T H .E Prefent Ruinous LAND-WAR, Proved to be a H r WAR, B Y Facts as well as Arguments; OR THE Opposition fully Vindicated. By a Lover of his Country. Vincit Amor Patria Si Nat lira ?iegat, facit Indignatio Verftim. LONDON: Printed for M. Cooper, in Patcr-nojlcv-r M D C C X L V. [Price One Shilling.] r x> Sfltf js [3 1 ?3 THE c/> CO >- and heartily purfue it, to become the happiejl and moft powerful Nation in Europe : And what renders this more deplorable, and more flocking is, that though fcarce any People ,'n the World are better acquainted with their rue Inter eft, never any purjued it lefs ; What uid we fay, purjued it lefs ! never any ran fo dia- metrically counter thereto. The late witty Earl ot'Rochefter, in one of his Poems on a miserable B Poetafler, 3068 jLO [4] Poetafter, has this Obfervation of him. As Jk it Jul Divers to the Bottom fall , Sooner than thofe who cannot dive at all; " So in this Way of writing, without thinking, " Thou haft a ftrange Alacrity in finking. And fure we are Mutatis Mutandis, never was this Obfervation more /r#/y verified, than it has been, of late Years, by thefe unhappy King- doms-y never did any People aft Jo inconfiderately, and without 'Thought ; never did any runfo head- long, upon certain and inevitable Perdition. It »wr uw, tf^wr W/7, nor indeed never can be, the real Interefl of Gratf Britain, to engage at all in a Land-War , and more espe- cially, not ^ Principals. It is mamfefi Ruin and DcftruStion ; it is running down a Precipice with oz/r £y« 0/W2 ; it is plunging de- liberately into a bottomlejs Abyfs, from whence there is no Return ; it is launching into a bound- It fs Ocean without Provifion, Stores, or M^w ; in fhort, it is intangling ourfelves within the Vortex of an all- devouring Whirlpool, which muft neceiTarily at once ruin our Commerce, and exhauft us of our moft ufeful Hands and Money ; and all this, without the lea ft probable Project, of onefingle Advantage to the Public k. We fay to the Publick-, for, that it will be fufficienth beneficial to fome private Purfes, we do not at all doubt. But, perhaps, we may be told, this Repre- . fcntation [si fentation of Things is Outrer le Tableau ; r*, ceeding all Bounds j and inflaming the Reckon- ing : We deny it ; bad as this Picture is, it is drawn too much to the Life, as we {hall find too foon, by dear bought Experience, it we perfift to go on, in the fame defperate and de- fkudive Track. For Great Britain to engage in a Land-War, is to the full as prepojlerous, as it would be in the Kings of Poland or PriiJ- fia, to aim at fitting out a formidable Fleet, 'and engage in a Sea-Fight, with the Maritime Powers. The former of thefe Monarchs has Domi- nions bordering upon thofe of our Sovereign, as Elector of Hanover ; and the latter, has Ter- ritories adjoining both to thofe of that Electo- rate, and the States General ; now, fuppofing this Contiguity of their Dominions, fhou'd oc- cafion any Difference between thofe feveral Powers, which could not be accommodated by Way of Negotiation; is it to be imagined, that either of thofe Princes, wou'd befo wrong- headed, fo blind to his own Intereft, to forego his natural Strength, and attempt fitting out a naval Armament, in order to bring their Ene- mies to Reafon? No Man living can believe they would aft fo ridiculoufly ; and yet even this would be as prudent and judicious, as it is for us to engage in a War by Land. In fuch a Cafe we are as much out of our Element, as a Fi{h out of the Water ; the Sea is our proper Sphere of Action, and to that wc B 2 ought [6] ought to confine all our Efforts, whether with Intent to ajfijl our Allies, or to annoy our Ene- mies ; this we ought to do if we were wife 5 and this we fiou'd do, if the Motives, to our embarking in this War, were entirely Britijh. The ftale Pretences of preferving the Ballance of Europe -, of fupporting the Queen of Hun- gary -, and of reducing the exorbitant Power of France, are now clearly feen through, by every intelligent and impartial Perfon in the three Kingdoms ; and known to be but mere Pretences, to difguife and cover other Defigns, not fit to be openly avowed. In Effect, had our Zeal, for the Preferva- tion of the Ballance of Power, been as real, as it is now pretended, how are we to account for our intolerable Indolence, Supinenefs and Inacti- vity, in 1734, when we fuffer'd the late Em- peror Charles VI. to be over-run, and deprived of all his Dominions in Italy, befides the irre- parable Lofs of all his Veteran Troops, without birring a Finger to help him ; though we might then have done it effectually, for one fourth of the Expence, it has fince cofl us on that Pretence ? If, indeed, our Zeal for this Meafure was really^ extraordinary, as is now pretended: Where was it, even before that Time, when we, in a Manner, compell'd that unfortunate Prince, to fabmit to the Intro- duction, of Six Thoujand Spanifj If r oops into tfufcany, and even carried them in Triumph thither, notwithitanding his earnejl Remon- Jlrances, I 7 ] [trances, Intreaties, and even arming to 0//>0/£ it ; becaufe he plainly fore/aw, (as indeed did every Man of common Senfe befides,) what bleffed EffeBs it would have? Where was it, (till before that, when we join'd in an Alliance with France, againft the Houfe of Auflria? But, perhaps, we may be afk'd, what is this to any Mar) now living ? We acknowledge the Conduct of that Minifter to have been fundamentally wrong, but he had the fupreme Direction of Affairs, and who could help it ? We {hail fee that prefently. Were not every one of thefe dejlruclive Meafures approv'd in P 1, even though the fatal Confequences, that would reiult from thence, were exprejly foretold? And could it have been poffible, for this wicked, weak, and corrupt Minifter, (who is now gone to anfwer for all his Treafons before a ^Tribunal he can neither corrupt, elude, nor e/capej to have fupported himfelf fo long in Power, without this their Sanction and Ap- probation ? And yet, were not many, of the mofl zealous Adopters of the contrary Meafures lately, the mofl zealous Ejpoufers of thoje ruinous Meafures, at that Time> What (hall we fay to fuch wE, confifient Conducl ! What powerful Eye-Salve, have thefe Gentlemen had lately to enlighten them ! Bat even this is not all : were not many of thefe Gentlemen the very Perfons, who effectually jkreend the Author of all this Mif- chief, from condign Punijhment - } and thereby made [8 ] made themfelves (as they may find one Day, unlefs they repent, to their Co/i) the Partakers and Accomplices of his Guilt, f If this is the real Cafe, and we defy the moft hardened, in Iniquity to deny that it is fo, can any Man in his Senfes believe, that this pretended Zeal, on a fudden, for rejloring^ the Ballance of Europe, which we had been inde- fatigabh, and, to our Shame be it fpoken, but too fuccefsfully, endeavouring, for above twenty Years to overturn, fubvert, and deftroy, was fincere and in earneft I Was it at all likely, that we fhou'd undo, at one Stroke, ,what we had been> long indufirioujly labouring to cffed ? ->n the contrary, muft they not plainly fee, s only a Cloak, to cover fome 'dtiLthdU 1 ; * (candalous to be avow'd? Whut ago might probably be, we may, perhaps, . $ in the Sequel We may then likewife f-e, the Pr*- ftwe otfupporting the Queen of Jfr»S*0'> and reducing the y*aw of France, was *?