B 
 
 UC-NRLF 
 
 SB 
 
 MATERIALISM 
 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 
REESE LIBRARY 
 
 ill' TIIK 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received 
 Accessions No. 
 
 X 
 
MATERIALISM 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN. 
 
MATERIALISM 
 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN 
 
 BY A LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 1881 
 
M-3 
 
I. 
 
 ON NATURE. 
 
 N a controversy respecting the rela- 
 tive merits and capabilities of the 
 German and French languages, the advocate 
 for the latter challenged his adversary to 
 translate * Nature' into pure German. There 
 was no response. It could not be denied 
 that the Teutons had borrowed the word 
 ' Natur ' from the Latin, or some Latin 
 dialect ; and their language, therefore, stood 
 condemned, as wanting a word to express a 
 conception of the most ordinary character. 
 
 I have since been led to inquire into the 
 meaning of this word, so frequently employed 
 both in its original form, as a substantive, 
 and in its derivatives, ' natural ' and ' super- 
 
 A 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 natural/ and I have arrived at the conclusion 
 that a language is not to be hastily convicted 
 of poverty, because it does not offer a word 
 of equivalent sense. 
 
 The word * Nature ' is sometimes em- 
 ployed to denote the objects of sense 
 collectively, as when we speak of the 
 'beauties of Nature;* and when it receives 
 this meaning, it may be rendered by the 
 Teutonic Welt with sufficient accuracy. 
 But the word we are considering frequently 
 receives another and a very different signifi- 
 cation, even from philosophical writers, who 
 speak of Nature as possessing a generative 
 or directive and foreseeing, if not a creative, 
 power. 
 
 We sometimes hear it said that the love 
 of parents for their children is a provision of, 
 or is implanted by Nature, for the preserva- 
 tion of the species. Gravitation is said to 
 be a law of Nature. Such and such things 
 come ' by nature,' ' are natural.' There is a 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 power by which they are what they are, 
 a power, not intelligent, not independent 
 of material things or energies, but pervad- 
 ing and directing them. Fire burns 'by 
 nature/ and so on. 
 
 These forms of expression are so common 
 that we have much difficulty in dispensing 
 with the use of them ; but I hold them to 
 involve an erroneous assumption : and it is 
 for the word Nature when so employed that 
 we seek in vain for a Teutonic equivalent, 
 and are forced to employ the Latin ' Natura.' 
 I propose to inquire whether when so used, 
 when used as something distinct from Welt, 
 the word possesses a meaning which deserves 
 to be expressed. 
 
 In the first place, we may safely assert 
 that Nature, supposing it to be something 
 other than the objects of sense x exter- 
 nal things, as they are called cannot 
 
 1 I use the expression, believing it to be generally intelli- 
 gible, not as philosophically accurate. 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 itself be an object of sense. It would, other- 
 wise, be an external thing, or a combination 
 of external things. In order that a belief in 
 the existence of Nature in the sense we are 
 considering may be justified, we must show 
 that the supposition or hypothesis of the 
 existence of Nature is probable ; or, in other 
 words, we must show that the supposition, 
 if adopted, accounts for and explains ob- 
 served phenomena. But how can the sup- 
 position that an unintelligent power exists 
 account for the phenomena which we ob- 
 serve ? We are led to believe that the 
 objects of our senses act upon each other, 
 and upon our senses in modes which, in 
 many instances, we can define. Why they 
 so act we do not know. 
 
 Admit that there exists an unintelligent 
 power called Nature, which pervades all 
 things : how does this supposition help us 
 to explain observed phenomena ? Bodies 
 attract each other. Why ? By a law of 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 Nature. It is Nature which causes their 
 mutual attraction. Why does Nature cause 
 attraction ? Nature proposes no end to it- 
 self, since, by supposition, it is unintelligent. 
 Nature, then, for no reason that we can 
 assign, causes bodies to attract each other. 
 It might equally cause them to repel 
 each other. Parents love their children by a 
 provision of Nature. Why do not parents 
 hate their children by a provision of 
 Nature, if Nature is unintelligent ? The 
 supposition that an unintelligent power 
 called Nature exists explains nothing. We 
 must, therefore, lay aside the hypothesis that 
 such an unintelligent power exists. 
 
