1$ 
 
NOTES 
 
 ON 
 i ^ 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 OF 
 
 1808—1809, 
 
 NORTH OF SPAIN. 
 
 N REFERENCE TO SOME PASSAGES IN LIEUT.-COL. NAPIER'S HISTORY 
 
 OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA. AND IN SIR WALTER SCOTT'S 
 
 LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. 
 
 By LIEUT.-COL. T. S. SORELL, 
 
 MILITARY SECRETARY AND AIDE-DE-CAMP TO SIR DAViD BAIRD, 
 DURING THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. 
 
 MDCCCXXVIII. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON", WHITEFRIARS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 ff{fi(rJ 
 
 The following Notes have been written with a 
 design of placing in a correct point of view the pro- 
 ceedings of the division of the British army which 
 landed at Coruna, under the command of sir David 
 Baird ; and of pointing out some mistakes which 
 occur in late publications, relative to the Campaign 
 of 1808-1809, in the North of Spain. This, it is 
 thought, will be best accomplished by giving ex- 
 tracts from the original correspondence on the sub- 
 ject ; which, as many of these extracts have not yet 
 been published, may at all events furnish matter of 
 reference to the future historian. It is intended to 
 show — 
 
 1st, That every effort was made to prepare the 
 division which landed at Coruna for the field, and to 
 effect its junction with that under sir John Moore. 
 
 2dly, That sir David Baird did not, as stated by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, in his History of the 
 War in the Peninsula, retire from Astorga to ^"illa 
 Franca, until ordered to do so by sir John Moore. 
 
 And, 3dly, That the disorder and irregularity 
 whicli attended the retreat ought principally to be 
 
 497 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 ascribed to the fatigues and privations which the 
 army underwent, and not to any want of exertion on 
 the part of the officers in command. 
 
 In laying these Notes before the public, the writer 
 has not the slightest intention to detract from the 
 general merit of the works to which he has occasion 
 to refer, but is actuated solely by considerations of 
 public justice and private friendship. 
 
 London, June 20, 1828. 
 
NOTES, 
 
 In lieutenant-colonel Napier's account of the early 
 part of the campaign of 1808-1809, that officer notices 
 the want of assistance and co-operation that both sir 
 John Moore and sir David Baird experienced from the 
 Spanish government and authorities. It would not, 
 therefore, be necessary to advert to that period, were 
 it not that the events which then occurred are so 
 intimately connected with those which followed, that 
 it would be impossible to fulfil the object I have in 
 view without alluding to our earliest transactions in 
 Spain. 
 
 It may, however, first be proper to notice an error 
 in sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon Bonaparte *, 
 although that error has not escaped the attention of 
 lieutenant-colonel Napier. Sir Walter Scott is mis- 
 taken in supposing that sir David Baird was sent by 
 sir John Moore to Coruria. Sir John Moore was 
 serving with the British troops in Portugal, under the 
 command of sir Harry Burrard, when the English go- 
 vernment determined to employ a force in Spain under 
 sir John Moore's orders. Sir Harry Burrard was di- 
 rected to place twenty thousand men of the troops 
 already in Portugal under the command of sir John 
 
 • Scott's Napoleon, vol. vi. p. 266. 
 
 B 
 
2 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Moore, and about twelve thousand were sent direct 
 from England to Coruna, under sir David Baird. The 
 plan of the campaign was framed in England by the 
 British government, with the advice of the marquis 
 de la Romana. It was intended that the British 
 troops should advance towards the Ebro in support of 
 the native armies, then represented to be in great 
 force, and in the most efficient order. Indeed, such 
 was the delusion which prevailed at the time in this 
 respect, that the only fear expressed in Spain was, 
 that the French might escape across the Pyrenees ; 
 and the plans most frequently discussed were those 
 for an invasion of France. Sir John Moore had the 
 option of proceeding by sea from Lisbon to Coruna, 
 uniting there with sir David Baird's force, and march- 
 ing his whole army through Galicia, or of moving the 
 corps at Lisbon through Portugal. He preferred 
 the latter alternative, and directed sir David Baird 
 to advance from Coruna on Astorga, whilst he 
 proceeded from Lisbon to Salamanca, intending to 
 form the junction at a point in Spain to be after- 
 wards determined on. From the reports he had 
 received respecting the state of the roads through 
 Portugal, he was induced to send the cavalry and 
 the principal part of his artillery by a circuitous 
 route through Merida, Almaraz, and the Escu- 
 rial. 
 
 On the 13th of October, 1808, the fleet of trans- 
 ports which conveyed the division of British troops 
 under sir David Baird to Spain, anchored in the port 
 of Coruna. The nature of his reception, and of 
 some of the difficulties which he experienced in pre- 
 paring his corps for field service, will perhaps be best 
 shown by a reference to part of his correspondence. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 3 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, at Lisbon. 
 
 Coruiia, 13th October, 1808. 
 
 " I have the honour to report to you my arrival in 
 the port of Coruna, in command of a division of his 
 majesty's forces, and to transmit, for your information, 
 a return of the strength of the different corps of 
 which it is composed. 
 
 " My instructions from lord Castlereagh direct 
 me, after reporting my arrival to you, to lose no time 
 in disembarking the troops, and, immediately on 
 clearing the infantry transports, to send them to 
 Lisbon, for the purpose of receiving on board part 
 of our force there, destined to act in this part of 
 Spain, in conjunction with the troops from England, 
 under your orders. 
 
 " An unexpected difficulty has, however, arisen to 
 prevent an immediate obedience to these orders, as 
 the junta of this province does not consider itself 
 authorised to receive us, or to permit our disem- 
 barkation, without the previous sanction of the su- 
 preme government of the kingdom. 
 
 " An extraordinary courier has accordingly been 
 despatched to Madrid to obtain this permission ; and 
 I have written to Lord William Bentinck, in that 
 city *, urging him to use every effort in his power to 
 obtain a speedy and favourable reply to our applica- 
 tion ; on receipt of which I shall lose no time in 
 carrying my instructions into effect," &c. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore. 
 
 Coruna, 15th October, 1808. 
 
 " Instead of arrangements being made for our 
 
 reception, as I was led to expect would be the case, 
 
 - • Lord William Bentinck had been employed on a political mission at 
 Madrid. Mr. Stuart, however, had succeeded him at this time, but his lordship 
 remained in that city in communication with the Spanish government. 
 
 b2 
 
4 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 the provincial government was not only unprepared 
 to receive us, but appears disinclined to afford us any 
 active assistance. 
 
 " As we brought no money with us, I have 
 
 been compelled to endeavour to obtain a supply, and I 
 am in expectation of procuring five thousand pounds. 
 I am afraid we shall find great difficulty in fulfilling 
 that part of my instructions which relates to the 
 purchase of horses and mules, as they appear to be 
 extremely scarce in this province." 
 
 It was expected by the British government that we 
 should have found no difficulty in procuring money 
 after our arrival in Spain for bills on the treasury : 
 in this expectation we were completely disappointed, 
 and much inconvenience was at first experienced in 
 consequence. The division was to be equipped for 
 field service in Galicia. It was, therefore, necessary 
 to procure horses and mules for the conveyance of 
 stores, baggage, &c. ; but none could be obtained 
 without immediate payment. Destined to a country 
 which was represented to be enthusiastic in the cause 
 we came to defend, it was naturally supposed in Eng- 
 land that our wants would be cheerfully supplied. 
 Every effort was made by sir David Baird to remedy 
 the effects of this disappointment. 
 
 Sir David Baird to the British consul at Oporto. 
 
 Coruna, 17th October, 1808. 
 
 "Being in the greatest want of money for the 
 payment and equipment of his majesty's forces in 
 Galicia, I have directed the deputy commissary- 
 general at this place, to send an assistant to Oporto, 
 for the purpose of endeavouring to procure cash for 
 bills on the British treasury ; and I beg to request you 
 will afford him every assistance in your power," &c. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 5 
 
 Sir David Baird to lord Castiereagh, 
 
 18th October, 1808. 
 
 " 1 am at a loss to know how we shall be able 
 
 to subsist the troops, without we can find some means 
 of getting money. We have as yet been only able 
 to raise about six thousand pounds," &c. 
 
 At length the courier who had been despatched 
 to Madrid arrived at Coruna, three days later than 
 his return was expected by the provincial junta. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, 
 
 Coruna, 24th October, 1808. 
 
 " The courier who was sent to Madrid on the 
 
 subject of our disembarkation returned on the 22d in- 
 stant ; and another messenger arrived from that city 
 yesterday, and brought me letters from Lord William 
 Bentinck and Mr. Stuart. The answer of the su- 
 preme government to our application, as read by Mr. 
 Frere last night, in presence of the junta of this 
 province, is certainly very different from what I ex- 
 pected. Instead of expressing any anxiety to pro- 
 mote our views, or dissatisfaction at the impediments 
 thrown in our way by the Galician government, it 
 merely permits us to land here in the event of it 
 being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. 
 Andero, and directs that, if a disembarkation takes 
 place, it shall be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 
 men each, which are to be successively pushed on 
 into Castile, without waiting for the necessary equip- 
 ment of mules and horses. As the execution of this 
 plan might bring part of my division in contact with 
 the enemy (in the event of the Spanish armies ex- 
 periencing a defeat) before a junction with you, and 
 is in direct opposition to the instructions I received 
 from lord Castiereagh, and to your orders, I felt it 
 my duty to object to it in the strongest terms, and 
 
6 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 finally to declare, that, unless I was permitted to 
 quarter the troops in this province until the necessary 
 provision of draught cattle could be procured, I should 
 feel myself compelled to suffer them to remain on 
 board until I had communicated with you and re- 
 ceived your further orders. 
 
 " At length, after a great deal of discussion, and 
 much opposition on the part of the junta, it has been 
 decided, that we shall be cantoned in the towns and 
 villages on the two principal roads leading from this 
 place towards Leon and Castile, until such time 
 as the necessary equipment can be effected to enable 
 us to take the field," &c. 
 
 In pursuance of this arrangement, the troops were 
 successively brought on shore ; but as obstacles to our 
 proceedings presented themselves every moment, sir 
 David Baird found it necessary to apply to Mr. Stuart 
 at Madrid, for the purpose of getting a Spanish officer 
 appointed to carry on our intercourse with the local 
 authorities. 
 
 Sir David Baird to Charles Stuart, Esquire. 
 
 Coruna, October 25th, 1808. 
 
