'■■■
 
 (Mpr-
 
 A Brigadier in France 
 1917-1918
 
 
   .... 
 
 
 . I Laniraii cA C iininuna V '(V 0.
 
 A Brigadier in France 
 1 9 1 7— 1 9 1 8 
 
 Hanway R. Cumming 
 
 With Introductions by 
 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. 
 and Major-General Sir David Campbell, K.C.B. 
 
 Jonathan Cape 
 
 Eleven Gower Street, London 

 
 First published 1922 
 All rights reserved 
 
 Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Frome and London
 
 THE Author hopes that these personal 
 experiences may be of interest to a certain 
 section of the public and asks their clemency 
 for any lapses in literary style which they may 
 possess, as he lays no claim to such proficiency. 
 Whatever merit they may have lies in the fact 
 that they cover a period of great interest in 
 the war, and one wherein many lessons of 
 omission and commission may be learnt.
 
 Introduction 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL CUMMING was 
 one of the many officers who, after safely 
 going through the Great War, met his death 
 at the hands of the Sinn Feiners at the time 
 when it was the policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment to try and restore order in Ireland by 
 the application of military force. 
 
 His devotion to duty, regard for his men, and 
 soldierly qualities in general were such that, 
 had not his career been cut short in the lament- 
 able way just mentioned, he might soon have 
 reached the higher rank of Major-General and 
 been given the command of a Division. 
 
 The narrative he left behind him descriptive 
 of the doings of the brigades he commanded 
 at different times on the West Front is an 
 unvarnished record of achievements which 
 reflect credit upon himself and the officers 
 
 7
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 and men who served under him. Moreover it 
 bears the impress of accuracy, and therefore 
 should, within its sphere, be as useful to the 
 military student and historian as it will be 
 interesting to those who shared in the arduous 
 operations described. 
 
 W. M. ROBERTSON, F.M. 
 December 14, 1921. 
 
 8
 
 Introduction 
 
 I FIRST met Brigadier-General Hanway 
 Robert Cumming, D.S.O., when he joined 
 my Division to take over command of the 
 noth Brigade, vice Brigadier-General Cayley. 
 Brigadier-General Cumming took over command 
 on March 18, 191 8, a few days before the great 
 German Offensive started. Between that time 
 and the Armistice on November 1 1, the 21st 
 Division was probably more heavily engaged 
 than any other Division in the British Army 
 during the same period. 
 
 During March, the Division was in the thick 
 of the Somme fighting, receiving a congratu- 
 latory message from the Commander-in-Chief 
 for the work it did. 
 
 Being transferred to the Ypres sector in 
 April it then, once more, sustained the shock 
 of the German attacks in that section, and 
 
 9
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 was one of the Divisions in the line when the 
 great German attack on April 29 was definitely- 
 held up. For the work performed, it 
 again received the congratulations of the 
 C.-in-C. 
 
 Being transferred to Champagne in May, 
 it took over the line on May 14, and experienced 
 the full brunt of the German attack which 
 was launched on May 27. Although the left 
 flank was completely turned, and by the evening 
 of the first day the enemy was actually occu- 
 pying positions in rear of those held by our 
 troops, all ranks fought with the greatest 
 gallantry, and, showing the most magnificent 
 discipline, maintained their positions in the 
 battle zone. 
 
 During the night May 27/28, pivoting on 
 the French, the Division formed a line at 
 right angles to the one they were holding the 
 previous evening, and so created a ground- 
 work on which other Divisions of the 9th 
 Corps, who had suffered terribly in the previous 
 day's fighting, were able to form. The way in 
 which the troops of the 9th Corps rallied on 
 May 28, after the experiences they had been 
 
 10
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 through on May 27, was, I firmly believe, as 
 fine a performance as any enacted during the 
 whole war, and had a very decisive effect in 
 finally bringing the Germans to a standstill. 
 Leaving the Champagne in June, the Division 
 was once more in the line by July 15. On 
 August 21 it started, with the other units of 
 the 7th Corps, on the final great 'allied counter- 
 offensive. During this period the Division 
 received unstinted praise from its Corps Com- 
 mander, Lieut.-General Sir C. D. Shute, a 
 very hard man to satisfy, as well as congratu- 
 latory messages from the C.-in-C. 
 
 Between August 21 and November 11, the 
 Division captured 114 officers, 3,758 other 
 ranks, and, considering what the Division had 
 been through during the previous months, this 
 amply testifies to the grand spirit which per- 
 vaded all ranks. I should here like to give a 
 small example which further testifies to this 
 magnificent spirit. 
 
 After the Division had been heavily engaged 
 with the enemy from early morning March 21 
 to the evening of March 25, during which time 
 rest was practically an impossibility, it was 
 
 11
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 withdrawn from the line during the night of 
 March 25/26. 
 
 It was sent back to Bray, some six miles in 
 rear, many of the troops not getting in till 
 the morning of the 26th. Every one was com- 
 pletely worn out with physical fatigue. After 
 forming the Division into a composite Brigade, 
 I ordered the men to get what rest they could. 
 At 4 p.m. orders were received that the 
 Brigade was to move up at once to Maricourt, 
 the place they had left the previous night, to 
 support the 35 th Division. I was positively 
 ashamed to have to make this call on men 
 who had just come through such a terrible 
 experience. The sequel is interesting. I was 
 standing with General Franks in his room 
 when we suddenly heard the sound of troops 
 marching, accompanied by loud singing. 
 It was the Brigade moving out, in perfect 
 order. General Franks turned to me and said, 
 " By God, that's fine, they are singing." And 
 it was. 
 
 During the whole of the fighting which I 
 have briefly mentioned, Brigadier-General 
 Cumming was in command of the 1 10th Brigade, 
 
 12
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 and proved himself to be not only a magnificent 
 leader of men, but also a soldier of the very- 
 highest class. 
 
 He was beloved by every one in the Brigade, 
 and the results obtained were very largely due 
 to his personality and the confidence he inspired 
 in all who served under him. 
 
 Not only was he a very fine Brigadier, but 
 on many occasions his advice to me, as his 
 Divisional Commander, was of inestimable 
 value. 
 
 I am sure a perusal of his book will do every 
 layman good and will explode, once and for all, 
 the absurd idea that the lot of generals and 
 such like was cast in fine chateaux and motor- 
 cars. 
 
 During the last eight months of the war, 
 owing to the scarcity of trained officers, the 
 work of brigadiers was of a most trying nature, 
 and it was only men like General Cumming, 
 possessed of health, strength, and indomitable 
 will power, who could possibly have stood the 
 strain. 
 
 I doubt if there was a Brigadier in France 
 more universally loved by those who served 
 
 13
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 with him, and his death has left a blank which 
 it will be hard to fill. 
 
 DAVID M. CAMPBELL, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Quetta, 
 
 November 21, 1 92 1. 
 
 H
 
 Contents 
 
 CHAPTER i PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTORY . . . . . . 17 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
 THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1 0,1 7 38 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 BUCQUOT CROISILLES — THE HINDENBURG LINE AND 
 
 BULLECOURT . . . . . • 5 1 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, MARCH, I918 . .88 
 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
 THE FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES, APRIL, I918 . . I29 
 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, I918 . . . . 1 54 
 
 CHAPTER 7 
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, AUGUST-NOVEMBER, I918 . 201 
 
 APPENDIX I ...... 269 
 
 APPENDIX 2 ...... 272 
 
 15
 
 Illustration and Maps 
 
 PAGES 
 
 Brigadier-General Hanway R. Cumming, D.S.O. 
 
 Frontispiece 
 
 The German Retreat in 191 7 . . . -43 
 
 The Hindenburg Line ...... 57 
 
 The German Offensive, First Phase {March, 191 8) . 100 
 
 The German Offensive, SecondPhase {March, 1918) 114-15 
 
 The Fourth Battle of Ypres {April, 1918) . . 135 
 
 The German Offensive in Champagne {May 27, 1918) 160 
 
 The Counter-Offensive {October-May, 191 8) . . 207 
 
 The Counter-Offensive, First Phase {to October 3, 
 
 1918) 218-19 
 
 The Counter-Offensive {October ^-October 24, 191 8) 248-49 
 
 16
 
 Chapter i : Introductory 
 
 WHILST in temporary command of a 
 Brigade, the real occupant of the position 
 being away on leave, the writer received the 
 welcome news one day that he had been ap- 
 pointed to command the 91st Infantry Brigade 
 in the 7th Division and was ordered to join it 
 forthwith. This was in November 1 91 6, the 
 6th Division to which he then belonged being at 
 Bethune, having just come out of the Battle 
 of the Somme after the usual three turns 
 in the fighting line, which was the general 
 custom in that very strenuous and exhausting 
 battle. 
 
 The 6th Division during their tour had been 
 through some of the hardest fighting, starting 
 from September 15 just south of Ginchy; they 
 had also taken part in the big attack on the 
 26th of the same month, when Morval and Les 
 Boeufs were taken, a day on which a big break 
 through seemed probable — when, from the high 
 
 17 B
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 ground beyond these villages, the Boche could 
 be seen retiring in considerable confusion to- 
 wards Le Transloy and the Bapaume Road. 
 Later, during October, they came in for the 
 operations in connection with the consolida- 
 tion of the line, in which the fighting, though 
 not so spectacular, was of a very bitter character, 
 East of Flers and Gueudecourt. After com- 
 pleting their part in this operation they were 
 taken out of the hurly-burly and sent back to 
 an area not far from Abbeville, where they 
 refitted and rested, and shortly afterwards were 
 railed to Bethune, where they took over the 
 line in the usual course. It was shortly after 
 arriving there that the orders arrived for taking 
 over the new Brigade. 
 
 On November 18 the Brigadier left his old 
 Brigade with many regrets, especially as his 
 own Battalion, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry, 
 formed part of it, and started off in a motor-car 
 in search of his new command. The 7th 
 Division at that time was on the march from 
 the North towards the familiar Somme area. 
 Having started early and made several inquiries 
 on the way, the Brigadier was able to trace 
 
 18
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 them as being somewhere near Doullens. On 
 reaching Doullens, he was lucky enough to 
 find a Staff Officer of a Division quartered in 
 the town who eventually discovered that the 
 7th Division H.Q. were in a small village West 
 of Doullens. There he eventually found them 
 and after a very welcome lunch with the Divi- 
 sional Commander, Sir Herbert Watts as he 
 eventually became, he pushed on to where his 
 Brigade H.Q. were located at the small village 
 of Villers L'Hopital, and there was greeted 
 by the Brigade-Major, Captain R. N. O'Connor, 
 of the Scottish Rifles, who had been in the 
 Brigadier's company at Sandhurst as a cadet. 
 Young, active, full of enthusiasm, and a first- 
 rate soldier, " Bunny " O'Connor, as he was 
 called in the Division, was an ideal Staff Officer, 
 and the Brigadier thought it was a fortunate 
 omen to find him there. 
 
 The Division at that time consisted of the 20th, 
 22nd, and 91st Infantry Brigades, the former 
 two being commanded by Brigadier-Generals 
 Green and Steele. The Divisional Artillery 
 was commanded by Brigadier-General Stanley 
 Clarke, but this had been left in the line 
 
 19
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 and did not rejoin the Division till some 
 time later. It was a very happy Division to 
 join, in which every one got on very well 
 together, which was not always the case. The 
 H.Q. Staff were very capable and helpful and 
 assisted in making the divisional machine go 
 " on oiled wheels." The Divisional Com- 
 mander himself was an ideal one and beloved 
 by every one alike, from highest to lowest. The 
 Brigadier felt that he had attained a happy 
 stage for his first venture in a new role. 
 
 The day after he joined, the Division moved 
 another stage in its march towards the line, 
 so that he had the chance of seeing his battalions 
 on the move and meeting the commanding 
 officers of the several units. The Brigade con- 
 sisted of the 2nd Queens, ist S. Staffordshires, 
 and the 21st and 22nd Manchesters, 91st 
 Machine Gun Company and 91st Trench 
 Mortar Battery. It was a fine body of men, 
 and the Brigadier was well pleased with their 
 appearance as they swung along the road past 
 him that autumn morning, and he felt a great 
 pride in being lucky enough to have them under 
 his command. 
 
 20
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 Two days later, the Brigade relieved a 
 Brigade of the 51st (Highland) Division which 
 had just taken the village of Beaumont Hamel, 
 and occupied and consolidated the newly 
 captured line which ran along the high ground 
 just East of the village, continuing in a sort of 
 semicircle as far as the Serre to Mailly-Maillet 
 road, just West of the village of Serre. The 
 line was in a very nebulous state and the relief 
 was complicated by having to take over part 
 of the front from the 32nd Division as well as 
 from the 51st. Naturally enough after such 
 a fiercely opposed attack the line was consider- 
 ably disorganised, with units mixed up with 
 one another and certain portions of the line 
 not quite linked up. The relief was, however, 
 carried out without a hitch and every one 
 started to settle down and make the best of 
 things as they were. 
 
 Brigade H.Q. started badly in a peculiarly 
 filthy dug-out in a part of the line called 
 the White City, a trench dug out of the 
 chalk between the village of Beaumont Hamel 
 and Auchonvillers. It had the great advan- 
 tage of being comparatively close to the 
 
 21
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 front line, but as it poured with rain, varied 
 by snow at intervals, from the moment 
 of taking over, it very soon became unin- 
 habitable from the water which penetrated 
 through the roof and walls ; added to which 
 the smell which arose from the wet floor 
 was appalling. It seemed to those who had 
 to live in it that something or somebody 
 had been buried underneath it. Under the 
 stress of it, the Brigade H.Q. began to be 
 affected, so much so that the Divisional Com- 
 mander put his foot down and ordered them 
 to leave it. A Brigade H.Q. was found in a 
 little house on the outskirts of Mailly-Maillet. 
 This was a distinct change for the better, but 
 its disadvantage was the distance from the 
 front line, which meant a considerable amount 
 more riding and walking for the Brigadier and 
 his staff. Although not everything that could 
 be desired, it certainly made a fairly com- 
 fortable H.Q. for the winter months, where at 
 any rate it was possible to get dry and warm 
 after returning from the trenches, covered 
 with mud and wet through. 
 
 The days following the relief were very busy 
 
 22
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 ones for everybody. The new lines had to be 
 practically reorganised, communication trenches 
 sited and dug and everything put in order. 
 The reconnaissance of the ground and endless 
 questions of supply of all sorts took up all the 
 time of the Brigade staff. Precautionary mea- 
 sures against trench feet was a big item, and this 
 necessitated a proper organisation for furnishing 
 men in the front line trenches with a regular 
 supply of dry socks, whale oil, and hot food, 
 a task of no small difficulty in view of the 
 appalling state of the ground, which had been 
 subjected to nearly two years of constant 
 shelling, and the bad weather conditions which 
 then prevailed and which continued incessantly. 
 The question of trench feet was so important 
 that the Brigadier started a competition be- 
 tween his battalions as to who would have the 
 least number of cases, and the result was 
 published in orders periodically throughout 
 the winter. It finally came to be looked on 
 as rather a disgrace to be at the bottom of the 
 list, and the result was that this unpleasant 
 and serious disease was reduced to a minimum. 
 The ration parties taking food up to the front 
 
 23
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 line at night used to take a sufficient number 
 of dry socks to equip every man in the trenches 
 and bring away with them the wet discarded 
 pairs, which were then washed and dried and 
 sent up in due course. That peculiarly useful 
 article the Tommy's Cooker was employed in 
 large numbers to enable the men to obtain 
 the hot food which the medical authorities 
 proclaimed as a panacea, or at any rate a 
 preventative, for trench feet, and this undoubt- 
 edly was the case. The difficulty always was 
 to obtain sufficient supplies of the Tommy's 
 Cooker, as the demand was always for more, the 
 men thoroughly appreciating the comfort of 
 being able to get a hot drink whenever they 
 wanted it. 
 
 No one who was in France during the winter 
 of 'l6-'l7 will ever forget it, at any rate if 
 they happened to be in the part of the line 
 which was held by the 7th Division during 
 that period. It was certainly the worst winter 
 experienced during the whole war. Incessant 
 and torrential rain from October to January 
 was followed by a sudden change to very 
 severe frost (6° Fahr. at times), which lasted 
 
 24
 
 i INTRODUCTORY 
 
 from the middle of January for six weeks and 
 then changed again to snow and sleet, accom- 
 panied by heavy thunderstorms lasting well 
 into April. 
 
 What these conditions meant to the troops 
 holding the line can be better imagined than 
 described, although it is hardly possible for 
 any one not acquainted with it to imagine the 
 depth and stickiness of the mud in the Ancre 
 Valley. The trenches became impossible. 
 With enormous labour they were constantly 
 repaired, and even rebuilt, only to fall in again 
 after a particularly bad downpour. While the 
 frost lasted all was well, but when the thaw 
 came they fell in like a pack of cards. It was 
 disheartening, and with weary and mud- 
 bedraggled men it at times seemed almost 
 impossible ; but the trenches had to be kept 
 going at all costs, and so it was done. That 
 Ancre mud was a positive nightmare, and to 
 no one more so than the Brigadier and his 
 Staff, for more than once he had literally to be 
 dug out of a trench in which he had sunk to 
 his waist during his rounds. On one occasion, 
 during a relief, an officer and two privates fell 
 
 25
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 into a shell hole on their way from the front 
 line ; every effort was immediately made to 
 rescue them, but without success, owing to the 
 state of the ground, the heavy shelling and 
 pitch darkness. These efforts were continued 
 until daylight, when the rescue party was 
 compelled to withdraw owing to their exposed 
 position. The following night a further rescue 
 party was organised, equipped with 'duck- 
 boards,' ropes, and shovels, and these with 
 great difficulty and at considerable personal 
 risk succeeded in effecting the rescue ; the 
 officer was just alive and recovered, but the 
 two men had succumbed to cold and exposure. 
 The lot of the front line troops during that 
 time was not a happy one. Four days of it was 
 as much as flesh and blood could stand, but 
 in spite of the horrible discomforts and appalling 
 conditions the men remained cheery and con- 
 tented. They would come out after relief 
 covered with mud, wet through, weary and 
 chilled to the bone ; but next day, after a 
 hot meal and a good sleep, they were singing 
 and joking and busy cleaning up their mud- 
 stained clothes and equipment and quite ready 
 
 26
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 to face it all again in three or four days' time 
 — in fact, not only ready, but eager and willing 
 on the off-chance of " outing a Boche." Truly 
 the salt of the earth, such men couldn't be 
 beaten, and their deeds deserve a modern 
 Virgil or Homer to do them justice. 
 
 In spite of the weather conditions, however, 
 there was no thought of allowing the Hun to 
 sit unmolested on the other side of the shell- 
 swept stretch of mud and rusty wire known as 
 " No Man's Land." His condition was even 
 worse than ours, and desertions under the 
 excuse of ' losing the way ' were common and 
 grew in frequency as the interminable winter 
 wore on. The Boche position in this part 
 overlooked ours in a most disconcerting way, 
 and his powers of observation were detrimental 
 to every one's peace and comfort in approaching 
 the forward areas. Moreover, as offensive 
 operations were due to take place as soon as the 
 state of the ground admitted, it was necessary 
 that a good position from which to start off 
 should be assured. With this object in view 
 a minor operation was planned, the objective 
 being the commanding ground known as 
 
 27
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Munich Trench, immediately East of the village 
 of Beaumont Hamel ; this trench constituted 
 the Boche front line. Great care was taken 
 to make the operation a success. The Brigade 
 was taken out of the line, and by means of 
 dummy trenches constructed in the back area 
 the different battalions were constantly prac- 
 tised in their various roles till every man knew 
 exactly where to go and what he had to do. 
 The great difficulty was the state of the ground ; 
 it was impossible to move quickly across No 
 Man's Land, the more so in view of the great 
 weight it is essential for men to carry in an 
 attack. It presented a very difficult problem. 
 Many people thought it would be impracti- 
 cable, but eventually it was decided that it was 
 possible if the weight carried by the individual 
 man could be reduced to a minimum and the 
 pace likewise reduced, so as to avoid undue 
 fatigue to the attacking troops. Some idea 
 can be formed of the state of affairs when it 
 is stated that the " Creeping Barrage " was 
 timed to advance at a rate of 50 yards in five 
 minutes, the slowest barrage, probably, that had 
 ever been known. This slow pace came in for 
 
 28
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 a great deal of hostile criticism ; it was argued 
 that such a barrage would defeat its own object 
 by giving the enemy time to bring his own 
 barrage down on the attacking troops before 
 they could get across the intervening space to 
 the enemy's trenches. On the other hand 
 unless the infantry could keep in touch with 
 their own covering barrage it was useless ; and 
 as it was impossible to move faster over that 
 ground in the state it was in, it was deemed 
 better to chance the enemy's retaliation coming 
 down so soon and so accurately, than to risk 
 the chance of certain failure by losing the cover 
 of our own artillery at the crucial moment — 
 i.e. the moment it lifted from the objective 
 trench which was known to be heavily defended 
 by machine guns as well as infantry. 
 
 Three battalions — the 1st S. Staff ordshires 
 (Lieut. -Colonel Beauman), the 21st (Lieut. - 
 Colonel Woodward) and the 22nd Manchesters 
 (Major Ramsbotham) — were detailed to carry 
 out the attack, the front of which was about 
 800 yards. The fourth battalion had the un- 
 enviable duty of providing carrying parties for 
 the attacking battalions — i.e. carrying parties 
 
 29
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 for the necessary supply of bombs, ammunition, 
 etc., thus relieving the weight on the actual 
 attackers. This particular duty is a thankless 
 as well as a dangerous task, and on this occasion 
 it was carried out by the 2nd Queens with a 
 precision and loyalty to its sister units which 
 left nothing to be desired. 
 
 The attack was to take place at dawn on 
 January II, 19 17. The Brigade took over the 
 line the previous night and the troops formed 
 up for the assault the next night at 2 a.m., on 
 the tape line which had been laid down in 
 front of the trenches earlier in the evening. 
 All the assembling and forming up was carried 
 out without attracting the attention of the 
 enemy, the night being very cold and dark, and 
 no casualties were incurred from the hostile 
 artillery. 
 
 The success of the enterprise was to a great 
 extent dependent on the capture of certain 
 trenches to the South of Munich Trench. 
 This had been done with complete success by 
 the 20th Infantry Brigade, under Brig.-General 
 Green, on the night before, with the result 
 of making the right flank secure. 
 
 30
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 A very heavy bombardment of all the enemy 
 trenches in the vicinity had been continued 
 for several days previous to the operation, but 
 with no special attention to the objective in 
 order to mislead the enemy as to the real point 
 of attack. At three minutes before " Zero," 
 the Divisional Artillery opened an intensive 
 bombardment on a line 300 yards in front of 
 the tape line on which the assaulting troops 
 formed up ; and at Zero this barrage moved 
 forward, followed by the infantry. 
 
 Zero was fixed for 6.40 a.m., at which hour 
 a heavy mist lay on the ground, which made 
 observation impossible and assisted to make the 
 operation the surprise that it was intended to 
 be. The morning was very dark and lowering, 
 with rain and sleet at intervals, turning to 
 snow ; a morning, in fact, when one would 
 think one's courage would be at its lowest ebb ; 
 but there was no faltering, and when Zero hour 
 came round and the barrage went forward, the 
 troops followed close upon it, wave after wave, 
 in the way in which they had been trained 
 beforehand. Everything went like clockwork 
 and the attacking troops captured their objec- 
 
 3 1
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 tives almost before the Boche had time to know 
 what was in the wind. There was some fierce 
 fighting at different points along the line and 
 great difficulty was found, in the mud-bedraggled 
 area, in actually finding Munich Trench at 
 all, more especially in those portions of the 
 line which had been obliterated by the com- 
 bined effect of artillery fire and weather. So 
 much so, that the battalion forming the right 
 of the line, the 22nd Manchesters, actually 
 overran the trench and went some distance 
 beyond it, causing some anxious moments to 
 the Brigadier until it was discovered what had 
 occurred and steps could be taken to recall the 
 over-zealous warriors. By 8.30 a.m. the whole 
 position had been taken, touch had been gained 
 all along the line with the exception of the 
 extreme right flank, where it was not established 
 till nightfall (owing probably to the confusion 
 caused by the right advancing too far), and 
 consolidation was being rapidly carried out. 
 It is one thing taking a position, under modern 
 conditions ; it is quite another holding it when 
 it is won. A new position is invariably made 
 the target of every gun that can be brought to 
 
 32
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 bear on it with the object of causing casualties 
 or preparing the way for a counter-attack. 
 The present one was no exception to the rule, 
 as the enemy shelled the position till dark very 
 severely from the moment he found out what 
 had occurred. To avoid, as far as possible, 
 the effects of this bombardment, the troops 
 holding and consolidating the front line had 
 been thinned out as soon as the line had some 
 stability, the idea being to hold it by a series 
 of small posts, instead of one continuous line, 
 with supports in the rear. This had been 
 very expeditiously carried out by the battalions 
 concerned, with the result that casualties were 
 comparatively light and the work of establishing 
 and strengthening the new line of posts was not 
 seriously interfered with. By nightfall the 
 assaulting companies were relieved by the ones 
 in reserve, and with the help of a party of 
 Royal Engineers and Pioneers, the work of 
 consolidation was carried on, wire was put up 
 in front of the line, duckboard tracks in lieu of 
 communication trenches laid out, and every- 
 thing done to secure the ground that had been 
 won. The night was bitterly cold, with a 
 
 33 c
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 north wind and some snow, which probably 
 assisted in hastening the preparations, as the 
 men worked hard to keep themselves warm. 
 The next day was uneventful, but the hostile 
 shelling still continued with unabated vigour, 
 but owing to the precautions taken this did not 
 cause the damage it might have done. Prepara- 
 tions, such as laying tape lines to the various 
 posts and completing the duckboard tracks, 
 were made for the relief of the attacking 
 Brigade. During the afternoon, the enemy 
 put down a heavy and sudden barrage on the 
 left of the line, a counter-attack was expected, 
 and an S.O.S. actually did go up from a neigh- 
 bouring Division, but it never materialised. 
 It is doubtful if a counter-attack could have 
 been made at such a short notice with the 
 ground in that state. It was discovered 
 later from an intercepted message that the 
 barrage was put down for defensive purposes 
 only, as apparently it was expected that the 
 assault would be renewed. 
 
 During the night of the I2th-I3th, the 
 Brigade was relieved by the 22nd Infantry 
 Brigade and the weary but cheerful troops 
 
 H
 
 INTROD UCTO RY 
 
 made their way out through the mud to a well- 
 earned rest. It was snowing hard and black 
 as Erebus when the Brigadier and his staff at 
 about 2 a.m. made their way back to the 
 ruined village of Auchonvillers, where a motor- 
 car was waiting to take them back to their new 
 headquarters. In spite of the weather it was 
 a very cheery party, weary though it was, that 
 picked its way from the filthy dug-out which 
 had formed the battle headquarters, back to the 
 comparative luxury of a dirty farm-house, 
 where a tub and a shave and some decent food 
 awaited them, prepared by a careful Staff 
 Captain, Morshead, who had preceded them 
 during the afternoon. The casualties on this 
 occasion were very little over 200 ; whilst 
 against them could be put 200 prisoners, 
 various machine guns and a very considerable 
 number of casualties on the enemy's part. 
 Altogether a successful show which appeared 
 in the official dispatch as " the most important 
 and successful of the Winter Operations." 
 The chief result of this affair was that it 
 deprived the Germans of most of the advantage 
 in observation which they had heretofore pos- 
 
 35
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 sessed, with a corresponding increase to our 
 own, and it was probably one of the factors 
 which eventually caused their withdrawal to 
 the Hindenburg Line later in the year. 
 
 Shortly after this operation the Brigadier 
 went home on leave, and the Division came out 
 of the line with the belief that it was to have 
 six weeks of rest and training in a back area — 
 a belief which, like many others, did not actu- 
 ally come off according to the programme, as 
 three weeks later found them moving once 
 more towards their old line to relieve the 62nd 
 Division, which had replaced them and which 
 had come in for a hard time during the severe 
 frost which lasted from the moment of their 
 taking over until well into February. 
 
 During the interval, the Division had lost 
 its popular Commander, General Watts, who 
 was given well-deserved promotion and ap- 
 pointed to the newly raised 19th Corps. Every 
 one deplored his departure, although they 
 were glad for his sake that promotion had come. 
 He was a fine leader of men, and had that 
 peculiar capacity of endearing himself to the 
 rank and file to a very marked degree. They 
 
 36
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 would have done anything for him, a valuable 
 asset not always appreciated at its due worth. 
 He was succeeded in command by Major- 
 General George Barrow, who later commanded 
 in Palestine with great success, and was awarded 
 the K.C.B. for his services. He did not remain 
 long, however, in command, but was succeeded 
 at the beginning of April by Major-General 
 Shoubridge, who commanded the Division 
 to the end of the war. 
 
 .37
 
 Chapter 2 : The Commence- 
 ment of the German Retreat^ 
 1917 
 
 A COLD, cheerless morning, a thick mist 
 ■**» overlying everything, emphasising the bit- 
 ing cold. The ground was sodden, and the 
 Ancre mud seemed thicker and stickier than ever. 
 In these circumstances the desolation and dreari- 
 ness of the front line was intense ; the whole 
 ground was littered with the debris of a battle- 
 field — 'dead bodies lay scattered, some lying in 
 shell-holes where one came across them suddenly, 
 others in the open, in a litter of equipment, 
 bombs, and ammunition-boxes ; while here 
 and there a rifle, stuck in the ground upside- 
 down, marked an impromptu grave. Truly 
 the abomination of desolation, depressing 
 beyond measure in the early grey of dawn, 
 when thoughts of breakfast and a fire were 
 powerful magnets to draw one back to head- 
 
 38
 
 THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1917 
 
 quarters, however squalid and uncomfortable 
 they might be. 
 
 Such was the scene that greeted the Brigadier 
 as he went round the line the morning after 
 the relief (February 23), accompanied by his 
 orderly and Brigade-Major. There was much 
 to be done : the front line consisted of isolated 
 posts in shell-holes, backed up by the semblance 
 of a trench, in which were a few old German 
 dug-outs constituting the Company head- 
 quarters of the troops in the line. A certain 
 amount of readjustment was needed to suit 
 his requirements — new posts to be selected 
 and put into position, Lewis-gun positions to 
 be sited, various small questions of supply of 
 rations and ammunition to be gone into and 
 discussed, all requiring reconnaissance and 
 calling for a considerable amount of creeping 
 and crawling and running to get to the best 
 places for seeing without too much exposure, 
 as the enemy line was supposed to be very close 
 to our own. 
 
 Everything was, however, as quiet as the 
 grave. There was no sound, not a rifle-shot, 
 not a movement of any kind, not even a 
 
 39
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 stray shell or anything to break the tense still- 
 ness. Gradually it dawned upon all three of 
 the little party that this hush was abnormal, 
 and almost unconsciously their movements got 
 more bold and their excursions towards the 
 front further than was customary, until, finally, 
 they got right under the wire of what used to be 
 one of the German front-line posts. Still not a 
 sound, no shot was fired. It was uncanny. 
 And then it flashed across them — had the Ger- 
 mans gone ? It looked like it and yet one knew 
 their guile. It required more than the little 
 party of three to find it out for certain. Back 
 they went as fast as they could drag their feet 
 out of the mud to the nearest Battalion Head- 
 quarters and the Brigadier quickly told the 
 situation to a hastily-aroused Commanding 
 Officer and ordered patrols to be instantly sent 
 out to find out what was actually happening. 
 The Brigade-Major was then sent on to the 
 other Battalion Headquarters with similar orders 
 for the CO. whose battalion was opposite 
 Serre, while the Brigadier made the best of his 
 way back to his headquarters to inform the 
 Division by telephone of what was happening 
 
 40
 
 THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1917 
 
 and the measures he had taken to deal with the 
 situation. It was an exciting time — every one 
 was on tenterhooks to hear the result of the 
 reconnaissance patrols which had been sent out, 
 but nothing could be done until something 
 definite from them came in. This waiting for 
 definite information is one of the trying fea- 
 tures of modern warfare ; and on this occasion, 
 as so much depended upon what the patrols 
 discovered, it was more trying than usual. The 
 morning and afternoon dragged on slowly, 
 relieved by rumours more or less authentic that 
 the patrols were making progress, and even- 
 tually at about 4 p.m. the C.O.'s concerned 
 sent back the patrol reports so anxiously 
 awaited. These definitely asserted that those 
 on the left had penetrated into Serre itself 
 without opposition, while on the right " Pen- 
 dant Copse " and the slopes south of the village 
 were also reported clear ; and that in the mean- 
 while the ground had been occupied by a new 
 line of posts. It was now 5 o'clock, the winter 
 day was rapidly drawing to a close and darkness 
 had practically set in. The state of the ground 
 absolutely precluded an advance that night, so 
 
 41
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 the Brigadier decided to advance at dawn the 
 following morning and occupy Serre Village 
 and the ridge running Southwards to the Ancre, 
 and thence to move forward towards the village 
 of Puisieux. The Division was informed and 
 the plan acquiesced in, and orders to this effect 
 were sent out to the two front-line battalions. 
 Shortly after the orders had been dispatched, 
 a car rolled up to the door of the Brigade Head- 
 quarters and the Army Commander came into 
 the room which served as office, sitting- and din- 
 ing-room combined. It was evident from the 
 first moment that he knew nothing of what had 
 occurred, and it transpired afterwards that he 
 had been out all day and had merely called in 
 on his way back, as he frequently did. The 
 Brigadier rapidly explained the situation to him 
 and informed him of the measures taken and of 
 the plan for the following day. The Army 
 Commander was naturally greatly surprised, as 
 .although such a move was thought likely by the 
 higher command, it was not expected that it 
 would take place so early or that it could be 
 accomplished without any indication to the 
 front-line troops. He wished the advance to 
 
 4 2
 
 Yards 
 
 1 000 
 
 I   
 
 6000 
 
 1 
 
 The German Retreat in 19 17. 
 
