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 The Carnatic Question Con- 
 sidered; in a Letter to a 
 ber of Parliament 

 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 THK 
 
 CARNATIC QUESTION 
 
 CONSIDERED ; 
 
 A LETTER 
 
 A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, 
 
 Jura neget gibi nata, nihil non arroget amis. HOR. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR R. H.TEVANS, PALL MALL, 
 BY C. MERCIER AND CO. NORTHUMBERLAND COURT, STRAND. 
 
 1806.
 
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 THE 
 
 CARNATIC QUESTION 
 
 CONSIDERED. 
 
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 SIR, 
 
 JL HE affairs of India have for some time attracted 
 the attention of Parliament; and a variety of docu- 
 ments, having a seejning tendency to explain several 
 extraordinary transactions of the late Asiatic Govern- 
 ments, have from time to time been called for and 
 produced, for the information of that August Assem- 
 bly. So rapid a succession, indeed, of great and 
 unexpected events have occurred in India, within a 
 very limited time, that the accounts required of them 
 by the House of Commons, are swollen into the size 
 and into the shape of many folio volumes. 
 
 The multifarious subjects, to which the papers 
 alluded to refer and, the extraordinary extent of 
 them, would seem sufficient to terrify any ordinary 
 person, not particularly interested in the event, from 
 examining their contents. And thus, by the very 
 frequent occurrence, as well as magnitude of the sub- 
 ejects which would seem worthy of inquiry, the 
 common mind might chance to be deterred from an 
 investigation, which it would otherwise have been in-
 
 clined to pursue, if a knowledge of them could have 
 been obtained by any plain and simple process, or 
 in any reasonable time. 
 
 If, by any fortunate turn of circumstances, a por- 
 tion of the substance of these voluminous documents 
 could be impressed on the public mind, or the un- 
 derstanding of the House, the result would be ob- 
 vious. Show but the merits of the cause, and advo- 
 cates must necessarily abound! 
 
 The danger to be apprehended, from the under- 
 taking of any individual, to put the House and Public 
 in possession of the heavy subjects of complaint, which 
 arise out of the papers in reference, is, that the 
 mixed and multiplied matter of supposed gravamen, 
 would be too complicated for individual retention: 
 and that the well-intentioned and best-disposed mind, 
 might sicken, and at last sink, under the voluntary 
 labours which it had at first proposed to itself. 
 
 You are not unacquainted, Sir, with the tricks of 
 office, and the very stale practice of mingling with 
 the official instruments required, and as often as 
 they are required, every possible paper, which the 
 ingenuity of placemen, or the interest of an opposite 
 party, may luckily suggest. These, exhibited to- 
 gether, are in general of so formidable an appear- 
 ance, as to forbid the meditated attack. 
 
 I know not in any better way to account, why an 
 inquiry has not long been instituted on an interest- 
 ing subject, which has agitated in a very peculiar 
 degree the public feeling, and opinion; the mate- 
 rials for which have been for years in the hands of 
 every member of the House of Commons. 
 
 The Gentleman, who first directed the attention of 
 the House to the matter to which I have alluded, 
 has not only the peculiar gift of a ready perception 
 of a subject, but of easily communicating his own 
 feelings to the bosoms of his auditors. He had, there- 
 fore, barely to mention the circumstances which he
 
 A 
 
 3 
 
 deemed necessary to be inquired into, when his 
 sentiments were adopted, and full and eager of his 
 subject, as he was capable of conducting it, he moved 
 for, and obtained, all the papers which he desired 
 for the prosecution of his design. 
 
 The documents on the Carnatic Question have 
 been fated, however, to lie as a caput mortuum on v 
 the, table of the House of Commons, for a space of 
 nearly three years. 
 
 Who is ignorant of the comprehensive and com- 
 manding talent of the Gentleman of whom I am 
 speaking ? And I will add too, of his political inte- 
 grity? It is felt and acknowledged throughout the . . 
 country. But his habits of ease, which not unfre- 
 quently paralyze and counteract these qualities, are, 
 perchance, not quite so well known. And the public 
 might imbibe a prejudice against a cause, which that 
 Gentleman had once espoused with warmth, and af- 
 terwards did not prosecute; if it were not explained, 
 that there possibly might be other reasons for the 
 dereliction of the purpose, than were inherent in the 
 cause itself. 
 
 That Mr. Sheridan has not conceived otherwise 
 of the measure of the proposed inquiry, since the 
 production of the documents in question, may fairly 
 be concluded from the tenor of his public conduct*. 
 For, since the papers have been produced, he has 
 given more than one intimation of his intentions, 
 though he has not mentioned any specific day for 
 the purpose, of offering the Carnatic Question, with 
 
 * Since this letter has been in the hands of the Printer, 
 Mr. Sheridan, speaking of the transactions in the Carnatic, 
 thus expresses himself ; 
 
 " JNly opinion of that transaction is unaltered, and I con- 
 " tinue to think it one of ihe most unjust, inhuman, and atro- 
 " ciaus acts, that ever stained the honour of the British name 
 " in India." Vide Mr. Sheridan's speech on Mr. Paul's motion 
 .for an impeachment. 
 
 B 2
 
 its merits or demerits, to the determination of the 
 House. 
 
 If I could indulge the most faint hope, that the 
 Right Honourable Gentleman would, in any given 
 reasonable time, state the circumstances, connected 
 with the transactions in the Carnatic, to the judg- 
 ment to which they are referred, I should not trou- 
 ble you with a word, Sir, on the subject ; but, from 
 the conviction of past events, and from a knowledge 
 of his having recently been admitted to the cares of 
 a public office, which must necessarily engross a 
 great portion of his time, I cannot indulge the 
 most distant prospect of an inquiry, in which, as an 
 Englishman I feel most deeply interested, ever 
 moving from him. Though such is my opinion of 
 the Right Honourable Gentleman, and in which I 
 would not be deceived, that, I am well persuaded, 
 he would lend the benefit of his transcendant abi- 
 lities to any one, who should originate the investi- 
 gation *. 
 
 Not wholly uninformed in Asiatic affairs, nor per- 
 sonally unacquainted with the measures, which at- 
 tended the succession of the present occupier of the 
 Musnud of the Carnatic, nor the consequences, in- 
 stant or remote, which flowed from it j I shall en- 
 deavour to awaken the slumbering spirit of those, 
 who once took an interest in the subject j and lead 
 them to consider the avowed principles of policy 
 which governed an event, that cannot be kept in 
 countenance by any precedent, in the most barbarous 
 age and country, to which history has attached it- 
 self. 
 
 I shall be fully satisfied, if I engage but one 
 member of the great body, of which i have often 
 spoken, (and one, I think, 1 may depend on) to look 
 
 * From the declaration of Mr. Sheridan, in the speech, be- 
 fore alluded to, my opinion, previously formed, of that Right 
 Honourable Gentleman is confirmed and fortified.
 
 dispassionately, but thoroughly, into the Carnatic 
 correspondence : for I am convinced that a pe- 
 rusal of - it can leave him no choice: but that he 
 must be anxious, day and night, to remove the 
 seeming temporary, but tacit sanction of his coun- 
 try from a measure, for which policy can frame no 
 excuse, nor power a pretext; and which, until it 
 shall be disowned as the act of Englishmen, must 
 leave a stigma on their character and name. 
 
 Jn the pursuance of my plan, I shall take, when- 
 ever it is possible, as the grounds on which I mean 
 to reason, the accounts, as far as they are verified 
 by any thing like proof, which have been rendered 
 by the Asiatic governments : for I would avoid, 
 in every practicable case, a difference in respect to 
 facts, which received, as partially related, on the au- 
 thority of one side or the other, might give rise to 
 distinct and varying deductions. The subject, from 
 the diffuse manner in which it has been treated by 
 the Secretaries and Authorities of the East, is so com- 
 plex, as to require a most cautious observance of as 
 simple an arrangement as the discussion is capable 
 of. 
 
 I shall aim to show, and from the details of office, v 
 that the non acknowledgment and subsequent de- . 
 thronement of the lawful heir of the late Nabob of 
 the Carnatic, was an arbitrary act of power : and 
 the attempted justification of it, if all the facts were 
 admitted, on which it asserts itself to be founded, is 
 not only puerile and absurd, but profligate and wicked. 
 And that the end, like the means, has been pro- 
 ductive of events, which must necessarily have been 
 foreseen, that call for responsibility and sanction. 
 
 As the history of the Nabobs of Arcot must be 
 familiar to all, who are at all conversant with Indian 
 politics, I shall content myself with briefly stating, 
 in this place, that the late and the preceding Nabob 
 of that country, as far as the Public could form any 
 judgment, quitted the seat of their successive go-
 
 vcrnments, by the common course of nature, in 
 seeming peace and amity with the East India Com- 
 pany ; and in possession of all the effects of the 
 alliance, which had subsisted for more than half a 
 century between those sovereigns, and the last men- 
 tioned Power. 1 do not however affect to be igno- 
 rant, that some questions had been previously stirred 
 by the Supreme Government, and their immediate 
 superiors at home, founded on certain alleged cir- 
 cumstances, of which I shall have much occasion to 
 speak hereafter ; having relation to the condition of 
 the Princes of the Carnatic, as it was supposed to 
 be affected by the alleged circumstances in re- 
 ference, under the operation of subsisting treaties. 
 But the circumstances, whatever they might be, and 
 the questions to which they had given rire, how- 
 ever well known to the local governments and to 
 their constituents at home, were kept as profound 
 secrets from the Nabob from foreign Asiatic courts 
 and from all the World besides until after the events 
 I have before particularized. 
 
 On the demise, therefore, of the late Nabob Omdut 
 ul Omrah, in the year 1801, the different Courts, 
 as well as the European establishments of Asia, 
 looked to the succession of the Prince Ally Hussein, 
 the only son of that Sovereign, to the dignities of 
 his Royal Predecessor, as a matter of undoubted 
 right j secured and guaranteed by the East India 
 Company in a solemn treaty. But at this period, 
 to the astonishment of the general mind, the fatal 
 secrets were disclosed, which were not only to dis- 
 solve all connections and engagements between the 
 Princes of the Carnatic, and the East India Com- 
 pany, but to have the wonder-working charm of 
 destroying their past operation ! 
 
 The palace at Chepauk, the residence of the 
 Nabob, was surrounded by the Military of the Com- 
 pany, under the specious pretext of preserving the 
 public peace i or, in other words, as a necessary
 
 precaution for suppressing the popular indignation 
 at the acts, which were about to be performed. 
 
 Before the lifeless body of the Nabob was shrouded, 
 within two short hours after its immortal tenant had 
 quitted its earthly habitation, two confidential per- 
 sonages were sent by the Governor of Fort St. 
 George, on a commission to the palace. Your 
 kindly disposition, Sir, and the heart of every Eng- 
 lishman, would seem to have foreran my infor- 
 mation. You have anticipated, no doubt, that this 
 confidential commission, arising out of the pious 
 solicitude of the parties in local power, was charged 
 with the office of humanity ! A Prince, scarcely of 
 eighteen years, and unaccustomed by birth, as well 
 as age, to the heavy hand of affliction, might well 
 seem to have deserved this early attention of his 
 friendly neighbour. But, alas ! how little are you 
 acquainted with the European heart under an In- 
 dian sky ? 
 
 These cold-blooded commissioners had a depu- 
 tation of another complexion. They had, it is true, 
 to penetrate into the house of grief ; not to join, 
 indeed, in the responses of heartfelt sorrow, but to 
 draw from the deepest recesses of its roof, the chief 
 and most secret mourner; hanging with the last, be^t 
 efforts of fondness, over the yet warm frame of his 
 departed Sire A retreat, and an employment, sa- 
 cred by nature from the profane foot of intrusion. 
 
 Yet at such a season, and from such duties, was the 
 youthful and pious prince hurried, (I am speaking from 
 official papers*) to answer (oh shame !) at a public 
 conference, the inquisitorial interrogatories of a dull 
 unfeeling committee ! to hear (abominable outrage !) 
 his fairpretensions questioned! to hear (unparalleled 
 barbarity !) his father's memory calumniated ! But 
 
 Vide Page 8 to 10 of the papers produced to the House of 
 Commons in 1801, and the letter of the Prince to his agents, at 
 the end of the same volume.
 
 I will endeavour to pursue my subject with feelings 
 less alive. 
 
 After the Prince had shown, by a disclosure of the 
 testament of his royal father, as required, that he was 
 the declared and appointed heir to all his dignities 
 his Highness was permitted to retire : but the commis- 
 sioners proceeded to make known to the Regents, who 
 were appointed to assist the Prince with their advice, 
 the further objects of their mission. 
 
 And here, for the first time, was it told, that the 
 way to the Musnud of the Carnatic was closed against 
 the Prince, from any hereditary pretensions, by the 
 acts of his immediate predecessors ; and that his High- 
 ness, if he ever attained to the dignity and state of 
 his forefathers, must owe his elevation to the mode- 
 ration and bounty of the Company. 
 
 I shall not stay the course of my detail, by showing 
 the surprise of the regents, at the information so 
 communicated, but shall pass to the consideration of 
 the objections stated to the unqualified succession of 
 the Prince to the dignities and honours of his house. 
 And these arise out of the correspondence of the 
 Government General, the subordinate government 
 of Madras ; the authenticated acts of their servants ; 
 and the official papers published, and intended to be 
 published, under their authority. 
 
 The papers, to which I would refer, are numerous: 
 but the substance of them, I think, I can fairly collect, 
 and I shall endeavour to confine, within a short space. 
 
 The Indian governments and their commissioners, 
 as would appear throughout the correspondence, 
 have acted on a course of reasoning, adapted to sup- 
 posed premises, which they had agreed on, and pri- 
 marily laid cknvn j namely, that by certain acts bf 
 the Nabob Wallajaw, or Mahommed Ally, and his 
 successor the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, asserted to 
 have been in violation of a treaty, particular rights 
 had accrued to the Company, which operated to the 
 defeazance of the title, and disherison of the heir
 
 9 
 or successor to their dignities and honors. Without 
 
 CJ 
 
 entering into the doctrine, which may be imagined to 
 have conveyed these advantages to the , Company, I 
 shall here advert to the grounds on which they are at- 
 tempted to be raised : and they resolve themselves, 
 divested of pompous phraseology, to these 
 
 That the territory of the Carnatic, by the treason 
 of the Nabobs Wallajaw and Omdut ul Omrah, 
 brought to light by the discovery of papers after the 
 fall of Seringapatam, passed by forfeiture to the East 
 India Company. This is the language and principle 
 assumed and acted on by the Indian Governments in 
 every part of their correspondence, both before and 
 after the possession of the territory in question. The 
 letters of Lord Wellesley, on the 7th and 23d of April 
 '1800, and the i5th September 1801 *, and the report 
 of the commissioners of the month of July preceding, 
 are in full proof of this assertion. But to use the 
 words of Lord Wellesley in his letter last alluded to* 
 
 " Your Lordship (meaning Lord Clive) is fully 
 " aware, and it is distinctly stated in the declaration 
 '' accompanying your Lordship's dispatch, that the 
 " result of the discovery which has been made of their 
 " lateHignesses, the Nabobs Wallajaw and Omdut ul 
 " Omrah, treacherous correspondence with the late 
 " '\ ippoo Sultaun, had placed the Soobudar of the 
 *' Carnatic in the situation of a public enemy to the 
 <c British government; had annihilated the exist- 
 " ing treaties between the Nabob of the Carnatic and 
 4t the Company; and had sanctioned tiie enforcement 
 " of such measures, as the British government might 
 " deem necessary for the security of its rights and 
 " interests, as connected with" the SoobuJary of 
 " Arcot. 
 
 " This is the fundamental principle upon which 
 
 * Vide pages 1 ami 2, of the papers laid on the table of the 
 House of Commons in 1803, and the Report of the Commis- 
 sioners, p. 8. 
 
 C
 
 10 
 
 <c the late arrangements have been founded, and con- 
 " sequentlv the acknowledgment of an inherent 
 " right in any member of the family of the late 
 " Nabobs Wallajaw and Omdut ul Omrah to succeed 
 " to the Soobudary of the Carnatic is incompatible 
 <l with the maintenance of that principle /" 
 
 It would seem, from the last paragraph, that the 
 Noble Lord, who was at the head of the adminis- 
 tration of the subordinate government, charged 
 with the immediate management of the negoc.ation, 
 respecting the succession to the Musnud of the 
 Carnatr, had mistaken, as he well might, the prin- 
 ciple of policy or justice, on which he was commis- 
 sioned to act. Unused to metaphysical reasoning, 
 with which his instructions were replete, he looked 
 directly to the object, which he knew and felt to be 
 in contemplation (the substantial possession of the 
 territories of the Carnatic), and so as he obtained it 
 in effect, he was not very scrupulous about the 
 means by which it was attained. 
 
 In the treaty first concluded with Azeem ul Dowlah, 
 the Madras Government, not so well informed of the 
 doctrine of forfeiture as afterwards, negociated with 
 his Highness, in express terms, on the principle of 
 hereditary right ; and although the blunder was de- 
 tected by the quick and shrewd eye of the Governor 
 General, he did net grow angry with an arrange- 
 ment, which had put him in possession of the fee- 
 simple of the Carnatic, subject to a trivial annuity ; 
 though the -preamble of the conveyance had not been 
 executed with technical precision. 
 
 Lord Wellcsley, sensible of the error of the in- 
 ferior Government, had yet the prudence to observe 
 on it, in his letter on the 1 5th of September, in a 
 way at once expressive of his own moderation, and 
 the delicate respect due to his noble coadjutor. For 
 he says * : " His Excellency in Council, however, 
 
 * First volume of '> papers of 1803, p. 72.
 
 11 
 
 " deeming ic advisable that the terms of the treat 
 " should be strictly, consistent with the fundamenta 
 " principle of the arrangement, in conformity to 
 " the foregoing observations, has introduced into 
 " the modified treaty a change of the terms of the 
 tf preamble, and of the first article as executed by 
 " your Lordship in Council ; and his Excellency, in 
 " Council, directs, that should your Lordship be of 
 " opinion, that the modified treaty may be proposed 
 " to his Highness's acceptance, without the hazard 
 " of his dissent or displeasure, or without compro- 
 cc wising the dignity or the public faith of the Go- 
 (i vernment, which your Lordship in Council may 
 " possibly have deemed it expedient to pledge to 
 " his Highness, for the acknowledgment of his he- 
 "_ reditary title, your Lordship will propose the 
 " modified treaty to his acceptance. But should 
 4f your Lordship in Council, suppose it to be unad- 
 " visable to make this proposition to his Highness, 
 " either on any of the grounds herein specified, or 
 " on others, of which his Excellency in Council is 
 " not at present apprised, your .Lordship is at liberty 
 " to return the modified treaty to Fort William, and 
 " to consider the former as binding and conclu- 
 " sive." 
 
 I know not which is most to be admired in this 
 farrago of diplomacy, the deiicacy to be observed 
 to the Prince, who had been enthroned, or the at- 
 tention to be shown to the dignity and good faith of 
 the Government, which had been supposed to be 
 plighted in the transaction. It is mockery to talk 
 of the hazard of the dissent or dispUasure of a puppet ! ! 
 the avowcH and declared creature of the Company's 
 workmanship and bounty , or of the compromise 
 of dignity or public faithi where none, except in terms, 
 had ever been pretended to!! The transaction is 
 bold arid barefaced It is daring and successful am- 
 bition triumphing over its prey. If it lose that cha- 
 
 c 2
 
 12 
 
 ractcr, I ?ee nothing about it that can otherwise pi\o- 
 tect it from abhorrence and contempt. 
 
 But, without any further prefatory observation, 
 let u; examine the premises from which the for- 
 feiture of the territories, and of the rights of the 
 lawful Sovereign of the Carnacic, is said to be the 
 dreadful result; and these are alleged to arise, in the 
 form of a number of ingenious syllogisms, from se- 
 veral pieces of , documentary evidence, supported 
 by slight oral testimony, ex part e taken; and of the 
 reasonings of Secretaries, Persian Translators, and 
 (if they may be mcntio <cd in the same sentence) by 
 Governors and their substitutes. 
 
 The main proposition sought to be established 
 is: 
 
 That the Nabob Wallajaw, and the Nabob Om- 
 dut ul Omrah, carried on a secret and traitorous 
 correspondence with Hyder and his successor, from 
 the year 1773, in violation of their engagements 
 with the Company. 
 
 Of the deduction, thence drawn, I shall not now 
 speak. 
 
 The papers principally relied on by the Govern- 
 ments of India, as serving to make out the propo- 
 sition, are several accounts given by the Ambassn- 
 dors of Tippoo, of the disposition of the Nabob 
 and his Son; of lerttrs. or supposed letters, from 
 the latter Princes; and of natural constructions 
 drawn by the representatives of the Company in 
 India, or their officers, from the writings of the 
 parties. " These latter are to be gathered from the 
 letters of the Go ve: nor General, to the G-vcrnmcnt 
 of Fort St. George; from the report r,f the Persian 
 Translator on the documerts submitted to his exa- 
 mination ; an,i from the detail of the Examiners of 
 the evidence of living witnesses v\ho had .been 
 interrogated, under the authority of tie supreme 
 government. The time included by the corre-
 
 spondcnce, and the acts to which it relates, is of J 
 the duration of twenty-eight years; and the best 
 order for the consideration of one, and the other, 
 would seem pointed out, by the natural succession of 
 events, in the course in which they took place. 
 
 Before I observe on this testimony (the name by 
 which it has been dignified), I must beg leave to call 
 your attention, Sir, to the situation of the principal 
 party; and to the very large interests, which are in- 
 volved in the inquiry. You have before you a 
 Prince, scarcely of a mature age, whose rights are 
 called in question, and are about to be determined 
 by a new species of evidence, which it is my business 
 to trace: evidence! not derived, nor pretended to 
 be derived, from any act of his, but from the conduct 
 of an ancestor long since dead ; which, in its conse- 
 quence, is to give or take away a kingdom ! to 
 destroy the throne of the Prince; to disturb the 
 memory of his Sire; to involve the living and the 
 dead in one common fate, in one fame ! 
 
 1 need not, I am sure, take much pains to impress 
 you with a feeling, which might give you no very 
 strong leaning to a proof drawn from a source, such 
 as I have described ; if, by any possibility, it could 
 be made applicable to the case. When we are called 
 on to consider the acts of parties dead, the mind na- 
 turally affixes to them, whenever it can indulge 
 such an interpretation, a good, rather than a bad mo- 
 tive : and, when it is obliged to pass a judgment on 
 any ambiguous saying or writing of the deceased, it 
 will, with the same candour, exercise the same 
 leniency. None can feel disposed to take either their 
 acts or their expressions in a bad sense, where a good 
 one, consistent with appearances, may be as well 
 maintained. And, if this disposition be natural in 
 ordinary cases, how much more reason is there to 
 expec: it, when the acts and writings of others, long 
 at rest, are to be relived, for the purpose of destroy- 
 ing the rights of an individual, unborn at the time,
 
 14 
 
 when most of them (if they shall appear to have any 
 ciiminality about them) were imagined and com- 
 mitted: I ask but, in this case, what the meanest 
 subject of the country would be entitled to in the ad- 
 judication,of his rights. 
 