 " The utter impossibility of making any sa- 
 tisfactory progress in our arrangements whilst we 
 are under the necessity of referring every subject to 
 a junta composed of a dozen persons, some of whom 
 throw obstacles in the way of every measure that is 
 suggested, urges me to request that you will point out 
 to the supreme government, in the strongest manner, 
 the importance of appointing some person of autho- 
 rity, to remain with the British troops at present here, 
 with full powers to make such arrangements as may 
 be requisite for their accommodation and supply, and 
 to enable them to move," &c. 
 
1808-^1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 7 
 
 The motive for urging this request will be pro- 
 perly understood, when it is explained that, although 
 the British troops arrived at Coruna on the 13th 
 of October, it was the 24th before any article of fresh 
 provision could be procured or purchased for them ; 
 they had till then been supplied with rations from 
 the transports. Such was the conduct of a people 
 whom we came to protect. One cause of their 
 backwardness was about this time discovered, — they 
 distrusted our real intentions, and suspected us of a 
 design to seize the arsenal of Ferrol. So jealous were 
 they, that two or three officers, who rode over to see 
 the place, were refused admission into the town ; and 
 a division of Spanish troops, which was on its march 
 from the south of Galicia to join Blake, was suddenly 
 ordered to retrace its steps, for the purpose of gar- 
 risoning and securing that fortress. 
 
 Sir David Baird to colonel Gordon. 
 
 Coruna, 25th October, 1808. 
 
 " The progress of our preparations has been 
 
 much delayed and impeded by an almost total want 
 of assistance from the government of the province. 
 The junta has been liberal in making promises, but 
 has hitherto failed in every instance in fulfilling 
 them ; and until yesterday, notwithstanding every 
 exertion, I found it absolutely impossible to procure 
 an ounce of bread for the soldiers. No other article 
 of provision has yet been obtained, although, from 
 the arrangements now in progress, I am in hopes of 
 securing regular supplies for the troops when landed," 
 &c. 
 
 Notwithstanding the difficulties and delays which 
 crossed sir David Baird at every step, the leading 
 
8 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 division of his column, composed of the light brigade 
 under brigadier-general Craufurd, was put in marcli 
 towards Astorga on the 28th October, only six days 
 after permission to land the troops had been received 
 at Coruna. On the preceding day sir David Baird 
 announced this movement as follows : 
 
 Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh. 
 
 Coruna, 27th October, 1808. 
 
 " We have indeed procured a sufficient sum of 
 
 money to pay the troops up to the 24th of this 
 month ; but the balance remaining is so small, that 
 unless we speedily receive a considerable sum in 
 addition, it will be impossible to proceed with our 
 arrangements, as the Spaniards require payment in 
 specie, not Only for mules and horses, but for every 
 article of provisions they furnish. 
 
 " We have hitherto been unsuccessful in our 
 
 endeavours to procure draught cattle ; four or five 
 mules being all we have as yet been able to get." 
 
 " Notwithstanding these circumstances, three 
 
 regiments will commence their march on the road 
 towards Leon to-morrow, and will proceed as far as 
 Lugo. They would have moved yesterday; but just 
 as they were setting out, the person who had con- 
 tracted to supply them with provisions in their can- 
 tonments refused to fulfil his engagement. 
 
 " The rains have just set in with great vio- 
 lence," &c. 
 
 This letter shows that we were still left to our 
 own resources, without the slightest assistance from 
 the Spanish authorities. Indeed, there was little 
 doubt but that some of them made a profit of our 
 difficulties, and derived pecuniary advantage from the 
 
. 1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 9 
 
 contracts they obliged us to have recourse to, instead 
 of furnishing us upon the same footing with Spanish 
 troops, as was proposed by sir David Baird. 
 
 By the 3rd of November, the whole of sir David 
 Baird's division, except one battalion, was in march. 
 On that day he wrote : 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir J, Moore. 
 
 Corufia, 3rd November, 1808. 
 
 " All the regiments of my division (with the 
 
 exception of the 3rd battalion 60th) are now on 
 shore, and moving slowly towards Astorga. I can- 
 not, at this moment, positively fix the day when my 
 advance will reach that place ; but I trust nothing 
 will, at all events, occur to delay it beyond the 13th 
 of this month. 
 
 " In the mean time measures are concerting for 
 the establishment of a depot ; and the first division 
 of waggons with provisions left Coruiia for Astorga 
 this morning. From all the information I have been 
 able to collect, that town is a very proper place for 
 the establishment of a magazine. The only doubt 
 I entertain respecting it, is whether it may not be 
 rather too far advanced," &c. 
 
 This was found too true in the sequel. Lieut.- 
 colonel Napier, at page 470, in speaking of the re- 
 treat through Astorga, says, " In the preceding month 
 large stores had been gradually brought up to that 
 town by sir David Baird ; and as there were no means 
 of transport to remove them, orders were given, after 
 supplying the immediate wants of the army, to de- 
 stroy them. But Romana, who would neither de- 
 fend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promise, 
 pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army ; and 
 when the English divisions marched in, such a tumult 
 
10 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 and confusion arose, that no orders could be executed 
 with regularity, no distribution be made, nor the de- 
 struction of the stores be effected," &c. 
 
 Astorga was fixed on by sir John Moore as a prin- 
 cipal depot for the army, and orders were given in 
 a letter from him, dated Lisbon, the 26th October, 
 to send provisions there sufficient for 20,000 men for 
 ten days. 
 
 Having thus explained the nature of our situa- 
 tion during the period which immediately followed 
 our arrival in Spain, I shall now proceed to notice 
 some further passages in colonel Napier's work. 
 
 At page 428, colonel Napier says, "The 26th 
 (November) the head of sir David Baird's column 
 was at Astorga, but the rear extended beyond Lugo." 
 
 As Coruria was fixed on as the* grand depot for 
 the whole army, and was the point where it was in- 
 tended that every thing coming from England should 
 be landed, and as major-general Broderick was left 
 there with a British battalion, it may be said that 
 sir David Baird's rear extended to that port. In- 
 deed, this was in some degree the fact, for it was 
 necessary to occupy the different towns on the whole 
 line from Astorga to Coruna, for the purpose of 
 furnishing escorts and assistance in forwarding the 
 supplies moving on. But the head of sir David 
 Baird's column was at Astorga as early as the 13 th 
 of November, and it was well closed up to that town 
 by the 29th of the same month. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore. 
 
 Coruna, 7th November, 1808. 
 
 " The troops continue on their route towards 
 
 Astorga. The first division will arrive (if no un- 
 looked-for accident should delay it) on the 13th ; 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 11 
 
 and by the 19th I expect we shall have seven regi- 
 ments in that town and its immediate neighbourhood. 
 We are also forwarding provisions and ammunition 
 as quickly as our circumscribed means will permit. 
 We have derived no sort of assistance from the go- 
 vernment. The junta have repeatedly promised us 
 carts, but have invariably failed in sending them ; 
 and we have been compelled to rely solely on our 
 own efforts to obtain the means of conveyance," &c. 
 
 " The first division of carts with provisions 
 
 will reach Astorga about the 18th instant, and every 
 exertion shall be made to complete the depot you pro- 
 pose establishing there. I think, however, it may 
 become a question (which you will hereafter be able 
 to decide), whether it may not be advisable that a 
 principal magazine should be formed further back, 
 and in rear of the defiles leading from Galicia into 
 Leon. I transmit enclosed copies of some letters and 
 other documents respecting the state and proceedings 
 of the Spanish armies, and the reinforcements which 
 have arrived, or are expected by the French, in Na- 
 varre and Biscay ; by which it appears that the 
 enemy in those two provinces only, will receive an 
 accession to his force of 78,000 men by the 10th 
 instant." 
 
 " It is my intention to leave Coruna about 
 
 the 10th or 12th instant for Astorga," &c. 
 
 The intelligence which at this time reached sir 
 David Baird of the large reinforcements which the 
 enemy were receiving, made him very desirous to 
 hasten his junction with sir John Moore. This de- 
 sire was augmented on the 9th, by a communication 
 from the provincial junta, of a despatch from general 
 Blake, announcing his defeat near Zornosa, on the 
 31st of October. Nothing, however, could rouse the 
 junta to a sense of their danger, or induce them to 
 
12 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 afford us the smallest assistance. Sir David there- 
 fore again wrote to Madrid, upon the necessity of 
 having a Spanish commissioner with the British 
 troops. 
 
 Sir David Baird to Mr. Frere. 
 
 Coruna, 11th November, 1808. 
 
 " I propose setting out to-morrow or next 
 
 day, for the purpose of approaching sir John Moore, 
 now, I understand, advancing towards Salamanca. 
 Indeed, the expediency of an early junction becomes 
 every day more apparent, as, from the large rein- 
 forcements which are pouring in, to the French army 
 in Navarre, it mJght become doubtful (in the event 
 of their pushing rapidly forward into the plains of 
 Castile and Leon) whether, if it was much longer 
 delayed, it could be effected at all. Under such cir- 
 cumstances, the continued indifference and inattention 
 to our wants, which we experience from the Galician 
 junta, is particularly mortifying, and strongly proves 
 the necessity, that the central government should 
 depute some person of consideration to accompany 
 the army, with power to procure from the local au- 
 thorities, not only of this province, but of any others 
 we may pass through on our advance, such aid and as- 
 sistance as the country can afford, and may be ne- 
 cessary to enable us to move. From the want of 
 such an arrangement, we have been compelled to 
 make contracts for provisions and forage at a most 
 exorbitant rate ; and the British government is thus 
 subjected to a loss, which might be prevented by our 
 being furnished upon the same terms as the Spanish 
 troops, or by issues from the government maga- 
 zines," &c. 
 
 On the. 13th of November, sir David Baird left 
 Cpruna for Astorga. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OP SPAIN. 13 
 
 On the 13th, 15th, l6th, and 17th November, 
 sir John Moore wrote as follows : 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 13th November, 180& 
 
 " The French have entered Burgos, and have 
 
 driven from it part of the Estremaduran army. 
 In what force they are, or whether their intention 
 is to advance farther, I know not. If they advance 
 whilst we are assembling, they will embarrass us. I 
 do not understand the movements of the Spanish 
 generals : they are separated without the possibility 
 of aiding each other ; the one in Biscay, the other 
 on the Alagon, leaving the whole country in our 
 front, whilst we are collecting, to the enemy. I have 
 addressed Castaiios to know his views, when I shall 
 be better able to decide what step to take. In the 
 mean time, the great object for us is to unite. I 
 wish, as soon as you have ascertained that they can 
 be subsisted, that you would push on your corps on 
 Benevente. I shall probably, by the time they reach 
 that, order them to continue on Zamora, and ulti- 
 mately we may be able to have the whole assembled 
 in Zamora, Toro, and this place. 
 