 43
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 be carried out at once and was desperately 
 anxious that no time should be lost in following 
 up and gaining touch with the enemy ; but it 
 was pointed out to him by the Brigadier that 
 such a move was impossible before daylight on 
 account of the nature of the ground and the 
 fact that it would have to be carried out by 
 the troops holding the line who were already 
 rather exhausted. After a little argument 
 the Brigadier carried his point, and with 
 many injunctions to press on as early and 
 as fast as possible Sir Hubert Gough departed 
 and every one settled down to complete the 
 thousand and one details essential to the 
 morrow's operations, with the welcome addi- 
 tion of dinner after such a hard and exciting 
 day. During the evening, news came from 
 the Division that Army Headquarters had 
 ordered a general advance all along the line 
 so that the Brigade's advance in consequence 
 would be assisted by other troops on its 
 left and right — a piece of information which 
 relieved the Brigadier's mind considerably — 
 and shortly afterwards he pushed his staff off 
 to bed, with the exception of the officer on 
 
 44
 
 THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1917 
 
 duty, whose pleasing task it was to sit at the 
 end of the telephone all night. 
 
 " Zero " had been fixed for 5 a.m. on the 
 following morning, at which hour both front- 
 line battalions were to advance under cover of 
 strong patrols and establish themselves on the 
 first objective (i.e. Serre Village and the ridge 
 running South of it), and gain touch with the 
 troops on their left and right. 
 
 Owing to the darkness and fog, and the 
 difficulty of forming up and making the neces- 
 sary preparations for an advance, the actual 
 move forward was not commenced until 6 a.m. 
 Once launched, however, the advance con- 
 tinued steadily. The battalion on the right, 
 the 1st S. Staffordshires, and the right company 
 of the left battalion, the 21st Manchesters, 
 passed the line of Pendant Copse at 6.30 a.m. 
 and moved steadily forward. Owing to the 
 thick fog, direction was lost to a great extent 
 at this point, the front line bearing off to the 
 left. Considerable opposition was met with at 
 one point on the Southern outskirts of Serre, 
 where the Boche had established a strong post 
 with machine guns. A determined attack was 
 
 45
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 organised, the line was reinforced and the post 
 forced to retire. The final objective was 
 reached in this part of the line at 9.30 a.m., 
 and the work of consolidation was commenced 
 at once. The left company of the line en- 
 countered an enemy post in Serre and was held 
 up for about an hour before it was finally out- 
 flanked and dislodged, the final objective being 
 reached here at 10.30 a.m. 
 
 In the meanwhile no trace of troops of the 
 62nd Division on the right could be found, 
 which left the flank considerably en Vair. 
 Eventually the reserve company of the 1st S. 
 Staffordshires was ordered up to form a defen- 
 sive flank in that direction. By the time they 
 arrived in position the fog had lifted and 
 patrols succeeded in locating the neighbouring 
 troops, who were further to the South than had 
 been intended. The reserve company there- 
 fore prolonged the line Southwards and ob- 
 tained touch with the battalion of the 62nd 
 Division on their right. On the left, too, 
 considerable difficulty was experienced owing 
 to the fog in getting into touch with the 19th 
 Division. It was not until the afternoon that
 
 THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1917 
 
 the troops of this Division could be seen advanc- 
 ing and touch was eventually established ; in 
 the meantime the reserve company of the 21st 
 Manchesters had had to form a defensive flank 
 facing Northwards during the day. As soon 
 as the first objective had been taken the Briga- 
 dier had been anxious to press forward and 
 establish the Brigade in Puisieux, which lay in 
 the valley beyond, and orders were sent to the 
 support and reserve battalions to be ready to 
 move forward through the front-line battalions 
 and advance on that objective. Owing, how- 
 ever, to the precarious situation of the Brigade, 
 with both flanks uncovered, the further advance 
 could not be attempted until the necessary 
 support could be obtained. By the time touch 
 had been gained and the flanking Divisions had 
 come into line, the afternoon was far advanced 
 and the light was beginning to fail. It was 
 considered inadvisable to continue the advance 
 that day, as although fresh troops were avail- 
 able the ground could not be reconnoitred, 
 and movement in the dark over unknown 
 ground might well have been disastrous. Orders 
 were therefore issued for the support and re- 
 
 47
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 serve battalions to relieve the front-line units 
 that night. This was carried out successfully 
 and completed matters as far as the Brigade was 
 concerned. 
 
 The operation was thus accomplished with 
 very little opposition. The total casualties 
 only amounted to one killed and eight wounded, 
 and five prisoners were taken with two or three 
 machine guns. These casualties were so light 
 that the Division, when the Casualty Report 
 was forwarded in due course, rang up to enquire 
 how many noughts had been omitted ! 
 
 Such resistance as was offered was clearly 
 that of small parties holding on to posts till the 
 last minute with the object of delaying our 
 advance. Serre, which once had been a charm- 
 ing little village, prettily situated on a knoll 
 overlooking all the adjoining country and sur- 
 rounded by trees and orchards, was now a 
 shapeless, shell-swept mud heap. No trace of 
 it remained ; hardly a brick could be seen and 
 every tree was either flattened or merely a 
 blackened pole. It was difficult even to deter- 
 mine the site of it ; so much so that the patrols 
 of the previous day, although they had actually 
 
 4 8
 
 THE GERMAN RETREAT, 1917 
 
 been in the village itself, had no idea of the fact 
 until their route had been carefully checked 
 from the map. The gallantry and ability with 
 which these patrols were handled was a notice- 
 able feature of the operation, and the young 
 officers who led them were deservedly given 
 the Military Cross for their exploit. 
 
 This operation, small and inexpensive as it 
 was, was productive of far-reaching results. It 
 opened the way to the big forward movement 
 for the pursuit of the Boche to his famous line 
 in rear. It inaugurated the beginning of that 
 open warfare to which every one was anxious to 
 return, and which, although it did not last for 
 long, had a tremendous effect on the moral of 
 the troops and showed both them and their 
 commanders that they were quite capable of 
 manoeuvring in the open against their adver- 
 saries. It served, too, to show that the judg- 
 ment and conclusions of the man on the spot, 
 whose appreciation of the situation is based on 
 what he has actually seen with his own eyes, 
 should not be ignored. He is the only man 
 who can choose the psychological moment for 
 initiating a movement of this kind, where 
 
 49 d
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 several factors have to be taken into account, 
 such as the state of the ground, knowledge of 
 the locality, or the reverse, and the fitness or 
 otherwise of the troops concerned. On this 
 occasion the Brigadier's views were admitted 
 to be sound, and although there were urgent 
 reasons to justify haste, he was allowed to carry 
 out the operation in his own time and in the 
 way he considered best suited to the occasion. 
 The result proved that the movement was a 
 sound one and that no time would have been 
 gained by initiating it earlier. 
 
 50
 
 Chapter 3 ; Bucquoy — Croisilles — 
 
 the Hindenburg Line. Bulle- 
 court 
 
 THE German retreat was carried out with 
 great steadiness and skill, the bulk of their 
 troops and heavy guns being removed under 
 cover of small rearguards composed largely of 
 machine guns and light artillery, and assisted 
 by heavily wired lines of trenches, which had 
 been in preparation months beforehand. 
 Owing to the weather and the state of the 
 roads, which were also mined before they were 
 evacuated, our advance was necessarily slow, 
 and great difficulty was experienced in moving 
 even the field artillery forward and keeping 
 them supplied with ammunition ; still greater 
 difficulty, as can be imagined, was found in 
 moving the heavy guns. The infantry there- 
 fore did not obtain sufficient support from guns 
 to enable them successfully to cope with the 
 
 51
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 wire and machine guns with which the enemy 
 opposed them at certain well-defined positions. 
 The higher command, meanwhile, were anxious 
 to press the enemy to the fullest extent and not 
 to allow him to retire in his own time. 
 
 An attack was carried out at Bucquoy on 
 March 13 by the Brigade. The Germans had 
 been gradually pushed back through Puisieux 
 to a line through Bucquoy which they intended 
 to hold in order to admit of their removing 
 their heavy guns and impedimenta further to 
 the rear. This line was a very strong one, 
 heavily defended by machine guns and thick 
 wire. The original idea was to attack it, in 
 conjunction with other divisions, with two 
 brigades on the Divisional front, but on March 
 13 it was reported by aeroplanes that the line 
 was not held in any strength and that there 
 were indications of the enemy retiring from it. 
 The Brigade at this time was holding the line 
 and was to be relieved the next day by the two 
 assaulting brigades. At about 1 p.m., however, 
 orders were received to occupy the village with 
 patrols and the front-line battalion was at once 
 ordered to send patrols forward to find out the 
 
 5 2
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 situation. Shortly after the receipt of the first 
 order a second was received with definite 
 instructions for an attack that night. Just 
 after 3 p.m. the O.C. front-line battalion sent 
 in the results of the patrols which he had sent 
 out. There were four altogether, all of whom 
 without exception reported the village strongly 
 held by machine guns and the wire very thick 
 and uncut. A report to this effect was sent in 
 by the Brigadier, who expressed in writing his 
 opinion that the attack was not a feasible pro- 
 position and that, as his battalions had only 
 recently taken over the line, they did not know 
 the ground ; moreover, that there was not 
 sufficient time to organise an attack by 11.45 
 that night, and that he considered that an 
 attack at dawn would have a greater chance 
 of success. The attack was however ordered 
 to proceed, although at 1 a.m. in place of 
 11.45 p.m. ; but although Zero hour was thus 
 pushed forward, the original intention of bom- 
 barding the village from 10 to 10.30 p.m. was 
 not altered, in spite of protests from the 
 Brigadier. The consequence was that the 
 active patrolling during the day and this bom- 
 
 53
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 bardment such a long time before the actual 
 operations of the infantry took place, put the 
 enemy on the qui vive and gave him a very good 
 indication of our intentions. As the Brigadier 
 expected, the operation was a complete failure. 
 At I a.m. the infantry moved forward. The 
 night was exceptionally dark and the ground 
 very heavy. The wire was found to be dense 
 and impenetrable. The enemy's artillery and 
 machine-gun fire was intense as soon as opera- 
 tions started. In one place only was an en- 
 trance effected — on the extreme right of the 
 attack. Here the right company of the right 
 battalion, the 22nd Manchesters, got through 
 the wire and established itself in the trench, 
 which they held until the supply of bombs, both 
 British and German, was exhausted. It was 
 eventually driven out by a determined hostile 
 counter-attack. Most of the surviving mem- 
 bers of that company were captured. As soon 
 as information reached Brigade Headquarters 
 that the operation had been unsuccessful, the 
 Brigadier ordered the troops to withdraw to 
 their original line. In the course of the follow- 
 ing twenty-four hours the Brigade was relieved. 
 
 54
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 The primary cause of this failure was the 
 state of the wire. In viewing the position 
 afterwards, when the Germans had withdrawn, 
 it was not surprising that it was able to with- 
 stand an impromptu attack in pitch darkness 
 and pouring rain by men to whom the ground 
 was entirely new. The triple belt of wire was 
 scarcely damaged and the trench in the rear 
 of it was full of machine-gun emplacements 
 carefully and skilfully placed to bring a cross 
 fire to bear in front of it. 
 
 In his own time the enemy evacuated the 
 Bucquoy line and ; slowly followed by our 
 advanced guards, withdrew further Eastwards, 
 making no prolonged resistance to our advance 
 until the comparatively high ground in front 
 of the Hindenburg Line was reached, which 
 formed an outpost position to the main line 
 behind. In this portion of the line, this con- 
 sisted of a ridge running between the villages 
 of Croisilles and Ecoust and continued to North 
 and South with small re-entrants running into 
 it from the West, in one of which the village 
 of Croisilles lay. It was a strong position, well 
 defended by a trench system and a considerable 
 
 55
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 amount of wire. Situated on a higher ridge, 
 in rear of it, was the famous Hindenburg Line, 
 with its lines of barbed wire which looked, 
 when viewed from a distance, as if it were one 
 solid block. A tough proposition to tackle, as 
 indeed it proved itself to be. 
 
 Since March 25, one battalion of the Brigade 
 had been holding the line facing the village of 
 Croisilles which was heavily defended by 
 trenches, wire, and machine guns ; it moreover 
 lay in a hollow, as already pointed out, and there- 
 fore was a difficult place to attack unless the high 
 ground on either side of it could be taken and 
 held. This meant a very wide extension of 
 front. Nevertheless, it was decided that an 
 attempt should be made to carry it with one 
 brigade as it was an important tactical point 
 for further operations. It was however pointed 
 out by the Brigadier, whose Brigade had been 
 detailed for this duty, that one brigade was not 
 sufficient to cope with such a big objective, the 
 front of attack being alone 1,500 yards, with a 
 defensive flank, if the operation was successful, 
 of a further 1,200 yards. An additional diffi- 
 culty lay in the fact that the wire had not been 
 
 56
 
 57
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 properly cut in front of the village, which 
 being in a hollow was screened from proper 
 observation by the artillery observing officers, 
 which rendered the cutting of the wire very 
 difficult and problematical. However, it was 
 essential that the village should be taken, or 
 that some indication should be obtained of 
 how it was held and in what strength, so the 
 operation was ordered to proceed. 
 
 On the night of March 27, the line of posts 
 East of St. Leger and opposite Croisilles, held 
 by one battalion of the Brigade, were taken 
 over by two fresh battalions, the 1st S. Stafford- 
 shires and the 22nd Manchesters, who were to 
 make the assault. The relieved battalion, the 
 2 1st Manchesters, went back to rest-billets, and 
 the fourth battalion of the Brigade, the 2nd 
 Queens, moved up early in the morning of the 
 28th to a position of readiness near Brigade 
 Headquarters, to support the attack. The task 
 of the left battalion, the 1st S. Staff ordshires, 
 was to make good the high ground North of 
 the village, and the right battalion, the 22nd 
 Manchesters, had a similar task on the South, 
 the scheme being that both these attacks should 
 
 58
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 effect a junction on the Eastern exit of the 
 village and thus completely surround it ; a 
 small proportion of each battalion only was to 
 work through the village. The assaulting bat- 
 talions were to be formed up on a line 200 yards 
 beyond the edge of St. Leger wood by Zero 
 minus 30 minutes, and were then to advance 
 300 yards so as to be close under the barrage 
 by Zero hour. The attack was launched at 
 5.45 a.m. on March 28. Both companies of 
 the 22nd Manchesters were met with heavy 
 machine-gun fire and failed to penetrate the 
 wire, which was uncut except for a small gap. 
 At one place however twelve men under a very 
 gallant officer, Captain Duguid, of the 22nd 
 Manchesters, cut a passage through the wire 
 and established themselves in the enemy lines 
 where they remained for thirty-six hours till 
 relieved. The remainder of the battalion dug 
 themselves in near the wire till nightfall, when 
 they were ordered to withdraw to the original 
 line. On the left, the right company of the 
 1st S. Staffordshires was immediately held up 
 by very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, but 
 had nevertheless succeeded in advancing a 
 
 59
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 considerable distance. The supporting com- 
 pany became absorbed in this attack, and a 
 mixed party worked close up to the enemy wire. 
 Here they were heavily counter-attacked, but 
 drove the attack back and inflicted considerable 
 casualties. Owing to their exposed situation 
 and the severity of the fire to which they were 
 subjected, this party was eventually forced to 
 withdraw about ioo yards to a sunken road, 
 where they dug in and remained throughout 
 the day. Meanwhile the left company had 
 advanced successfully a considerable distance 
 towards their objective, but were eventually 
 held up by heavy enfilade and frontal machine 
 gun and rifle fire. Owing to the failure of the 
 right company to advance, a considerable gap 
 had been formed between the two companies. 
 What happened afterwards to this company is 
 very obscure, but probably, after maintaining 
 their isolated position under very heavy fire for 
 two hours, they were heavily counter-attacked 
 from the German main position and completely 
 enveloped. All except the left platoon, who 
 were acting as a defensive flank, became casual- 
 ties, or were taken prisoners. A further effort 
 
 60
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 with the reserve company and four machine 
 guns was made later, about 8 a.m., but it was 
 found impossible to advance over the open 
 owing to the exposed nature of the ground 
 which on this flank was a regular glacis. When 
 darkness came on, the troops were ordered to 
 retire to their original line. It was proposed 
 to renew the attack at dawn next morning with 
 two fresh battalions, but this was cancelled, the 
 attack on the village becoming part of a larger 
 attack four days later. 
 
 Considered in the light of subsequent events, 
 there is little cause for surprise at the result of 
 this attack. For one brigade to advance over 
 a mile of exposed country and occupy an objec- 
 tive 1,500 yards in extent is, in itself, an opera- 
 tion of considerable magnitude. When 1,200 
 yards of this advance is exposed to a village, 
 heavily wired and strongly held, and when the 
 left flank was exposed to a depth of 1,200 yards, 
 the problem is further complicated. Con- 
 sidered, however, as a reconnaissance in force, 
 the attack established the fact that the enemy 
 was not prepared to throw open the approaches 
 to the Hindenburg Line, and this information 
 
 61
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 may have contributed to the success of the 
 operation on April 2. 
 
 About this time the Brigadier was present 
 at a very interesting conference which was held 
 at Divisional H.Q. The Commander-in-Chief, 
 Sir Douglas Haig, was present and amongst 
 others with him were Generals Allenby, com- 
 manding the 3rd Army, Gough, commanding 
 the 5th Army, and David Campbell, com- 
 manding the 2 1 st Division. Sir Douglas had 
 come to confer with his Army Commanders 
 on the ground, in regard to the operations at 
 Arras which were due to take place on or about 
 April 9. 
 
 Four days later, on April 2, the attack on 
 Croisilles was renewed, but on a much larger 
 scale. In conjunction with the 21st Division 
 on the left and the 4th Australian Division on 
 the right the 7th Division was ordered to 
 capture the villages of Ecoust-Longatte and 
 Croisilles, and to establish a line of posts on 
 the slopes below the Hindenburg Line. The 
 task of the right brigade of the 21st Division 
 was to establish itself on the high ground North 
 of Croisilles and work round the Eastern exits 
 
 62
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 from the village, where they were to gain 
 touch with the 91st Brigade. 
 
 A sister brigade on the right was to capture 
 Ecoust-Longatte and the line of the railway 
 running Northwards towards Croisilles. The 
 role of the 91st Brigade was to occupy the line 
 of the railway and the high ground South of 
 Croisilles and work round the Eastern exit of 
 the village and then gain touch with the 21st 
 Division, thus completely surrounding the vil- 
 lage ; and at the same time to establish a line 
 of posts running parallel to the South boundary 
 of the village, as a temporary defensive flank. 
 When these operations were complete, the 
 village was to be cleared by direct assault. 
 
 The artillery arrangements were carefully 
 worked out and co-ordinated, the infantry 
 advancing under a creeping barrage to their 
 objective, and the village itself was bombarded 
 with heavy artillery until the first objective 
 was taken. The artillery support was excellent 
 and materially contributed to the success of 
 the operation. All day long, as soon as the 
 first objective had been taken, they were able 
 to engage as targets the bodies of enemy infan- 
 
 63
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 try retiring into the Hindenburg Line and 
 inflict heavy casualties on the portion of the 
 enemy who attempted to break out from 
 Croisilles by the Fontaine Road. The heavy 
 howitzers, too, did good work in reducing the 
 strong points in Croisilles and its outskirts, 
 especially the one usually called the " Tooth," 
 which required two separate doses before it 
 was finally disposed of. 
 
 The attack was carried out by three bat- 
 talions in line, namely the 2nd Queens, 21st 
 Manchesters, and 1st S. Staffordshires respect- 
 ively from left to right, their objective being 
 the line of the railway already mentioned, the 
 left battalion forming the defensive flank along 
 the line of the village and establishing itself 
 on the Eastern exit and gaining touch with the 
 2 1st Division there. The 22nd Manchesters 
 were to clear the village. A fifth battalion, 
 the 2nd Royal Warwickshires, was lent to the 
 Brigade to hold the line vacated by the 
 attacking troops. 
 
 The night of the ist-2nd of April was fine, 
 with bright moonlight which assisted the march 
 of the troops to their forming-up positions. 
 
 64
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 In the clear moonlight however one company 
 of the leading battalion, the 2nd Queens, was 
 observed advancing down an exposed spur, a 
 number of " golden rain " rockets were imme- 
 diately sent up by the enemy and the valley 
 beyond the spur was heavily shelled. But the 
 limits of this barrage were so clearly defined 
 that the battalions who followed were able to 
 keep clear of it, and carry out the assembly 
 march successfully. 
 
 At 5.15 a.m. the advance started. The 1st 
 S. Staffordshires met with little opposition and, 
 gaining their objective, opened a heavy Lewis- 
 gun fire on parties of the Boche making their 
 escape across the open to the Hindenburg Line. 
 The centre battalion was checked at the outset 
 by our own barrage, which was somewhat short, 
 but as it lifted they were able to advance. 
 The railway embankment however at this point 
 proved to be a very formidable obstacle, being 
 some forty feet high and covered with a low 
 scrub. A small culvert ran through the em- 
 bankment about the centre, above which was 
 a strong machine-gun emplacement heavily 
 wired. The top of the embankment was 
 
 65 E
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 defended by a series of rifle posts with a con- 
 siderable amount of wire in the scrub in front 
 of them. As the battalion advanced it was met 
 by heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from the 
 embankment and from a machine gun concealed 
 in the culvert. Machine-gun fire from the 
 South side of Croisilles, where the left battalion 
 had been delayed, also hampered the advance. 
 The embankment however was gained after a 
 struggle, by 6.30 a.m. The enfilade machine- 
 gun fire from the village then became so in- 
 tense that the line was forced to retire below 
 the embankment. The right company event- 
 ually succeeded in getting a Lewis gun over, 
 and by means of dribbling little parties of men 
 over and using the culvert, the line was estab- 
 lished in the sunken road beyond, by 10 a.m. 
 Meanwhile the right and centre battalions 
 had pushed on to the slopes in front of the 
 Hindenburg Line, and the second objective 
 was reached by all three battalions shortly after 
 II a.m. and consolidation at once commenced. 
 The Brigadier at this point ordered up six 
 Vickers guns to the railway embankment which 
 now formed a very strong support line. Touch 
 
 66
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 was maintained throughout the morning with 
 the Brigade operating on the right, but no 
 signs of the Division on the left could be found 
 East of Croisilles, where they should have been 
 " according to plan." The consequence was 
 that the idea of completely isolating and 
 surrounding the village did not come off. 
 Throughout the morning parties of the enemy 
 attempted to leave the village by the Fontaine 
 Road, but were turned back by the fire of our 
 posts. They however eventually escaped by the 
 road North-East from the village, which the left 
 Division should have occupied, but they appar- 
 ently had been held up until it was too late, 
 which was a pity, as there was little doubt that, 
 had that exit been blocked, a very large number 
 of the enemy would have been effectively cut off. 
 The situation of the front line being now 
 assured, the Brigadier ordered the 22nd Man- 
 chester under Colonel Woodward to clear the 
 village. Two companies forming up on either 
 side of the river Sensee, which runs through the 
 village, started at 11.30 a.m. under a barrage, 
 the objective being the sunken road at the 
 Eastern exit, strong bombing parties being also 
 
 67
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 detailed to work round the outer defence of 
 the village on the North side. 
 
 In this formation the battalion entered the 
 village and became swallowed up in it for the 
 time being ; little information came through, 
 and the battalion practically disappeared into 
 the labyrinth of ruined houses and masonry- 
 cumbered streets of which the village was com- 
 posed. The left company pushed on towards 
 its objective, but soon became scattered and 
 disorganised, as always happens in village fight- 
 ing. The right company in the same way soon 
 lost its direction and only one platoon event- 
 ually reached the objective — the sunken road 
 already referred to. The bombing party be- 
 came held up by a strong point on the Northern 
 boundary. At 1.15 p.m. the support company 
 was pushed in and became involved in the 
 melee. Finally the two reserve platoons were 
 sent by the Officer Commanding to deal with 
 two strong points located by the advanced 
 troops. By skilful handling and the proper use 
 of Lewis guns, these were eventually overcome 
 and the village was cleared except for some 
 desultory fighting with isolated fragments of 
 
 68
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 the enemy, which continued most of the night. 
 The situation was not finally cleared up until 
 the early morning of the 3rd, when touch was 
 established at all points with the left Division. 
 The Brigade was relieved on the night of the 
 2nd /3rd, with the exception of the battalion 
 actually in the village, which remained there 
 until relieved by the Division on the left on 
 the night of the 4th /5th, an unnecessarily long 
 time to have kept a battalion which had had 
 a very difficult task to perform and had carried 
 it out with great dash and skill, but thus it 
 was ordained by the Division in spite of the 
 protest of the Brigadier. 
 
 The operation was entirely successful, and 
 once more demonstrated clearly how much 
 more efficacious and economical an attack on 
 a broad front, properly co-ordinated and 
 supported, was than the isolated enterprises 
 which were so often attempted and which 
 were earmarked beforehand for failure. The 
 way to the Hindenburg Line was now clear on 
 this part of the front, and the great offensive 
 from the direction of Arras was the necessary 
 
 sequel to the operation. 
 
 69
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 The battle of Arras commenced on April 9, 
 after a tremendous artillery preparation which 
 lasted for about a week or longer, during which 
 the enemy line was subjected to the heaviest 
 bombardment which, up to that time, had 
 been seen. The attack, which started on 
 April 9, was a complete success ; the infantry 
 pushing forward drove the enemy from his 
 positions East of Arras and penetrated deeply 
 into his line. As time went on however the 
 available troops became exhausted, and the 
 operation eventually ended on the Sensee 
 River. The whole front of the attack pivoted 
 during the move forward on the village of 
 Croisilles, which had been taken as described 
 on April 2, and which considerably aided the 
 operation. 
 
 It was not until May 1 1 that the 7th Division 
 came again into the picture, as it was relieved 
 and taken out to rest, although occasionally 
 holding the line for short spaces of time. 
 
 It had been determined by the higher com- 
 mand that the Hindenburg Line should be 
 attacked and broken in the vicinity of Bulle- 
 court, a village forming part of the line 
 
 70
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 immediately to the East of Ecoust — the main 
 Hindenburg Line running through the Western 
 outskirts of the village with the support line 
 on the high ground East of it. This operation 
 was to have been carried out simultaneously 
 with an attack on the line of the Sensee River 
 by General Allenby's army to the North. 
 The primary operation was carried out by the 
 62nd Division and was a complete failure, the 
 Boche position being very strong at this point 
 and well supported by artillery. This Division, 
 too, had only arrived a short time before from 
 home and were therefore rather raw and 
 untrained, and this was their first experience 
 of heavy fighting. They were a fine Division 
 and proved their worth later on, but on this 
 occasion they were severely handicapped. 
 
 However, it was considered necessary that 
 the village should be taken at all costs and 
 the attacks were continued, the 7th Division 
 being brought into line for this purpose. 
 First one and then the other brigade attempted 
 the task, but in spite of the utmost gallantry 
 were unable to obtain more than a footing 
 on the extreme edge of the village. It was 
 
 71
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 then decided that the 91st Brigade was to 
 make a further attempt in conjunction with 
 an Australian Division on the right. The 62nd 
 Division on the left was to send a party to 
 capture a strong point known as " The Cruci- 
 fix," which was situated on the extreme Western 
 edge of the village and thus covered and sup- 
 ported the left flank. The Australian Division 
 on the right was to capture the Hindenburg 
 Support Line, South of the village, and link 
 up with the Brigade assaulting the village. All 
 the attacks hitherto made had been entirely of 
 a frontal nature. The Brigadier, however, 
 on being informed of the task he was to carry 
 out, had intimated that he would prefer to 
 attack from a new direction and produced a 
 scheme for assaulting the village from a South- 
 westerly direction, from the Southern end of the 
 Ecoust-Bullecourt Road. By this means touch 
 was more easily obtained with the Australian 
 Division on the right, the forming up of the 
 assaulting troops was simplified and could be 
 carried out comparatively under cover, and 
 the supporting barrage could be made in 
 enfilade, which increased its efficiency. An 
 
 72
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 attack from this direction would also, he argued, 
 come more as a surprise than if carried out in 
 the former way. After some argument and 
 not a little opposition this plan was eventually 
 approved and sanctioned. Two battalions, 
 the i st S. Staffordshires and the 2nd Queens, 
 were detailed to make the assault, forming up 
 on a tape line previously laid on the required 
 alignment. Another battalion, the 2 1st Man- 
 chester, was detailed to carry out the " mop- 
 ping up " of the village after capture, sending 
 a company to each assaulting battalion for 
 this purpose to follow the battalion with which 
 they were acting. The fourth battalion, the 
 22nd Manchesters, remained in reserve in 
 Ecoust with one company holding the line 
 of the railway North of Ecoust and North 
 of the Ecoust-Bullecourt Road. The Brigade 
 Headquarters were in the vaults below what 
 had once been the church of Ecoust, but 
 which was now merely a chalk rubbish heap. 
 These vaults were rather curious and were 
 quarried out of hard chalk, the church having 
 been built from the material taken from them. 
 In places they were sixty feet deep and were 
 
 73
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 very safe and commodious headquarters, but 
 ventilation of any kind was an impossibility 
 and the stuffiness of them will never be forgot- 
 ten, although they felt cool when compared 
 with the broiling heat outside, as the weather 
 had suddenly become hot — hotter than any 
 May ever remembered. 
 
 On the night of May io/li, the Brigade 
 took over the line from a sister Brigade of the 
 Division (the 20th Brigade), the two assaulting 
 battalions taking over the posts in Bullecourt 
 in their respective spheres of attack. On the 
 night of 11 /i 2, the tape line for forming up on 
 was laid out by the Engineers, and Brigade 
 Headquarters moved from the sunken road 
 which went by the cheery name of " The Dead 
 Man " to the headquarters below the church in 
 Ecoust. In the early morning of the 12th the 
 two battalions making the attack were formed 
 up with their leading waves on the tape line. 
 This was successfully carried out with slight 
 casualties, although the enemy maintained 
 a steady bombardment on the South-West 
 corner of the village. 
 
 Judging that the enemy's retaliation would 
 
 74
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 be heavy and continuous, every means of com- 
 munication was carefully thought out and 
 organised by the Brigadier and his Signal 
 Staff. Relay posts for runners were established 
 in the communication trench (the only one) 
 from Longatte to the South-West corner of 
 Bullecourt. Two telephone lines had also 
 been laid by different routes to the combined 
 Battalion Headquarters in the line. A " power 
 buzzer " set in duplicate was established, and 
 this was supplemented by a field wireless 
 apparatus. Every battalion was also supplied 
 with carrier pigeons. In spite of all these 
 preparations, communication broke down badly. 
 The enemy very early in the proceedings put 
 down a heavy high explosive and shrapnel 
 barrage, which in a few minutes cut both 
 telephone wires, smashed the power buzzer 
 and the wireless apparatus, and in spite of 
 heroic efforts on the part of all members of 
 the signal section, the telephone lines remained 
 practically useless for the rest of the day ; as 
 soon as they were renewed, they were cut 
 again and again. All communication there- 
 fore devolved on the hard worked " runners," 
 
 75
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 many of whom became casualties in their en- 
 deavours to get through. The pigeons were 
 also a failure — most probably they refused to fly 
 through the heavy barrage, or else became con- 
 fused by it and lost their way or were killed. 
 
