ON THE
.ETHICS OF NATURALISM
BY
W. E. SOELEY, M.A.
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ; AND EXAMINER IN
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXY
PBEFATOKY NOTE.
THE Deed of Foundation of the Shaw Fellowship pro-
vides that " it shall be in the power of the Senatus
Academicus of the University of Edinburgh to re-
quire the holder of the Shaw T Philosophical Fellow-
ship, during the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of
it, to deliver in the University of Edinburgh a course
of Lectures, not exceeding four, on any of the subjects
for the encouragement of the study of which the Fel-
lowship has been founded." The following pages
consist of four lectures delivered in the University of
Edinburgh, in accordance with this provision, in the
month of January 1884.
Since their delivery, the argument of the lectures
has been revised, and in some places enlarged. I have
also thought it better to modify their original form by
dividing the discussion into chapters.
W. K. S.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
PAGE
1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy, . . 1
(a) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view, . 1
(b) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy, . . 3
2. The inquiry into the ethical end, .... 5
(a) Fundamental, ...... 5
(&) Implies a new point of view, .... 7
(c) Distinct from other ethical questions, ... 9
(a) From the inquiry into the methods of ethics, . 10
() From moral psychology and sociology, . . 13
3. Scope of the present inquiry, . . . . 14
PAET I.
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY.
CHAPTER II.
EGOISM.
Definition of Naturalism, . . . . .20
Pyschological hedonism, . . . . .21
Vlll CONTENTS.
1. Its theory of action ambiguous, . . . .22
Eef erring to
(a) Actual consequences of action, . . .23
(b) Or its expected consequences, . . .23
(c) Or its present characteristics, . . .24
2. Ethical inferences from this theory, . .25
3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism, . 31
4. Possible objections considered, . . . .37
CHAPTER III.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.
1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State, . 41
2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to
Bentham, ...... 45
(a) Utilitarianism not a political duty, . . .46
(b) Nor a moral duty, ..... 47
(c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty, . . .49
(d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, . . 50
3. Exhaustive character of Bentham' s treatment from his point
of view, ....... 51
(a) The religious sanction (Paley), . . .53
(b) Limits of the political sanction, . . .54
(c) Uncertainty of the social sanction, . . .55
(d} And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the
social, ....... 56
4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, . . .57
(a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, . . .58
(b} Ambiguities in his proof, . . . .60
5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, . . . .62
(a) Recognition of sympathy, . . . .64
(b) The idea of equality, ..... 69
6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connec-
tion, ....... 73
7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological
hedonism, ...... 75
CONTENTS. ix
CHAPTER IV.
MORAL SENTIMENT.
1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the oppo-
nents of ethical hedonism, . . . .78
2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, . . .84
3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, . . .89
(a) As harmony of impulses, . . . .90
(b) As a separate sensitive faculty, . . .92
(c) As an internal law, . . . . .100
4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, . .105
PAET II.
THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
CHAPTER V.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MORALITY.
1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, . .107
An assertion of the unity of life, . . . .109
Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, . 110
2. The development of morality, . . . .116
(a) Historical psychology, . . . . .116
Its difficulties, . . . . .117
Its result, ...... 123
(b) Development of society, . . . .124
CHAPTER VI.
t
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.
Bearing of the theory of evolution, . . . .126
1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, . 127
X CONTENTS.
(a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their
origin, ...... 130
(b) Organic character of moral sentiments, . .132
Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, . 133
2. On egoism : relation of egoism to altruism, . . .134
(a) Social nature of the individual, . . . 135
(b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, . 141
(a) Continued existence of competition, . .142
()8) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, . 143
(7) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, . 143
(5) Weakness of altruistic feelings, . . .146
(c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, . .148
Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, . 148
Nor of ethical hedonism, . . . .150
3. On utilitarianism, . . . . . .152
Modification of the utilitarian method, . . .153
And of its principle, . . . . . .155
Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, . . 155
(a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, . . 156
(6) As a theory of consequences, . . .160
(c) As related solely to sensibility, . . .161
CHAPTER VII.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.
1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, . . .164
(a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws
of life, ...... 164
(b) From interpreting life by pleasure, . . .165
2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and
pleasure, . . . . . .167
3. Objections to this argument, . . . .168
(a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain,. . 169
(a) From the negative nature of pleasure, . . 171
(j8) From the facts of human life, . . .172
(b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to
pleasure, . . . . . .172
CONTENTS. xi
(a) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument, . 173
(0) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to/
misery, . . . . . .175
(aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious, . . 176
(66) The nature of volition, . . .177
(cc) The facts of human progress, . . .179
Individual progress, . . . .179
Social progress, . . . .181
The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation
to evolutionist ethics, . . . . .186
(a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, . . 187
(b) The conditions of pleasure and pain, . . .190
(c) Application of the theory of evolution, . .197
CHAPTER VIII.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by
the theory of evolution, ..... 201
1. Adaptation to environment, . . . .203
(a) As the end for present conduct, . . . 207
Opposed to progress, . . . .207
Does not fully represent evolution, . . . 209
(b) As describing the ultimate condition of life, . 210
Resultant absolute code, . . . .211
(a) Abstract principles of social relation, . * . 212
() Personal end only denned as adaptation, . 213
(7) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, . 213
(c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, . 217
2. End suggested by the tendency to variation, . . 221
(a) Prescribes self - development rather than self-
preservation, . . . . .222
(b) Standard for measuring development found in com-
plexity of act and motive, .... 227
(a) Antinomy between social and individual ends, 231
(j8) Psychological defects, . . . .232
3. Development or increase of life as the end, . . 236
Xil CONTENTS.
(a] Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, . 242
Cannot define life without an objective standard, . 244
(b) Objective standard : defined in two ways, . . 247
(a) Conformity to the type, . . . 248
Which can be reduced to
($) Abundance and variety of vital power, . 251
That is, to the subjective standard, . . 253
Summary as to the evolutionist end, . . . .256
(a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends, . 256
(b) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible, . 257
(c) No independent ethical ideal, . . . .259
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
1. Principles involved in theory of evolution, . . . 263
2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics, . 264
(a) The principles being treated empirically, . . 265
(b) No logical transition having been effected from
efficient to final cause, . . . .267
3. Difference between causality and teleology, . . .269
4. Reference to self -consciousness implied in evolution, , 277
(a) Attempt to trace the genesis of self -consciousness, . 278
(b) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action, . 283
5. The unity of self -consciousness, .... 284
(a) As making possible the transition from knowledge
to morality, ...... 284
(6) As determining the character of the ethical end, . 286
(c) As showing that the realisation of the end must be
progressive, ...... 291
1TY
.
THE ETHICS OF NATUEALTSM,
CHAPTEE I.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
IT is a common remark that a writer's ethical i. connec-
doctrine is throughout conditioned by his attitude with theo-
to the problems of theoretical philosophy. The
main lines of dispute in questions of ethics may
be regarded as prolongations of the controversies
which arise in metaphysics and psychology. The
Eealism or Idealism which marks a speculative
system reappears in its ethics, whilst differences
in the psychological analysis of mental states, or
concerning the relation of pleasure to desire, are
grounds of distinction between schools of moralists.
And not only are the special controversies of ethics
decided in different ways, but the scope of the (a)
whole science is differently conceived, as the spec- ethtomion
ulative standpoint changes. Thus, not for one JJJJJJfJf
school only, but for a whole period in the history view
A
"2 ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
(a)teieoio- of reflection, ethics was regarded as an inquiry
into the highest human good. Opposed schools
agreed in looking from this point of view, however
much they might differ from one another in defining
the nature of that highest good. At other times,
(&)jurai, according to the prevailing view, to investigate and
systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted
the scope of ethics controversies being carried
on as to the nature of those rules, and their source
in external authority or in the internal revelation
of conscience. Again, ethical inquiry has been
(c> empir- apparently identified with the analysis and history
of the moral affections and sentiments ; while a
purely external point of view seems to be some-
times adopted, and ethics held to be an investiga-
tion of the historical results of action, and of the
forms, customary and institutional, in which those
results find permanent expression.
These different ways of looking at the whole
subject proceed from points of view whose effects
are not confined to ethics, but may be followed
out in other lines of investigation. They corre-
spond to ideas which dominate different types of
thought and form different philosophical stand-
points. The first starts from a teleological con-
ception of human nature, as an organism con-
sciously striving towards its end. The second
assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments,
and is connected with the jural conceptions of
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 3
theology and law. The two last are concerned
to show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts
which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive
and historical methods. These different points of
view, however, are to be regarded as complement-
ary rather than as conflicting, although their com- to be con-
. nected by
plete synthesis must be worked out in the region philosophy,
of general philosophy, and not on purely ethical
ground. Philosophy has thus to deal with the
notions which determine the scope and character
of ethical thought ; and in this way it must neces-
sarily pass from the purely speculative to the
practical point of view. If it is the business of
philosophy to bring into rational order the material
supplied by experience, cosmical and anthropo-
logical, it cannot be without bearing on the func-
tion of man as a source of action in the world.
The question, What are the ends man is naturally
fitted to attain ? or if we prefer so to express it
What are the ends he ought to pursue ? is not
merely as natural as the question, What can a man
know of the world and of himself ? But the two
questions are inseparably connected. To know
man is to know him not only as a thinking but
also as an active being ; while to solve the problem
of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his
nature and of the sphere of his activity.
Much distrust is often expressed of metaphysics. (&> Ethics
But it is not denied that the philosophy whether n<
4 ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
to complete metaphysical or not in which our most compre-
hensive view of the world finds its reasoned ex-
pression, cannot neglect that aspect of things in
which man is related to his surroundings as a
source of action. Eecent ethical literature is itself
a proof of this fact. In its speculative develop-
ments, both realistic and idealistic, the philosophy
of the present day has made the endeavour to con-
nect its conceptions of the world of thought and
nature with the ends contemplated as to be realised
in the realm of action. Whatever difficulties may
be involved in the transition from the " is " to the
" ought to be," it is yet implied that the transition
requires to be made, not merely in order that
human activity may be shown to be rational, but
that reason itself may be justified by leaving
nothing outside its sphere.
We must make no attempt, therefore, to draw
a line of absolute separation between the first two
of the three questions in which, as Kant says, 1 all
the interests of our reason centre. The "What
ought I to do ? " of ethics is for ever falling back
on the " What can I know ? " of metaphysics. The
question of practice must accordingly be treated
throughout in connection with the question of
knowledge, If we use Kant's distinction between
speculative and practical reason, we must always
bear in mind that it is the same reason which is
1 Werke, ed. Hartenstein (1867), iii. 532.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 5
in one reference speculative, in another practical. 1
We are not at liberty to assume with Butler 2 that
"morality . . . must be somewhat plain and
easy to be understood : it must appeal to what we
call common-sense." Nor may we presuppose, as
Hutcheson did, 3 that it is a subject "about which
a little reflection will discover the truth." The
question must be looked upon not so much as one
of immediate practical as of scientific interest, and
reason is to be regarded as the only court of
appeal.
The form just quoted, in which Kant states the 2. The in-
problem, is not altogether free from ambiguity. tLethfcai
"What ought I to do?" may be taken to signify, end
What means should I adopt for the attainment of
some end presupposed, perhaps unconsciously, as
the end to be sought ? But it is evident, not only
that this is not what Kant himself meant by the
question, but that, as thus put, it necessarily im-
plies a further and deeper question. Not the di
covery of the means, but the determination of the
end itself the end which cannot be interpreted
as a mere means to some further end is the (a) funda-
fundamental question of ethics. It is only by m
misconception that this can be thought to be a
trivial question. To say, as a recent scientific
1 Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237.
2 Sermons, v., towards the end.
3 Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv.
6 ETHICS AND ITS PKOBLEMS.
writer does, 1 " that happiness in one disguise or
another is the end of human life is common ground
for all the schools/' is either to ignore what the
schools have taught, 2 or else to use the word
"happiness" merely as another name for the
highest good. But, even were it still the case, as
it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men
were agreed as to the name of the highest good,
and that the common people and the cultured alike
called it happiness, the difference as to what they
meant by the term would still remain. To say
that the ethical end is happiness is, to use Locke's
terminology, a " trifling proposition " ; for in so
doing we merely give it a name 3 and one which
the controversies of philosophy have surrounded
with confusion. That the end is happiness in any
definite sense, for example, as the greatest balance
of pleasure over pain, may be perfectly true, but
stands very much in need of proof. That happi-
1 W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur
Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2d ed., p. 21.
2 Not to mention Kant, the consistent opponent of every
eudsemonistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist
such as Mazzini (see Life and Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference
may be made to a writer like W. K. Clifford, who looks from the
scientific point of view, and yet holds that " happiness is not to
be desired for its own sake." Lectures and Essays (1879), ii.
121, 173.
3 "Auch dieser Begriff [Gliickseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss
formaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmung zulasst."
Zeller, Ueber Begriff und Begriindung der sittlichen Gesetze
(1883), p. 23.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 7
ness is the highest ethical end can be assumed as
true only when " happiness " is nothing more than an
abbreviated expression for " the highest ethical end."
A difficulty of a more radical kind meets us, at (&) implies a
,1 P . , -, -, . , . . . , new point of
the very outset of our inquiry, in the distinctively vieWj
ethical notion expressed by the word "ought."
Various attempts have been made to surmount or
circumvent this difficulty ; and some of these will
come under consideration in the sequel.. The very
notion of conscious activity contains the idea of
bringing about something which does not yet exist.
It involves a purpose or end. The notion " ought,"
it is true, means more than this: it implies an
obligation to pursue a definite end or conform to
definite rules, regarded generally as coming from
an authoritative source. In this clear and full
sense, "oughtness" or duty is a comparatively
recent notion, foreign to the classical period of
Greek ethics. The force and defmiteness belong-
ing to the modern conception of it are due to the
juridical aspect which the Stoic philosophy, Eoman
law, and Christian theology combined to impress
upon morality. But even the notion of purpose or
end implies a " preference " of the end sought : the
state to be realised is looked upon as " better " or
" more to be desired " than the existing state. We
may ask for the reason of this superior desirable-
ness ; but the answer must soon fall back upon the
assertion of something held to be desirable in it-
8 ETHICS AND ITS PKOBLEMS.
self. The question which we are always asking,
and cannot help asking, " Why is such and such an
end to be pursued by me ? " or " Why ought I to
follow such and such a course of conduct ? " must
soon lead to the assertion of an ultimate end.
the transi- This end, therefore, must not be sought for some
req^irel^- 11 ulterior end, nor desired as a means to satisfy any
vestigation; O ther desire. But it is still necessary to inquire
into the way in which the end, held to be ultimate
in a practical regard, stands related to the con-
stitution of man and his environment. And the
question to which I would draw attention, as the
fundamental problem of ethics, is, What is that
which men have variously called happiness, the
highest good, the ethical end ? or, more precisely,
How can a transition be made from the notions of
theoretical philosophy to the determination of that
ethical end ? No assumption is made, at starting,
as to the nature of this end, or the manner of
arriving at it. It may be a transient state of feel-
ing, or a permanent type of character; or it may
by its very nature defy exact definition, the idea
itself being perfected as its realisation is progres-
sively approached. In any case it requires to be
brought into connection with the ultimate concep-
tions of thought and existence.
This question of the ethical end or highest good
is thus fundamental in ethical science, and upon it
all other questions in ethics finally depend. But
\
V
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 9
it is easy to see that it does not cover the whole
field, and that the other points of view already
referred to have a legitimate application. Ethics
has not only to determine the end, but to apply it
to practice, and so to decide as to what is right or
wrong in particular actions, and virtuous or vicious
in character. And, in addition to the two questions
thus implied the question as to the ethical end,
and that as to the application of it to practical
affairs there is another department of inquiry
which has had a place assigned to it in most ethi-
cal systems, and which has a right to be regarded
as belonging to ethics. We may investigate the
place, in the individual and the community respec-
tively, both of the sentiments and ideas and of the
social institutions and customs through which mor-
ality is manifested; and this inquiry covers the
twofold ground of what may be called moral psy-
chology and moral sociology.
Of these three questions, the first forms the sub- (c) distinct
. . , ,, T from other
ject oi inquiry in the following pages. It seems to ethical
me that a great part of the obscurity which sur- que '
rounds ethical argument is due to confounding these
different questions. It is true that no one of them
is without bearing on the others ; but it is none the
less necessary, in discussing any one of them, to
keep its distinctness from those others well in view.
In inquiring into the foundation on which the ethi-
cal end is based, I do not intend to develop a code
10
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
of ethics.
of rules for practical conduct or a theory of human
virtue ; nor shall I attempt to trace the origin and
nature of moral sentiments and ideas, or of the
social institutions and customs connected with mor-
ality. If these subjects have to be introduced at all,
it will be only in so far as they may be thought to
decide, or tend to decide, the question more imme-
diately in view.
(a) from in- Thus it forms no part of the present inquiry to
th^methods follow u ^ the application to conduct of different
ethical ends, or to exhibit the different practical
systems to which different ends naturally lead. It
might seem indeed, at first sight, as if the develop-
ment of their practical consequences might solve
the question as to the nature of the ends them-
selves. If we assume certain possible and primd
facie reasonable ethical ends, and then see what
codes of morality they will yield, surely (it may be
thought) that one which affords the most consist-
ent and harmonious code for the guidance of life
will be the end to be sought in preference to
all others. But in order that the criticism of what
Professor Sidgwick has called the methods of ethics
may be able to answer the question as to the end
or principle of ethics, certain conditions must first
be complied with. In the first place, it is necessary
^at the ends or principles whose applications to
conduct are to be examined must not be uncritic-
ally accepted from the fluctuating morality of com-
Limitation
inquiry
from
ing an log-
ical alter-
natives,
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 11
mon- sense nor from the commonplaces of the
schools, but must be shown to be "alternatives
between which the human mind" is "necessarily
forced to choose when it attempts to frame a com-
plete synthesis of practical maxims, and to act in a
perfectly rational manner." 1
But although this requisite is complied with, it (66) from
will still remain possible, in the second place, that ^TLif-con-
two or more of the assumed principles may yield Jjj|*J* co<
systems of practical rules perfectly self-consistent, possible,
and yet inconsistent with one another. 2 It would
be very hard indeed to show that both the theory
of Egoistic Hedonism, and what is generally called
Utilitarianism, do not succeed in doing so : and thus
the examination of methods is not of itself suffi-
cient to settle the question of the end of conduct.
And since to quote Mr Sidgwick 3 it is " a fun-
damental postulate of ethics that either these
methods must be reconciled and harmonised, or all
but one of them rejected," it follows that the criti-
cism of methods leads naturally up to an indepen-
dent criticism of principles, unless indeed it can be
shown that one method only yields a consistent
code of practical rules.
1 Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. 5, 3d ed., p. 11.
2 " The rule, * Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple,
and, in a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and
reasonably as the rule, * Love your neighbour as yourself.' "
Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.
3 Methods of Ethics, I. i. 3, p. 6.
12 ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
(cc) from its Even in this case, however, if it led to the adop-
assumption ,
that the true tion or the end in question, it must be borne in
gtfe pe?* min(i tnat th 6 postulate would be implied that the
fectiycon- ^rue ethical end must be able to yield a consistent
sistent rules.
and harmonious system of rules for practical life.
"Without altogether denying this postulate, it yet
seems to me that it stands in need of qualification.
For in different circumstances, and at different
stages of individual and social development, the
application of the same ethical end may naturally
produce different and conflicting courses of conduct.
We must not start with any such assumption as
that the rationality of the end consists in some sort
of mathematical equality which ignores alike the
different environment with which one age and an-
other surround different generations, and the differ-
ent functions which one individual and another
have to perform in the social whole. We must
leave open the possibility that what is right now
may be wrong in another age ; we must remember
that everybody may not count for one, and that
some people may count for more than one; we
must admit that we may have sometimes to do to
others what we would not that others should do
to us. The only consistency we have a right to
demand must leave room for such a variety of differ-
ent conditions as to be, by itself, a very insecure
guide.
From the difficulty of complying with the above
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 13
*
conditions, it seems practically impossible for the
criticism of ethical methods to decide the question
of the ethical end. Even if the application to con-
duct of every important end has been taken account
of, we are met with the difficulty that two or more
mutually antagonistic though self-consistent prac-
tical codes may probably have been developed,
while we are not even justified in assuming that
inability to yield a system which will fit the com-
plex circumstances of life in a perfectly harmonious
manner is sufficient ground for rejecting an end
shown in some other way to be reasonable.
The last department of ethics referred to that (/s) distinct
.,-.., from moral
which has to do with the origin and nature ot moral psychology
sentiments and social customs has a bearing on
the question of the end of conduct in some respects
more important than the investigation of ethical
methods. For, whereas the latter expressly assumes
certain ends as primd facie reasonable, the former
inquiry, on the contrary, is now frequently under-
stood to be able, without presupposing any ethical
relations whatever, to trace the way in which, from
primitive feelings and customs, morality itself has
been evolved. The psychological side of ethical
inquiry has always had an important place with
English moralists. At times, indeed, the ques-
tion of the " moral faculty " has excited so much
interest as to divert attention from the nature of
morality itself. Moral truth has been supposed to
14 ETHICS AND ITS PKOBLEMS.
be something known and indisputable, the only
question being how we came to know it. But the
psychology of ethics, reinforced by the knowledge
sociology gives of the development of morality,
rises now to larger issues. It attempts to show
the genesis of the moral from the non-moral, to
account thus for the origin of ethical ideas, and
even to determine what kinds of ends are to be
striven after. In this way, a theory of the origin
and growth of moral sentiments and institutions is
made to render important help to more than one
of the theories which will fall to be considered in
the sequel.
3. Present The present Essay has to inquire into the way in
limited which we may determine what the end of human
conduct is, into the basis of ethics, therefore. But
I do not propose to offer an exhaustive investiga-
tion of all the theories which have been or may be
started in solution of the problem. On the con-
trary, I will begin by excluding from the inquiry
all theories which seek the basis of ethics in some-
thing outside the constitution of man as a feeling
and reasoning agent : l not because I contend that all
1 The difference between Aristotle and Kant in ethics is some-
times expressed (see Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitrage zur Phil.,
iii. 171 ff.) as if it consisted in the fact that the former in-
vestigated human nature in order to find its re'Aos, whereas the
latter sought the standard of action in a transcendental ground.
There is reason for this distinction in Kant's manner of state-
ment. But both may be regarded as investigating human nature.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 15
such theories are primd facie unreasonable, but be-
cause it is at any rate the more obvious course to to theorie
seek to determine the function of an organism by on P the dmi
studying its inner constitution, than by having re- JSSnu 1
gard to something which is external to it, and does
not act upon and modify it as a necessary part of
its environment. It is only when this method has
been tried and has failed that we should seek out-
side us for some guide as to the part we ought to
play in the universe. Tor this reason I shall not
take into consideration the views of the basis of
ethics which find it in positive law either divine
or human, except in so far as they are shown to
follow from the nature of man. It is not necessary
for me to deny that the source of all moral obliga-
tion may be the will of God, or the commands of
the sovereign, or the opinion of society, and that
the highest moral ideal may be obedience to such a
rule. But theories of this kind make ethics merely
an application of positive theology, or of legislation,
or of social sentiment, and seem only to have an
Their difference rather consists in the different position and func-
tion assigned to reason in man. It is because Kant is for the
moment looking upon reason as something distinct from human
nature that he says that " the ground of obligation is to be sought,
not in the nature of man or in the circumstances in the world in
which he is placed, but cu priori simply in the notions of pure
reason" (Werke, iv. 237). His "metaphysical" view of ethics,
however, follows from the rational constitution of the human
subject and his experience, and does not depend on any source
that really " transcends " the reason of man.
16 ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
appropriate place when we have failed to find an
independent basis for action.
The question which remains to be put may be
expressed in these terms : Can we find in human
nature (taken either alone or in connection with its
environment) any indications of the end of human
conduct, or, in other words, of the principle on
which human beings " ought " to act ? and if so, in
what direction do these indications point, and what
is their significance ? The answer to this question
will thus necessarily depend on the view we take
of the constitution of man and his relation to his
environment. And I purpose to bring this dis-
cussion within the necessary limits by consider-
ing the ethical consequences of one only of the
two views into which philosophical opinion is
divided.
and here to Now the fundamental principle of division in
Naturalism, philosophical opinion lies in the place assigned to
reason in human nature. 1 According to one theory,
man is essentially a sensitive subject, though able
to reason about his sensations that is, to associate,
compound, and compare them. He is supposed to
be built up of sense-presentations associated with
feelings of pleasure and pain. Recipient of external
impressions which persist in idea and are accom-
1 Opinion is also divided according to the place assigned to
reason in the world, this principle of division corresponding
almost exactly with the former.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 17
panied by pleasure or pain on his part, and thus
followed by other ideas and impressions, man's
mental constitution is explained without attrib-
uting to reason any spontaneous or productive
function. 1 The other view differs from this in as distm-
attributing spontaneity to reason making it, in ? r u m Ration-
one way or another, the source of forms of thought, al ethics>
principles, or ideas. The former may be called the
Naturalistic, the latter the Eationalistic view of
man : from that follows a Naturalistic or Natural
ethics, from this a Eationalistic or Eational ethics.
Into both these theories, in a theoretical as well as
in an ethical aspect, the historical turn of thought
which has characterised recent inquiry has intro-
duced a profound modification. On the basis of Naturalism
Naturalism, we may either look "upon man as an vIduTiiTtic
individual distinct from other individuals, as was
done by Epicurus and Hobbes and the materialists
of the eighteenth century, or we may consider the
race as itself an organism, apart from which the orhistoricai.
individual is unintelligible, and look upon human
nature as having become what it now is through a
long process of interaction between organism and
environment, in which social as well as psychical
and physical facts have influenced the result. This
is the view to the elaboration of which Comte and
1 Thus it is the object of Helve'tius's first discours " De 1'es-
prit " to prove that physical sensibility and memory are the only
productive causes of our ideas.
B
18 ETHICS AND ITS PKOBLEMS.
Darwin and Spencer have in different ways con-
tributed. 1 What makes the historical method of
importance philosophically, is not the mere fact
that it traces a sequence of events in time, but the
fact that, by doing so, it is able to look upon each
link in the chain of events as necessarily con-
nected with every other, and thus to regard as
a system or, rather, as an organism what pre-
vious empirical theories had left without any
principle of unity.
Rationalism A similar movement of thought has introduced
viduSiBtic" a like modification into the nationalistic theory.
According to older doctrines, the individual rea-
son is mysteriously charged with certain a priori
principles which are to us laws of knowledge and
of action ; whereas the form of Eationalism which
is now in the ascendant resembles the theory of
natural evolution in this, that as the latter finds
the race more real than the individual, and the
individual to exist only in the race, so the former
or universal- looks upon the individual reason as but a finite
manifestation of the universal reason, and attempts
to show the principles or constitutive elements of
this universal reason or consciousness in their
logical or necessary connection leaving open to
empirical investigation the way in which they
have gradually disclosed themselves in the in-
1 Comte, by connecting ethics with biology ; Darwin and Spen-
cer, by the doctrine of evolution.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS. 19
dividual human subject, and in the expression of
the collective life of the race. Thus, as Natural
Ethics is divided into an individualistic and an
historical view, a similar distinction might be
made in Eational Ethics, though in this case it
would be more difficult to follow out the dis-
tinction in detail; and many ethical systems can-
not be said to have kept consistently either to one
side of it or to the other.
In the following discussion I shall investigate
the ethical theory which is founded on the basis of
Naturalism working out and criticising in some-
what greater detail that form of the theory which,
from the agreement it lays claim to with the results
of modern science, plays so important a part in
contemporary philosophical thought.
20
PAET I.
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOKY,
CHAPTEE II.
EGOISM.
Definition of IT is difficult to give an exact definition or even
description of what I have called the " natural "
view of man. Perhaps it may be best defined,
negatively, as the view which denies to reason any
spontaneous or creative function in the human
constitution. For this definition, if it still leaves
the positive description wanting, will at least
make the classification into " natural " and " ra-
tional" exhaustive and mutually exclusive. At
the same time it is to be noted that, on the theory
of Naturalism, reason is not supposed to be ex-
cluded from all share in determining questions of
conduct or the choice of ends. It would, indeed,
EGOISM. 21
be impossible to have even the pretence of an
ethical theory without a certain use of reason.
But its function, in this case, is limited to the
merely formal one of bringing different presenta-
tions (or objects) and feelings into connection,
and comparing the different states of mind thus
formed with one another, not with a reason-given
standard.
Since the function of reason is thus restricted,
and its competency to supply an end for, or prin-
ciple of, action is denied, we must seek this end
either in the feelings of pleasure and pain which
accompany both sensory and motor presentations,
perceptions, that is to say, and actions, or in the
more complex, or apparently more complex, emo-
tions of the mind. And the latter may either be
themselves reducible to feelings of pleasure or pain
accompanying presentations directly pleasurable or
painful, and thence transferred by association to
other presentations, or they may be regarded as
somehow motives to action which may be or ought
to be followed on their own account. The Indi-
vidualistic Theory, therefore, is not necessarily
hedonistic. It admits of a twofold view of the
" natural " man : one which looks upon him as in
essence a pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding animal;
another which regards him as having a variety of
impulses, some of which are not directed to his own
pleasure or avoidance of pain.
22 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
i. its theory The former view psychological hedonism, as it
is called claims to be an exhaustive analysis of
the motives of human conduct, perfectly general
indeed, but yet valid for every case of action. It
denies the possibility of a man acting from any
other principle than desire of pleasure or aversion
from pain. The theory is, that it is a psychological
law that action is motived by pleasure and pain,
and that nothing else has motive-power over it.
If, then, one pleasure (or avoidance of pain) is
chosen in preference to another, it must be either
by chance, an alternative which has no ethical
significance no significance, that is, for the guid-
ance of voluntary conduct, or because the one
course promises, or seems to promise, th6 attain-
ment of a greater balance of pleasure than the
other, or is actually at the time more pleasant than
that other. Thus the view that pleasure is the
only motive of human action is really identical, for
ethical purposes, with the theory loosely expressed
in the law that action follows the greatest pleasure. 1
ambiguous, I say " loosely expressed"; for the law as thus
stated really admits of three quite different in-
1 Meaning by " greatest pleasure," greatest balance of pleasure
over pain, and thus inclusive of the meaning "least pain." It is
the expression in terms of feeling of the statement sometimes
preferred, that " action follows the line of least resistance " a
statement to which no exception can be taken, nor any import-
ance allowed, till it be translated into definite psychological
language.
EGOISM. 23
terpretations, not always distinguished with the referring to
precision which such subjects require.
(a) In the first place, the law might mean that (a) actual
action always follows the course which, as a matter quences of
of fact, will in the long-run bring the greatest actlon>
balance of pleasure to the agent. It is evident
that there is no ground in psychology for main-
taining this view. Yet it is a fair interpreta-
tion of the "law" of psychological hedonism, as
commonly stated ; and it is at least an admissible
supposition that this meaning of the phrase has
not been without effect upon the uses to which
the law has been put by some of its upholders.
The second interpretation of the law namely (5), or (&> its ex-
that action is always in the direction which seems sequences)
to the agent most likely to bring him the greatest
balance of pleasure, whether it actually brings it or
not is the sense in which it appears to have been
most commonly taken when expressed with any
degree of accuracy. It is in this sense that in
language which ascribes greater consistency to
men's conduct than it usually displays " interest "
is asserted by the author of the 'Syt&me de la
nature ' to be " the sole motive of human action." l
1 " Ainsi lorsque nous disons que Vinteret est I 'unique mobile
des actions humaines, nous voulons indiquer par la que chaque
homme travaille a sa maniere a son propre bonheur, qu'il place
dans quelqu'objet soit visible, soit cache", soit re"el, soit imagin-
aire, et que tout le systeme de sa conduite tend a 1'obtenir."
Systeme de la nature (1781), i. 268.
24 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
The same view is adopted by Bentham ; l and both
James Mill and John Stuart Mill identify desire
with pleasure, or an " idea " of pleasure, in terms
which are sufficiently sweeping, if not very care-
fully weighed ; 2 while the will is said to follow
desire, or only to pass out of its power when
coming under the sway of habit. 3 Still another
meaning may, however, be given to the " law " of
psychological hedonism, according to which the
doubtful reference to the manifold pleasures and
pains, contemplated as resulting from an action, is
or (c) its got rid of, and (c) the agent is asserted always to
1 " On the occasion of every act he exercises, every human
being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his
view of the case taken by him at the moment, will be in the
highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness."
Constitutional Code, book i. 2 ; Works, ix. 5. The continued
existence of the species is, Bentham thinks, a conclusive proof of
this proposition.
2 Thus, according to James Mill, " the terms ' idea of pleasure '
and * desire ' are but two names ; the thing named, the state of
consciousness is one and the same. The word Desire is com-
monly used to mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation when the
future is associated with it." Analysis of the Phenomena of the
Human Mind, J. S. Mill's edit., ii. 192 ; cf. Fragment on Mac-
kintosh (1835), p. 389 f. To the same effect J. S. Mill says :
" Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and
thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or
rather two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of lan-
guage, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact."
Utilitarianism, 7th ed., p. 58.
3 " Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion
of its parent only to come under that of habit." Utilitarianism,
p. 60.
EGOISM. 25
choose that action or forbearance which is actually present
most pleasant, or least painful, to him at the time istics.
taking account, of course, of imaginative pleasures
and pains, as well as of those which are imme-
diately connected with the senses. It is in this
interpretation of its law that psychological hedonism
seems to be most capable of defence, and in this
sense it has been more than once stated and
defended. 1
The ethics of the form of Naturalism which is 2. Ethical
inferences
now under examination must be inferred from the from this
" law " that human action follows the greatest
1 Thus Jonathan Edwards says : " When I say that the Will is
as the greatest apparent good, or (as I have explained it) that
volition has always for its object the thing which appears most
agreeable, it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and
needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate
object of the act of volition, and not some object to which the
act of will has only an indirect and remote respect. " On the
Freedom of the Will, part i. 2 ; Works, i. 133. The matter
is put still more clearly by the late Alfred Barratt : " Action
does not always follow knowledge. Of course not : but the doc-
trine [Hedonism] does not require that ib should ; for it says, not
that we follow what is our greatest possible pleasure, or what we
know or ' think ' to be so, but what at the moment of action
is most desired." Mind, vol. ii. 173 ; cf. Physical Ethics, p. 52 ff.
So Mr Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 47 : " It is more accurate
to say that my conduct is determined by the pleasantest judg-
ment, than to say that it is determined by my judgment of what
is pleasantest." The negative side of the same view was ex-
pressed by Locke in his doctrine that action is moved by the
most pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi. 29, 31), and distinguished
by him from the former view (b), that the " greater visible good "
is the motive (II. xxi. 35, 44).
26 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
pleasure, in one or other of the above meanings
which that law admits of. The law is the datum or
premiss from which we are to advance to an ethical
conclusion. The "right" is to be evolved from
the pleasurable ; and the pleasurable, consequently,
cannot be made to depend upon the right. It is
certainly true of the conduct of most men, "that
our prospect of pleasure resulting from any course
of conduct may largely depend on our conception
of it as right or otherwise." x But this presupposes
that there is a right independent of one's own
pleasure, and therefore does not apply to an ethics
based on the simple theory of human nature put
forward by psychological hedonism. -
(a) m its first It is scarcely necessary to discuss the first alter-
meaning, , / \ i-i-j 11 i
native (a), as no psychologist would seriously main-
tain it. A society composed of men constituted
in the way it supposes men to be constituted, would
be a collection of rational egoists, omniscient in
all that concerned the results of action, and each
adopting unerringly at every moment the course
of conduct which would increase his own pleasure
the most. The conduct of any member of such a
society could only be modified when and would
always be modified when the modified conduct
actually brought pleasurable results to the agent :
never so as to make him prefer the public good
(6) in its to his own. The second alternative (b) admits of
1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 40.
EGOISM. 27
such modification taking place only when it seems second
to the individual that this modified action will m
produce a greater balance of pleasure or smaller
balance of pain than any other course of action.
Under this theory an individual might indeed
prefer the public good or another man's good to
his own, but only through his being deceived as to
the actual results of his course of action. Ethics
as determining an end for conduct is put out of
court ; though the statesman or the educator may
modify the actions of others by providing appro-
priate motives. If the " two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure," " determine what we shall do,"
it is hardly necessary for them also " to point out
what we ought to do." l The end is already given
in the nature of action, though an enlightened
understanding will teach men how the greatest
1 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap, i., Works,
i. 1. With this statement may be compared the assertion of
Helve'tius : " II semble que, dans 1'univers moral comme dans
1'univers physique, Dieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tous
ce qui a e'te'. ... II semble qu'il ait dit pareillement a
Thomme : . . . Je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la
douleur : 1'un et 1'autre veilleront a tes pense'es, a tes actions ;
engendrerpnb tes passions, exciteront tes aversions, tes amities,
tes tendresses, tes fureurs ; allumeront tes de'sirs, tes craintes, tes
espeYances, te de'voileront des ve'rite's ; te plongeront dans des
erreurs ; et apres t' avoir fait enfanter mille systemes absurdes et
diffe'rens de morale et de legislation, te decouvriront un jour les
principes simples, au deVeloppement desquels est attache* 1'ordre
et le bonheur du monde moral." De 1'esprit, III. ix, QEuvres
(ed. of 1818), i. 293.
28 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
balance of pleasure may be obtained. We can
only get at a rule prescribing an end by changing
our point of view from the individual to the state.
It is best for the state that each individual should
aim at the common happiness ; but, when we talk
of this as a moral duty for the individual, all we
can mean is that the state will punish a breach of
it. In the words of Helvetius, 1 " pain and pleasure
are the bonds by which we can always unite per-
sonal interest to the interest of the nation. . . .
The sciences of morals and legislation can be only
deductions from this simple principle." According
to Bentham's psychology, a man is necessitated by
his mental and physical nature to pursue at every
moment, not the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, but what seems to him his own greatest
happiness. And what the legislator has to do is,
by judiciously imposed rewards and punishments,
especially the latter, to make it for the greatest
happiness of each to pursue the greatest happiness
of all. 2 As distinguished from this " art of legisla-
tion," " private ethics " consists only of prudential
rules prescribing the best means to an end pre-
determined by nature as the only possible end of
human action : it " teaches how each man may
1 De 1'homme, concl. gn., GEuvres, ii. 608.
2 Cf. Systeme de la nature, i. 120: "La politique devrait etre
1'art de rgler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le
bien de la socie'te'."
EGOISM. 29
dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive
to his own happiness." l The consequences to the
theory of action of the third alternative (c) are ( C ) in its
similar: it only states the law with more appear- fining.
ance of psychological accuracy. If a man always
follows that course of action which will give him
at the time the greatest (real and imaginative)
satisfaction, it is impossible for us to infer from his
nature an ethical law prescribing some other end,
without admitting a fundamental contradiction in
human nature ; while to say that he ought to seek
the end he always does and cannot help seeking,
is unnecessary and even unmeaning. Modification
of character may of course be still brought about,
since the kinds of action in which an individual
takes pleasure may be varied almost indefinitely.
But the motive made use of in this educative pro-
cess must be personal pleasure ; and the end the
legislator has in view in his work must be the
same, 2 though it is often quietly assumed that
for him personal pleasure has become identified
with the wider interests of the community.
The different significations of which it admits Result of
show that the psychological law that action follows
the greatest pleasure is by no means so clear as it
may at first sight appear. Probably it is the very
1 Bentham, op. cit., chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879),
20; Works,i. 148.
2 Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5.
30 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to
provide a basis for an ethical system. When it is
said that greatest pleasure is the moral end of
action, this " greatest pleasure " is looked upon as
the greatest possible balance of pleasurable over
painful states for the probable duration of life : on
the egoistic theory, of the life of the individual ;
on the utilitarian theory, of the aggregate lives of
all men or even of all sentient beings. But when
it is said that greatest pleasure is, as a matter of
fact, always the motive of action, it is obvious that
"greatest pleasure" has changed its signification.
For if the same meaning were kept to, not only
would the psychological law as thus' stated be
openly at variance with facts, but its validity
would render the moral precept unnecessary. It
is even unmeaning to say that a man " ought " to
do that which he always does and cannot help
doing. 1 On the other hand, if the double meaning
of the phrase had been clearly stated, we should at
ethical once have seen the hiatus in the proof of egoistic
hedonism the gap between the present (or appa-
rent) pleasure for which one does act, and the great-
est pleasure of a lifetime for which one ought to act
as well as the additional difficulty of passing
1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41 ; cf.
Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9 : "To a being who is simply
a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws
is unmeaning."
EGOISM. 31
from egoism to utilitarianism. If greatest appa-
rent pleasure or greatest present pleasure is by
an inexorable law of human nature always sought,
how can it be shown that we ought to sacrifice the
apparent to the real the present pleasure that is
small to the greater future pleasure? If the in-
dividual necessarily pursues his own pleasure, how
can we show that he ought to subordinate it to
the pleasures of the " greatest number " ?
It is a matter of fact, however, that the psychol- 3. Transition
ogists who maintain that action follows the great- logSaTto
est pleasure meaning by that, greatest apparent f e ^| sm
or greatest present pleasure have in their ethics Right action
will imply
made the transition to an enlightened Egoism, or
even to Utilitarianism. The nature of the transi-
tion thus requires to be more clearly pointed out.
If the former interpretation of the law of psycho-
logical hedonism could be accepted, and a man's
motive for action were always what seemed to
him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on
the whole, ethics what Bentham calls private
ethics could be reduced (as Bentham finally re-
duces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To be
fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and (a) correct
. estimate of
pain, and to estimate them correctly, would imply conse-
possession of the highest (egoistic) morality. If action!" (
men could be made to think rightly as to what
their greatest pleasure consisted in, then right
action on their part that is to say, the pursuit of
32 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
their greatest pleasure would (according to Ben-
tham's psychology) follow as a matter of course.
:t Eight conduct, however, is not so purely an affair
of the intellect as this would make it. Indeed,
Bentham's psychological assumption requires only
to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with the
facts of human action to become apparent. The
" video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor " ex-
presses too common an experience to be so easily
explained away. The impulses by which action is.
governed are not always in accordance with what
the intellect decides to be best on a survey of the
whole life and its varied chances. In judging the
consequences of action, a future good ' is compared
with a present, regardless of the mere difference of
(6) and cor- time by which they are separated. But the springs
Itrength^ which move the will are often at variance with the
feeling. decisions of the understanding ; and many men are
unable to resist the strength of the impulse to act
for the pleasure of the moment, though they fore-
see that a greater future satisfaction would follow
from present self-denial.