 '* In all this, however, you must be guided 
 
 by the information you receive of the eneniy. Were 
 they to advance immediately, whilst the regiments on 
 this side were moving forward in succession, I should 
 have no option but to fall back," &c. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 15th November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 " In the night of yesterday I was informed that 
 
 the French had entered Valladolid on the 13th. This 
 
 morning the post from Valladolid has not arrived, 
 
 and the report of the French being there is confirmed. 
 
1* NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Their force is not stated ; but as it is to be presumed 
 that a small force durst not have ventured so far, I am 
 preparing to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo, in order to 
 concenter my force, which is now marching on and 
 from that place to this. Two regiments came in 
 here yesterday, and two are coming in to-day. The 
 whole will not be here before the 25th. Under such 
 circumstances, I have no option but to fall back on 
 Ciudad Rodrigo. My motions afterwards will depend 
 upon circumstances. I expect hourly intelligence 
 of the movement of the enemy. I shall not quit this 
 place until I find they are marching on it. In the 
 mean time I keep every thing ready for a start. You 
 must, of course, not separate your force by sending 
 any part of it towards this, until you find that the 
 enemy have retired from Valladolid, and that I con- 
 tinue here. In short, you must now look to yourself ; 
 be ready to fall back, if necessary, on Coruna, or take 
 such steps as circumstance!^ direct. 
 
 " We have done what we could to join and be 
 
 of use to this nation ; if we have not succeeded, it is 
 their fault, not ours. We had a right to expect that 
 they would have been able to cover us until united. 
 
 " Believe me," &c. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 16th November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 " I expect, in the course of this day, accurate in- 
 formation of the movement of the French from 
 Burgos. It does not appear that they have ever been 
 in Valladolid in any number ; and certainly, I believe, 
 they have not yet been beyond it. In the present cir- 
 cumstances I think you should collect your whole 
 force at Astorga and its neighbourhood ; by means of 
 your cavalry you can keep a good look out, and by 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 15 
 
 other means you can be informed of every movement 
 the enemy makes towards you; and, at the same 
 time that you keep your corps in readiness to join 
 me when I desire it, you must prepare to retreat 
 on Coruna should circumstances render it necessary. 
 Of these last circumstances you must be alone the 
 judge. You must retire rather than commit, in any 
 degree, the safety of your corps. It is when united 
 that we can alone do good, not by fighting separately 
 partial actions, if they can be avoided." &c. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, IJth November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 " Last night, an officer I had sent out on the Val- 
 ladolid road for information returned. He was in 
 Valladolid. All the inhabitants, the magistrates and 
 fifty or sixty people excepted, had abandoned it on 
 the arrival of the French, who entered the town on 
 Sunday afternoon, the 13th instant, with a thousand 
 cavalry and two pieces of artillery. 
 
 " My wish is, if possible, to assemble the army 
 
 between Zamora and this place. I hope the enemy 
 is not yet prepared to disturb us; but in coming to 
 me you must use your discretion, and act upon the 
 information you receive of his movements," &c. 
 
 These four letters sir David Baird received whilst 
 on the road from Coruna to Astorga, where he arrived 
 late on the night of the 19th. He answered them 
 immediately after his arrival. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore. 
 
 Astorga, 19th November, 1808. 
 
 " In addition to the information you com- 
 municate respecting the movement of French troops, 
 I have received positive intelligence, that the army of 
 
16 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 general Blake, after sustaining repeated attacks, has 
 been completely defeated, and almost entirely dis- 
 persed. The general himself, with the very small 
 portion of his force which he was able to keep to- 
 gether, has retired to the mountains bordering on the 
 Asturias ; and it appears that a few of the fugitives 
 and some artillery are collecting at Leon, which is 
 threatened by the enemy. 
 
 " I enclose copies of some reports which have been 
 addressed to colonel Craufurd and myself upon the 
 subject. 
 
 " Under these circumstances, I confess I am of 
 opinion, that it would be attended with much danger 
 if I were to make any partial advance on Benevente, 
 until some cavalry have come up and a considerable 
 portion of my force is collected ; as it would be easy 
 for the enemy, if they are in any strength, to inter- 
 cept and cut off the communication between my 
 advanced corps and the rest. By the 28th or the 
 29th, we shall have at this place at least one regiment 
 of dragoons, the horse artillery, three brigades of six- 
 pounders, and the greater part of my infantry ; and I 
 should then be in sufficient force to advance with some 
 degree of security. 
 
 " Should you, however, be desirous that I should 
 move forward with what troops I have at present 
 here, I will instantly do so; and I beg to assure you, 
 my dear sir John, that in every instance, and on 
 every occasion, it will be my most anxious desire to 
 meet your wishes and views. 
 
 " In pursuance of the advice and directions in 
 your letter of the 15th, I am making arrangements 
 to secure my retreat on Galicia, should such a measure 
 unfortunately become indispensable. Coruiia would 
 be a bad point to retire on, as the harbour is com- 
 pletely commanded from the surrounding heights. 
 
1808^1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 17 
 
 I have sent directions to have Vigo and the neigh- 
 bouring sea-ports examined, and I expect reports on 
 the subject very soon. 
 
 " Every possible effort has been made to complete 
 the equipment of this division, but owing to the total 
 want of assistance, which we experienced in Galicia 
 from the local authorities, (and which I have had re- 
 peated occasions to notice to you) our success has not 
 been great. In this province I hope, however, to be 
 more successful, and that we shall very speedily be 
 able to collect the number of mules and horses we 
 require," &c. 
 
 To this letter sir John Moore immediately re- 
 plied. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, 
 
 Salamanca, 21st November, 1808. 
 
 "My dear sir David, 
 
 " As I was sending off an officer to you with the 
 enclosed, your letter of the 19th arrived. 
 
 " My wish all along was, and still is, that you 
 should use your entire discretion in obeying whatever 
 order I send you, and I shall only feel comfortable in 
 proportion as I am assured that you will do so. Do 
 not, therefore, advance a man from Astorga until you 
 think it safe to do so. When you are ready you will 
 apprise me, and I shall move a corps from this to 
 Zamora, and shall probably go with it myself But 
 if the French, in consequence of Blake's defeat, turn 
 a force against you, we must give up the junction, 
 and you must retreat and re-embark ; in this case it 
 would be well to send the cavalry, for which no ships 
 will be found, through Portugal to Lisbon, from 
 whence they might join me, and yourself with the 
 troops sail for that port, at which place I should write 
 to you for your further proceeding," &c. 
 
 c 
 
18 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 The enclosure, alluded to at the commencement of 
 this letter, and which was consequently written first, 
 was another letter from sir John Moore, in which he 
 repeated his intention, if circumstances should permit, 
 of collecting the army at Salamanca, Zamora, and 
 Benevente. 
 
 On the 21st, sir David wrote again to sir John 
 Moore. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore. 
 
 Astorga, 21st November, 1808. 
 
 " I enclose a letter I received late last night 
 
 from General Leith, communicating the entire defeat 
 and dispersion of Blake's army, and a report from 
 captain Pasley of the royal Engineers, upon the same 
 subject. From that army I can now expect no as- 
 sistance or support. A number of fugitives from 
 that and the Estremaduran corps, entirely destitute 
 of order and without proper officers, have, I understand, 
 entered Leon, and joined a small party already in that 
 city. The whole may amount to about 150 cavalry 
 and 2000 or 3000 infantry ; and they have some ar- 
 tillery and thirty-four pieces of ordnance belonging 
 to Blake's army in the town. The commanding 
 officer of the artillery came here last night and pro- 
 posed joining me with his guns, which I directed 
 him to do, as there is no chance of Leon being suc- 
 cessfully defended if the enemy advances in any force. 
 I have also ordered the cavalry to join me as speedily 
 as possible, as they may prove of great service in 
 reconnoitring, &c. until such time as our own dra- 
 goons come up. 
 
 " In my last letter of the 19th, I pointed out, 
 
 that as far as I was then able to judge, it would not 
 be advisable to make any partial advance of the troops 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 19 
 
 at present here, until such time as part of the cavalry, 
 the ammunition, and money were come up ; and until 
 we were able to procure some positive information re- 
 specting the movements and views of the enemy, who 
 in addition to Bessieres' * force which advances by the 
 road from Burgos, have now the army that defeated 
 Blake unoccupied. By the 29th I expect to have 
 the greater part of my infantry, with one regiment of 
 cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery in this neigh- 
 bourhood, and I should then be able to move with 
 greater confidence and security, if not previously com- 
 pelled to fall back, by the advance of a superior force 
 of the enemy. Should I at present advance to Bene- 
 vente and the French approach, a retreat would 
 become very difficult for infantry, through an open 
 country, and in face of a powerful cavalry. 
 
 '* I must, however, repeat, that if you are desirous 
 that I should immediately advance what troops are 
 here, I shall instantly do so ; although I think such a 
 measure might be attended with considerable danger, 
 as, in addition to our want of cavalry, we are at this 
 moment destitute of' spare ammunition, which from 
 colonel Murray's letter to Bathurst, ajypears also to 
 he the case with your force. 
 
 " I have caused persons to be sent forward by Leon 
 and on the road to Palencia, to obtain information ; 
 and I shall not fail to communicate the result of their 
 observations to you. I enclose twp reports which 
 reached me this morning. I have also despatched 
 engineer officers to the rear, for the purpose of as- 
 certaining what impediments to the progress of the 
 enemy we might occasion by the destruction of 
 
 • Marshal Bcssieres was stated to have about 14,000 or 15,000. 
 
 C 2 
 
90 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 bridges, &c. in the event of being hard pressed and 
 compelled to fall back on Galicia." 
 
 " I remain," &c. 
 
 And yet sir Walter Scott in his life of Napoleon 
 Buonaparte, volume 6, page 275, states " a retreat 
 into, if not through Galicia was the only mode of 
 avoiding the perils by which the British were sur- 
 rounded. The plan of defending this strong and 
 mountainous province, or at least of effecting a re- 
 treat through it with order and deliberation had 
 been in view for several weeks. Sir David Baird's 
 division had passed through it on their advance to 
 Astorga ; yet so imperfect at that time was the British 
 general staff, that no accurate knowledge seemed to 
 have been possessed of the roads through the country, 
 of the many strong military positions which it pre- 
 sents, or of the particular military advantages which 
 it affords for defensive war." 
 