 Zero hour was at 3.40 a.m., at which 
 hour the attack started. The 2nd Queens 
 on the right accomplished their task with 
 little opposition and, in touch with the Aus- 
 tralian Division on the right, reached its object- 
 ive in fine style by 4.15 a.m. Thence they 
 at once pushed out a series of posts to the front, 
 and consolidated a line just North of the road. 
 Touch was gained with the Australian Division 
 and with the battalion on the left, and as far 
 as this part of the attack was concerned, all 
 was couleur de rose. The advance of the 
 1 st S. Staff ordshires on the left was not so 
 easy, however. At Zero hour, the enemy at 
 once put down a very heavy barrage on the 
 South-West corner of Bullecourt. Numerous 
 machine-gun and rifle posts opened from the 
 corner of the village. That part of the advanc- 
 ing troops immediately South of the road 
 suffered very heavily, made little progress, and 
 
 76
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 became very disorganised. But the troops 
 farther South were able to obtain more cover, 
 and in spite of losing a lot of men, pushed on 
 very steadily and by 7 a.m. had established 
 themselves in the Northern portions of the 
 village, and touch was gained with the battalion 
 on the right. At about 9 a.m. Colonel Beau- 
 man, commanding the 1st S. Staff ordshires, 
 considered that a fresh attack was necessary 
 to drive the enemy from the Hindenburg 
 Line West of the village and the houses adjoin- 
 ing it which were evidently strongly held and 
 which formed the chief point of resistance. 
 He therefore ordered up his reserve company 
 to attack this part of the village. This attack 
 was met with very heavy machine-gun fire, 
 was unable to proceed, and eventually dug 
 in in the centre of the village. In the mean- 
 while the 62nd Division on the left had failed 
 to secure The Crucifix, with the result that the 
 left flank remained uncovered and the Germans 
 were able to send reinforcements into the 
 village without hindrance. 
 
 The situation at this time was a very curious 
 one. The whole of the village was occupied 
 
 77
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 by the Brigade except the Hindenburg Line 
 running along its Western edge and the houses 
 adjacent to it, the only outlet to which was 
 the line of trench running from The Crucifix 
 to the Hindenburg Support Line along the 
 Northern edge of the village. Could this 
 latter be carried the village was theirs, and the 
 position won. 
 
 During the whole of this time, the Brigade 
 Headquarters was in a state of ignorance as to 
 what was happening on account of the failure 
 of communication, due to the causes already 
 touched upon. An aeroplane reconnaissance 
 had, however, brought in the information that 
 the troops had entered the village and that the 
 right battalion and the Australians had gained 
 their objectives. But the situation was very 
 obscure, and the lack of information from the 
 left battalion was the cause of much anxiety 
 to the Brigadier — anxiety which was not 
 lessened by the continuous and irritating 
 complaints from the Division of the absence 
 of news. It transpired that continuous reports 
 had been sent from the battalion which never 
 reached Brigade Headquarters, every runner 
 
 78
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 being either killed or badly wounded and the 
 other means of communication being, of 
 course, entirely suspended. By seven o'clock, 
 no information having being received, the 
 Brigadier sent one of his staff to the left Bat- 
 talion Headquarters to obtain news of the 
 situation and to return as soon as possible. 
 At about 1 1 a.m. the first report was received, 
 giving the situation at 9 a.m. as already des- 
 cribed above. The Brigadier thereupon ordered 
 three companies of the 22nd Manchesters to 
 move forward and place themselves under the 
 orders of the Officer Commanding the 1st S. 
 Staffordshires, to whom he sent instructions 
 to use these companies to attack the Western 
 part of the village still occupied by the 
 enemy and drive them out, in the manner 
 best suited to the situation as it appeared 
 to him at the time. By the time however 
 that this order reached him, the Officer 
 Commanding considered it impossible to 
 deploy troops in daylight for an attack, 
 owing to the intensity of the enemy's barrage 
 and the rifle and machine-gun fire from this 
 position, which had evidently been reinforced. 
 
 79
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 He therefore kept these companies in reserve 
 under cover and did not use them. During 
 the remainder of the day no further advance 
 could be made, but the positions held were 
 firmly consolidated. At about I p.m. the Staff 
 Officer returned from the front line and con- 
 firmed what had already been reported, also 
 bringing back a report from Colonel Beauman 
 with a request for reinforcements to com- 
 plete the taking of the village. These how- 
 ever had already been dispatched in accordance 
 with the appreciation of the situation from 
 former reports received before this arrived. 
 On receipt of this information the Brigadier 
 shortly after 2 p.m. made his way to the Bat- 
 talion Headquarters, accompanied by his acting 
 Brigade-Major, Captain Morshead, an officer 
 as capable as he was reliable and the possessor 
 of a charming personality, to see for himself 
 how matters stood, to confer with his 
 Battalion Commanders as to the steps to be 
 taken, and to give orders for further operations. 
 On arrival, after a very rough passage, further 
 accentuated by its being a boiling day, when 
 running across the open to dodge shells and 
 
 80
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 machine-gun bullets was not a form of exercise 
 to hanker after, he found the situation to be 
 as follows : The 2nd Queens were firmly estab- 
 lished in their objective, not having suffered 
 excessive casualties, and reorganised into proper 
 formation. The ist S. Staff ordshires and the 
 " mopping up " Battalion, the 21st Manches- 
 ter, on the other hand, although well estab- 
 lished in the village, were much disorganised 
 from the constant fighting in which they had 
 been engaged among the ruined houses and 
 derelict streets, than which nothing is more 
 conducive to disorganisation and difficulties 
 of control. Moreover, the men were thor- 
 oughly exhausted by the heat and suffering 
 from want of water which, although supplies 
 were adequate, was difficult to distribute 
 owing to the constant sniping which came 
 from the enemy line on the West of the 
 village. The Crucifix had not been taken, 
 although early in the day a report had been 
 received at Brigade Headquarters to the 
 contrary. It was evident, however, from 
 information received that the enemy still 
 had means of communication with his main 
 
 81 F
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 line to the isolated posts still in the Western 
 end of the village. With this aspect of the 
 situation in his mind and thinking that a 
 counter-attack was probable, the Brigadier, 
 after the conference, decided to withdraw 
 the ist S. Staff ordshires and the 2ist Manches- 
 ter to the rear of Ecoust after dark, where 
 they could reorganise, and to relieve them 
 in the line by the 22nd Manchesters who were 
 comparatively fresh. As it was impossible 
 to move troops in daylight he also detailed a 
 fifth battalion, the 2nd Royal Warwickshires, 
 which had been lent him from a sister Brigade 
 to make an attack at dawn the next morning 
 on the German line still holding out on the 
 West of the village. He indicated on the 
 ground the way he wished the attack to be 
 carried out. It was to start from a line East 
 of the Boche line and, working westwards, to 
 assault this line from the rear. With the 
 exception of a short, sharp barrage of mixed 
 H. E. and shrapnel from the field artillery, 
 a few moments before Zero, the attack was 
 not to be supported by artillery, as he deemed 
 it wiser to trust to the element of surprise in 
 
 82
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 an attack from this direction, and also because 
 arrangements for artillery support would have 
 been very difficult, especially as time was short. 
 Having settled all these points, the Brigadier 
 returned to his headquarters to issue the neces- 
 sary orders and to make arrangements for the 
 various moves it entailed, well pleased with 
 the success obtained and confident of being 
 able to bring the operation to a satisfactory 
 conclusion on the following day. On arrival, 
 he rang up the Divisional Commander on the 
 telephone and after explaining the situation 
 he detailed the measures he proposed to take 
 to deal with it and the way in which he was 
 prepared to carry them out. He was met with 
 a blank refusal to entertain his plans and was 
 told that the operation had been a failure, and 
 that the attack must be continued at all costs. 
 The Brigadier replied by reiterating his former 
 arguments against any further operations during 
 daylight, and concluded by saying that the plan 
 which he had already indicated was the one 
 which he considered had the best chance of 
 success, but that he was willing to carry out 
 any other operation which the Divisional 
 
 »3
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Commander might consider necessary. The 
 latter appeared to be somewhat annoyed and 
 rang off after intimating that further orders 
 would be sent and that no relief of any of the 
 troops was to take place. In a few minutes 
 the telephone bell rang again : it was the 
 Divisional Commander, who proceeded to 
 inform the Brigadier that in his opinion the 
 Brigadier was too tired to cope with the situa- 
 tion, that his judgment was therefore warped, 
 and that he considered it advisable that he 
 should relinquish his command to the next 
 senior and return to Divisional Headquarters 
 for the night. After protesting against this 
 arrangement, the Brigadier was forced to obey 
 and handed over command that evening to 
 Colonel Norman of the 21st Manchesters, and 
 proceeded as ordered to Divisional Head- 
 quarters, departing on leave the following day. 
 After the Brigadier's departure, an attack by 
 the 2nd R. Warwickshires and two companies 
 of the 22nd Manchesters was planned to take 
 place at 3.40 a.m. on the following morning. 
 This attack was a combined frontal and envelop- 
 ing one, the two companies of the 22nd Man- 
 
 84
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 chesters attacking from the North side of the 
 main road, the 2nd Warwickshires advancing 
 from the South- West to attack that portion 
 of the line. This operation was launched at 
 the time named but was a complete failure, as 
 they could make no progress in face of the heavy 
 hostile shelling. The two companies of the 
 22nd Manchesters, after being held up by 
 their own barrage, eventually moved forward 
 when it lifted, but were held up by heavy 
 machine-gun fire from the German trench. 
 The attacking troops were withdrawn at about 
 io a.m., having suffered very severely. From 
 now onwards, during the 13th and 14th of 
 May, various small attacks by one or two com- 
 panies at a time were organised and delivered, 
 but with no other effect than that of increasing 
 the casualty list. On the night 14/15 May, 
 the Brigade was relieved and a further attack 
 by two companies of still another battalion of 
 a sister Brigade was ordered to take place in 
 the early morning of the 15th. From midnight 
 onwards, however, the enemy shelled Ecoust 
 and the communication trench very heavily 
 with H. E. and gas shells, and at 3.55 a.m. 
 
 85
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 heavily counter-attacked the advanced line 
 which was driven back through the village 
 to a line which, after being reinforced, was 
 held and consolidated, some distance in the 
 rear. On the night of the l5/l6th the 
 Division was relieved. 
 
 Here again is an instance of that fatal policy 
 of attempting to attack entrenched positions, 
 strongly and skilfully held by a determined 
 enemy, with inadequate numbers, and of trying 
 to effect with small numbers what has been 
 proved to be incapable of assault by larger 
 forces. The small attack, hastily organised 
 and inadequately prepared, is bound to fail. 
 No gallantry in the world can make up for 
 properly organised support of all kinds ; and 
 ample time for preparation is essential to make 
 a success of such an attack against a strong 
 position where no possibility of manoeuvre 
 is open to the attacking forces. After the 
 initial success on this occasion, a properly 
 organised attack with sufficient numbers should 
 have been organised to exploit the first step, 
 ample time for its proper organisation being 
 allowed and fresh troops being detailed to make 
 
 86
 
 CROISILLES & BULLECOURT 
 
 it ; and if possible the troops in the front 
 line, who were in a very uncomfortable situa- 
 tion, and were much exhausted from severe 
 fighting in almost tropical heat, should have 
 been relieved. The fetish for instant action 
 on all occasions does not commend itself when 
 applied to assaulting prepared, entrenched 
 positions which have no flanks to turn ; this 
 resolves itself into siege warfare, where positions 
 can only be taken piecemeal and step by step. 
 It is a very different thing in what is known 
 as " open warfare," where quick decision and 
 instant action are so often necessary to seize 
 fleeting opportunities. The constant shelling 
 on this occasion rendered all quick communi- 
 cation impossible ; the only way of getting 
 information was by means of orderlies with 
 written messages, a very slow and precarious 
 method ; and this alone would have made 
 proper preparations difficult and hurry and 
 dispatch impracticable and dangerous. 
 
 87
 
 Chapter 4 : The German Offen- 
 sive — March ^ 1 9 1 8 
 
 AFTER returning from France in May, 
 1 91 7, there came a period of service in 
 England. Although more peaceful and less 
 exacting, it was still a very strenuous time and 
 very little leisure was attached to it. 
 
 The post to which the Brigadier was ap- 
 pointed after a short period of leave was the 
 command of the Machine Gun Corps at Grant- 
 ham, and his efforts were concentrated in train- 
 ing and equipping officers and men of that 
 Corps in as short a period as possible, and 
 sending them out to the various fronts fit, as 
 far as time allowed, to take their place in the 
 fighting line. The time allowed was very 
 short — nine to twelve weeks for the men and 
 six to eight weeks for the officers. Not a 
 moment of this could be wasted and train- 
 ing was, of course, continuous and exacting ; 
 
 88
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 but it served its purpose, and as the wastage 
 all through the summer and autumn of 191 7 
 was very high every effort had to be expended 
 to supply the requisite number of men to 
 make good the deficiencies. At this time too 
 the necessity for change in the organisation 
 of the Machine Gun Corps was becoming 
 more and more apparent, as the scope and 
 utility of these weapons became better under- 
 stood and more widely appreciated. 
 
 The number of machine guns in a Division 
 had been gradually increased since the war 
 started from two guns per battalion, making 
 a total of twenty-four in the Division, to 
 sixteen guns per Brigade, making forty-eight 
 guns to the Division. The old Machine Gun 
 Section (two guns) of the battalions had been 
 done away with and replaced by Lewis guns 
 with each platoon, and the machine guns had 
 been organised, very wisely, into a separate 
 Corps. But it was essential, to get the full 
 effect of these weapons, that they should be 
 capable of being used collectively and not 
 frittered away piecemeal attached to Brigades. 
 After much discussion and a certain amount 
 
 89
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 of opposition, it was finally decided to organise 
 the Machine Gun Companies into Battalions 
 of four companies of sixteen guns each, making 
 a total of sixty-four to a Division, which would 
 then become part of the Divisional Troops, 
 where they would be properly administered 
 and trained by a senior officer who would also 
 become, ex officio, the Machine-Gun Adviser 
 to the Divisional General. This change of 
 organisation was worked out at Grantham, 
 in conjunction with the Machine Gun School 
 at Camiers in France, and meant a considerable 
 amount of work for the staff at both places. 
 That the change was a wise one, and more than 
 justified itself during the whole of the fight- 
 ing in 191 8, must be admitted by even its 
 most bitter opponents. 
 
 In February, 191 8, the Brigadier relinquished 
 his appointment at Grantham, preparatory 
 to taking over a Brigade in France, and on 
 March 16 left England for that purpose. On 
 arrival he was posted to the 1 10th Brigade of 
 the 2 1 st Division, and after a night spent at 
 Boulogne, he left by train for Amiens, with 
 the vaguest idea as to where the Division was ; 
 
 90
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 he only knew that a car would meet him at 
 Amiens station to take him on his way. On 
 arriving at Amiens among the throng which were 
 congregated in the station yard, he found with 
 some difficulty the car in charge of a smart man 
 with a very broad Scotch accent and a pair 
 of piercing black eyes which twinkled in an 
 extraordinary way, and who evidently had a 
 keener sense of humour than his countrymen 
 are generally suppose to possess. He was 
 destined to drive the Brigadier on many other 
 occasions of a less pleasant character, as he 
 remained with the Division till it was demobi- 
 lised in April, 1 91 9. After lunching at the old 
 familiar Godbert Restaurant, the Brigadier pro- 
 ceeded on his way, the driver informing him that 
 Divisional Headquarters were at Longavesnes 
 and that the 1 10th Brigade were at that moment 
 in the line with headquarters at Saulcourt, which 
 meant that they were on the ground where 
 the German counter-attack, after the Battle 
 of Cambrai in November, 191 7, took place. 
 Late in the afternoon he arrived at Divisional 
 Headquarters, which consisted of a series of 
 the usual wooden huts on the sheltered side of 
 
 9i
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 a low ridge and provided with mined dug-outs 
 as protection against aerial bombing, which at 
 that time was common in this part of the 
 line. As it was getting late, the Divisional 
 Commander arranged for the Brigadier to 
 stay the night at Divisional Headquarters and 
 take over the command of his Brigade the next 
 morning, which, as he had been travelling since 
 7 o'clock that morning, he was very pleased to 
 do. This rest, by the way, was productive of 
 many good results when viewed by the light 
 of subsequent events, as it enabled the Brigadier 
 to make acquaintance with the Staff, and it 
 also gave him the opportunity of hearing from 
 the Divisional Commander his views on the 
 situation as it stood and discussing various 
 other questions which are so necessary for a 
 good understanding between a Divisional Com- 
 mander and his Brigadiers. The situation, on 
 the whole, was a sufficiently grave one ; the 
 extent of front held by the Division, with two 
 Brigades in the line and one in reserve, was 
 appallingly large, more especially considering 
 that the Brigades were weak — for already 
 each had been depleted of one battalion 
 
 92
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 and the remainder were not up to strength. 
 The weakness of the Division dated from 
 the latter end of 191 7, when the strength 
 of battalions was so much reduced owing to 
 there being an insufficient number of recruits 
 forthcoming to keep them up to strength, that 
 it was decided to disband a certain number 
 of battalions so as to strengthen the remainder. 
 At the same time it was decided not to alter 
 the number of Divisions, so that the only other 
 alternative was to reduce the strength of the 
 Brigades ; the latter were therefore reduced 
 from four to three battalions, making the 
 infantry strength of a Division ten battalions 
 instead of thirteen. Apart from the loss of 
 strength, this decision — from a Brigadier's point 
 of view — was very unfortunate, as the diffi- 
 culties of inter-battalion reliefs were thereby 
 increased. It can easily be seen that, with 
 four battalions in the Brigade, two could be 
 placed in the front line, leaving one in support 
 and one in reserve, these latter two relieving 
 the front line battalions which, in their turn, 
 became support and reserve. With three 
 battalions however this was not so, because 
 
 93
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 it almost invariably occurred that two 
 battalions were in the front line, leaving only 
 one for relieving purposes, and thus making it 
 imperative to keep one of the front line batta- 
 lions a longer time in the line. Incidentally, 
 too, it was a great waste of Staff, as it was just 
 as easy to administer and command four or 
 even five battalions as three. 
 
 Added to this loss of strength, in spite of 
 incessant work, which had seriously interfered 
 with the training during the winter, the 
 trenches, which had had to be absolutely 
 remodelled, were not yet finished. The out- 
 post zone and the main line of defence were 
 complete, but the same could not be said 
 for the lines in rear of these. Main routes of 
 telephone communication had been buried 
 but were by no means complete, and the 
 German attack which was clearly foreshadowed 
 by various indications might take place at any 
 moment. Filled with the thoughts of what 
 he had heard, the Brigadier went to bed that 
 night well pleased with what he had seen of his 
 new Division, but little thinking what was in 
 store for him in the course of the next few days. 
 
 94
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 The 2 1 st Division at this time wa9 com- 
 manded by Major-General Sir David Campbell, 
 formerly of the 9th Lancers, with which 
 regiment, and later in command of a cavalry 
 Brigade, he had been through the opening 
 phases of the war. From this cavalry Brigade 
 he had been appointed direct to the command 
 of the 2 1 st Division, which he continued to 
 command till March, 1919. Very quick and 
 alert, with an inexhaustible supply of energy, 
 a great sense of humour and a fund of common 
 sense, he was the perfection of a Divisional 
 Commander. He was very popular with all 
 ranks, and rightly so, as he never spared himself 
 in looking after their comfort and efficiency in 
 every way. Added to which he was a fine 
 soldier, with sound and original ideas on 
 training, and possessed a strong will of his own 
 without being in any way obstinate. 
 
 The Division at this time was composed of 
 the 110th, 62nd and 64th Infantry Brigades, 
 commanded respectively by the writer, Briga- 
 dier-Generals G. H. Gater and T. Headlam. 
 The Divisional Artillery was commanded by 
 Brigadier-General Newcombe, the C.R.E. being 
 
 95
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Colonel Addison. General Gater was a pro- 
 duct of the New Army ; he had never seen 
 or thought of soldiering before the war, but 
 had joined up as soon as it started and had 
 worked up to his present rank. He was a 
 first-class Brigade Commander, very able and 
 quick ; indeed it was difficult to imagine 
 him in any other capacity. A delightful 
 companion and a good comrade, he was uni- 
 versally liked throughout the Division. 
 
 The i ioth Brigade, known as " The Leicester 
 Brigade," was originally made up of the 6th, 
 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions Leicestershire 
 Regiment. The latter had, however, been 
 disbanded and at this time only the first three 
 were in being. They were a fine, upstanding 
 lot of magnificent fighting men, with excep- 
 tional esprit de corps and proud of their 
 unofficial title. The Brigade-Major was Major 
 Whittuck, of the Somerset Light Infantry ; 
 a very capable officer, with a sangfroid which 
 nothing could disturb ; and an equally capable 
 Staff Captain was found in Captain Ibbotson, to 
 whom Napoleon's axiom might apply that 
 " Difficulties only arose to be overcome." 
 
 96
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 The next morning, March 18, the Brigadier 
 bade adieu to Divisional Headquarters and 
 motored to Saulcourt, a ruined village near 
 the line, where, in a sunken road leading from 
 the North-East corner of it, he found his 
 headquarters, comprising a series of " elephant 
 shelters " dug into the bank of the road with 
 a mined dug-out below them ; altogether very 
 snug and comfortable quarters, as things went. 
 He thereupon took over the command from 
 the outgoing Brigadier, who had been appointed 
 to the command of a Division and was there- 
 fore anxious to get away. After discussing 
 the situation and having shown the positions 
 of the troops on the map and the defensive 
 measures generally which had been taken, 
 General Cayley departed and the relief was 
 complete. Not very much could be done that 
 day, but the rest of the afternoon was spent 
 with the Brigade-Major, going more into 
 details of the defensive scheme and the methods 
 of supply, relief, communications, artillery 
 support, and the thousand and one other details 
 which it behoves a Brigadier to have at his 
 finger-ends and to be thoroughly au courant 
 
 97 c
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 with if he wishes to keep his finger on the pulse 
 of his command. Various other matters claimed 
 his attention, such as the settling down in his 
 new quarters, making acquaintance with the 
 various members of his staff, having the means 
 of communication thoroughly explained to him 
 by his signal officer and last, but not least, 
 making a prolonged reconnaissance of the 
 Brigade sector from the bank above his head- 
 quarters, with field-glasses and telescope whilst 
 the light permitted. He decided that night to 
 commence inspecting the line the following 
 morning and arranged, in company with the 
 Brigade-Major, to see the left half of the line 
 the morning of the 19th and the right half on 
 the 20th, employing the afternoon in seeing 
 the reserve battalion, the transport lines and 
 the various other oddments which go to form 
 the rear line of a Brigade on these occasions. 
 It was a comprehensive programme and meant 
 a very considerable amount of walking, but 
 seeing what the situation was, it was imperative 
 to get some idea of the line and how it was held 
 as quickly as possible, as there was no knowing 
 when the blow might fall. The 7th and 8th 
 
 98
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Leicesters were at this time holding respectively 
 the left and right sectors of the front with the 
 6th Leicesters in reserve at Saulcourt in huts. 
 The extent of the front held by the Brigade 
 was prodigious, although not more so than any- 
 other in the 5th Army front. It ran from the 
 Southern extremity of the village to Epehy, 
 where it joined up with the 16th Division, along 
 the railway cutting which followed its Eastern 
 face, through the village of Peiziere to the 
 slopes below Vaucellette Farm, which was 
 held by the 62nd Brigade ; a total distance of 
 about 2,100 yards. Every Division and every 
 Brigade in the 5th Army was alike in this 
 respect ; is it any wonder that, as Ludendorff 
 discloses in his memoirs, the 5 th Army was 
 selected by the German High Command as the 
 point for attack ? Is it any wonder that 
 holding, as they were obliged to do, this 
 extended front with eleven weak Divisions, 
 with only three in reserve, they were obliged 
 to give ground when assailed by the weight 
 of superior numbers ? The only wonder is 
 that they were not hopelessly broken, as the 
 enemy calculated that they would be. Only 
 
 99
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 the skilful and determined way in which they 
 were handled by the Army Commander, his 
 wise and soldierlike decision at a critical 
 moment to retire behind the Somme, and the 
 gallant and determined fighting qualities of 
 the rank and file, kept the line intact and pre- 
 vented the enemy in spite of all his efforts and 
 carefully organised plans from breaking through. 
 On the 19th and 20th, the Brigadier carried 
 out the programme which he had mapped out, 
 and although the time was all too short for the 
 purpose he managed to see the whole of his 
 forward zone and the main line of resistance, 
 which included the defences of Epehy and 
 Peiziere, and to get a good idea of how his 
 flank joined up with the neighbouring units. 
 Some time was necessarily spent in carefully 
 reconnoitring from the front line trenches of 
 the Outpost Zone the three re-entrant valleys 
 (Linnet Valley, Thrush Valley and Fourteen 
 Willows Road), which led from the German line 
 towards the Epehy ridge, as they were obvious 
 lines of approach for any hostile attack. During 
 this tour acquaintance with the various com- 
 manding officers of units and details of their 
 
 101
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 strength and the various defensive measures 
 for which they were responsible were gone into 
 and discussed. There was not time during 
 these two days to do more than take a cursory 
 glance at everything, and it was lucky that so 
 much was able to be done in that brief space, 
 as although handicapped to a large extent by 
 his lack of knowledge of all the details, the 
 Brigadier had seen enough to be able to fight 
 his Brigade with confidence when the blow 
 fell on the following morning, March 21. 
 
 During the 19th and 20th the outlook had 
 seemed very peaceful ; everything had been 
 quiet, there had been very little shelling and 
 no indication on the surface that anything was 
 in the wind. But from information received 
 beforehand, especially from the statement of 
 two prisoners who had been captured and who 
 on interrogation gave the 21st as the date 
 which had been chosen for the attack, special 
 watchfulness was enjoined on everybody and 
 every precaution of readiness for instant action 
 was taken. Actually the Brigadier was scep- 
 tical, but his doubts were rudely dispelled 
 when he was awakened the following morning 
 
 102
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 at 4.30 a.m. by the crash of the opening bom- 
 bardment. It came down like a thunderclap 
 on all parts of the line, even as far back as 
 Brigade Headquarters, and left no doubt in 
 any one's mind from its depth and intensity 
 that it meant business. 
 
 A hurried move from the shelter to the dug- 
 out was accomplished and, as a considerable 
 proportion of gas shell was being used, gas masks 
 had to be worn and continued to be necessary 
 at intervals during the day, which did not 
 add to the comfort of the proceedings. The 
 morning was cold and damp and a thick mist 
 enveloped everything, so that it was impossible 
 to see any part of the front. Luckily the 
 main telephone lines were buried, so that 
 communication with the front line and the 
 observation posts in Epehy was possible, but 
 even these could not see much, owing to the 
 mist. For six hours the bombardment con- 
 tinued, and it was not until 10.30 a.m. that any 
 infantry attack developed ; then a general 
 attack along the whole line took place and, 
 favoured by the fog, the enemy penetrated the 
 forward zone in several places but were eventu- 
 
 103
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 ally driven out again. It was evident from the 
 first that the Boches were employing a new 
 form of tactics, pushing forward light machine 
 guns which opened the way for small parties of 
 infantry advancing under cover of their fire ; 
 where these bodies met with determined 
 opposition the attack was not forced, but 
 wherever there was a gap or the opposition was 
 able to be overcome, there the attack was 
 pressed and reinforcements directed. Thus a 
 system of infiltration was established and the 
 strong points were gradually surrounded and 
 cut off. This was a very difficult system to 
 combat, as, owing to the shortage of numbers, 
 it was necessary to occupy the extensive front 
 in a series of small posts mutually supporting 
 each other. The mist however rendered this 
 mutual support difficult, hence this infiltration 
 was more successful than it otherwise would 
 have been, with the consequence that parts of 
 the line were penetrated. Epehy and Peiziere 
 were defended by a series of strong points in 
 the villages themselves ; these had separate 
 garrisons, were well wired, and disposed for 
 mutual support of one another. The position 
 
 104
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 was further strengthened by a strong machine- 
 gun defence from the rear and flanks and a 
 converging artillery barrage so arranged as 
 to sweep these valleys at irregular intervals 
 as they formed obvious forming-up places for 
 the attacking troops ; and it is quite possible 
 that this bore good fruit, as the frontal attacks 
 on Epehy and Peiziere did not develop to any 
 extent for some considerable period. During 
 the morning, at about 11 a.m. the enemy 
 apparently filtered through the battalion on 
 the left and a strong party entered Peiziere ; 
 a local counter-stroke by the 7th Leicesters, 
 assisted by two tanks, however, drove them out 
 successfully. At noon the main line of resist- 
 ance was still intact and part of the forward 
 zone remained in our hands, but both flanks 
 were considerably threatened and reports from 
 these directions of bombing enterprises on the 
 part of the enemy went to show that all was 
 not well there. Especially was this the case on 
 the right where as far as could be ascertained 
 there was a considerable gap. The telephone 
 lines were still working with the forward 
 Observation Post, and by this means a very fair 
 
 105
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 idea of the situation was obtained. At 3 p.m. 
 a heavy attack developed from Linnet and 
 Thrush Valleys against the right (8th Leices- 
 ters). The line, however, remained intact, 
 but the situation on the extreme flank, where 
 the 1 6th Division joined up, was very critical 
 as the enemy appeared to have broken through 
 at this point and in conformity with their plan, 
 as sketched above, were pushing past it towards 
 St. Emilie. The Brigadier therefore ordered 
 up the 6th Leicesters to form a defensive 
 flank, pivoting on the South edge of Epehy, 
 towards Saulcourt ; and later they were 
 reinforced from the Divisional Reserve by two 
 companies R.E., three machine guns and a 
 company of the 1st E. Yorks. Regt. And so 
 the day wore on towards evening, and still the 
 line was intact and the defensive flank holding 
 its own ; but disquieting rumours of the 
 enemy pushing down the St. Emilie Road 
 caused much anxiety to the Brigadier. The 
 position on the left flank was most satisfactory, 
 as although Vaucellette Farm ridge had been 
 taken yet Chapel Hill was still in our hands 
 and the 12th /13th Northumberland Fusiliers 
 
 106
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 were echeloned in rear of the Railton-Peiziere 
 Railway. At 10.30 p.m. the fight had died 
 down and as far as the Brigade front was 
 concerned everything was in statu quo, except 
 that the forward posts had gone — after a 
 desperate fight from which unfortunately few 
 returned. They undoubtedly broke up the 
 enemy's attack on more than one occasion, 
 prevented him from making an organised 
 assault on the main line of resistance of Epehy, 
 and remained at their posts until entirely sur- 
 rounded. Even then, from reports received 
 late in the afternoon, they were still holding 
 out. It is difficult to say when or how they 
 ceased to exist, but nothing could be finer than 
 their performance and no words of praise are 
 adequate for such men. Their epitaph lies 
 in the text of the German Communique, 
 which said : " The Leicester Brigade at Epehy 
 gave us the most trouble." 
 