It would seem, then, that the facts of experience
are sufficient to show that a man's conduct does not
always follow the course which he thinks likely
to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole.
But the view that a man always acts for what is
most pleasant or least painful at the time can-
not be dismissed so easily. It is not enough simply
EGOISM. 33
to point to the facts of human action in order to
show that this hypothesis is inconsistent with
them. If we instanced the self -restraint in which
so many pass their lives from day to day, it might
perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea
of duty, or love of reputation, or fear of social
stigma, the repression of which would be more
painful than the restraint it puts upon other im-
pulses. Even the martyr who deliberately parts
with life itself for the sake of an ideal, may be said
to choose death as the least painful course open to
him at the time. It should be borne in mind,
however, that Professor Bain, the most thorough
psychologist of Bentham's school, refuses to admit
this line of defence for psychological hedonism,
and holds that, in actions such as those referred to,
men are really carried out of the circle of their
self-regarding desires. 1 But my present purpose is
not to discuss the merits of any such psychological
theory, but rather to investigate its ethical conse-
quences. And for this purpose the question re-
quires to be put, how a passage is effected from
psychological hedonism to an egoistic and even
to a utilitarian theory of ethics.
If a man always acts for his greatest present Thepostu-
, , , . . ., late that
pleasure, real and imaginary, it seems a far step to ac tio n can
say that he " ought " to act or in any way to J e tiona1 '
expect that he will act at each moment for the
1 Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff.
C
34 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
greatest sum of pleasure attainable in the probable
duration of his life. But on reflection, this may
turn out to follow if we postulate that conduct
can be rationalised. What is meant by this ego-
istic " ought " may be said to be simply that to
the eye of reason the pleasure of any one moment
cannot be regarded as more valuable than the
equal pleasure of any other moment, if it is equally
involves certain ; and that therefore to act as if it were is to
these con- .
ditions, act unreasonably. Man tails in acting up to rea-
son in this sense, because his action is not motived
by reason, but directly by pleasure and pain ; and
not by a mere estimate of pleasure and pain, but
by pleasure and pain themselves. The psycho-
logical hedonist must maintain that the estimates
of future pleasure and pain only become motives
by being not merely recognised (intellectually) but
felt (emotionally) that is, by themselves becoming
pleasurable or painful. If the Egoist calls any
action irrational, it cannot be because the motive
which produced it was not the greatest pleasure
in consciousness at the time. It can only be on
the ground that the greatest pleasure in conscious-
ness at the time is likely to lead to a sacrifice of
greater pleasure in the future ; and this must be
due either to intellectual misapprehension or to
the imagined fruition of future pleasure not being
strong enough to outweigh the pleasure which
comes from a present stimulus, and to the imagined
EGOISM. 35
fruition of the more distant being weaker than that
of the less distant pleasure. It is owing to a
defect of the imagination on a man's part that
even with complete information he does not act
" up to his lights " irrational action being partly
a consequence of insufficient acquaintance with the
normal results of conduct, partly due to defective
imagination. Were a man's imagination of future
pleasure and pain as strong as his experience of
present pleasure and pain, and did he correctly
appreciate the results of his conduct, then his
action would, of psychological necessity, harmo-
nise with the precepts of egoistic hedonism.
Egoistic hedonism may therefore, in a certain
sense, be said to be a " reasonable " end of conduct
on the theory of psychological hedonism ; it is the
end which will be made his own by that ideally
perfect man whose intellect can clearly see the
issues of conduct, and whose imagination of the
future causes of sensibility is so vivid that the
pleasure or pain got from anticipating them is as
great as if they were present, or only less lively in
proportion as there is a risk of their not being
realised. Conversely it would seem that only that
man can act " reasonably " in whom imagination of the latter of
pleasure (or of pain) is already of equal strength
with the actual experience of it. But, if the " pleas-
ures of the imagination " are as strong as those of
sense or of reality, the latter obviously become
36 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
superfluous ; and it follows that the ideally perfect
man is left without any motive to aim at the real
thing, since he can obtain as much pleasure by
imagining it. The cultured hedonist must, it would
seem, be able to
" Hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus,
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite
By bare imagination of a feast."
is inconsist- So far as feeling or motive to action goes, no differ-
ent with . .
the nature encc must exist for mm between reality and ima-
ary gination. And thus, although we may admit that,
on this psychological basis, conduct when ration-
alised agrees with that prescribed by egoistic
hedonism, yet it can only be rationalised by a
development of the strength of the imagination,
which would make the feeling which it brings with
it as strong as that which accompanies a real object,
and hence take away the motive for the pursuit of
the latter. The discrepancy between representa-
tion and presentation which is necessary for the
state of desire, 1 is no longer present. Hedonism
vindicates its rationality only on conditions which
imply the futility of action altogether. It is not
merely that the attainment of the hedonistic end in
practical conduct implies a strength of imagination
of which no one is capable, but the conditions of
1 Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.
EGOISM. 37
acting both rationally and hedonistically, are condi-
tions which would paralyse all activity.
The foregoing argument may perhaps be ob- 4. possible
jected to on two grounds. On the one hand, it may to^pre^Sng
be said that it ignores the vast complexity of hu- ar g*ment:
man motive, and treats action as if it were a simple
and abstract thing. On the other hand, we may be
reminded of the fact that, while all men act for
pleasure, the moral quality of their conduct does
not depend on this fact, but on the kind of things
in which they take pleasure.
So far as the first objection is concerned, it seems (a) compiex-
to me that the fault belongs to the psychological tive but it
theory of human action, the ethical consequences of
which are under investigation. It is this theory aonism
J which ig-
which asserts that, however interwoven the threads nores this.
of impulse, aversion, and habit may be, their most
complex relations can be reduced to the formula,
" greatest pleasure, or least pain, prevails." It is
not necessary, indeed, that every action should be
the conscious pursuit of a pleasurable object already
before the mind in idea. But the theory, if con-
sistently carried out, implies that the action which
follows in the line of a previously formed habit,
does so because the discomfort or pain of breaking
through the habit would be sufficient to counter-
balance any satisfaction that might result. The ob-
jection, therefore, of excessive simplicity or-"ab-
stractness," is one which cannot have greater force
38 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
than when urged against the theory of psychologi-
cal hedonism.
(6) differ- Further and this is the second objection the
ofpieasur- above analysis may be considered by some not to
awe objects; ^^ taken su ffi cient account O f the difference in
the objects in which a human being can take pleas-
ure, and of the fact that the moral quality of men
differs, not according as they act for pleasure or
not, but according to the kind of actions and suf-
ferances in which they find pleasure. There can be
no doubt of the importance of this distinction for
questions of practical morals. The man in whom
" selfishness takes the shape of benevolence," as it
did in Bentham, is infinitely better than the man
in whom it retains the form of selfishness. But
the consideration is important just because it goes
on the implied assumption that the hedonistic is
not the chief aspect of conduct, and that there is a
difference between courses of action more fundamen-
tal than the pleasurable or painful feeling attend-
but this in- ant on them. If the principles on which the objec-
Ire^ce to^ ti n i g founded were consistently adhered to and
something followed out, they would make not pleasure, but
else than J
pleasure, something else that, namely, by which pleasures
differ from one another in kind the ethical stand-
ard. But if, in ultimate analysis, it is the pleasure
felt or expected that moves to action, it would seem
that there is no way in which the conclusion of the
preceding argument can be avoided. If pleasure is
EGOISM. 39
the motive, it must be qud pleasure that is to say,
either the greatest apparent pleasure, or the great-
est present pleasure, is the motive. If difference of
quality be admitted, we are introducing a determin-
ing factor other than pleasure. Certain kinds of
pleasure may be better than others for the race or
for the state. But these differences must be reducible which psy-
. -, i chological
to terms of individual pleasure admitting of purely hedonism
quantitative comparisons, before they become mo- admit^f.
tives to action. 1 From the point of view of the
whole, we may say that one action leads to a greater
sum of pleasure than another. But, in judging the
action of individuals, all that we can say of it is,
that to one man one class of actions gives pleasure,
to another another : each man is equally following
the course of action which either (a) will bring, or
(6) seems to him likely to bring, the greatest pleas-
ure, or (c) is actually most pleasant at the time.
From the nature of the individual we can evolve no
end beyond egoistic hedonism. And even this end
can only be made his at each occurrence of action
(assuming the first alternative (a) to be incorrect)
by enlightening his intellect so that (6) will corre-
spond with the actual greatest pleasure, or by also
1 Cf. J. Grote, ' Utilitarian Philosophy,' p. 20, note : " One
kind of pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferred to
another, but it must be because the pleasures classified under it
generally exceed those under the other in intensity, or some other
of the elements of value."
40 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
enlivening his imagination of future pleasures and
pains so that (c) will correspond with it ; and this,
as has been shown, could only be effected under
conditions which are inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of human action.
41
CHAPTER III.
THE TEANSITION TO UTILITAEIANISM.
IT still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical i. Different
end in some other way than by studying individual onndfvT^uai
human nature. We may, for instance, looking from and state
the point of view of the community, fix its greatest
happiness, instead of his own, as the individual's
end. But the difficulty then arises of persuading
the individual or, indeed, making it possible for
him to regard this impersonal goal as the end of
his conduct. For this purpose, Bentham seemed to
look to the exercise of administrative control which,
by a system of rewards and punishments, will make
the greatest happiness of the individual coincide so
far as possible with that of the community. 1 J. S.
Mill, on the other hand, with his eyes turned to the
1 Professor Bain distinguishes with greater clearness than his
predecessors, first, legal duty, or that the contravention of which
is punished by the ministers of the state ; secondly, moral duty,
enforced by the unofficial punishment of social disapprobation ;
and thirdly, the conduct which society leaves to individual choice,
without censuring either its commission or omission. Moral duty
is further distinguished by him from the meritorious, or conduct
42 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
subjective springs of action, saw in the gradual
growth of sympathetic pleasures and pains the
means by which an individual's desires would cease
to conflict with those of his neighbours.
It is in some such way that the transition is
made from Egoism to Utilitarianism. The transi-
tion is made : Bentham and his school are an evi-
dence of the fact. But it is not therefore logical.
It is, indeed, important to notice that we only pass
from the one theory to the other by changing our
original individualistic point of view. Having al-
ready fixed an end for conduct regardless of the
difference between the individual at the time of
acting and at subsequent times, we proceed to take
the much longer step of ignoring the difference be-
tween the agent and other individuals. The ques-
tion is no longer, What is good or desirable for the
person who is acting ? but, What is best on the
whole for all those whom his action may affect-
that is to say, for the community ?
cannot be But while it is comparatively easy to see how
connected tins transition is effected as a matter of fact, it is
difficult to establish any logical connection between
its different stages, or to offer any considerations
fitted to convince the individual that it is reason-
able for him to seek the happiness of the commu-
nity rather than his own. Only that conduct, it
which society encourages by approval, without censuring its
omission.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 43
may seem, can be reasonable which directs and per-
fects the natural striving of each organism towards
its own pleasure. We may, of course, let our point through
of view shift from the individual to the social " or- state to L
ganism." And in this case, if the " natural " end diyidua1 '
of each human being is his own greatest pleasure,
the end of the community, or organised body of
pleasure-seekers, will naturally be concluded to be
the greatest aggregate pleasure of its members.
Thus, if we can hypostatise the community, and
treat it as an individual with magnified but human
wants and satisfactions, then, for this leviathan, the
ethical end will correspond to what is called Utili-
tarianism or Universalistic Hedonism. But, when Difference
we remember that the community is made up of ^Town
units distinct from one another in feeling and action, {^rTasure
the difficulty arises of establishing it as the natural of others
end, or as a reasonable end, for each of these units
to strive after the greatest pleasure of all. Tor it
is evident that the pursuit of the greatest aggregate
pleasure may often interfere with the attainment
by the individual of his own greatest pleasure, j On
the other hand, the self-seeking action of the indi-
vidual may no doubt lead to a loss of pleasure on
the whole ; \ but then it is not his own pleasure that
is lost, only other people's. To the outsider as
to the community it may seem irrational that a
small increase in the pleasure of one unit should
be allowed at the expense of a loss of greater pleas-
44 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOKY.
ure on the part of other units. But it seems irra-
tional only because the outsider naturally puts him-
self in the place of the community ; and neither
takes account of the fact that to the individual agent
there is a fundamental difference between his own
pleasure and any one else's pleasure : for him the
former is, and the latter is not, pleasure at all. 1
overlooked This fundamental difference seems to be over-
argumg j 00 ^ e( j w j ien the attempt is made to argue logically
1 Mr Gurney's attempt (Mind, vii. 349 ff.) to rationalise
the utilitarian " ought " depends upon the assumption that the
individual feels a desire (not only for his own, but) for other
people's pleasure (p. 352). From the point of view of the psy-
chological hedonist, however, this desire is only secondary and
derivative, depending upon the fact that it increases the pleasure
of the subject. "Your pleasure," the psychological hedonist
would say, " is desired by me qud my pleasure." If, on the other
hand, it is admitted that the individual has other ends than his
own pleasure, there seems no ground in psychological fact for
limiting these ends to something aimed at because pleasurable to
others. From this point of view the first step in the establish-
ment of an ethical theory would be an attempt to find a principle
of unity in the various ends actually aimed at by individuals, and
recognised by them as "good." This is made by Professor Sidg-
wick, who, while allowing that " it is possible to hold that the
objective relations of conscious minds which we call cognition of
Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Freedom of action, &c. , are good,
independently of the pleasures that we derive from them," main-
tains that " we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we
attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in
one way or another, to the happiness of conscious (or sentient)
beings" (Methods of Ethics, iii. xiv. 3, 3d ed., p. 398). But
Mr Sidgwick's Utilitarianism depends on a Rational view of
human nature which is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion. See below, p. 74.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 45
from egoistic psychology (or even from egoistic from egoism
ethics) to utilitarianism. Indeed, the hiatus in an^m. 1
logical proof is often only concealed by a confusion
of standpoints ; and J. S. Mill, while emphasising
the distinction between modern Utilitarianism and
the older \Epicureanisrnj has even allowed his
official " proof " of utilitarianism such proof,
that is, as he thinks the principle of Utility to be
susceptible of to rest on the ambiguity between
individual and social happiness.
This ambiguity does not seem to have been con- 2. connec-
sistently avoided even by Bentham. For the most egoism and
part, indeed, nothing can exceed the clearness with
which he recognises the twofold and possibly con- i n
flicting interests involved in almost every action.
There is the interest of the agent, and the interest
of others whom his action may affect. And he
also holds that, in the case of divergence of interests,
the individual will act for his own. I^The happi-
ness of the individuals," he says, 1 "of whom a
community is composed, that is, their pleasures
and their security, is the end, and the sole end,
which the legislator ought to have in view the
sole standard in conformity to which each indi-
vidual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator,
to be made to fashion his conduct. But whether
it be this or anything else that is to be done, there
1 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iii. 1 ; Works,
i. 14.
46 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made
to do it, but either pain or pleasure/* that is, of
course, his own pain or pleasure. fHere, then,
ethical Utilitarianism and psychological Egoism
are both plainly involved. A man, it is said, can
only pursue general happiness by its being identical
with his own happiness. And as it is evident, and
admitted, that these two happinesses often diverge
in the courses of action naturally leading to them,
a man can only be beneficent, rather than selfish,
through some artificial arrangement which makes
beneficence to be for his interest: 1 in plain lan-
guage (since rewards are only of exceptional ap-
plicability), through his being punished for not
(a) utmtari- being beneficent. 2 But, as Bentham clearly shows,
poiitoi a many cases of action cannot be safely touched by
duty ' the legislator's art. Such cases u unmeet for
punishment" include not only the actions which
are beneficial or neutral in their results, but also
actions hurtful to the community, though they
may elude such vigilance as the state can contrive,
or their restraint by punishment inflicted by the
1 As Paley put it, with characteristic plainness of statement,
" We can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain
or lose something by." Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii.
chap. ii.
2 Cf. Bain, Emotions, p. 264 : " I consider that the proper
meaning or import of these terms [Morality, Duty, Obligation, or
Right] refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of
punishment."
THE TKANSITION TO UTILITAKIANISM. 47
state may constitute a greater evil than the
offence. 1 Probity may be exacted by the " persons
stated and certain" who happen to be political
superiors : except in rare instances, positive benefi-
cence can not. Utilitarian conduct, therefore, is
not a "political duty," because it is not fully
enforced by definite punishment. The " art of
legislation" is indeed said to teach "how a mul-
titude of men, composing a community, may be
disposed to pursue that course which upon the
whole is the most conducive to the happiness of
the whole community, by means of motives to be
applied by the legislator." 2 But the means here
indicated are such as cannot fully compass the
attainment of the end. For the motives applied
by the legislator either cannot reach a large part
of the extra-regarding conduct of individuals, or
could only reach it by entailing greater evils than
those they would be used to prevent.
But if utilitarian conduct is not a political duty, (&> nor a
it may seem evident that it is at least a moral m
duty. Now a moral duty is said by Bentham 3 to
1 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap, xix,
(xvii.), 9 ff ; Works, i. 144 ff.
3 Ibid., 20, p. 148.
3 Fragment on Government, chap. v. ; Works, i. 293. Cf.
Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. iii. 5, p. 14, where
the Moral Sanction is said to proceed from " such chance persons
in the community as the person in question may happen in the
course of his life to have concerns with."
48 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
be " created by a kind of motive which, from the
%7icertainty of the persons to apply it, and of the
species and degree in which it will be applied, has
hardly yet got the name of punishment : by various
mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons
fcmcertain and variable, the community in general ;
that is, such individuals of that community as he
whose duty is in question shall happen to be con-
nected with." In plain language, then, moral duty
simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours
which follows his conduct in so far as that conduct
affects them disagreeably. Such ill-will on the
part of a man's neighbours may result from success
or from failure on his part, from a breach of eti-
quette, from refusal to sacrifice to the caprice of
those neighbours the wider good of the society
whom his conduct affects (but to whom it may be
unknown), from deception or from telling the truth.
In a word, the duty that is, the punishment is
entirely uncertain : not only as regards the persons
applying it, its nature and its amount, but also as
regards the kind of actions to which it applies.
They will be actions unpleasant to the people who
inflict the punishment, but not necessarily hurtful
to the common weal: since the immediate effects
of an action are easily recognised, while its wider
and more lasting consequences are neither so ap-
parent nor appeal so surely to the interest of those
who are cognisant of the action and immediately
THE TKANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 49
affected by it. Moral duty, therefore, as Bentham
defines it, depending on, or rather identical with,
the ill-will of one's neighbours, is indefinite and
limited in its nature, and can command or sanction
no such definite and wide-reaching rule for conduct
as that a man should always act for the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of people whom
his action may affect. Utilitarian conduct, there-
fore, is neither a political duty nor a moral duty ; \
nor does Bentham follow Paley in insisting upon (c) nor in-
,.. i . .-IT i i sisted on as
it as a religious duty " created by punishment ; by a religious
punishment expected at the hands of a person duty '
certain the Supreme Being." And " if he persists
in asserting it to be a duty but without meaning
it to be understood that it is on any one of these
three accounts that he looks upon it as such all
he then asserts is his own internal sentiment ; all
he means then is that he feels himself pleased or
displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct
in question, but without being able to tell why. In
this case he should e'en say so ; and not seek to
give an undue influence to his own single suffrage,
by delivering it in terms that purport to declare
the voice either of God, or of the law, or of the
people." x
This plain piece of advice which Bentham gives
to Blackstone is not often neglected by himself.
The motive, he once said, of his own exceptional
1 Bentham, Fragment on Government, loc. cit.
D
50 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
devotion to the interests of the community was
that it pleased him. " I am a selfish man/' he wrote,
" as selfish as any man can be. But in me, somehow
or other, so it happens, selfishness has taken the
shape of benevolence." l But when the matter is
thus brought back from the regions of political,
(d) nor sum- moral, and religious duty, to the individual ground
motived in of " private ethics," we have still to refer to Ben-
tham's own discussion of the question, " What mo-
tives (independent of such as legislation and reli-
gion may chance to furnish) can one man have to
consult the happiness of another ? " 2 Bentham at
once replies and indeed the answer on his princi-
ples is obvious enough that there is no motive
which always continues adequate. But yet there
are, he says, " no occasions in which a man has not
some motives for consulting the happiness of other
men." Such are " the purely-social motive of sym-
pathy or benevolence," and " the semi-social motives
of love of amity and love of reputation." A man
is directly moved to promote the happiness of
others through the sympathetic feelings which
make the happiness of others in some degree pleas-
urable to himself; and he is indirectly moved to
promote their happiness through his desire of their
friendship and good opinion. So far, therefore, it
is quite true that " private ethics " or what Ben-
1 Works, xi. 95 ; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 137.
2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii.), 7 ff.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 51
tham regards as such " concerns every member
that is, the happiness and the actions of every '
member of any community that can be proposed." l
It certainly concerns their happiness, but only in
so far as this is a means to the happiness of the
agent. So that when Bentham says that "there
is no case in which a private man ought not to
direct his own conduct to the production of his
own happiness and of that of his fellow-creatures,"
he should rather say that a man will 2 only direct
his conduct to the happiness of his fellow- creatures
in so far as such action leads to his own happiness.
Private ethics, therefore, has to do with the happi- which can
ness of others only so far as this reacts on the topm-
happiness of self ; or, as Bentham ultimately defines dence *
it, in terms to which no exception can be taken :
" Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose
himself to pursue the course most conducive to his
own happiness by means of such motives as offer
of themselves." 3
Under Bentham's hands " private ethics " is thus 3. Ben-
-. , .. . tham's treat-
reduced to prudence, at the same time that the me nt ex-
author has failed to show why the general happi- haustlve
1 Loc. cit., 8, p. 144.
2 " Ought " is inappropriate here according to Bentham's prin-
ciples, since there is no question of punishment inflicted by a po-
litical or social or religious superior.
3 Loc. cit., 20, p. 148.
52 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
from his ness is to be aimed at by the individual as a reli-
Stew. gious or political or moral duty. Nor is this failure
due to any lack of skill in following out the con-
sequences which his premisses involved. The argu-
ments used against him have thus an equally valid
application to all who adopt the same general line
of thought. For Bentham appears to have seen as
clearly as any of his disciples the difficulty of bring-
ing the egoistic basis of his theory of human nature
into harmony with the universal reference required
by his ethics. And the criticism already offered of
the way in which Bentham attempts to bring about
this connection may be shown not to be restricted
to his special way of putting the case.
It is necessary to remember that throughout this
chapter we are looking from the individual's point
of view, and inquiring how far it is possible to work
from it in the direction of utilitarianism. Now it
is admitted that, in pursuing his own happiness,
he is sometimes led, and may be led on the whole,
to neglect the general happiness. A sufficient
reason for following the latter or an obligation to
do it can therefore only come either from the
supreme power or from one's fellow-men, and from
the latter either as organised in the State, and ex-
pressing themselves by its constituted authorities,
or else by the vaguer method of social praise and
blame. Bentham's classification of the possible
sources or kinds of duty into religious, political,
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 53
and moral [or social], is therefore a natural conse-
quence of the individualistic system.
The first of these possible sources of duty is in- ( a > The re-
deed only mentioned by Bentham, and then passed ^ us
by. And yet it might seem that the religious sanc-
tion is a more efficient motive - power than the
social, while it applies to regions of conduct which
legal enactment cannot reach. Without question,
the operation of such a motive is capable of bringing
egoistic conduct into harmony with utilitarianism,
or with any other principle of action to which the
sanction may be attached. " Private happiness is relied on by
our motive, and the will of God our rule," says
Paley ; l and in this case such conduct will be
obligatory as the rule may arbitrarily determine ;
while, whatever it may be, there will be a strong
enough motive to follow it. The whole fabric of a
moral philosophy such as Paley's, therefore, rests
on two theological propositions that God has or-
dained the general happiness as the rule of human
conduct, and that He will punish in another life
those who disregard that rule. The basis of mor-
ality is laid in a divine command enforced by a
divine threat. Perhaps it will be generally agreed
that Bentham acted wisely in not laying stress on
this application of the " religious sanction." Even
those least inclined to theological agnosticism would
reject any such rough-and-ready solution of the
1 Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii.
54 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
inverts the problem which deals with the relation of morality
tween ethics to the divine nature. Paley's method of treatment,
io gy> e they would say, inverts the relation in which the-
ism stands to morality. The divine will cannot be
thus arbitrarily connected with the moral law. It
can be conceived to approve and sanction such an
object as the happiness of mankind only when God
is first of all regarded as a moral being, and the hap-
piness of mankind as an obj ect of moral action. If any
relation of consequence can be asserted between them,
the general happiness is to be regarded as a moral
duty first, and only afterwards as a religious duty.
(&) Limits of When he comes to the political sanction, Ben-
sanction, tham's treatment wants nothing in respect of ful-
ness, and even those who do not agree with his esti-
mate of the infelicific character of many existing
institutions and enactments will admit that even the
best-intentioned legislator cannot make utilitarian
conduct a political duty. We must bear in mind
here, also, the effect which individual desires and
opinions have not only on social judgments, but also
on statute-law. In arguing on the relation of the
individual to the State, we are too ready to forget
that the State is represented by a legislator or body
of legislators, and that we can never assume that
in their cases private interest has already become
identified with the larger interests of the com-
munity. 1 For were this the case, the accusation
1 This is clearly recognised by Bentham : " The actual end [as
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 55
of class-legislation or private interest would not be
heard so often as it is.
A modern disciple of Bentham would thus be
compelled, just as Bentham himself was, to make social sane- 6
utilitarianism neither a political nor religious but tlon>
a " moral " duty, enforced by and founded on the
shifting and uncertain punishments or sanctions of
society what Professor Bain describes as "the
unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the
exclusion from social good offices." 1 But as a
logical proof of utilitarianism, this means is, if
possible, weaker than the preceding : for social
opinion, though of somewhat wider applicability
than legal enactment, has probably been, for the
most part, in even less exact correspondence than
it with the general happiness. The social sanction
is strict on indifferent points of etiquette, does not
consult the general interests of mankind on points
of honour, and is lenient towards acts that the
utilitarian moralist condemns. 2
distinguished from the right and proper end] of government is,"
he says, " in every political community, the greatest happiness of
those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government
are exercised." Constitutional Code, booki., Introd., 2 ; Works,
ix. 5.
1 The Emotions and the Will, p. 264.
2 Cf. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 287. Professor
Bain says (Emotions, p. 276 n.), "we ought to have a written
code of public morality, or of the duties imposed by society, over
and above what parliament imposes, and this should not be a
loosely written moral treatise, but a strict enumeration of what
56 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
(d) and of Prof essor Bain, however, advances from the ex-
the internal
sanction so temal disapprobation to an internal sanction
far as a re- T T . . . , , . ,
suit of the looking upon conscience as one ot the powers which
inflicts punishment, and lies at the source of the
feeling of obligation. But if conscience is only " an
ideal resemblance of public authority, growing up
in the same individual mind, and working to the
same end," it can, as little as its archetype, point
to the maxim of utilitarianism. According to
Professor Bain, it is through this sentiment at
first a mere imitation of external authority that
the individual becomes a law to himself, on recog-
nising the utilities that led to the imposition of the
law. 1 But on this theory, in so far as conscience
continues to point to the conduct impressed upon
it by its external pattern, it fails to correspond
with the utilitarian maxim. If, on the other hand,
it is modified by the comprehensive and unselfish
view of the effects of conduct which utilitarianism
demands, it must be at the expense of correcting
society requires under pain of punishment by excommunication
or otherwise, the genuine offences that are not passed over."
This would certainly be very desirable, were it not from the
nature of the case impracticable. Popular judgment as to a
man's conduct, what society imposes, is one of the things most
difficult to predict : it is under the influence of most hetero-
geneous causes, personal, industrial, religious, political, &c. I do
not think, for instance, that any one could safely undertake to
describe exactly the kind of actions which will infallibly call forth
the censure of British public opinion, or that of the smaller and
intersecting groups into which society is divided.
1 Emotions, p. 288.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 57
its original edicts, and so far discrediting its author-
itative claims.
The "social sanction" would be of much greater vaiueofthe
service if used to show how a solidarity is brought S* *
about between the interests and feelings of the
individual and those of his neighbours, from which
the utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a gen-
eralisation of his principle of conduct as modified
by the social impulse. But this would not consti- apart from
tute a logical justification of utilitarianism : it would f^tmtari-
show how the principle has been arrived at, but amsm *
without giving a sufficient reason to the individual
for adopting it. And this is really the tendency of
much recent discussion of Professor Bain's theory
of conscience as a reflex of the external order, of
George Grote's analysis of the moral sentiment,
and of Mill's doctrine of the progressive identifica-
tion of the individual's feelings with those of his
neighbours through the gradual increase of sym-
pathetic pleasures and pains: for it was to this
source that Mill looked for the practical solution
of the antinomy between his psychological and
ethical theories, though he himself tried to pass
from one position to the other by means of
the " highway in the air " constructed by his own
logic.
Mill's attempt to pass by a logical method from 4. MQI-S
psychological hedonism to utilitarianism is an in- logical d<
'
58 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
fence of structive commentary on the difficulties which
ism: beset the transition. His work may be described
as a vindication of the utilitarian morality, first,
from the charge of sensualism ; and secondly, from
that of selfishness. And it is largely owing to his
polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked
upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It
is not sensual, unless, indeed, the pleasures of most
men are of a sensual kind. So far from being
selfish, it is almost stoical in the subordination of
individual desires it enjoins. But Mill wished to
do more than clear the character of utilitarian
ethics. He wished to show a logical reason for
utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather than
base ones, and to demonstrate the connection of his
moral imperative with the principles which the
school he belonged to laid down for human motives.
In both these respects his failure is conspicuous,
(a) distinc- In the former endeavour, he went against Ben-
tion of kinds ., , ,. ^ T , j -1-1
of pleasure, tham by attempting to draw a distinction in kind
amongst pleasures a distinction not reducible to
quantitative measurement. A higher degree of
quality in the pleasure sought was to outweigh any
difference in its amount or quantity. With this
modification, utilitarianism is made to require a
subordination of the lower or sensuous nature to
the higher or intellectual nature. Pleasure, indeed,
is still the end ; but the " higher " pleasure takes
precedence over the "lower," irrespective of the
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 59
amount of pleasant feeling that results. Pleasure
is still the standard, but not the ultimate standard ;
for a further appeal has to be made to the criterion
that distinguishes one pleasure from another, not
as merely greater or less, but as higher or lower.
As is well known, Mill did not look either to the
action or to the feeling itself for this criterion. To
have done so would have implied an acknowledg-
ment that pleasure was no longer regarded as the
ultimate standard. He found the criterion of determined
., 1 ,1 T by author-
superiority simply in the opinion people of ex- i ty ,
perience have about the relative desirability of
various sorts of pleasure. But such a criterion
'only pushes the final question of the standard one
step farther back. Those people of experience to
whom Mill refers who have tried both kinds of
pleasure, and prefer one of them l can they give
no reason for, no account of, their preference ? If
so, to trust them is to appeal to blind authority,
and to relinquish anything like a science of ethics.
But, if Mill's authorities can reflect on their feelings,
as well as feel, they can only tell us one or other
of two things. Either the so-called " higher " pleas-
ure is actually, as pleasure, so preferable to that
called " lower," that the smallest amount of the one
would be more pleasurable than the largest amount
1 I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two kinds
of pleasure easily distinguishable. But the question is really
much more complicated.
60 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
of the other ; or else the higher is called higher,
and is to be preferred to the lower even although
the latter may be greater as pleasure because of a
quality belonging to it over and above its character
either can as pleasant feeling. The former verdict would be
to difference ^ n tne ^ rst P^ ace paradoxical, and, in the second
of quantity, place, would give up Mill's case, by reducing
or leads to r ' J
non-hedon- quality to a quantitative standard. Besides, it
ard ; would be no valid ground of preference for men in
general ; since the pleasure of various actions and
states differs according to the susceptibility of the
subject. According to the latter verdict, the char-
acteristic upon which the distinction of quality
depends, and not pleasure itself, becomes the
ethical standard.
(&)ambigui- In respect of his main contention, that utilitarian-
proofof 18 i sm * s a theory of beneficence, and not of prudence
utilitarian. or O f selfishness, Mill emphasised even more strongly
than Bentham had done the distinction between
the egoism which seeks its own things, and the
utilitarianism according to which everybody counts
for one, and nobody for more than one. But when
he attempted to connect this doctrine logically with
the psychological postulates of his school, he com-
mitted a double error. In the first place, he con-
fused the purely psychological question of the mo-
tives that influence human conduct with the ethical
question of the end to which conduct ought to be
directed ; and, in the second place, he disregarded
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 61
the difference of end there may be for society as a
collective whole, and for each member of the society
individually. " There is in reality," he says, 1 " noth-
ing desired except happiness ; " and this psycholog-
ical theory is too hastily identified with the ethical
principle that happiness alone is desirable, or what
ought to be desired and pursued. Moreover, " no
reason," he says, "can be given why the general
happiness is desirable, except that each person, so
far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his
own happiness." And this admission, which seems
as good as saying that no reason at all can be given
why the individual should desire the general hap-
piness, is only held to be a sufficient reason for it,
through assuming that what is good for all as an
aggregate is good for each member of the aggregate :
"That each person's happiness is a good to that
person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good
to the aggregate of all persons." 2
It may appear strange to offer the preceding as the imperfect
logical basis of an ethical principle which has had of ethical 6
so wide and, on the whole, beneficial an influence JJ
as utilitarianism. The explanation is to be found o
in the want of full coherence which often exists,
and is nowhere commoner than in English ethics,
between an author's practical view of life and the
foundation of psychology or metaphysics with which
1 Utilitarianism, p. 57. 2 Ibid., p. 53.
62 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
it is connected. It would certainly be wrong to
imagine that Bentham's self-denying labours rested
on a confusion of standpoints, or that Mill's moral
enthusiasm had no other support than a logical
quibble. To both of them, and to many others,
utilitarianism was an ethical creed influencing their
lives, which was scarcely connected with the at-
tempt to justify it logically. Such reasons in its
favour as they adduced were rather after-thoughts
for the defence of their creed than the foundations
on which it was built.
5. Actual The formula of utilitarianism cannot be expressed
transition to .
utilitarian- as the conclusion or a syllogism or or an inductive
inference. It seems rather to have been arrived at
by the production or the recognition of a sympa-
thetic or " altruistic " sentiment, which was made
to yield a general principle for the guidance of con-
duct. This process involves two steps, which are
consecutive and complementary, although the posi-
tions they connect are not necessarily related. The
first step is to overcome the selfish principle of
action in the individual ; the second to generalise
it, and obtain a principle for the non-selfish action
that results. Mill seems to be the only recent
writer who, in making this transition, adheres
strictly to the psychological hedonism distinctive
of his school. He looks to the influence of educa-
tion in increasing the feeling of unity between one
man and his neighbours, till individual action be-
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 63
comes merged in altruistic or social action. " The
social state," he says, a is at once so natural, so
necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in
some unusual circumstances, or by an effort of
voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself
otherwise than as a member of a body." l This is
perfectly true, but does not imply a sublation of
selfishness. A man " never conceives himself other-
wise than as a member of a body ; " but it does not
follow from this that he will subordinate his own
interests to the interests of the other members when
the two clash. In cases of conflict the individual
often tends to sacrifice the good of his neighbours
to his own good ; and he may do so although he
fully recognises the social consequences of action,
just because he still remains at the ethical stand-
point which treats private good as superior to public.
It is true, as Mill contends, that, " in an improving
state of the human mind, the influences are constant-
ly on the increase, which tend to generate in each
individual a feeling of unity with all the rest ; which
feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of,
or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in
the benefits of which they are not included." 2 But
this is not sufficient, to connect the two antagonistic
1 Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of
man could be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler,
Sermons, i.
2 Utilitarianism, p. 48.
64 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
poles of Mill's system. It starts with assuming the
notion of an "improving state/' of the human mind, as
determined according to an ethical standard not yet
arrived at ; and it gives no valid account of the means
by which the improvement is to be brought about.
It is prophetic of a time when the motives of human
nature will have been so modified that the antagon-
ism between self and others will be no longer felt ;
but it offers no practical solution of the antinomy
suited to present circumstances,
(a) recogni- The basis of the ethical sentiment by which the
tionofSym- .
pathy desires and actions of a man are to be brought into
harmony with those of his fellows is investigated
in a more thorough manner by Professor Bain and
by George Grote. But both of these writers stand
on a somewhat different platform from the strict
psychological hedonism which Mill never relin-
quished. Thus Grote enumerates as " elementary
tendencies of the mind," which ethical sentiment
presupposes, and out of which it is compounded,
self-regarding tendencies, sympathetic tendencies,
benevolent affections, malevolent affections, and
(though in a smaller degree) love and hatred of
those who cause pleasure and pain to others ; l and
this without interpreting sympathy, in the way that
Mill does, as having for its end the pleasures which
come with the gratification of the sympathetic
impulse, or the removal of the pain caused by its
1 Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6.
THE TRANSITION" TO UTILITARIANISM. 65
restraint. As Professor Bain argues, this position
of Mill's " is tenable only on the ground that the
omission of a disinterested act that we are inclined
to, would give us so much pain that it is on the
whole for our comfort that we should make the
requisite sacrifice. There is plausibility in this
supposition." But " the doctrine breaks down
when we try it upon extreme cases. . . . All
that people usually suffer from stifling a generous
impulse is too slight and transient to be placed
against any important sacrifice." 1 In recognising as
sympathy as a " purely disinterested " impulse, 2 Mr Bam,'
Bain breaks loose at an important point from the
psychology of Bentham. He is indeed only kept
from a complete break with it by the position he
ascribes to sympathy as outside of the ordinary
sphere of voluntary action. Above all things, it
would seem to be necessary that nothing should
conflict with "our character as rational beings,
which is to desire everything exactly according
to its pleasure-value." 3 But sympathy obviously
" clashes with the regular outgoings of the will
in favour of our pleasures ; " so that it ought to
be placed outside voluntary action, and regarded
1 The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 295.
2 Ibid., p. Ill ; cf. Mind, viii. 55 : "The important exceptions
to the law of Pleasure and Pain are (1) Fixed Ideas, (2) Habits,
and (3) Disinterested action for others. "
3 Emotions, p. 438.
E
66 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
simply as " a remarkable and crowning instance
of the Fixed Idea." 1
without be- It is owing to its exclusion, as a fixed idea, from
tJfdetermtae the sphere of voluntary conduct, that sympathetic
the ethical a pp r0 p r i a tion of the feelings of others has little or
no place assigned it by Professor Bain, when he goes
on 2 to describe the way in which the moral opinions
of men have actually originated. They have, he
holds, a twofold source the one arising from the
necessity for public security, the other being of
sentimental origin. The former makes society
ordain those acts and services required for its own
preservation. The latter leads to the confusion of
this necessary element of morality with the senti-
mental likes and dislikes which may be character-
istic of different people. These are " mixed up in
one code with the imperative duties that hold
society together;" and it is only when "we dis-
entangle this complication, and refer each class of
duties to their proper origin," that we can " obtain
a clear insight into the foundations of morality." 3
Morality, therefore, is that which is imposed by
society for its own preservation and security, and
which is sanctioned by the punishments of society
either in its "public judicial acts," or "by the
unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the
exclusion from social good offices." 4 Of this ex-
1 Emotions, p. 121. 2 Ibid., p. 271 ff.
3 Ibid., p. 273. 4 Ibid., p. 264.
THE TKANSITION TO UTILITAEIANISM. 67
ternal law the moral sense or conscience is merely
a subjective mirror or copy. The duty of unselfish-
ness is not connected with the disinterested impulse
of sympathy, but is traced to the external order of
society, which has found it necessary to restrain
the self-seeking action of individuals a restraint
which has come to be transferred to the consciences
of the members of the society.
Mr Bain's theory falls back in this way upon
external authority, just as Bentham's did ; and, for
the same reasons, they are neither of them able to
prescribe the utilitarian principle of conduct. But,
in his assertion of the disinterested nature of sym-
pathy, Mr Bain has introduced though he has not
himself utilised a fruitful principle, by means of
which a basis of moral sentiment may be found
by means of which it is possible to escape from
ethical as well as psychological egoism.
This element of sympathy is most fully recog- and by
nised in the instructive analysis of ethical sentiment
by the late George Grote. At the same time, Grote
does not, like Adam Smith, for instance, attempt to
evolve the material characteristics of approbation
and disapprobation from this source. The mere
putting of one's self in the place of a spectator or
in that of the patient instead of that of the agent,
is only a formal change, which will modify our
judgments or feelings without accounting for their
actual content. But a uniform formal element
68 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
in all ethical sentiment is, according to Grote, a
man's " constant habit of viewing and judging of
circumstances around him," both from the point of
view of the agent and from that of the patient. 1
This twofold position is occupied by every indivi-
dual. He is an agent, and in that position his own
interests and feelings are separate from, and often
at variance with, those of others. But he is also a
patient in respect of the actions of others, and in
that position his interests and his feelings are com-
monly in unison with those of the majority. Hence
a man is led constantly to adopt ideally the point
of view which is not actually his own at the time,
so that " the idea of the judgment which others will
form becomes constantly and indissolubly associ-
ated with the idea of action in the mind of every
agent." In every community, certain actions are
visited with the admiration, esteem, and protection
of the society ; certain other actions with the oppo-
site feelings and results : so that there arises " an
association in my mind of a certain line of conduct
on the part both of myself and of any other indivi-
dual agent, with a certain sentiment resulting from
such conduct, and excited by it, in the minds of the
general public around us. It is a sentiment of
regulated social reciprocity as between the agent
and the society amongst which he lives." And
this sentiment, when enforced by a sanction,
1 Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 69
constitutes the complete form of ethical senti-
ment.
As a complete explanation of the moral senti-
ments and judgments of men, this theory does not
seem to be above criticism. It requires not only
an association between every personal action and
the feelings sympathetically imagined by the
agent with which the action will be regarded by
others, but it also implies that this association has
become so inseparable that the feeling appears as
an individual or personal one, distinguished by the
subject from other sentiments which he has on con-
sciously imagining himself in the position of others.
But it is referred to here as illustrating what we
find in Mill, and, in a different way, in Professor
Bain, that the first real step towards the utilitarian
standard is to make the individual pass somehow
or other to a standpoint outside his own nature.
In Mill this is done mainly by the assertion of the
social nature of man, in Grote by showing how a
moral sentiment may be arrived at by the com-
bined action of sympathy and association.