 Perhaps, in requesting this allowance, I may have 
 given a seeming weight to the supposed proof which 
 i am immediately to treat. As it regards the Prince 
 himself, I have been accustomed ro feel myself 
 wholly without an apprehension, either as to its 
 tendency or effect. But I own 1 am a little anxious 
 (not improperly anxious, I hope,) to free the me- 
 mories of the high personages, implicated in the 
 bearing of it, from the calumnious fost-obitory ob- 
 loquy, which it is tendere \ wich a view to fix on 
 them. 
 
 The first act, in which the Nabob Mahommed 
 Ally pr Wallajaw is asserted to be implicated, took 
 place in the year i773j and his inferred offence is 
 to be collected from a correspondence of an Ambas- 
 sador, at the Court or the Nabob, to his Sovereign 
 Hyder Ally.' This matter of accusation is furnished 
 by the Governor General to the Madras Govern- 
 ment, in his letter of May 1800*, with a long com- 
 mentary by the Persian Translator. 
 
 It must not be understood, in considering the 
 paper in question, that I am admitting such a docu- 
 ment, in its nature, as any thing, in the most distant 
 shape, of evidence j either against the Nabob Ma- 
 hommed Ally, or any individual, other than the 
 party writing it. it is too monstrous a proposition, 
 to be tolerated for an instant, that an indifferent 
 person can be implicated in the thinking, or writing 
 of another, to which he had not subscribed, or set 
 son;e mark of his privity or approbation. Of this I 
 may have occasion to speak somewhat more at large 
 
 * Pago 32, of the papers laid on the table of the House 
 in 1803.
 
 15 
 
 in another place. But to return to the letter of 
 1773*, written by Mohammud Osmaun; of which 
 I shall give such extracts, as are relied on by the 
 Persian translator; and as are adopted by the Mar- 
 quis Wellesley, and forwarded to the Government 
 of Fort St. George. 
 
 In the commencement of the report of the Persian 
 Translator, he observesf: " That the circtim- 
 (f stances, however, most important, which are dis- 
 ' closed by the documents adverted to" (meaning 
 ihe letters discovered at Seringapatam), " is an in- 
 " timate connection, which he" (the Nabob) "ap- 
 tf pears to have formed with Hyder Ally, at a time 
 " when he was supposed, by the British government, 
 " to entertain the most inveterate animosity against 
 <c him. The rise and progress of the connection is 
 " to be traced in the letters of Mahomrned Osmaun, 
 " which are very voluminous: but the nature and 
 " tendency of it is sufficiently developed by the ac- 
 " companying translation of one of them, dated in 
 " 1773 j relating the substance of a private confer- 
 " ence between him and the Nabob, in which the 
 " latter is represented to have expressed his attach- 
 " ment to Hyder Ally, and his disposition to con- 
 " ntct himself with that prince, by ties of common 
 " interest, in terms as forcible as language can convey: 
 " terms ! not only incompatible with the faith of his 
 " alliance with the British Nation, but indicating and 
 " implying a desire for the subversion of the British 
 " Power in India; and an anxious wish to establish 
 " his own independence on the ruins of it." And in 
 verification of his report he quotes passages from 
 the written instrument alluded to. " The Nabob" 
 (as Mahommed Osmaun writes), <c taking me by the 
 
 * It is given at length, page 122, of the papers first pro- 
 duced to the House of Commons. 
 
 f Page 33, of the second set of papws laid on tire table of 
 the House.
 
 id 
 
 " hand, led me to the top of the house, where there 
 " was a room, from whence the beautiful prospect 
 " of the sea, Fort St. George, &c. &c. like a plain, 
 " appearing to our view : he remarked, what a 
 <c beautiful spot it was, and added, f May the Al- 
 " mighty God soon produce a cause, from which 
 " the Nabob, Hyder Ally, and I shall he enabled 
 " here to sit and enjoy ourselves together.' Again, 
 "- f It is necessary a friendship should subsist between 
 " us, so firm, as that both our countries should be 
 " one. Your master may make many friends; 
 " but, doubtless, such a friend as I am, he can 
 " never acquire. I am that friend, who, if he 
 " (which God prevent) should require the sacrifice 
 " of my child, as a mean of promoting his pros- 
 " perity and dominion, would (looking upon this as 
 <{ the greatest blessing in the world) most willingly 
 " deliver up my offspring to him. It is my wish to 
 " establish such a friendship with your master, that 
 " our children after us may be united in the bonds 
 " of affection and love.' ' 
 
 The interpreter goes on with other passages like 
 these, and then concludes:" Were these sen- 
 * c timents consistent with the nature of the Nabob's 
 " connections with the English? Were they com- 
 " patible with the aiJ, which the British govern- 
 " ment had a right to expect from him? And did 
 c< they not point out to Hyder Ally, the neutrality, 
 <c if not the assistance, which he might expect from 
 " the Nabob in a future war with the English?" 
 In this way he proceeds to draw his inferences, 
 which, if taken to be truly deduced, i. e. from un- 
 erring premises, would involve the Nabob io a 
 situation as odious as could well be conceived. 
 
 You are led of course to imagine, from the 
 wrathful ebullition, and the indignant conclusions of 
 the Persian Translator, imbibed in all their bitterness 
 by his superior, that the Nabob, in making such a 
 communication, as he is supposed to have done, to
 
 17 
 
 
 
 the Ambassador of Hyder Ally, had acted, not only 
 against the knowledge, but againsj the advice and 
 interests of the Company, as well as against the letter 
 and spirit of his engagements. 
 
 You will not be a little surprised, Sir, when you 
 shall see, from the Company's own records, that this 
 treasonable intercourse, this abominable breach of 'faith, 
 of which they have the effrontery to complain, was 
 not only acted with their knowledge, but was the 
 object of their earnest wishes, and the favourite aim 
 of their policy. 
 
 The following extracts cannot be read without 
 putting the matter beyond the possibility of doubt 
 
 ' Letter from the President of Fort Saint George, to the 
 Nabob of Ar cot, dated 30//z August, 1773. 
 
 " I have been honoured with the receipt of your 
 " Highness's favour of the 27th instant, enclosing 
 <( copies of two letters from Mahommed Osmaun ; my 
 " sentiments, concerning the answers to which, you 
 " are pleased to desire. 
 
 " As your Highness, from more intimate know- 
 fc ledge, must be much better acquainted with the 
 " particular circumstances of your situation, with 
 : respect to the several Country Powers, than I can 
 " possibly pretend to be, and of course a much 
 " better judge, not only on the construction which 
 * c may be put, and consequences which may attend, 
 " the receiving of a vakeel from Hyder Ally Khan, 
 " and the sending one to him j but also the particular 
 " form and mode of expression, proper to be made 
 " use of on so nice an occasion: in reply to these 
 " letters, I must beg leave to refer the same to your 
 " Highness's better judgment; taking the liberty 
 " only to give the following general opinion, to 
 " wit, that as the tranquillity of the Carnatic is of 
 tc the last and highest importance, both to your Highness 
 " and the Company, I think that every endeavour, con- 
 
 D
 
 18 
 
 ' sistent with honour, and the maintenance of harmony 
 " with other powers, should be employed towards the 
 ft keeping up of a good understanding with Hyder Ally 
 Khan." 
 
 Extract of Secret Consultations of Fort St. George, 
 
 Dec. 23d, 1773. 
 
 " The Nabob, after relating the state of parties in 
 (( the Marhatta Government, &c. observed, that 
 " having received a letter from Hyder Ally Cawn, 
 fi with certain proposals, for a treaty of alliance, it 
 " was necessary he should come to a speedy determi- 
 " nation, either to accept of, or reject his -proposals ; 
 " that, for this purpose, he had desired to consult with 
 " his friends," (meaning the English Government,) 
 " on some very material circumstances, which ought to 
 " be well weighed before an answer is returned to 
 " Hyder Ally , that Hyder Ally had many advantages 
 " to expect from an alliance with the Carnatic, 
 " whereas we had none to expect in uniting with 
 " him; that his (Hyder's) strength was very inade- 
 " quate to a war with the Marhattas, and should we 
 " be engaged in hostilities with that Power, all 
 " Hyder's force, joined to our army, would not save the 
 <c country from being ruined. Should the Marhattas at- 
 " tack the Mysore country, and we determine to assist 
 <e Hyder with an European army, the Marhattas 
 " would infallibly invade the Carnatic, and cut off 
 " all communication with the army on the other 
 side of the hills, &c. &c. The Nabob added 
 " many other objections to an alliance with Hyder Ally, 
 " and from the whole tenor of his conversation, evidently 
 " showed, that an alliance with the Marhattas was 
 " the measure he had most at heart-, and, for which 
 ' purpose, he represented the strength of Hyder 
 " Ally as nothing, when compared to the force of 
 " the Marhattas."
 
 Extractof a Letter of the Nabob, to the Government 
 of Fort Saint George, 29th Dec. 1773. 
 
 After lamenting, that his proposal of an union 
 with the Marhattas was not accepted, the Nabob 
 writes 
 
 l< The talk of the former Governor and Council 
 " was for an alliance with Hyder Ally Cawn, and 
 ".they considered the tranquillity of the country as 
 " consisting therein : Ally Zemaun Cawn, and also 
 <f Mahedur Ally Cawn, are now come on the part 
 '* of Hyder Ally Cawn, with the view of an alliance 
 and mutual assistance. Since then, and on 
 * c account of the reasons aforementioned, and the 
 ff additional one, that my friends do not esteem an 
 " alliance with the. Marhattas proper, 1 'am ready, 
 " conformable to the advice of the Governor and Coun- 
 f( cil t and to the present situation of affairs, to form 
 an alliance with Hyder Ally Cawn; and, accord- 
 " irigly, enclosed I send, for your inspection, a copy 
 <{ of the letter from him, together with a copy of 
 <c the paper containing his proposals, brought me 
 " by his Vakeels; also, a copy of the proposals I 
 " have considered in reply to his proposals/' 
 
 Extract from a Letter of the Governor of Fort Saint 
 George, to the Nabob, dated 5th Jan. 1774. 
 
 The Governor of Fort St. George, having stated, 
 that he had for his own reasons declined an alliance 
 with Hyder Ally, for the protection of his country, 
 writes 
 
 " I beg your Highness will, on no account, how- 
 " ever, consider what I have said, as in any measure 
 " meant to discourage your Highness from establish- 
 " ing a friendship with Hyder Ally Cawn: I think, 
 " on the contrary, it is for the interest of the Car- 
 " natic, that a good understanding should subsist 
 '< between your Highness and him, and that every 
 " consistent means of cultivating the same should 
 * accordingly be made use of." 
 
 P2
 
 Extract from the Military Letter of Fort Saint 
 
 George, dated 6th July, 1774, to the Court of 
 
 Directors. 
 
 " It is, however, worthy of remark, that when 
 " the Nabob was eager for the expedition against 
 " Tanjore, in order to lessen the apprehension of 
 " the Marhattas,. he seemed inclined to an alliance 
 " with Hyder Ally, and went so far as to signify, 
 <c that if a vakeel were sent to him from Hyder 
 <f Ally, he would return a letter of friendship to 
 " Hyder Ally, by a person of consequence. A 
 <* vakeel from Seringapatam has been with the 
 " Nabob for about three months, and it was only in 
 " consultation of the 1 6th January, that we were in- 
 <c formed by the Nabob, that he proposed without 
 " loss of time to return the vakeel with a letter to 
 " his master. We do not mean to infer from hence, 
 * f that the Nabob's sentiments are changed. No, we 
 " are convinced, that his favourite scheme has always 
 " been to join the Marhattas, and totally extirpate 
 " Hyder." 
 
 Is this the secret correspondence in abuse of the con- 
 fidence of the Company? Is it hence, that the dis- 
 position of the Nabob is to be argued in favour of 
 Hyder Ally, and in hostility to his ancient engage- 
 ments? Do these contain the seeds of a friendship 
 intended to destroy the British interests, and to 
 subvert their power and stability? Or has the Persian 
 Translator, in considering tlie purport of his report, 
 wholly overlooked the circumstances related with 
 the grounds of it ? 
 
 It would seem extraordinary, perhaps, at the first 
 blush, that such a paper, and such a commentary, 
 should be introduced in the vindication of the Car- 
 natic Succession, when so ready and complete an 
 answer might be given to it. But natural astonish- 
 ment will cease, when the season of the production 
 is attended to. It will be recollected, that this, and 
 pther writings, were submitted, during the negocia-
 
 21 
 
 tion, to the young Prince, with a view to show the 
 hopelessness of his cause ; at a time when his mind, 
 if it had at all been acquainted with the particulars of 
 preceding reigns, might not, from domestic afflic- 
 tion, have been very competent to refer to them; or, 
 if it had been, the means of the refutation of the cir- 
 cumstances alleged were not in his immediate reach* 
 but in the archives and keeping of the Company. 
 And a negociation, managed at the point of the bayonet, 
 was not very likely to allow time to hunt for papers, 
 to defeat its own object. So that there were a chance 
 at least that the impression, which it was calculated to 
 make, might have its temporary operation. There 
 was no apprehension then, that an inquiry might be 
 demanded ; which would expose every transaction, 
 relative to this unparalleled negociation, to the view 
 of thinking and ingenuous minds. But happily, the 
 occasion, not then meditated, has now arrived. The 
 eye of an intelligent Public is now directed to the 
 detection of a fraud, too glaring to require the ex- 
 tended finger to point it out; and too loathsome to 
 be dwelt on. 
 
 I should be glad to turn to any other part, where 
 the understanding might not chance to be offended 
 with similar impositions. But wheresoever the most 
 careless observer shall glance his eye, on any side of 
 the transaction, it will be disgusted with attempts, 
 perhaps not so flagrant., but certainly as determinate, 
 to mislead his judgment and opinion. 
 
 I have before explained, that the bulk of the sup- 
 posed evidence, of the Nabob's violation of the sub- 
 sisting treaties, is inferred from written documents, 
 explained principally by the oral evidence of the am- 
 bassadors of Tippoo Sultaun; of which not one is in y 
 the hand-writing of the high personage most materi- 
 ally interested; and but two, as it is stated, in the 
 hand of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, during the 
 life-time of his father : the rest are the writings of 
 persons, neither subject to their commands, nor in /\
 
 22 
 
 any sort of connection or relation with them. From 
 the result of all, it is contended, that, by a secret and 
 unlawful intercourse with the Sovereign of Mysore, 
 the Nabob Mahommed Ally had placed himself, 
 from the situation of an ally, in the condition, with 
 all its consequences, of an enemy to the East India Com- 
 pany j and that the aim of the secret intercourse, 
 which is stated to have led to the latter relation of 
 the Prince, was to seek an alliance with Tippoo, 
 either of a political, or of a religious nature ; in either 
 case, equally operative; in opposition to, and in the 
 subversion of his engagements with the Company. 
 
 It is peculiarly thrown on the Eastern Governments, 
 not only from the staleness of the dace at which the 
 accusation h brought forward, but from their plain 
 and manifest interest in the inquiry, to make out a 
 clear and indisputable state of things, so as to include 
 the Nabob within the charge, which they have 
 preferred against him, and the penalty resulting from 
 it. 
 
 The alleged pieces of written evidence, which ex- 
 tend to the number of 21, and are annexed to the 
 Declaration of the Government of Fort Saint George, 
 I shall first consider, in a substantive and detached 
 wayj and afterwards, shall speak of their general 
 tendency and purport. 
 
 No. 1*, appears to be two extracts from a letter 
 written by Golaum Ally Khaun and Alii Rhezza 
 Khaun to Tippoo Sultaun, under a date correspon- 
 dent with the 1 5th June 1792. This relates to the 
 first visit paid by the Princes, the sons of Tippoo Sul- 
 taun, to the Nabob Mahommed Ally on the ;0th of 
 June ; and to the return of the visit by the Nabob on 
 the 1 Hth of the same month. On the first of those 
 dates, the ambassadors state to their master, that the 
 Nabob had expressed himself in terms to the follow- 
 ing effect: 
 
 * Pages 44 and 45 of the papers laid before the House of 
 (Jo.mmo.iis in 1802.
 
 23 jgi g 
 
 " May God long preserve Tippoo Sultaun, who is 
 <c a Pillar of the Religion of Mahommed. Night and 
 " day I used to be absolved in this contemplation, 
 tf and to pray for his Highness's prosperity ; I call 
 " God to witness this fact, because the confederacy of 
 " three Allies was for the subversion of the Mahomme- 
 " dan religion. It is solely to be attributed to the 
 ff divine goodness, that the prayers of us sinners have 
 " been accepted. Believe it true, that I, from my heart; 
 <f desire the welfare of the Sultaun." And at part- 
 ing on the above occasion, the Nabob is again said 
 to have made use of further friendly assurances. 
 
 " He then told us" (as the Ambassadors write), 
 fi that his life was now drawing to a close ; that for 
 " what had hifhertotaken place, between his Highness 
 " and your Majesty, there, was no remedy j but 
 <' now, merely out of a regard to the/aith (of which 
 cc your Majesty was a Pillar) he was desirous of estab- 
 " lishing a cordial harmony with your Majesty." And, 
 after setting: forth an endeavour to interest the Am- 
 
 
 
 bassadors, in bringing about such harmony, they 
 proceed " That although his Highness wanted to 
 " prevent the war between your Majesty and the 
 " three allied States, yet that Nizam AH Khaun, at 
 " the latter period of his life, was thus preparing for 
 <c futurity, by exerting himself for the destruction of 
 " religion. It was solely from a regard to the faith 
 * x that his Highness did not encourage the measure, 
 " &e. &c." 
 
 I shall not again repeat, what I have before ob- 
 served, that this account, given by the Ambassadors, 
 cannot be taken as conclusive of any thing against the 
 Nabob Wallajaw, who never saw it, nor could in any 
 way or shape have been considered privy to it. 
 This, in common justice, would not be denied, if 
 the account could be considered as a fair narrative 
 of circumstances, in the manner in which they oc- 
 curred j but when the writers of the detail, them- 
 selves, have distinctly stated (as I shall hereafter
 
 24 
 
 show), that they were in the habits of enlarging and 
 modifying the sentiments of the Nabob, and of adapt- 
 ing their phrase and meaning to the gratification of 
 their master, little or no consideration can possibly 
 be given to them. From the conversations of his 
 Highness, on this and other occasions, as reported 
 by the Ambassadors, much however is argued. 
 
 The Persian Translator, from one of the very 
 passages 1 have just quoted, makes this conclusion * 
 
 Hi ';* * i '>TW >-.:! w-.jh >' 
 
 *' It is obvious, from these expressions, that from the very 
 " commencement of the war between the allies and Tippoo 
 " Sultaun, the Nabob, Wallajaw (or Mahommed Ally), wished 
 " success to the arms of Tippoo against the Power, with which 
 *' he was connected by the most solemn obligations of union 
 " and alliance. And that by entertaining sentiments so inimi- 
 " cal to its interests, he violated the fundamental principles of 
 " that alliance. 'Tins pre-established fact gives additional force 
 " to the open declarations which the Nabob subsequently made, 
 " &c. &c." 
 
 I should give no very great weight, nor credit, to 
 any deduction (I mean not to speak with disrespect 
 of his abilities) which the Persian Translator might 
 have drawn, if I had not seen, that such deduction 
 had been received and acted on by the Governor 
 General, so as to become his own. And this is to 
 be clearly observed in the Declaration, which his 
 Lordship sanctioned and intended to publish to the 
 world j but which he afterwards thought proper, from 
 prudential motives, to suppress. 
 
 So, a few empty compliments, and stale wishes for 
 the prosperity of the Sultaun, expressed in the true 
 Eastern style, not at the time when such wishes could 
 be available, but after the determination of a success- 
 ful war against him, in which the Nabob had taken 
 
 * See printed Report of the Persian Translator, from page 
 4 to 18 of the papers of 1803.
 
 25 
 
 an active part with the Company, are to be con- 
 verted into the violation of the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of his alliance ; and to be viewed as the sub- 
 stratum for other proof of the traitorous disposition 
 of his Highness ! This sort of argumentation is too 
 
 O * * 
 
 trifling for a boy in his primer. 
 
 Could it be expected, by flattery so gross, and 
 at a first 'visit to the Ambassadors, that the Na- 
 bob could imagine that he was laying the foundation 
 of a future and sincere friendship ? To admit such a 
 supposition, you must first contemplate the Nabob, 
 and the parties whom he is addressing, as the veriest 
 dolts in the world. For if the Nabob had put up 
 his prayers, for the success of the arms of Tippoo 
 (of which his Highness only could be informed], 
 what must naturally be supposed to be the sincerity 
 of them, when the success, which they went to im- 
 plore, would not only have brought down ruin on 
 his only protectors, but would consequently have 
 involved his personal interests in inevitable destruc- 
 tion ? For Tippoo could not be imagined as having 
 any great disposition to extend his mercy to a 
 Mussulman, over whom he had prevailed by the 
 means and chance of war. 
 
 But then, the hostilities, in which the three Allies 
 were engaged, had (as it is stated to have been ob- 
 served by the Nabob) a tendency to subvert the 
 Mahommedan religion. And therefore the Nabob, 
 it is alleged, had a wish for the termination of them 
 in favor of the Sultaun. In a word, his Highness is 
 averred to have had the disinterested motive, to give 
 up his own dominions, and to sacrifice the territory 
 of a second Mussulman Potentate, which the Nizam, 
 one of the other confederates, was, for the purpose 
 of erecting one great Mussulman Power in the person 
 of Tippoo Sultaun. Yes, the Nabob evinced, at 
 the introductory visit, such a warmth of affection for 
 the Sultaun, and so much bigotry for the faith, that 
 his disposition could not be doubted. From the ar- 
 

 
 26 
 
 dcncy of the Nabob's professions for the Mahom- 
 medan faith, in this and other places, an inclination 
 is argued to have been in his Highness, for entering 
 into a holy league for the support of it j and hence, 
 a hundred alarming effects in the minds of the Inter- 
 preter and his Noble Patron, are conjured up and 
 recounted, though at the distance of several years 
 from the date when they were uttered. 
 
 The Marquis Cornwallis and other intelligent 
 minds, who were on the spot, when these pious 
 pranks were playing, saw nothing of that alarming 
 consequence, which has since been descried in them; 
 and the event has not shown, that these illustrious 
 characters were blind to what was passing. 
 