 So the hours of darkness came, hours full of 
 anxiety and work. There was no sleep for 
 anybody, as there was much work to be done, 
 reports to be received, orders sent out and 
 rations to be arranged for ; and the oppor- 
 
 107
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 tunity was taken of sending everything in the 
 way of impedimenta to the rear, out of the 
 way. The next morning (22nd) was still 
 misty. At 6.45 a.m. a heavy bombardment 
 commenced on the front line and to the rear 
 of it, and about 8.15 a.m. the S.O.S. signal 
 went up from Epehy where the enemy was 
 developing a heavy infantry attack on the 
 Southern defences of the village, at the same 
 time pushing an attack from the direction of 
 the Epehy-St. Emilie road against the defensive 
 flank ; the latter attack extended as far as 
 St. Emilie on the 16th Divisional Front. This 
 attack was stoutly resisted, and fierce fighting 
 at close quarters took place in and around the 
 Southern portion of the village. Eventually 
 the Southern group of posts were surrounded 
 and captured, and the left of the defensive 
 flank had to be withdrawn slightly to the 
 North-West in consequence. At 9 a.m. the 
 attack on this flank grew stronger and orders 
 were sent for the line to withdraw North-West- 
 wards to a line Capron Copse — Saulcourt. 
 Lieut. -Colonel Stewart, D.S.O., commanding 
 the 6th Leicesters, a very gallant officer and a 
 
 108
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 great loss, was killed just before the withdrawal 
 took place. By 10 a.m. the movement was 
 complete, the 7th Leicesters still holding the 
 main line of resistance and the village of 
 Peiziere. At II a.m. orders were received 
 from the Division for the Brigade to withdraw 
 in rear of the reserve Brigade, who were in 
 position along the Saulcourt — St. Emilie line, 
 and reorganise near the aerodrome at Long- 
 avesnes. To comply with these orders was 
 not an easy matter. The enemy was pressing 
 the defensive flank, the Southern defences of 
 Epehy had gone and the remainder were 
 in close touch with the Boche, if not already 
 surrounded. The enemy had occupied St. 
 Emilie and were pressing on down the Villers 
 Faucon road. It seemed doubtful if the unit 
 would be able to disentangle itself from such 
 close grips and then make its way out through 
 the gap that was left. The Brigadier issued 
 orders for the Brigade to rendezvous at Long- 
 avesnes, the retirement being carried out from 
 the left, the 6th Leicesters to hold on to the 
 flank to enable the 7th and 8th Leicesters to 
 get away. The greatest latitude was left to 
 
 109
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Commanding Officers to withdraw their com- 
 mands in the way best adapted to the changing 
 situation. Headquarters remained at Saul- 
 court till it was known that the orders had 
 been received and the movement had started. 
 In the meantime the personnel of Brigade H.Q. 
 made up of cooks, servants, signallers, etc., 
 were formed into a fighting formation and took 
 their places in the Reserve Line which ran 
 immediately in front of the H.Q., to fill a gap 
 which existed where one of the battalions of 
 the reserve Brigade had not yet arrived. At 
 about 12 noon, the Brigadier with his staff, in 
 small separate parties, moved to Longavesnes, 
 there to await the Brigade. This journey was 
 by no means a pleasant one as a considerable 
 area in front of Saulcourt through which their 
 pathway lay was being heavily barraged by 
 the enemy ; considerable practice in shell- 
 dodging was obtained, but the passage was 
 successfully carried out, with no casualties. 
 The personnel of H.Q. were ordered to follow as 
 soon as they were relieved, but owing to the 
 exigencies of the situation they were unable 
 to leave till the Reserve Line was evacuated 
 
 no
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 during the afternoon, when the remnant 
 eventually joined up. The consequence was 
 that the Brigade, for the remainder of the 
 operations, was left with very few signallers 
 and none of their equipment, which proved a 
 great handicap in the strenuous days that fol- 
 lowed. In spite of the close proximity of the 
 enemy, who followed up the retirement of the 
 defensive flank, the operation was successfully 
 accomplished and was complete by 1.30 p.m., 
 although stragglers who had got lost or been 
 temporarily cut off continued to come in 
 for some time afterwards. Lieut.-Colonel 
 Utterson, D.S.O., 8th Leicesters, however, 
 and the greater part of the surviving garrison 
 of Epehy were missing, having been, as was 
 afterwards ascertained, surrounded and cap- 
 tured. The remnants of the battalions were 
 rapidly formed up and reorganised as they 
 arrived. The majority of the 8th Leicesters 
 had disappeared and the 6th and 7th had both 
 suffered heavily. The men were given a meal 
 of sorts and a rest ; but not for long, as orders 
 were received at 3.30 for the Brigade to with- 
 draw to Aizecourt-le-Haut, to act as reserve 
 
 in
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 to the remainder of the Division, who were 
 to hold a line East of Templeux-la-Fosse. By 
 7.30 that evening the Brigade were settled in 
 their bivouacs, dog-tired and weary with the 
 march after their strenuous exertions of the 
 previous days. The battalions were ordered 
 to get as much rest as possible but to be ready 
 to turn out at a moment's notice ; and, sure 
 enough, during the night the situation East 
 of Curlu Wood, on what was known as the 
 Green Line, became very critical and the 
 Brigade was ordered to come into position on 
 the left of the 62nd Brigade by 4.30 a.m. on 
 the 23rd, with the 9th Division prolonging the 
 line to the North. The battalions of the 
 Brigade were by this time so reduced that 
 they were temporarily merged into one, and 
 placed under the command of Lieut. -Colonel 
 Sawyer, D.S.O. of the 7th Battalion. The 
 14th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers 
 (Pioneers) shortly afterwards joined the Brigade 
 and acted with it during the remainder of the 
 operation. At 6.40 a.m. the enemy opened 
 with his artillery on the Green Line and the 
 main Aizecourt-Curlu road, and his infantry 
 
 112
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 commenced to push forward. At 8 a.m., 
 acting on orders received, the Brigade fell 
 back on an old trench line running from the 
 Peronne-Curlu road, East of Aizecourt-le- 
 Haut, towards Moislains, the line South of the 
 road being held by the 64th Brigade ; the 
 62nd Brigade occupied the part East of Aize- 
 court. From now onwards, their strength 
 being so much reduced, the 62nd and 110th 
 Brigades amalgamated and acted under the 
 joint orders of the two Brigadiers. About 
 10 a.m. both flanks of their position were 
 turned, and the troops holding it fell back to 
 the high ground at Haut Allaines, the 6th, 7th 
 and 8th Leicesters retiring through Moislains 
 in conformity with the movement. 
 
 It was about this time that a very exciting 
 incident befel the Brigadier. While on the 
 heights close to Haut Allaines, where the joint 
 Brigade H.Q. were temporarily established, 
 just before the troops started to retire from 
 their positions at Aizecourt, touch with the 
 Division was required to report the situation 
 and obtain orders for further movements. For 
 this purpose the Brigadier, attended by his 
 
 113 H
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 orderly, rode rapidly back through the village 
 to the cross-roads about a mile to the West, 
 where the 64th Brigade H.Q. were situated, 
 and where it was known that telephone con- 
 nection was established with Divisional H.Q. 
 
 The Girman Offinsivi, Sfco 
 
 On arrival he was able to converse with the 
 Divisional Commander and having got all the 
 information he could, he started back without 
 losing a moment to where he imagined he 
 would find his H.Q. Some time of course had 
 
 114
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 elapsed before he had started back and in the 
 meantime the enemy had pushed rapidly for- 
 ward, the two Brigades with their head- 
 quarters having been compelled to retire across 
 the canal, leaving the village to be occupied 
 
 &z (March, 191 8). 
 
 by the enemy. Quite unaware of this situation, 
 he was cantering through when suddenly he 
 was fired at at comparatively short range, one 
 bullet hitting his horse just in front of the 
 saddle. Rapidly realising the situation, he 
 
 "5
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 turned his horse and shouted to his orderly to 
 turn and gallop as hard as he could. Every 
 moment the firing grew more intense and, while 
 turning, both horses were again hit but luckily 
 without breaking a bone. A wild gallop out 
 of the village, followed by a regular fusillade 
 which, however, did not do any further damage, 
 brought them to shelter round an angle in the 
 road and the horses, mortally wounded though 
 they were, were stout-hearted enough to con- 
 tinue till the village was left well in the rear. 
 Having put a sufficient distance between them 
 and the village, the Brigadier pulled up and 
 sending his orderly on towards Clery-sur- 
 Somme with the horses, with orders to shoot 
 them, he started to walk across country and 
 eventually rejoined his H.Q. who had retired 
 to the high ground west of the canal, over- 
 looking Moislains. The orderly took the horses 
 back, but the Brigadier's horse died on the 
 way, and the other was shot shortly afterwards. 
 Both riders owed their lives, and certainly their 
 freedom, to the gallant way in which, although 
 badly wounded, the horses had kept up suffi- 
 ciently to carry them out of danger. 
 
 116 

 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 By 12 noon the whole Division had crossed 
 the Canal and had taken up a position on the 
 ridge overlooking it, with the right of the 64th 
 Brigade on Clery-sur-Somme. The enemy 
 were now in possession of the East bank of the 
 canal and their artillery was causing considerable 
 losses to the transport which had got jammed 
 on the Clery road, as the devastated country 
 of the old Somme battlefield rendered move- 
 ment across country impossible for wheeled 
 traffic. Unluckily the Brigade Headquarters 
 wagons were blown up, with the result that 
 Brigade H.Q. were left with nothing but what 
 they stood up in — not that that mattered very 
 much at the moment, but its effects were felt 
 very much in days to come. Later in the 
 afternoon a further retirement was made to 
 higher ground East of Bouchavesnes, but 
 shortly afterwards, finding that both flanks 
 were in the air, the Brigadier withdrew the 
 line to the Bois Marriere ridge, where touch 
 was obtained with the 64th Brigade North of 
 Clery ; no junction, however, with the 9th 
 Division to the North could be obtained. The 
 remnants of the two Brigades (62nd and 110th) 
 
 117
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 were now retiring on the upland country North 
 of the Clery road — a blank desolated area, 
 where it was impossible, owing to lack of neces- 
 sary equipment, to get touch or get into com- 
 munication except by runners, so that during 
 this period no information or orders were 
 received, and the force under the Brigadier 
 had to act on its own initiative, endeavouring 
 as far as possible to conform to the general 
 movement. Carrying out this idea during the 
 night of the 23rd /24th, the Brigadier withdrew 
 the force to a line one thousand yards West of 
 the Bois Marriere ridge, and by this means, 
 early in the morning, gained touch again with 
 the 64th Brigade and eventually with the 9th 
 Division. At 7 a.m. that morning, the 21st 
 Division was holding the line East of Clery, over- 
 looking the Clery-Feuillaucourt canal to a point 
 South of the Bouchavesnes-Mt. St. Quentin 
 road, where it joined with the 9th Division. 
 Between 9 and 10 that morning, Clery village 
 was taken by the enemy and the 64th Brigade 
 were withdrawn to a line running West of 
 Clery and North- West of Hem Wood. Earlier 
 in the morning a staff officer arrived from the 
 
 118
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Division bringing orders and information of 
 the situation, together with news that fresh 
 troops were coming up to relieve them, and 
 between 11 and 12 noon a Brigade of the 35th 
 Division arrived to take over the line West of 
 Clery from the 64th Brigade, while the 110th 
 and 62nd Brigades retired to the ridge two 
 miles South-East of Maurepas. Up till now 
 the Brigade H.Q. of both the 62nd and 110th 
 Brigades had been merged in the front line, 
 but they were now ordered back to Hem Wood, 
 where they remained for the greater part of 
 the day, orders being sent out by runners and 
 touch with the Division at Maricourt being 
 once more established by telephone, which 
 made things much easier. During the after- 
 noon orders were received for the relief of the 
 Division by the 35th, and later the Brigades 
 withdrew to the Maurepas-Curlu line and 
 subsequently via Maricourt to Suzanne where 
 they halted for the night and battalions were 
 reorganised as far as possible. Early next 
 morning (25 th) the whole Division moved to 
 Bray-sur-Somme, where a composite Brigade, 
 under Brigadier-General Headlam, of the 64th 
 
 119
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Brigade, was organised, made up of a composite 
 battalion from each Brigade, which eventually 
 took up a position from Bray to Dernancourt, 
 between the Somme and the Ancre. Having 
 organised and handed over the battalion, Bri- 
 gade H.Q. late in the evening proceeded to 
 Sailly-le-Sec, where they spent the night. 
 The roads during this march were filled with 
 troops and guns retiring Westwards and mingled 
 with the rest were crowds of country people 
 moving in the same direction accompanied by 
 every sort of vehicle, from farm carts to peram- 
 bulators, conveying as much of their household 
 treasures as they could. It was a sad sight to 
 see, as nearly all of them were old men and 
 women accompanied by very young children, 
 to whom a journey of this kind must have 
 been a great hardship, more especially as this 
 was the second time they had had to do it. 
 If it had not been for the tragedy of it, it was 
 almost laughable to see what the loads on the 
 carts were chiefly composed of. Apparently 
 the most treasured possessions were beds, and 
 it was chiefly with these bulky articles that the 
 carts were loaded. What help could be afforded 
 
 120
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 to them was given in the way of transport, but 
 it was doubtful if they all got away as a large 
 proportion of them were very feeble and could 
 neither move fast nor far. 
 
 In the early morning of the 26th, the nucleus 
 parties of the three battalions, the last remain- 
 ing part of the Brigade, were organised as a 
 company, and, together with similar ones from 
 other Brigades, were formed into a battalion 
 under Lieut.-Colonel McCulloch and sent to 
 take up a position South of Morlancourt. The 
 same morning Brigade H.Q. were ordered to 
 Heilly, where the Brigadier was to organise a 
 Brigade. On arrival he found an Entrenching 
 battalion and a mass of men collected from 
 drafts, men returning from leave, and a certain 
 number of stragglers. These he organised into 
 a " Highland " battalion from the drafts of 
 the 9th Division and a " Draft " battalion 
 from the remainder ; and these with the En- 
 trenching battalion made up the Brigade. 
 The Brigade, when organised, was to occupy a 
 line from Ribemont-sur-Ancre to Heilly ; sub- 
 sequent orders were however received to take 
 up the line of the old trench system running 
 
 121
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 from Ribemont to Sailly-le-Sec. The 2nd 
 Cavalry Division, under General Mullins, had 
 by this time arrived ; they took up a position 
 in front of this line, and were in touch with 
 the troops on the South of the Somme, so that 
 information regarding the situation on that 
 side was forthcoming. The situation was none 
 too rosy, and the enemy were pressing hard 
 South of the Somme, where there were only 
 tired and disorganised troops to oppose them. 
 Reinforcements were on their way but had not 
 yet arrived, and the line was now getting dan- 
 gerously close to Amiens. North of the river, 
 too, there were no fresh troops to oppose a 
 determined effort on the part of the enemy. 
 It was an anxious time, especially for the 
 Brigadier, with a hastily organised and unknown 
 force under his command, and with an attack 
 of unknown strength imminent at any moment. 
 By the early morning of the 27th the Brigade 
 was firmly established in position, and during 
 the night Lieut.-Colonel McCulloch's force 
 had also arrived and entrenched itself in rear. 
 At 11.30 a.m. the nth Australian Brigade 
 arrived by lorry and that afternoon took over 
 
 122
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 the front line, the Brigadier's force withdraw- 
 ing into immediate support in rear of them. 
 The Australian troops were a magnificent body 
 of men, fresh and well-trained as they came 
 straight from six weeks' rest and training near 
 the sea and had been rushed up by lorry to 
 reinforce this part of the front. The Brigades 
 were well up to strength, and their Brigadier 
 and all his staff appeared to be particularly 
 alert and capable. They were eventually able 
 completely to get the upper hand of the Boche, 
 who lived in terror of them ; and when the 
 advance took place later in the year they went 
 through in fine style. 
 
 Brigade H.Q. moved from Heilly Chateau, 
 which was taken over by the nth Australian 
 Brigade, to the Lime Kilns on the Corbie road 
 — a more central position, but unthinkably 
 dirty and uncomfortable. The day was a 
 comparatively peaceful one ; nothing happened 
 on our immediate front, although the 3rd 
 Australian Division had issued orders for the 
 Brigadier's force to be prepared to attack in 
 the direction of Sailly-le-Sec in case of need. 
 The necessity never arose, much to the Briga- 
 
 123
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 dier's relief, as the idea of attacking with tired 
 and newly organised battalions without any 
 means of transport was not attractive. The 
 situation in the afternoon about Sailly and 
 South of the Somme was cleared up by the 
 cavalry and the enemy made no effort that 
 day in that direction. On the 28th, the Briga- 
 dier's force was relieved by another Brigade of 
 the 3rd Australian Division, with orders for 
 all details to rejoin their Divisions. Brigade 
 Headquarters moved to Behencourt, where the 
 " details " of the Brigade had already gone. 
 During the night 28th /29th the Brigade was 
 ordered to furnish a composite battalion to 
 form part of another Composite Brigade of the 
 Division, which was to be under the command 
 of General Gater and was to move to a position 
 East of Baizieux if required ; but again the 
 necessity never arose. On the evening of the 
 29th the Brigade moved to Allonville, and 
 during the march, under sudden orders issued 
 by the Corps, the Composite Brigade under 
 General Gater was diverted to la Neuville to 
 support the 3rd Australian Division. So once 
 more the Brigadier was minus his Brigade, and 
 
 124
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 arrived at Allonville very late in the evening 
 in pitch darkness, where he had some difficulty 
 in finding his Headquarters. Eventually he was 
 lucky enough to get some dinner at Divisional 
 Headquarters, whither he went to report the 
 departure of the Composite Brigade — the first 
 decent meal he had had for nine days. 
 
 On the 30th, General Gater's Brigade came 
 in, not having been required ; and the follow- 
 ing day General Headlam's force and Colonel 
 McCulloch's arrived and all details rejoined 
 their Brigades which were at once reorganised 
 into battalions, wofully attenuated, averaging 
 little over 200 fighting men each battalion. 
 
 Thus ended, as far as the 21st Division was 
 concerned, the German Offensive on this part 
 of the front. By the help of reinforcements, 
 both French and British, the tired and shat- 
 tered Divisions were relieved, and the line 
 stabilised practically on the same positions on 
 which they had finished up. A certain amount 
 of devastated country had been lost, but other- 
 wise not much harm had been done. The 
 line had never been broken, the enemy had 
 failed to interpose between the allied armies, 
 
 125
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 and although under fire of his guns, Amiens 
 had not been taken " according to plans ". 
 Looked at in this light, the German Offensive 
 was a failure, and a costly one, but its failure 
 was due solely to the fighting qualities of the 
 troops and the able handling of the 5th Army 
 by its Commander. 
 
 It proved the impossibility of defending a 
 position, thinly held, with a paucity of reserves, 
 against a well-organised attack in superior num- 
 bers. The fallacy of trying to hold defensive 
 positions with a series of posts instead of a 
 connected line was exposed and the policy, 
 although rendered necessary by circumstances, 
 was shown to be unsound, more especially with 
 only partially trained troops. The uses of 
 light and heavy machine guns both in attack 
 and defence were clearly exemplified, especially 
 their power when ably handled in attack, as it 
 was in great measure due to them that the 
 German infantry were able to pursue their 
 tactics of infiltration. The necessity for defence 
 in depth by machine guns was clearly shown 
 on many occasions, also for this defence in 
 depth to be maintained throughout a retire- 
 
 126
 
 THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 ment, being carried out by echeloning those 
 weapons and carrying out a rearward move- 
 ment by successive " leap-frogging ". At 
 Epehy the machine guns placed on the flanks 
 of Epehy and Peiziere broke up the attack by 
 their barrage fire and materially assisted the 
 defence. By their position on the flanks, they 
 were also enabled to turn their attention to the 
 flank attacks and prevent their developing. It 
 also demonstrated the necessity for the machine 
 guns of a Division to be worked under one 
 command, and for that commander to be in 
 close touch with the Division, so as to carry 
 out the wishes of the Divisional Commander 
 in co-operation with the other arms. 
 
 One thing that appeared surprising was that 
 the enemy made no attempt to use his cavalry, 
 although on several occasions if boldly handled 
 they must have had opportunities of acting 
 with direful results on the weary infantrymen. 
 The British cavalry, on the other hand, when 
 they arrived, did yeoman service in checking 
 the advancing enemy. 
 
 As for the fighting men themselves, no words 
 can express the admiration evoked by their 
 
 127
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 doggedness and tenacity in circumstances which 
 would have tried and might have demoralised 
 the best and highest trained troops. There 
 may have been instances of their leaving posi- 
 tions too soon, but this, when it occurred, was 
 due to sheer fatigue and the lack of sufficient 
 officers in the later stages. There were no 
 signs of panic at any time ; if they retired they 
 simply walked away and could be stopped and 
 brought up again with no difficulty if there 
 was any one to lead them. They were handi- 
 capped severely by lack of that training which 
 they ought to have had during the winter 
 months. This was inevitable, however, owing 
 to the enormous amount of work which had 
 had to be done in constructing a new line over 
 an enormous front and making successive lines 
 in rear of it. Training under these circum- 
 stances had to go to the wall. The fault lay, 
 if fault it were, in taking over more front than 
 we had troops to occupy it with — in fact, to 
 use an Americanism, we had " bitten off more 
 than we could chew." 
 
 128
 
 Chapter 5 : The \th Battle of 
 Tpres — Aprils 1 9 1 8 
 
 THE 2 1 st Division came out of the fighting 
 described in the previous chapter con- 
 siderably knocked about and with greatly 
 depleted numbers, but with their moral and 
 confidence unshaken. Although they had been 
 obliged to make a retrograde movement, it 
 had been carried out with steadiness and dis- 
 cipline, the front had remained unbroken and 
 there was no doubt that heavy losses had been 
 inflicted by them on the enemy. New drafts 
 of men were quickly forthcoming to fill the 
 vacancies but these were of course comparatively 
 raw, and to a certain extent untrained, although 
 good material if time could be given to let 
 them settle down and be properly organised 
 and trained with their battalions. This respite 
 was, however, from force of circumstances not 
 procurable. The Division was sent straight 
 
 129 1
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 from the Somme to the 2nd Army and even- 
 tually to the Ypres area where another Boche 
 attack commenced, and fighting of the fiercest 
 description took place shortly after its arrival. 
 The Division was handicapped severely by its 
 inability to train and rest the harassed battalions 
 of the Brigades. They nevertheless rose nobly 
 to the occasion, and throughout one of the 
 biggest battles which entailed a considerable 
 amount of movement it was wonderful how 
 the recently joined recruits fell into the scheme 
 of things, acting and fighting like veterans in 
 maintaining the already high reputation of the 
 Division. Both the 62nd and 64th Brigades 
 were detached to other Divisions for certain 
 purposes shortly after the fighting started, and 
 it was not till towards the end that the 62nd 
 Brigade returned. In the meanwhile the 
 Division was made up of Brigades from other 
 Divisions which were attached to it for varying 
 periods, the 21st Brigade, the 39th Division 
 Composite Brigade and the 89th Brigade being 
 used for this purpose at different times. 
 
 On the afternoon of April 1, the 110th 
 Brigade left Allonville and marched to Amiens. 
 
 130
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 where it entrained that evening and proceeded 
 to a place in the 2nd Army Area appropriately 
 called Hopoutre and thence marched to Locre. 
 It was far from being a pleasant journey. In 
 the first place the Boche airmen had been mak- 
 ing a target of the St. Roch station in Amiens, 
 where they entrained, and while the entrap- 
 ment was in progress it was quite on the cards 
 that the station might be bombed from the 
 air at any minute. When the Brigadier's train 
 came to start something went wrong and it 
 was kept for three hours in the station before 
 finally getting under way. That time of wait- 
 ing was rather trying, as there seemed to be no 
 particular object in waiting in such a very 
 exposed place and an accurate attack would 
 have been disastrous. However there was 
 nothing to be done, and eventually the train 
 moved off, to every one's great relief, the airmen 
 not paying a visit that night. The discomfort 
 of these railway journeys was intense ; the 
 rolling stock used for the purpose was by no 
 means first class and a journey of thirty-six 
 hours in a filthy carriage of a suburban train 
 type was no luxury. Apparently the trains 
 
 131
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 were used to such an extent that any idea of 
 cleaning them was impossible. On this occa- 
 sion the carriage was so filthy that all hands 
 had to set to to clean it as best they could before 
 starting. In these circumstances the Brigade 
 H.Q. mess-corporal, the admirable Eldridge, 
 always surpassed himself by producing meals 
 in the most extraordinary way ; how he did it 
 was always a marvel to every one. On arrival 
 at Locre Brigade H.Q. were quartered in a 
 little house near the hospital which a few weeks 
 later became part of the battle area, with the 
 usual result of reducing it to a heap of ruins. 
 On April 4 the 21st Division relieved the 1st 
 Australian Division on the Wytschaete-Messines 
 ridge with the 62nd and 64th Brigades in the 
 line and the 110th Brigade in reserve at Fairy 
 House, to which place they moved on the 4th. 
 On the 7th however the Division was relieved 
 by the 19th Division and was ordered to take 
 over the Menin road sector East of Ypres, from 
 the 49th Division. The Brigade moved there- 
 fore to La Clytte on the 7th, and to Quebec 
 Camp on the 8th. While this latter move 
 was in progress the Brigadier and his Brigade 
 
 132
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 Major went by motor-car to reconnoitre and 
 make arrangements for relieving the 148th 
 Brigade in the line. They found the H.Q. of 
 this Brigade in a series of huts just North of 
 Zillebeke Lake on Warrington Road and the 
 Brigadier, General Green Wilkinson, turned 
 out to be an old friend of South African War 
 days. Here arrangements for the relief were 
 worked out and all details with regard to the 
 defence of the sector explained and discussed. 
 There was no time that day actually to recon- 
 noitre the line, but the commanding officers of 
 the battalions, together with the company 
 officers of the battalion actually taking over 
 the front line, were sent to reconnoitre with 
 the respective battalions which they were to 
 relieve. Everything was very quiet and peace- 
 ful — but it was not to remain so for long. 
 
 On the following night, the 9th/ioth, the 
 Brigade took over the line, the 6th Leicesters, 
 now commanded by Lieut. -Colonel Chance 
 (5th Lancers), relieving the 5th York and Lanes. 
 Regt. in the front line on Tower Hamlets ridge, 
 the 8th Leicesters in support at Zillebeke Lake 
 and the 7th Leicesters in reserve at Scottish 
 
 133
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Wood. A battalion of 22nd Corps troops, 
 composed of Australian Light Horse and New 
 Zealand Cyclists, were already in the line in the 
 right subsector of the Brigade front and became 
 attached to the Brigade. The move up to the 
 line was carried out by light railway which 
 saved the troops a very long march, and was a 
 great help in every way. The relief went off 
 without incident during the evening and, owing 
 to the able arrangements of the 148th Brigade, 
 was completed before midnight. 
 
 The forward system of the line held by the 
 Brigade comprised a fairly well-developed 
 though irregular trench system East of the 
 Basseville Beke on Tower Hamlets ridge as far 
 as the Menin Road on the left battalion front. 
 On the right it consisted of a line of posts 
 West of the Basseville Beke which connected 
 up with the outpost line of the 9th Division 
 on the right, North of the canal. A support 
 line ran in rear along the spur overlooking the 
 Basseville Beke valley. The marshy ground in 
 this valley formed a serious obstacle against 
 any attack from the East, but it also precluded 
 any direct junction between the left and right 
 
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 135
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 subsectors — a disadvantage partially met by a 
 system of signalling across the valley. 
 
 The morning of April 10 practically saw the 
 commencement of the 4th Battle of Ypres. 
 The enemy commenced on this day that pres- 
 sure which led up to the violent attack culminat- 
 ing in the taking of Wyschaete and Messines 
 and later Mt. Kemmel, threatening the Scher- 
 penberg and the Mont des Cats, with Hase- 
 brouck as the objective — the capture of which 
 would have necessitated the evacuation of 
 Ypres. The thrust which started to the South 
 of the salient eventually spread Northwards, 
 the most Northerly portions of it finally reach- 
 ing the Southern defences of Ypres itself 
 between Zillebeke Lake and Voormezeele. It 
 was a fierce and long-drawn-out struggle, and 
 as the enemy penetrated deeper into the line 
 further South, it became necessary to retire 
 and change front on the Northern part of the 
 line, with Ypres as the pivot. These move- 
 ments were by no means easy as they had to 
 be carried out under constant and heavy artil- 
 lery fire and entailed constant vigilance and 
 very hard work on the part of the troops, in the 
 
 136
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 face of an enterprising and active enemy. The 
 battle finally culminated in a violent effort on 
 the enemy's part to straighten out the salient 
 he had formed and make ground Northwards, 
 with which intent he attacked in a North- 
 Westerly direction from Wyschaete towards 
 Ypres ; the final phase lasted all through the 
 27th, 28th, and 29th of April, and ended on 
 the line Hill 60 — Voormezeele — Ridge Wood. 
 This critical attack was successfully resisted 
 with very heavy casualties to the enemy, and 
 practically ended the battle as far as this part 
 of the front was concerned. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th (the day follow- 
 ing the relief of the 49th Division) the enemy, 
 in conjunction with his operations further 
 South, started heavy shelling of the battery 
 positions round Zillebeke Lake and all the 
 roads and tracks leading to the front line. 
 The support battalion was in an exposed situa- 
 tion in a hut camp near the lake, so, partly to 
 obtain shelter for them and partly as a pre- 
 cautionary measure, they were ordered to move 
 up to dug-outs in Observation ridge — Tor Top 
 and Canada tunnels. The Brigade H.Q. itself 
 
 137
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 was not in a very happy position, being exposed 
 in huts on Warrington Road in the centre of 
 the shelled area. They bore with it for some 
 time, but the following day after several high 
 velocity shells had come very near and one 
 had pitched within ten yards of the mess hut 
 (luckily in a shell hole full of mud and water), 
 the Brigadier decided that it was time to move, 
 and shifted Headquarters to the dam which 
 ran along the West side of Zillebeke Lake, 
 where a certain amount of shelter could be 
 obtained, although even there it was more 
 moral then material ; however it was a decided 
 improvement. The Divisional Pioneers were 
 in occupation of these shelters at the time, but 
 with the greatest good will gave up a sufficient 
 number of them to accommodate the party ; 
 Colonel Weyman, who commanded them, was 
 particularly helpful and unselfish in assisting 
 to carry out the change. There had always 
 been a particularly good understanding with 
 the Divisional Pioneers since the time when 
 during the Somme Battle they became part 
 of the Brigade for a short while. 
 
 On the night of the nth/ 1 2th, the 7th 
 
 138
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 Leicesters relieved the 22nd Corps composite 
 regiment in the right subsector. The com- 
 posite regiment went back to Scottish Wood 
 in reserve, but the following day were taken 
 away and sent to another part of the front, 
 thus reducing the Brigade to three battalions 
 again, a loss of strength which at that particular 
 moment could ill be afforded. On the same 
 night (nth/ 1 2th) the enemy attempted to 
 raid an isolated post of the 6th Leicesters, 
 but the attack was beaten off and a sergeant of 
 the 393rd Regiment was left dead on our wire, 
 which was a very valuable identification. 
 
 Nothing of importance happened during 
 the next two days, but big things were taking 
 place further South and the news was grave 
 concerning the progress of the enemy's 
 attack. On the 15th orders were received to 
 withdraw the line from the forward positions 
 to a line South of Zillebeke Lake, running just 
 North of French Farm to Convent Lane, con- 
 necting on the left with the 6th Division, the 
 right being continued to Snipers Barn by the 
 39th Division Composite Brigade attached to 
 the Division. The new position to be taken 
 
 139
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 up was organised on the Brigade front as an 
 outpost zone and a main line of resistance, the 
 former consisting of the line already indicated, 
 with supporting points in the rear, and the 
 latter being the old G.H.Q. line running parallel 
 with the road from Shrapnel Corner to Kruis- 
 traat Hoek. This latter was an old line which 
 had been dug in 191 7 and had now partially- 
 fallen in and required digging out ; but still 
 it was there, which was something. The out- 
 post defences had to be constructed, and there 
 was much to be done, but very little time to 
 do it in. 
 
 The withdrawal was carried out that night 
 (15th/ 1 6th), the two front line battalions, 
 the 7th and 8th Leicesters, gradually vacating 
 their positions after dark, and quietly and care- 
 fully retiring through two companies of the 
 6th Leicesters under Major Burdett, who were 
 left as a rearguard on Observation ridge from 
 Tor Top to Mt. Sorrel ; this rearguard re- 
 mained in position until the new line had 
 been dug and organised for occupation. The 
 same night work was started on the new line 
 and was continued night and day until it was 
 
 140
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 completed. Two companies of the 6th and 
 8th Leicesters were detailed for the purpose 
 and worked with such a will that the line was 
 ready for occupation by the night of the 
 1 7th/ 1 8th, a very creditable performance. It 
 was then taken over by the 7th and 8th Batta- 
 lions who occupied the whole system in depth, 
 two companies in the Outpost Zone and two 
 companies in the G.H.Q. line. Meanwhile the 
 two companies of the 6th Leicesters, which 
 were eventually reinforced on the night of the 
 20th /21st with the remaining two companies 
 of the battalion, had held the rearguard position 
 on Observation ridge till the 23rd, when they 
 were relieved by the 7th Battalion who con- 
 tinued to hold it till they were ordered to 
 withdraw on the 26th. The holding of this 
 isolated position was a very trying and arduous 
 duty, entailing incessant watchfulness and care 
 on the part of all concerned. It was only a 
 skeleton force, scattered over a wide extent of 
 front in small posts with practically no sup- 
 port. It was really a colossal piece of bluff to 
 cover, in the first instance, the construction of 
 the new line ; but it was continued for some 
 
 141
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 time longer as it prevented the enemy from 
 gaining a commanding bit of ground from 
 which observation of the whole area was pos- 
 sible. It proved a most successful device, as 
 the enemy advanced very slowly and cautiously 
 towards it, and it was not until the 17th that 
 he pushed forward and established a general 
 line in front of it. Thenceforward the line 
 was very little molested, except by sniping 
 and trench mortaring (which rendered com- 
 munication between the posts impossible in 
 daylight), and by an unsuccessful raid on the 
 right post on the night of the 20th /21st, which 
 was beaten off with apparently heavy casualties 
 to the enemy ; but he was able in the darkness 
 to remove his wounded. 
 
 The situation on the 23rd was rather a 
 curious one on this portion of the front ; the 
 6th Leicesters were holding the forward out- 
 post line, immediately in front of the main 
 line sector held by the 6th Division West of 
 Zillebeke Lake. The continuation of the 
 outpost line on the right from Mt. Sorrel 
 to the Eikhof Farm, South of the Canal, was 
 held by the 21st Brigade with two battalions 
 
 142
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 in front and one in reserve, and behind the 
 line was the sector of the new line astride the 
 Canal from French Farm to Convent Lane, held 
 as already described by two battalions of the 
 noth Brigade. The enemy's artillery action 
 during the whole of this time was very violent 
 and continuous, a large amount of gas shell 
 being used which caused a considerable num- 
 ber of casualties and prevented the troops 
 getting any rest or sleep. Although still only 
 on the fringe of the battle which was raging 
 further to the South, and although no actual 
 infantry action had as yet materialised, still 
 the strain of the constant shelling and the 
 watchfulness required from the liability of 
 attack at any moment was beginning to have 
 its effect on the personnel, who were getting 
 very tired and worn out. No relief was pos- 
 sible but the men, weary as they were, stuck 
 it out manfully and when the actual attack did 
 take place, showed that their stamina was equal 
 to the occasion. 
 