The further influence required in the transition (&) The idea
to utilitarianism is the idea of equality. The best
expression of utilitarian doctrine followed soon after
the assertion of the equal rights of men which
signalised the politics of the end of last century
in 'the French and American revolutions. Bentham
was permeated by the spirit of this movement,
70 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
however far he might be fron accepting its ab-
stractions about natural rights. In his hands, too,
utilitarianism was a political rather than an ethical
doctrine. " Everybody to count for one and nobody
for more than one" follows naturally from the
phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest
yto number." Without this assertion of the necessity
sympathy; of an equal distribution, there is no safeguard
against sympathy being restricted and partial in
its operation. Indeed the feeling of sympathy in
itself is naturally strongest towards those with
whom one is in most frequent relation, or con-
nected by numerous associative ties ; and if left to
itself, it might therefore be expected to give rise to
the extended selfishness of class or family interest,
only relieved by a spasmodic humanitarianism.
This tendency is corrected by the dogma of human
equality, which had been formulated as a juridical
maxim in the Eoman Jus Gentium, but afterwards
passed into a political creed, and found vent in the
literature of the eighteenth century and in the
public events which marked its close.
The change which this notion of human equality
passed through has been traced by Sir Henry
Maine. " Where the Eoman jurisconsult had
written ' aequales sunt/ meaning exactly what he
said, the modern civilian wrote ' all men are
equal ' in the sense of ' all men ought to be equal.'
The peculiar Eoman idea that natural law co-
THE TKANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 71
existed with civi 1 law and gradually absorbed it,
had evidently been lost sight of, or had become
unintelligible, and the words that had at most
conveyed a theory concerning the origin, composi-
tion, and development of human institutions, were
beginning to express the sense of a great standing
wrong suffered by mankind." l Now Bentham, influence of
however far he may have been from trusting to
the system of 'natural law,' 2 was certainly not
beyond the influence of the idea of human equality
which it carried in its train ; and, from his own
point of view, he laboured to defend it. In assimi-
lating this idea, utilitarianism has preserved one
of the best results of the old . " law of nature,"
without the ambiguity with which it had formerly
been used, 3 if in a sense which admits of a some-
what narrow and abstract interpretation.
1 Ancient Law, 8th ed., p. 93.
2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. ii. 14 n.
3 The ambiguity of the phrase is explained in an interesting
way in Sir H. Maine's account of the change from its juridical to
a political or ethical meaning. In some writers it seems to have
a third and still different signification. We must thus distinguish
(1) the juridical meaning, originating in the Roman " law common
to all nations," which had arisen through the " constant levelling
or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the praetorian
system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants," modified
subsequently by the Greek conception of iVdrojs. (2) The
political meaning, that all men ought to be equal, arose from
the preceding. But its notion of " ought " seems often to depend
on an idea of the constitution of nature according to which all
men are actually born equal not only in rights, soon to be
obscured by human convention, but also in power or faculty,
72 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
It is true that this does not give exactly the
result which is usually described as utilitarianism.
I have spoken of the notion of equality as the
regulator of sympathy a canon in accordance with
which the sympathetic impulse is to be guided.
Sympathy impels us to relieve the pains and in-
crease the pleasures of our fellow-men. The prin-
ciple of equality dictates that this sympathetic
activity is to be directed to the happiness of all
men equally. Every one whom our conduct may
be made to affect is to count as a unit, and a unit
only. The distribution is not to be according to
kinship of blood or social ties, though it is so much
afterwards unequally developed by education. Hence (3) the
natural meaning. The doctrines of evolution and heredity have
made this view seem as strange to us now as it would have done
to the Komans from whom it was illegitimately derived. Yet at
one time it seems to have been assumed, almost without question,
that there is but little difference in the natural endowments of
different men. This assumption lay at the basis of Hobbes's
political theory Leviathan, I. xiii. p. 60, was stated in a more
guarded form by Locke On Education, 1 ; Works, ed. of
1824, i. 6, and adopted almost without qualification by Hel-
vetius, who, carrying out Locke's metaphor of the soul as, at
birth, a " tabula rasa," afterwards written over with the pen of
experience, says : " Quintilien, Locke, et moi, disons : L'ine'galite'
des esprits est 1'efifet d'une cause connue, et cette cause est la
difference de 1'education " the causes of the existing inequality
being afterwards stated as twofold : first, the difference of environ-
ment, which may be called chance ; and secondly, the difference
of strength in the desire for instruction. De 1'homme, II. i., III.
i., IV. xxii. ; (Euvres, ii. 71, 91, 280. (Quintilian's statement,
however, is even more guarded than Locke's. Cf. Opera, ed.
Spalding, i. 47.)
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 73
more in our power to promote the happiness of
those closely connected with us, that it may fairly
occupy a larger share of our thought and energy
than the happiness of other people does. Utili-
tarianism carries the application of the principle
of equality still farther, by looking upon self as a
unit whose happiness is to be regarded as of exactly
equal value with that of any one else. "With every
individual reduced to the same ethical worth,
happiness is declared to be the end of moral action,
and equality of distribution the rule for deciding
between the claims of competing individuals.
It seems to me, therefore, that utilitarianism is 6. The two
a theory compounded out of two quite different ele- utilitarian
ments. On the one side the basis of the theory has gMy 0t
been laid by Bentham and Mill in a naturalistic connected,
psychology which looks upon pleasure as the only
object of desire. To this there is superadded the
idea of equality, which is the distinctively ethical
element in the theory. But it is only by confusion
that the idea of equality which Bentham expresses
by the proposition that the happiness of one man
is to count for no more than the happiness of
another can be supposed to be derived from the
same theory of human nature as that which iden-
tifies pleasure and desire. Utilitarianism only
becomes a practicable end for individual conduct
when psychological hedonism has been given up.
It is futile to say that one ought to pursue the
74 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
greatest happiness of the greatest number, unless
it is possible for the individual to act for some-
thing else than his own pleasure that is, for an
end which is for him not pleasure at all. In a
word, utilitarianism, while maintaining that the
only thing worth desiring is pleasure, must at the
same time admit that pleasure is not the only
object that can be or is desired : otherwise, it can
never advance from the egoistic to the universal-
istic form.
This view receives confirmation from the way in
which utilitarianism is held by the most eminent
of living moralists. In the 'Methods of Ethics/
the tradition of Bentham is expressly united with
the doctrines of Butler and Clarke. Professor
Sidgwick agrees with Bentham, and the long line
of moralists from Epicurus downwards, in main-
taining the doctrine of ethical hedonism, that
pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable ;
but, with Butler, he rejects the psychological
hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only
object of desire. So far from these two positions
being inconsistent, it is only through the second
that the first can be held in its universalistic form.
The problem is, however, how to unite them. In
Professor Sidgwick's theory, they are connected by
the application of the ethical maxims of benev-
olence and equity, which an exhaustive exami-
nation of ethical intuitions has left standing as
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 75
axioms of the practical reason. Though utilitari-
anism, therefore, is still adhered to, it is on an
expressly Eational ground, not on the basis of
Naturalism.
In this and the previous chapter, I have looked 7. summary
at human nature from the point of view of psycho- conseqwn-
logical hedonism, and have endeavoured to show 2hdS2i"
what ethical principles that theory leads to, or is hedonism :
consistent with. The theory does not deny that
there is a great diversity of capacities and interests
in man. But it holds that, so far as concerns
conduct, they admit of being brought under one
general law that every action is subject to the
rule of the " two sovereign masters, pleasure and
pain." It is evident, therefore, that if ethics is
to be connected at all with psychology if what
ought to be done is in any degree what can be
done the end of conduct must be hedonistic.
The psychological fact cannot indeed be without
more ado turned into a moral imperative. Yet
this much may be admitted, that if this interpre-
tation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the
end prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure,
or the avoidance of pain.
The question, therefore, was how to determine (a)noiogi-
the pleasure which is to be sought ? And I have tfon^tiT
tried to show, in the chapter just concluded, that ^ hta
utilitarianism does not admit of being logically
76 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
arrived at from this point of view. It may indeed,
under certain circumstances, 1 be the guide of politi-
cal or social enactments; but these can only be
made to bear upon the conduct of individuals
by the sanctions which the State or Society has
at its command. The individual can have as his
maxim of conduct an end which corresponds with
utilitarianism in two events only: when he is
so constituted as to find his pleasure in the great-
est aggregate pleasure of mankind, or when the
political and social sanctions are so complete and
searching as to make his individual interest and
the collective interest coincide. The former event
is unfortunately too rare to be taken into account
in establishing a theory ; the latter would imply
an interference with individual liberty so impracti-
cable that it is not contemplated even in the most
comprehensive of socialistic schemes.
Hedonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism
in ethics. But even this theory, as the previous
chapter has shown, has its own difficulties to meet.
The antagonism of individual and universal has not
yet been got rid of. The difficulty is no longer
caused by the conflict between one man and his
neighbours : it is the difference between the feeling
1 That is, when (1) the legislature accurately expresses the
average feeling of all the members of the State ; or (2) the legis-
lators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom " selfishness "
has taken the shape of benevolence.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 77
and action of a moment, and the sum of feelings and
actions which makes up a lifetime. It is true that,
if we admit that pleasure is the only thing worth
pursuing, and that by .." pleasure" a man means
" his own pleasure," there is so far no reason for
preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of
another, except as more certain or of greater
amount or degree ; l but this is to start with ascrib-
ing a value to pleasure, and not with the simple
fact that pleasure is desired. If psychological
hedonism is our starting-point and we give to the
theory the interpretation that has the greatest
verisimilitude it is the greatest present pleasure
that rules. And, although the man of reflection only under
will no doubt attempt to estimate the future pleas- cS
ure at its true value in comparison with the
pleasure actually present, this can never have full
effect upon his will. It has been shown, indeed,
that the realisation of egoistic hedonism is not
merely unattainable from the point of view of
psychological hedonism, but that it would involve
conditions inconsistent with the nature of desire.
1 Although, as is well known, propinquity was held by Ben-
tham to be an independent ground of distinction and preference.
Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iv. sect. 2.
78
CHAPTER IV.
MORAL SENTIMENT.
i. A uni- PSYCHOLOGICAL hedonism possesses the merit of
such asps7- ff erm g a simple and uniform theory of mental
ac ti n It m ay admit conflicting accounts of the
kinds of action and sufferance which actually give
men pleasure and pain, a point on which, for
example, Hobbes and J. S. Mill differ widely.
But it has one general formula for the relation of
feeling to action, which has been precise and clear
enough to attract many psychologists. The ethical
consequences of the theory have, indeed, turned
out if the argument of the preceding chapters
is valid to be neither so obvious nor so satisfac-
tory as its adherents have commonly supposed.
But it must nevertheless be admitted that, if
psychology shows pleasure to be, as a matter of
fact, the constant end of action, it will be useless
even if it is not impossible for ethics to prescribe
any other end.
MOKAL SENTIMENT. 79
The opponents of ethical hedonism have thus not supplied
uniformly insisted that the theory which makes pon^ts of
pleasure the end and motive of all conscious activity f hical he ~
domsm,
is imperfect ; and this psychological question has
been the battle-field of many of the controversies,
at any rate, of English ethics. Psychological he-
donism has not, however, been confronted by the
English moralists with an opposed theory of equal
simplicity, nor can the controversy be said to
have led to a thorough analysis of action. The
psychological investigation has, in most cases, been
carried no farther than the ethical interests at
stake seemed to require ; and the predominance
of these interests has perhaps prevented the in-
quiry from being carried out with complete free-
dom from preconception on either side.
A uniform theory under which our various par-
ticular desires might be brought may, indeed, be
said to have been suggested by Butler. He meets
the hedonistic proposition that all desire is for
personal pleasure, by the doctrine that no particu-
lar desire has pleasure as its end, since all pleas-
ure presupposes a previous desire in the satisfac-
tion of which it consists. 1 This theory, which may
have been derived from Plato, 2 and was afterwards
1 " The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presup-
poses particular passions or appetites ; since the very idea of
interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection
enjoys its object." Sermons, Pref. ; cf. Serm. xi.
2 Phil., 31 ff. ; cf. Gorg., 495 f. ; Rep., ix. 585.
80 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
used by Schopenhauer to prove the negative nature
of pleasure and consequent worthlessness of life,
is, however, a generalisation which cannot be made
to include the whole facts to be taken account of. 1
Many pleasures occur independently of any pre-
cedent desire. And what Butler had to show
and was really concerned to show was that desire
was not exclusively directed to objects thus inde-
pendently found to be pleasurable : the contra-
dictory, that is to say, and not the contrary, of
psychological hedonism.
in maintain- For this purpose Butler pointed to the whole
Sftyofnon- c ^ ass ^ affections which, although they may also
hedonistic en( j ^ p r i va t e interest, have an immediate refer-
activity.
ence to the good of others; and, in addition to
these, he contended for an original principle of
benevolence towards others in human nature, as
well as of self-love or care for one's own interests
and happiness. This latter, he held, so far from
being the sole principle of action, implied the exist-
ence of a number of particular passions and affec-
tions, directed immediately to external objects the
satisfaction of these desires giving pleasure, though
pleasure was not the end they aimed at. Volun-
tary action is thus not brought under any common
rubric ; for, at the same time that the calm prin-
ciple of self-love is directed to the agent's greatest
pleasure, the object of hunger, for example, is said
1 Cf. Sidgwick. Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 81
to be not pleasure but food, that of benevolence
not personal pleasure but the good of others.
The attempt to give unity to the non-hedonistic
view of desire has come from a different quarter.
Uninfluenced by the exigencies of ethical contro- by Herbart >
versy, which formed the entire motive of Butler's
investigation, Herbart and his school have worked
out a theory of desire, which has many points of
comparison with that of Butler. However much
they may differ from the English moralist of
whose existence they are mostly ignorant they
are at one with him in rejecting the maxim of
psychological hedonism, nihil appetimus nisi sub
specie loni ; and their differences from him are
largely due to their having gone further in their
analysis of the facts, and endeavoured to bring them
under a general principle.
Butler's view of the object of desire is distin-
guished from the Herbartian chiefly in two respects.
In the first place, he identifies that object with the
external or real thing, whereas Herbart is careful
to point out that it is a presentation or idea. In
the second place, while Butler is content to pos-
tulate an original tendency of our nature towards
certain objects, Herbart attempts to get behind this
tendency, and explain the phenomena of striving
from the interaction of presentations. Over and
above the ordinary hypothesis of natural realism,
Butler's theory implies a sort of pre-established
F
82 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
harmony between our active tendencies and things
outside the mind, in virtue of which some of these
things do, and some do not, attract our desires,
from the Herbart, on the other hand, attempts nothing less
ideas to aeif- than a complete genetic account of mental phen-
ion. omena ^ explaining the facts of presentation, desire,
and feeling through " the persistence of presenta-
tion in consciousness and their rise into clearer
consciousness." 1 The phenomena of desire and
feeling are both accounted for by this mechanism
of impelling and inhibiting forces. 2
It would be beyond the scope of this Essay to
examine the above view of the active side of mental
phenomena. For present purposes it is enough to
draw attention to the fact that the common de-
duction of the phenomena of desire and will from
the feelings of pleasure and pain is not the only
" scientific " theory of human action, and that it
is rejected on its merits by writers who have no
hankering after what the psychological hedonist
would call the mystical element of free-will. It
is of interest to note, too, that Professor Bain, in
1 Herbart, Psychologic als Wissenschaft, 104, Werke, vi. 74 ;
cf. Waitz, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, 40,
p. 418 : " It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the
presentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same
time, held back by an inhibition."
2 With Herbart's doctrine may be compared Mr H. Spencer's
view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of
Psychology, 2d ed., part iv. chaps, viii. and ix.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 83
whose works the traditions of psychological hedon-
ism find their most careful expression, has modified
the doctrine so as to allow of desire of pleasure and
avoidance of pain explaining less than had been
formerly required of them. Outside the circle of This ten
hedonistically -determined motives, he recognises the
influence of the presentation or idea as a self-realis-
ing element in the individual consciousness, apart
from its pleasurable or painful characteristics. 1
Those "fixed ideas,' 7 as Mr Bain calls them,
tend both to persist in the mind, and to project
themselves into action, independently of pleasure
and pain or at least with a force which is out of
proportion to the pleasure they bring. As has been
already seen, it is by means of this doctrine that he
explains " the great fact of our nature denominated
sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity, compassion, disinter-
estedness." 2 To the same category belongs " much
of the ambition and the aspirations of human
beings. ... A certain notion say of power,
wealth, grandeur has fixed itself in our mind and
keeps a persistent hold there." It is asserted, in-
deed, that the action of such fixed ideas " perverts
the regular operation of the will which would lead
us to renounce whatever is hopeless or not worth
the cost." And, certainly, their admission among
1 Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f.
2 The Senses and the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344 ; cf. Mental and
Moral Science, pp. 90, 91 .
84 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
mental phenomena seems to imply the superposition
of a new theory of action upon the old theory of psy-
chological hedonism. There is no disguising the im-
portance of the modification thus introduced. The
name " fixed idea " is misleading if it be taken to
imply that persistency and tendency to action are
properties belonging to a certain class of ideas only.
Mr Bain's doctrine is founded on the hypothesis of
the identity of the nervous centres which function
in representation and in sensation, and is therefore
valid of all representations or ideas. The char-
acteristics of persistency, and of tendency to action,
are therefore normal characteristics of presentations,
though they may belong in an unusual degree to
some ideas from the relation these hold to the
dominant cluster of ideas in the individual con-
sciousness. And if we thus attribute to all ideas
without exception the tendency to self-realisation,
and recognise as we must the relation of mutual
assistance or inhibition which ideas bear to one
another in virtue of their being " presented " to the
same subject, we have granted the material out of
which, in Herbart's skilful " Mechanik des Geistes,"
the phenomena of feeling and desire are woven.
2. The non- The view of individual human nature, which
thto iS of C nolds tnat a11 its desires are not directed to per-
action. sonal pleasure, thus claims consideration. With
its less restricted theory of action, this doctrine
MOEAL SENTIMENT. 85
may seem to offer a larger means of determining
the appropriate end of human conduct. In par-
ticular, the suggestion naturally occurs that the
ethical end will, on this theory, be something else
than pleasure. 1 But there is, nevertheless, no con-
tradiction in holding as Mr Sidgwick does that
although other objects than pleasure are actually
desired, there is nothing else which can be held to
be ultimately desirable, or the tendency to which
can be said to have moral worth.
The ethical barrenness of psychological hedonism Difficulty of
has been seen to result from its narrow and inflex- vSk^ g im he
ible view of human nature. But theories such as ? uls , QS {i
implies,
those now to be considered have, in an ethical
regard, to overcome a difficulty of another kind in
the variety of impulses which they admit upon the
stage. The " objects " to which these impulses or
desires relate have as yet received no further charac-
terisation than that they are objects of desire. And
the difficulty of finding a principle by which some
order of precedence or value amongst them may be
determined is just, in other words, the difficulty of
obtaining a moral standard.
The question does not ordinarily arise in the
1 " If there be any principles or affections in the mind of man
distinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend
towards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in
themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be
rested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle
or affection." Butler, Sermons, Pref.
86 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
above form, because the moral standard is com-
monly taken for granted, and the various impulses,
affections, and dispositions are made to derive their
ethical rank from their relation to that standard.
But this method is obviously inappropriate when
the standard is still to be ascertained, its determina-
tion being the object of inquiry. And it may seem
that the constitution of man contains in itself a
means of distinguishing the moral value of its vari-
ous elements, or of the actions to which they lead,
so as to de- and thus furnishing a moral standard or end for
standard* conduct. This purpose seems to have been to some
for action. ex fc en ^ though not quite clearly, kept in view by
the writers who, in last century, contended against
the selfish theory which had been so crudely enun-
ciated by Hobbes. They attempted to show that
selfishness was not the only, nor even the most
prominent, principle of action ; and, from the
system of diverse principles which they found
implanted in human nature, they endeavoured to
work out a theory of conduct.
This at- Especially amongst the later English moralists
the English Adam Smith, for instance the question of the
moralists, en( j Qr s t an( j ar (i came almost to drop out of sight
in the midst of the controversy regarding the
nature of the " moral sense " or " moral faculty "
the way, that is, in which we become aware of
the difference between right and wrong. But in
Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson the writers
MORAL SENTIMENT. 87
who formulated this doctrine of the moral sense
the attempt is made to connect a theory of the
criterion of morality with the source of our know-
ledge of it. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson both but along
looked upon social welfare or the general happiness tartan cri-
as the end of moral conduct, and the criterion in t lon>
accordance with which moral character is ascribed
to actions ; at the same time that their main con-
tention was for the immediateness of the " sense "
by which we perceive these moral qualities. And
they sought to establish the connection of the two
doctrines by means of the benevolent feelings
which they held to be original and independent of
private interest and their immediate approval by
the reflex or moral sense of the individual man.
Similar ideas appear in Butler, at the same time
that he tended to make conscience or the moral
sense the standard of morality, as well as the
source of our knowledge of it. They, as well as
he, however, found it necessary to come back from
the social or political to the individual point of
view. Even if their conception of " the good " was
not evolved from the nature of the individual man,
their philosophical standpoint required them to
leave broader ground, and show it to be the in-
dividual's natural goal. And in doing this, their and with
constant tendency is to revert to egoistic argu-
ments demonstrating the complete harmony of
virtue and interest, or attempting to prove to the
88 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
individual that his own happiness consists in the
exercise of the social affections. Thus Shaftesbury
tries to show, by an empirical collection of results,
that to have the " natural " (or social) affections too
weak, or the private affections too strong, is a source
of misery, 1 as well as the chief source of vice ; and
that, largely owing to the pleasure of virtuous
action, it is " to the private interest and good of
every one to work to the general good." 2 Hutche-
son, again, devotes a large portion of his most
mature work to allay the suspicion " that in follow-
ing the impulse of our kind affections and the
moral faculty we are counteracting our interests,
and abandoning what may be of more consequence
to our happiness than either this self -approbation
or the applauses of others ; " 3 while Butler, re-
ferring to virtuous conduct, says, in a well-known
passage, that " when we sit down in a cool hour we
can neither justify to ourselves this or any other
pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our
happiness, or at least not contrary to it." 4 Opposed
as the whole school were to the selfish theory of
human action, they never spoke of any sacrifice
of private happiness as a thing to be looked for, or
in any way taken into account, in conduct which is
the result of calm deliberation. It is difficult, there-
1 Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3.
2 Ibid., II. ii., conclusion.
3 System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99. 4 Sermons, xi.
UN]
MOKAL SENTIMENT.
fore, to avoid the judgment passed upon them by
Schleiermacher, that " the English school of Shaftes-
bury, with all their talk about virtue, are really
given up to pleasure." l
At the same time, their writings constantly sug- 3. Ethics
gest a theory of morals which is neither obliged to
adopt off-hand a utilitarian criterion of virtue, nor
forced to fall back upon the egoistic sanctions of
personal pleasure and pain. Their psychological
theory points to an ethical doctrine in which
pleasure is neither the sole end of action, nor its
sole motive. They do not, indeed, make quite clear
the transition from the psychological to the ethical
point of view ; and critics are still fond of confront-
ing Butler with the objection he anticipated Why
ought I to obey my conscience ? The apparent
petitio principii of Butler's answer, Because it is
the law of your nature, is due to the way in which
the teleological standpoint is introduced. The pur-
pose of which (according to Butler) man is the
vehicle or realising organism is spoken of as a law
externally imposed, and deriving its authority, not
from its own nature, but from the nature of its
origin.
There would seem to be one way only to sur-
mount the difficulty arising from the variety of
impulses of which the nature of man is made up,
and that is by consistently following out the teleo-
1 Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54.
90 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
logical point of view. But what, the question is,
is the final or comprehensive end to which human
nature points amidst this diversity of objects of
striving ? The doctrine of the " moral sense "
Different attempts to answer the question. Now this moral
n^ e of tbe sense may either be regarded as not itself a separate
the moral f acu lty, but simply an expression for the harmony
of human tendencies ; or it may be looked upon as
a separate and superior capacity, which, again, may
either be interpreted in terms of sense, or of the
understanding the former interpretation leading
to its identification with pleasure, the latter to its
being conceived as law.
(a) The bar- These different methods were attempted by the
i^puisfs. English moralists the first, however, to a less
shaftes- extent than the others. But it inspired much of
bury s
theory. Shaftesbury's work, though it cannot be said to
have been consistently developed by him. The
conflict of impulses in man was too obvious a fact
not to be apparent even in Shaftesbury's roseate
view of life. He recognised, indeed, not only
private or self-affections, promoting the good of
the individual, and " natural " or social affections,
which led to the public good, but also " unnatural
affections," which tended to no good whatever. 1
The reference to consequences is thus made pro-
minent at once. The last class of affections is
1 Inquiry, II. i. 3.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 91
condemned outright because of its infelicific re-
sults; while an attempt is made to prove from
experience that the courses of conduct to which
the two former lead coincide. Shaftesbury con-
tended for a real organic union between the indi-
vidual and society ; but, when he came to establish
its nature, he made it consist in an asserted har-
mony of interests, while the obligation to virtue
was allowed to rest on its conduciveness to personal
pleasure. He sometimes spoke of virtue as identical
with the harmonious development of the affections of
the individual man ; * but he expressly defined it as
consisting in the individual " having all his inclina-
tions and affections . . . agreeing with the good of
his kind or of that system in which he is included,
and of which he constitutes a part." 2 And the
two views can only be connected by proving that
the harmonious development of an individual's
affections will lead to the good of the species : the
proof of this depending on a one-sided summation
of consequences. Shaftesbury does, indeed, throw
out the idea that both the self -affections and the
" natural " or social affections become self-destruc-
tive when carried out so as to interfere with one
another. But this, again, has only the previous
calculus of the results of conduct to support it. He
cannot show that the contradiction in the conception
of a completely solitary being belongs also to the con-
1 Inquiry, II. i. 3 ; II. ii. 2. 2 Ibid., II. i. 1.
92 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
ception of a judiciously selfish being. The latter
being loses the pleasures of virtuous action; but
perhaps he may gain greater pleasures in their room.
He does not develop his whole nature ; but if that na-
ture contains totally infelicific passions, the develop-
ment of the whole nature is not to be recommended.
Thus Shaftesbury is unable to reach a conception
of man's nature as a harmony of impulses just on
account of the external point of view which makes
him treat it as an aggregate, though he contends
that it is an organism. His ingenious and subtle
account of the relations between the individual
and society does not really go to the root of the
matter, because, after all, it remains a calculus of
the results of action, not an analysis of its nature.
And his view of the affections constituting the
individual system leaves them wanting in the
unity of organic connection. An effort is made,
however, to supply this defect by means of the
reflex affections called the " moral sense/' to which
he ascribes an oversight over the other affections
and their resultant actions. In what way, then,
must we regard the nature of this faculty and the
important functions assigned to it ?
It was left to Shaftesbury's disciple, Francis
Hutcheson, to elaborate with thoroughness this
conception of the moral sense as a separate faculty.
Hutcheson did not make any important addition
MORAL SENTIMENT. 93
to the ideas of Shaftesbury and Butler. But he
worked them out more systematically ; and in his
last work, the ' System of Moral Philosophy/ the
protest against the egoism of Hobbes has found
expression in a complete theory of human nature,
in which the " moral sense " is supreme, and the
ends of conduct independent of self - interest.
Hutcheson, too, keeps more closely than either
of his immediate predecessors to the way of look-
ing at human nature which is spoken of in this
volume as " naturalistic." He rejects even more
decidedly than Shaftesbury much more so than
Butler any creative function of reason in deter-
mining the constitution and direction of the moral
sense. 1 The questions thus arise (a) What is the TWO ques-
moral sense when not regarded as a rational deter- ingTt?^
mination of the ends of conduct ? and (&) To what
determination of ends or other distinction between
right and wrong in action does it lead ? On both
these points there is a difference between his early
' Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty
and Virtue ' (1725), and the more mature ' System/
published in 1755, eight years after his death.
" What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting
any end ? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists
is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is
determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another
instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper
a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness ? "
Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115.
94 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
() Nature of Hutcheson is in earnest with the rejection of
this faculty:
not reason; reason as a creative force. I he moral sense is not,
he says, a source of new ideas. Its objects are
received in the ordinary ways by which, through
"sensation and reflection," we come by our know-
ledge. 1 But just as we have a sense of beauty in
the forms of sensible objects, so there is a moral
sense given us from which, in the contemplation of
our actions, we derive " still nobler pleasures " than
at first de- those of physical sensation. This moral sense is
ing of lima- " a determination of our minds to receive amiable
or pam, OY disagreeable ideas of actions." 2 So far, there-
fore, it seems to be simply a pleasure in the con-
templation of certain actions which, we say, have
" an immediate goodness." " By a superior sense,"
says Hutcheson, " which I call a moral one, we
perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such
actions in others, and are determined to love the
agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in
being conscious of having done such actions our-
selves) without any view of further natural advan-
tage from them." 3 The significance of this posi-
tion' is easily seen. It is not only meant to give a
criterion of moral action ; it is also a short cut to
the conclusion that virtue is for our private in-
terest. The disquieting suspicion that morality
may involve a sacrifice of individual happiness
1 Cf. System, i. 97 ; Inquiry, p. 124. 2 Inquiry, p. 124.
3 Ibid., p. 106.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 95
" must be entirely removed, if we have a moral
sense and public affections, whose gratifications are
constituted bvnature our most intense and durable
pleasures." 1 {JTEe elaborate analysis of conduct and
enumeration of the pleasures which various affec-
tions and actions bring in their train, which
Hutcheson gave in his latest work, were thus
unnecessary as long as the position was maintained
that the moral sense is emphatically a pleasure or
pain, and that the pleasures it gives are the most
intense and durable we have.
There was only an apparent contradiction in this
theory which placed the test of morality in a pleas-
ure consequent upon moral action, and yet held
that such actions were not performed from inter-
ested motives. In the spirit of Butler's psychology,
Hutcheson contends 2 that virtue is pleasant only
because we have a natural and immediate tendency
towards virtuous action ; our true motive is " some
determination of our nature to study the good of
others ; " and this, although not always immediately
pleasant in itself, is yet succeeded by the calm
satisfaction of the moral sense. The real weakness
of Hutcheson's position is the fatal one that he
cannot show that it corresponds with facts; that
the pleasures incidental to the moral sense out-
1 Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affec-
tions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. xix.
2 Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff.
96 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
weigh all others. Indeed, he defends his opinion
in their favour only, in a way which reminds one
of Mill's method in the ' Utilitarianism/ by making
every juror stand aside unless he has pledged him-
self to morality. 1 It is open to any one, however,
to hold that the pleasures of benevolent action and
the " relish " of the moral sense are not of sufficient
hedonistic value to make up for the restraints they
put upon conduct and the enjoyments they oblige
one to forego. Even if this position be not correct,
it is merely a mistake in estimating doubtful quan-
tities. The man who chooses the smaller pleasure
will be the loser by his mistake ; but we cannot
say that the selfish man is to blame for not being
benevolent, because the pleasures of benevolence
and the moral sense are greatest, any more than
we could blame the benevolent man for not being
selfish, if selfishness should turn out on the whole
to leave a greater hedonistic balance at the indi-
vidual's credit.
afterwards A more objective determination of the nioral
, 8 sense is afterwards given by Hutcheson. Without
professedly changing ground, he ceases to speak of
it as a mere feeling of pleasure, and calls it a judg-
ment of approbation or disapprobation. " It is," he
he says, 2 " a natural and immediate determination
1 Introduction to Moral Philosophy, translated from the Latin,
2d ed., 1753, p. 43 ; cf. Essay on the Passions and Affections,
&c., p. 128. 2 System,!. 58.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 97
to approve certain affections and actions consequent
upon them ; or a natural sense of immediate excel-
lence in them, not referred to any other quality
perceivable by our other senses or by reasoning."
Nor is this judgment of approbation consequent
upon the feeling of pleasure the affection or action
produces in us. The action is not "judged good
because it gains to the agent the pleasure of self-
approbation, but it gains to him this pleasure be-
cause it was antecedently good, or had that quality
which, by the constitution of this sense, we must
approve." l But, in attempting to make clear the but this
nature of this judgment, Hutcheson seems to re- In ^dt
turn, though not in so many words, to his earlier f^^* 10
position. To seek a basis for the judgment in reason
would have been to make the " moral sense " what
Kant afterwards made it, simply practical reason.
This, however, would have been a "metaphysic
of ethics" inconsistent with Hutcheson's whole
position. He had always opposed the narrowly
intellectual view of morality in Clarke and Wollas-
ton, and he had no conception of the function of
reason which would admit of an interpretation of
the judgment of approbation by an appeal to a
rational determination, depending upon an idea
conceived as inherent in the human constitution,
and to be realised in action. The judgment, there-
fore, is referred to a " taste or relish " 2 for certain
1 System, i. 53. 2 Ibid., i. 59.
98 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
affections and actions, and this he takes no pains
to distinguish from pleasure.
The analogy he seeks to draw between the moral
sense and our other powers does not really favour
a distinction of it from pleasure. " To each of our
powers," he says, " we seem to have a corresponding
taste or sense, recommending the proper use of it
to the agent, and making him relish or value the
like exercise of it by another. This we see as to
the powers of voice, of imitation, designing, or
machinery, motion, reasoning ; there is a sense
discerning or recommending the proper exercise
of them." 1 That is to say, besides the sense of
hearing, which has to do with sounds, there must
needs be another sense which has to do with our
way of hearing sounds ; besides the sense of sight,
which has to do with form and colour, there must
needs be another sense which has to do with our
way of perceiving form and colour ; and so with
every other activity, especially those which proceed
from our " highest powers." A doctrine such as this
sets no limits to the manufacture of additional senses.
The whole view of human nature upon which it pro-
ceeds is one of meaningless complexity, which serves
the one good purpose only of showing how -much
ethics has suffered from a defective psychology.
The mental objects or presentations which are
distinguished from one another by the difference
1 System, i. 59.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 99
of their characteristic qualities, and which we
therefore call colours, or sounds, or movements,
are accompanied by varying degrees of pleasurable
or painful feeling ; and it is possible to hold that
the moral sense is a name for such feelings following
in the train of those complexes of presentations
to which we give the name of actions, or of those
other recurring complexes we call affections. This,
practically, was the position with which Hutcheson
started in the c Inquiry/ Benevolence pleased us
and selfishness pained us; just as the taste of
sugar was pleasant, and that of wormwood dis-
agreeable. Perhaps Hutcheson departed from this
theory, because he saw that if conduct was made a
matter of taste, there would be no sufficient reason
for condemning selfishness any more than an un-
usual taste. He therefore relinquished, or seems to
have relinquished, the view of the moral sense as a
feeling of pleasure or pain ; and under the influence,
no doubt, of Butler, spoke of it as a judgment of
approbation or disapprobation. But he fell back on
his original theory by making this judgment depend
on " a taste or relish," which only lends itself to
interpretation as a peculiar feeling of pleasure.
The reflex nature of the moral sense is brought ($ The ot>-
out more distinctly in the 'System' than in the
' Inquiry/ In his earlier work, Hutcheson had I
spoken of it as directly related to actions. But
it was more consistent with his maturer thought
100 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
afterwards to regard it as having to do with mental powers
tions ; or " affections " in the first instance, and with
actions only indirectly or mediately. " The object
of this sense," he says, 1 " is not any external motion
or action, but the inward affections or dispositions ; "
and this is made by him to account for the dis-
crepancy which the deliverances of the moral sense
show in regard to actions. It " seems ever to
approve and condemn uniformly the same imme-
diate objects, the same affections and dispositions ;
though we reason very differently about the actions
which evidence certain dispositions or their con-
traries." This distinction is applied with unlimited
confidence in its efficacy. By means of it he would
explain the most fundamental differences in the
moral code of men and nations. Thus people un-
acquainted with the industrial improvements which
give the character of permanence to property, may
" see no harm in depriving men of their artificial
acquisitions and stores beyond their present use,"
that is to say, " no evil may appear in theft." 2
But it is more important in another respect ; for
it enables the author to avoid the difficulty of
finding any principle according to which the moral
sense may be related to the empirical content of
action. As long as the moral sense was simply
spoken of as a feeling of pleasure, it could be
conveniently regarded as the consequent of ex-
1 System, i. 97. 2 System, i. 93.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 101
ternal actions. But if it is an internal sense
distinct from pleasure, it is easier to relate it to
what he calls our internal powers or affections
than to action. The moral sense, then, is to be
the regulator of all our powers ; and by means of
it Hutcheson attempts to reduce human nature to
a scale of morality.
It is to be noted that, in the classification he but its
offers, 1 what are commonly called the virtues of preference
candour, veracity, &c., are not accounted virtues
at all, but only immediately connected with virtuous
affections : these are identified with the " kind " or
benevolent affections, directed to the happiness of
sentient beings. Within the latter there are two
grounds of preference : the deliberate affections are
preferred to the passionate ; those which are more
extensive in the range of their objects to the less
extensive. With regard to the former ground of
preference, the " moral sense " of the community has
perhaps undergone some modification since Hut-
cheson's time, and looks upon enthusiasm with less
suspicion than it formerly did. The other ground
of preference ascribed to the moral sense refers not
so much to the affection itself which is the direct
or immediate object of the moral sense as to the
way in which the affection is applied, the number mainly de-
of the objects to which it is directed. The affec- p<
1 System, i. 68 ff. With this may be compared the elaborate
classification of motives, according to their moral quality, in Dr
Martineau's ' Types of Ethical Theory,' ii. 176 ff.
102 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOKY.
the nature tion of benevolence is the same in nature whether
of the affec- . .
tion, but on its object be wide or restricted; though difference
objects. .^ ^ig respect profoundly influences the actions to
which it leads. The object approved or most ap-
proved by the moral sense is therefore, according
to Hutcheson, utilitarian conduct, or rather, as he
would say, the calm disposition leading thereto. 1 In
this way he obtains a principle for determining the
morality of actions ; but only through the arbitrary
assertion that this principle is immediately ap-
proved by the moral sense/ The connection of the
moral sense with an object such as universal bene-
volence could only be made out by showing a
rational, or at any rate an organic union between
individual sentiment and social wellbeing ; and
Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, has no conception of
attempting this in any other way than the tradi-
tional one of exhibiting the personal advantages of
benevolent conduct, and the disadvantages that
accompany selfishness.
(c) Third Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were often led
moral sense, astray by a tendency to interpret facts as they
wished them to be, rather than as they were.
Their view of the consequences of action was
Butler. coloured by their optimism. Butler, too, in spite
of the difference in his general attitude to the
value of human life, was not altogether free from
1 System, i. 50.
MORAL SENTIMENT. 103
a similar error. He thinks that Shaftesbury " has
shown beyond all contradiction that virtue is natur-
ally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery
of such a creature as man." l But, in view of par-
ticular exceptions, or of any one not being con-
vinced of "this happy tendency of virtue," he
thinks it necessary to emphasise the "natural conscience
authority of the principle of reflection." Con- tatireUw,"
science is, he holds, a part of our inward nature ;
but it differs from the other parts of our nature
inasmuch as it is not related immediately to an
external object, but to the actions dealing with
such objects, and to the dispositions leading to
those actions. It is a principle of "reflex appro-
bation or disapprobation," which is said to have
equal respect to both public and private good.
This tendency, however, would seem to be ascer-
tained empirically. The deliverances of conscience
are immediate judgments as to the morality of
actions and affections (for Butler speaks of it as
referring to both equally) ; and its reference to
the ends which those actions or the exercise of
these affections may ultimately tend to would,
therefore, seem to be indirect. 2 Butler was care-
ful, moreover, not to speak of it as an aesthetic
1 Sermons, Pref.
2 Although it is not "at all doubtful in the general, what
course of action this faculty or practical discerning power within
us, approves. ... It is ... justice, veracity, and regard to the
common good." Dissertation on Virtue.
104 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
or sensitive faculty, but as a judgment. It is not
a feeling of pleasure, but the revelation of law.
and the The approval of conscience is thus made the
of'moraiity. criterion of morality. But a difficulty arises as
to the way in which we are to regard the author-
ity which conscience is said to carry along with
it. Butler's utterances here commonly imply a
teleological reference to an end implanted in human
nature, and to be discovered by observing that
nature the realisation of the end being obliga-
tory, because it is shown to be the purpose which
the author of nature had in view in making man
as he is. 1 The authority of conscience thus seems
to be derived from the divine purpose which it
displays. It carries within itself a claim to obedi-
ence ; but the justification of this claim depends
on a theological basis. And hence the question
of the nature and origin of conscience is at once
raised, in order to determine the legitimacy of its
claim to be, rather than any other part of our
constitution, a divinely-implanted guide.
Teieoiogicai But more than one current of thought runs
rtewsnot through Butler's ethical treatise. The theological
Tfimy d ' reference is sometimes so used as to make the
developed, obligation to morality, and even the nature of
morality, depend on the will of God : though
hardly according to Paley's crude method of seek-
ing in the external revelation of the divine com-
1 Sermons, ii. iii.
MOKAL SENTIMENT. 105
mand a means of uniting the divergent interests
of the individual and of society. In general,
Butler's ruling idea is the idea of the system or
unity of human nature, for which he was largely
indebted to Shaftesbury's revival of the Platonic
conception. Conscience is regarded by him as the
expression of this unity. But its nature is never
more deeply probed. Its deliverances are justified
now by its supernatural mission, and now by the
more prosaic fact that it leads to our individual
interest 1 at any rate, " if we take in the future "
while it could not be recommended as a guide
if it did not. 2 On one side, therefore, Butler tends
to a form of theological utilitarianism, such as was
common in his own day, and was afterwards formu-
lated by Paley. 3 On the other hand, his ethics
more naturally allies itself with a different theory,
in which the moral law is conceived as having its
source in practical reason, and the naturalistic basis
of ethics is definitely abandoned.
On the whole, it would appear that the psycho- 4. The ethics
logical ethics worked out by Shaftesbury and his timenta 86
school occupies an insecure position between the ^^^
view discussed in the two preceding chapters and
that which ascribes to reason a function in the
formation of objects of desire. Shaftesbury and
his followers tried to strike out a middle course
1 Sermons, iii. v. 2 Ibid., xi.
3 Cf. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, i. 192.
106 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
between the theory that ends of action may be
determined by reason, and that which looks upon
all desires as being desires for objects as pleasur-
able. They made the attempt to found a system
of ethics on human nature, and they held that
that nature could not be accounted for by the
simple psychological analysis of the Epicurean
school as then represented by Hobbes. On the
other hand, they did not see their way to adopt
the " rational " ethics only known to them in the
abstract form it had received at the hands of
Clarke and Wollaston. But their own theory of
human nature requires a principle of harmony and
co-ordination among the various impulses which
they were unable to give a satisfactory account
explanation of. It may seem, however, that the idea of the
attempted development of man with which we are now
evomuon f f am ili ar > ma 7 enable us to overcome the diffi-
culties which formerly appeared insurmountable
showing the unity of human nature, and the ten-
dency of its activity. The general course of evolu-
tion, to which all life has been subject, is thought
to have brought about a harmony between indi-
vidual and social feelings, as well as between
individual and social interests, and thus to have
removed the obstacles in the way of founding
morality on the basis of Naturalism. It is, there-
fore, of importance to examine with care the ethical
bearings of the theory of evolution.