«*/# *»r Aianr, and only a M#, for fome unwarrant- able Scheme, or fome iniquitous Job, too Jhame- ful to be brought to Light. ' In (hort it is a iwc/? */2(/M^ and amazing Policy, which wou'd involve Great-Britain in $i JF*r *y ZW, on Account of any Quarrels ot cur Neighbours on the Continent ; it is a very difputable Point, whether we ought to engage, in any War at all, on their Behalf ; fince it is very certain, whilft the true Interejl of thefe Kingdoms is purfucd, which will of Courfe [ 9 ] make us an united People, let the IfTue be as it will, the conquering Power (whatever artful and defigning Men may pretend) can never hurt Great-Britain, whilft me continues Mi/lrefs of the Sea ; on the contrary, it is evident, me has the bejl Opportunity in the World, of increafmg and extending her Com?nerce, whilft her Neighbours are involv'd in a War, and worrying each other. This is a Piece of found Policy, whereof our prudent Neighbours the Dutch are well apprized, and which they have hitherto had Jujfcient good Senfe to put in Practice ; wou'd to Hea- ven, we had been wife enough, to follow their Example ! Thus far we have thought fit to premife, in general, by Way of Introduction, proceed we now to (hew more particularly, not only that the prefent ruinous Land War, was not begun, upon any Motives that were truly Britifi, but that it arofe from Views, altogether different from what was pretended, namely, to promote the Advantage of certain foreign Dominions. This we hope to prove, as plainly as the Na- ture of the Thing will admit, firjl, by (hew- ing that it never can be the true Intere/l of thefe Kingdoms, to engage in fuch a War ; and fe- condly, by demonstrating from the Manner in which it has been carried on, that neither the Intereft of the Queen of Hungary, or any of our Allies has been coniulted, nor vet the Re- duclion t io ] duttion of the Power of France profecuted, with any Vigour whatever. Fir ft, then, that it can never be our real In- tereft'i to embark in a Land-War, mofl evi- dently appears, becaufe as we are I/landers, and indifputably the greateft Maritime Power, and the greateft Trading Nation, in the known World, our natural and principal Strength mull neceffarily lye in our Naval Armaments ; from whence it confequently follows, that, unlefs we are as blind as Moles, and as wrong- headed as Sir Martin Mar-all, unlefs we have a Mind to give our Enemies a vifible Advantage over us which none would do but Ideots, and none wou'd advife but Tr rs, we ought to confine all our Efforts to the Sea, which, in reality, may almoft as properly be call'd our Element, on fuch Occafions, as it may that ot the Fifh. If then we are defirous, of profecuting a War in fuch a Manner, as may be moft advan- tavious to ourfelves, and moft prejudicial and moft deftruBive to our Foes ; in fuch a Manner as may fooneft reduce them to Reafon ; reftore our almoft ruind Trade ; retrieve our finhng Ma- mfaBures ; and procure us ufafe, honourable, and lafting Peace : it muft be by a vigorous Exertion of our Strength upon the Main ; which alone can effect all thefe ; and will do more it properlv conduced, towards re-eftabltfiing the Ballance of Power, and humbling the haughty French t !1 1 Fra^ Monarch and the Fary of Spain, in ^w 2^zrj, than all our Efforts by Land, even if fucce/sful, which is y£*rtt to be hoped, much lefs expeked, will be able to accompliih in ten. Another Reafon, and a weighty one too, why, we ought never to engage in a Land-War, upon any Consideration whatever, is, becaufe it drains us mojt of our moft ufeful Hands and Money ; and confequently mujt impoverijh and ruin us the /oo»{/?. In a Land-War, prodigious Sums imift be annually remitted Abroad, for the Ptf)' and Subfiftence of our Troops, very little of wfyieh, if any, ever returns again to thefe Kingdoms j whereas in a Sea-War almoft all the Money is fpent and circulates among ourfelvcs, infomoch that the Nation in general is very little im- poverifi'd thereby ; and, were it not that it lays our joreign Trade under fome Difficulties, by obliging our Merchant Ships to waii tor Con- voys, and expofmg them to the Danger of being taken by the Enemy, we might bear it for numberlefs Years, without any con fider able In- convenience. In Effect, it is notorious that a Land-War impoverishes us more in one Year, than a Naval one cou'd poffibly do in three \ and that, by cur hopeful Management of the prefent W r, it has already coll: us more, without being of the lea ft Advantage to our fives, or any of our Allies, than it" would have done, had it been carried on only by Sea, in ten Years ; nay, C even t 12 ] even our laft Jhameful and never to be jor gotten Campaign, where, to our eternal Reproach, we were forced to Jkulk behind our Intrenchments, whilft the Enemy were taking Town after Town, in our Sight, and under our very Nofes, was of more Expence to thefe unhappy King- doms, than, had it been well employ' d, and prudently directed, would havefecured us Foot- ing in the Spanijb Weft- Indies, and prevented the Return of thofe immenfe I'reafures, without which Spain could not have carried on the War one Campaign longer; nor could France have kept Bavaria, the Elector Palatine, or even Sweden in her Alliance ; in which Cafe, PruJJia mull: have been glad to have comply'd, almoft at any Rate. Again, another Circumftance, which makes a Land-War infinitely more ruinous to us, than one by Sea, is, that it exhaufts us more, as was before obferv'd, of our moft ufefu I. Hands, we mean, our able bodied Men. In a Sea En- gagement, let it be ever fo bloody, the Lofs of Men feldom or never amounts to more than two or three thou/and, which it will be always in our Power to recruit, without any great In- convenience, for fome Years ; but in the Land Service, it is quite the contrary ; Skirmifhes there are happening every Day, wherein, tho' they mould not come to a pitch'd Battle, many thou lands are loll ; not to mention Defertion, and Sicknefs through over Fatigue, and being forced to incamp in unwholefime Stations. Of Of this we have lately had two remarkable lnjlances, in the Armies of France, and Pruffia 5 which, without coming to any fet Engagement, were each of them almoft half cut off, in one Winter ; infomuch that neither loft fo few as twenty thoufand Men ; and at the fingle Battle of Malplaquet, the Allies themfelves though Conquerors, loft as many Thoufands, befides thofe who died afterwards of their Wounds ; fuch is the Havock and Defolation that is occa- fioned by a Land-War, even when fuccefsful ! And, (hall we though Ijlanders, and a Maritime Power, ftill prepofteroujly continue, to expofe ourfelves to fuch a dreadful Calamity ! How long, and feverely, did the poor Swedes /mart for this Folly in their objlinate and Jelf- will'd Monarch, the late Charles XII. who though he met with uninterrupted Succefs, for many Years together, and conftantly drove all his Enemies before him, till the Battle of Pultowa, had fo effectually