 On the 1 6th Brigade Headquarters moved 
 from Zillebeke Lake to Walker Camp, about a 
 mile to the West of Dickebusch. It was 
 
 43
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 merely a hut camp round a ruined farm house 
 with no protection except that which was 
 afforded by the standing walls of the house, 
 into which " elephant " shelters protected by 
 sand bags had been introduced, which gave a 
 sense of security and protection against splin- 
 ters, but could not have withstood a direct hit. 
 Here Headquarters remained for the rest of 
 the time, but as more and more guns took 
 up their position all round it in the vicinity, 
 and of course attracted the enemy's fire, it 
 was not a healthy place of residence, and the 
 Brigadier thought that he was much safer 
 and quieter when he was forward in the line 
 than he was at his own Headquarters. 
 
 On the 25th the enemy, after a very heavy 
 bombardment, commenced an attack on a line 
 roughly North-West from the direction of 
 Wyschaete and Kemmel and drove the line 
 held by the 39th Composite Brigade and the 
 9th Division, to which the 64th Brigade was 
 attached, back to the West of Kruistraat and 
 Kemmel Village, causing the 39th Brigade to 
 form a defensive flank from St. Eloi to Ridge 
 Wood. The 62nd Brigade the same morning 
 
 144
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 was moved up to a position of readiness and 
 during the evening sent one battalion to rein- 
 force the 39th Brigade in Ridge Wood, the 
 remaining two battalions continuing the defen- 
 sive flank to Hallebast Corner. The 62nd 
 Brigade Headquarters and the 39th Composite 
 Brigade Headquarters were accommodated in 
 Walker Camp, which became considerably 
 congested in consequence. 
 
 On the 26th the enemy extended his front 
 of attack Northwards and drove in the 21st 
 Brigade, capturing the Bluff and the Spoil 
 Bank. It was in consequence of this acquisition 
 of commanding ground that the 7th Leicesters 
 were ordered to withdraw from Tor Top and 
 retire into Brigade reserve near Hanover House. 
 The situation otherwise remained the same 
 from Voormezeele southwards, although the 
 enemy constantly developed attacks against 
 Ridge Wood and its vicinity which was the 
 scene of some very desperate fighting at close 
 quarters. 
 
 On the night of the 27th/28th the 39th 
 and 62nd Brigades were relieved by the 89th 
 Brigade, and the same evening shortly after 
 
 145 K
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 dusk a large enemy raiding party about 250 
 strong surprised and surrounded Lankhof Farm 
 and the four posts East of it. One officer and 
 twenty men fought their way out but the 
 Company Headquarters at Lankhof Farm and 
 about seventy men were missing. The enemy 
 maintained his hold on the position, which 
 stood on higher ground than the adjoining 
 posts, in spite of a counter-attack by a company 
 of the 7th Battalion sent up to eject them. 
 The loss of this part of the line was a very 
 serious one and prevented the relief between 
 the 89th Brigade and the 110th Brigade in 
 that part of the line from Lock 8 to Vimy 
 Post. 
 
 On the 28th the enemy attacked Voorme- 
 zeele, and a desperate fight took place for its 
 possession. The village was taken and retaken 
 twice before it finally remained in Boche hands. 
 After capturing the village, the enemy pro- 
 ceeded to work Northwards up the trench 
 leading to Lock 8, by means of bombing 
 parties which eventually captured Lock 8 by 
 7 p.m. and occupied Vimy post. Owing to 
 this move a company of the 6th Leicesters 
 
 146
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 with one platoon of the 7th Leicesters were 
 obliged to throw back their flanks on both 
 sides of the canal between Lock 8 and the 
 Iron Bridge. The fighting on this day was 
 carried on at close quarters with bayonet, bomb 
 and rifle, and was controlled and carried out 
 chiefly by the junior officers of the battalions 
 concerned with great dash and skill. The local 
 situation was constantly changing and required 
 individual action in carrying out the general 
 scheme without waiting for definite orders ; 
 and the training which they had received for 
 this purpose bore fruit here. 
 
 The artillery activity of the enemy, which 
 had been gradually increasing in its intensity, 
 culminated on the 29th in a terrific bombard- 
 ment of the G.H.Q. line, Bedford House 
 area, Ridge Wood, and all battery positions 
 and approaches to the line. This bombard- 
 ment started about 3 a.m. and at 6 a.m. the 
 infantry assault started ; this was chiefly con- 
 centrated on Ridge Wood and the G.H.Q. 
 line as far as Kruistraathoek cross roads, and a 
 subsidiary attack also developed on the outpost 
 line along the Canal from Lock 8. The gap 
 
 H7
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 caused by the loss of Vimy post and Lock 8 
 became increasingly dangerous, so the Brigadier 
 during the morning ordered the withdrawal 
 of the company holding the Canal between 
 Lock 8 and the Iron Bridge, and arranged for a 
 new defensive flank to be formed running 
 from the Iron Bridge across to Bellegoed 
 Farm, which in this way linked up the Bedford 
 House-French Farm line with the G.H.Q. 
 system. This latter operation was carried out 
 by one company of the 7th Leicesters, the 
 supporting battalion, and another from the 
 same battalion was used to relieve the right 
 flank company of the 6th Leicesters in the 
 G.H.Q. line, who had sustained a continuous 
 bombardment mixed with heavy gas shells 
 for two days and had also been strongly 
 attacked, their casualties being particularly 
 heavy and the men dead beat from want of 
 sleep. The fighting round Ridge Wood and 
 its vicinity was of a particularly fierce character, 
 the enemy renewing his efforts again and again ; 
 but the 89th Brigade, assisted by well placed 
 machine guns and with the skilful co-operation 
 of the artillery, successfully beat off all attacks 
 
 148 '
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 and inflicted very severe losses on the enemy. 
 
 At 2.30 p.m. the enemy assembled to attack 
 the Iron Bridge, having probably noticed the 
 withdrawal of the post in front of it. The 
 attack was finally broken up and dispersed by 
 combined artillery, machine gun and rifle 
 fire, but not before a considerable amount of 
 hand-to-hand bomb and bayonet work had 
 taken place in the canal bed itself. Splendid 
 work was done here by officers and men alike 
 of the companies of the 6th and 7th Leicesters 
 concerned, and they left their mark on the 
 enemy to such purpose that the attack was not 
 renewed. The 8th Leicesters on the left, as 
 far as French Farm, were also attacked in some 
 force, but had no difficulty in defeating the 
 attempt which was the extreme limit of the 
 attack. The fighting, which had lasted all 
 day, gradually died down about dusk and the 
 night was quiet except for the usual shelling, 
 but even that was not of the intensive character 
 it had been. 
 
 During the night of the 29th/30th a com- 
 pany of the 14th Northumberland Fusiliers 
 (Divl. Pioneers) and the 126th Co. R.E. 
 
 149
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 assisted the Brigade in digging and wiring the 
 new line between the Iron Bridge and Bellegoed 
 Farm, which thus became properly consolidated 
 and constituted a grave menace against any 
 attack from the direction of Voormezeele 
 against the G.H.Q. line. 
 
 The 30th passed quietly. The enemy did 
 not renew his attacks, and there was a consider- 
 able diminution in the shell fire during the 
 day ; and this lull continued during the night 
 when the 58th Brigade relieved the 110th 
 which withdrew to near Busseboom. The 
 relief, although very late, was carried out with- 
 out incident and with no casualties, and the out- 
 post line was handed over intact. It was nearly 
 3 a.m. before the Brigadier and his Brigade- 
 Major left their Headquarters, the relief 
 having been reported complete. They were 
 not sorry to see the last of it, as it had proved 
 a most unpleasant refuge. They were both 
 tired and weary to the verge of breaking point 
 as the Brigade had been in action for practically 
 three weeks, from the loth to the 30th. 
 Although not actually fighting during the 
 whole time the strain on the staff had been 
 
 150
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 very severe, and the last three days especially 
 had been a period of strenuous activity with 
 little sleep and constant anxiety. They 
 stumbled along the dark muddy road for about 
 a mile to where the motor-car awaited them 
 on the lee side of a little farm house, the 
 cellars of which had been converted into a field 
 dressing station. There they found the car, 
 but at first nothing would induce it to start, 
 which was trying to overstrained nerves as 
 it was by no means a sheltered spot and had 
 been heavily shelled the day before. How- 
 ever, they eventually got away and a short 
 run over a very bumpy road brought them to 
 their new abode. During the run in the 
 darkness, it was curious to see how narrow and 
 deep the salient appeared. The Boche Very- 
 lights seemed to be going up from every quarter 
 and the gap through them appeared astound- 
 ingly small when seen in this way. Something 
 to eat and drink was ready for them on arrival, 
 and finally a sleep in a more or less com- 
 fortable bed, with the additional joy of being 
 able to get into pyjamas — the first time for 
 three weeks ! 
 
 I 5 I
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 The battle continued for a short time longer, 
 but not with the same intensity. The force 
 of the attack had been spent and never 
 revived. Further South the German advance 
 was brought to a halt in no uncertain manner 
 by the 1st Australian Division at Meteren. 
 French reinforcements were rapidly pushed 
 up and the line was stabilised ; Wyschaete, 
 Messines and Kemmel remained in Boche 
 hands, but the Scherpenberg and the Mont 
 des Cats were still intact. They never 
 succeeded in getting nearer to Ypres than the 
 outskirts of Ridge Wood and the village of 
 Voormezeele, and the line remained where 
 the Brigadier had left it. The Boche remained 
 in the salient he had created, much to his own 
 detriment, until he finally withdrew in the 
 last phase of the war. This attack had cost 
 him very dearly, and except for a slight gain 
 in territory in a most desolated and unpleasant 
 area he had hardly benefited at all. 
 
 The practical lessons that could be learnt 
 from this battle were not of a very obvious 
 character in this portion of the front. There 
 had been a certain amount of manceuvring 
 
 152
 
 FOURTH BATTLE OF YPRES 
 
 which was of extreme value in giving officers 
 and men alike great confidence in themselves 
 and the true infantry weapon — the rifle. The 
 vogue of the bomb had passed, never to return, 
 it was hoped. It showed what a necessity 
 there was for continued training in musketry 
 of all kinds, and in the proper tactical handling 
 of the Lewis gun. What little training had 
 been carried out in the way of teaching the 
 young officers how to handle their platoons 
 had borne fruit an hundredfold and showed 
 that this was the right foundation for future 
 training. 
 
 153
 
 Chapter 6 : In Champagne^ May^ 
 1918 
 
 THE 2 1 st Division was now somewhat war 
 weary. It had taken a prominent part 
 in two important battles, and rest and time to 
 train the new drafts and organise the battalions 
 again seemed to be almost imperative for its 
 well-being and future efficiency. But its 
 labours were by no means over and it was 
 destined to continue its career of martial glory 
 to the bitter end. Wherever it went, North 
 or South, it seemed to be a magnet for drawing 
 the Boche forward to make an attack. It was 
 generally supposed that G.H.Q. really did 
 try to find a quiet spot in the line for the 
 Division to rest in, but fate or that magnetic 
 attraction was too strong and the plan went 
 "all agley". 
 
 On arrival at Thieushouk on May 4, it was 
 found that the Division was destined to pro- 
 
 154
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 ceed Southwards into Champagne and become 
 part of the IX British Corps, reinforcing the 
 6th French Army, who were holding the 
 sector of line East of Soissons which included 
 Rheims, the Chemin des Dames and the line 
 of the Aisne in its area. 
 
 The move was carried out by rail, the 110th 
 Brigade marching to Wizernes, near St. Omer, 
 where it entrained on the afternoon of the 5th, 
 arriving at Lagery on the 6th. 
 
 After the desolated area of Ypres and the 
 flat, uninteresting country of Flanders and 
 the North of France, the landscape of Cham- 
 pagne appeared particularly charming — a de- 
 lightful corner of the real France, peopled by 
 kindly country folk with an old-world courtesy 
 that was a pleasant change. A country of hill 
 and dale, well-watered and wooded and con- 
 taining such towns as Soissons, Epernay and 
 Rheims, full of historical associations, ancient 
 architecture in its best period — and good wine. 
 The valleys of the Aisne, the Vesle and the 
 Marne are little known to the ordinary traveller, 
 but for beauty of their special kind they are 
 hard to beat, the Marne especially with its 
 
 155
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 broad, stately river flowing serenely through 
 the deep valley, with a background of rolling 
 uplands as far as the eye can reach. A won- 
 derfully pleasant country to the eye and 
 never more so than during this month of May, 
 when everything was showing the signs of early 
 spring with all its beautiful effects of young 
 greenery and the hint of blossom. It seemed 
 incongruous, almost impossible, that war, with 
 its horrors and devastation, should visit this 
 lovely land. But so it was to be — and at no 
 very distant date. 
 
 At Lagery the noth Brigade rested in peace 
 and comfort for a week. It was a fine training 
 ground and full use was made of it, training 
 in musketry being much practised, as there were 
 excellent rifle ranges already existing. The men 
 were very comfortable, either in hut camps, 
 which were extraordinarily good and well 
 run, lit by electric light and with plenty of 
 water, or in good clean billets in the villages. 
 The French arrangements in the back areas 
 appeared to be particularly good and efficient, 
 being well and carefully organised under good 
 officers, who by reason of wounds or ill health 
 
 i 5 6
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 were unable to serve at the front. Although 
 not of long duration, this pleasant period 
 worked wonders with the men, who presented 
 a very different appearance to what they did 
 on arrival, war-worn and weary from the Ypres 
 fighting. 
 
 On the 13th, the Brigade marched to Pevy 
 in readiness to go into the line, where the 21st 
 Division were to relieve the 74th French 
 Division in the left sector (Chalons le Vergeur) 
 of the 38th French Corps. The 110th Brigade 
 were to relieve the 230th French Infantry 
 Regt. (Le regiment de Savoie) in the centre of 
 the Divisional front on the night I4th/i5th of 
 May. The 62nd Brigade took over the left 
 sector with their left on the Aisne, and the 
 64th Brigade the right sector, joining up with 
 the 45th French Division just North of Loivre. 
 
 The Brigadier, starting early on the 13th, 
 went forward to the 230th Regt. H.Q. to 
 reconnoitre the line, get all the information 
 he could from the French colonel commanding 
 the sector and make arrangements for the relief. 
 The colonel proved to be a charming person- 
 ality — a true type of the versatile French 
 
 157
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Army. The staff, too, were typical of the 
 smart regiment to which they belonged. No- 
 thing was too much trouble and everything 
 that could be done to help was done in a spirit 
 of good will and good comradeship which was 
 most engaging. A sumptuous lunch, in a 
 style and on a scale which the British Army 
 could never hope to compete with, was provided 
 at Headquarters, after which the line was 
 visited and the salient points of the defence 
 scheme were pointed out on the ground and a 
 general view of the trenches obtained. The 
 front was so extensive that it was hopeless 
 to attempt to get more than a cursory view 
 of the line in one day. 
 
 For the time being the 21st Division was 
 under the tactical orders of the 38th French 
 Corps, and it was not until the 16th that the 
 IX British Corps, under Lieut-General Hamil- 
 ton Gordon, took over the Corps sector. The 
 IX Corps consisted of the 8th, 21st, 25th and 
 50th Divisions and was subsequently reinforced 
 by the 19th Division. The 21st Division was 
 in the line on the right from Brimont to the 
 Aisne. The 8th and 50th Divisions were 
 
 158
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 North of the Aisne, holding the sector between 
 that river and the lower slopes of the Chemin 
 des Dames, where they joined up again with 
 the French. The 8th Division were on the 
 right, with their right resting on the river : 
 the 50th Division on the left, joining up with 
 the French. The 25th Division were in Corps 
 reserve. It was at once apparent that the 
 front held in this manner was very extended 
 for the number of troops allotted for its 
 defence. The Divisional front extended for a 
 distance of 7,500 yards. The 110th Brigade 
 had a front of 2,500 yards to be held by three 
 weak battalions, who had only been filled up 
 recently by a large proportion of young and 
 untrained men, and there had been little time 
 to rectify this before going into the line. 
 The position on the divisional front was a bad 
 one ; the Aisne Canal ran along the whole 
 length of it and divided it into two portions, 
 the area East of the Canal and that West of 
 it. 
 
 On the flanks the forward line ran close to 
 the Canal, but in the centre it made a deep 
 loop away from it, the greatest distance being 
 
 J 59
 
 Berry^au-Bac 
 
 Aisne RiverGernic<5urt" 
 and Canal 
 
 Aguilcourr 
 
 RoucyRouffignereux 
 St 
 
 LaNcuvil[e 
 
 / 
 
 .eGodat 
 
 'Bermicourt ff 
 
 Ft, 
 
 c m L-^ Germiqn 
 
 The German Offensive in Champagne (May 27, 1918).
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 about 1,000 yards. The Canal itself was 
 broad and constituted a formidable obstacle 
 which was enhanced by a belt of marsh about 
 150 yards broad, lying immediately to the East 
 of it. The area East of the Canal formed in 
 this way an Outpost Zone for the remainder 
 of the area West of it, but it was entirely 
 dominated by the Boche positions — Hill 108, 
 Mt. Sapinand Sapin gneul, and above all Mt. 
 Brimont. 
 
 The area to the West of the Canal was 
 defended by a double belt of strong points 
 connected by a continuous trench line. This 
 position lay for the most part along a low 
 ridge overlooking the Canal and formed a 
 strong defensive line with a good obstacle in its 
 immediate front, but there were insufficient 
 numbers allotted to it to admit of its being 
 properly manned together with the forward 
 zone East of the Canal. 
 
 The whole of the Divisional sector, including 
 the lofty St. Aubceuf ridge in rear of it, was 
 under observation from the enemy positions. 
 This was to some extent neutralised by the 
 excellent road camouflage erected by the 
 
 161 L
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 French and the thick woods which covered 
 the slopes of St. Auboeuf. To judge from the 
 enemy's initial artillery bombardment, the 
 existence of Brigade H.Q., though on the 
 forward slopes of the St. Auboeuf ridge, was 
 never suspected. The enemy's forward areas 
 and portions of his main roads were under 
 observation from both the crest of St. Auboeuf 
 ridge and from the rising ground West of the 
 Canal. 
 
 On the 14th, the units of the Brigade left 
 their camps and billets at 3 a.m. and marched 
 to day halting places, so as to arrive by 6.30 
 a.m. before it was light. This was done 
 in order to keep the troops under cover from 
 enemy observation during the day and to get 
 them near enough to the front to be able to 
 relieve without undue fatigue. The 6th 
 Leicesters were to take over the right subsector 
 and the 7th Leicesters me left, while the 8th 
 Battalion remained in reserve at Chalons le 
 Vergeur. Brigade H.Q. were very pleasantly 
 situated in a wood at the foot of the St. 
 Auboeuf ridge, just below the Tour de 
 Rougemont — an old, dilapidated masonry 
 
 162
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 watch-tower standing on the crest of the 
 ridge, which proved a prominent landmark for 
 miles round. The whole Headquarters were 
 accommodated in a dug-out, tunnelled into a 
 bank on the hillside and, being in the middle 
 of the wood, it was beautifully screened from 
 any aerial observation. The wood itself was 
 delightful, full of lilies of the valley and 
 spring wild flowers, and its shade was very 
 welcome in the boiling heat which prevailed 
 at this time. 
 
 The Brigadier, not relishing the idea of 
 living in the dug-out, had a small wooden hut 
 built for himself outside, which improved 
 matters considerably. Altogether these Head- 
 quarters were something entirely new, and 
 much more comfortable than was usually the 
 case in the line. The relief was successfully 
 carried out that night between 10 and mid- 
 night, and after breakfast the French colonel 
 departed with many expressions of goodwill 
 and friendship. The weather was lovely, 
 almost too hot. The Headquarters were rather 
 far back and as it was impossible to ride 
 further than the Cormicy road it meant a 
 
 163
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 considerable amount of walking in visiting the 
 line, especially the forward area, and this in the 
 abnormal heat made the distances seem greater 
 than they really were. 
 
 The general atmosphere of the front was 
 absolutely peaceful prior to May 27. Shells 
 were few and far between, and trench mor- 
 taring was slight and practically confined to a 
 small area, while hardly any registration of 
 any calibre of gun took place. From the 
 22nd onwards, however, enemy movement 
 behind the line was seen by observers to have 
 greatly increased. A large amount of traffic 
 was noticed, chiefly converging on the sector 
 astride the Aisne, and one morning about dawn 
 numerous teams of horses, undoubtedly artillery 
 teams, were seen withdrawing from a suspected 
 battery area. On the 25th a raid on the 
 enemy's line was attempted by two parties of 
 the 7th Leicesters, but the front line was 
 found empty and the second line, to which 
 they penetrated, was found to be so strongly 
 wired that it was impossible to approach it. 
 The raid accomplished nothing and failed to 
 acquire an identification which was much 
 
 164
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 required. As soon as the line was taken over, 
 very active patrolling was instituted, but 
 directly the enemy found our attitude was 
 becoming aggressive he ceased his own patrol- 
 ling activity altogether, evidently with the 
 idea of avoiding all chance of losses in prisoners 
 who might give valuable information. It was 
 only the excessive movements in back areas, 
 together with the laying of cables and air 
 lines which was observed on the 26th, and 
 their determination to avoid giving away 
 identification, that gave any indication whatever 
 of an offensive — and these indications were not 
 very conclusive. 
 
 The 8th Leicesters relieved the 6th Leicesters 
 in the right subsector on the night of the 
 20th/2ist and the 7th Leicesters should have 
 been relieved by the 6th Battalion on the night 
 of the 27th/28th. This relief was cancelled, 
 however, as on the 26th information was 
 received that prisoners taken by the IX French 
 Corps had stated that an attack would take 
 place on the morning of the 27th, and in 
 consequence of this the following precautions 
 were taken. One company of the 6th Leices- 
 
 165
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 ters reinforced the 7th Battalion in the line as a 
 support, and the Battalion H.Q., which was 
 rather far forward on route 44, was brought 
 back to the Tenaille de Guise, East of Cormicy. 
 The nucleus parties of the 7th and 8th Bat- 
 talion, who were at the transport lines, were 
 organised into a company and ordered to a 
 position of readiness East of the Cavroy- 
 Cormicy Road, as a reinforcement for the 
 8th Battalion. The indications were so slight 
 and everything was so calm that the chance of 
 an attack seemed very small to the Brigadier's 
 mind, but the information turned out to be 
 perfectly correct. No doubts could possibly 
 be entertained after the beginning of the open- 
 ing bombardment at 1 a.m. on the 27th that it 
 was the prelude to a very heavy attack. This 
 bombardment was extremely intense with all 
 calibres, shrapnel, high explosive, and gas being 
 all used. No buried routes for the telephone 
 cables were in existence, with the consequence 
 that, after the commencement of the bombard- 
 ment, all telephonic communication forward of 
 Brigade H.Q. ceased within a few minutes and 
 could never be restored — a very serious draw- 
 
 166
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 back at such a moment. Everything was 
 wrapped in fog until after 8 a.m. and it was 
 quite impossible to see anything from either 
 the forward O.P.'s or from those in the St. 
 Aubceuf ridge. The only information that 
 could be obtained was by message from the 
 forward battalion which, however, arrived very 
 regularly. Up to 7.15 a.m., these merely 
 reported the fact of heavy shelling and com- 
 plete invisibility. At 7.15 a.m. a message from 
 the 7th Leicesters reported that the enemy had 
 captured La Neuville, were pushing South- 
 West and had already reached the West bank 
 of the Canal. A further message, timed 7.20 
 a.m., reported enemy patrols creeping from the 
 Canal towards the main line of resistance West 
 of the Canal. This information was very 
 puzzling to the Brigadier as no big infantry 
 attack had been reported East of the Canal, and 
 it was considered that the strength in that 
 area was sufficient to hold up any attack 
 for some considerable period. It was evident 
 from the initial stages that something extra- 
 ordinary had occurred, and that from some 
 cause or other the weight of the attack was 
 
 167
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 coming from the North, and this indeed proved 
 to be the case. The forward area East of the 
 Canal, although attacked in front, was also 
 turned and attacked round its left flank, with 
 the result that the whole of the garrison was 
 surrounded and cut off before they had a chance 
 to retire across the Canal. This was a very- 
 serious loss, as practically a third of the Brigade 
 strength thus disappeared, and the proportion 
 of numbers to length of front was already very 
 small. Owing to the virtual annihilation of 
 the companies East of the Canal, it is practically 
 impossible to say the exact time when the 
 enemy launched his infantry attack, but from 
 various indications it is presumed that it started 
 between 3 and 4 a.m. 
 
 The explanation of what occurred North 
 of the Aisne was disclosed later. Apparently 
 three or four hours after the opening of the 
 bombardment, the enemy attacked in force the 
 French Divisions holding the Chemin des 
 Dames. Heavily attacked and exposed on the 
 ridge to the intense bombardment, these 
 Divisions were driven off the high ground and 
 were unable to prevent the enemy reaching the 
 
 168
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 Aisne and seizing the bridges over it. The 
 50th Division was by this move practically cut 
 off fighting to the last, ceasing to exist except for 
 a few isolated fragments who managed to make 
 their way South to the Aisne. The same thing 
 happened, though in a less degree, to the 8th 
 Division, which however had more time to 
 adapt itself to the new situation ; but the 
 result was that it became badly split up and 
 suffered very heavy casualties, those portions 
 of it which crossed the Aisne being too dis- 
 organised to be of much further use as a 
 fighting formation. By reason of these develop- 
 ments, the left flank of the 21st Division 
 became uncovered and remained so for the 
 rest of the operation. The forward companies 
 East of the Canal were able to hold their 
 ground against the frontal attack, but their 
 left flank was turned before they had time 
 to realise what had occurred, and they became 
 enveloped by penetration along the line of the 
 Canal. The whole of the troops in this for- 
 ward area were cut off and every Brigade lost 
 a third of its fighting strength, which it could 
 ill afford. The enemy pressed the advantage 
 
 169
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 which he thus obtained during the remaining 
 days of the withdrawal, but was unable to 
 break the line or the cohesion with the 45th 
 French Division. He was continually turning 
 the left flank, which remained " en l'air " and 
 thus forcing the Division to pivot on the 
 right flank by continually throwing back the 
 left, until troops could be brought up to fill 
 the gap. The 25th Division, directly it was 
 known that a break through had occurred and 
 that the enemy were on the Aisne, were 
 brought up to protect this flank, but, although 
 becoming heavily engaged, their numbers were 
 insufficient to stem the tide. 
 
 From 7.30 a.m. onwards the 21st Division, 
 fighting doggedly, was gradually pressed back 
 by weight of numbers and by the fact that its 
 left flank was being continually turned. The 
 reserve battalions of all three Brigades were 
 by degrees used up as reinforcements and to 
 restore the situation by counter-attack. Fin- 
 ally, as a last reinforcement, the Pioneer 
 Battalion, and all three Field Companies R.E. 
 were thrown into the fight. The struggle 
 was a very bitter one ; desperate fights occurred 
 
 170
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 for the strong points of the line ; the Tenaille 
 de Guise for one was taken and retaken twice 
 before being actually overcome. Garrisons 
 of the works immediately to the West of the 
 Canal continued to fight although surrounded, 
 when the enemy was attacking the Cormicy- 
 Cavroy road well in the rear. Heavily attacked, 
 outnumbered and outflanked, the Division 
 managed to keep its line and its fighting for- 
 mation intact. 
 
 By 6 p.m. the Division had been driven 
 back as far as the line of the Cormicy-Cavroy 
 Road, the 62nd Brigade holding Cormicy 
 village and throwing a flank back in the 
 direction of the Bois de Val, with a Brigade 
 of the 25th Division continuing the line further 
 to the West. The 64th Brigade was holding 
 the outskirts of Cavroy in touch with the 
 45 th French Division on their right, in the 
 direction of Villers Franqueux. Such was 
 the situation when orders were received to 
 withdraw during the night, as soon as it was 
 dark, in a South-Westerly direction, the idea 
 being to occupy a new front, pivoting on 
 Hermonville, the line then running by the 
 
 l 7 l
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 high ground of St. Aubceuf in the direction 
 of Bouvancourt. The 64th Brigade, with 
 their right on Hermonville, which was to be 
 occupied by a battalion of the 45th French 
 Division, were to swing back to the high 
 ground at St. Aubceuf. The 7th Brigade, 
 25th Division, was to continue the line to the 
 Chalons le Vergeur road, West of St. Aubceuf. 
 The 110th Brigade to hold from there along 
 the ridge towards Bouvancourt, where junction 
 with the 8th Division was to be formed. The 
 62nd Brigade was to withdraw and form the 
 Divisional Reserve. 
 
 The withdrawal was a matter of some 
 difficulty, the troops were for the most part in 
 close contact with the enemy, and some 
 difficulty was experienced in getting orders 
 to the extreme left of the Brigade (the 7th 
 Leicesters) as they were situated in the wood 
 near La Sabliere, where they had been engaged 
 with the enemy for some little time before the 
 orders reached them, and were somewhat 
 disorganised in consequence. All this impor- 
 tant work of getting orders delivered was 
 carried out by " runners," and no one knows 
 
 172
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 what wonderful skill and initiative they showed 
 in carrying out their duties. Their work was, 
 naturally, carried out in circumstances where 
 no one saw their difficulties or their methods 
 in overcoming them ; they could only be 
 judged by results. It required a man with a 
 stout heart and iron nerve to carry a message 
 successfully in pitch darkness through a thick 
 wood, of which his knowledge was small and 
 which was full of enemy patrols. Their duty 
 was not a spectacular one ; they were generally 
 alone and there was every facility for shirking 
 if they had felt so inclined, but such a 
 thing was rare, if not entirely unknown. 
 Many wonderful instances of the devotion 
 and bravery of these men in circumstances 
 which might appal the bravest are known 
 and vouched for, but no greater trial could 
 be found than those endured by these men 
 throughout that night in getting urgent 
 and essential orders to their battalions. All 
 honour to them, as very few got through 
 unscratched. 
 
 Orders for the withdrawal having been 
 issued and the fact of their delivery having 
 
 173
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 been ascertained, Brigade H.Q. withdrew to the 
 crest of the St. Aubceuf ridge and there 
 awaited the arrival of the Brigade. At this 
 place caves existed cut out of the rock ; these 
 were known as the Champignonieres and were 
 apparently devoted to the cultivation of mush- 
 rooms in happier times. While waiting, the 
 Brigadier got in touch with Divisional Head- 
 quarters on the telephone, but the only 
 information he got before the telephone line 
 was cut was that the enemy were in possession 
 of Chalons le Vergeur, where Divisional Head- 
 quarters had been but a short time before. 
 This news was not very encouraging, as Chalons 
 was not very far from the road along which the 
 Brigade had to go to reach its new position 
 and it had not yet even disentangled itself 
 from the woods. Eventually the battalions 
 arrived — or what was left of them, as the two 
 forward companies of the 7th and 8th 
 Battalions and one company of the 6th 
 Battalion, which had been sent as a reinforce- 
 ment to the 7th Battalion early in the day, 
 had totally disappeared. The remainder were 
 considerably disorganised, and stragglers and 
 
 174
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 small parties who had lost themselves in the 
 woods continued to make their appearance for 
 some time afterwards. The Brigade assembled 
 at the junction of the Bouvancourt and 
 Chalons Ie Vergeur roads at about 11.30 p.m. 
 where the three battalions were hastily organ- 
 ised into one battalion, placed under command 
 of Colonel Chance of the 6th Battalion, and 
 guided to their positions. Brigade H.Q. were 
 established at Vaux Varennes. By 1.30 a.m. 
 however it was learnt from information 
 derived from patrols that there were no for- 
 ward elements of either the 8th Division or 
 the 7th Brigade (25th Division) on the left or 
 right, and Bouvancourt itself was found to be 
 occupied by the Boche. Further, from re- 
 ports brought in by despatch riders, and from 
 a company of the 2nd Lincolns who had passed 
 through on their way to rejoin their Brigade 
 in the direction of Pevy, it was evident that 
 the enemy were pushing patrols Westwards 
 from Bouvancourt and had already cut the 
 road South of Vaux Varennes, thus completely 
 isolating the Brigade from Divisional Head- 
 quarters at Prouilly, so that no information 
 
 *75
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 about the situation was obtainable. In these 
 circumstances the Brigadier decided to with- 
 draw the Brigade as quickly as possible and to 
 endeavour, under cover of darkness, to obtain 
 touch with the 64th Brigade, whose Headquar- 
 ters were known to be at Luthernay Farm. 
 Orders to this effect were sent out at once and 
 the Brigade formed up on the cross-country 
 track running East from Vaux Varennes to- 
 wards Luthernay Farm, the only route which 
 appeared available. The withdrawal began 
 about 3.30 a.m., covered by one company of 
 the 6th Leicesters, under Captain Scholes, 
 and was carried out without incident, except 
 for low flying enemy planes about dawn. 
 Luthernay Farm was reached shortly after 
 dawn, and a hasty conference with the 64th 
 Brigade disclosed the fact that their left flank 
 was uncovered. Their right, however, was in 
 touch with the French at Hermonville. It 
 was decided between the two Brigadiers that 
 the 110th Brigade should take up a position 
 on the left flank, holding the high ground 
 at St. Aubceuf and forming a defensive flank 
 on the ridge just West of the Chalons le 
 
 176
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 Vergeur-Pevy road. This was accordingly done 
 and the Brigade, which had once more resumed 
 its battalion formation, was got into position, 
 the 6th Leicesters on the St. Auboeuf ridge 
 and the 7th and 8th Battalions forming the 
 defensive flank. Brigade H.Q. were established 
 in a bank about half a mile further South, on 
 the Pevy road. 
 