 If we reject the supposition that there 
 exists an unintelligent power under the 
 name Nature, then the term ' natural ' 
 loses the signification which is frequently 
 attached to it. That is considered natural 
 which exists or occurs by nature, by means 
 of an unintelligent power, as supernatural is 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 applied to occurrences referred by us to an 
 intelligent power, interrupting the course of 
 events which take place by the unintelligent 
 power, or Nature. We must, therefore, if 
 we wish our language to be in accordance 
 with philosophy, reject the terms ' natural ' 
 and ' supernatural' in their ordinary signi- 
 fication, as importing a distinction which 
 cannot be shown to exist. 
 
 We may, of course, if we please, employ 
 the word Nature to denote ordinary exist- 
 ences and occurrences, but there is this 
 objection to such employment, that it does 
 by usage imply not only that the existences 
 and occurrences to which it is applied are 
 ordinary, but also that the origin of these 
 existences and occurrences is in some 
 way explained by the assumption of an 
 unintelligent power called Nature. It 
 seems, therefore, safer to discard this word 
 in philosophical discussion as productive 
 of error; and to employ in its stead 
 
ON NATURE. 
 
 the words ' external objects/ and instead of 
 'natural' to adopt 'usual' or 'ordinary,' 
 and instead of ' supernatural' to use the 
 words ' unusual ' or ' excessively unusual.' 
 
II. 
 
 ANCIENT MATERIALISM. 
 
 F we lay aside, as wholly without 
 rational foundation, the hypothesis 
 of an unintelligent power called Nature, then 
 it appears to me that we are reduced to the 
 choice between two other suppositions in 
 order to account for usual existences and 
 occurrences : namely, the supposition that 
 they result from intelligence, and the sup- 
 position that they result without intelligence 
 or, in other words, from chance. If we 
 do not admit intelligence as a cause of 
 these existences and occurrences if we say 
 that they arise without any intelligence I 
 see no alternative but chance, the negation 
 of intelligence. 
 

 ANCIENT MATERIALISM. 
 
 The theory that all things have their 
 origin in chance, advanced by Epicurus, is 
 known to us best by the work of Lucretius 
 De Rerum Naturd. All that the subtle 
 intellect of the Grecian master all that the 
 poetical genius of his Roman disciple could 
 contribute towards rendering this theory 
 attractive and plausible, has been lavished 
 on its development. Yet, in the first place, 
 the whole theory rests on a very disputable 
 assumption the eternal existence of par- 
 ticles of matter, indivisible, perfectly hard, 
 and constantly coming into collision with 
 each other; and, in the next place, the 
 assumption, if accepted, does not explain 
 the facts supposed to result from it. No 
 attempt even is made to assign a cause for 
 the existence of these particles ; they are 
 assumed to exist and to be put in motion 
 by Nature ; in other words, without a cause. 
 For, besides these particles, according to 
 Epicurus, nothing exists, except indeed the 
 
i o ANCIENT MA TERIALISM. 
 
 ' Natura Deorum,' which in no degree in- 
 terferes with the visible world 
 
 ' Semota a nostris rebus sejunctaque longe.' 
 
 And it is scarcely necessary to observe that 
 even this assumption is wholly insufficient 
 to explain the most ordinary phenomena. 
 These phenomena are noted by Lucretius 
 with much ability the generations of animals 
 and vegetables succeeding each other, con- 
 stantly preserving a resemblance to their 
 predecessors, and differing from them within 
 certain limits. This is the result of what 
 he terms the 'semina rerum:' but how these 
 semina are produced by his atoms he does 
 not explain. This very constancy in 'the 
 nature of things,' to which he frequently 
 alludes, seems entirely out of harmony with 
 his premises, where chance governs all. 
 The difficulties of Lucretius are immensely 
 increased when he attempts to explain the 
 existence of sensation. How, out of par- 
 
ANCIENT MA TERIALISM. T i 
 
 tides possessing, by hypothesis, only hard- 
 ness and weight, can be constructed a 
 sentient being ? How is it that particles, 
 absolutely void of sensation, should, by 
 being assembled in certain groups (the 
 result of accident), become endowed with 
 sensation, an entirely new quality, in no 
 manner resembling any quality which, by 
 supposition, the separate particles possess, 
 differing from those qualities, not in degree, 
 but in essence and kind ? How all this 
 comes about remains without even an 
 attempt at solution. 
 
 The only resource of Lucretius is to sup- 
 pose that the particles of the soul and mind, 
 1 anima' and ' animus/ are much smaller than 
 other particles. But it is obvious that this 
 supposition does not help him to explain 
 why these very small parti^es, collected in 
 sufficient numbers, ^^^jy amd/ think. He 
 would repudiate the nofjpn that the in- 
 dividual particles possess these^qualities 
 
1 2 ANCIENT MA TERIALISM. 
 
 such a notion would destroy the very basis 
 of his theory and he does not explain how 
 their aggregation can give birth to totally 
 new faculties. 
 
