C LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF 
 CALIFORNIA 
 
 SAN IEGO
 
 **~- 
 
 T
 
 THE FATES 
 From a painting by Paul Thumann
 
 Discourses of Epictetus 
 
 With a Critical and Biographical Introduction 
 by John Lancaster Spalding 
 
 Illustrated 
 
 New York 
 
 D. Appleton and Company 
 1904
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1900, 
 BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 OF the life of Epictetus little need be said. His 
 biography is his character, and this lies open in 
 his books, where the fine spirit of an earnest and 
 noble soul still breathes. He was born in Phrygia, about 
 the middle of the first century. His mother was a slave; 
 his father is unknown. Epictetus is not his name, but is 
 a Greek word which denotes his servile condition. In his 
 youth he became the property of Epaphroditus, a freed- 
 man of Nero's, who permitted him to attend the lectures 
 of Musonius Rufus, one of the most celebrated teachers 
 in Rome. Having acquired freedom, he began himself to 
 give lessons; but he was soon sent into exile, together with 
 the other philosophers, by the Emperor Domitian. 
 
 Settling at Nicopolis, in Epirus (the modern Albania), 
 he opened a school, and continued to teach the doctrines 
 of stoicism to the time of his death, at the age, it is sup- 
 posed, of nearly a hundred years. He was feeble in body, 
 lame, poor, and unmarried, living alone until he took an 
 old woman into his house to care for an orphan whom 
 he had adopted. He wrote nothing, but talked with his 
 pupils in a familiar way of whatever concerns the conduct 
 of life. Arrian, his favourite disciple, took notes of his 
 conversations, not with a view to publication, but for his 
 own use. When, however, without his knowledge, they 
 had fallen into the hands of several, he edited them him-
 
 iv EPICTETUS 
 
 self. Thus we owe to an accident the existence of these 
 " Discourses," which form one of the world's vital books. 
 The " Manual " is a collection of aphorisms taken sub- 
 stantially from the larger work. 
 
 Epictetus was not the founder of a new philosophy. 
 Zeno, the originator of the Stoic system, was his master, 
 and Zeno himself derived his fundamental principles from 
 Antisthenes, the author of the cynic school and the friend 
 of Socrates. 
 
 The Greeks are the creators of philosophy, and their 
 earliest attempt at systematic thought was an effort to 
 understand Nature. But they soon learned that it was 
 necessary to begin from within, since to know anything 
 man must first know himself. Thus the problem of the 
 conduct of life forced itself upon them. This is the con- 
 stant preoccupation of Socrates, who was born five hun- 
 dred years before Epictetus. He taught that the good is 
 to be sought not in outward things, nor in the indulgence 
 of appetite, but in virtue, which for him, however, is an 
 intellectual rather than a moral habit. His calm and ra- 
 tional temper led him to the belief that man always acts 
 in accordance with his knowledge, does what insight shows 
 him to be useful to himself. He who does evil, does it from 
 a mistake of judgment. Sin is error. Virtue, then, being 
 chiefly knowledge, may be taught, and to teach it is the 
 philosopher's life work. But Socrates moved in a circle 
 from which there was no escape. To know the useful is vir- 
 tue. But what is the useful? That which makes for virtue. 
 
 Antisthenes does not attempt to determine the mean- 
 ing of the good. He simply declares that virtue is the 
 only good, and, in his view, virtue is the intelligent con- 
 duct of life. Right life is the essential good; virtue is its 
 own reward, and one need not look to its results. It is, 
 in the midst of whatever vicissitudes, a sure possession. 
 The virtuous man is independent of events, and stands
 
 
 EPICTETUS V 
 
 secure against fate and fortune. The world is full of things 
 he does not need; he seeks not wealth, nor fame, nor hon- 
 our, nor pleasure. 
 
 Zeno, the Stoic, born in Cyprus about 340 B. c., is the 
 heir of the Cynics. The sage, as he conceives the truly 
 wise and virtuous man, is first of all independent of the 
 world, since only on this condition can he be free and find 
 happiness in himself alone; and as what is external is but 
 little subject to human will, he must overcome the worlcT 
 within himself by gaining the mastery over the feelings 
 and desires which it excites. To be self-contained and 
 self-sufficient, to remain unmoved in the presence of good 
 or of evil fortune, imperturbable though the universe be 
 shattered, is the goal he must strive to reach. If he can 
 not defend himself against the excitations of feeling, he 
 will at least refuse his assent, and thereby prevent them 
 from becoming passions. His ideal is apathy, absence of 
 emotion. The course of things may bring him pleasure 
 and pain, but since he holds that the one is not a good, 
 the other not an evil, he retains his equanimity. Virtue 
 is his sole good, and the only evil is to permit passion to 
 conquer reason. This withdrawal of the individual within 
 himself, however it may be modified and supplemented, is 
 an essential element in the Stoic's conception of life. 
 Reason, from his point of view, is not only man's nature, 
 but that of the universe, while the impulses of the senses 
 are irrational. The soul, as part of the World-Reason, 
 must therefore exclude from itself all excitation of feeling. 
 " To live in harmony with Nature is to rise into a sphere 
 where the senses cease to trouble; it is to live in com- 
 munion with the cosmic power, from which all things 
 proceed, in cheerful obedience to the eternal destiny, 
 which, being the will of God, is the divine law. The wise 
 >rnan accepts this life as his first and highest duty. It is 
 the task which Reason imposes upon him. The Stoics,
 
 vi EPICTETUS 
 
 however, holding that man is by nature social, require 
 that he lead a social life. The social ideal of the sage is 
 that of a universal ethical community, and he is indiffer- 
 ent to forms of government and to actually existing states. 
 He is a citizen of the world, demands justice and sympathy 
 ; for all, and refuses to recognise the division of mankind 
 ; ^into Greeks and barbarians. 
 
 The chief stress is laid upon the worth of moral person- 
 ality, upon the paramount value of the good that lies 
 within, though the duty of co-operating with one's fellow- 
 men for the general welfare is inculcated. The metaphys- 
 ical principle is pantheistic, and involves fatalism; but the 
 Stoics, preoccupied exclusively with moral ideas and in- 
 terests, cared little for logical consistency, and stoutly as- 
 serted the freedom of the will, holding fast to liberty of 
 choice and to the universality of causation. 
 
 Though of Greek origin, stoicism attained its highest 
 practical significance in Rome, where its doctrines seemed 
 to be suited to the character of the people. Those stern, 
 self-controlled, and brave men were attracted by a system 
 which emphasized the value of independence, courage, and 
 imperturbability. They found in it a source of the moral 
 enthusiasm which the pagan religions had no power to 
 inspire. They were drawn to the society of the philoso- 
 phers, received them into their houses, and became their 
 disciples. By daily intercourse with these earnest and 
 austere teachers, such men as Scipio and Laelius, as Brutus, 
 Cato, and Cicero, were formed. The prestige and authority 
 of the preachers of stoicism were heightened by the general 
 corruption which was undermining the state, and the public 
 calamities which were becoming more and more frequent. 
 
 The noblest souls, despairing of the cause of liberty, 
 withdrew from politics, and sought consolation in a phi- 
 losophy which taught them how to bear the ills of life 
 and how to die. In Rome, where only what is practical
 
 EPICTETUS vii 
 
 was rightly appreciated, little attention was given to the 
 metaphysical presuppositions of stoicism, and the great 
 teachers, losing sight of the logical requirements of the 
 system, took what seemed to them true and to the pur- 
 pose wherever it was found. Indeed, contradiction and 
 inconsistency did not repel, as we have seen, the early 
 Stoics, and in its Roman development the philosophy be- 
 came more and more eclectic. 
 
 Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius are the three 
 famous names of this later school of stoicism, and they are 
 all teachers of the conduct of life, in love with inner per- 
 fection, and comparatively heedless of mere speculation. 
 In the midst of the general decadence and threatening col- 
 lapse of the civilized world, they sought to rouse con- 
 science; and as the pagan religion could do nothing for 
 them, they strove to give a kind of sacredness to human 
 wisdom. To derive profit from their works it is not neces- 
 sary to understand their theories. All that is required is an 
 open mind and a tractable heart. What is speculative dis- 
 appears in the presence of the practical worth of the truths, 
 they utter. To read them aright we need an attentive and 
 devout spirit rather than an acute and curious intellect. 
 
 Of these three teachers of the later stoicism, Epictetus is 
 the noblest character and the greatest authority. His life 
 is more completely in harmony with his doctrine. He rises 
 in moral elevation to the level of his maxims and precepts. 
 His purity equals his insight. He is the venerable sage. 
 He is the saint of a philosophical religion, a man who from 
 an abject condition raised himself to the worthiest dis- 
 positions of mind and heart, who in the midst of a cor- 
 rupt society remained unstained and faithful, his thought 
 fixed on the highest moral ideals, and following to the 
 end his vocation as a preacher of righteousness a slave, 
 a cripple, a pauper, as his epitaph declares, but dear to the 
 gods. He has drawn for us an ideal of the Stoic sage, in
 
 yiii EPICTETUS 
 
 which his own character is portrayed. He accuses neither 
 God nor man; he controls desire; he knows not anger, nor 
 resentment, nor envy, nor pity; he fences himself with vir- 
 tuous shame. He has nothing to conceal; he does not fear 
 exile or death, for wherever and however he is there also 
 is God. But it is not enough that he be good in and for 
 himself. He is a messenger sent by Zeus to instruct men 
 concerning good and evil, to point out to them that they 
 walk in wrong ways. He must cry out: " Oh, mortals, 
 whither are ye hasting? Why do ye tumble about, like 
 the blind? The good is not in the body; it is not in wealth, 
 or power, or empire; it lies in yourselves. God has sent 
 you one to teach you by his example. Take notice of me 
 that I am without a country, without a house, without an 
 estate, without a servant: I lie on the ground; have no 
 wife, no children, no coat, but have only earth and heaven 
 and one poor cloak. And what need I? Am I not with- 
 out sorrow, without fear? Am I not free? Did I ever 
 blame God or man? Did I ever accuse any one? Have 
 any of you seen me look discontented?" Epictetus is 
 direct, plain, and earnest in his speech. His style is bare 
 of ornament, vigorous, and incisive. He is always serious, 
 often stern, and at times pathetic. He does not deliver 
 finished discourses, is heedless of rhetorical ornament, and 
 wholly intent on improving his hearers by inciting them 
 to the love and practice of virtue. He is not so much an 
 orator as a brave, genuine man, whose whole being vibrates 
 in his words, which are vital and electric. They are the 
 honest and fearless expression of what he thinks in his 
 heart, of what he feels and lives. They are the utterance 
 of what is deepest and permanent in man, and therefore 
 they never lose the power to stimulate and nourish faith in 
 the worth of a life led in obedience to the divine com- 
 mands. The simple and straightforward manner in which 
 he speaks the highest truth has made him a favourite not
 
 EPICTETUS ix 
 
 with scholars merely, but with all classes of readers. Who- 
 ever is persuaded that life is chiefly conduct may derive 
 help from him. Only the learned can read Plato with 
 profit, and the fewest of these study him, but an ordinary 
 mind may find in Epictetus a friend and teacher, for his 
 philosophy is of the most practical character and easily 
 understood. Wisdom consists in knowing how to distin- 
 guish between what is our own and what is not ours. 
 Our will, our opinions, desires, inclinations, and aversions 
 are ours; the rest body, possessions, honour, and reputa- 
 tion is not ours. The divine law bids us hold fast to what 
 is our own, and make no claim to what is not ours. God 
 in endowing us with free will gives us control over what 
 is ours, but other things he has not placed in our power* 
 A man's business is with himself, with learning to think 
 rightly and will wisely. Here he is master, here he has 
 full control. Let him give heed to this, and in other things 
 resign himself with a cheerful heart to the guidance of 
 the all-wise Father, who rules the whole. Since we can 
 not determine the course of Nature, it is our duty to ac-| 
 cept with courage and resignation whatever befalls. Is\ 
 money, or friend, or wife, or child taken from us, let us re- 
 member that they never were ours; they were but lent 
 to us, and have been returned to the owner. Shall we 
 complain when he asks us to restore what belongs to him? 
 But it lies with us to have an independent soul and a vic- 
 torious will, to remain imperturbable, serene, reverent, and 
 thankful, despite disgrace and misfortune, which can not 
 touch our inmost being or deprive us of freedom and 
 virtue. These are the sole good, and so long as they are 
 ours all else is unimportant. Will that things happen as 
 they do, and nothing shall happen contrary to thy will. 
 But how shall I bear the wrongs which the wicked inflict? 
 May not God choose his agents to demand of thee what 
 he has lent. Thou art but a player to whom a role has
 
 X EPICTETUS 
 
 been assigned. Take cheerfully whatever character is given 
 thee, whether it be that of a beggar or that of a king. Thy( 
 sole business is to act well the part to which God has ap- 
 pointed thee. Think of him as often as thou breathest, and 
 let thy whole study and desire be to know and do his will. 
 
 For Epictetus a virtuous life is not a means, but an 
 end. The sage does right not from the hope of prosperity 
 and good name, not that he may have health of body and 
 mind, not because wise behaviour produces a contented 
 and happy temper, but he does what is just, avoids what 
 is base, without thought of reward or punishment, im- 
 pelled solely by a sense of duty. He clings to virtue 
 though virtue be his death sentence, and though he have 
 no expectation of a future life. He makes no sacrifice in 
 abandoning all things for virtue, for virtue is his only 
 good. He who wishes to please men, who desires to be 
 known and praised even for his virtue, is not a lover of 
 virtue, as he who loves money or pleasure or glory is not 
 a lover of mankind. The wise man's will rolls like a wheel 
 with steady and even motion toward the one eternal goal, 
 to which the universe also is drawn. " If there be any] 
 worth in thee, O man, learn to walk alone and to conj 
 verse with thyself! " 
 
 In the " Manual " Epictetus appears as a stern, uncom- 
 promising Stoic. In the " Discourses " we find him in the 
 midst of his friends and disciples, where he takes a more 
 human and sympathetic tone. Here he infuses into his 
 morality the glow of religion, which makes it vital and 
 effective. We are not always made to feel that virtue lacks 
 vigour, unless it be hard and repellent, that pride heightens 
 truth, or that insolence is a mark of goodness, or that 
 harshness is zeal, or modest assertion of opinion a com- 
 promise with error. We almost seem to hear Thrasea 
 declare that he fears to hate even vice too much, lest per- 
 chance he come to hate his fellow-men. It is in the " Dis-
 
 EPICTETUS xi 
 
 courses " that he tells us that the true Stoic is " the father 
 of mankind; that all men are his sons and all women his 
 daughters. He attends to all, takes care of all. Is it from 
 impertinence that he rebukes those he meets? He does it 
 as a father, as a brother, as a minister of the common 
 parent, Zeus." He does not marry, he has no children, 
 he accepts no office, that nothing may interfere with the 
 work which God has given him to do. He is careful of 
 his health and appearance, lest he repel those whom he 
 wishes to attract. Above all, he is clean of heart, for how,'^ 
 if he is himself guilty, shall he reprove others? He watches 
 and labours for men, becomes purer day by day; he rules 
 all his thoughts as the friend, as the minister of the gods, 
 as a partner in the empire of Zeus. He has, besides, so 
 much patience as to appear to the vulgar insensible and 
 like a stone; " for there is this fine circumstance connected 
 with the character of a Cynic: that he must be beaten like 
 an ass, and yet when beaten must love those who beat 
 him as the father, as the brother of all." 
 
 Epictetus does not reject the pantheism of the Stoics 
 nor the polytheism of his age, but whatever his theological 
 opinions, which seem to have been vague, he does not 
 think of God as an indeterminate somewhat, but as a per- 
 son to whom he is bound by ties of obedience, reverence, 
 and love; and though he often speaks of the gods, the 
 Supreme Being is never absent from his mind. He is the 
 creator of the world and the ruler of all things. He can 
 not conceive that the universe should have come into ex-1 
 istence or should continue without God. The glory and 
 harmony of the creation fill him with devout enthusiasm. 
 " What can I, a lame old man, do other than praise God? 
 Were I a nightingale, I should perform the office of a 
 nightingale; were I a swan, that of a swan; but as I am 
 a rational being, I must praise God. This is my work, 
 this I do, nor shall I cease from the task while life is left
 
 xii EPICTETUS 
 
 me. And upon you also I call to intone this hymn." With 
 his last breath he hopes still to continue his sacred song: 
 " Nothing but thanks to thee do I utter, because thou 
 hast deemed me worthy to partake with thee of life's feast, 
 to behold thy works, and to follow thy government of 
 the world." Day and night he is mindful of the divine 
 commands; his thoughts are raised to Heaven, and in 
 earthly things he sees God, not as the Creator alone, but 
 also as the Father who watches over his children and has 
 care of even the least among them. 
 
 Epictetus takes what seems to him true and good 
 wherever it be found. He has no respect for mere theory, 
 and prizes only the knowledge which is brought to bear 
 on the conduct of life. The beginning of philosophy, he 
 says, is the turning from intellectual conceit and the recog- 
 nition of one's own helplessness in the most indispensable 
 things. To talk like a Stoic is easy; to live like one is 
 difficult. He challenges his hearers to show him one whose 
 life is in harmony with his principles. And yet all that 
 is needed is the will. Will, and thou art free. From with- 
 in come salvation and ruin. If the heart is set upon ex- 
 ternal things, a god can not rescue thee. But let us forget 
 the past, he cries, and begin anew. God has placed us in 
 the midst of the battle of life ; we have sworn to be true to 
 him, our king and leader, to defend at whatever cost the 
 post he has assigned us. " I am thine. Where will'st thou 
 that I live in Rome, or Athens, or Thebes, or on the des- 
 ert island of Gyara? Only, be mindful of me there." 
 
 Epictetus is not a Christian: he knows nothing of God's 
 anger and mercy, of guilt and punishment, of redemption 
 and forgiveness. In contradiction with his doctrine of 
 providence, he holds to the old Stoic tradition which per- 
 mits suicide, and in certain cases makes it a duty. He 
 who can live content wherever God places him is ready 
 to quit the tabernacle of the soul if the house is too full
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 of smoke. Though not a Christian, he certainly knew 
 something of the Christian religion. He lived in Rome 
 as student and teacher of philosophy from the year 73 to 
 95, and at this time Christianity had penetrated even the 
 higher circles of Roman society; and the charge of atheism 
 which caused Domitian to send the philosophers into exile 
 led him also to banish the Christians, many of whom suf- 
 fered martyrdom while Epictetus was delivering his dis- 
 courses at Nicopolis. He takes occasion to mention the 
 heroism with which these Galileans, as he calls them, met 
 death. They die without fear, he says, not from ignorance 
 of the danger, nor from weariness of life, nor from mad- 
 ness, nor yet from philosophic conviction, but from habit. 
 Galileans is not the name by which the Roman writers of 
 this period designate the Christians. They did not call 
 themselves Galileans, and to the Jews they were known as 
 Nazarenes. It is probable, therefore, that Epictetus found 
 the word in the New Testament writings, where the epithet 
 is not infrequently applied to the followers of Jesus. Galen, 
 who was educated in the Stoic philosophy and who lived 
 but a short time after Epictetus, speaks of the contempt 
 for death shown by " those men who are called Chris- 
 tians." He goes on to say that their doctrines are deliv- 
 ered in parables, which are more easily understood than 
 abstruse arguments, and that their lives are in many re- 
 spects like to that of the true philosophers. In fact, while 
 the world view of the Stoic differs radically from the Chris- 
 tian, the moral teaching of the pagan philosopher and of 
 the follower of Christ is often much the same. Both at- 
 tach the highest importance to religious faith and senti- 
 ment; both hold that virtue is the chief good; both em- 
 phasize the principle of liberty, and draw from it that of 
 free personality; both declare that man holds his earthly 
 possessions as a steward of the divine owner, to whom he 
 is responsible for the use he makes of them.
 
 XIV 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 The early Stoics had taught in a general way that men 
 are the children of God, but in Epictetus the doctrine is 
 developed with a fulness which is found in no writer before 
 the birth of Christ. He preaches with fiery zeal that all 
 men are children of God, and that even slaves must be con- 
 sidered and treated as brothers. For him, as in the Gos- 
 pel, every human being is one's neighbour. His ideal of 
 the Cynic or perfect Stoic is that of a Christian apostle; 
 his view of celibacy seems to have been taken from St. 
 Paul. The portrait he draws of Hercules, as a conscious 
 son of God and saviour of the world, is very like the char- 
 acter of the divine Master as revealed in the New Testa- 
 ment, and unlike that of the traditional Hercules, who 
 stands at the parting of the ways. 
 
 But Epictetus though he certainly knew something of 
 the Christian faith, and though his " Manual " was a favour- 
 ite book of some of the early Christians, and became, with 
 simply a change of certain words, a kind of rule for St. 
 Nilus and the anchorets of Mount Sinai remains a Stoic. 
 For him God is not love, but the eternal destiny, and his 
 enthusiasm for humanity is dominated by his resignation 
 to fate. His religion is a philosophical piety founded on 
 self-surrender to the inexorable laws of Nature. He is, 
 nevertheless, one of those who have had the clearest in- 
 sight into the duties of man, and his utterances have now 
 for eighteen hundred years been a source of patience, cour- 
 age, and strength to minds of widely varying opinions and 
 beliefs. He is a genuine man, whose true image looks out 
 upon us from these " Discourses." In reading him we 
 lose sight of his metaphysical theories, and are mindful 
 only of the great principles which he expresses with rare 
 force and which underlie all right human life. 
 
 JOHN LANCASTER SPALDING.
 
 THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 ADRIAN to LUCIUS GELLIUS, with wishes for his 
 happiness: I neither* wrote these " Discourses 1 of 
 Epictetus " in the way in which a man might write 
 such things; nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch 
 as I declare that I did not even write them. But whatever 
 I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in 
 his own words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of pre- 
 serving them as memorials to myself afterward of the 
 thoughts and the freedom of speech of Epictetus. Ac- 
 cordingly, the " Discourses " are naturally such as a man 
 would address without preparation to another, not such 
 as a man would write with the view of others reading 
 them. Now, being such, I do not know how they fell 
 into the hands of the public, without either my consent or 
 my knowledge. But it concerns me little if I shall be con- 
 sidered incompetent to write; and it concerns Epictetus 
 not at all if any man shall despise his words; for at the, 
 time when he uttered them it was plain that he had no 
 other purpose than to move the minds of his hearers to 
 the best things. If, indeed, these " Discourses " should 
 produce this effect, they will have, I think, the result which 
 the words of philosophers ought to have. But if they shall 
 not, let those who read them know that, when Epictetus 
 delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected 
 in the way that Epictetus wished him to be. But if the
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 " Discourses " themselves, as they are written, do not effect 
 this result, it may be that the fault is mine, or, it may be, 
 that the thing is unavoidable. 
 Farewell! 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 A. Gellius (i, 2, and xvii, 19) speaks of the " Discourses of Epictetus " 
 as arranged by Arrian ; Gellius (xix, i) speaks of a fifth book of these 
 " Discourses," but only four are extant and some fragments. The whole 
 number of books was eight, as Photius (Cod. 58) says. There is also an 
 " Encheiridion " or " Manual," consisting of short pieces selected from 
 the "Discourses of Epictetus," and the valuable commentary on the 
 " Encheiridion" written by Simplicius in the sixth century A. D., in the 
 reign of Justinian. 
 
 Arrian explains in a manner what he means by saying that he did not 
 write these " Discourses of Epictetus" ; but he does not explain his mean- 
 ing when he says that he did not make them public. He tells us that he 
 did attempt to write down in the words of Epictetus what the philosopher 
 said ; but how it happened that they were first published, without his 
 knowledge or consent, Arrian does not say. It appears, however, that he 
 did see the "Discourses" when they were published; and as Schweig- 
 hauser remarks, he would naturally correct any errors that he detected, 
 and so there would be an edition revised by himself. Schweighauser 
 has a note (i, ch. 26, 13) on the difficulties which we now find in the 
 " Discourses."
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 BOOK I 
 
 CHAPTER PACK 
 
 I. Of the things that are in our power, and not in our power . i 
 II. How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper 
 
 character . ....... . ,. . . 6 
 
 III. How a man should proceed from the principle of God being 
 
 the Father of all men to the rest . .... . . 10 
 
 IV. Of progress or improvement ,....>; ,- . . . .12 
 V. Against the academics . .,>;,, . .,-* 16 
 
 VI. Of Providence . . . ..... ... - vrt ..,., , . . . 17 
 
 VII. Of the use of sophistical, hypothetical, and the like argu- 
 ments . . . . . . .; ^ . ;'.* .21 
 
 VIII. That the faculties are not safe to the uninstructed . . 25 
 IX. How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may 
 
 proceed to the consequences .,.;.. . . .27 
 
 X. Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome . . 31 
 XI. Of natural affection .... . . . . 33 
 
 XII. Of contentment ,,-, ,.,..; . 37 
 
 XIII. How everything may be done acceptably to the gods . . 41 
 
 XIV. That the Deity oversees all things .,-.<,>,.-. ^- . . 42 
 XV. What philosophy promises .-....!;. . . .44 
 
 XVI. Of Providence . ^-,, m - ! ,.. -, ,>,-. >.,*, ?#, : . , . . .45 
 
 XVII. That the logical art is necessary . ;. ,, . . . . 47 
 
 XVIII. That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of 
 
 others ... . <:, , ; . . . . . r \^ f/ ^ . . 51 
 
 XIX. How we should behave to tyrants ,;. t . ..j, ,,,,< ',/ . -55 
 
 XX. How reason contemplates itself . . . . . .58 
 
 XXI. Against those who wish to be admired . ' . - . .61 
 
 XXII. Of prascognitions ... 62 
 
 XXIII. Against Epicurus . . . . ( , . . .65 
 
 XXIV. How we should struggle with circumstances . . .66 
 XXV. On the same subject . . . ... ; ,. -69 
 
 XXVI. What the law of life is 73 
 
 xvii
 
 XV 111 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 XXVII. 
 XXVIII. 
 
 , XXIX. 
 XXX. 
 
 In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids 
 
 we should provide against them 76 
 
 That we ought not to be angry with men ; and what are 
 
 the small and great things among men ... 79 
 
 On constancy (or firmness) 83 
 
 What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances 91 
 
 BOOK II 
 
 I. That courage is not inconsistent with caution ... 92 
 II. Of tranquility (freedom from perturbation) . . .98 
 
 III. To those who recommend persons to philosophers . . 101 
 
 IV. Against a person who had once been detected in adul- 
 
 tery .''..'. .102 
 
 V. How magnanimity is consistent with care . " ;j . 104 
 VI. Of indifference . . '*'.'.': t. . . .!'. . 108 
 VII. How we ought to use divination ' -i- . ' . '.' '. 112 
 VIII. What is the nature of the good : -.-' * ;',".. . . 114 
 IX. That when we can not fulfil that which the character of 
 a man promises, we assume the character of a philoso- 
 pher 119 
 
 X. How we may discover the duties of life from names . 123 
 
 XI. What the beginning of philosophy is . A;. ..-Ml . 137 
 
 XII. Of disputation or discussion . ',>-' .1 ; . . 130 
 
 XIII. On anxiety (solicitude) . : i. ;- - ;f; . - -v . . ^ 1^3 
 
 XIV. ToNaso . . . . . >'<,- . . . .137 
 XV. To or against those who obstinately persist in what they 
 
 have determined . . > ; .' ,' . . . . . 141 
 XVI. That we do not strive to use our opinions about good 
 
 and evil . . v ; "- i!i - /', 'Sij< : - m <'v-.-: ' I ! . /. 144 
 
 XVII. How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases . 150 
 
 XVIII. How we should struggle against appearances. >. ,. : . 155 
 XIX. Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only 
 
 in words ..-.-.. . : i > . .159 
 
 XX. Against the Epicureans and Academics . >.vj .; .. . 164 
 
 XXI. Of inconsistency . . . ; . . . . 170 
 
 XXII. On friendship . - V'<t ^MV <'< '. ' * . . . 173 
 
 XXIII. On the power of speaking , ^ '- : ;.-.>. i. 179 
 
 XXIV. To (or against) a person who was one of those who 
 
 were not valued (esteemed) by him . . . ' . 186 
 
 XXV. That logic is necessary . . . . . . '/ . 190 
 
 XXVI. What is the property of error . . r- . .. , .i'.. 191
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 xix 
 
 BOOK III 
 
 PAGE 
 192 
 
 I. Of finery in dress . , f , .>, ,..;; : ,. F ; y :. 
 II. In what a man ought to be exercised who has made profi- 
 ciency ; and that we neglect the chief things . /. . 198 
 
 III. What is the matter on which a good man should be em- 
 
 ployed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves 201 
 
 IV. Against a person who showed his partisanship in an un- 
 
 seemly way in a theatre . ,, .,.,. , , ,-(. , s //. /. 204 
 V. Against those who on account of sickness go away home . 206 
 VI. Miscellaneous . . 4r.i,:tiKuin-:'i*i: .*"..;, ; r ' 2O 9 
 VII. To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epi- 
 curean v-rMi'j) v^ibE-Jt ony^ -><><*(>, >..;?- ,. ;' 211 
 VIII. How we must exercise ourselves against appearances . 216 
 IX. To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a 
 
 suit 217 
 
 X. In what manner we ought to bear sickness . . . 220 
 
 XI. Certain miscellaneous matters 223 
 
 XII. About exercise 224 
 
 XIII. What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is 227 
 
 XIV. Certain miscellaneous matters 231 
 
 XV. That we ought to proceed with circumspection in every- 
 thing 233 
 
 XVI. That we ought with caution to enter into familiar inter- 
 course with men 236 
 
 XVII. Of Providence 238 
 
 XVIII. That we ought not to be disturbed by any news . . 239 
 XIX. What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a 
 
 philosopher 240 
 
 XX. That we can derive advantage from all external things . . 241 
 XXI. Against those who readily come to the profession of 
 
 sophists 244 
 
 XXII. About cynicism 248 
 
 XXIII. To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation 263 
 
 XXIV. That we ought not to be moved by a desire for those 
 
 things which are not in our power 269 
 
 XXV. To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose . . 285 
 
 XXVI. To those who fear want 287 
 
 BOOK IV 
 
 I. About freedom 
 
 II. Of familiar intimacy 
 
 III. What things we should exchange for other things 
 
 293 
 3'9 
 321
 
 xx EPICTETUS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 IV. To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquility . 323 
 
 V. Against the quarrelsome and ferocious . . , . 330 
 
 VI. Against those who lament over being pitied . . . 336 
 
 VII. On freedom from fear 342 
 
 VIII. Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philo- 
 sophic dress '.^"'-i '' "';''' ( *y ^.^ :< ;ri ' *>: J t f ^49 
 IX. To a person who had been changed to a character of 
 
 shamelessness . . . . 'v'" 1 . ''.-' '.-'; . 355 
 X. What things we ought to despise and what things we 
 
 ought to value . '-\ L ' |: ''. V * ; *J <>'>; ! ' ; ; . - '. '. 358 
 
 XI. About purity (cleanliness) . * -,!'-v. M ... ^. ^ ^ ^64 
 
 XII. On attention "*'. <J ' J .' : ' M v " '. . . '. . . 369 
 
 XIII. Against or to those who readily tell their affairs . . 372
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 FACING 
 PAGE 
 
 THE FATES Frontispiece 
 
 From a painting by Paul Thumann. 
 
 DIOGENES 66 
 
 From a painting by Jean L6on GeYdme. 
 
 THE AUGURS 202 
 
 From a painting by Jean Le"on G^rome. 
 
 MEDITATIONS 
 MARCUS AURELIUS Frontispiece 
 
 From a bust in Rome. 
 
 HADRIAN'S TOMB 78
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 BOOK I 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER, AND NOT IN OUR 
 
 POWER 
 
 OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon 
 mention), you will find not one which is capable of 
 contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capa- 
 ble either of approving or disapproving. How far 
 does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power? 
 As far as forming a judgment about what is written and 
 spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about 
 melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By 
 no means. But when you must write something to your 
 friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write ; 
 but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell 
 you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but 
 whether you should sing at the present time and play on the 
 lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty 
 then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself 
 and all other things. And what is this faculty? The 
 rational faculty ; for this is the only faculty that we have re- 
 ceived which examines itself, what it is, and what power it 
 has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other 
 faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden 
 i 1
 
 2 EPICTETUS 
 
 things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves? 
 Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of ap- 
 pearances. 1 What else judges, of music, grammar, and the 
 other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occa- 
 sions for -using them? Nothing else. 
 
 As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all 
 and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have 
 placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all 
 other things they have not placed in our power. Was it be- 
 cause they did not choose ? I indeed think that, if they had 
 been able, they would have put these other things also in our 
 power, but they certainly could not. 2 For as we exist on the 
 earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions, 
 how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these 
 things by externals ? 
 
 But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I 
 would have made both your little body and your little prop- 
 erty free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not 
 ignorant of this : this body is not yours, but it is clay finely 
 tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I 
 have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, 3 this 
 faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty 
 of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using 
 the appearances of things ; and if you will take care of this 
 faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never 
 be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not 
 lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person. 
 
 Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not. 
 Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now 
 when it is in our power to look after one thing, and 
 to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many 
 things, and to be bound to many things, to the body 
 and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to 
 child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many 
 things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For 
 this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit 
 down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see 
 what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us? 
 When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my 
 good man, or when it shall please JEolus; for God has not
 
 DISCOURSES 3 
 
 made you the manager of the winds, but ^Eolus. What 
 then ? We must make the best use that we can of the things 
 which are in our power, and use the rest according to their 
 nature. What is their nature then ? As God may please. 
 
 Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would 
 you have all men lose their heads that you may be con- 
 soled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus 4 
 did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded ? For 
 when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble 
 blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched 
 it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by 
 Epaphroditus, 5 Nero's freedman, who asked him about the 
 cause of offence which he had given, he said, "If I choose to 
 tell anything, I will tell your master." 
 
 What then should a man have in readiness in such circum- 
 stances ? What else than this ? What is mine, and what is 
 not mine ; and what is permitted to me, and what is not per- 
 mitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I 
 must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must 
 go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going 
 with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment ? Tell me the 
 secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power. 
 But I will put you in chains. 6 Man, what are you talking 
 about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my 
 will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you 
 into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your 
 head off. When then have I told you that my head alone 
 can not be cut off ? These are the things which philosophers 
 should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which 
 they should exercise themselves. 
 
 Thrasea 7 used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than 
 be banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus 8 say to him ? 
 If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great 
 is the folly of your choice ? But if, as the lighter, who has 
 given you the choice ? Will you not study to be content with 
 that which has been given to you ? 
 
 What then did Agrippinus 9 say? He said, "I am not a 
 hindrance to myself." When it was reported to him that 
 his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, "I hope it may 
 turn out well ; but it is the fifth hour of the day" this was
 
 4 EPICTETUS 
 
 the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take 
 the cold bath "let us go and take our exercise." After he 
 had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, "You have 
 been condemned." "To banishment," he replies, "or to 
 death?" "To banishment." "What about my property?" 
 "It is not taken from you." "Let us go to Aricia, then," 10 
 he said, "and dine." 
 
 This it is to have studied what a man ought to study; 
 to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free 
 from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I 
 am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because 
 it is the dinner-hour ; after this I will then die. How ? Like 
 a man who gives up what belongs to another. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The Stoics gave the name of appearances ( fiavradtai) to all im- 
 pressions received by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external 
 things. 
 
 * Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Epictetus does not intend to limit the 
 power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being 
 what it is, they can not do contradictories. They have so constituted 
 things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give 
 to man a power of not being hindered by externals? Seneca (De 
 Providentia) says: "But it may be said, many things happen which 
 cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could 
 not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all." This is 
 the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the common 
 assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can 
 combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to 
 make five. This is indeed a very absurd way of talking. 
 
 1 Schweighauser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoid- 
 ance, and of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appear- 
 ances, belong to animals as well as to man ; but animals in using ap- 
 pearances are moved by passion only, and do not understand what they 
 are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. Salmasius 
 proposed to change rf^TBpov into v^repov, to remove the difficulty 
 about these animal passions being called "a small portion of us (the 
 gods)." Schweighauser, however, though he sees the difficulty, does 
 not accept the emendation. Perhaps Arrian has here imperfectly repre- 
 sented what his master said, and perhaps he did not. 
 
 4 Plautius Lateranus, consul-elect, was charged with being engaged 
 in Piso's conspiracy against Nero. He was hurried to execution without 
 being allowed to see his children ; and though the tribune who executed 
 him was privy to the plot, Lateranus said nothing. (Tacit. Ann. xv. 
 49, 60.) 
 
 8 Epaphroditus was a freedman of Nero, and once the master of 
 Epictetus. He was Nero's secretary. One good act is recorded of 
 him : he helped Nero to kill himself, and for this act he was killed by 
 Domitian (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 14).
 
 DISCOURSES 5 
 
 1 This is an imitation of a passage in the Bacchae of Euripides (v. 
 492, etc.), which is also imitated by Horace (Epp. i. 16). 
 
 7 Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic philosopher, who was ordered in Nero's 
 time to put himself to death (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 21-35). He was the 
 husband of Arria, whose mother Arria, the wife of Caecina Paetus, 
 in the time of the Emperor Claudius, heroically showed her husband 
 the way to die (Plinius, Letters, iii. 16). Martial has immortalised the 
 elder Arria in a famous epigram (i. 14) : 
 
 "When Arria to her Paetus gave the sword 
 Which her own hand from her chaste bosom drew, 
 'This wound,' she said, 'believe me, gives no pain, 
 But that will pain me which thy hand will do.' " 
 
 * C. Musonius Rufus, a Tuscan by birth, of equestrian rank, a phi- 
 losopher and Stoic (Tacit. Hist. iii. 81). 
 
 8 Paconius Agrippinus was condemned in Nero's time. The charge 
 against him was that he inherited his father's hatred of the head of the 
 Roman state (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 28). The father of Agrippinus had been 
 put to death under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tib. c. 61). 
 
 10 Aricia, about twenty Roman miles from Rome, on the Via Appia.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER 
 
 CHARACTER 
 
 TO the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable ; 
 but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are 
 not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how 
 the Lacedaemonians 1 endure whipping when they 
 have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To 
 hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the 
 opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In 
 short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is 
 pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; 
 and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that 
 which is rational. 
 
 But the rational and the irrational appear in a different 
 way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the 
 profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particu- 
 larly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the 
 preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several 
 things comformably to nature. But in order to determine 
 the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates 
 of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate 
 to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason 
 to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, 
 that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will 
 not receive his food : but if he shall hold the pot, he will not 
 suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man 
 not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable 
 for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to 
 do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you 
 should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that 
 the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of 
 it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not 
 being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by 
 these things, go and hold the chamber pot. "But this," you 
 say, "would not be worthy of me." Well then, it is you
 
 DISCOURSES 7 
 
 who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not 
 I ; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth 
 to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell 
 themselves at various prices. 
 
 For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he 
 should go down to Nero's 2 spectacles, and also perform in 
 them himself, Agrippinus said to him, "Go down" : and 
 when Florus asked Agrippinus, "Why do not you go down?" 
 Agrippinus replied, "Because I do not even deliberate about 
 the matter." For he who has once brought himself to delib- 
 erate about such matters, and to calculate the value of exter- 
 nal things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their 
 own character. For why do you ask me the question, 
 whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or 
 pleasure? I say pleasure. "But if I do not take a part in the 
 tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off." Go then and 
 take a part, but I will not. "Why?" Because you con- 
 sider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the 
 tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you 
 should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no de- 
 sign to be anything superior- to the other threads. But I 
 wish to be purple, 3 that small part which is bright, and makes 
 all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do 
 you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how 
 shall I still be purple ? 
 
 Priscus Helvidius 4 also saw this, and acted conformably. 
 For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into 
 the senate, he replied, "It is in your power not to allow me 
 to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go 
 in." "Well, go in then," says the emperor, "but say noth- 
 ing." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." "But 
 I must ask your opinion." "And I must say what I think 
 right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When 
 then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your 
 part, and I will do mine : it is your part to kill ; it is mine to 
 die, but not in fear : yours to banish me ; mine to depart with- 
 out sorrow." 
 
 What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single 
 person? And what good does the purple do for the toga? 
 Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as
 
 8 EPICTETUS 
 
 purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other 
 things? But in such circumstances another would have 
 replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, "I 
 thank you for sparing me." But such a man Vespasian 
 would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he 
 knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or, 
 if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished and add even 
 more. 
 
 In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of 
 dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother 
 came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, "Come, 
 brother, what are you going to do ? Shall we amputate this 
 member and return to the gymnasium?" But the athlete 
 persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked 
 Epictetus, how he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher? 
 "As a man," Epictetus replied, "and a man who had been 
 proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and 
 had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with 
 such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's 6 school." 
 Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if 
 he could have lived without it.' Such is that regard to char- 
 acter which is so strong in those who have been accustomed 
 to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things 
 into their deliberations. 
 
 "Come then, Epictetus, shave 6 yourself." If I am a philo- 
 sopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. "But I will take 
 off your head ?" If that will do you any good, take it off. 
 
 Some person asked, how then shall every man among us 
 perceive what is suitable to his character? "How," he re- 
 plied, "does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, dis- 
 cover his own powers and put himself forward in defence 
 of the whole herd ? It is plain that with the powers the per- 
 ception of having them is immediately conjoined : and, there- 
 fore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of 
 them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man ; 
 but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the sum- 
 mer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not 
 concern us." 
 
 Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if 
 for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for
 
 DISCOURSES 9 
 
 a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps 
 belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then, 
 if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us 
 like him ? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that 
 all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, 
 since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no 
 pains ? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates ; 
 but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall 
 never be a Milo, 7 and yet I do not neglect my body; nor 
 shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; 
 nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything be- 
 cause we despair of reaching the highest degree. 
 
 1 The Spartan boys used to be whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthia 
 till blood flowed abundantly, and sometimes till death; but they never 
 uttered even a groan (Cicero, Tuscul. ii. 14; v. 27). 
 
 * Nero was passionately fond of scenic representations, and used to 
 induce the descendants of noble families, whose poverty made them 
 consent, to appear on the stage (Tacitus, Annals, xiv. 14, Suetonius, 
 Nero, 21 ). 
 
 8 The "purple" is the broad purple border on the toga named the toga 
 prcetexta, worn by certain Roman magistrates and some others, and by 
 senators, it is said, on certain days (Cic. Phil. ii. 43). 
 
 4 Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a philosopher, is com- 
 mended by Tacitus (Hist. iv. 4, 5) as an honest man: "He followed 
 the philosophers who considered those things only to be good which 
 are virtuous, those only to be bad which are foul ; and he reckoned 
 power, rank, and all other things which are external to the mind as 
 neither good nor bad." Vespasian, probably in a fit of passion, being 
 provoked by Helvidius, ordered him to be put to death, and then re- 
 voked the order when it was too late (Suetonius, Vespasianus, 15). 
 
 8 Baton was elected for two years gymnasiarch or superintendent of 
 a gymnasium in or about the time of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 This is supposed, as Casaubpn says, to refer to Domitian's order to 
 the philosophers to go into exile. Some of them, in order to conceal 
 their profession of philosophy, shaved their beards. Epictetus would 
 not take off his beard. 
 
 7 Milo of Croton, a great athlete.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD 
 BEING THE FATHER OF ALL MEN TO THE REST 
 
 IF a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he 
 ought, that we are all sprung from God 1 in an especial 
 manner, and that God is the father of both men and of 
 gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble 
 or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the em- 
 peror) should adopt you, no one could endure your arro- 
 gance; and if you know that you are the son of 
 Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so; 
 but since these two things are mingled in the gen- 
 eration of man, body in common with the animals, 
 and reason and intelligence in common with the 
 gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and 
 mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. 
 Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything 
 according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the 
 few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty 
 and a sure use of appearances, have no mean or ignoble 
 thoughts about themselves ; but with the many it is quite the 
 contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable 
 man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed ; but 
 you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why 
 then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you 
 attach yourself to this? 
 
 Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining 
 to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mis- 
 chievous ; some become like lions, savage and bestial and un- 
 tamed ; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other 
 worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malig- 
 nant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and 
 meaner animal? See 2 then and take care that you do not 
 become some one of these miserable things. 
 