exhaufied his Coun- try, of all the mojl ufeful Hands, that, upon his receiving that one fingle Defeat, he was irrecoverably ruined-, and his Kingdom was fo much drained, that (or want of Men to perform all thofe laborious Offices, for which the moft robujl alone are proper, the very Women were obliged to till the Ground, drive the Carriages, and ply in the Boats upon their Rivers ; info- much that it is much to be queftion'd, whether they have yet recover'd, the Ruin then brought C 2 upon [ 14 ] upon them, by that mijguided and unfortunate though truly heroick Prince. What a lively Picture, of the mo/l confum- mate Miftry, was unhappy Sweden, at that Time ! And what an ufeful and infrucJive Leffon, for all fucceedlng Monarchs, might be drawn, from the Misfortunes of that ill fated King, not to plunge their People into fuch aimoff irretrievable Difa/lers, either to gratify their Ambition, Avarice, or any other darling and unwarrantable Pafjtonl It is a prudent ^.nd talutary Maxim with us Britons, that our Sovereigns can do no wrong ; if therefore any prepofierous Me a fur es are pur- fued, and obftinately per fi fled in, even after wo- ful Experience has mown them to be funda- mentally wrong, the Advifers of them are refpon- fible for all the badConfequences that rcfult from thence; neither will it at all avail them, if call'd to an Account before a truly Britifh Parliament, to plead they did fo, in Compliance with any favourite Views of the Prince for the Time being 5 it was not in the leaft doubted then, nor is it at prefent, that the unfortunate Earl of Strafford, confulted the Inclination and Pafjions of his unhappy Mafter, which were to render himfelf abfolute (a Paffon, that prevails but too much in mod Princes !) when he propofed fend- ing for an Army from Ireland, to awe the Parliament ; and yet, though there was then no Law, that no Pardon under the Great Seal, fhould be pleadable again ft an Impeachment by the [ M 1 the Commons ; Nay, though there was no ex- prefs Law, to make his Crimes Treafon, King Charles, notwithstanding he ftruggled hard for it, found it impoffible to fave him, and was forced to give him up. That the precipitating us into a Land-War \ was a Meafure fundamentally wrongs will not be denied, we believe, by any true Briton j and mould ever an Enquiry be made, into the Mo- tives that occasioned it, we dare fay, they will be found not to have been Britifi -, to perfift: in it, therefore, any longer, than till we can get well out of it, would be yet worfe ; not but we approve of treating Sword in Hand-, and would not advife leaving our Allies in the Lurch, now that we have drawn the French Armies into Flanders, as we did laft Year, by our frepojlerous Conduct - } and as it was foretold we (hould. All we wou'd infer from hence is, if the Dutch will not come into the Alliance heartily , and totis Viribus ; if, by temporizing, they can provide for the Security of their Barrier, and of the Netherlands ; it will be abfolutely necef- Jary for us, to defijl from our military Opera- tions by Land, and convert our intended Af- fiftance of the Queen of Hungary into a. pecu- niary Aid-, (which will be of infinitely more Service to her, and of infinitely lefs Detriment to ourfelves,) whilft we make our utmofl Efforts by Sea, the only probable Way, of bringing our haughty and perfidious Enemies to Reafon. In [ 16 ] In Effect, what Advantage can we ever pro- pofe to ourfelves by carrying on a Land-War ; and efpecially in Flanders, where the French are well known to be the flrongejl, and almofl invulnerable ? The late Duke of Schomberg, who was an able Politician, as well as a Great General, ufed to fay, That to attack the French in Flanders, was like taking a Bull by the Horns-, meaning thereby that there was as little Hopes of overcoming the former one Way, as of fubduing the latter the other 5 and indeed the Experience of Queen Anne's War, when they fupported a ten Years War ; under one uninterrupted Series, of aftonijhing Lops and Defeats, is a convincing Proof his Grace was not much miftaken. It is an old, and generally a true Saying, that Experience makes even Fools wife , but, to cur Sorrow and Shame be it fpoken, not the rnoft woful Experience can make us fo : The Proverb fays, "The burnt Child dreads the Fire ; but we are fuch Children, that no Burning can make us dread it ; the Moment it is over, nay, before the Smart is quite gone of, before our Wounds are half healed, we are running our Fingers into it again. If the French were able to fupport fuch a Series of amazing Difajlers, for Jo long, even though a fevere Famine had likewife added to their Calamities ; and all this againft two fuch Generals as Prince Eugene, and the Duke of Uirlhorcvgh, that is, (without Difparagement to [ '7 ] to the Merits of the gallant Prince Charles of Lorrain, or the intrepid young Hero, who is now named to command our Forces,) againfl two of the greatejl Commanders many Ages have afforded ; if the French were able to do this, we fay, and at the laft, were fo little weaken' d, that upon theCeffation of Arms, and Separation of only the Britijb National Forces, they carried all before them, and recovered more in one Campaign than they had loft in three ; would any Briton, who is not a downright Lu- natick, or fomewhat yet worfe than a Limatick, confent to engage his Country again in fuch a deflruflive, and alUconfuming Meafure-, and that at a Time, when me was already Jinking under the intolerable Prefure of Debts and Taxes, oc- cafioned by ufelefs ftanding Armies, Raree-Shew Naval Armaments, and expenftve, wretchedly conduced, and worfe executed Expeditions ? No, it is very certain, no Man whofe Heart was* not altogether Germanized, and fleer d againfl the Miferies of his Fellow -Subjects, wouloMiave done this ; and it is as certain, if there are not too many of the fame Kidney in a certain Place, no Man will again be fuffer'd, to do the fame with Impunity ; it is even to be hoped, what is paft, is not altogethery^tf^ or forgiven. One would wonder, but that we have lived to fee Times, when we ought to wonder at no- thing, what could be urged, by its vile Par- tisans, in favour of fuch a dcftruclive Men Jure ; but it fcems they have found out, for the poor Creatures [ i8 ] Creatures muft fay fomething, though they de- pend more upon Numbers than Argument, that unlefs we find the French full Employme n t by Land, they will foon invade us with fuch a>- perior Force, it will be impofible for us to refifi them ; which is juft as true, as, to ufe a vul- gar Expremon, that the Candle ate the Cat : In Effect, it wou'd not be true, were even a Bridge , is broad s*nd jetti \% that of London, laid over the Barrow Seas j it would not be true, were they Ma/iers of all «fi Ports and Shipping in the jjto* Provinces ; whioh we hope they never will, becaufe, fhould they ever over-run them like a Deluge, as they were near doing in 1672, it would be our real Inter -eft to receive them with open Arms; as we have Land more than enough to fubfift them ; and they need leave the Enemy only a drowned Country 5 which, unlefs we were yet more infatuated than we are at prefent, (and that is