 He, in fact, asserts that the 'anima' and 
 1 animus' must consist of particles, because he 
 has established to his own satisfaction that 
 nothing exists besides hard and indestructi- 
 ble particles ; and then, taking cognisance of 
 only one phenomenon, that of death, from 
 the body remaining unaltered at the moment 
 when death takes place, when the ' anima ' 
 and ' animus* disappear, he concludes that 
 only very minute particles have been with- 
 drawn, and that the mind and soul, there- 
 fore, consist of such particles. 
 
 The mode in which Lucretius explains 
 the existence of free-will is still more re- 
 markable. The particles of matter fall 
 through the void, and their collisions give 
 rise to all the phenomena of Nature ; but 
 they do not fall quite vertically. If they 
 
j& 
 
 UN] t'Y 
 
 ANCIE^^M^TERIALISM. 13 
 
 did, all things would be bound by an iron 
 and inflexible rule of fate. Therefore, they 
 must decline a little, a very little, from the 
 vertical. Why they decline from the ver- 
 tical is as little explained as why they fall 
 vertically, and we are left equally in the 
 dark as to the manner in which freedom of 
 will is produced by these exceedingly small 
 deviations. After this we may well ask 
 whether any faith can exceed the faith 
 which philosophers place in their own 
 theories. / 
 
 o 
 
 jAt^' 
 
 1 n 
 
III. 
 
 MODERN MATERIALISM. 
 
 T is not a very uncommon belief that 
 modern discoveries have rendered 
 the materialist theory more probable, that 
 they have gone far towards demonstrating 
 that all phenomena are produced by the 
 combination of material particles acting ac- 
 cording to certain general laws. 
 
 But it may be observed, in the first place, 
 that the assumptions on which this conclu- 
 sion is based are much larger than those 
 of Lucretius. His hypothesis required an 
 infinite number of perfectly hard particles 
 existing from eternity to eternity, perpetu- 
 ally in motion, and constantly coming in 
 contact with each other. The superstruc- 
 
MODERN MA TERIALISM. 1 5 
 
 ture of modern materialism also is built on 
 the hypothesis of an infinite number of 
 indivisible particles, self-existing from eter- 
 nity to eternity. 
 
 But these particles are divided into many 
 classes, each class constituting a simple sub- 
 stance. And the particles of each class 
 differ widely from the particles of another 
 class. They differ in weight, and in their 
 affinities with other particles. Particles of 
 different classes combine according to certain 
 laws, but these laws are various, and dis- 
 covered only by experience. Moreover, be- 
 sides the simple substances composed of 
 particles, there are certain agents or energies 
 differing from all these classes more widely 
 than the classes differ among themselves. 
 The agents called heat, electricity, magne- 
 tism, light, etc., are also subject to laws, as 
 they are termed, but to laws by no means 
 similar to those which govern the action of 
 the simple substances on each other, and 
 
1 6 MODERN MA TERIALISM. 
 
 sometimes interfering greatly with those 
 actions. Again, I imagine no one at the 
 present day believes, that the ultimate par- 
 ticles received by modern science actually 
 come into collision with each other, or that 
 if they did come into such contact, the fact 
 would explain in the smallest degree the 
 various qualities of the simple substances. 
 The modern materialist must therefore, 
 before attempting to explain the phenomena 
 of matter, require to have granted the self- 
 existence of an apparatus of particles, far 
 more complicated than that imagined to be 
 sufficient for this purpose by the ancient 
 philosophers. The particles must be sup- 
 posed to be endowed with various qualities, 
 to associate with each other according to 
 various laws, and to be acted upon by those 
 energies we have mentioned (whether them- 
 selves consisting of particles or not) accord- 
 ing to other laws, doubtless certain, but not 
 yet by any means fully ascertained. 
 
MODERN MATERIALISM. 
 
 The modern material hypothesis, there- 
 fore, draws much more largely on the faith 
 of its professors, than the ancient material- 
 istic doctrine ; which only demanded the 
 eternal existence of an infinite number of 
 perfectly hard particles, of various sizes, 
 coming constantly into collision with each 
 other, diverging from the direction of their 
 motion, only very slightly, in order to 
 account for free-will. 
 