 NOTES 
 * Epictetus speaks of God (6 8eos) and the gods. Also conformably 
 
 10
 
 DISCOURSES 1 1 
 
 to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus. 
 The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one. 
 "Father of men and gods," says Homer of Zeus, and Virgil says, of 
 Jupiter, "Father of gods and king of men." Salmasius proposed 
 rov Qeov. 
 
 8 'Opart Kai jt^odexsre pr) n TOVTOOV aito/3f}T robv ^ arvx 
 Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6; opart Kai itpotiextre aito r 
 etc. Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike 
 the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which 
 Epictetus was teaching. Schweighauser also refers to Wetstein's New 
 Testament.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT 
 
 HE who is making progress, having learned from phi- 
 losophers that desire means the desire of good 
 things, and aversion means aversion from bad 
 things ; having learned too that happiness and tran- 
 quillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not fail- 
 ing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which 
 he would avoid ; such a man takes from himself desire alto- 
 gether and defers it, and he employs his aversion only on 
 things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts 
 to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that 
 sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes 
 to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises 
 good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also 
 the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these 
 things. For it is always true that to whatever point the per- 
 fecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards 
 this point. 
 
 How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said, 
 and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of 
 it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who 
 then makes improvement ? Is it he who has read many books 
 of Chrysippus? 1 But does virtue consist in having under- 
 stood Chrysippus? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing 
 else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we 
 admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that 
 approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress 
 or improvement. Such a person says one, is already able to 
 read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making 
 great progress. What kind of progress ? But why do you 
 mock the man ? Why do you draw him away from the per- 
 ception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the 
 effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improve- 
 ment? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And 
 where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you
 
 DISCOURSES 1 3 
 
 may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may 
 not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit 
 and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and sus- 
 pension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first 
 things, and the most necessary, are those which I have 
 named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not 
 to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are im- 
 proving. 
 
 Do you then show me your improvement in these things ? 
 If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your 
 shoulders; and then he might say, "Here are my Halteres." 
 You and your Halteres 2 look to that. I should reply, I 
 wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when you say : 
 "Take the treatise on the active powers ( op^), and see how 
 I have studied it." I reply, Slave, I am not inquiring about 
 this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and 
 aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself, 
 whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably, 
 give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making 
 progress : but if not conformably, be gone, and not only ex- 
 pound your books, but write such books yourself ; and what 
 will you gain by it ? Do you not know that the whole book 
 costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to 
 be worth more than five denarii ? Never then look for the 
 matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another. 
 
 Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing 
 himself from externals, turns to his own will (itpoaipc<rts) to 
 exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it con- 
 formable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded, 
 faithful, modest; and if he has learned that he who desires 
 or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither 
 be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with 
 them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of 
 necessity must subject himself to others who have the power 
 to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid ; finally, 
 when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these 
 rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man ; in 
 like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his 
 chief principles (rd irporjyov^eva) as the runner does with
 
 14 EPICTETUS 
 
 reference to running, and the trainer of the voice 
 with reference to the voice this is the man who 
 has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained 
 his efforts to the practice of reading books, and 
 labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to 
 return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs 
 there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But 
 the other thing is something, to study how a man can rid 
 his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, "Woe to 
 me," and, "Wretched that I am," and to rid it also of mis- 
 fortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and 
 exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say 
 when he is in fetters, "Dear Crito, if it is the will of the 
 gods that it be so, let it be so" ; and not to say, "Wretched 
 am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this?" 
 Who is it that speaks thus ? Do you think that I shall name 
 some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not 
 Priam say this? Does not CEdipus say this? Nay, all 
 kings say it ! 3 For what else is tragedy than the perturba- 
 tions (Ttdtoj) of men who value externals, exhibited in this 
 kind of poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no 
 external things which are independent of the will concern 
 us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which 
 I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must con- 
 sider for yourselves what you wish. 
 
 What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to 
 know that these things are not false, from which happiness 
 comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will 
 learn how true and conformable to nature are the things 
 which make me free from perturbations. O great good for- 
 tune ! O the great benefactor who points out the way ! To 
 Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because 
 he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered 
 truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not 
 the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well, 
 who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or 
 has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this ? Be- 
 cause the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to 
 them: but because they Jiave produced in the human mind
 
 DISCOURSES 1 5 
 
 that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which 
 relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii) states that Chrysippus 
 wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word 
 a-vyyp6.fijj.ara means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus, 
 in B.C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil 
 of the Stoic Cleanthes. 
 
 3 Halteres are gymnastic instruments, literally "leapers." They are 
 said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making 
 jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to 
 boys who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose. 
 Martial says (xrv. 49) : 
 
 "Quid pereunt stultp fortes haltere lacerti? 
 Exercet melius vinea fossa viros." 
 
 Juvenal (vi. 421) writes of a woman who uses dumb-bells till she 
 sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man, 
 
 "Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia massa." 
 
 * So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare 
 what Marcus Aurelius (xi. 6) says of Tragedy.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 AGAINST THE ACADEMICS 
 
 IF a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not 
 easy to find arguments by which we shall make him 
 change his opinion. But this does not arise either from 
 the man's strength or the teacher's weakness ; for when 
 the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a 
 stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argu- 
 ment? 
 
 Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the under- 
 standing, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is 
 resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from 
 contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of 
 the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, 
 but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed 
 with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to 
 apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is 
 in a bad condition : but if the sense of shame and modesty 
 are deadened, this we call even power (or strength). 
 
 Do you comprehend that you are awake ? "I do not," the 
 man replies, "for I do not even comprehend when in my 
 sleep I imagine that I am awake." Does this appearance 
 then not differ from the other? "Not at all," he replies. 
 Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire or what 
 iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is dead- 
 ened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. 
 He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the 
 contradiction : he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, 
 but he is not moved, and makes no improvement : he is even 
 in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his 
 sense of shame; and the rational faculty has not been cut 
 off from him, but it is brutalised. Shall I name this strength 
 of mind ? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in cat- 
 amites, through which they do and say in public whatever 
 comes into their head. 
 
 16
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 OF PROVIDENCE 
 
 FROM everything which is or happens in the world, it 
 is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these 
 two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and 
 happens to all persons and things, and a grateful dis- 
 position. If he does not possess these two qualities, one 
 man will not see the use of things which are and which hap- 
 pen : another will not be thankful for them, even if he does 
 know them. If God had made colours, but had not made 
 the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use ? 
 None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty 
 of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the 
 faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of 
 it ? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but 
 had not made light? In that case, also, they would have 
 been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that 
 and that to this ? And who is it that has fitted the knife to 
 the case and the case to the knife ? Is it no one ?* And, in- 
 deed, from the very structure of things which have attained 
 their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work 
 is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been 
 constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these 
 things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things 
 and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him ? And 
 the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for 
 conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are con- 
 structed, do not even these declare the workman? If they 
 do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding 
 according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, 
 we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also 
 select something from them, and subtract something, and 
 add, compound by means of them these things or those, and, 
 in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, 
 resemble them : is not even this sufficient to move some men, 
 and to induce them not to forget the workman ? If not so, 
 
 17
 
 1 8 EPICTETUS 
 
 let them explain to us what it is that makes each several 
 thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like 
 the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their 
 own proper motion ? 
 
 What, then, are these things done in us only? Many, 
 indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had pecu- 
 liarly need ; but you will find many common to us with irra- 
 tional animals. Do they then understand what is done ? By 
 no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is an- 
 other. God had need of irrational animals to make use of 
 appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances. 
 It is therefore enough for them to eat and drink, and to sleep 
 and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they 
 severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the 
 intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient ; for unless 
 we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to 
 the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never at- 
 tain our true end. For where the constitutions of living be- 
 ings are different, there also the acts and the ends are differ- 
 ent. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted 
 only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal (man), 
 which has also the power of understanding the use, unless 
 there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never 
 attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every ani- 
 mal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, an- 
 other to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for 
 which purposes what need is there to understand appear- 
 ances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has 
 introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works ; 
 and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For 
 this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where 
 irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where 
 they begin, and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature 
 ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of 
 life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die with- 
 out having been spectators of these things. 
 
 But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of 
 Phidias, 2 and all of you think it a misfortune to die without 
 having seen such things. But when there is no need to take 
 a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of
 
 DISCOURSES 19 
 
 God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand 
 them ? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what 
 you were born for, or what this is for which you have re- 
 ceived the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are 
 some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are 
 there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you 
 not pressed by a crowd ? Are you not without comfortable 
 means of bathing ? Are you not wet when it rains ? Have 
 you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable 
 things? But I suppose that setting all these things off 
 against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and en- 
 dure. Well then and have you not received faculties by 
 which you will be able to bear all that happens ? Have you 
 not received greatness of soul? Have you not received 
 manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why 
 do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I pos- 
 sess greatness of soul ? What shall distract my mind or dis- 
 turb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for 
 the purposes which I received it, and shall I grieve and la- 
 ment over what happens? 
 
 Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave, 
 have you hands ? Is it not that you may wipe your nose ? 
 Is it then consistent with reason that there should be run- 
 ning of noses in the world? Nay, how much better it is 
 to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think 
 Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, 
 and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bes- 
 tial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out ? 
 And what would he have been doing if there had been noth- 
 ing of the kind ? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped 
 himself up and have slept? In the first place then he would 
 not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all 
 his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been 
 one, what would have been the use of him ? and what the use 
 of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his 
 body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circum- 
 stances and occasions had not roused and exercised him? 
 Well then must a man provide for himself such means of ex- 
 ercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his 
 country, and a boar, and a hydra ? This would be folly and
 
 2O EPICTETUS 
 
 madness: but as they did not exist, and were found, they 
 were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exer- 
 cising him. Come then do you also having observed these 
 things look to the faculties which you have, and when you 
 have looked at them, say : Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty 
 that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and 
 powers 3 for honouring myself through the things which hap- 
 pen. You do not so : but you sit still, trembling for fear 
 that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting, 
 and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame 
 the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness 
 of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us 
 these faculties ; by which we shall be able to bear everything 
 that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, 
 like a good king and a true father, He has given us these 
 faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, un- 
 impeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, with- 
 out even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering 
 or impeding. You, who have received these powers free 
 and as your own, use them not : you do not even see what you 
 have received, and from whom ; some of you being blinded 
 to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor, 
 and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves 
 to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I 
 will show to you that you have powers and means for great- 
 ness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for 
 finding fault and making accusations, do you show me. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Goethe has a short poem, entitled "Gleich und Gleich" (Like and 
 Like) : 
 
 " Ein Blumenglockchen 
 Vom Boden hervor 
 War friih gesprosset 
 In lieblichein Flor ; 
 Da kam ein Bienchen 
 Und naschte fein : 
 Die mussen wohl beyde 
 Fur einander seyn." 
 
 9 This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jupiter) 
 by Phidias, which was at Olympia. 
 
 'Antoninus (ix. i). Epictetus says that the powers which man has 
 were given by God : Antoninus says, from nature. They mean the same 
 thing. See Schweighauser's note.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 OF THE USE OF SOPHISTICAL, HYPOTHETICAL, AND LIKE 
 
 ARGUMENTS 
 
 THE handling of sophistical and hypothetical argu- 
 ments, and of those which derive their conclusions 
 from questioning, and in a word the handling of 
 all such arguments, relates to the duties of life, 
 though the many do not know this truth. For in every 
 matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover 
 the proper path and the proper method of dealing with it. 
 Let then people either say that the grave man will not de- 
 scend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he 
 does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not 
 conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and 
 answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the 
 other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry 
 ought to be made into those topics (roit^v) on which question- 
 ing and answering are particularly employed. For what 
 is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propo- 
 sitions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those 
 which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only 
 this? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also 
 enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the 
 use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he 
 should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spuri- 
 ous? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to 
 this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and 
 distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmas? Con- 
 sequently also in reasoning what has been said is it not 
 enough ; but is it necessary that a man should acquire the 
 faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the 
 false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Be- 
 sides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should 
 accept what follows from that which you have properly 
 granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know 
 this ? It is not enough ; but a man must learn how one thing 
 
 91
 
 22 EPICTETUS 
 
 is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows 
 from one thing, and when it follows from several collect- 
 ively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power 
 should also be acquired by him who purposes to conduct 
 himself skilfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating 
 himself the several things which he has proposed, and the 
 power of understanding the demonstrations of others, and of 
 not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstra- 
 ting. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and 
 exercise of conclusive arguments and figures, and it has been 
 shown to be necessary. 
 
 But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the 
 premises or assumptions, and there results from them some- 
 thing ; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does re- 
 sult. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the 
 falsehood ? And how is that possible ? Well, should I say 
 that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon? 
 But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say 
 that the consequence does not arise through what has been 
 conceded? But neither is this allowed. What then must 
 be done in this case ? Consider if it is not this : as to have 
 borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to 
 this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the 
 money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to 
 compel you to admit the inference that you have granted the 
 premises (TO. Iriwara), but you must abide by what you have 
 granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as 
 they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary 
 for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must ac- 
 cept their consequences: but if the premises do not remain 
 such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely 
 necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, 
 and from accepting what does not follow from the words in 
 which our concessions were made. For the inference is now 
 not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since 
 we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. 
 We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and 
 such change and variation of them (from one meaning to 
 another) , by which in the course of questioning or answer- 
 ing, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other
 
 DISCOURSES 23 
 
 such way, the premises Undergo variations, and give occasion 
 to the foolish to be confounded, if they do not see what con- 
 clusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to 
 examine? In order that we may not in this matter be em- 
 ployed in an improper manner nor in a confused way. 
 
 And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments ; 
 for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of 
 some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which 
 follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is pro- 
 posed, or not allow every one ? And if not every one, which 
 should we allow ? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, 
 must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he 
 sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and 
 not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man 
 says, "If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will 
 draw you an impossibility." With such a person 
 shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a con- 
 test, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? 
 But what other man than the man of sense can 
 use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and 
 answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived 
 by false reasoning ? And shall he enter into the contest, and 
 yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not 
 rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how 
 can he be such a man as we conceive him to be ? But without 
 some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a contin- 
 uous and consistent argument ? Let them show this ; and all 
 these speculations (Qeooprf^ara) become superfluous, and are ab- 
 surd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious 
 man. 
 
 Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and 
 why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being 
 watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a 
 mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father? 
 Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could 
 kill him ? What then have you done ? The only fault that 
 was possible here is the fault which you have committed. 
 This is the very remark which I made to Rufus 1 when he 
 blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted 
 in a certain syllogism : I suppose, I said, that I have burnt
 
 24 EPICTETUS 
 
 the Capitol. "Slave," he replied, "was the thing omitted here 
 the Capitol ? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Cap- 
 itol and to kill your father?" But for a man to use the ap- 
 pearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and care- 
 lessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, 
 nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and an- 
 swering what is consistent with that which we have granted 
 or is not consistent ; is there no error in this ? 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. i). To kill a father and to burn the 
 Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. 
 Horace, Epode, iii; Cicero, De Amicit. n; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, 
 c. 20.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THAT THE FACULTIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED 
 
 IN as many ways as we can change things which are 
 equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we 
 can change the forms of arguments (ticixetpwara) and 
 enthymemes (lrQvjurfjuara\ in argumentation. This is 
 an instance : if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe 
 me the money : you have not borrowed and you have not re- 
 paid ; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skil- 
 fully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for 
 if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that 
 he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be 
 equally expert in the imperfect also. 
 
 Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another 
 in this manner ? Because, I reply, at present, though we are 
 not exercised in these things and not distracted from the 
 study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress 
 in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this 
 occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an 
 occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary 
 things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arro- 
 gance, and no small cause. For great is the power of argu- 
 ing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it 
 should be much exercised, and also receive additional orna- 
 ment from language: and so universally, every faculty ac- 
 quired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the dan- 
 ger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by 
 what means could one persuade a young man who excels in 
 these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage 1 
 to them, but to make them an appendage to himself ? Does 
 he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated 
 and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him 
 and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he 
 has turned aside? 
 
 What then was not Plato a philosopher? 9 I reply, and 
 was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippo- 
 
 25
 
 26 EPICTETUS 
 
 crates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speaK thus in respect 
 of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which 
 have been accidentally united in the same men? And if 
 Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work 
 and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was 
 necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was 
 at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you 
 not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men 
 become philosophers, and what things belong to them in 
 other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you 
 also to be made lame ? 3 What then ? Do I take away these 
 faculties which you possess ? By no means ; for neither do 
 I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what 
 is the good of man, I can not mention to you anything else 
 than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect 
 to appearances. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of 
 speaking, his chief excellence. He should use it to set off something 
 which is superior. 
 
 1 Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for 
 not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that 
 Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician. 
 
 * Epictetus was lame.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN 
 MAY PROCEED TO THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
 IF the things are true which are said by the philosophers 
 about the kinship between God and man, what else re- 
 mains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never 
 in reply to the question, to what country you belong, 
 say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you 
 are a citizen of the world (K-O<T/O$) . For why do you say 
 that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that 
 you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body 
 was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an 
 Athenian or a Corinthian from the place which has a greater 
 authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and 
 all your family, but even the whole country from which the 
 stock of your progenitors is derived down to you ? He then 
 who has observed with intelligence the administration of 
 the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and 
 the most comprehensive community is that which is com- 
 posed of men and God, and that from God have descended 
 the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all be- 
 ings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and 
 particularly to rational beings for these only are by their 
 nature formed to have communion with God, being by means 
 of reason conjoined with him why should not such a man 
 call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, 1 
 and why should he be afraid of anything which happens 
 among men? Is kinship with Caesar (the emperor) or with 
 any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us 
 to live in safety, and above contempt, and without any fear at 
 all ? and to have God for your maker (xotTfr^y), and father and 
 guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears ? 
 
 But a man may say, "Whence shall I get bread to eat when 
 I have nothing?" 
 
 And how do slaves, and runaways on what do they rely 
 when they leave their masters ? Do they rely on their lands 
 
 27
 
 28 EPICTETUS 
 
 or slaves, or their vessels of silver? They rely on nothing 
 but themselves; and food does not fail them. 2 And shall it 
 be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel 
 into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not 
 to take care of himself ; and shall he be inferior to irrational 
 animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-suffi- 
 cient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suit- 
 able way of living, and one conformable to nature ? 
 
 I indeed think that the old man 3 ought to be sitting here, 
 not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor 
 mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that 
 there be not among us any young men of such a mind, that 
 when they have recognised their kinship to God, and that we 
 are fettered by these bonds the body, I mean, and its po- 
 sessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary 
 to us for the economy and commerce of life they should in- 
 tend to throw off these things as if they were burdens pain- 
 ful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this 
 is the labour that your teacher and instructor ought to be 
 employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You 
 should come to him and say, "Epictetus, we can no longer 
 endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and 
 giving it drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of 
 the body complying with the wishes of these and of those. 4 
 Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us; and is 
 not death no evil ? And are we not in a manner kinsmen of 
 God, and did we not come from him ? Allow us to depart 
 to the place from which we came ; allow us to be released at 
 last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed 
 down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of 
 justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they 
 have some power over us by means of the body and its pos- 
 sessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power 
 over any man." And I on my part would say, "Friends, 
 wait for God : when He shall give the signal and release you 
 from this service, then go to Him ; but for the present endure 
 to dwell in this place where He has put you: short indeed 
 is this time of our dwelling here, and easy to bear for those 
 who are so disposed : for what tyrant or what thief, or what 
 courts of justice, are formidable to those who have thus con-
 
 DISCOURSES 29 
 
 sidered as things of no value the body and the possessions of 
 the body ? Wait then, do not depart without a reason." 
 
 Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to 
 ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher 
 is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you 
 have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about 
 the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch, 
 if you have it, you will have it ; if you have it not, you will 
 depart from life. The door is open. 5 Why do you grieve? 
 where does there remain any room for tears? and where is 
 there occasion for flattery ? why shall one man envy another ? 
 why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if 
 they be both very strong and of violent temper? for what 
 will they do to us? We shall not care for that which they 
 can do ; and what we do care for, that they can not do. How 
 did Socrates behave with respect to these matters ? Why, in 
 what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced 
 that he was a kinsman of the gods? "If you say to me 
 now," said Socrates to his judges,' "we will acquit you on 
 the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in 
 which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our 
 young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves 
 ridiculous by thinking that, if one of our commanders has 
 appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and 
 maintain it, and to resolve to die a thousand times rather 
 than desert it ; but if God has put us in any place and way of 
 life, we ought to desert it." Socrates speaks like a man 
 who is really a kinsman of the gods. But we think about 
 ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and 
 shameful parts; we fear, we desire; we flatter those who 
 are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also. 
 
 A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who, 
 as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly 
 he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all, 
 and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive 
 manner; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back 
 to me and said, "I wished for your help, not your pity: no 
 evil has happened to me." 
 
 Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to 
 say: This and this will befall you from your master; and
 
 30 EPICTETUS 
 
 when I replied that these were things which happen in the or- 
 dinary course of human affairs. Why then, said he, should I 
 ask him anything when I can obtain it from you? For, in 
 fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and fool- 
 ish to receive from another? Shall I then, who am able 
 to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous 
 spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial 
 office ? I hope not : I will not be so ignorant about my own 
 possessions. But when a man is cowardly and mean, what 
 else must be done for him than to write letters as you would 
 about a corpse. Please to grant us the body of a certain per- 
 son and a sextarius of pure blood. For such a person is, in 
 fact, a carcase and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood 
 and nothing more. But if he were anything more, he would 
 know that one man is not miserable through the means of 
 another. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 So Jesus said, "Our Father which art in heaven." Cleanthes, in his 
 hymn to Zeus, writes, K orov yap yevo$ tajuev. Compare Acts of 
 the Apostles, xvii. 28, where Paul quotes these words. It is not true 
 then that the "conception of a parental deity," as it has been asserted, 
 was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of 
 Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teach- 
 ing. 
 
 1 In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning 
 and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their 
 food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some 
 look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by 
 honest labour. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep 
 your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labour, live an heroic life, 
 which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian. 
 
 Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals. 
 Millions die annually for want of sufficient food ; and many human 
 beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did 
 not know these facts. 
 
 Compare the passage in Matthew vi. 25-34. It is said, v. 26: "Be- 
 hold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor 
 gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not 
 much better than they?" The expositors of this passage may be con- 
 sulted. 
 
 * The old man is Epictetus. 
 
 * He means, as Wolf says, "on account of the necessities of the body 
 seeking the favour of the more powerful by disagreeable compliances. 1 ' 
 
 B Compare Matthew vi. 31 : "Therefore take no thought, saying, What 
 shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be 
 clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek), for your 
 heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things," etc. 
 
 * This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as that in 
 Plato's "Apology," 17.
 
 CH AFTER X. 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO EAGERLY SEEK PREFERMENT AT ROME 
 
 IF we applied ourselves as busily to our own work as the 
 old men at Rome do to those matters about which they 
 are employed, perhaps we also might accomplish some- 
 thing. I am acquainted with a man older than myself, 
 who is now superintendent of corn 1 at Rome, and I remember 
 the time when he came here on his way back from exile, and 
 what he said as he related the events of his former life, and 
 how he declared that with respect to the future after his re- 
 turn he would look after nothing else than passing the rest 
 of his life in quiet and tranquillity. "For how little of life," 
 he said, "remains for me." I replied, you will not do it, but 
 as soon as you smell Rome, you will forget all that you have 
 said ; and if admission is allowed even into the imperial pal- 
 ace, he 2 will gladly thrust himself in and thank God. "If 
 you find me, Epictetus," he answered, "setting even one foot 
 within the palace, think what you please." Well, what then 
 did he do ? Before he entered the city, he was met by letters 
 from Caesar, and as soon as he received them, he forgot 
 all, and ever has added one piece of business to another. I 
 wish that I were now by his side to remind him of what he 
 said when he was passing this way, and to tell him how much 
 better a seer I am than he is. 
 
 Well then do I say that man is an animal made for doing 
 nothing? 8 Certainly not. But why are we not active? 4 
 (We are active.) For example, as to myself, as soon as 
 day comes, in a few words I remind myself of what I must 
 read over to my pupils ; then forthwith I say to myself, But 
 what is it to me how a certain person shall read? the first 
 thing for me is to sleep. And indeed what resemblance is 
 there between what other persons do and what we do? If 
 you observe what they do, you will understand. And what 
 else do they do all day long than make up accounts, enquire 
 among themselves, give and take advice about some small 
 quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits ? Is 
 
 31
 
 32 EPICTETUS 
 
 it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it : 
 I intreat you to permit me to export 5 a small quantity of 
 corn; and one to this effect: "I intreat you to learn from 
 Chrysippus what is the administration of the world, and 
 what place in it the rational animal holds ; consider also who 
 you are, and what is the nature of your good and bad." Are 
 these things like the other, do they require equal care, and 
 is it equally base to neglect these and those ? Well then are 
 we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep ? No ; but 
 much rather you young men are. For we old men when we 
 see young men amusing themselves are eager to play with 
 them ; and if I saw you active and zealous, much more should 
 I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 A "Praefectus Annonae," or superintendent of the supply of corn 
 at Rome is first mentioned by Livy (iv. 12) as appointed during a 
 scarcity. At a later time this office was conferred on Cneius Pompeius 
 for five years. Maecenas advised Augustus to make a Praefectus 
 Annonae or permanent officer over the corn market and all other mar- 
 kets. He would thus have the office formerly exercised by the aediles. 
 
 * I can not explain why the third person is used here instead of the 
 second. 
 
 * The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He 
 ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a 
 lazy life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only. 
 
 4 Schweighauser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but 
 I do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, "Why are we not 
 active?" He means, Why do some say that we are not active? And 
 he intends to say that, We are active, but not in the way in which some 
 people are active. I have therefore added in ( ) what is necessary 
 
 to make the text intelligible. 
 
 8 A plain allusion to restraints put on the exportation of grain.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 OF NATURAL AFFECTION 
 
 WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates, 
 Epictetus inquired of him about several particu- 
 lars, and asked if he had children and a wife. 
 The man replied that he had; and Epictetus in- 
 quired further, how he felt under the circumstances. "Miser- 
 able," the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect, 
 for men do not marry and beget children in order to be 
 wretched, but rather to be happy. "But I," the man replied, 
 "am so wretched about my little children that lately, when my 
 little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I 
 could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person 
 sent me news that she had recovered." Well, then, said Epic- 
 tetus, do you think that you acted right? "I acted natur- 
 ally," the man replied. But convince me of this that you 
 acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything 
 which takes place according to nature takes place rightly. 
 "This is the case," said the man, "with all or at least most 
 fathers." I do not deny that : but the matter about which 
 we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right ; for in 
 respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come 
 for the good of the body, because they do come ; and gener- 
 ally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly 
 all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then 
 how your behaviour is natural. "I can not," he said; "but 
 do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and 
 is not rightly done." 
 
 Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and 
 black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing 
 between them? "The sight," he said. And if about hot and 
 cold, and hard and soft, what criterion ? "The touch." Well 
 then, since we are inquiring about things which are accord- 
 ing to nature, and those which are done rightly or not 
 rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should 
 employ? "I do not know," he said. And yet not to know 
 
 3 33
 
 34 EPICTETUS 
 
 the criterion of colours and smells, and also of tastes, is per- 
 haps no great harm ; but if a man do not know the criterion 
 of good and bad, and of things according to nature and 
 contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm? 
 "The greatest harm (I think)." Come tell me, do all things 
 which seem to some persons to be good and becoming, 
 rightly appear such ; and at present as to Jews and Syrians 
 and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions 
 of all of them in respect to food are right? "How is it pos- 
 sible?" he said. Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary 
 that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions 
 of the rest must be wrong : if the opinions of the Jews are 
 right, those of the rest can not be right. "Certainly." But 
 where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning 
 and training in things which are necessary. He assented 
 to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for 
 the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else, 
 and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the 
 criterion of things which are according to nature, and by 
 using it also to determine each several thing. But in the 
 present matter I have so much as this to aid you towards 
 what you wish. Does affection to those of your family 
 appear to you to be according to nature and to be good? 
 "Certainly." Well, is such affection natural and good, and is 
 a thing consistent with reason not good? "By no means." 
 Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction 
 with affection? "I think not." You are right, for if it is 
 otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being 
 according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature. 
 Is it not so ? "It is," he said. Whatever then we shall dis- 
 cover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent 
 with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good. 
 "Agreed." Well then to leave your sick child and to go away 
 is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it 
 is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with 
 affection. "Yes, let us consider." Did you then, since you 
 had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when 
 you ran off and left her ; and has the mother no affection for 
 the child? "Certainly, she has." Ought then the mother 
 also to have left her, or ought she not? "She ought not."
 
 DISCOURSES 35 
 
 And the nurse, does she love her ? "She does." Ought then 
 she also to have left her? "By no means." And the peda- 
 gogue. 1 Does he not love her ? "He does love her." Ought 
 then he also to have deserted her? and so should the child 
 have been left alone and without help on account of the great 
 affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should 
 she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor 
 cared for her? "Certainly not." Now this is unfair and un- 
 reasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with 
 yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do 
 because you have affection. "It is absurd." Come then, if 
 you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affec- 
 tionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you 
 alone and deserted ? "By no means." And would you wish 
 to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affec- 
 tion you would always be left alone in sickness ? or for this 
 reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved 
 by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so, 
 it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate 
 act. Well then, was it nothing which moved you and in- 
 duced you to desert your child ? 
 
 "How is that possible ?" But it might be something of the 
 kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while 
 a horse was running which he favoured; and when 
 contrary to expectation the horse won, he required 
 sponges to recover from his fainting fit. "What then 
 was the motive?" The exact discussion of this does 
 not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it 
 is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philoso- 
 phers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere with- 
 out, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the 
 cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not 
 saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding 
 any thing or pursuing : the very thing which is now the cause 
 to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and 
 hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. "And what is 
 this ?" Is it any other than our will to do so ? "No other." 
 But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have 
 been doing than that which we willed to do ? This then was 
 the cause of Achilles' lamentation, not the death of Patro-
 
 36 EPICTETUS 
 
 clus ; for another man does not behave thus on the death of 
 his companion ; but it was because he chose to do so. And 
 to you this was the very cause of your then running away, 
 that you chose to do so ; and on the other side, if you should 
 (hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And 
 now you are going to Rome because you choose ; and if you 
 should change your mind, you will not go hither. And in 
 a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of 
 the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing ; but 
 our own opinions and our wills (Soyfiara). 
 
 Do I convince you of this or not? "You do convince me." 
 Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are 
 the effects. When then we are doing anything not rightly 
 from this day we shall impute it to nothing else than to the 
 will (Soyiuxor opinion), from which we have done it; and it 
 is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extir- 
 pate more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body. 
 And in like manner we shall give the same account of the 
 cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no 
 longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or 
 neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we 
 do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we 
 do not the acts which follow from such opinions ; and as to 
 thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in ex- 
 ternals. "It is so," he said. From this day then we shall in- 
 quire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or 
 its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs noth- 
 ing else than opinions. "I hope so." You see than that you 
 must become a Scholasticus, 2 an animal whom all ridicule, 
 if you really intend to make an examination of your own 
 opinions : and that this is not the work of one hour or day, 
 you know yourself. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a peda- 
 gogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm." Epictetus, Frag. 
 
 97- 
 
 1 A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools ; a studious and 
 literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 OF CONTENTMENT 
 
 WITH respect to gods, there are some who say that a 
 divine being does not exist : others say that it ex- 
 ists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no 
 forethought about any thing; a third class say 
 that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only 
 about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing 
 on the earth ; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises 
 forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly 
 things, but in a general way only, and not about things sev- 
 erally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Soc- 
 rates belong, who say: "I move not without thy know- 
 ledge." 1 
 
 Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire 
 about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or 
 not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper 
 end to follow them ? And if they exist, but take no care of 
 anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow 
 them? But if indeed they do exist and look after things, 
 still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, 
 nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow 
 them) ? The wise and good man then after considering all 
 these things, submits his own mind to him who administers 
 the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He 
 who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed 
 with this intention, "How shall I follow the gods in all 
 things, how shall I be contented with the divine administra- 
 tion, and how can I become free?" For he is free to 
 whom every thing happens according to his will, 
 and whom no man can hinder. What then is free- 
 dom, madness?" Certainly not: for madness and free- 
 dom do not consist. "But, you say, I would have 
 every thing result just as I like, and in whatever way 
 I like." You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not 
 know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for 
 
 37
 
 38 EPICTETUS 
 
 me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I incon- 
 siderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even 
 most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writ- 
 ing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? 
 No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be 
 written. And how with respect to music? In the same 
 manner. And what universally in every art or science? 
 Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to 
 know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's 
 whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest 
 and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to 
 will inconsiderately ? By no means ; but to be instructed is 
 this, to learn to wish that every thing may happen as it does. 
 And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed 
 them? And he has appointed summer and winter, and 
 abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such 
 opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he 
 has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and 
 companions. 
 
 Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought 
 to go to be instructed, not that we may change the consti- 
 tution of things, for we have not the power to do it, nor is 
 it better that we should have the power, but in order that, 
 as the things around us are what they are and by nature 
 exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the 
 things which happen. For can we escape from men? and 
 how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we 
 change them? Who gives us the power? What then re- 
 mains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce 
 with them? Is there such a method by which they shall 
 do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in 
 a mood which is conformable to nature? But you are un- 
 willing to endure and are discontented : and if you are alone, 
 you call it solitude ; and if you are with men, you call them 
 knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own 
 parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. But you 
 ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name 
 of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the 
 gods ; and when you are with many, you ought not to call it
 
 DISCOURSES 39 
 
 crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, 
 and so accept all contentedly. 
 
 What then is the punishment of those who do not accept? 
 It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with 
 being alone ? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his 
 parents ? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied 
 with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into 
 prison. What prison ? Where he is already, for he is there 
 against his will ; and where a man is against his will, there 
 he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was 
 there willingly. 
 
 "Must my leg then be lamed?" Wretch, do you 
 then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world ? 
 Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole ? Will you 
 not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with it to 
 him who gave it ? And will you be vexed and discontented 
 with the things established by Zeus, which he with the 
 Moirse (fates) who were present and spinning the thread 
 of your generation, defined and put in order? Know you 
 not how small a part you are compared with the whole. I 
 mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are 
 not inferior to the gods nor less ; for the magnitude of intelli- 
 gence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by 
 thoughts. Will you not then choose to place your good in 
 that in which you are equal to the gods ? 
 
 "Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother." 
 What then, was it permitted to you to come forth 
 and to select and to say: "Let such a man at this 
 moment unite with such a woman that I may be pro- 
 duced ?" It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your 
 parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. Of 
 what kind of parents? Of such as they were. Well then, 
 since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to 
 you? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess 
 the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched 
 if you closed your eyes when colours were brought before 
 them ; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility 
 of spirit for every event that may happen, and you know 
 not that you possess them, are you not more unfortunate and 
 wretched ? Things are brought close to you which are pro-
 
 4O EPICTETUS 
 
 portionate to the power which you possess, but you turn away 
 this power most particularly at the very time when you ought 
 to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather 
 thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these 
 things which they have not placed in your power, and have 
 made you accountable only for those which are in your 
 power? As to your parents, the gods have left you free 
 from responsibility; and so with respect to your brothers, 
 and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For 
 what then have they made you responsible ? For that which 
 alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why 
 then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are 
 not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to your- 
 self. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 The line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena : "Hear me child 
 of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even 
 move without thy knowledge." Iliad, x. 278. Socrates said that the gods 
 know everything, what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, Mem. 
 i. I, 19). Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deprum, i. i, 2; and Dr. Price's 
 Dissertation on Providence, sect. i. Epictetus enumerates the various 
 opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the 
 notes in Schweighauser's edition. The opinions about God among 
 modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or less, do 
 not seem to be so varied as in ancient times ; but the contrasts in modern 
 opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a 
 God, though the number of those who deny is perhaps not large, and the 
 superstitious notions about God and his administration of the world, 
 which are taught by teachers, learned and ignorant, and exercise a great 
 power over the minds of those who are unable or do not dare to exer- 
 cise the faculty of reason.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS 
 
 WHEN some one asked, how may a man eat accept- 
 ably to the gods, he answered : H he can eat justly 
 and contentedly, and with equanimity, and tem- 
 perately and orderly, will it not be also acceptably 
 to the gods ? But when you have asked for warm water and 
 the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has brought only 
 tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then 
 not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this accept- 
 able to the gods? "How then shall a man endure such per- 
 sons as this slave?" Slave yourself, will you not bear with 
 your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is 
 like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from 
 above ? But if you have been put in any such higher place, 
 will you immediately make yourself a tyrant ? Will you not 
 remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are 
 kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the 
 offspring of Zeus? 1 "But I have purchased them, and they 
 have not purchased me." Do you see in what direction you 
 are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that 
 it is towards these wretched laws of dead men ? 2 but towards 
 the laws of the gods you are not looking. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Mrs. Carter compares Job xxxi. 15 : "Did not he that made me in 
 the womb make him (my man-servant) ? And did not one fashion us 
 in the womb?" 
 
 * I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave 
 to another ; and when he says "dead men," he may mean mortal men, as 
 contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers.
 
 CHAPTER XIV; 
 
 THAT THE DEITY OVERSEES ALL THINGS 
 
 WHEN a person asked him how a man could be con- 
 vinced that all his actions are under the inspec- 
 tion of God, he answered, Do you not think that 
 all things are united in one? "I do," the person 
 replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a 
 natural agreement and union with heavenly things? "I do." 
 And how else so regularly as if by God's command, when 
 He bids the plants to flower, do they flower ? when He bids 
 them to send forth shoots, do they shoot ? when He bids them 
 to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He 
 bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids 
 them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them 
 down ? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves ? 
 and when He bids them to fold themselves up and to remain 
 quiet and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest ? And 
 how else at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the 
 approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration 
 and change to the contrary seen in earthly things ? But are 
 plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, 
 and are not our souls much more? and our souls so bound 
 up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of 
 Him ; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts 
 as being his own motion connate with himself? Now are 
 you able to think of the divine administration, and about all 
 things divine, and at the same time also about human affairs, 
 and to be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in 
 your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to 
 some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things 
 to suspend your judgment; and do you retain in your soul 
 so many impressions from so many and various things, and 
 being moved by them, do you fall upon notions similar to 
 those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and 
 the memories of ten thousand things ; and is not God able to 
 oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive 
 
 43
 
 DISCOURSES 43 
 
 from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to 
 illuminate so large a part of the All, and to leave so little not 
 illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth's 
 shadow ; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go 
 round, being a small part of himself compared with the 
 whole, can not He perceive all things ? 
 
 "But I can not," the man may reply, "comprehend all these 
 things at once." But who tells you that you have equal power 
 with Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a 
 guardian, every man's Daemon, to whom he has committed 
 the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never 
 deceived. For to what better and more careful guardian 
 could He have intrusted each of us ? When then you have 
 shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never to 
 say that you are alone, for you are not; but God is within, 
 and your Daemon is within, and what need have they of light 
 to see what you are doing ? To this God you ought to swear 
 an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But they who are 
 hired for pay swear to regard the safety of Caesar before all 
 things ; and you who have received so many and such great 
 favours, will you not swear, or when you have sworn, will 
 you not abide by your oath? And what shall you swear? 
 Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to 
 find fault with any thing that he has given, and never unwill- 
 ingly to do or to suffer any thing that is necessary. Is this 
 oath like the soldier's oath ? The soldiers swear not to prefer 
 any man to Caesar : in this oath men swear to honour them- 
 selves before all. 1
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES 
 
 WHEN a man was consulting him how he should per- 
 suade his brother to cease being angry with him, 
 Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to 
 secure for a man any external thing. If it did 
 (or, if it were not, as I say), Philosophy would be allowing 
 something which is not within its province. For as the car- 
 penter's material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper, 
 so the matter of the art of living is each man's life. "What 
 then is my brother's life?" That again belongs to his 
 own art ; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external 
 things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But 
 Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance 
 I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to 
 nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she 
 says. 
 
 "How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me?" 
 Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to 
 say to you about his anger. 
 
 When the man, who was consulting him, said, "I seek to 
 know this, How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me, 
 shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?" 
 Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since 
 not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that 
 you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time : let 
 it flower 1 first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then 
 the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour, 
 and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a 
 time and so easily ? Do not expect it, even if I tell you. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 " The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom" (Mrs. 
 Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which 
 becomes the fruit. 
 
 44
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 OF PROVIDENCE 
 
 DO not wonder if for other animals than man all things 
 are provided for the body, not only food and drink, 
 but beds also, and they have no need of shoes nor 
 bed materials, nor clothing ; but we require all these 
 additional things. For animals not being made for them- 
 selves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so 
 as to need other things. For consider what it would be for 
 us to take care not only of ourselves, but also about cattle and 
 asses, how they should be clothed, and how shod, and how 
 they should eat and drink. Now as soldiers are ready for 
 their commander, shod, clothed, and armed : but it would be 
 a hard thing for the chiliarch (tribune) to go round and shoe 
 or clothe his thousand men : so also nature has formed the 
 animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and 
 requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick 
 drives the cattle. 
 
 But now we, instead of being thankful that we need not 
 take the same care of animals as of ourselves, complain of 
 God on our own account ; and yet, in the name of Zeus and 
 the gods, any one thing of those which exist would be 
 enough to make a man perceive the providence of God, at 
 least a man who is modest and grateful. And speak not to 
 me now of the great things, but only of this, that milk is 
 produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from 
 skins. Who made these things or devised them ? No one, 
 you say. O amazing shamelessness and stupidity ! 
 
 Well, let us omit the works of nature, and contemplate her 
 smaller ( subordinate, ndpepya} acts. Is there anything 
 less useful than the hair on the chin? What then, has not 
 nature used this hair also in the most suitable manner pos- 
 sible? Has she not by it distinguished the male and the 
 female ? does not the nature of every man forthwith proclaim 
 from a distance, I am a man : as such approach me, as such 
 speak to me ; look for nothing else ; see the signs ? Again, in 
 
 45
 
 46 EPICTETUS 
 
 the case of women, as she has mingled something softer in 
 the voice, so she has also deprived them of hair (on the 
 chin). You say, not so: the human animal ought to have 
 been left without marks of distinction, and each of us should 
 have been obliged to proclaim, "I am a man." But how is not 
 the sign beautiful and becoming and venerable? how much 
 more beautiful than the cock's comb, how much more becom- 
 ing than the lion's mane? For this reason we ought to pre- 
 serve the signs which God has given, we ought not to throw 
 them away, nor to confound, as much as we can, the distinc- 
 tions of the sexes. 
 
 Are these the only works of providence in us ? And what 
 words are sufficient to praise them and set them forth accord- 
 ing to their worth? For if we had understanding, ought 
 we to do any thing else both jointly and severally than to sing 
 hymns and bless the deity, and to tell of his benefits ? Ought 
 we not when we are digging and ploughing and eating to 
 sing this hymn to God? "Great is God, who has given us 
 such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth: 
 great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallow- 
 ing, a stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of 
 breathing while we sleep." This is what we ought to sing 
 on every occasion, and to sing the greatest and most divine 
 hymn for giving us the faculty of comprehending these 
 things and using a proper way. Well then, since most of 
 you have become blind, ought there not to be some man to 
 fill this office, and on behalf of all to sing the hymn to God ? 
 For what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to 
 God? If then I was a nightingale, I would do the part of 
 a nightingale, if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But 
 now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise God : this 
 is my work; I do it, nor will I desert this post, so long as I 
 am allowed to keep it ; and I exhort you to join in this same 
 song.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY 
 
 SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses 1 and perfects 
 the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by 
 what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this 
 should be done either by itself or by another thing. 
 Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else 
 superior to reason ; which is impossible. But if it is reason, 
 again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reasn 
 does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we 
 shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity 
 and have no end. 2 Reason therefore is analysed by itself. 
 Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions 3 ) and the 
 like. Will you then hear about those things ? Hear. But 
 if you should say, "I know not whether you are arguing truly 
 or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way am- 
 biguously, and you should say to me "Distinguish," I will 
 bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more 
 urgent." 4 This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic 
 teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of 
 corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if 
 we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a 
 balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh any- 
 thing? . 
 
