was engaged. The 
 firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was 
 driving before him the enemy till about noon, 
 when it became certain the enemy had come to 
 a stand, and that our forces on the other side 
 of Bull-Run were all engaged artillery and 
 infantry. Here you (Tyler) sent me the order 
 to cross over with the whole brigade to the as 
 sistance of Colonel Hunter. 
 
 "Early in the day, when reconnoitering the 
 ground, I had seen a horseman descend from 
 a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show 
 himself in the open field ; and inferring we 
 could cross over at the same point, I sent for 
 ward a company as skirmishers and followed 
 with the whole brigade. We found no diffi 
 culty in crossing over, and met no opposition 
 in ascending the steep bluff opposite." 
 
 This shows that Sherman knew " early in the 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 55 
 
 day" that he could cross the stream, but 
 Tyler s orders for him to do so were not given 
 until " about noon, when it became certain the 
 enemy had come to a stand and that our forces 
 on the other side were all engaged artillery 
 and infantry." 
 
 Surely this was not pressing forward the 
 attack ? 
 
 Tyler s division was the one of the three 
 active divisions which had the shortest line 
 to the battle-field (say 3 or 4 miles), and 
 should have done the most fighting. The ob 
 ject of the long and tiresome march (some 
 twelve miles) of Hunter and Heintzelman, was 
 by turning the enemy s left to open the way 
 for Tyler s command, fresh and en masse, to 
 reach the field of battle by a single stride. But 
 it turned out that the divisions which did the 
 marching had also to do most of the fighting. 
 
 To return to Sherman : crossing the Run, he 
 says : u I learned that General McDowell was 
 on the field. I sought him out, and received 
 his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy." 
 Though his brigade took an active part in the 
 later phases of the action, Sherman saw nothing 
 more of Tyler during the battle. Tyler says, 
 in his report, p. 349, " I ordered Colonel Sher 
 man, with his brigade, to cross Bull-Run, and 
 to support the two columns already in action. 
 Colonel Sherman, as appears by his report, 
 
56 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 crossed the Run without opposition, and after 
 encountering a party of the enemy flying be 
 fore Hunter s forces, found General McDowell, 
 and received his orders to join in the pursuit. 
 The subsequent operations of this brigade and 
 its able commander having been under your 
 own eye and direction, I shall not follow its 
 movements any further." 
 
 All of this time Tyler was not only under the 
 obligations of the general plan of battle, but 
 was under the special obligation of the order 
 he had received, to press the attack. Yet he 
 nowhere admits that he acted upon that 
 order, on the contrary he still acted upon his 
 own judgment. He says in his report p. 349: 
 "As soon as it was discovered that Hunters^ 
 division had ~been arrested, I ordered up Keyes 
 brigade." Was it pressing the attack, or was 
 it soldiership, if there had been no such orders, 
 lying on the flank of an inferior force of the 
 enemy to wait within the sound of Hunter s 
 musketry for his division to be arrested? "I 
 ordered Keyes brigade to follow Sherman, ac 
 companying the movement in person, as I saw 
 it must necessarily place me on the left of our 
 line, the best possible position, &*c. I ordered 
 Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of 
 Sherman s brigade," says Tyler. McDowell s 
 adjutant General was sent to flnd Tyler and 
 hurry him into action. En route he passed 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 57 
 
 Sherman s brigade; met Tyler while Keyes 
 brigade was still marching by Hank ; told him 
 that we were victorious, to form line to the left 
 and advance up the slope in front. Tyler con 
 tinues in his report, p. 394 : "The charge was 
 here ordered and the 2nd Maine and 3rd Con 
 necticut regiments, which were opposed to this 
 portion of the enemy s line, pressed forward 
 to the top of the hill until they reached the 
 buildings held by the enemy ; drove them 
 out, and for a moment had them in posses 
 sion. At this point, finding the brigade under 
 the fire of a strong force behind breast- works, 
 the order was given to march by the left 
 flank across an open field until the whole line 
 was sheltered by the right bank of Bull- Run, 
 along which the march was continued, &c. 
 The march was conducted for a considerable 
 distance below the Stone-Bridge, &c." Keyes, 
 in his report, p. 353, fixes the hour at which 
 the first, and it may be said the last, active 
 service of his brigade was rendered in the fight. 
 He says after describing his crossing of the 
 Run: " At about 2 p. M. General Tyler ordered 
 me to take a battery on a height in front." 
 After the attempt to do that, Keyes says in his 
 report : "I ordered the Maine regiment to face 
 to the left flank and move to a wooded slope 
 across an open field, to which point I followed 
 them. The balance of the brigade soon rejoined 
 
58 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 me, and after a few moments rest, I again 
 put it in motion and moved forward to find an 
 other opportunity to charge." This movement 
 forward is the one l sheltered by the right bank 
 of Bull-Run, already mentioned by Tyler, and 
 this is the brigade which Tyler accompanied 
 "in person, to the best possible position." 
 Why he sent Keyes under the bluff to find an 
 other " opportunity to charge," is not disclosed 
 by the records of the rebellion. The fact is, that 
 after that one "charge" was made by Keyes 
 brigade, about 2 P. M. it filed off and marched 
 along, under the bluff, and did no more fight 
 ing. Keyes confirms this. He says in his 
 report, p. 354: "I continued my march and 
 sent my Aide, Lieut. Walter, to the rear* to 
 inquire of General McDowell how the day was 
 going ? The discontinuance of the firing in our 
 lines becoming more and more apparent, I 
 inclined to the right, and after marching six 
 hundred or seven hundred yards farther, I was 
 met by Lieut, E. Upton, Aide to General Tyler, 
 and ordered to file to the right, as our troops 
 were retreating. I moved on at an ordinary 
 pace, and fell into the retreating column. 
 * * " At the moment I received the order to 
 retreat and for some time afterwards, it (his 
 brigade) was in as good order as in the morning 
 
 * McDowell was in front. 
 