 But if the modern schools of material 
 philosophy demand wider assumptions than 
 the ancient, with regard to the self-existing 
 particles which it requires to have granted, 
 we must admit that its success in explaining 
 the phenomena of matter is much more than 
 proportionately increased. Or, perhaps, we 
 should speak more correctly by saying that 
 the ancient philosophy explained nothing, the 
 modern much. Although the laws by which 
 small parts of bodies act upon each other 
 are still unknown, and although the laws of 
 
1 8 MODERN MA TERIALISM. 
 
 crystallisation even are still undiscovered, 
 yet we know with accuracy the results which 
 will ensue from the close contact of bodies, 
 whether simple or compound, and from the 
 application to them of heat and electricity: 
 and, that the field of discovery will hereafter 
 be widened, almost indefinitely, can scarcely 
 be doubted. 
 
 An enthusiastic disciple of the modern 
 materialist school might even find little 
 difficulty in believing, that the varied pheno- 
 mena of vegetable life may one day be 
 deduced from certain qualities of the simple 
 substances, of which vegetables are composed. 
 I believe, however, I am correct in saying 
 that not a single step in this direction has 
 as yet been made. 
 
 But the difficulty, to which all other diffi- 
 culties appear light, has been as little sur- 
 mounted by the modern as by the ancient 
 materialist. The one can as little as the other 
 pass over the gulf which separates the sentient 
 
MODERN MATERIALISM. 19 
 
 being from the non-sentient matter. It is 
 impossible to deny the existence of sensation, 
 it is impossible to account for it by any combi- 
 nation, however complicated, of non-sentient 
 particles. The combination may produce 
 many wonderful effects, but they must, as far 
 as our reason can be trusted, produce effects 
 not differing in essence from the qualities of 
 the component parts. 
 
 An automaton may be constructed which 
 shall walk, talk, write ; but is it conceivable 
 that it can be constructed so as to feel ? 
 And if this be possible, the fact cannot be 
 explained on materialist principles : matter is 
 by hypothesis non-sentient; the properties of 
 matter, affinity, attraction, repulsion, and so 
 on. You cannot conceive any combination 
 of these qualities producing sensation or 
 capacity for sensation ; and if you admit 
 sensation as a quality of matter, that sentient 
 matter is not the matter of the materialist. 
 Hence even the simple phenomenon of sen- ' 
 
20 MODERN MA TERIALISM. 
 
 sation remains as much unaccounted for by 
 modern as by ancient materialism. 
 
 The other incidents of animal life are still 
 more inexplicable than those of mere sensation 
 upon the material hypothesis. The suitable- 
 ness of the organs of sense to receive the 
 vibrations of the mediums with which they 
 are in contact, the fitness of the internal 
 organs to receive and assimilate air and 
 food, the suitableness of the sexes to each 
 other, and of one sex to the nourishment 
 and rearing of progeny, all these and many 
 other arrangements, without which the races 
 of animals, including man, must soon cease to 
 exist, all these aptitudes which the most 
 robust believer in materialism would hardly 
 venture to describe as the results of chance 
 and accident, seem to call loudly for at least 
 an attempt at explanation from the advocates 
 of a theory which professes to be founded 
 on reason and experience. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 HE ' Theory of Development ' would 
 not, I think, supposing it to be 
 established by observation, at all assist the 
 materialists in surmounting these difficulties. 
 The ' Theory of Development ' assumes the 
 existence of something to be developed, and 
 that this something is organised, possessing 
 a very simple organisation, it may be, but 
 still possessing some organisation. 
 
 No difficulty is avoided by supposing the 
 ' protoplasm ' to be extremely small. Small 
 and large are merely relative terms, and if a 
 protoplasm has a definite form, it is conceiv- 
 able that the protoplasm consists of parts as 
 much smaller than the protoplasm itself, as 
 it is smaller than the earth. Again, if we 
 
22 THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 admit that the organisation of the protoplasm 
 is the result of chance, how are the develop- 
 ment of organs of respiration, digestion, or 
 of sense, to be accounted for ? A living 
 creature which possesses sight might be 
 supposed to improve that sight through the 
 desire of seeing more perfectly, but how can 
 a being which does not see, and knows 
 nothing of sight, form a desire to see ? 
 How and why is the rudimentary organ of 
 sight formed ? How is the desire of sight 
 generated ? Does matter in general desire 
 to see, or only certain kinds of matter, or 
 certain combinations of matter ? 
 
 It is perfectly true that the organ of an 
 animal is developed, by the animal being 
 placed in circumstances which call for the 
 use of that particular organ ; it is true that 
 the development of the organ may be 
 transmitted to the posterity of the animal ; 
 but these facts are powerless to explain the 
 origin of that which is developed. 
 
THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. 23 
 
 Again, the causes that produce the phe- 
 nomena of development, which are estab- 
 lished by observation, are in no degree 
 explained by the theory itself. Why does 
 the desire to obtain more perfect results, by 
 the use of a particular organ, improve that 
 organ ? Why are the peculiarities of the 
 parent transmitted to the offspring ? Why 
 does an animal select as its mate one of the 
 opposite sex distinguished for its beauty ? 
 To account for the fact as resulting from 
 the principle of ' natural selection' is merely to 
 say, in other words, that selection is observed 
 to take place on this ground. Why it so 
 takes place is left entirely unaccounted for. 
 
 Then with regard to the higher mental 
 faculties : it is admitted on all hands that 
 they are susceptible of improvement, through 
 the desire and attempt to improve them, or 
 simply by being used ; but how can they 
 originate in this desire or use ? How can the 
 desire to improve these faculties or the use of 
 
24 THE THEOR Y OF DE VELOPMENT. 
 
 them precede their existence ? The ' Theory 
 of Development/ as its name imports, never 
 can explain the commencement of anything. 
 When brought forward for this purpose, its 
 propounders resemble the philosophers who 
 taught that the earth was supported by an 
 elephant, and the elephant by a tortoise, and 
 so on. They merely remove the difficulty 
 by one step, or by several steps. Supposing 
 it to be established that the intellect of a 
 man is only the developed intellect of a 
 monkey, and that of a monkey the developed 
 intellect of a dog, you must at length come 
 to the end of the chain, and be brought face 
 to face with the question, How did intellect 
 in its lowest form originate ? 
 
 It is clear therefore that while the Theory 
 of Development may account for the aug- 
 mentation of that which is, it cannot account 
 for the generation of that which is not. If 
 this theory should prevail, it may show how 
 a simple sentient being is developed into a 
 
THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. 25 
 
 more complicated one, but it leaves un- 
 touched the question, How can non-sentient 
 particles, in consequence of being arranged 
 in a particular manner, become sentient ? It 
 is all very well to talk of * protoplasm/ but 
 the name does not remove the difficulty. 
 A protoplasm on the hypothesis contains 
 the germ of sensation. It is composed of 
 particles, if the materialist theory be true ; 
 and if that theory be true, the particles of 
 which it is composed are non-sentient. 
 How then does the materialist theory 
 account for sensation, either in protoplasms 
 or in the development of protoplasms ? 
 
 The conclusion then is that the ma- 
 terialist theory, the theory that attributes 
 all phenomena to particles self-existent and 
 possessing certain properties acting accord- 
 ing to definite laws, that this theory, while 
 sufficient to explain many chemical pheno- 
 mena, and promising to explain many others, 
 entirely fails to explain the existence of 
 
26 THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 sensation, and, a multo fortiori, the existence 
 of higher and more complicated mental 
 phenomena. 
 
 The possibility still remains that certain 
 particles of matter are endowed with sensa- 
 tion, and that sentient beings are composed, 
 in part at least, of such particles. Such a 
 supposition, however, is entirely fatal to 
 materialism, which professes to explain 
 mental phenomena by means of the ordinary 
 properties of matter. To admit that certain 
 self-constituted particles, such as, in this 
 theory, material particles are supposed to 
 be, possess also sentient properties, is, in 
 effect, to admit the existence of mind, or 
 that which is capable of sensation, existing 
 like matter from all eternity. On this 
 supposition the materialist theory fades 
 away, and we again arrive at the ordinary 
 belief in the existence of two principles 
 mind and matter. 
 
 The theory which would assume that the 
 
THE THEOR Y OF DE VELOPMENT. 2 7 
 
 higher mental qualities of sentient beings 
 are composed of very numerous mental 
 existences, in the same manner that a 
 tangible body is composed of very numerous 
 small particles, has, as far as I am aware, 
 never been brought forward, at least in a 
 complete shape. I will not therefore at- 
 tempt to refute that which no one seriously 
 propounds. 
 
V. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS OF AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE. 
 