 In this case then if we have not fully learned and accu- 
 rately examined the criterion of all other things, by which 
 the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accu- 
 rately and to learn fully anything else ? How is this possi- 
 ble ? Yes ; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which 
 produces no fruit. But it is a thing which can measure 
 corn. Logic also produces no fruit. As to this indeed we 
 shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is 
 enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and ex- 
 amining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and 
 weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, 
 and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say 
 
 47
 
 48 EPICTETUS 
 
 so ? 6 And who is it that has written that the examination of 
 names is the beginning of education? And does not Soc- 
 rates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that 
 he began with the examination of names, what each name 
 signified? 6 Is this then the great and wondrous thing to 
 understand or interpret ChryMppus? Who says this? 
 What then is the wondrous thing? To understand the will 
 of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your 
 own power ? and what more have you need of ? For if it is 
 true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the 
 truth, of necessity you must act right. But in truth I do not 
 apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is ? 
 They say that it is Chrysippus. I proceed, and I inquire 
 what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to under- 
 stand what he says : I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus. 
 Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the 
 Roman tongue. 7 What then is the superciliousness of the 
 interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly 
 be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will 
 of nature, but does not follow it himself ; and much more is 
 this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chry- 
 sippus for his own sake, but in order that we may under- 
 stand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his 
 own acount, but because we think that through him we shall 
 know the future and understand the signs given by the gods ; 
 nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, 
 but because through them signs are given; nor do we look 
 with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through 
 them gives signs? 
 
 I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacri- 
 ficer, and I say, "Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what 
 signs they give." The man takes the viscera, opens them, and 
 interprets : "Man," he says, "you have a will free by nature 
 from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the 
 viscera." I will show you this first in the matter of assent. 
 Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth ? No 
 man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false. 
 No man can. You see that in this matter you have the 
 faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compul- 
 sion, unimpeded. Well, then, in the matter of desire and
 
 DISCOURSES 49 
 
 pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can over- 
 come pursuit except another pursuit? And what can over- 
 come desire and aversion ( EKKXICTIY ) except another desire 
 and aversion ? But, you object : "If you place before me the 
 fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is 
 placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is 
 better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is 
 your opinion that compelled you : that is, will compelled will. 
 For if God had made that part of himself, which he took 
 from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hin- 
 dered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would 
 not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he 
 ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these 
 are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you 
 are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will 
 charge no one. All will be at the same time according to 
 your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divin- 
 ation I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admir- 
 ing him for this interpretation, but admiring the things 
 which he interprets. 
 
 ffOTES 
 
 l A6yo$ kcrriv 6 dtapQp&v. Aiapfcovv means "to divide a thing into 
 its parts or members."The word "analyse" seems to be the nearest 
 equivalent. 
 
 * This is obscure. The conclusion, "Reason therefore is analysed by 
 itself" is not in Epictetus; but it is implied. Antoninus writes: "These 
 are the properties of the rational soul ; it sees itself, analyses itself." If 
 reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other 
 reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so 
 on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be 
 analysed by itself. 
 
 3 " Our opinions." There is some defect in the text, as Wolf remarks. 
 "The opponent," he says, "disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing 
 which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching 
 to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialecti- 
 cian will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching." 
 
 4 He repeats the words of the supposed opponent ; and he means that 
 his adversary's difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic. 
 
 * Antisthenes who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and 
 Physic. 
 
 * Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and 
 we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they 
 should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the 
 case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to some words, but 
 it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the 
 word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunder-
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 stood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we 
 use; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ig- 
 norance to some degree. 
 
 1 The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says "the Ro- 
 man tongue," perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman 
 and does not know Greek well.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS 
 (FAULTS) OF OTHERS 
 
 IF what philosophers say is true, that all men have one 
 principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that 
 a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion 
 that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of 
 judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also 
 in the case of a movement towards any thing the persuasion 
 that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to 
 think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, 
 and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards an- 
 other, why then are we angry with the many? 1 They are 
 thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by 
 thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and 
 evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity 
 them? But show them their error, and you will see how 
 they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, 
 they have nothing superior to their present opinion. 
 
 Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be des- 
 troyed ? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way : 
 This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the 
 most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of 
 vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty 
 which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy 
 him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is 
 which you say, and that it is just as if you would 
 say, "Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf 
 man?" But if the greatest harm is in the priva- 
 tion of the greatest things, and the greatest thing 
 in every man is the will or choice such as it 
 ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you 
 also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected 
 contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him 
 rather : drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and 
 these words which the many utter: "these accursed and 
 
 51
 
 52 EPICTETUS 
 
 odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once? 
 and how are you so peevish ? Why then are we angry ? Is 
 it because we value so much the things of which these men 
 rob us ? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not 
 be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your 
 wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn 
 that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things 
 which are yours, but in those which belong to others and 
 which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things 
 and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still 
 angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry 
 with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. 
 Consider the matter thus : you have fine clothes ; your neigh- 
 bour has not: you have a window; you wish to air the 
 clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good con- 
 sists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the 
 very thing which you also think. Must he not then come 
 and take them away ? When you show a cake to greedy per- 
 sons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to 
 snatch it from you ? Do not provoke them : do not have a 
 window : do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron 
 lamp placed by the side of my household gods: hearing a 
 noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had 
 been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp 
 had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I 
 said, you will find an earthen lamp : for a man only loses that 
 which he has. "I have lost my garment." The reason is that 
 you had a garment. "I have pain in my head." Have you 
 any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for 
 we only lose those things, we have only pains about those 
 things which we possess. 2 
 
 But the tyrant will chain what? the leg. He will take 
 away what? the neck. What then will he not chain and 
 not take away ? the will. This is why the ancients taught the 
 maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought to exercise our- 
 selves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to 
 the greater. "I have pain in the head." Do not say, alas ! "I 
 have pain in the ear." Do not say, alas! And I do not say, 
 that you are not allowed to groan, but do not groan in- 
 wardly ; and if your slave is slow in bringing a bandage, do
 
 DISCOURSES 53 
 
 not cry out and torment yourself, and say, "Everybody hates 
 me" : for who would not hate such a man? For the future, 
 relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not 
 trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man 
 ought not to be invincible in the way that an ass is. 3 
 
 Who then is the invincible? It is he whom none of the 
 things disturb which are independent of the will. Then ex- 
 amining one circumstance after another I observe, as in the 
 case of an athlete ; he has come off victorious in the first con- 
 test : well then, as to the second ? and what if there should 
 be great heat? and what, if it should be at Olympia? And 
 the same I say in this case: if you should throw money in 
 his way, he will despise it. Well, suppose you put a young 
 girl in his way, what then? and what, if it is in the dark? 4 
 what if it should be a little reputation, or abuse ; and what, if 
 it should be praise ; and what if it should be death ? He is 
 able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, and what 
 if it is in the rain, and what if he be in a melancholy (mad) 
 mood, and what if he be asleep ? He will still conquer. This 
 is my invincible athlete. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Mrs. Carter says : "The most ignorant persons often practice what 
 they know to be evil ; and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their 
 inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it. 
 (Perhaps she means "them," "their inclinations.") The doctrine of 
 Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the 
 voice of reason and conscience ; nor is it less pernicious than ill- 
 grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, 
 all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our 
 fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers 
 did not teach repentance towards God." 
 
 Mrs. Carter has not understood Epictetus; and her censure is mis- 
 placed. It is true that "the most ignorant persons often practise what 
 they know to be evil," as she truly says. But she might have said more. 
 It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they 
 know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least 
 before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they 
 have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with 
 others who are bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Mrs. Carter 
 seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they 
 who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justi- 
 fied by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as 
 they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts 
 which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to 
 mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and 
 direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness, 
 and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if
 
 54 EPICTETUS 
 
 the interests of society require the guilty to be punished : but he will not 
 punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I 
 assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I 
 understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells 
 us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others : the matter 
 of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have 
 towards those who do wrong, "because they are mistaken about good 
 arid evil." 
 
 He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men's mistake 
 further than this : men think that a thing or act is advantageous ; and 
 it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to 
 desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to 
 show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not 
 here examining the way of showing them their error ; by which I sup- 
 pose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit 
 that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors ; for he says, 
 "if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their pres- 
 ent opinion." 
 
 This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Mrs. Carter 
 in her zeal has not seen. 
 
 1 The conclusion explains what precedes. A man can have no pain in 
 his horns, because he has none. A man can not be vexed about the loss 
 of a thing if he does not possess it. 
 
 3 That is obstinate, as this animal is generally ; and sometimes very 
 obstinate. The meaning then is, as Schweighauser says : "a man should 
 be invincible, not with a kind of stupid obstinacy or laziness and slow- 
 ness in moving himself like an ass, but he should be invincible through 
 reason, reflection, meditation, study, and diligence." 
 
 " From the rustics came the old proverb, for when they commend 
 a man's fidelity and goodness they say he is a man with whom you may 
 play the game with the fingers in the dark." Cicero, "De Officiis," iii. 19.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS 
 
 IF a man possesses any superiority, or thinks that he does, 
 when he does not, such a man, if he is uninstructed, will 
 of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, the 
 tyrant says, "I am master of all !" And what can you do 
 for me? Can you give me desire which shall have no hin- 
 drance ? How can you ? Have you the infallible power of 
 avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the power of 
 moving towards an object without error? And how do you 
 possess this power ? Come, when you are in a ship, do you 
 trust to yourself or to the helmsman? And when you are 
 in a chariot, to whom do you trust but to the driver ? And 
 how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In what then 
 lies your power? "All men pay respect to me." Well, I also 
 pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it ; and for 
 the sake of my oil flask, I drive a peg into the wall. "Well 
 then, are these things superior to me?" No, but they supply 
 some of my wants, and for this reason I take care of them. 
 Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I not wash his feet? 
 Do I not clean him ? Do you not know that every man has 
 regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard 
 to his ass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show 
 me. Who wishes to become like you ? Who imitates you, 
 as he imitates Socrates ? "But I can cut off your head." You 
 say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to you, 
 as I would to a fever and the bile, and raise an altar to you, 
 as there is at Rome an altar to Fever. 
 
 What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? is 
 it the tyrant and his guards ? [By no means.] I hope that 
 it is not so. It is not possible that what is by nature free can 
 be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing 
 than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions which disturb 
 him : for when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your 
 leg," he who values his leg says, "Do not; have pity:" but 
 he who values his own will says, "If it appears more advan- 
 
 55
 
 56 EPICTETUS 
 
 tageous to you, chain it." Do you not care ? "I do not care." 
 I will show you that I am master. You can not do that. 
 Zeus has set me free ; do you think that he intended to allow 
 his own son to be ashamed? But you are master of my 
 carcase : take it. "So when you approach me, you have no 
 regard to me?" No, but I have regard to myself ; and if you 
 wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that 
 I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin. 
 
 This is not a perverse self-regard, for the animal is con- 
 stituted so as to do all things for itself. For even the sun 
 does all things for itself ; nay, even Zeus himself. But when 
 he chooses to be the Giver of rain and the Giver of fruits, and 
 the Father of Gods and men, you see that he can not obtain 
 these functions and these names, if he is not useful to man; 
 and, universally, he has made the nature of the rational 
 animal such that it can not obtain any one of its own proper 
 interests, if it does not contribute something to the common 
 interest. In this manner and sense it is not unsociable for a 
 man to do everything for the sake of himself. For what do 
 you expect? that a man should neglect himself and his own 
 interest? And how in that case can there be one and the 
 same principle in all animals, the principle of attachment 
 (regard) to themselves ? 
 
 What then? when absurd notions about things independ- 
 ent of our will, as if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the 
 bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to 
 tyrants; for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants 
 only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is it that 
 the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him 
 superintendent of the close stool ? How is it that we say im- 
 mediately, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were 
 ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to 
 you to be a fool. 
 
 Epaphroditus 2 had a shoemaker whom he sold because he 
 was good for nothing. This fellow by some good luck was 
 bought by one of Caesar's men, and became Caesar's shoe- 
 maker. You should have seen what respect Epaphroditus 
 paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I pray?" 
 Then if any of us asked, "What is master (Epaphroditus) 
 doing?" the answer was, "He is consulting about something
 
 DISCOURSES 57 
 
 with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good for noth- 
 ing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is an 
 instance of valuing something else than the things which 
 depend on the will. 
 
 Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who 
 meet him offer their congratulations: one kisses his eyes, 
 another the neck, and the slaves kiss his hands. 3 He goes to 
 his house, he finds torches lighted. He ascends the Capitol : 
 he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who ever sacri- 
 ficed for having had good desires ? for having acted conform- 
 ably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods for those 
 things in which we place our good. 
 
 A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of 
 Augustus. 4 I say to him : "Man, let the thing alone : you 
 will spend much for no purpose." But he replies, "Those 
 who draw up agreements will write my name." Do you 
 then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons, 
 "It is I whose name is written there" ? And if you can now 
 be present on all such occasions, what will you do when you 
 are dead ? My name will remain. Write it on a stone, and 
 it will remain. But come, what remembrance of you will 
 there be beyond Nicopolis? But I shall wear a crown of 
 gold. If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses and 
 put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Such a man was named in Greek KoiTcavirrjs in Latin "cubicu- 
 larius," a lord of the bedchamber, as we might say. Seneca, "De Con- 
 stantia Sapientis," speaks "of the pride of the nomenclator (the an- 
 nouncer of the name), of the arrogance of the bedchamber man." 
 
 1 Once the master of Epictetus. 
 
 1 Hand-kissing was in those times of tyranny the duty of a slave, not 
 of a free man. This servile practice still exists among men called free. 
 
 4 Casaubon, in a learned note on Suetonius, "Augustus," c. 18, in- 
 forms us that divine honours were paid to Augustus at Nicopolis, which 
 town he founded after the victory at Actium. The priesthood of Au- 
 gustus at Nicopolis was a high office, and the priest gave his name to 
 the year; that is, when it was intended in any writing to fix the year, 
 either in any writing which related to public matters, or in instruments 
 used in private affairs, the name of the priest of Augustus was used, 
 and this was also the practice in most Greek cities. In order to establish 
 the sense of this passage, Casaubon changed the text from rd? <f>oovd? 
 into TO. crviKfHoya, which emendation Schweighauser has admitted into 
 his text
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 HOW REASON CONTEMPLATES ITSELF 
 
 EVERY art and faculty contemplates certain things 
 especially. When then it is itself of the same kind 
 with the objects which it contemplates, it must of 
 necessity contemplate itself also: but when it is of 
 an unlike kind, it can not contemplate itself. For instance, 
 the shoemaker's art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely 
 distinct from the material of skins : for this reason it does not 
 contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian's art is em- 
 ployed about articulate speech ; is then the art also articulate 
 speech? By no means. For this reason "it is not able to 
 contemplate itself. Now reason, for what purpose has it 
 been given by nature? For the right use of appearances. 
 What is it then itself? A system (combination) of certain 
 appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contem- 
 plating itself also. Again, sound sense, for the contempla- 
 tion of what things does it belong to us ? Good and evil, and 
 things which are neither. What is it then itself? Good. 
 And want of sense, what is it ? Evil. Do you see then that 
 good sense necessarily contemplates both itself and the oppo- 
 site ? For this reason it is the chief and the first work of a 
 philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them 
 and to admit none without examination. You see even in 
 the matter of coin, in which our interest appears to be some- 
 what concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many 
 means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight, the 
 touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws the coin 
 (denarius) down, and observes the sound, and he is not con- 
 tent with its sounding once, but through his great attention 
 he becomes a musician. In like manner, where we think that 
 to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great differ- 
 ence, there we apply great attention to discovering the things 
 which can deceive. But in the matter of our miserable 
 ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit 
 every appearance, for the harm is not noticed. 
 
 58
 
 DISCOURSES 59 
 
 When then you would know how careless you are with 
 respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to 
 things which are indifferent (neither good nor evil), ob- 
 serve how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight 
 of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived, and you 
 will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do 
 in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which re- 
 quires much preparation, and much labour and study. Well 
 then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small 
 labour ? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very 
 brief. If you would know, read Zeno's 2 writings and you 
 will see. For how few words it requires to say that man's 
 end (or object) is to follow the gods, and that the nature of 
 good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say What 
 is God, what is appearance, and what is particular and what 
 is universal 3 nature ? then indeed many words are necessary. 
 If then Epicurus should come and say, that the good must be 
 in the body ; in this case also many words become necessary, 
 and we must be taught what is the leading principle in us, 
 and the fundamental and the substantial; and as it is not 
 probable that the good of a snail is in the shell, is it probable 
 that the good of a man is in the body? But you yourself, 
 Epicurus, possess something better than this. What is that 
 in you which deliberates, what is that which examines every 
 thing, what is that which forms a judgment about the body 
 itself, that it. is the principal part ? and why do you light your 
 lamp and labour for us, and write so many books ? is it that 
 we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what 
 we are with respect to you? Thus the discussion requires 
 many 4 words. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 *A comparison of lib. i. chap. I, will help to explain this chapter. 
 Compare also lib. i. chap. 17. 
 
 1 Zeno, a native of Citium, in the island of Cyprus, is said to have 
 come when he was young to Athens, where he spent the rest of a long 
 life in the study and teaching of Philosophy. He was the founder of 
 the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character. 
 He wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school 
 by Cleanthes. 
 
 'Epictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to 
 attempt to do what man can not do. But man does attempt to do it, and 
 only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also. 
 
 4 Epicurus is said to have written more than any other person, as
 
 60 EPICTETUS 
 
 many as three hundred volumes (KvXivSpot, rolls). Chrysippus was 
 his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus 
 vied with him in writing as much ; and for this reason he often repeated 
 himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left 
 his writings uncorrected in consequence of his hurry.
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED 
 
 WHEN a man holds his proper station in life, he does 
 not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do 
 you wish to happen to you? 
 
 I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conforma- 
 bly to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an 
 object as I am by nature formed to do ; and purpose and de- 
 sign and assent." 
 
 Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed 
 a spit ? 
 
 "My wish has always been that those who meet me 
 should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim 
 O the great philosopher." 
 
 Who are they by whom you wish to be admired ? Are they 
 not those of whom you are used to say, that they are mad? 
 Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen ? 
 
 61
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 ON PRAECOGNITIONS 1 
 
 P RECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and prae- 
 cognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For 
 who of us does not assume that Good is useful and 
 eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to 
 follow and pursue it ? And who of us does not assume that 
 Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the 
 contradiction arise ? It arises in the adaptation of the prae- 
 cognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, "He 
 has done well : he is a brave man," and another says, "Not 
 so ; but he has acted foolishly ;" then the disputes arise among 
 men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians 
 and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness 
 should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be 
 pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. 
 You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and 
 Achilles ; 2 for call them forth. What do you say, Agamem- 
 non? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? 
 "Certainly." Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not 
 admit that what is good ought to be done? "I do most cer- 
 tainly." Adapt your prsecognitions then to the present mat- 
 ter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought 
 not to give up Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You 
 ought." It is certain that one of the two makes a' wrong 
 adaptation of the praecognition of "ought" or "duty." 
 Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to restore 
 Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you." 
 Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" 
 "Yes, her whom you love." "Must I then be the only man 
 who goes without a prize ? and must I be the only man who 
 has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins. 3 
 
 What then is education? Education is the learning how 
 to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things 
 conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of 
 things some are in our power, but others are not: in our 
 
 62
 
 DISCOURSES 63 
 
 power are will and all acts which depend on the will ; things 
 not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, posses- 
 sions, parents, brothers, children, country and generally, 
 all with whom we live in society. In what then should we 
 place the good ? To what kind of things (ova-fa) shall we 
 adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not 
 health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? 
 and are not children and parents and country? Who will 
 tolerate you if you deny this? 
 
 Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. 
 Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does 
 not obtain good things, that he can be happy ? It is not pos- 
 sible. And can he maintain towards society a proper beha- 
 viour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look 
 after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate 
 in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. 
 If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to 
 steal it from the bath. 4 This is the origin of wars, civil 
 commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be 
 still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus ? for if I sustain 
 damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me ; and what 
 is he to me if he can not help me ; and further, what is he to 
 me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am ? I 
 now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, 
 why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such 
 as to Fever ; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver 
 of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place 
 the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows. 
 
 What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true 
 philosopher who is in labour. Now I do not see what the 
 Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad ? Yes. But suppose 
 that I place the good somewhere among the things which 
 depend on the will : all will laugh at me. There will come 
 some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and 
 he will shake his head and say, "Hear, my child. It is right 
 that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some 
 brains also : all this that you are doing is silly. You learn 
 the syllogism from philosophers ; but you know how to act 
 better than philosophers do." Man, why then do you blame 
 me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am
 
 64 EPICTETUS 
 
 silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: "Excuse 
 me, as you would excuse lovers ; I am not my own master ; 
 
 I am mad." 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Praecognitions (itpoXrjipzts) is translated Praecognita by John 
 Smith, Select Discourses^ p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): "Notionem 
 appello quod Graeci turn evvoiav, turn npoXrj^iv dicunt. Ea est insita 
 et ante percepta cuj usque forms cognitio, enodationis indigens." In 
 the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: "Quse est enim gens aut quod 
 genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quan- 
 dam deorum, quam appellat Ttpofayfyiv Epicurus ? id est, anteceptam 
 animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nee intelligi quidquam 
 nee quaeri nee disputari potest." Epicurus, as^ Cicero says in the follow 
 ing chapter (17), was the first who used Ttpokrityts in this sense, which 
 Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions 
 of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be uni- 
 versal ; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See i. c. 2; Tuscul. 
 i. 24 ; De Fin. iii. 6, and 7tp6A.r}i(>is in iv. 8. 6. 
 
 1 Horace, Epp. i. 2. . , 
 
 1 Iliad, i. The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up 
 Chryseis to her father. 
 
 4 The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the op- 
 portunity of carrying off a bather's clothes. From men's desires to have 
 what they have not, and do not choose to labour for, spring the disorders 
 of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. I, to which Mrs. 
 Carter refers.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 AGAINST EPICURUS 
 
 EVEN Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social, 
 but having once placed our good in the husk he is no 
 longer able to say anything else. For on the other 
 hand he strongly maintains this, that we ought not 
 to admire nor to accept any thing which is detached from 
 the nature of good; and he is right in maintaining this. 
 How then are we [suspicious], if we have no natural affec- 
 tion to our children ? Why do you advise the wise man not 
 to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may 
 thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on ac- 
 count of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What 
 does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamenta- 
 tion to him? But Epicurus knows that if once a child is 
 born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care 
 about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who 
 has any sense also does not engage in political matters ; for 
 he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such 
 things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as 
 you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you ? But 
 Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should 
 not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own 
 offspring, nor yet a wolf ; and shall a man desert his child ? 
 What do you mean ? that we should be as silly as sheep ? but 
 not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as 
 wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well, 
 who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping 
 after falling on the ground ? For my part I think that even 
 if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle, 
 that you would say what you have said, they would not have 
 cast you away.
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 IT is circumstances (difficulties) that show what men 
 are. Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you, re- 
 member that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has 
 matched you with a rough young man. For what pur- 
 pose? you may say. Why that you may become an Olym- 
 pic conqueror ; but it is not accomplished without sweat. In 
 my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficulty than 
 you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an ath- 
 lete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now 
 sending a scout to Rome ; l but no man sends a cowardly 
 scout, who, if he only hears a noise and sees a shadow any 
 where, comes running back in terror and reports that the 
 enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and 
 tell us, Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome, terrible is 
 death, terrible is exile; terrible is calumny; terrible is pov- 
 erty; fly, my friends; the enemy is near we shall answer, 
 Be gone, prophesy for yourself; we have committed only 
 one fault, that we sent such a scout. 
 
 Diogenes, 2 who was sent as a scout before you, made a 
 different report to us. He says that death is no evil, for 
 neither is it base: he says that fame (reputation) is the 
 noise of madmen. And what has this spy said about pain, 
 about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be 
 naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the 
 bare ground is the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of 
 each thing that he affirms his own courage, his tranquillity, 
 his freedom, and the healthy appearance, and compactness 
 of his body. "There is no enemy near," he says; "all is 
 peace." How so, Diogenes? "See," he replies, "if I am 
 struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man.'' 
 This is what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and 
 tell us one thing after another. Will you not go back, and 
 you will see clearer when you have laid aside fear ? 
 
 What then shall I do ? What do you do when you leave a 
 
 66
 
 DISCOURSES 67 
 
 ship? Do you take away the helm or the oars? What 
 then do you take away ? You take what is your own, your 
 bottle and your wallet; and now if you think of what is 
 your own, you will never claim what belongs to others. 
 The emperor (Domitian) says, "Lay aside your laticlave. 3 " 
 See, I put on the angusticlave. "Lay aside this also." See, 
 I have only my toga. "Lay aside your toga." See, I am now 
 naked. "But you still raise my envy." Take then all my 
 poor body : when, at a man's command, I can throw away 
 my poor body, do I still fear him ? 
 
 But a certain person will not leave to me the succession 
 to his estate. What then? had I forgotten that not one of 
 these things was mine. How then do we call them mine? 
 Just as we call the bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper 
 at his death leaves you the beds; all well; but if he leaves 
 them to another, he will have them, and you will seek an- 
 other bed. If then you shall not find one, you will sleep on 
 the ground : only sleep with a good will and snore, and re- 
 member that tragedies have their place among the rich and 
 kings and tyrants, but no poor man fills a part in a tragedy, 
 except as one of the Chorus. Kings indeed commence with 
 prosperity : "ornament the palace with garlands" : then 
 about the third or fourth act they call out, "Oh, Cithaeron, 4 
 why didst thou receive me" ? Slave, where are the crowns, 
 where the diadem? The guards help thee not at all. 
 When then you approach any of these persons, remember 
 this that you are approaching a tragedian, not the actor, but 
 CEdipus himself. But you say, such a man is happy ; for 
 he walks about with many, and I also place myself with the 
 many and walk about with many. In sum remember this : the 
 door is open ; 8 be not more timid than little children, but as 
 they say, when the thing does not please them, "I will play 
 no longer," so do you, when things seem to you of such a 
 kind, say "I will no longer play," and be gone : but if you 
 stay, do not complain. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 * In the time of Domitian philosophers were banished from Rome and 
 Italy by a Senatusconsultum (Sueton. Domitian, c. ro; Dion, 67, c. 
 13), and at that time Epictetus. as Gellius says (xv. n), went from 
 Rome to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he opened a school. We may sup-
 
 68 EPICTETUS 
 
 pose that Epictetus is here speaking of some person who had gone from 
 Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the state of affairs there under the 
 cruel tyrant Domitian. (Schweighauser.) 
 
 3 Diogenes was brought to King Philip after the battle of Chaeronea 
 as a spy (iii. 22, 24). Plutarch in the treatise, Quomodo assentator ab 
 amico dignoscatur, c. 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he 
 was a spy, he replied, "Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of 
 judgment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to 
 put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single hour." 
 
 * The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a 
 senator; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the 
 dress of a man of the equestrian order. 
 
 4 The exclamation of GEdipus in the GEdipus Tyrannus of Sopho- 
 cles, v. 1391. 
 
 ' This means "you can die when you please." Comp. i. c. 9. The 
 power of dying when you please is named by Plinius (N. H. ii. c. 7) 
 the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of 
 life. Horace, Epp. ii. 2, 213, 
 
 " Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis : 
 Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti; 
 Tempus abire tibi."
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 ON THE SAME SUBJECT 
 
 IF these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are 
 not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of 
 man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every- 
 thing else does not concern us, why are we still dis- 
 turbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which 
 we have been busied are in no man's power : and the things 
 which are in the power of others, we care not for. What 
 kind of trouble have we still? 
 
 "But give me directions." Why should I give you direc- 
 tions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not 
 given to you what is your own free from hindrance and 
 free from impediment, and what is not your own subject 
 to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what 
 kind of orders did you bring when you came from him? 
 Keep by every means what is your own ; do not desire what 
 belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtu- 
 ous shame is your own ; who then can take these things from 
 you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using 
 them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not 
 your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such 
 promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you 
 still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I 
 more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do 
 you want any others besides? Well, but he has not given 
 these orders, you will say. Produce your praecognitions 
 ( irpo\rrr(>ei$ ) , produce the proofs of philosophers, produce 
 what you have often heard, and produce what you have said 
 yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you 
 have meditated on; and you will then see that all these 
 things are from God. "How long then is it fit to observe 
 these precepts from God, and not to break up the play ?" As 
 long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Sa- 
 turnalia 1 a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom 
 to play at this game. The king commands : "Do you drink, 
 
 69
 
 70 EPICTETUS 
 
 Do you mix wine with me, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you 
 come." I obey that the game may not be broken up through 
 me. But if he says, "Think that you are in evil plight :" I 
 answer, I do not think so ; and who will compel me to think 
 so? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. 
 He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, "Go to 
 Achilles and tear from him Briseis." I go. He says, "Come," 
 and I come. 
 
 For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, 
 so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I sup- 
 pose that it is night. Well then ; is it day ? No, for I ad- 
 mitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you 
 think that it is night? Suppose that I do. But also think 
 that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis. 
 So in this case also : Suppose that you are unfortunate. 
 Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well 
 then are you troubled with an unfavourable daemon (for- 
 tune) ? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This 
 is not consistent with the hypothesis: and another (Zeus) 
 forbids me to think so. 
 
 How long then must we obey such orders ? As long as it 
 is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that which 
 is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour 
 and of bad temper, and they say, "I can not sup with this 
 man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in 
 Mysia" : "I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill : then 
 I began to be besieged again." But another says, "I prefer 
 to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes." 
 And do you compare these estimates (judgments) : only do 
 nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as 
 thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to 
 that. Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is 
 moderate, I will stay ; if it is excessive ; I go out : for you 
 must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is 
 open. Well, but you say to me, "Do not live in Nicopolis." 
 I will not live there. "Nor in Athens." I will not live in 
 Athens. "Nor in Rome." I will not live in Rome. "Live in 
 Gyarus." 2 I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great 
 smoke to live in Gyarus ; and I depart to the place where no 
 man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is
 
 DISCOURSES 71 
 
 open to all ; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, 
 no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the 
 reason why Demetrius 3 said to Nero, "You threaten me 
 with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admira- 
 tion on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave : 
 if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave : for I 
 immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as 
 if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part 
 of him which he guards ; and do you be assured that what- 
 ever part you choose to guard, -that part your master will 
 attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or 
 fear? 
 
 "But I should like to sit where the Senators sit." 4 Do you 
 see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeez- 
 ing yourself. "How then shall I see well in any other way in 
 the amphitheatre?" Man, do not be a spectator at all; and 
 you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself 
 trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, 
 seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun 
 yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we 
 who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is 
 our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is 
 it to be reviled ? Stand by a stone and revile it ; and what 
 will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what 
 profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a step- 
 ping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, 
 then he accomplishes something. "Strip him." What do 
 you mean by him ? "Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I 
 have insulted you." Much good may it do you. 
 
 This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason 
 why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and' 
 study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be 
 unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk para- 
 doxes. 8 But are there no paradoxes in the other arts ? and 
 what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in 
 order that he may see? If any one said this to a man igno- 
 rant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? 
 Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things 
 which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced ?
 
 72 , EPICTETUS 
 
 NOTES 
 
 'A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license 
 (Livy, xxii. i). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15, in which 
 Nero is chosen by lot to be king : and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient, c. 
 12, "Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque 
 ac tribunal imitantur." 
 
 1 Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the yEgean sea, to which 
 criminals were sent under the empire at Rome. Juvenal, Sat. i. 73. 
 
 1 Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca says : "He was 
 in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest." 
 One of his sayings was : "You gain more by possessing a few precepts 
 of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning 
 many if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius. 
 The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Di- 
 ogenes Lsertius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (Apologia, 27). 
 
 4 At Rome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for 
 the different classes of men at the public spectacles. 
 
 Taradoxes (rtapdSo^a), "things contrary to opinion," are contrasted 
 with paralogies (Ttapdkoya), "things contrary to reason." Cicero 
 says (Proremium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are "something 
 which cause surprise and contradict common opinion ;" and in an- 
 other place he says that the Romans gave the name of "admirabilia" to 
 the Stoic paradoxes. The puncture of the eye is the operation for cat- 
 aract
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 WHAT THE LAW OF LIFE IS 
 
 WHEN a person was reading hypothetical argu- 
 ments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothet- 
 ical law that we must accept what follows from 
 the hypothesis. But much before this law is the 
 'aw of life, that we must act conformably to nature. For 
 if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what 
 is natural, it is plain that in every thing we ought to make 
 it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape 
 us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then 
 philosophers exercise us in theory 1 (contemplation of things), 
 which is easier; and then next they lead us to the more 
 difficult things ; for in theory, there is nothing which draws 
 us away from following what is taught; but in the mat- 
 ters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is 
 ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the 
 matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more 
 difficult things; and we ought to employ this fact as an argu- 
 ment to those parents who are vexed at their children learn- 
 ing philosophy: Am I doing wrong then my father, and 
 do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming? If 
 indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you 
 blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me; and if you can 
 not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know 
 how to teach. For what do you think ? do you suppose that 
 I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good ? I hope that 
 it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing 
 wrong ? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should 
 get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught by anger 
 the art of a pilot or music? Do you think that by means 
 of your anger I shall learn the art of life? He only is al- 
 lowed to speak in this way who has shown such an inten- 
 tion. 2 But if a man only intending to make a display at a 
 banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical 
 arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what 
 
 6 73
 
 74 EPICTETUS 
 
 other object has he than that some man of senatorial rank 
 who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are 
 the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches 
 here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the 
 reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the ap- 
 pearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are 
 great. I know a certain person who complained, as he em- 
 braced the knees of Epaphroditus. that he had only one hun- 
 dred and fifty times ten thousand denarii 3 remaining. 
 What then did Epaphroditus do ? Did he laugh at him, as 
 we slaves of Epaphroditus did ? No, but he cried out with 
 amazement, "Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how 
 did you endure it?" 
 
 When Epictetus had reproved (called) the person who 
 was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher 
 who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, 
 Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at your- 
 self : you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascer- 
 tain whether he was able to understand these matters; but 
 perhaps you are only employing him as a reader." Well 
 then said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to un- 
 derstand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving 
 praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that 
 he is able to form a judgment about good or bad? and if 
 such a man blames any one, does the man care for the 
 blame? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in 
 such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who 
 praises can not see what is consequent on the hypothesis? 
 
 This then is the beginning of philosophy, a man's percep- 
 tion of the state of his ruling faculty ; for when a man knows 
 that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the 
 greatest difficulty. But at present, if men can not swallow 
 even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to de- 
 vour them ; and this is the reason why they vomit them up 
 or suffer indigestion : and then come gripings, defluxes, and 
 fevers. 4 Such men ought to consider what their ability 
 is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person; 
 but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be con- 
 vinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But
 
 DISCOURSES 75 
 
 Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected 
 to examination. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 x This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General prin- 
 ciples are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the 
 application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to under- 
 stand general principles of law which are true and good ? But in practice 
 cases are presented to us which as Bacon says, are "immersed in mat- 
 ter;" and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the 
 principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It 
 is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the 
 rules of life; but the difficulty of applying them is that in which the 
 young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be 
 taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered ; 
 but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion 
 and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know 
 this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to 
 the practice of them by the only method which is possible; and this 
 method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who 
 direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons 
 live. 
 
 * "Such an intention" appears to mean "the intention of learning." 
 "The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philoso- 
 phy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of dis- 
 play." Wolf. 
 
 * This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae, or of the Roman 
 equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly ex- 
 pressed by "sexagies centena millia H. S.," or simply by "sexagies." 
 
 4 Seneca, "De Tranquillitate animi," says : "What is the use of count- 
 less books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life 
 the tables of contents? The number only confuses a learner, does not 
 instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than 
 to wander through many."
 
 CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS 
 WE SHOULD PROVIDE AGAINST THEM 
 
 APPEARANCES are to us in four ways: for either 
 things appear as they are; or they are not, and do 
 not even appear to be; or they are, and do not ap- 
 pear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. 
 Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit 
 the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever 
 it is that annoys (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply 
 a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho 1 and of the Academ- 
 ics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy 
 to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which 
 some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let 
 us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, 
 we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we 
 find against habit? The contrary habit. You hear the 
 ignorant say : "That unfortunate person is dead : his father 
 and mother are overpowered with sorrow; 2 he was cut off 
 by an untimely death and in a foreign land." Hear the 
 contrary way of speaking : Tear yourself from these expres- 
 sions: oppose to one habit the contrary habit; to sophistry 
 oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason; 
 against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have 
 manifest praecognitions ( apo^-fieis ) , cleared of all impurities 
 and ready to hand. 
 
 When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in 
 readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death 
 is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall 
 I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of 
 Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way : I will go and I am 
 resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to an- 
 other the opportunity of doing so; if I can not succeed in 
 doing any thing myself, I will not grudge another the doing 
 of something noble. Suppose that it is above our power 
 to act thus ; is it not in our power to reason thus ? Tell me 
 
 76
 
 DISCOURSES 77 
 
 where I can escape death : discover for me the country, show 
 me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. 
 Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, 
 what do you wish me to do ? I can not escape from death. 
 Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die la- 
 menting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is 
 this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. 
 Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my 
 wish, I change them ; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out 
 the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is 
 not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure 
 the falling into evil. Then at last, when I am neither able 
 to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who 
 hinders me, I sit down and groan and abuse whom I can, 
 Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for 
 me, what are they to me ? Yes, but you will be an impious 
 man. In what respect then will it be worse for me than it 
 is now? To sum up, remember this that unless piety and 
 your interest be in the same thing, piety can not be main- 
 tained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary 
 (true) ? 
 
 Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and 
 make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure 
 for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence 
 of common consent (opinion). If I had a suit even about 
 a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. 
 With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which 
 belongs to the matter in hand. 3 How indeed perception is 
 effected, whether through the whole body or any part, per- 
 haps I can not explain : for both opinions perplex me. But 
 that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect cer- 
 tainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow 
 anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own. 
 When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, 
 but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you your- 
 selves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the 
 senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he 
 intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill ? 
 
 What then ? Ought we not with all our power to hold to 
 this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortify-
 
 78 EPICTETUS 
 
 ing ourselves against the arguments which are directed 
 against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well, 
 he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as 
 to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly 
 broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better 
 on something else. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 * Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to have 
 accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition. The time 
 of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety. 
 
 *Aittii>teTo does not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother 
 is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides, Alcestis, v. 825 : 
 
 a.7tGDA.OJLl(TQa 1ta.VT.e,y OV KEtYTf /J.OV 
 
 * " The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and 
 the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this: 
 whether there is a criterion of truth ; and in the first place, the question 
 is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those 
 things which are perceived by the senses." Schweighftuser. 
 
 The strength of the Stoic system was that "it furnishes a ground- 
 work of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which 
 to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life : on the other 
 hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the 
 word, was abandoned." Levin's Six Lectures, p. 70.
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN ; AND WHAT 
 ARE THE SMALL AND THE GREAT THINGS AMONG MEN 1 
 
 WHAT is the cause of assenting to anything? The 
 fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible 
 then to assent to that which appears not to be 
 true. Why? Because this is the nature of the 
 understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with 
 the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. 
 What is the proof of this? Imagine (persuade yourself), 
 if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take 
 away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. 
 Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the 
 stars are even in number. 2 It is impossible. When then 
 any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did 
 not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwill- 
 ingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity 
 seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of 
 the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood ? We have 
 the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable 
 and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and 
 that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a 
 man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? 
 He can not. How says Medea ? 3 
 
 " Tis true I know what evil I shall do, 
 But passion overpowers the better counsel." 
 
 She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance 
 on her husband was more profitable than to spare her chil- 
 dren. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her plainly 
 that she is deceived, and she will not do it ; but so long as you 
 do not show it, what can she follow except that which ap- 
 pears to herself (her opinion) ? Nothing else. Why then 
 are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been 
 bewildered about the most important things, and is become 
 a viper instead of a human creature? And why not, if 
 
 79
 
 8o EPICTETUS 
 
 it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, 
 so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which 
 are supreme? 
 
 Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the 
 measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion), 
 whether the thing appears good or bad : if good, he is free 
 from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is 
 impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and 
 he who suffers another person whoever remembers this 
 will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any 
 man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel 
 with any man. 
 
 So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this 
 origin, in the appearance (opinion) ? Yes, this origin and 
 no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and 
 the use of appearances. It appeared 4 to Alexander to carry 
 off the wife of Menelaus : it appeared to Helene to follow 
 him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it 
 was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have 
 happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but 
 the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great 
 things depend? But what do you mean by such great 
 things ? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of 
 many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is 
 it nothing? But what great matter is the death of many 
 oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks 
 being burnt or destroyed? Are these things then like those? 
 Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of 
 oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the 
 nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? 
 Or show me what is the difference between a man's house 
 and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling; except that 
 man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, 
 and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork 
 and a man then like things ? What say you ? In body they 
 are very much alike. 
 
 Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork ? Don't 
 suppose that I say so ; but there is no difference in these mat- 
 ters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the differ- 
 ence? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in 
 another matter. See whether it is not in a man the under-
 
 DISCOURSES 8 1 
 
 standing of what he does, see if it is not in social community, 
 in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. 
 Where then is the great good and evil in men ? It is where 
 the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains 
 fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, 
 nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved; but if any 
 of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the 
 man too perishes ; and in this consist the great things. Alex- 
 ander, you say, sustained great damage then when the 
 Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when 
 his brothers perished. By no means ; for no man is damaged 
 by an action which is not his own; but what happened at 
 that time was only the destruction of stork's nests : now the 
 ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of 
 modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. 
 When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? 
 Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when 
 he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was at Troy not 
 to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin 
 of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of 
 cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are 
 corrupted. 
 
 When then women are carried off, when children are 
 made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not 
 evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these 
 opinions? Explain this to me also. I shall not do that; 
 but how is it that you say that these are not evils ? Let us 
 come to the rules; produce the praecognitions ( TrpoA^cts).: 
 for it is because this is neglected that we can not sufficiently 
 wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of 
 weights, we do not judge by guess : where we intend to 
 judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. 
 In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in 
 any matter, never will any man among us do anything by 
 guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the 
 only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or un- 
 happiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we 
 are inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like 
 scales (balance), nothing like a rule: but some appearance 
 is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I
 
 82 EPICTETUS 
 
 then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, 
 so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many 
 evils : and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me ? 
 And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus 
 of Euripides, what is it? An appearance. The CEdipus of 
 Sophocles, what is it? An appearance. The Phoenix? An 
 appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What 
 kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no 
 regard to this matter ? And what is the name of those who 
 follow every appearance? They are called madmen. Do 
 we then act at all differently? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See Chapter 18 of this book. 
 
 1 We can not conceive that the number^ of stars is either even or odd. 
 The construction of the word a.Ttoitdcrx Elv is uncertain, for says 
 Schweighauser, the word is found only here. 
 
 1 The Medea of Euripides, 1079. 
 
 4 This is the literal version. It does not mean "that it appeared right," 
 as Mrs. Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was 
 right or wrong. All that appeared to him v/as the possessing of Helene, 
 and he used the means for getting possession of her, as a dog who spies 
 and pursues some wild animal.
 
 CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS ) 
 
 THE being (nature) of the Good is a certain Will; the 
 being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What 
 then are externals? Materials for the Will, about 
 which the will being conversant shall obtain its own 
 good or evil. How shall it obtain the good. If it does not 
 admire (overvalue) the materials; for the opinions about 
 the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good : 
 but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. 
 God has fixed this law, and says, "If you would have any 
 thing good, receive it from yourself." You say, No, but I 
 will have it from another. Do not so: but receive it from 
 yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls 
 me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put 
 you in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my feet. 
 If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my 
 head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say, You 
 threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me 
 with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten 
 you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern 
 me, he does not threaten me at all ; but if I fear any of them, 
 it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the 
 master of what? The master of things which are in my 
 own power ? There is no such master. Do I fear the mas- 
 ter of things which are not in my power? And what are 
 these things to me? 
 
 Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I 
 hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the 
 power over things which they possess ? Take my poor body, 
 take my property, take my reputation, take those who are 
 about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, 
 they may truly accuse me. Yes, but I intend to command 
 your opinions also. And who has given you this power? 
 How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By 
 applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you 
 
 83
 
 84 EPICTETUS 
 
 not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered 
 by another? But nothing else can conquer Will except the 
 Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most 
 powerful and most just, which is this : Let the stronger 
 always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than 
 one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for 
 dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man 
 has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which 
 they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker? If 
 the one possesses right opinions and the others do not. 
 Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it 
 possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the 
 heavier draw down the scale in which it is. 
 