 Shortly after the troops gained their posi- 
 tions orders were received from the Division 
 for the 64th and 62nd Brigades to take up a 
 line on the Hermonville-Montigny ridge, and 
 for the 110th Brigade to withdraw into Divi- 
 sional Reserve, at Pevy. Orders to this effect 
 were sent out at once, but owing to the 
 despatch rider being wounded the 6th Leicesters 
 never received theirs and became detached 
 for the remainder of the day with the 64th 
 Brigade. 
 
 About this time it became apparent that 
 the enemy was advancing so rapidly, and 
 the situation changing in consequence so 
 often, that it was impossible for the Division 
 to keep pace with it and issue and deliver 
 orders in time for them to be acted upon. 
 
 177 M
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 It therefore devolved upon Brigadiers to make 
 decisions and order movements on their own 
 initiative, endeavouring as far as possible to 
 carry out the general scheme without orders 
 and with no information — a by no means 
 easy task, as the point of view of a Brigadier 
 is necessarily somewhat limited. This was 
 especially the case during this day's opera- 
 tions (28th), when the enemy moved so fast 
 round the left flank that it became merely a 
 question of delaying his advance as long as 
 was compatible with withdrawing the troops 
 before they were actually surrounded and cut 
 off. Altogether it can be imagined that it 
 proved a somewhat hectic day for the Brigadiers 
 in the front line. 
 
 Having issued the orders for the withdrawal 
 toPevy, the 110th Brigade H.Q., about 6 a.m., 
 proceeded down the road towards that village, 
 with the object of getting arrangements made 
 beforehand for the advent of the troops. As they 
 approached the village, however, the heights 
 above it were suddenly occupied by the enemy 
 who, on catching sight of those in the road, 
 immediately opened a heavy fire with machine 
 
 i 7 8
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 guns. It was a complete surprise as nothing 
 was further from the Brigadier's thoughts at 
 that moment than to find the enemy there. 
 There was no time to lose, so he ordered the 
 H.Q. to get off the road and make for the 
 Prouilly ridge on the opposite side of the 
 valley. This move entailed crossing a swamp 
 in the centre of the valley and a stiff climb 
 up to the ridge on the opposite side, fol- 
 lowed the whole way by heavy but fortun- 
 ately inaccurate fire, from the Boche machine 
 guns on the hill. No one was hit and the 
 movement was carried out without mishap ; 
 but it was not pleasant, especially for those 
 men with bicycles, who had to carry them 
 across the marsh and haul them on the opposite 
 side. The Headquarters mess waiter, Meadows, 
 was in charge of the few utensils that were 
 being used and the rations, all of which were 
 in a sack. This he insisted on carrying ; 
 nothing would induce him to leave it, and he 
 finally bore it in triumph to safety on the top 
 of the ridge — a fine feat of doggedness and 
 muscle on a hot day. 
 
 On arrival the crest of the ridge was found 
 
 179
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 to be held by some disorganised elements of 
 the 8th and 25th Divisions. On the extreme 
 left flank, facing West and South-West, over 
 the valley of the Vesle, were the 14th North- 
 umberland Fusiliers (Pioneers) together with 
 the 1 2th/i 3th N.F.'s of the 62nd Brigade. On 
 the arrival of the 110th Brigade H.Q. the line 
 was reorganised and placed in position. Touch 
 was gained on the right with the two battalions 
 of French troops and some more troops of the 
 25th Division. Connection for the time being 
 had of course been lost with the troops of 
 the Brigade who, when this happened, had 
 been in process of withdrawing to Pevy. They 
 however, for the most part, made their way 
 across the head of the valley, and eventually 
 reorganised on the crest of the ridge ; Captain 
 Scholes' company of the 6th Leicesters, who 
 had acted as rearguard from Vaux Varennes, 
 also falling back on it during the morning. The 
 enemy made no attempt to attack this position 
 throughout the morning, although he occa- 
 sionally shelled it fairly heavily. But masses 
 of his troops could be seen defiling towards 
 the valley of the Vesle in the direction of 
 
 180
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 Jonchery, which shortly afterwards burst into 
 flames. The 64th Brigade had also been forced 
 back during the morning and was now occupy- 
 ing the remainder of the Trigny-Prouilly 
 ridge, just North of Trigny. At about 3 p.m. 
 the line North of Trigny was heavily shelled 
 and attacked and appeared to give way and 
 withdraw some distance. A very heavy attack 
 preceded by artillery and machine-gun fire 
 developed along the whole front at about 
 3.30 p.m. and the left of the line, being much 
 exposed from the valley, was driven back. Both 
 flanks being now uncovered, it was decided 
 to withdraw to the line of the Vesle in accord- 
 ance with instructions issued from the Division 
 earlier in the day. Orders were accordingly 
 sent to carry this movement out, but it was 
 very difficult to get them to all the scattered 
 and intermingled units on the hill, and portions 
 of the ridge remained held by the French and 
 some of our own men till nightfall, when they 
 were able to retire. The withdrawal to the 
 line of the river Vesle was carried out without 
 hindrance. The battalion were able to reor- 
 ganise to some extent and took up a position 
 
 181
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 from the Tile Works West of Muizon to Muizon 
 itself. The 62nd Brigade continued the line 
 Westwards towards Jonchery. By 8 p.m. the 
 troops were in position, and during the night 
 touch was gained at Muizon with the 64th 
 Brigade, the 6th Leicesters rejoining the next 
 morning. Brigade Headquarters of both 62nd 
 and 110th Brigades were established at the 
 Chateau in Rosnay from which, as it was 
 situated on a hill, an excellent view of the 
 surrounding country could be obtained, 
 although the actual line of the river was 
 screened by the thick woods. 
 
 The night of the 28th/29th and the early 
 morning of the 29th passed fairly quietly, 
 except that it became increasingly evident 
 that the enemy intended pushing his attack 
 mainly from the direction of Jonchery in a 
 South-Westerly direction, still pursuing his 
 tactics of turning the left flank. It was in 
 consequence of this tendency that, as a pre- 
 cautionary measure in the first instance, an 
 observation post was established on the early 
 morning of the 29th on Hill 202, a small knoll 
 standing considerably above the surrounding 
 
 182
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 country about one mile West of Rosnay. 
 Some French troops by this time had been 
 brought up on the left flank and some of these 
 were holding a line West of the Treslon- 
 Sapiecourt road, joining up with the 62nd 
 Brigade troops holding the line of the Vesle. 
 The main enemy movement however was more 
 in a South-Westerly direction, aiming at 
 enveloping the Treslon-Faverolles-Savigny 
 flank. 
 
 Later in the morning as the situation 
 developed all available troops and stragglers 
 were sent up to a position of readiness near 
 Hill 202. This force was placed under the 
 orders of Lieut. -Colonel Chance, of the 6th 
 Leicesters, who at once organised a defensive 
 line in the vicinity of the hill and sent a 
 detachment to support the French on the 
 Treslon-Sapiecourt line. This line was heavily 
 attacked during the morning from the direction 
 of Branscourt and was gradually forced back. 
 Reports from the Vesle front indicated that 
 all was quiet on that side, so the 1st Lincolns 
 and, later, the 12th/ 13th Northumberland 
 Fusiliers of the 62nd Brigade, were withdrawn 
 
 183
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 and sent to strengthen the Hill 202-Sapiecourt 
 front during the afternoon. 
 
 And so the fight ebbed and flowed during the 
 morning and early afternoon, the enemy attacks 
 on the Treslon-Sapiecourt front becoming 
 stronger and stronger as the day wore on. 
 Information was obtained also of heavy enemy 
 attacks in the direction of Savigny along the 
 line of the valley of the Ardre. But there 
 were evidences of more French troops arriving 
 who were directed towards this point, and 
 rumour also had it that the 19th British 
 Division was on its way, advancing up the 
 valley of the Ardre. The immediate left flank 
 of the Brigade (the Treslon-Sapiecourt line) 
 and Hill 202 were a source of endless anxiety 
 throughout the day as, if that gave way, the 
 situation of the troops holding the line of the 
 Vesle would be seriously jeopardised. 
 
 During the morning, after a visit from an 
 enemy aeroplane flying very low, which no 
 doubt reported that the Chateau was being 
 used as a Headquarters, Rosnay was very 
 heavily shelled, especially in the vicinity of 
 the Chateau. The Headquarters of all three 
 
 184
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 Brigades had therefore to depart somewhat 
 hurriedly and established themselves on the 
 edge of the woods on the high ground South of 
 Rosnay, where they remained until late in the 
 afternoon. 
 
 At 6.45 p.m. Lieut-Colonel Sawyer, 7th 
 Leicesters, reported the situation on the Vesle 
 front still fairly quiet, but that his left flank 
 was seriously menaced by large numbers of the 
 enemy threatening an attack near his junction 
 with the I2th/i3th Northumberland Fusiliers, 
 who were prolonging the line with the French 
 and some elements of the 25 th Division down 
 to Sapiecourt. This was very soon developed 
 into a very serious attack all along the line. 
 By 7.30 p.m. the salient where the two forces 
 joined was driven in and Colonel Sawyer with- 
 drew his force to a line West of and parallel 
 to the Les Vautes-Rosnay road. At the same 
 time Sapiecourt was taken and shortly after- 
 wards Courcelles as well, and the enemy 
 finally crossed the Treslon-Sapiecourt road and 
 secured a footing on the slopes of Hill 202. 
 This position prior to the attack had been 
 very heavily shelled throughout the afternoon, 
 
 185
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 causing heavy casualties, as there was little cover, 
 and, much to every one's grief, Lieut.-Colonel 
 Chance was killed. He was a great loss and 
 his death added considerably to the anxieties 
 of the Brigadier as he had been the life and 
 soul of the defence on this important flank 
 during the whole day. Captain Tooth, the 
 adjutant of the 6th Battalion, took over the 
 command and carried on the action with 
 great ability for the remainder of the operation, 
 finally bringing the troops on that flank out of 
 action. 
 
 Shortly afterwards it was reported that 
 Treslon had been captured, but as more and 
 more French reinforcements appeared about 
 this time advancing in that direction it was 
 hoped that the situation might improve. At 
 8 p.m. the position was sufficiently serious, 
 however ; French troops and about 200 men 
 of the 110th Brigade were holding a line West 
 of Rosnay Farm, roughly along the line of the 
 Treslon Road ; other mixed elements continued 
 the line West of Rosnay to the Courcelles 
 Road ; thence the remainder of the 7th 
 Battalion, estimated at about 100 strong, 
 
 186
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 continued the line along the East side of the 
 Les Vautes-Rosnay road to Muizon, where 
 they joined up with the 64th Brigade. 
 
 The troops were dead beat and by this time 
 considerably disorganised and mixed up after 
 the three days' fighting in circumstances which 
 never afforded a minute's breathing space in 
 which to reorganise. But disorganised as they 
 were, the units kept their cohesion in a won- 
 derful way ; naturally in the confusion arising 
 from withdrawing at night from St. Auboeuf 
 woods and the withdrawal the following morn- 
 ing from Luthernay farm, there were a great 
 many stragglers — men who had lost their way 
 and were endeavouring to find their units. 
 These were collected and organised from time 
 to time in formations composed of men of all 
 three battalions and possibly of other units 
 as well, who were then sent into the fight 
 again, where they fought well and bravely, in 
 spite of the difficulties under which they 
 laboured. In the evening all three Brigade 
 Headquarters withdrew to the village of Mery 
 Premicy, in accordance with instructions from 
 the Division, and orders were received about 
 
 187
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 9 p.m. that the 15th French Division were 
 taking over the line and that units of the 21st 
 Division were to withdraw wherever their 
 front was covered by troops of that Division. 
 Instructions to this effect were sent out. As 
 the troops were scattered and intermixed, it 
 was a matter of some difficulty, but it was 
 eventually managed by each Brigade sending 
 a mounted staff officer to explain personally 
 to commanding officers of units and detach- 
 ments what was required, and where the units 
 were to rendezvous on retirement. Between 
 I and 2 p.m. on May 30 the scattered units 
 West of Rosnay under Captain Tooth and 
 those North of Rosnay under Colonel Sawyer 
 were withdrawn and retired to Mery Premicy 
 where the Brigade H.Q. were established and, 
 after a short halt in which battalions were 
 reorganised and sorted out, the Brigade marched 
 to Pourcy. Here a halt of three hours was 
 made, during which the men got some hot food 
 and a rest which they badly needed. The 
 same morning about 11 a.m. the march was 
 resumed, the Marne was crossed at Damery and 
 the Division finally halted for the night in 
 
 188
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 the Foret D'Epernay, half way between 
 Vauciennes and St. Martin D'Ablois. The 
 next day the 1 10th Brigade marched to Etrechy 
 and went into billets, where at last a real rest 
 was obtained. The following day (1st June), 
 the Division organised a Composite Brigade, 
 under General Gater, composed of a battalion 
 made up from each Brigade. The 110th 
 battalion, 350 strong, was commanded by Lieut.- 
 Colonel Irwin, 8th Leicesters. This Composite 
 Brigade was then sent forward on June 2 
 to take up a line along the Marne between 
 Dormans and Troissy, with Brigade H.Q. at 
 Comblizy, where it remained until relieved 
 later in the month. 
 
 The German offensive ended on the Marne 
 at Chateau Thierry and along the line of the 
 river as far East as Chatillon, and thus succeeded 
 in producing a deep salient in the angle between 
 Soissons, Chateau Thierry and Rheims — a 
 very small gain when compared with the 
 sacrifices it entailed ; a gain, too, which in the 
 end when the time for counter-attack arrived 
 proved itself to be a snare and a delusion. The 
 2 1 st Division took no further part in the 
 
 189
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 operations except for the role played on the 
 Marne by the Composite Brigade under the 
 tactical orders of the French. What was left 
 of the latter marched by easy stages to an 
 area near Sezanne whence it was railed to the 
 Oisemont area, rejoining the Division about 
 June 21, when Brigades were reorganised and 
 new drafts were forthcoming to amalgamate 
 with the battalions. 
 
 The Division 'subsequently moved to the 
 Gamache area, near Dieppe, a delightful 
 locality where good training ground was 
 available. It was thought that a certain time, 
 perhaps six weeks, would now be given to the 
 Division to recuperate and train its newly 
 constituted units ; and considering what the 
 Division had been through this would have 
 been scarcely too long to restore it to its former 
 state of efficiency. The Gamache area was 
 one of the most pleasant of the back areas. 
 The country was charming, especially so at 
 this time of the year ; the villages were good 
 and clean, and provided comfortable billets 
 for the men ; moreover the training area 
 was conveniently situated and possessed the 
 
 190
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 requisite natural features for carrying out 
 practical exercises. The sea coast between 
 Dieppe and Eu was within reach and rendered 
 sea bathing possible — a thing the men much 
 enjoyed and which did them a lot of good in 
 many ways. 
 
 The Brigadier went off on leave to England 
 at the end of June and confidently expected 
 to find the Division where he had left it on 
 his return. Shortly after arrival in England 
 he received a wire telling him to rejoin on the 
 7th July, and on getting back he found that the 
 Division had moved to Beauquesne and had 
 joined the 5th Corps preparatory to going into 
 the line East of Acheux. And so ended any 
 idea of any rest or training. 
 
 From the operations just described little can 
 be gained for any instructional purpose. The 
 fighting while it lasted was so intense and the 
 pace was so severe that everything became 
 confused and disorganised to such an extent 
 that nothing could be extracted from such a 
 hurly-burly to serve as a guide for future 
 operations of a like kind. It was a time when 
 quick decisions were necessary and rapid 
 
 191
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 movement essential, when all that could be 
 done was to keep the line intact and un- 
 broken and carry out the scheme of delaying 
 the advance as long as possible and so enable 
 reinforcements to arrive before it was too late. 
 Of the finer elements of tactics there were none. 
 It was simply hammer and tongs all the time, 
 where every man and every gun was employed 
 with the one idea of stemming the tide to the 
 best of their ability in the circumstances in 
 which they happened to find themselves at 
 any moment. 
 
 The Field Artillery, however, after the first 
 day's operations, when they fought their guns 
 to the last moment to check the attack and 
 had some difficulty in getting away in conse- 
 quence, manoeuvred with considerable success 
 and tactical skill in the open fighting which 
 occurred later. Finding it difficult, if not 
 impossible, to define accurately the position of 
 their own infantry, and noting that the chief 
 danger lay in the exposed left flank, they con- 
 centrated all their efforts on covering that 
 flank by their fire. They were able to get 
 excellent positions and their targets were such 
 
 192
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 as a gunner dreams of but seldom sees — and 
 their efforts were successful, as, although 
 gravely exposed after the first twenty-four 
 hours, that flank was never driven in except by 
 an attack in force. This action assisted the 
 infantry to a far greater extent than support 
 against frontal attacks would have done, where 
 it would have been difficult to locate targets 
 with any accuracy. 
 
 The most outstanding feature was the choice 
 of the defensive position from the Aisne South- 
 wards towards Rheims. Here was exemplified 
 that fetish for retaining ground wherever 
 won, regardless of whether it was the best 
 position tactically or not. The position held 
 was tactically unsound : it was dominated by 
 the enemy positions and it had a very serious 
 obstacle in rear. The ground East of the 
 Canal could have no sentimental value, being 
 composed of marsh and a medley of shell holes 
 and trenches of no use to any one. The only 
 reason that could be adduced for retaining it 
 was that it had been won and therefore must 
 be held at all costs. In war such reasons are 
 folly, and worse than folly — they are almost 
 
 193 N
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 criminal. In this particular case the advantages 
 gained if this ground had been given up would 
 have been immense. A strong line existed to 
 the West of and commanding the Canal and 
 this would have possessed the obstacle of the 
 Canal and marsh in front of it, well within 
 range — an ideal combination. An outpost 
 zone, holding the line of the Canal and the area 
 between that and Route 44, could have been 
 established and this would have made the 
 position an almost ideal one ; for an advance 
 entailing the crossing of the Canal and the marsh, 
 with the ground dominated as it was from 
 both forward and back positions, would have 
 proved a very costly operation, if not entirely 
 impossible. Representations were made for 
 carrying out this change, at any rate in part, 
 but nothing was done owing to the enemy's 
 advance taking place before a change could be 
 made. This was by no means the only instance 
 of ground being occupied regardless of the 
 tactical requirements, and merely for the 
 sentimental idea that ground once won should 
 never be given up. Sentiment has no place 
 in war and should never be given precedence 
 
 194
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, i g i 8 
 
 over tactical principles the neglect of which 
 leads to defeat and disaster. 
 
 Many people seemed to think that Trench 
 Warfare differed from Open Warfare, and that 
 the former required a special form of tactics. 
 In reality, however, the principles laid down 
 in Field Service Regulations apply just as much 
 to one as to the other. In actual practice 
 the principles of defence laid down in that 
 excellent book apply equally to Trench War- 
 fare, and can be, and should always be, carried 
 out in extenso when such a phase become 
 necessary during operations. 
 
 On July 3 the Division left the Gamache 
 area and moved by rail to the vicinity of 
 Beauquesne, billeting in the villages in that 
 area. There they remained until the 12th, 
 employing the time in training of all kinds, 
 especially musketry, as good ranges existed for 
 that purpose. The Division now formed part 
 of the 5th Corps, under Lieut.-General Cam- 
 eron Shute, the other Divisions in the Corps 
 being at this time the 63rd (Naval) Division 
 and the 35th (Welsh) Division. Later on the 
 17th Division replaced the 63rd, which then 
 
 x 95
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 became part of the 4th Corps who were in 
 position North of the 5th Corps. The Corps 
 sector comprised that part of the line running 
 from a point just North of Albert to Beaumont 
 Hamel, the northern part of the line being 
 very familiar ground to the Brigadier. 
 
 On the 13 th the Brigade moved forward to 
 Acheux, taking over the line from a Brigade of 
 the 63rd Division on the 14th ; Brigade H.Q. 
 were located in a sunken road on the Western 
 outskirts of the village of Englebelmer. The 
 Brigade sector ran approximately from the 
 Northern corner of Aveluy Wood to the high 
 ground immediately West of the village of 
 Hamel, the Northern half of the Divisional 
 front (up to Beaumont Hamel) being occupied 
 by another Brigade. 
 
 This sector ran along the Ancre valley, 
 which is here a deep ravine, with the heights 
 of Thiepval on one side and on the other 
 the lower elevations of the high ridge which 
 runs from just North of Albert to Auchon- 
 villers. The banks of the Ancre are in this 
 part high and precipitous, dropping sharply 
 from the heights to the river below. In a 
 
 196
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 shallower depression at the point where the 
 Ancre turns sharply Eastwards below the 
 Thiepval heights, situated on the West bank 
 is, or rather was, the village of Hamel — once a 
 prettily situated village, nestling in a fold of 
 the slopes with vistas of the Ancre valley 
 stretching South and East in a long perspective 
 of wooded banks, now a blackened heap of 
 ruins after three years in the front line. The 
 Ancre valley itself was unoccupied as it was 
 commanded and overlooked from both sides : 
 it was the happy hunting ground of night 
 patrols and there was many a lively skirmish in 
 its depths before we finally claimed it for our 
 own. The village was always a doubtful 
 spot, and it was never finally established 
 whether it was actually occupied by the 
 Boche or not. It was certainly occupied by 
 them with small posts after dark as an outpost 
 to their trench system, which here was astride 
 the river and ran up to the ravine leading to 
 Beaumont Hamel. These small outlying posts 
 were a magnet for many night patrols and 
 efforts were continually made to try and 
 capture them, but they were very wary 
 
 197
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 birds and never occupied the same place two 
 nights running. There was many a fight 
 between the patrols and these posts on this 
 account, but we never succeeded in rounding 
 up and capturing one of them. 
 
 From the 14th onwards the Brigade con- 
 tinued to occupy this sector and took part 
 once again in the wearisome process known 
 as " holding the line ". It was by no means a 
 pleasant part, either. The trenches were not 
 particularly good or well built — they never 
 were in this part of the line where the Ancre 
 mud is so fickle that what may be a trench one 
 day is a quagmire the next. There was a lot 
 of work to be done ; support and reserve lines 
 had to be reorganised and practically rebuilt, 
 communications improved, and schemes for 
 the support of existing trench lines and for 
 counter-attack under all circumstances had to 
 be thought out and put into shape. It was 
 thought when the line was first taken over 
 that an attack was imminent on this part of 
 the front, and later, when this had passed after 
 the success which occurred further South in 
 the middle of July, came the opposite swing 
 
 198
 
 IN CHAMPAGNE, MAY, 1918 
 
 of the pendulum, when the enemy was expected 
 to withdraw. That was a period of incessant 
 activity and watchfulness, commencing at the 
 beginning of the month of August and lasting 
 till the beginning of the advance on the 21st 
 of that month. During the whole period 
 the enemy was particularly active with his 
 artillery, the area being constantly subjected 
 to bursts of artillery fire of all calibres. Gas 
 he made a speciality of more particularly at 
 night, and in spite of every precaution it was 
 difficult to evade the effects of the mustard 
 concentrations which he frequently put over. 
 This particular form of gas is the hardest to 
 combat as owing to its peculiar properties it 
 sticks to and impregnates anything with which 
 it comes in contact. Any one who passed 
 through an area in which this gas had been let 
 loose had immediately to change his outer gar- 
 ments, otherwise it was impossible for him to 
 avoid being affected himself and affecting any 
 one else in the vicinity from his own clothing. 
 It was a constant source of trouble and anxiety 
 as it was not always easy to tell where a gassed 
 area had been after a certain time had elapsed, 
 
 199
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 and casualties were sometimes considerable 
 from this cause. One night, when the reserve 
 line at Englebelmer was heavily gassed the 
 company holding the trenches concerned was 
 immediately moved from the vicinity, accord- 
 ing to orders. Although not affected that 
 night, the following morning when the sun 
 came out the whole company became casual- 
 ties, partially from their own clothing and 
 partially because a gentle breeze blowing in 
 the right direction wafted the gas, drawn out 
 of the ground by the heat of the morning sun, 
 directly across them. No precaution or care 
 could fight against such a devilish combination 
 but everything was done that could be thought 
 of to combat the evil. 
 
 Thus this month of waiting drew towards 
 its close. It was the final experience of trench 
 warfare, which as far as the Brigadier's career 
 was concerned, began and ended in very much 
 the same spot. 
 
 200
 
 Chapter 7 ; The Counter-Offen- 
 sive — August— November, 
 1918 
 
 FROM August 20 onwards, the final offens- 
 ive on our part may be said to have started. 
 Owing to the successful operations near Villers 
 Bretonneux by the Australian Corps of the 
 4th Army, the position of the enemy on the 
 right bank of the Ancre, North of Albert, was 
 getting more and more precarious and resulted 
 eventually in his gradual withdrawal from South 
 to North. The whole of Aveluy Wood was 
 clear of the enemy by the 5th. Hamel was 
 evacuated about the 16th, and by the 17th the 
 2 1 st Division outpost line had pushed forward 
 to the line of the Ancre East of Hamel, thence 
 immediately West of Beaucourt to the high 
 ground North of it. 
 
 From now onwards, an enemy withdrawal 
 on a large scale was anticipated, and it was 
 
 201
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 therefore of paramount importance to keep in 
 close touch with him and to discover the 
 moment such a retirement would commence. 
 Ceaseless patrolling was ordered and arrange- 
 ments made to follow up instantly any such 
 move on his part. This entailed very hard 
 work for the front line troops, as this patrolling 
 work, carried out by strong fighting patrols 
 of the strength of one platoon, was of a trying 
 and arduous nature. At various times during 
 this period patrols forced their way, with great 
 difficulty and admirable skill, across the Ancre 
 and penetrated into the enemy lines, procuring 
 valuable information and having many exciting 
 experiences and a considerable amount of fight- 
 ing in doing so. One patrol, venturing too 
 far one misty morning, was ambushed and cut 
 off, and a spirited and running fight ensued, 
 from which only one of the patrol managed to 
 escape. Although at considerable cost, valu- 
 able information was gained by this encounter. 
 These patrols were boldly and skilfully handled, 
 and enabled the higher command to watch the 
 enemy as a cat does a mouse : no move that 
 he made could go undetected. They were 
 
 202
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 however carried out at the expense of a certain 
 number of casualties at a time when the Brigade 
 was by no means fresh, having been in the line 
 for a considerable time. 
 
 It was decided that a move forward should 
 be made on August 21, the scheme of attack 
 being that the 62nd Brigade should capture 
 Beaucourt and advance along the high ground 
 North of the Ancre towards Miraumount in 
 conjunction with a similar advance carried out 
 by the 42nd Division further North. Beau- 
 court having been captured, the 110th Brigade 
 was to cross the Ancre and endeavour to estab- 
 lish itself on the high ground South-East of 
 the river in conjunction with a similar advance 
 by the 17th Division further South. Six com- 
 panies, four from the 6th and two from the 
 7th Leicesters, were ordered to carry out this 
 operation. 
 
 In accordance with this scheme, on the night 
 of the 20th/2ist, the 114th Brigade relieved 
 the 110th Brigade, who in their turn relieved 
 the 62nd Brigade further North. After this 
 reorganisation the 7th Leicesters under the 
 command of Lieut.-Colonel Sawyer, D.S.O., 
 
 203
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 became the front line battalion, with the 6th 
 Leicesters under the command of Lieut. - 
 Colonel Martyn in support and the 1st Wilts 
 under the command of Lieut. -Colonel Ward, 
 D.S.O., in reserve ; Brigade Headquarters 
 moved from Englebelmer to the vicinity of 
 Auchonvillers. 
 
 The next morning (21st) the 62nd Brigade 
 attacked and captured Beaucourt, advancing 
 beyond it towards Miraumont. The operation, 
 however, of crossing the Ancre and making 
 good the high ground South-East of it was 
 found impracticable. The marshes were not 
 fordable and no crossings existed ; moreover 
 the Eastern edge was strongly held by the 
 enemy. It had been decided beforehand that 
 if strong opposition was encountered the opera- 
 tion was not to be pressed. On the following 
 night (2ist/22nd), two footbridges were very 
 skilfully constructed by the Royal Engineers, 
 and by means of these two companies of the 
 7th Leicesters crossed, and after hard fighting 
 established and maintained themselves on the 
 slopes above the river. This brilliant little 
 action was the first step towards gaining com- 
 
 204
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 plete possession of the high ground which was 
 so important for further operations Eastwards. 
 
 On the night of the 22nd/23rd the 50th 
 Brigade (17th Division) relieved the 110th 
 Brigade, which became Divisional Reserve and 
 was concentrated in the trench system East of 
 Mailly Maillet and Englebelmer. Brigade 
 Headquarters moved to the trench system 
 immediately East of Beaussart. 
 
 During the 23rd, preparations were made 
 for an attack on a big scale to take place on 
 the whole Army front. The 5th Corps was 
 to take the Thiepval heights and push East- 
 wards up the valley of the Ancre towards Pys 
 and Le Sars. The 17th Division was to attack 
 the heights while the 21st Division moved 
 along the valley with the object of capturing 
 the high ground East of Boom Ravine and 
 South of Miraumont. The 64th Brigade 
 was detailed to carry out the first part of 
 the latter operation, the 110th Brigade passing 
 through them to finish it. These orders 
 were subsequently slightly altered owing 
 to the suspected withdrawal of the enemy, 
 and the 64th Brigade were ordered instead 
 
 205
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 to push straight on to the high ground 
 East of Boom Ravine and the noth Brigade 
 to make for the ground South of it so 
 as to link up with the 17th Division further 
 South. 
 
 To carry this out the Brigade concentrated 
 in Battery Valley at 12 midnight and formed 
 up in order of attack with the 6th Leicesters 
 on the right, 7th Leicesters in the centre, and 
 1st Wilts, on the left. This necessitated a 
 night march over exceedingly difficult ground, 
 combined with crossing the river over narrow 
 footbridges — an operation requiring very careful 
 timing arrangements and reconnaissance. The 
 64th Brigade assembled earlier in the night, 
 and the noth Brigade was to follow them. 
 The Brigade Headquarters moved the same 
 night from Beaussart to a dug-out in the 
 trenches just West of Beaucourt as a temporary 
 resting place whence communication could be 
 obtained direct by visual signalling with the 
 troops in the valley ; this was the first occasion 
 on which this method had been used for a 
 long time. It was quite successful and was 
 employed thereafter as a supplementary means 
 
 206
 
 207
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 of communication during the whole of the 
 subsequent advance. The night assembly was 
 carried out without any undue hitch ; but as 
 the 6th Leicesters (the leading battalion) 
 approached Battery Valley, they found that 
 the Southern end, and the trench line South of 
 it, was still held by the enemy in some force. 
 Lieut.-Colonel Martyn, commanding the 6th 
 Leicesters, at once realised the situation, and 
 without hesitation or waste of time attacked at 
 once and drove them out, capturing three 
 trench mortars and a number of prisoners, 
 thus clearing the valley. The consequence of 
 this was that only the 7th Leicesters and the 
 1st Wilts, formed the attacking line, and the 
 6th Leicesters, after they had reorganised, 
 followed in support. At 5 a.m. the Brigade 
 started from Battery Valley and made good 
 progress Eastwards towards their objective. 
 The 64th Brigade, starting earlier, had gone 
 ahead very fast and touch with them had to a 
 great extent been lost. It afterwards trans- 
 pired that they had pushed rapidly down the 
 valley, meeting with little opposition at first, 
 until they came to Boom Ravine ; nothing 
 
 208
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, i 9 i 8 
 
 daunted, they pushed on and after some heavy 
 fighting seized the high ground South of 
 Miraumont. Here, however, isolated as they 
 were with their flanks in the air, they had con- 
 siderable difficulty in holding their position ; 
 their Brigadier, General McCulloch, was 
 wounded and their casualties severe, but their 
 action was a very brilliant one and justified 
 the risk taken, as it materially assisted the 
 42nd Division on the North and forced the 
 early evacuation of Miraumont by the enemy. 
 The 110th Brigade moved steadily forward, 
 echeloned in rear of the 64th, the 17th Division 
 on their right again being also some distance 
 in rear, owing to their initial difficulty in gain- 
 ing the heights at Thiepval. 
 