 On the return of the Ambassador's visit, by the 
 Nabob, (as it is stated in the same paper, No. l.) 
 Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows were pre- 
 sent; and his Highness here, as is related by the 
 Ambassadors, used a language equally as warm as at 
 the first interview, and to the same effect 
 
 " That his Highness took occasion to observe, 
 " that we considered him to have been an enemy, 
 <( whereas he declared, in the presence of God, 
 " that he was not, and is not. That, on the con- 
 " trary, he was a friend and well-wisher 5 and that 
 " he had opposed the breach between your Majesty 
 . <f and the three allied States, to such a degree, that 
 ** every one decided in his own mind, that inwardly 
 c your Majesty and his Highness were one.'" 
 
 If there had been nny supposed criminality in the 
 professions of his Highness, it was plain, that he 
 did not endeavour to conceal it. But it is said, 
 by the Persian Translator, to do away this inconsist- 
 ency, " That the sentiments, above quoted, are re- 
 " presented to have been expressed in the presence 
 " of Marquis Cornwallis, Sir C. Oakly, &c. &c. ; 
 " but.it is easy to conceive the facility with which 
 " the Nabob might have held such discourse, with-
 
 27 
 
 cc out being observed by the person who interfered 
 " between him and his Lordship." 
 
 Now all who have ever been in India, or are at 
 all informed of local customs, must know with what 
 ceremony and publicity these sort of state visits are 
 made -, the vast number of attendants and inter- 
 preters, who surround the parties engaged in any 
 conference ; and the impossibility of any public con- 
 versation escaping the general ear. 
 
 But, it was not probable, in a formal visit of this 
 sort, that any privacy should be affected. The 
 Ambassadors contradict every possible supposition 
 of it, by expressly stating 
 
 " That the Nabob desired them to ask Lord Corawallis and 
 " General Meadows, who were present, whether he said true 
 " or not." 
 
 Need I trouble you, Sir, with another observation 
 here ? 
 
 On the two succeeding documents, I shall not 
 have occasion to offer much remark. They are 
 extracts of letters from and to the same parties as 
 the last, selected from the same source, and exhi- 
 bited with the same intent. One of them is dated 
 on the 21st, and the other on the 22d of June, 
 1792. 
 
 To show the mind with which these papers were 
 produced, I must again refer you to the report of 
 the Persian Interpreter, which says 
 
 " That the Vakeels (or Ambassadors) were charged, by 
 " Tippoo Sultaun, with some concealed commission at Ma- 
 " dras, appears from several of the accompanying documents, 
 " particularly from two letters, from the Vakeels to Tippoo 
 " Sultaun, dated in June 1192, in which they profess the 
 " most inviolable secrecy ; and, also from the mysterious ex- 
 
 " pression, o frequently made use of in tho correspondence 
 
 1 
 
 E 2
 
 " between the Vakeels and Seringapatam ; ' The ajair you 
 " know of:' but what the nature of it was does not clearly 
 " appear." 
 
 And hence it is argued, that such secret corre- 
 spondence must be at once adverse to the Nabob's 
 engagements, and the Company's interests. 
 
 You will perceive, Sir, that by going on in this 
 course, the Nabob's name and character might be 
 involved in all the numerous objects of the mission, 
 on which the Ambassadors had been sent; whether 
 he was connected with them or not. If any thing 
 of ambiguity should occur in their correspondence, 
 of which they only could be competent, and could be 
 required to explain, 4 OCS h follow of course, that 
 the ambiguity should be construed into the crimi- 
 nality of the Nabob ? What if his name be. not 
 mentioned, nor any act spoken of, in which it could 
 be insinuated, that he had the least possible con- 
 cern ? Yes, the Governor General and his immediate 
 agent will have it so. 
 
 They have adopted and argued, and re-argued on 
 the premises; however erroneous, however fallible 
 they must seem to every reasoning creature. They 
 have held them and retained them, as long as they 
 could be retained ; and they would still have kept 
 them as their key-stone, if evidence, afterwards 
 produced by themselves, had not destroyed their 
 air-built foundation, and their visionary superstruc- 
 ture ; if they had not been made to confess, that 
 such a course of reasoning was liable to fallacy ; and 
 that the proof of it was discoverable in their own 
 conclusions. 
 
 The injunctions of secrecy from Tippoo Sultaun, 
 and the expressions of incorruptible fidelity on the 
 part of the Ambassadors, which these letters dis- 
 close, it is at length felt and acknowledged, might 
 have another possible relation than to the devoted
 
 29 
 
 Sovereign, to whom they were at first applied. 
 The ultimate report of the Persian Translator- sets 
 this matter clear as light * 
 
 " From Ally Rhezza Khaun's evidence, however, it ap. 
 " pears, that their promises of inviolable secrecy, (mentioned 
 " in the letters Nos. 2 and 3.) referred to the key of the 
 " figured cypher, .which Tippoo Sultaun sent to his Vakeels, 
 " for the purpose of communicating secret intelligence; and 
 " the affair you know of, to a marriage projected between the 
 " families of the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun; and not to the 
 " supposed political negotiations between the Nabob and the 
 " Sultaun." 
 
 And, considering another paper at the same time, 
 on which it will be necessary to observe hereafter, 
 he concludes 
 
 " And therefore the inference deduced in the report, from 
 " the documents above mentioned, must be considered as er- 
 " roneous." 
 
 How easy is it to imagine, that a mind, anxious 
 for the establishment, and interested in the event of 
 a fact, may fall into a way of thinking, conducive 
 to the conclusion of it ! If this, of itself, should 
 make one pause, ere we afford an ear to such 
 sort of reasoning; how much more should we 
 hesitate, when we have detected, and when we arc 
 at every instant detecting, false inferences from spe- 
 cious and delusive data ? I ask not a total disbelief 
 of every deduction, which the Indian Logicians 
 shall come to j but, that you will be slow to receive 
 them, seeing, not only how erroneous, and how un- 
 charitable their course of reasoning has been, but 
 
 * Page 47, of the papers before the House of Commons of 
 1803.
 
 50 
 
 how inconclusive in its nature, such a species of ar- 
 gument always is. All other inference from what I 
 have now shown, I shall at present leave to others 
 to make, and proceed to the examination of the 
 fourth paper. 
 
 This is a letter also from the Ambassadors, un- 
 der date the 4th of August 1792; and refers, as 
 the first number, to a visit by the Nabob, and the 
 usual complimentary return. In this intercourse, 
 the Nabob, in an address to the hostage Princes, 
 takes an opportunity of pouring out a plentiful 
 draught of pious flattery, on the merits of the Sul- 
 taun, their father; and, in the same general way, 
 in which he had served up a like offering on the 
 preceding occasion. He is hailed by the Nabob, as 
 " the pillar of faith, the sole support of religion, the 
 " victorious and triumphant" and Heaven is invoked 
 to keep him so ! ! Whether this rhapsody made any 
 impression on the children, it may not be very 
 fitting to inquire ; on any other, it could never have 
 been imagined to have had the least effect: for 
 every one, of maturer judgment, must have known, 
 what sort of victory and triumph the Sultaun had at 
 that time to rejoice in and maintain, when they 
 adverted to the very unfortunate end, that had been 
 just put to a war, which he had waged against the 
 Company, and the Nabob; which had placed half 
 his territories, and (indelible disgrace !) his favorite 
 sons, in the hands of the British Government, for 
 the fulfilment of his capitulation. 
 
 His Highness, here also, as in the first visit, tells 
 a long story, about the share he had in bringing 
 about this desirable peace for the Sultaun ; and calls 
 on Major Dovcton to vouch for his friendly inter- 
 ference. Here also, as in all other visits to the 
 hostage Princes, it is to be observed, that a public 
 officer of the Company, well versed in the Persian 
 language (for on that account he was selected for 
 the office), is consrantfy present, and is advised of
 
 31 
 
 all the secret overtures, that are made on such suit- 
 able occasions. 
 
 Although at this mutuation of ceremonious calls, 
 between the Nabob and the Ambassadors, with their 
 charge, no one distinct proposal is made (as well 
 might be expected) ; yet the Persian Translator 
 (though he admits this by his silence) consumes 
 the space of three folio pages *, in endeavouring to 
 make out, from the general complimentary ex- 
 pressions, bandied about with much dexterity, from 
 one party to the other, that the Nabob, from re- 
 ligious motives, was laying the foundation for a con- 
 nection, hostile to the British Nation in India. 
 
 But let us see how far the foundation was advanced 
 at this date ? How far the Nabob had succeeded in 
 his devotional pursuit, which is supposed to have 
 been the object of his wishes by day, and of his 
 prayers by night? At this last meeting, which is at 
 a distance of nearly two months from the former, 
 the Nabob is said to have observed to the Ambas- 
 sadors : " In my first conversation with you, I 
 " spoke to you on the subject of establishing a 
 tf friendship and harmony, between me and Tippoo 
 <( Sultaun ; have you intimated it to him ? and have 
 <c you received a favorable answer r" Two months 
 are suffered to elapse, without any direct communi- 
 cation between these Eastern Pylades and Orestes ; 
 and, all the notice ultimately taken, of these more 
 than amicable advances, is casually and cursorily 
 exhibited by the party, who first felt the ardent sen- 
 timent, which he wi:,hed to be returned. A cold 
 visit of form is conceived to be the best place and 
 time of imparting the reciprocal passion, the 
 " mollia tempora fandi." And what do the bearers 
 of the Sultaun's response communicate ? 
 
 " We replied" (say they, in waiting to the Sultaun), "that 
 " we had set forth to your Majesty, word for word, the 
 
 * Vide pages 6, 7, and 8, of the first Report.
 
 32 
 
 " friendly sentiments his Highness had expressed, and that 
 " your Majesty had written, in reply, that friendship, union, 
 " and brotherly regard, had, from the beginning, been esta- 
 " blished among the professors of Llumism, as was evinced by 
 " the testimony of the Holy Book, agreeably to the prescrip- 
 " tions of which your Majesty wished that cordial friendship 
 " and attachment should, without prejudice, or partiality, be 
 " established between the followers of the faith, as the means 
 " of the supporting the religion of Mahommed. And that 
 " your Majesty had added, God preserve the Nabob Walla- 
 " jaw, who is a Prince, and one of the leaders of the faithful, 
 " and a pillar of faith." 
 
 At this cold ice-cold return to an ardent and 
 glowing declaration from the Nabob (which barely 
 states the shadow of a regard, and that not on per- 
 sonal grounds, but on the score of professing a com- 
 mon faith), the Nabob, like an old dotard, is repre- 
 sented to have melted into tears. 
 
 " At the term, a pillar of faith" (say they), " the Nabob 
 " could not suppress his tears, and said, ' I am, what I know 
 " myself to be. Tell the Sultaun he is the pillar of faith, and 
 " may God preserve him, and grant him a long life, &c. &c.' w 
 
 What the actual impression, which these scenes 
 and reports made upon the Sultaun, we may read 
 in his letter, which was thereupon written to the 
 Ambassadors, and which is the paper, No. 5. As 
 this speaks for itself, and describes particularly the 
 progress of this extraordinary "riendship at this time, 
 I shall give it at length. I am the more inclined to 
 do this, as it is not very long. 
 
 " I have received and understand the contents of your Arzee, 
 " intimating the distinguished kindness and regard, with which 
 " the Nabob Wallajaw treats my sons, and the sincere friend- 
 " ship which he entertains towards me. It is evident, that 
 " the Nabob is a pillar of the Mahoinmedan religion, the
 
 33 
 
 ** Elect -of the Almighty, a man of dignity and worldly expe- 
 ** rience. Whatever favour and attention he may show to- 
 " wards my sons, who are his guests, and you, I shall assuredly 
 ** consider as a kindness conferred upon myself. This clr- 
 " cumstance affords me much pleasure. 
 
 " My hopes from Almighty God, and his Divine Messenger, 
 " are, that the Nabob will do whatever may tend to the sup- 
 " port of the religion of Mahommed, and that he will give 
 " the necessary attention to the point. You will mention fo 
 " him, that he must consider my sons as his own, that, in con- 
 f< formity to the command of God and the Prophet, the im- 
 " provement of friendship amongst the professors of Islamism, 
 " will be beneficial to various concerns, both spiritual and 
 " temporal ; and that deeming me attached to our common 
 ** religion, and to his Highness's person, he will direct his 
 " attention accordingly. You will also state to the Nabob 
 " other points of friendship, which you have repeatedly heard, 
 " from my mouth." 
 
 Now, if these writings are indicative of the dis- 
 positions and acts of the parties, you have before 
 you something more than fanciful deductions from 
 their correspondence, made and adapted to the views 
 of the Eastern Governments: you have the plain 
 and undisguised sentiments of one of the parties him- 
 self. His thoughts are before you, as imagined at 
 the time, and drawn from an indisputable source, 
 his own records j and it could never have been pre- 
 supposed, that they would have been ushered into 
 light, for the purposes for which they are now 
 drawn forth. This most decidedly evidences, that 
 at this juncture, though many complimentary and 
 courteous expressions had been used, nothing in the 
 shape of a proposal had been understood by the 
 Ambassadors, and, in pursuance of such an under- 
 standing, had been forwarded to their Court; or, 
 if forwarded, that it had been declined or over- 
 looked.
 
 34 
 
 If you wish any further satisfaction, as to the 
 worth or extent of these friendly protestations, you 
 will obtain it, in profusion, from the secret exami- 
 nation, at the instance of the Supreme Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Alii Rhezza, one of the Ambassadors, being 
 asked* 
 
 " What were the expressions of friendship, which Tippoo 
 " Sultaun states you to have heard from his mouth ?" 
 
 Ans. " I never heard any expression of friendship from his 
 " mouth, and consider the expression to be nothing more than 
 " form." 
 
 " (The papers Nos. 1 and 2, are shown to him.") 
 
 Ques. " It is stated that the Nabob Wallajaw dissuaded 
 " Lord Cornwallis from the war. Did you hear the Nabob 
 " say so ?" 
 
 Ans. " The Nabob did address himself particularly to me, 
 " and did use those expressions." 
 
 Ques. " Did you believe the Nabob sincere in those expres- 
 " sions?" 
 
 Ans. " I did not. There was no sincerity on either part 
 " in those expressions." 
 
 Ques. " Although you do not believe any sincerity to have 
 " been intended, by the Nabob Wallajaw, in hi expression 
 " of friendship towards Tippoo Sultaun Do you give any 
 " credit to his professions of interference founded on his 
 " attachment to the religion of Mahommed ? " 
 
 Ans. " The whole is compliment, flow is it possible that 
 " the Nabob Wallajaw could forget the indignities sustained 
 " by his own family at the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, when 
 " Abouel Whaab Khaun was confined, and his daughter and 
 " grand-daughter taken into the Mahal ? And, if there were 
 " any sincerity in these expressions of friendship, why was not 
 
 * Vide page 105, and infra, of the first papers laid before 
 the House.
 
 35 
 
 " the chain preserved, after the departure of the Princes from 
 " Madras." 
 
 Ques. " Is the warmth of expression in this letter (No. 4.) 
 " consistent with the general forms of civility ?" 
 
 Ans. " In the western world, people are correct in ex- 
 *' pressing themselves; but the people in India exaggerate 
 "' extravagantly their expressions of regard. I regard the 
 " whole of the expressions on this letter (No. 4.) to be exag- 
 " gerated." 
 
 Ques.-r-" Did the Nabob Wallajaw absolutely make use of 
 " those expressions ?" 
 
 Ans. " It was customary for the Vakeels to heighten the 
 " expressions of regard which fell from Lord Cornwallis, or the 
 *' Nabob Wallajaw, or any other person, for the purpose of 
 " conciliating the mind of Tippoo Sultaun." 
 
 But to urge any thing further, on what is so ob- 
 vious, would be to affront the meanest understand- 
 ing. 
 
 I am now come to the consideration of No. 6, 
 which is stated to be the key to the cypher found y 
 among the records of Seringapatam j and it is to be 
 lamented, that, with the key, the cypher itself 
 which must have been in the possession of the Go- 
 vernment, had not also been produced; as the one 
 might have served to explain the other, and render 
 the meaning and purport of it not to be mistaken ; >\ 
 if the actual intent had been meant tp be ex- 
 plained. 
 
 The party, by whom this instrument was written^ / 
 is not clearly established. The Persian Translator 
 says, that there is a note, at the bottom of it, by 
 one of Tippoo's Moonshees, which indicates that it 
 was written by the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah. But 
 he could not be supposed to be acquainted with the 
 Nabob's writing ; and Alii Rhezza, says*, "That 
 
 , f Page 103, of the last-mentioned Papers. 
 F 2
 
 36 
 
 " the original was written in pencil by Khadlr 
 " Nawas Khan, or some person about the Nabob 
 Cf Wallajaw." By whomsoever it may have been 
 written, is not very material; it is produced to evince 
 a further progress towards a secret and treacherous 
 intercourse, between the Nabob Wallajaw and the 
 Sultaun. 
 
 Now before such an instrument as this could be 
 supposed to be effective, not only a good under- 
 standing should be manifested between the parties, 
 who were to use it; but the purposes, to which it was 
 meant to be applied, should have been mutually 
 sanctioned and agreed on. To frame such a paper, 
 in any other state of things, would be ridiculous in 
 the extreme. 
 
 1 have shown, that, at this interval, no one step 
 had been taken towards a correspondence. If any 
 other proof be wanting, it is afforded by the act of 
 the Sultaun himself, in respect to this very paper. 
 For, instead of taking a copy of it, and returning, 
 as had been desired, the original to the Nabob, the 
 Sultaun is described as putting it up sulkily into 
 his bureau, and not complying with the very first 
 request of this strongly-cemented friendship. Thus 
 the overture of a clandestine intercourse is met in 
 limine by the Sultaun. 
 
 Indeed, such was the exasperated state of the 
 mind of the Sultaun, at this period, against the Na- 
 bob and his advice, as I shall have occasion almost 
 instantly to remark, that the Ambassadors were 
 afraid of writing what they deemed necessary on the 
 subject; and yet, at this moment, the Indian 
 Governments would infer, there were such an union 
 of sentiment and design between the two Sovereigns, 
 that they had agreed on this instrument to signify 
 their mutual wishes and purposes. 
 
 Looking at the contents of this paper, it is dif- 
 ficult to perceive any thing which could imply an 
 hostile intent, or afford the means of hostile infor-
 
 57 
 
 mation. There is nothing expressive of aid, of 
 military implements, or preparations, of troops, of 
 arm-, or even any designation of numbers: in short, 
 there is not one material about it, which could render 
 it an operative instrument for the purposes alleged. 
 But then it is said to contain terms of reproach 
 against the Allies of the English, &c. as it describes 
 the one as "mean and despicable," and the other 
 as " nothing, or non-entity." But, does the instru- 
 ment, in the very nature of the thing, pretend to 
 express the real sentiments of the Nabob? Is it not 
 attempted, in all private signs, to designate things 
 under opposite and obscure allusions? It would be 
 to ascribe little less than fatuity to the frame rs of 
 the cypher, that they meant it themselves, and 
 wished it to be understood by others, in its primitive 
 sense, and literal signification. It any sentiment is 
 to be deduced from the terms of the paper, it is not 
 opprobious, but most complimentary to the Allies. 
 For it is to be presumed, that in such an estimation 
 were the powers, referred to in the cypher, held by 
 the framers of it, that they imagined the Nizam, or 
 the Marhattas, could never have been known under 
 the ostensible designation assigned to them. 
 
 The cypher, however, was -intended, as it is 
 argued, for private communication, and all commu- 
 nication, unless made known to the British Govern- 
 ment, must have been in violation of the Nabob's 
 treaties : and this proposition, with some modifications, 
 is true. The Nabob could not hold a correspond- 
 ence with Tippoo Sultaun, or any other Eastern 
 Power, for state purposes, or for entering into a close 
 political connection, without advising his Allies of 
 his intentions and designs; but I conceive it to be 
 equally arguable, that he could maintain, without a 
 breach of his engagement, a correspondence with a 
 friendly Power, as Tippoo at this time was, for 
 domestic purposes and views: and in whatever way 
 he might think proper to conduct it. 
 
 35484 r/
 
 . 38 
 
 Of the fitness of this cypher to carry on an inof- 
 fensive correspondence of this latter nature, or of 
 any other kind, I do not mean to decide. At this 
 late season, it might not have been very easy, per- 
 chance, to have dived into the meaning of the par- 
 ties, in framing such a device. But, we are freed 
 from the pains and hazard of conjecture, by the in- 
 formation afforded by the Eastern Governments 
 themselves, not only of the probable, but of the 
 actual use*, to which this instrument was applied. 
 For the terms of it, say they, have been resorted to 
 in the subsequent correspondence with the Court of 
 Tippoo, and between the latter Court and the 
 Nabob. I will give them credit for drawing from 
 the Escritoire of Tippoo every available document 
 to detect the perfidy of their hollow Ally ! And I will 
 satisfy you, Sir, that neither in one, nor all of the do- 
 cuments put together, which the Eastern Govern- 
 ments have thought proper to select from the papers 
 discovered at Seringapatam, is there any one saying, 
 or allusion, that can be tortured into the appearance 
 of an adverse meaning. 
 
 If you will observe the course of reasoning into 
 which the Persian Translator, and, after him, the 
 Governor General, falls in commenting on the paper 
 (No. 7), which I shall next consider, you will have 
 an additional instance of the fallibility of their re- 
 spective judgments. 
 
 This is a letter from one of the Ambassadors to 
 Tippoo Sultaun, announcing the departure of his 
 colleague, agreeably to the order of his Master j and 
 he tells the Sultaun, that he is charged with a pur- 
 pose of bringing to a favorable issue the propositions 
 of Lord Cornwallis and the well-wisher of mankind, 
 And he adds 
 
 * See page 8, of the Persian Interpreter's Report, in the 
 papers of 1803.
 
 S9 
 
 " There are many points that cannot be committed to paper, 
 " and can only be communicated in person." *And continues, 
 " The particulars of this summary, which is an unlooked-for 
 " good, will be made known by the verbal representations of 
 " Alii Rhezza." And lastly, " When youf Majesty shall 
 " have deliberated, and fully brought home to your mind, the 
 " representation of both the Sirdars, from a consideration of *>/ 
 " the changeableness of the times, your Majesty's agreeing to 
 " this affair, on the principle of the words of Hafiz' (which 
 are quoted), " seems highly expedient and advantageous to 
 " your Majesty's interests." 
 
 The first report of the Translator, after setting 
 forth several reasons for doubt arising out of the ex- 
 pressions of this letter, and which he states to be 
 confirmed by the copies of two letters from the Sul- 
 taun to the Nabob and his son (which will be subse- 
 quently referred to), concludes 
 
 ** That there can be but little doubt, that by ' both the Sir- 
 " dars' were meant Wallajah and Omdut ul Omrah, that ' the 
 " unlocked for good' was some proposition on their part, favour- 
 " able to Tippoo's views and interests; and probably of no 
 " slight importance, as Alii Rhezza is stated to have attended 
 " the presence, especially for that purpose. And the affair, 
 " which Golaum Alii Khaun so earnestly recommends to Tip- 
 " poo Sultaun's adoption, was the proposition, with which Alii 
 " Rhezza appears to be charged." 
 