fcarce poffible) it wou'd never be in their Power to make habitable. But fuptofing the Dutch wou'd fooner chooje Slavery With them, than Liberty with us and would ajtfi them to fubdue and enjlave us j fup- pofinz all the Princes of Germany would ftand by quieth, and fee them poffefs them/elves of all tL Netherlands i which is very unlikely even of the King of Pruffia himfelf, whofe Dorm- nions border thereon ; might not we, before anv fuch Event could happen, by a right Ma- nagement, dcjlroy all the Shipping of France f 19] and Spain, and would they then be our Supe- riors at Sea, even with the Ajjijiance of the Dutch ? Again, fuppofing thtmthem>in Poffejjion of all the Shipping, and Sailors of the three Na- tions, and that all were joined, and embark' & at Dunkirk, ready to invade us ; provided we are an united People, which we fhall foon be, if our real Inter eft is purfued -, what would all the Forces, they could bring over, avail, againft a People, who, if they were but tolerably di/ci- plined, could oppofe them in three Days, with above a hundred Thou/and of the braved Men in Europe ? Who, if they received one Defeat, could eqfily recruit ; and at the fame Time, by their Navy, render it almoft impracticable, for the Enemy either to recruit, or retreat. Unlefs, therefore, the Gentlemen, who fa often urge this Argument, believe we are quite abandoned by Providence, which, we confefs, we have deferved but too much ; and for which they may, perhaps, find fome weighty Reafons, within the gloomy Recejjes of their own Breajls ; (and in that Cafe nothing canfave us -,) we can- not fee any Caufe for this, to our thinking, prepojlerous Fear of Invafons ; and are, there- fore, very apt to apprehend, the Danger of them is only infifted on, to cover fome det eft able De- ftgn, that will not bear the Light ; and make us fw allow fome bitter Pill, jhat would not othcrwiie go down without abfolute Compulfion* Of this Pretence, our Grand Vizier, lately de- D parted, t 20] parted, to his own Place, frequently made an admirable life j whenever he wanted a Vote of Credit, an Augmentation of the Army or Navy, or any other Point otjimilar Importance ; and his worthy Succefor, though no Man living could make a greater Jeft of it, under his Pre- deceffor, took Care to tread exactly in the fame Steps, and for the fame hopeful Ends. That we are, at prefent, vaftly fuperior to both the French and Spaniards, by Sea, is con- feiVd by all ; is it not therefore in our own Power, by a vigorous Profecution of the War upon that Element, utteriy to difable them from ever becoming our Rivals, by deftroying all their Shipping, wherever we can find them ? Nay, is it not our Intereft, if we were wife enough to fee it ? Should we not have done it long ago, had we not been abfolutely the Reverfe, and quite infatuated ? By ruining their Commerce , ravaging their Colonies, and inter- cepting their Plate Fleets, which they would not be able to prevent, we fhould at once, render them incapable of carrying on the War ; put an End to their Breed of Sailors ; retrieve our own decay* d Trade, and enrich ourfelves. It is a commonly received Maxim, and, we believe, U will generally hold true, that a trad- ing Nation ought always, if poffible, to avoid a War ; and, more efpecially, a Rupture with Spain, was eve* deem'd contrary, to the real Inter eft of thefe Kingdoms j but, with Submif- fion to wifer Pleads , fince the Houfe oiBour- bon 9 [ 21 ] bon, have not only got firm PoJfeJJion of the Crowns of France and Spain, but there is the ftrifteft Union between the two Courts ; fince, by our incomprehenfible Policy, the Kingdom of the two Sicilies is now alfo veiled in a Branch of that Family ; fince, they have now almoft engrofsd the Commerce to the Levant and Tur- key, as well as Spain ; fince, by our Supinenefs and Negleff, and their own indejaiigable ln- duftry, they are not only become our Rivals, but have almofl fupplanted us in the Sugar Trade, to the inexprejjible Detriment of our Co- lonies ; fince, by the Help of the Wool they purloin from us, they entirely fupply Spain, and the Weft- Indies with Woollen ManiifaBures ; fince they have fupplanted us likewife, in a great Meafure, in the Guinea Trade ; and have artfully and perfidiou/ly worm'd us abfolutely out of the AJpento ; fo that the Mines of Peru and Mexico yield their Treafures, not fo much for the Spaniards themfelves, as the French ; and fince, in a Time of Peace, by the Cambricks, Brandies, Teas, Wines, and Silks, which they con flan tly find the Means to run in upon us, they draw from us an immenfe Sum yearly in ready Mo- ney j fince there is not the leaft Likelihood, that we fhall ever regain our Trade to the South Seas, of which the French will* foon be too firmly poJjejs y d; fince, we mould regain but very little of our Spanijlj or American Trade, even though we were to have a Peace witli Spain to morrow ; whereas, on the contrary, D 2 the [ 22 1 the French would carry on theirs openly, with- out Interruption, and in jull Security, which at prefent they cannot j fince we fhould fcarce recover that to the Levant, wherein they have already got too firm a Footing ; Thanks to our fenlelefs and wicked Introduction of the Spamjh Troops into Tufcany ! Since, on the contrary, (as it is not to be fuppofed, Spain will ever make a Peace without France) we fhould loje more than we mould get, by the clandeftine Trade they would then carry on with us, for their Cambricks, Silks, Brandies, Wines, and Teas they would run in upon us, and which is yet worfe, by the Wool they would fmuggle from us, as was before obferved 5 fince this, we fay, is the real Cafe between us, at prefent, however odd this Pofition may found, in the Ears of inconfiderate Perfons, we will venture to affirm, it is more the true Interefi of tneie Kingdoms in general, and even the Merchants themfelves, (thofe who traded to Spain, and the South Seas excepted) that we mould continue in a State of War with them, (fo that War is • carried on only by Sea) than in a State oj Peace Nay we will go yet farther ; and make no Scrupleto affert, whilft the Crowns of France Spain, and the Two Sicilies, continue united, as they are at prefent ; our Commerce, in Ge- neral, vAttpurifi more, under a vigorous and well-managed Naval War (if our ^— v, ^— ng and iV— v Offices &# free from Corruption 5 if [ *3 ] if Convoys are not delay'd, nor Ships to fcowr the Channel, and Irifh Seas wanting ; if Stores are timely provided -, if Provifions are wholefome ; and proper Order given, and z/z- trufted with proper Perfons j if all thcfe Things, we fay, are duly and honefily obferved, our Com- merce will fourifi more, we repeat it agai^ under a vigorous and i^f// managed Naval War, than under tf«y Peace, which mould allow an e^zz Intercourfe with thofe two Nations. The Reafon of this is plain -, in fuch a War, we mould gain more by our Raptures from them, than we could, by what Trade we fhou'd now carry on with Spain -, and as to that with France, we are much better without it, as the Balance has always been confiderably againfr. us, which, in that Cafe, muft conftantly be paid in Money. Again, by fuch a War, we mould