 In reference to this passage see sir David Baird's 
 letter to sir John Moore, dated 8th December, page SS. 
 
 Colonel Napier, at page 433, says, " While await- 
 ing the reply, he directed sir David Baird, if the 
 enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push 
 the troops on to Salamanca as fast as they should 
 arrive at Astorga. Sir David was proceeding to do 
 so, when Blake advised him that a considerable 
 French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Am- 
 pudia with a view of interrupting the march. This 
 arrested the movement, and Baird, after destroying 
 some of his stores at Astorga, fell back to Villa 
 Franca. As sir John Moore's information led him 
 to believe that Blake's report was false, he recalled 
 Baird, but valuable time was thus lost." &c. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 21 
 
 The reasons which led Sir David Baird to think it 
 would be injudicious to advance further than Astorga 
 before the 29th of November, have already been 
 shown from his letters. Until that day he would not 
 have a sufficient force up, to enable him to move with 
 security, as the country between Astorga and Bene- 
 vente is an open plain, and he was without cavalry. 
 Colonel Napier states at Page 431, that the move- 
 ment which sir John Moore contemplated in case " he 
 could draw the extended wings of his army together 
 in good time" was " to abandon all communication 
 with Portugal, and throwing himself into the heart 
 of Spain, to rally Castanos' army (if it yet existed), 
 upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and 
 trust to the effect which such an appeal to the pa- 
 triotism and courage of the Spaniards would pro- 
 duce." This I think must be a mistake. It will be 
 seen presently what sir John Moore himself says 
 upon the subject. At all events it is most certain, 
 that any movement, at the moment alluded to, which 
 would have caused us to abandon all communication 
 with Portugal and Galicia, (and this would have 
 been a necessary consequence of throwing ourselves 
 into the heart of Spain), must inevitably have been 
 followed by the ruin of the army. A considerable 
 portion of sir David Baird's division was still in the 
 rear. The whole of sir John Moore's force was not 
 yet collected ; but what was of still more importance, 
 both divisions were deficient in ammunition, as ap- 
 pears by sir David Baird's letter to sir John Moore of 
 the 21st. 
 
 But even supposing the whole of the army to have 
 been imited, the execution of such a plan would have 
 been prevented by the defeat of Castarios at Tudela 
 
2a NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 on the 23d of November, the day on which the next 
 letter I shall quote was written. 
 
 Sir David Baird to sir John Moore. 
 
 Astorga, 23d November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir John, 
 
 " I wrote to you on the 19th and 21st from this 
 place, explaining the nature of our situation ; and was 
 in hopes I should have had the satisfaction of hearing 
 from you in reply to my first communication, before 
 this. The length of time which has elapsed since I 
 despatched that letter makes me apprehensive that 
 you may have felt it expedient to fall back on Ciudad 
 Rodrigo, or that our communication may be inter- 
 cepted. 
 
 " The more I consider our situation, the more 
 I am convinced of the danger that would attend my 
 making, at the present moment, any movement in 
 advance, or attempt to join you, before my force 
 is more collected. We have no kind of support to 
 expect from the Spaniards, who are completely dis- 
 persed, and driven from the field ; and if I were to 
 move forward the infantry I have at present here, I 
 should necessarily expose myself to be beaten in detail, 
 without a chance of being able to oppose any effec- 
 tual resistance. 
 
 " The enemy are , certainly at Mayorga, and their 
 parties have pushed forward almost close to Bene- 
 vente. From my present want of cavalry, I have 
 not been able to ascertain how forward their infantry 
 may be. 
 
 " I enclose a copy of some intelligence com- 
 municated by a person who was sent from Leon to 
 obtain information respecting the movements of the 
 
1808— -1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 23 
 
 French, and of a letter written by Colonel Graham 
 from the head-quarters of Castanos' army. 
 
 ** From the latter, it is clearly apparent how very 
 much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated 
 of the strength of the Spanish armies have been. 
 In all probability, Castanos and Palafox may by 
 this time have experienced a reverse similar to that 
 of Blake, in which case the Spaniards would have no 
 force deserving the name of an army in the field," &c. 
 
 By a remarkable coincidence, it happened that, at 
 the moment when sir David Baird was thus express- 
 ing his fears for Castanos, the work of destruction 
 against that general was going on. 
 
 Sir David Baird was in constant communication 
 and correspondence with the Marquis de la Romana, 
 then at Leon. On the 26th, he wrote to apprise 
 the marquis, that in the event of his receiving in- 
 telligence that sir John Moore had retired, or that 
 the enemy approached Astorga in force, he should 
 be obliged, in obedience to the orders he had re- 
 ceived, to retreat forthwith on Galicia. He recom- 
 mended also, that, in that case, the marquis should 
 fall back on the Asturias. 
 
 About this time, sir David Baird experienced con- 
 siderable uneasiness, in consequence of reports which 
 reached him respecting movements of the enemy, and 
 also from his not having received any intelligence for 
 several days from ' sir John Moore. He thought it 
 probable that sir John might have found it necessary 
 to retire : he therefore made arrangements for re- 
 treating on Galicia, and communicated his intention 
 to do so, to lord Castlereagh and sir John Moore. 
 
 His mind was however soon after relieved by the 
 receipt of a letter from Salamanca. 
 
24 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 26th November, 1808. 
 
 " I do not believe that yet the enemy have any 
 
 considerable corps at Kio Seco, or Ampudia. My 
 information is very incorrect, if they have any in- 
 fantry so near ; for some days past, they have had 
 eight or nine hundred cavalry at Valladolid. 
 
 " All your precautions are perfectly good. I 
 
 have explained myself to you already so fully, that I 
 need say no more ; v^hatever you do I am* certain will 
 be right." 
 
 ^' I have written my sentiments fully to go- 
 vernment by this messenger. Do not detain him 
 longer than to write yours, which I believe do not 
 differ much from mine ; and the sooner the eyes of 
 the good people of England are opened, the better." 
 
 Sir David Baird's fears respecting sir John Moore 
 being thus removed, he immediately proceeded to 
 Leon, and had an interview with the marquis de la 
 Romana ; who expressed a hope that, in the course 
 of eight or ten days, he should be able to assemble 
 from eight to ten thousand men. The appearance 
 of the Spanish troops was, however, far from en- 
 couraging, as they seemed to be entirely devoid of 
 order, half-armed, and in want of every thing*. 
 
 Sir David Baird, on his return from Leon, ad- 
 dressed lord Castlereagh, stating, that, after having 
 experienced much anxiety in consequence of the 
 long silence of sir John Moore (from whom he had 
 not heard for five days), he had the satisfaction to 
 
 * Sir David Baird sent, some time afterwards, colonel Symes (an intelligent 
 and judicious officer), on a particular mission to Romana; the real object of 
 which was, to ascertain correctly the state of the Spanish troops ; and nothing 
 could be more unfavourable than the report that officer made. See this report 
 in Mr. James Moore's Narrative, page 211. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 25 
 
 find, by a letter from that officer, that the commu- 
 nication was still open ; and as the enemy had not 
 advanced with the rapidity, or in the force, which 
 circumstances had led him to expect, he had aban- 
 doned the intention of retreating, and should endea- 
 vour to effect a junction with sir John Moore, as 
 soon as his whole force was collected. 
 
 On the 28th, sir John Moore wrote to sir David 
 Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 28th November, 1808. 
 
 " The marquis de la Romana's intelligence is 
 
 wrong ; the French have no infantry on this side of 
 Burgos. They have infantry, I believe, at Aranda de 
 Duero. They are moving against Castanos, and have 
 reached Soria. They have intercepted his communica- 
 tion with Madrid ; and have in view to turn his left, 
 whilst probably another corps attacks him in front. 
 
 " The junta have taken the alarm, and will 
 
 retire to Toledo, if not to Cordova. 
 
 " I hold my resolution to remain and form 
 
 the junction in the manner already explained in my 
 former letters. In the execution of this, you will use 
 your own discretion as I do mine. If the enemy 
 move against you, you cannot do it ; you will, in 
 that case, retreat, giving me notice. If he moves 
 against me, I must do the same, and I shall give you 
 notice. Your retreat cannot be more difficult than 
 mine will be. I have but one brigade of artillery, 
 and no cavalry. On the 1st of December you will 
 be able to move with one regiment of cavalry, and 
 such number of infantry as you choose to take. I 
 wish, therefore, you would do so as far as Benevent^, 
 where you may arrive on the 2nd. I shall move 
 from this on the 1st towards Zamora and Toro, at 
 each of which places we shall arrive from this also on 
 
26 N0TE3 ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 the 2iid. I shall myself be with the corps at Toro, 
 from whence I shall communicate with you." &c. 
 
 On receipt of this letter, the necessary orders were 
 given by sir David Baird, for moving forward on the 1st 
 of December ; but these orders were countermanded, 
 in consequence of a second letter from sir John 
 Moore, written on the evening of the same day. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 28th November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 " I have received this evening, despatches from 
 Mr. Stuart at Madrid, announcing the defeat and 
 dispersion of Castanos' army. The French in Spain 
 are estimated at eighty thousand men, and thirty 
 thousand are expected in the course of a week. 
 It certainly was much my wish to have run great 
 risks in aid of the people of Spain ; but after this 
 second proof of how little they are able to do for 
 themselves (the only two armies they had having 
 made so little stand), I see no right we have to 
 expect from them much greater exertions. At any 
 rate, we should be overwhelmed before they could 
 be prepared. 
 
 " I see no chance of our being able to form a 
 junction, as certainly at Burgos the French have a 
 corps, which will now move forward. 
 
 " I have, therefore, determined to retreat upon Por- 
 tugal, with the troops I have here, and if possible 
 with Hope's corps, if by forced marches he can join 
 me. I wish you to fall back on Coruna. Send back 
 immediately your stores under such part of your force 
 as you judge proper. You may then stay with the 
 rest a little longer, if you can depend upon knowing 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 27 
 
 the movements of the enemy. I propose this, as 
 were you at once to retire, it might encourage the 
 enemy to push at once at Hope and me, and prevent 
 our junction, which is the more necessary, as I must 
 stop upon the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon 
 as long as possible. On your arrival at Coruiia, you 
 will, of course, embark and sail for the Tagus, where 
 orders shall be waiting you. Write immediately to 
 England, and give notice of what we are doing, and 
 beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon : they will 
 be wanted ; for when the French have Spain, Portugal 
 cannot be defended. 
 