 Let us briefly examine how well founded this fur- 
 ther deduction is, by adverting to the examination V 
 of Alii Rhezza, and the questions put to him by the 
 Examiners and his answers. 
 
 * (The Paper, No. 7, is produced). 
 
 Ques. " What are the points which could not be committed 
 " to paper, and could only be communicated in person?" 
 
 * Vide page 102, of the papers of 1301.
 
 40 
 
 Ans. " To recapitulate, according to Lord Cornuallis's direc- 
 " tions, the course of hostile transactions, which had taken' 
 " place from early times between the two states ; to insist on 
 " the detention of the prisoners by Tippoo Sultaun, and his 
 " cruelty towards them ; to inculcate the necessity of a reform 
 *' in his sentiments towards the British nation ; and to lay the 
 " foundation of permanent friendship to be further confirmed 
 " in Europe. These propositions of Lord Comwallis were con- 
 " firmed by the advice of the Nabob IVullajaw, founded on his 
 " long experience and age." 
 
 Ques. " What Sirdars are meant in the passage, ' at this 
 " time the friendship and good-will of both Sirdars is from 
 " God and the Royal Auspices.' ' ; 
 
 Ans. " Lord Comwallis and the Nabob Wallajaiv." 
 
 Ques. " Why could not these points be committed to wril- 
 " ing at Madras, since they were committed to writing after your 
 " arrival at Seringapatam ?" 
 
 Ans. " The time for paying the Kists were past, and the 
 " prisoners were still detained : it was with the intention 
 " therefore of using my personal influence with the Sultaun in 
 " these points, since all writing had proved vain. M 
 
 This passage, from the examination, does not 
 only overturn the insinuation of the Persian Trans- 
 lator, but tends, in an irresistible manner, to demon- 
 strate the minds and actings of the parties at the 
 interval. It clearly establishes that the Nabob's 
 propositions always accompanied, nay indeed were 
 identified with those of the English ; and that the 
 sentiments of the Sultaun, and his behaviour, were 
 not only dissonant, but directly opposite to any 
 amicable overture, or project; that all the writing 
 of his Ambassador had been vain; and that the last 
 means of enforcing a show, even, of friendly attention, 
 had been resorted to, which eventually did not suc- 
 ceed. 
 
 The Persian Translator here again, as in former
 
 41 
 
 instances, is reduced to his recantation ; which fol- 
 lows 
 
 " The ambiguous terms of the paper (No. 7), afforded great 
 " reason to believe, that when AJli Rhezza Kha'un returned to 
 " Serhtgapafam, he was charged with some specific negotia- 
 " tioii between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun. By a paper, 
 " however, which was discovered after the date of the report 
 " of the Persian Translator, it appeared, that he had repaired 
 " thither at the instance of Marquis Corniuallis; and that the 
 " contents of the paper (No. 7), referred to what he had to 
 " communicate on the part of his Lordship and the Nabob 
 " jointly : this is fully confirmed by Alii Rhezza's evidence ; 
 " and therefore the inference deduced in the report from the 
 " document above-mentioned must be considered as erro- 
 
 Having pointed out how the pretended inferences, 
 at first relied on by the Indian Governments as 
 proofs of Holy Writ, melt away one by one, when 
 they come to be seriously considered, I shall go to 
 the next link of documentary evidence, which are 
 the papers Nos. 8 and 9. 
 
 These are copies or translations of letters written 
 in the month of November 1792, from the Sultaun 
 to the Nabobs Wallajaw and Omdut ul Omrah. In 
 these, as in the Nabob's conversations, are discern- 
 ible many general and loose declarations of friend- 
 ship j but not one expression of a direct object, 
 either in resolve or meditation. 
 
 The Reporter upon these papers, in his first 
 jealousy, had conceived that there was some- 
 thing decidedly demonstrative in them of a clandes- 
 tine purport; and that they went to disclose a con- 
 cert between the Nabob and the Sultaun, in an un- 
 authorized matter. I shall only take a passage or 
 two from these ceremonious greetings: the same 
 
 G
 
 42 
 
 which the Reporter has selected and comment- 
 ed on. 
 
 In the letter to the Nabob Wallajaw, Tippoo 
 Sultaun writes : 
 
 " My hopes from Almighty C^od, and my confidence in the 
 " Prophet is, that, according to the command of God and the 
 " Prophet, which is well known to all Mussulmen, all the 
 " faithful will exert themselves with heart and soul in main- 
 " taining and rendering permanent the religion of Mahommed. 
 " I'pon your Highness, who is one of the heads of the faith, 
 " this is an absolute duty ; and I am confident, that your 
 " Highness will, by all means, constantly employ your time in 
 " performing what is obligatory on you." 
 
 And in his letter to Omdut ul Omrah 
 
 " I am confident that you will direct your attention to the 
 " adjustment of aflairs between me and the ivcll-ivis/icr of Man- 
 " kind, who is the chief and principal of the professors of 
 " Islamism." 
 
 From these the Reporter (the Persian Translator) 
 argues : 
 
 " These documents are of particular importance, not only as 
 " they tend to establish the existence of a reciprocity of views, 
 " between the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, but as carrying, 
 " upon the face of them, almost positive proof of a secret inlet - 
 " course between those Princes; and also as they throw con- 
 " siderable light upon another document, which is otherwise 
 " very mysterious and obscure." 
 
 The other document, mentioned in the preceding 
 sentence, is the letter, No. 7, last considered j and 1 
 have shown how mysterious and obscure that docu- 
 ment was, on the after-allowance of the Commenta- 
 for himself. As these papers were meant to be
 
 43 
 
 considered as elucidative one of the other, having de- 
 monstrated not only the harmless tendency of the one, 
 but its meritorious objects, I have entitled the other, 
 as of course, to a like consideration and character. 
 
 What then is the reciprocity of views of the two 
 Princes at this date ? the observance of an outward 
 demeanour, of an amicable construction towards 
 each other, which the Ambassador Alii Rhezza went 
 to Seringapatam, at the desire of Lord Cornwallis 
 and the Nabob, for the purpose of cultivating. 
 
 And thus, this almost positive proof of a secret in- 
 tercourse slips, like many preceding ones, from ihe 
 hand that eagerly grasped it. 
 
 The correspondence which I have had occasion to 
 notice is the only epistolary communication, which 
 took place between the two Courts, for the first seven 
 months after the arrival of the Ambassadors at Ma- 
 dras. The next, which I shall observe on, relates to 
 circumstances subsequent to the 14th of January 
 1794 j which is No. 1O of the exhibits annexed to 
 the declaration : arid as this, as well as No. 12, con- 
 tains fresh matter of suspicion, and affords a new 
 subject of declamation, I shall take a view of them 
 together j because what I have to say on the one 
 will be applicable also to the other. [The interme- 
 diate No. 1 1, giving a short account of an exhibition 
 of fireworks, by the command of the Nabob, for the 
 amusement of the hostage Princes, seems of too 
 triHing a nature to take into the series of investiga- 
 ted papers.] 
 
 The documents in question are letters from the 
 Ambassadors to Tippoo Sultaun, between the dates 
 of the 14th of January and the 5th of June, 1793, N/ 
 stating the substance of the alleged verbal commu- 
 nications made to them by Khadir Nev*az Khaun, a 
 Messenger of the Nabob Wallajaw. The purport, 
 nay, the very words of the first communication, as 
 stated by the Vakeels, are these : 
 
 G 2
 
 44 
 
 " I have always kept stationed at Bengal several persons of 
 " the higher class, for the purpose of collecting and transmit- 
 " ting secret intelligence daily. In the paper of intelligence, 
 '' which cameona date answering to the 10th of December 1792, 
 " it is stated, that Sir C. Mallet, the English resident at Poonah, 
 " has written to Lord Cornwallis, that numerous messengers 
 " from the Khoodadad Sircar daily pass to and fro' between 
 " Seringapatam and Poonah ; whence it would seem, that Tip- 
 " poo Sultaun was endeavouring to form a close connection 
 " and affiance with the Poonah Government, and through that 
 " Government with the Mogul Nizam Alii Khaun, and that 
 " deeming this information of importance, he had written it to 
 " his Lordship. The Members of Council in Bengal, on hear- 
 " ing this, are said to have staled their opinion to his Lordship, 
 " thatTippoo Sultaun was infringing the settlement, which had 
 " taken place between him and his Lordship, and was entertain- 
 " ing views of a similar nature; that, for example, the Sultaun 
 *' withheld paymentof the Kists as prescribed in the treaty, and 
 " refused tp release the European and other prisoners, subjects 
 " of the Company ; that this sort of discourse had excited some 
 " degree of suspicion, nay even of alarm, inhis Lordship's mind. 
 " Such is the present state of affairs What, in the judgment 
 " of this well-wisher, now appears expedient, is this : in a short 
 " time his Lordship will go to Europe; the Princes, please 
 " God, will soon return ; and the Kists are in a course of pay- 
 " ment. After his Lordship's departure, the liquidation of the 
 " Kistsand other points, whatever may be his Highness's, Tip- 
 " poo's, pleasure, will be right and proper : at present it is bet- 
 " ter to be silent upon every thing; because, at this time, h,is 
 " Highness's honor would, at all events, be called in question. 
 " When another shall arrive from Europe, the imputation will 
 " in every respect and measure fall on him." 
 
 The second communication from the same party 
 is said to be in these terms : 
 
 " At this time a complete rupture has taken place between 
 the English and French. The story of the King of the French,
 
 45 
 
 " and their domestic commotions, are well known. Six or seven 
 
 " European Powers have united for the destruction of the 
 
 " French, and you will soon hear, that the whole of the French 
 
 " territory has been divided amongst others. The English 
 
 " troops, at Madras, will proceed in a day or two against Pon- 
 
 *' dicherry. Although there is a body of troops in that place, 
 
 " yet domestic dissensions have arisen to the utmost pitch 
 
 *' there, and nothing will be done ; and the place wiJJ at Jengfh 
 
 '* be taken. My object in mentioning this event is this. The 
 
 " Vakeel of the Ahmedy Sircar, who was at Pondicherry, has 
 
 '' lately, it seems, returned to the presence (Tippoo Sultaun's). 
 
 " Please God, there is no doubt, that the Sultaun keeps in 
 
 " view all the ups and downs of the time. At this time no 
 
 " kind of assistance will be afforded ; but out of that friendship 
 
 " which I feel for the Sultaun, I recommend that the Vakeel 
 
 " remain a short time at the presence, and also that epistolary 
 
 " correspondence be discontinued for a short time. Although 
 
 " a friendly connection has long subsisted with the French on 
 
 " the part of the Ahmedy Sircar, yet, considering the circum- 
 
 " stance and the times, it is not advisable ; should there be 
 
 " any point of urgency to communicate, there is no objection 
 
 " to do it verbally. For God's sake let not the Sultaun ascribe 
 
 " what I say to a wrong motive ; I am actuated solely by my 
 
 " good wishes in making this communication. Since the day 
 
 " that a cordial union took place between us, let me be no lon- 
 
 " ger a Mussulman, nor a Servant of God, if I have not always 
 
 " offered my prayers for the Sultaun's goodj and afterwards 
 
 " for my own. May the Almighty preserve firm and unin- 
 
 " jured the Mahommedan Church, and the safety of the Sul- 
 
 " taun." 
 
 The Persian Translator, having made many la- 
 bored observations on these communications, which 
 were afterwards avowed in the declaration of Govern- 
 ment, comes to this ultimate conclusion 
 
 " Considering this transaction in the most favorable point of 
 (l view, it is still a confirmation of the close connection sup-
 
 A 
 
 46 
 
 " posed to have been previously established between his 
 " Highness and Tippoo Sultaun, and a direct breach of the 
 " 10th Article of the Treaty of 1792, between his Highness 
 " and the Company." And afterwards more direct, " That 
 " the Nabob Wallajaw, by certain overt acts," (meaning the 
 communications in question,) " founded upon his recent con- 
 " nect'-uii with Tippoo Sultaun, manifested a participation of 
 \ "S and designs with that Prince, hostile to the British 
 " Interests in India." 
 
 Now let us endeavour to ascertain how fairly this 
 further conclusion is raised on its alleged premises ? 
 
 I shall barely mention here, that these communi- 
 cations are liable to every doubt, which I have stated 
 against former papers, and to several additional 
 suspicions. They are to be taken on the account of 
 the Ambassadors, which they, themselves, have 
 stated not to be correct. They are founded on the 
 sentiments of another, delivered by a third party, who, 
 like the Ambassadors, might have given them a 
 latitude not authorized. And those sentiments, when 
 delivered by the Ambassadors, are dressed in an 
 V English garb by the Persian Translator, the Reporter 
 and Commentator on their import. 
 
 But taking these communications, as they rtand, 
 and as unquestionable in their nature What do they 
 speak ? Is there any thing in the whole like a breach 
 of moral obligation, or of political compact ? Is there 
 any thing of an injurious tendency to the British in- 
 terests, or power? It will be remembered, that at 
 the time when these communications were made, the 
 British Government and the Sultaun were on terms 
 of amity and friendship : so that there was nothing 
 arising out of the condition of the parties, which 
 should render the imparting of the intelligence be- 
 tween them, an act of hostility: if such intelligence 
 had not a tendency to injure the interests of the 
 Company with an aspect either to Tippoo Sultaun, 
 or to the Nabob of the Carnaric.
 
 47 
 
 But, says the Reporter, it was a clandestine corre- . 
 spondence, and contrary to the letter of the treaty of v 
 1792, which states, that the Nabob shall not enter 
 into any negociation, or political correspondence,^ 
 with an European or Native Power, without the 
 consent of the Company. Now by what sort of con- 
 struction, can the matter communicated be sup- 
 posed to be conducive to a negotiation, or a corre- 
 spondence leading to one, which is in the contem- 
 plation of the Treaty? Jt is plain, that the negociation 
 meant and adverted to in the Treaty, and the corre- 
 spondence as subservient to it, was a negociation for 
 some new relation or alliance, which the Nabob v/ 
 might afterwards be desirous of forming with some 
 foreign Court. It could never, in common sense, 
 be understood, that any loose message or conver- 
 sation with the Ambassadors of a then friendly power 
 with himself and the Company, should be construed 
 into a violation either of the spirit or letter of the 
 engagement. 
 
 If the actual letter of the Treaty be not broken by 
 the communication in question j yet, the advice it 
 inculcated is, as the Reporter argues, irrefragably 
 demonstrative of the hostile spirit of the Nabob, 
 against the Company's interest in India. Now 
 nothing, in my idea, can be more clear, than the 
 Nabob's motive throughout, both in the extent of 
 the information given, and in the end to which it 
 was offered. Nothing, I am persuaded, could be 
 more pure than the intention, and the effect. The 
 scope of the Nabob's endeavour is to keep the 
 Sultaun in a state of peace with the British Couit, \j 
 and its Allies. This is every where observable, and 
 his motive will be as patent as his act, if you will 
 advert, but for an instant, to his situation. 
 
 In the event of a war, by the stipulations of the 
 treaty of 1792, the Nabob would have been stripped 
 of all control, civil and military, in his dominions ; 
 and the whole of the Carnatic, as in the late war,
 
 48 
 
 would have reverted to the hands of the Company. 
 His countries, at the conclusion of the peace, had 
 again been delivered over to him, and it cannot be 
 ^ considered as very wonderful, that he should be 
 anxious for retaining them. This could in no other 
 way be atchieved, but by conciliating the Powers, 
 which were likely to fall into hostilities with the 
 British, or their Allies. The attempt therefore to 
 lead the Sultaun from #11 acts, which should endanger 
 the tranquillity of the times, is not only natural, but 
 praise-worthy. 
 
 Now, what is the intelligence, which the Nabob 
 is said to have given, and the advice as conformable 
 to it? The whole tenor of the intelligence is 
 
 " That the Sultaun had been supposed, by the Supreme 
 " Government of Bengal, to have held too frequent a commu- 
 " nication with the Court of the Peishwa ; and from the 
 " repeated messengers who were passing between Seringapa- 
 " tarn and Poonah, it was imagined, that the Sultaun was eri- 
 " deavouring to form a close conneciion and affiance with the 
 " latter Government; that from this circumstance, and from 
 " Tippoo's failure in the regular payment of the Kists, and 
 " from his detention of the English prisoners, Lord Cornwallis 
 " was inclined to think, that the Sultaun was intent on in- 
 " fringing the settlement, which he ha'd recently made with 
 " his Lordship." 
 
 What is there in the complection of this intelli- 
 gence, that should give the least offence to the Bri- 
 tish Government? What is there in it, that had not 
 in effect been urged to the Sultaun himself, at the in- 
 stance of Lord Cornwallis ? Did not his Lordship and the 
 Nabob jointly, as we have before explained, require 
 that Alii Rhezza should recapitulate to Tippoo Sultaun 
 the course of hostile transactions between him and the 
 Confederate States? That he should carry a remon- 
 strance to him, on his detention of the English pri-
 
 49 
 
 soners ; and that he should insist on the necessity of 
 a reform in his sentiments? Is the Gist of the Na- 
 bob's intelligence, in any way, distinct from this ? 
 It is a mere repetition of this well-meant comrnuni- ' 
 cation, and offered with the same intent. It tells the 
 Sultaun, that his actions, which are enumerated, 
 had given offence to the principal of the Allies; that, 
 if he thought they were concealed, he was indulging 
 a wrong speculation; and that, if he persisted in the 
 course of them, a rupture must inevitably be the 
 consequence. Is the Nabob's advice in contradic- 
 tion to the motive, as explained, which furnished 
 the substance of the intelligence? Is it not of a most 
 pacific, amicable tendency ? Is it not, if complied 
 with, of a nature most directly conducive to the 
 maintenance of peace between the three Powers. He 
 recommends, in the supposed communication, not 
 that the Sultaun should break his engagements, bur, 
 * e that he should go on in the payment of his Kists;" 
 and, when they had been fulfilled, and he had, in 
 consequence, received back his Sons (the hostage 
 Princes), that then, if he were so inclined, he might 
 think of measures, which it- was suspected, at the 
 time, that he had in intention; that to infringe the 
 settlement just made with Lord Cornwallis, and 
 while he was in the country, would be in his (the 
 Nabob's judgment) in the highest degree dishonour- 
 able, and disreputable to his character in the esti- 
 mation of the Eastern Courts. 
 
 What is the indisputable effect of this advice? 
 That, after payment of the Kists and the receipt of 
 his Sons, the objects which instantly exasperated the 
 Sultaun's mind, and rendered it hostile to the British, 
 would be removed ; that he would have no ground, 
 nor interest in going to war. 
 
 The last question is, what prejudice could this 
 advice, if it were accepted and acted on, effect 
 to the Company ? Let us see the severe injury which 
 would befal them, if Tippoo, unfortunately, should
 
 50 
 
 be induced to listen to the wicked council of the 
 Nabob ? Their Treasury would be enriched from the 
 circumstance, with almost half the specie of Tippoo's 
 country as the Kists were stipulated in so much 
 hard money and in proportion as the payment should 
 appear to impoverish the Sultaun's resources, it 
 would, in the same degree, have the effect of en- 
 riching and extending those of his most powerful 
 rival. So that, in each aspect of the supposed effect 
 of the advice, it would have a beneficial operation 
 to the Company. Besides removing the objects of 
 contention, it would super-induce the Joss of 
 means ; and, with it, the consequent power of me- 
 ditated hostility. The thing is too palpable to be 
 further insisted on ; so I shall pass to the consi- 
 deration of the tendency, of the second communi- 
 cation. 
 
 What is the hostile bent of the intelligence im- 
 parted here ? 
 
 " That hostilities were about to commence between the 
 " English and the French ; that six or seven European 
 " Nations were about to make common head against the 
 " latter ; and that the probable result would be the disnicm- 
 " berment of France; that the English, in a clay or two, 
 " were about to march against Pondichrrry ; and that the 
 " place would undoubtedly be taken." And advice is there- 
 upon given : " That Tippoo should use every possible prc- 
 " caution, in any communication which he might hold with 
 " the French Government in India, which might involve him 
 " in a quarrel with the English." 
 
 At this period, as at the former, the Sultaun was 
 in friendship with the English, and their allies ; and, 
 it is plain, the Nabob wished that such a relation 
 should be maintained, from the tenor of what he has 
 recommended. In giving this intelligence, he .is not 
 charged with any difect breach of confidence re-
 
 posed in him ; so that he must be taken to have 
 communicated what he did, on the credit of general 
 report. And, in truth, he could be relating no very 
 great news to the Ambassadors; as the Court of 
 Tippoo, at this season, kept up, as theretofore, an 
 open correspondence with the French at Pondi- 
 cherry. 
 
 But the matter of the advice, coupled with the 
 intelligence given at the time, is stated to have been 
 of an offensive character. And how? Does the Nabob 
 represent to the Sultaun, that the season was advan- 
 tageous for leaguing with the enemies of Britain ? 
 Does he flatter the cause, or dissemble the state of 
 the Power, which was about to commence hostilities ? 
 Does he persuade the Sultaun, to enter into a 
 compact with the enemy ? On the contrary, does 
 not he make use of every argument, to detach 
 the Sultaun from such a connection ? Does not he 
 show the despair of any fruit from it ? and does he 
 not in every word recommend, that the Sultaun 
 should so conduct himself, as to give no umbrage 
 to the English ? 
 
 To object to the Nabob, on this account, is to 
 object to the situation of things, which it would 
 seem the aim and interest of the British at that time 
 to have produced. Was it the desire of the Eastern 
 Governments, that the Nabob should preach hosti- 
 lities and war ? If so, the Nabob's advice must not 
 only have been inopportune, but prejudicial. 
 Whilst, however, it shall be thought improvident to 
 stir up a second power against you, whom you 
 might expect to be your enemy, until you shall have 
 subdued the first, actually in armsj I cannot but 
 consider the tendency of the Nabob's advice, as 
 most friendly and most politic. 
 
 But what need I say more in favor of it, than by 
 stating, that although the Governments of India 
 thought proper to reprobate the measure afterwards, 
 
 H 2
 
 52 
 
 they adopted and sanctioned it, by their own conduct, 
 at the time. For Alii Rhezza distinctly says* 
 
 " That at the time of the equipment against Pond i cherry, 
 " Sir Charles Oakely acquainted the Vakeels, in a private 
 " nutnncr, that. Pondicherry would certainly fall into the hands 
 " of the English ; and if Tip poo should ofler the French as- 
 " sistancc, it would be certainly attended with injurious con- 
 " sequences to him." 
 
 This is not the only instance, as I have shown, 
 where the Eastern Governments have reproached 
 the acts of the Nabob, when they have been 
 prompted by their councils, or sanctioned by their 
 conduct. The mind is tired in pursuing at any 
 length such detailed deceptions, such childish com- 
 plainings. 
 