107
PAKT II.
THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
CHAPTEE Y.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MORALITY.
To relinquish the individualistic theory of ethics i- General
. characteris-
does not necessarily imply a recourse to evolution, tics of the
It may still be possible to rest the foundation of evoiut
ethics on the state, without that view of the
growth of the community and of its connection
with the individual which the theory of evolution
involves. This, as has already been pointed out,
was, in part, what Bentham did ; while an attempt
in some respects more elaborate still to deduce
morality from society was made by Hobbes. The
theory of Bentham, and of his successor Professor
Bain, is indeed partly individualistic, partly social. 1
1 The social basis of ethics is emphasised by Professor Bain
108 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
Iii the former reference, ethics becomes a theory of
prudence ; in the latter, a part of legislation. With
Hobbes, on the other hand, the identification of
individual and social interests is supposed to be
brought about by the absolute necessity, in order
to personal security, of a supreme political power,
into the hands of which all men have agreed to
transfer their rights to all things. But both
Hobbes and Professor Bain might have avoided
obvious difficulties had they had the theory of
evolution to assist them, and had they thought
themselves justified in making use of it. 1 For
want of it the former has to explain morality and
its binding force by means of the fiction of an
" original contract " ; while the latter has to ac-
count by the associations of a few years for the
harmony of feeling between the individual and the
whole, and for the good of the community coming
to be so faithfully reflected in the consciences of its
in his Practical Essays (1884), p. 155 : " ' How is society to be
held together ? ' is the first consideration ; and the sociologist
as constitution-builder, administrator, judge is the person to
grapple with the problem. It is with him that law, obligation,
right, command, obedience, sanction, have their origin and their
explanation. Ethics is an important supplement to social or
political law. But it is still a department of law. In any other
view it is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment."
1 Without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of
evolution to mind, Professor Bain holds that, as a fact, moral
sentiment has not become organic and hereditary " that there
are no moral instincts properly so called." The Emotions and
the Will, 3d ed., p. 56.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 109
members. The theory of evolution, by its doctrine
of the hereditary transmission of acquired modifi-
cations, gives a scientific basis for this existing
solidarity between man and society.
The great consensus of opinion amongst those
who are best qualified to judge amongst those
who alone are qualified to judge may be regarded
as having established the claim of the theory of
evolution to give the most satisfactory account of
all forms of natural life. And it may seem only
advancing the theory a step further, or only de-
veloping one of its applications, to make it yield a
complete explanation of human nature, mental as
well as physical. If ethics, then, is to be founded
on a " natural " basis, no theory would seem to be
complete which leaves evolution out of account.
In general, the theory of evolution is an assertion an assertion
of the unity of life, or, in its widest form, of the ofiife; Um
unity of existence. Progressive modifications and
hereditary transmission of such modifications are,
it is contended, sufficient to explain the different
forms and species which life now manifests. The
assumption is specially discarded that there are
fixed differences between kinds of living things
making it impossible for them all to have developed
from simple germs, originally of like constitution,
which have, in the course of time, become more
heterogeneous and complex, and so given rise to
the wealth of organic life. But this general doc-
110 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
trine, held (wholly or in part) in modern times by
Kant, Wolff, and Lamarck, needed to be supple-
mented by a definite view of the way in which the
progressive modifications took place ; and this re-
quired to be established as a really operative
cause, before evolution could receive scientific'
proof. This more special element of the theory
was Darwin's contribution to the subject. Evolu-
tion, he showed, and herein consists his theoret-
ical advance on Lamarck, has taken place by the
" natural selection " of organisms, so modified as to
fit them for survival in the struggle for existence.
Organisms in which advantageous modifications
have been produced tend to survive, and to trans-
mit their modified structure to descendants, while
organisms in which such modifications have not
been produced, are less able to preserve their life
and to hand it on to successors. Older types, it is
true, remain, but only in circumstances in which
their continued existence does not seriously inter-
fere with the organisms which, in the struggle for
life, have developed a structure better suited to
their environment: when more perfect and less
perfect forms cannot exist together, only the better
adapted survive.
in first in-/' The theory of evolution is thus primarily the
history of an order of sequent facts and relations.
It is an account of the origin or growth of things,
which attempts to explain their nature and consti-
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. Ill
tution by showing how they have come to be what
they are. But, in so doing, it naturally reveals the
method and tendency of this order. And it is by but impli
means of this its teleological aspect that we see how ca^aspe
it may be possible for it not merely to trace the de- ^
velopment of historical facts, such as the feelings conse -
quences.
and customs of men, but at the same time to make
a more real contribution to ethics by pointing out
the course of action to which human nature is
adapted. It does not, like the old teleology, at- ^J
tempt to show that each thing has been formed
with the design of subserving some particular
purpose. On the contrary, it reverses this way of
looking at things. The fitness of an organism to
fulfil any definite end comes to be regarded as the
result not of a conscious design, independent of the
environment, but of the modifications produced on
the organism through the necessity laid upon it by
its surroundings of adapting itself to them or else
disappearing. What the theory does show is, that
adaptation to environment is necessary for life, and
that organisms unable to adapt themselves pass
away. Adaptation to environment will thus be
implied in, or be an essential means towards, self-
preservation and race -preservation, self -develop-
ment and race-development. And should this pre-
servation or development be looked upon as the end
of conduct, the adaptation to environment it im-
plies may help to define and characterise the end.
112 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
Again : when an organism adapts itself to its en-
vironment, it does so by some modification being
produced in its structure corresponding to the modi-
fied function required by the conditions of life. In
this way, one organism increases in complexity in a
certain direction, while another organism, in differ-
ent circumstances, also develops a more compli-
cated structure, though one of a different kind.
Thus organisms, alike to begin with, become heter-
ogeneous in nature through exposure to different
surroundings. At the same time, by constant in-
teraction with their environments, they become
more definite and coherent in structure. Incipient
modifications are developed and defined in different
ways by different circumstances, and the parts of a
living being are brought into closer reciprocal rela-
tions, and thus welded into a coherent organic
whole. This is what Mr Spencer means when he
says that evolution implies a transition from " an
indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite co-
herent heterogeneity " : 1 the whole process being
interconnected in such a way that these different
aspects of it definiteness, coherence, heterogeneity
increase together and imply one another. By
this the inference would appear to be suggested
that, if conduct is to harmonise with the conditions
of evolution, this characteristic feature of it must
be recognised in the ethical end.
1 First Principles, 4th ed., p. 380.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 113
In saying this, I am perhaps anticipating results. Distinction
But it is well to show at the outset how the essen-
tially historical inquiry carried out by the evolu- ethical
aspects.
tionists may suggest conclusions which are ethical
in their nature. To some, indeed, it will appear
superfluous to have spent even a sentence in suggest-
ing a primd facie case for the ethical importance
of evolution. If there is one subject more than
another, it may be thought, which has secured a
place for itself in the scientific consciousness of the
day, it is the evolution-theory of ethics.<-Without
question, the phrase has been received into the
scientific vocabulary ; but there is a good deal, even
in the official literature on the question, to make
one doubt whether it is always used with a distinct
conception of its meaning. When reference is made
to the " ethics of evolution," no more is sometimes
meant though a great deal more should be meant
than an historical account of the growth of moral
ideas and customs, which may provide (as Mr
Stephen expresses it) " a new armoury wherewith
to encounter certain plausible objections of the
so-called Intuitionists." This, however, would only
affect the ethical psychology of an opposed school.
The profounder question still remains, What bear-
ing has the theory of evolution, or its historical
psychology and sociology, on the nature of the ethical
end, or on the standard for distinguishing right and
wrong in conduct? The answer to this question
H
114 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
will be the " reconstruction " and " deeper change "
which Mr Stephen holds to be necessary. 1 It is
the ambiguity of the subject or rather its twofold
range which has made the application of evolution
to ethics look so obvious, and made a discussion of
the easier question frequently do duty for a solution
of the more difficult. The ethical writings of the
evolutionists, indeed, often confuse the problems of
history and theory in a way which presents the
same difficulty to the critic as the works of the cor-
responding school in -jurisprudence. In both, the
writers seem disinclined fairly to put to themselves
the question as to the kind of subjects to which so
fruitful a method as that which has fallen into their
hands is appropriate : what its conditions are, and
whether it has any limits at all. Every one is now
familiar with the evils of hypothetical history, and
with the iniquity of the proverbial philosophic
offence of constructing facts out of one's inner con-
sciousness. The historical jurists deserve no little
credit for the thoroughness with which this has
been enforced by them ; perhaps, too, the same les-
son may be learned from the facts of the develop-
ment of morality. But it may be questioned whether
we are not at the present time more apt to confuse
fact and theory in the opposite way : whether the
science of law is not sometimes lost sight of in the
history of legal institutions, and ethics in danger
1 Science of Ethics, p. vi.
THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION. 115
of being identified with the development of moral
sentiments and customs.
We may naturally expect the theory of evolution
to throw light on such questions as the growth of
moral feelings and ideas, and of the customs and
institutions in which morality is expressed and
embodied. But to show the process morality has
passed through in the individual mind and in society
still leaves the question as to the end of conduct
unanswered. It is necessary, therefore, to keep
clearly before us the distinction between the histo-
rical and the ethical problem, if we would success-
fully attack the subject of the bearing of the theory
of evolution on this fundamental question of ethics.
To the theory of evolution we are indebted for the
opening up of a new field of investigation the his-
torical treatment of conduct. But it is one thing
to describe the way in which men have acted in the
past : to determine the end for their action now is
quite a different problem ; and there is no reason why
the distinction should be overlooked. The interest
which belongs to the history of morality is not
solely nor mainly due to its bearing on questions
beyond the historical sphere. That its results will
not be without relation and that of an important
kind to questions of theory may well be expected.
But it can only tend to confusion if we treat the
development of morality, in the human mind and
in society, from a preconceived attitude dogmatic
116 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
or agnostic towards the central problem of
ethics.
2. The de- The way in which the theory of evolution is ap-
ofmoramy: P^ e( ^ to ethical psychology is easy enough to under-
(a) historical s fc an( j j n principle, though complex and obscure in
psychology.
many of its details. We have only to postulate
that mental as well as bodily traits admit of modi-
fication, and that modifications once produced can
be transmitted to descendants, 1 and it 1 at once fol-
lows that sentiments and -ideas leading to actions
which promote life will be encouraged and devel-
oped by natural selection. Thus parental and filial
feelings, once originated, may have been developed
through those families and tribes in which they
were strongest, presenting a more united, and
therefore stronger, front against hostile influences.
The feelings of tribal sympathy and patriotism, too,
may have had a similar history. Those races in
which they were strongest would, other things
being equal, obtain the mastery over and extermi-
nate other races in which they were relatively weak.
The compactness of the community would even be
promoted by that fear of the political and of the
1 It would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only
takes place in the form of modified physical structure (cf. Gr. H.
Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, i. 164). But, if we
regard it as established that every mental change has a structural
modification corresponding to it, the possibility of mental evolu-
tion and inheritance presents no new difficulty^
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 117
religious control in which the feeling of obligation
is said to have had its root. In general, benevo-
lence and sympathy amongst a people give it a soli-
darity from which it derives a stronger position, so
that in turn the benevolent and sympathetic feel-
ings gain free scope to develop and expand.
But the working out of this theory is not with- its difficui-
out its own difficulties. In the first place, the factor origin of
in the theory of evolution which can be most w s fe(
clearly traced the principle of natural selection
is not itself a source of change or of the production
of new results. It is only the means by which
advantageous changes are preserved and disadvan-
tageous changes passed by. The initiative in these
changes comes either from the unequal pressure of
the environment or from some tendency to vary in
the organism itself. Now, if we suppose certain
moral relations and the feelings corresponding to
them to exist in a society, and to tend to greater
certainty and' fulness of life on the part of those
who possess them, such relations and feelings will
be favoured by the operation of natural selection,
and will gradually be assimilated into the tissue of
the social organism. But this does not account for
the origin of morality generally nor of any par- ^
ticular moral relation ; it merely shows how, having
been somehow originated, it has naturally come to
persist. There are thus really two points to be
considered in tracing the development of moral
118 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
ideas the question of origin and the question of
persistence. The latter is accounted for by natural
selection; the former must be brought under the
obscure laws of variation, laws so obscure that
variations in nature are frequently spoken of as if
they took place by chance. These two questions
are involved at each stage in the progress of
morality. But it is at the initial stage that the
and of the question of origin is of greatest importance: when
sdousness"- ^ e a ^tempt is made to show how, in the course of
time, and by the aid of purely physical and biolo-
gical laws, feelings and conduct, from being merely
natural and reflex, have acquired a moral character
when, in a word, the moral is being evolved out
of the non-moral. A difficulty comes to the front
here which scarcely arises when we are simply
tracing the various phases through which the moral
consciousness has passed, and the various forms in
which moral conduct and feelings have expressed
and embodied themselves. The latter subject is
obviously within the scope of the theory of evo-
lution, if that theory applies to the processes of
the human mind and society as well as to those of
external nature. And, although each stage involves
a modification to be accounted for not by natural
selection, but by the laws of variation, yet the
variation is within facts of the same order, and
creates no more difficulty than the successive modi-
fications of living tissue which have been implied
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOKALITY. 119
in the evolution of organic nature. But the transi-
tion from the non-moral to the moral is a transition
to a different order of facts or perhaps we should
rather say to a different way of looking at facts,
and should not be assumed to be a process of the
same kind and explicable by the same method of
investigation as the passage from one fact to the
similar fact which immediately follows it. It may
be compared, perhaps, to the transition from the
sphere of inorganic matter to that of life. At the
same time, it is frequently maintained that we
unduly limit the application of the law of evolution
if we deny its power to show how morality has
developed out of customs and institutions whose
origin can be traced to purely natural or non-
moral causes. And, for present purposes, it is
sufficient to have pointed out that this does not
necessarily follow from the admission that evolution
applies to mental and social processes as well as
to the facts of external nature. It is not my object
to criticise any doctrine of the development of mor-
ality ; but, starting with the position taken up with
regard to it by the theory of evolution, to inquire
what conclusions it may lead to as to the end of
action.
A further difficulty has to be met by the theory thedeveiop-
n, ini ,., ,.,.. ment of feel-
oi the development or morality, which is in a sense i llgs apart
complementary of the initial difficulty encountered
in differentiating the moral from the non-moral.
120 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
This further difficulty awaits it at a subsequent
stage of development when the extension and re-
finement of moral feeling seem to have gone on in
circumstances where there is no room for natural
selection to work. Thus it has been admitted that
the feeling of sympathy, and the habitual exercise
of mutual good offices among members of a com-
munity, strengthen that society, and make it fit
to prevail in the struggle for existence over other
similar societies, the members of which are not so
much at one amongst themselves in feeling and
in act.
But as benevolence and sympathy widen, and
become less closely connected with a definite
association of individuals, such as the family or
tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to
the welfare of which these social feelings contri-
bute, the operation of the law of natural selection
becomes less certain. This law only tends to con-
serve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue
of the fact that the associations to whose good they
lead are successful in the struggle for life over
other associations the members of which are not
animated by like feelings. The one association
lives and expands, while the others are unable to
maintain themselves against the encroachments of
their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces. The law
of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only
when there are competing organisms struggling
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 121
against one another for the means of subsistence
and development. Not only is it the case, therefore,
that the sympathy which aids the weak who are
unable to take care of themselves, does not seem to
be of the kind that would contribute to success in
the struggle for existence; but the more general
and catholic our sympathies are, the less will the
law of evolution help to preserve and develop
them because the less will they tend to promote
the welfare of one rival association rather than
that of another. Thus the growth of really un-
restricted sympathy with men as men cannot have
been promoted in this way. The " enthusiasm of
humanity" which animated the early Christians,
the self-renouncing brotherhood of Buddha, the
<}>i\av6 /owTi-ia attributed to men like Xenocrates 1 who
had freed themselves from the aristocratic pre-
judices of Athens, the " caritas generis humani " of
the Stoics, such feelings as these could not have
been encouraged, any more than they could have
been produced, by the operation of natural selection.
For, however much they tend to elevate the human
character, and to promote human happiness, they
do not advance the welfare of one body of men to
the exclusion of some other competitor in the
struggle for existence. 2
1 ^Elian, V. H., xiii. 30.
2 If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it
by Clifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, "the preservation of
122 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
But, although the law of natural evolution can-
not account, by survival of the fittest, for any
progress made by universal benevolence, yet it may
explain the value ascribed to the feeling of benev-
olence, when its object is the family or the com-
munity. Besides as has already been pointed
out natural selection always implies an initiative
got from elsewhere : it does not itself produce
modifications ; it only chooses out favourable ones
and adds them together when produced. It always
implies an independent modification of the organ-
ism; its part is to select the modifications best
fitted to promote life. Hence the mere fact of
benevolence being universalised is not in itself an
anomaly on the theory of natural selection, any
more than is the fact of its being extended from
the family to the tribe. Only, the latter extension
is one which it perpetuates, the former is not. No
aspect of the theory of evolution seems able to
account for an extension of the feeling of universal
benevolence among different people or throughout
different societies. This feeling has neither tended
to promote the welfare of the race animated by it
to the exclusion of other competing races for
there are no competing races whom it could
affect nor can it be shown that it makes the
individuals possessing it fitter to wage successful
society in the struggle for existence," then it can never reach
universal benevolence or prescribe " duties towards all mankind."
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 123
war against opposing forces, than other individ-
uals. 1
Apart from such special difficulties, however, its result:
comparative psychology has shed a new light on the LcMnatu
mental structure of the individual. The facts it ^ indl
brings forward show that the nature of the individual
man cannot be explained without taking into account
the relations in which he stands to society by birth,
education, and business. He is, from the first, sur-
rounded by, and dependent upon, other individuals,
and by a set of established usages and institutions
which modify his life; and he is connected with
these in such a way that it is impossible to consider
him as merely acted upon by them and influencing
them in turn. He has been produced by, and has
become a part of them. His physical and mental
structure bears the marks of the same influences as
those by which his so-called environment has been
1 A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Professor Bain,
who holds that the " pleasure of malevolence " is not only a real
element in the human constitution, but greater than would be
naturally called forth by the conditions and course of develop-
ment. " It is remarked by Mr Spencer." he says ; " that it was
necessary for the progress of the race that destructive activity
should not be painful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of
fact, however, the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond
what these words express, and much beyond what is advantageous
to the collective interest of animals and of human beings alike.
The positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great."
The Emotions and the Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this
argument, however, I must confess myself still amongst the un-
convinced regarding the " pleasure of malevolence."
124 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
formed. He is cell in the " tissue " of which the body
social is composed. This was partly recognised, it
is true, before the theory of evolution had been
elaborated. But the organic nature of the social
union is confirmed by that theory, and erected into
a scientific view of human life.
(&) Develop- Now the various sentiments which bring one man
locLy. i^o mental union with others act with greatest
facility when men are connected with one another
by some definite mutual bond such as that which
forms the family, the clan, or the nation. The
individual's feeling of sympathy with his neighbours
both promotes this social union and depends upon
it. But it is characteristic of the theory of evolu-
tion to put the external aspect first the social cus-
toms and institutions and to evolve from them the
corresponding sentiments and ideas. Not word or
thought or power, it holds, is to be regarded as the
origin of morality : " Im Anfang war die That." The
whole composed of these units bound together by
reciprocity of feeling and function is termed the
" social organism " ; and what has been called moral
sociology shows the way in which the outward forms
which express and. embody morality have grown up
and become part of it.
In this connection, the theory of natural evolution
traces the process by which, from the rudimentary
beginnings of society, the members composing it
have gradually become more coherent amongst one
another, related in definite ways instead of merely
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 125
by chance, and more differentiated in function.
Certain rudimentary forms such as the family
(in its rudest structure) and the corresponding
instincts are presupposed. And from this basis the
origin of institutions and customs, political, reli-
gious, and industrial, is traced. In developing these
various customs and institutions, along with the
corresponding sentiments, the course of social evolu-
tion has had the effect of gradually bringing out and
cultivating those feelings and tendencies in the indi-
vidual which promote the welfare of the organism,
while other individual tendencies, hostile to social
welfare, have been repressed. Not sympathy and
benevolence only, but honesty, temperance, justice,
and all the ordinary social and personal virtues, may
have their natural history traced in this way by
showing how they have contributed to the life of the
individual, or of the society, or of both. 1 Through
the operation of purely natural laws, the wicked are
" cut off from the earth," while the "perfect remain in
it" and leave their possessions to their children. This
is an obvious result of natural selection. For those
communities are always fittest to survive in which
each member, in feeling and in act, is most at one
with the whole. The tendency of evolution seems to
be to produce not merely an ideal but an actual iden-
tification of individual and social interests, in which
each man finds his own good in that of the state.
1 This subject is carefully discussed in Mr Stephen's ' Science
of Ethics.'
126
CHAPTEE VI.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.
Bearing of BEFORE going on to inquire into the positive con-
of evoStton tributions to ethics which the theory of evolution
nas to offer, it is necessary to consider the relation
theories. ft bears to the preceding individualistic systems of
morals. It was by way of investigations in psy-
chology and in the theory of society, that it first
began to influence ethical thought. And, at first;
sight, it appeared to come as a natural ally of
one of the opposed schools, dreaded by the side
it opposed, 1 welcomed with open arms by that
favoured with its friendship. But since the first
shock of pained and pleased surprise, there have
been rumours of dissension in the allies' camp ;
and the distribution of parties has now become a
matter of difficulty. The doctrine of evolution,
first seized upon for rebutting the arguments of the
intuitional moralists, has been found to transform
1 Cf . Miss Cobbe, in ' Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays '
(1872), p. 5.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 127
rather than to destroy their system ; and the utili-
tarianism in whose interests the new controversial
weapon was employed, seems to have been subjected
to a parallel process of transformation. The bearing
of evolution on egoism may appear to be even more
fundamental. For the inheritance by an individual
of the qualities acquired by his ancestors may be
thought to establish scientifically the theory of the
unity of the race, and, in doing so, to make the
selfish system of conduct an anachronism.
It is not necessary to examine at any length the i. on theo-
application of evolution to the theories which con- in^onmoni
struct ethical principles on the basis of moral senti-
ment, because these theories have been found either
to resolve themselves into a subtle form of egoistic
hedonism, or else to rest their ethical system on
a teleological conception^ which transcends the
" naturalistic " view of man. Evolution has its own
explanation to give of the seemingly intuitive char-
acter of moral ideas showing how their immediate
necessity for the individual of the present day may
be reconciled with their empirical origin in the
mental history of the race. It attempts thus to
supplant both egoism and intuitionism by the same
doctrine of the organic union between individuals.
The phenomena of conscience and the moral
sentiments had been brought forward to show
that the origin of morality was independent of the
experience of the pleasurable or painful results of
128
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
Origin and
history of
moral senti-
ments and
intuitions
traced by
evolution.
action : that certain actions and traits of character
were immediately approved and pronounced to be
right by the individual conscience, and certain
others as inexplicably but infallibly disapproved
and pronounced to be wrong. This phenomenon of
moral approbation or disapprobation had indeed
been thought by some as has been already seen
to be only a special feeling of pleasure or pain.
Even as such, however, it pointed to a peculiar
harmony or sympathy between the feelings of the
individual and the fortunes of society. For the
pleasure or pain of the individual was seen to be
excited by actions and dispositions which might be
shown to involve the common interests, but were
without relation to his own.
Even on the " empirical " interpretation of them,
such facts of the individual mind were in need of
explanation ; and the theory of evolution has taken
in hand to show how the pre - established har-
mony grew up. The results of this explanation
are, of course, not put forward as explaining the
facts away, or depriving them of reality, but as
enabling us to see their true place and bearing in
the economy of human nature. In tracing the
origin and history of the " altruistic " and >" moral "
sentiments of the individual, the theory of evolution
has this end in view. It offers so it is often said
terms of compromise between the " intuitional "
and the " empirical " psychology of morals. It will
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 129
admit the immediate and intuitive character in the
individual of the sentiments which older empiricism
had tried to make out to be composite, growing up
in each person out of the materials afforded by his
environment, and the experiences to which he was
subjected. The theory of evolution contends for
an empiricism on a larger scale, which will more
closely connect the individual with the race, and
both with their environment.
The question thus arises, What bearing has this Bearing of
. . . . , , , this on their
psychological or psycnogomcal theory on the validity :
ethical validity of moral intuitions and sentiments ?
It certainly does not follow that they are of no
moral value, merely because their origin can be
traced to simpler elements of experience. They
would lose ethical importance only if it were first
of all shown that their validity depended on their
not being derived from, or compounded out of,
other elements. As Professor Sidgwick says, " Those
who dispute the authority of moral or other in-
tuitions on the ground of their derivation, must be
required to show, not merely that they are the
effects of certain causes, but that these causes are
of a kind that tend to produce invalid belief." l
But what the theory of evolution has to de-
termine with regard to moral intuitions or sen-
sibilities would seem to be not so much their
ethical validity or invalidity, as the range and
] Methods of Ethics, III. i. 4, 3d ed., p. 211.
I
130 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
manner of their ethical application. It attempts
to show that particular moral beliefs or feel-
ings have been originated and formed by certain
external customs belonging to the conditions of
social or family life. These customs have im-
pressed themselves upon the mental structure, and
reappear in the individual in the shape of organic
tendencies to certain actions, or classes of actions,
and of aversion to other actions, accompanied by
a corresponding mental sentiment or judgment
of approbation or disapprobation. Thus the indivi-
dual comes instinctively to feel or to judge, " A
ought to be done," " B ought not to be done." Now
the evolutionist, as I conceive, does not proceed to
infer that such judgments are invalid because he
has shown how they originated does not conclude
(to use Mr Sidgwick's words) that " all propositions
of the form ' X is right ' or ' good/ are untrust-
worthy ; " but he does ask in what way the history
of these judgments affects their application. 1
(a) different (a) He recognises, in the first place, that all such
judgments are the natural result of a certain social
con( lition, and that there is, therefore, some pro-
resulted, bability that the same kind of social state could
not continue to exist were those moral judgments
1 Cf. Professor F. Pollock, "Evolution and Ethics "Mind,
i. pp. 335 ff. Apart from the bearing of a utilitarian test on
inherited instincts, to which Mr Pollock refers, I have tried to
show what meaning they will have for the evolutionist who judges
them solely from the point of view of his theory.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 131
habitually disregarded in conduct. They have re-
sulted from a certain state of society, and have
been assumed after insufficient experience, per-
haps to be required for the stability of that state,
so that every action opposed to these moral judg-
ments will probably tend to weaken social bonds.
But the evolutionist's conclusions are not restricted
to such generalities. He may show that certain
moral judgments or sentiments have had their
origin from the habits of union between individuals,
and of respect for the rights of property, which
have obtained in every relatively permanent society,
and which may therefore be inferred to be pro-
bably necessary for the continued existence of any
community ; that certain other sentiments or in-
tuitions have descended to present individuals from
customs which have not been so universal in the
history of societies, although the communities pos-
sessing them have shown greater power of vitality
than those in which they were absent ; while others,
again, may be traced to institutions which, from
their occasional and unprogressive character, may
be shown to be neither necessary nor beneficial.
The evolutionist will therefore contend that and conse
different degrees of value for the regulation of
conduct belong to different moral intuitions or valuef r
conduct ;
classes of them. If one class is habitually dis-
regarded, he may assert that historical evidence
goes to show that society will fall to pieces, and
132 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
the life of man become, in the expressive words of
Hobbes, " solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."
The disregard of another class will probably lead
to a more precarious existence, or one less filled
with the experiences which make up life ; while
opposition to a third .class, so far from being hurt-
ful or dangerous, may remove unnecessary restric-
tions, and aid the development both of the individual
and of society.
(6) their (&) There is a second point which will also be
character, recognised by the evolutionist. Although these
intuitions have been derived, they are now organic,
and their disappearance from the human mind as
instinctive tendencies towards or against action can
only be slow and painful. The process must involve
a certain amount of loss : at the same time, it is
not a process that can be easily avoided. As soon
as the reason of the instinctive tendency is inquired
into, it is weakened as instinct. We pass 'from the
action itself to the end it is fitted to subserve ; and,
if the instinctive action is not the most appropriate,
or has hurtful results, we have already reached the
stage in which the instinct is checked, and begins
to yield to action directed by a principle. Yet it
dies out only gradually, and, so to speak, after a
struggle. JSTor does it seem possible to assert with
confidence, as mitigating this struggle, that the
strongest impulses will always be those which are
necessary or advantageous to the existence of
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 133
society. For it is a common experience that the
moral intuitions which lead to conduct that has
ceased to serve a purpose, and the internal sanctions
which follow disregard of them, are often even
more powerful than those which protect such vir-
tues as justice or veracity.
From the preceding argument it follows that it Resultant
cannot be held that moral intuitions are invalid evoiution-
because evolved. The evolutionist will certainly ^ n * m intui '
go very far wrong, as Mr Sidgwick points out, if he
maintains that a " general demonstration of the
derivedness or developedness of our moral faculty
is an adequate ground for distrusting it." Instead
of holding that, if we succeed in tracing the origin
of an intuition, it is thereby discredited, he will
admit that the mere fact of our possessing any
moral intuition shows that the habits of action
from which it was derived have been permanent
enough to leave their traces on the mental struc-
ture, and that the conduct to which it leads, like
the custom from which it came, will not destroy
society, but, on the contrary, will probably tend to
its permanence. The general attitude of the evolu-
tion-theory to moral intuitions is therefore, after
all, very similar to that which Mr Sidgwick has
reached as a result of his elaborate examination of
the maxims of common-sense. It is an attitude of
trust modified by criticism. In both an appeal
is made from the axioms themselves : in the one
134 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
case, to their historical genesis and the facts in
which they originated ; in the other, to the search-
ing test of logical consistency, and their capability
of being applied to conduct. But the theory of
evolution, if it succeeds in tracing the origin of our
moral intuitions, does seem to involve the abandon-
ment of the old intuitional method which accepted
them as rules of conduct from which no appeal
could be taken.
2. Bearing The theory of evolution transforms intuitionism
ofevoiuttoif by the way in which it connects the individual
on egoism. w ^ ^ race> jj. g g rgt e p ec ^ U p 0n egoism is similar.
The nature of the individual man as now exhibited
is widely different from that which the older indivi-
dualistic theory used to deal with. The latter is
typified by the marble statue to which Condillac l
compares the percipient subject, as yet unaffected
by sense-impressions. The variety of mental life
which is actually met with is accounted for by the
different kinds of experiences different men pass
through ; and the consequent difference in the
sources of pleasure and pain accounts for the
diverse lines of activity which human beings follow
out. But the theory of evolution shows that human
nature is infinitely varied, not only through the
variety of circumstances, but through the variety
of inherited dispositions. One individual is not
1 Traite des sensations, (Euvres (1798), vol. iii.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 135
merely connected with others through considerable
similarity of experience built upon an equally
characterless basis; but he is organically related
to all the members of the race, not only bone of
their bone and flesh of their flesh, but mind of their
mind. He is connected with others by a thousand
subtly interwoven threads of emotion which enter
into his life, and unite his desires and activities
with the functions of the larger organism of which
he is a member.
The theory of evolution has thus an important Relation of
contribution to make to the question of the relation altruism
between egoism and altruism. It has remained for Jl^ 6 * 8
it to show historically how the individual is so con- ( a) nature of
the individ-
nected with the community that the good, or the ual s ciai,
pleasure, of the one cannot be considered apart from
that of the other. From the non-evolutionist point
of view it was always open to show how the indi-
vidual depended on society, how his wants could
only be supplied by it, and how the security and
happiness of every one were bound up with those
of his fellows. The individualistic theory was thus
able to give all sorts of egoistic reasons why people
should indulge in what is now called altruistic
conduct. Self was seen to be " a poor centre for
a man's actions," and only chosen by the short-
sighted person, who thereby missed both the good
to himself that followed from his neighbours' well-
being, and the peculiar pleasure of sympathy and
136 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
benevolent action. But the theory of evolution
has shown how the two things have developed
together in the race : first, the actual solidarity be-
tween the individual and the whole ; and secondly,
the subjective reflection of the same fact, sympathy
with the feelings of others. When we ask, there-
fore, whether it is our own pleasure (or good) or
that of others that we ought to aim at, we are
pointed to the gradual obliteration of the distinc-
tion between the interest and feelings of the in-
dividual and those of the ' whole. Were this com-
pletely accomplished, there need be no more ques-
tion about the matter. If conduct with an egoistic
motive or aim always resulted in altruistic equally
with egoistic effects, and if altruistic conduct had
always egoistic equally with altruistic consequen-
ces, it would even then be little more than vain
subtlety to ask whether egoism or altruism was
to be the 'real end of conduct. But if, in addi-
tion to the identity of interests, there were also
an identity of motive or feeling, 1 the question
would be no longer in place at all. For there
would cease to be either a subjective distinction
in motive between egoism and altruism, or an
objective distinction in the courses of conduct to
but not which they led. And it is just because this
identification is manifestly incomplete because
1 It is to a condition of this sort that a phrase such as Clifford's
"tribal self " (Lectures and Essays, ii. Ill) would apply.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 137
neither the interests nor the desires of the indi- social.
vidual harmonise with any degree of exactness
with those of his fellows that we must examine
how far the conception of the social organism is
a true expression for the connection of individuals.
At most, the theory of organic evolution can make Difference
out that there is a tendency towards the identifica- in e d ^u a i
tion of the interests of the individual with those andsocial
organisms
of society. It cannot demonstrate a complete iden-
tification. The community has indeed been called
an organism, and the individual spoken of as a
cell in the tissue of which it is composed; but
we must avoid pressing this analogy to the point
of breaking. Among so many points of similarity
between society and an individual organism, there
is one essential distinction, the social organism
has no feelings and thoughts but those of its in-
dividual members the conscious centre is in the
unit, not in the whole ; whereas, when we regard
the individual organism and its constituent mem-
bers, consciousness is seen to exist only in the
whole, not in each several unit. The absence of
a " social sensorium " l should, therefore, make us
hesitate to identify the ends of individual with
those of collective action. Every cell in the in-
dividual body has a life-history of its own, besides
partaking of the life of the organism ; and, did it
possess the reason which " looks before and after/'
1 Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. 479.
138 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
it might probably adopt an egoistic attitude, and
object to the subordination of its private interests
to the good of the whole. In the same way, the
many individual lives which make up the social
organism since each of them possesses a separate
consciousness are apt to disregard the life of the
larger whole whose members they are. Now what
the theory of utilitarianism requires is, that the
happiness or pleasurable consciousness of the com-
munity or of the race, not that of the individual,
be made the end ; and those who make egoism the
end of ethics, commonly maintain that the general
happiness is the end of politics. 1 The individual
is not indeed required to be entirely unselfish or
" altruistic " in action. He is not altogether for-
bidden to seek his own things, nor enjoined to
seek only the things of others ; and evolutionist
utilitarianism, indeed, would tell him to seek his
own happiness in the happiness of the community.
But the obvious remark must be borne in mind,
that society, the social organism, cannot experience
happiness. However it may resemble the indi-
vidual organism in the manner of its growth, the
modes of its activity, and even its relation to its
component members, yet it cannot feel pleasure or
pain as an individual does. The "happiness of
the community " does not mean the happiness of
the social organism, but is only a concise formula
i Cf . Barratt, " Ethics and Politics "Mind, ii. 453 ff.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 139
for the aggregate happinesses of the individuals
composing it.
When it is said, therefore either as a political in respect
or an ethical theory that the happiness of society
is the end for conduct, the end prescribed is altru-
istic rather than social. Its object is not an organ-
ism, but an aggregate of individuals. A certain
organisation of society may lead to an increase in
this aggregate happiness, and so be necessary for
the attainment of the end ; but if the end is hap-
piness, the social organism and its wellbeing are
no longer the thing cared for, but the greatest
aggregate of pleasures on the part of its members.
So long, therefore, as the end is pleasure, it must
have reference to individuals. The utilitarian may
try to persuade the agent to seek the pleasures
of others as if they were his own requiring him
thus to seek his end out of himself, and the circle
of his own pleasures. And, while we continue to
hold pleasure to be the end, the evolution-theory^
can go no further than this. It seemed to have made
out an organic unity between different individuals,
through which it might be possible to effect a
reconciliation between the rival ethical principles of
egoism and altruism. But the feeling of pleasure
is just the point where individualism is strongest,
and in regard to which mankind, instead of being an
organism in which each part but subserves the pur-
poses of the whole, must rather be regarded as a col-
140 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
lection of competing and co-operating units. It is
true that the social factor in the individual life is
brought into scientific cognisance by the theory of
evolution. It shows the way in which his interests
and feelings depend upon others. And if, through
the influence of a political standpoint, or of some
intuition of reason, a universalistic ethics has been
already arrived at, it can bring forward the organic
union of individual and society as a means of en-
forcing the social end upon the individual agent.
Theory of In this way the theory of evolution makes a
obligation ., . ,, . .. .
simplified, contribution to ethics at a critical point where
istJce V nT al " the individualist theory failed. For ethics must
arrived at. no res t content with pointing out an end for con-
duct or standard of morality, without giving a
reason to the individual why he should make this
end his own that is, developing a doctrine of obli-
gation. In many current theories, notably in the
common forms of utilitarianism, the two things are
not necessarily connected, since the standard is
fixed from the point of view of the whole, and obli-
gation has reference to the individual. The devel-
opment of morality may appear to show how the
two standpoints can be connected. If it could be
made out that the happiness of the community and
of the individual are identical, a standard of moral-
ity which made the aggregate happiness the end
might be regarded as carrying its own obligation
within itself: politics and ethics would (on the
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEOKIES. 141
hedonistic theory) be harmonised. And, in so far
as evolution has brought the individual and society
into closer reciprocal dependence, it has lessened
the practical difficulty of bringing about this con-
ciliation, or to speak with the utilitarians of
making the standard of morality supply a doctrine
of obligation. At present, however, the course of
human development is far from having reached the
point at which actual harmony between the race
and each member of it is established ; and it would
therefore still be a subject for inquiry whether the
theory of evolution could provide a basis for moral
obligation, even were the moral standard or the end
for conduct satisfactorily established. But, in deter-
mining this latter question, we find that the above
psychological and sociological investigations have
no longer the same degree of value as before. In
the theory of obligation, every fact brought for-
ward by evolution to show the harmony of indi-
vidual and social welfare makes the way easier
for establishing the reasonableness of the pursuit
of social ends by the individual. But from these
facts of past development we have also to deter-
mine an end for present and future action. And
this question cannot be solved merely by showing
how morality has developed, though that develop-
ment may form an important part of the evidence
from which our conclusions are to be drawn.
The harmony of interests and the harmony of oo Limits to
142 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
complete feelings required for the empirical reconciliation
of egoism of egoism and altruism is a condition which needs
and aitm- on jy to ^ Q s t a ted to show how far it is from being
ism : J
realised in present circumstances. The constant
struggle involved in the course of evolution throws
doubt even on its ultimate attainment. The rule
has always been that the better-equipped organism
asserts and maintains its supremacy only by van-
quishing the organisms which are not so well
(a) con- equipped. Conflict and competition have been
ence of com" constant f actors in development. The present cir-
petition; cumstances of the individual have been deter-
mined for him by the war of hostile interests
between different communities, and between differ-
ent members of the same community; and his
mental inheritance has been largely formed by the
emotions corresponding to this rivalry. Perhaps
the necessity for conflict has diminished with the
advance of evolution; but it is still sufficiently
great to make competition one of the chief forma-
tive influences in industrial and political life. And
the causes from which the struggle of interests arises
are so constant the multiplication of desires and
of desiring individuals keeps so well in advance of
the means of satisfying desires that it is doubtful
whether the course of evolution is fitted to bring
about complete harmony between different individ-
uals. It would almost seem that the " moving
equilibrium " in human conduct, in which there is
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 143
no clash of diverse interests, cannot be expected to
be brought about much before the time when the
physical factors of the universe have reached the
stage in which evolution ends.
Besides, it does not do to speak as if the only 03) different
and conflict-
alternative to egoism were a comprehensive altru- ing degrees
ism. Man is a member of a family, a tribe, a Ol
nation, the race. His altruism, therefore, may take
the narrow form of family feeling, or it may extend
to tribal feeling, or to patriotism, or even rise to
devotion to humanity. And these do not merely
supplement one another : they are often conflicting
principles of conduct. Action for the sake of the
family may frequently be most unsocial ; the keen
patriot ignores the rights of other peoples ; the
" citizen of the world " is too often a stranger
to the national spirit. Further, when civilisation
grows complex, the same man is a member of many
intersecting societies a church, a trade, a party
organisation l and has to balance the claims which
each of these has upon him. The sublation of
egoism would still leave to be determined the
different shares which these various social wholes
have in a man's sympathies, and their different
claims upon his conduct.
Any theory of society will show how the good ( y ) the aitm-
of the individual is not merely a part of the good estandthe*
of the whole, but reacts in various ways upon the ^ of
1 Cf. Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 113.
144 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
organism of which he is a member. But, in the
case of any one individual, the results of acts done
for his own good (or pleasure), and the results
of those done for the good (or pleasure) of the
whole, do not correspond with any exactness, and
often widely diverge. If, then, the individual is
consciously aiming at his own good (or pleasure),
it is if we look from the point of view of indi-
vidualistic ethics only an incidental and fortui-
tous result of the action when it promotes the
common good. When we recognise the social factor
in the individual, this judgment must be modified.
The evolution-theory shows how he has become
so constituted that much that pleases him indi-
vidually, must of necessity benefit society at large.
But there are obvious limits to the harmony. The
pleasure or interest of the individual is often the
reverse of advantageous to society. It may be
the case that in seeking his own private ends, he
is yet, to use the words of Adam Smith, " led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention/' 1 But, if so, the end
is invisible as well as the hand that points to it.