 [AVING considered the hypothesis 
 which assumes the existence of an 
 unintelligent power called Nature, and the 
 theory which is based upon the eternal 
 existence of matter possessing certain quali- 
 ties, I proceed now to examine that which 
 takes for its foundation a self-existent and 
 intelligent power, proceeding as before with 
 the inquiry, how far this theory agrees with 
 observed phenomena. I shall afterwards 
 consider a modification of this theory, which 
 involves the supposition of an intelligent \ 
 power, and also the existence of an unin- 
 telligent power called-^Nature^ the^ two 
 acting concurrently on most occasions, but 
 
AN INTELLIGENT CA USE. 29 
 
 sometimes the former interfering with and 
 overruling the latter. And I shall also 
 refer to another modification of the theory 
 of an intelligent power, which proceeds on 
 the supposed existence of such an intelligent 
 power, and also of matter, self-existing from 
 eternity. 
 
 The supposition of a self-existent in- 
 telligent power, that is, an intelligent power 
 existing without a cause, no doubt involves 
 great difficulties. In the first place, we are 
 accustomed to see events follow each other 
 in a certain order; every event having a 
 predecessor which occasioned the successor ; 
 and an event without a cause is to us in- 
 conceivable. The self-existence of an in- 
 telligent power stands, in this respect, on a 
 level with the self-existence of unintelligent 
 matter. 
 
 The fact, however, of matter being visible 
 and tangible, while intelligence and power 
 are neither the one nor the other, turns the 
 
30 HYPOTHESIS OF AN 
 
 scale in favour of the self-existence of the 
 former, upon the first impression, or if we 
 trust to our senses only : and the constant 
 contemplation of material objects, and the 
 exclusive study of their properties, appear 
 to strengthen this impression. We con- 
 sequently find materialists actually assuming 
 the eternal existence of matter as requiring 
 no proof, as a self-evident fact. Yet this 
 self-existence of matter is not less difficult to 
 conceive than the self-existence of intellect. 
 It may indeed be said that there is this 
 difference in favour of the self-existence of 
 matter, that we find the parts of matter 
 retaining the same properties, notwithstand- 
 ing any changes in their condition to which 
 we can subject them. No application of 
 heat or of other agents, however powerful, 
 has ever been found to convert particles of 
 silver into particles of gold. The particles 
 of silver retain, so far as we can discern, 
 precisely the same qualities as those which 
 
INTELLIGENT CA USE. 3 1 
 
 they possessed before they were subjected 
 to the treatment, however violent, however 
 long continued. Hence it is concluded that 
 these properties are unalterable, and from 
 this, that they have existed for ever, and are 
 therefore self-existing existing without a 
 cause. 
 
 It may further be said that, unlike material 
 existences, mental existences apparently come 
 to an absolute end ; that if continued after 
 death, we can perceive no trace of such 
 continued existence; and that, therefore, 
 it is more reasonable to believe in the exist- 
 ence of matter from eternity, than in the 
 existence of intelligence from eternity. 
 
 This reasoning appears to me not without 
 weight, although by no means conclusive. 
 It is not conclusive, because we have no 
 certain proof that the qualities of matter 
 are absolutely unchangeable, although they 
 may have undergone no sensible change for 
 a long series of ages. Neither have we 
 
32 HYPOTHESIS OF AN 
 
 any strict proof that mental existence is 
 terminable. 
 
 Still, if the question between the mental 
 and material theories was to be decided 
 simply by an answer to the question, Which 
 hypothesis involves the fewer difficulties ? 
 I am disposed to think it must be decided 
 in favour of the material theory. 
 
 But we have to consider not merely which 
 supposition is in 4tself the more probable, 
 independently of the consequences derivable 
 from it, but also which, if adopted, will the 
 better explain observed phenomena. We 
 have already seen, in a former chapter, how 
 far the material hypothesis is successful in 
 this respect. Let us now put to the same 
 test the alternative hypothesis. 
 
 If we suppose that an intelligent power 
 has eternally existed, it is evident that all 
 observed phenomena may be accounted for 
 as proceeding from this cause, provided the 
 intelligence and power are admitted to be 
 
INTELLIGENT CA USE. 33 
 
 sufficiently great. The importance and 
 number of the effects which they may pro- 
 duce become merely a question of degree. 
 A child one year old possesses a certain 
 amount of power and intelligence, but it is 
 prodigiously inferior, in this respect, to a man 
 of twenty, and many of the effects which the 
 man can produce are inconceivable by the 
 child, and entirely beyond its comprehension. 
 If we suppose another being exceeding the 
 man in power and intelligence, in the same 
 degree as that in which the man exceeds 
 the child, then the effects which might be 
 expected to follow the exertions of this 
 superior being, would be incomprehensible 
 to the man, although they might excite his 
 astonishment and admiration. 
 