 To proceed to the 1 3th and 14th numbers of the 
 papers, which appear to be two letters, from the 
 Ambassadors to their master, written on the 23d 
 of July 1793, and a subsequent day j and which are 
 rilled with materials of a like description with the 
 last. These give an account of two private meet- 
 ings between the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and the 
 Vakeels of Tippoo ; the one at the suggestion of 
 Khadir Newaz Khaun, on the behalf of his Highness, 
 and the other at the instance of the Vakeels. 
 
 At the first meeting, his Highness, Omdut ul 
 Omrah, leads the Ambassadors into the interior of 
 a Mosque, under the pretence of a religious cere-r 
 monys and there he is said to have asked the Va- 
 keels 
 
 " Whether they had full power from the Sultaun, or were 
 " under the necessity of making reference to their Court." 
 "When they are stated to reply, " That they had been a year 
 
 1 Page 108, of the Examination, in the papers of 1802.
 
 53 
 
 " or more in attendance there, during which period many points 
 " of business had been negotiated, and continued to be nego- 
 " dated by them, that the question appeared extraordinary." 
 
 Extraordinary indeed, it must appear to the most 
 common understanding, when connected with the 
 appearance of facts, and the necessary conclusions 
 from them, which the Governments of India have 
 been industrious and anxious to make out ! They, 
 it is well known, have exhausted all their rhetoric 
 to persuade the world, that, for a year antecedent, 
 a private connection had been founded between the 
 Nabob and the Sultaun, through the instrumentality 
 of the Vakeels, and had been cemented by numerous 
 subsequent professions and acts : and now, at more ' 
 than twelve months from the time, when the com^ 
 pact is supposed to have been sealed and consum- 
 mated, we find one of the subscribing parties to it 
 is asking the other for the production of his ere- 
 dentialsl And when the latter has taken pains to 
 convince the Inquirer, that he has the requisite au- 
 thority ; that the whole terminates in a few general 
 expressions of regard and friendship j and without 
 one overture of a specific nature or tendency ! If 
 reference be had to the account of the first meeting, 
 as it is related in the letter of the 23d of July, it 
 will be seen, that it contains not any one sentiment, 
 but what had been again and again uttered, and al- 
 ternated by the Nabob Mahommed Ally, at the 
 former interviews with the Vakeels. 
 
 Now for the second private meeting, which is the 
 subject of the communication in the paper No. 14, 
 that had been solicited by the Ambassadors, on 
 the eve of their departure from Madras. And what 
 is stated to have passed at it, more than the inter- 
 change (a very current coin, but of no great value) 
 of mutual protestations of regard ? But it is added, 
 that the Nabob, Omdut ul Omrah, " had then made
 
 54 
 
 use of some particular expressions of his attachment - t 
 requiring the Vakeels, upon oath, not to commit 
 them to writing, but to defer the communication of 
 them, until their return to the Sultaun." 
 
 The Persian Translator, in rendering the passage 
 into English, has followed the custom of the Va- 
 keels, and given a glow and colouring to the ex- 
 pressions, which intrinsically they will not bear. 
 For in his translation, hfe has made the Nabob re- 
 quire the oath of the Vakeels, to the secrecy of his 
 communication, whereas Alii Rhezza, in his exa- 
 mination*, has expressly said, that in this passage 
 the Nabob had merely conjured them, not on oath, 
 but by personal solicitation, to keep his council. 
 But to what did all this coquetry and solemn foolery 
 tend ? They who are acquainted with the means and 
 arts of Eastern diplomacy, will not be at a loss -to 
 assign an answer. The result, the only result of 
 them, was a manifestation of a general friendly dis- 
 position on the part of Omdut ul Omrah, served 
 up with sauce so piquant by the proper cooks, as to 
 be extremely gratifying to the sense of the Sultauo, 
 their master. And in his next letter, which is No. 
 15, of the written documents; the Sultaun, pleased 
 with the promise of these conferences, a few frothy 
 overflowings of the grace-cap, evinces his anxiety to 
 be informed of every attendant particular. 
 
 Here is another proof (if it were wanted) in the 
 anxiety of the Sultaun to be advised of different ex- 
 pressions of regard from the Nabob Omdut ul Om- 
 rah, that no pre-existing engagement had taken 
 place for mutual convenience j for if such had been 
 concerted, within the twelve months of the Vakeel's 
 previous residence, what reason is there now on the 
 6th of August, 1793, for the Sultaun's catching at a 
 itray and accidental compliment ? But the innocence 
 
 * Page <J7 of the first Papers.
 
 55 
 
 of the conference, which I have just noticed, is so 
 well and so fully established by the testimony of Alii 
 Rhezza, in the course of his examination, that it 
 would seem unnecessary to add another observation 
 on it. 
 
 I am led, in the pursuance of my arrangement, to 
 the consideration of the document, No. ] 6, which pur- 
 ports to be a translation of a letter from the Vakeels 
 to the Sukaun, under date 31st of August 1793. 
 Before I go into any examination of the contents of 
 this paper, I shall beg leave to offer one preliminary 
 observation. It is evident, from the last letter of the 
 Sultaun, that he was solicitous to be informed of the 
 particulars of the conversations, which took place at 
 the alleged preceding meetings j but of so little 
 consequence, it appears, did the Ambassadors re- 
 gard the import of them, that in their next letter, 
 nor in any other subsequent one, do they take the 
 least notice, or make the most distant allusion 
 to it. 
 
 The document, No. 16, gives an account of some 
 transactions which took place at a Mosque in Tri- 
 plicane, near the residence of the Nabob ; and much 
 is inferred from these transactions against the fidelity 
 of his Highness j and of his co-operation with the 
 Sultaun from notions of a common religion. The 
 transactions alluded to are the promulgation and dis- 
 cussion in the Mosque of certain doctrinal points of 
 the Mahommedan faith, which would seem to re- 
 commend a never-ceasing warfare against the pro- 
 fessors of all religion, but that of Islamism, and the 
 enjoining and administering an oath, in the face of 
 the congregation, of fidelity to the faith, and the 
 cause of the Sultaun. 
 
 In these acts the Persian Translator, and the In- 
 dian Governments proceeding on his credit, would 
 make the Nabob, or, at least, his son, Omdut ul 
 Omrah, a party. The Translator broadly states, in
 
 56 
 
 one place*, the fact of the -presence of Omdut ul 
 Omrah at the ceremony, and takes occasion to deal 
 out a few invectives against him on that account. 
 But in a posterior report, he is obliged to gainsay all 
 that he had said, and he does the Nabob Wallajaw, 
 or Mahommed Ally, another slow and unwilling act 
 of justice, in supposing that he might have been 
 wholly unacquainted with the progress of the affair. 
 
 Without showing the privacy of the Nabob Ma- 
 hommed Ally in the acts of the Ambassadors, the 
 Indian Governments well knew, that they could 
 prove nothing from the transaction, as prejudicial to 
 the character of the Nabob j and they have endea- 
 voured, by the close examination of the Ambassador, 
 who promoted and urged the points of doctrine and 
 administered the oath, to explain all particulars relat- 
 ing to the circumstance, either in reference to the 
 Nabob, or his people ; and he has unequivocally 
 said, in the most clear and satisfactory manner, that 
 his discourse was principally directed to the suite 
 and followers of the embassy, and the oath strictly 
 confined to them. He admits, that the act was not 
 defensible in an Ambassador residing at a friendly 
 court ; but he excuses himself by saying, that he was 
 enjoined it by his master, whose, will was to him a 
 law. 
 
 Though the act, which is here complained of, 
 does not serve to evidence any criminal purpose in the 
 Nabob Mahommed Ally, which it was offered with the 
 view of demonstrating, it has a most direct tendency 
 to establish the contrary position the non-existence 
 at the date (the end of August 1793) of any league 
 between the Nabob and the Sultaun, which had been 
 promoted, as it is said, by religious views ; and 
 which had been argued again and again by the 
 
 * See p. JO, of the 1st vol. of papers of 1803, and infra, p. 4-8 
 of the same volume.
 
 i. 57 
 
 Eastern Governments, as having been concluded for 
 more than fourteen months antecedently. If such a ^y 
 league had been formed between the Sovereigns, it 
 would have been the height of absurdity to suppose 
 that it would be necessary for the Ambassador of 
 Tippoo to attempt, as he is stated to have attempted, 
 to prevail either on the consciences, or the minds, of 
 the subjects of the Nabob, by the publication of 
 the doctrine in question. And here is another in- / 
 stance, that in aiming to prove too much, the Indian 
 Governments have not only proved nothing, but 
 have demonstrated that which defeats every possible 
 inference, that they were apparently so anxious to 
 draw. 
 
 The next Paper which presents itself is the docu- 
 ment No. 17, and this is a letter said to have been 
 written, in pencil, by the Nabob, in August 1794, 
 and subscribed with the assumed signature of Gholaum 
 Hussein. It is addressed to Gholaum Alii Khan, one 
 of the Ambassadors, after his return to Seringapa- 
 tam. This is a short letter, with congratulations on 
 the marriage of some of the Princes of Mysore j 
 and announcing an intention, on the part of the Na- 
 bob Wallajaw, to send the customary presents on the 
 occasion; with a general compliment to the Sultaun, 
 which Gholaum Alii Khan is requested to take a 
 seasonable opportunity of delivering. I shall add a 
 word more to this, when I am adverting hereafter 
 to a further letter written to the same person, and 
 under the same assumed designation. 
 
 Of the Nos. 18 and 19, which are translations of 
 two several letters from Mahommed Ghyauss and 
 Mahommed Ghose Khan, on the 7th of December 
 1795, and of an ulterior date, I shall have occasion 
 only to take a slight notice i as the effect attempted 
 to be operated by the production of this corre- 
 spondence, is avowedly defeated and given up by 
 those who were commissioned to urge it ; namely,
 
 58 
 
 by the Persian Translator and the Examiners at 
 Vellore. 
 
 These letters were intended as proofs of a con- 
 tinued adverse intercourse between the Nabob Om- 
 dut ul Omrah and the Sultaun, after the decease of 
 the Nabob Mahommed Ally ; and consequently, af- 
 ter the succession of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah to 
 the Musnud of the Carnatic. They contain accounts 
 of the progress of the Embassy sent to Madras, for 
 the purpose of condolence with the Nabob on the 
 death of his father, and of the treatment and recep- 
 tion of the Ambassadors who are writing the ac- 
 count. 
 
 From these writings,' and the constructions which 
 are alleged, to arise out of the face of them, the conti- 
 nuance of a supposed secret hostile understanding 
 between the two Courts, as all along inferred by the 
 Eastern Governments, is meant to be argued; and 
 therefore, these papers were, at first, placed in the 
 series of documents annexed to the declaration. 
 Why they continue to hold a place there, I shall 
 leave for others to conclude. That all unfair deduc- 
 tion from them has long been given up, we have 
 only to refer to the report of the Examiners, Mr, 
 Webbe and Col. Close *, which says 
 
 " We have been unable to examine Mahommed Ghyauss 
 " and Mahommed Ghose Khan, according to your Lordship's 
 " instructions, the former having returned toCuddapah, and the 
 " residence of the latter being unknown. We are satisfied, how- 
 " ever, from the concurrent testimony of Gholan Ally,MeerSud- 
 " door, theDewanPurniah, and Hubbut Allah, that the Embassy 
 " entrusted to them was merely a mutter of form on the death 
 " of the Nabob Wallajaw ; and this information is supported 
 
 Vide p. 39, of the 2d vol. of papers of 1803.
 
 59 
 
 ' by the Character of those persons, who are not likely to have 
 " been entrusted with a secret negocM'ioti." 
 
 Here again we have to remark (and where have 
 we not an opportunity of doing it, when we are in- 
 vestigating these transactions?) that a base construe- 
 don is put on a simple and innocent instrument, in- 
 capable, on examination, of any such meaning -, and 
 that the construction is sustained by the Eastern Go- 
 vernments until shame and decency will not longer 
 permit it to be countenanced. 
 
 To proceed to No. 20, a supposed letter of the 
 Nabob Omdut ul Omrah to Gholaum Alii Khan, 
 under date the 8th of January, 1797. This, like the 
 letter No. 17, abounds in general compliments, and 
 refers to the Vakeels last noticed, to make known to 
 Ghokum Ally the friendly intentions of the Nabob. 
 
 A great stress is laid on this letter, and the one 
 immediately referred to from the circumstance of its 
 being written by the Nabob under the signature of 
 Gholaum Hussein j and, it must be confessed (if there 
 were any thing else either in the matter, or drift of 
 the Writing, which could countenance the supposi- 
 tion), that the circumstance of the assumption of a 
 secret signature, would lend a considerable weight to 
 the suspicion. But to judge from appearances, as 
 applicable to the state of Western Society, from the 
 manners of the Eastern Courts, which are governed 
 by local reasons, and are to be explained by local 
 customs, would be to form a judgment liable ta 
 error; and conducive to frequent, and, as I have 
 shown at every instant, to the most flagrant in- 
 justice. 
 
 After commenting on these writings, and on the 
 paper No. 21, which is of the same description, and 
 open to every observation, I have offered and am 
 about to offer, and dwelling on the surmises which 
 the adoption of a strange signature by the Na- 
 
 i 2
 
 tfO 
 
 bob, had given rise to, the Persian Translator ob- 
 serves * 
 
 . " Three circumstances are stated in the evidence of Ally 
 " Rezza Khan and Gholaum Ally Khan, which seem to ex- 
 " plain the occasion of the letters which passed between the 
 " Nabob Omudt ul Omrah, Ally Rhezza Khan, and Kawder 
 " Newaz Khan, Nos. 20 and 21, at the period of the Mis- 
 " sion of Mahommed Ghyas and Mahommed Ghause Khan, 
 *' and tend to discredit the facts inferred from them in the re- 
 " port. One is, that the Vakeels were disgraced by Tippoo 
 " Sultaun, soon after their return to Seringapatam, and were 
 " in disgrace at the time that Mahommed Ghyas and 
 " Mahommed Ghaus Khan were deputed to Madras. Another, 
 *' that Tippoo Sultaun had possession of Gholaum Ally Khan's 
 " seal, and occasionally made use of it. The cause of their 
 " disgrace is said to be, though it is not stated by Gholaum 
 " Ally Khan nor Ally Rhezza Khan, a suspicion on the part 
 " of Tippoo Sultaun, that they were attached to the British 
 " interests. A third is, that Mahommed Ghyas and Mahom- 
 " med Ghause Khan were instructed to say, in the event of 
 " Omdut ul Omrah making any inquiry for Ally Rhezza 
 *' Khan and Gholaum Ally Khan, that they attended the Dur- 
 " bar as usual." 
 
 So that at the period when the Nabob was at first 
 imagined to have been carrying on directly in his 
 own hand, and by the pen of his confidential servant, 
 and through the medium of Gholaum Ally Khan, a 
 correspondence with the Sultaun, the immediate 
 mean of communication, so far from being in favour, 
 was in utter disgrace with Tippoo : certainly not a 
 very likely hand to be employed in conducting a se- 
 , cret negotiation ! 
 
 Scarcely any other thing could be devised or 
 
 * Vide p. 43, of the 4t vol. of papers of 1803.
 
 61 
 
 fancied, which could show, in a more forcible light, 
 the exact state of communication between the parties. 
 Here were two men, who had been supposed to have 
 segociated an intercourse of a very important nature 
 between Tippoo and the Nabob, and had been made 
 the ostensible channel of all their communications ; 
 had remained, without the knowledge of the Nabob, 
 in disgrace with the Sultaun for a space of more than 
 four years 4 , and had been forbidden his presence for 
 a supposed attachment to the British interest : so, it 
 is impossible to imagine, that any communication, in 
 that long interval, could have taken place in the ob- 
 servation of the terms of a secret agreement, as in- 
 sisted on by the Eastern Governments. And Ma- 
 hommed Ghyas and Mahommed Ghause Khan, the 
 latter Ambassadors, are desired to inform the Nabob 
 in 1797, that their predecessors attended the Durbar 
 as usual. Such was the knowledge of the Nabob of 
 what was doing at the Court of the Sultaun, his warm 
 and devoted friend. 
 
 But these circumstances not only explain, that there 
 had been no intercourse kept up between the Courts ; 
 but that none in point of fact had ever existed. If 
 any had been formed, it had been set on foot by 
 Gholaum Ally and Ally Rhezza Khan ; and it would 
 have been the clear and plain policy of the Sultaun 
 to have sent them to Madras, to strengthen and re- 
 new the engagement, if any had been meditated ; 
 more especially as they seemed to stand so high in 
 the estimation of the Nabob, as to be admitted to his 
 correspondence. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to make out, that thero 
 was nothing in the papers annexed to the declaration, 
 taken either separately or conjointly, which evi- 
 denced, even an intention, much less an act of the 
 Nabob to deviate from the letter or spirit of his en- 
 gagement with the East India Company. And, not- 
 withstanding the assertions of the Indian Govern- 
 ments to the contrary, I cannot be brought to be-
 
 62 
 
 licvc, that they themselves ever fancied that these 
 papers afforded them a serious or plausible ground 
 for the conclusions, which they afterwards deduced 
 and founded on them. 
 
 If the papers afforded them a reasonable ground, 
 and -an excuse for the political measure they were 
 about to carry into effect, there would have been no 
 need of all the pains, which were taken in subsequent 
 proceedings ; instituted with a view, and with no in- 
 considerable care, to extract an hostile purpose out 
 of the heart of the papers. There would have been 
 no need to have called for the testimony of Alii 
 Rhezza and Gholaum Alii Khan ; nor for the Su- 
 preme Government to have taken the trouble so 
 frame, as it appears they have done, a long string of 
 interrogatories to be exhibited to the living wit- 
 K. nesses. There would have been no need to have 
 dispatched the Chief Secretary of the Madras Go- 
 vernment to a distant station j or to call the Resident 
 from a foreign Court, for the purpose of conducting 
 the examination : and which, after all, by the admis- 
 * sion of the Examiners, turned out a bootless errand. 
 
 But these extraordinary efforts did not complete 
 the pious work. The whole papers, as well as the 
 depositions, were to be submitted to an official in- 
 quisitor, to be racked and tortured in order to wring 
 out a discovery. The execution of the design was 
 not put, it should seem, into very bad hands j for 
 the v/ork has been perfected with strict attention, 
 and delayed not by any show of tenderness. If the 
 Inquisitor has at times been forced, as I have shown, 
 to hear and feel the cry of truth, in searching with 
 his pincers for the supposed latent purpose j he has 
 still gone on with his work with the apathy suitable 
 to his , office; and has not despaired, though often 
 defeated, to arrive at the wished-for end. 
 
 If the nature of the writings, in the scries which 
 I have noticed, be taken into your consideration, and 
 the oral testimony, which has been called for in ex-
 
 63 
 
 planation of them, it would seem almost an interpo^ 
 sition of Providence, that the design of the Eastern 
 Governments has been completely foiled. 
 
 It is not difficult to imagine, that, from the lax 
 and imperfect relations of the Ambassadors, of events 
 and circumstances, which occurred during their 
 Embassy, aided by subsequent explanations, adapt- 
 ed to the posterior interests and conditions of the 
 writers of them, much pretended intercourse, for 
 private purposes, might have been argued and made 
 out. The Indian Governments saw this distinctly, 
 and the expectation of a favourable result (the direct 
 opposite of which has happened in the examination 
 of the Ambassadors) might by them have been rea- 
 sonably looked for. 
 
 The examination was to be held in the secrecy of 
 the dungeon; and every practicable means observed 
 to elude the public notice. The witnesses to be ex- 
 amined, it will be recollected, could have no commu- 
 nion, nor very strong predilection for the Nabob, as 
 the success of his arms, in conjunction with those of 
 the Company, had wrested the territories of their 
 Sovereign from his hands, and had placed their own 
 persons in the custody of the Company ; that, by the 
 affected clemency and bounty of the latter, they were 
 spared and maintained. At the very time at which 
 they were examined they were the prisoners and pen- 
 sioners of the Company. And you will observe, if 
 you will look at the examination, that the Examiners 
 spared no pains to advise the Ambassadors, as they 
 were instructed, cither of their dependent situation, 
 or their future expectancies, if they did not speak 
 agreeable truths. 
 
 If men like these (who have not failed to say 
 that, in the course of their examinations, which ex- 
 posed themselves to personal hazard) shall have 
 given a true and honest testimony, in contradiction 
 to the obvious admonition of the powerful party pro-
 
 ducing it, and in opposition to their own interests ; 
 it is not only 3 rare instance of its kind in India, but, 
 under ail circumstances, a sacrifice to truth which has 
 been seldom exceeded in any age or country. 
 
 A very nice and critical attention is every where 
 observable throughout the examination to involve 
 these witnesses in curious explanations and conjec- 
 tures. But I think it may be very fairly said, what- 
 ever temporary embarrassment may be apparent at in- 
 tervals, that, on the whole, they have extricated 
 themselves from the snares and pitfalls laid for them, 
 ^ with ease and perspicuity. So much were the Ex- 
 aminers possessed of the utter failure of their com- 
 mission, in the principal point to which* it was direct- 
 ed, that they have contented themselves with giving 
 the substance of the examination, without attending to 
 their instructions, which had directed the depositions 
 A to be taken in the Persian language. 
 
 I know that the Examiners, in their account of the 
 conducting of the froces verbal^ although they have 
 given, as they could not otherwise have acted, a 
 general credit to the explanations and evidence of 
 Alii Rhezza, have yet endeavoured to throw a slur on 
 the testimony of Gholaun Alii Khan. But it is not 
 to be endured, that a party shall first fish out for evi- 
 dence ; and when it will not answer his purpose, that he 
 shall be at liberty, not only to discard it, but, in con- 
 sequence of the disappointment, to vent his rage and 
 his abuse upon his own witness. This would not be 
 tolerated in an OM Baily Solicitor. 
 
 The Examiners have stated that the last witness 
 " commenced with the most artful . affectation of 
 " imbecility and dotage ; and his feigned condition 
 " was so well assumed, as, joined to his old age and 
 " infirmity, was well calculated to elude inquiry." 
 But it may not be a far-strained supposition to 
 imagine, that the imbecil.ty and dotage of Gholaum 
 All i might be real, rather than assumed. They, who
 
 65 
 
 ^ 
 
 saw the old paralyzed Vakeel, while he was carried 
 
 about Madras, a motionless and almost lifeless form, 
 nearly ten years antecedently, will not very much 
 wonder, that he should at this period appear not 
 quite so alive to stale transactions, or so collected, 
 as his active Examiners would have him. But be 
 this as it may, the Indian Governments are the last 
 parties in the world, who have a right to take ex- 
 ception to his testimony. /\ 
 
 I have shown, and I trust satisfactorily, that nei- 
 ther in the Papers, nor in the explanatory evidence 
 of the Ambassadors, as acknowledged by the act of 
 the Examiners themselves, is there any foundation for 
 surmise, much less a well-authenticated proof of the 
 mal-intent of the Nabob Mahommed Ally, in rela- 
 tion to his engagements. 
 