 How strange then that Socrates should have been so 
 treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates ? 
 Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body 
 of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to 
 prison by stronger men, and that any one should have 
 given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it 
 should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange, 
 do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things 
 blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these 
 things? Where then for him was the nature of good? 
 Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does 
 Socrates say? Anytus and Melitus 1 can kill me, but they 
 can not hurt me : and further, he says, "If it so pleases God, 
 so let it be." 
 
 But show me that he who has the inferior principles over- 
 powers him who is superior in principles. You will never 
 show this, nor come near showing it ; for this is the law of 
 nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower 
 the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior. 
 One body is stronger than another : many are stronger than 
 one : the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This 
 is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakeful- 
 ness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the 
 lamp at this price : for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless 
 fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good 
 bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, 
 and is drawing me to the public place : then others bawl out,
 
 DISCOURSES 85 
 
 "Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see 
 you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded." 
 And what system of philosophy (eta-ay wy f}v) could I have 
 made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my 
 cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should 
 have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not 
 be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have 
 learned to see that everything which happens, if it be inde- 
 pendent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you 
 have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage 
 in any thing else than in that in which you have learned that 
 advantage is? 
 
 Then sitting in prison I say: The man who cries out 
 in this way neither hears what words mean, nor understands 
 what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philoso- 
 phers say or what they do. Let him alone. 
 
 But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your 
 prison. If you have no further need of me in prison, I 
 come out : if you should have need of me again, I will enter 
 the prison. How long will you act thus ? So long as reason 
 requires me to be with the body : but when reason does not 
 require this, take away the body, and fare you well. Only 
 we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any 
 slight reason ; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it 
 to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabit- 
 ants in it. But if he sounds the signals for retreat, as he 
 did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as 
 if he were a general. 2 
 
 Well then, ought we to say such things to the many? 
 Why should we? Is it not enough for a man to be per- 
 suaded himself? When children come clapping their hands 
 and crying out, "To-day is the good Saturnalia," do we say, 
 "The Saturnalia are not good" ? By no means, but we clap 
 our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to 
 make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, 
 and clap your hands with him ; and if you do not choose to 
 do this, keep silent. 
 
 A man must keep this in mind; and when he is called to 
 any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come 
 for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come
 
 86 EPICTETUS 
 
 into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has 
 practised the resolution of syllogisms ; and if any person pro- 
 poses to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather propose to 
 me a syllogism which is skilfully complicated that I may 
 exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissatisfied with 
 slight young men, and say, "He can not lift me." "This is 
 a youth of noble disposition." [You do not so] ; but when 
 the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, "I 
 wish that I had learned more." A little more of what ? If 
 you did not learn these things in order to show them in prac- 
 tice, why did you learn them? I think that there is some 
 one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a 
 woman in labour, and saying, "Oh, that such a difficulty 
 does not present itself to me as that which has come to this 
 man ; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when 
 I might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one an- 
 nounce to me such a contest?" Such ought to be the dis- 
 position of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar 
 (the Emperor) there are some who complain grievously that 
 they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer 
 up prayers to God and address themselves to their superin- 
 tendents intreating that they may fight. 3 And will no one 
 among you show himself such? I would willingly take a 
 voyage [to Rome] for this purpose and see what my athlete 
 is doing, how he is studying his subject. I do not choose 
 such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your power to take 
 what subject you choose? There has been given to you 
 such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such 
 a country, such a place in your country : then you come to 
 me and say, Change my subject. Have you not abilities 
 which enable you to manage the subject which has been 
 given to you? [You ought to say] : It is your business to 
 propose ; it is mine to exercise myself well. However, you 
 do not say so, but you say, "Do not propose to me such a 
 tropic, 4 but such [as I would choose] :do not urge against me 
 such an objection, but such [as I would choose]." There 
 will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that 
 they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak. 5 I 
 say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter 
 something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor
 
 DISCOURSES 87 
 
 or a buffoon ; for both of you have all the rest in common. 
 If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins 
 and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, 
 is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain? If he has 
 voice, he still remains. 
 
 An example of another kind. "Assume the governorship 
 of a province." I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I 
 show how an instructed man behaves. "Lay aside the lati- 
 clave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing yourself 
 in rags, come forward in this character." What then have I 
 not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing 
 something that I ought to do) ? How then do you now ap- 
 pear (on the stage of life) ? As a witness summoned by 
 God. "Come forward, 6 you, and bear testimony for me, for 
 you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me: 
 is any thing external to the will good or bad ? Do I hurt any 
 man? have I made every man's interest dependent on any 
 man except himself? What testimony do you give for 
 God?" I am in a wretched condition, Master 7 (Lord), and 
 I am unfortunate; no man cares for me, no man gives me 
 anything ; all blame me, all speak ill of me. Is this the evi- 
 dence that you are going to give, and disgrace his summons, 
 who has conferred so much honour on you, and thought you 
 worthy of being called to bear such testimony ? 
 
 But suppose that he who has the power has declared, "I 
 judge you to be impious and profane." What has happened 
 to you? I have been judged to be impious and profane? 
 Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same person had 
 passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism (a-vrjvuntvov), 
 and had made a declaration, "the conclusion that, if it is day, 
 it is light, I declare to be false," what has happened to the 
 hypothetical syllogism? who is judged in this case? who has 
 been condemned ? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who 
 has been deceived by it? Does he then who has the power 
 of making any declaration about you know what is pious or 
 impious? Has he studied it, and has he learned it? 
 Where? From whom? Then is it the fact that a musician 
 pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest chord 
 in the lyre is the highest ; nor yet a geometrician, if he de- 
 clares that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circum-
 
 88 EPICTETUS 
 
 ference are not equal ; and shall he who is really instructed 
 pay any regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces 
 judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is 
 just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the in- 
 structed. Did they learn this here? 
 
 Will you not leave the small arguments (Tioydpia) about 
 these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit 
 in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no 
 one gives them any thing; and will you not come forward 
 and make use of what you have learned ? For it is not these 
 small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the 
 Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is 
 wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his 
 acts shall bear testimony to his words. Assume, I intreat 
 you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools 
 the examples of the ancients, but may have some example 
 of our own. 
 
 To whom then does the contemplation of these matters 
 (philosophical inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure, 
 for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is 
 shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do : 
 we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen 
 at one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the lute- 
 player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has 
 taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time 
 looks round : then if any one calls out his master's name, the 
 slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shame- 
 ful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature. 
 For what is a master? Man is not the master of man; but 
 death is, and life and pleasure and pain; for if he comes 
 without these things, bring Caesar to me and you will see 
 how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things, 
 thundering and lightning, 8 and when I am afraid of them, 
 what do I do then except to recognize my master like the 
 runaway slave? But so long as I have any respite from 
 these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so do 
 I : I bathe, I drink, I sing ; but all this I do with terror and 
 uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters, 
 that is from those things by means of which masters are
 
 DISCOURSES 89 
 
 formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have 
 I still? 
 
 What then, ought we to publish these things to all men? 
 No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant 9 
 (rois tSidorait) and to say : "This man recommends to 
 me that which he thinks good for himself : I excuse him." 
 For Socrates also excused the jailor, who had the charge of 
 him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to 
 drink the poison, and said, "How generously he laments over 
 us." 11 Does he then say to the jailor that "for this reason we 
 have sent away the women?" No, but he says it to his 
 friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he treats 
 the jailor as a child. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 'The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, c. 18; 
 Epictetus, ii. 2, 15). 
 
 1 Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was con- 
 tent to die, and thought that it was a good thing; and this was the 
 reason why he made such a defence as he did, which brought on him 
 condemnation ; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreat- 
 ing the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things 
 unworthy of himself, as others did. Plato, Apology, cc. 29-33. 
 
 1 The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and 
 that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii. 16). Seneca says (De Provi-d. 
 c. 4), "I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of 
 C- Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibi- 
 tions: 'What a glorious period of life is wasting.'" "Virtue," says Sen- 
 eca, "is eager after dangers ; and it considers only what it seeks, not 
 what it may suffer." Upton. 
 
 'Tropic (rpoitiKov) a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweig- 
 hauser translates "propositio connexa in syllogismp hypothetico." 
 
 The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is 
 set before you: as we say, you are not content "to do your duty in that 
 state of life unto which it shall please God to call you." Now this is as 
 foolish, says Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his ad- 
 versary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man's 
 own case. 
 
 ' There will be a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their 
 business is, but will think that it is all show. So. says Wolf, philoso- 
 phers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and 
 morals what they really are ; or they will be like false monks, who only 
 wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity. 
 
 * God is introduced as speaking. SchweighSuser. 
 
 T The word is Kvpios, the name by which a slave in Epictetus ad- 
 dresses his master (dominus), a physician is addressed by his patient, 
 and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists. 
 They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24), and Jesus is ad- 
 dressed by the same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master.
 
 90 EPICTETUS 
 
 Mrs. Carter has the following note : "It hath been observed that this 
 manner of expression is not to be met with in the heathen anthors be- 
 fore Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture language 
 coming early into common use." 
 
 But the word (Kvpioe,) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one 
 who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Roman "dominus" 
 as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictetus 
 was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before 
 his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two cen- 
 turies before, the Christian era, and the New Testament writers would 
 use the Greek word which was current in their age. The notion of 
 "Scripture language coming early into common use" is entirely un- 
 founded, and is even absurd. Mrs. Carter's remark implies that Epicte- 
 tus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular lan- 
 guage of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New 
 Testament writers would do the same. There are resemblances between 
 the language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as 
 the expression /*?) ysvoiro of Paul, which Epictetus often uses; but this 
 is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ep. ii. i, 4), "that by these 
 ye might be partakers of the divine nature," are a Stoic expression, and 
 the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the 
 Stoics. 
 
 8 Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristo- 
 phanes. (Acharn. 531), where it is said of Pericles: 
 
 "He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas." 
 
 *He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word "Idiotae," 
 "idiots," which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiota was a pri- 
 vate individual as opposed to one who filled some public office ; and 
 thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any par- 
 ticular act, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy. 
 
 "Compare the Phaedon of Plato (p. 116). The children of Socrates 
 were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died ; 
 and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his 
 death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before 
 he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away 
 lamenting and bewailing.
 
 CHAPTER XXX 
 
 WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY IN DIFFICULT CIRCUM- 
 STANCES 1 
 
 WHEN you are going in to any great personage, re- 
 member that another also from above sees what 
 is going on, and that you ought to please him 
 rather than the other. He then who sees from 
 above asks you : "In the schools what used you to say about 
 exile and bonds and death and disgrace?" I used to say that 
 they are things indifferent (neither good nor bad). "What 
 then do you say of them now? Are they changed at all?" 
 No. "Are you changed then?" No. "Tell me then what 
 things are indifferent?" The things which are independent 
 of the will. "Tell me, also, what follows from this." The 
 things which are independent of the will are nothing to me. 
 "Tell me also about the Good, what was your opinion ?" A 
 will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appear- 
 ances. "And the end (purpose), what is it?" To follow 
 thee. "Do you say this now also ?" I say the same now also. 
 Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember 
 these things; and you will see what a youth is who has 
 studied these things when he is among men who have not 
 studied them. I indeed imagine that you will have such 
 thoughts as these : Why do we make so great and so many 
 preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which men 
 name power? Is this the antechamber? this the men of the 
 bed-chamber? this the armed guards? Is it for this that I 
 listened to so many discourses? All this is nothing: but I 
 have been preparing myself as for something great. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 The reader may understand why Epictetus gave such a lesson as 
 this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time lived.
 
 BOOK II 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THAT COURAGE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION 
 
 THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some 
 to be a paradox; but still let us examine as well as 
 we can, if it is true that it is possible to do every- 
 thing both with caution and with confidence. For 
 caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and 
 contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to 
 many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in 
 my opinion is of this kind : if we asserted that we ought to 
 employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might 
 justly accuse us of bringing together things which can not be 
 united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said? 
 for if these things are true, which have been often said and 
 often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appear- 
 ances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things inde- 
 pendent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor 
 of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say 
 that where things are not dependent on the will, there you 
 should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on 
 the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad 
 consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to 
 be used where things are dependent on the will. But if 
 things independent of the will and not in our power are noth- 
 ing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence; 
 and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed 
 confident because of our caution. For by employing cau- 
 tion towards things which are really bad, it will result that 
 we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not 
 so. 
 
 92
 
 DISCOURSES 93 
 
 We are then in the condition of deer j 1 when they flee from 
 the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and 
 in what do they seek refuge as safe ? They turn to the nets, 
 and thus they perish by confounding things which are ob- 
 jects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus 
 we also act : in what cases do we fear ? In things which are 
 independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do 
 we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In 
 things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to 
 act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek some- 
 thing, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in 
 things which are independent of our will. But where there 
 is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run 
 away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we 
 may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest 
 matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to 
 nature, into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness ; 
 and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice 
 and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if 
 a man should transfer caution to those things in which the 
 will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will imme- 
 diately by willing to be cautious have also the power of 
 avoiding what he chooses : but if he transfer it to the things 
 which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid 
 the things which are in the power of others, he will of neces- 
 sity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For 
 death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. 
 For this reason we commend the poet 2 who said 
 
 " Not death is evil, but a shameful death." 
 
 Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against 
 death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we 
 do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to 
 escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness, 
 rashness and indifference. These things Socrates properly 
 used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear 
 terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected 
 in like manner by events (the things which happen in life) 
 for no other reason than children are by masks. For what
 
 94 EPICTETUS 
 
 is a child ? Ignorance. What is a child ? Want of know- 
 ledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way 
 inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it 
 and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must 
 be separated 3 from the spirit either now or later as it was sep- 
 arated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be 
 separated now ? for if it is not separated now, it will be sep- 
 arated afterwards. Why ? That the period of the universe 
 may be completed, 4 for it has need of the present, and of the 
 future, and of the past. What is pain ? A mask. Turn it 
 and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on 
 the contrary smoothly. If this does no.t satisfy (please) 
 you, the door is open: if it does, bear (with things). For 
 the door ought to be open for all occasions ; and so we have 
 no trouble. 
 
 What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which 
 ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those 
 who are really educated ; release from perturbation, release 
 from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not be- 
 lieve the many, who say that free persons only ought to be 
 educated, but -we should rather believe the philosophers who 
 say that the educated only are free. How is this ? In this 
 manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of liv- 
 ing as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men, 
 do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then 
 who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear? 
 Do you wish to live in sorrow ? Do you wish to live in per- 
 turbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state 
 of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free ; but whoever is de- 
 livered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at 
 the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can 
 we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you 
 say, We only allow free persons to be educated ? For phi- 
 losophers say we allow none to be free except the educated ; 
 that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned 3 
 round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing? 
 He has done something. What? He has turned round his 
 own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more? 
 Yes : he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twen- 
 tieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this
 
 DISCOURSES 95 
 
 ceremony become free? No more than he is become free 
 from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round 
 (free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl 
 or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant ? why 
 do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial 
 (danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often 
 say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which 
 you may determine what those things are with reference to 
 which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those 
 things with reference to which you ought to be cautious: 
 courageous in that which does not depend on your will ; cau- 
 tious in that which does depend on it. 
 
 Well have I not read to you, 6 and do you not know what 
 I was doing ? In what ? In my little dissertations. Show me 
 how you are with respect to desire and aversion (eKKfao-iv) : 
 and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish, 
 and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid : 
 but as to these long and laboured sentences you will take 
 them and blot them out. 
 
 What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so 
 much ? 7 But how ? As he could not always have at hand 
 one to argue against his principles or to be argued against 
 in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he 
 was always treating at least some one subject in a practical 
 way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But 
 little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he 
 leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who 
 being free from perturbations 8 have leisure, or to such as 
 are too foolish to reckon consequences. 
 
 And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and 
 display those things which you possess, and recite them, and 
 make an idle show, and say, See how I make dialogues ? Do 
 not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disap- 
 pointed of that which I desire : See how I do not fall into 
 that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you 
 will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condem- 
 nation. This is the proper display of a young man who is 
 come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and 
 let no one ever hear you say a word about these things ; and 
 if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but
 
 96 EPICTETUS 
 
 think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show 
 that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your 
 desire and how never to fall into that which you would 
 avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and 
 syllogisms : do you labour at thinking about death, 9 chains, 
 the rack, exile; 10 and do all this with confidence and reliance 
 on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has 
 judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed 
 you will show what things the rational governing power 
 can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are 
 not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox 
 will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a 
 man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous : 
 courageous towards the things which do not depend on the 
 will, and cautious in things which are within the power of 
 the will. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers 
 of various colours on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards 
 the nets. Virgil, Georg. iii. 372 
 
 Puniceaeve agitant pavidos formidine pennae. 
 
 * Euripides, Fragments. 
 
 8 It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion 
 of the divinity sent down into human bodies. 
 
 4 This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert. 
 vii. 137) speaks of God as "in certain periods or revolutions of time 
 exhausting into himself the universal substance (ovcria) and again 
 generating it out of himself." Antoninus (xi. i) speaks of the periodi- 
 cal renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the 
 doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then 
 being renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most 
 men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the 
 present and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of 
 all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds 
 above the paltry things which others prize above their worth. 
 
 4 This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a 
 slave before the praetor. 
 
 The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established 
 in B.C. 356 and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax 
 being paid by the master; but in iii. 26, he speaks of it as paid by the 
 enfranchised slave. 
 
 * These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has 
 written. 
 
 7 No other author speaks of Socrates having written any thing. It 
 is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who 
 took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Soc-
 
 DISCOURSES 97 
 
 rates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have 
 spoken of talking as if it were writing; for he must have known that 
 Socrates was not a writer. 
 
 "The word is vnb drapa&ag. Mrs. Carter thinks that the true 
 reading is vito aitpa^iae,, ' through idleness ' or ' having nothing to dp ' ; 
 and she remarks that 'freedom from perturbations' is the very thing 
 that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and 
 is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore can not be well supposed 
 to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt 
 It is probable that Mrs. Carter is right. Upton thinks that Epictetus 
 is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as 
 speaking ironically; and this may also be right. Schweighftuser at- 
 tempts to explain the passage by taking 'free from perturbations' in 
 the ordinary simple sense ; but I doubt if he has succeeded. 
 
 '"The whole life of philosophers," says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), follow- 
 ing Plato, "is a reflection upon death." 
 
 Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, tor- 
 ture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common 
 accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently en- 
 deavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected 
 that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman em- 
 perors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually lia- 
 ble to such kind of dangers." Mrs. Carter. All men even now are 
 exposed to accidents and misfortunes against which there- is no security, 
 and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of 
 Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION) 
 
 CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you 
 wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. 
 For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to 
 nature, you have every security, every facility, you 
 have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in 
 your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content 
 with these, what else do you care for ? For who is the mas- 
 ter of such things? Who can take them away? If you 
 choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to 
 be so ? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who 
 shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not 
 to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not 
 think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will 
 determine against you something that appears formidable; 
 but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can 
 he do that ? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoid- 
 ing of them are in your power, what else do you care for? 
 Let this be your preface, 1 this your narrative, this your con- 
 firmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your 
 applause (or the approbation which you will receive). 
 
 Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him 
 to prepare for his trial, 2 "Do you not think then that I have 
 been preparing for it all my life?" By what kind of prepara- 
 tion? "I have maintained that which was in my own 
 power." How then? "I have never done anything unjust 
 either in my private or in my public life." 
 
 But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor 
 body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise 
 you to make from this moment all possible preparation, and 
 then consider both the nature of your judge and your adver- 
 sary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his 
 knees ; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you 
 have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave 
 and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave, 
 
 98
 
 DISCOURSES 99 
 
 and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or 
 the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or unin- 
 structed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure 
 to be beaten until you die or yield at once ; and let it not hap- 
 pen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if 
 these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the 
 nature of evil and good ? It is where truth is : where truth is 
 and where nature is, there is caution : where truth is, there 
 is courage where nature is. 
 
 For what do you think? do you think that, if Socrates 
 had wished to preserve externals, he would have come for- 
 ward and said : "Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, 
 but to harm me they are not able?" Was he so foolish as not 
 to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and 
 fortune, but to another end ? What is the reason then that 
 he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates 
 them ? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had 
 a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to 
 the judges ( StKao-rais ) that his case was just, said when he 
 had come to the peroration of his speech, "I will neither in- 
 treat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it 
 is you rather than I who are on your trial." And thus he 
 ended the business. What need was there of this? Only 
 do not intreat; but do not also say, "I do not intreat;" unless 
 there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was 
 the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such 
 a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order 
 to submit to trial ? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and 
 the cross will come : but if you choose to submit and to plead 
 your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consist- 
 ent with this object, provided you maintain what is your 
 own (your proper character). 
 
 For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, Suggest some- 
 thing to me 3 (tell me what to do). What should I suggest 
 to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself 
 to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is 
 ignorant of letters should say, "Tell me what to write when 
 any name is proposed to me." For if I should tell him to 
 write Dion, and then another should come and propose to 
 him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be
 
 IOO EPICTETUS 
 
 done? what will he write? But if you have practised writ- 
 ing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that 
 is required. If 4 you are not, what can I now suggest ? For 
 if circumstances require something else, what will you say, 
 or what will you do? Remember then this general precept 
 and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after ex- 
 ternals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obe- 
 dience to the will of your master. And who is the master ? 
 He who has the power over the things which you seek to 
 gain or try or avoid. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech. 
 
 * Xenophon has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of 
 Hermogenes. 
 
 "The meaning is, You must not ask for advice when you are come 
 into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to be 
 ready on all occasions to act as he ought; just as he who knows how 
 to write can write any name which is proposed to him." Wolf. 
 
 4 "The reader must know that these dissertations were spoken ex- 
 tempore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts 
 of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when the dis- 
 course is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from perturba- 
 tions, Epictetus should now speak of philosophical preparation, which 
 is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness." Wolf.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 DIOGENES said well to one who asked from him 
 letters of recommendation, "That you are a man, 
 he said, he will know as soon as he sees you; and 
 he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is 
 by experience skilful to distinguish the good and the bad; 
 but if he is without experience, he will never know, if I write 
 to him ten thousand times." 1 For it is just the same as if 
 a drachma (a piece of silver money) asked to be recom- 
 mended to a person to be tested. If he is skilful in testing 
 silver, he will know what you are, for you (the drachma) 
 will recommend yourself. We ought then in life also to 
 have some skill as in the case of silver coin that a man may 
 be able to say like the judge of silver. Bring me any 
 drachma and I will test it. But in the case of syllogisms, 
 I would say, Bring any man that you please, and I will dis- 
 tinguish for you the man who knows how to resolve syllo- 
 gisms and the man who does not. Why ? Because I know 
 how to resolve syllogisms. I have the power, which a man 
 must have who is able to discover those who have the power 
 of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act ? At one 
 time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. What is 
 the reason? The contrary to that which is in the case of 
 syllogisms, ignorance and inexperience. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 Mrs. Carter says "This is one of the many extravagant refinements 
 of the philosophers; and might lead persons into very dangerous mis- 
 takes, if it was laid down as a maxim in ordinary life." I think that 
 Mrs. Carter has not seen the meaning of Epictetus. The philosopher 
 will discover the man's character by trying him, as the assayer tries the 
 silver by a test. 
 
 Cicero (De legibus, i. 9) says that the face expresses the hidden char- 
 acter. Euripides (Medea, 518) says better, that no mark is impressed 
 on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad. 
 Shakespere says 
 
 "There's no art 
 To find the mind's construction in the face." 
 
 Macbeth, act i. sc. 4. 
 
 101
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAD ONCE BEEN DETECTED IN 
 ADULTERY 
 
 AS Epictetus was saying that man is formed for fidelity, 
 and that he who subverts fidelity subverts the pecu- 
 liar characteristic of men, there entered one of those 
 who are considered to be men of letters, who had 
 once been detected in adultery in the city. Then Epictetus 
 continued, But if we lay aside this fidelity for which we are 
 formed and make designs against our neighbour's wife, what 
 are we doing? What else but destroying and overthrow- 
 ing? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of modesty, the 
 man of sanctity. Is this all ? And are we not overthrow- 
 ing neighbourhood, and friendship, and the community ; and 
 in what place are we putting ourselves ? How shall I con- 
 sider you, man? As a neighbour, as a friend ? What kind 
 of one ? As a citizen ? Wherein shall I trust you ? So if 
 you were an utensil so worthless that a man could not use 
 you, you would be pitched out on the dung heaps, and no 
 man would pick you up. But if being a man you are unable 
 to fill any place which befits a man, what shall we do with 
 you? For suppose that you can not hold the place of a 
 friend, can you hold the place of a slave? And who will 
 trust you? Are you not then content that you also should 
 be pitched somewhere on a dung heap, as a useless utensil, 
 and a bit of dung ? Then will you say, no man cares for me, 
 a man of letters? They do not, because you are bad and 
 useless. It is just as if the wasps complained because no 
 man cares for them, but all fly from them, and if a man can, 
 he strikes them and knocks them down. You have such a 
 sting that you throw into trouble and pain any man that you 
 wound with it. What would you have us do with you? 
 You have no place where you can be put. 
 
 "What then, are not women common by nature P" 1 So I 
 say also ; for a little pig is common to all the invited guests, 
 but when the portions have been distributed, go, if you think 
 
 102
 
 DISCOURSES 103 
 
 it right, and snatch up the portion of him who reclines next 
 to you, or slily steal it, or place your hand down by it and 
 lay hold of it, and if you can tear away a bit of the meat, 
 grease your fingers and lick them. A fine companion over 
 cups, and Socratic guest indeed! Well, is not the theatre 
 common to the citizens? When then they have taken their 
 seats, come, if you think proper, and eject one of them. In 
 this way women also are common by nature. When then 
 the legislator, like the master of a feast, has disturbed them, 
 will you not also look for your own portion and not filch and 
 handle what belongs to another. " But I am a man of letters 
 and understand Archedemus." 2 Understand Archedemus 
 then, and be an adulterer, and faithless, and instead of a 
 man, be a wolf or an ape ; for what is the difference ? 3 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 It is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature in 
 any rational sense. Zeno and his school said "it is their opinion also 
 that the women should be common among the wise, so that any man 
 should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in 
 the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato; and we shall 
 love all the children equally like fathers, and the jealousy about adultery 
 will be removed." These wise men knew little about human nature, if 
 they taught such doctrines. 
 
 * Archedemus was a Stoic philosopher of Tarsus. We know little 
 about him. 
 
 ' A man may be a philosopher or pretend to be ; and at the same time 
 he may be a beast
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE 
 
 THINGS themselves (material) are indifferent; 1 but the 
 use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a 
 man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the 
 same time be careful and neither rash nor negligent ? 
 If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are in- 
 different; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what 
 the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the 
 cast of the dice, this is my business. 2 Thus then in life also 
 the chief business is this: distinguish and separate things, 
 and say, Externals are not in my power : will is in my power. 
 Where shall I seek the good and the bad? Within, in the 
 things which are my own. But in what does not belong 
 to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage 
 or any thing of the kind. 
 
 What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In 
 no way : for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of 
 the will, and consequently against nature; but we should 
 act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should 
 also act with firmness and freedom from perturbations be- 
 cause the material is indifferent. For where the material is 
 not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me. 
 Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of 
 those things is not in my power, nor is it good or bad ; but 
 the use is either bad or good, and the use is in my power. 
 But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these two 
 things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the mat- 
 ter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has 
 no regard for it ; but it is not impossible : and if it is, happi- 
 ness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case 
 of a voyage. What can I do ? I can choose the master of 
 the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes 
 a storm. What more have I to care for? for my part is 
 done. The business belongs to another, the master. But 
 the ship is sinking what then have I to do ? I do the only 
 
 104
 
 DISCOURSES IO5 
 
 thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor scream- 
 ing nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been pro- 
 duced must also perish : for I am not an immortal being, but 
 a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day : 
 I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. 
 What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away, 
 whether by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass 
 through some such means? 
 
 This is just what you will see those doing who play at 
 ball skilfully. No one cares about the ball 3 as being good 
 or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this there- 
 fore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment, 
 so that even if I spread out my lap I may not be able to 
 catch it, and another, if I throw, may catch the ball. But if 
 with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what 
 kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady, 
 and how shall a man see the order in the game? But one 
 will say, "Throw ;" or "Do not throw ;" and another will say, 
 "You have thrown once." This is quarrelling, not play. 
 
 Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How? By 
 using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. "Tell me," 
 he says, "Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in 
 God. The Daemons (Safcovei) , who are they, think you? Are 
 they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men?" 
 When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, "Who then, think 
 you, can believe that there are mules (half asses), but not 
 asses." And this he said as if he were playing at ball. 4 And 
 what was the ball in this case? Life, chains, banishment, a 
 draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving chil- 
 dren orphans. These were the things which he was playing ; 
 but still he did play and threw the ball skilfully. So we 
 should do : we must employ all the care of the players, but 
 show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought 
 by all means to apply our art to some external material, not 
 as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our 
 art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but ex- 
 ercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you 
 food and property and is able to take them away and your 
 poor body also. When then you have received the material, 
 work on it. If then you come out (of the trial) without 
 8
 
 IO6 EPICTETUS 
 
 having suffered anything, all who meet you will congratulate 
 you on your escape; but he who knows how to look at such 
 things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the 
 matter, will commend you and be pleased with you; and if 
 he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper 
 behaviour, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is 
 reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonable. 
 
 How then is it said that some external things are accord- 
 ing to nature and others contrary to nature? It is said as 
 it might be said if we were separated from union (or so- 
 ciety) : for to the foot I shall say that it is according to na- 
 ture for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot and as a 
 thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step 
 into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut 
 off for the good of the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer 
 a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves 
 also. What are you? A man. If you consider yourself 
 as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live 
 to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider 
 yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the 
 sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at 
 another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at an- 
 other time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. 
 Why then are you troubled ? Do you not know, that as a foot 
 is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are 
 no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For 
 what is a man ? A part of a state, of that first which con- 
 sists of Gods and of men ; then of that which is called next 
 to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What 
 then must I be brought to trial ; must another have a fever, 
 another sail on the sea, another die, and another be con- 
 demned ? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a 
 universe of things, among so many living together, that such 
 things should not happen, some to one and others to others. 
 It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you 
 ought, to arrange these things as it is fit. 5 Then some one 
 says, "I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much 
 good may it do you : I have done my part ; but whether you 
 also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is 
 some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice.
 
 DISCOUSES 107 
 
 NOTES 
 
 'The materials (v\ai) on which man works are neither good nor 
 bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the 
 use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well 
 or ill, conformably to nature or not. 
 
 1 Terence says (Adelphi, iv. 7) 
 
 Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cadit, 
 Illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas. 
 
 'Dexterously' is 'arte,' rsxviKobs in Epictetus. Upton. 
 
 * The word is apTtacrrov, which was also used by the Romans. One 
 threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of 
 a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, "De Beneficiis," 
 ii. 17). Martial has the word ("Epigrams" iv. 19) "Sive harpasta 
 manu pulverulenta rapis" ; and elsewhere. 
 
 4 In Plato's "Apology," Socrates addresses Meletus ; and he says, 
 it would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals 
 of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and 
 asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in some 
 texts of the "Apology" is manifestly wrong. 
 
 1 He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is 
 come into the world, he must do his duty in it
 
 CHATPER VI 
 
 OF INDIFFERENCE 
 
 THE hypothetical proposition is indifferent: the judg- 
 ment about it is not indifferent, but it is either 
 knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indif- 
 ferent : theuseis not indifferent. When any man then 
 tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become 
 negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about 
 such things), do not become abject and struck with admira- 
 tion of material things. And it is good for you to know 
 your own preparation and power, that in those matters where 
 you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be 
 vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too 
 in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them; 
 and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them 
 by saying, "I have learned them, and you have not." Thus 
 also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which 
 is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in 
 that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself 
 content with firmness of mind. 
 
 Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. 
 But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make 
 my way through the window; and when I have found the 
 door shut, I must either come back or enter through the 
 window. But still speak to him. In what way? Not 
 meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you 
 wanted. Was this your business, and not his ? Why then 
 do you claim that which belongs to another? Always re- 
 member what is your own, and what belongs to another ; and 
 you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well, 
 So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to 
 those which are more adapted to the conservation of that 
 which is according to nature ; for God himself has given me 
 the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated 
 (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even 
 move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence, 
 
 108
 
 DISCOURSES 109 
 
 would move to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn 
 produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do 
 they not become dry that they may be reaped? 2 for they are 
 not separated from communion with other things. If then 
 they had perception, ought they to wish never to be reaped ? 
 But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So 
 we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to 
 die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. 
 But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are 
 reaped, we are vexed at it ; for we neither know what we are 
 nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who 
 have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But 
 Chrysantas 3 when he was going to strike the enemy checked 
 himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so 
 it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than 
 to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses, 
 even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weep- 
 ing and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call 
 them circumstances. What kind of circumstances, man? 
 If you give the name of circumstances to the things which 
 are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call 
 hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying 
 of that which has been produced ? But that which destroys 
 is either a sword, or a wheel, or a sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. 
 Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades? 
 All ways are equal. 4 But if you will listen to the truth, the 
 way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never 
 killed a man in six months : but a fever is often a year about 
 it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty 
 names. 
 
 I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I 
 in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many 
 earthquakes : and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what 
 hazard do you run ? Is it not the hazard of your life ? But 
 I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own ? 
 how ? For who can compel you to have any opinion which 
 you do not choose ? But is it as to another man's opinion ? 
 and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opin- 
 ions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it 
 to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome?
 
 I JO EPICTETUS 
 
 Yes : what then if I should be sent to Gyara ? If that suits 
 you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to an- 
 other place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who 
 sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then 
 do you go up to Rome as if it were something great ? It is 
 not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth 
 should say, it was not worth while to have heard so much 
 and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the 
 side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remem- 
 ber that division by which your own and not your own are 
 distinguished: never claim any thing which belongs to 
 others. A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high 
 and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if 
 you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then 
 be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans 
 in prison. 6 But in our present disposition, consider if we 
 could endure in prison another person saying to us, "Would 
 you like me to read Paeans to you?" "Why do you trouble me? 
 do you not know the evils which hold me ? Can I in such cir- 
 cumstances (listen to paeans) ?" "What circumstances ?" "I 
 am going to die." "And will other men be immortal?" 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return 
 from Nicopolis to Rome, feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was par- 
 ticularly severe towards philosophers. 
 
 The title "of indifference" means "of the indifference of things;" of 
 the things which are neither good nor bad. 
 
 a Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides. 
 Compare Antoninus (vii. 40) : "Life must be reaped like the ripe ears 
 of corn : one man is born : another dies." Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii. 
 25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are 
 these two: 
 
 turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges : sic jubet necessitas. 
 
 *The story is in Xenophon's Cyropaedia (IV, near the beginning) 
 where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name. Epictetus, as 
 Upton remarks, quotes from memory. 
 
 4 So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is 
 the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43.) What follows is 
 one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant 
 may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus
 
 DISCOURSES 1 1 1 
 
 would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death 
 are not indifferent: some ways of dying are painful, and even he who 
 can endure with fortitude, would prefer an easy death. 
 
 * Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote in 
 prison a Paean, and he gives the first line which contains an address to 
 Apollo and Artemis.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION 
 
 THROUGH an unreasonable regard to divination many 
 of us omit many duties. 1 For what more can the 
 diviner see than death or danger or disease, or gen- 
 erally things of that kind? If then I must expose 
 myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die 
 for him, what need have I then for divination ? Have I not 
 within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and 
 of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of 
 both? What need have I then to consult the viscera of vic- 
 tims or the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he 
 says, "It is for your interest?" For does he know what is 
 for my interest, does he know what is good ; and as he has 
 learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs 
 of good and evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he 
 knows the signs both of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of 
 the just and of the unjust. Do you tell me, man, what is 
 the thing which is signified for me ; is it life or death, pov- 
 erty or wealth ? But whether these things are for my inter- 
 est or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you. 
 Why don't you give your opinion on matters of grammar, 
 and why do you give it here about things on which we are 
 all in error and disputing with one another? 2 The woman 
 therefore, who intended to send by a vessel a month's pro- 
 visions to Gratilla 3 in her banishment, made a good answer 
 to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent, I 
 would rather, she replied, that Domitian should seize all than 
 that I should not send it. 
 
 What then leads us to frequent use of divination ? Cow- 
 ardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason 
 why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed 
 to the property of my father ? Let us see : let us sacrifice on 
 the occasion Yes, master, as fortune chooses. When he 
 has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him 
 
 112
 
 DISCOURSES 1 1 3 
 
 as if we received the inheritance from him. The conse- 
 quence is that they play upon us. 4 
 
 What then should we do? We ought to come (to divinia- 
 tion) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the 
 man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his jour- 
 ney's end), without any desire for that which leads to the 
 right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any 
 road except the road which leads (to his end). In the same 
 way ought we to come to God also as a guide ; as we use our 
 eyes, not asking them to show us rather such things as we 
 wish, but receiving the appearances of things such as the 
 eyes present them to us. But now we trembling take the 
 augur (bird interpreter) by the hand, and while we invoke 
 God we intreat the augur, and say "Master have mercy on 
 me; suffer me to come safe out of this difficulty." Wretch, 
 would you have then any thing other than what is best ? Is 
 there then any thing better than what pleases God ? Why 
 do you, as far as in your power, corrupt your judge and lead 
 astray your adviser ? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 "Divination was a great part of ancient religion, and, as Epictetus 
 says, it led men "to omit many duties." In a certain sense there was 
 some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can 
 see certain signs in the administration of the world by which they can 
 judge what their behaviour ought to be, they can learn what their 
 duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen 
 right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external 
 forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human 
 debasement, and the true indications of God's will may be neglected. 
 Upton compares Lucan (ix. 572), who sometimes said a few good 
 things. 
 
 * A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a 
 thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion 
 on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which 
 we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things 
 unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are 
 known, and so we may learn what kind of man he is. 
 
 ' Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and 
 Italy by Domitian. 
 
 4 As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the 
 superstitious.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GOOD 1 
 
 GOD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial. 2 
 It is consistent then that where the nature of God 
 is, there also the nature of the good should be. 
 What then is the nature of God ? 3 Flesh ? Cer- 
 tainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? 
 No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes. 
 Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I sup- 
 pose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek 
 it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a 
 rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in 
 the superiority of rational over irrational minds? 4 Now 
 plants have not even the power of using appearances, and 
 for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. 
 The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it re- 
 quire this use only ? For if you say that it requires this use 
 only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness 
 are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and 
 you do right ; for if they possess even in the highest degree 
 the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of un- 
 derstanding the use of appearances ; and there is good reason 
 for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and 
 they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does 
 not exist for any superiority over others. No ; but because 
 we had need of a back which is able to bear something ; and 
 in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for 
 this reason he received also the faculty of making use of ap- 
 pearances, for otherwise he would not have been able to 
 walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had 
 also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appear- 
 ances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not 
 then have been subjected to us, nor would he have done us 
 these services, but he would have been equal to us and like 
 to us. 
 
 Will you not then seek the nature of good in the ra- 
 
 114
 
 DISCOURSES 115 
 
 tional animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to 
 say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). 
 What then? are not plants and animals also the works of 
 God? Theyare; buttheyarenot superior things,nor yet parts 
 of the Gods ? But you are a superior thing ; you are a portion 
 separated from the deity ; you have in yourself a certain por- 
 tion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble 
 descent ? 5 Why do you not know whence you came ? will you 
 not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat 
 and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a 
 woman, will you not remember who you are who do this 
 thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are 
 exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, 
 know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are 
 exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god 
 with you, and you know it not. 6 Do you think that I mean 
 some God of silver or of gold, and external ? You carry him 
 within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting 
 him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image 
 of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the 
 things which you are doing : but when God himself is present 
 within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of 
 thinking and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your 
 own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why 
 do we fear when we are sending a young man from the 
 school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, 
 eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women ; and 
 lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest 
 fine garments should make him proud? This youth (if he 
 acts thus) does not know his own God: he knows not with 
 whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure 
 when he says " I wish I had you (God) with me." Have you 
 not God with you ? and do you seek for any other, when you 
 have him ? or will God tell you any thing else than this ? If 
 you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you 
 would think both of yourself and of the artist, and if you 
 had any understanding (power of perception) you would 
 try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of 
 yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (at- 
 titude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus
 
 Il6 EPICTETUS 
 
 has made you, for this reason do you care not how you 
 shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the 
 artist in the other ? or the work in the one case like the other ? 
 And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the 
 faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not 
 marble or bronze, or gold or ivory ? and the Athena of Phi- 
 dias when she has once extended the hand and received in it 
 the figure of Victory 7 stands in that attitude for ever. But 
 the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they 
 have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the 
 power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist 
 do you dishonour him ? And what shall I say, not only that 
 he made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and made 
 you a deposit to yourself ? Will you not think of this too, 
 but do you also dishonour your guardianship ? But if God 
 had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him ? 
 He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, "I 
 had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself; keep him 
 for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, un- 
 terrified, free from passion and perturbation." And then 
 you do not keep him such. 
 
 But some will say, "Whence has this fellow got the arro- 
 gance which he displays and these supercilious looks?" I 
 have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I 
 do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what 
 I have assented to : I still fear my own weakness. Let me 
 get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I 
 ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have ; then 
 I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it 
 is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious counte- 
 nance? Does the Zeus at Olympia 8 lift up his brow? No, 
 his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say 
 
 "Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail." Iliad, i. 526. 
 
 Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free 
 from perturbation What, and immortal too, exempt from 
 old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a 
 god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess ; this 
 I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I
 
 DISCOURSES 1 1 7 
 
 will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What 
 nerves 9 are these? A desire never disappointed, an aver- 
 sion which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper 
 pursuit ( opurfv ) , a diligent purpose, an assent which is not 
 rash. These you shall see. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 ^chweighauser observes that the title of this chapter would more cor- 
 rectly be o cos tv vulv, God in man. There is no better chapter in 
 the book. 
 
 2 Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, 8) concludes "that the useful is 
 good to him to whom it is useful." 
 
 ' I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other descrip- 
 tion of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who 
 have attempted to answer a question which can not be answered. But 
 see ii. 14, 11-13. 
 
 * Compare Cicero, de Offic. i. 27, 
 
 5 Noble descent. See i. 9. 
 
 The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said 
 (Apud Theon. Soph. Progym.) : , 
 
 f O rovs yap r)niv tartr kv eKaorco <9e6j. 
 
 The doctrine became a commonplace of the poets (Ovid, Fast. vL), 
 " Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo ;" and Horace, Sat. ii. 6, 79, 
 "Atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae." See i. 14, note 4. 
 
 8 Mrs. Carter has a note here. "See i Cor. vi: 19; 2 Cor. vi: 16; 2 
 Tim. i : 14 ; i John iii : 24, iv : 12, 13. But though the simple expression 
 of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel 
 to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more 
 venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to 
 dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God, 
 and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show 
 the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from 
 that of Scripture." 
 
 The passage in i Cor. vi : 19, is ("What? know ye not that your 
 body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of 
 God, and ye are not your own" ? This follows v. 18, which is an ex- 
 hortation to "flee fornication." The passage in 2 Cor. vi : 16 is, "And 
 what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the 
 temple of the living God ; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and 
 walk in them," etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of 
 these two passages. 
 
 It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles 
 in the New Testament : but whence did these writers learn such forms 
 of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe 
 that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epic- 
 tetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were 
 teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the 
 spirit of God is in man. 
 
 Swedenborg says, "In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the 
 Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being
 
 Il8 EPICTETUS 
 
 the Lord's mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is 
 nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees 
 by these faculties ; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior de- 
 grees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it 
 may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and 
 the Lord in him." Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, "the fac- 
 ulty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man's, but Gold's in 
 man." 
 
 I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist 
 cught to be understood in the church of England service. Some English 
 divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the 
 ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of 
 his body which was broken ; as we see in T. Burnet's posthumous work 
 (de Fide et Officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of 
 the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be 
 the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and 
 by some members of the church of England, whose notions approach 
 near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the 
 sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the 
 Communicants, for the prayer is "Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the 
 flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful 
 bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through 
 his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he 
 in us." This is a different thing from Epictetus' notion of God being in 
 man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in 
 the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy 
 Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a 
 particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end 
 of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and 
 wine remain what they were, "and that the natural body and blood of 
 our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the 
 truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time in more places than one." 
 It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English 
 church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual pres- 
 ence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines : 
 and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted; 
 and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, "that 
 the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament 
 we have 'true Communion in Christ's body and blood.'" (Contem- 
 porary Review, p. 464, August 1874). What would Epictetus have 
 thought of the subtleties of our days? 
 