 Imagine now a degree of power and 
 intelligence exceeding that of the intelligence 
 and power, superior to the intelligence of 
 man in the same proportion as the intelligence 
 and power before supposed exceeded those of 
 
34 HYPOTHESIS OF AN 
 
 man ; the effects which might be produced by 
 such exalted power and intelligence would be 
 still more wonderful and incomprehensible. 
 
 It is not too much to say, that the occurrence 
 
 of all the wonderful phenomena which we 
 
 perceive in the universe might be produced 
 
 ^\H5y power and intelligence, if we suppose the 
 
 \series of constantly increasing power and 
 
 wisdom to be prolonged without limit. 
 
 Comparing then the material hypothesis 
 with that of an intelligent power, we find, 
 that, while the first accounts for some material 
 phenomena, but fails entirely to explain the 
 existence of sensation or any other mental 
 phenomenon, the second, if adopted, is 
 sufficient to account for all phenomena, both 
 mental and material. Whilst, therefore, we 
 admit that, taken without regard to the con- 
 sequences deducible from it, the former is 
 the more probable, this probability is entirely 
 outweighed by that of the latter, when these 
 consequences are taken into account. 
 
INTELLIGENT CAUSE. 35 
 
 Lucretius denies that the universe could 
 be created and governed by the gods, on 
 the ground that they could not possess suffi- 
 cient power to produce the effects which 
 we observe. But it is evident that this 
 reasoning is based on the assumption, that 
 the poet was acquainted with the limits of 
 their power. 
 
 He would no doubt have equally asserted 
 that the sun could not produce any motive 
 effect upon the earth, if he had been aware 
 that it would take a fleet horse (supposing 
 his speed could be maintained) 500 years to 
 pass over a distance equal to that of the 
 sun from the earth : but still, on finding 
 how completely the supposition of attraction 
 exercised by the sun on the earth explained 
 phenomena not explicable on any other 
 hypothesis, he would no doubt have ad- 
 mitted the possibility of such an effect, even 
 at a distance incomparably greater than that 
 of the sun from the earth, as in the instance 
 of comets. 
 
VI. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS OF SELF-EXISTENT MATTER 
 AND INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 NOW proceed to consider two 
 hypotheses compounded of those 
 I have discussed, less on account of their 
 importance than of the acceptance they 
 have frequently met with. 
 
 The first of these hypotheses assumes at 
 once the eternal and self existence of matter, 
 and also the eternal existence of an intelli- 
 gent power. This belief was much more 
 prevalent in ancient than in modern times, 
 and was adopted, I believe, by at least 
 some sects of the Gnostics. The existence 
 of evil was attributed to the intractability 
 of matter, matter which in its stubborn- 
 
SELF-EXISTENT MA TTER. 3 7 
 
 ness would not yield to the power of the 
 supreme intelligence. 
 
 If we examine the properties of matter, 
 we do not, I think, find much evidence of its 
 rebellious nature. The surface of the earth 
 is suitable for the production of vegetables, 
 and these vegetables are absolutely neces- 
 sary for the continued existence of animals. 
 The interior of the earth contains various 
 substances coal, metals, etc. which are 
 highly suitable for various uses, when the 
 labour and intelligence of man have been 
 applied to them. That they are of little 
 or no use without this application does not 
 show that they are opposed to intelligence. 
 Labour is not always, or even generally, 
 an evil : it is often highly beneficial to him 
 who exercises it. The uses of inert matter, 
 as it is sometimes termed, are incalculable ; 
 and these uses are called into play, not by 
 overcoming the properties of inert matter, 
 but by taking advantage of them, 
 c 2 
 
38 SELF-EXISTENT MA TTER 
 
 This Gnostic theory, in fact, appears to 
 have originated, not from the observation 
 of the properties of matter, but from a 
 desire to account for the existence of evil ; 
 the attempt, however, must be admitted to 
 be in this respect also a failure. 
 
 The theory seldom formally brought for- 
 ward, yet often quietly assumed to be true, 
 that the universe has arisen from an in- 
 telligent cause, and also an unintelligent 
 cause called Nature, merits some attention, 
 by reason of its frequent acceptance, if not 
 from according with the conclusions of 
 reason. 
 
 This theory supposes that certain things 
 exist by nature, and certain others by the 
 action of an intelligent cause. 
 . The boundaries between the two creations 
 have not been, as far as I am aware, exactly 
 defined by those who entertain this opinion, 
 but perhaps, according to the belief of the 
 greater number, inanimate objects are the 
 
AND INTELLIGENCE. 39 
 
 production of nature, animated beings of an 
 intelligent cause. 
 