 And what else is there, of which his Highness, 
 or his Successor, is accused ? A solitary act, em- 
 blazoned and dwelt on by the Governor General, 
 not as a substantive grievance, but produced as an 
 accumulative load of offence ; but, neither of the 
 like complexion, nature, or family, with the ori- 
 ginal imputed sin. I allude to the alleged vio- 
 lation of treaty, and consequent breach of faith in 
 the Nabob, in having granted Tuncaws or Assign- 
 ments on the countries, which had been allotted 
 to the Company, in the event of the failure in the 
 payment of his Kists or Subsidy. This on the 
 principle of June fa juvant," is set forth with 
 much show and circumstance in the intended Pro- 
 clamation, which I shall notice by and by. It is 
 said 
 
 " That the Nabob Mahommed Ally, as well as his son and 
 " successor, had repeatedly granted Tuncaws and Assignments 
 " of revenue, of the districts pledged to the Company, in 
 " direct violation of the treaty of 1792, and to the manifest 
 " injury of tho territorial security provided by the Company, 
 
 K
 
 66 
 
 " for its interest in the Carnatic ; the British Governments, 
 " however, continued to extend to their Highnesses, the in- 
 " dulgent operation of the beneficial conditipns of the Treaty 
 " of 1792, by abstaining from the exercise of the just rights 
 " acquired against their Highnesses, under the express stipu- 
 " lotions of that engagement, and under the acknowledged 
 "' interpretation of the laiv of nations." 
 
 Now there is nothing like proof, in any of 
 the documents I have examined, that Tuncaws or 
 Assignments on the revenues cf the Carnatic, 
 contrary to the 8th article of the Treaty, had ever 
 been granted by one or other of the Princes, named 
 in the passage of the Declaration just quoted ; and, 
 on the other hand, in the letter of his Highness the 
 Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to the Marquis Wellesley, 
 shortly after his arrival in India, the fact is positively 
 denied ; and, as the Marquis has not contested the 
 matter with his Highness, I think the reasonable pre- 
 sumption is, that no such Assignment ever did exist. 
 
 But besides this presumption, you have the total 
 silence of the Company, and their Governments 
 abroad, on this subject. The countries, pledged 
 for the purposes of the Treaty, by the 5th article of 
 that instrument, have since come to the hands of the 
 Company j and no one complaint is uttered, either 
 of the existence of such assignments, or of prejudice 
 being in any way effected either to the lands, or to 
 the revenues derivable from them. A contrary fact 
 is indeed endeavoured every where to be established ; 
 namely, of the production and increased revenue of 
 the Carnatic (I will not here say by what means), 
 since the country has been subject to the Company's 
 management. 
 
 It is also evident, that, to the end of the Nabob 
 Omdut ul Omrah's life, the Kists, stipulated by the 
 treaty of 1792, had been duly and faithfully dis- 
 charged ; and it was only by a failure, on the part
 
 67 
 
 of the Nabob, in the payment of such Kists, that 
 the Company could have any interest in the revenues 
 of the districts in question. So that, if any assign- 
 ment had been made by either of the Princes, of v 
 the description charged, howsoever they might have 
 afforded an indication of inattention to the letter of 
 the treaty in this particular, it is plain, that the act 
 has not been followed by any prejudicial effect, to 
 the rights of the Company, as insisted on in the De- 
 claration. A 
 
 But assuming the fact, that Tuncaws had actually 
 been granted, which the Nabob had engaged that 
 he would abstain from the grant of; from the ex- 
 ercise ot what just rights have the Company abstained, 
 which they were, entitled to exercise, by the con- 
 ditions of the treaty, and the law of nations, which, 
 is asserted in the Declaration ? 
 
 I know it has been argued by some, certainly ca- 
 pable of arguing better, that by a grant of Tuncaws, 
 the Nabob, on the fair interpretation of the Treaty, 
 would have forfeited the beneficial stipulations of it ; 
 and have rendered, not only the mortgaged districts, 
 but the whole Carnatic, subject to the seizure of the 
 Company. To manifest the fallacy, as well as folly, 
 of such an argument, you have only to peruse the ar- 
 ticle of the treaty, which contains the provision in. 
 question. And it is this 
 
 " la consequence of this measure, whereby the districts, 
 " mentioned in the schedule, No. 2, become responsible for 
 " any arrears that may accrue in the payment of the above 
 " stipulated Kists, the said Nabob agrees, that he will not 
 " grant Tunkaws or Assignments, on any account, on the re- 
 " venues thereof; and if, contrary to this condition, any Tun- 
 " kaws or Assignments should exist, when the said districts, 
 " or any of them, shall be assumed by the Company, such 
 " Tynkaws or Assignments, shall be declared by the said Corn- 
 It 3
 
 68 
 
 " pany, and the said Nabob, of no value, nor shall they rc- 
 " main in effect*." 
 
 Now what remedy is the Company entitled to in 
 this case, and how is it available on the event of 
 the breach of the stipulation, by this article of the 
 treaty ? It gives no right at all to the Company, to 
 enter on the mortgaged premises, if we may use the 
 term, and much less any other premises, until after 
 the failure in the payment of the Kists at the stated 
 time ; and then, by the first clause of the 8th ar- 
 ticle, it is provided, that the Company shall not 
 enter on the whole of the districts, pledged for the 
 payment of the Kists ; but " shall assume the ma- 
 " nagement of such district, or districts, the revenue 
 (< of which, after deducting the charges of collec- 
 t tion, shall equal the amount of the Kists, which 
 " shall have fallen in arrear" The whole remedy 
 given to the Company by this article, in the possible 
 event of any Assignments or Tunkaws, existing at 
 -the time of their taking possession of the soil, is, 
 that all charges, with which the Nabob may have 
 burdened it, shall be null and void* and that his 
 Highness shall be called upon to declare to that 
 effect. 
 
 The evident operation of the treaty here is, to 
 render the Nabob liable, by other available means, 
 if there were any, to the creditors on the soil ; anc! 
 to exonerate the Company from all existing onus 
 upon it. 
 
 If you will take the trouble to turn to the letter 
 .of the Marquis Cornwallis, wherein he assigns his 
 inducements to, and his explanations of the Treaty 
 before quoted, you will see, that the article in ques- 
 tion, if there be any supposed doubt in the wording 
 of it, will admit of no- other construction, than that 
 which I have adopted. His Lordship appears to 
 have had a reluctance in proposing the- article 3 from 
 
 * Fifth clause of the 8th article.
 
 69 
 
 the too humiliating condition, in which it would 
 seem to place the Nabob in the eye of the world. 
 But he, at length, submitted it; and his Highness, 
 without reserve, put his hand to the agreement. 
 There wanted but this to give a most perfect security 
 to the Company j not possible to be injured by any 
 after act, either of the Nabob or others. For by 
 the publication of the Treaty, which afterwards took 
 place at all the Settlements in India, and through all 
 the public prints, the whole world were informed of 
 the incumbrances to which the districts, set apart by 
 the treaty, were liable: so that, if any one should 
 lend money on them, they would have no remedy 
 but in the equitable principles of his Highness. 
 
 To talk, after this, of the possibility of either 
 immediate or remote injury being done to the in- 
 terests of the Company is as ridiculous, as to main- 
 tain their supposed rights, according to any crude or 
 fanciful interpretation of the Law of Nations, as- 
 serted by the Eastern Governments in their intended 
 public acts. But it is clear, notwithstanding their 
 magnanimous manifestoes, as abundant in high- 
 sounding and sonorous phrases, as empty in sense, 
 that the Eastern Governments themselves could not 
 have entertained an opinion, that a grant of Tuncaws, 
 or Assignments, could have furnished the least pre- 
 tence for possessing themselves of the territories of 
 the Nabob. It is observable, in every part of the 
 correspondence, that the Company and their Go- 
 vernments, for a long series of years, have ma- 
 nifested the most anxious wish to seize, if occasion 
 should offer, the dominions of their Ally. They 
 have not pretended even to cloak itj and I shall 
 show, in a future place, that they never were more 
 desirous of effecting this object, than when the 
 Marquis Wellesley was proceeding to the East. And, 
 if an opportunity, I mean a defensible opportunity, 
 had discovered itself, there was nothing in the in- 
 structions of his Constituents, nothing in the dispo-
 
 70 
 
 sition of the Governor General, as we may see from 
 his subsequent acrs, which would have hindered him 
 from accomplishing his end. 
 
 If the fact of the grant of the Assignments were 
 made out, or capable of it, and if the penalty, now 
 insisted on, resulted from it, it is plain, that the 
 Indian Governments would have enforced it, inas- 
 much as the reason and justice of the enforcement 
 would be manifest to the meanest capacity. It would 
 be a direct, open, breach of an engagement, and as 
 ouvert, and manifest a remedy, which the Company 
 had an indisputable right to avail themselves of. 
 They would not in that event have been constrained 
 to have had recourse to grounds the most vague, and 
 the most doubtful, when they had a good avowable 
 cause, and would not have endeavoured to defend 
 their acts, which are pretended to be raised on them, 
 on the most obscure, and I think I may be allowed 
 to add, the most absurd data. 
 
 I know that the footing on which the Eastern 
 Governments have chosen to rest their acts mainly, 
 is in assertion of a more strong and defensible nature j 
 and I know, that it was most probable, if credited, y 
 to give a more striking appearance of reason and 
 justice to the act that they were about to 
 commit. But from the disputable ground of it, if it 
 should have been inquired into, and which was not 
 unlikely, it was infinitely less safe. The one, if 
 founded in point of fact, which is contended, was 
 most capable of 'evidence', while the other, if demon- 
 strable at all, was to be deduced by nice and fine- 
 drawn constructions, not from facts, but from falla- 
 cious appearances. 
 
 The very shift of adding this comparatively trivial 
 breach of the fulfilment of the engagement on the 
 part of the Nabob, and which at last is of no positive 
 nature, demonstrates the little reliance placed on the 
 grave matter, which is exhibited as the burden of the 
 complaint, if that could have been believed by the
 
 71 
 
 Governments of India, and they were able to create, 
 from unerring circumstances, a similar conclusion in 
 the minds of their countrymen, and of the different 
 Asiatic Courts, there could have been very little 
 reason to have adjoined to the daring guilt of treason, 
 the petty larceny of deceit. Of the junction of these , 
 different degrees and species of offence, which the 
 world were called on to try at the same instant, there 
 was some hope, that the mind would have been, 
 distracted in the judgment which it might form; and 
 might be so perplexed, that, on retiring from so 
 mixed an inquiry, it might chance to bear away some 
 faint impressions, or prejudices, not very determinate 
 perhaps, but leaning to the conclusion, that some of 
 the complaint might have been founded in truth 
 that the party, who had been accused of much, 
 might at least have been convicted of a part. 
 
 1 have taken some pains to make out, that neither 
 the fact, of granting Tuncaws, or Assignments, (which 
 were capable of proof, if existent) nor the fair con- 
 structions to be drawn from the documentary testi- 
 mony, the only other ground on which it is defended, 
 could have warranted the Eastern Governments in 
 settling the succession to the Musnud of the Car- 
 natic, in the manner in which it has been done. 
 
 A great deal of ingenuity had been exhausted in 
 framing a Declaration, which the Indian Govern- 
 ments had it in contemplation at first to publish, to V 
 show to the world, that their act was founded, in a 
 pretence at least, of justice j but the attempt, when 
 made, had so inauspicious a termination, as to induce 
 the framers of it to abandon their own child. They y\ 
 could not, even on their view of the case, excuse it 
 to their own consciences. The fate of this unhappy 
 Paper was, to be sent to Madras, for the purpose of 
 being returned to Calcutta: unless the transmission 
 of it to the different Governments of India, for the V 
 private information of their own residents, can be 
 deemed a more extended publicatioa.
 
 Of this notable Paper it would seem, that I am 
 now called to offer the few observations which I have 
 to make. I might otherwise, perchance, be suspected 
 of having omitted some of the reasons, which in- 
 fluenced the Eastern Governments in adopting the 
 line of policy, which I have ascribed to them. 
 
 The Declaration describes the part, which the 
 British Government had taken, in supporting the 
 pretensions of the Nabob Mahommcd Ally in early 
 times; the different Treaties which had been thence 
 concluded between the former, and the latter Power; 
 the various acts of the British Government in the 
 fulfilment of the engagements on its part, and the 
 generous relinquishment of the pecuniary rights ac- 
 quired by the Treaty of 1 7 87, by the posterior Treaty 
 of 1792 j and, above all, its forbearance to avail it- 
 self of the penalty of the alleged breach of covenant 
 in respect to the Tuncaws, or Assignments, before 
 spoken of. 
 
 I have shown what the Company have resigned, 
 in point of right, as connected with the alleged As- 
 signments, and some idea may be entertained of the 
 great liberality of that body, in the relinquishment 
 of its pecuniary rights, by reference to the letter of 
 Lord Cornwallis, when he was settling the treaty of 
 1792. It will there be seen, that the alteration of 
 the treaty of 1787, in respect to the amount of the 
 Subsidy, was a measure not of generosity, but of ex- 
 pedience; founded on the sense, that the pecuniary 
 provisions of the existing engagement were too heavy 
 for the Nabob to bear, and too chimerical for the 
 Company to expect that they should be realised. 
 And it would be libelling the memory of Lord 
 Cornwallis, to suppose, that he was giving away 
 as a boon, the rights of his Constituents, and his 
 Country. 
 
 The Declaration, however, implies this, and assumes 
 no inconsiderable degree of credit to the Company, 
 for their moderation and bounty. It weeps, while it is
 
 recounting, reluctantly recounting, the misconduct 
 and ingratitude of a perjured Ally 1 
 
 How painful it was to the British Government, as 
 expressed in the Declaration, to expose the alleged 
 conduct of the Nabobs, may be gathered from the 
 very dilated manner in which their supposed perfidy 
 is related, as well as from the space, occupied in the 
 Declaration, in dwelling and descanting on the situa- 
 tion, to which the acts of those Princes had been ima- 
 gined by the Eastern Governments to have subjected 
 them. It fastens on the body of the supposed fault, 
 not with the ferocity of the tiger, but the playful- 
 ness of the cat, mouthing and sporting over the 
 agonies of its bleeding prey. 
 
 In all the State Papers which have been 
 ever given to the world, I can discover none, 
 which in any possible view of it, can compare 
 with this, in the obscurity of its style, in the fallacy 
 of its conclusions, or in the misapplication of its 
 results to the purposes it had in contemplation. 
 
 I have before demonstrated, that not one of the 
 documents, said to have been found at Seringa- 
 patam, .^-considered, or aided by the testimony of 
 those, who were called to speak to them, manifested 
 an intention, much less an act, of any adverse con- 
 struction to the Company, or their Allies: and this 
 is further proved by the evidence of history. Both 
 the Princes have completed their reigns, without 
 exhibiting a single public act that can keep any 
 one of the suspicions of the Indian Governments, 
 as avowed in th'eir Declaration, in countenance or 
 semblance. 
 
 The times, in which they lived, afforded them 
 opportunities enough, of evincing their regard for 
 the Mahommedan Faith, and the illustrious pillar of 
 it, so often talked of, if they had entertained such 
 designs; and more especially if they had entered 
 into the solemnity of a league for giving them effect. 
 On the contrary, however, the British Government 
 
 L
 
 74 
 
 have beheld the Nabobs of the Carnatic, fighting by 
 their side, in all their wars, with the fanatic and tyran- 
 nical Sovereign of Mysore. 
 
 So that, in opposition to the fine-spun web of the 
 Eastern Government, to catch the heir to the Musnud 
 of the Carnatic in their toils, you have the expe- 
 rience of the conduct of the Nabobs, in direct con- 
 tradiction of every thing they have asserted. 
 
 If you look at the time, when the secret inter- 
 course is said to have taken place, and for the pur- 
 poses inferred, you will perceive that no period 
 could have been selected more unseasonable for giving 
 it effect. Tippoo Sultaun had just been obliged to sign 
 a convention in his capital, where he had been shut 
 up by the Allies, whereby he gives away for ever 
 one half of his dominions ; and more, that the amount 
 of his present treasure So that he, in this situation, 
 was not likely to prove a very profitable Ally to the 
 Nabob. Now what sort of an Ally could the Nabob 
 be to Tippoo, if that Sovereign should have wished 
 to cultivate his friendship for the restoration of his 
 desperate affairs ? Had the Nabob any one of the 
 means, cither troops, or stores, or any other the 
 sinews of war, which could promise the requisite 
 assistance that Tippoo wanted. 
 
 It is notorious that the Nabob could not protect 
 himself; the defence of the Carnatic having been 
 left entirely to the subsidized troops of the Company. 
 Unless, therefore, you could suppose both the Sove- 
 reigns deranged in intellect, you would never dream, 
 in this conjuncture, that they could be thinking of 
 alliances -, so that you have not only the evidence of 
 after acts, but a positive state of things, plain as they 
 could speak, that repel every supposition which the 
 Governments of India have endeavoured to raise. 
 And besides all this, you will learn from the evidence 
 of Purniah, the Vakeels, and others, that the minds 
 of the parties were as hostile to any supposed union 
 for cojnm'on purposes, as. the surrounding state of
 
 75 
 
 things. For the Nabob is represented by the Va- 
 keels to have been incapable of forgetting the in- 
 juries which his family had sustained by the private 
 acts of violence of the Sultaun. And Tippoo is 
 stated by Purniah, his late Minister, and the present 
 favoured Protege of the Company, to have enter- 
 tained, to the last moment of his existence, the most 
 sovereign contempt for the Nabob. 
 
 Now, to what does all the bombastic show of cir- 
 cumstances in their delusive Declaration ; all the 
 lengthened, abortive reasoning of the Eastern Go- 
 vernments, amount to ? It is a laboured excuse, long 
 in detail, complicated in its view, and purposely in- 
 explicit. It aims at much, but effects nothing. You 
 would think, at every instant, that it was pregnant 
 with some mighty matter, when at the next moment 
 the hope of the anterior is destroyed. You are 
 every where told of secret intercourse, of private 
 correspondence, and of mysterious views, between 
 the Nabob and Tippoo Sultaun, but they never con- 
 descend to let you know, in the end, for what pur- 
 pose all these were had. 
 
 I have laid before you all the papers from which 
 they have drawn their information, and founded their 
 resolves. If any thing should be thought to be left 
 unexplained by me, in respect to the discovered in- 
 struments, you have only to read the correspondence 
 of the Nabob with Tippoo, which was carried on / 
 under the eye, and conducted through the channel, * 
 of the Government of Fort St. George *. You will 
 there find all the expressions of anxiety for the faith, 
 of friendship tor the person, and solicitude for the 
 family of Tippoo, as are to be found in the supposed 
 unauthorized correspondence which has been spoken 
 of afc length. 
 
 I have explained, that the Declaration " goes about 
 
 * Vide page 267, et infra, of the 1st vol. of papers laid on 
 the tablepf the House in 180$. 
 
 L 2
 
 7<5 
 
 it and tboKt it," but never comes to any point, as to 
 the drift of the secret intercourse, with which k 
 charges the Nabobs. 
 
 It states, however, that it is manifest (speaking 
 from the papers I have last referred to), that the inten- 
 tions of the Nabobs Mahommed Ally and Omdut ul 
 Omrah have been uniformly and without interruption 
 hostile to the British Power in India, and that those 
 /\ intentions had been carried into effect, to the full 
 extent of the actual power possessed by their High- 
 nesses respectively. I shall not go into verbal criti- 
 cisms, and so shall not observe on the possible ope- 
 ration of hostile intentions as to a breach of treaty, if 
 such intentions were apparent. But these intentions 
 are said to have been carried into effect, and therein, 
 Indeed, would consist the offence, if any. But in 
 what and how are they carried into effect ? The 
 Government have not deigned to explain, except by 
 saying generally, " to the full extent of the actual 
 power possessed by their Highnesses respectively." 
 So that, as to the extent of the effect, and of the ac- 
 tual power of the one, or either of the Nabobs, we 
 are left wholly in the dark. 
 
 Having begged the first step, " the pretended hos- 
 tile intentions," as a result of fallacious and deceptive 
 argument (from premises which will not bear it out), 
 the Declaration goes on to assume another step, and, 
 from construction on construction, result after result, 
 would arrive at the final position where every thing 
 is to be rested. 
 
 Having argued an hostile intention from the docu- 
 ments found at Seringapatam, which are incapable of 
 such a construction j the Declaration gives to the in- 
 tention, which is no where charged with a fixed and 
 definitive object, a qualification of its own. It makes 
 it hostile to the British Power, and subversive of its 
 influence. 
 
 This stone being laid, the architect of constructive 
 treason begins to rear his edifice. Like Aladdin,
 
 77 
 
 and by the same invisible means, he builds his house 
 with the rapidity of thought. 
 
 What was hostile intention only in the first para- / 
 graph, is in the next conjured into an hostile act. V 
 For the Declaration, without interruption, states 
 
 ft By acting on these principles of conduct, the Nabobs Ma- 
 f* hommed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, not only violated the 
 " rights of the Company, but, by uniting their interests with 
 " those of the most implacable enemy of the British Empire, 
 " the Nabobs Mahommed Ally and Omdut ul Omrah, actually 
 " placed themselves in the relation of public enemies to the 
 " British Government ; dangerous to the extent of their respec- 
 11 firepower, and active according to the means and opportu- 
 " nities afforded to them by the circumstances of the moment, 
 ** and especially by the most severe exigency and pressure of 
 " war. Every principle, therefore, of public law, releases the 
 <( Government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 
 f f 1792." 
 
 And the Declaration goes on with asserting the 
 rights accruing from the alleged breach of the en- 
 gagement on the part of the Nabobs; and the tem- 
 perance and moderation, in which the British Go- 
 vernment meant to have exercised them towards the 
 Nabob Omdul ul Omrah, who had unfortunately 
 died before he received this last proof of the Com- 
 pany's magnanimity. 
 
 I am at a loss, I confess, td understand this part 
 of the Declaration very clearly. I disdain, as I have 
 before said, the foppery of a discussion about words. 
 I know not that the Declaration had previously im- 
 puted to their Highnesses any one act, as in direct, 
 offence, except the mere writing of the papers enu- 
 merated, or the conversations mentioned in the cor- 
 respondence of the Vakeels, 
 
 And what, in this point of view, and I know of no 
 other, had the Nabob Wallajaw, or the Nabob Ora-
 
 78 
 
 dut ul O in rah acted, which had placed them, or 
 could be supposed to have'placed them, in the situa- 
 tion of public enemies. They had written letters ; 
 they had held a friendly language about Tippoo 
 Sultaun; they had spoken about their common faith. 
 This is the way (for no other is even pretended) in 
 which the Nabobs Wallajaw and Omdut ul Omrah, 
 united their interests with the most implacable enemies 
 of the British Empire. 
 
 It is to be observed, that at the time alluded to, 
 so far from being in a state of enmity, Tippoo had 
 entered into an amicable Treaty with the British 
 Government, and had all the outward appearances of 
 a friend. 
 