 " Believe me," &c. 
 
 On the 29th, sir John Moore wrote again as follows : 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 29th November, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 " I have nothing to add to what I wrote to you 
 last night. You will make your retreat, concealing 
 your intention as long as you can. I had written to 
 the marquis de la Romana that I should assemble 
 the army, and act, if possible, with* him. That is 
 now out of the question, tell him. When, on the 
 frontier of Portugal, I shall be ready to retire, if 
 circumstances render it eligible, or by embarking and 
 going round to another part of Spain, we may be 
 more useful. We by no means abandon the cause 
 of Spain, but only withdraw from a situation where, 
 without aiding it, we should ourselves be destroyed." 
 &c. 
 
 It was not until after the receipt of these orders, 
 that a retreat was commenced. Instructions were 
 
28 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 sent to halt the different corps and stores advancing, 
 and subsequently they were put in motion to the 
 rear. Colonel Napier certainly mistakes in supposing 
 that any stores were destroyed. 
 
 On the day he received sir John Moore's last 
 letter, sir David addressed the marquis de la Romana. 
 
 Sir David Baird to the marquis de la Romana. 
 
 Astorga, 30th November, 1 808. 
 
 " I feel great concern in acquainting your excellency 
 that at a late hour last night, I received a despatch 
 from Sir John Moore, announcing the defeat of 
 General Castanos's army, and directing me immedir 
 ately to fall back, for the purpose of joining him, 
 either by sea or by the way of Portugal ; it being 
 impossible, under existing circumstances, to effect our 
 junction by the road through Benevente and Zamora. 
 
 " I lose no time in apprising your excellency, that in 
 consequence of these orders I am preparing to move 
 the infantry to the rear ; the cavalry I propose leaving 
 at Astorga a few days longer. 
 
 " As I have reason to believe that the Spanish 
 troops are in great want of shoes, blankets, canteens, 
 and havresacks, I beg to acquaint you, that I shall be 
 able to spare you a quantity of each kind, (which 
 were intended for sir John Moore's division), and to 
 request you will appoint proper persons to receive 
 them, at Villa Franca and Lugo." &c. 
 
 In order to tranquillize the minds of the Spanish 
 people on the subject of- our retrograde movement, it 
 was judged proper to prepare an address to the in- 
 habitants of Galicia and Leon, which was translated 
 into Spanish and printed. Its circulation was however 
 limited by subsequent events. It was as follows. 
 
1808— 18Q9, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 29 
 
 "The unfortunate events which have recently 
 occurred in Biscay and on the Ebro, and the conse- 
 quent movements of the enemy, having rendered it 
 indispensably necessary that his Britannic Majesty's 
 forces in Spain should unite and concentrate, for the 
 purpose of being enabled to afford effectual support 
 and succour to the Spanish people in the glorious 
 efforts they are making in defence of their independ- 
 ence ; lieutenant-general sir David Baird, com- 
 manding the division in Galicia and Leon, announces 
 to the loyal inhabitants of these kingdoms, that he 
 has received orders from sir John Moore, commander- 
 in-chief of the British armies in Spain, to lose no 
 time in proceeding to join him by the way of Portugal. 
 
 " The object of this movement is in no way con- 
 nected with any intention of withdrawing from Spain, 
 or abandoning its cause, so dear to Great Britain ; but 
 solely with a view of assembling the British army, 
 for the purpose of acting on some point where its 
 services may be more required and more useful. 
 
 " The kingdom of Galicia, strong from the nature 
 of the country, will require no force to defend it, 
 beyond its own brave army, now assembling at Leon, 
 under the marquis de la Romana; and the presence 
 of an additional number of troops in its passes and 
 on its mountains, would but tend to exhaust its re- 
 sources, without adding to its security. 
 
 To the inhabitants of these kingdoms, the warmest 
 acknowledgements of the British army are due, for 
 the friendly reception it has met with ; and the lieu- 
 tenant-general trusts, that the same sentiments of 
 attachment and regard, which now exist, will continue 
 to animate the two nations towards each other for 
 ages to come. 
 
 ** In quitting, probably for a short time, this part 
 
30 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 of the Peninsula, the lieutenant-general feels it his 
 duty to call upon the inhabitants of these districts, 
 by their loyalty to their king, their affection for their 
 families, and by every tie they may venerate or hold 
 dear, to rise in defence of their religion and their 
 country! Without the most vigorous efforts on the 
 part of the people and the government, the cause of 
 Spain is in danger ; if these are made, it cannot, with 
 the assistance of divine providence, fail of being 
 successful." 
 
 On the 3d of December, sir David wrote again to 
 Romana, in reply to an urgent application to delay 
 the retreat. 
 
 Sir David Baird to the 7)mrquis dc la Romana. 
 
 Astorga, 3d December, 1808. 
 
 " I have this instant had the honour to receive 
 your excellency's letter of yesterday, and although, 
 in obedience to my orders, I had commenced the 
 retreat of my division on Villa Franca, yet, in con- 
 sequence of your excellency's opinion, that the con- 
 tinuance of a British force at Astorga is essential to 
 afford security to the Spanish army assembling at 
 Leon, and to enable it to retire upon Galicia in safety, 
 I am induced to halt the troops in their present posi- 
 tions, and to direct the cavalry to remain at Astorga 
 for a few days, by which I shall afford time and op- 
 portunity to sir John Moore to send me any fresh 
 instructions he may wish, in case he should have any 
 such intention. 
 
 " I have the honour," &c. 
 
 The above extracts will prove that colonel Napier 
 mistakes, in supposing that sir David Baird had 
 fallen back ou Villa Franca without instructions to 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 31 
 
 do SO from sir John Moore. Sir David Baird received 
 the order to retreat on the 29th of November ; on the 
 3d December, he was still at Astorga with all the 
 cavalry, and the greater part of the infantry. The 
 cavalry, indeed, never retrograded, but proceeded a 
 few days afterwards, under lord Paget, to join sir 
 John Moore. 
 
 It may be asked why, if the cavalry could join sir 
 John Moore from Astorga, the whole force there might 
 not have done the same ? Experience has proved that 
 this was practicable; but it was doubted at the 
 time. Cavalry could move with much greater security 
 through an open country than infantry, and they might 
 make longer marches. Perhaps, also, sir John Moore, 
 having determined to retreat on Portugal, did not 
 wish to be embarrassed by any additional infantry ; 
 and certainly it was important not to uncover the 
 road from Astorga to Coruiia, which would have 
 risked the loss of the depots and stores of the army 
 on that line. 
 
 On the 2d of December sir John Moore wrote as 
 follows : 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 2d December, 1808. 
 
 " As you have transports but for one regiment 
 
 of cavalry *, and you will perhaps be under the ne- 
 cessity of marching the other two through Portugal, 
 I should be glad you would send one to me. I do 
 not think that it will run the smallest risk at this 
 moment on the route by Benevent^ to Zamora. I 
 say this, upon the supposition that you have not sent 
 them all already back towards Coruna, in which case 
 I do not wish one to be brought back ; but if one of 
 
 * The cavalry consisted of the 7th, lOtli, ami loth hussars. 
 
S2 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 the regiments is still at Astorga, and your intelligence, 
 like mine, assures you that it can be done without 
 risk, I should wish to have it here. 
 
 " Buonaparte is at Burgos, probably waiting 
 
 the arrival of reinforcements to move forward in this 
 direction. Whether my junction with you could have 
 been accomplished or not, I know not; it would have 
 been attended with the risk of the destruction of the 
 whole ; and if accomplished, would have left us to 
 contend single-handed with the whole French army ; 
 for the Spaniards are dispersed, and until the present 
 government is changed, and men of more ability are 
 brought forward, there is little chance of their being 
 able to form any thing to join us, or to resist France. 
 If they are able we shall see, and we shall be still 
 able to go to their assistance. I am satisfied with 
 the decision I have made ; how it will be viewed by 
 others, or approved in England, God knows ! 
 " I remain, faithfully," &c. 
 
 Sir David Baird proceeded from Astorga to Villa 
 Franca on the 4th of December. His presence there 
 became necessary, in consequence of the change of 
 circumstances. The counter-march of every thing 
 on the road from Coruna towards Astorga, had un- 
 avoidably created considerable confusion. As all were 
 moving upon one line, artillery, troops, baggage, 
 stores, provisions and forage, and as large quantities 
 of the two last were bringing up to form depots, the 
 road was much encumbered, and it required very 
 active superintendence to establish order. Every 
 thing, however, was fairly on its way towards Coruna 
 by the 7th, on the evening of which day sir David 
 heard from sir John Moore as follows : 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 33 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 5th December. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 " The city of Madrid have taken up arms, have 
 refused to capitulate to the French, are barricading 
 their streets, and say they are determined to suffer 
 every thing rather than submit. This arrests the 
 French, and people, who are sanguine, entertain 
 great hopes from it. I own, myself, that I fear this 
 spirit has arisen too late, and that the French are 
 now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There 
 is, however, no saying, and I feel myself the more 
 obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a 
 formal representation, which I received this evening. 
 I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your 
 march until you hear from me again, and make 
 arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be 
 necessary. All this appears very strange and unsteady ; 
 but if the spirit of enthusiasm does arise in Spain, and 
 the people will be martyrs, there is no saying, in that 
 case, what our force may do. I hope, in the mean 
 time, that the regiment of cavalry is coming to me 
 which I asked you for. 
 
 " Believe me," &c. 
 
 Immediate orders were despatched to stop the fur- 
 ther retreat, and early on the following morning, sir 
 David Baird wrote to sir John Moore. 
 
 VillalVanca, 8th December, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir John, 
 " At a late hour last night I received your letter of 
 the 5th instant, and, in compliance with your desire, 
 immediate orders were sent off to halt the regiments 
 in the different positions they occupied, and to sus- 
 pend any further preparation for re-embarkation. 
 One brigade had reached within a day's march of St. 
 Jago, on the road to Vigo. 
 
 D 
 
34 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 " I trust long ere this letter reaches you, that you will 
 have been joined by lord Paget and the cavalry. I 
 was induced to send the three regiments, for the 
 reasons I have already stated in two former letters. 
 