 Now, in a former chapter, I have, I think, 
 shown conclusively, that the assumption of 
 an unintelligent cause, by whatever name it 
 may be called, in no degree accounts for the 
 known properties of matter, such as attrac- 
 tion, repulsion, and affinity, constantly acting 
 in a manner so regular, that we can, in many 
 instances, predict with certainty the changes 
 in position and qualities, which in particular 
 circumstances matter will undergo. Can we 
 reasonably believe that this regularity, exact 
 and constant, as far as our observations 
 extend, is the work of chance ? Is it a matter 
 of chance that water is always found to be 
 resolvable into one volume of oxygen and 
 two of hydrogen ? Is it a matter of chance 
 that the planets move round the sun in curves 
 varying from ellipses, by so much only as they 
 would deviate, if acted upon by each other, 
 according to a rule which we can state with 
 
40 SELF-EXISTENT MA TTER 
 
 precision, and from which we can calculate 
 beforehand the deviations which we after- 
 wards observe ? Yet if these results, this 
 accurate and constant coincidence with a 
 definite and predetermined rule is attributed 
 to a non-intelligent cause, whether you call 
 that cause Nature or by another name, then 
 this wonderful coincidence is, in other words, 
 the effect of chance. 
 
 It is obvious, then, that in order to avoid 
 a conclusion so untenable as this, we must, 
 if we suppose that inanimate things exist 
 independently of an intelligent cause, and 
 animated beings by means of such a cause, 
 again assume that the various qualities of 
 inanimate matter, with which we are ac- 
 quainted, are self-existent, and that the 
 intelligent cause which we also assume, in 
 this hypothesis, acts upon such matter in 
 order to form animated beings. But this 
 hypothesis is open to an objection which 
 appears to me fatal. One of the supposi- 
 
EN 
 
 FO.^NIA 
 AND INTELLIGENCE. 41 
 
 tions on which it rests is unnecessary, if the 
 other supposition is admitted. The assump- 
 tion of an intelligent cause, endowed with 
 sufficient power, is able, though standing 
 alone, to account for all phenomena, both 
 of inanimate matter and of animated beings. 
 The introduction of the supposition that 
 inanimate matter and its infinite variety of 
 properties are self-existent, is therefore super- 
 fluous, and consequently unphilosophical. 
 
 I have thought it worth while to treat this 
 subject at some length, and with some minute- 
 ness, because there has prevailed of late an 
 impression that the rapid advance of science 
 has, in some way, shaken the basis of the 
 belief, respecting the origin of man and the 
 universe, entertained (with few exceptions) 
 by the greatest philosophers from Socrates 
 to Newton. And this impression has not 
 been confined to those who have adopted 
 materialistic views : it has also affected many 
 who were previously convinced that the 
 
42 SELF-EXISTENT MATTER 
 
 reasoning in favour of an intelligent cause 
 was unassailable. Many have been seized 
 by an apprehension, that their faith was 
 being steadily though secretly undermined 
 by the current of scientific discovery. It 
 may allay these apprehensions to remember, 
 that they were not entertained by him to 
 whom the extension of science must be 
 chiefly attributed, whose own discoveries 
 were the most important of all that have 
 been made in the realms of science, the 
 most important it may be in themselves, 
 but certainly the most important in this, that 
 they gave an impulse and a true direction 
 to investigation, by displaying the brilliant 
 results which attend an adherence to a sound 
 method of investigation. 
 
 Sir Isaac Newton, when he contemplated 
 ( the great ocean of truth which lay un- 
 explored ' before him, did not appear to 
 entertain any apprehension that, if he had 
 been permitted to navigate it, he would have 
 
AND INTELLIGENCE. 43 
 
 been in danger of making shipwreck of his 
 faith in the cause of its existence. The 
 expression of which he made use leads 
 us to suppose that he foresaw a constant 
 advance of scientific discovery ; but if we 
 consider the principles of research which 
 he had laid down, and acted upon with 
 such unprecedented success, we must feel 
 convinced that he could not conceive it pos- 
 sible, from the domain of law and order 
 being more and more widely extended, men 
 would find stronger and yet stronger evi- 
 dence that the universe is governed by 
 chance or aimless laws, and less and less 
 probability that it is subordinate to the 
 direction of intelligence. 
 
 T. AND A. CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 BERKELEY 
 
 Return to desk from which borrowed. 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 
 
 MAR 3? 1948 
 MAY 6 1948 
 
 200clSi: 
 
 MAY 14 1957 
 
 
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