 During the whole of this advance the right 
 flank of the Brigade was unprotected and was 
 subjected to continual machine-gun fire. In 
 spite of this, however, the Brigade continued 
 to press forward. At about 9 a.m. everything 
 seemed going well and Brigade Headquarters 
 moved from the high ground at Beaucourt, 
 crossed the river, and after a short halt in 
 Battery Valley, where they joined the 6th 
 
 209 o
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Leicesters, they pushed on across country in 
 rear of the two leading battalions to where a 
 peculiarly shaped, isolated bush grew on the 
 bank of a sunken road, about 1,000 yards West 
 of Boom Ravine. Here the attack was for a 
 time held up, partially by our own barrage, 
 which they had over-run, and partially from 
 enfilade fire coming from the right flank. The 
 64th Brigade was being hard pressed, and it 
 was of the greatest importance to get across 
 Boom Ravine and support their right ; so the 
 Brigadier, on arrival, seeing the situation, 
 ordered the left battalion (1st Wilts.) to push 
 on, having sent back word for the guns to 
 lengthen range ; the 7th Leicesters were 
 instructed to follow slightly in echelon on the 
 right and to push out a company to the right 
 to protect that flank. Brigade Headquarters 
 remained for the rest of the day at the " Bush." 
 It was not a pleasant place as, during the advance 
 to it and at intervals afterwards, the Head- 
 quarters were severely sniped by machine-gun 
 fire from the right by detachments of the 
 enemy which had not as yet been cleared by 
 the 17th Division. At one period, too, the 
 
 210
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Bush appeared to be ranging mark for the 
 enemy's artillery, for at a critical moment, 
 when orders for the night's advance were being 
 received over the telephone, it became the 
 object of most uncalled for attention by the 
 enemy's artillery. 
 
 All went well, however ; the objective was 
 gained at about 3 p.m. and the situation of the 
 64th Brigade assured. As touch could not be 
 gained with the 17th Division and the two 
 front line companies of the 7th Leicesters could 
 not be found, the two support companies were 
 ordered up to fill the gap. These former two 
 companies, commanded by Captain Home and 
 Captain Vanner, had gradually been diverted 
 from the true line of advance owing to the 
 enfilade fire from the right to which they had 
 been subjected during the advance, and event- 
 ually found themselves on the outskirts of 
 Courcelette, which was on the line of advance 
 of the 17th Division. They proceeded to 
 occupy the village and made a considerable 
 number of prisoners, including a battalion com- 
 mander. These they handed over to the 17th 
 Division on arrival and, next morning, rejoined 
 
 211
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 the Brigade. Apart from the loss of direction 
 this was quite a brilliant little affair and reflected 
 great credit on the leadership of the two officers 
 concerned ; but they were the cause of much 
 anxiety to the Battalion Commander and the 
 Brigadier, who thought they must have been 
 cut off and captured — a loss which they could 
 ill have afforded at that moment. 
 
 Later, about 6 p.m., information was received 
 that the 17th Division was advancing on 
 Courcelette, and the 1 10th Brigade was ordered 
 to push on at once and make good a line North- 
 West of Le Sars and thence to push patrols 
 into Le Sars if possible, gaining touch with 
 the Divisions on left and right. The battalions 
 were ordered to concentrate on the Mirau- 
 mont Road East of Boom Ravine by 8.30 p.m., 
 the 6th Leicesters on the left, 1st Wilts, on 
 right, 7th Leicesters (less the two companies 
 temporarily lost) in support. The route, which 
 lay over the old battlefield area, was a mass of 
 shell holes and of course had no landmarks 
 to go by, so the march had to be conducted 
 by compass bearing. This night march proved 
 a most difficult operation, carried out hurriedly 
 
 212
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 as it was, and with no previous reconnaissance. 
 Luckily the night was a moonlight one, which 
 helped considerably. Boom Ravine itself 
 proved a difficult obstacle, and it was no easy 
 matter in the darkness to find the way into 
 and out of it as the sides were precipitous and 
 deep and the exits on the Eastern sides were 
 few and far between. 
 
 Brigade Headquarters arrived in the road 
 at about 8 p.m. and formed up the Brigade 
 as they arrived. By some mischance two 
 companies of the 6th Leicesters lost their 
 way and did not arrive, but as time was all- 
 important, the Brigadier ordered the move- 
 ment to proceed without them and started 
 the battalions off, while he remained at the 
 rendezvous to send the two companies on 
 their way when they arrived. After waiting 
 for some time without hearing or seeing any- 
 thing of them, he decided to push on, and 
 started to march on a compass bearing to a 
 previous selected map location on the high 
 ground West of Le Sars which he had chosen 
 for his Headquarters. It had been his original 
 intention for the Headquarters to march with 
 
 213
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 the support battalion, but owing to the delay 
 caused by the non-arrival of the two companies 
 of the 6th Leicesters the Headquarters were 
 now some distance in rear. He thought, 
 however, that his small party could move 
 quicker and catch up. As a matter of fact 
 he lost all touch with them for the remainder 
 of the night. After a very unpleasant march, 
 falling into shell holes and derelict trenches 
 and getting caught up in barbed wire, the 
 Headquarters finally arrived at the spot they 
 had previously selected, only to find it a very 
 exposed place on the crest of a spur with no 
 cover to speak of. At the moment they 
 arrived, very heavy firing broke out from the 
 direction of Le Sars and the spur became a 
 most unpleasant spot, being apparently right 
 in the line of fire, and the only available cover 
 was in shell holes and a very derelict trench. 
 As there was nothing to be done in the dark- 
 ness, the Brigadier decided to withdraw his 
 Headquarters further back, and stumbling 
 back through the darkness he came upon the 
 Headquarters Company of the 6th Leicesters 
 with their CO. (Lieut.-Colonel Martyn), 
 
 214
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 who had lost touch with his front line com- 
 panies. As the place where he found them 
 was much exposed he withdrew them together 
 with his own Headquarters to a sunken road 
 South of Pys, and from there sent out patrols 
 to endeavour to get touch with the battalions. 
 Just before dawn the sunken road was very 
 heavily shelled by the enemy but not much 
 damage was done, although the shooting was 
 extremely accurate. During the night Lieut.- 
 Colonel Martyn with his Intelligence Officer, 
 Lieut. Alcock, and his orderly, went forward 
 to locate his forward companies ; but in the 
 darkness they walked into a quarry located 
 on the road, just North- West of Le Sars ; here 
 he was ambushed and, after a struggle, was 
 captured and his orderly killed. Lieut. Alcock, 
 however, managed to escape and brought 
 back word of what had happened. By dawn 
 the two forward companies of the 6th Leices- 
 ters had been located, but touch had not been 
 gained with either the 1st Wilts, or the 7th 
 Leicesters. 
 
 As can be imagined, the Brigadier was some- 
 what harassed and anxious. He decided at 
 
 215
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 dawn to go himself and locate the missing 
 troops and started off accordingly, accom- 
 panied by his Brigade-Major, Captain Ozanne 
 of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, a 
 keen, capable, active young officer. 
 
 The plan of operations for this day was 
 for the 62nd Brigade at dawn to pass through 
 the 110th Brigade and capture Le Sars and 
 the trench line North of it, after which the 
 110th Brigade was to pass through and capture 
 the road line still further East. 
 
 The Brigadier and Brigade-Major started 
 off in a thick mist and made for the places 
 where the objective of the 1st Wilts, had been, 
 according to plan. On their way they came 
 across the 62nd Brigade advancing. They 
 reached the high ground West of Le Sars just 
 as the mist lifted, and found the leading troops 
 in the act of attacking the village. The high 
 ground was no place to remain on long, as the 
 whole area was alive with machine-gun bullets 
 fired at the attackers and supports in rear, 
 so they hastened their steps to a small valley 
 where cover was obtainable. Here they found 
 the 62nd Brigade Headquarters but no sign 
 
 216
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 of the Wiltshire Regiment, who however 
 were near at hand, having successfully attained 
 their original objective during the night. In 
 the hurly-burly of a desperate attack such 
 as the taking of Le Sars proved to be, it was 
 impossible to discover anything, so the Brigadier, 
 considerably worried, decided to return ; but 
 as the fog lifted and the country became visible, 
 he eventually found the 7th Leicesters and 
 established his Headquarters with them. 
 Shortly afterwards touch was obtained with 
 the 1st Wilts., the two missing companies of 
 the 6th Leicesters arrived, and later also the 
 other two of the 7th Leicesters, who had 
 strayed to Courcelette. The 62nd Brigade 
 having been successful at Le Sars, the 110th 
 Brigade was ordered to push through and 
 capture the road line further East. The 
 Brigade therefore concentrated south of Pys, 
 the 6th and 7th Leicesters forming the front 
 line, with the 1st Wilts, in support. At about 
 2 p.m., while the Brigade was moving to its 
 assembly positions prior to starting for the 
 attack, the Brigade Headquarters moved to the 
 Headquarters of the 62nd Brigade for the oper- 
 
 217
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 ation. On arrival the Brigadier found the 62nd 
 Brigade being heavily counter-attacked. He 
 immediately sent off his Brigade-Major to 
 the two leading battalions, with orders for them 
 
 The Counter-Offensive, Firs 1 
 
 to press on quickly and attack at once, giving 
 verbal orders to the Battalion Commanders 
 as to the direction and task of each battalion. 
 The 1st Wilts, he ordered to stand fast, West 
 
 218
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 of Le Sars. The 6th and 7th Leicesters 
 changed direction, and quickly grasping the 
 
 uyencbuRjt | - ~V7Epehy 
 *Peiziere3 
 
 iiase (to October 3, 19 18). 
 
 situation, moved rapidly forward and attacked 
 in their turn the flank of the Boche counter- 
 attack. By 3.30 p.m. the enemy had been 
 completely repulsed but the original attack 
 
 219
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 had been cancelled. The 6th and 7th Leices- 
 ter however remained in line under the 
 tactical orders of the 62nd Brigade, and the 
 1st Wilts, withdrew to their original position 
 West of Le Sars. Brigade Headquarters took 
 up their quarters in a trench just West of 
 Le Sars in shelters which had been occupied 
 shortly before by a German artillery brigade. 
 They had only been recently built and were 
 comparatively clean. 
 
 Here an amusing incident occurred which 
 caused great laughter and, if meant for a joke 
 by the Hun, was a very successful one. In 
 examining the mess hut a very unpleasant 
 looking red bomb was found embedded between 
 the sandbag wall and the door post. Warnings 
 had been issued about " booby traps," and 
 this had every appearance of beingone; prepara- 
 tions were therefore made to remove it. After 
 everything of value had been removed from the 
 hut a long line of telephone wire was procured 
 and one end very gingerly tied round the 
 bottom of the bomb, the other end being led 
 to a trench some thirty yards away ; from this 
 secure position it was decided to pull the 
 
 220
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 bomb out. On the first pull the wire broke. 
 This was repeated four times with the same 
 result, but the fifth effort proved successful. 
 Out came the bomb — it was empty ! The 
 question was (and is) whether it was a leg- 
 pull or not. 
 
 At dawn on the 26th the 64th Brigade 
 went through the 62nd Brigade and captured 
 the high ground South of La Barque. The 
 62nd Brigade then attempted to exploit this 
 success but were unable to advance more than 
 two or three hundred yards owing to the heavy 
 enfilade fire from La Barque and Ligny Thilloy. 
 
 The 17th Division had reached Martin- 
 puich and the 63 rd Division on the left was 
 believed to be holding La Barque, but appar- 
 ently not the Southern part of the village. 
 
 The 6th Leicesters, now commanded by 
 Major Burdett, were withdrawn South of 
 Warlencourt, but the 7th Leicesters remained 
 with the 62nd Brigade. On the 27th, at 
 dawn, the 110th Brigade moved forward with 
 the line of the Thilloy — Lusenhof Farm Road 
 as their objective, with the 6th Leicesters 
 on the left, the 1st Wilts, on the right and the 
 
 221
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 7th Leicesters in support. Brigade Head- 
 quarters had moved forward to the Butte de 
 Warlencourt, a very prominent landmark which 
 had the appearance of a slag heap, standing 
 about a hundred feet higher than the surround- 
 ing country. The Brigadier was watching 
 the advance of the troops from the top : they 
 had already reached the line of the road called 
 Blue Cut when a telephone message was 
 handed to him telling him that the attack was 
 cancelled and that the troops were to be with- 
 drawn. Prompt action was necessary. He 
 flew down to his Headquarters at the base 
 of the mound and quickly got his Brigade- 
 Major and another officer to run and stop the 
 two leading regiments. There was no other 
 means of communicating, the battalions being 
 on the move. The two officers being young 
 and active eventually succeeded in stopping 
 them, but not before the 6th Leicesters had 
 suffered some casualties from machine-gun 
 fire from the left flank. 
 
 The attack was cancelled owing to the 17th 
 and 63rd Divisions not attacking on the South 
 and North at Guedecourt and Le Thilloy 
 
 222
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 respectively, as had been arranged beforehand. 
 The Brigade withdrew to its old position, 
 West of Le Sars. 
 
 The 28th was a quiet day and the troops 
 got a rest, which they badly needed. At 3 
 p.m. however the Brigade was ordered to relieve 
 the 62nd Brigade in the front line. The relief 
 was effected that night, the front line being 
 the line of Yellow Cut Road, where junction 
 was obtained with the 42nd Division at La 
 Barque and with the 17th Division just East 
 of Eaucourt L'Abbaye. At 9 p.m. informa- 
 tion was received that the 38th Division was 
 attacking on the South, in the direction of 
 Ginchy, at 5.30 a.m. This attack proved 
 to be successful, and the enemy started to 
 retire all along the line. The two front line 
 battalions were ordered to push forward 
 advance guards and make ground " by bounds " 
 Eastwards. In this way they were able to 
 advance as far as the high ground West of Beau- 
 lencourt. Further progress was not possible, 
 as the enemy were holding the Bapaume- 
 Peronne Road in strength. The 1st Wilts, on 
 the right and the 7th Leicesters on the left 
 
 223
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 proceeded to consolidate, the 6th Leicesters 
 in support being on the reverse slope of the 
 high ground East of the Lusenhof Farm Road. 
 Brigade Headquarters occupied a filthy dug- 
 out in the trench system just South of the 
 farm. 
 
 The enemy shelled the forward battalions 
 very heavily that night, but showed no dis- 
 position to attack. Beaulencourt was shelled 
 by us during the night until 2 a.m., at which 
 hour patrols were pushed forward to recon- 
 noitre. These patrols were only able to get to 
 about 300 yards from the Western outskirts 
 of the village as the latter was found to be very 
 strongly held by machine guns. On the 
 morning of the 30th, and again during the 
 night of the 30th/3ist, the bombardment was 
 repeated and patrols sent out with the same 
 result. 
 
 Meanwhile the 42nd Division on the left 
 attacked and captured Riencourt, East of the 
 Bapaume Road, but the right Division found 
 Le Transloy strongly occupied. At 10 a.m. 
 on the 31st the Division intimated that the 
 Brigade would have to be prepared to attack 
 
 224
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Beaulencourt, and alternative schemes for a 
 night or day attack were prepared. A day- 
 light operation would have necessitated a 
 frontal attack, but a night attack which allowed 
 a certain amount of manoeuvring could take 
 the position from the flank. The approaches 
 to Beaulencourt from the front presented a 
 glacis-like slope with no cover, which would 
 have made a frontal attack very risky and 
 costly. A night attack from the North 
 however presented less difficulties and would 
 introduce the element of surprise. Moreover 
 the necessary movements could be made under 
 cover of darkness. 
 
 The latter plan was eventually decided on, 
 and orders were issued with the artillery pro- 
 gramme, for the attack to take place the follow- 
 ing morning (1st September) at 2 a.m. The 
 plan of attack was that the 6th Leicesters 
 on the left, with their left on the Bapaume 
 Road and the 1st Wilts, on the right, were to 
 form up in the valley running South-West from 
 the Bapaume Road and immediately West of 
 Riencourt, and move parallel with the Road, 
 preceded by an enfilade artillery and machine- 
 
 225 p
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 gun barrage, and capture and occupy the vil- 
 lage. The 7th Leicesters, in the meanwhile, 
 were to hold the trench line West of Beaulen- 
 court. 
 
 At 7 p.m. the Division ordered a supple- 
 mentary attack to be made on the Sugar 
 Factory North of Le Transloy at 5.30 the 
 same morning, in conjunction with an attack 
 on Le Transloy by the 17th Division : the 
 7th Leicesters were ordered to carry out this 
 attack with one company. 
 
 The attack on Beaulencourt was completely 
 successful : as a flank attack, it obviously took 
 the enemy completely by surprise. The 6th 
 Leicesters and 1st Wilts, swept through the 
 village and, after some very heavy fighting in 
 which good use was made of Lewis guns and 
 trench mortars, the whole of the village was 
 captured and a position consolidated round 
 the Eastern and South-Eastern portions of it. 
 The captures included three officers and 130 
 men, two field guns, nine anti-tank guns, 
 4 trench mortars and 36 machine guns, 
 as well as a Field Hospital more or less 
 intact. 
 
 326
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 The attack by the 7th Leicesters did not 
 materialise as, owing to the short time available 
 for reconnaissance, the company detailed failed 
 to reach the forming up line. An enemy- 
 counter-attack on the South-East corner of 
 the village was beaten off by the 1st Wilt- 
 shires. 
 
 The attack on Le Transloy failed. At 2 
 a.m. on the 2nd the 7th Leicesters attacked 
 the Sugar Factory with three companies. 
 The operation was followed at 5 a.m. by a 
 general attack all along the line, the 64th Bri- 
 gade going through the 110th Brigade towards 
 the high ground East of the Bapaume Road, 
 the 4th Corps on the left attacking Villers-au- 
 FIos and the 17th Division making an encircling 
 attack on Le Transloy from North and South. 
 The Sugar Factory was captured by 5 a.m. and 
 the 64th Brigade and 4th Corps attacks were 
 successful ; but the enemy fought desperately 
 for Le Transloy. At 10 a.m. the Sugar Fac- 
 tory was heavily shelled and retaken, but by 
 11.30 a.m. the situation was restored, the 
 7th Leicesters regaining the Sugar Factory, 
 and the 17th Division cleared Le Transloy and 
 
 227
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 pushed on to the high ground East of the road. 
 Here the 17th Division gained touch with the 
 2nd Division of the 4th Corps and thus pinched 
 out the 2 1 st Division. The 64th Brigade was 
 therefore withdrawn, and the day ended with 
 the 7th Leicesters holding a line from the Sugar 
 Factory to the high ground in rear of the 
 17th Division, with the 6th Leicesters 
 garrisoning Beaulencourt, the 1st Wilts, 
 being withdrawn into support in the original 
 trench line. Brigade Headquarters moved 
 from the dug-out near Lusenhof Farm to 
 some huts in a sunken road West of Riencourt, 
 near the Bapaume road — a very pleasant 
 change. 
 
 The 42nd and 17th Divisions pressed on 
 during the 3rd, captured Barastre and Roc- 
 quigny, and pushed forward beyond these 
 villages. The 110th Brigade withdrew to 
 Divisional Reserve. The Division for the next 
 two days was in Corps Reserve and was able 
 to obtain a little rest which was badly needed. 
 It was wonderful what these short periods of 
 rest did for the men. After constant fighting, 
 moving with little rest or sleep and with 
 
 228
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 periods during which the tactical situation 
 did not admit of proper food being taken, 
 the men at times were strained to the limit of 
 human endurance. Fatigue became almost 
 a pain ; yet one day's complete rest with good 
 hot food and a comprehensive wash, worked 
 wonders. Of course the moral effect of advanc- 
 ing and hammering the Boche was a great asset 
 in keeping the men going, and added to their 
 ardour. Their tails were right over their 
 backs ; fatigue and hardship no longer 
 counted. 
 
 On September 5 the 21st Division again 
 came into the line, relieving the 38th Division 
 which had pushed on East of the Canal du 
 Nord in the vicinity of Manancourt and 
 Etricourt. The noth Brigade, in Divisional 
 Reserve, moved to Sailly-Saillisel. Here they 
 remained till the 7th, when they moved 
 forward to the Canal du Nord about Manan- 
 court and Etricourt. Brigade Headquarters 
 were established in a very comfortable hutted 
 camp in Manancourt, formerly a German 
 Corps Headquarters. In the meanwhile the 
 front line troops had been pressing steadily 
 
 229
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 but slowly forward in the face of gradually 
 increasing opposition. On the 9th, the 17th 
 
 Division on the North had reached the old 
 trench line South of Gouzeaucourt, the 64th 
 and 62nd Infantry Brigades continuing the 
 line South through Revelon Farm and East 
 of Heudicourt, where the 58th Division joined 
 up with them, carrying the line further South, 
 just to the West of Peiziere. 
 
 During the night 9th/ioth the 1 10th Brigade 
 relieved the 62nd Brigade in the line. On the 
 loth instructions were received to the effect 
 that the 110th Brigade would extend its line 
 to the North, relieving the 64th Brigade, and 
 attack the trench line running South from Chapel 
 Hill. Accordingly the 1st Wilts, carried out 
 the relief on the night ioth/nth, and the 7th 
 Leicesters made the attack on the morning of 
 the nth. This attack was successful, 50 
 prisoners and a number of machine guns being 
 captured, but some difficulty was experienced 
 in gaining touch with the 1st Wilts, on the 
 North owing to the pocket of the enemy 
 holding out in Chapel Redoubt. Complete 
 touch was not gained until the 6th Leicesters 
 
 230
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 relieved the 7th Battalion on the night of the 
 I2th/i3th. 
 
 At 9.20 a.m. on the 13th a deserter from the 
 enemy was brought into Brigade Headquarters. 
 On examination he stated that a Flamenwerfer 
 attack would take place about Chapel Hill as 
 part of a larger operation at 10 a.m. There 
 was very little time to be lost if advantage 
 was to be taken of this information. Battalions 
 were warned, the Division was rung up and 
 asked to bring the heavy artillery into action 
 at once, and the Brigadier himself dashed across 
 the road to the supporting F.A. Brigade Head- 
 quarters, who were fortunately near at hand, 
 to bring the field guns into action at once to 
 forestall the attack. The enemy's opening 
 barrage and our own commenced at about the 
 same moment, 9.45 a.m., our guns making 
 beautiful shooting on the enemy trenches 
 where they should have been forming up for the 
 attack. Sure enough, the enemy started their 
 attack with flamenwerfer at 10 a.m. The 
 counter-attack after a short, though sharp, 
 fight was beaten off. The enemy gained 
 a temporary footing in the vicinity of Chapel 
 
 231
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Redoubt, but were soon ejected by an immedi- 
 ate and well organised counter-attack delivered 
 by a platoon of the 1st Wilts., leaving nine 
 prisoners and one machine gun in our hands. 
 This attack caused the enemy a considerable 
 number of casualties. 
 
 The 2 1 st Division was now working over 
 ground with which it was very familiar as they 
 had borne the German onslaught of March 
 2 1 st while holding this part of the front. It was 
 a curious experience, finding themselves working 
 back over this old ground, where many evi- 
 dences of our former occupation were found ; 
 the Brigadier himself found in an old dug- 
 out which he occupied as a Headquarters, and 
 which had been the Headquarters of the 
 I2th/l3th Northumberland Fusiliers in March, 
 191 8, an old cheque-book in which the last 
 cheque drawn was dated March 19. 
 
 The night of the 16th was a most unpleasant 
 one ..for Brigade Headquarters, which were 
 under canvas in the vicinity of a sunken road 
 immediately West of Manancourt. Dinner 
 had just been finished about six p.m. and all 
 were very busy with orders and preparations 
 
 232
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 for the coming attack, when without warning 
 an enemy aeroplane dropped 6 bombs into 
 the small camp. A direct hit was obtained 
 on the office tent ; Sergeant Winney, the chief 
 " G " clerk, was killed instantaneously and 
 Private Osie, assistant clerk, so badly wounded 
 that he died shortly afterwards. Typewriter, 
 stationery, files and correspondence were of 
 course blown to atoms. The Brigade despatch 
 rider was also killed. Altogether, out of a 
 total of 30 officers and men, the casualties 
 amounted to 6 killed and 10 wounded. There 
 were some extraordinary escapes. The Officers' 
 Mess tent was riddled with splinters but none 
 of the officers were touched, although all were 
 blown off their feet by the force of the 
 explosion. 
 
 The Brigade had been relieved by the 19th 
 Brigade (33rd Division) during the night of 
 the I5th/i6th and withdrawn to the West of 
 the Canal du Nord near Manancourt. At 
 noon that day (16th) orders were received for 
 an operation on a big scale and on a wide 
 front, to take place on the morning of the 
 18th. 
 
 233
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 The scheme for the 21st Divisional attack was 
 for the 62nd Brigade to capture the trenches 
 East of the railway between, and including, 
 Vaucelette Farm and Peiziere. After this 
 the 110th Brigade on the right and the 64th 
 Brigade on the left, were to go through and 
 capture the trench system running West and 
 South of Villers Guislain, whereupon the 1 10th 
 Brigade was to exploit further East to protect 
 the flank of the 12th Division, who, further 
 South, was to attack Epehy and the trench 
 system East of it. 
 
 It was decided to make the attack with the 
 6th Leicesters on the right and 1st Wilts, on 
 the left, the 7th Leicesters being in support. 
 The battalions moved about 9 a.m. and marched 
 to the assembly position near Heudicourt 
 whence they were to follow the 62nd Brigade 
 when the attack started. Brigade Head- 
 quarters moved to a dug-out in a sunken road 
 just South of Heudicourt where the 62nd 
 Brigade was already established, and later, when 
 the attack started, they moved forward to a 
 similar one in a sunken road just West of 
 the railway and South of Chapel Hill. 
 
 234
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 The attack started just before dawn. The 
 62nd Brigade took their objective, and the 
 Iioth then passed through them. The 6th 
 Leicesters on the right found their right 
 flank exposed and had some difficulty in clear- 
 ing the trenches just North of Peiziere. They 
 pushed on as far as 14 Willows Road, but were 
 obliged to halt here and throw out a defensive 
 flank as the 12th Division had failed to take 
 Epehy, thus leaving this flank exposed to an 
 enfilade fire from the enemy trenches East 
 of the village. The leading companies of the 
 1st Wilts, reached their final objective, but 
 owing to the lack of support on their right 
 were eventually compelled to withdraw to the 
 high ground East of 14 Willows Road where 
 they remained, throwing their flank back to 
 the road itself. By 10.30 a.m. the supporting 
 battalion, the 7th Leicesters, reached the line 
 of 14 Willows Road, immediately in rear of the 
 1st Wilts., and consolidated a position there. 
 The 64th Brigade had captured their final 
 objective and was firmly 'established. The 
 38th Division on the right, however, was 
 only in possession of the trenches immediately 
 
 2 35
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 East of Peiziere and could not advance further. 
 The operation, on the whole, had been very- 
 successful ; 20 officers, 400 men and 8 
 field guns were captured, but exploitation 
 further East was stopped by the failure on 
 the right, Epehy not having been taken. 
 At 9 p.m. orders were received to renew 
 the attack next morning, but these were 
 subsequently cancelled and the Brigade was 
 relieved by the 19th Brigade, 33rd Division, 
 on the following night (i9th/20th), and again 
 withdrew to Manancourt. 
 
 From the 21st to the 23rd, the Division 
 rested in this area. The 5th Corps had been 
 reinforced by the 33rd Division, so the four 
 Divisions were organised into a right and left 
 wing, the 38th and 33rd relieving each other 
 on the right and the 17th and 21st doing the 
 same on the left. On the night of the 25 th/26th 
 the 110th Brigade relieved the 51st Brigade 
 (17th Division) in the sector East of Gauche 
 Wood, running as far North as Quentin Hill ; 
 the 6th Leicesters on the right, the 7th Leices- 
 ters on the left and the 1st Wilts, in support, 
 Brigade Headquarters in dug-outs at Chapel 
 
 236
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Hill. Here the noth Brigade remained, the 
 62nd Brigade on their left holding a trench 
 line running round the South and West edges 
 of Gouzeaucourt. 
 
 Information was received from the 4th 
 Corps on the morning of the 28th that the 
 enemy were withdrawing on their front, and 
 later in the morning the 62nd Brigade was 
 able to push through Gouzeaucourt as far 
 East as the railway. The 6th and 7th Leices- 
 ters were thereupon ordered to push out 
 patrols and occupy the trench line West of 
 Gonnelieu. By 5 p.m. this operation was 
 complete. 
 
 On the 29th, at 3 p.m., the 62nd and noth 
 Brigades attacked Eastwards, the 62nd Brigade 
 attacking Gonnelieu and the noth Brigade 
 the trench line South of it. The 6th Leices- 
 ters led the attack, followed by the 1st Wilts., 
 who were to pass through them at a later 
 stage. The attack however was not a suc- 
 cess, the enemy held the high ground in 
 strength and with great determination — 
 evidently to allow other troops to get across 
 the Canal. The 6th Leicesters were unable 
 
 2 37
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 to advance owing to heavy machine-gun 
 fire ; one company on the extreme right got 
 forward and captured the cemetery North- 
 West of Villers Guislain and part of the trench 
 line North of the cemetery ; but here the 
 attack was held up. The 62nd Brigade was 
 also unable to advance through Gonnelieu. 
 The 4th Corps attack from the North had its 
 effect next day, the enemy evacuating Gon- 
 nelieu ; both Brigades then pushed forward 
 and finally drove the enemy across the Canal 
 and consolidated the old trench line on the 
 high ground West of Bantouzelle to Honne- 
 court Wood. Here the advance halted for two 
 days, while preparations to attack and cross 
 the Canal were completed. Brigade Head- 
 quarters, meanwhile, had moved to the Quarry 
 just East of Gouzeaucourt, which proved a 
 nice change from the dug-out on Chapel 
 Hill. It was not so safe, perhaps, but the 
 shelling in the back area was not so severe, 
 and the comfort of being in the open air 
 was well worth the risk. The atmosphere 
 in a dug-out was invariably damp and stuffy, 
 and the Brigadier always felt it a wrench to 
 
 238
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 191S 
 
 leave the fresh air and descend into the black 
 depths, though never unmindful of the immor- 
 tal Captain Corcoran : — 
 
 " But when the breezes blow 
 I generally go below, 
 And seek the seclusion that a cabin 
 grants." 
 
 On the 3rd the 62nd Brigade was with- 
 drawn and the 110th Brigade took over the 
 whole of the Divisional front, having two 
 battalions in the front line (7th Leicesters on 
 the left and the 1st Wilts, on the right), and 
 the 6th Leicesters in support. Constant 
 patrolling was carried out towards the Canal 
 to keep touch with the enemy, but patrols 
 were invariably engaged by machine guns on 
 approaching the Canal bank. At dawn on the 
 $th however patrols of the Brigade on the 
 right crossed the Canal at Honnecourt, and by 
 8.30 a.m. had occupied a line East of it. The 
 two front line battalions were at once ordered 
 to cross the Canal. This was carried out, but 
 only with considerable difficulty owing to the 
 bridges having been destroyed. 
 
 239
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 Once across, they pushed on rapidly under 
 advanced guards and found the whole of the 
 Hindenburg Line evacuated. This they occu- 
 pied and sent patrols to the East of it. The 
 6th Leicesters meanwhile moved to Banteux 
 Spur in readiness to cross the Canal, which they 
 did later in the afternoon. By the evening 
 the whole Brigade was occupying the Hinden- 
 burg Line with an outpost line in front of it. 
 Brigade Headquarters moved forward to a 
 position West of the Canal. During the 
 afternoon the 64th Brigade passed through the 
 Hindenburg Line to occupy the Beaurevoir 
 Line which was reported clear, but meeting 
 with strong opposition they were unable to 
 advance far. The next day Brigade Head- 
 quarters moved to the Hindenburg Line and, 
 during the 7th, preparations were made for a 
 further advance on the 8th on a big scale. 
 The 2 1 st Division was to capture the Nasmieres- 
 Beaurevoir system and Walincourt and the 
 high ground to the North of it. Divisions on 
 the right and left were also advancing on a wide 
 front. The plan for the Divisional attack was 
 for the 64th Brigade (right) and the noth 
 
 240
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Brigade (left) to capture the Beaurevoir Line 
 between Angle Chateau and Ardissart Farm, 
 after which two battalions of the 110th 
 Brigade would form up South of Ardissart 
 Farm, facing North, and attack Northwards, 
 the objective being the Beaurevoir Line and 
 the high ground immediately East of it as far 
 North as Hurtebise Farm, where junction with 
 the 37th Division could be established. This 
 operation completed, the 62nd Brigade was to 
 pass through and capture Walincourt and the 
 high ground North of it. The 1st Wilts, were 
 detailed for the initial stages of the 110th 
 Brigade attack, the 6th and 7th Leicesters 
 carrying out the final stage. Zero hour for 
 the first stage was 1 a.m. (8th). The assembly 
 march of the 1st Wilts, was successfully carried 
 out in spite of an exceptionally dark night. 
 The attack was delivered with great dash, 
 although the wire was thick and practically 
 undamaged. Their objective in conjunction 
 with that of the 64th Brigade was made good. 
 The fighting in and around Angle Chateau, 
 however, went on till mid-day as it was strongly 
 and tenaciously held by machine-gun posts. 
 