 " It has frequently occurred to me that, in the 
 event of our being obliged to adopt defensive mea- 
 sures, it might be more advantageous for the combined 
 British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than, 
 by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to aban- 
 don the defence of these provinces. The Asturias 
 might be occupied by the troops of the marquis de la 
 Romana, and if you judged it proper, by a flank 
 movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of As- 
 torga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occu- 
 pying the strong ground behind it, we should be able 
 to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until 
 it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed 
 and determined to make in defence of the national 
 independence. The royal road from Coruna to this 
 place and Astorga is remarkably good, although 
 mountainous ; and, with the sea open to us, we should 
 be able to receive with facility such reinforcements 
 and supplies as the British government might deem 
 it proper to send. I do not think much difficulty 
 would be experienced for a few months, from a want 
 of provisions. The country abounds with cattle : 
 bread, indeed, would be required; but flour might be 
 obtained from England ; and, in the mean time, Ga- 
 licia would have an opportunity of arming under our 
 protection ; and our presence in Spain would furnish 
 a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spa- 
 niards *," &c. 
 
 • The above is copied from the original Notes on which the letter was founded. 
 The letter itself was, I believe, more full and explicit on the subject of a defence 
 of Galicia ; but no complete copy seems to have been kept. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 35 
 
 On the same day sir David Baird received further 
 instructions from sir John Moore. 
 
 air John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 6th December, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 " I wrote to you last night to suspend your retro- 
 grade movement. I now write to you to beg that you 
 will put to the right about, and return, bag and 
 baggage, to Astorga. The people of Madrid, it is said, 
 are enthusiastic and desperate, and certainly at this 
 moment do resist the French. The good which may 
 result from this it is impossible to say. I can neither 
 trust to it, nor can I altogether despise it. If the flame 
 catches elsewhere and becomes at all general, the best 
 results may be expected. If confined to Madrid, that 
 town will be sacrificed, and it will be as bad, or worse 
 than ever. In short, what is passing at Madrid may 
 be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at 
 hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever hap- 
 pens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand 
 this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended. I 
 mean to proceed bridle in hand ; for if the bubble bursts, 
 and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it." &c. 
 
 On the 10th, sir John Moore wrote again from Sa- 
 lamanca. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Salamanca, 10th December, 1808. 
 
 " Madrid has capitulated : but the people say 
 
 the duke of Castel Franco and M. de Morla have be- 
 trayed them, and they refuse to part with their arms. 
 The French have the gates, the Retiro, and the Prado. 
 Madrid thus continues to occupy a part of the French 
 army. Saragossa still holds out, and they say they 
 are endeavouring to collect forces in the south. Thus 
 
 D<2 
 
56 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 all cannot be directed against us, and we must try our 
 hands." &c. 
 
 On the 12th, sir John Moore wrote again. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, 
 
 Salamanca, 12th December, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 ** I have received both your letters of the 8th. 
 
 " I am much obliged to you for your opinion 
 
 on the Galicias and Vigo ; and it is that which now pro- 
 bably I shall follow, should such a measure become 
 necessary. I am therefore most anxious that maga- 
 zines should be formed on that communication. I 
 have written home to direct that all transports, &c. 
 should call at Coruna, and go to Vigo, unless other- 
 wise directed. Coruna must be the place for all sup- 
 plies from England. The communication through 
 Portugal is difficult and tardy." 
 
 On the 13th of December, sir John Moore arrived 
 at Alaejos, and wrote on the following day. 
 
 Sir John Moore to sir David Baird. 
 
 Head Quarters, Alaejos, 14th of December. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 " I received last night your letters of the 10th and 
 11th instant. It was my intention to have moved 
 to-morrow on Valladolid, but a letter from Bonaparte 
 to Marshal Soult at Saldanha, which we have inter- 
 cepted, (the officer who carried it having been mur- 
 dered by the peasantry,) has induced me to change my 
 direction, and shall be to-morrow, with all the troops 
 I have, at Toro and its immediate neighbourhood. 
 It appears that Marshal Soult, Due de Dalmatie, 
 has with him two divisions at Saldanha^ besides oi;ie 
 
1808 — 1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 37 
 
 under the Due d'Abrantes, which is collecting at 
 Burgos, and another under the Due de Trevise, which 
 has received orders to march on Saragossa, but which 
 of course may be recalled. Madrid has submitted 
 and is quiet, and the French from thence are march- 
 ing upon Badajos. Their advanced guard was at 
 Talavera la Reina on the 10th instant. My object is 
 now to unite the army as soon as possible, you at 
 Benevente, and I at Toro, from whence, either by a 
 forward or flank movement, the two corps can be 
 joined. I shall direct all my stores from Zamora to 
 be forwarded to Benevente. The arrangement with 
 respect to yours, which I communicated to you in my 
 letter of the 12th may go on, by which we shall have 
 a certain portion at Benevente and the rest at Astorga 
 and the rear. It appears from the intercepted letter, 
 from deserters and from prisoners we have taken, 
 that the French are in complete ignorance of our 
 present movements and think we have retreated. As 
 they will now know the truth, what change this may 
 make in their march on Badajos, I know not, but 
 Marshal Soult will certainly be checked in his in- 
 tended operations, which were projected upon the 
 supposition that he had nothing but Spaniards to 
 oppose him. Every arrangement which I before 
 directed with a view to enable us to live in the Gal- 
 licias should be strictly attended to, for though in the 
 first instances, we may not have opposed to us, more 
 than we can face; it will be in the power of the 
 enemy to increase their force, far beyond our 
 strength," &c. 
 
 On the l6th of December, sir John Moore was at 
 Toro, and sir David Baird at Benevente. From Toro, 
 sir John Moore wrotfe as follows. 
 
3& NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Toro," 16th of December, 1808. 
 
 " My dear sir David, 
 
 " Upon my arrival here yesterday, I received from 
 the messenger your letter of the 1 2th ; to-morrow I 
 purpose to march to some villages, which I understand 
 will hold all this corps, within two or three leagues 
 of Benevente. I shall then be so near to you, as to 
 give perfect security to the assembling of your corps 
 at that place ; I shall then also be able to have the 
 pleasure of meeting you. 
 
 "I cannot help again pressing upon you to take 
 every measure for the forming of magazines at As- 
 torga. Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruna, for 
 though we may do something here, we must always 
 look to a retreat on Galicia. For the present, whilst 
 the army united is so near, I do not see that any 
 corps of the enemy can attempt to disturb the passage 
 of our stores by Astorga, or endeavour to place him- 
 self between us and the passes into Galicia,'' &c. 
 
 From some passages in the two last letters it 
 would appear that sir John Moore at that time di- 
 rected his attention to Galicia, in the event of his 
 being obliged to retreat. 
 
 On the 20th of December, the junction of the two 
 corps was effected at Mayorga. 
 
 I trust it has been satisfactorily shown that no 
 time was lost by sir David Baird, either in preparing 
 his force for the field, or in pushing it forward for 
 the purpose of joining sir John Moore. On the 13th 
 of November, the head of sir David's column reached 
 Astorga : sir John Moore's advance only entered Sala- 
 manca on the following day. By the 29th, sir David 
 Baird had with him at Astorga the greater part of 
 his infantry, one regiment of cavalry, a troop of horse- 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 39 
 
 artillery, and three car brigades of the same arm. 
 Sir John Moore had at Salamanca his infantry, and 
 one brigade of artillery, but no cavalry. 
 
 I shall now proceed to offer a few observations 
 on the advanced movement which followed the con- 
 centration of the army. 
 
 It is a maxim in war, which ought never to be 
 departed from, that the object in view should be 
 adequate to the risks to be incurred in endeavouring 
 to attain it *. That the object was not worth the risk 
 in the present instance, in the opinion of sir John 
 Moore himself, is evident by his letters "f. The ad- 
 vance was originally intended as a diversion in favour 
 of the southern provinces (for Madrid was known to 
 have fallen), and to this object was subsequently 
 added (in consequence of the intelligence obtained at 
 Alaejos on the 13th December) the chance of suc- 
 cessfully attacking Soult. Considered solely as a 
 diversion, if it could have been made before the sur- 
 render of the capital, it might perhaps have been 
 of some value. But after that " bubble had burst," 
 there was nothing known to be in arms, to take ad- 
 vantage of it ; and the risk was far too great to be 
 incurred on vague rumours of troops being about to 
 assemble in the south ; the value of such rumours 
 
 • Perhaps the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula furnish the 
 beat practical illustration of this principle upon record. 
 
 + See various passages in the extracts frcm sir John Moore's letters already 
 given. See also his letter to lord Castlereagh, dated Astorga, 31st of December. 
 
 " From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult As 
 a diversion, it answered completely ; but as there is nothing to take advantage of 
 it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose." 
 
 " This army, I have no doubt, would have distinguished itself had the 
 
 Spaniards been able to offer any resistance ; but from the beginning it was placed 
 in situations in which, without the possibility of doing any good, it was itself 
 constantly risked." 
 
 Also his letter to lord Castlereagh, dated Coruna, 13th of January, 1809: 
 
 " Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military 
 
 man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanisn 
 armies were then beaten. There was no Spanish force to which we could unite.'* 
 — Moore's Narrative, Appendix, pages 128, 129, 130. 132. 
 
40 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 being well understood by the commander of the forces. 
 In regard to the chance of defeating Soult, the con- 
 summate skill with which the movements of the French 
 were directed, was too well known to justify us in cal- 
 culating on the blunders of our enemy ; and certainly 
 it was too manifestly the interest of the French marshal 
 to draw us on as far as we would go, to make it 
 reasonable to suppose that he would not have gra- 
 dually retired as we advanced, to give time to a 
 superior force from the south, to intercept our retreat, 
 and cut us off from Galicia. 
 
 In a despatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, 
 datied Downing-street, 10th December, 1808, Mr. 
 Canning observes : 
 
 ^ " You will recollect that the army which has been 
 appropriated by his majesty to the defence of Spain 
 and Portugal is not merely a considerable part of the 
 disposable force of the country : it is, in fact, the Bri- 
 tish army. The country has no other force disposable : 
 It may, by a great effort, reinforce the army for an 
 adequate purpose, but another army it has not to send. 
 
 " You are already apprised, by my former 
 
 despatch (enclosing a copy of General Moore's instruc- 
 tions) that the British army must be kept together 
 under its own commander; must act as one body 
 for some distinct object, and on some settled plan. 
 