not only dijlrefs our natural E?temy to the laft Degree, but, by ruining their Com- merce, and dejlroying their Colonies, which they cou'd hardly prevent, whilft we are fo much their Superiours by Sea, we fhou'd, in a great Meafure, retrieve our own, and make them jlourijh again as formerly. Nor would this be all ; for we mould thereby, at the fame Time, put it out of their Power, either to contend with us upon our own Element, or to think of invading us, with the leafi Pro (peel of Advantage to themfelves : We mould be able to keep their Men of War either ufelefs, and blocked up in their Harbours, or, if they ftirr'd out, we mould [ 2 4 ] fhould take or deftroy them ; and their Breed of Sailors, Shipwrights, &c. wou'd dwindle away by Degrees, till they wou'd be again reduced to the fame weak Condition, they were in, before the Reign of Lewis XIV. By a well-managed Defcent upon their Sugar Ifands, of which they are as tender as of the Apple of their Eye, we mould at once ruin them, and promote the Welfare of our own for many Years. This might be done, by only de- firoying their Ingenious or Sugar-Works, and carrying off their Slaves ; which they cou'd fcarce be able to hinder, nor, during a State of War, if we keep z good Look-out, cou'd wr be able to recruit. Befides, if we have zftritf Eye upon the Irijh, and prevent their fupplying them with Provifon ; (which they frequently do, by pretending to be bound to our Colonies, and then failing dire&ly into fuch Latitudes where they are almoft fure to fall into their Hands, and for which they never fail of being well paid ;) we may go a great Way, towards farving them. In Effect ; it is notorious, were it not for our Lumber, and our Provifon, the French Sugar Ifands cou'd neither fubfijl, nor carry on their Trade ; if therefore, we can but pre- vent the Irifi from fupplying them with the one, and our Northern Colonies from Jurnijhing them with the other, we may effedually ruin them without ftriking a Stroke. It is likewife well known, that the Spaniards in the Weft-Indies, cannot cannot fubjijl without divers European Com- modities j if, therefore, we can prevent, their being fupply'd therewith from France or Spain, which by good Manageinent, in a Time of War, we certainly may, they will of themfelves carry- on a clandejiine Tirade with Jamaica; which will be more to our Profit, than any Trade, they will allow us to carry on with them, in a Time of Peace. Nor is even this all ; for, by a proper Ufe of Gibraltar, and Port-Mahon, with fome farther Advantages, which, by ^.prudent Conduc7,we may derive from thence, we might render their Trade to the Mediterranean, and the Levant, not only precarious, but abfolutely impracticable : And by this Means, we mould, at the fame Time, in a great Meafure, retrieve our Turkey Trade, now almojl lojl, befides preventing the Junction of the Bre/l, and Toulon Squadrons. Another Circumftance, which would pro- bably follow from thence, and which may hereafter prove of great Moment, is, that, by the fame Means, we may pombly leffen that Infuer.ce, our natural Enemies have had, of late Tears, at the Porte ; fince, if we ruin their Tur- key Trade, which is entirely in our own Power, by having a ftriB Eye upon our Smugglers of Wool; (for which Set, by the Bve, of unnatural and abandon* d Mifcreants, no Punijhment, not even Death itfelf is too bad; as they con- tribute to the Jlarving of thoufands of their Feliow-fubjefts, and to the Ruin of their native Country [ 26 ] Country in general) and by keeping always a/»- perior Squadron, of clean Ships, in the Medi- terranean, to »* finifler Purpofe 5 unce, we repeat it once more, we mould thereby re- trieve on Levant, turkey, and Sugar Trade, befides our Newfoundland Fifiery ; ot whicn, though not the M ™^ we haV " n ?' mentWd a Word before, fmce we (hould confequently, thereby, render our ManufaBures at Home, and our Colonies 'Abroad flour ifloing; [27] fince it would rather enrich than impoverijh us, and, at the fame Time, greatly weaken and almofi beggar our Enemies-, fince, likewife, a Land- War produces diretily contrary Effecls, and both ruins and beggars us, without in the leafl hurting or weakening our Foes-, fince it is the very Meafure, our mod inveterate and im- placable Adverfaries, would ivi/h to fee us />«* z« Practice; and, had they tf«y Influence still over our Councils, which, we hope, they have not, would advife ; what lefs can it be thought, than an almo/t- judicial Infatuation, to delay the one, or perfift in the other, an Hour longer, than is abfolutely unavoidable ? Since fo many, then, zndfo great Advantages, muft naturally, and almoft neceffarily, flow from 0/zW£ Reaf'on : As the /, and would have W<* ^ P oor Ro & ue > even in ?&V. -'••'", »>r If /fe* tf Man as this, could find the Means, to flireen hi ml elf fo effectually, that not only no corporal Punijhment mould be inflicted on htm, but that, (though he was given up on all bides, by Friends as well as Enemies, even by his pro- Mid Advocate, the profligate Author oi Fac- tion deleted) he (hou'd be fufferd to dye in Peace, at leaf}, in his Bed, (for of his Peace we have /to* »fl*fc J and even to enjoy unmolefled the Fruits of all his **/>/»', Wickednefs, and torruptio* ; nay, not only fo, but that the Publication of the i?i?/>^ of his Tm*/^, and Mf [demeanours, mould be prevented ; and it one could be found, after all this, fluff ciently abandoned, to endeavour to canonize and al- moft deify him ; as was done in the ZWy ^< dvertifer, of March 20 J If M, we fay, was the Cafe, and lately too, of y«f* * Man muft not every one agree with us, that Dark Deeds will alwavs 0»» /fc Light , and that it is next toimpofjible, if the Offenders are of a *"*?« iW, todraa their iniquitous Practices io tai into *// £)- Of thefe two oppofite Methods, the former was infinitely the w^ eligible, and certainly ought to have been fnferrd by us, upon all D Accounts-, [ 35] Accounts ; and, had we been actuated by any Motives i that had been either truly Britiflo, or dictated , by a real Concern, for the Inter efi of the Queen of Hungary , or even for the Pre- fervation of the Ballance of Power, this Method would have been approved of, and followed. As it was not, this one Circumjlance alone, amounts to a convincing Proof, to every one of common Un- ' derftanding, to every one who does not wilfully J7:ut his Eyes againft the Light, that we never were ferious, or fncere, in either of thefe Pre- tences. What made the former of thefe Methods the mofi eligible, was, firfi, with Refpect to Europe in general, whofe Peace it would have fecured-, and that at the flight, Expence, of four Dutchies in Sile/ia j to which his P ruffian Majeity had an indijputahle Right, and for which he ofFer'd a very valuable Confide rat ion, though it might not, perhaps, amount to a full Equivalent : And yet, it is much to be queflioned, all Cir- cumflances con/iderd, whether it was not even more than a full Equivalent. However that be, this her Hungarian Ma- iefty must have comply' 'd with, had we told her plainly, we coitd net afijl her, upon any other Terms; and, it is certain, this (lie would have comply d with, had we