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 
 
 on the road." Military readers, especially 
 those who are acquainted with the Bull-Run 
 affair, can analyze the foregoing facts for them 
 selves. It may be added that Keyes brigade 
 of "about 2,500 men," as he reported it, 
 shows : killed, no officers, 19 enlisted men ; 
 
 FIELD ABOUT TIME UNION EETEEAT BEGAN, JULY 21ST. 
 
 wounded, 4 officers and 46 enlisted men. Sher 
 man s brigade which fought under McDowell s 
 personal orders, lost : killed, 3 officers and 
 117 enlisted men ; wounded, 15 officers, 193 
 enlisted men. 
 
60 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 Neither Schenck s brigade of Tyler s divisio 
 nor Tyler s Artillery, crossed Bull-Run durii 
 the battle. After 8 o clock the Stone-Brid^ 
 was defended by only a handful of skirmisher 
 The turnpike was obstructed by some falL 
 trees. Ordinary vigor and industry wou 
 have carried the bridge and cleared the pi] 
 in a few minutes. Tyler testifies, that about 
 A. M. he received orders to press the attack, 
 he had pushed his division, or merely tl 
 fine regular batteries of Ayers and Carlis 
 into the contest, as late even as 2 o clock, ] 
 might have saved the day and averted tl 
 consequences of his delay in the mornin 
 Tyler s three brigades, Sherman s, Keyes ai 
 Schenck s were from 6 o clock in the mornir 
 concentrated near the Stone-Bridge, in front 
 Evans until about 8 A. M. and on his flank ar 
 not more than a mile from it, after he left tl 
 Stone-Bridge and formed a line of battle perpe 
 dicular to Tyler s front which he had done by 
 A. M., to resist the attack of Hunter andHein 
 zelman. Tyler was on the ground with the; 
 three fresh brigades and his artillery in han< 
 and with McDowell s orders to press the attacl 
 anl was informed of the progress of the flankir 
 divisions by his staff officers who observed tl 
 movements from tree- tops, as Tyler says in h 
 report. What he did under these circumstai 
 ces is shown in the records of which an outlii 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 61 
 
 has been given. His own services in that battle 
 do not justify him, to say the least of it, in 
 criticising McDowell. Except in the one par 
 ticular of the delay in the morning, McDowell 
 made no complaint against Tyler on the 21st, 
 though he fully understood the facts in the case. 
 The battle was lost, and he chose to let the 
 blame rest upon his own shoulders rather than 
 place any part of it upon his subordinates. 
 
 The object of this article is to repel the 
 direct and outrageous attack made upon 
 McDowell, not to praise him. But the occasion 
 seems appropriate for citing an analysis of him, 
 made by Secretary Chase in a letter to a friend, 
 dated Sept. 4, 1862. (Warden s " account of 
 the private and public, services of Salmon P. 
 Chase/ ) 
 
 " McDowell has been unfortunate, but he is 
 a loyal, brave, truthful, capable officer. He is 
 a disciplinarian. While he never hesitated to 
 appropriate private property of rebels to public 
 use, he suppressed, as far as possible, private 
 marauding as incompatible with the laws of 
 civilized war, and equally incompatible with 
 the efficiency of troops. Then he never drinks, 
 or smokes, or chews, or indulges in any kind 
 of license. He is serious and earnest. He 
 resorts to no acts of popularity. He has no 
 political aims, and perhaps not any very pro 
 nounced political opinions, except the convic- 
 
62 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 
 
 tion that this war sprung from the influences 
 of slavery, and that whenever slavery stands 
 in the way of successful prosecution, slavery 
 must get out of the way. He is too indifferent 
 in manner. His officers are sometimes alien 
 ated by it. He is too purely military in his 
 intercourse with his soldiers. There is an 
 apparent hauteur no, that is not the word- 
 rough indifference expresses better the idea, 
 in his way towards them, that makes it hard 
 for them to feel any warm personal sentiment 
 towards him, unless they find, what they 
 hitherto have not found, that he leads them 
 successfully, and the honor of serving under 
 him compensates for their grief." 
 
 The communication in the Post says : u The 
 true and full history of the War of the Rebel 
 lion cannot be written until sufficient time has 
 elapsed to allow the many diaries, letters, and 
 private papers of the chief participants in its 
 stirring scenes to be made accessible by their 
 death." Diaries, letters, &c., are valuable data 
 for history,but as much cannot be said for recol 
 lections recorded twenty years after stirring 
 scenes, especially if they are prepared without 
 referring to the reports, diaries, &c., made at 
 the tim e. Death is valuable to history by giving 
 to the public the diaries, letters, &c., of par 
 ticipants in stirring military scenes, and also 
 by putting an end to the new versions of those 
 
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 63 
 
 scenes which, the participants issue from time 
 to time as they pass on in life Vanity, interest 
 and prejudice work against memory. The oper 
 ations of war appeal strongly to the imagin 
 ation, and latter day recollections in some 
 instances illuminate, in others, obscure the 
 truth. 
 
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