 " It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no 
 danger ; when, through that difficulty and danger, the 
 commander is enabled to see his way to some definite 
 purpose : but, in order to this, it will be necessary that 
 such purpose should have been previously arranged, 
 and that the British army should not again be left, as 
 that of sir John Moore and sir David Baird have re- 
 cently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of 
 
 * See Appendix to Colonel Napier, page 73. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 41 
 
 information except such as they could pick up from com- 
 mon rumour of the events passing around them." &c. 
 
 This despatch was written under a supposition that 
 sir John Moore had continued his retreat on Portugal ; 
 and could not have reached Mr. Frere in time to 
 have had any influence on the events of the campaign: 
 but it refers to former instructions, breathing a si- 
 milar spirit: and yet Mr. Frere thought himself 
 justified in urging the commander of that army to 
 hazard its fortunes and safety, upon the most loose 
 and uncertain information. 
 
 It is much to be lamented that sir John Moore 
 did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates 
 of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to 
 suggestions and opinions which, being founded on 
 false data, scarcely merited serious attention. When 
 the British minister at Madrid urged him to advance, 
 he was himself deceived and deluded. He grounded 
 his advice on statements respecting the strength and 
 success of the Spanish armies, which the commander 
 of the forces knew to be erroneous. The advice thus 
 given, under false impressions, ought not perhaps to 
 have had any influence, but the situation of sir John 
 Moore was one of great and almost unexampled dif- 
 ficulty. 
 
 Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion 
 thrown out in sir David Baird's letter of the 8th De- 
 cember from Villa Franca was not adopted, as an 
 alternative between the dangers of an advance and 
 the inconveniences of a retreat. 
 
 Had the British army been collected on the fron- 
 tiers of Galicia about the middle of December, there 
 can be little doubt that it would have been able 
 to have maintained itself, at least during j;he winter; 
 and, long before spring, the face of affairs was com- 
 
4^ . NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 pletely changed by the departure of Napoleon and 
 of the force which followed him to the Austrian war. 
 The question of a defence of Galicia was very different 
 at the time when the letter alluded to was written, 
 from what it became when we were retiring rapidly 
 through the country, with an enemy pressing upon 
 our rear. When the suggestion was offered, our 
 strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and 
 the great body of the French was occupied with 
 Madrid. Between the 8th of December, when the 
 letter was despatched from Villa Franca, and the 
 29th, when we retreated through Astorga,much might 
 have been done to improve our situation : besides, the 
 enemy, in the hope of intercepting our retreat, were 
 drawn on us, in consequence of our advance, earlier 
 than would otherwise have been the case. In the 
 breathing time which probably would have been 
 allowed us, Lugo and other points might have been 
 fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depots 
 established, and, by a judicious disposition of our 
 force, the danger of being turned by the road through 
 Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and 
 the Asturias might have been sufficiently guarded 
 against. The road which passes through Orense is 
 particularly difficult, and had been reported to sir 
 David Baird, by the officers he sent to examine it, as 
 susceptible of defence by a very inferior force. The 
 others are still more impracticable; and were, at the 
 time, almost impassable from the season and the 
 snow. 
 
 The kingdom of Galicia contains upwards of a 
 million and a half of inhabitants (perhaps nearly one 
 sixth of the whole population of Spain). The army 
 of Romana might have recruited itself under our 
 protection: and I very much question whether the 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 43 
 
 presence of a British force on the frontiers of that 
 province (particularly considering its geographical 
 position on the right of the French line of commu- 
 nication from the Bidassoa to Madrid*) would not 
 have operated more effectually, as a diversion in 
 favour of the south of Spain, than our momentary 
 irruption into Castile. 
 
 I see no reason to suppose that we should have ex- 
 perienced any serious difficulty in subsisting the army. 
 Salt provisions might, if necessary, have been drawn 
 from the provision ships which accompanied our division 
 to Coruila ; and although the mountains of Galicia 
 are barren, the valleys are fruitful, and amply stored 
 with cattle. Indeed, a country that feeds a popula- 
 tion of fifteen hundred thousand souls, cannot want 
 the means of supporting thirty or forty thousand ad- 
 ditional individuals, particularly when the latter 
 possess the power of enforcing requisitions. 
 
 But the situation of the enemy in our front would 
 have been very different. Colonel Napier says, at page 
 474, that, " sweeping the rich plains of Castile with 
 their powerful cavalry, they might have formed maga- 
 zines at Astorga and Leon ; and from thence been sup- 
 plied in abundance, while the English were starving." 
 
 I do not think it probable that the French, at that 
 season of the year, could have formed magazines any 
 where near the entrance of the mountainous districts 
 of Leon and Galicia ; and to have remained in force 
 
 • The opinion of Bonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Galicia 
 by an enemy to France might have had on the war in Spain is recorded in a 
 letter ^hich was written under his dictation to General Savary, at Madrid, a short 
 time before our arrival at Coruiia. In speaking of the relative importance of the 
 operations of the different French corps, and in alluding to that commanded by 
 Marshal Bessieres, who was acting against the army of Galicia, the emperor says, 
 " Eniin, le moindre insucces du Marechal Bessieres intercepte tous les commu- 
 nications de Tarmee, et compromcttrait meme sa surete : le General Dupont se 
 bat pour Andujar, et le Marechal Bessieres se bat pour les communications de 
 rarm^*, et pour les operations les plus importans aux affaires d'Espagne," &c 
 Colonel Napier, Appendix, page 32. 
 
44 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 for any considerable time in the gorges of the moun- 
 tains would have been impossible. Indeed, it does 
 not appear that the French have ever formed maga- 
 zines to any extent in Spain, or have been able to 
 keep a large army concentrated in that country for 
 any considerable length of time. In the progress of 
 his work, colonel Napier will have more than one 
 occasion to notice the inflexible firmness with which 
 the duke of Wellington maintained his defensive po- 
 sitions on the confines of Portugal, in face of a very 
 superior force, until the want of provisions compelled 
 the enemy to separate, which became a signal for 
 offensive operations on his part. 
 
 That sir John Moore thought favourably of the plan 
 in question is apparent, both from his letters to sir 
 David Baird of the 12th, 14th, and 16th of December, 
 already referred to, and from a passage in a despatch he 
 addressed to lord Castlereagh from Salamanca, almost 
 immediately after he had received sir David Baird's 
 suggestion. In this despatch, dated the 12th De- 
 cember, he observes : " If I am forced to retreat, it 
 will probably be on the Galicias. The road is good, 
 and the country is capable of being defended. In this 
 case we shall want flour, as the country produces only 
 cattle in abundance ^." Thus repeating the information 
 sir David Baird had communicated on the subject. 
 
 It only remains for me to notice the retreat. In 
 alluding to it generally, it must certainly be admitted 
 that much disorder prevailed, and that many irregu- 
 larities were committed by the troops. This always 
 has been and ever must be the case, where soldiers are 
 required to make greater efforts than their physical 
 powers are calculated to support; especially when 
 
 * Sec Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 92. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 45 
 
 under those feelings of moral depression which always 
 attend a retreating army. Similar scenes have occurred 
 on every similar occasion ; and if examples were neces- 
 sary to prove the truth of this remark, they would be 
 furnished by what has happened under the two greatest 
 commanders of the age : in the retreat from Burgos in 
 1812, and in the almost total disorganization of the 
 French army during Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. 
 
 The question then seems to be, — to what cause 
 ought principally to be ascribed, the disorders and 
 losses which attended the retreat to Coruna ? Did they 
 proceed from any defect in the character and composi- 
 tion of the army ? from a want of proper attention to 
 their duties on the part of the officers? or from the force 
 of the circumstances in which the army was placed ? 
 
 A retreat in the face of a powerful and active 
 enemy is always an operation of infinite difficulty : but 
 various imfavourable circumstances, combined with 
 the rapidity with which the one in question was con- 
 ducted, to render it peculiarly disastrous. I do not 
 mean to question the necessity which dictated this 
 speed, but it may fairly be urged in extenuation of the 
 charges which have been brought against the army. 
 Colonel Napier admits that the conduct of the troops 
 was excellent during the advance : I see no sufficient 
 reason to suppose they would not have continued to 
 merit the same praise, had not their discipline been 
 impaired by over-exertion. When the moral and 
 physical powers of the officer are exhausted by fa- 
 tigue, it is fruitless to expect that he can be atten- 
 tive to the conduct of the men ; and when the soldier 
 is worn down by constant marching and want of food, 
 he becomes deaf to the voice of his officer, and indif- 
 ferent to every thing but to a sense of his own im- 
 mediate necessities. 
 
46 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Sir John Moore wrote to lord Castlereagh from 
 Benevente on the 28th of December, shortly after 
 the commencement of the retreat*: 
 
 " Since I had the honour to address you, on the 
 l6th, from Toro, the army has been almost constantly 
 marching through snow, and with cold that has been 
 very intense. The weather within these few days has 
 turned to rain, which is much more uncomfortable 
 than the cold, and has rendered the roads almost im- 
 passable." And again, from Astorga, on the 31st f: 
 " It is impossible to deny that its (the army's) disci- 
 pline has been affected by the late movements : the 
 shoes and necessaries are destroyed ; and for some time 
 after it reaches the coast, the men will be in the worst 
 state." And this was said when the army had still 
 two hundred miles to march, and before the com- 
 mencement of our most formidable difficulties ! 
 
 A reference to dates, and to the map of the country, 
 will show the length of the marches which the army 
 performed. But it was not the length of the marches, 
 so much as their almost incessant continuance, the 
 nature of the country they had to traverse, and the 
 inclemency of the season and weather, which pro- 
 strated the strength and depressed the moral energies 
 of both officers and men. Compelled to move on one 
 road, carried in many places over, or along the sides 
 of stupendous mountains, and completely broken up 
 by the constant passage of heavy carriages, the pro- 
 gress of the column was necessarily very slow. To 
 the difficulties of the road were added the obstacles 
 caused by the fall of horses, and other accidents to 
 the train of guns and artillery-waggons which accom- 
 panied the troops. These broke the order of the march> 
 
 * See Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 121. 
 ■)- Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 130. 
 
1808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 47 
 
 and occasioned numerous delays, more distressing 
 by far to the soldier than a continued progress ; as 
 he remained, without the power of resting or shelter- 
 ing himself, exposed to the violence of frequent storms 
 of snow and hail. The men's shoes were worn out, or 
 lost in the snow and mud : some died from fatigue and 
 cold ; and what greatly added to the distress of the 
 scene, many women and children had accompanied 
 their husbands and fathers on the advance. Most of 
 these unfortunate beings now perished ; and their suf- 
 ferings furnished pictures of human distress and mi- 
 sery which it would be difficult for the imagination to 
 colour too highly. 
 