 7 The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian 
 Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of 
 wood, covered with ivory and gold. The figure of Victory stood on the 
 hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins. 
 
 * The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias. It was a 
 seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right 
 hand. 
 
 9 An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to 
 show their shoulders, muscles and sinews as a proof of their strength.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THAT WHEN WE CAN NOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHAR- 
 ACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER 
 OF A PHILOSOPHER 
 
 IT is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the 
 promise of a man's nature. For what is a man ? The 
 answer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the 
 rational faculty from whom are we separated? From 
 wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and 
 like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild 
 beast ; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man ; 
 you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do noth- 
 ing like a sheep ; but if you do, in this case also the man is 
 lost. What then do we do as sheep ? When we act glutton- 
 ously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, in- 
 considerately, to what have we declined ? To sheep. What 
 have we lost ? The rational faculty. When we act conten- 
 tiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to 
 what have we declined? To wild beasts. Consequently 
 some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of 
 a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be 
 eaten by a lion. 1 But in all these ways the promise of a man 
 acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive 
 (complex) proposition maintained? 2 When it fulfils what 
 its nature promises; so that the preservation of a complex 
 proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is 
 a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it prom- 
 ises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? 
 (when they severally keep their promise). What is the 
 wonder then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in 
 like manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved 
 by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry, 
 the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accus- 
 toms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art 
 will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions pre- 
 serve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him: 
 
 119
 
 1 2O EPICTETUS 
 
 and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the 
 contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand con- 
 trary actions strengthen contrary characters : shamelessness 
 strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless 
 man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an 
 angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the 
 avaricious man more avaricious. 
 
 For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be sat- 
 isfied with learning only, but also to add study, and then 
 practice. 3 For we have long been accustomed to do con- 
 trary things, and we put in practice opinions which are con- 
 trary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in prac- 
 tice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the ex- 
 positors of the opinions of others. For now who among 
 us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about 
 good and evil things (in this fashion) ? That of things 
 some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent : 
 the good then are virtues, and the things which participate 
 in virtues ; and the bad are the contrary ; and the indifferent 
 are wealth, health, reputation. Then, if in the midst of our 
 talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or 
 some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are 
 disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you 
 were talking about? Whence did you produce and utter 
 them. From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you 
 corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat 
 the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? 
 For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a store- 
 house, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten, 
 is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, 
 blood, healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored 
 up, when you choose you can readily take and show it ; but 
 you have no other advantage from it except so far as to ap- 
 pear to possess it. For what is the difference between ex- 
 plaining these doctrines and those of men who have different 
 opinions ? Sit down now and explain according to the rules 
 of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain 
 his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus him- 
 self. 4 Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do 
 you deceive the many ? Why do you act the part of a Jew, 5
 
 DISCOURSES 1 2 I 
 
 when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is 
 called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian ? and when we see 
 a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, This 
 man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has as- 
 sumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish 
 doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he 
 is named a Jew. 6 Thus we too being falsely imbued (bap- 
 tized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. 
 Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we 
 are far from practising what we say, and that of which we 
 are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil 
 even what the character of a man promises, we even add to 
 it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a bur- 
 den, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should at- 
 tempt to raise the stone which Ajax 7 lifted. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the 
 nobler animal. 
 
 *A conjunctive or complex (crvj.ntK-ith.E'y/j.evov) axiom or lemma. 
 Gellius (xvi. 8) gives an example: " P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was 
 both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was 
 the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship." Gellius adds, "in every 
 conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, 
 the whole is said to be false," For the whole is proposed as true: there- 
 fore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive 
 (8i&vy)*Evov) is of this kind: "pleasure is either bad or good, or 
 neither good nor bad." 
 
 * We often say a man learns a particular thing; and there are men 
 who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art ; and 
 they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn; and learning means 
 that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art 
 professes that the scholar shall be able to practice the art, the art of 
 making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who 
 profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men 
 may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue ; 
 and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have 
 told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality and of virtue, 
 mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of 
 virtue ; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of 
 religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher's teaching is in fact 
 only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches. 
 
 * "He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and 
 proper manner the Stoic principles : for the same person can explain the 
 principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and 
 perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently 
 he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean; which is ab- 
 surd." Schweig. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions
 
 122 EPICTETUS 
 
 does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must 
 according to Stoic principles practice them in order to be a Stoic philoso- 
 pher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts 
 which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know 
 him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false ; 
 and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions 
 are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evi- 
 dence which can not be mistaken. 
 
 * It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of 
 Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know 
 that some Jews became Christians. 
 
 " It is possible, as I have said, that by Jews Epictetus means Christians, 
 for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as 
 the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. 7, Epictetus 
 gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to 
 the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii: 28), "For he 
 is not a Jew, which is one outwardly but he is a Jew which is one in- 
 wardly," etc. His remarks (ii: 17-29) on the man "who is called a Jew, 
 and rests in the law and makes his boast of God" may be compared with 
 what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not 
 practice that which he professes. 
 
 1 See ii. 24, 26 ; Iliad, vii. 264, etc. ; Juvenal, xv. 65. 
 
 "Nee hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax 
 Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam 
 ./Enese." Upton.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES 
 
 CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are 
 a man; and this is one who has nothing superior 
 to the faculty of the will, but all other things sub- 
 jected to it ; and the faculty itself he possesses un- 
 enslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from 
 what things you have been separated by reason. You have 
 been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated 
 from domestic animals ( itpopdroov ) . Further, you are a citi- 
 zen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient 
 (serving) , but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are 
 capable of comprehending the divine administration and of 
 considering the connexion of things. What then does the 
 character of a citizen promise (profess) ? To hold nothing 
 as profitable to himself ; to deliberate about nothing as if he 
 were detached from the community, but to act as the hand 
 or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the con- 
 stitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in 
 motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference 
 to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if 
 the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he 
 would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and 
 mutilation, since he knows 1 that these things are assigned 
 to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the 
 whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen. 
 But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty 
 to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable 
 for our choice, for we were made among other things for 
 this. 
 
 After this remember that you are a son. What does this 
 character promise? To consider that every thing which is 
 the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, 
 never to blame him to another, nor to say or do any thing 
 which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and 
 give way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After 
 
 123
 
 1 24 EPICTETUS 
 
 this know that you are a brother also, and that to this charac- 
 ter it is due to make concessions ; to be easily persuaded, to 
 speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to 
 him any of the things which are independent of the will, but 
 readily to give them up, that you may have the larger share 
 in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it 
 is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to 
 gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is 
 the advantage. 2 
 
 Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember 
 that you are a senator : if a youth, that you are a youth : if 
 an old man, that you are an old man ; for each of such names, 
 if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties. 
 But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You 
 have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the 
 next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the 
 hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you 
 have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have be- 
 come an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one 
 thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, 
 who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischie- 
 vous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost noth- 
 ing? But, (I suppose) you must lose a bit of money that 
 you may suffer damage ? And does the loss of nothing else 
 do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or 
 music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you 
 shall lose modesty, moderation ( x-ararrfroA^x) and gentleness, 
 do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first 
 mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent 
 of the will, and the second by our own fault ; and as to the 
 first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful ; but 
 as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shame- 
 ful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does 
 the pathic lose? He loses the (character of) man. What 
 does he lose who makes the pathic what he is ? Many other 
 things; and he also loses the man no less than the other. 
 What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the 
 (character of the) modest, the temperate, the decent, the 
 citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry? 
 Something else. What does the coward lose? Something
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 125 
 
 else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage. 
 If then you look for the damage in the loss of money only, 
 all these men receive no harm or damage; it may be, they 
 have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit of money 
 by any of these deeds. But consider that if you refer every 
 thing to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in 
 your opinion damaged. Yes, you say, for he is mutilated 
 in his body. Well ; but does he who has lost his smell only 
 lose nothing? Is there then no energy of the soul which is 
 an advantage to him who possesses it, and a damage to him 
 who has lost it? Tell me what sort (of energy) you mean. 
 Have we not a natural modesty? We have. Does he 
 who loses this sustain no damage ? is he deprived of nothing, 
 does he part with nothing of the things which belong to him ? 
 Have we not naturally fidelity? natural affection, a natural 
 disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbear- 
 ance? The man then who allows himself to be damaged in 
 these matters, can he be free from harm and uninjured. 
 What then ? shall I not hurt him, who has hurt me ? 3 In the 
 first place consider what hurt ( pxdprf) is, and remember what 
 you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good 
 consists in the will (purpose, intention, irpocaea-st ) , and the 
 evil also in the will, see if what you say is not this : What 
 then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust 
 act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act 
 to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves (mentally 
 think of) something of this kind? But where there is 
 any detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm 
 there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of 
 the will, there is (you suppose) no harm; for he who has 
 been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither 
 suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he 
 lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than (security 
 to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest 
 and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the 
 least, except only in the school so far as a few words are 
 concerned. Therefore our proficiency is limited to these 
 few words, but beyond them it does not exist even in the 
 slightest degree. 4
 
 126 EPICTETUS 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This may appear extravagant ; but it is possible to explain it, and 
 even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the 
 course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he 
 knows it is appointed for him to suffer : he would submit and he would 
 endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively promote the end 
 or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent 
 with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher's 
 saying is too hard to deal with ; and as it rests on an impossible as- 
 sumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers, 
 if we say no more about it. 
 
 1 A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably 
 means a seat of superiority, a magistrate's seat, a Roman sella curulis. 
 
 3 Socrates We must by no means then do an act of injustice. Crito. 
 Certainly not. Socrates. Nor yet when you are wronged must you do 
 wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an 
 unjust act. Plato, Crito, c. 10. 
 
 4 The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written 
 on moral subjects : they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or 
 writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an 
 idle hour for him who listens ; and that is all. Epictetus blames our in- 
 dolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of 
 philosophy in disputation.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 THE beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters 
 on it in the right way and by the door, is a con- 
 sciousness of his own weakness and inability about 
 necessary things. For we come into the world with 
 no natural notion of a right angled triangle, or of a diesis (a 
 quarter tone), or of a half tone; but we learn each of these 
 things by a certain transmission according to art; and for 
 this reason those who do not know them, do not think that 
 they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and 
 ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and mis- 
 fortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do 
 and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world 
 without having an innate idea of them ? Wherefore we all 
 use these names, and we endeavour to fit the preconceptions 
 to the several cases (things) thus: he has done well, he has 
 not done well ; he has done as he ought, not as he ought ; he 
 has been unfortunate, he has been fortunate; he is unjust, he 
 is just : who does not use these names? who among us defers 
 the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use 
 of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds? 
 And the cause of this is that we come into the world 
 already taught as it were by nature some things on this 
 matter (roitov ) , and proceeding from these we have added to 
 them self-conceit ( ofya-ir ) . For why, a man says, do I not 
 know the beautiful and the ugly ? Have I not the notion of it? 
 You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars ? You do. Do 
 I not then adapt it properly? In that lies the whole ques- 
 tion ; and conceit is added here. For beginning from these 
 things which are admitted men proceed to that which is mat- 
 ter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation ; for if they 
 possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those 
 things, what would hinder them from being perfect? But 
 now since you think that you properly adapt the preconcep- 
 tions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this (as- 
 
 127
 
 128 EPICTETUS 
 
 sume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not 
 seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper 
 adaptation ; or does he not think so ? He does think so. Is 
 it possible then that both of you can properly apply the pre- 
 conceptions to things about which you have contrary opin- 
 ions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything 
 better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your 
 thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other 
 things than the things which seem to him right? Is then 
 this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not sufficient. 
 Come then to something which is superior to seeming 
 (TOV SOKSIV) . What is this ? 
 
 Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a percep- 
 tion of the disagreement of men with one another, and 
 an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a con- 
 demnation and distrust of that which only seems, and a 
 certain investigation of that which seems whether it seems 
 rightly, and a discovery of some rule (x-axo^og-) , as we have 
 discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a 
 carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and 
 crooked things. This is the beginning of philosophy. Must 
 we say that all things are right which seem so to all ? And 
 how is it possible that contradictions can be right ? Not all 
 then, but all which seem to us to be right. How more to 
 you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more 
 than what seem right to the Egyptians ? why more than what 
 seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. 
 What then seems to every man is not sufficient for deter- 
 mining what is ; for neither in the case of weights or mea- 
 sures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each 
 case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then 
 is there no rule superior to what seems? And how is it 
 possible that the most necessary things among men should 
 have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? 
 There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the 
 rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying 
 from it, not even stretching out the finger without it ?* For 
 this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their 
 madness those who use mere seeming as a measure, and 
 misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain
 
 DISCOURSES 1 29 
 
 things (principles) known and made clear we may use in 
 the case of particular things the preconceptions which are 
 distinctly fixed. 
 
 What is the matter presented to us about which we are 
 inquiring? Pleasure (for example) . Subject it to the rule, 
 throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a 
 thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it ? Yes. And 
 in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to 
 trust to any thing which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure 
 any thing secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of 
 the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. 
 But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not 
 enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over 
 what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over 
 present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; 
 but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the 
 balance. 2 Thus things are tested and weighed when the 
 rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and 
 confirm the rules ; and then to use them when they are known 
 is the act of a wise and good man. 3 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb. 
 
 1 That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly 
 of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with 
 the aid of a balance can you do it, that you can not even use a balance, 
 and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me. 
 Schweig. 
 
 1 This is a just conclusion. We must fix the canons or rules by which 
 things are tried ; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good 
 tc all cases.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION 
 
 WHAT things a man must learn in order to be able to 
 apply the art of disputation, has been accurately 
 shown by our philosophers (the Stoics) ; but 
 with respect to the proper use of the things, we 
 are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom 
 you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he can not 
 discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved 
 the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not 
 know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules 
 him, and says, "He is an illiterate man; it is not possible to 
 do any thing with him." Now a guide, when he has found a 
 man out of the road leads him into the right way : he does not 
 ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show 
 the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows. 
 But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule 
 him, but rather feel your own incapacity. 
 
 How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his 
 adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he 
 wanted no other witness. 1 Therefore he could say, "I care 
 not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the 
 evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the 
 opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disput- 
 ing with me." For he used to make the conclusion drawn 
 from natural notions so plain that every man saw the contra- 
 diction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus) : Does 
 the envious 2 man rejoice? By no means, but he is rather 
 pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils? 
 and what envy is there of evils ? Therefore he made his ad- 
 versary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, 
 would any man envy those who are nothing to him ? By no 
 means. Thus having completed the notion and distinctly 
 fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary, 
 Define to me envy ; and if the adversary had defined envy, he 
 did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the 
 
 130
 
 DISCOURSES 131 
 
 definition do not correspond to the thing defined These are 
 technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly 
 intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) 
 can not lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who 
 follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to 
 concede any thing or reject it, we can never by the use of 
 these terms move him to do. Accordingly being conscious 
 of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing; at least 
 such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part 
 and the rash, when they enter into such disputations, confuse 
 themselves and confuse others ; and finally abusing their ad- 
 versaries and abused by them, they walk away. 
 
 Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, 
 never to be irritated in argument, never to utter any thing 
 abusive, any thing insulting, but to bear with abusive persons 
 and to put an end to the quarrel. If you would know what 
 great power he had in this way, read the Symposium of 
 Xenophon, 3 and you will see how many quarrels he put an 
 end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power 
 is most highly praised, 
 
 "Quickly with skill he settles great disputes." 4 
 
 Well then ; the matter is not now very safe, and particularly 
 at Rome; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a 
 corner, you may be sure, but must go to a man of consular 
 rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him, Can you 
 tell me, Sir, to whose care you have entrusted your horses? 
 I can tell you. Have you entrusted them to any person in- 
 differently and to one who has no experience of horses ? By 
 no means. Well then ; can you tell me to whom you entrust 
 your gold or silver things or your vestments? I don't en- 
 trust even these to any one indifferently. Well; your own 
 body, have you already considered about entrusting the care 
 of it to any person? Certainly. To a man of experience, 
 I suppose, and one acquainted with the aliptic,* or with the 
 healing art? Without doubt. Are these the best things 
 that you have, or do you also possess something else which is 
 better than all these ? What kind of a thing do you mean ? 
 That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests
 
 132 EPICTETUS 
 
 each of them, and deliberates. It is the soul that you mean ? 
 You think right, for it is the soul that I mean. In truth 
 I do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the 
 others which I possess. Can you then show us in what way 
 you have taken care of the soul ? for it is not likely that you, 
 who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, in- 
 considerately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing 
 that you possess to be neglected and to perish. Cer- 
 tainly not. But have you taken care of the soul yourself; 
 and have you learned from another to do this, or have you 
 discovered the means yourself ? Here comes the danger that 
 in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good 
 man, who are you? Next, if you persist in troubling him, 
 there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you 
 blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of 
 instruction until I fell into these dangers.' 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato. 
 
 * Socrates' notion of envy is stated by Xenophpn to be this : "it is the 
 pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and 
 that such are the only envious persons." Bishop Butler gives a better 
 definition ; at least a more complete description of the thing. "Emulation 
 is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, 
 with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any 
 other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied 
 in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great 
 grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the par- 
 ticular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, 
 I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that 
 the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlaw- 
 ful one, envy, aims at is the same ; namely, that equality or superiority : 
 and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely 
 the means it makes use of to attain its end." Sermons upon Human 
 Nature, I. 
 
 * The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant. 
 4 Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87. 
 
 1 The aliptic is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best 
 means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the 
 art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equiva- 
 lent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises, 
 which are also a means of preserving the body's health, when the exer- 
 cises are good and moderate. 
 
 * Epictetus is speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 ON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE) 
 
 WHEN I see a man anxious, I say, What does this 
 man want? If he did not want some thing 
 which is not in his power, how could he be 
 anxious? For this reason a lute player when 
 he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters 
 the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and 
 plays well on the lute ; for he not only wishes to sing well, but 
 also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. Ac- 
 cordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. Bring 
 any single person who knows nothing of music, and the 
 musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a 
 man knows nothing and has not been practised, there he is 
 anxious. What matter is this? He knows not what a 
 crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However he has 
 learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest ; but what 
 the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life he 
 neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must 
 of necessity tremble and grow pale. I can not then say that 
 a man is not a lute player when I "see him afraid, but I can 
 say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first 
 of all I call him a stranger and say, This man does not know 
 in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here 
 so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the cus- 
 toms, and what is permitted and what is not; and he has 
 never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the 
 laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know 
 how it ought to be written, or he employs a person who does 
 know; nor does he rashly seal a bond or write a security. 
 But he uses his desire without a lawyer's advice, and aver- 
 sion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose. 
 How do you mean without a lawyer? He does not know 
 that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that 
 which is of necessity ; and he does not know either what is his 
 own or what is another man's ; but if he did know, he would 
 
 133
 
 134 EPICTETUS 
 
 never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not 
 be anxious. How so ? Is any man then afraid about things 
 which are not evils ? No. Is he afraid about things which 
 are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not 
 happen? Certainly he is not. If then the things which are 
 independent of the will are neither good nor bad, and all 
 things which do depend on the will are within our power, 
 and no man can either take them from us or give them to us, 
 if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety? But 
 we are anxious about our poor body, our little property, 
 about the will of Caesar ; but not anxious about things inter- 
 nal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion ? 
 No, for this is in my power. About not exerting our move- 
 ments contrary to nature ? No, not even about this. When 
 then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from 
 the complexion, this man's spleen is disordered, that man's 
 liver; so also say, this man's desire and aversion are disor- 
 dered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For noth- 
 ing else changes the colour, or causes trembling or chattering 
 of the teeth, or causes a man to 
 
 "Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot." 1 
 
 For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus, 2 
 he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any 
 of the things which Zeno admired ; and Zeno did not care for 
 those things over which Antigonus had power. But Anti- 
 gonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he 
 wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of 
 his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus; 
 for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who 
 has no such skill. 
 
 Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you 
 know the measure by which one man is estimated by another. 
 Have you taken pains to learn what is a good man and what 
 is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other? 
 Why then are you not good yourself? How, he replies, am 
 I not good? Because no good man laments or groans or 
 weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will 
 he receive me, how will he listen to me? Slave, just as it
 
 DISCOURSES 135 
 
 pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to 
 others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what pro- 
 ceeds from you ? Certainly. And is it possible that a fault 
 should be one man's, and the evil in another? No. Why 
 then are you anxious about that which belongs to others? 
 Your question is reasonable ; but I am anxious how I shall 
 speak to him. Can not you then speak to him as you choose ? 
 But I fear that I may be disconcerted ? If you are going 
 to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be 
 disconcerted? By no means. Why? is it not because you 
 have practised writing the name? Certainly. Well, if you 
 were going to read the name, would you not feel the same? 
 and why ? Because every art has a certain strength and con- 
 fidence in the things which belong to it. Have you then not 
 practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the 
 school ? Syllogisms and sophistical propositions ? For what 
 purpose? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skilfully? 
 and is not discoursing skilfully the same as discoursing sea- 
 sonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and also with- 
 out making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all 
 this with confidence? Yes. When then you are mounted on 
 a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched 
 against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in 
 which you are practised, and he is not ? Yes, but that person 
 (to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me. 3 
 Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor 
 claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your 
 masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body, 
 follow every man who is stronger than yourself. Socrates 
 used to practise speaking, he who talked as he did to the 
 tyrants, 4 to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison. 
 Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to 
 Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. 
 These men were confident in the things which they practised. 
 But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave 
 them : go and sit in a corner, and weave syllogisms, and pro- 
 pose them to another. There is not in you the man who can 
 rule a state.
 
 1 36 EPICTETUS 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Iliad, xiii. 281. 
 
 *In Diogenes Laertius (Zeno, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus 
 to Zeno and Zeno's answer. Simplicius (note on the Encheiridion, c. 51) 
 supposes this Antigonus to be the King of Syria; but Upton remarks 
 that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia. 
 
 * The original is "but that person ( kKei'vos ) has power to kill me." 
 "That person" must be the person already mentioned, and Mrs. Carter 
 has done right in adding this explanation. 
 
 4 The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were called. The talk of Soc- 
 rates with Critias and Charicles two of the Thirty is reported in Xeno- 
 phon's "Memorabilia" (i. 2, 33). The defence of Socrates before those 
 who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato's 
 "Apology," and in the "Phaedon" and "Crito," Diogenes was captured 
 by some pirates and sold (iv. I, 115).
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 TO NASO 
 
 WHEN a certain Roman entered with his son and 
 listened to one reading, Epictetus said, This is 
 the method of instruction; and he stopped. 
 When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus 
 said, Every art when it is taught causes labour to him who 
 is unacquainted with it and is unskilled in it, and indeed the 
 things which proceed from the arts immediately show their 
 use in the purpose for which they were made; and most of 
 them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed 
 to be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a 
 pleasant thing; but the shoe is useful and also not disagree- 
 able to look at. And the discipline of a smith when he is 
 learning is very disagreeable to one who chances to be 
 present and is a stranger to the art : but the work shows the 
 use of the art. But you will see this much more in music; 
 for if you are present while a person is learning, the disci- 
 pline will appear most disagreeable; and yet the results of 
 music are pleasing and delightful to those who know noth- 
 ing of music. And here we conceive the work of a phi- 
 losopher to be something of this kind : he must adapt his wish 
 (/3ov\7f<nv) to what is going on, so that neither any of the 
 things which are taking place shall take place contrary to our 
 wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not 
 take place when we wish that they should. From this the 
 result is to those who have so arranged the work of phi- 
 losophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which 
 they should avoid ; without uneasiness, without fear, without 
 perturbation to pass through life themselves, together with 
 their associates maintaining the relations both natural and 
 acquired, 1 as the relation of son, of father, of brother, of citi- 
 zen, of man, of wife, of neighbour, of fellow traveller, of 
 ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we conceive to be 
 something like this. It remains next to inquire how this 
 must be accomplished. 
 
 137
 
 138 EPICTETUS 
 
 We see then that the carpenter (reVrcov) when he has 
 learned certain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by 
 learning certain things becomes a pilot. May it not then in 
 philosophy also not be sufficient to wish to be wise and good, 
 and that there is also a necessity to learn certain things ? We 
 inquire then what these things are. The philosophers say 
 that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he 
 provides for all things ; also that it is not possible to conceal 
 from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts. 2 
 The next thing is to learn what is the nature of the Gods ; for 
 such as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and 
 obey them, must try with all his power to be like them. If 
 the divine is faithful, man also must be faithful ; if it is free, 
 man also must be free; if beneficent, man also must be bene- 
 ficent ; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous ; as 
 being then an imitator of God he must do and say every thing 
 consistently with this fact. 
 
 With what then must we begin? If you will enter on 
 the discussion, I will tell you that you must first understand 
 names (words). So then you say that I do not now under- 
 stand names. You do not understand them. How then do 
 I use them? Just as the illiterate use written language, as 
 cattle use appearances : for use is one thing, understanding is 
 another. But if you think that you understand them, pro- 
 duce whatever word you please, and let us try whether we 
 understand it. But it is a disagreeable thing for a man to 
 be confuted who is now old, and, it may be, has now served 
 his three campaigns. I too know this: for now you are 
 come to me as if you were in want of nothing: and what 
 could you even imagine to be wanting to you? You are 
 rich, you have children and a wife perhaps, and many slaves : 
 Caesar knows you, in Rome you have many friends, you 
 render their dues to all, you know how to requite him who 
 does you a favour, and to repay in the same kind him who 
 does you a wrong. What do you lack ? If then I shall shew 
 you that you lack the things most necessary and the chief 
 things for happiness, and that hitherto you have looked after 
 every thing rather than what you ought, and to crown all, 3 
 that you neither know what God is nor what man is, nor 
 what is good nor what is bad; and as to what I have said
 
 DISCOURSES 1 39 
 
 about your ignorance of other matters, that may perhaps be 
 endured, but if I say that you know nothing about yourself, 
 how is it possible that you should endure me and bear the 
 proof and stay here ? It is not possible ; but you immediately 
 go off in bad humour. And yet what harm have I done 
 you? unless the mirror also injures the ugly man because it 
 shows him to himself such as he is ; unless the physician also 
 is supposed to insult the sick man, when he says to him, Man, 
 do you think that you ail nothing ? But you have a fever : 
 go without food to-day; drink water. And no one says, 
 what an insult ! But if you say to a man, Your desires are 
 inflamed, your aversions are low, your intentions are incon- 
 sistent, your pursuits (movements) are not conformable to 
 nature, your opinions are rash and false, the man immedi- 
 ately goes away and says, He has insulted me. 
 
 Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded assembly. 
 Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen ; and the greater part 
 of the men come to buy and sell, and there are some few who 
 come to look at the market and to inquire how it is carried 
 on, and why, and who fixes the meeting and for what pur- 
 pose. So it is here also in this assembly (of life) : some 
 like cattle trouble themselves about nothing except their 
 fodder. For to all of you who are busy about possessions 
 and lands and slaves and magisterial offices, these are noth- 
 ing except fodder. But there are a few who attend the as- 
 sembly, men who love to look on and consider what is the 
 world, who governs it. Has it no governor? And how is 
 it possible that a city or a family can not continue to exist, 
 not even the shortest time without an administrator and 
 guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be 
 administered with such order and yet without a purpose and 
 by chance? 4 There is then an administrator. What kind 
 of administrator and how does he govern? And who are 
 we, who were produced by him, and for what purpose? 
 Have we some connexion with him and some relation to- 
 wards him, or none? This is the way in which these few 
 are affected, and then they apply themselves only to this one 
 thing, to examine the meeting and then to go away. What 
 then ? They are ridiculed by the many, as the spectators at 
 the fair are by the traders ; and if the beasts had any under-
 
 140 EPICTETUS 
 
 standing, they would ridicule those who admired anything 
 else than fodder. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Compare iii. 2, 4, iv. 8, 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes : "There are 
 three relations [between thee and other things] : the one to the body 
 which surrounds thee : the second to the divine cause from which all 
 things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee." This is 
 precise, true and practical. Those who object to "the divine cause," may 
 write in place of it "the nature and constitution of things ;" for there is 
 a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to discover ; and 
 for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is 
 of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discov- 
 ered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists; or, if that 
 expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists 
 and we can not help thinking so. 
 
 1 When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks 
 called itpovoia, providence. (Epictetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of 
 these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Provi- 
 dence. 
 
 Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation 
 of phenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God's 
 providence by observing his administration of the world and all that 
 happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain 
 intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God's 
 works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have 
 certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way. 
 On the supposition that all man's powers are the gift of God, man's 
 power of judging what happens in the world under God's providence is 
 the gift of God; and if he should not be satisfied with God's administra- 
 tion, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, con- 
 demns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man, 
 who is God's work, are in opposition to one another. 
 
 If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because 
 of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed 
 to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such 
 as he can not reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will 
 be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But 
 he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judg- 
 ments are his own, and that he can not say how he acquired them, or 
 how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily 
 using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man 
 can say is that he has such powers. 
 
 1 The original is "to add the colophon," which is a proverbial expres- 
 sion and signifies to give the last touch to a thing. 
 
 4 From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that 
 we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. Letter to Mde. 
 Necker.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT 
 THEY HAVE DETERMINED 
 
 WHEN some persons have heard these words, that a 
 man ought to be constant (firm), and that the 
 will is naturally free and not subject to compul- 
 sion, but that all other things are subject to 
 hindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they 
 suppose that they ought without deviation to abide by every 
 thing which they have determined. But in the first place 
 that which has been determined ought to be sound (true). 
 I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such as exists in a 
 healthy body, in an athletic body ; but if it is plain to me that 
 you have the tone of a phrensied man and you boast of it, I 
 shall say to you, man, seek the physician : this is not tone, but 
 atony (deficiency in right tone). In a different way some- 
 thing of the same kind is felt by those who listen to these dis- 
 courses in a wrong manner ; which was the case with one of 
 my companions who for no reason resolved to starve himself 
 to death. 1 I heard of it when it was the third day of his 
 abstinence from food and I went to inquire what had hap- 
 pened. I have resolved, he said. But still tell me what it 
 was which induced you to resolve; for if you have resolved 
 rightly, we shall sit with you and assist you to depart ; but if 
 you have made an unreasonable resolution, change your 
 mind. We ought to keep to our determinations. What are 
 you doing, man ? We ought to keep not to all our determi- 
 nations, but to those which are right ; for if you are now per- 
 suaded that it is night, do not change your mind, if you 
 think fit, but persist and say, we ought to abide by our deter- 
 minations. Will you not make the beginning and lay the 
 foundation in an inquiry whether the determination is sound 
 or not sound, and so then build on it firmness and security? 
 But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not your 
 miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and 
 the stronger are the materials which you shall lay on it? 
 
 141
 
 142 EPICTETUS 
 
 Without any reason would you withdraw from us out of life 
 a man who is a friend, and a companion, a citizen of the same 
 city, both the great and the small city ? 2 Then while you are 
 committing murder and destroying a man who has done no 
 wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your deter- 
 minations ? And if it ever in any way came into your head 
 to kill me, ought you to abide by your determinations ? 
 
 Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his 
 mind. But it is impossible to convince some persons at pres- 
 sent; so that I seem now to know, what I did not know be- 
 fore, the meaning of the common saying, That you can 
 neither persuade nor break a fool. 3 May it never be my lot 
 to have a wise fool for my friend : nothing is more untract- 
 able. "I am determined," the man says. Madmen are also ; 
 but the more firmly they form a judgment on things which 
 do not exist, the more ellebore 4 they require. Will you not 
 act like a sick. man and call in the physician? I am sick, 
 master, help me; consider what I must do; it is my duty to 
 obey you. So it is here also : I know not what I ought to do, 
 but I am come to learn. Not so; but speak to me about 
 other things: upon this I have determined. What other 
 things ? for what is greater and more useful than for you to 
 be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made your deter- 
 mination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy) 
 of madness, not of health. I will die, if you compel me to 
 this. Why, man? What has happened? I have deter- 
 mined I have had a lucky escape that you have not deter- 
 mined to kill me I take no money. 5 Why ? I have deter- 
 mined Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which 
 you now use in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder 
 you at some time from inclining without reason to take 
 money and then saying, I have determined. As in a distem- 
 pered body, subject to defluxions, the humour inclines some- 
 times to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly soul 
 knows not which way to incline : but if to this inclination and 
 movement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then 
 the evil becomes past help and cure.
 
 DISCOURSES 143 
 
 MOTES 
 
 "The word isaitoitaprepeiv, which Cicero (Tusc. i. 34) renders "per 
 inediam vita discedere." The words "I have resolved" are in Epictetus, 
 KeKpiKa. Pliny (Epp. i. 12) says that Corellius Rufus, when he de- 
 termined to end his great sufferings by starvation made the same answer, 
 KetcptKa, to the physician who offered him food. 
 
 * The great city is the world. 
 
 * The meaning is that you can not lead a fool from his purpose either 
 by words or force. "A wise fool" must mean a fool who thinks himself 
 wise ; and such we sometimes see. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in 
 the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness de- 
 part from him." Proverbs, xxvii. 22. 
 
 4 Ellebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Sat. ii. 3. 
 82 
 
 "Danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris." 
 
 "Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some pro- 
 fessor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers, 
 and then, indirectly at least, had blamed our philosopher for receiving 
 some fee from his hearers." Schweig.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD 
 
 AND EVIL 
 
 WHERE is the good ? In the will. 1 Where is the 
 evil? In the will. Where is neither of them? 
 In those things which are independent of the will. 
 Well then? Does any one among us think of 
 these lessons out of the schools? Does any one meditate 
 (strive) by himself to give an answer to things 2 as in the 
 case of questions? Is it day? Yes. Is it night? No. 
 Well, is the number of stars even ? 3 I can not say. When 
 money is shown (offered) to you, have you studied to make 
 the proper answer, that money is not a good thing? Have 
 you practised yourself in these answers, or only against 
 sophisms ? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which 
 you have studied, in those you have improved ; but in those 
 which you have not studied, in those you remain the same? 
 When the rhetorician knows that he has written well, that he 
 has committed to memory what he has written, and brings 
 an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? Because he is 
 not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want ? 
 To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of 
 being able to practise declamation he has been disciplined; 
 but with respect to praise and blame he has not been disci- 
 plined. For when did he hear from any other what praise is, 
 what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind of praise 
 should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned ? 
 And when did he practise this discipline which follows these 
 words (things) ? 4 Why then do you still wonder, if in the 
 matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others, 
 and in those in which he has not been disciplined, there he is 
 the same with the many. So the lute player knows how to 
 play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembles 
 when he enters on the stage; for these matters he under- 
 stands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts 
 of a crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what 
 
 144
 
 DISCOURSES 145 
 
 anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of another, 
 whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if 
 he has been praised, he leaves the theatre puffed up, but if he 
 has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured 
 and subsides. 
 
 This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire? 
 Externals. About what things are we busy? Externals. 
 And have we any doubt then why we fear or why we are 
 anxious? What then happens when we think the things, 
 which are coming on us, to be evils ? It is not in our power 
 not to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious. 
 Then we say, Lord God, how shall I not be anxious ? Fool, 
 have you not hands, did not God make them for you? Sit 
 down now and pray that your nose may not run. Wipe 
 yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he 
 given to you nothing in the present case ? Has he not given 
 to you endurance ? has he not given to you magnanimity ? has 
 he not given to you manliness ? When you have such hands, 
 do you still look for one who shall wipe your nose? But we 
 neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a 
 man who cares how he shall do any thing, not for the obtain- 
 ing of a thing, but who cares about his own energy. What 
 man, when he is walking about, cares for his own energy? 
 who, when he is deliberating, cares about his own delibera- 
 tion, and not about obtaining that about which he deliber- 
 ates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well 
 we have deliberated ; did I not tell you, brother, that it is im- 
 possible, when we have thought about any thing, that it 
 should not turn out thus ? But if the thing should turn out 
 otherwise, the wretched man is humbled ; he knows not even 
 what to say about what has taken place. Who among us for 
 the sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among 
 us as to his actions has not slept in indifference? Who? 
 Give (name) to me one that I may see the man whom I have 
 long been looking for, who is truly noble and ingenuous, 
 whether young or old ; name him. 
 
 Why then are we still surprised, if we are well practised 
 in thinking about matters (any given subject), but in our 
 acts are low, without decency, worthless, cowardly, impatient 
 of labour, altogether bad ? For we do not care about these
 
 146 EPICTETUS 
 
 things nor do we study them. But if we had feared not 
 death or banishment, but fear itself, we should have studied 
 not to fall into those things which appear to us evils. Now 
 in the school we are irritable and wordy; and if any little 
 question arises about any of these things, we are able to 
 examine them fully. But drag us to practice, and you will 
 find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some disturbing appear- 
 ance come on us, and you will know what we have been 
 studying and in what we have been exercising ourselves. 
 Consequently through want of discipline we are always add- 
 ing something to the appearance and representing things to 
 be greater than what they are. For instance as to myself, 
 when I am on a voyage and look down on the deep sea, or 
 look round on it and see no land, I am out of my mind and 
 imagine that I must drink up all this water if I am wrecked, 
 and it does not occur to me that three pints are enough. 
 What then disturbs me? The sea? No, but my opinion. 
 Again, when an earthquake shall happen, I imagine that the 
 city is going to fall on me ; but is not one little stone enough 
 to knock my brains out ? 
 
 What then are the things which are heavy on us and dis- 
 turb us? What else than opinions? What else than opin- 
 ions lie heavy upon him who goes away and leaves his com- 
 panions and friends and places and habits of life? Now 
 little children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse leav- 
 ing them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive 
 a small cake. Do you choose then that we should compare 
 you to little children ? No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be 
 pacified by a small cake, but by right opinions. And what 
 are these ? Such as a man ought to study all day, and not to 
 be affected by any thing that is not his own, neither by com- 
 panion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own 
 body, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes. 
 And what is the divine law? To keep a man's own, not to 
 claim that which belongs to others, but to use what is given, 
 and when it is not given, not to desire it ; and when a thing is 
 taken away, to give it up readily and immediately, and to be 
 thankful for the time that a man has had the use of it, if you 
 would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what mat- 
 ter does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on
 
 DISCOURSES 147 
 
 what he depends? In what respect are you better than he 
 who cries for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymnasium, and 
 little porticoes and young men and such places of amuse- 
 ment? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer 
 drink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than 
 that of Dirce ? But I was used to the water of Dirce. 5 And 
 you in turn will be used to the other. Then if you become 
 attached to this also, cry for this too, and try to make a verse 
 like the verse of Euripides, 
 
 "The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water." 
 
 See how tragedy is made when common things happen to 
 silly men. 
 
 When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis? 
 Wretch, are you not content with what you see daily? have 
 you any thing better or greater to see than the sun, the moon, 
 the stars, the whole earth, the sea ? But if indeed you com- 
 prehend him who administers the Whole, and carry him 
 about in yourself, do you still desire small stones, and a beau- 
 tiful rock ? 6 When then you are going to leave the sun itself 
 and the moon, what will you do ? will you sit and weep like 
 children? Well, what have you been doing in the school? 
 what did you hear, what did you learn? why did you write 
 yourself a philosopher, when you might have written the 
 truth ; as, "I made certain introductions, 7 and I read Chrysip- 
 pus, but I did not even approach the door of a philosopher." 
 For how should I possess any thing of the kind which Soc- 
 rates possessed, who died as he did, who lived as he did, or 
 any thing such as Diogenes possessed? Do you think that 
 any one of such men wept or grieved, because he was not 
 going to see a certain man, or a certain woman, nor to be 
 in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it should so happen, in Susa 
 or in Ecbatana ? For if a man can quit the banquet when he 
 chooses, and no longer amuse himself, does he still stay and 
 complain, and does he not stay, as at any amusement, only so 
 long as he is pleased ? Such a man, I suppose, would endure 
 perpetual exile or to be condemned to death. Will you not 
 be weaned now, like children, and take more solid food, and 
 not cry after mammas and nurses, which are the lamentations
 
 148 EPICTETUS 
 
 of old women ? But if I go away, I shall cause them sorrow. 
 You cause them sorrow? By no means; but that will 
 cause them sorrow which also causes you sorrow, opinion. 
 What have you to do then ? Take away your own opinion, 
 and if these women are wise, they will take away their own : 
 if they do not, they will lament through their own fault 
 
 My man, as the proverb says, make a desperate effort on 
 behalf of tranquillity of mind, freedom and magnanimity. 
 Lift up your head at last as released from slavery. Dare 
 to look up to God and say, Deal with me for the future as 
 thou wilt ; I am of the same mind as thou art ; I am thine : 
 I refuse nothing that pleases thee : lead me where thou wilt : 
 clothe me in any dress thou choosest: is it thy will that I 
 should hold the office of a magistrate, that I should be in the 
 condition of a private man, stay here or be an exile, be poor, 
 be rich ? I will make thy defence to men in behalf of all these 
 conditions : I will shew the nature of each thing what it is. 
 You will not do so ; but sit in an ox's belly and wait for your 
 mamma till she shall feed you. Who would Hercules have 
 been, if he had sat at home ? He would have been Eurystheus 
 and not Hercules. Well, and in his travels through the world 
 how many intimates and how many friends had he? But 
 nothing more dear to him than God. For this reason it was 
 believed that he was the son of God, and he was. In obedi- 
 ence to God then he went about purging away injustice and 
 lawlessness. But you are not Hercules and you are not 
 able to purge away the wickedness of others ; nor yet are you 
 Theseus, able to purge away the evil things of Attica. Gear 
 away your own. From yourself, from your thoughts cast 
 away instead of Procrustes and Sciron, 8 sadness, fear, desire, 
 envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But 
 it is not possible to eject these things otherwise than by look- 
 ing to God only, by fixing your affections on him only, by 
 being consecrated to his commands. But if you choose any 
 thing else, you will with sighs and groans be compelled to fol- 
 low* what is stronger than yourself, always seeking tran- 
 quillity and never able to find it; for you seek tranquillity 
 there where it is not, and you neglect to seek it where it is.
 
 DISCOURSES 149 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See ii. 10, as. 
 
 *"To answer to things" means to act in a way suitable to circum- 
 stances, to be a match for them. 
 
 ' Perhaps this was a common puzzle. The man answers right ; he can 
 rot say. 
 
 * That is which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making 
 the proper use of praise or of blame. 
 
 * Dirce a pure stream in Bcrotia. which flows into the Ismenus. The 
 Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was constructed 
 B.C. 144, and was the best water that Rome had. Some of the arches of 
 this aqueduct exist The "bright stream of Dirce" is spoken of in the 
 "Hercules Furens" of Euripides (v. 573). The verse in the text which 
 we may suppose that Epictetus made, has a spondee in the fourth place, 
 which is contrary to the rule. 
 
 The "small stones" are supposed to be the marbles which decorated 
 Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis. 
 
 'In the original it is Eiffaytajrcd, It was a name used for short 
 commentaries on the principles of any art ; such as we now call Intro- 
 ductions, Compendium?. Elements. Gellius, xvi. 8. 
 
 Procrustes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were 
 destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus. 
 
 * Antoninus x. 28. "only to the rational animal is it given to follow 
 voluntarily what happens ; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on 
 all." Compare Seneca, Quest. Nat. ii. 59,
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 WHAT is the first business of him who philoso- 
 phizes? To throw away self conceit (ofydis). 1 
 For it is impossible for a man to begin to 
 learn that which he thinks that he knows. As 
 to things then which ought to be done and ought not 
 to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, 
 all of us talking of them at random go to the phi- 
 losophers; and on these matters we praise, we censure, we 
 accuse, we blame, we judge and determine about principles 
 honourable and dishonourable. But why do we go to the 
 philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not 
 think that we know. And what is this ? Theorems. 2 For 
 we wish to learn what philosophers say as being something 
 elegant and acute ; and some wish to learn that they may get 
 profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous then to think 
 that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn an- 
 other; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that 
 which he does not learn. But the many are deceived by this 
 which deceived also the rhetorician Theopompus, 8 when he 
 blames even Plato for wishing everything to be defined. 
 For what does he say? Did none of us before you use the 
 words Good or Just, or do we utter the sounds in an unmean- 
 ing and empty way without understanding what they sever- 
 ally signify ? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had 
 not natural notions of each of these things and preconcep- 
 tions (npoXrrfEis} ? But it is not possible to adapt precon- 
 ceptions to their correspondent objects if we have not dis- 
 tinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what object must 
 be subjected to each preconception. You may make the 
 same charge against physicians also. For who among us 
 did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippo- 
 crates lived, or did we utter these words as empty sounds? 
 For we have also a certain preconception of health, but we 
 
 150
 
 DISCOURSES 151 
 
 are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, abstain 
 from food ; another says, give food ; another says, bleed ; and 
 another says, use cupping. What is the reason? is it any 
 other than that a man can not properly adapt the preconcep- 
 tion of health to particulars ? 
 