defired it, and made it a Condition, Sine qua non, of c fupporting her at all'. ' It is der . ; :i, we fay, me would have comply* d with tk erms, ife, at our Dcfirc, ihc afterwards agreed to i F • ■ C 3& 3 niteh worfe, by a Ceffion of the whole nch Pro- vince of S*fc/&, without a«y Equivalent -what- ever ■ after which, to (hew how punctually Ze regard Treaties, any longer than they will fovea certain fun, (our own, we dare not, cur own, we -will not call it) we left her tn- famoufly in the Lurch. J It had been fo«2 expend forefeen ™ A fi re - ta U, by ««£«r^, that, unlefs the Grand Duke oTuflny, her Confort, was elected King of It Romans, before the Deceafe o hts Father- n-Law the Emperor CW&rVI. the De- putes about the Aujlrian Succejfion would fet *// Chri/lendom in a Ftaw: And, notwith- ftandina the Pragmatick SanBion, winch was calcu ated to fettle it entire, upon the female line in Cafe" of F«7«r, of Male IJjue ,n the Houfe oiAujlria, was £««■«*«<» by Great Britain, France, Spain, Mufrovv, and the Em- life as a Body, together with theDafc* and Dm- wr'k every one, of C— &»/? , was very /enfi- hl thefe G»fce*J G«ar*rt*«, would be regarded hut as Cyphers, by France, Spain, Saxony or Bavaria-! the lafl of which had never acceded thereto, and had P««**«, not altoge thet without Grounds, (as had Saxon, alfo, though (he had ™*«* them /™ T*f*£ for a £«/«»/ Advantage) to a confiderable Part therc- ° f This as was obferved before, having been foretold, foreseen, and apprehended, by all Ewq*> { it nt,Jfl antating, when a »« Breeder [ 37] flarted up, ivhofe Pretenjions were far from groundlefs, and, it was plain, if not immediately fatisfied, muft ferve for the Bafis to a Confede- racy, which would foon infallibly over- run all her Hungarian Majefty's Dominions ; is it not amazing, we fay, when a new Pretender ftarted up, and that one fo powerful as the King ofPruf- fia, that we mould not advife the Way o£ Accom- modation ; but fhould fpur that Princefs on, to repel Force by Force, and even offer to Jupport her therein flrenuoufly. It was the real Inter eft of Great Britain, to bring Matters to an amicable ljjue, between thefe two jarring Powers ; that the Queen of Hungary, having her Hands at Liberty, might be able to exert her whole Strength, if invaded, againfr. France, and Bavaria j which, however, in that Cafe, was not much to be apprehended, becaufe his P ruffian Majefty not only offer'd, upon the Ceffion, of even lefs, than what he claim'd as his Right, to advance a large Sum of Money, but to affift her with an Army of Twenty Thoufand Men ; nay, in Cafe of Nc- cefiuy, to jupport her with his whole Force ; and not only to become the chief Protector of her Houfe, againft all Pretenders, but to v.ic his in mod Intereft, to let the Grand Duke her Con- tort, upon the Imperial Throne, I lis Prufjlan Majeity went even farther than all this; for, to lhew he was really in Earneft, (which it were to be wifu'd, fome others, who made a greater Buftle, had been,) and that his 306s£(f AHloni r 3* i Actions fhonld be conformable to his Words, (though he had receiv'd a pretty abrupt Ante er, to call it no worfe, to* his Propofals, from a certain Court ; ) upon having Intelligence, that the Eledor of Bavaria intended, to invade the Auftrian Dominions, he fent that Prince No- tke in a Letter, under his own Hand, that unlets he defifted from his Defign, he fhou'd be orpos'd by an Army, of Thirty-five Thoufand Pruffiam, headed bv himfelf in Perfon. It was viftbly, then, the real Inter eft ot Great Britain, as was obferv'd before, to bring Matters to an amicable Iffue, between the King of Pruffia, and Queen of Hungary ; and that we did not do fo, is mofi a/lonijhing ; efpecially when we confider, of what Importance^ theie Offers were, to fecure the Tranquility ot Germany i and what fatal Confequmces, the n^ kino-' an Enemv of his Prufian Majefty at fuch a delicate' Juncture, might be attended Kith, to all Europe ; and this was yet the • more afiomjhing, becaufe there was no one o fort-fab fed, not to fore fee, that France would fake Advantage, of a * i^fan? between that ' Prince and her Hungarian Majefty, to compleat . the long-defired Ruin of the Houfe of ^«/Zr/* ; and becaufe both Spain and B*wrw, had acluai- ly put in their refpetfive Claims, to Part of the lite Emperor s Succeflion, almoft as loon as the Death of that Monarch was known. Every one, therefore, forefaw, that a War, between thefc Two jarring Powers, mud be fol- lowed [ 39 ] lowed with the mod dangerous Effe&s to her Hungarian Majefty ; and that no one good Con- fequence could pojjibly enfue from thence ; whereas, on the contrary, the PruJJian Mo- narch's Friendfhip at that ticklifh Crifis was of the greateji Moment ; and was indeed the only Thing, cou'd fave that unfortunate Princejs y from imminent De/lruBion, and prevent all Europe's being fet in a Flame. It was not only forefeen, but exprejly foretold, that our acting any other Part, than that of Mediators, by declaring againft Pruflia, would, in all Proba- bality, put the flni/Jjing Hand to her Ruin ; that it would throw his PruJJian Majefty into the Arms of France, and draw a powerful Invafion, upon every Corner of her Dominions. Thefe pernicious, and even dejlrucfive Con- fequences, of fuch a prepofierous Conduct, having not only been forefeen, but exprefv foretold, will it not be read, with the utmo/l Aftoniflment, and Indignation, by after- Ages, that a P 1 of G t-Br n, could be induced, and in- fluenced, by any Motives whatever, to concur with lb defperate a Meajure ? Yet more, that they fhould be induced to do this, againft a Prince, not only nearly allied in Blood to the pre- fent Royal Family, but who, cou'd he have made his Efcapc, without Detection, out of his Fa- ther's Dominions, had certainly married a Daughter of England ; who, even underwent Imprifonment on that very Account ; and, which is Jiill more Jurprizing, who, in Cafe of L 4o ] of Failure of that Family, is next Heir to the Crown of Great Britain, and may /"? A '> tho' not probably, be one Day, Sovn Kingdoms ? That they mould be induced to do this, we fay, when it not only tended vijihly, to involve us in a confuming Land-War, and to #&//* tf general Flame, throughout Chriftendom $ but, when we were already engaged in one by Sea, of which we had hitherto given but a very firry Account ; Nay, when we were groan- ing under a monftrous Debt, jlill unpaid, after above Twenty Tears Peace, and were ready to fink every Hour, under the intolerable Decay of our Trade, and Load of our Taxes ? It is therefore, man if eft, to every Man of Common Senfe, that this pretended Zeal, on a fudden, for the Queen of Hungary, and the Balance of Power, was no more than a Mafk, to cover /&/» fhould continue as inactive,, as our Troops by Land ; and, though we had been fome Years in a State of War with the Spaniards, that we fhould not dare to moleft thofe our profefsd Enemies ; but (hoxA&fuffer them quietly to transport, a formidable Body of Forces to Italy, to over-run, ravage, and pojfefs them- ielves of, all the Dominions, the Queen oijlun- gary had yet remaining in thole Parts. Such v/as the mighty Alliance, we