 241 Q
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 At 5 a.m. the 6th and 7th Leicesters formed 
 up on the line of a communication trench South 
 of Ardissart Farm. This was no easy operation 
 in the pitch-black night, more especially as the 
 communication trench in question was barely 
 a foot deep and therefore extremely difficult 
 to find. Again the attack was everywhere 
 successful, and was certainly the surprise it 
 was intended to be; 624 prisoners, 4 field 
 guns, 67 machine guns and 6 trench mortars 
 were the tangible results of this attack. At 
 8 o'clock the 62nd Brigade passed through for 
 their advance on Walincourt. By I p.m. the 
 front had been reorganised, the 64th Brigade 
 extending northwards to Haut Farm, the 
 remainder of the front to Hurtebise Farm being 
 held by the 6th Leicesters. The 1st Wilts, 
 and 7th Leicesters were ordered to move North 
 and concentrate West of Briseux Wood in 
 readiness to attack Guillemin Farm and the 
 high ground East of it, but this idea was 
 subsequently modified by the 62nd Brigade 
 carrying out this attack, the 1st Wilts, being 
 lent to them as a supporting battalion. This 
 operation, carried out at 4.30 p.m., was suc- 
 
 242
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 cessful to start with, but a strong counter- 
 attack drove it back to the line of the Sargrenon 
 brook in the valley. Walincourt was however 
 taken and remained in our hands. During the 
 late afternoon Brigade Headquarters moved to 
 a dug-out at Montecouvrer Farm. This was a 
 most successful day, although an arduous 
 combination of hard fighting with a long 
 advance. On going over the ground next day 
 it was astounding to see the depth and thickness 
 of the wire, practically undamaged, through 
 which the troops had forced a passage. More- 
 over the intense darkness made the feat all the 
 more marvellous. 
 
 The second attack, from the South, was 
 evidently a great surprise to the enemy and 
 had the advantage of evading the wire by get- 
 ting behind it. The large haul of machine 
 guns was undoubtedly due to this fact. 
 
 The 17th Division came through on the 9th 
 and pushed forward, the enemy retiring in 
 front of them. The noth Brigade moved 
 forward on the 10th and went into billets at 
 Caullery, where they remained resting, train- 
 ing and reorganising till the 22nd. 
 
 243
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 On the 13 th, the Brigadier was able to get a 
 few days' leave to England. He arrived in 
 London on the 14th, but on the evening of the 
 1 6th received a wire to return at once, so he 
 left again on the morning of the 1 6th, getting 
 back to Caullery by the evening of the 17th. 
 It was a hurried journey, but well worth the 
 trouble ; for the rest and good food and a sleep 
 in a good bed for a few nights made a great 
 difference. The troops had also benefited 
 considerably by their ten days' respite in com- 
 fortable billets — a thing they had not seen for 
 a long time. New drafts arrived and were 
 organised with the battalions and received 
 some training. The devastated area had now 
 been left behind and the enemy had no time to 
 destroy the towns and villages, although he 
 did his best by blowing down every church 
 that he had the time and opportunity to des- 
 troy — an unnecessary and disgraceful act of 
 vandalism for which there was no excuse 
 whatever. When the Division moved forward 
 again it was in great fettle with the battalions 
 nearly up to strength ; and the men, refreshed 
 and rested, were full of themselves after their 
 
 244
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 previous successes and eager to continue the 
 advance and give the enemy something of that 
 which they themselves had suffered earlier in 
 the year. 
 
 On the morning of the 22nd orders were 
 issued for an attack on a big scale on the 3rd 
 and 4th Army Fronts, the 5 th Corps attacking, 
 with the 33rd Division on the right and the 
 2 1 st Division on the left. The scheme was a 
 comprehensive one and made provision for a 
 long advance to be carried out " by bounds " — 
 a series of objectives being attacked and 
 captured in succession by different formations. 
 The 2 1 st Division in this had five objectives 
 allotted to it : (1) The high ground North- 
 East of Amerval ; (2) A line of road running 
 along a spur East of Ovillers ; (3) Vendegie 
 village and the line of road running South of it ; 
 
 (4) The high plateau West of Poix-du-Nord ; 
 
 (5) The high ground East of Poix-du-Nord and 
 the outskirts of the Foret de Mormal. 
 
 The 110th Brigade on the left, in conjunc- 
 tion with the 64th Brigade on the right, were 
 ordered to take the first three of these objectives, 
 the 62nd Brigade then passing through and 
 
 245
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 accounting for the remainder. The Brigade 
 orders were for the 1st Wilts, on the right and 
 the 7th Leicesters on the left to capture the 
 first two of the objectives allotted. On com- 
 pletion of this phase the 6th Leicesters were to 
 pass through and make good the line of Ven- 
 degie village. As a preliminary to this oper- 
 ation the 2 1 st Division took over the line held 
 by the 17th Division on the night of the 
 22nd/23rd, the 6th Leicesters taking over 
 from the 52nd Brigade the front allotted to the 
 noth Brigade, roughly along the ridge North 
 and South of Amerval. 
 
 Zero hour for the attack was 2 a.m. on the 
 23rd. By 12.30 a.m. the 7th Leicesters and 
 1st Wilts, had formed up along their assembly 
 position, the line of road running East of 
 Amerval. When in position, the enemy heavily 
 bombarded the Brigade front, this particular 
 road coming in for a large share of the shelling, 
 which caused very heavy casualties and con- 
 siderable disorganisation among the battalions. 
 In spite of this initial disadvantage both 
 regiments advanced according to programme 
 and captured their first objective up to time. 
 
 246
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 In moving forward however to their second 
 objective, they encountered heavy opposition, 
 and delay was caused by the Brigade on the 
 left being held up at the Red House. By 
 means of the support afforded by the 6th 
 Leicesters this opposition was overcome, and 
 by 7.15 a.m. a message was received to the 
 effect that the 6th Leicesters were in position 
 and ready to advance. This battalion then 
 passed through and advanced towards the 
 third objective. Here they met with strenu- 
 ous opposition, chiefly from Dukes Wood, 
 which was full of machine guns. The advance 
 was held up for some time until one company 
 succeeded in working round the southern 
 edge of the wood to the Chateau, thus out- 
 flanking the position. From this point the 
 advance was resumed without much difficulty, 
 the third objective being in our hands by 
 10 a.m. Patrols were pushed out through 
 the village and the exits were held before the 
 leading troops of the 62nd Brigade passed 
 through at about 10.30 a.m. 
 
 Brigade Headquarters during these man- 
 oeuvres moved from Inchy to Neuvilly and 
 
 247
 
 .Neuville 
 
 jP=V/ 
 
 Solesmes 
 
 Poix du 
 \Nord, 
 
 Vendeqies 
 
 lChateau 
 
 Briastrej 
 Viesl: 
 
 Ouillers" 
 
 Amerva 
 
 Croix) 
 
 L Montay 
 >Le Cateau 
 
 
 o i 2 3 «■ 5 Kilometres 
 i l I i ' ' 
 
 The Codnter-Offensive {October ^-October 24, 19 18).
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 from thence to a small copse North-East of 
 
 Amerval at u a.m. At 3.30 p.m. news 
 
 arrived of the capture of the fourth objective 
 
 by the 62nd Brigade, but further advance 
 
 was impossible. At 3.45 p.m. the Brigade was 
 
 concentrated ready to move forward, the 6th 
 
 Leicesters in Vendegie, the 7th Leicesters 
 
 North of Ovillers, the 1st Wilts, holding the 
 
 line of the second objective in readiness to 
 
 move forward. Brigade Headquarters were 
 
 established at Ovillers. No further movement 
 
 was possible that day, but the advance was 
 
 ordered to be continued the next day (24th), 
 
 the 62nd and 64th Brigades to attack and make 
 
 good the line of the road through Grand Gay 
 
 Farm, a further advance to be undertaken by 
 
 the 110th Brigade with the Jolimetz-Le 
 
 Quesnoy Road as objective. The operations 
 
 this day had again been most successful ; the 
 
 Brigade had captured 340 prisoners and made 
 
 good all its objectives. The flank movement 
 
 of the company round Dukes Wood had been a 
 
 particularly good bit of work, showing great 
 
 initiative and excellent leading on the part 
 
 of the officers concerned. By means of this 
 
 250
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 outflanking movement Vendegie Chateau was 
 surrounded before the German Regimental 
 Commander, whose headquarters it was, could 
 get away and he was captured with most of his 
 staff. The attack was resumed on the 24th, the 
 leading battalions of the Brigade, the 1st Wilts, 
 on the right and the 7th Leicesters on the left, 
 crossing the high ground North-East of 
 Vendegie at 7 a.m., keeping in close touch 
 with the progress of the attack. Brigade 
 Headquarters moved to Vendegie Chateau 
 at 8 a.m. On arrival there news was received 
 that the first objective (the high ground North- 
 East of Poix-du-Nord) had been captured, and 
 that the advance was being continued. The 
 Brigadier therefore pushed on with an advanced 
 Headquarters to Poix-du-Nord, leaving word 
 for the remainder to follow later. 
 
 The situation at noon however showed that 
 further advance East of the first objective was 
 definitely stopped by heavy machine-gun fire 
 and a greater measure of artillery fire than 
 had hitherto been experienced. The 7th 
 Leicesters and 1st Wilts, had reached and 
 halted on the line of the Fontaine le Conte- 
 
 251
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 brook, North of Poix, the 6th Leicesters being 
 in position on the plateau West of the village. 
 There they remained till 2 p.m. when the 
 battalions were ordered back, the 6th Leicesters 
 to Vendegie, the 7th Leicesters and 1st Wilts. 
 to a position on the plateau. Brigade Head- 
 quarters returned to Vendegie Chateau. No 
 further change in the situation occurred that 
 day. 
 
 On the 25th little advance was made as 
 patrols reported the enemy holding the line 
 of Grand Gay Farm Road very strongly with 
 infantry and machine guns. That night, the 
 25th/26th, the 110th Brigade relieved the 62nd 
 and 64th Brigades in the line and Brigade 
 Headquarters moved to Poix-du-Nord. At 
 I a.m. (26th) patrols were pushed out from the 
 front line under a Field Artillery barrage, and 
 posts were established about 300 yards in 
 advance. 
 
 The following night (26th/27th) the Brigade 
 was relieved by the 52nd Brigade, 17th 
 Division, the 110th Brigade Headquarters 
 moving to Ovillers, the 6th Leicesters and 1st 
 Wilts, to billets in Ovillers and the 7th Leicesters 
 
 252
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 to camp near Amerval. Two nights later 
 (29th/30th), the Brigade relieved the 52nd 
 Brigade in the same line as that held prior 
 to the previous relief. The Brigade remained 
 in the line till the end of the month, the 
 area being shelled very heavily at times. Poix 
 itself received considerable attention, mainly 
 between dusk and dawn, with a certain amount 
 of gas. The billets were good in Poix, but it 
 was hardly a safe place of residence. 
 
 On the night of the 2nd/3rd of November 
 the Division was relieved by the 17th Division, 
 the 52nd Brigade again relieving the noth 
 Brigade, which withdrew to Ovillers. 
 
 On the 3rd, orders were received that the 
 1st French Army, together with the 3rd and 
 4th and 1st British Armies, were to resume the 
 offensive on November 4. Up till now the 
 advance had been carried out in a North- 
 Easterly direction, but the further operations 
 now to take place were to be carried out due 
 East. This necessitated a partial wheel to the 
 right and meant attacking through the Foret 
 de Mormal from West to East — a strenuous 
 proposition if the latter proved to be tena- 
 
 253
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 ciously held. The 17th Division was to clear 
 the Foret de Mormal up to Locquignol in 
 the first day's operation. The 21st Division 
 on the following day was to pass through 
 the 17th Division, endeavour to cross the river 
 Sambre and establish a line East of it. This 
 meant an advance of over 12,000 yards during 
 the two days. 
 
 On the 4th the operations started, the 17th 
 Division advancing with apparently little 
 opposition and was swallowed up in the forest. 
 The 2 1st Division meanwhile assembled in the 
 area West of the forest, near Futoy, ready 
 to move forward. Brigade Headquarters 
 moved in the afternoon to a small house near 
 Futoy. On arriving after dark at this place, 
 the Brigadier, accompanied by his Brigade- 
 Major (Capt. Ozanne) and Intelligence Officer 
 (Capt. Victor Kelly, a brilliant and gallant 
 product of young Oxford,) found the house in 
 direst confusion. It had evidently been hit 
 by one of our shells and had also been system- 
 atically ransacked by the Hun before evacuation. 
 All hands had to turn to to make it fit for 
 occupation ; two dead Germans amongst other 
 
 254
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 things were disposed of before anything else 
 was done. 
 
 By the evening it was reported that the 17th 
 Division had reached a line in the forest about 
 2,000 yards short of their original objective. 
 The morning of the 5th was misty and damp, 
 and this subsequently turned to a continuous 
 rain which lasted till the end of the operations. 
 It was a cheerless morning when the 62nd 
 Brigade led off the advance at about dawn, 
 the noth Brigade following close in the rear 
 in close touch with the support battalion of that 
 Brigade. Brigade Headquarters had moved at 
 6 a.m. and joined with the 62nd Brigade at 
 Pont a Vache. As soon as the 62nd Brigade 
 had moved off and the noth Brigade had 
 formed up ready to start, the Brigadier moved 
 off in advance of the head of the column and 
 established Headquarters in advance of the 
 Brigade at the Institute Forestier, about the 
 centre of the forest, on the Locquignol — Tete 
 Noire Road, which was reached about 8.30 a.m. 
 In the meanwhile reports came in that the 
 52nd Brigade was steadily advancing and had 
 reached a line Tete Noire — Grande Carriere and 
 
 2 55
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 were moving forward towards the Sambre at 
 Berlaimont without much opposition. 
 
 As soon as this news was received the Brigadier 
 rode on to Tete Noire, leaving word for the 
 column to follow, and joined the 62nd Brigade 
 Headquarters established in the village. Here 
 it was found that further advance was being 
 strenuously opposed in and around Berlaimont, 
 and the advance was held up for a time. It 
 was decided that the 110th Brigade should not 
 attempt to advance till the 62nd Brigade could 
 establish themselves East of Berlaimont and 
 prepare bridge-heads to cover the crossing. 
 At 1 1. 1 5 a.m. the head of the Brigade column 
 arrived at Tete Noire. Their march had been 
 much delayed by the congestion on the road 
 caused by the large and deep craters which had 
 been blown by the Boche in the road, at 
 Locquignol and West of Tete Noire. It was 
 pouring with rain, too, which made the roads 
 through the forest very muddy and difficult. 
 
 The further advance of the 62nd Brigade 
 showed every sign of being delayed for the 
 remainder of the day, so the 110th Brigade 
 was ordered to billet in Tete Noire. Brigade 
 
 256
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 Headquarters were established in a farm house 
 on the Eastern side of it, and preparations were 
 made and orders issued for the attack and 
 crossing of the Sambre the following day. 
 
 The 62nd Brigade had cleared Berlaimont 
 during the evening, and during the night had 
 been able to push across small parties at the 
 Lock, where they occupied a very restricted 
 position, but had managed to improvise a 
 bridge over the shattered remains of the 
 masonry of the Lock. This bridge merely 
 consisted of single planks about two feet wide, 
 laid zigzag across the dilapidated masonry, 
 with no handrail or supports on either side. 
 It was a most rickety structure over which to 
 cross troops on a pitch dark and rainy night, 
 the more so as the river below was swift running. 
 By this contrivance the 6th Leicesters and 1st 
 Wilts. — the former on the left and the latter 
 on the right — managed to cross the river at 
 5.30 p.m. and established themselves along the 
 Eastern bank of the river in readiness to advance. 
 Brigade Headquarters moved forward and estab- 
 lished themselves at a house on the Western 
 outskirts of Berlaimont. Up till 8.30 a.m. no 
 
 257 R
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 advance could be made owing to the heavy 
 machine-gun fire from Aulnoye and the direct 
 artillery fire from batteries posted on the high 
 ground East of it. The 6th Leicesters how- 
 ever managed to extend their flank slightly by 
 capturing and occupying the Factory, and also 
 pushed a patrol up the East bank of the Canal 
 towards Aymeries. This they followed up by 
 sending more troops in this direction with the 
 idea of turning Aulnoye from the North. 
 
 During the whole morning the enemy had 
 continuously and heavily barraged the line of 
 the Sambre, which prevented any advance. 
 Owing to the civilian population known to be 
 in Aulnoye, the employment of artillery fire 
 on the village to assist the troops in its capture 
 was not permitted. If it had not been for 
 this restriction the advance would have been 
 made much earlier in the day. As it was, it 
 was not until noon that the enemy fire died 
 down and an advance could be made. By 
 12.45 p.m. the 6th Leicesters had occupied 
 Aulnoye and the 1st Wilts, were advancing 
 with them on the right. By 6 p.m. the final 
 objective, the line of the road East of Aulnoye 
 
 258
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 and Aymeries from Les Quatre Bras through 
 Etree to the Sambre, had been captured, and 
 touch had been established with the 33rd 
 Division on the right although not with the 
 5th Division on the North, who should have 
 joined up at the bridge South of Pont sur 
 Sambre. 
 
 All through the previous night and during 
 the next day the rain had been heavy and 
 continuous, which combined with the desperate 
 fighting during the day made the lot of the 
 front line troops very trying and uncomfort- 
 able. In spite of the weariness of the men, 
 orders were received for the advance to be 
 continued the following morning (7th), and 
 accordingly at dawn the 7th Leicesters and 
 1st Wilts, moved forward under an artillery 
 barrage and occupied the high ground West 
 of Limont Fontaine. Little opposition was 
 met with during this advance towards the 
 Maubeuge Road. Brigade Headquarters had 
 meanwhile advanced firstly to Aulnoye Brewery 
 at 7.30 a.m. and later, at about 9 a.m., to 
 Etree, being received everywhere with open 
 arms by the inhabitants who were crazy with 
 
 259
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 joy at being free once more. Flowers and 
 everything they had — mostly coffee — were 
 pressed on the troops, and flags sprang out 
 everywhere like mushrooms in a night. Touch 
 with the 33rd Division was still maintained on 
 the right, but the 5th Division had only been 
 able to make good the line of railway East of 
 Pont sur Sambre. A defensive flank was there- 
 fore thrown back by the 7th Leicesters across 
 the high ground facing North, to guard this 
 flank as a temporary measure until the 5 th 
 Division was able to get into the line. Mean- 
 while the 64th Brigade, after some hard fighting, 
 had been checked on the Eastern limits of 
 Limont Fontaine, and it was not till about 5 
 p.m. that they finally took this and advanced 
 to a line about 500 yards West of the Maubeuge 
 Road. 
 
 During the night 7th/8th the 17th Division 
 came through to continue the advance, where- 
 upon the 110th Brigade withdrew to billets 
 in Berlaimont. Brigade Headquarters were 
 billeted at the home of an old French military 
 surgeon, who had fought in the war of 1870, a 
 charming old gentleman who did everything 
 
 260
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 he could to make his self-invited guests com- 
 fortable. In the course of conversation he 
 told the Brigadier a curious story, which he 
 himself thoroughly believed and vouched for. 
 He said that after the retreat in 1914, about 
 400 British soldiers with a proportion of officers 
 were cut off and remained hidden in the Foret 
 de Mormal. Here they remained for eight 
 months, living partly on what they could 
 catch in the way of game, and partly on 
 what the villagers could send them secretly. 
 The country people, he said, were very much 
 struck with the discipline which was still main- 
 tained, the men turning out spotless, with their 
 rifles and accoutrements clean and always ready 
 for use. Eventually the Germans somehow 
 discovered their whereabouts and organised a 
 search through the Forest. Apparently, from 
 what he gathered, a large number were killed 
 and the remainder captured. It would be 
 interesting to know what truth there is in this 
 extraordinary story ; owing to the extent and 
 density of the forest in those days it seems 
 probable the men could have remained hidden 
 in the depths ; but eight months seems a long 
 
 261
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 time for such a secret to have been kept, no 
 matter how carefully guarded. 1 Latterly of 
 course the Germans felled a large portion of 
 the forest for timber, and it is now no longer 
 what it used to be. 
 
 The Division remained at Berlaimont and 
 its vicinity till the nth, when orders were 
 received for the cessation of hostilities from 
 1 1 a.m. that day. The news was received with 
 a certain amount of pleasure, but, strange as it 
 may seem, not wholly with delight. From 
 evidence which was apparent on every hand, 
 the enemy's retreat had become in the last 
 three or four days more and more of a precipi- 
 tate flight. It was known, too, that a big 
 offensive was due to start from near St. Mihiel 
 Northwards which, if successful, as there was 
 little doubt it would be, would have had the 
 effect of cutting in on the enemy's line of 
 retreat Eastwards. This with their front badly 
 broken, as it was in front of the 4th, 3rd and 
 1st Armies, would have meant a serious debacle 
 and a crushing defeat to the enemy. Further 
 advance would of course have been a very 
 
 *Sce Appendix 2. 
 262
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 difficult problem owing to the difficulties of 
 transport, but every one would have gladly gone 
 on on half rations to finish the job properly. 
 
 On the nth the noth Brigade marched to 
 Beaufort, while a squadron of the North Irish 
 Horse on bicycles formed an outpost screen 
 beyond, with Headquarters at Croisies. Here 
 they remained till December 14, and employed 
 the time in training and reorganisation in 
 preparation for any further move which might 
 be necessary. Sports of all kinds were organised 
 and everything done to keep the troops happy 
 and fit. On November 18 the Brigadier at 
 last got his long-deferred leave and this time, 
 instead of being recalled, he was agreeably sur- 
 prised by being given a week's extension. 
 
 The trip from Beaufort to Boulogne, carried 
 out by motor-car, was a most interesting one, 
 the route being by Valenciennes, Lille, Arras, 
 through the devastated and familiar area to 
 Bailleul and thence, via St. Omer, to Boulogne. 
 Bailleul, which the Brigadier remembered five 
 months before as quite a charming little town, 
 comparatively intact, with a particularly com- 
 fortable Officers' Club just off the principal 
 
 263
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 square, was now merely a rubbish-heap, knocked 
 absolutely flat. Shortly after the Brigadier 
 returned from leave, the Division moved back 
 to an area near Amiens, in the Somme Valley. 
 The noth Brigade marched on December 14 
 by stages to Inchy, where they were transported 
 in motor buses to Bevelles, arriving there about 
 December 17, just in time to make necessary 
 preparations for Christmas. 
 
 There had been little scope for tactical 
 manoeuvring during these last three months. 
 Big movements were certainly made, but they 
 appertained more to strategy than to tactics, and 
 the role of the fighting troops could hardly be 
 called Open Warfare as flanks were still, in the 
 big sense, " un-get-at-able ". Trench systems 
 such as the Hindenburg and Masnieres Line 
 were still in being and were held, but it was 
 possible from time to time to introduce a 
 certain amount of tactical manoeuvres into 
 these operations, such as the taking of Beaulen- 
 court and the Masnieres Line, which showed 
 what can be done by such flank movements, 
 especially when they introduce that element of 
 surprise which produces effects out of all pro- 
 
 264
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 portion to its intrinsic value. The chief lesson 
 learnt during these times was in the co-opera- 
 tion of the Field Artillery with the infantry. 
 In long advances the infantry very soon got 
 beyond the support of the Heavy Artillery and 
 depended entirely on the lighter arm for sup- 
 port. Undoubtedly the Field Artillery, long 
 accustomed as they had been to the system of 
 barrages — so essential in an attack on a limited 
 objective — were somewhat at sea and rather 
 u sticky " when confronted with the problem 
 of supporting infantry in the open. They 
 very quickly adapted themselves to the changed 
 conditions, at first adopting the principle of 
 attaching sections to the forward battalions 
 with excellent results ; but this savoured of a 
 makeshift. This principle of pushing guns 
 forward to support the infantry would have 
 been sounder and more in accordance with the 
 Field Artillery training if it had been applied 
 to complete batteries and even to Brigades. 
 Indirect fire could still have been employed 
 where necessary, and fire brought to bear over 
 open sights when opportunity offered. Some 
 portion of the guns in an advance of this kind 
 
 265
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 should be far enough forward to be able to 
 take advantage of opportunities, which may 
 be fleeting ones, for energetically supporting 
 the infantry. The machine guns during this 
 period had made great strides. Their tactical 
 handling was getting more and more under- 
 stood ; they were no longer tied to the apron- 
 strings of the Brigadier or Battalion Comman- 
 der, but were given a definite place in the 
 general scheme and allowed to carry out their 
 role without being hampered or fettered with 
 unnecessary orders and instructions. Their 
 chief raison d'etre is to support the infantry 
 whole-heartedly and to the last man and gun, 
 and it was now clearly understood that this 
 support could be obtained, not with the infantry, 
 but by pursuing their own tactics for the infan- 
 try. Here again close support is essential, and 
 this was obtained by the principles of echelon- 
 ing in depth and continuous leap-frogging in 
 the advance. Their performance was excellent 
 but, to be hypercritical, it seemed that freer and 
 better use of limbers might have improved it. 
 
 The years 1917-1918 will never be forgotten 
 by the writer. They were a priceless experi- 
 
 266
 
 THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 1918 
 
 ence of war in nearly all its phases and, through 
 it all, the chief thing which remains in his 
 mind is a deep and ineffaceable admiration for 
 the men who really won it, the bed-rock of 
 the fighting line — the imperturbable British 
 Infantryman. 
 
 In February of the following year the Briga- 
 dier took over command of the Division from 
 Major-General Sir David Campbell, who went 
 to another command, much to the regret of 
 everybody. No further move was made, the 
 Brigadier remaining in command of the Divi- 
 sion till it was gradually demobilised and 
 finally ceased to exist early in May. 
 
 As the Brigade gradually melted away in 
 the fierce heat of demobilisation, the Briga- 
 dier felt many a pang in seeing the departure 
 of the men in whom he took such a pride and 
 who had fought so long and so well under his 
 command. What splendid men they were ! 
 No one who was not actually there with them 
 can have any idea of what they went through, 
 especially during the last three months. Dur- 
 ing that last period there was practically no 
 rest for them. Weary and footsore they never 
 
 267
 
 A BRIGADIER IN FRANCE 
 
 faltered or gave way. It was their proud 
 boast that, during that time, they never failed 
 to obtain their objective and never lost what 
 they won. Truly a command to be proud of, 
 and the Brigadier saw them go with reluctance 
 and grief. Such men are beyond all price, 
 and so long as England produces them and sees 
 that they are looked after in the right way and 
 that their spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion 
 to duty is fostered and encouraged to the 
 highest possible degree, she need have no fear 
 of any diminution in the National Spirit which 
 is the right and heritage of her sons. One was 
 reminded of those stirring lines in "The 
 Shropshire Lad " : — 
 
 Yes, God will save her, fear you not, 
 Be you the lads you've been — 
 
 Get you the sons your fathers got, 
 And God will save the Queen ! 
 
 268
 
 Appendix i 
 
 Mentions of the 2 1 st Division in the Com- 
 mander - in - Chief's Dispatches from 
 January to October^ 19 18 
 
 March 24, 19 18. 
 
 " During the fir6t two days of the enemy's offensive South of 
 Arras, the 21st Division maintained its position at Epehy against 
 all assaults and only withdrew from the village under orders when 
 the progress made by the enemy to the South rendered such a 
 course necessary. Before this Division withdrew it inflicted 
 great loss on the enemy and the German Official reports acknow- 
 ledge the bitterness of the fighting." 
 
 April 30, 191 8. 
 
 " 8.34 p.m. Following a bombardment of great intensity, 
 the French and British positions from the neighbourhood of 
 Meteren to Zillebeke Lake were violently attacked this morning 
 by large hostile forces. Attacks were made also upon the Belgian 
 positions North of Ypres. 
 
 " Fighting of great severity developed rapidly on the whole 
 Allied front. 
 
 ' The 25th, 49th and 21st British Divisions completely repulsed 
 every attempt made by the enemy to enter their position, and 
 despite the constant succession of determined attacks in great 
 strength, maintained their line intact." 
 
 May 2, 1918. 
 
 "Please inform the G.O.C. and Officers and men of the 21st 
 Division that the share taken by them in the recent fighting North 
 
 269
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 of the Lys, following so closely upon their gallant action on the 
 battle front South of Arras, reflects credit alike on their Division 
 and upon the British Army. I thank them for the great courage 
 and devotion they have already displayed and am confident that 
 any further test which the future may bring will be met by them 
 with the same unflinching resolution." 
 
 May 29, 19 18. 
 
 " On our right the 21st Division in touch with our Allies held 
 their battle positions throughout the day and successfully with- 
 stood the enemy's attempts to advance." 
 
 September 14, 191 8. 
 
 "The 21st Division which on March 21 distinguished itself 
 in the defence of Epehy was in line opposite to Beaucourt on 
 August 21, capturing Beaucourt. During the following days 
 it advanced with great gallantry over the Somme Battlefield, 
 overcoming stiff resistance in the neighbourhood of Le Sars and 
 Beaucourt L'Abbaye." 
 
 September 19, 191 8. 
 
 " North of Peiziere, the 21st Division attacked over the North- 
 ern position of the sector defended by it with so much gallantry 
 on March 21 and 22. Having captured its old front trenches, 
 together with the strong point known as Vaucelette Farm and 
 beaten off a hostile counter-attack, it pushed forward more than 
 a mile beyond this line, capturing several hundred prisoners and 
 a German Battery complete with teams in the course of its advance. 
 
 October 9, 19 18. 
 
 " In the centre, Welsh and English troops of the 38th and 21st 
 Division broke through the German defence system known as 
 the ' Beaurevoir-Masnieres Line ' and captured Malincourt 
 and the trench line West of Malincourt. Obstinate resistance 
 was met with from strong bodies of the enemy with M. Gs. in 
 Villers Outreaux. After a period of hard fighting, Welsh 
 troops gained possession of the village." 
 
 270
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 October 24, 191 8. 
 
 " English troops of the 25th Division had hard fighting in 
 Bishop's Wood (East of Le Cateau) and made good progress 
 through it. East County troops of the 18th Division advancing 
 to a depth of 8| miles captured Bousies. English and Scottish 
 Battalions of the 21st and 23rd Divisions secured the crossings 
 of the Harpies at Vendegie Wood and captured Vendegie 
 Village." 
 
 Headquarters, October 30, 1918. 
 
 Times, Monday, March 25, 191 8. 
 
 THE FIFTY MILE BATTLE 
 
 On the right of Gauche Wood were other troops — namely 
 Leicesters and Northumberland Fusiliers — from the height below 
 Gauche Wood known as Chapel Hill to Peziere and Epehy. Some 
 three divisions and parts of a fourth were thrown against our one 
 division. At one point only the enemy got into our line just 
 round Vaucellette Farm where he was actually in our advanced 
 posts in the fog before we saw him. Waves of Germans flowed 
 past the farm and round it on both sides, but in the farm itself 
 were a party of Leicesters who held out though completely sur- 
 rounded, and fought, refusing to surrender until every man was 
 either killed or so wounded that he could fight no more. 
 
 On the left of this bit of the line the Leicesters and Northum- 
 berland Fusiliers together held Chapel Hill against attacks which 
 lasted throughout the day. On the right more Leicesters had 
 Peziere in their keeping and here the same bloody struggle raged, 
 immense numbers of Germans being killed and immense numbers 
 more coming on. At one time the Germans forced their way 
 into the village of Peziere by the use of the Flammenwerfer. 
 Then we attacked with a couple of tanks and infantry and drove 
 the enemy out again. 
 
 ***** 
 
 At the end of the day all this section of the front was intact, 
 except where a small dent remained by Vaucelette Farm, and 
 the men told me that they could have re-established even that 
 one dent and " held on till 1920 " if they had been allowed to 
 
 27I
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 stay and do it. But the troops on the right of Ep6hy had been 
 compelled to fall back and to conform to this that evening the 
 line from Gouzeaucourt to Peziere also fell back. 
 
 The Germans had pushed us back nearly as far as St. Emilie 
 so that our flank at Epehy was exposed to a depth of 6ome 2,000 
 yards. 
 
 Times, April 24. 
 
 "HEROIC BRITISH DIVISIONS" 
 
 Of the 2 1 st Division's magnificent fighting at Epeliy and Pezi- 
 ere and by Chapel Hill I told in my dispatch of March 24. when 
 Leicesters, Lincolns, and Northumberland Fusiliers all did so 
 gallantly, and I spoke of it again in my message of April 4. The 
 2 1 st has done very well in other battles in this war, as in the Wan- 
 court-Henivel area in the battle of Arras last year and in the 
 capture of the Reutel Ridge on October 4, 1917. Nothing could 
 have been stouter than this fighting on the first days of this German 
 offensive. 
 
 And again in The Times of May 29, in an article entitled " Battle 
 on two Fronts." 
 
 Appendix 2 
 
 Some three months after General Cumming had left the 91st 
 Brigade an incident occurred which may be recorded here. At 
 about 1.30 a.m. on the night August 6/7, 1917, No. 282046 Pte. 
 B. Taylor, 2 /4th London Regiment, crawled into the right post 
 of the Brigade, which was still holding the Bullecourt sector. 
 His battalion had taken part in an attack on June 15, and he, 
 being disabled with a fractured thigh, had crawled with a friend 
 into a disused shelter about 200 yards behind the enemy's front 
 line. His companion could walk, and would go out after dark to 
 procure iron-rations and water from the dead in the vicinity, and 
 in this manner they lived for no les3 than seven weeks, until one 
 night the companion failed to return. After twice failing, Taylor 
 eventually succeeded in dragging himself across the enemy 
 trenches and wire defences, and into our lines. For this remark- 
 able feat he was subsequently awarded the D.C.M. 
 
 272
 
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