 And here also the alleged acts (as the intentions 
 before spoken to) have a meanipg and tendency 
 equally as mysterious, equally as indefinite and un- 
 explained; they are said to be "dangerous to the 
 extent of the respective power, and means, and oppor* 
 t unities of the Nabobs." The effect of these terms 
 I shall endeavour to elucidate hereafter, in their ap- 
 plication to a correspondent case. 
 
 It is not a little curious, that when a mind, cer- 
 tainly of great intelligence and of some erudition, is 
 intent on laying before the world a corpus delicti, and 
 that a very flagrant offence (taking it to be true and 
 felt), and is not able to communicate any definite or 
 precise idea of it this of itself would show what 
 sort of a case was in contemplation: certainly, not a 
 very plain one, nor for the comprehension of plain 
 men. I do not recollect to have ever seen an account 
 of a supposed crime, with so much confusion in it, 
 as is observable in the statement which I am con- 
 sidering. 
 
 The papers and the conversations are the sources, 
 or proofs, relied on in the Declaration, whence the 
 hostile intentions of the Nabobs are inferred; and 
 then, in the same breath, the same proofs are con- 
 verted into evidence, the only evidence given us, of
 
 79 
 
 hostile acts. They are at the same time the design, 
 and the deed, the motive, and the act. 
 
 And, what is the tendency of the alleged inten- 
 tions and acts? What mischief were they calculated 
 ' to produce? What mischief have they in point of 
 fact done? Have the Indian Governments told you 
 this ? Had they no intention to tell it you ? You 
 have a long Declaration which was framed with this 
 very purpose. And does it assert any thing in the 
 shape of a precise fact, which makes out the accu- 
 sation ? 
 
 A prolix and tedious paper narrates a long tale, 
 and at last concludes, that the intentions of the 
 Nabobs Wallajaw and the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah 
 were carried into effect: and the effect was dan- 
 gerous to the extent of their power, means, and op- 
 portunities 
 
 " Quorsum haec tarn putida tendunt ?" 
 
 There- is no need of divination, those who run 
 may read. 
 
 Take the whole of the Declaration, as far as it can 
 be understood, and it speaks this : That the Nabobs 
 were hostile, or at least are pretended to be so, 
 in their intentions only; and that they would have been 
 so in act, if they had had the power, or the means 
 of being so. If it had been otherwise, or could be 
 otherwise stated, you would have had the catalogue 
 of their ill deeds. Insinuation, a flimsy insinuation, 
 was all that was meant ; too thin not to be seen 
 through by the purblind Courts of Asia: and there- 
 fore the Declaration has been suppressed. 
 
 But you will wish to know how all these things, 
 if admitted, could affect the young Prince ? Suppose 
 even, that the Nabob Mahommed Ally and Omdut 
 ul Omrah had been untrue to the extent insinuated, 
 to the terms of their engagements what then?
 
 80 
 
 How is the Prince Ally Hussain concerned or in- 
 terested in their acts ? [ will shortly acquaint you, 
 from the Declaration, how the Indian Governments 
 have applied their reasoning, and their public law, 
 to the predicament of the young Prince, in his rela- 
 tion to the Sovereigns just mentioned. 1 
 
 I have before told you of certain vaunted rights of 
 the Company, arising out of the alleged condition 
 of things, as connected with the Nabobs. They 
 state, with a serious and solemn face, and in the 
 instrument referred to 
 
 " That every principle of public law released the British 
 " Government from the intended obligations of the treaty of 
 " 1792, and every consideration of self-defence and security, 
 ** authorized the Company to exercise its power in the manner 
 " most expedient for the purpose of frustrating the hostile 
 " councils of the late Nabob of the Carnatic," meaning the 
 Nabob Omdut ul Omrah. 
 
 And explaining why they had not sent the Decla- 
 ration, and its appendix, to the Nabob Omdut ul 
 Omrah, they afterwards say 
 
 '." That his subsequent death frustrated the wish c f the 
 " British Government to obtain from that Prince satisfactory 
 *' security for th? rights pledged to the Company in the Car- 
 " natic." 
 
 Could absurdity be well supposed to make a fur- 
 ther advance than this ! ! What rights in'the Carnatic 
 (as mentioned in the preceding paragraph) had the 
 British Government, or the Company, for which 
 they had a reason to demand a satisfactory security ? 
 They were rights, as they tell you, fledged to the 
 Company, arising, of course, out of the stipulation 
 of the treaty of 1792; they could be no other. And 
 what had become of that instrument at the juncture 
 in which these rights are talked of? It was a dead
 
 81 
 
 letter. The British Government were released, as 
 they have insisted, from all intended obligations un- 
 der it. And will any one be sottish or bold enough 
 to argue, that the relative obligations of the Princes 
 of the Carnatic, created by the Treaty, should exist 
 after the treaty itself? That the Company shall put 
 the pecuniary advantages secured by it into their 
 pockets (which seems all that they ever had in in- 
 tention), and that they shall be liberated from the 
 duties, of which the gold of the Carnatic was the 
 declared and avowed consideration? The reasoning 
 is too absurd to be more than stated. 
 
 But I will show how all this trash is intended to 
 be made applicable to the Prince Ally Hussein. 
 And I cannot take a readier way, than by quoting 
 that part of the Declaration hereafter, which is in 
 allusion to his Highness's condition 
 
 In which you will have the imaginary circum- 
 stances; the specious reasonings of the Indian Go- 
 vernments; and the doctrine of the Law of Nations, 
 which is to justify their conduct. 
 
 By this, is the character of British Faith and the 
 British Government (Tor it is every where used in the 
 Declaration, as a correlative term with the Asiatic 
 Executive), to be vindicated and supported. 
 
 You will see what are the circumstances of offence 
 imputed by the Declaration, and the alleged operation 
 of public lawy as argued to be applicable to them. I 
 am ashamed of the term law, when applied to Asiatic 
 transactions. 
 
 The pretended offence of the young Prince, is the 
 act of his Grandfather; it is not otherwise even 
 argued. It is charged, that Mahornmed Ally, in his 
 reign, was guilty of a criminal intent, a design to 
 break his engagement with the Company, which 
 was carried into effect as far as he had means or 
 power. Take all for granted,- for the purpose of the 
 argument, the offence amounts but to this. f 4 
 
 M
 
 I have before stated, that all the complaints of a 
 breach, or intended breach of the peace, in the part 
 of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, during the con- 
 tinuance of his reign, and the pretended grounds, on 
 which they had been asserted, were given up by the 
 Indian Governments, or their Officers, in their search 
 after evidence to sustain them. 
 
 The whole of the argument of the Governments of 
 India would seem to be bottomed on ground, either 
 misunderstood, or supposititious. 
 
 It assumes as a principle, to which the existence of 
 the Treaty gives a direct contradiction, that the right 
 of sovereignty of the Carnatic was created by the 
 treaty : whereas, the very act of convention, for the 
 negociation of the treaty, presupposes the independ- 
 ence and sovereignty of the Nabobs; it shows, in 
 express language, the footing on which both parties 
 contract. It admits, but does not establish the 
 character of an independent power. And as the 
 Treaty does not create the right, but acknowledges it, 
 a breach of the treaty, it is evident, would leave the 
 right of sovereignty and succession, as it existed be- 
 J fore the conclusion of it, by the parties contracting. 
 
 In the treaty of 1792, the East- India Company do 
 not pretend that they are conferring any rights on 
 the Nabobs of the Carnatic: but they stipulate and 
 guarantee, as the British Government had before 
 done in the treaty of Paris, for the protection of the 
 Nabobs' rights of Sovereignty, and for the succession 
 j^ to them in the course of hereditary pretensions. 
 
 Of the benefit of the Company's guarantee, the 
 young Prince is said to be deprived by the acts of 
 the Nabob Wallajaw, or Mahommed Ally, one of 
 the original contracting Powers: for the Declaration 
 says 
 
 " The death of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, has not affected 
 ** the rights acquired by the British Government, under the dis-
 
 83 
 
 ** covet}' of the breach of the alliance. Whatever claim the 
 <e reputed Son of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah may be supposed 
 "" to possess, to the Company's support of his pretensions to 
 " t!ie Government of the Carnatic, is founded, on the grounds 
 " of right of Omdut ul Omrah, to the assistance of the Com- 
 pany, in securing his succession to the Nabob Mahommed 
 *' Ally, founded on the express stipulation of the treaty of 
 " 1792." '*'* 
 
 And it is then stated, that the result of the pro- 
 positions in the Declaration, shows, that the funda- 
 mental principles of the alliance, between the Com- 
 pany and the Nabob, as declared in the treaty of 
 1792, had been violated and rendered of no effect, 
 previous to the ostensible conclusion of that instru- 
 ment ; and therefore, that the Nabob Omdut ul 
 Ornrah, could derive no rights from the ratification 
 of that . Treaty, the vital spirit of which, as con- 
 tended, having been previously annihilated. And 
 as the Prince Ally Hussein, claimed through the 
 Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, that with the latter, his 
 Highness's pretensions must fall, and in this way 
 the Declaration proceeds to the end. 
 
 In language less to be mistaken, the argument of 
 the Eastern Government is this : 
 
 The Nabob Mahommed Ally, had at one time 
 entertained a criminal intent against the Company, 
 looking to his engagements then subsisting. But 
 at a subsequent date, he entered into a new contract 
 for himself and for his successors. He dies, and at 
 a distance of several years, and after the intervention 
 of an intermediate reign, the successor- of Ma- 
 hommed Ally is told, that he cannot have the ad- 
 vantage of the latter engagement, as, prior to the 
 time of the conclusion of it, his ancestor had dis- 
 covered a sentiment, hostile to his original treaty. 
 
 Need we refer to the opinion of learned jurists, 
 and the law of nations, applicable to circumstances 
 
 M 2
 
 84 
 
 like these ? Does not every one know, that in sign- 
 ing and exchanging new Treaties, that all the pre- 
 vious actions of the parties arc committed to ob- 
 livion : And that a contrary supposition would de- 
 stroy the manifest spirit and intent of such an in- 
 strument. Does not the circumstance of the sub- 
 scription, change the parties to them, often from 
 the condition of declared enemies, into close and 
 cordial friends ? But where would be the security 
 of the instrument, if it were to be open to either 
 - party, as convenience might dictate, to find in the 
 anterior hostility of the other, an excuse for the 
 breach of the engagement ? These instruments ex- 
 press the supposed disposition of the parties at the 
 time, and their future respective obligations. It is 
 idle to imagine, that parties may go back, when they 
 please, to ancient doings and long- buried grudges, 
 as a pretence for the annulment of their own solemn 
 compacts. 
 
 But let us observe a little more closely, how 
 things stood at the time when the Governor Ge- 
 neral tells the young Prince, that he is in the con- 
 dition of a public enemy. And let us see how the 
 principle of the Law of Nations will apply to them. 
 
 His Grandfather, the Nabob Mahommed Ally, 
 had entertained sentiments in his life-time, as it is 
 presumed by the Declaration, of an hostile tendency 
 to the interests of the East-India Company. But 
 the precise extent and object of the intention of 
 Mahommed Ally, at the time it was entertained, has 
 never been' discovered ; nor was the intent itself 
 known, until after the demise of the party, who 
 had conceived it. So that the whole of the possible 
 offence, which could have followed from the act in 
 contemplation of the Nabob, if the intent had 
 shown itself in any act, would have been personal 
 in the Nabob Mahommed Ally. He completes 
 his reign, and month after month, to the time of 
 his death, gives substantial proofs of his compliance
 
 85 
 
 with the most material part of his engagements, by 
 the payment of the Subsidy, stipulated and anxiously- 
 secured against all possible disappointments, by the 
 provisions of the Treaty of 17.92. He dies in the 
 year 1705 : a date subsequent to the commence- 
 ment of the supposed friendly intercourse (and 
 which has been stated to have existed through the 
 whole of the interval) of twenty two years ! At no 
 period of this extended space did the Indian Go- 
 vernments apprise his Highness, the Nabob Ma- 
 hommed Ally, that he had any sentiments of favor, 
 towards the Court of Seringapatam. On the con- 
 trary, the only representation made by the Indian 
 Governments, of his sentiments towards the Prince 
 of Mysore, gives them the tendency of inveterate 
 animosity to his cause and person. The crime, 
 therefore, of the Prince's Grandfather, if any crime 
 there was about him, is suffered to descend with 
 him to the grave, the last repository of human 
 frailty, and remote from the search, as it should 
 seem, of human vengeance. 
 
 The Nabob Omdut ul Omrah, the father of the 
 young Prince, and the successor of the Nabob Ma- 
 hommed Ally, ascends the Musnud of the Carnatic, 
 and continues to occupy it, from the death of his 
 father to the year 1801, when he also closes his 
 reign and his life together. And in this interval, 
 also, no one intimation is made to his Highness, 
 that he had entered into negociations or alliances, 
 in contravention of his existing engagements with the 
 East India Company. It is pretended, however, 
 after the death of the Nabob, but I have observed 
 on what -frail grounds, that the Governor General 
 had it in contemplation to state the alleged breach 
 of treaty. 
 
 ,The young Prince Ally Hussein, the acknowledged 
 son, and declared heir of hrs Highness Omdut ul 
 Omrah, undisputed by the Governor General, and 
 indisputable in point of fact, acknowledged too, in
 
 86 
 
 the writings, and by the acts of the Indian Govern- 
 ments, appears before the representatives of the 
 East India Company, with the treaty of 1792 in 
 his hand, and points to the provision which it holds 
 out, for the guarantee of his Succession. And at 
 this time of day, and under, these circumstances, is 
 the first mention made of the forfeiture of the be- 
 neficial conditions of the treaty, as referring to the 
 Prince. 
 
 And what now is the language to the youthful 
 and interesting object, which presented itself, and 
 laid claim to the protection of the British Govern- 
 ment ? " Horresco referens" I am speaking from 
 the Declaration * 
 
 " Whatever claim to the Company's protection and support 
 " you may derive from your supposed father, (delicate insi- 
 " nuation !) has been utterly destroyed by the hostile conduct 
 " of Onidut ul Omrah. It follows, therefore, that you have 
 " succeeded to the condition of your father, which was the 
 " condition of a public enemy : and consequently, that at the 
 " death of Onidut ul Omrah, the British Government remained 
 " at liberty to exercise its rights, founded on the faithless po- 
 " licy of its ally, in whatever manner might be most con- 
 " ducive to the immediate safety, and to the general interests 
 " of the Company in the Carnatic." 
 
 < x . 
 
 And after dwelling for some time on the mode- 
 ration and forbearance of the British Government, 
 in having offered to heal the wounds, inflicted by the 
 supposed breach of treaty, by the acceptance of the 
 entire, unconditional surrender of the territory of 
 the Carnatic, which the Prince would not accede to 
 in the extent of the proposition, the doom of the 
 Prince, and sentence of the Governor General, is 
 further pronounced in these words 
 
 * Vide page 43, of the first papers laid before the House.
 
 87 
 
 " You, the reputed son of Omdut ul Omrah, by and with. 
 " the advice of the persons appointed by your father's will, 
 " to assist your Councils, have persisted in opposing a deter- 
 " mined resistance to our demand, thereby exhibiting an un- 
 " equivocal proof, that the spirit, which actuated the hostile 
 " councils of the Nabobs Mahommed Ally and Omdut ul Om- 
 " rah, has been transmitted with unabated vigor to you, the 
 <c supposed son of Omdut ul Omrah ; secured in its operation 
 <c under the sanctimonious forms of their testamentary injunc- 
 " tions, and preserved with religious attachment by you, the 
 " ostensible descendant of that Prince. 
 
 " Frustrated in the hope of obtaining from you reparation 
 " for its injuries, and security for its rights, the British Govern- 
 " ment is now reluctantly compelled to publish to the world 
 " the proofs of this flagrant violation of the most sacred ties of 
 " amity and alliance by the Nabobs Mahommed Ally, and 
 " Omdut ul Omrah, and the hereditary spirit of enmity, mani- 
 " fested by you, to the interests of the British Government. 
 " The duty and necessity of self-defence require the British Go- 
 " vernment, under the circumstance of this case, to exercise its 
 " power in the attainment of an adequate security for its rights. 
 _" JUSTICE and MODERATION warrant, that the family of Omdut ul 
 " Omrah shall be deprived of the means of completing its sys- 
 " tematic course of hostility. WISDOM and PRUDENCE demand, 
 " that you shall not be permitted to retain possession of re- 
 " sources, dangerous to the tranquillity of the British Govern- 
 " ment in the peninsula of India." 
 
 The Prince is then hurled from his throne, and 
 another, with as much pretensions as the parry fa- 
 vouring them, is seated by the authority and force of 
 the Asiatic Government in his destined and hallowed 
 seat ! 
 
 Judge Jefferies himself (or if any other more ty- 
 .rannical in temper or more depraved in heart can be 
 imagined) never outraged the feelings, by profaning 
 the name of law the sacred term of justice and all 
 the qualities, which dignify and adorn the human breast,
 
 88 . . 
 
 in addressing the devoted and guilty wretch, who had 
 fallen within the range of his authority j more fla- 
 grantly and more violently, than they are here outraged, 
 in the case of an innocent and inoffensive Prince. 
 
 To call aloud on public law, for a sanction to the 
 act, is to evince that there is as little decency as re- 
 morse in the actors of this shameful scene ! Happy 
 would it be for their security happy for the peace of 
 their own bosoms if they shall be able, at a proper 
 season, to bring any principle of natural justice, any 
 even musty dictum of the Jurist, to defend and excuse 
 an act, which, as long as it shall remain unsupported 
 by such aid, must bring down a shame on the heads 
 of the perpetrators of it, and, as long as it shall remain 
 unpunished, a lasting slander on the country. 
 
 But though the law of nations can afford not, in my 
 comprehension of it, and I have turned over the works 
 of those who have the credit of expounding it with 
 truth, any thing in the nature of a precedent, or avail- 
 able justification, for measures such as these ; they are 
 not without their similitude, at least, if not their coun- 
 tenance, in the law ofnafure. One of the profoundest 
 writers on this species of Ethics has a case (it is but a 
 solitary one indeed) that would seem, from the apt- 
 ness of its adaptation in every part, to have been 
 made for the purpose. But though JEsop has deli- 
 neated features in his picture, which would seem iden- 
 tified with the object here spoken of, yet he has add- 
 ed such a commentary on his text, that would be nei- 
 ther creditable nor comfortable in the application. 
 
 ** One hot, sultry day (says the learned author), a wolf and a 
 " Jamb happened to come just at the same time to quench their 
 " thirst in the stream of a clear silver brook, that ran tumbling 
 " down the side of a rocky mountain. The wolf stood upon 
 " the higher ground, and the lamb at some distance from him 
 " down the current. However, the wolf, having a mind to 
 " pick a quarrel with him, asked him what he meant by dis-
 
 89 
 
 " turbing the water and making it so muddy, that he could 
 " not drink, and at the same time demanded satisfaction. The 
 " lamb, frightened at this threatening charge, told him, ih a tone 
 " as mild as possible, that, with humble submission, he could 
 fe not conceive how that could be, since the water which he 
 " drank, ran down from the wolf to him, and therefore it 
 " could not be disturbed so far up the stream. ' Be that as it 
 " will,' replied the wolf, 'you are arasca/,andlhave been/oW, 
 " that you treated me with ill language behind my back, about 
 " half a year ugo.' ' Upon my word/ says the lamb, ' the lime 
 " you mention was before I was born' The wolf, finding it to 
 " no purpose to argue any longer against truth, fell into a great 
 " passion, snarling and foaming at the mouth, as if he had been 
 " mad. And, drawing near to the lamb, 'Sirrah,' sayshe, ' if it 
 '.' was not you, it was your father, and that's all one.' So he 
 " seized the poor innocent helpless thing, tore it to pieces, and 
 " made a meal of it." Vide JEsop's Reports. 
 
 Every thing is decided here according to the na- 
 ture and necessity of things. The wolf eats his 
 prey without excuse, without remorse^ without grace, 
 cither before or after his meal; without any boast 
 of justice, of moderation, of magnanimity. It is for 
 human practice to improve upon the brute, to preach 
 the doctrine of conscience, and of immutable justice, 
 at the time that it is stifling the best emotions of 
 the heart, and treacherously trampling upon the most 
 sacred principles of moral duty. 
 
 A more palpable abuse of power, of arbitrary, un- 
 controlled power cannot be found in the annals of 
 recorded tyranny. And it will require no great 
 pains to prove that the deed had been for years in 
 meditation, before any of the shallow pretences set up 
 for the excuse of it had been discovered or imagined. 
 
 In the acts of preceding Governments, you 
 will read the laborious endeavours which had been 
 used, under a variety of specious pretexts, for assum-? 
 ing and appropriating the territories of the Nabob, 
 
 V
 
 90 
 
 At one time the amelioration of the condition of the 
 subject ; at another, the amendment of the political 
 condition of the state, by simplifying the sources of 
 authority j is held out as the ostensible reason of the 
 Company, for wishing the entire dominion of the 
 Country. But- at all times the sole possession of the 
 power of the State is looked to as a desirable and 
 profitable thing ; and the inconveniencies and horrors 
 arising from the separation of the civil from the 
 military power of the Country, arc every where de- 
 precated and deplored. The difficulties of divided 
 dominion are sang with so much querulousness, and 
 with so much apparent feeling, you would think 
 that the Nabob, in turning a deaf ear to the dirge, 
 was the hardest and cruellest Prince on earth. 
 
 " How, in one house, 
 
 " Should many people, under two commands, 
 " Hold amity ? 'Tis hard, almost impossible." 
 
 LEAR. 
 
 The reasonableness of the proposition of the 
 Company, that the Nabob should give them the 
 Civil Power of the State, because he had given them 
 the Military, is too clear to be denied. It must ap- 
 pear to every thinking mind a much more fit and 
 easy thing tor the Nabob to yield the remaining 
 branch of his authority, than for the Company to re- 
 nounce his bounty. And his Highness is therefore 
 truly represented, as the most unjust and ungrateful 
 being, in not obliging his faithful allies, in their mo- 
 dest and moderate wishes, in not consulting his peo- 
 ple's good, by surrendering the fertile provinces, 
 which had been put under his protection by the 
 hand of Providence, and transferring to the pastoral 
 keeping of the Company, the subject flock, which 
 he was bounden, by the most sacred of all duties, to 
 watch over and protect. 
 
 When we see men expressing their dissatisfaction 
 at the refusal of a Prince to assign his people, if the
 
 91 
 
 thing could be done, like so many sheep, to the 
 custody of a strange shepherd, we may form some 
 possible conjecture at their mind and mode of rea- 
 soning. It is plain that they would seek their in- 
 terest at any rate, and by any means. 
 