gave that unfortunate Princefs, in the Height of her Diftre/s, after our repeated Promifes to fupport ^£\j her at all Events ! But let us, for Shame, * draw a Veil, over a tfranfacJion fo difionourable to thefe Kingdoms in general ; and (b dero- gatory from the antient Glory of the Britijh Name. Having got out of this ugly Scrape, at the Expence of our Honour and Treafure, into which it had been brought by its own infati- able Avarice, and the unexpected Difcovery of its iniquitous Schemes, the El — te, though part- ly dij appointed of its Views, was refolved to con- trive fome Way to lick itfelf whole : It had been put to the Charge of augmenting its Forces with Six thoufand Men, in Hopes of being re- hnburfed by the Spoils, of its Prufjian Neighbour; but this laudable Dejign being prevented- and de- tected, by the Queen of Hungary, and the C rina\ refuting to concur therein ; and the Ta- G blcs [ 44 1 bles being turn'd upon itfelf, by the March of Maillebois, and the Prujfian Forces, towards its Frontiers; fome other Method was to be thought of, for the Pay and Subftjlence of thefe now ufelejs Troops ; as alfo, to defray the Ex- pence, it had been at for Levy-money, and o- ther Military Preparations. It was well known, all thefe could not be obtained, from any other State, than Great Britain ; which had, often before, been made to facrifice her own Inter eft, to the Views of that wortbkfi Darling ; and it was neceflary to find out fome colourable Pretence, for loading the Nation with (o odious a Burthen, before it could be fuppofed, as much Dupes of H— r as we had hitherto been, that this would be con fen ted to even by us ; and for this, none could be devifed more fpecious, than to cover it over with the old Mafk, of an extraordinary Zeal for the Ballance of Power, and Re-eft ablijhme?it of the Affairs, of the Queen of Hungary. Well then, upon this flale Pretence, _ we were induced to (addle ourfelves, with the into- lerable Load, of Sixteen Thoufand H ns ; though it had been plainly feen/pH before,wheri we left that Heroine fo baftly in the Lurch, and abandoned her both by Sea and Land, how lit- tle all our mighty Profefjions were to be trufted ; and it was well known, how little they would be regarded, fliould the El— te, come a fecond Time into Danger; nay, though it was as well known, thefe Troops durft not ac~t off en- freely, [ 45 ] fively, in fhofe Places where thc r r they might be of moji Service to that Princefs, for fear of having their Prince put to the Ban of the Empire. This Difficulty being now got over, and thefe Forces taken into the Britifo Pay, let us proceed to obferve, how vigoroujly we went on ; and what mighty Feats we performed, for the Service of that Princefs. Firft, they were ta- ken into our Service, full fix Months before they could be of any Manner of Ufe ; and fe- condly, they were ordered to a Place, where it was apparent they could be of no Benefit ; in- ftead of being fent after Maillebois, to harrafs him in his Rear ; and prevent his difengaging his Countrymen, who were coop'd up in Prague ', and muft otherwife have been either all cut off, or made Prifoners at Dijcretion. This would certainly have been dene, Lad our Zeal for the Queen of Hungary, been as realm was pretended \ and it was the moft effe - tual Service could have been rendered her ; but it was very evrdent, by our contrary Con- duct, that all that was intended was, to indem- nify H r for her paft Expences, and pre- serve her worthlefs Troops from Danger. This was yet more manife/l, the / ■ i ; Z Ca paign ; when, though the Enemy unex t'axlCd us at Detlingcn, wheie.i - ; .. wa i rent, we never intended to attack them ; and tho , by the innate Bravery of our National Troops, we vigoroujly repulfed them, and might ha G 2 < ul U6] an entire VicJory ; which, at that critical Jun- cture, might have put an End to the War, at one Blow; our worthlefs Mercenaries refused to join us ; our own Men were call'd off from the Purfuit ; and the French fuffer'd quietly to repaj's the River Mayne, contrary to all the Rules of War, and found Policy ; when, having gain'd this Advantage, or rather, to call it more properly, having had this lucky EJcape, we made a precipitate Retreat, and even abandoned our ownfck and wounded to the Mercy of a defeated, and flying Enemy ; when, after this, we never fir uck, nor attempted, to Jlrike another Stroke ; and when, to crown all, we refufed to join Prince Charles, pafs the Rhine, and c" /cio we would reduce the French. Again, had Gz 1 56] Prince, for traverfing the Views of that El—te upon the Territories before fpecify'd ; which lay very conveniently for the long-defired Arron- dijjement of her Dominions ? Was not our im- politick and fiameful Defertion of that Prince, in 1734, contrary to our exprefs Engagements, not many Years before, when we became Gua- rantees of the Pragmatick SanBion, altogether owing to the fame Motives? And is not the prefent ruinous hand-War the hopeful ProducJ of our Inaclion at that Time ? After all this, no Man furely can deny, that it is righly named, when it is call'd a H -r War ; neither, if we periifr. therein much longer •, after feeing what blefjed Confequences it has had already, can it well be afcribed to any other Caufe. In fhort, after all our boajling of con- quering Alsace, and recovering Lorr a i n, af- ter all our prodigious Expences already incurr'd, what is the Sum Total, of our mighty Feats, in this fo-much-crf d-up , and fo-eagerly-profecuted Undertaking f Afk the Dutch, and they will tell us ; the Lofs of great Part of their Barrier ; and en- dangering the Reft. Afk the Queen of Hungary, fhe will an fwer j the Giving up all Silefia ; the Ra- vaging and depopulating Bohemia a fecondTime-, the cxpofing it to the fame Hazard, a ^/6/r d ; and to crown all, the drawing down the French Arms upon the Netherlands, and rifquing ,the Lofs, of all her PoiTe (lions in thofe Countries, which were before in no Danger ; befides a Probability, [57] Probability, of Tujcany, and all her Italian Do- minions, meeting with the fame Fate ; by the foon-expefled Junction of the Genoefe ; and our Fleet not daring, lad Year, to affift Prince Lobkowitz effectually, for Fear Saxony fhould make Reprizah upon that Darling, the helplefs El — te - y though it had been the Original Caufe of all thefe Calamities , and confequently, de- fer v'd mo ft, in common Jujlice, to faff 'er. But, fhall we go yet farther, and afk the King of Sardinia, of what Advantage this for- midable Diver/ion, fo-much-extoll'd, in Flanders, has been to his Majefly. Might he not reply, with great Truth and Ju/lice, demand it of my lofl Savoy, and my other dejblate Domi7iions ; demand it of my reduced Fortreffes, and ruined Sub] eels ; or, if that is not fufficient, demand it of the trembling Inhabitants, of my Capital, Turin ; who expect to be befieged therein, be- fore the End of the approaching Campaign. Might he not alfo juftly add, that all thefe Difaflers, might have been prevented, had our Fleet and Army exerted themselves la/l Summer, as was expected, after all our mighty Promifes, and Boa/lings. Such have been the bleffed Fruits, Such the w/V/vy