And the good of society can be said to be the
natural and uniform consequence of the individ-
ual's action, only when he consciously makes it
his end. In a word, the true altruism or, as we
might call it, using a word appropriated to another
1 Wealth of Nations, book iv. ch. ii.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 145
purpose the true socialism is when the good of
others or of society is pursued for its own sake ;
and this is to be distinguished from the false or
imperfect altruism, in which the same outward
result is aimed at, because it is seen to be the
most prudent way of promoting one's own good.
Thus Mr Spencer's elaborate argument 1 to show
that conduct of purely egoistic tendency, equally
with conduct of purely altruistic tendency, is in-
sufficient and self-destructive, does not reach be-
yond the external results of action, and leaves
it possible for both end and motive to be still
egoistic. If "morality is internal/' 2 the discus-
sion proves no ethical proposition at all. The
egoism of external prudence may indeed be tran-
scended by recognising that the pleasures and
pains of others are sources of sympathetic feel-
ing in ourselves. But a subjective or emotional
egoism remains. And if the fact that we " receive
pleasure from the pleasure of another man " 3 is
our reason for seeking his pleasure, we shall cease
to seek it when a means of greater pleasure offers.
In human life as at present constituted, no secure
principle of conduct can be based on the agree-
ment of individual with social good ; for, if they
1 Data of Ethics, chap. xiii.
2 Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 155 ; cf. Spencer, Data of
Ethics, p. 120.
3 Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 226.
K
146 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
diverge, as they often do, there is no standard left
for determining their competing claims.
) altruistic It will not do to divide all men, as Mr Stephen
eakf 8 seems to do, 1 into two classes, typified by the
reasonable and therefore sympathetic man who
has struck a bargain with society to take " common
stock of pains and pleasures," and the systematic-
ally selfish man who " must be an idiot." For most
men belong to neither of those two classes : their
bargain with society has not been fully completed,
and can be withdrawn ' from temporarily when
circumstances make withdrawal convenient, though
this process cannot be carried on indefinitely with-
out greatly weakening the sympathetic feelings.
The majority of men are neither entirely sympa-
thetic nor yet "systematically selfish": they are
unsystematically sympathetic and unsystematically
selfish. Such men have the sensibilities that give
"leverage" to the moralist. 2 But it is futile to
tell them to be more sympathetic, or entirely sym-
pathetic. For sympathetic feelings cannot be pro-
duced at will : they can only come with that slow
modification of the character brought about by
conduct. Shall we then say that a man should
in all cases of conduct prefer the pleasure of the
whole or of others to his own pleasure ? If a man
were to do so, then perhaps, by consistent self-
abnegation, altruism might become pleasant, and
1 Science of Ethics, p. 263. 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 442.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 147
both the man himself and his descendants become
more sympathetically constituted ? This perfection
of altruistic sympathies is looked forward to by
Mr Spencer as characteristic of a subsequent
the final stage of evolution. When that period
comes, men will compete with one another for the
few remaining opportunities of self-sacrifice. 1 At
present, Mr Spencer argues, pure altruism is suicidal.
The individual whose sympathetic nature is un-
developed may, however, go further, and ask what
right we have to say that "the moral law" is
" conformity to the conditions of social welfare," 2
rather than to those of individual welfare ? Evo-
lution, it would seem, does not suffice to prove
this proposition, which appears, on the contrary, to
be a survival of the social or political way of look-
ing at things inherited from the utilitarian theory.
But the point to be proved is why I ought to adopt
this standpoint when considering what the end of
my action is to be. And this point stands in need
of proof here as much as in utilitarianism, and
seems almost equally destitute of it.
Feelings leading to altruistic conduct are un- and may be
doubtedly possessed by the average man at his b^reflTc-
present stage of development. Yet the being who tlou>
is able to reflect on the feelings possessed by him,
and compare the characteristics of different emo-
tional states, and the activities following from
1 Data of Ethics, p. 253. 2 Science of Ethics, p. 349.
148 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION".
them, has already before him the possibility of
transcending them. He is able to estimate their
value in terms of simpler or of other feelings;
and the man who rigorously does so by the test of
personal pleasure and pain manifests the spirit of
the egoistic hedonist a spirit which the theory of
empirical evolution does not seem able to exorcise.
( c ) Tendency At the same time the tendency of the evolution-
to supplant theory is not to support but to supplant egoism.
egoism Neither the basis of psychological hedonism on
Evolution r J
not the basis which egoism is usually made to rest, nor the
of psycholo-
gical hedon- independent arguments which have been urged
for its ethical theory, are drawn from the facts of
development. The theory of evolution may, in-
deed, be made to suggest that non-hedonistic action
has arisen out of hedonistic: "That all affections
are generated by association with experienced
pleasure only that the association is mainly an-
cestral in the case of c affections ' proper. The
dim remembrance of ancestral pleasures, the force
of ancestral habit, produces that propension of
which Butler speaks, disproportionate to (distinct)
expectation and (personal) experience of pleasure." l
But this view will be rejected by the pure egoist, 2
who must maintain that the pain of acting con-
trary to ancestral habit would in every case be
1 F. Y. Edgeworth, Old and New Methods of Ethics (1877),
p. 11.
2 Cf. A. Barratt, Mind, iii. 280.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 149
greater than the expected pleasure foregone by
following it. According to the view suggested,
all deliberate volition would still be regarded as
hedonistically determined, though other motives
than pleasure may affect action through having
been inherited from cases of ancestral conduct in
which they tended to personal pleasure. Even
were it shown, however, that altruistic conduct has
been developed out of egoistic, the fact of its devel-
opment would not alter its present characteristic.
If action now is not always moved by pleasure
and pain alone, it becomes a question of merely
historical interest to trace its genesis to conduct
to which our ancestors were hedonistically im-
pelled. The fact remains that the original sim-
plicity of motive has been broken into, and some-
thing else than personal pleasure admitted to have
sway. But it does not seem to have been made
out that action in the early stages of human life
was completely egoistic, any more than that it is
so now. " From first to last," as Mr Spencer puts
it, 1 self-sacrifice seems to have been involved in
the preservation of each successive generation of
individuals. We inherit propensities to action
which have been evolved from an initial stage in
which there was no conscious distinction between
egoism and altruism, though both tendencies were
present and were necessary for the continued exist-
1 Data of Ethics, chap. xii.
150 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
ence of the species. The feelings inherited by the
egoistic hedonist are assessed by him at their pleas-
ure-value. But such feelings would never have been
acquired by his ancestors, had they tested each ger-
minal emotion in the same way, and so restrained
self-sacrifice for offspring and fellow-men. Perhaps
they did not clearly see or realise what their pleas-
ure consisted in, or accurately distinguish it from
family or tribal welfare ; but, through this defi-
ciency of imagination, the feelings were able to
grow and perpetuate themselves, which have tended
to the preservation and consolidation of society,
nor of Nor can we gather from evolution any ethical
htd'onism. argument leading to egoism as the principle or end
for conduct; and it is worthy of remark that the
proof attempted by the late Mr Barratt is un-
affected by his recognition of the theory of evolu-
tion as applied to mind, depending on definitions
and axioms which hold (if at all) for the individual
man. Pleasure is defined by him as "that state
of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded
performance (as such) of its function by one or
more of the parts of our organism ; " 1 and the
good is forthwith identified with pleasure, by its
being shown that it is a " state of consciousness,"
and that it " results from the due performance of
function (as such)." 2 But the " due 3 performance
1 Physical Ethics, p. 12. 2 Ibid., p. 17.
3 In the word " due" an idea of worth is involved. Probably
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 151
of function " is itself a state or states of conscious-
ness ; and in it, not in any sequent or concomitant
circumstances, the good may consist. The good,
we may say, is not pleasure, but the evepyaa of
which pleasure is only the consequent or comple-
tion. This is not a mere question of words. For
" due performance of function " cannot be measured
by the resultant or accompanying feeling of pleas-
ure : the most perfect functioning, just because it
has become habitual, has often the slightest accom-
paniment of pleasant feeling. The way in which
the argument is put in ' Physical Ethics ' is thus
well fitted to bring out the fundamental antithesis
between ethical systems according as they place
the good in the active element of function, or in
the passive element of pleasurable feeling which
accompanies functioning. The theory of evolution
seems to have led many of the writers who have
applied it to ethics to the other side of the anti-
thesis than that adhered to by Mr Barratt. They
recognise ethical value as belonging to a due per-
formance of function," rather than to the pleased
states of consciousness which follow ; and in this
way their theory leads them beyond hedonistic ethics. 1
Mr Barratt meant by "due performance" one which made the
faculty correspond with its medium (cf. Physical Ethics, p. 9) ;
but this introduces a new standard of value.
1 The transition involved in passing from " pleasure " to " per-
formance of function" or "life" as the end of conduct, may be
illustrated by the following passage from Mr Pater's 'Marius
anism
152 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
3. Bearing It has been argued that the theory of evolution
ofthetheory . . , ., ., ... . . ,
of evolution 1S > in tendency, hostile to the egoistic principle.
Had egoism been consistently recognised and acted
upon during the course of human development, the
features of social life which most promote co-
operation and progress would never have become
persistent. But the same objection cannot be
urged against universalistic hedonism. It is true
that this has not been the end consistently aimed
at in the past. Those from whom our social
instincts are inherited cannot be credited with
having had either the general happiness or social
evolution in view. Society and institutions further-
ing the common good were not the work of primitive
utilitarians plotting for the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. They have come down to
the Epicurean' (1885, i. 163): "Really, to the phase of reflec-
tion through which Marius was then passing, the charge of
( hedonism/ whatever its real weight might be, was not properly
applicable at all. Not pleasure, but fulness of life, and ' insight '
as conducting to that fulness energy, choice and variety of
experience including noble pain and sorrow even loves such as
those in the exquisite old story of Apuleius ; such sincere and
strenuous forms of the moral life, as Seneca and Epictetus
whatever form of human life, in short, was impassioned and
ideal: it was from this that the 'new Cyrenaicism' of Marius
took its criterion of values. It was a theory, indeed, which
might rightly be regarded as in a great degree coincident with
the main principle of the Stoics themselves, and a version of the
precept ' Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy
might ' a doctrine so widely applicable among the nobler spirits
of that time ; and as with that its mistaken tendency would lie
in the direction of a kind of idolatry of mere life, or natural gift
or strength Vidoldtrie des talents."
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 153
us from times when social organisation was forced
upon men by the rude logic of facts which exter-
minated tribes in which the bond of union was
weak; and they have been gradually modified by
the pressure of external circumstances and the
growing influence of mental conceptions of what
is best. But the adoption of general happiness as
the end of action would not have had the same
effect on social evolution, as the adoption of per-
sonal happiness as the end would have had. It
would have aided and not have hindered the growth
of the feeling of unity among the members of a
tribe or state, as well as have led to the recogni-
tion of the individual as subordinate to the social
organism. It may thus seem quite natural to look
to utilitarianism as giving the end for reflective
action, and yet to hold along with it what is loosely
called the ethics of evolution.
But this first attitude of evolution to utilitarian- has led to
ism was not fitted to be permanent ; and the catton 1
" start " l Mr Spencer got on being classed with
anti-utilitarians must have been repeated in the
experience of other moralists as they found them-
selves drifting from their ancient moorings. Mr
Spencer's difference from the utilitarians is not
such as to lead him to reject or modify their
1 " The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly class-
ing me with anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as an
anti-utilitarian." Mr Spencer's letter to J. S. Mill, printed in
Bain's Mental and Moral Science, p. 721.
154 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
principle. He maintains, as strongly as they do,
that " the ultimately supreme end " is " happiness
special and general." l But he disagrees with them
in method, in method, holding that, owing to the incommen-
surability of a man's different pleasures and pains,
and to the incommensurability of the pleasures and
pains of one man with those of others, coupled with
the indeterminateness of the means required to
reach so indeterminate an end, happiness is not
fitted to be the immediate aim of conduct. 2 But
another method is open to us. For " since evolu-
tion has been, and is still, working towards the
highest life, it follows that conforming to those
principles by which the highest life is achieved, is
furthering that end." 3 It is possible " to deduce,
from the laws of life and the conditions of exist-
ence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to pro-
duce happiness, and what kinds to produce un-
happiness." 4 Greatest pleasure, that is to say, is
the end. But it is so impossible to compare dif-
ferent kinds of pleasure, different people's pleasure,
and different means for obtaining a maximum of it,
that it is not a practical end for aiming at. No
doubt is expressed that greatest happiness is the
ultimate end; although no good reason is given
for holding that it is. But it is an indeterminate
1 Data of Ethics, p. 173 ; cf. p. 30.
2 Ibid., pp. 154, 155. 3 Ibid>? p< 171
4 Letter to J. S. Mill, in Data of Ethics, p. 57.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 155
end, and needs to be interpreted by the course of
evolution which is held to tend to it. It is not
too much to say, therefore, that Mr Spencer is only
nominally a utilitarian. His ethical principles are
not arrived at by an estimate of the consequences
of action, but by deduction from the laws of that
" highest life " which is now in process of evolu-
tion. This alliance between evolutionism and hed-
onism will be examined in the following chapter.
At present it is necessary to consider the reasons
which have led other evolutionists to look upon
the new morality as superseding the utilitarian
end.
Mr Spencer's " dissent from the doctrine of
utility, as commonly understood, concerns," he tells
us, 1 " not the object to be reached by men, but the
method of reaching it." In other writers, however,
the theory of evolution has not only supplanted
the method of utilitarianism, but also led to a
modification of its principle. The objections they andm
have taken to it may perhaps be summed up by pl
saying that they consider utilitarianism to look
upon conduct from a mechanical, instead of from
an organic point of view. It prescribed conduct
to a man as if he were a machine with a certain
kind and quantity of work to turn out. His nature
was looked upon by it as fixed, and his social con-
1 Letter to J. S. Mill, in Bain's Mental and Moral Science, p.
721.
156 THE TIIEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
(a) ideal of ditioHS as unvarying ; and the ideal set before him
ism objected was therefore unprogressive something that he
gressive Pr " was to ^ or to g et > not something that he was
to become. " If consistently applied," it has been
recently argued, " utilitarianism seems irrevocably
committed to a stereotyped and unprogressive
ideal." l According to Mr Stephen, it " considers
society to be formed of an aggregate of similar
human beings. The character of each molecule
is regarded as constant." It can, therefore, give
a test which is " approximately accurate " only,
which does not allow for the variation of character
and of social relations. 2 - To the same effect Miss
Simcox maintains that it "might pass muster in
a theory of social statics, but it breaks down alto-
gether if we seek its help to construct a theory of
social dynamics/' 3 These writers do not seem to
have made it quite clear, however, in what way
utilitarianism assumes a stationary condition of
human nature, and so formulates conduct in a
way unsuited to a progressive state. To say simply
that the greatest happiness of the greatest number
is the end, is not in itself inconsistent with a pro-
gressive state of human nature. It is true that, in
all the enthusiasm for and belief in progress to be
seen in a writer such as J. S. Mill, there is a con-
1 J. T. Punnet, "Ethical Alternatives" Mind, x. 95.
2 Science of Ethics, p. 363.
3 Natural Law ; An Essay in Ethics (1877), p. 101.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 157
stant goal always set to it in the possible maximum
of pleasant feeling. It would not have been incon-
sistent for him, however, to look upon human
nature as capable of developing new susceptibili-
ties for pleasure. Progress is made by increasing
the amount of pleasure actually got. And so far,
the ideal itself is certainly fixed, while progress
consists in its gradual realisation. But there is
no special virtue in having an ideal which is itself
progressive. A progressive ideal simply means an
ideal which is incompletely comprehended, and the
comprehension of which proceeds gradually with
its realisation. At any time the definition of such
an ideal can only be tentative: with the actual
assimilation of character to it, the intellect comes
to grasp its nature with increasing clearness. I
do not myself think that we can expect to have
more than such a tentative and progressive com-
prehension of the moral ideal of humanity. But
we must not take objection to a theory because
it gives at once a clear and definite view of the
final end of conduct : though we must not refrain
from inquiring how the end is known.
But the bearing of the objection to utilitarianism Force of the
becomes apparent when we try to give some definite ^en 1
meaning to the end greatest happiness. If we are
101
content to receive it as simply a very general or interpret
greatest
rather abstract expression for our ideal, nothing happiness,
need be said, except to put the question, which has
158 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
been already asked, How we came by such an ideal ?
The difficulty arises when we attempt to apply the
by showing ideal to practice. With men of fixed character in
the way in . . ,
which men an unchanging society, our way might be compara-
tively clear. But, when both character and social
relations vary, and their variation extends to sus-
ceptibility to pleasure and pain, and depends on the
actions adopted to obtain the end, utilitarianism
may well appear to be without a principle by which
to determine between different kinds of conduct.
To an objection similar to this, but taken from the
old point of view, that we have no time before acting
to sum up the pleasurable and painful consequences
of our actions, Mill replied that there had been
" ample time namely, the whole past duration of
the human species " l in which to estimate the f eli-
cific results of conduct. The variability of faculty
and function makes this answer lack convincing
power. Yet, perhaps, we are apt at present to dis-
regard the real value of this collective experience of
the race. True, human nature is not a constant ;
yet certain of its qualities are persistent and con-
stant enough not to leave us in doubt as to whether,
say, murder and theft are beneficial or injurious
to happiness. There are at least certain actions,
and, still more, certain abstentions, upon which
human security the basis of happiness depends.
But it would seem that those " secondary laws "
1 Utilitarianism, p. 34.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 159
may be more properly regarded as conditions of life
than means to pleasure.
The difficulty, however, comes most clearly to andamax
the front when we attempt to define the maxi- m
mum, and that not for an indiyidual or genera-
tion only, but for the race. It/ is not happiness
merely, but greatest happiness, that is the utili-
tarian end. Is there any way, then, of deter-
mining how the maximum of happiness is to be
obtained for generations whose characters, though
inherited from present individuals, may be modified
almost indefinitely ? The very existence and num-
bers of these future generations are problematic ; and
Mill, as is well known, spent much of his energy
in trying to convince the present generation to re-
strict the numbers of the next. Even on the funda-
mental question as to whether happiness is to be
obtained by the restriction of desires or by the satis-
faction which leads to their recurrence and increase,
no principle can be extracted from utilitarian ethics.
The theory of evolution has shown how desires may
be uprooted in the character of the race, though
they remain to the end in the present individuals ;
but in each case utilitarianism would require us to
sum up and estimate the relative advantages of re-
nunciation and satisfaction, a problem which the
modifiability of human character seems to make
impracticable. Thus, even if certain rules of living
may be ascertained, and justified by the utilitarian
160
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
(6) Objection
to utilitari-
anism as a
theory of
conse-
quences ;
principle, it would seem that the end of greatest
happiness for the race of man, or the sentient crea-
tion generally, must remain " abstract." There
seems no principle through which it may be ap-
plied to conduct no hope of an accurate esti-
mate of results when the variability of the
individual and of social relations is taken into
account.
Connected with this is the assertion that moral-
ity must have an inward, not an external standard.
The evolutionists are inclined to condemn utilitari-
anism as a theory of consequences, dealing solely
with work produced. According to Mill, " utili-
tarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others
in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with
the morality of the action, though much with the
worth of the agent/' l And this seems to be just
what evolutionism objects to. Even the worth of
the agent is, according to utilitarianism, only a
tendency to perform the actions called moral : " a
good or a bad disposition" is said to be "a bent
of character from which useful or from which hurt-
ful actions are likely to arise." 2 Against this view
Mr Stephen maintains that " the attempt to secure
an absolute and immutable moral law in its exter-
nal shape must be illusory. The moral law can be
stated unconditionally when it is stated in the form
' Be this/ but not when it is stated in the form ' Do
1 Utilitarianism, p. 26. 2 Ibid., p. 27 n.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 161
this.' " l This, however, appears to express the matter
in a way not free from difficulty. The organic view
of conduct will object not only to considering action
apart from character, but also to considering char-
acter apart from action. We must treat conduct as
a whole : and, in order to do so, we must treat it as
both arising out of and forming character ; and we
must treat character not as mere potentiality, but
as it realises itself in conduct. The weakness of
the utilitarian theory is its method of treating
actions merely in respect of their results : the evo-
lutionist must show how results are connected with
motives, how character and conduct are different
aspects of a whole.
The difference of the evolutionist view from utili- (c) and as re-
tarianism comes out at another point. The latter to s
places the standard and test of conduct in its effects lty '
on the sensibility. The best is that which brings
most pleasure. Utilitarians are now, for the most
part, ready to admit that, to be in earnest with their
theory, they must reject Mill's attempt to distin-
guish qualities among pleasures. " If morality is to
be defined by happiness, we must, of course, allow
all kinds of happiness to count, and to count equally
so far as they are actually equal. We must reckon
the pleasures of malevolence as well as those of
benevolence." 2 Of his own pleasures of the rela-
tive amounts of pleasure he gets from various sources
1 Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 385. 2 Ibid., p. 361.
L
162
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
of which
there is no
common
measure.
each man is the final judge. One man prefers
"push-pin" to poetry, another poetry to "push-
pin "; and neither has a right to call the other mis-
taken. If we are to aim at the greatest maximum
pleasure, therefore, we must not strive for what
are commonly called " high " pleasures rather than
" low " pleasures, except as greater in intensity. If
we must have a standard, the judgment of the <po-
VI/AOS for which Mill contended must be superseded
by the judgment of the average man. If pleasure
is the only end, and satisfaction is simply another
name for it, then it is plainly incorrect to say that
" it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than
a pig satisfied ; better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied." 1 As has been urged from
the evolutionist point of view, " there is no common
measure of happiness to enable us to say that the
more perfect being enjoys more of it than the less." 2
There seems one way only in which utilitarianism
can bring its moral ideal into harmony with the
upward tendency claimed for itself by evolution-
ist ethics and that is, by maintaining that the
pleasures incident to what are regarded as the
higher functions are the pleasures which excel
others in respect of " fecundity " : they are the
source of future pleasures, and are frequently inex-
clusive even in their present enjoyment. The dif-
ficulty in making this assertion is just that these
1 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14. 2 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 101.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 163
" higher " pleasures are but slightly appreciated by
the majority of men, and can hardly be said to be
pleasures for them at all. But here the theory of
evolution, whose adherents have been acting the
part of the candid friend to utilitarianism, must
come to its aid, and admit that human nature may
be so modified in the future as to allow of the " high-
est " becoming also the " greatest " of pleasures. The
argument in the mouth of the utilitarian is perhaps
a somewhat arbitrary one, since it could be applied
equally well to any class of pleasures. The notion
of " higher," as applied either to conduct or to pleas-
ure, has been accepted from current moral opinion.
But the theory of evolution has set itself to explain
this notion, and to develop a theory of morality in
harmony with its own scientific positions, and free
from the defects which it has found in other sys-
tems. How far it contributes to the determination
of the ethical_end will form the subject of investi-
gation in the following chapters.
164
CHAPTER VII.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.
i. Alliance THE alliance between Evolutionism and Hedonism
tionlsm and may be arrived at from either of the two points of
effected v ^ ew which are being brought into connection : may
two ways : j^ either an attempt to bring the hedonistic end into
the definite region of law revealed by the evolution
of life ; or may result from the endeavour to give
clearness and persuasiveness to an ethical end which
evolution itself seems to point to.
(a) greatest The former point of view is represented in Mr
be P o?tSn S e d Spencer's rejection of empirical utilitarianism, and
L y g C to n iawT substitution for it of a practical end which is not
of life or of enunciated in terms of pleasure. Happiness is still
evolution ;
regarded by him as the supreme end ; but the tend-
ency to it is not to be adopted as the end in practical
morality. There are certain conditions to social
equilibrium which " must be fulfilled before complete
life that is, greatest happiness can be obtained in
any society." l Thus the form of " rational utilitari-
1 Data of Ethics, p. 171.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 165
anism " which he endeavours to establish " does not
take welfare for its immediate object of pursuit,"
but " conformity to certain principles which, in the
nature of things, causally determine welfare." 1 Hav-
ing deduced " from the laws of life and the conditions
of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend
to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce
unhappiness," we are to recognise these deductions
"as laws of conduct . . . irrespective of a direct
estimation of happiness or misery." 2 The assump-
tion is thus distinctly made that the tendency of
life is to happiness, and that the laws of its evolu-
tion yield practical principles by following out which
the greatest happiness may be obtained, without
attempting the impossible task of estimating directly
the felicific and infelicific results of conduct.
Starting with the evolutionist point of view, but (&) ethical
with an opposite estimate of the relative value for evolution
practice of the ends supplied by evolutionism and
by hedonism, a like identification of them might
seem advisable. The "increase of life" to which
evolution tends may be regarded as not merely an
account of the actual process of existence, but as a
principle of action for a conscious being. In this
way some such ethical imperative as "Be a self-
conscious agent in the evolution of the universe " 3
may be formulated. Yet as the " evolution of the
1 Data of Ethics, p. 162. ' 2 Ibid., p. 57.
3 Cf. A. Barratt, in Mind, ii. 172 n.
166 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
universe " is a somewhat large conception, and its
laws are not clear to every one, it may seem neces-
sary that the end should be explained by translation
into better-known terms. And this may .be done if
the conduct which promotes life most is, at the same
time, the conduct which increases pleasure most. In
this way, although the ultimate end is life, or, in
vaster phrase, " the evolution of the universe," the
practical end is pleasure. The moral value of con-
duct will depend on its tendency to increase the
balance of pleasure over pain. The ethics of evolu-
tion will be reduced to hedonism.
This way of determining the evolutionist end is
put forward as a logical possibility rather than as
representing the views of any party. The contri-
bution which the theory of evolution has to offer
towards the determination of the ethical end, has
not yet received that definite expression which
would justify our passing by any logical interpreta-
tion of it, on the ground of its not being actually
adopted by ethical writers. Yet it would seem that
the above point of view is not altogether foreign to
evolutionist morality. The preservation or develop-
ment of the individual or of the race which is
put forward as an expression both for the actual
course of evolution and the subjective impulse cor-
responding to it, is often assumed to agree at each
step with the desire for pleasure, and, when the
stage of reflective consciousness is reached, to be
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 167
identical with the pursuit of a maximum of pleasure. 1
In this way it is assumed that the preservation and
development of life tend always to pleasure, and
that the end or tendency of evolution is being ful-
filled when the greatest pleasure is wisely sought.
It is therefore necessary to inquire how far the
correspondence between life and pleasure, or between
development and pleasure, actually holds, that we
may see whether it is possible for the one to take
the place of the other in determining the end for
conduct.
Now it is argued, from the point of view of 2.
evolution, that, taking for granted that pleasure me
motives action, the organisms in which pleasurable
acts coincided with life-preserving or health-pro- and P leas -
moting acts must have survived in the struggle for
1 As illustrating this I may refer to G. v. Gizycki, Philosophische
Consequenzen der Lamarck-Darwin'schen Entwicklungstheorie
(1876), p. 27 : "Wir haben oben die Erhaltung und Forderuug
des Lebens des Individuums und der Gattung als das eine Ziel der
Einrichtung des geistigen Organismus gekennzeichnet." P. 58 :
"Auf das Streben nach in sich befriedigtem psychischen Leben
[that is to say, pleasure] sind alle animalen Organismen angelegt."
In his popular essay, 'Grundziige der Moral' (1883), Dr Gizycki' s
principle and method are utilitarian. With the above may be
compared Guyau, Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction
(1885), p. 15 : " L'action sort naturellement du fonctionnement de
la vie, en grande partie inconscient ; elle entre aussitot dans le
doinaine de la conscience et de la jouissance, mais elle n'en vient
pas. La tendance de 1'etre a perse' ve'rer dans 1'etre est le fond de
tout de'sir sans constituer elle-meme un de'sir determine'."
168 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
existence at the expense of those organisms whose
pleasurable activity tended to their destruction or
to the hindrance of their efficiency. 1 The assump-
tion in this argument, in addition to the constant
postulate of natural selection, is simply that pleas-
ure is a chief motive of action ; the conclusion to
which it leads is, that there is a broad correspond-
ence between life-preserving and pleasurable acts
that the preservation and development of life are
pleasurable. It is necessary to examine with care
the validity of this important argument with refer-
ence to the attacks that may be made on it from
the pessimist point of view ; and, if its doctrine
of the correspondence of life and pleasure is not
entirely erroneous, to inquire further whether this
correspondence can be made to establish an end for
conduct, in accordance with the theory of evolution,
by measuring life in terms of pleasure,
objec- What then is to be said of the supposed " conflict
between Eudaemonism [Hedonism] and Evolution-
ism " which v. Hartmann 2 opposes to the optimist
doctrine that evolution has tended to make life and
pleasure coincide ?
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 82 f ; Principles of Psychology,
125, 3d ed., i. 280 ; Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 83. The
simplicity of this argument will be appreciated if we consider
the difficulty Comte experienced in trying to reach a similar con-
clusion. See Positive Philosophy, Miss Martineau's translation,
ii. 87 ff.
2 Cf. Phanomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins, pp. 701,
708.
*
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 169
The problem of Pessimism resolves itself into
two questions which admit of being kept distinct :
(a) The first is, Does life on the whole give, or can
it give, a balance of pleasure ? This is the funda-
mental question of the value of life as put by those,
whether optimists or pessimists, who assume that
" value " means " pleasure-value." If it be answered
in the negative, the hedonistic ideal must be the re-
duction of the adverse balance to the zero-point of
feeling striven after by Eastern ascetics, but, to all
appearance, obtained only and most easily by death. 1
(b) The second question is, Does the evolution of life
lead to an increase of pleasure and diminution of
pain ? This is the question brought into promin-
ence in recent discussions, and of most importance
for the present inquiry; and upon an affirmative
answer to it Evolutionist Hedonism is plainly de-
pendent. To both questions v. Hartmann gives an
answer in the negative.
(a) If the pessimist view of life is correct, Mr (a) that life
Spencer holds, 2 then " the ending of an undesirable
existence being the thing to be wished, that which
causes the ending of it must be applauded." And
this is so far true, though not necessarily true in
the way Mr Spencer thinks. Eor this undesirable
existence cannot, perhaps, be brought to a final con-
clusion merely by ending the individual life : this
1 Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 127.
2 Data of Ethics, p. 26.
170 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
would only leave room for other individuals to fill
the vacant places. Annihilation is the end not
directly for the individual, but for the race. Not
life itself, according to Schopenhauer, but the will
to live, is to be killed in the individual man. Even
this code of morals, Hartmann thinks, is a remnant
of the false, pre - evolutionist individualism, and
would hinder the course of the universe, by leaving
the game to be played out by the remaining indi-
viduals whose wills were not strong enough to curb
or kill themselves. It is a mistake to think that
the will to live which pulses through all existence
can be annihilated by the phenomenal individual.
The individual's duty is not to seek for himself the
painlessness of annihilation or passionless Nirwana,
but to join in the ceaseless painful striving of
nature, and, by contributing to the development of
life, to hasten its arrival once more at the goal of
unconsciousness. The self-destruction, not of the
individual will, but of the cosmic or universal will,
is the final end of action.
Apart from the metaphysical view of things with
which this estimate of the value of life is connected,
and which may be regarded perhaps as its conse-
quent rather than its cause, 1 the pessimist doctrine
has a double foundation, in psychology and in the
facts of life.
1 Cf. Vaihinger, Hartmann, Diihring und Lange (1876), p.
124.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 171
Psychologically, it seems to be best supported ( a ) from the
by Schopenhauer's doctrine of will or desire as an nature^
incessant painful striving, pleasure being merely P leasure
the negative of this pain, and always coming short
of completely satisfying it. But this position in-
volves a double error in psychological analysis, and
is relinquished even by Hartmarm, though he still
regards pleasure as in all cases satisfaction of desire.
Desire is itself merely a secondary or derived fact
in human nature, consequent on the inhibition of
volitional energy. 1 The pleasures we call passive
are independent of it ; and those which attend upon
activity, but are not themselves part of the end of
action, are also enjoyed without being striven after
in order to satisfy a want. Further, it is a mistake
to look upon the pleasure of attainment as a mere
negation of the pain of desire. The painful element
in desire comes from the inhibition of the attempted
realisation of an ideal object. In unsatisfied de-
sires, it is true, the pain is in proportion to the
strength of the restrained longing. But, if the
inhibition is overcome, the pain is not equal to the
strength of the desire, but only to the amount of
opposition that has to be conquered in satisfying
it. Hence, not only are there other pleasures than
those of satisfied desire, but even the pleasure got
from such satisfaction is something more than a mere
recompense for the pain accompanying the desire.
1 Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 216.
172 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
0> from the The support got by pessimism from the facts of
man 8 life ; U human life is more difficult to estimate at its true
value. It is obvious that pleasure and pain are
intermingled in almost every experience ; and the
proportion in which they are mixed varies greatly
in different circumstances and according to the
susceptibilities of different persons. If we ask a
number of people whether life is on the whole
pleasant to them, not only do we receive a variety
of answers which it is hard to sum up and average,
but the answers we get are apt to reflect the feeling
of the moment rather than to represent an impartial
estimate of the pleasure and pain of a lifetime.
Thus experience seems unable to give us a trust-
worthy answer as to the average pleasure-value of
life ; but, if its verdict is correct, that to some life
is pleasant, though to many painful, this shows
that a surplus of pain does not follow from the
nature of life, and thus destroys the position of
thoroughgoing pessimism, which looks upon this as
the worst of all possible worlds.
(&) that the (&) It may still be maintained, however and
t this is the position which chiefly concerns us here
tend to that the course of evolution does not tend to in-
pleasure.
crease the pleasure in life at the expense of the pain
in it, and that, therefore, even although pleasure and
evolution may both of them be possible ends of con-
duct, they are ends which point in different direc-
tions and lead to different courses of action.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 173
It is necessary for the evolutionist who holds (a) incom-
that the development of life does not tend to theevoiu-
increased pleasure, to meet the argument already j^f argu "
adduced l to show their correspondence. Nor does
that argument seem to be altogether beyond criti-
cism. To compare progress or development with
pleasure, we ought to know exactly what is meant
by both terms. Yet it is impossible to have a clear
notion of progress without an idea of the end to
which it tends, and this has not yet been obtained.
It is largely on account of the difficulty of ob-
taining such an idea that some evolutionists seem
to have been driven to measure progress in terms
of pleasure, just as, owing to the difficulty of esti-
mating and summing up pleasures, some hedonists
have been induced to measure them by the progress
of evolution. What we have now to see is whether
the correspondence assumed between progress and
pleasure actually exists. And, to avoid the tauto-
logy of saying that progress is increase of life, we
must judge of it simply by empirical observation of
the nature of human activity and of the course of
human affairs.
Now the attempted identification of pleasurable
and life-promoting activities rests on an incomplete
account of the motives and results of action. For,
in the first place, even admitting that pleasure and
avoidance of pain are the only motives to action,
1 See above, p. 167 f.
174 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
the influence of natural selection has not prevented
actions hurtful to life being sometimes accom-
panied by pleasant sensations. Its tendency to do
so has been much more effective in the lower
orders of animal life than in the higher. The
latter, especially man, possess the power of repre-
senting ideal states in the imagination, and are
thus able to avoid actions hurtful to life, although
these actions are pleasant at the time. For the
hurtful consequences - of the action may be so
vividly represented in idea as to outweigh the in-
fluence of the present pleasure which could be got
from its enjoyment. 1
And further, the analysis of volition involved in
the argument seems to be insufficient. For there
are other springs of action to be taken account
of than pleasure and its opposite. Habit, imita-
tion, and interests of a more comprehensive kind
than desire of pleasant feeling, are all motives to
action. It is true that pleasure is always felt in
the successful performance of an action, and it is
also true that the inhibition of will is always
painful ; but it is none the less incorrect to look
either upon the pleasure that follows from the
action, or the pain that would be the result of its
inhibition as, in ordinary cases, the motive. It is
motives of a different kind than pleasure, such as
1 Cf. Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874), ii.
332 f.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 175
imitation 1 and the influence of ideal ends, which
most often lead to progress. And the progress
that is due to such motives cannot be measured
by its effect in increasing pleasure, nor assumed to
make pleasure and life correspond. Other activ-
ities less advantageous in nature in all respects
but this, might, so far as the reasoning goes, lead
to equal or to more pleasurable consequences. At
the best, therefore, the above argument only proves
a general tendency towards the coincidence of
pleasurable actions with actions which promote
life ; it does not show that the increase of life
can be accurately measured by pleasure. The pro-
cess of natural selection might kill off all organisms
whose desires led them normally to action hurtful'
to life. But sufficient evidence has not been
brought forward to show that it is fitted to pro-
duce an exact proportion between progress and
pleasure.
Hartmann, however, attempts to strike a more OB) The pes-
i % ' i sinrist doc-
iundamental blow than this at the presupposition trine that
involved in the argument for evolutionist hedon-
ism. For he contends that, throughout all life, the
1 " Imitation," according to Kant (Grundlegung zur Met. d.
Sitten, Werke, iv. 257), " has no place at all in morals ; " and this
is true if the naked law of duty or respect for it is the sole
ethical motive. But if morality consists in the attainment of
an ideal which is being gradually realised in man, moral value
will not be denied to the motive which leads the individual to
fashion his own nature after that in which morality has attained
more complete realisation.
176 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
(<m) the hy- great pulse of progress is neither, on the one hand,
pothesis of . , , .
theuncon- desire lor pleasure, nor, on the other, the more
scious; complex and varied motives just referred to, but
that it is the incessant striving towards fulness of
life by a universal unconscious will, which is mani-
fested in all things, and which is for ever pressing
onwards towards conscious realisation, regardless
of the increase of pain which the course of evolu-
tion implies. But this hypothesis of unconscious
will is not a justifiable metaphysical principle got
at by the analysis of experience, and necessary for
its explanation, though lying beyond it. It is a
" meternpirical," or rather mythical, cause inter-
polated into the processes of experience. Hence
the antagonism in which it stands to psychological
fact : its disregard of the effect of pleasure as a
powerful motive in volition ; and its neglect of the
obvious truth that function so reacts upon organ
that all actions have simply by continuance a
tendency to be performed with greater ease, and
therefore to yield in their performance increase
of pleasure. The smoothness and precision with
which it works may, indeed, lead to a function
being performed unconsciously, and thus without
either pain or pleasure. But the normal exercise
of conscious activity is uniformly pleasurable. 1
While giving up Schopenhauer's doctrine of the
merely negative character of pleasure, Hartmann
1 See the concluding pages of this chapter.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 177
yet contends that " eternal limits " are set by the (&&) the na-
very nature of volition, which make it impossible tl^n;
to have a world with more pleasure in it than
pain. But his arguments * come very far short
of proving his case. For, in the first place, to say
that the stimulation and wearying of the nerves
imply the necessity of a cessation of pleasure as
well as of pain, is to confuse complete states of
consciousness with the subjective feeling which
accompanies each state. It is not true that one
ever becomes weary of pleasure : to talk as if there
were one class of nerves for pleasure, and another
for pain, is absurd. But every mental state, how-
ever pleasurable to start with, tends to become
monotonous, wearisome, or painful. Pleasure thus
requires a change from one mental state to another :
to say that it requires a change from pleasure to
something else is a contradiction in terms. It is
the objects or activity that require to be varied,
not the feeling of pleasure. Again, in the second
place, it is true that pleasure is to be regarded as
indirect in so far as it is entirely due to the
cessation of a pain, and not to instantaneous satis-
faction of will. But it does not do to regard the
pleasure as altogether indirect when, although the
cessation of a pain is necessary for its production,
it is itself something more than this cessation.
The inhibition of will often prevents the realisa-
1 Philosophic des Unbewussten, 6th ed., p. 660 ff.
M
178 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
tion of an object which is very much more than a
recompense in pleasurable quality for the pain of
the restraint ; and although the pleasure only arises
from the removal of this painful state of inhibi-
tion, there is a direct and positive gain over and
above the gratification of having pain removed.
In the third place, Hartmann argues that the
satisfaction of will is often unconscious, whereas
pain is eo ipso conscious. But, even admitting the
reality of unconscious will or desire, which this
argument involves, it does not follow that pleas-
ure and pain are differently affected in regard to
it. If pain is eo ipso conscious, so also is pleasure ;
if the satisfaction of unconscious desire gives no
pleasure, neither does the absence of such satis-
faction give pain. 1 It is true, as Hartmann adds
in the fourth place, that desire is often long and
the joy of satisfaction fleeting ; but this refers not
so much to mental pleasures as to those connected
with physical appetite. Of them it is true that
" These violent delights have violent ends,
And in their triumph die."
But in the higher pleasures with more permanent
objects of pursuit, although the desire may be long-
continued, the pleasure does not disappear in the
moment of gratification.
It would seem, therefore, that the pessimist psy-
chology, in treating pleasure in a different way from
1 Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 226 n.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 179
pain, mistakes the true nature of both as simply
" polar extremes " l of feeling, and prevents the
argument being faced which has been brought
forward to show the increasing correspondence
of pleasure and life.
The failure of the psychological argument makes ( CC ) the facts
the whole burden of the proof of pessimism rest props':
upon the argument from historical facts. And the
attempt has been definitely made to show, from
observation of the course of human affairs, that
the progress of the world tends to misery. It
is necessary, therefore, to ask whether it can be
established that the facts included under the vague
term " human progress " have a normal tendency
either to increase pleasure or to act in the opposite
way. Now progress is a characteristic both of the
individual and of society ; but pleasure only be-
longs to the former, so that an answer to the
question whether individual progress tends to in-
crease the surplus of pleasure over pain, still leaves
unsettled the question as to the effect of social
progress.
It seems evident that both the physical and individual
mental development of the individual imply greater pl
adaptability to, and correspondence with, the exter-
nal world, and that, on account of this develop-
1 Cf. J. Ward, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xvi. (1882),
377.
180 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
ment, there is less unpleasant friction between
outer and inner relations, and means are at hand
for obtaining objects of desire with less exertion
than formerly. But, at the same time, the increase
of knowledge and of skill always implies not merely
the means of satisfying old wants, but the creation
of new ones : we see more of the evil in the world
than our forefathers did, and there are more avenues
by which it can approach us, if we have also more
effective means for avoiding what we dislike. And,
although knowledge brings with it not only the
pleasure of gratified curiosity, but that recognition
of a universal order which frees the mind from the
evils bred by a belief in the fickleness of nature,
yet this all-pervading sense of law has so regulated
our beliefs and methods of research that science
itself may seem to have lost the peculiar freshness
of interest that belonged to its earlier stages ; while
the feelings called forth by a vision of the divine
presence in the world, find but a poor substitute in
the sublime region of " cosmic emotion." Further,
the widening of the sympathetic feelings and their
consequent activities, and the refinement of the
whole sensitive nature by which it responds more
quickly and accurately to emotional stimuli, have
made the present generation more susceptible to
both pain and pleasure than its predecessors. But
Hartmann's argument that the duller nervous sys-
tem of the savage races (Naturvolker) makes them
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 181
happier than the civilised (Culturvolker), 1 leaves out
of sight the new sources of pleasure as well as pain
that are opened up to a refined sensibility. Accord-
ing to Hartmann, the aesthetic sensibilities may be
a source of painless pleasure: yet even their cul-
tivation cannot be said to be matter of pure gain
to their possessors; for the pain of discord is to
be set against in his opinion, it outweighs the
pleasure of harmony. On the whole, then, it would
appear that the evolution of the individual leads to
greater possibilities both of pleasure and of pain.