 So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life. 
 Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful 
 and not useful ; for who among us has not a preconception of 
 each of these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect pre- 
 conception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt 
 the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato, 
 for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the 
 useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it 
 possible then that both of you are right ? How is it possi- 
 ble ? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to 
 the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the 
 matter of pleasure and to that of health ? For, generally, if 
 all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them, 
 and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the no- 
 tions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we 
 quarrel, why do we blame one another ? 
 
 And why do I now allege this contention with one another 
 and speak of it? If you yourself properly adapt your pre- 
 conceptions, why are you unhappy, why are you hindered? 
 Let us omit at present the second topic about the pursuits 
 (opuas) and the study of the duties which relate to them. 
 Let us omit also the third topic, which- relates to the assents 
 (dvyKaraQeteii) : I give up to you these two topics. Let us 
 insist upon the first, which presents an almost obvious de- 
 monstration that we do not properly adapt the preconcep- 
 tions. Do you now desire that which is possible and that 
 which is possible to you? Why then are you hindered? 
 why are you unhappy? Do you not now try to avoid the 
 unavoidable ? Why then do you fall in with any thing which 
 you would avoid ? Why are you unfortunate ? Why, when 
 you desire a thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not 
 desire it, does it happen ? For this is the greatest proof of 
 unhappiness and misery ; I wish for something, and it does 
 not happen. And what is more wretched than I ? 
 
 It was because she could not endure this that Medea came
 
 152 EPICTETUS 
 
 to murder her children : an act of a noble spirit in this view 
 at least, for she had a just opinion what it is for a thing not 
 to succeed which a person wishes. Then she says, "Thus I 
 shall be avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged 
 and insulted me ; and what shall I gain if he is punished thus ? 
 how then shall it be done? I shall kill my children, but I 
 shall punish myself also ; and what do I care?" 4 This is the 
 aberration of soul which possesses great energy. For she 
 did not know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish; 
 that you can not get this from without, nor yet by the altera- 
 tion and new adaptation of things. Do not desire the man 
 (Jason, Medea's husband), and nothing which you desire 
 will fail to happen: do not obstinately desire that he shall 
 live with you : do not desire to remain in Corinth ; and in a 
 word desire nothing than that which God wills. And who 
 shall hinder you? who shall compel you? No man shall 
 compel you any more than he shall compel Zeus. 
 
 When you have such a guide and your wishes and desires 
 are the same as his, why do you still fear disappointment? 
 Give up your desire to wealth and your aversion to poverty, 
 and you will be disappointed in the one, you will fall into the 
 other. Well give them up to health, and you will be unfor- 
 tunate: give them up to magistracies, honours, country, 
 friends, children, in a word to any of the things which are 
 not in man's power (and you will be unfortunate). But 
 give them up to Zeus and to the rest of the gods ; surrender 
 them to the gods, let the gods govern, let your desire and 
 aversion be ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will 
 you be any longer unhappy? But if, lazy wretch, you envy, 
 and complain, and are jealous and fear, and never cease for a 
 single day complaining both of yourself and of the gods, why 
 do you still speak of being educated? What kind of an 
 education, man ? Do you mean that you have been employed 
 
 about Sophistical Syllogisms (dvHoyidjiovs fieraitiitrovras)! 
 
 Will you not, if it is possible, unlearn all these things and 
 begin from the beginning, and see at the same time that 
 hitherto you have not even touched the matter; and then 
 commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all 
 that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do
 
 DISCOURSES 153 
 
 not choose, and nothing shall fail to happen which you do 
 choose ? 
 
 Give me one young man who has come to the school with 
 this intention, who is become a champion for this matter 
 and says, "I give up everything else, and it is enough for me 
 if it shall ever be in my power to pass my life free from 
 hindrance and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present) 
 my neck to all things like a free man, and to look up to 
 heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing that can happen." 
 Let any of you point out such a man that I may say, "Come, 
 young man, into the possession of that which is your own, 
 for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy: yours are these 
 possessions, yours these books, yours these discourses!' 
 Then when he shall have laboured sufficiently and exercised 
 himself in this part of the matter (r6?rov), let him come to 
 me again and say, "I desire to be free from passion and free 
 from perturbation ; and I wish as a pious man and a philoso- 
 pher and a diligent person to know what is my duty to the 
 gods, what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to my 
 country, what to strangers." (I say) "Come also to the 
 second matter (roxov) : this also is yours." "But I have 
 now sufficiently studied the second part (TOICOV} also, and 
 I would gladly be secure and unshaken, and not only when 
 I am awake, but also when I am asleep, and when I am filled 
 with wine, and when I am melancholy." Man, you are a 
 god, you have great designs. 
 
 No : but I wish to understand what Chrysippus says in his 
 treatise of the "Pseudomenos" 5 (the Liar). Will you not 
 hang yourself, wretch, with such your intention ? And what 
 good will it do you ? You will read the whole with sorrow, 
 and you will speak to others trembling. Thus you also do. 
 "Do you wish me, 6 brother, to read to you, and you to me" ? 
 You write excellently, my man ; and you also excellently in 
 the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you 
 in the style of Antisthenes. Then having told your dreams 
 to one another you return to the same things : your desires 
 are the same, your aversions the same, your pursuits are the 
 same, and your designs and purposes, you wish for the same 
 things and work for the same. In the next place you do not 
 even seek for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if
 
 1 54 EPICTETUS 
 
 you hear such things (as I say). Then you say, "An ill-na- 
 tured old fellow : when I was going away, he did not weep 
 nor did he say, Into what danger you are going : if you come 
 off safe, my child, I will burn lights. This is what a good 
 natured man would do." It will be a great thing for you if 
 you do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn lights 
 for such a person : for you ought to be immortal and exempt 
 from disease. 
 
 Casting away then, as I say, this conceit of thinking that 
 we know something useful, we must come to philosophy as 
 we apply to geometry, and to music : but if we do not, we 
 shall not even approach to proficiency though we read all the 
 collections and commentaries of Chrysippus and those of 
 Antipater and Archedemus. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See ii. II, I, and iii. 14, 8. 
 
 * Theorems are defined by Cicero, "De Fato," c. 6, "Percepta appello 
 quae dicuntur Graece Qeooprrtiara." 
 
 1 This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be 
 the same person as Theopompus of Chios, the historian. 
 
 * This is the meaning of what Medea says in the "Medea" of Euripides. 
 Epictetus does not give the words of the poet. 
 
 * The "Pseudomenos" was a treatise by Chrysippus. "The Pseudo- 
 menos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a 
 person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks 
 truth : if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many 
 books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself 
 in studying to answer it." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 ' Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their 
 writings. Upton compares Horace, Epp. ii. 2, 87. 
 
 "ut alter 
 
 Alterius sermone meros audiret honores 
 Discedo Alcaeus puncto illius? ille meo quis?. 
 Quis nisi Callimachus ?"
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES 
 
 EVERY habit and faculty is maintained and increased 
 by the corresponding actions: the habit of walking 
 by walking, the habit of running by running. If 
 you would be a good reader, read ; if a writer, write. 
 But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succes- 
 sion, but have done something else, you will know the con- 
 sequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten 
 days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will 
 see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if you 
 would make any thing a habit, do it ; if you would not make 
 it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something 
 else in place of it. 
 
 So it is with respect to the affections of the soul: when 
 you have been angry, you must know that not only has this 
 evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit, 
 and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have 
 been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not 
 reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also 
 nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible 
 for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced, 
 when they did not exist before, and others not be increased 
 and strengthened by corresponding acts. 
 
 In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases 
 of the mind grow up. For when you have once desired 
 money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil, 
 the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is 
 restored to the original authority. But if you apply no 
 means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but 
 being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is 
 inflamed to desire quicker than before: and when this takes 
 place continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous), 
 and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For 
 he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not 
 in the same state that he was before, unless he has been com- 
 
 155
 
 156 EPICTETUS 
 
 pletely cured. Something of the kind happens also in 
 diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in 
 it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is 
 again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not 
 blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an 
 angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on it 
 which will increase it : at first keep quiet, and count the days 
 on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion 
 every day; now every second day; then every third, then 
 every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make 
 a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to be weak- 
 ened, and then is completely destroyed. "I have not been 
 vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding 
 day during two or three months ; but I took care when some 
 exciting things happened." Be assured that you are in a 
 good way. To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did 
 not say to myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is 
 her husband ; for he who says this says, Happy is her adul- 
 terer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind ; the woman 
 present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side. 
 I stroke my head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have 
 solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is 
 called the master sophism. And if even the woman is will- 
 ing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also 
 fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be 
 victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is 
 named the Liar, and the Quiescent. Over such a victory as 
 this a man may justly be proud ; not for proposing the master 
 sophism. 
 
 How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to 
 be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to 
 God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with 
 God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says, 
 "Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the tem- 
 ples of the averting deities." It is even sufficient if you resort 
 to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself 
 with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go 
 to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and 
 mocking his beauty : consider what a victory he at last found 
 that he had gained over himself; what an Olympian victory;
 
 DISCOURSES 157 
 
 in what number he stood from Hercules; 1 so that, by the 
 Gods, one may justly salute him, Hail, wondrous man, you 
 who have conquered not these sorry boxers and pancratiasts, 
 nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing 
 these objects on the other side you will conquer the appear- 
 ance : you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first 
 place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance, 
 but say, Appearances, wait for me a little : let me see who you 
 are, and what you are about : let me put you to the test. And 
 then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw 
 lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you 
 do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather 
 bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appear- 
 ance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are ac- 
 customed to be exercised in this way, you will see what 
 shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now 
 it is only trifling words, and nothing more. 
 
 This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself 
 against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried 
 away. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for 
 kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from per- 
 turbation. Remember God : call on him as a helper and pro- 
 tector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri 2 in a storm. For 
 what is a greater storm than that which comes from appear- 
 ances which are violent and drive away the reason ? For the 
 storm itself, what else is it but an appearance? For take 
 away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and 
 lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm 3 and 
 serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once 
 been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and 
 then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in 
 so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even 
 know afterwards that you are doing wrong, but you will 
 even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong 
 doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod 4 to be 
 
 true, 
 
 " With constant ills the dilatory strives." 
 
 NOTES 
 
 * Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have 
 been the first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling
 
 158 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in 
 the second or third place after him, and so on. 
 * Castor and Pollux. Horace, Carm. i. 12 : 
 
 "Quorum simul alba nautis 
 Stella refulsit, etc." 
 
 * " Consider that every thing is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. 
 Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, 
 who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, every thing stable, 
 and a waveless bay." Antoninus, xii. 
 
 4 Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 411.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS 
 ONLY IN WORDS 
 
 THE argument called the ruling argument (6 xvpievoov 
 \6yo$) appears to have been proposed from such 
 principles as these: there is in fact a common con- 
 tradiction between one another in these three propo- 
 sitions, each two being in contradiction to the third. The 
 propositions are, that every thing past must of necessity be 
 true ; that an impossibility does not follow a possibility ; and 
 that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true. 
 Diodorus 1 observing this contradiction employed the proba- 
 tive force of the first two for the demonstration of this pro- 
 position. That nothing is possible which is not true and 
 never will be. Now another will hold these two : That some- 
 thing is possible, which is neither true nor ever will be : and 
 That an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But 
 he will not allow that every thing which is past is necessarily 
 true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Anti- 
 pater copiously defended them. But others maintain the 
 other two propositions, That a thing is possible which is 
 neither true nor will be true: and That everything which 
 is past is necessarily true ; but then they will maintain that an 
 impossibility can follow a possibility. But it is impossible 
 to maintain these three propositions, because of their com- 
 mon contradiction. 2 
 
 If then any man should ask me, which of these propo- 
 sitions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do not 
 know; but I have received this story, that Diodorus main- 
 tained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and 
 Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of Chrysip- 
 pus a third. What then is your opinion? I was not made 
 for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to 
 me, and to compare what others say and to form an opinion 
 of my own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all 
 from the grammarian. Who was Hector's father ? Priam. 
 
 159
 
 l6o EPICTETUS 
 
 y. 
 
 Who were his brothers ? Alexander and Deiphobus. Who 
 was their mother ? Hecuba I have heard this story. From 
 whom? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think, 
 writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him. 
 And what further have I about the ruling argument ? Noth- 
 ing. But, if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet I 
 surprise the guests by enumerating those who have written 
 on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonder- 
 fully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has 
 written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. Anti- 
 pater also has written not only in his work about Possibil- 
 ities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument. 
 Have you not read the work? I have not read it. Read. 
 And what profit will a man have from it? he will be more 
 trifling and impertinent than he is now; for what else have 
 you gained by reading it? What opinion have you formed 
 on this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and 
 Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never 
 will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great impor- 
 tance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of 
 your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens 
 to us much more than in these things of which we are speak- 
 ing. 
 
 Speak to me about good and evil. 3 Listen : 
 
 "The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores 
 Brought me." 4 
 
 Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are 
 indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things 
 which partake of the virtues : the bad are the vices, and the 
 things which partake of them; and the indifferent are the 
 things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth, 
 health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know 
 this? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history; for what 
 difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes 
 has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes ? Have you 
 then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of 
 your own? Show how you are used to behave in a storm 
 on shipboard? Do you remember this division (distinction 
 of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows noth-
 
 DISCOURSES l6l 
 
 ing of times and seasons, stands by you when you are 
 screaming and says, "Tell me, I ask you by the gods, what 
 you were saying just now, Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck : 
 does it participate in vice?" Will you not take up a stick and 
 lay it on his head ? What have we to do with you, man ? we 
 are perishing and you come to mock us ? But if Caesar send 
 for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinc- 
 tion ? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a per- 
 son should come up to you and say, "Why do you tremble, 
 man? what is the matter about which you are engaged? 
 Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those 
 who go in to him ?" You reply, Why do you also mock me 
 and add to my present sorrows? "Still tell me, philosopher, 
 tell me why you tremble ? Is it not death of which you run 
 the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or 
 disgrace? What else is there? Is there any vice or any- 
 thing which partakes of vice?" What then did you use to 
 say of these things ? "What have you to do with me, man ? 
 my own evils are enough for me." And you say right. 
 Your own evils are enough for you, your baseness, your 
 cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat 
 in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what 
 belonged to others ? Why did you call yourself a Stoic ? 
 
 Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find 
 to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are 
 Epicureans, a few Peripatetics, 6 and those feeble. For 
 wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal 
 to everything else or even superior ? But show me a Stoic, 
 if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an 
 endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. 
 For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any 
 worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also 
 with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic? As we call a 
 statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of 
 Phidias; so show me a man who is fashioned according to 
 the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man who is sick 
 and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile 
 and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him : I desire, by 
 the gods, to see a Stoic. You can not show me one fashioned 
 so ; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown 
 ii
 
 1 62 EPICTETUS 
 
 a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour : do not grudge 
 an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do 
 you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the 
 Athena, a work of ivory and gold? Let any of you show 
 me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to 
 blame 6 either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about 
 any thing, not to consider himself damaged by any thing, not 
 to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous ; and why 
 should I not say it direct? desirous from a man to become 
 a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellow- 
 ship with Zeus. 7 Show me the man. But you can not. 
 Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others? and 
 why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and 
 walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and 
 things which do not belong to you? 
 
 And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my 
 school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from 
 restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosper- 
 ous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. 
 And you are here to learn and practise these things. Why 
 then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a pur- 
 pose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose 
 also have such qualification as I ought to have? What is 
 that which is wanting ? When I see an artificer and material 
 lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer, 
 here the material ; what is it that we want ? Is not the thing 
 one that can be taught ? It is. Is it not then in our power ? 
 The only thing of all that is in our power. Neither wealth 
 is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word 
 any thing else except the right use of appearances. This 
 (right use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is 
 free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the 
 work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my 
 fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or 
 through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, 
 and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the 
 fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, 
 in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to 
 bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of
 
 DISCOURSES 163 
 
 the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, 
 and you will see. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Diodoru's, surnamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of 
 Ptolemoeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and dis- 
 tinguished in dialectic. 
 
 2 If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction 
 to the third and destroy it. 
 
 * "Speak to me," etc., may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who 
 has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians' learning. 
 When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the 
 Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is noth- 
 ing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as anything else. Then 
 he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he 
 learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a 
 philosopher. He is bantering the hearer : it makes no matter from what 
 author I learned them ; it is all the same. The real question is, have 
 you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion 
 yourself ? 
 
 4 Odyssey, ix. 39. 
 
 5 The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed 
 to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excel- 
 lence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5, 31. 
 
 * "To blame God" means to blame the constitution and order of 
 things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked; 
 as absurd as for the potter's vessel to blame the potter, if that can be 
 imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break. 
 
 7 " 'Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ,' 
 I John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides 
 those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity 
 between Epictetus and the Scriptures: and will perceive from them, 
 either that the Stoics had learned a good deal of the Christian language 
 or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such 
 strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the 
 philosophers, especially Epictetus." Mrs. Carter.
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS 
 
 THE propositions which are true and evident are of 
 necessity used even by those who contradict them: 
 and a man might perhaps consider it to be the great- 
 est proof of a thing being evident that it is found 
 to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it 
 at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that 
 there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must 
 make the contradictory negation, that nothing is univer- 
 sally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this ? For 
 what else is this than to affirm thatwhatever is universally af- 
 firmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and 
 say : Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all 
 things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, 
 Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought 
 not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, 
 Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any 
 thing ; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now 
 in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I 
 name? Those who call themselves Academics? "Men, 
 agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another] : believe 
 us that no man believes anybody." 
 
 Thus Epicurus 1 also, when he designs to destroy the nat- 
 ural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of 
 that which he destroys. For what does he say? "Be not 
 deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken : there is no 
 natural fellowship among rational animals ; believe me. But 
 those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false 
 reasons." What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. 
 Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that 
 there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by 
 all means to be preserved ? Nay, it will be much better and 
 safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? 
 Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your 
 lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so 
 
 164
 
 DISCOURSES 165 
 
 many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the 
 gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one 
 may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? 
 For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a 
 worm, of which you judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, 
 and en joy women, and ease yourself, and snore. 2 And what is 
 it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether 
 right or wrong ? For what have we to do with you ? You 
 take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, 
 and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable 
 thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, 
 and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like 
 you to be shorn and milked ? For this you ought to say to 
 your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it 
 from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade 
 them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that tem- 
 perance is a good thing; in order that all things may be 
 secure for you? 3 Or ought we to maintain this fellowship 
 with some and not with others ? With whom then ought we 
 to maintain it ? With such as on their part also maintain it, 
 or with such as violate this fellowship ? And who violate it 
 more than you who establish such doctrines ? 
 
 What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, 
 and compelled him to write what he did write? What else 
 was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, Nature, 
 which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling 
 and complaining ? For since, she says, you think that there is 
 no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave 
 it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your 
 own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then 
 say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and 
 roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes 
 and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him 
 to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as 
 madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele) ? So 
 strong and invincible is man's nature. For how can a vine 
 be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of 
 an olive tree ? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be 
 moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner 
 of a vine ? It is impossible : it can not be conceived. Neither
 
 1 66 EPICTETUS 
 
 then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements 
 (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their 
 genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man's 
 desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a 
 man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a 
 friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could 
 not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or 
 blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their 
 might to do it. What a shame is this ? when a man has re- 
 ceived from nature measures and rules for the knowing of 
 truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules 
 and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavours to 
 take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the 
 truth? 
 
 What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do 
 you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate 
 that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it, that our 
 citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no 
 longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have 
 you then the demonstrations? I have, and I am thankful. 
 Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the con- 
 trary : That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take 
 no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and 
 them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of 
 among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or 
 certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and 
 checking wrong doers. 4 Well done, philosopher, you have 
 done something for our citizens, you have brought back all 
 the young men to contempt of things divine. What then, 
 does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is noth- 
 ing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son 
 nothing. Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the 
 young men, that we may have more with the same opinions 
 as you and who say the same as you. From such principles 
 as these have grown our well constituted states ; by these was 
 Sparta founded : Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spar- 
 tans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile con- 
 dition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free 
 men more honourable than base, and that those who died at 
 Thermopylae 5 died from these opinions; and through what
 
 DISCOURSES 167 
 
 other opinions did the Athenians leave their city? 6 Then 
 those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ 
 themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and 
 interpreters. Of whom ? of gods who do not exist : and they 
 consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and 
 they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and 
 imposture. 
 
 Man what are you doing ? 7 are you refuting yourself every 
 day ; and will you not give up these frigid attempts ? When 
 you eat, where do you carry your hand to ? to your mouth or 
 to your eye ? When you wash yourself, what do you go into ? 
 Do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit ? If I were a 
 slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him 
 daily, I would rack him. If he said, "Boy, throw some olive 
 oil into the bath," I would take pickle sauce and pour it down 
 on his head. What is this? he would say An appearance 
 was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not 
 be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it Here give 
 me the barley-drink (tisane), he says I would fill and carry 
 him a dish of sharp sauce Did I not ask for the barley 
 drink ? Yes, master : this is the barley drink ? Take it and 
 smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our 
 senses deceive us? If I had three or four fellow-slaves of 
 the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through 
 passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by 
 using all the things which nature gives, and in words des- 
 troying them. 
 
 Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do noth- 
 ing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough 
 to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter 
 Persephone or a Pluto : 8 not to mention that they are enjoy- 
 ing the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the 
 stars, and the sea and the land and the co-operation of man- 
 kind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these 
 things to turn their attention to them ; but they only seek to 
 belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and 
 when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. 
 But what they shall say, and about what things or to what 
 persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, 
 they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any
 
 1 68 EPICTETUS 
 
 generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any 
 harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all 
 the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we should give an 
 adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a 
 public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse 
 from these doctrines ; nor if another who neglects his parents 
 should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching. What 
 then in your opinion is good or bad ? This or that ? Why 
 then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as 
 these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from 
 them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much 
 sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than 
 those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils. 9 
 
 MOTES 
 
 1 Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote 
 to Hermarchus when he was dying, says "that the actions of Epicurus 
 were inconsistent with his sayings," and "his writings were confuted 
 by his probity and morality." 
 
 1 Paul says, I Cor. 15 -.32: "If after the manner of men I have fought 
 with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? 
 let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The words "let us eat and 
 drink," etc. are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The 
 meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the 
 dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This 
 is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text. 
 
 * It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all 
 that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made 
 for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing. 
 
 4 Polybius when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men 
 of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions 
 about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than 
 those in his time who would destroy such opinions. 
 
 " Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae B. C. 
 480 against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus has recorded the inscrip- 
 tion placed over the Spartans : 
 
 "Stranger go tell the Spartans, Here we lie 
 Obedient to those who bade us die." 
 
 'When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city 
 and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, B.C. 480. 
 
 7 He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know 
 nothing. 
 
 8 Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny 
 Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the 
 common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the 
 existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives. 
 
 *"This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily
 
 DISCOURSES 169 
 
 I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of 
 God before you." Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. 
 
 To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston 
 replied, "Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you?" When 
 the Academic denied it, Ariston said, "Who made you blind? who stole 
 your power of sight?" (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 163.) 
 
 xa
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 [ 
 
 OF INCONSISTENCY 
 
 SOME things men readily confess, and other things they 
 do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or 
 without understanding; but quite the contrary you 
 will hear all men saying, I wish that I had fortune 
 equal to my understanding. But men readily confess that 
 they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I confess; 
 but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish. 
 A man will not readily confess that he is intemperate; and 
 that he is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no 
 means confess that he is envious or a busy body. Most men 
 will confess that they are compassionate. What then is the 
 reason? The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency 
 and confusion in the things which relate to good and evil. 
 But different men have different reasons ; and generally what 
 they imagine to be base, they do not confess at all. But they 
 suppose timidity to be a characteristic of a good disposition, 
 and compassion also; but silliness to be the absolute charac- 
 teristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess) 
 the things which are offences against society. But in the 
 case of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced 
 to confess them, because they imagine that there is some- 
 thing involuntary in them as in timidity and compassion; 
 and if a man confess that he is in any respect intemperate, 
 he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what is involun- 
 tary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involun- 
 tary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something 
 involuntary; and for this reason they confess to jealousy 
 also. 
 
 Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ig- 
 norant of what they say, and of the evils which they have or 
 have not, and why they have them, or how they shall be re- 
 lieved of them, I think it is worth the trouble for a man to 
 watch constantly (and to ask) whether I am also one of 
 them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct 
 
 170
 
 DISCOURSES 171 
 
 myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether 
 I conduct myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say 
 this, that I have been taught to be prepared for everything 
 that may happen. Have I the consciousness, which a man 
 who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? 
 Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to 
 obey ? or do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn 
 history and understand the books which I did not under- 
 stand before, and, if it should happen so, to explain them 
 also to others ? Man, you have had a fight in the house with 
 a poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you 
 have frightened the neighbours, and you come to me as if 
 you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how 
 I have explained some word, and how I have babbled what- 
 ever came into my head. You come full of envy, and hum- 
 bled, because you bring nothing from home; and you sit 
 during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how 
 your father is disposed towards you and your brother. 
 "What are they saying about me there? now they think that 
 I am improving, and are saying, He will return with all 
 knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before I re- 
 turn : but much labour is necessary, and no one sends me 
 any thing, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty ; every thing 
 is bad at home, and bad here." 
 
 Then they say, no one gains any profit from the school. 
 Why, who comes to the school? who comes for the pur- 
 pose of being improved ? who comes to present his opinions 
 to be purified? who comes to learn what he is in want of? 
 Why do you wonder then if you carry back from the school 
 the very things which you bring into it ? For you come not 
 to lay aside (your principles) or to correct them or to re- 
 ceive other principles in place of them. By no means, nor 
 any thing like it. You rather look to this, whether you pos- 
 sess already that for which you come. You wish to prattle 
 about theorems ? What then ? Do you not become greater 
 triflers? Do not your little theorems give you some oppor- 
 tunity of display? You solve sophistical syllogisms. Do 
 you not examine the assumptions of the syllogism named the 
 Liar ? Do you not examine hypothetical syllogisms ? Why 
 then are you still vexed if you receive the things for which
 
 172 EPICTETUS 
 
 I 
 
 you come to the school? Yes; but if my child die or my 
 brother, or if I must die or be racked, what good will these 
 things do me? Well, did you come for this? for this do 
 you sit by my side? did you ever for this light your lamp or 
 keep awake? or, when you went out to the walking place, 
 did you ever propose any appearance that had been presented 
 to you instead of a syllogism, and did you and your friends 
 discuss it together? Where and when? Then you say, 
 Theorems are useless. To whom ? To such as make a bad 
 use of them. For eye-salves are not useless to those who 
 use them as they ought and when they ought. Fomenta- 
 tions are not useless. Dumb-bells are not useless; but they 
 are useless to some, useful to others. If you ask me now if 
 syllogisms are useful, I will tell you that they are useful, and 
 if you choose, I will prove it. How then will they in any 
 way be useful to me? Man, did you ask if they are useful 
 to you, or did you ask generally? Let him who is suffer- 
 ing from dysentery, ask me if vinegar is useful; I will say 
 that it is useful. Will it then be useful to me? I will say, 
 no. Seek first for the discharge to be stopped and the ulcers 
 to be closed. And do you, O men, first cure the ulcers and 
 stop the discharge; be tranquil in your mind, bring it free 
 from distraction into the school, and you will know what 
 power reason has.
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 ON FRIENDSHIP 1 
 
 WHAT a man applies himself to earnestly, that he 
 naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves 
 earnestly to the things which are bad? By no 
 means. Well, do they apply themselves to things 
 which in no way concern themselves ? not to these either. It 
 remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only 
 about things which are good ; and if they are earnestly em- 
 ployed about things, they love such things also. Whoever 
 then understands what is good, can also know how to love: 
 but he who can not distinguish good from bad, and things 
 which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he pos- 
 sess the power of loving ? To love then is only in the power 
 of the wise. 
 
 How is this? a man may say; I am foolish, and yet I 
 love my child. I am surprised indeed that you have begun 
 by making the admission that you are foolish. For what 
 are you deficient in ? Can you not make use of your senses ? 
 do you not distinguish appearances? do you not use food 
 which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation ? 
 Why then do you admit that you are foolish ? It is in truth 
 because you are often disturbed by appearances and per- 
 plexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you; 
 and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then 
 the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad ; 
 and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are 
 changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are 
 foolish. And are you not changeable in love? But wealth, 
 and pleasure and in a word things themselves, do you some- 
 times think them to be good, and sometimes bad? and do 
 you not think the same men at one time to be good, at an- 
 other time bad? and have you not at one time a friendly 
 feeling towards them, and at another time the feeling of an 
 enemy ? and do you not at one time praise them, and at an- 
 other time blame them? Yes; I have these feelings also. 
 
 173
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about 
 a man is his friend? Certainly not. And he who has se- 
 lected a man as his friend and is of a changeable dispostion, 
 has he good-will towards him? He has not. And he who 
 now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him? This 
 man also has no good-will to the other. Well then, did you 
 never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, 
 so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but 
 that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh 
 among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself 
 and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he 
 will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to 
 die. Then you will change your tone and say, what a son I 
 have brought up ! He has long been wishing to bury me. 
 Throw a pretty girl between you ; and do you the old man 
 love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little 
 fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You 
 will utter the words of the father of Admetus ! 
 
 " Life gives you pleasure : and why not your father ?" * 
 
 Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when 
 he was little ? that he was not in agony when the child had a 
 fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever in- 
 stead of the child? then when the test (the thing) came and 
 was near, see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles 
 and Polynices from the same mother and from the same 
 father? Were they not brought up together, had they not 
 lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often 
 kissed one another ? So that, if any man, I think, had seen 
 them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the para- 
 doxes which they utter about friendship. But when a quar- 
 rel rose between them about the royal power, as between 
 dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say 
 
 Polynices. Where will you take your station before the towers? 
 
 Eteocles. Why do you ask me this? 
 
 Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to kill you. 
 
 Et. I also wish to do the same. * 
 
 Such are the wishes that they utter.
 
 DISCOURSES 175 
 
 For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached 
 to nothing so much as to its own interest. 4 Whatever then 
 appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this 
 be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it 
 hates, spurns, curses: for its nature is to love nothing so 
 much as its own interest; this is father, and brother, and 
 kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods ap- 
 pear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and 
 throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alex- 
 ander ordered the temples of ^Esculapius to be burned when 
 his dear friend died. 6 
 
 For this reason if a man put in the same place his in- 
 terest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and 
 friends, all these are secured : but if he puts in one place his 
 interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kins- 
 men and justice itself, all these give way being borne down 
 by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine 
 are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines : if 
 in the flesh, there is the ruling power : if in the will, it is there: 
 and if it is in externals, it is there. 6 If then I am there 
 where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I 
 ought to be, and son, and father ; for this will be my interest, 
 to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, 
 of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my rela- 
 tions (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and 
 honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes 
 strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is 
 that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous). 
 
 It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and 
 the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both; 
 and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Mace- 
 donians with both ; and the Romans with the Getas. 7 And 
 still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Al- 
 exander was the giiest of Menelaus; and if any man had 
 seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed 
 any one who said that they were not friends. But there was 
 cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a hand- 
 some woman, and about her war arose. And now when you 
 see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do 
 not conclude from this any thing about their friendship, not
 
 176 EPICTETUS 
 
 even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to 
 be separated from one another. For the ruling principle 
 of a bad man can not be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain 
 rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different 
 times by different appearances. But examine, not what 
 other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and 
 brought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but 
 examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether 
 in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name 
 them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or con- 
 stant, or brave or free : do not name them even men, if you 
 have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human 
 nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one 
 another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if 
 they were mountains, 8 and in the courts of justice display 
 the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intem- 
 perate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes 
 them do whatever else men do against one another through 
 this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their 
 interests in the things which are not within the power of 
 their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think 
 the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is 
 a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself 
 whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associ- 
 ated a long time and are companions, but when you have 
 ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are 
 friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are 
 just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidel- 
 ity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest 
 things and of nothing else? 
 
 But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so 
 long; and did he not love me? How do you know, slave, 
 if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his 
 shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast ? How 
 do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, 
 he will not throw you away like a broken platter? But this 
 woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long. 
 And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was 
 the mother of children and of many? But a necklace 9 came 
 between them: and what is a necklace? It is the opinion
 
 DISCOURSES 177 
 
 about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was 
 the thing which broke asunder the friendship between hus- 
 band and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a 
 wife, nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man 
 among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friend 
 himself or have another for his friend, cut out these opinions, 
 hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all 
 he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with 
 himself, he will not change his mind, he will not torture 
 himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like him- 
 self, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he 
 will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind 
 to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance, 
 on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest 
 importance ; but he will be harsh to no man, being well con- 
 vinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of 
 truth unwillingly. If you can not do this, yet you can do in 
 all other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge 
 together, and sail together, and you may be born of the same 
 parents ; for snakes also are : but neither will they be friends 
 nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opin- 
 
 ions. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship 
 is only possible between the good." Schweig. He also says that there 
 was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he ex- 
 pressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (i. i, note 12). 
 Schweig. draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus ; and he 
 supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four 
 books of Epictetus' discourses by Arrian, which have been lost. 
 
 Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says "nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse," 
 and c. 18. 
 
 1 The first verse is from the "Alcestis" of Euripides, v. 691. The 
 second in Epictetus is not in Euripides. 
 
 *From the "Phcenissae" of Euripides, v. 723, etc. 
 
 * Compare Euripides, "Hecuba," v. 846, etc : 
 
 ye QvrfTois o$ aitavra 
 rds dvdyKag aos vo^oi Stabptdar, 
 nQevres rovs ye TtoXe/utoordrovt 
 TS rovs Ttplv evfievels itoiovjtevoi. 
 
 'Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian, Expedition of 
 Alexander, vii. 14. 
 
 * Matthew vi. 21, "for where your treasure is, there will your heart be 
 also."
 
 1 78 EPICTETUS 
 
 7 The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly 
 in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. i.) The quar- 
 rel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of 
 Herodotus (i. i). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Per- 
 sians is the subject of Arrian's expedition of Alexander. The Romans 
 were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may 
 assume that Epictetus was still living then. 
 
 * Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning : "as wild beasts in the 
 mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in 
 deserted places, but even in the forum." 
 
 ' The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a neck- 
 lace.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING 
 
 EVERY man will read a book with more pleasure or 
 even with more ease, if it is written in fairer char- 
 acters. Therefore, every man will also listen more 
 readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by appro- 
 priate and becoming words. We must not say then that 
 there is no faculty of expression : for this affirmation is the 
 characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of 
 an impious man, because he undervalues the gifts which 
 come from God, just as if he would take away the commod- 
 ity of the power of vision, or of hearing, or of seeing. 
 Has then God given you eyes to no purpose ? and to no pur- 
 pose has he infused into them a spirit 1 so strong and of such 
 skilful contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the 
 forms of things which are seen? What messenger is so 
 swift and vigilant? And to no purpose has he made the 
 interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that the 
 vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a man- 
 ner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without 
 the presence of which there would be no use in any other 
 thing ? 
 
 Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget 
 the things which are superior to them. But indeed for the 
 power of seeing and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and 
 for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits 
 which are dry, and for wine and oil give thanks to God : but 
 remember that he has given you something else better than 
 all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them and 
 estimating the value of each. For what is that which gives 
 information about each of these powers, what each of them 
 is worth ? Is it each faculty itself ? Did you ever hear the 
 faculty of vision saying any thing about itself ? or the faculty 
 of hearing ? or wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog ? No ; 
 but they are appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the 
 faculty which has the power of making use of the appear- 
 
 179
 
 l8o EPICTETUS 
 
 ances of things. And if you inquire what is the value of 
 each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you? 
 How then can any other faculty be more powerful than this, 
 which uses the rest as ministers and itself proves each and 
 pronounces about them ? for which of them knows what itself 
 is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when 
 it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it 
 which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from 
 objects to which it ought not to apply them and does apply 
 them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision? No; 
 but it is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty 
 which closes and opens the ears? what is that by which 
 they are curious 'and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved 
 by what is said ? is it the faculty of hearing ? It is no other 
 than the faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing 
 that it is amidst all the other faculties which are blind and 
 dumb and unable to see any thing else except the very acts 
 for which they are appointed in order to minister to this 
 (faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees sharp and 
 sees what is the value of each of the rest; will this faculty 
 declare to us that any thing else is the best/ or that itself is? 
 And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see? 
 But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain per- 
 son, and in what manner, who tells us ? The faculty of the 
 will. And whether we ought to believe what is said or not 
 to believe it, and if we do believe, whether we ought to be 
 moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it not the faculty of 
 the will ? But this faculty of speaking and of ornamenting 
 words, if there is indeed any such peculiar faculty, what else 
 does it do, when there happens to be discourse about a thing, 
 than to ornament the words and arrange them as hair-dress- 
 ers do the hair? But whether it is better to speak or to be 
 silent, and better to speak in this way or that way, and 
 whether this is becoming or not becoming, and the season 
 for each and the use, what else tells us than the faculty of 
 the will? Would you have it then to come forward and 
 condemn itself? 
 
 What then? it (the will) says, 2 if the fact is so, can that 
 which ministers be superior to that to which it ministers, can 
 the horse be superior to the rider, or the dog to the hunts-
 
 DISCOURSES l8l 
 
 man, or the instrument to the musician, or the servants to 
 the king ? What is that which makes use of the rest ? The 
 will. What takes care of all? The will. What destroys 
 the whole man, at one time by hunger, at another time by 
 hanging, and at another time by a precipice? The will. 
 Then is any thing stronger in men than this? and how is it 
 possible that the things which are subject to restraint are 
 stronger than that which is not ? What things are naturally 
 formed to hinder the faculty of vision? Both will and 
 things which do not depend on the faculty of the will. It 
 is the same with the faculty of hearing, with the faculty of 
 speaking in like manner. But what has a natural power of 
 hindering the will? Nothing which is independent of the 
 will; but only the will itself, when it is perverted. There- 
 fore this (the will) is alone vice or alone virtue. 
 
 Then being so great a faculty and set over all the rest, let 
 it (the will) come forward and tell us that the most excel- 
 lent of all things is the flesh. Not even if the flesh itself de- 
 clared that it is the most excellent, would any person bear 
 that it should say this. But what is it, Epicurus, which pro- 
 nounces this, which wrote about the End (purpose) of our 
 Being, 8 which wrote on the Nature of Things, which wrote 
 about the Canon (rule of truth), which led you to wear a 
 beard, which wrote when it was dying that it was spending 
 the last and a happy day ?* Was this the flesh or the will ? 
 Then do you admit that you possess any thing superior to 
 this (the will) ? and are you not mad? are you in fact so 
 blind and deaf ? 
 
 What then ? does any man despise the other faculties ? I 
 hope not. Does any man say that there is no use or excel- 
 lence in the speaking faculty ? I hope not. That would be 
 foolish, impious, ungrateful towards God. But a man ren- 
 ders to each thing its due value. For there is some use even 
 in an ass, but not so much as in an ox : there is also use in 
 a dog, but not so much as in a slave : there is also some use 
 in a slave, but not so much as in citizens : there is also some 
 use in citizens, but not so much as in magistrates. Not in- 
 deed because some things are superior, must we undervalue 
 the use which other things have. There is a certain value in 
 the power of speaking, but it is not so great as the power
 
 1 82 EPICTETUS 
 
 of the will. When then I speak thus, let no man think that 
 I ask you to neglect the power of speaking, for neither do 
 I ask you to neglect the eyes, nor the ears nor the hands nor 
 the feet, nor clothing nor shoes. But if you ask me what 
 then is the most excellent of all things, what must I say? I 
 can not say the power of speaking, but the power of the will, 
 when it is right (0/06?)). For it is this which uses the other 
 (the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both 
 small and great. For when this faculty of the will is set 
 right, a man who is not good becomes good: but when it 
 fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are 
 unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one an- 
 other, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this 
 which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we care- 
 fully look after it, makes happiness. 
 
 But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that 
 there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an 
 ungrateful man towards those who gave it, but also of a 
 cowardly man: for such a person seems to me to fear, if 
 there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able 
 to Hespise it. Such also are those who say that there is no 
 difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would hap- 
 pen that a man would be affected in the same way if he saw 
 Thersites and if he saw Achilles : in the same way, if he saw 
 Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and 
 clownish notions, and the notions of men who know not the 
 nature of each thing, but are afraid, if a man shall see the 
 difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried 
 off vanquished. But this is the great matter; to leave to 
 each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to 
 it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to 
 learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue 
 this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other 
 things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as 
 far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we 
 must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most 
 excellent thing, but we must take care of them on account of 
 the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true 
 natural condition, if it does not rightly use the other facul- 
 ties, and prefer some things to others.
 
 DISCOURSES 183 
 
 What then is usually done ? Men generally act as a trav- 
 eller would do on his way to his own country, when he enters 
 a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there. 
 Man, you have forgotten your purpose : you were not travel- 
 ling to this inn, but you were passing through it. But this 
 is a pleasant inn. And how many other inns are pleasant? 
 and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing 
 through. But your purpose is this, to return to your coun- 
 try, to relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the 
 duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the 
 usual magistracies. 5 For you are not come to select more 
 pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and 
 of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind 
 takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since 
 by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive 
 here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and 
 correct the faculty which makes use of the appearances of 
 things; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (de- 
 livery) of theorems to be effected by a certain mode of ex- 
 pression and with a certain variety and sharpness, some per- 
 sons captivated by these very things abide in them, one cap- 
 tivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another 
 again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn 
 (itavSoKciov) of this kind; and there they stay and waste 
 away as if they were among Sirens. 
 
 Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself ca- 
 pable of using conformably to nature the appearances pre- 
 sented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your 
 aversion from things not to fall into that which you would 
 avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to 
 have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, con- 
 forming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it, 
 well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one 
 with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses 
 
 "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny." 
 
 Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of 
 expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you 
 abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the
 
 184 EPICTETUS 
 
 things at home, and do you say, These things are fine? 
 Who says that they are not fine? but only as being a way 
 home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an 
 unfortunate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes ? and 
 what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chry- 
 sippus, 6 from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envy- 
 ing, in a word, from being disturbed, from being unhappy? 
 Nothing. You see then that these were inns, worth noth- 
 ing; and that the purpose before you was something else. 
 When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am re- 
 jecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But 
 I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding 
 about these things incessantly and putting our hopes in them. 
 If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to 
 him, reckon me too among those who do this harm : for I 
 am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent 
 and supreme, to say that another is so, in order to please you. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The word for "spirit" is itvevjia, a vital spirit, an animal spirit, 
 a nervous fluid, as Schweighauser explains it, or as Plutarch says 
 (De Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15), "the spirit which has the power of vision, 
 which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the 
 eye;" and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. 8), "the instru- 
 ments of perception said to be intelligent spirits (Ttrevjuara rospd) 
 have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs." 
 
 1 On the Greek text Upton remarks that, "there are many passages in 
 these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account 
 of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by 
 oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes." 
 
 * This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 18) entitles 
 on the "supreme good" (de summo bono), which, as Cicero says, con- 
 tains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is 
 mentioned by Velleius in Cicero de Nat. Decorum i. c. 16, as "that celes- 
 tial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment." See also De Fin. 
 i. 19. 
 
 * This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in 
 great pain (Diog. Laert. x. 22) ; Cicero (De Fin. ii. c. 30) quotes this 
 letter. 
 
 * The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace 
 (Ep. i. I, 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic prin- 
 ciples : 
 
 "Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis." 
 
 but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of 
 a citizen, says Epictetus ; he should even marry and beget children. 
 But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty ; and the con- 
 tinuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male
 
 DISCOURSES 185 
 
 and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the 
 Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could 
 not live without women, they should make the best of this business of 
 marriage. (Gellius, i. 6.) 
 
 * Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes 
 Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dialec- 
 ticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the 
 Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus,
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 TO (OR AGAINST) A PERSON WHO WAS ONE OF THOSE WHO 
 WERE NOT VALUED (ESTEEMED) BY HIM 
 
 A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus) : Fre- 
 quently I desired to hear you and came to you, and 
 you never gave me any answer: and now, if it is 
 possible, I intreat you to say something to me. Do 
 you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in any thing 
 else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has 
 the art, will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak 
 unskilfully? I do think so. He then who by speaking 
 receives benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will 
 speak skilfully: but he who is rather damaged by speaking 
 and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of 
 speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and 
 others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear bene- 
 fited by what they hear ? Or will you find that among them 
 also some are benefited and some damaged ? There are both 
 among these also, he said. In this case also then those who 
 hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully 
 are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in 
 hearing also, as there is in speaking? It seems so. If you 
 choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice 
 of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And 
 the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it 
 belongs ? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skil- 
 fully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art ? 
 This also requires the aid of art. Then if speaking properly 
 is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear 
 also with benefit is the business of the skilful man ? Now as 
 to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully, 1 let us for 
 the present, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a 
 long way from every thing of the kind. But I think that 
 every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear phi- 
 losophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is 
 it not so ? 
 
 186
 
 DISCOURSES 187 
 
 Tell me then about what I should talk to you : about what 
 matter are you able to listen ? About good and evil. Good 
 and evil in what ? In a horse ? No. Well, in an ox ? No. 
 What then ? In a man ? Yes. Do we know then what a 
 man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have 
 we our ears in any degree practised about this matter ? But 
 do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any 
 degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstra- 
 tion to you? How? Do you understand this very thing, 
 what demonstration is, or how any thing is demonstrated, 
 or by what means; or what things are like demonstration, 
 but are not demonstration ? Do you know what is true or 
 what is false? What is consequent on a thing, what is re- 
 pugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or inconsistent ? But 
 must I excite you to philosophy, and how ? Shall I show to 
 you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through 
 which they differ about things good and evil, and about 
 things which are profitable and unprofitable, when you know 
 not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is? 
 Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with 
 you : excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which 
 is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclina- 
 tion to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will 
 not be moved to eat ; so there are in us certain natural incli- 
 nations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be 
 somebody, when he himself shall excite us : but when he 
 shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite 
 a man's desire (to speak) ? Does the vine say to the hus- 
 bandman, "Take care of me?" No, but the vine by showing 
 in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he 
 does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When 
 children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite 
 to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them ? 
 But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it ? for 
 though it is small, it is still a little ass. 
 
 Why then do you say nothing to me? I can only say this 
 to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what pur- 
 pose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is 
 associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and 
 the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands dis-
 
 1 88 EPICTETUS 
 
 course nor 'demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false, 
 and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire 
 according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor in- 
 tend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent nor suspend his judg- 
 ment : to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and 
 blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Is 
 this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever 
 since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have 
 arisen through this ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and 
 Achilles quarrel with one another ? Was it not through not 
 knowing what things are profitable and not profitable ? Does 
 not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her 
 father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable? 
 does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of an- 
 other, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did 
 they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and 
 for what purpose they had come there ? Oh, man, for what 
 purpose did you come? to gain mistresses or to fight? To 
 fight. With whom? the Trojans or the Hellenes? With the 
 Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your 
 sword against your own king? And do you, most excel- 
 lent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the 
 people's guardian and have such cares; and are you quar- 
 relling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies, 
 whom you ought by every means to take care of and pro- 
 tect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well be- 
 haved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all 
 respect ? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what 
 is profitable does? 
 
 But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamem- 
 non ? But I am also handsome. Are you then more hand- 
 some than Achilles? But I have also beautiful hair. But 
 had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold coloured ? and 
 he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also 
 strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or 
 Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of 
 a goddess mother? are you the son of a father sprung from 
 Zeus? What good then do these things do to him, when 
 he sits and weeps for a girl? But I am an orator. And 
 was he not ? Do you not see how he handled the most skil-
 
 DISCOURSES 189 
 
 ful of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix? how 
 he stopped their mouths ? 2 
 
 This is all that I have to say to you ; and I say even this 
 not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me. 
 For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who 
 are expert in riding are roused by generous horses? Must 
 I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. To your 
 dress? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your 
 look? That is the same as nothing. When you would 
 listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, "You tell me noth- 
 ing;" but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for 
 hearing; and you will see how you will move the speaker. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 "That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art 
 of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage 
 from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears 
 are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a 
 philosophical discussion." Schweig. 
 
 * In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messen- 
 gers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful 
 example of eloquence.
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY 
 
 WHEN one of those who were present said, "Per- 
 suade me that logic is necessary," he replied, Do 
 you wish me to prove this to you ? The answer 
 was "Yes" Then I must use a demonstrative 
 form of speech. This was granted. How then will you 
 know if I am cheating you by my argument ? The man was 
 silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that you yourself are ad- 
 mitting that logic is necessary, if without it you can not 
 know so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not nec- 
 essary ? 
 
 190
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERROR 
 
 EVERY error comprehends contradiction : for since he 
 who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is 
 plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what 
 does the thief wish to do? That which is for his 
 own interest. If then the theft is not for his own interest, 
 he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational 
 soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it 
 does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered 
 from doing contradictory things: but when it does under- 
 stand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the con- 
 tradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from 
 the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as 
 this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to 
 truth. 
 
 He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of 
 exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man 
 the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove 
 how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which 
 he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man 
 will himself withdraw from that which he does; but so long 
 as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man per- 
 sists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing 
 right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also 
 trusting to this power used to say, "I am used to call no other 
 witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him 
 with whom I am discussing and I ask him to give his opinion 
 and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is 
 sufficient in the place of all." For Socrates knew by what the 
 rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it 
 must incline, whether it chooses or not. Show the rational 
 governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from 
 it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him 
 who is not persuaded. 
 
 191
 
 BOOK III 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 OF FINERY IN DRESS 
 
 A CERTAIN young man, a rhetorician, came to see 
 Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than 
 was usual and his attire in an ornamental style; 
 whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not 
 think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of 
 all other animals. "I do think so," the youth replied. Are 
 not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? "Cer- 
 tainly." Do we then for the same reason call each of them in 
 the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something pe- 
 culiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we 
 see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for an- 
 other, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale, 
 we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to 
 be beautiful then when it is most excellent according to its 
 nature ; but since the nature of each is different, each of them 
 seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so ? 
 He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog 
 beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a 
 horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their na- 
 tures are different. "It seems to be so." For I think that 
 what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a wrestler to be 
 not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; and he who 
 is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling. 1 
 It is so said he. What then makes a man beautiful ? Is it 
 that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beauti- 
 ful? "It is," he said. What then makes a dog beautiful? 
 The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes 
 a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a 
 
 192
 
 DISCOURSES 193 
 
 horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the 
 possession of the excellence of a man ? And do you then, if 
 you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the ac- 
 quisition of human excellence. But what is this ? Observe 
 whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons 
 without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust? 
 "The just." Whether do you praise the moderate or the 
 immoderate? "The moderate." And the temperate or the 
 intemperate? "The temperate." If then you make your- 
 self such a person, you will know that you make your- 
 self beautiful : but so long as you neglect these things, you 
 must be ugly ( atdxpov ) , even though you contrive all you 
 can to appear beautiful. 
 
 Further I do not know what to say to you: for if I say 
 to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps 
 leave the school and not return to it : and if I do not say 
 what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to 
 be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you 
 come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to 
 you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave 
 you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall ac- 
 quire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say, 
 What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in 
 such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition, 
 he neglected me and never said a word ? did he so much de- 
 spair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to 
 reason ? and how many other young men at this age commit 
 many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from be- 
 ing a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change. 
 Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Pole- 
 men; 2 yet he might have set my hair right, he might have 
 stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from 
 plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me 
 dressed like what shall I say? he kept silent. I do not 
 say like what; but you will say when you come to your 
 senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such 
 a dress. 
 
 If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what de- 
 fence shall I make ? Why, shall I say that the man will 
 not be persuaded by me ? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo ? 
 13
 
 194 EPICTETUS 
 
 Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for 
 the oracle ? 3 Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to 
 tell him the truth ? I indeed do not know, whether you will 
 be persuaded by me or not : but Apollo knew most certainly 
 that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But 
 why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo, 
 and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed him- 
 self in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the 
 inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the 
 words "Know yourself" written in front of the temple, 
 though no person takes any notice of them ? 
 
 Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of them- 
 selves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he 
 had been placed in this position by the deity, as 'he himself 
 says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his 
 judges? "If you acquit me on these conditions that I no 
 longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I 
 will not desist ; but I will go up both to young and old, and, 
 to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask 
 the questions which I ask now ; and most particularly will I 
 do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more 
 nearly related to me." 4 Are you so curious, Socrates, and 
 such a busy-body? and how does it concern you how we 
 act? and what is it that you say? Being of the same com- 
 munity and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show 
 yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to 
 your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours. 
 Who then are you ? Here it is a great thing to say, "I am 
 he whose duty it is to take care of men; for it is not every 
 little heifer which dares to resist a lion ; but if the bull comes 
 up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, 'and who 
 are you, and what business have you here?' ' Man, in 
 every kind there is produced something which excels; in 
 oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that 
 which excels, "Who then are you ?" If you do, it will find a 
 voice in some way and say, "I am such a thing as the purple 
 in a garment: do not expect me to be like the others, or 
 blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest 
 of men." 
 
 What then ? am I such a man ? Certainly not. And are
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 195 
 
 you such a man as can listen to the truth ? I wish you were. 
 But however since in a manner I have been condemned to 
 wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a 
 philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if 
 I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do 
 you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who 
 you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a 
 human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the 
 power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant 
 by "rationally"? Conformably to nature 6 and completely. 
 What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the ani- 
 mal part ? No. Is it the condition of mortality ? No. Is 
 it the power of using appearances ? 6 No. You possess the 
 rational faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify this ; 
 but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come, 
 what other appellations have you ? Are you man or woman? 
 Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. 
 Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has 
 much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited 
 at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous 
 not to have hair ; and if he has no hair, he is a monster ; but 
 if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we 
 do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what 
 name shall we show him ? I will exhibit to you a man who 
 chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible 
 sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a 
 notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their 
 hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man 
 what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made 
 you a man ? What then ? was it fit that nature should make 
 all human creatures women? and what advantage in that 
 case would you have had in being adorned ? for whom would 
 you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were 
 women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to 
 work then upon the whole business. Take away what is 
 its name? that which is the cause of the hairs : make your- 
 self a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken : 
 do not make one half man, and the other half woman. 
 .Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them 
 as a man. Well ; but they like smooth men. Will you not
 
 1 96 EPICTETUS 
 
 hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites, 
 would you become one? Is this your business? were you 
 born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight 
 in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Cor- 
 inth and perchance a prefect of the city, or chief of the 
 youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well, 
 and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your 
 hairs plucked out ? To please whom and for what purpose ? 
 And when you have begotten children, will you introduce 
 them also into the state with the habit of plucking their 
 hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician. 
 We ought to pray that such young men be born among us 
 and brought up. 
 
 Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but 
 when you have once heard these words, go away and say to 
 yourself, "Epictetus has not said this to me : for how could 
 he? but some propitious God through him: for it would 
 never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is 
 not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let 
 us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger." You 
 say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies 
 any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God 
 through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a 
 human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you, 
 that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signi- 
 fies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and con- 
 cerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through 
 the noblest messenger ? What else is it which the poet says : 
 
 "For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent 
 Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer, 
 The husband not to kill nor wed the wife." 7 
 
 Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to 
 him (^gisthus) ? And now the gods say this to you and 
 send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not 
 to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy your- 
 self about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman 
 to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man, 
 and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh 
 and hair, but you are will (xpoaipedis) ; and if your will is
 
 DISCOURSES 197 
 
 beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present 
 time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that 
 you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what 
 Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men 
 Alcibiades : "Try then to be beautiful." What does he say to 
 him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs? 
 Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad 
 opinions. How with the body ? Leave it as it is by nature. 
 Another has looked after these things : intrust them to him. 
 What then, must a man be uncleaned ? Certainly not ; but 
 what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man 
 should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as 
 a child. You say no : but let us also pluck out the lion's 
 mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's comb for 
 he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the 
 lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is, 
 both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises, 
 which are expressed by one Greek line, 
 
 Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling. 
 
 * Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253. 
 
 Quaero, faciasne quod olim 
 Mutatus Polemon? etc. 
 
 The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute 
 youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lec- 
 turing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Pole- 
 mon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came 
 out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the 
 school of the Academy. See Epictetus, iv. II, 30. 
 
 * Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children. 
 The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if 
 he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for 
 he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child 
 CEdipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer 
 of Laius. 
 
 4 Plato, Apology, i. 9, and 17. 
 
 6 Cicero, de Fin. ii. n ; Horace, Epp. i. 10,12. This was the great prin- 
 ciple of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface 
 to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted 
 in following nature, that it is "a manner of speaking not loose and un- 
 determinate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true." 
 
 * The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals; a 
 rational use of them is peculiar to man. Mrs. Carter, Introd. sec 7. 
 
 T From the Odyssey, i, 37, where Zeus is speaking of ^Egisthus.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE 
 PROFICIENCY ; AND THAT WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS 
 
 THERE are three things (topics, ronoi) in which a man 
 ought to exercise himself who would be wise and 
 good. 1 The first concerns the desires and the aver- 
 sions, that a man may not fail to get what he de- 
 sires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not 
 desire. The second concerns the movements (towards an 
 object) and the movements from an object, and generally 
 in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according 
 to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing con- 
 cerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and 
 generally it concerns the assents (dvyKaraBedeti). Of these 
 topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to 
 the affects (TO. naty, perturbations); for an affect is pro- 
 duced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which 
 a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish 
 to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, dis- 
 orders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and 
 envy; that which makes men envious and jealou's; and by 
 these causes we are even unable to listen to the precepts of 
 reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man ; for 
 I ought not to be free from affects (aitofirf) like a statue, but 
 I ought to maintain the relations (<?**'<>?) natural and ac- 
 quired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen. 
 
 The third topic is that which immediately concerns those 
 who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security 
 of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance 
 unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in 
 melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But 
 the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the 
 second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on 
 the third, using sophistical arguments (usraitiirrovra?), mak- 
 ing conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses, 
 lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on 
 
 198
 
 DISCOURSES 199 
 
 these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must ? 
 The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting 
 to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are 
 you free from deception in the matter of money ? If you see 
 a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your 
 neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed? 
 Now there is nothing else wanting to you except unchange- 
 able firmness of mind (dpsTairraHtia)'? Wretch, you hear 
 these very things with fear and anxiety that some person 
 may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person 
 may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in 
 a certain conversation in which the question was, Who is 
 the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a cer- 
 tain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which 
 was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if 
 another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not 
 worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he 
 know ? he has only the first principles, and no more ? then you 
 are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I 
 will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. It 
 is seen by these very things : why do you wish to show it by 
 others ? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of 
 the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger ? 2 
 And then when the man was wild with rage, "This," he said, 
 "is the certain person ; I have pointed him out to you." For a 
 man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood ; 
 but when any person shows the man's principles, then he 
 shows him as a man. 
 
 Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain 
 that you value not at all your own will (xpoaipedi',), but 
 you look externally to things which are independent of your 
 will ? For instance, what will a certain person say ? and what 
 will people think of you? will you be considered a man of 
 learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you 
 have read Archedemus 3 also, you have every thing [that you 
 can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not 
 show us who you are ? Would you let me tell you what man- 
 ner of man you have shown us that you are ? You have ex- 
 hibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passion- 
 ate, cowardly, finding fault with every thing, blaming every
 
 20O EPICTETUS 
 
 body, never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited to 
 us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse 
 should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man. 
 For such a death awaits you as it did 4 what was the man's 
 name? Crinis; and he too was proud, because he under- 
 stood Archedemus. 
 
 Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not 
 concern you at all ? These things are suitable to those who 
 are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who 
 can say: "I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy: I 
 am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for 
 me ? I have leisure, I am tranquil : let us see how we must 
 deal with sophistical arguments ; let us see how when a man 
 has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any 
 thing absurd." To them such things belong. To those 
 who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine ; if they 
 choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is 
 sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails. 5 
 
 NOTES 
 
 l KaXb$Kal ay oboe, is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect 
 man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdedly called "virtue," 
 KaXov (beautiful), because it naturally "calls" ( KaXel) to itself those 
 who desire it. The Stoics also said that every thing good was beautiful 
 (/or/Ids), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The 
 Roman expression is "Vir bonus et sapiens." Perhaps the phrase 
 KaXds Kal ay aQ6$ arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being 
 the combination of a perfect human being. 
 
 1 To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the 
 greatest contempt for him. 
 
 * As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, n. ditexet^ ajtavra: this expression 
 is compared by Upton with Matthew vi. 2, dit4x v( > 1 MrfQor. 
 
 4 Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. 
 We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of 
 fright. 
 
 8 The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things 
 which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those 
 only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which 
 is not the philosopher's condition. He is compared to a sinking ship, 
 and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour 
 of hoisting the sails.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE 
 EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRAC- 
 TISE OURSELVES 
 
 THE material for the wise and good man is his own 
 ruling faculty : and the body is the material for the 
 physician and the aliptes (the man who oils per- 
 sons) ; the land is the matter for the husbandman. 
 The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances 
 conformably to nature : and as it is the nature of eVery soul 
 to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain 
 in suspense as to that which is uncertain-, so it is its nature to 
 be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion 
 from the evil ; and with respect to that which is neither good 
 nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer 
 (banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller 
 of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, 
 he must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also in the 
 matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately 
 attracts to itself ; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will 
 never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more 
 than persons will reject Caesar's coin. On this principle de- 
 pends every movement both of man and God. 
 
 For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate 
 relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relation- 
 ship between me and my father, but there is between 
 me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted ? Yes, for such 
 is my nature ; and this is the coin which God has given me. 
 For this reason if the good is something different from the 
 beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and 
 brother and country, and every thing. But shall I overlook 
 my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give 
 it up to you ? Why ? I am your father. But you are not my 
 good. I am your brother. But you are not my good. 
 But if we place the good in a right determination of 
 the will, the very observance of the relations of life is 
 M aoi
 
 2O2 EPICTETUS 
 
 good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things, 
 obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your 
 property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will 
 have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have 
 as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share 
 of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection ? For who will 
 eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither 
 has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my own 
 power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it him- 
 self, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. 
 When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if 
 a man presents this coin, he receives that which is sold for it. 
 Suppose. that there comes into the province a thievish procon- 
 sul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him, 
 and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is 
 an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a 
 man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the 
 seller, and buy [what you want]. Another is eager to possess 
 boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. An- 
 other is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog. 
 Though he groans and laments, he will sell for it that which 
 you want. For another compels him from within, he who 
 has fixed (determined) this coin. 1 
 
 Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a 
 man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the 
 morning, examine every man whom you see, every man 
 whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you 
 seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is 
 this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent. 
 Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting 
 over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing 
 independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul 
 met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a pro- 
 consul's office? Independent of the will, or dependent on it? 
 Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand ex- 
 amination : cast it away : it is nothing to you. 
 
 If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily 
 from morning to night, something indeed would be done. 
 But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every ap- 
 pearance, and it is only, if ever, that an the school we are
 
 
 THE AUGURS 
 From a painting by Jean I.eon Gerome
 
 DISCOURSES 203 
 
 roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man 
 lamenting, we say, "He is undone." If we see a consul, we 
 say, "He is happy." If we see an exiled man, we say, "He 
 is miserable." If we see a poor man, we say, "He is 
 wretched : he has nothing to eat." 
 
 We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to 
 this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weep- 
 ing and lamenting? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opin- 
 ion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is 
 blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling? 
 All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions 
 about things independent of the will, as if they were good 
 and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things de- 
 pendent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be 
 firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things 
 around him. Such as is a dish of water, such 'is the soul. 
 Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are 
 the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also 
 seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a 
 man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues 
 which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) 
 on which they are impressed ; but if the spirit be restored to 
 its settled state, those things also are restored. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21-23. Schweig- 
 hauser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing 
 is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing 
 willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away 
 by the passion which rules him. The "another" who compels is God, 
 Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must 
 postpone everything else to that thing in which he places his Good: 
 and he adds, that it is man's fault if he places his good in that thing, in 
 which God has not placed it. 
 
 Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is 
 "compelled and allows himself to be carried away," etc. The notion of 
 "compulsion" is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is 
 unlucky. He is like him "who sees," as the Latin poet says, "the better 
 things and approves of them, but follows the worse."
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTISANSHIP IN AN 
 UNSEEMLY WAY IN A THEATRE 
 
 THE governor of Epirus having shown his favour to an 
 actor in an unseemly way and being publicly blamed 
 on this account, and afterwards having reported to 
 Epictetus that he was blamed and that he was vexed 
 at those who blamed him, Epictetus said, What harm have 
 they been doing ? These men also were acting as partizans, 
 as you were doing. The governor replied, Does then any 
 person show his partizanship in this way? When they see 
 you, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a friend of 
 Caesar and his deputy, showing partizanship in this way, 
 was it not to be expected that they also should show their 
 partizanship in the same way? for if it is not right to show 
 partizanship in this way, do not do so yourself ; and if it is 
 right, why are you angry if they followed your example? 
 For whom have the many to imitate except you, who are 
 their superiors? to whose example should they look when 
 they go to the theatre except yours? See how the deputy 
 of Caesar looks on : he has cried out, and I too then will cry 
 out. He springs up from his seat, and I will spring up. 
 His slaves sit in various parts of the theatre and call out. I 
 have no slaves, but I will myself cry out as much as I can 
 and as loud as all of them together. You ought then to 
 know when you enter the theatre that you enter as a rule and 
 example to the rest how they ought to look at the acting. 
 Why then did they blame you? Because every man hates 
 that which is a hindrance to him. They wished one person 
 to be crowned ; you wished another. They were a hindrance 
 to you, and you were a hindrance to them. You were found 
 to be the stronger; and they did what they could; they 
 blamed that which hindered them. What then would you 
 have ? That you should do what you please, and they should 
 not even say what they please? And what is the wonder? 
 Do not the husbandmen abuse Zeus when they are hindered 
 
 204
 
 DISCOURSES 2O5 
 
 by him? do not the sailors abuse him? do they ever cease 
 abusing Caesar? What then? does not Zeus know? is not 
 what is said reported to Caesar ? What then does he do ? he 
 knows that, if he punished all who abuse him, he would have 
 nobody to rule over. What then ? when you enter the thea- 
 tre, you ought to say not, "Let Sophron (some actor) be 
 crowned," but you ought to say this, "Come let me maintain 
 my will in this matter so that it shall be conformable to 
 nature: no man is dearer to me than myself. It would be 
 ridiculous then for me to be hurt (injured) in order that 
 another who is an actor may be crowned. Whom then do 
 I wish to gain the prize ? Why the actor who does gain the 
 prize ; and so he will always gain the prize whom I wish to 
 gain it." But I wish Sophron to be crowned. Celebrate as 
 many games as you choose in your own house, Nemean, 
 Pythian, Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But 
 in public do not claim more than your due, nor attempt to 
 appropriate to yourself what belongs to all. If you do not 
 consent to this, bear being abused : for when you do the 
 same as the many, you put yourself on the same level with 
 them.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 I AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return 
 home. At home, I suppose, you were free from sick- 
 ness. Do you not consider whether you are doing any 
 thing here which may be useful to the exercise of your 
 will, that it may be corrected ? For if you are doing nothing, 
 towards this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go 
 away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling 
 power can not be maintained in a state conformable to na- 
 ture, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to 
 increase your money, you will take care of your father in his 
 old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office: 
 being bad you will do badly any thing else that you have 
 to do. But if you understand yourself, and know that you 
 are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in 
 their place, and if you have changed your state of life from 
 things which are not within your will to things which are 
 within your will, and if you ever say, Alas ! you are not say- 
 ing what you say on account of your father, or your brother, 
 but on account of yourself, do you still allege your sickness ? 
 Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise 
 us while we are doing something ? the husbandman while he 
 is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage? 
 what would you be doing when death surprises you, for you 
 must be surprised when you are doing something? If you 
 can be doing anything better than this when you are sur- 
 prised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death 
 when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that 
 I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from 
 hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I 
 wish to be found practising these things that I may be able 
 to say to God, "Have I in any respect transgressed thy com- 
 mands ? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which 
 thou gavest me? have I misused my perceptions or my pre- 
 206
 
 DISCOURSES 207 
 
 conceptions ( icpoM^>t6i) ? have I ever blamed thee ? have 
 I ever found fault with thy administration? I have been 
 sick, because it was thy will, and so have others, but I was 
 content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will, 
 but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office, 
 because it was not thy pleasure that I should : I have never 
 desired it. Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discon- 
 tented? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful 
 countenance, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy 
 signals? Is it now thy will that I should depart from the 
 assemblage of men? I depart. I give thee all thanks that 
 thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men 
 and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administra- 
 tion." May death surprise me while I am thinking of these 
 things, while I am thus writing and reading. 
 
 But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick. 
 Go to your mother then; for you are a fit person to have 
 your head held when you are sick. But at home I used to lie 
 down on a delicious bed. Go away to your bed : indeed you 
 are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do not 
 then lose what you can do there (at home). 
 
 But what does Socrates say? 1 As one man, he says, is 
 pleased with improving his land, another with improving his 
 horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing 
 better. Better in what? in using nice little words? Man, 
 do not say that. In little matters of speculation (esaop^ara) ? 
 what are you saying? And indeed I do not see what 
 else there is on which philosophers employ their time. Does 
 it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any 
 person, neither with God nor man ? to have blamed nobody ? 
 to carry the same face always in going out and coming in? 
 This is what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he 
 knew any thing or taught any thing. 2 But if any man asked 
 for nice little words or little speculations, he would carry him 
 to Protagoras or to Hippias; and if any man came to ask 
 for potherbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who 
 then among you has this purpose (motive to action) ? for if 
 indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and 
 in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love 
 with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true. 3
 
 208 EPICTETUS 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Xenophon (Memorab. i. 6, 14) ; but Epictetus does not quote the 
 words, he only gives the meaning. Antoninus (viii. 43) says, "Differ- 
 ent things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the 
 ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from 
 any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all 
 with welcome eyes, and using every thing according to its value." 
 
 * Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself 
 to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by 
 imitating his example. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 3. 
 
 * Upton explains this passage thus : "He who loves knows what it is 
 to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with 
 love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what 
 would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal, 
 the chief of beautiful things?"
 
 _, CHAPTER VI 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 WHEN some person asked him how it happened that 
 since reason has been more cultivated by the men 
 of the present age the progress made in former 
 times was greater. In what respect, he answered, 
 has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the 
 progress greater then ? For in that in which it has now been 
 more cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found. 
 At present it has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving 
 syllogisms, and progress is made. But in former times it 
 was cultivated for the purpose of maintaining the governing 
 faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress 
 was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and 
 do not expect, when you are labouring at one thing to make 
 progress in another. But see if any man among us when 
 he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state conform- 
 able to nature and living so always, does not make progress. 
 For you will not find such a man. 
 
 The good man is invincible, for he does not enter the 
 contest where he is not stronger. If you (his adversary) 
 want to have his land and all that is on it, take the land; 
 take his slaves, take his magisterial office, take his poor body. 
 But you will not make his desire fail in that which it seeks, 
 nor his aversion fall into that which he would avoid. The 
 only contest into which he enters is that about things which 
 are within the power of his will ; how then will he not be in- 
 vincible ? 
 
 Some person having asked him what is Common sense, 
 Epictetus replied, As that may be called a certain Common 
 hearing which only distinguishes vocal sounds, and that 
 which distinguishes musical sounds is not Common, but 
 artificial; so there are certain things which men, who are 
 not altogether perverted, see by the common notions which 
 all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named Com- 
 mon sense. 1 
 
 209
 
 2IO EPICTETUS 
 
 It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it 
 easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook. 2 But those who 
 have a good natural disposition, even if you try to turn them 
 aside, cling still more to reason. Wherefore Rufus gener- 
 ally attempted to discourage (his pupils), and he used this 
 method as a test of those who had a good natural disposition 
 and those who had not. For it was his habit to say, as a 
 stone, if you cast it upwards, will be brought down to the 
 earth by its own nature, so the man whose mind is naturally 
 good, the more you repel him, the more he turns towards 
 that to which he is naturally inclined. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The Greek is Koivoe, vav$, the Communis sensus of the Romans, and 
 our Common sense. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 65) speaks of a man who "corn- 
 muni sensu plane caret," one who has not the sense or understanding 
 which is the common property of men. 
 
 *This is a proverb used by Bion, as Digenes Laertius says. The 
 cheese was new and soft, as the ancients used it
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN 
 
 EPICUREAN 
 
 WHEN the administrator 1 came to visit him, and the 
 man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is prop- 
 er for us who are not philosophers to inquire of 
 you who are philosophers, 2 as those who come to 
 a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are ac- 
 quainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order 
 that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is 
 best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. 
 For that there are three things which relate to man, soul, 
 body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It re- 
 mains for you philosophers to answer what is the best. 
 What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was 
 it for this that Maximus 8 sailed as far as Cassiope in winter 
 (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that 
 he might be gratified in the flesh ? When the man said that 
 it was not, and added, "Far be that from him." Is it not fit 
 then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best ? 
 It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we 
 possess which is better than the flesh ? The soul, he replied. 
 And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good 
 things of the worse? The good things of the best. And 
 are the good things of the best within the power of the will 
 or not within the power of the will? They are within 
 the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a 
 thing within the power of the will ? It is, he replied. And 
 on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that 
 can not be conceived : for there must first exist a certain sub- 
 stance or nature (ov6ia) of good, by obtaining which we 
 shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also. 
 On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul ? 
 for if it shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (na- 
 ture) of the good is discovered; for good can not be one 
 thing, -and that at which we are rationally delighted another 
 
 211
 
 212 EPICTETUS 
 
 thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which 
 comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes 
 after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But 
 you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for 
 you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus 
 and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the 
 pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the 
 body : and again that those bodily things must be the things 
 which precede and the substance (nature) of the good. 
 
 For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the 
 voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh, 
 that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts fool- 
 ishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when 
 he is a judge ( dtteaerfo) and able to take it. But, if you 
 please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done 
 secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For 
 not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad, 4 
 but he admits that detection is ; and because it is impossible 
 to have security against detection, for this reason he says, 
 Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done clev- 
 erly and cautiously, we shall not be detected : further also we 
 have powerful friends in Rome both men and women, and 
 the Hellenes ( Greeks ) are weak, and no man will venture to 
 go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do 
 you refrain from your own good ? This is senseless, foolish. 
 But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe 
 you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears 
 false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is im- 
 possible to abstain from that which appears good. But 
 wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in pro- 
 ducing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth ? And 
 why should we not corrupt our neighbour's wife, if we can 
 do it without detection ? and if the husband foolishly prates 
 about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If 
 you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a per- 
 fect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you 
 must act thus] . If you would not, you will not differ at all 
 from us who are called Stoics ; for we also say one thing, but 
 we do another: we talk of the things which are beautiful 
 (good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse
 
 DISCOURSES 213 
 
 in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is 
 good. 
 
 In the name of God, 5 are you thinking of a city of Epicu- 
 reans? [One man says], "I do not marry." "Nor I, for a 
 man ought not to marry ; nor ought we to beget children, nor 
 engage in public matters." What then will happen ? whence 
 will the citizens come? who will bring them up? who will be 
 governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exer- 
 cises ? and in what also will the teacher instruct them ? will he 
 teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what 
 the Athenians were taught ? Come take a young man, bring 
 him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad, 
 subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becom- 
 ing to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief 
 city: it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to 
 abstain from that which belongs to others ; no woman ought 
 to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and no youth, 
 no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except your own). 
 Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and 
 by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain 
 from things which have such persuasive power to lead us 
 and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these 
 things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps 
 to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this end, 
 what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic 6 art 
 which is the best part ? the silver or the workmanship ? The 
 substance of the hand is the flesh ; but the work of the hand is 
 the principal part (that which precedes and leads the rest). 
 The duties then are also three : those which are directed to- 
 wards the existence of a thing ; those which are directed to- 
 wards its existence in a particular kind ; and third, the chief 
 or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not 
 to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal (lead- 
 ing things, ra Ttportyov^sva) . What are these? Engaging 
 in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating 
 God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires, 
 aversions ( kKK\iveiv ) , pursuits of things and avoidances, in 
 the way in which we ought to do these things, and according 
 to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature? 
 Free, noble, modest: for what other animal blushes? what
 
 214 EPICTETUS 
 
 other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression) 
 of shame? and we are so constituted by nature as to subject 
 pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order 
 that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep 
 us constant in acts which are conformable to nature. 
 
 "But I am rich and I want nothing." Why then do you 
 pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver 
 vessels are enough for you. What need have you of princi- 
 ples (opinions) ? "But I am also a judge (KPITTJ^} of the 
 Greeks." Do you know how to judge ? Who taught you to 
 know ? "Caesar wrote to me a codicil." 7 Let him write and 
 give you a commission to judge of music; and what will be 
 the use of it to you? Still how did you become a judge? 
 whose hand did you kiss ? the hand of Symphorus or Nume- 
 nius? Before whose bedchamber have you slept? 8 To 
 whom have you sent gifts ? Then do you not see that to be 
 a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is ? "But I 
 can throw into prison any man whom I please." So you can 
 do with a stone. "But I can beat with sticks whom I please." 
 So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. 
 Govern us as rational animals: show us what is profitable 
 to us, and we will follow it : show us what is unprofitable, and 
 we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as 
 Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like 
 a governor of men, who made them subject to him their de- 
 sires, their aversion, their movements towards an object and 
 their turning away from it. Do this : do not do this : if you 
 do not obey, I will throw you into prison. This is not gov- 
 erning men like rational animals. But I (say) : As Zeus has 
 ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will feel the 
 penalty, you will be punished. What will be the punish- 
 ment ? Nothing else than not having done your duty : you 
 will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do 
 not look for greater penalties than these. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 'The Greek is diop&oorrrf. The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs 
 in inscriptions, and elsewhere. 
 
 * The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them 
 were arrogant men. 
 
 1 Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against 
 the Parthians, in which he lost his life.
 
 DISCOURSES 2 1 5 
 
 Cassippe or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between 
 Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived. 
 
 4 Diogenes Laertius, quoted by Upton. "Injustice," says Epicurus 
 "is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on 
 account of suspicion." 
 
 8 Upton compares the passage (v. 333) in the "Cyclops" of Euripides, 
 who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage in 
 public affairs were Epicurean doctrines. 
 
 * The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and 
 of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material. 
 
 T A codicillus is a small codex and the original sense of codex is a 
 strong stem or stump. Lastly it was used for a book, and even for a 
 will. Codicilli were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which 
 men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book 
 or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor 
 conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a 
 small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament, but this sense 
 is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de 
 jure codicillorum.) 
 
 * Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you ? and 
 he compares i. 19. Schweig. says that this is not the meaning here, 
 and that the meaning is this : He who before daybreak is waiting at the 
 door of a rich man, whose favour he seeks, is said in a derisive way to 
 be passing the night before a man's chamber.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES 
 
 AS we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, 
 so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against ap- 
 pearances ; for these appearances also propose ques- 
 tions to us. A certain person's son is dead. An- 
 swer; the thing is not within the power of the will : it is not 
 an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do 
 you think of it ? It is a thing beyond the power of the will, 
 not an evil. Caesar has condemned a person. It is a thing 
 beyond the power of the will, not an evil. The man is af- 
 flicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends on the 
 will : it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely. 
 That is a thing within the power of the will : it is a good. If 
 we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress; 
 for we shall never assent to any thing of which there is not 
 an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son is 
 dead. What has happened? Your son is dead. Nothing 
 more? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened ? 
 Your ship is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has 
 happened ? He has been led to prison. But that herein he 
 has fared badly, every man adds from his own opinion. But 
 Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters. Why? 
 because he has made you capable of endurance? because he 
 has made you magnanimous ? because he has taken from that 
 which befalls you the power of being evils ? because it is in 
 your power to be happy while you are suffering what you 
 suffer; because he has opened the door to you, when things 
 do not please you ? Man, go out and do not complain. 
 
 Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you 
 would like to know. Italicus, who was the most in repute 
 of the philosophers, once when I was present being vexed 
 with his own friends and as if he was suffering something 
 intolerable said, "I can not bear it, you are killing me : you 
 will make me such as that man is ;" pointing to me. 
 
 216
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON 
 
 A SUIT 
 
 WHEN a certain person came to him, who was going 
 up to Rome on account of a suit which had re- 
 gard to his rank, Epictetus enquired the reason 
 of his going to Rome, and the man then asked 
 what he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied, If 
 you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will suc- 
 ceed or fail, I have no rule (Qecbp^jua) about this. But if 
 you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have 
 right opinions (S6yj*ara), you will fare well; if they are 
 false, you will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his 
 acting is opinion. For what is the reason why you desired 
 to be elected governor of the Cnossians? Your opinion. 
 What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome ? 
 Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and 
 expense. I must go. What tells you this ? Your opinion. 
 Then if opinions are the causes of all actions, and a man has 
 bad opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect. 
 Have we then all sound opinions, both you and your adver- 
 sary? And how do you differ? But have you sounder 
 opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. 
 And so does he think that his opinions are better ; and so do 
 madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show to me that you 
 have made some inquiry into your opinions and have taken 
 some pains about them. And as now you are sailing to 
 Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and 
 you are not content to stay at home with the honours which 
 you had, but you desire something greater and more con- 
 spicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the pur- 
 pose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out, 
 if you have any that are bad ? Whom have you approached 
 for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it? What 
 age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are 
 ashamed of me (knowing the fact), when you were a boy, 
 
 217
 
 2l8 EPICTETUS 
 
 did you examine your own opinions ? and did you not then, 
 as you do all things now, do as you did do? and when you 
 were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and 
 yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you 
 were deficient in? And when you were a young man and 
 engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and 
 were gaining reputation, who then seemed your equal ? And 
 when would you have submitted to any man examining and 
 showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you 
 wish me to say to you? Help me in this matter. I have 
 no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you came 
 to me for this purpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as 
 to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what purpose 
 then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that 
 whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and con- 
 tinue to be conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a 
 small thing? No; but the greatest. What then? does it 
 need only a short time? and is it possible to seize it as you 
 pass by? If you can, seize it. 
 
 Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet 
 with a stone or a statue : for you saw me, and nothing more. 
 But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his opinions, 
 and in his turn shows his own. Learn my opinions : show 
 me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let us 
 examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it 
 away: if you have any, show it. This is the meaning of 
 meeting with a philosopher. Not so, (you say) : but this 
 is only a passing visit, and while we are hiring the vessel, we 
 can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you 
 go away and say : Epictetus was nothing ; he used solecisms 
 and spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you 
 come as judges ? Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend 
 to such matters (as you do), I shall have no land, as you 
 have none ; I shall have no silver cups as you have none, nor 
 fine beasts as you have none. In answer to this it is perhaps 
 sufficient to say : I have no need of such things : but if you 
 possess many things, you have need of others : whether you 
 choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have 
 I need of? Of that which you have not: of firmness, of a 
 mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from
 
 DISCOURSES 219 
 
 perturbation. Whether I have a patron 1 or not, what is 
 that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than 
 you : I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me : for this 
 reason, I flatter no man. This is what I possess instead of 
 vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils of gold; but 
 your discourse, your opinions, your assents, your move- 
 ments (pursuits), your desires are of earthenware. But 
 when I have these things conformable to nature, why should 
 I not employ my studies also upon reason ? for I have leisure : 
 my mind is not distracted. What shall I do, since I have no 
 distraction ? What more suitable to a man have I than this ? 
 When you have nothing to do, you are disturbed, you go to 
 the theatre or you wander about without a purpose. Why 
 should not the philosopher labour to improve his reason? 
 You employ yourself about crystal vessels : I employ myself 
 about the syllogism named the lying : 2 you about myrrhine 3 
 vessels; I employ myself about the syllogism named the 
 denying (rov cbro^do-x-ovros). To you every thing appears 
 small that you possess : to me all that I have appears great. 
 Your desire is insatiable: mine is satisfied. To (children) 
 who put their hand into a narrow-necked earthen vessel and 
 bring out figs and nuts, this happens; if they fill the hand, 
 they can not take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of 
 them and you will draw things out. And do you part with 
 your desires : do not desire many things and you will have 
 what you want. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The Roman word "patronus," which at that time had the sense of a 
 protector. 
 
 * On the syllogism named lying ( (pevdofievos) see Epict. ii. 17, 34. 
 
 ' "Murrhina vasa" were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and 
 they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they 
 were made.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS 
 
 WHEN the need of each opinion comes, we ought to 
 have it in readiness i 1 on the occasion of break- 
 fast, such opinions as relate to breakfast; in the 
 bath, those that concern the bath; in bed, those 
 that concern bed. 
 
 " Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes, 
 Before each daily action thou hast scann'd : 
 What's done amiss, what done, what left undone; 
 From first to last examine all, and then 
 Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice." 4 
 
 And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we 
 may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when 
 we exclaim "Paean Apollo." 3 Again in fever we should have 
 ready such opinions as concern a fever; and we ought not, 
 as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. (A man 
 who has a fever) may say: If I philosophize any longer, 
 may I be hanged : wherever I go, I must take care of the poor 
 body, that a fever may not come. But what is philosophi- 
 zing ? Is it not a preparation against events which may hap- 
 pen ? Do you not understand that you are saying something 
 of this kind? "If I shall still prepare myself to bear with 
 patience what happens, may I be hanged." But this is just 
 as if a man after receiving blows should give up the Pan- 
 cratium. In the Pancratium it is in our power to desist and 
 not to receive blows. But in the other matter if we give up 
 philosophy, what shall we gain? What then should a man 
 say on the occasion of each painful thing? It was for this 
 that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. God 
 says to you, "Give me a proof that you have duly practised 
 athletics, 4 that you have eaten what you ought, that you have 
 been exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler 
 and rubber)." Then do you show yourself weak when the 
 time for action comes ? Now is the time for the fever. Let 
 
 220
 
 DISCOURSES 221 
 
 it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well; 
 now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your 
 power? who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder 
 you from drinking ; but he can not prevent you from bearing 
 thirst well : and he will hinder you from eating ; but he can 
 not prevent you from bearing hunger well. 
 
 But I can not attend to my philosophical studies. And 
 for what purpose do you follow them? Slave, is it not 
 that you may be happy, that you may be constant, is it not 
 that you be in a state conformable to nature and live 
 so ? What hinders you when you have a fever from having 
 your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the 
 proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For 
 this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like 
 journeying by land, so also-is fever. Do you read when you 
 are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a fever. 
 But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a 
 man who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all 
 that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever 
 well ? Not to blame God or man ; not to be afflicted at that 
 which happens, to expect death well and nobly, to do what 
 must be done : when the physician comes in, not to be fright- 
 ened at what he says; nor if he says, "You are doing well," 
 to be overjoyed. For what good has he told you ? and when 
 you were in health, what good was that to you ? And even 
 if he says, "You are in a bad way," do not despond. For what 
 is it to be ill ? is it that you are near the severance of the soul 
 and the body? what harm is there in this? If you are not 
 near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world 
 going to be turned upside down when you are dead ? Why 
 then do you flatter the physician ? 6 Why do you say if you 
 please, master, I shall be well? 5 Why do you give him an 
 opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud; or show- 
 ing his importance) ? Do you not value a physician, as you 
 do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a car- 
 penter when he is building your house, and so treat the phy- 
 sician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead ? 
 He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this : if he 
 does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not 
 the business of a philosopher to look after these externals,
 
 222 EPICTETUS 
 
 neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own 
 ruling power. But as to externals how must he act ? so far as 
 not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for 
 fear? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear 
 about what belongs to others, about things which are of no 
 value ? For we ought to have these two principles in readi- 
 ness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad ; and that 
 we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. My brother 
 ought not to have behaved thus to me. No ; but he will see 
 to that : and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself 
 towards him as I ought. For this is my own business : that 
 belongs to another ; no man can prevent this, the other thing 
 can be hindered. 
 