 This truth is spoken as openly, as men of such a 
 description and character are used to speak, in the 
 letters ot the Governor General of India to the Court 
 of Directors, in the month of October, 1801. In 
 the glow of supposed success, he heedlessly breaks 
 forth 
 
 " It is a great satisfaction to have ultimately accomplished 
 " an object, long and anxiously desired by the honorable Com- 
 " pany, and earnestly recommended by the Court of Directors to 
 " my special attention, when I had tlie honor to receive the charge 
 " of this Government. Your honorable Committee is apprized 
 " of the early solicitude which I manifested for the accomplish- 
 (< ment of this important measure, upon my first arrival at Ma- 
 " dras, in the month of April 1798, as well as of the repeated 
 " attempts which I made on various occasions, in the years 
 " 179.8 and 1799, .to effect the same salutary arrange-nent. The 
 " successive failure of these attempts, combined with the re- 
 " flections arising from the equally unpropitious result of every 
 " preceding proposition of a similar nature, have enhanced, in 
 " my mind, the pleasure of witnessing the conclusion of the 
 " late Treaty. The intimate connection of this happy event, 
 " with the success of your arms in Mysore, forms a peculiar 
 ". and interesting feature of the whole transaction j nor can 
 " your honorable Committee fail to remark, that the posses- 
 " sion of the Records of the House of Hyder Ally, in disclos- 
 " ing to your Government the whole system of the policy of 
 " your enemies in India, is the source from which we have de- 
 " rived that information, which has enabled us to complete the 
 " settlement of the Carnatic *." 
 
 * Vide page 86, ft infra, of the Papers of 1802. 
 N 2
 
 92 
 
 This remarkable confession, suddenly and hastily 
 avowed, does not only tend to show the principle on 
 which the Company and their Governors have acted ; 
 but it demonstrates, beyond all controversy, the ex- 
 treme good faith, and the strict and steady persever- 
 ance of the Nabob in the observance of his engage- 
 ments. For how rigid must have been the Nabob's 
 attention to the terms of his obligations, when a 
 party interested, and anxiously intent on taking ad- 
 vantage of the breach of them, could not, in a series 
 of years, find even a plausible pretence for availing 
 himself of his object. 
 
 The avidity with which the apparent justificatory 
 means are seized, it is not an unnoticeable feature in 
 the transaction, when contrasted with the slow and 
 tardy act which followed the discovery. The pre- 
 tended records of Seringapatam are never suffered to 
 see the light until 1801; though they furnished, 
 from the moment of their being possessed, a reason 
 for the seizure of the country. Was it that the Go- 
 vernor General was not prepared to determine on 
 the right which they gave rise to ? Was the season 
 not fitted for the purpose ? Or was he waiting for a 
 mandate from Leadenhall Street, to sanction on his 
 partial representation the intended act of his Govern- 
 ment ? 
 
 The pause is certainly remarkable. It is some- 
 what accounted for, however, in a dispatch of the 
 Governor of Fort'Saint George, and in other corre- 
 spondence of the Supreme Government. 
 
 It is said in the former paper* : 
 
 " That at an early period of time, after the discovery of 
 " the Papers found at Seringapatam, the Governor General had 
 " found it expedient and prudent to transmit eventual Instruc- 
 
 * Vide page 78, of the last-mentioned Papers.
 
 93 
 
 r< tions to Lord Clive, applicable to the contingency of the 
 
 " Nabob Otndut ul Omrah's death, previously to the determi- 
 
 " nation of the measures, which, might be rendered necessary 
 
 <f to our safety, by the detection of the faithless and hostile 
 
 " conduct of the Nabob." 
 
 Reading this passage seriously, we might not be 
 much censureable in concluding from it, that neither 
 the papers, nor the pretended right resulting from 
 them, were intended to be insisted on, until after 
 the death of the existing Nabob : a period of fairer 
 promise. 
 
 It appears also, from the writing of the Governor 
 General, that there was some apprehension in his 
 mind, which prevented him from taking advantage 
 of the circumstance at the instant. A negociation, 
 it would seem, was at that time pending, which was 
 to extend the alliance of the East India Company 
 with the Nizam. And it was feared (certainly not 
 an unreasonable fear), that the proposed new con- 
 struction of treaties, and the intended application of 
 it, might have temporarily alarmed the weak state of 
 his Highness's nerves, so as to have deferred the 
 conclusion of the desired engagement. And who is 
 there that does not agree in the policy of the Go- 
 vernor General? -For what power could be supposed, 
 as inclinable to benefit itself by the British alliance, if 
 it should see one of its most ancient and faithful Allies 
 repudiated and thrown off on the most idle and ridi- 
 culous pretences? It would at any time have been a 
 mad measure, but at this a perfect phrenzy. 
 
 It would seem neither fit nor necessary to pursue 
 this further : so I shall satisfy myself with observing, 
 that after coolly waiting and deliberating, as I have 
 described, execution is at length done, and on the 
 principle which has been examined of Power, 
 boldly directed to the accomplishment of its design; 
 which, with the indifference of a mechanical inven-
 
 94 
 
 tion, rolling in its destined course, to the prescribed 
 law of the mechanist; deaf to all cries, and proof 
 against all impediment, sweeps with relentless fury 
 every object in his Way. 
 
 It is impossible for any man to form another idea 
 of the transaction. If it had been an act reconcile- 
 able to any just and avowablc principle, it would be 
 natural to expect that the principle would be re- 
 sorted to, and acted on in a similar case, if any 
 such had thereafter occurred. Such a one did ac- 
 tually occur in a short time afterwards. And what 
 is extraordinary, with all the alleged circumstances, 
 infinitely more aggravated, than in the hypothetical 
 case of the Nabob. 
 
 In searching the cabinet of Tippoo (and God 
 knows if the Cabinets of other Courts were ransacked 
 and explored, we might find abundance of such ma- 
 terials) certain documents were found, which im- 
 peached the conduct of the Peishwa then in alliance 
 with the Company. 
 
 The Marquis Wellesley, in addressing Colonel 
 Close, the English Resident at Poonah, in a letter, 
 which is also on the table of the House of Commons, 
 takes occasion to give, in pretty forcible terms, his 
 opinion of the Peishwa's conduct. Amongst other 
 things, he says 
 
 " That the Peishwa adopted a system of. measures, by 
 " which he hoped to secure every attainable gratification of his 
 " hatred and jealousy of the British name. 
 
 " That he professed a cordial disposition to co-operate with 
 " the British arms, &c. but by a course of studied evasion, 
 " and systematic deceit, he avoided all active interference in 
 " the contest with Tippoo, and actually maintained an ami- 
 " cable intercourse with the enemy, through the channel of 
 " Tippoo's Vakeels; whom the Peishwa persisted in detaining 
 " at his Court, in opposition to the repeated and earnest re- 
 " monstrances of the Governor General.
 
 r< The combined evidence of these documents, and of the 
 " Peishwa's conduct during the war, affords unequivocal proof 
 " of the hostility of his disposition towards the British PoWer." 
 
 And again 
 
 " The Peishwa has not only been uniformly and progres- 
 " sively jealous of the power of the British in India, but actu- 
 " ally hostile to the utmost practicable extent, consistently with 
 " the security of his Government, and with the irresolution 
 " and timidity of his character." 
 
 But large as was the actual offence of the Peishwa 
 (as it is described in the indictment of the Governor 
 General 1 ;, it was not large enough for the purpose. 
 So he is railed at and abused for being a traitor only 
 by halves! For that he had not given some bold 
 and decisive sign of treason; that he had been a 
 puny villain, without spirit sufficient to be the de- 
 clared foe of the all-powerful East India Company. 
 In action, he \sjudged-, when quiescent, he is calum- 
 niatedIn both, his guilt is decreed, for it was deter- 
 mined that it should be so. 
 
 Now the Nabob of the Carnatic was as white as 
 snow, when placed by the side of an offender so 
 black: and what follows 
 
 The Peishwa, by his neglect of his engagements 
 with the Company,- and of the overtures of the Go- 
 vernor General, falls into disputes with his neigh- 
 bours, and is ultimately driven, an outcasr, without 
 a follower, from the circuit of his dominions; and is 
 obliged to solicit an asylum in the territories of the 
 Company. 
 
 Does the Governor General put in his claim, or 
 assert his pretended rights to the territory of the 
 Peishwa, arising out of the breach, the glaring breach 
 of his engagements? Does he talk of satisfaction for 
 the past, or security for the future conduct of his 
 Ally ? What is the course of reasoning and action into
 
 which the Governor General then falls, for the satis* 
 faction of his just revenge. 
 
 You can expect nothing less than that the Peishwa, 
 like the NabobVizier, shall be caged j or like Marsyas, 
 be flayed alive. 
 
 You need scarcely be informed, Sir, that so gra- 
 cious an object did the dethroned Peishwa appear 
 at this moment, that the Governor General wantonly 
 interposed in his quarrels, and laid the foundation of 
 an extensive and ruinous warfare, which has unin- 
 terruptedly prevailed to this moment ; and now 
 rages, and of which cannot be foreseen, either the 
 termination or the event : a warfare, which has 
 exhausted the Company's coffers, and dried up the 
 means of the defence of their extensive settlements ; 
 and which, if protracted, must ruin, with their credit 
 abroad, their affairs and their resources at home. 
 I do not mean to find fault with the act of the Go- 
 vernor General, in the case of the Peishwa ; nor 
 shall I, for it is not my business at present, in- 
 vestigate, much less attempt to decide on the in- 
 trinsic merits of the action. All I intended is done. 
 I have shown, that the principle of the Governor 
 General was an easy and convenient principle ; to 
 be enforced or relaxed according to his will and 
 pleasure. His right, as his argument, was in his 
 sword. 
 
 Taking it to be an exercise of power, the question 
 will then be, if it has been wisely and profitably, if 
 notjusfty resorted to ? And the shortest inquiry will 
 convince us, that neither the occasion warranted the 
 recourse to it, nor the opportunity, if it had been 
 available, improved by the Governor General, ei- 
 ther in the manner, or to the extent which it ought. 
 
 I take it, that it will not be disputed, so that the 
 event of his policy were accomplished, that the 
 effecting of it with the least possible injury, to sup- 
 posed rights and feelings of individuals, and with 
 the least possible insult to neighbouring Courts, was
 
 - ; ; 97 
 
 a most desirable thing. And next to this, that the 
 job, when done, I am speaking in the cant of trade> 
 should be made as profitable, to the Company as it 
 could be. 
 
 It was manifest, through all the ncgociation about 
 the Succession to the Musnud, that the whole of the 
 family of his late Highness the Natob Omdut uj 
 Omrah j the whole of the noble and respectable 
 Mahomedans about the Court ; the whole of the 
 people of the Carnatic, took a peculiar interest in 
 the claims of his Highness Ally Hussein. I may 
 satisfy myself with stating this, as the circumstance 
 will not admit of question. It ts apparent, in a 
 hundred places, in the papers before the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 It was, therefore, the peculiar duty of the local 
 Governments, to have studied and persevered to 
 have procured, if it had been practicable, the ac- 
 ceptance by the Prince. Ally Hussein, of the terms 
 which were afterwards offered to Azeem ul Dowlah. 
 
 The answer to this, perhaps, may be ; why we 
 did endeavour to treat with His Highness ? but he 
 would not come into our terms. And, 1 admit, 
 that this answer would, for a moment, be entitled 
 to credit. But it will then be asked, in what manner 
 did you treat ? Was it likely that the extreme kind- 
 ness of your address should win, at the instant, the 
 heart of the young Prince ? Or were the terms of 
 your propositions so easy, as they could not be re- 
 fused ? Be that as it may, it will be replied, he knew 
 what the terms were, and he had time enough to 
 consider them. 
 
 But surely a day or two of delay would have pro- 
 duced no very bad consequence ; if it could have 
 promised an adjustment less violent and sanguinary 
 in its effect ? No, the Prince was determined in his 
 conduct, and a victim to bad advice j and therefore 
 we betook ourselves to another with more com- 
 pliancy of temper.
 
 98 
 
 But was there always in the disposition of the 
 Prince Ally Hussein, this determined acrimonious 
 spirit of hostility to the mild proposals of the Com- 
 pany ? Did he not exhibit, at any time of the nego- 
 ciation, a submission to the will of his Allies ? Yes, 
 but ic was then too late, for we were treating with 
 the Prince Azeem ul Dowlah. But would it not 
 have been better, to have broken off such nego- 
 ciation, if not concluded, than have effected a mea- 
 sure which was certain in its nature to give a general 
 disgust ? No : the seal was placed by the Prince on 
 his own fate ; there was no place for repentance, no 
 retractation of his act. Besides, would it not have 
 been doing, at the period, an injury to the rights of 
 the Prince Azeem ul Dowlah ? 
 
 Now, pray, who was Azeem ul Dowlah ? And 
 what his pretensions ? The father of Azeem ul Dow- 
 lah was Ameer ul Omrah (second Son of Mahom- 
 med Ally) a personage very noticeable on the re- 
 cords of the East India Company, and ever repre- 
 sented as entertaining sentiments the most hostile to 
 the British influence; so that if treason were inherit- 
 able, Azeem ul Dowlah, on the principle of the Go- 
 vernor General, could have no very meritorious 
 claims. As to any founded on hereditary descent, it 
 was clear that he had none-, as between him and the 
 Musnud, there were several intervenient claims j so 
 that in point of mere right, he had as much claim to 
 the throne as the veriest stranger in the Country. 
 
 To t?.lk of any rights of Azeem ul Dowlah, there - 
 fi re, as standing in the v/ay of the acceptance of the 
 prsterior submission of the Prince, would be farcical 
 in the extreme ; for you have seen the anxiety of 
 the Governor General, after the conclusion of the 
 original Treaty between Azeem ul Dowlah and the 
 Government of Fort Saint George, to do away the 
 possible supposition of the succession of that Prince 
 being founded on the principle of hereditary right,
 
 99 
 
 or on any other, than the moderation and bounty of 
 the Company. 
 
 If then the feelings of mankind, and the principles 
 of justice, were to be scorned and set at defiance, 
 has the sin been rendered productive of pecuniary 
 advantage, in a degree proportionate to its enormity ? 
 Has the young Prince's blood been pompensated in 
 price by shekels of silver ? 
 
 Are the company so rich j or are they so callous, 
 as to be careless equally of their wealth as the cha- 
 racter of their Asiatic Governments, that their Go- 
 vernors may do just what they please, with the one, 
 and with the other? The melancholy state of the 
 Company's finances, and their frequent applications 
 to Parliament for pecuniary aid, demonstrate at least 
 that there is need of some care of their concerns j 
 but I am free to confess, that steeped so much in 
 blood as they are, the character of their government^ 
 is almost beyond restitution. 
 
 If neither right nor conscience were to be con- 
 sulted in the act, what need was there to fashion an 
 automaton Nabob, at the expence which has been 
 paid for it in the Treaty of 1 8O1 ? He is not created, 
 nor pretended to be created, for any one efficient 
 use ; nor is he loco-motive, unle-ss moved by the wire 
 of the master of the puppet. A barren sceptre is 
 put into his hand, and a crown of thorns upon his 
 head j and, in reality a slave, he is hailed with the 
 title of king ! A king without a kingdom, a sovereign 
 without a people, a -people without a sovereign, have 
 the Indian Legislators formed, for the ridicule and 
 mockery of the office, and for the astonishment of 
 the Eastern world ! 
 
 But it may be said, that there was some advantage 
 to be gained by appearances, and that a show of de- 
 licacy was nece; sary. 
 
 That the Treaty was an imfcsiig instrument, and 
 o 2
 
 100 
 
 was likely to have its beneficial effects at the 
 Courts of Asia ! I have just explained, how nice 
 the Indian Governors have been about appearances. 
 And if you will look at the Treaty of 18O1, you will 
 observe how far the squeamish ness of delicacy has 
 been carried. 
 
 I have remarked on the situationin which the Treaty 
 has placed the creature of its hands. You have only 
 to see the principle, or, as the Indian Government 
 affect the term, the 'vital sprit of the Treaty, to pro- 
 nounce it one of the most clumsy, bungling, and 
 coarse attempts that was ever made for the decep- 
 tion of mankind. You will see the Company, in the 
 instrument^ giving the whole country or" the Carnatic 
 with one hand to the Nabob; and, with the other, 
 receiving it back from him as a mark of his gracious 
 bounty. You will see them duping and cajolling 
 themselves, whilst they are supposing the world, the 
 deluded instrument of the grossest imposition. 
 
 For the chance of the success or this juggler's 
 trick, it certainly could not have been much worth 
 the while of the Company to pay, as they have done 
 in the Treaty, any very large sum. 
 
 I am "aware that some pains, as well as money, 
 have been employed in giving a sort of colouring to 
 this act of power at the Eastern Courts, and else- 
 where. Some of them, and more especially the 
 Court of thq Nizam, might, as it was foreseen, wish 
 an explanation of a measure which in principle 
 might not at first sight be comprehended, or ad- 
 mitcd. The Resident at Hydrabad has indeed 
 hinted at the distrust of that Court, which had been 
 raised by the transaction ; and has thanked the Go- 
 vernor General for having transmitted to him the 
 Declaration and Appendix, not indeed to be shown to 
 the Court, but as affording him th6 means of setting 
 up an excuse for the British Government, or, in 
 pcher words, of giving him the materials for blacken-
 
 101 
 
 ing the memories of the Company's departed 
 Allies. 
 
 Another labour has been assumed by the Eastern 
 Governments, with the same intent, of making the 
 idol of their creation subscribe letters, giving a fa- 
 bulous relation of the principle on which he had 
 been set up for worship. For it is impossible not to 
 respect the letters of Azeem ul Dowlah, as the letters 
 of the Government of Fort Saint George. He has 
 a Secretary of their approbation, if not of their ap- 
 pointment ; and they are the channel of the commu- 
 nication of all his correspondence with the Eastern 
 and other Courts j and have the liberty to retain or 
 reject it at their pleasure. 
 
 And the letters of Azeem ul Dowlah are no slight 
 evidence, both of the known injustice of the act, and 
 of the impossible excuse for it, but also of the ma- 
 nifest design in the Indian Governments to impose on 
 every one who might be supposed to have a regard 
 for the principle of hereditary right, which had been 
 trod upon and violated by the favoured succession of 
 that Prince. 
 
 In his communication to the Mogul, the fountain 
 from which all the Sovereignty of the East is derived ; 
 and to the great and illustrious personage, who, with 
 the hearc-felt wishes of the people, and the wise 
 provision of the law, is one day to fill a throne of 
 distinguished grace, and undiminished royalty, hap- 
 pily nearer to our view: Azeem ul Dowlah is made 
 to represent his rights, as growing out of hereditary 
 descent; a foundation haply to be favoured by the 
 princely, high-born minds, to whom the representa- 
 tion was made. But in his letters to the Court of 
 Directors, to whom he well knew, that such a com- 
 munication would be more a disrecommendation, than 
 a circumstance of favour, he is obliged to express 
 himself, with all the humility of their abject vassal 
 and dependent. Has shame no blush ?
 
 102 
 
 In this way has the property of the Company been 
 won! In this way, worn! 
 
 The consequences, the natural consequences, re- 
 sulting from such a line of policy (if it can be so 
 termed), with respect to Asiatic Courts, are too 
 manifest to be detailed. Some unhappy results we 
 are now witnessing in the distress of the Treasury of 
 the Company; and in the waste, the unnecessary and 
 irremediable waste of the blood of their soldiers. 
 The feelings of the Country are too much stricken 
 to require that this should be enforced. 
 
 Of the immediate consequences, which trod on the 
 foot of the act, and attended, from its completion, 
 the youthful Prince, whom it went to depose; the 
 wretched family of the Nabob Omdut ul Omrah; 
 and the noble personages, who had held high official 
 situations in the administration of the Government of 
 the Carnatic I had intended to speak. But my 
 subject has extended beyond my expectation ; and I 
 feel myself too exhausted, at the instant, to give to 
 this part of my narrative, either the vigour, or the 
 feeling which it calls for. 
 
 If there be any thing flagrant or wicked in the 
 dethronement itself of the Prince,, which I think I 
 have incontestably proved; the guilt of the deed is 
 doubled, by the cruel, barbarous, and unfeeling 
 manner in which it was brought about, and perfected 
 in all its parts. Of this I shall not fail to give you 
 an account at a future day. 
 
 I have now clearly demonstrated, Sir, that the 
 dethronement of the Prince Ally Hussein, the lawful 
 Sovereign of the Carnatic, and the placing of Azeem 
 ul Dowlah in his stead, was an act of arbitrary power 
 and flagrant injustice. 
 
 That the influence of the State has been used to 
 the destruction of the laws of the State, which have 
 denounced the accession of dominion, but by legal 
 and declared means; that the attempted justification
 
 103 
 
 of the Indian Governments, is neither founded in 
 fact, nor defensible in system: that instead of truth, 
 it presents falshood; instead of right, fraud; instead 
 of conviction, defeat. It avows motives which are 
 mentioned, but not felt ; and asserts principles, which 
 their acts are always contradicting. It is founded on 
 an imaginary breach of treaty, whilst, in reality, it 
 exhibits in its presumed defence, the most glaring 
 abuse; the most palpable violation, and the most 
 inexcusable contempt of the most solemn obliga- 
 tions. 
 
 It affords not the show or semblance of an excuse, 
 whilst it boldly avows an act, which puts the boasted 
 pride of England, and of Englishmen, to indelible 
 and unspeakable shame ! 
 
 The only retribution, which can now be made, on 
 the exposure of such deeds, is, by giving a striking 
 example to the world, that such things cannot be 
 perpetrated, without rousing the indignant spirit of 
 the Nation, whose character they asperse ; nor, when 
 perfected, can possibly escape the punishment which 
 they provoke. The distance of the scene of action 
 is not so wide, as to destroy the interest, or to cut off 
 the proof, on which the national justice is invoked, 
 and is to be asserted. And the season, I cannot but 
 contemplate, as peculiarly adapted to the inquiry. 
 
 The administration of the affairs of the Country 
 and of the East, is committed to new hands. And 
 I am sure, that they will be as happy, as they are 
 fortunate, in the occasion of showing that it has been 
 confided to pure ones. They will be glad, not only 
 to exhibit to their countrymen, a foretaste of the 
 virtue of their administration, while they will afford 
 to the Indian community, an instance of that integrity 
 on which they mean their official character to rest. 
 The season is propitious, too, in point of justice to 
 the parties who are implicated in the transaction ; 
 they are all at hand to answer for the palpable acts 
 of their Government. And the evidence is as little
 
 out of reach, as the persons of the principals accused. 
 It rests on the table of the House of Commons, and 
 c/ies loudly for an immediate investigation. 
 
 The terror of the suggested inquiry, from the fate 
 of a late impeachment, is removed, by the near pre- 
 sence of the proofs, and of the parties. The expence 
 of the prosecution, if that were a consideration, is 
 already paid; the scaffold is erected. Nothing re- 
 mains, but that justice take its course. 
 
 The Company may feel a disinclination, to sur- 
 render Provinces, which have once come (no matter 
 how) to their possession. But let the just spirit of 
 our Government exert itself. 
 
 May the world be taught that the eye of British 
 justice penetrates into the remotest regions; nor is 
 her energy destroyed by time. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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