The refinement of the intellectual and emotional
nature opens up wider ranges of both kinds of
feeling ; and we are driven to look mainly to the
improvement of the social environment for the
means of increasing pleasure and diminishing
pain.
But to estimate the hedonistic value of social social pro.
progress is a still more difficult task than the pre- &
ceding. For the march of affairs has often little
regard to its effect on the happiness of the greater
number of people concerned. Industrially, it may industrial,
be thought that the increase in the amount of
wealth produced affords a vastly greater means of
comfort and luxury. Yet, it is doubtful whether
this increase has always been sufficient to keep
pace with the growth of population ; and it is cer-
tain that every society whose territory is limited,
1 Phil. d. Unbewussten, p. 747.
182 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
must, when its numbers have increased beyond
a certain point, begin to experience the diminishing
returns which nature yields for the labour expended
upon it. Indeed, the tendency to an excess in the
rate of increase of population over that of means of
subsistence is one of the chief causes which make
it so difficult to assert that civilisation tends to
greater happiness. But, even although the average
quantity of wealth be greater now than before, it
must be remembered that wealth is measured by
its amount, whereas happiness depends on the
equality with which that amount is distributed. 1
Yet the present industrial regime tends to the
accumulation of immense wealth in a few hands,
rather than to its proportionate increase throughout
the community. The industrial progress which
increases the wealth of the rich, has little to recom-
mend it if it leaves the "labouring poor" at a
starvation-wage.
1 Bentham, Theory of Legislation (by Dumont, 1876), p^
103 ff. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologic, 2d ed., p. 469, finds
in this an instance of Weber's law. Thus, the man with 100
receives the same pleasure on receipt of 1, as the possessor of
1000 does on receiving 10. As Wundt remarks, however, this
is only true within certain limits. Sixpence may give more
pleasure to a beggar who is never far from the starvation-point,
than the clearing of a million to Baron Eothschild. Further than
this, the law only states an "abstract" truth. For the suscepti-
bility to pleasure is not only very different in different individuals,
but this difference depends on many other circumstances than the
amount of wealth already in possession, such as original emotional
susceptibility, &c.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 183
" And what if Trade sow cities
Like shells along the shore,
And thatch with towns the prairie broad
With railways ironed o'er,"
if the population can be divided into plutocrats
and proletariate ? Moreover, the very nature of
economic production seems to imply an opposition
between social progress and individual wellbeing.
For the former, in demanding the greatest possible
amount of produce, requires an excessive and
increasing specialisation of labour. Each worker
must perform that operation only to which he has
been specially trained, or which he can do best.
And in this way industrialism tends to occupy the
greater part of the waking hours of an increasing
proportion of human lives in the repetition of a
short series of mechanical movements which call
out a bare minimum of the faculties of the worker,
dwarf his nature, and reduce his life to a mere
succession of the same monotonous sensation. 1 In
spite, therefore, of immense improvements in the
general conditions of wellbeing, it is still difficult
to say that the happiness of the average human life
has been much increased by the march of industrial
progress.
A more hopeful view may, perhaps, be taken of and poiiti-
the effect of political progress. The increase of &
popular government gratifies the desire for power,
1 Cf. Comte, Positive Philosophy, ii. 144.
184 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
and, in some cases, even tends to a more efficient
management of affairs. Still more important in its
effect on happiness is the greater security for life
and property which the gradual consolidation of
political control has brought about. It would seem,
too, that the harsher features of the struggle by
which this advance takes place have been modified ;
and that the war of politics has abated in fury more
than the war of trade. On the whole, therefore,
the tendency of modern political rule appears to
be towards an almost unmixed gain in respect of
happiness, by the security it affords for life and
property, by its wide distribution of political power,
and by the room it gives for individual freedom.
Yet the last of these results in the laissez-faire
system of industrialism to which it has led, and
which, in spite of many modifications, is still in the
ascendant has effects of a more doubtful character.
This mere reference to one or two of the leading
features of progress would not be sufficient to sup-
port a thesis either as to its beneficial or baneful
tendency. But evidence enough has been led to
show that the effects on pleasure of individual and
social development are of a mixed kind, that
culture and civilisation have neither the tendency
to misery which Hartmann follows Eousseau in
attributing to them, 1 nor, on the other hand, that
steady correspondence with increasing pleasure
1 Phan. d. s. B., p. 640.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 185
which would be required to establish the position
of evolutionist hedonism.
It follows, therefore, that, without adopting a Necessity of
. . , . , .,-, , . choosing
pessimist view, we must still make our choice between
between evolutionism and hedonism. The course ^and* 1 *
of evolution so far as experience helps us to hedonism -
understand it cannot be measured by increase of
pleasure. Nothing is said here to show that it
is not perfectly consistent to hold that the moral
feelings and ideas, the customs to which they have
given rise, and the institutions in which they are
embodied, have been produced by the ordinary laws
of evolution, and yet to maintain that the moral end
for reflective beings is the hedonistic or utilitarian
end. It may be possible, that is to say, to be an
evolutionist in psychology and sociology, at the
same time that one is a hedonist in ethics. But it
is not allowable to adopt pleasure as the end, and
yet speak of it as determined by evolution. Evolu-
tion can determine no such end until it be shown
that the progress it connotes implies a proportionate
increase of pleasure.
Such is the conclusion to which we are led by a
consideration of the bearings of evolution upon the
increase of pleasure and pain. But this argument
requires to be supplemented by the more satisfac-
tory method of an independent analysis of pleasure
in relation to the development of human nature;
and from this analysis we may hope to discover
186 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
how far the theory of evolution is consistent with
the ethics of hedonism.
4. The psy- The relative and transient nature of pleasure has
analysis rf b een urged as an objection against any form of
hedonism by man 7 philosophers since the time of
lationtothe Plato. And the argument has of late years been
ethics of
evolution, brought forward in a way which shows that the
calculus of "pleasures" and "pains" which Ben-
tham's ethics implies is much less certain and easy
than its author supposed. This has been made
clear both by the subtle analysis carried out by the
late Professor Green, and by Professor Sidgwick's
examination of the difficulties which beset the
"hedonistic calculus." It does not appear, how-
ever, to have been made out that the nature of
pleasure proves hedonism to be impossible as the
end of conduct. But it may, perhaps, appear that
the case is altered when we consider the matter in
the light of the evolutionist form of hedonism now
under examination, and estimate from this point
of view the ethical bearings of the psychological
analysis of feeling.
The difficulty of denning pleasure or pain is not
the same as the difficulty or impossibility of denning
any elementary sensation. Tor the latter is con-
nected in definite ways with other similar sensations,
can be compared and associated with them, and by
such association go to make up an object or thing.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 187
But pleasure and pain are neither objects nor parts
of objects : they cannot be distinguished from or nature of 1 '
associated with the impressions of the senses so as ple *
to constitute an object. They can only be spoken
of as an affection of the percipient and active sub-
ject, different in kind both from the objects it knows
and the acts it performs : each can only be denned
as the opposite of the other. Pleasure and pain
are not real phenomena with a distinguishable
existence of their own, like sensations, conceptions,
or actions ; they have no trace of objectivity what-
ever, but are, as Hamilton puts it, 1 "subjectively
subjective " : " pleasure is not a fact, nor is pain a
fact, but one fact is pleasurable, another painful." 2
Pleasure, therefore, is a mere feeling of the subject,
concomitant with the sensory or motor presenta- its connec-
tions which, by reason of their presence to conscious- objective
ness, we call objects or actions. It is not something
1 Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 432.
2 L. Dumont, Theorie scientifique de la sensibility 2d ed., p.
83 ; cf. F. Bouillier, Du plaisir et de la douleur, 2d ed., p. 29 ff.
Reference may also be made to the leading psychological text-
book. " Das Gefiihl," says Volkmann (Lehrbuch der Psychologic,
127, 3d ed., ii. 300), " ist namlich keine eigene Vorstellung neben
den anderen (es gibt keine eigenen 'Gefiihlsvorstellungen'), ja
iiberhaupt gar keine Vorstellung." Professor Bain's view is
different, but does not altogether prevent him from acknowledg-
ing the subjectivity of feeling : " Without intellectual images
clearly recollected, we do not remember feelings ; the reproduction
of feeling is an intellectual fact, and the groundwork is intellec-
tual imagery." Emotions, p. 63.
ma;
the
conduct.
188 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
by itself which we can choose rather than something
else, as we may select a peach instead of an apple,
through It can only be made the end of conduct in an
,y be made indirect way. We must aim not at pleasure per se,
but at objects which we have reason to believe will
be accompanied by pleasurable feeling. Pleasure
and pain, as it has been urged, 1 are not quantities
that can be added and subtracted. It is not the
pleasurable or painful feeling, but the perceptional
or cognitive elements in the mental state of which
it is an element, that admit of plurality and
measurement. But we may foresee that one mental
state will be accompanied by pleasurable, another
by painful feeling, and, on that account, we may
choose the former. In a great number of cases we
are further able to make a quantitative estimate,
and to say that the pleasurable feeling accompany-
ing one object or action is more intense than that
accompanying another, and thus to choose one ob-
ject rather than another, not merely because one
is pleasurable while the other is painful, but (in
cases where both are pleasurable) because it is sup-
posed that the one will yield more intense or more
prolonged pleasure than the other. If this be true,
the purely subjective nature of pleasure does not
make it impossible for it to be taken as the prac-
tical end of conduct for the individual however
inexact and tentative many of its estimates must be
1 Cf. Green, Introduction to Hume, ii. 7.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 189
though it will shortly appear that its nature un-
fits it to be the end on the theory of evolution.
The difficulty arises when we attempt to inter-
pret, by means of pleasure, the increase and de-
velopment of life to which the course of evolution
tends, and which is sometimes put forward as the
end which the evolution-theory prescribes for con-
duct. And the difficulty also meets us when we
seek to explain the conception of a maximum of
pleasures as the end, by means of the conception
of evolution.
As long as we are content to look upon human
nature as consisting of constant sources of activity
and enjoyment, and having fixed susceptibilities for
pleasure and pain, it is easy to adopt the increase
of pleasure and diminution of pain as our aim.
But the case is altered when we take into consider-
ation the fact that man's actions and sensibilities
are subject to indefinite modification. Pleasure, as
we have seen, is a feeling of the subject dependent
upon the objects, sensory and motor, present at any
time to consciousness. These objects alone can be
our end ; but we may aim at certain of them rather
than others, simply on account of their pleasurable
accompaniment. It may happen, however, that an
object or action at one time pleasurable becomes
painful at another time, and that what is now pain-
ful ceases to be so and becomes pleasurable. In
this case our course of action, if motived by pleasure,
190 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
would have to be entirely changed, our practical
ethics revised and reversed. And, although no
sudden alteration such as this ever takes place, the
theory of evolution shows that a gradual modifica-
tion of the kind is going on.
(6) The con- The conditions of pleasure and pain, physiolo-
pfeunreand gi a l an( J psychological, are matter of dispute ; and
the dispute is complicated by the confusion of the
physiological with the psychological problem. It
will be evident, however, if only we keep differ-
ent things clear of each other, that both kinds of
explanation are possible, and that they are distinct
from one another. The question of the nervous
antecedents and concomitants of feeling is one
thing, and quite distinct from the question which
now arises of the mental antecedents or concomi-
tants of feeling. And here the theories which
have attempted a generalisation of the phenomena
are, in the light of recent inquiry, mainly two :
the theory that pleasure follows, or is the sense of,
increase of life, and that which holds it to be the
concomitant of unimpeded conscious functioning or
of medium activities.
(a) Pleasure The former theory l might be put forward as in-
abie as the dicating how it is possible to institute a connection
1 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, iii. 11, schol. ; Hobbes, Leviathan, i. 6,
p. 25 ; Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 283. Professor
Bain's statement is carefully guarded : " A very considerable
number of the facts may be brought under the following prin-
ciplenamely, that states of pleasure are connected with an in-
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 191
between pleasure and evolution. But it has been sense of
already shown that neither the actual facts of life, ^taSty
nor the tendencies to action, can be so interpreted
as to make their nature and development corre-
spond, with any degree of exactness, with pleasure
and its increase. 1 Nor is it possible to make out
that every pain corresponds to a loss of vitality,
every pleasure heightens it. On the contrary, the
assertion that pleasure-giving actions and life-pre-
serving actions coincide, is due to a hasty general-
isation which cannot include all the facts. That it
holds throughout a considerable extent is true.
Pleasure is, at any rate, a usual accompaniment
of the normal processes of the development of
life; and pain reaches its climax in death. But
yet there is a broad margin of experience for
which the generalisation is incorrect. There are
numerous cases of painful and pleasurable sensa-
tions which cannot be shown to be, respectively,
destructive of, and beneficial to* vitality. As
Mr Bain, who always keeps the facts in view,
admits, with regard to the feelings connected with
the five senses, " we cannot contend that the de-
crease, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of
the vital functions."
1 As Mr Spencer allows, Psychology, 126, i. 284: "In the
case of mankind, then, there has arisen, and must long continue,
a deep and involved derangement of the natural connections be-
tween pleasures and beneficial actions, and between pains and
detrimental actions."
192
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
O) may be
*
tioning.
gree of augmented vital energy corresponds always
with the degree of the pleasure." l The same discrep-
ancy may be observed in more complex experiences.
The effort after a fuller life, whether physical or
mental, even when its ultimate success is not
doubtful, may bring more pain than pleasure;
while the life which never strains its powers
towards the limits of endurance, may experience
almost uninterrupted pleasure: but such pleasure
is the sure herald of the process of degeneration.
The theory that pleasure follows increased vital-
ity, and pain decreased vitality, is supplemented or
PP se d in modern psychology by the theory that
feeling depends on function: that pleasure is the
concomitant of medium activities, 2 or of conscious
functioning, which is unimpeded and not over-
strained 3 pain accompanying the opposite con-
dition. The objection urged against this view,
1 The Senses and the Intellect, p. 286. The Law of Conser-
vation is incomplete, Mr Bain holds, and must be supplemented
by the Law of Stimulation (p. 294).
8 Spencer, Psychology, 123, i. 277 : " Generally speaking,
then, pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities, where
the activities are of kinds liable to be in excess or in defect ; and
where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive, pleasure in-
creases as the activity increases, except where the activity is
either constant or involuntary."
3 Hamilton, Lectures, ii. 440 : " Pleasure is the reflex of the
spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose ener-
gies we are conscious. Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or re-
pressed exertion of such a power." Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N., vii.
12, p. 1153 a 14, x. 4, p. 1174 b 20.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 193
that it leaves the so-called " passive pleasures "
out of account, seems to be made without sufficient
consideration of what is meant by attributing pas-
sivity to pleasure. All that such an expression
can denote, would appear to be that, in the pleas-
urable experience referred to, no exercise of the
muscles is implied, not that such an experience can
take place without any conscious activity on the
part of the subject. At the same time, the theory
that pleasure in all cases depends upon function,
must be admitted to be obliged to call in the aid of
hypothesis in order to explain all the facts. If the
generalisation required by the theory can be made
out, it must be by emphasising the fact that feeling
is never properly regarded as purely passive, but
implies subjective reaction ; and by supposing that
the variation of feeling between pleasure and pain
depends on a difference in the character of this
subjective reaction. At the same time, the com-
plete accuracy of this generalisation is not of vital
importance here, as it is mainly with the feeling
which manifestly results from activity or function-
ing that we are concerned.
Whether pleasure depends upon increase of vital Modification
energy, or upon unimpeded or medium function-
ing, it must be subject to modification along with ^
the conditions under which life may continue and
increase, or the modes of activity which may be
carried on without opposition and in moderation.
N
194 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
This constant modification of the objects in which
one takes pleasure, or which give one pain, is, in-
deed, a fact which must be admitted by any theory
of feeling. A state of mind may be at first pleas-
urable; but, if it be long-continued, the pleasure
will give way to the pain of monotony. The same
is true of a painful state of mind : its continuance
does not prolong the same intensity of painful con-
sciousness, but the sensibility becomes dulled and
the pain diminishes. The transition is still more
striking in the case of motor activities. In learning
to walk, or to ride, or to play any instrument, the
first experiences are those of painful effort. Gra-
dually, however, the co-ordinations of movement
required entail less and less pain, till the feeling
passes over into its opposite, and we have a pleas-
urable sense of successful effort and well-adapted
functioning. But, just as pain gave way to pleasure,
so pleasure itself subsides, the action becomes
merely reflex and passes out of consciousness al-
together, unless it be so long continued as to pro-
duce fatigue that is, pain. Habit, as Dumont
remarks, 1 intensifies perceptions, but weakens pleas-
ure and pain.
suggests These are psychological facts not mere theories
which hold true even of the individual experience.
objective J> U th e y naye l e( J psychologists to the theory, SUp-
intensity.
ported by a vast amount of direct experiment, that
1 Thdorie scientifique, p. 78.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 195
there is no object or action which can be said to be
absolutely and in itself either pleasant or painful. 1
The feeling of pleasure or pain accompanying the
object is a function of its intensity in relation to the
subject. This proposition cannot, indeed, be fully
demonstrated regarding each simple sensation: to
the emotions into which intricate relations of per-
ceptions enter, it does not apply, till their complexity
has been reduced. Some sensations and perceptions
are certainly felt as painful in any intensity in which
they are distinctly present to consciousness. But,
although this is a real difficulty, it does not seem
insuperable. The instances which Mill cites 2 to
throw doubt on the generalisation that quality of
feeling depends on intensity are unfortunately chosen
for his purpose. For to take his example the
taste of rhubarb is to many not painful but pleasant;
and, indeed, every case of acquired taste shows that
pleasure and pain can be modified through habit and
custom, and suggests that, even in the case of those
sensations which are painful in any form we have
been able to experience them, there is a degree of
intensity below which they would, if experienced,
be pleasant. Experiment has proved of the majority
even of sensible qualities, and analogy leads us to
conclude of all, that there is a degree in which each
1 Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., p. 470 ; Fechner, Vorschule
der Aesthetik, ii. 243 f.
2 Exam, of Hamilton's Philosophy, 5th ed. 3 p. 559.
196 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
may be pleasant, and a degree in which each may
be painful, and, between them, a real or imaginary
zero-point of feeling, where there is neither plea-
sure nor pain. This must, it is true, be received as
a hypothesis only; but it is a hypothesis which is
suggested by a wide range of facts, and which is
able to include even those facts with which it is
seemingly inconsistent, by supposing that could
their intensity be indefinitely diminished without
their passing out of consciousness, these sensations
would reach a point after which they would be felt
as pleasant and not as painful. Further, experiment
shows that this dividing-point which separates the
two poles of feeling is not always placed at the same
degree of intensity, that it differs not only for every
object, but for each individual subject as well, and
that it undergoes modification in the course of the
subject's development. 1
What is true of sense-perception is still more
evident regarding those experiences in which the
activity of the subject is more obviously involved.
As any function may, if carried beyond a certain
degree of intensity, be painful, so any function con-
sistent with life may be a source of pleasure.
From the preceding discussion two things may be
inferred: first, the dependence of pleasure and pain
on the subject-activity, whether the activity be that
1 See Fechner, loc. cit.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 197
of perception or of what is specifically called action ;
and secondly, the modification of pleasure and pain,
and transition from one to the other, along with the
modification of that subject-activity. To the appli-
cation of both these conclusions there may be limits;
but their general accuracy does not seem doubtful.
What the doctrine of evolution adds to this is its (<0
tion of the
proof of the indefinite modifiability of human f unc- theory of
T , ' i i i < i * n *- evolution :
tion. " It is an essential principle or lite, Mr
Spencer wrote, 1 before he had arrived at his general
theory of evolution, " that a faculty to which circum-
stances do not allow full exercise diminishes ; and
that a faculty on which circumstances make exces-
sive demands increases ; " and to this we must now
add, " that, supposing it consistent with maintenance
of life, there is no kind of activity which will not
become a source of pleasure if continued ; and that
therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every
mode of action demanded by social conditions." 2
It is, he holds, a " biological truth," that " everywhere
faculties adjust themselves to the conditions of exist-
ence in such wise that the activities those conditions
require become pleasurable." 3 The vast periods of
time over which evolution stretches are scarcely
needed to show how pleasure may be made to follow
from almost any course of action consistent with the
continuance of life. The change of habits which
1 Social Statics, p. 79. 2 Data of Ethics, p. 186.
3 Mind, vi. 85.
198 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
often takes place in the history of a nation, and even
in the life of an individual, makes this sufficiently
obvious. But, if we still think of making attainment
of pleasure the end of conduct, the doctrine of evolu-
tion must give us pause. It has been already argued
that, given certain sources of, and susceptibilities for,
pleasure, the course of evolution has not been such
as to produce an exact coincidence between them
any conduct and the actions which further life. But it would
consistent .-, . -. , . . . . i i ,
with condi- seem that, given habits or acting which are consist-
e conditions f life> an ^ which are system-
be pieasur- atically carried out, these will not fail to grow plea-
a Die j
sant as the organism becomes adapted to them. At
the best, it is difficult enough to say, even for the
individual, whether one imagined object or course of
action will exceed another in pleasurable feeling or
not. But, when we remember that function and
feeling may be modified indefinitely, it is impossible
to say what course of conduct will produce the
greatest amount of pleasure for the race. Taking
in all its effects, we cannot say that one way of
seeking pleasure is better that is, will bring more
pleasure than another. Bearing in mind the modi-
fications which evolution produces, it seems impos-
sible to guide the active tendencies of mankind
towards the goal of greatest pleasure, except by
saying that the greatest pleasure will be got from
the greatest amount of successful, or of unrestrained,
or of medium activity.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 199
If, then, we have been seeking to define the evolu- maximum
tionist end by interpreting it in terms of pleasure,
it appears that we have only succeeded in making
the round of a circle : pleasure as the end is seen to
be only definable as life or activity, although it was
adopted as the end in order that by its help we might
discover what life or activity meant as the end for
conduct. We may, perhaps, still be able to hold to
a form of hedonism, if we turn our attention from
the race to a small portion of present mankind. In
spite of the modifiability of function and its parasite
feeling, we may still be able to say that such and
such a course of action is likely to bring most
pleasure to the individual or even to the family.
But we cannot extend such a means of interpreting
the ethics of evolution to the race, where the possi-
bility of modification is indefinitely great, and the
pain incurred in initiating a change counts for little
in comparison with its subsequent results. If we
continue to look from the evolutionist point of view,
the question, What conduct will on the whole bring
most pleasure ? can only be answered by saying
that it is the conduct which will most promote life
an answer which might have been more satis-
factory had it not been to give meaning to this end
" promotion of life " that it was interpreted in terms
of greatest pleasure. The evolution-theory of ethics
is thus seen to oscillate from the theory which looks
upon the summum bonum as pleasure, to that which
200 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
finds it in activity. It contains elements which
make it impossible for it to adhere to the former
alternative. The comprehensiveness of its view of
life makes it unable to adopt pleasure as the end,
since pleasure changes with every modification of
function. And it has now to be seen whether the
empirical method of interpretation to which it
adheres will allow of its notion of life or activity
affording a satisfactory end for conduct.
201
CHAPTER VIII.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
IN showing the important bearing which evolution wantofhar-
has on the causes of pleasure, the argument of the tweenevoiu-
preceding chapter has also made clear that the ends
of evolutionism and of hedonism cannot be made to
explain one another. The theory which starts with
a maximum of pleasure as the ultimate end, but
points to the course of evolution as showing how
that end is to be realised, is confronted by the fact
that the development of life does not always tend
to increased pleasure, and that the laws of its
development cannot therefore be safely adopted as
maxims for the attainment of pleasure. The same
objection may be taken to the method of interpret-
ing the evolutionist end by means of the pleasurable
results of conduct. The two do not correspond with
that exactness which would admit of one doing duty
for the other as a practical guide. And a further
difficulty has been shown to stand in the way of
202 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
this method. IJor, on coming to analyse pleasure,
we find that it may, by habituation, arise from any
or almost any course of conduct which the con-
ditions of existence admit of. The evolutionist,
therefore, can have no surer idea of greatest pleas-
ure even although this may not be a very sure
one than that it will follow in the train of the
greatest or most varied activity which harmonises
with the laws of life.
Necessity of We must therefore forsake the method of eclec-
investigat-
ing indepen- ticism, and inquire whether the theory of evolution
tionisTend". can niake any independent contribution towards
determining an end for conduct. We are frequently
told that it prescribes as the end " preservation," or
" development," or " the health of the society." But
to obtain a clear meaning for such notions, we must
see what definite content the theory of evolution
can give them, without considering, at present, the
grounds for transforming them into ethical pre-
cepts. Now, it may be thought and the sugges-
tion deserves careful examination that we may
find in the characteristics of evolution itself l an
indication of the end which organisms produced
by and subject to evolution are naturally fitted to
attain. These characteristics must therefore be
1 Taking evolution in its widest sense, since the theory of
evolution does not " imply some intrinsic proclivity in every
species towards a higher form." Spencer, First Principles, App.
p. 574 ; Principles of Sociology, i. 106.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 203
passed under review, that their ethical bearings
may be seen.
1. The first condition of development, and even i. Adapta-
of life, is correspondence between an organism and vironment :
its environment. The waste implied in the pro-
cesses which constitute the life of an organised
body has to be supplied by nutriment got from
surrounding objects. It requires food, air, light,
and heat in due proportions in order that its various
organs may do their work. When these circum-
stances change, either it adapts itself to the new
conditions or death ensues. Thus "we find that
every animal is limited to a certain range of cli-
mate ; every plant to certain zones of latitude and
elevation," 1 though nothing differs more among
different species than the extent of an organism's
adaptability to varying conditions. A definite or-
ganism and a medium suitable to it are called by
Comte the two " fundamental correlative conditions
of life " ; according to Mr Spencer they constitute
life. " Conformity " is absolutely necessary between
" the vital functions of any organism and the con-
ditions in which it is placed." In this conformity
there are varying degrees, and "the completeness
of the life will be proportionate to the completeness
of the correspondence." 2 Even when life is not
altogether extinguished, it is impeded by imperfect
1 Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 73. 2 Ibid., i. 82.
204 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
adaptation. Where external circumstances make
the attainment of nourishment difficult and pre-
carious, life is shortened in extent, and, within its
limits, more occupied with simply maintaining its
necessary functions less full, varied, and active.
The same holds good whether the external circum-
stances are natural or social, applies equally to
those whose energies are exhausted in the produc-
tion of a bare livelihood from a niggard soil and
unpropitious climate, and to those who, under
changed conditions, feel the hardship of adapting
themselves to a new social medium,
spoken of as Shall we say, then, that the end of human conduct
the ethical , .. . , m1 . ,
end; 1S adaptation to environment? Inis seems to be
the position taken up by some evolutionists. In
the language of von Baer, 1 "the end of ends is
always that the organic body be adapted to the
conditions of the earth, its elements and means of
nutriment;" and Mr Spencer holds "that all evil
results from the non-adaptation of constitution to
condition/' 2 The hedonism which Mr Spencer
definitely accepts as his ethical principle prevents
him, indeed, from fully adopting the theory of
human action which von Baer seems to regard as
the result of the doctrine of evolution. Yet com-
plete adaptation of constitution to condition is held
by him to be characteristic of that perfect form of
life to which evolution tends, and the laws of which
1 Reden (1876), ii. 332. 2 Social Statics (1850), p. 77.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 205
are to be our guides in our present imperfect social
condition. In working out his theory of ethics, he
describes acts as "good or bad according as they
are well or ill adjusted to ends/' identifying the
good with " the conduct furthering self-preserva-
tion," and the bad with "the conduct tending to
self-destruction." l The notion of self-preservation
thus introduced is na-turally suggested as the end
subserved by the activity of an organism being
adjusted to surrounding conditions. Self-preserva- defines the
tion, therefore, rather than adaptation to environ- seif-preser-
ment, will be regarded as the end, with which adap- vatlon *
tation will be connected as the essential means.
This notion of self-preservation has played a
remarkable part in ethical and psychological dis-
cussion since the time of the Stoics. It withdraws
attention from the relative and transient feeling of
pleasure to the permanence of the living being.
Thus, with the Stoics, the notion of self-preserva-
tion was accompanied by an ethics hostile to in-
dulgence in pleasure ; while, on the other hand, in
Spinoza and in Hobbes, pleasure was recognised
as the natural consequence of self -preserving acts
the former defining it as a transition from less to
greater perfection, the latter as the sense of what
helps the vital functions. The theory of evolution
has, of course, not only its distinctive contribution
to make to the connection between self-preservation
1 Data of Ethics, p. 25.
206 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
and pleasure a subject already referred to, but
also shows how an increasing harmony has been
produced between acts which tend to self-preserva-
tion and those which tend to social-preservation.
With Mr Spencer these two points are united. His
doctrine that the " conduct which furthers race-
maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the con-
duct which furthers self - maintenance " l is pre-
liminary^to the establishment of the proposition that
the highest life is one in which egoistic and " altru-
istic" acts harmonise with one another and with
external conditions : "the life called moral is one in
which this moving equilibrium reaches completeness
or approaches most nearly to completeness." 2
- As has been already pointed out, 3 it is not the
case, in the present state of human life, that egoistic
servation. ^^ altruistic tendencies, even when properly under-
stood, always lead to the same course of conduct ;
and even the theory of evolution does not do away
with the necessity for a " compromise " between
them. But, even had the theory of evolution' over-
come the opposition between the individual and
social standpoints, much would still remain to
be done for the purpose of constructing a system
of ethics, or determining the ethical end. It seems
better, therefore, to pass over at present the con-
flict of competing interests. According to Pascal,
1 Data of Ethics, p. 16. 2 Ibid., p. 71.
3 See above, chap. vi. p. 137 ff.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 207
" the entire succession of men, the whole courses, of
ages, is to be regarded as one man always living
and always learning/ 1 And this is a suggestion
which the theory of evolution only states more
definitely, though it cannot completely vindicate
it. On this supposition, self-preservation is social-
preservation, and the possibly divergent interests
of the individual and the whole are left out of
account. The end for the race then is, according
to the theory most explicitly stated by von Baer,
a state of " moving equilibrium " : and to this state
of affairs we are at least, Mr Spencer holds, indu-
bitably tending. In the final stage of human devel-
opment, man will be perfectly adapted to the con-
ditions of his environment, so that, to each change
without, there will be an answering organic change.
The ideal which seems to be held up to us is that
of a time in which there will be no more irksome
fretting in the machinery of life, and circumstances
will never be unpropitious, because the organism
will never be wanting in correspondence with them.
If this adaptation be adopted as the practical (a) AS the
end for conduct under present conditions, and not pr ese nt
merely as describing a far-off ideal to which we l; ^^
are supposed to be tending, man may continue to progress;
manifest a law of progress, but its initiation will
be from external conditions. If " adaptation to en-
vironment" is consistently made the end, activity
will have to be restricted to suiting one's powers
208 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
to an external order of nature, and desire will have
to be curbed when it does not bring the means
of satisfaction along with it. " Bene latere " will
again be an equivalent for " bene vivere," and hap-
piness will have to be sought in withdrawal from the
distractions of political life, and in the restriction
of desire. It is strange to see the theory which
is supposed to be based upon and to account for
progress, returning in this way to an ideal similar
to that in which the post-Aristotelian schools took
refuge amid the decline of political and intellectual
life in Greece. The end which Stoic and Epicurean
alike sought in complete emancipation from the
conditions of the external world, 1 is now, in more
scientific phrase, made to consist in complete har-
mony with these conditions. But, in their practical
results, the two theories would seem scarcely to
differ. It is not astonishing, therefore, if this gos-
pel of renunciation finds little favour among prac-
tical men in our day. It is seen that, if a man
has not wants, he will make no efforts, and that,
if he make no efforts, his condition can never be
bettered. Thus social reformers have often found
that the classes they have tried to elevate did not
feel the evil of their lot as their benefactors saw it,
and they have had to create wants before attempt-
ing to satisfy them. 2 And the practical tendency
1 Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, 3d ed., III. i. 454, 470.
2 Lassalle's tirade against the " verdammte Bediirfnisslosigkeit "
of the German workman is a case in point.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 209
finds its counterpart in speculative opinion, so that,
whereas Epicurus placed happiness in freedom
from wants, modern hedonism usually considers a
man the happier the more wants he has and is able
to supply. 1
This practical tendency brings out the truth that does not
it is not only by the subordination of self to cir- sen t the
cumstances, and the restriction of desire to present evolution.
means of satisfaction, that the required harmony
between outer and inner relations can be brought
about. The other alternative is open : circum-
stances may be subordinated to self. For this lat-
ter alternative the theory of evolution seems really
to leave room as much as for the former. It is ex-
cluded only when a one-sided emphasis is laid on
the necessity of adaptation to environment. For
evolution implies a gradually increasing heterogen-
eity of structure as the prelude to perfect agree-
ment with circumstances : " the limit of heterogen-
eity towards which every aggregate progresses is
the formation of as many specialisations and com-
binations of parts as there are specialised and com-
bined forces to be met." 2 The end of evolution is a
correspondence between inner and outer which is
not produced by the easy method of both being very
simple, but which is consistent with, and indeed
requires, the complexity and heterogeneity pro-
1 Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, 2d ed., ii. 458.
2 Spencer, First Principles, p. 490.
210 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
duced in both by constant interaction. 1 The greater
this complexity, the more filled with sensation,
emotion, and thought life is, the greater is what Mr
Spencer calls its " breadth." But, if " adaptation "
is still regarded as expressing the end, then, the
more perfect this adaptation is, the less room seems
left for progress, and the end of human conduct is
placed in a state of moving equilibrium in which
action takes place without a jar and without dis-
turbing the play of external conditions. 2
(6) AS <ie- This end of " adaptation " is looked upon by Mr
uitimTte e Spencer not as representing the conduct prescribed
ufe, !t f by morality in present circumstances, but as describ-
ing the ultimate condition of human life. As such,
it is the foundation of his Absolute Ethics that
" final permanent code " which " alone admits of
being definitely formulated, and so constituting
ethics as a science in contrast with empirical
ethics." 3 The " philosophical moralist," he tells us,
" treats solely of the straight man. He determines
the properties of the straight man ; describes how
the straight man comports himself ; shows in what
relationship he stands to other straight men ; shows
how a community of straight men is constituted.
1 An aspect of Mr Spencer's ethical theory which will be con-
sidered in the sequel : p. 228 ff.
2 Cf. A. Barratt, Physical Ethics, p. 294, where morality is
placed in "reasonable obedience to the physical laws of nature."
3 Data of Ethics, p. 148.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 211
Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged
wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his
premisses without vitiating all his conclusions. A
problem in which a crooked man forms one of the
elements is insoluble by him." 1
How, then, are we to conceive the nature or con- complete
duct of the " straight man " ? To begin with, it is SSeeirttfa
made clear that his dealings are only with straight ^l r "
men ; for there are no " crooked men " in the ideal
community. " The coexistence of a perfect man
and an imperfect society is impossible ; and could
the two coexist the resulting conduct would not
furnish the ethical standard sought." 2 "The ulti-
mate man is one in whom this process [of adapta-
tion to the social state] has gone so far as to produce
a correspondence between all the promptings of his
nature and all the requirements of his life as car-
ried on in society. If so, it is a necessary implica-
tion that there exists an ideal code of conduct for-
mulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted
man in the completely-evolved society." This is Resultant
the code of Absolute Ethics, whose injunctions alone code of 6
are " absolutely right," and which, " as a system of ethlcs
ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guid-
ance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of
real conduct." 3 At the outset, we were required to
" interpret the more developed by the less devel-
1 Social Statics, quoted in Data of Ethics, p. 271.
2 Data of Ethics, p. 279. 3 Ibid., p. 275.
212 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
oped;" 1 the conclusion sets forth that the less de-
veloped is to be guided by the more developed, the
real by the ideal. Now, ethics " includes all con-
duct which furthers or hinders, in either direct or
indirect ways, the welfare of self or others." 2 Thus
Absolute Ethics, like Eelative Ethics, has two divi-
(a)iays sions, personal and social. As to the latter, Mr
Bte$iin- Spencer formulates certain principles of justice,
retetkmof negative beneficence, and positive beneficence, 3 which
individual describe the harmonious co-operation of ideal men
to society ;
in the ideal state. These principles may perhaps
be capable of a modified application to the present
state of society, in which there is a conflict of in-
terests: although Mr Spencer's representation of
them which is still, however, incomplete suggests
the belief that they are not so much guides which
the ideal gives to the real, as suggestions for the
construction of a Utopia gathered from the require-
ments of present social life. But, supposing the
"harmonious co-operation" of individuals to be
thus provided for, what is the personal end ?
and what, it might be added, is the social end, if
society has any further function than regulating
the relation of its units to one another ? Absolute
ethics does not seem to be able to give much guid-
i Data of Ethics, p. 7. 2 Ibid., p. 281.
3 These are examined by Mr F. W. Maitland, in an incisive
criticism of " Mr H. Spencer's Theory of Society," Mind, viii. 354
ff., 506 ff.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 213
ance here. " A code of perfect personal conduct," 0) further
we are told, " can never be made definite." 1 There ^dofoon-
are various types of activities, all of which may be- adaptation
long to lives " complete after their kinds." But yet
" perfection of individual life " does imply " certain
modes of action which are approximately alike in
all cases, and which, therefore, become part of the
subject-matter of ethics." We cannot lay down
" precise rules for private conduct," but only " gen-
eral requirements." And these are : to maintain
the balance between waste and nutrition, to observe
a relation between activity and rest, to marry and
have children. 2 This is " how the straight man com-
ports himself." Apart, therefore, from the sugges-
tion thrown out that a man's function may be the
realisation of a type of activity complete after its
kind a suggestion to be considered in the sequel
all that we can say of the " completely-adapted
man " would seem to be that he will be adapted to
his circumstances.
"We have a right to demur if the pleasures of the oO cannot
final condition of equilibrium be held up to our 1( ^ ^
imagination as a reason for aiming at it. That it ha PP mess -
is " the establishment of the greatest perfection
and most complete happiness," 3 seems an unwar-
rantable assumption. Yet it is through this as-
sumption that an apparent harmony between Mr
i Data of Ethics, p. 282. 2 Ibid., p. 283.
3 First Principles, p. 517.
214 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
Spencer's hedonistic ethics and his view of the
tendency of evolution is brought about. It is not
at all certain that the result of perfectly adapted
function is great increase of pleasure. It is true
that all the pains of disharmony between inner
desire or feeling and outer circumstances would,
in such a case, disappear ; but with them also there
would be lost the varied pleasures of pursuit and
successful struggle. It cannot even be assumed
that other pleasures would continue as intense as
before. For, as acts are performed more easily,
and thus with less conscious volition, they gradu-
ally pass into the background of consciousness, or
out of consciousness altogether ; and the pleasure
accompanying them fades gradually away as they
cease to occupy the attention. "Where action is
perfectly automatic, feeling does not exist." l The
so-called passive pleasures might still remain. But
the fact of effort being no longer necessary for the
adjustment of inner to outer relations might have
the effect of making the "moving equilibrium"
still called " life " automatic in every detail.
Indeed, if the suggestions of the ' First Principles '
are to be carried out, it would seem that the
moving equilibrium is " a transitional state on the
way to complete equilibrium," 2 which is another
1 Spencer, Psychology, 212, i. 478.
2 First Principles, p. 489.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 215
name for death. 1 So far, therefore, from heightened
pleasure being the result of completely perfect
adjustment of inner to outer relations, this adjust-
ment would seem to reach its natural goal in un-
consciousness a conclusion which may commend
itself to those of Mr Spencer's disciples who take
a less optimist view of life than their master.
It seems evident, therefore, that to take adapta-
tion to environment, or self-preservation as inter-
preted by adaptation, as the end of conduct, is to
adopt an end which cannot be shown to be desirable
on the ground of yielding a maximum of happiness
or pleasure. And it is almost with a feeling of
relief that one finds Mr Spencer's confidence in
the tendency of evolution so far shaken as to admit
of his saying that " however near to completeness
the adaptation of human nature to the conditions
of existence at large, physical and social, may be-
come, it can never reach completeness." 2 " Adap-
tation to environment " must, at any rate, be kept
quite distinct from any theory of ethics which
takes pleasure as the end of life; and it cannot
consistently determine any result as of ethical
value on account of its pleasurable consequences.
The goal it sets before us, and in which human
progress ends, is conformity with an external order.
1 " A complete equilibrium of the aggregate is without life,
and a moving equilibrium of the aggregate is living." Principles
of Sociology, i. 106. 2 Data of Ethics, p. 254.
216 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
The modification of these external conditions by
human effort is to be justified ethically by the
opportunity it gives for bringing about a fuller
agreement between the individual or race and its
environment. The result is a stationary state of
human conduct, corresponding with, or a part of,
that general " equilibration " to which, according to
Mr Spencer, all evolution tends. But this theory,
which places the goal of conduct in what seems to
be the actual tendency of evolution, gains no real
support from this apparent harmony of ethics with
general philosophy. It may be granted that the
evidence of physical laws goes to show that the
evolution of the solar, or even stellar, system is
towards a condition in which the " moving equili-
brium" will at last pass into a form in which
there is no further sensible motion, and the con-
centration of matter is complete. But to infer
from this that the theory which places the end
of conduct in a similar equilibrium shows the
harmony of morality with the tendency of exist-
ence in general, would really involve a confusion
of the two different meanings of " end." The end
or termination of all things may be equilibrium,
motionlessness, or dissolution, but this is no reason
why the end or aim of conduct should be a similar
equilibrium.
Indeed, to say that we ought to promote the end
of evolution, and that this end is annihilation, is
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
inconsistent with the postulate always implied by
the ethics of evolution the postulate that con-
duct should promote evolution because life is de-
sirable, 1 and increase of life comes with the progress
of evolution. Nor is it of any assistance to reply
to this by saying that the dissolution in which
evolution ends may be only the prelude to another
process of evolution in which life will gradually
progress till it again reaches equilibrium. For, in
the first place, this is only a problematical sug-
gestion is not, to speak in Mr Spencer's language,
" demonstrable a priori by deduction from the per-
sistence of force," as the tendency of present evolu-
tion to equilibrium is held to be ; and secondly,
the new process, if it were to come about, would
have to begin again the slow ascent from the low-
est rung of the ladder of existence : so that, in aid-
ing evolution towards the goal of equilibrium, we
should be only guiding it to the old starting-point
which has now, after many a painful struggle, been
left far behind.