 This is not an overcharged representation of what 
 the army endured : I am confident it will be con- 
 firmed, in its fullest extent, by every officer in sir 
 David Baird*s division who witnessed the march 
 over the mountain near Nogales, the night march 
 from the position in front of Lugo to Guiteritz, and 
 that of the succeeding night, from Guiteritz to Be- 
 tanzos. 
 
 I own I feel jealous for the honour of the army 
 which served in Galicia. Much was expected from it 
 by the country, and much I think it would have done 
 to merit its approbation and gratitude, had the course 
 of events been more favourable to a development of 
 its energies. Although the difficulties by which it was 
 environed made it impossible that it could acquire 
 renown ; perhaps, if circumstances had permitted its 
 commander to follow the principles which guided 
 Fabius, it might at least have been sufficiently for- 
 tunate to have escaped reproach, t 
 
 At page 476, Colonel Napier says, " Tlie reserve 
 and the cavalry marched during the night toBembibre. 
 On their arrival, Baird's division proceeded to Villa 
 
48 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 Franca; but the immense wine vaults of Bembibre had 
 such temptation, that many hundreds of his men re- 
 mained behind inebriated," &c. 
 
 Sir David Baird's division left the banks of the 
 Bzla on the morning of the 29th of December. It 
 reached Astorga, a distance of about twenty miles, 
 on the evening of the same day. The town was 
 fully occupied by other troops, including the Spa- 
 nish army of Romana. Much difficulty was con- 
 sequently experienced in getting the men under 
 cover ; and before that could be effected, and a 
 very scanty supply of provisions procured, the 
 night was far advanced. As early as four o'clock on 
 the following morning (30th December) the division 
 was on its march for Manzanal (a village in the 
 mountains, on the road towards Coruna), where it 
 was intended to bivouac for the night. The weather 
 was most severe, and the snow deep on the sides of 
 the road ; the road itself a mass of mud, from causes 
 which have already been explained. The column 
 reached Manzanal towards the close of a winter 
 day. There was ]ittle cover for the men ; but they 
 screened themselves as well as they could from the 
 wind, under banks and inequalities of the ground. 
 Provisions were wanting: but, after considerable 
 delay, some bullocks were procured and slaughtered ; 
 and the men were preparing their meal, when orders 
 were received from the commander of the forces to 
 proceed forthwith to Bembibre (another long march 
 towards the sea), and the whole was in motion by 
 ten o'clock the same night. A large portion of the 
 men had not had time or means to prepare their 
 food : yet, thus fasting, they proceeded on their 
 way ; and it was six o'clock on the following morn- 
 ing (the 31st) before they reached Bembibre, worn 
 
1808—1809, IxN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 49 
 
 down by fatigue and want of sleep. The inhabit- 
 ants closed their houses, and refused admission to 
 the soldiers: the consequence was, that some were 
 broken into; and as, when open, the men poured 
 into them in search of food and rest, many of the 
 wine-cellars were entered, and much intoxication was 
 the consequence; the effect of the wine being evi- 
 dently increased by the exhausted state of the soldiers. 
 
 The halt at Bembibre was but for a very few hours : 
 the early arrival of the commander of the forces with 
 the reserve made it necessary to proceed ; and before 
 noon the division was again on the march to Caca- 
 vellos. The effects, however, of this unrelenting march 
 were now becoming so apparent, that, previously to 
 quitting Bembibre, I was sent by sir David Baird to 
 sir John Moore (whilst the former was attending the 
 punishment of some soldiers for their excesses in the 
 town), to submit to the commander of the forces 
 whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it 
 might not be better to risk a loss of men by endea- 
 vouring to make a stand, than incur the certainty of 
 diminishing our force and means by urging the 
 retreat. The commander of the forces being, how- 
 ever, of opinion that circumstances made it necessary 
 to proceed, the division moved to Cacavellos, where it 
 arrived late on the evening of the 31st ; having thus 
 marched nearly sixty miles since the morning of the 
 preceding day, during which period it had, with very 
 short intervals, been constantly under arms*. 
 
 At Cacavellos and in the neighbouring villages 
 the troops were quartered for the night, and moved 
 on the following day, through Villa Franca to Her- 
 rerias. At Villa Franca the division only halted to 
 
 • I state the distance from recollection ; but I think I have rather under- 
 rated the length of the march in question. 
 
 £ 
 
50 NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 receive rations. A considerable depot of provisions 
 and forage had been formed in that town : but much 
 had been consumed or wasted by the divisions which 
 preceded us. This evil did not arise from a want of 
 exertion on the part of the commissariat: it was an 
 almost inevitable consequence of our situation, and 
 must always occur, to a certain extent, where suffi- 
 cient time cannot be allowed to preserve order, or to 
 make the requisitions and distribution with regularity. 
 As appears to have been the case at Smolensko and 
 at Wilna, on Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow, the 
 soldiers crowded round the magazines, and the pro- 
 visions disappeared as soon as produced, without 
 regard to weights and measures : and thus a store, 
 which was calculated to have subsisted the whole 
 army several days, yielded, under our unfortunate 
 circumstances, only a partial and irregular supply. 
 
 It may naturally be asked. Why were not impedi- 
 ments thrown in the way of the advancing enemy, to 
 retard his progress, as proposed, in the event of a retreat 
 through Galicia, in sir David Baird's letter to sir 
 John Moore, of the 21st November ? It was one of 
 the fatalities we were doomed to experience, that an 
 order which was given by sir John Moore at Astorga, 
 to destroy the intrenching tools, on account of a 
 deficiency in the means of transport, was too lite- 
 rally interpreted, and too largely applied. The con- 
 sequence was, that the engineer officers who were em- 
 ployed to mine two or three bridges, could not procure 
 the instruments which were necessary to form the 
 mines properly, and they therefore exploded partially, 
 without producing their full effect. This was no fault 
 in the officers, but arose, I believe, entirely from the 
 cause I have mentioned. 
 
 I do not think it requisite to notice what colonel 
 
1808—1809, IN THK NORTH OF SPAIN. 51 
 
 Napier says, at page 479, respecting the employment 
 of a dragoon to convey a despatch, further than to 
 observe that, if the words " blameable irregularity" 
 are intended to apply to the conduct of the dragoon, 
 I must consider the expression as far too mild ; if to 
 the general, as much too strong, and indeed altogether 
 uncalled for by the nature of the case. It has always, 
 I believe, been a common practice to employ orderly 
 dragoons to carry despatches. They are selected as 
 trusty and well-behaved men. In cases of importance 
 it may be better to send staff officers : but the staff is 
 limited in number, and may be otherwise employed. 
 I do not recollect the particular circumstance alluded 
 to by colonel Napier, further than that an orderly 
 dragoon who was sent with a letter to a division which 
 preceded us on the retreat, lost the letter. It related, 
 I thought, to a change in the direction of the retreat, 
 which was originally intended to be made on Vigo 
 instead of Coruiia ; nor was I aware that the accident 
 had occasioned any loss of men, or any serious incon- 
 venience beyond the countermarch of a brigade which 
 had advanced a day's journey on the road towards 
 Vigo. 
 
 It is riot necessary for the object in view to pursue 
 the course of the retreat any further. Sufficient has 
 perhaps been said to show, that any want of attention 
 on the part of the officers, or of order and obedience 
 in the men, ought, principally to be ascribed to the 
 fatigues and privations they underwent, which made 
 it physically impossible that they should properly 
 fulfil all their duties as soldiers. Oppressed by want 
 of sleep, and exhausted by constant marching, they 
 moved on, silent and sullen, regardless of, and indif- 
 ferent to, every object which surrounded them. If 
 any doubt should exist as to the extent of their suf- 
 
Bit NOTES ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 fering, the records of the military hospitals which 
 they crowded on their arrival in England would 
 prove the state of disease and debility in which they 
 returned. 
 
 I have no doubt colonel Napier's remarks, at page 
 488, are perfectly correct, and that the reserve pre- 
 served greater order during the retreat than the other 
 divisions. This, in a great measure, was a necessary 
 consequence of their proximity to the enemy, which 
 created a mental excitement not felt by the rest of the 
 army. Had we been advancing, or following, instead of 
 retiring from our foe, I am persuaded the same ground 
 might have been passed over by the same men, in 
 a shorter space of time, and with a diminished sense 
 of fatigue. 
 
 In his account of the action at Coruna, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Napier says, at page 496, " This being 
 observed by the commander-in-chief, who directed 
 in person the operations of Baird's division," &c. 
 
 This passage seems to require some explanation. 
 Sir David Baird's division formed the right of the 
 British army. The action began by a cannonade 
 from eleven guns which the French had placed on a 
 height which commanded that part of the position. 
 Sir John Moore immediately rode to the right ; and 
 as the enemy's columns, which descended the hill to 
 attack sir David Baird's division, approached, sir 
 David asked the commander of the forces if he did 
 not think it was time to move forward to meet them, 
 inquiring also if sir John would give the word of com- 
 mand ? He replied, " No, Baird, do you." The order 
 was immediately given to advance, and the fire of 
 musketry soon after began. 
 
 Sir David Baird was wounded very early in the 
 action. A grape-shot struck the upper part of his 
 
1 808—1809, IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN. 53 
 
 left arm, and shattered the bone a few inches from 
 the shoulder. He was immediately obliged to dis- 
 mount from his horse; but, recovering from the shock, 
 he was desirous of remaining on the field. This, 
 however, the nature of the wound made impossible ; 
 and he proceeded first to Coruiia, and afterwards 
 on board his majesty's ship Ville de Paris. The 
 shot entered so near the shoulder that the arm could 
 not be amputated in the usual way. It was removed 
 altogether out of the socket of the shoulder in the 
 course of the same evening. 
 
 By the death of sir John Moore, the command of 
 the army devolved on sir David Baird ; but his situ- 
 ation incapacitated him from exercising it. Early on 
 the ensuing morning, therefore, he formally resigned 
 it to lieutenant-general Hope, requiring from that 
 officer a report on the events of the preceding day, and 
 requesting him to carry into effect the intentions of 
 our deeply regretted commander. This done, he 
 signed the despatch which announced to his ma- 
 jesty's government the loss we had sustained, and the 
 honourable though unfortunate termination of the 
 campaign. 
 
 THE END. 
 

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