Feats we- have perform'd, in a War, wherein we engag'd only through H r Views, Ambition, and Ava- rice ; and wherein, neverthelefs, all our Efforts, have been render'd ineffectual, by the Objlruc- tions raifed bv H r alone. In Effect, it is now no News any wn that, [ S» ] that, on the Rupture between the King of Pruffia, and Queen of Hungary, we were in- duced to act as Parties againft the former, ra- ther than as Mediators between them, and common Friends to both, in Compliance with the feljtfh Views of H r ; which were to ffh in troubled Waters, and lay hold of that Opportunity, to feize on fome of the P ruffian Dominions ; for which verv righteous Purpofe, that Court had increafed their Troops with 7 or 8000 Men. Thefe Views being fruftrated, by the King of Pruffia's throwing himfelf into the Arms of France, (to which Extremity our rajh Meajures had reduced him, as it was foretold they would,) there remained no other Remedy, but either to dijband thofe Troops, now become ufelefs, (in which Cafe the Levy-Money, and other Ex- pences, incurr'd upon that Head, wou'd have been altogether loft,) or, by fome plaufible Pre- tence, to prevail on us, (the well-known Bubbles of all Europe,) to take them into our Service. Service did we fay ? \Ye_rn^njntg_gurJPai l , 7^ for Service they never did us_gg£j_ on the con- U2ry, by the Preference given to them in every Refpeft, they rather appear'd as our Mafters, and we as their Drjidges ; intitled to nothing, but to take what Quarters they pleafed to leave us, and what Provijion we could find, afccr they were gorg'd. To return, however, from whence we have di^refs'd, the mojl fpecious Pretence, that cou'd D be be devifed for this Purpofe, was to involve us in a Land-War, at firft, as Auxiliaries to the Queen of Hungary, after which, it was eafily forefeen, we fhou'd foon become Principal/. and then it was prefum'd, thofe Troops wou'd' of Courfe, be /addled upon us for fome Tears This hopeful Scheme , then, to enable H—r tc Utck herfelf whole, at our Coft, was the real Motive to our engaging in this ruinous War- though coloured over with a pretended Zeal for her Hungarian Majefty, and the £*/**„? f iW- j and this it was, prevented our becom- ing Mediators between the contending Parties as in found Policy, and even in Consideration Of the Tyes of Blood, we were other wife oblig'd to have done. This we mould have done had we been actuated by Motives entirely Bril ttjh ; and had we aded thus prudently as al- mod any other People, in the like Circumftances but our/elves, wou'd, by fecuring the Kino- f PruJJia in our hiterejl, we fhould, in all Pro- bability, not only have preve?ited the Efufion of fo much Chriflian Blood, (of which we have now been i ndireffly, if not dirtBly, the Occa- sion) but, we fhould alfo have hindered the breaking out of the War in Germany, and all the Calamities that have thence enfued, Had his PruJJian Majeity's/^ Offers to our Court been accepted, (and no one good Real on can be given, why they were not ;) Prance would never have offer'd to fupport the Pre- ten/ions of Bavaria ; as knowing /oo «*//, bow I dearly \ [ °'° ] death ^1 her Attempts, to cam the War into the Heart of Germany, have always hitherto coft her ■ neither, indeed, would the late Emperor himfelf have dared diflurb the Peace of the Empire, had he been ajjured, of thereby w/A (?« the War, with *7g0»r, and '/?r/£* feme decifive Stroke ; in Order to put an "End thereto as" fdon as pojjible, and even, if an Opportunity offer'd, at one Blow ; it became likewife as manifestly the hit er eft of H r , (unlefs fhe cou'd obtain jomething more [ 6i 1 more or, at leaft, equally advantages, fomc ArronMement to her Territories, by a Treaty) to make only an empty Parade of Adion, but to protract, and jpin out the War, as long as was practicable ; in Order to keep fo large a Body of their worthlefs Forces, fo much the longer in our Pay : Now, let us proceed, to examine how we did aB 5 whether for the Advantage of G— t B—n, and her Allies or of the El—te ; and let this be the Teft, or Touch/lone, to try whether ffo Pretences, that vnretrumpt up, on a fudden, to precipitate us into this r»W0»J Land-V/ar, were w//y J>ttr- //»£, or bafe Metal \ The taking theie Troops «rt;«r Pty, ful l ^ Six Months /boner thanvf^oMJoJipfji^ O^^foTthem,^, of itfeif Mctent, t^J^f convince any one, not wilfully blind, wboje Ad- vantage was primarily confulted ; but, not to /# too much upon this, (though it wou d puzzle, we fear, fome of our wifeft Heads, to account for it fatisfcftorily) let us fee how vve behav'd the Summer following. Why, truly, , after beft Part of the Seafon for Adtion was fpent in ufelefs Marches, and Counter-marches, without any Defign, as was apparent by the Sequel, of coming to an Engagement we had brought our Troops into iuch a fine Scrape, that in all Probability, they had no other Remedy, but to ftarve, be cut in Puces, or furrender at Dijcretion. Fortunately for us, the Count 'ae bra- I 2 wo!.: s [62] monfs Courage got the better of his Conduct; and, upon his rajhly beginning to attack us, by the innate Bravery of our national Forces, he not only receiv'd a fevere Repulfe, as was ob- ferved before, but, had we followed our Blow> as by all the Rules of War, and found Policy, we certainly ought, the flying Enemy, whom we had driven back almoft to the River, muft have been precipitated therein ; the^ Refult^of which cooid not fail toJiave^eenjL_S/^/ De- Jf at > P er ^p s : Valmojl as'Jznal, and zfdec~ifoe too, as that at Hoch/te t. ~ Bat this did not agree with the Views of H —f> as it: mi ght have put an End to the War t0 ° loon > an d her Troops enter'd into our Pay, not to fight, but to eat 5 accordingly, they not only refused to c oncur_ with us injhe^attle^ ^tjvcnjojol n in the Purfuit ; and, left the Refolutton of our national Troops, mould of it- felf be fujficient, to >//£ afe /^r£, they were «0W off, and a S/# w put to all W^r ^faw, for that Day : And, what never happen- ed before, nor can be parallelled in all Hiftory the ViBors make a precipitate Retreat from a conquered Foe, leaving their jfc* and «*«» but, on the Profpecl: of an approaching Change of the M -y, and the Hopes, that it would be followed by a Change, not only of 285?»j but, (as was promifed by our former Jehu, as well as his Suc- cfthrs, and will always be, by artful and defgning Mm) by another, and better, of Meafures, it was laid afide for that Time. It was then intended to be addrefTed, to zMem- b'er of the old Minifterial Paction ; but there having beeri - another fines', providentially defeated, who have all united with the cthn-s, in a Body, as one common Band of M — re — s ; (Which is no more than what was natural, fince in Support of the fame laudable Views, and Schemes, and for the fame dif- i'fiterrfted Ends ;) it was thought proper 'to throw it into another Form, and publijh it now, fin.ee according to all Appearance hitherto, it may be equally fea finable at prefent ; and may ferve to open the Eyes of all, who are net abfolute- ly deta 'mined to keep them /hut, till they fall into INEVIT- ABLE Beggary, and confequently,RuiN, and Slavery. FINIS. A A 000 206 755 1