But further, it would seem that the theory of
evolution itself is not fairly represented by a view adaptation
which emphasises the fact of adaptation to environ-
ment to the exclusion of that of variation. The
latter is as necessary to progressive development
as the former. Adaptation to environment might
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 26.
218 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
seem to be most nearly complete when organism
and environment were both so simple as to be
hardly separate. The polype, which is scarcely
different from the sea -water it inhabits, might
seem by correspondence with its medium to be
near the maximum of adaptation, though at the
very beginning of life. It may be solely because
the environment is subject to numerous changes
that the organism of simple structure cannot main-
tain life. But it is only through its own inherent
power of variation that progress in organic life is
possible. Perfect correspondence with the environ-
ment was not reached by simple organisms, not
only on account of the want of uniformity in their
tendency to surroundings, but also because there is in every
IiTorgan- in organism a tendency to variation through which
isms, fa Q modifications are produced which natural selec-
tion takes hold of. Did organisms not tend to vary
in function and structure, no progressive modifica-
tion would be possible. Those fittest to live would
be selected once for all, and all but those adapted
to the environment weeded out.
It is not necessary for our present purpose to
have any definite theory of the obscure laws by
which this variability is governed. 1 It is enough
that natural selection requires the striking out of
new modifications as well as the transmission of
1 Darwin, Origin of Species (1859), pp. 43, 131, 466.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 219
those already produced. 1 It may be the fact that
variation is, in the last resort, due to changes in
surrounding circumstances, to the unequal inci-
dence of external forces upon a finite aggregate. 2
But, with living bodies as now constituted, it has,
at any rate as proximate cause, a twofold source.
It may be due to the direct effect of external forces,
or it may be caused by the energy stored up in the
organism in growth. 3
In man the outgo of this force is conscious ; and, consciously
by means of his conscious or intelligent volition,
governed by interests of various kinds, he can
anticipate and modify the action of natural
selection. The law that the fittest organism sur-
vives may perhaps work in man as in the lower
animals, if only we give a wide enough meaning
to " fittest," so as to admit even of the weak being
made fit through the sympathy and help of the
strong. Natural selection becomes dependent upon
variations of a kind different from those in the
merely animal world, so that its practical effect
may be in some cases apparently reversed. We
thus see how it is that even Darwin holds that in
moralised societies "natural selection apparently
effects but little," 4 at the same time that we may
1 Spencer, Biology, i. 257. 2 First Principles, p, 404 f,
3 Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 101.
4 Descent of Man, 2d ed., p. 137, cf. pp. 198, 618 ; cf. A. R.
Wallace, Contributions (1870), p. 330.
220 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
not be inclined to deny the truth of Schaffle's con-
tention 1 that, although circumstances differ, the
law of action remains the same. Schaffle points
out how, as we rise in the scale of life, especially
as it is manifested in human society, the organisa-
tion becomes more delicate, and other than merely
natural facts have to be taken account of, so that
the fittest to live in the new social and intellectual
environment is no longer the man of greatest
physical strength and skill.
The theory of natural selection as applied to the
ordinary spheres of plant and animal life, may per-
haps, for some purposes, neglect consideration of
the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation
in the organisms whose growth it describes. But,
when the variation in the behaviour of the organ-
ism becomes conscious and designed, there is thereby
produced a preliminary indication or determination
of the lines on which natural selection is to work.
And, before the theory of evolution can give a full
account of the ethical in man, it must distinguish
consciously-determined from merely natural action,
and give an analysis of what is implied in the
former. We must bear in mind that it may be the
case that the ground and possibility of progress
and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human con-
duct which " adaptation to environment " has been
unable logically to explain or leave room for are
1 Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., i. (1877), 543 ff.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 221
to be found in this differentiating fact of conscious
activity. But we must first of all see whether,
from the empirical characteristics of variation, we
can extract an ethical end or any guide for
conduct.
2. " The lower animals," says a writer on biology, 2. End sug-
" are just as well organised for the purposes of their thifttnd-
life as the higher are for theirs. The tape-worm is ency *
variation
relatively quite as perfect as the man, and dis-
tinguished from him by many superior capabili-
ties." l It is incorrect to look upon the evolution
of animal life as working upon one line, so that the
different kinds of living beings can be arranged, as
it were, in an order of merit, in which the organ-
isation of the higher animal plainly excels that of
the lower. The conditions of life are manifold and
various enough to permit of the existence of many
species equally perfect in relation to their environ-
ments. The fact that we are still able to speak of
one species or one animal as higher than another,
is not owing to the one being better adapted to its
environment than the other, but is supposed rather
to be due to the higher forms having " their organs
more distinctly specialised for different functions." 2
Even Mr Spencer, for whom equilibrium is the goal
of life, implicitly admits that " adaptation " alone is
1 Rolph, Biol. Probl., p. 33.
2 Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 336.
222 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
not the end of human action, by his doctrine that
the degree of evolution may be measured by the
complexity of the adjustments it effects between
organism and environment. The end, therefore, it
scribes self- . .
development may be said, is no longer the mere " selt-preserva-
" f ound in adaptation to environment, but the
self-development " which implies temporary dis-
harmony between organism and surroundings.
For " self-preservation " and " self-development,"
though frequently spoken of *as identical, are really
distinct and often opposed notions the former de-
noting a tendency to persist in one's present state
of being, while the latter implies more or less
change. It may be held, however, that for an
organism such as man to persist in his state of
being, implies modification of his faculties, and that
this modification involves development. For any
organism to exist apart from change is, of course,
impossible. Life is only known to us as a series of
changes. But that change does not necessarily
mean development or "change to a higher condi-
tion." Degradation is as well known a fact as
development ; and between the two, there is room
for a state of existence of which it is difficult to
say whether it improves or deteriorates. And
whatever may be intended by the phrase, " self-
preservation " points to a state of this kind rather
than to an improving condition. The notion of
" self -development " has therefore a richer content
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 223
than that of " self-preservation " ; but just on this
account it cannot be explained by a reference to
the nature of things as they are.
It is true that self-development can only go on thus taking
, .. P T i j , account of
by a continuous process or adjustment ; but it is variability
also necessary for it that this tendency to adapta-
tion should be continually hindered from becoming
complete or lapsing into equilibrium. It is here
that the function of variation comes in. On the
one side there is this tendency to vary after a
fashion often without any apparent regard to ex-
ternal conditions; on the other side, there is the
action of the external conditions selecting and
favouring those variations which bring the organ-
ism into closer correspondence with them. The
wide range over which the theory of natural selec-
tion applies is due to the fact that the environment
is never uniform and never constant, so that modifi-
cations on the part of the organism have a chance
of suiting its varied and changing character. Its
changes, moreover, are often the result not so much
of any absolute alteration in external circumstances,
as of a new relation between them and living beings
having been brought about. For the enormous re-
productive faculty of most organisms makes them
multiply so rapidly as to press ever more and more
closely against the limit of subsistence, and thus
to produce competition for the means of living.
Hence the fresh lines of development originated
224 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
by each organism have to be tested by their cor-
respondence with a constantly changing medium.
The altered circumstances give the modifications
which organisms are for ever striking out an
opportunity of perpetuating themselves,
which com- By each new variation the existing relation
plicatesthe , . . L-J-I.-UJ
tendency to between organism and environment is disturbed,
de^ce with ^ ne var iation may, however, prove its utility at
environ- once ^y a more exact correspondence than before
ment,
with the requirements of external conditions. But,
in what are called the higher grades of life, varia-
tions from the type are sometimes not immediately
useful, although they may ultimately become most
advantageous. 1 Were it not for the remarkable
power of persistence possessed by the higher
animals, the modified organism would be unable
to hold its own. The great majority of such
eccentric or extraordinary variations do, as a
1 Thus Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 51, speaking of the " advan-
tage to man " it must have been " to become a biped," says :
" The hands and arms could hardly have become perfect enough
to have manufactured weapons, or to have hurled stones and
spears with a true aim, as long as they were habitually used for
locomotion and for supporting the whole weight of the body ; or,
as before remarked, as long as they were especially fitted for
climbing trees." The hands had to lose their dexterity for the
latter purposes before they could acquire the more delicate ad-
justments necessary for skill in the former. The transition was
of course a gradual one ; but the initial variations required would
seem to have been at first unfavourable to man's chances in the
struggle for existence, though it was through them that he rose
to his place at the summit of the organic scale.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 225
matter of fact, soon disappear, because unable to
prove their utility. But others of them, either by
the power they give the organism to mould circum-
stances to itself, or by their appropriateness to the
greater complexity which conies with the increased
number of living organisms, and the more delicate
readjustment it requires, prove themselves to be
fitter to live than if no variation had taken place
and the preceding state of relative equilibrium
had been maintained. The higher adjustment of
life to its surroundings, which marks each stage of
advancing evolution, had its beginning in the rup-
ture of the original simpler harmony that previously
existed.
If we compare human conduct with that of especially
animals lower in the organic scale, it becomes conduct. 11
evident that there is a broad difference between
the two in this, that actions in the former are
purposed, performed with a definite end in view ;
whereas, in the latter, they seem 'to be the blind
result of impulse, and there are slight, if any,
traces of purpose. In activity of the latter kind,
natural selection works in the ordinary way by
choosing for survival the animals which behave so
as best to suit their environment. But actions
done with a view to an end may anticipate the
verdict of this natural law. The agent may see
that conduct of a particular kind would conduce
to the promotion of life, while conduct of a differ-
p
226 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
ent kind would render him less fit to live ; and,
as a consequence, the former action may be chosen.
In this way development may be anticipated, and
the present order of affairs may be disturbed, more
or less forcibly, in order to bring about a foreseen
better state of things.
We are thus able to see more clearly how it is
that the theory of evolution may be thought to
give rise to two different ethical ends. The first
of these is the theory already criticised, " adaptation
to environment," which corresponds to the notion
of self-preservation. But this end, as we have
seen, only takes one side of the theory of evolution
into consideration neglects the tendency to varia-
tion which evolution postulates, and which, in the
higher organisms, becomes purposed. The other
end which seems to be suggested by the theory of
evolution takes account of this tendency to varia-
tion, and may be said to correspond to the notion
of self-development ; but this end it is harder to
define. Adaptation we can easily understand by
a reference to the environment to which life is
to be adapted. This involves a knowledge of the
conditions of the environment, but nothing more.
Development can be measured by no such standard.
On the one hand it implies an independent, or
relatively independent, tendency to variation. On
the other hand, however, it is necessary that the
disharmony with environment, in which this tend-
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 227
ency to variation may begin, should not be exces-
sive and should not be permanent ; for without a
certain amount of adaptation to environment no
organism can live. The extent of initial dishar-
mony which is possible, or is useful, varies accord-
ing to the versatility of the faculties of each indi-
vidual organism, and to its place in the scale of
being ; but throughout all existence it is true that
want of adaptation beyond a certain varying degree
is fatal : " a mode of action entirely alien to the
prevailing modes of action, cannot be successfully
persisted in must eventuate in death of self, or
posterity, or both." l
By what standard, then, can we measure develop- (&) standard
ment ? We have already seen, from the " formula," i ng develop-
as it is called, or definition, of evolution, that it m
implies an advance to a state of increased coherence,
definiteness, and heterogeneity, by the double process
of differentiation of parts, and integration of these
parts into a whole by the formation of definite
relations to one another. The notions of coherence
amongst parts and of increased definiteness of
function and structure are easily understood. But
the heterogeneity postulated is a more complex
notion, has, in the first place, a double reference,
" is at the same time a differentiation of the parts
from each other and a differentiation of the con-
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 280.
228 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
solidatecl whole from the environment ; " 1 and sec-
ondly, is manifested in living beings in increased
complexity of every kind of structure, form,
chemical composition, specific gravity, temperature,
and self-mobility. 2 Can we then apply this at
once to ethics, and say that the most developed
that is, the most moral conduct is that which is
most definite, coherent, and heterogeneous ? This
doctrine has at least the merit of not leaving out
of sight so fundamental a characteristic of evolution
as the tendency to variation ; and, without being
consistently held to, it is the burden of much of
Mr Spencer's ' Data of Ethics/ where it is illustrated
and defended with great ingenuity.
round in That moral conduct is distinguished by definite-
complexity ness and coherence that it works towards a de-
motive and terminate end, and that its various actions are in
agreement with one another and parts of a whole
may be admitted. But this is at most a merely
formal description of what is meant by morality in
conduct. To say that conduct must be a coherent
whole, and must seek a determinate end by appro-
priate means, leaves unsettled the question as to
what this end should be, or what means are best
fitted to attain it. But, when we go on to say that
as conduct is more varied in act, 3 more heterogene-
1 Spencer, Biology, i. 149. 2 Ibid., i. 144.
3 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 71 : " Briefly, then, if the con-
duct is the best possible on every occasion, it follows that as the
occasions are endlessly varied the acts will be endlessly varied to
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 229
ous in motive, 1 it is higher in the moral scale, we
seem to have got hold of something which may
be a guide for determining the ethical end. The
mark of what is higher in evolution, and conse-
quently in morality, will be greater heterogeneity
or complexity. 2
This conclusion follows from an attempt not
merely to treat "moral phenomena as phenomena
of evolution," but also to find the " ultimate in-
terpretations " of ethics " only in those fundamen-
tal truths which are common to all " the sciences,
physical, biological, psychological, sociological. 3
Now the fundamental truths which these sciences
have in common are those only which are most
abstract. But as we pass from mere relations be- Difficulties
tween matter and motion to life, and from life theory:
to self -consciousness, we have something different
from these fundamental truths with the addition
of certain others not fundamental: we find that
things are not merely more complex, but are
changed in aspect and nature. Even though it
be true that the new phenomena may still admit
suit the heterogeneity in the combination of motions will be
extreme."
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 106 : " The acts characterised
by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts,
have all along been of higher authority for guidance."
2 Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 94 f., where a similar
definition is given in answer to the question, " What is the mean-
ing of better ? ' '
3 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 63.
230 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
of analysis into the old simpler terms, and that
life, mind, and society may be interpreted as redis-
tributions of matter and motion, 1 it must yet at
least be admitted that the change passed through
is one similar to those which Mill compared to
chemical composition: the new compound differs
fundamentally in mode of action from the elements
out of which it was formed. Now, in saying that
the most complex adjustments of acts to ends are
the highest kinds of conduct, and that we should
be guided by the more complex in preference to
simpler motives, this obvious difficulty is passed
over. It is true that Mr Spencer, in chapters rich
in suggestion, and filled with skilfully chosen
illustrations, has passed in review the various
aspects of conduct according as we look at it from
the point of view of the physical environment,
of life, of mind, or of society. But when these
different aspects are brought together and com-
pared, it becomes clear that the attempt to judge
conduct by reference to the " fundamental truth "
that evolution implies an advance towards greater
complexity, must necessarily end in failure. 2
1 Cf. Spencer, First Principles, p. 566.
2 So far as the following criticism may appear to apply to Mr
Spencer, and not merely to a possible way of denning moral con-
duct, it is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface to
the ' Data of Ethics ' : " With a view to clearness, I have treated
separately some correlative aspects of conduct, drawing conclu-
sions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the
other."
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 231
In the first place, there is a notable discrep- ( a ) antinomy
ancy between the biological and the sociological ^between y
aspect. For the complete development of the ^ 8 i ^ 1
individual life implies that every function should v *<iuaiends;
be fulfilled, and that its fulfilment should interfere
with the performance of no other function. " The
performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral
obligation." " The ideally moral man ... is one
in whom the functions of all kinds are duly ful-
filled," that is to say, " discharged in degrees duly
adjusted to the conditions of existence." l A fully
evolved life is marked by multiplicity and complex-
ity of function. And, if from the individual we
pass to the social organism, we find that the same
truth holds. The state, or organised body of in-
dividuals, has many functions to perform ; but it
can only perform them in the most efficient way
through the functions of its individual members
being specialised. From the social point of view,
therefore, the greatest possible division of labour is
a mark of the most evolved and perfect community.
And this division of labour implies that each in-
dividual, instead of performing every function of
which he is capable, should be made to restrict
himself to that at which he is best, so that the
community may be the gainer from the time and
exertion that are saved, and the skill that is pro-
duced, by the most economic expenditure of indi-
1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 75 f.
232 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
vidual talent. Thus social perfection appears to
imply a condition of things inconsistent with that
development of one's whole nature which, from the
biological point of view, has just been denned as a
characteristic of the ideally moral man. It seems,
indeed, inevitable that any such abstract prelimin-
ary notion of development as that which would
test it by increase of complexity must fail in such a
case as this where there is no question between the
competing claims of two phenomena on the same
level, but where harmony is wanted between the
different aspects the same phenomena present when
looked at from the point of view of the individual
and from the point of view of the whole.
O)itspsy- There is still greater difficulty in applying this
aspect' 1 Ca criterion, when we come to the psychological aspect
of morality the aspect most prominent in mod-
ern philosophy from the revival of independent
ethical speculation till the time of Kant. Accord-
ing to Mr Spencer, " the acts characterised by the
more complex motives and the more involved
thoughts, have all along been of higher authority
for guidance." l But the later or more advanced
in mental evolution is not always more complex in
structure; for it is a characteristic of mental develop-
ment that the processes by which a result has been
arrived at gradually disappear on account of the dim-
inished attention they receive, so that there remains
1 Data of Ethics, p. 106.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 233
what is, so far as psychical structure is concerned, a
simple mental state. Complexity of structure and confounds
. . -M T np , complexity
indirectness of origin are thus really two different of structure
characteristics of states of mind, which frequently JJJJiliof
go together, but frequently part company. 1 When ori s in >
Mr Spencer, accordingly, goes on to say 2 that " for
the better preservation of life the primitive simple
presentative feelings must be controlled by the
later-evolved compound and representative feel-
ings," he is really passing to a different standard
without giving up the former. The sympathy with
injured Zulus or Afghans which would be approved
by Mr Spencer 3 may be a more indirect, represen-
tative, or re-representative feeling, than the senti-
ments which led to British invasion, and, as such,
may be more to be commended. But it would be
rash to say that sympathy with the " British in-
terests " supposed to be at stake interests of com-
merce, and of the balance of jpolitical power, as
well as those arising from the subtle effect of
national prestige is less complex than the feeling
of sympathy with a people dispossessed of its ter-
ritory. The latter feeling may be more indirect or
representative, as implying an imaginative appro-
1 Although Mr Spencer holds that representativeness varies as
definiteness, and measures complexity, including that complexity
implied by increasing heterogeneity. Principles of Psychology,
ii. 516 f.
2 Data of Ethics, p. 113.
3 Cf . Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.
234
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
neither of
which can
serve as an
ethical
standard.
priation of the circumstances of another community ;
but, so far as structure is concerned, it is composed
of far fewer and simpler component elements than
the feeling for British interests.
Nor, on the other hand, can we allow ourselves
to take refuge in the conclusion that, if the more
complex emotion cannot be held to be better
morally, then that which is later in evolution may
at least be regarded as of higher authority than the
earlier evolved feeling. According to Mr Spencer,
the man who obtains by fraud the money to support
his family is to be condemned, because, although we
admit the claim his family have upon him, " we
regard as of superior authority the feelings which
respond to men's proprietary claims feelings which
are re-representative in a higher degree and refer
to more remote diffused consequences." x But were
this the ground of distinction, we ought also to
regard the feelings^ prompting a man to distribute
his fortune in any foolish enterprise " as of superior
authority " to those which prompt him to support
his family, if only the former are " re-representative
in a higher degree," and their consequences more
" remote " and " diffused." Many of the greatest
evils which infect social life and warp the moral
feelings of men, are evils which are only possible
as the result of a highly advanced civilisation and
a refined and delicate organisation of the mind.
1 Data of Ethics, p. 123.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 235
The factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casu-
istry with the effect of confusing the ordinary dis-
tinctions of right and wrong are, in almost all cases,
more indirect and re-representative than the feelings
in harmony with the moral consciousness of the
community which they set aside in the individual
conscience. So obvious, indeed, are objections of
this kind objections, that is to say, taken from
the impossibility of so applying the criterion as
to construct a workable system of morals that
Mr Spencer virtually relinquishes his own theory,
talking of it as true only " on the average," 1 and
even allowing that it is in some cases suicidal. 2
As it cannot be held that the more complex in
evolution is of greater authority than the less
complex, nor that the later in evolution has such
authority over the earlier, we must admit that the
so-called " fundamental characteristics " of evolu-
tion, which find a place in its definition or "for-
mula," are unable to determine its value in an
ethical regard. The richness of life, physical, in-
tellectual, and social, has indeed been produced
only as the result of a long course of development,
and by the assimilation of many various elements
into a complex organisation ; but its value cannot
be measured either by the test of mechanical com-
plexity, or by the length of time it has taken to
evolve. We must therefore seek some other
1 Data of Ethics, pp. 107, 129. 2 Ibid., p. 110.
236 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
method of giving a meaning to evolution in the
region of moral values ; and we find Mr Spencer
himself really falling back in his discussion on the
more general answer to our question, that the end
of evolution is life : " evolution becomes the highest
possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves
the greatest totality of life in self, offspring, and
fellow-men." 1 Since it appears, then, that the char-
acteristic of complexity or variety is as unsatis-
factory a criterion of morality, as the notion of
" adaptation to environment " was found to be, we
must ask for some further interpretation of the
notion of " development " or " increase of life "
when regarded as the end of conduct.
3. Further
vel . have as yet found it has always proceeded on the
assumption that life is desirable, and that it has
life as the a y a l ue which makes its pursuit and promotion
a reasonable moral end. How this fundamental
ethical assumption 2 is to be justified, I do not at
present inquire. But the question must now be
faced What is meant by " life " when we say
1 Data of Ethics, p. 25; cf. Lange, Ges. d. Mat., ii. 247.
Lange's statement is noteworthy : " Die menschliche Vernunft
kennt kein anderes Ideal, als die moglichste Erhaltung und Ver-
vollkommnung des Lebens, welches einmal begonnen hat, verbun-
den mit der Einschrankung von Geburt und Tod."
2 The " endeavour to further evolution, especially that of the
human race," is put forward as a " new duty" by Mr F. Galton,
Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), p. 337.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 237
that its " increase " or " development " is the moral
end, and speak of its " greatest totality " in a
way that implies that it admits of quantitative
measurement ? The biological definition of life is Biological
definition of
itself matter of dispute. But, even were such a de-
finition as that proposed by Mr Spencer agreed to, C1
it would be insufficient to provide a standard for
human conduct. The very generality which may
make it fit to stand as a definition, or at least
abstract description, of life, renders it at the same
time incapable of serving as a criterion by which
the various modes of the manifestation of life may
be judged. One point, however, generally empha-
sised by the theory of evolution, may be admitted.
The life which human conduct " ought " to increase
is not merely that of one individual man, but the
whole life of the community " self, offspring, and
fellow-men " with which the individual life is
bound up. Evolution has shown how the growth
of the individual has been so dependent upon that
of the whole body of society that it is impossible
to separate their interests. At the same time, no
complete identity has been brought about, and it
remains one of the greatest difficulties of any em-
pirical theory to harmonise their competing claims.
For argument's sake, however, and to admit of the
quality of the end being investigated apart from
considerations as to the method of distribution, the
question may be discussed as if natural selection
238 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
had produced complete solidarity between the life
of the individual and that of the race.
"What criterion have we, then, of the development
of human nature or life ? The answer at once sug-
gests itself that the higher evolution of life can be
accurately measured by the amount of pleasure got
by living beings. But this view has been examined
in the preceding chapter, and found to be unsup-
ported by sufficient evidence ; so that we are driven
to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion that will
give meaning to the phrase " development " or
"increase of life," when prescribed as. the ethical
end.
Health as Nor is the matter made any clearer by saying that
either used the " health" of society is the end we ought to pro-
rnote. 1 Tnis nas been P ut forward as an interpre-
tation of the hedonistic principle, which brings that
principle into accord with the theory of evolution.
As such, however, it seems open to fatal objections.
Given as an explanation of " pleasure," it falls back
upon the notion of "life"; for health can only be
1 Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 121 ; Stephen, Science of Ethics,
p. 366. Earlier than either of these writers, Dr Hutchison Stir-
ling suggested Health as a practical principle to be set against the
anarchy of individualism. But with him, it is not an empirical
generalisation of the tendency of evolution. It is as " the out-
ward sign of freedom, the realisation of the universal will," that
" health may be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious
operation of the whole system as sign and as goal of a realisation
of life." Secret of Hegel, ii. 554.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 239
defined as that which conduces to continued and
energetic life. Further than this, there is a special
difficulty in adopting health as the proximate end
where pleasure is the ultimate end. Even if we
could assert that health always leads to pleasure, it
is not evident that it is better known, or more
easily made the end, than pleasure. For of present
pleasure we have a standard in our own conscious-
ness from which there is no appeal. And, although
the value of a series of pleasures is much harder to
estimate, there is also no slight difficulty in saying
what will promote the efficiency or health of an
organism. Besides, the question arises whether
health really corresponds with pleasure; and this
is, in another form, the question which has been
already answered in the negative, whether life
can be measured by pleasure.
On the other hand, if " health " is to be taken or fails back
not as an explanation of or means to pleasure, but as notion of
a substitute for the notion of " life," then we hardly llfe -
get beyond our original terms. " Health " must be
interpreted simply as that which leads to strong
and continued life : so that the only information to
be got from the new term is that the life we are to
promote must be vigorous and long ; and this was
already implied in saying that it is the increase or
development of life that is the end. It will not do
to identify the notion with the mere balance of
physiological functions which, in common language,
240 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
appropriates to itself the term " health." We must
include the health of the soul as well as the health
of the body, and the health of society as well as the
health of the soul. The balance of mental and
social, as well as of physiological, functions, is im-
plied in the complex life of whose evolution we
form a part. To say that we are to promote this
balance of various functions, is to say nothing more
than that we are to promote the life into which
physical and mental and social factors enter. The
attempt to arrive at an end for conduct, by consid-
eration of the characteristics of evolution, has been
made without success. It has been found, too, that
" development " or " increase of life " does not admit
of translation into the language of hedonism : and
the question thus arises, how we are to define this
end, which we are unable to interpret in terms of
pleasure.
ways of What meaning can be given to the notion " in-
crease of life " as the end of conduct, without inter-
P r eting life in terms of pleasure ? Can we, the
question may be put, reach a " natural " good as dis-
tinct from " sensible good " or pleasure ? We must
discard at the outset any such " rational " view of
nature as gave colour to the Stoic doctrine by iden-
tifying nature with the universal reason. And we
must equally avoid the doctrine that reason regulative
of conduct is manifested in the constitution of man
either in a distinct faculty, such as " conscience," or
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 241
in the due regulation of the various impulses. Tren-
delenburg's teleological conception of human na-
ture, for instance, implies a rational element which
could not be got from the causal sequence traced by
evolution. 1 For he determines the essence of man
by reference to the inner end of his constitution,
and postulates an organic unity of impulses which,
in the form of conscience, protests against self-
seeking action on the . part of any single impulse.
But no other hierarchy of motives can be admitted
here than that produced by the natural law of evo-
lution; and this law can only show how one im-
pulse, or class of impulses, has become more author-
itative, by showing how it has become stronger or
more persistent : the other methods of evolving this
authority on the basis of naturalism, do so by means
of the pleasurable or painful consequences of motives
and actions.
There are two ways in which, on most or all either sub-
ethical theories, the attempt may be made to dis- i^^S*.
tinguish "good" from "bad" conduct. We may
either look to a subjective motive or impulse as
giving the means of distinction, or we may test
conduct by its conformity with an objective stand-
ard. If we like to make use of the terms self-pre-
servation and self-development, then these may refer
either to the subjective impulse which urges man
to preserve or develop his life, or to some objective
1 Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, 2d ed., 1868.
Q
242 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
standard for estimating actions according as they
actually tend to prolong life or enrich it. Both
these possibilities are open to the theory of evolu-
tion. Although the subjective impulse is, of course,
a property of the individual, it may be the result
of the whole course of social development, and thus
take in others as well as self in the range of its
application. It is therefore necessary to examine
both methods of determination with some care,
especially as we are in no little danger of reaching
an illusory appearance of conclusiveness by allow-
ing the subjective standard to rest on the objective,
and the objective, in turn, on the subjective.
To begin with the subjective side. It may be
ard : most thought that we can point to some impulse, tendency,
Impulses* motive, or class of motives in the individual mind by
folio wing which the evolution of life will be promoted,
and that we are thus able to solve the question of
practical ethics, though our conception of what the
evolution of life connotes may still be in want of
exact definition. As already pointed out, such an
impulse (unless it depends on an objective standard)
must carry its own authority with it by its strength
or persistency. The case would, of course, be per-
fectly simple, if we could assert that the carrying
out of all impulses in one's nature was to be ap-
proved as tending to the development of life. Could
this assertion be made, there might be no difficulty
in ethics, or rather, there might be no ethics at all,
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 243
because there would be no difficulty in conduct. It
is obvious, however, that the development of one
natural tendency often conflicts with that of another
in the same individual, as well as with the tendencies
of other individuals. The course of evolution has
no doubt tended to modify, though it has not rooted
out, the impulses which are most prejudicial to in-
dividual and social welfare. But the increase of
wants as well as satisfactions which it has brought
about in human nature, makes it doubtful whether
it has on the whole tended to diminish the conflict
of motives.
Again, when it is said that a man should " be implies dis-
himself," or that this is his " strongest tendency," l tween per-
there is an implicit reference to a distinction between
a permanent and a transient, or a better and a worse self
self, and it seems to be imagined that this distinction
can be reduced to difference in degrees of strength.
But evolution has not enabled us to obviate Butler's
objection to taking the "strongest tendency"
meaning by this the tendency which is at any time
strongest as representing "nature." For it is an
undeniable fact that the tendency which for a time
is the strongest it may even be that which is
strongest throughout an individual life frequently
leads to a diminution of vital power on the part of
the agent, as well as to interference with the free
exercise of the vital powers of others. Some advan-
1 Cf. E. Simcox, Natural Law, p. 97.
244 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION.
tage is gained, perhaps, by substituting for " strong-
est " the nearly equivalent phrase " most persistent "
tendency. All those impulses which have in the
past served to promote life have been chosen out
and stored up as a sort of permanent basis for the
human fabric ; whereas other impulses, not so ad-
vantageous in their effects, have a less permanent
influence, though they are not less real. The more
regular or persistent class of impulses may, there-
fore, (the idea is) be taken as representing the
course of the evolution by which they have been
produced.
but includes To a large extent this distinction of two classes
iinpiiiseTin ^ impulses is justified. There seems no doubt that
the former, j.] ie soc j a ^ an( j wna t are usually termed moral,
feelings have a tendency to return into consciousness
after any temporary depression or exclusion, which
is not shared by some of the feelings with which
they most commonly conflict. Other impulses, not
usually classed as moral, no doubt share this char-
acteristic of persistency or recurrence. " The wish
for another man's property," says Darwin, "is as
persistent a desire as any that can be named/' The
selfish feelings have obviously this persistent char-
acter. But an evolutionist may perhaps maintain
that it is one of the defects of ordinary moral opinion
that it depreciates the necessity and value for life
of the selfish feelings, just because they are so strong
as to stand in need of no encouragement. And it is
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 245
not necessary that the evolutionist morality should
agree at all points with ordinary moral opinion or
moral intuition. It recognises, or ought to recognise
the agency of immoral as well as moral forces, ad-
mitting that it is by the action of both of these that
man as he is at present has been produced, although
the principle of the survival of the fittest has tended,
though by no means uniformly, towards the elimina-
tion of the immoral factor. We may admit, therefore,
that there is a pressure on the will of the average
individual towards certain kinds of conduct rather
than others, or, put more precisely, that while all
acts are performed in consequence of pressure on
the will, the pressure towards certain kinds of acts
is a permanent force which, although overcome for
the time, always tends to reassert itself, while the
tendency towards other acts inconsistent with these
is more intermittent and variable, and does not re-
assert itself in the same way. But this subjective
experience is so limited in accuracy and extent as
to be an unfit test of morality.
In the first place, selfish conduct is as necessary
for the preservation and development of man as
" altruistic " conduct, and must therefore have given
rise to an equally great and persistent pressure on
the will : so that the subjective criterion of persist-
ency leaves untouched what is often regarded as the
most difficult question of morals, the balance of social
and individual claims. In the second place, this
246
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
define
nature of
morality.
is restricted subjective tendency is only a recurrence of antece-
hawts of dent advantageous characteristics, and does not lead
' tmg ' us beyond the status quo, so that, if any progress is to
be made in the future, it will be only possible through
the pressure of new external conditions : no function
is left for any ethical ideal which points beyond
and cannot past and present habits of action. In the third place,
subjective tendency only enables us to say generally
that some acts or tendencies are more persistent
than others, without giving any further description
of what sort of acts these are. Were these tend-
encies or impulses a perfect guide to conduct, this
defect would be of little practical consequence. It
would prevent our having a definite ethical theory
only in circumstances in which no ethical theory
would be likely to be asked for. But the line be-
tween the more and less persistent motives is a
narrow and shifting one. The impulses which are
the residua of advantageous ancestral actions are
counteracted by other impulses, residua of actions
which would not be counted as moral, though we
inherit tendencies to them because they formed a
real part of our ancestral activity. We therefore
stand in need of some characteristic by which to
distinguish the one class of tendencies from the
other. And as the only subjective characteristic is
that of strength or persistency, and this has been
found insufficient, an objective standard is shown
to be necessary.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 247
The impossibility of the subjective test doing Thus sub-
duty alone without support from some objective Standard
criterion, is practically acknowledged by the writer ^ n e d w t "
who has discussed this part of the subject with depend on
greater penetration than any other investigator on
the same lines. "The average man," it is said,
" feels the pressure upon his own individual will
of all the unknown natural sequence of motive
which caused his ancestors to do on the whole
more often the right thing than the wrong " 1 or,
as we must read it without objective assumption,
" to do on the whole more often one class of acts
than another." The right must be defined simply
as that to which this " special feeling in the sub-
ject is directed," and it therefore becomes necessary
" to discover what descriptions of acts inspire this
feeling." 2 Thus, with greater facility than would
be permitted to a critic, we are made to pass
from the subjective to the objective method of
determination.
The question, What is right? is thus relinquished (6) objective
for the question, What is good ? Good is said to s
be of three kinds natural, sensible, and moral.
But as by sensible good is meant pleasure, 3 and
pleasure is not the end, and as by moral good
is meant "the pursuit of natural good under dif-
ficulties," 4 it follows that natural good is the
1 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 86. 2 Ibid., p. 87.
3 Ibid., p. 90. 4 Ibid., p. 99.
248 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
end we seek. We have thus to determine, as
exactly as may be, this objective standard called
natural good. It is interpreted in two ways, which,
however, may be " not necessarily inconsistent " :
(a) "the perfection of the type as it is," and (/3)
" the absolute abundance and variety of vital
power." l
(a) confer- This phrase, "the perfection of the type as
type. it is," is somewhat misleading. When "the per-
fection of the type " is said to be the end, we
naturally regard the type as something that needs
to be brought to perfection, and ex Jiypothesi is not
perfect at present, or " as it is." But if " the per-
fection of the type as it is " is the standard, this
implies, unless the standard itself is faulty, that
the type is already perfect, and, therefore, that the
perfection spoken of is the characteristic of a thing
which conforms to the type, and not something to
which the type has to conform. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by the fact that imperfection is
defined as " only departure from the class type." 2
Plainly, then, the objective standard meant is con-
formity to the type. What, then, is the type ?
Concerning things made by art the answer is easy.
The type, as Mr Stephen puts it, represents the
The type maximum of efficiency," 3 or, as we may say, is
defined as .
what that which most fully realises the purpose for
1 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104. 2 Ibid., p. 87.
3 Science of Ethics, p. 76.
X"'
i
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. ^49
>^L
which the thing was formed. The best bow is best serves
that which shoots truest and farthest with a lt]
relatively small expenditure of strength by the
archer ; that which best realises the purpose of a
bow is the typical bow. A similar explanation of
types may be given regarding animals modified by
artificial selection. The typical pointer or hunter
can be defined from this teleological point of
view ; and, as long as people lived in the belief
that all things were made for man, it was natural
to fix the type of each class by reference to the
human purpose it could best subserve. So also,
as long as people think that, whether all things
were made for man or not, all things may be
made use of by him, there will be a tendency
towards the same anthropomorphic interpretation
of types. If, then, the typical products of art, and,
to a large extent, the typical products of nature,
are those which best serve human purposes, or
best correspond with human ideals, how shall we
define the typical man himself the type which
it is our perfection to conform to ? " Every
reasoning agent," it may perhaps be allowed, 1
" represents a certain type ; " but the type can no
longer be defined merely as " maximum of effici-
ency," for it is the end or purpose of this efficiency
which now requires determination. In defining the
typical man, we must have no idea of final cause
1 Science of Ethics, p. 74.
250 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
or purpose which is not rooted in the nature of
his organism.
How, then, shall we now determine the type in
conformity to which perfection consists ? 1
or as the The first answer to this seems to be, that the
type is what is normal, " what we have learned
to regard as the normal development of objects
belonging to " the class. 2 But the normal may
have either of two meanings it may, in the first
place, mean the usual or customary. This, how-
ever, would make the typical man mean the ordi-
nary or average man ; and the ideal of conformity
to the type would be reduced to doing the cus-
tomary thing, and not trying to be better than
one's neighbours. But it is evident that this sta-
tionary morality does not represent properly what
is fundamental in the theory of evolution : " what-
ever other duties men may acknowledge, they do
not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species
in statu quo. 1 ' 3 If natural science teaches one
thing more clearly than another, it is that the type,
like the individual, is not permanent, but the sub-
ject of gradual modifications. If the type is what
is normal, we must mean by " normal " something
1 Even were we to succeed in getting a satisfactory view of the
type, we should still have to leave room for the individuality of
each person, which is such that his function must differ in a
manner corresponding to his peculiar nature and surroundings
(cf. Lotze, Grundziige der praktischen Phil., p. 13 f.)
2 Simcox, Natural Law, p, 88. 3 Ibid., p. 100.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 251
else than customary. But the only other meaning O r as what
of the word seems to imply a reference to a rule ^t vitality
either a rule imposed from without, or an inner or l aids de '
velopment,
constitution or order. If the former alternative is that is,
adopted, then we may use another definition of
Mr Stephen's, and say that " the typical organism
is ... that organism which is best fitted for
all the conditions of life, or, in other words,
which has the strongest vitality ; " 1 and thus
have to fall back either on the notion of " adapta-
tion to environment," or on that of " strongest
vitality " the notion we are seeking to interpret.
If the other meaning, which the reference to a
rule may convey, be adopted, then we are met by
the fact that the inner order or constitution which
is to be our guide, can (from our present empirical
point of view) mean nothing different from the line
of development. And as we have already seen that
it is unsatisfactory to interpret this as equivalent
to adaptation to environment, or to increase of
definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity, this prin-
ciple of conformity to the type is reduced to the
general principle which we have been attempting
to define more exactly increase of life.
Thus the first "determination of natural good os)Abun-
. dance and
as " perfection of the type is seen to reduce variety of
itself to the second, " absolute abundance and V1
variety of vital power." For the additional state-
1 Science of Ethics, p. 120.
252 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION.
ment, which, makes the highest excellence consist
in "conformity to the type as it is going to be,
but as, except in a few chosen specimens, it is
not yet discernible to be," l is unsatisfactory. For
to those " few chosen specimens " the end would
seem to be simply to remain as they are a con-
clusion which is hardly consistent for a writer
who regards morality as a continual progress to-
wards a higher life, a process of " climbing." 2
And, for the generality of men, there must be
some standard for determining what is " going to
be," and for certifying that the " few chosen speci-
mens " have realised this state in its perfect form.
Thus " conformity to the type as it is going to be,"
equally with " perfection of [conformity to] the
type as it is," seems to be but another way of
saying " abundance and variety of vital power," or,
more fully stated, " the possession of abundant
faculties, active and passive, fully developed, and
in regular and equal exercise." 3 The question
thus comes to be how we are to determine this
" abundance of faculties." We cannot do so by
reference to such characteristics as increase in the
number and complexity of these faculties ; for a
criterion of this kind, as we have seen, is of no
1 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104. 2 Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid., p. 89 ; cf . J. T. Punnet, Mind, x. 91 : " What the
progress -principle makes its aim and end is not complexity, but
the highest and choicest fruits of complexity the harmonious
unfolding of all the latent capacities of man."
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 253
assistance in deciding the most fundamental ethical
questions. To say that these faculties must be
" regular and equal " in their exercise, is to give
a merely formal canon. For how the equality
and regularity are to be brought about, which
faculties are to be supreme and which subordin-
ate what meaning equality can have in view of
the admitted diversity in a man's nature, are
questions left altogether undetermined. And to
describe the ideal or perfect universe as one in
which there is no conflict or collision, 1 is to give
a description which is negative as well as merely
formal. We are thus obliged to fall back on which fails
a subjective criterion, and say that the abundant subjective 6
life which it is the end of conduct to promote standard -
is a man's strongest tendencies, or the greatest
number of these. Natural good is determined by
" preferring out of all the rudimentary possibilities
existing in nature, the combination that harmon-
ises the greatest number of the strongest tenden-
cies." 2 We set out, be it remembered, to obtain a
characterisation of those acts to which the most
persistent tendencies of human nature lead us ;
and the conclusion we have arrived at is, that they
are the acts which harmonise the greatest number
of the strongest tendencies. The objective stand-
Iu 0f real tendencies" Natural Law, p. 98. But what
tendencies are not real ?
2 Natural Law, p. 98.
254
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
Strongest
tendencies
the result
of past
activities,
ard is thus reduced to the subjective standard,
which it was brought in to explain and support.
Now these strongest tendencies, in the harmoni-
ous play of which natural good or perfection is said
to consist, are themselves the result of the courses
of conduct which have been most vigorous and suc-
cessful in ancestral organisms, and they may there-
fore, perhaps, be taken as a survival and index of
the antecedent state of human nature. The realis-
ation or, rather, continuation of human nature
as it has been and is, seems thus to be the ideal
which empirical evolution is able to set before
conduct, with this formal modification, that, while
the various impulses are, so far as possible, to have
free play given them, they should be developed in
a harmonious manner. It seems doubtful how far
this tendency towards harmony is properly suggested
by, or consistent with, evolution, which has implied
a ceaseless struggle of opposing forces. At any
rate, evolution does not seem competent to give
any principle of relative subordination between the
various impulses, such as might add reality to the
formal principle of harmony. But what it is
essential to lay stress on here is, that the only
end which empirical evolution seems able to estab-
lish is conformity to human nature as it is the
tendencies in it which are strongest and most
persistent.
We thus see that the attempt to explain on
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 255
empirical grounds what is meant by positing " life,"
or "increase and variety of life," as the end of
action, is practically reduced to making the most
persistent impulses of human nature the guide of
conduct. But these impulses, it has been shown,
are only the survival or remnant of past stages in
the course of development, not anticipations of
future stages : so that evolution is in this way and thus
i i P -IIP i T give no ideal
incapable or giving an ideal or progress as the end for p rogr ess.
for conduct, and the last word it seems able to give
us as a guide for action is that we should tread in
the places where the footprints of ancestral conduct
have left the deepest impress. The ideal of such
a system is summed up in the new Beatitude,
"Blessed is he that continueth where he is." It
is probably just because the empirical aspect of
evolution seems so little able to yield an end for
human conduct corresponding to the actual course
of evolution which has been progress that no
thorough attempt has been made to develop a
system of morals from the principle just reached.
It is true that systems have been worked out by
moralists who have taken human nature as their
standard, and that Trendelenburg, at any rate,
expressly includes historical development in his
conception of man. But both Trendelenburg and
a moralist like Butler (who has as yet no conception
of the gradual modifications of human character
and tendencies produced by evolution) have a view
256 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
of human nature essentially distinct from that
which has been called the " naturalistic " view. 1
For both assume a definite rational organisation of
impulses similar to that taught in Plato's analogy
between the individual man and a political consti-
tution, so that the whole nature, or human nature
as a whole, cannot be identified with the impulses
which strength at any time makes most persistent,
but depends upon the rational allotment of function
and measure to each.
summary. In summing up the argument of the preceding
chapters, it is necessary to refer again to the dis-
cussion carried on in chapter vi. on the relation
between egoism and altruism as affected by the
Difficulty of theory of evolution. This discussion was not in-
indivixiuTf serted in order to throw an additional obstacle in
and social fa Q wa y obtaining an ethical end from the em-
ends. J
pirical theory of evolution. It is an integral part
of an attempt to estimate the ethical value of the
evolution -theory. The antinomy between the in-
dividual and social standpoints cannot be solved
by a theory of morality which does not recognise
that the individual, in his rational nature, is not
i Cf. Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, p. 45 : " Von der philoso-
phischen Seite kann es kein anderes Princip der Ethik geben als
das menschliche Wesen an sich, d. h., das menschliche Wesen in
der Tiefe seiner Idee und im Reichthum seiner historischen
Entwickelung. Beides gehort zusammen. Denn das nur His-
torische wiirde blind und das nur Ideale leer."
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 257
opposed to other individuals, but in reality one with
them. The theory of evolution certainly seems to
go a long way towards establishing the unity of the
individual with the race, and in substituting an
organic connection between them, in place of the
almost contingent reciprocal relations spoken of in
earlier empirical theories. But when we come to
inquire into this unity of organic connection, at-
tempting still to keep to the purely empirical point
of view, we find that the old difficulties return, that
it must be recognised that the connection is em-
pirically incomplete, and that it gives way at
the very places where a firm basis for the theory
of morals is required. It was in this way that,
quite apart from this opposition between the in-
dividual and the whole, the empirical character
of the theory prevented our getting from it any
clear and consistent notion of the ethical end it
leads to.
It appeared at first that the ethics of evolution, Hedonistic
when interpreted empirically, might be easily re- tfonof evoi-
conciled with the older theory of hedonism, by
identifying life with pleasure holding that the
highest or most evolved life is that which contains
most pleasure, and that increase of pleasure is
therefore the end of conduct. In this way the end
of evolutionism would be reduced to the end of
utilitarianism. Some utilitarians, on the other hand,
sought to get rid of the difficulties of their calculus,
B
258 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
by the assumption that the greatest pleasure would be
found by following the direction of evolution. But,
around both points of view, and the correspondence
they assumed to exist between pleasure and evolu-
tion, special difficulties were seen to gather. Any
hedonistic theory might be met by the assertion
that life is essentially a painful experience, and
pleasure unattainable ; and although the grounds
on which this assertion was made seemed to be
distinctly erroneous, and hedonism did not appear
to be an impossible theory of conduct, yet a similar
objection told with greater force against the com-
bination of evolutionism and hedonism. For it
holds the double position that the end is to pro-
mote life, and that life is to be promoted by adding
to pleasure ; or else, that the end is pleasure, but
that pleasure is to be got by following evolution.
It postulates, therefore, that the progress of life
tends, and tends even in a proportionate degree, to
the increase of pleasure. Yet we could obtain no
proof that this progress does, as a matter of fact,
increase pleasure in any regular way. On the con-
trary, the facts of experience seemed to show that
life and pleasure do not advance proportionately,
nor even always concomitantly. But a still more
important and fundamental objection to the hedon-
istic form of evolutionism was deduced from the
nature of pleasure itself; for it can be modified
indefinitely, and always follows in the wake of
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 259
function. Thus the sole intelligible account we
can give of what conduct will bring the greatest
pleasure is, that it is the conduct which calls forth
the greatest amount of successful energising, that
which employs the greatest number and the strong-
est of the human faculties. Hence, instead of being
able to measure life by pleasure, we were driven to
interpret pleasure in terms of life.
And perhaps at first sight it seemed that the NO indepen-
dent ethical
theory of evolution could lead us beyond the pleas- ideal afford-
ure- basis of older Naturalism. But, when the theory of
matter was examined more closely, without depart- evolution -
ing from the empirical point of view, it was found
that the notions put forward were unsatisfactory, -
that they did not represent the progressive nature
of the course of evolution, and that their apparent
force fell away before logical analysis. It became
evident, in the first place, that no appropriate end
of human conduct could be derived from the nature
of evolution in general. It is true that adaptation
to environment is necessary for life ; but to put for-
ward such adaptation as the end for action, is to set
up a practical goal which corresponds but ill with
the facts from which it professes to be taken,, mak-
ing the theory which is supposed to account for
progress establish no end by pursuit of which pro-
gress becomes possible for human action. Further
than this, it neglects a factor in evolution as neces-
sary to it as is adaptation to environment the ele-
260 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
ment, namely, of variation. A theory which took
the latter as well as the former of these factors into
account seemed, in the next place, to be given by
those general characteristics which are said to mark
all progress increase of definiteness, coherence,
and heterogeneity. But from these, again, it was
found impossible to elicit a coherent and consistent
rule for determining right and wrong in conduct, or
a definite end for action: they were too abstract
and mechanical to suit the living organism of hu-
man conduct ; and we were thus driven back on the
more general statement that " life " or the " increase
of life " is the end after which we should strive.
In inquiring into the meaning which could be given
to this end, without interpreting it as pleasure, it
was found, after tracing it through various forms of
expression, that it reduced itself to making a man's
strongest and most persistent impulses both stand-
ard and end. And this proved to be not only an
uncertain and shifting guide for conduct, but an
imperfect representation of what was to be expect-
ed from a progressive, because evolutionist, ethics.
For these persistent impulses could only be re-
garded as the survival of past activities, and conse-
quently, contained no ideal beyond that of continu-
ing in the old paths, and re-treading an already
well-beaten course. Just as from the external end
of adaptation to environment, so from this internal
THE EVOLUTIONIST END. 261
or subjective principle, no ideal for progress, ^or
any definite end of action, could be obtained.
It would appear, therefore, that the theory of
evolution however great its achievements in
the realm of natural science is almost resultless
in ethics. It only remains now to inquire whether
this want of competency to determine practical
ends may not be due to the superficiality of the
ordinary empirical interpretation of evolution, which
has hitherto been adhered to.
262
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
THE peculiarity of the conclusion we have reached
is, that the theory which is used to explain the
nature of progress, seems unable to give any canon
or end for conduct which points out the way for
progressive advance. The view of human nature
became unsatisfactory just at the critical point
when we attempted to get at a knowledge of its end
or final cause, which would give unity and purpose
to action. To say that the end is increase of life
or function appeared a merely formal notion unless
we defined life as pleasure, while pleasure itself
was found to be unintelligible except as perform-
ance of function. This uncertainty seems to indi-
cate a certain superficiality in the ordinary empiri-
cal way of looking at evolution. 1
1 The empirical interpretation of evolution is that adopted by
the majority of evolutionists, but is not essential to the truth of
the theory. A protest against it is entered by Mr Wallace, though
in the somewhat crude form of postulating supernatural inter-
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 2G3
The principles involved in the theory of evolution i. principles
are, in brief, as follows. In the first place, it shows th* theory of
that there is a tendency, brought about by natural evolution -
selection, for organisms to harmonise with or be-
come adapted to their environment a tendency,
that is to say, towards unity of organism and envi-
ronment, and, in so far as external conditions are
uniform, towards a general unity of life. In the
second place, the theory implies variation in
organisms, produced either by the unequal in-
cidence of external forces, or by the spontane-
ous action of the organism, or by both causes
combined. The mere increase in the number
of living organisms leads to a modification of the
conditions of life by which new variations are
encouraged. And this tendency to variation in
organisms not merely the diversity of external
environment is perpetually complicating the con-
ditions which the former tendency, that towards
unity, helps to bring into harmony. It thus hap-
pens that there is, in the third place, a continual
process of readjustment and oscillation between
the tendency towards unity and that towards va-
riety, which, through opposition and conciliation,
produces continuity in nature. Each newly formed
ference for the production of certain classes of phenomena (cf.
Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 359), at the
same time that his conception of nature does not seem to differ
otherwise from that of Hiickel.
264 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
unity between organism and environment is broken
by a new variation of the organism or of the envi-
ronment, which further complicates the problem to
be solved by the unifying process, and gives scope
for a more intricate and more comprehensive re-
adjustment. Unity, Variety, and Continuity are
thus the three principles implied in the theory of
evolution. 1
2. unsucces- It is from these principles that the attempt has
tioiTofthese been made to show the ethical bearing of evolution.
toS?! The first of them > Unit y> is represented in the
theory that would make adaptation to environment
the end of conduct ; and the second is represented
ethically in the doctrine suggested by Mr Spencer,
that the degree of morality depends on the de-
gree of complexity in act and motive. But both
of these views are obviously one-sided, even from
the point of view of empirical evolution. Taken
together, the principles on which they depend make
up that law of continuous and progressive advance
which may be regarded as expressing the essential
characteristic of the theory. And from this more
general and accurate expression of it, we might
have expected to have been able to elicit the contri-
bution which evolution has to make to the deter-
mination of the ethical end. But after examin-
1 The reference in the above to Kant, Werke, iii. 438 ff. , is obvi-
ous ; but it is nevertheless a true account of the principles in-
volved in the theory of evolution.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 265
ing the various forms which it may take, we have
been unable to obtain from it a principle of action.
In inquiring into the reason which has made
the theory of evolution seemingly so barren in its
ethical consequences, the first point which requires
attention is that the characteristics of Unity, Vari-
ety, and Continuity are treated by it not as princi-
ples involved in development, but as theories in-
ferred from, or superinduced upon, the facts of
development. We are led by facts to suppose
certain hypothetical laws namely, that organisms
tend to harmony with their environment, but that
there are certain causes promoting variation, and,
consequently, that the history of all life is that of
a continuous process towards more comprehensive
uniformities, passing always into more intricate
variations. Additional facts are compared with
these hypothetical causes, and, by their ability to
explain such facts, the hypotheses are raised to the
position of laws of nature, and are confidently ap-
plied to account for new phenomena of the same
kind. But when we pass beyond facts lying imme-
diately on the plane of those from which our laws
have been gathered, it is to follow an insufficient
analogy if we interpret them by theories only shown
to belong to the former order. And this becomes
still more obvious when the change is not merely
to a different order of facts, but to a different way
of looking at facts, as is the case in the transition
266 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
from the point of view of knowledge to that of
action.
notasde- But there is another way in which the principles
Tprinc?!.^ of Unity, Variety, and Continuity may be regarded,
^perien^e; Instead of being simply generalisations gathered
from experience and depending upon it, they may
be founded on a principle which is itself the basis
of the possibility of experience. Of course, no one
would think of denying that it is to the accumulated
mass of experienced facts that these laws owe their
prominence in modern scientific opinion, and their
acceptance by the judgment of the best scientists.
But the process by which a man has been led to lay
hold of such principles is one thing ; their logical
position in relation to experience quite another.
Our definite recognition of the laws may very well
be the result of experience, at the same time that
the principle of Continuity is presupposed in our
having experience at all. As long as we kept to the
ground from which we started, and did not attempt
to get beyond the categories of causality and reci-
procity, our progress might seem to be easy enough.
Although their logical relations may be misconceived,
the laws are, of course, actually there, in experience :
their application to the successive phenomena of
nature remains the same, and may be duly appre-
hended. The extension of facts into laws is ex-
plained by the scientific imagination, and we do not
stay to inquire into the conditions on which the
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 267
scientific imagination works and has applicability
to experience. But, when we try to pass from effi-
cient cause to the notion of purpose or of morality,
we find ourselves driven back on the fundamental
constitution of knowledge, and see that it is only
through the unifying and relating action of a self-
conscious subject that knowledge is possible or things
exist for us at all. And this is the reason why we
are able to say that the Unity or Continuity of
nature is a principle or law of experience. 1 Were
that principle not involved in knowledge, there
would be no world of nature for us at all. The
empirical interpretation of evolution, which has
been hitherto adopted, has made the negative side
of this truth sufficiently evident : it has shown that
we cannot, on empirical ground, reach the end or
purpose of human nature. The question thus arises,
whether what may be called the " metaphysical " or
"transcendental" interpretation of evolution can
show the reason of this defect and suggest a
remedy.
The insufficiency of the empirical way of look- (&) no logical
ing at things is seen most clearly when we at-
tempt to make the transition just referred to, and ^^0^
determine an end for conduct. It seems often to tinal cause -
1 Cf. Stirling, Secret of Hegel, ii. 615 : " One grand system,
unity of type, all this must be postulated from the very constitu-
tion of human reason ; but from the very constitution of experi-
ence as well, it can never be realised in experience. "
268 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
be thought that, in pointing out the tendency of
affairs, we are, at the same time, prescribing the
end towards which human endeavour ought to be
directed. Now, it is very difficult to say how far an
empirical method enables us to anticipate tendencies
of this kind at all. Even from the historical point
of view the conditioning circumstances are so com-
plicated that it is by no means easy to predict the
result of their combination. It is argued, however,
by Schaffle, 1 that we are at least able to see as far
as the next stage in the series of historical progress,
and this is thought to lead to the conclusion that
we should make this next stage of development our
end : further than it we cannot see, and therefore
need not provide. If, then, we have no ultimate end
for conduct, at least we need never be without a
proximate end and one which is always changing
with the course of events. Instead, therefore, of
saying that we should take no thought for the
morrow, the contention would seem to be that we
should live for the morrow but take no thought for
the day after. But here the altered point of view
is scarcely concealed. From the discussion of effi-
cient causes we proceed all at once to decide upon
ends or final causes. We have shown (let it be
granted) that, taking account of the present position
and mode of action of the forces we are able to
examine, they will modify the present state of affairs
1 Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers, ii. 68.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 269
in a certain known manner. To-day we are in state
A ; to-morrow we shall be in, or well on the way
towards, state Ab ; therefore, runs the conclusion,
implied or expressed, we ought to make Ab our end.
But this is more than a fallacy due to the confusion
of the two meanings of " end." The conclusion to
which it leads is inconsistent with, or at least shows
the one-sidedness of, the premisses from which it was
drawn. For, if Ab is really the next term in the
series of historical progress, our making it our end
can neither help nor hinder its realisation. If, on
the other hand, there is really a meaning in our
making the world-end our own, then we cannot
bring that end, the realisation of which is conceived
as still in the future, under the category of efficient
causality, and say with confidence that it is the next
stage in the course of events.
The idea does not work itself out in the same way 3. Difference
as an efficient cause works in the processes of nature.
"We might indeed speak perhaps with some intel- ^ o d tele *
ligible meaning of the tendency of evolution be-
coming conscious in man, and then working towards
its own realisation as a fixed idea. So far as the
simpler representations are concerned, this mode of
action has been clearly illustrated in Mr Bain's
writings ; and the characteristic is not limited to
the less complex kinds of mental objects. The idea
is, in its own nature, a force tending both to exist
in consciousness and to realise itself through the
270 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
motor energies. 1 Consciousness of an end is a motive
to action. Thus the notion of final cause includes
that of efficient cause ; but the two are not convert-
ible. The idea of an end, being conceived by reason,
cannot be described simply as a tendency become
conscious. It has passed into the region in which
various conceptions are, or may be, competing against
one another, and the resultant is decided on upon
grounds which may be called subjective since they
proceed from conscious determination. However
the laws of this conscious determination may be ex-
pressed, they are not to be identified with the natural
sequence of events as it may be conceived to exist
independently of the individual consciousness. What
seems the tendency of things may be altered or
modified upon some ground of preference by the
conscious subject. In passing therefore to the work-
ing out of a rational or mental idea such as is im-
plied in the conception of an end we can no longer
fully represent our notions by means of the deter-
mined temporal succession called causality.
These no- Thus the empirical standpoint leaves the case
nectedby incomplete. A man might quite reasonably' ask
empiricism, ^y ^ Q s } lou i ( j a( j pt as maxims of conduct the laws
seen to operate in nature. The end, in this way, is
not made to follow from the natural function of man.
It is simply a mode in which the events of the world
1 Cf. Fouille'e, Critique des systemes de morale contemporains,
p. 13 ff.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 271
occur ; and we must, therefore, give a reason why it
should be adopted as his end by the individual agent.
To him there may be no sufficient grounds of induce-
ment to become " a self-conscious agent in the evolu-
tion of the universe." From the purely evolutionist
point of view, no definite attempt has been made
to solve the difficulty. It seems really to go no
deeper than Dr Johnson's reply to Boswell, when
the latter plagued him to give a reason for action :
" ' Sir,' said he, in an animated tone, ' it is driving
on the system of life/" 1 When any further an-
swer is attempted now to the question, it appears to
be on hedonistic grounds.
But it is not certain that the next stage of even with
development will bring more pleasure along with anceTf 8 "
it than the present. Enough has already been hedonism -
said of the difficulties and uncertainties which
surround any attempt to interpret evolution as
tending constantly to increased pleasure. It may
be thought, however, that, if neither optimism nor
pessimism is the conclusion to which we are led,
the modified doctrine of what is called Meliorism
may be accepted. And this theory which holds
that the world is improving, that the balance of
good over evil, or that of pleasure over pain, is
on the increase might seem to form a convenient
support to the present doctrine. Tor it may ap-
pear to follow from it that, if the next stage in
1 Boswell's Life of Johnson, chap. liv.
272 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
the world-process that towards which evolution
is tending is known, then we should make it
our end to accelerate this stage, as it will be one
which brings with it a better state of affairs than
the present. But not even the most enthusiastic
" meliorist " has tried to show anything more than
that his doctrine holds true in general, and that,
although progress has many receding waves, the
tide of human happiness is rising. But we cannot
tell how great these receding waves may be ; nor
may we say that our action can have no power
to check them. It follows, therefore, that, in
judging of any special and temporary movement
of events (and it is not pretended that our antici-
patory knowledge of the future can extend far),
we cannot assume that the second stage will be
better than the first, or that voluntary modifica-
tion of it if that be possible might not improve
both the immediate result and its later conse-
quences. It becomes necessary, therefore, to com-
pare the value of the two by the directly pleasurable
effects they may be expected to have, so that we
are driven back to test the course of evolution
by reference to some other principle. The further
we go in examining an empirical theory, the clearer
does it become that it can make no nearer approach
to the discovery of an ethical end, than to point
out what courses of action are likely to be the
pleasantest, or what tendencies to action the strong-
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 273
est: while this can only be done within certain
limits. The doctrine of evolution itself, when
added to empirical morality, only widens our view
of the old landscape does not enable us to pass
from "is" to "ought," or from efficient to final
cause, any more than the telescope can point
beyond the sphere of spatial quantity.
We are endeavouring to get at the idea or end New point
of human nature in an impossible way when we tro
attempt to reach it on purely empirical lines, and teleol sy
think that, if we work long enough on them, we
are sure to come to it. In the same way it was
formerly thought by physiologists that, if we thor-
oughly examined the brain with microscope and
scalpel, we should come upon the seat of the soul
at last, while psychologists were fain to believe
that, in addition to all our presentations of ob-
jects, we had also a presentation of the subject or
thinking being. The mistake of both was in
imagining that the soul was a thing amongst other
things, or a presentation amongst other presenta-
tions, instead of the subject and condition of there
being either things or thoughts at all. Of a similar
character is the attempt to get at an end or final
cause without leaving the point of view of efficient
causality. Were it successful, it would reduce final
cause to mechanism. To look upon man or upon
nature as manifesting an end implies an idea or
notion of the object as a whole, over and above
s
274 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
the mutual determination of its various parts, and
thus necessitates the contemplation of it " as though
an understanding contained the ground of the unity
of the multiplicity of its empirical laws/' 1 It is
the attempt to get at an external purpose for
objects of experience that has made teleology be
looked upon askance by men of science. A con-
ception of this kind went far to vitiate physics in
the middle ages, till it was, with justice, strictly
excluded from the scientific interpretation of nature
by the leaders of modern philosophy. 2 But tele-
ology does not stand or fall with this external form
of it, which takes its illustrations from the products
of the factory, not from the manifestations of life, 3
and which is really only mechanism misunderstood,
necessary in The conception of an end is forced upon us in
me, 81 ' considering life, because then it is necessary to take
account of the being as organised, and therefore as
a whole. In the investigation of nature, on the
other hand, things may be apprehended without
relation to the conception of the whole ; and tele-
ology, therefore, seems to be unnecessary. The
notion of purpose, it is often said, is essential
to biology, but out of place in physical science.
But when we look on the world as a whole, the
1 Kant, Werke, v. 187 (Kr. d. Urt., Einl. iv.)
2 Descartes, Princ. pliil., iii. 3, i. 28 ; Bacon. De augm., iii. 5,
Novum organum, ii. 2.
3 Cf. Kant, Werke, v. 387 (Kr. d. Urt., 65).
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 275
notion of end or purpose is introduced, and the
functions of its various parts conceived from a new
point of view. And the end of an organism can
only be partially understood, when that organism
is conceived as a whole apart from its environment.
It is only a partial manifestation or example of the
more perfect reality in which things are to be
regarded as not merely conditioned and condition-
ing, but as revelations of purpose. But, although
the notion of purpose cannot be dispensed with in
considering organic nature, the teleological notions
we form of living things are imperfect and "ab-
stract." Thus the organism is often, more or less
explicitly, judged by its utility for some human
purpose. In these cases the end is clearly 'an
external and dependent one. And, when the
adaptation of its parts is spoken of in relation to
its type or perfect form, a conception is involved
over and above what can be inferred from the
nature of the organism in itself. The notion of the
end depends upon a rational ideal, which passes
beyond the causal interrelation of parts to the
conception of the organism as a whole, whose
function is necessarily related to its environment.
Our knowledge of the ends of the lower animals and lif
is really much more imperfect than our knowledge
of the human end. For the only life we really
know is self-conscious life, and that we are unable
to attribute to them. We know their life only
276 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
by conjecture, our knowledge of it being but an
abstraction from our own consciousness. The
ethical, as Trendelenburg puts it, 1 is the higher
stage of the process, a lower stage of which is the
organic. The purpose, which is conceived as blind
or unconscious in nature, becomes conscious and
voluntary in man. But our notion of the former
is simply an abstraction from the free and con-
scious purpose which characterises our own activity.
The conception of life is only known to us as is
only an element or moment in our own self-
consciousness. And life which is not self-con-
scious can only be judged in relation to the self-
consciousness which contains in itself the explana-
tion both of life and of nature. The germ of truth
in the old mechanical teleology may perhaps be
seen in this way. For it had right on its side in
so far as it referred everything to the self -con-
sciousness manifested in man ; it was mistaken
only in so far as it made things relative to his
needs and desires. The teleological anthropomor-
phism which judges all things according to their
correspondence with human purposes, must be tran-
scended, equally with the speculative anthropo-
morphism which frames the unseen world in the
likeness of the phenomena of our present experi-
ence. But to attempt to escape from what is some-
times called anthropomorphism the reference of
1 Historische Beitriige zur Philosophic, iii. 165.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 277
the nature and purpose of things to self -conscious-
ness, as expressive of the ultimate reality is to
attempt to escape from thought itself, and makes
one's thinking from the beginning void and con-
tradictory.
Now this reference to self has been omitted in 4. Reference
. . T , ,. ^ Tr , toself-con-
our consideration of empirical evolution. We nave SC i usness
taken the purely objective ground of science, and %
we have admitted what science has told us of how
all sorts of things came to be, how man appeared
on the earth, gradually adapted himself to his sur-
roundings and modified them how sentiments ex-
panded, customs grew, and one institution developed
out of another. But science shows us all this only
as an external process of events in space and time
a process in which the preceding determines each
succeeding state, and all parts are united together.
It does not show us the process from the inside.
And, in the end, it can do no more than point to-
wards, without reaching, the comprehensive idea of
a whole, by reference to which idea all the members
of the whole are determined, in such a way that it
is insufficient to look upon one as causing another,
and with the others making up the aggregate ; since
each member only exists for the sake of the whole,
and the idea of the whole precedes the parts which
constitute it. 1 The teleological conception thus
necessarily leads us beyond the ordinary categories
1 Cf. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, iii. 228.
278 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
of science, by which all things are conceived as con-
nected causally in space and time. But the scien-
tific theories that we have been discussing do not
recognise this altered point of view ; and, without
giving any justification for the change of stand-
point, lay down the moral law that we ought to
aim at the realisation of something which can only
be described as a mental conception or idea. Here
a double change in point of view is involved. We
are no longer considering a process going on outside
us, in which the reference to self may be fairly
ignored, but we put ourselves in relation to this
external order : and we do so, not merely as cogni-
tive, but as active as the potential source of actions
which we say " ought " to be performed by us.
(a) made The assumption involved in the former change is
attempt^ 6 tna ^ m &de by comparative or evolutionist psycho-
> w ^ en tt attempts to play the part of a theory
peif-con- of knowledge. The development of impressions
sciousness.
and ideas is made to pass upwards to more compli-
cated stages, till it reaches the point at which the
individual, conceived as determined by external
forces and reacting upon them, becomes conscious
of itself as a subject of knowledge and source of
action. This transition from the category of caus-
ality to self - consciousness is, in some systems
that of Mr Spencer, for example either concealed
or held to with no firm grasp. Throughout his
objective treatment of psychology, it would seem
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 279
that Mr Spencer is evolving mind or self-conscious-
ness out of the process in which simple relations of
matter and motion form the lowest stage, and reflex
action is that which approaches most nearly to hav-
ing mental characteristics. And, from this objective
point of view, he speaks of his philosophy as an
interpretation of "the detailed phenomena of life,
mind, and society, in terms of matter, motion, and
force." l But when he discusses the subjective side,
he admits that it is entirely unique and sui generis?
and adopts what is known as the "two aspects"
theory the theory that mind cannot be accounted
for as derived from matter, any more than matter
can be accounted for as derived from mind, but that
they are both phases of one ultimate and unknown
reality. 3 This admission involves a practical acknow-
ledgment that it is impossible to arrive at conscious-
ness or at subjectivity by a process of natural devel-
opment. We must, it affirms, postulate two aspects
or phases of existence, or two lines of development,
connected probably in their ultimate reality, but, as
known to us, distinct from one another, and without
mutual influence.
The doctrine that a reference to self-conscious- Reference
i . . . i -i i to self-con-
neSS is implied in experience, may perhaps be made SC i usness,
clearer by considering a criticism to which it has
1 First Principles, 194, p. 556.
2 Principles of Psychology, 56, i. 140.
3 Ibid., 272, 273, i. 624 ff.
280 OX THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
recently been subjected by an able psychological
writer. Professor W. James writes as follows :
" The doctrine of the post-Kan tians, that all knowledge is
also self-knowledge, seems to flow from this confusion [be-
tween the psychologist's standpoint and the standpoint of
the feeling upon which he is supposed to be making his re-
port]. Empirically, of course, an awareness of self accom-
panies most of our thinking. But that it should be needed
to make that thinking ' objective ' is quite another matter.
4 Green-after-red-and- other- than-it ' is an absolutely complete
object of thought, ideally considered, and needs no added
element. The fallacy seems to arise from some such reflec-
tion as this, that since the feeling is what it feels itself to be,
so it must feel itself to be what it is namely, related to each
of its objects. That the last is covers much more ground
than the first, the philosopher here does not notice. The
first is signifies only the feeling's inward quality ; the last is
covers all possible facts about the feeling, relational facts,
which can only be known from outside points of view, like
that of the philosopher himself." l
Now it seems to me that the real confusion here
is between the point of view of experience, and the
point of view of reflection on experience, and that it
is not the " post-Kantians " who confuse the two
points of view. The "post-Kantians" by whom
Professor James means T. H. Green and the
writers commonly associated with him habitu-
thoughnot ally occupy the latter standpoint. They do not
of expert?* holcl that " all knowledge is also self-knowledge," in
ence ' the sense that " an awareness of self accompanies
most [or all] of our thinking." When we have this
1 Mind, ix. 21.
x^
ff "
ff UNI\
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 281
^^
empirical " awareness of self," our object is the
more or less distinct contents of perception, &c.,
which make up the empirical ego. But this know-
ledge of the empirical ego, equally with knowledge
of external nature, implies logically the action of logically
self -consciousness. When we reflect upon experi- e "
ence, one constant element is seen to be implied in
it the reference to a subject of knowledge and
feeling. Certainly " post-Kantians " do not imagine
as Professor James seems himself to imagine and
to think they do that a feeling feels itself, or an
object knows itself. " Green-after-red-and-other-
than-it " is for them, as for him, if not " an abso-
lutely complete object of thought," yet relatively
complete. It may be apprehended alone as a part
of experience. But reflection on experience shows
that it, like any other object of thought, depends
upon a knowing subject. The " post-Kantians " do
not assert that knowing an object involves for the
individual knower actual consciousness of what his
knowledge implies, any more than they would say
that the "plain man" is already a metaphysician.
But they hold that reflection on experience shows
that self-reference, or reference to a subject, is a
logical condition of there being experience at all.
So far from confusing the two standpoints, they
require carefully to emphasise their difference, lest
the actual content of a state of consciousness in the
individual man be held to be equivalent to the
282 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
grounds or conditions of that state of conscious-
ness.
The reason why there is even an apparent plausi-
bility in the attempt to get at a natural develop-
ment of self-consciousness, is that the reference to
self is, from the outset, implicitly, but logically,
assurfted in tracing the sequence of events which
forms the subject-matter of the theory of evolution,
while the course of development does nothing more
than render its implication explicit. Self-conscious-
ness is not something that exists apart from the
world of known and knowable objects, any more
than it is itself a special department of this world
of objects distinguishable from, and determined by,
its surroundings. It is, on the contrary, the supreme
condition of the world of objects having any exist-
ence whatever. It is only through objects being
brought into relation with the identical and per-
manent subject of knowledge, that there is unity in
nature, or, in other words, that there is a known
world of nature or experience at all. The evolution
of mind or self-consciousness out of experience is,
therefore, not merely to be rejected as a problem
too intricate for psychological analysis. It is a
mistake to think that it is a possible problem at all ;
for it attempts to make experience account for and
originate the principles on w r hich its own possibility
depends.
(&> made But it is the second change in point of view
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 283
which needs special emphasis here the change clear in the
from the point of view of science to that of moral-
ity. Taken in its bare form, this is perhaps little reflexaction.
more than a confusion of thought. The fact of
things being of a certain constitution, and of their
progress tending in a certain direction, cannot of
itself supply a law for the exercise of our activity.
But the view is associated with a theory of the
nature of human action which seeks to bring it into
the strict line of natural development. Just as
empirical psychology attempted to treat self -con-
sciousness as a stage in the evolution of experience
or knowledge, so the empirical theory of morality,
aided by the doctrine of evolution, tries to show
how the action which is called moral has been de-
veloped out of purely physical or reflex action. But
this theory of the development of moral action is
really open to the same objection as that which was
urged against the theory which evolves self-con-
sciousness from the unconscious. The objection to
the latter was, that experience, itself constituted by
consciousness, is made to produce the condition of
its own possibility ; and a similar confusion is in-
volved in attempting to develop moral action out of
merely physical or reflex action. The only case of
true psychical or conscious action is that in which
there is a conscious determination of end and means ;
and action of this kind implies the same relation to
self -consciousness as that by which knowledge is
284 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
constituted. The relation is, however, manifested
in a different way : it is not an apprehension of the
manifold of impression into the unity of conscious-
ness, but the externalisation of self-consciousness
in realising a conceived end or idea. Now, in so
far as physical and psychical facts are phenomena
of experience and they have no other existence, at
least none that can have any intelligible meaning
given to it they presuppose self-consciousness ; for
it is only in relation to it that experience is pos-
sible. That is to say, their existence logically im-
plies a reference to a subject whose active external-
ising manifestation is the determination of means
and end which constitutes moral (as distinguished
from merely natural) action. So far, therefore,
from our being able to trace the development of
moral action from the simpler phenomena of natural
action, we find that these, in their most rudimen-
tary form, by virtue of their being phenomena of
experience, imply and receive their reality from
the self-consciousness which is the ^differentiating
quality both of knowledge and of moral action.
5. The unity From this it follows that, although, empirically,
sciousups": ^ e change from the point of view of science to that
of morality is a transition to a different order of
facts, yet the passage may be possible transcenden-
(a) as mak- tally through self-consciousness. For in self-con-
the transi- 6 sciousness we reach the element of identity between
tion from k now i ec [g e an( j action. It is, therefore, of import-
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 285
ance to understand the nature of this self-conscious knowledge
activity in relation to knowledge and to action. If tc
the fundamental characteristic of knowledge is the
bringing into relation to consciousness, then all
conscious action has this characteristic ; for it de-
termines self towards some particular line of activ-
ity that is to say, towards an object or end which
is thereby related to consciousness. Action there-
fore, we may say, is knowledge. And in the same
way, on the other hand, since the relating to con-
sciousness which constitutes knowledge can only be
regarded as originated by the subject, it follows,
conversely, that knowledge is action. 1 " We act,"
says Spinoza, " only in so far as we know or under-
stand/' Action is but one aspect or manifestation
of that which, in another aspect or manifestation, is
knowledge. But the aspect of self-consciousness
we call knowledge and that we call action are dif-
ferent from one another. In the former the relat-
ing to consciousness in the definite forms of thought
and perception is the prominent thing. In the lat-
ter it is the realising energy of the self-conscious
1 From "action "in this its ultimate meaning as equivalent
to origination by the subject, it is necessary to distinguish
"action " as a phenomenon in the external world. The latter is
one of the modes in which the relation of objects is known to us,
the former a characteristic of knowing. The active nature of
knowledge is worked out in an interesting way in Professor S. S.
Laurie's ' Metaphysica nova et vetusta,' by " Scotus Novanticus "
(1884).
286 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
subject. The ordinary distinction between know-
ledge and action is therefore correct, if not pushed
to the extent of making an absolute separation
between them : in the former we idealise the real,
in the latter we realise the ideal. But they are at
one in this, that both involve self-conscious activity.
(&) as deter- The self-consciousness which in one relation is
SiTractCTof knowledge, in another action, is thus the fundamen-
the ethical ^ act O f h uman nature i and on it, therefore, the
end,
ethical end must be based, if that end can be dis-
closed by the nature of man, and is to express what
is most fundamental in his nature. Now, as know-
ledge finds its completion when all things are con-
nected with one another and the subject in a defi-
nite system of relations, the end of completed self-
conscious activity cannot be different. In their
final perfection, as in their fundamental 'nature,
the two are at one. As Kant puts it, 1 the specu-
lative and the practical reason are reconciled in the
notion of end. However virtue may differ from
knowledge in the processes of ordinary experience,
the distinction only belongs to their finite realisa-
tion. An intuitive understanding, or understand-
ing which, in knowing, creates the objects of know-
ledge, is the highest conception of reason. Yet the
very notion of a finite self implies that neither
such knowledge nor such activity belongs to it. In
knowledge and action, as properties of the ultimate
1 Werke, iii. 538 ; cf. Adamson, Philosophy of Kant, p. 138.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS, 287
self-consciousness, human beings only participate.
It is only by means of the laborious methods of
observation and inference that they approach the
intuition of all things as a unity in which perfect
knowledge consists ; and, in the same way, it is
only by the gradual volitional adaptation of means
to end that they are able, in some measure, to con-
tribute to the realisation of self-consciousness in the
world.
An end can only be made our own when con- as seif-reaii-
ceived as necessary for realising or completing our
idea of self. Conscious volition only follows a
conceived want, or recognition that the self as
imagined the ideal self is not realised in the
actual self. The action is towards a fuller working
out of the idea of self ; and the end may therefore,
in all cases of conscious action, be said to be self-
realisation, though the nature of this end differs
according to each man's conception of self. This
may be expressed, as Green expresses it, by saying
that " self -satisfaction is the form of every object
willed; but . . . it is on the specific difference
of the objects willed under the general form of
self-satisfaction that the quality of the will must
depend." l It appears to me, however, that this
statement requires to be guarded by an explanation.
The self-satisfaction sought must not be looked ^
upon as a feeling, for if it is, it can only be
1 Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 161.
288 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
! interpreted psychologically as pleasure but as
simply conscious self-realisation. And this self-
realisation is the objective consciousness of an
attained end, which is accompanied by, but is not
\ the same as, the feeling of pleasure. Self-realisa-
tion is the end, not the pleasurable feeling which
follows it ; self-satisfaction, not the " pleasure of
self-satisfaction." In this way, the common ex-
perience " that the objects with which we seek
to satisfy ourselves do not turn out capable of
satisfying us," 1 might be expressed by saying that
the method adopted for the realisation of self is
often found in its result to lead to incomplete, or
even to illusory, self-realisation.
The question thus arises, What is the true self
that is to be realised, and what is meant by the
realisation of it? The will that wills itself is as
bare a notion in ethics, as the thought that thinks
itself is in metaphysics. The "good will," which
Kant rightly held to be the only ultimate good,
never altogether escaped this formality in Kant's
own treatment of it. His idea of humanity as a
realm of ends was limited by his formal conception
of the function of reason, though it suggests the
way by which the mere tautology of will may be
transcended. It is of the essence of a finite will
that its end is different from the realisation of the
end. But the rationality of the will implies that it
1 Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 165.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 289
must aim at nothing less than the harmonious arti-
culation of its whole activity in the unity of self-
consciousness.
It has been argued above that both knowledge butastrans-
and morality are expressions of self-conscious
activity: in it these different manifestations find
an element of fundamental identity. But it may
be maintained, further, that this "unity of self-
consciousness" is not merely the unity of the
different states of an individual, but that it is an
element which transcends the difference by which
concrete individuals are distinguished from one
another. If this view can be carried out, it seems
to lead us to attribute to other men something more
than a " similar consciousness " x to our own, and
to make us look on all self-conscious beings as
sharing in, or manifesting, in various imperfect
ways, one identical self -consciousness. From this
point of view, self-realisation would be established
as no mere individual end. The first law of morality
would be not the " natural " impulse for each to
take care of himself in the struggle for life, but,
on the contrary, the sublation of that distinction
between the particular ego and other individuals
which would admit of the one using the others
as mere means to his own advancement. His true
end is the same as theirs: the realisation of the
self-consciousness in which both partake its realis-
1 Sidgwick, "Green's Ethics," Mind, ix. 180.
T
290 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
ation, that is to say, not in one individual only, but
wherever it is manifested. 1 This is the rationale
of what the empirical theory of evolution tries to
establish by pointing to the growing harmony in
feeling and interest between the individual and
society. What evolution really shows is the gradual
manifestation in actual volition of the identity of
nature in all men. 2 I do not say that this funda-
mental identity of nature does away with all conflict
between self-realisation in one's self and in others ;
but it does much, if it establishes the principle that
the realisation of one's own nature involves the
realisation of that of others. As Schaffle says,
" the moral law is the direction of the will to the
genuinely human as humanity ; " and " this is a
transcendental element embedded in the hearts of
all men though in its basis only, for it is developed
and ripened in the course of history." 3 And the
more fully self-consciousness is realised, the clearer
does it become that its complete realisation implies
that "kingdom of ends" spoken of by Kant, in
which all self-conscious beings are at once subjects
and sovereign.
1 This is implied in Hegel's well-known imperative, " Be a per-
son and respect others as persons." Phil. d. Rechts, p. 73.
2 Thus Hoffding maintains that " the highest ethical idea " is
"the idea of the human race as a realm of personalities." Grund-
lage der humanen Ethik (aus dem danischen), p. 74.
3 Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers, i. 173.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS. 291
Further, self-realisation in both its aspects as ( C > as show.
,..,,-, . , . .-, . ing that the
individual and as social is necessarily progressive, realisation
It is only at the highest stage of its development *^* d
that nature becomes the organ of intelligence and progressive.
morality. 1 And, just as knowledge expresses
itself through the forms of space and time, and,
therefore, by gradual colligations of facts, so the
conscious determination of activity is manifested
in the world in an order of consecutive acts, and is
therefore subject, in its manifestation, to the laws
^of temporal succession. It is the part of a system
of metaphysics at any rate, it does not belong to
the present inquiry to show how reason manifests
itself in space and time, and how, through the
rationality of this manifestation, everything in
space is and acts only in relation to its environ-
ment, and through it, to the rest of the world, and
how each event in time is the result of preced-
ing events, and determines those which follow it.
What it thus shows the necessity of is the process
of evolution ; and it is because this process is deter-
mined by reason that the world is the object of
knowledge and the sphere of moral action. Evolu-
tion is thus not the foundation of morality, but the
manifestation of the principle on which it depends.
Morality cannot be explained by means of its own
development, without reference to the self-consci-
1 Cf. H. Siebeck, Philosophische Monatshefte, xx. 340.
292 ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
ousness which makes that development possible.
However valuable may be the information we get
from experience as to the gradual evolution of
conduct, its nature and end can only be explained
by a principle that transcends experience.
THE END.
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