 NOTES . 
 
 1 "As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for 
 cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles 
 (Soyfiara), ready for the understanding of things divine and human, 
 and for doing every thing, even the smallest, with a recollection of the 
 bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither 
 wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same 
 time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary." Marcus 
 Aurelius. 
 
 * These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras. 
 See iv. 6, 32. 
 
 1 The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i. 17 : 
 "namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant: Apollo Maedice, Apollo 
 Paean." 
 
 *etvo^{^oofffQ\ij<raf. "St. Paul hath made use of this very expres- 
 sion tav pr) vofiifioa^ dQMftfy, 2 Tim. ii. 3." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 "Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere montes ?" Persius, iii. 65. 
 Craterus was a physician. 
 
 * Upton compares Matthew, viii. 2. "Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst 
 make me clean."
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
 
 THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law for those 
 who disobey the divine administration. Whoever 
 thinks any other thing to be good except those things 
 which depend on the will, let him envy, let him de- 
 sire, let him flatter, let him be perturbed : whoever considers 
 any thing else to be evil, let him grieve, let him lament, let 
 him weep, let him be unhappy. And yet, though so severely 
 punished, we can not desist. 
 
 Remember what the poet 1 says about the stranger : 
 
 "Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come." 
 
 This then may be applied even to a father : I must not, even 
 if a worse man than you should come, treat a father un- 
 worthily; for all are from paternal Zeus. And (let the same 
 be said) of a brother, for all are from the Zeus who presides 
 over kindred. And so in the other relations of life we shall 
 find Zeus to be an inspector. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the Odyssey, xiv. 
 55, et seq. 
 
 "Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come, 
 111 treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus, 
 Strangers and poor." 
 
 223
 
 CHAPTER XH 
 
 ABOUT EXERCISE 
 
 WE ought not to make our exercises consist in means 
 contrary to nature and adapted to cause admira- 
 tion, for if we do so, we who call ourselves phi- 
 losophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. 
 For it is difficult even to walk on a rope ; and not only diffi- 
 cult, but it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to 
 practise walking on a rope, or setting up a palm tree, 1 or em- 
 bracing statues? By no means. Every thing which is dif- 
 ficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice ; but that is 
 suitable which conduces to the working out of that which is 
 proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us 
 as a thing to be worked out ? To live with desire and aver- 
 sion (avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And 
 what is this? Neither to be disappointed in that which you 
 desire, nor to fall into any thing which you would avoid. 
 Towards this object then exercise (practice) ought to tend. 
 For since it is not possible to have your desire not disap- 
 pointed and your aversion free from falling into that which 
 you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you 
 must know that if you allow your desire and aversion to 
 turn to things which are not within the power of the will, 
 you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your 
 object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoiding 
 that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads 
 (prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and 
 aversion only to things which are not within the power of 
 our will, we ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit, 
 and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances, 
 there to oppose the habit of exercise. 
 
 I am rather inclined to pleasure: I will incline to the 
 contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise. I 
 am averse to pain : I will rub and exercise against this the 
 appearances which are presented to me for the purpose of 
 withdrawing my aversion from every such thing. For who 
 
 224
 
 DISCOURSES 225 
 
 is a practitioner in exercise? He who practises not using 
 his desire, and applies his aversion only to tljings which are 
 within the power of his will, and practises most in the things 
 which are difficult to conquer. For this reason one man 
 must practise himself more against one thing and another 
 against another thing. What then is it to the purpose to set 
 up a palm tree, or to carry about a tent of skins, or a mortar 
 and pestle? 2 Practise, man, if you are irritable, to endure if 
 you are abused, not to be vexed if you are treated with dis- 
 honour. Then you will make so much progress that, even 
 if a man strikes you you will say to yourself, Imagine that 
 you have embraced a statue: then also exercise yourself to 
 use wine properly so as not to drink much, for in this also 
 there are men who foolishly practise themselves ; but first of 
 all you should abstain from it, and abstain from a young girl 
 and dainty cakes. Then at last, if occasion presents itself, 
 for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper time you will 
 descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you 
 as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which 
 is stronger than yourself : the contest is unequal between a 
 charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The 
 earthen pitcher, as the saying is, and the rock do not agree. 3 
 After the desire and the aversion comes the second topic 
 (matter) of the movements towards action and the with- 
 drawals from it; that you may be obedient to reason, that 
 you do nothing out of season or place, or contrary to any 
 propriety of the kind. The third topic concerns the assents, 
 which is related to the things which are persuasive and at- 
 tractive. For as Socrates said, we ought not to live a life 
 without examination, so we ought not to accept an appear- 
 ance without examination, but we should say, Wait, let me 
 see what you are and whence you come; like the watch at 
 night (who says) "Show me the pass (the Roman tessera)." 
 Have you the signal from nature which the appearance that 
 may be accepted ought to have? And finally whatever 
 means are applied to the body by those who exercise it, if 
 they tend in any way towards desire and aversion, they also 
 may be fit means of exercise ; but if they are for display, they 
 are the indications of one who has turned himself towards 
 something external and who is hunting for something else 
 '
 
 226 EPICTETUS 
 
 and who looks for spectators who will say, "Oh the great 
 man." For this reason Apollonius said well, "When you 
 intend to exercise yourself for your own advantage, and you 
 are thirsty from heat, take in a mouthful of cold water, and 
 spit it out and tell nobody." 4 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " To set up a palm tree." He does not mean a real palm tree, but 
 something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned 
 by Lucian, de Dea Syria (c 29). Schweighauser has given the true in- 
 terpretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a 
 high piece of wood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active 
 youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what 
 this is. 
 
 It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were cov- 
 ered with snow for the purpose of exercising himself. I suppose bronze 
 statues, not marble which might be easily broken. The man would not 
 remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps 
 the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general, 
 setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was as a punishment. 
 
 a This was done for the sake of exercise says Upton ; but I don't 
 understand the passage. 
 
 * There is a like fable in ^Esop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen. 
 Upton. 
 
 4 Schweighauser refers to Arrian's "Expedition of Alexander" (vi : 
 26) for such an instance of Alexander's abstinence. There was an 
 Apollonius of Tyana, whose life was written bv Philostratus : but it 
 may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here.
 
 WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLI- 
 TARY MAN IS 
 
 SOLITUDE is a certain condition of a helpless man, 
 For because a man is alone, he is not for that reason 
 also solitary; just as though a man is among num- 
 bers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then 
 we have lost either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom 
 we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are left soli- 
 tary, though we are often in Rome, though such a crowd 
 meet us, though so many live in the same place, and some- 
 times we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is 
 solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless per- 
 son and exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this 
 reason when we travel, then especially do we say that we are 
 lonely when we fall among robbers, for it is not the sight of a 
 human creature which removes us from solitude, but the 
 sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to us. 
 For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say 
 that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration 1 and bewails 
 himself saying, "Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera, 
 nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descend- 
 ant, nor kinsman." This is what some say that he does when 
 he is alone at the conflagration. 2 For they do not under- 
 stand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because 
 they set out from a certain natural principle, from the nat- 
 ural desire of community and mutual love and from the 
 pleasure of conversation among men. But none the less a 
 man ought to be prepared in a manner for this also (being 
 alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his 
 own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is 
 tranquil by himself, and thinks of his own administration 
 and of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitable to 
 himself; so ought we also to be able to talk with ourselves, 
 not to feel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with 
 the means of passing our time; to observe the divine admin- 
 
 227
 
 228 EPICTETUS 
 
 istration, and the relation of ourselves to every thing else ; to 
 consider how we formerly were affected towards things that 
 happen and how at present ; what are still the things which 
 give us pain ; how these also can be cured and how removed ; 
 if any things require improvement, to improve them accord- 
 ing to reason. 
 
 For you see that Caesar appears to furnish us with great 
 peace, that there are no longer enemies nor battles nor great 
 associations of robbers nor of pirates, but we can travel at 
 every hour and sail from east to west. But can Caesar give 
 us security from fever also, can he from shipwreck, from 
 fire, from earthquake or from lightning ? well, I will say, can 
 he give us security against love ? He can not. From sorrow ? 
 He can not. From envy? He can not. In a word then he 
 can not protect us from any of these things. But the doctrine 
 of philosophers promises to give us security (peace) even 
 against these things. And what does it say? Men, if you 
 will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing, 
 you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor 
 hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations 
 and free from every thing. When a man has this peace, not 
 proclaimed by Caesar, (for how should he be able to proclaim 
 it?), but by God through reason, is he not content when he is 
 alone ? when he sees and reflects, Now no evil can happen to 
 me ; for me there is no robber, no earthquake, every thing is 
 full of peace, full of tranquillity : every way, every city, every 
 meeting, neighbour, companion is harmless. One person 
 whose business it is, supplies me with food; another with 
 raiment; another with perceptions, and preconceptions 
 (jtpoA.r}il>et$). And if he does not supply what is necessary, 
 he (God) gives the signal for retreat, opens the door, and 
 says to you, "Go." Go whither? To nothing terrible, but to 
 the place from which you came, to your friends and kins- 
 men, to the elements: what there was in you of fire goes 
 to fire; of earth, to earth ; of air (spirit), to air; of water to 
 water : no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlege- 
 thon, but all is full of Gods and Daemons. When a man 
 has such things to think on, and sees the sun, the moon and 
 stars, and enjoys earth and sea, he is not solitary nor even 
 helpless. Well then, if some man should come upon me
 
 DISCOURSES 229 
 
 when I am alone and murder me? Fool, not murder You, 
 but your poor body. 
 
 What kind of solitude then remains ? what want ? why do 
 we make ourselves worse than children? and what do chil- 
 dren do when they are left alone? They take up shells and 
 ashes, and they build something, then pull it down, and build 
 something else, and so they never want the means of pass- 
 ing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and 
 weep, because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I 
 then have no shells, no ashes? But children do what they 
 do through want of thought (or deficiency in knowledge), 
 and we through knowledge are unhappy. 
 
 Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners. 
 You must then bear such things as you are able, but con- 
 formably to nature : but not .... Practise sometimes a way of 
 living like a person out of health that you may at some time 
 live like a man in health. Abstain from food, drink water, 
 abstain sometimes altogether from desire, in order that you 
 may some time desire consistently with reason; and if con- 
 sistently with reason, when you have anything good in you, 
 you will desire well. Not so; but we wish to live like wise 
 men immediately and to be useful to men Useful how? 
 what are you doing ? have you been useful to yourself ? But, 
 I suppose, you wish to exhort them? You exhort them! 
 You wish to be useful to them. Show to them in your own 
 example what kind of men philosophy makes, and don't trifle. 
 When you are eating, do good to those who eat with you; 
 when you are drinking, to those who are drinking with you ; 
 by yielding to all, giving way, bearing with them, thus do 
 them good, and do not spit on them your phlegm (bad 
 humours). 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This was the doctrine of Heraclitus "that all things were composed 
 from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it," an opinion 
 afterwards adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant, as it may 
 appear to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is 
 in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way, 
 and have a new beginning. 
 
 1 The Latin translation is : "hoc etiam nonnulli facturum cum in 
 conflagratione mundi .... aiunt." But the word is icoiei : and this 
 may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again. 
 The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with
 
 230 EPICTETUS 
 
 the consideration of time. Even Herodotus (ii: n), in his speculations 
 on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of 
 the possibility of it being tilled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern specu- 
 lators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion 
 of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the 
 ignorant have conceived it
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
 
 AS bad 1 tragic actors can not sing alone, but in company 
 with many: so some persons can not walk about 
 alone. Man, if you are anything, both walk alone 
 and talk to yourself, and do not hide yourself in the 
 chorus. Examine a little at last, look around, stir yourself 
 up, that you may know who you are. 
 
 When a man drinks water, or does anything for the sake 
 of practice (discipline), whenever there is an opportunity he 
 tells it to all : "I drink water." Is it for this that you drink 
 water, for the purpose of drinking water? Man, if it is 
 good for you to drink, drink; but if not, you are acting ri- 
 diculously. But if it is good for you and you do drink, say 
 nothing about it to those who are displeased with water- 
 drinkers. What then, do you wish to please these very men ? 
 
 Of things that are done some are done with a final pur- 
 pose (itpaTiyovfievooi), some according to occasion, others with 
 a certain reference to circumstances, others for the purpose 
 of complying with others, and some according to a fixed 
 scheme of life. 2 
 
 You must root out of men these two things, arrogance 
 (pride) and distrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that 
 you want nothing (are deficient in nothing) : but distrust is 
 the opinion that you can not be happy when so many circum- 
 stances surround you. Arrogance is removed by confuta- 
 tion; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (to 
 know) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek. 
 This search will do you no harm; and in a manner this is 
 philosophizing, to see how it is possible to employ desire and 
 aversion ( **xA*'<7e* ) without impediment. 
 
 I am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular 
 rank. Another says, I have been a tribune, but you have 
 not. If we were horses, would you say, My father was 
 swifter? I have much barley and fodder, or elegant neck 
 ornaments. If then while you were saying this, I said, 
 
 231
 
 232 EPICTETUS 
 
 Be it so : let us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man 
 such as running in a horse, by which it will be known which 
 is superior and inferior? Is there not modesty (a/s&s), 
 fidelity, justice? Show yourself superior in these, that you 
 may be superior as a man. If you tell me that you can kick 
 violently, I also will say to you, that you are proud of that 
 which is the act of an ass. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 All the manuscripts have "good" (teakof), which the critics have 
 properly corrected. 
 1 This section is not easy to translate.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION IN 
 EVERY THING 1 
 
 IN every act consider what precedes and what follows, and 
 then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you 
 will at first begin with spirit, since you have not thought 
 at all of the things which follow ; but afterwards when 
 some consequences have shown themselves, you will basely 
 desist (from that which you have begun). I wish to con- 
 quer at the Olympic games. [And I too, by the gods : for it 
 is a fine thing] . But consider here what precedes and what 
 follows ; and then, if it is for your good, undertake the thing. 
 You must act according to rules, follow strict diet, abstain 
 from delicacies, exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed 
 times, in heat, in cold ; drink no cold water, nor wine, when 
 there is opportunity of drinking it. 2 In a word you must 
 surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to a physician. 
 Next, in the contest, you must be covered with sand, 3 some- 
 times dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity 
 of dust, be scourged with the whip; and after undergoing 
 all this, you must sometimes be conquered. After reck- 
 oning all these things, if you have still an inclination, go to 
 the athletic practice. If you do not reckon them, observe 
 you will behave like children who at one time play as 
 wrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a 
 tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So 
 you also do : you are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a 
 gladiator, then a philosopher, then a rhetorician; but with 
 your whole soul you are nothing; like the ape you imitate 
 all that you see; and always one thing after another pleases 
 you, but that which becomes familiar displeases you. For 
 you have never undertaken any thing after consideration, 
 nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to a 
 strict examination; but you have undertaken it at hazard 
 and with a cold desire. Thus some persons having seen a 
 philosopher and having heard one speak like Euphrates 4 
 
 16 233
 
 234 EPICTETUS 
 
 and yet who can speak like him? wish to be philosophers 
 themselves. 
 
 Man, consider first what the matter is (which you propose 
 to do) , then your own nature also, what it is able to bear. If 
 you are a wrestler, look at your shoulders, your thighs, your 
 loins: for different men are naturally formed for different 
 things. Do you think that, if you do (what you are doing 
 daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that you 
 can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same 
 way be angry and out of humour ? You must watch, labour, 
 conquer certain desires, you must depart from your kinsmen, 
 be despised by your slave, laughed at by those who meet you, 
 in every thing you must be in an inferior condition, as to 
 magisterial office, in honours, in courts of justice. When 
 you have considered all these things completely, then, if you 
 think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in 
 exchange for these things freedom from perturbations, lib- 
 erty, tranquillity. If you have not considered these things, 
 do not approach philosophy : do not act like children, at one 
 time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then a rhetorician, 
 then a procurator (officer) of Caesar. These things are not 
 consistent. You must be one man either good or bad: you 
 must either labour at your own ruling faculty or at external 
 things : you must either labour at things within or at external 
 things : that is, you must either occupy the place of a philoso- 
 pher or that of one of the vulgar. 
 
 A person said to Rufus 5 when Galba was murdered, "Is 
 the world now governed by Providence?" But Rufus re- 
 plied, "Did I ever incidentally form an argument from Galba 
 that the world is governed by Providence?" 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " This chapter has a great conformity to Luke xiv : 28, etc. But it 
 is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some 
 persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious 
 men : but Christianity requires and enables all to be such." Mrs. Car- 
 ter. 
 
 The passage in Luke contains a practical lesson, and so far is the same 
 as the teaching of Epictetus : but the conclusion in v : 33 does not ap- 
 pear to be helped by what immediately precedes v. 28-32. The remark 
 that Christianity "enables all to be such" is not true, unless Mrs. Carter 
 gives to the word "enables" a meaning which I do not see.
 
 DISCOURSES 235 
 
 1 The commentators refer us to Paul, i Cor. c. 9, 25. Compare Horace, 
 "Ars Poetica," 39: 
 
 "Versate diu quid ferre recusent, 
 Quid valeant humeri." 
 
 ' Wolf thought that the word itapopvcrareaQai might mean the loss 
 of an eye ; but other commentators give the word a different meaning. 
 
 4 In place of Euphrates the "Encheiridion" 29 had in the text "Socra- 
 tes," which name the recent editors of the "Encheiridion altered to "Eu- 
 phrates," and correctly. The younger Pliny (i. Ep. 10) speaks in high 
 terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher 
 Euphrates, who is mentioned by M. Antoninus (x. 31) and by others. 
 
 * Rufus was a philosopher. See 1:1,1:9. Galba is the emperor Galba, 
 who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and 
 it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury 
 remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter n or 14, or per- 
 haps to the end of chapter 17.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR 
 INTERCOURSE WITH MEN 
 
 IF a man has frequent intercourse with others either for 
 talk, or drinking together, or generally for social pur- 
 poses, he must either become like them, or change them 
 to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of 
 quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the 
 quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning char- 
 coal will light that which is quenched. Since then the dan- 
 ger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies 
 with those of the common sort, and remember that it is im- 
 possible that a man can keep company with one who is cov- 
 ered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself. 
 For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about 
 horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men ? Such a 
 person is bad, such a person is good : this was well done, this 
 was done badly. Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an 
 ill-natured disposition ? Is any man among us prepared like 
 a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he has 
 touched the strings, he discovers which are discordant, and 
 tunes the instrument? such a power as Socrates had who 
 in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his 
 own purpose ? How should you have this power ? It is there- 
 fore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by 
 the common kind of people. 
 
 Why then are they more powerful than you? Because 
 they utter these useless words from their real opinions: 
 but you utter your elegant words only from your, lips ; for 
 this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is 
 nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your miserable 
 virtue, which is talked of every where (up and down). In 
 this way the vulgar have the advantage over you : for every 
 opinion (Soyjua) is strong and invincible. Until then the 
 good (tco^ai) sentiments ( vitoX-fifa 1 *) are fixed in you, and 
 you shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I 
 
 236
 
 DISCOURSES 237 
 
 advise you to be careful in your association with common 
 persons : if you are not, every day like wax in the sun there 
 will be melted away whatever you inscribe on your minds in 
 the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from the sun so 
 long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason 
 also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, 
 because ancient habits distract them and do not allow a be- 
 ginning to be made of a different habit ; nor can we tolerate 
 those who meet us and say : "See such a one is now a philoso- 
 pher, who was once so and so." Thus also physicians send 
 those who have lingering diseases to a different country and 
 a different air; and they do right. Do you also introduce 
 other habits than those which you have: fix your opinions 
 and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so : you go 
 hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of 
 exercise (Suo-roV), to a circus; then you come back later, 
 and again from this place you go to those places, and still the 
 same persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor 
 attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind. 
 How shall I use the appearances presented to me ? according 
 to nature, or contrary to nature ? how do I answer to them ? 
 as I ought, or as I ought not? Do I say to those things 
 which are independent of the will, that they do not concern 
 me? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your 
 former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever 
 to begin to be something.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 OF PROVIDENCE 
 
 WHEN you make any charge against Providence, 
 consider, and you will learn that the thing has 
 happened according to reason. Yes, but the un- 
 just man has the advantage. In what? In 
 money. Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flat- 
 ters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the won- 
 der? But see if he has the advantage over you in being 
 faithful, in being modest : for you will not find it to be so ; 
 but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you 
 have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was 
 vexed because Philostorgus was fortunate: Would you 
 choose to lie with Sura P 1 "May it never happen," he replied, 
 "that this day should come?" Why then are you vexed, if he 
 receives something in return for that which he sells; or how 
 can you consider him happy who acquires those things by 
 such means as you abominate; or what wrong does Provi- 
 dence, if he gives the better things to the better men ? Is it 
 not better to be modest than to be rich ? He admitted this 
 Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better 
 thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the 
 truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an 
 advantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior; 
 and you will never be vexed. 
 
 But my wife treats me badly. Well, if any man asks you 
 what this is, say, my wife treats me badly Is there then 
 nothing more? Nothing. My father gives me nothing 
 [What is this? my father gives me nothing Is there noth- 
 ing else then? Nothing] : but to say that this is an evil is 
 something which must be added to it externally, and falsely 
 added. For this reason we must not get rid of poverty, but 
 of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 1 Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or 
 Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 13). 
 
 238
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED BY ANY NEWS 
 
 WHEN any thing shall be reported to you which is of 
 a nature to disturb, have this principle in read- 
 iness, that the news is about nothing which is 
 within the power of your will. Can any man re- 
 port to you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a bad 
 desire? By no means. But perhaps he will report that 
 some person is dead. What then is that to you ? He may 
 report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that 
 to you ? Or that your father is planning something or other. 
 Against whom? Against your will (itpoatpscrts) ? How 
 can he ? But is it against your poor body, against your lit- 
 tle property? You are quite safe: it is not against you. But 
 the judge declares that you have committed an act of im- 
 piety. And did not the judges (SiKaa-rai) make the same 
 declaration against Socrates ? Does it concern you that the 
 judge has made this declaration? No. Why then do you 
 trouble yourself any longer about it? Your father has a 
 certain duty, and if he shall not fulfill it, he loses the char- 
 acter of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness. 
 Do not wish him to lose any thing else on this account. For 
 never does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in an- 
 other. On the other side it is your duty to make your de- 
 fence firmly, modestly, without anger: but if you do not, 
 you also lose the character of a son, of a man of modest be- 
 haviour, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free 
 from danger? No; but he also is in equal danger. Why 
 then are you still afraid of his decision ? What have you to 
 do with that which is another man's evil? It is your own 
 evil to make a bad defence: be on your guard against this 
 only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that 
 is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another per- 
 son. A certain person threatens you. Me? No. He 
 blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs. 
 He is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched 
 man. 
 
 239
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF A COMMON KIND OF MAN AND 
 OF A PHILOSOPHER 
 
 THE first difference between a common person (iSiwr^ ) 
 and a philosopher is this : the common person says, 
 "Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for 
 my father." 1 The philosopher, if he shall ever be 
 compelled to say, Woe to me, stops and says, "but 
 for myself." For nothing which is independent of 
 the will can hinder or damage the will, and the 
 will can only hinder or damage itself. If then we 
 ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when we 
 are unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember 
 that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tran- 
 quillity except our own opinion, I swear to you by all the 
 gods that we have made progress. But in the present state 
 of affairs we have gone another way from the beginning. 
 For example, while we were still children, the nurse, if we 
 ever stumbled through want of care, did not chide us, but 
 would beat the stone. But what did the stone do ? Ought 
 the stone to have moved on account of your child's folly? 
 Again, if we find nothing to eat on coming out of the bath, 
 the pedagogue never checks our appetite, but he flogs the 
 cook. Man, did we make you the pedagogue of the cook 
 and not of the child ? Correct the child, improve him. In 
 this way even when we are grown up we are like children. 
 For he who is unmusical is a child in music ; he who is with- 
 out letters is a child in learning: he who is untaught, is a 
 child in life. 
 
 NOTE 
 1 Compare iii : 5, 4. 
 
 240
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 THAT WE CAN DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM ALL EXTERNAL 
 
 THINGS 
 
 IN the case of appearances which are objects of the vision, 1 
 nearly all have allowed the good and the evil to be in 
 ourselves, and not in externals. No one gives the name 
 of good to the fact that it is day, nor bad to the fact 
 that it is night, nor the name of the greatest evil to the opin- 
 ion that three are four. But what do men say ? They say 
 that knowledge is good, and that error is bad ; so that even 
 in respect to falsehood itself there is a good result, the 
 knowledge that it is falsehood. So it ought to be in life 
 also. Is health a good thing, and is sickness a bad thing? 
 No, man. But what is it ? To be healthy, and healthy in a 
 right way, is good : to be healthy in a bad way is bad ; so that 
 it is possible to gain advantage even from sickness, I declare. 
 For is it not possible to gain advantage even from death, 
 and is it not possible to gain advantage from mutilation ? 
 Do you think that Menceceus gained little by death ? 2 Could 
 a man who says so, gain so much as Menceceus gained? 
 Come, man, did he not maintain the character of being a 
 lover of his country, a man of great mind, faithful, gener- 
 ous? And if he had continued to live, would he not have 
 lost all these things ? would he not have gained the opposite ? 
 would he not have gained the name of coward, ignoble, a 
 hater of his country, a man who feared death? Well, do 
 you think that he gained little by dying? I suppose not. 
 But did the father of Admetus 3 gain much by prolonging his 
 life so ignobly and miserably? Did he not die afterwards? 
 Cease, I adjure you by the gods, to admire material things. 
 Cease to make yourselves, slaves, first of things, then on ac- 
 count of things slaves of those who are able to give them or 
 take them away. 
 
 Can advantage then be derived from these things ? From 
 all ; and from him who abuses you. Wherein does the man 
 who exercises before the combat profit the athlete? Very 
 
 241
 
 242 EPICTETUS 
 
 greatly. This man becomes my exerciser before the com- 
 bat : he exercises me in endurance, in keeping my temper, in 
 mildness. You say no: but he, who lays hold of my neck 
 and disciplines my loins and shoulders, does me good; and 
 the exercise master (the aliptes, or oiler) does right when he 
 says, "Raise him up with both hands;" and the heavier he 
 (tKEtvos) is, so much the more is my advantage. But if a 
 man exercises me in keeping my temper, does he not do me 
 good ? This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from 
 men. Is my neighbour bad ? Bad to himself, but good to 
 me: he exercises my good disposition, my moderation. Is 
 my father bad? Bad to himself, but to me good. This is 
 the rod of Hermes: touch with it what you please, as the 
 saying is, and it will be of gold. I say not so: but bring 
 what you please, and I will make it good. 4 Bring disease, 
 bring death, bring poverty, bring abuse, bring trial on cap- 
 ital charges: all these things through the rod of Hermes 
 shall be made profitable. What will you do with death? 
 Why, what else than that it shall do you honour, or that it 
 shall show you by act through it, what a man is who follows 
 the will of nature ? What will you do with disease ? I will 
 show its nature, I will be conspicuous in it, I will be firm, 
 I will be happy, I will not flatter the physician, I will not 
 wish to die. What else do you seek ? Whatever you shall 
 give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, honoured, a thing 
 which a man shall seek. 
 
 You say "No : but take care that you do not fall sick : it is 
 a bad thing." This is the same as if you should say, "Take 
 care that you never receive the impression (appearance) that 
 three are four : that is bad." Man, how is it bad ? If I think 
 about it as I ought, how shall it then do me any damage? 
 and shall it not even do me good? If then I think about 
 poverty as I ought to do, about disease, about not having 
 office, is not that enough for me? will it not be an advan- 
 iage? How then ought I any longer to look to seek evil and 
 good in externals? What happens? these doctrines are 
 maintained here, but no man carries them away home; but 
 immediately every one is at war with his slave, with his 
 neighbours, with those who have sneered at him, with those
 
 DISCOURSES 243 
 
 who have ridiculed him. Good luck to Lesbius,* who daily 
 proves that I know nothing. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 "The original is Qsaoptfriic&r <pavra(Siobv which is translated in 
 the Latin version visa theoretica, but this does not help us. Perhaps 
 the author means any appearances which are presented to us either by 
 the eyes or by the understanding ; but I am not sure what he means. 
 
 2 Menceceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life by which he would 
 save his country, as it was declared by an oracle. (Cicero, Tuscul. i. c. 
 48.) Juvenal (Sat. xiv. 238) says 
 
 "Quarum Amor in te 
 
 Quantus erat patriae Deciorum in pectore ; quantum 
 Dilexit Thebas, si Grsecia vera, Menceceus." 
 
 Euripides, Phcenissae, v. 913. 
 
 1 The father of Admetus was Pheres (Euripides, Alcestis). 
 
 * Mrs. Carter quotes the epistle to the Romans (viii. 28) : "and we 
 know that all things work together for good to them that love God" ; 
 but she quotes only the first part of the verse and omits the conclusion, 
 "to them who are the called according to his purpose." 
 
 8 Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus. 
 We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, " each of 
 you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Lesbius, etc." Schweig's note.
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO READILY COME TO THE PROFESSION OF 
 
 SOPHISTS 
 
 THEY who have taken up bare theorems 
 immediately wish to vomit them forth, as persons 
 whose stomachs are diseased do with food. First di- 
 gest the thing, then do not vomit it up thus : if you 
 do not digest it, the thing becomes truly an emetic, a crude 
 food and unfit to eat. But after digestion show us some 
 change in your ruling faculty, as athletes show in their shoul- 
 ders by what they have been exercised and what they have 
 eaten ; as those who have taken up certain arts show by what 
 they have learned. The carpenter does not come and say, 
 Hear me talk about the carpenter's art; but having under- 
 taken to build a house, he makes it, and proves that he knows 
 the art. You also ought to do something of the kind ; eat 
 like a man, drink like a man, dress, marry, beget children, 
 do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unrea- 
 sonable brother, bear with your father, bear with your son, 
 neighbour, companion. 1 Show us these things that we may 
 see that you have in truth learned something from the phi- 
 losophers. You say, No ; but come and hear me read ( phil- 
 osophical) commentaries. Go away, and seek somebody 
 to vomit them on. (He replies) And indeed I will expound 
 to you the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can : I 
 will explain his text most clearly : I will add also, if I can, 
 the vehemence of Antipater and Archedemus. 2 
 
 Is it then for this that young men shall leave their coun- 
 try and their parents, that they may come to this place, and 
 hear you explain words? Ought they not to return with a 
 capacity to endure, to be active in association with others, 
 free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a pro- 
 vision for the journey of life with which they shall be able 
 to bear well the things that happen and derive honour from 
 them? 3 And how can you give them any of these things 
 which you do not possess ? Have you done from the begin- 
 
 244
 
 DISCOURSES 245 
 
 ning any thing else than employ yourself about the resolu- 
 tion of syllogisms, of sophistical arguments (pi ns.Taniitrovrt^ 
 and in those which work by questions ? But such a man has 
 a school; why should not I also have a school? These 
 things are not done, man, in a careless way, nor just as it 
 may happen; but there must be a (fit) age and life, and God 
 as a guide. You say, No. But no man sails from a port 
 without having sacrificed to the gods and invoked their help ; 
 nor do men sow without having called on Demeter ; and shall 
 a man who has undertaken so great a work undertake it 
 safely without the gods ? and shall they who undertake this 
 work come to it with success? What else are you doing, 
 man, than divulging the mysteries? You say, there is a 
 temple at Eleusis, and one here also. There is an Hiero- 
 phant at Eleusis, 4 and I also will make an Hierophant : there 
 is a herald, and I will establish a herald: there is a torch- 
 bearer at Eleusis, and I also will establish a torchbearer ; 
 there are torches at Eleusis, and I will have torches here. 
 The words are the same : how do the things done here differ 
 from those done there ? Most impious man, is there no dif- 
 ference? these things are done both in due place and in due 
 time; and when accompanied with sacrifice and prayers, 
 when a man is first purified, and when he is disposed in his 
 mind to the thought that he is going to approach sacred rites 
 and ancient rites. In this way the mysteries are useful, in 
 this way we come to the notion that all these things were 
 established by the ancients for the instruction and correction 
 of life. But you publish and divulge them out of time, out 
 of place, without sacrifices, without purity; you have not 
 the garments which the hierophant ought to have, nor the 
 hair, nor the headdress, nor the voice, nor the age ; nor have 
 you purified yourself as he has : but you have committed to 
 memory the words only, and you say, Sacred are the words 
 by themselves. 5 
 
 You ought to approach these matters in another way : the 
 thing is great, it is mystical, not a common thing, nor is it 
 given to every man. But not even wisdom 8 perhaps is 
 enough to enable a man to take the care of youths : a man 
 must have also a certain readiness and fitness for this pur- 
 pose, and a certain quality of body, and above all things he
 
 246 I EPICTETUS 
 
 must have God to advise him to occupy this office, as God 
 advised Socrates to occupy the place of one who confutes 
 error, Diogenes the office of royalty and reproof, and the 
 office of teaching precepts. But you open a doctor's shop, 
 though you have nothing except physic : but where and how 
 they should be applied, you know not nor have you taken 
 any trouble about it. "See," that man says, "I too have 
 salves for the eyes." Have you also the power of using 
 them ? Do you know both when and how they will do good, 
 and to whom they will do good? Why then do you act at 
 hazard in things of the greatest importance? why are you 
 careless ? why do you undertake a thing that is in no way fit 
 for you ? Leave it to those who are able to do it, and to do it 
 well. Do not yourself bring disgrace on philosophy through 
 your own acts, and be not one of those who load it with a bad 
 reputation. But if theorems please you, sit still, and turn 
 them over by yourself ; but never say that you are a philoso- 
 pher, nor allow another to say it : but say : "He is mistaken, 
 for neither are my desires different from what they were 
 before, nor is my activity directed to other objects, nor do I 
 assent to other things, nor in the use of appearances have I 
 altered at all from my former condition." This you must 
 think and say about yourself, if you would think as you 
 ought : if not act at hazard, and do what you are doing ; for 
 it becomes you. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 * The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in iii. c. 7, and it 
 is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice : "If we 
 open our eyes and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what 
 we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and ef- 
 forts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the 
 \vorld, which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus 
 had" (Strauss, " Der alte und der neue Glaube." p. 74). 
 
 1 Cicero ( Academ. Prior, ii. 47) names Antipater and Archidemus 
 (Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also opiniosissimi homi- 
 nes. 
 
 * This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of 
 Epictetus in the matter of education ; and some other remarks to the 
 same effect follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we 
 have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer, 
 who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus says : " it can not be de- 
 nied that in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief 
 object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible 
 men and women ; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I main- 
 tain that the education of these schools is good for nothing I do not
 
 DISCOURSES 247 
 
 propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and 
 dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and 
 wise by a cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the disci- 
 pline necessary for that purpose, and by the example of him who gov- 
 erns, directs and instructs." Further, "my men and women teachers 
 have something which the others have not : they have a purpose, an end 
 in their system of education; and what is education? What is human 
 life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry, 
 order and the exercise of moderate abilities? Great abilities are rare, 
 and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities 
 useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society." 
 
 4 There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica, 
 and solemn mysteries, and an Hierophant or conductor of the cere- 
 monies. 
 
 8 The reader, who has an inclination to compare religious forms an- 
 cient and modern, may find something in modern practice to which the 
 words of Epictetus are applicable. 
 
 8 This is a view of the fitness of a teacher which, as far as I know, is 
 quite new ; and it is also true. Perhaps there was some vague notion of 
 this kind in modern Europe at the time when teachers of youths were 
 only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office 
 of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the 
 present "ordering of Deacons" in the Church of England, the person, 
 who is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following 
 question by the bishop : "Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by 
 the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve 
 God for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people?" "In 
 the ordering of priests" this question is omitted, and another question 
 only is put, which is used only in the ordering of Deacons : "Do you 
 think in your heart that you be truly called, according to the will of 
 our Lord Jesus Christ," etc. The teacher ought to have God to advise 
 him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He does not say 
 how God will advise ; perhaps he supposed that this advice might be 
 given in the way in which Socrates said that he received it. 
 
 "Wisdom perhaps is not enough" to enable a man to take care of 
 youths. Whatever wisdom may mean, it is true that a teacher should 
 have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it 
 disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a 
 reasonable living by his labour: if he seeks only money and wealth, he 
 is on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying 
 and selling, a butcher or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of 
 society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. But the teacher 
 has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into 
 good men and women. Should he be ordered like a Deacon or a Priest, 
 for his office is even more useful than that of a Priest or Deacon ? Some 
 will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so.
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 ABOUT CYNICISM 
 
 WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and 
 he was a person who appeared to be inclined to 
 Cynicism, what kind of a person a Cynic ought to 
 be and what was the notion (itpolijfas') of the 
 thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure : but I have 
 so much to say to you that he who without God attempts 
 so great a matter, is hateful to God, and has other purpose 
 than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed 
 house no man comes forward, and says to himself, I ought 
 to be manager of the house. If he does so, the master turns 
 round, and seeing him insolently giving orders, drags him 
 forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the 
 world) ; for here also there is a master of the house who 
 orders every thing. (He says) You are the sun ; you can by 
 going round make the year and seasons, and make the fruits 
 grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them 
 remit, and warm the bodies of men properly: go, travel 
 round, and so administer things from the greatest to the 
 least. You are a calf; when a lion shall appear, do your 
 proper business (*'. e. run away) : if you do not, you will suf- 
 fer. You are a bull : advance and fight, for this is your 
 business, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead 
 the army against Ilium : be Agamemnon. You can fight in 
 single combat against Hector : be Achilles. But if Thersites 1 
 came forward and claimed the command, he would either not 
 have obtained it; or if he did obtain it, he would have dis- 
 graced himself before many witnesses. 
 
 Do you also think about the matter carefully: it is not 
 what it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now and 
 I shall wear it then: I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep 
 hard then : I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff, 
 and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those 
 whom I meet ; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of 
 his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or 
 
 248
 
 DISCOURSES 249 
 
 if he walks about in purple If you imagine the thing to be 
 such as this, keep far away from it : do not approach it : it is 
 not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is, 
 and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a 
 great thing you undertake. 
 
 In the first place in the things which relate to yourself, you 
 must not be in any respect like what you are now : you must 
 not blame God or man: you must take away desire alto- 
 gether, you must transfer avoidance (cx-xvUrfis) only to the 
 things which are within the power of the will : you must not 
 feel anger nor resentment nor envy nor pity ; a girl must not 
 appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputa- 
 tion, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought 
 to know that the rest of men throw walls around them and 
 houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they 
 have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door, 
 he sets somebody before the chamber : if a person comes, say 
 that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of 
 all these things must use modesty as his protection: if he 
 does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the 
 open sky. This is his house, his door : this is the slave be- 
 fore his bedchamber: this is his darkness. For he ought 
 not to wish to hide any thing that he does : and if he does, 
 he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man 
 who lives under the open sky, of a free man : he has begun 
 to fear some external thing, he has begun to have need of 
 concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses. 
 For where shall he hide himself and how? And if by 
 chance this public instructor shall be detected, this peda- 
 gogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer? 
 When then a man fears these things, is it possible for him 
 to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men ? It can 
 not be: it is impossible. 
 
 In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty 
 pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say), 
 to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood 
 is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker ; and my busi- 
 ness is the right use of appearances. But the body is noth- 
 ing to me : the parts of it are nothing to me. Death ? Let 
 it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a
 
 250 EPICTETUS 
 
 part. Fly, you say. And whither; can any man eject me 
 out of the world ? He can not. But wherever I go, there is 
 the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens, 
 and the conversation (6/*/U'a) with gods. 
 
 Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic can not be sat- 
 isfied with this ; but he must know that he is sent a messen- 
 ger from Zeus to men about good and bad things, 2 to show 
 them that they have wandered and are seeking the substance 
 of good and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never 
 think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off to 
 Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a 
 Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and 
 which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and 
 to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so 
 as to point out as enemies those who are not enemies, nor 
 in any other way to be perturbed by appearances nor con- 
 founded. 
 
 It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occa- 
 sion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say 
 like Socrates : Men, whither are you hurrying ; what are you 
 doing, wretches ? like blind people you are wandering up and 
 down : you are going by another road, and have left the true 
 road : you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are 
 not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not 
 believe him. Why do you seek it without ? 3 In the body ? 
 It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophel- 
 lius. 4 In possessions? It is not there. But if you do not 
 believe me, look at Croesus : look at those who are now rich, 
 with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? It 
 is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been 
 twice and thrice consuls ; but they are not. Whom shall we 
 believe in these matters? You who from without see their 
 affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the men them- 
 selves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan, 
 when they grieve, when on account of these very consul- 
 ships and glory and splendour they think that they are more 
 wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It 
 is not : if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sarda- 
 napalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though he
 
 DISCOURSES 251 
 
 was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; but while 
 others are snoring, what is he doing? 
 
 " Much from his head he tore his rooted hair :" 
 
 Iliad, x: 15. 
 
 and what does he say himself? 
 
 " ' I am perplexed,' he says, 'and 
 
 Disturbed I am,' and 'my heart out of my bosom 
 Is leaping.' " 
 
 Iliad, x: 91. 
 
 Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your posses- 
 sions? No. Your body? No. But you are rich in gold 
 and copper. What then is the matter with you ? That part 
 of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you and is cor- 
 rupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid, 
 with which we move towards and move from things. How 
 neglected ? He knows not the nature of good for which he 
 is made by nature and the nature of evil; and what is his 
 own, and what belongs to another ; and when any thing that 
 belongs to others goes badly, he says, "Woe to me, for the 
 Hellenes are in danger." Wretched is his ruling faculty, 
 and alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going 
 to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do 
 not kill them, will they not die? Yes; but not all at once. 
 What difference then does it make? For if death is an 
 evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is 
 equally an evil. Is any thing else then going to happen than 
 the separation of the soul and the body ? 5 Nothing. And if 
 the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your 
 power to die? It is. Why then do you lament and say, 
 "Oh, you who are a king and have the sceptre of Zeus !" 
 An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god. 
 What then art thou ? In truth a shepherd : for you weep as 
 shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep : 
 and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why 
 did you come hither ? Was your desire in any danger ? was 
 your aversion (&o<Aidzs) ? was your movement (pursuits) ? 
 was your avoidance of things? He replies, "No; but the 
 wife of my brother was carried off." Was it not then a great
 
 252 EPICTETUS 
 
 gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife? "Shall we be de- 
 spised then by the Trojans?" What kind of people are the 
 Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight 
 with them ? If they are fools, why do you care about them ? 
 
 In what then is the good, since it is not in these things ? 
 Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you 
 do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it : for if you chose 
 to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves ; nor 
 would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what 
 belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your 
 thoughts into yourselves : observe the preconceptions which 
 you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good 
 to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that 
 which is not impeded. Come, and do you not naturally 
 imagine it to be great, do you not imagine it to be valuable ? 
 do you not imagine it to be free from harm ? In what ma- 
 terial then ought you to seek for that which flows easily, for 
 that which is not impeded? in that which serves or in that 
 which is free? In that which is free. Do you possess the 
 body then free or is it in servile condition? We do not 
 know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of 
 gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of 
 every thing which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How 
 then is it possible that any thing which belongs to the body 
 can be free from hindrance ? and how is a thing great or val- 
 uable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud ? Well then, 
 do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing. 
 And who is able to compel you to assent to that which ap- 
 pears false? No man. And who can compel you not to 
 assent to that which appears true ? No man. By this then 
 you see that there is something in you naturally free. But 
 to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object 
 or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose 
 to do anything, which of you can do this, unless he has re- 
 ceived an impression of the appearance of that which is pro- 
 fitable or a duty ? No man. You have then in these things 
 also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched 
 men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here. 
 
 And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who 
 is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a
 
 DISCOURSES 253 
 
 slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily ? See, 
 God has sent you a man to show you that it is possible. 6 
 Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, with- 
 out possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I 
 have no wife, no children, no prastorium, but only the earth 
 and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want? 
 Am I not without sorrow? am I not without fear? Am I 
 not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object 
 of my desire ? or ever falling into that which I would avoid ? 
 did I ever blame God or man? 7 did I ever accuse any man? 
 did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countenance? 
 And how do I meet with those you are afraid of and admire? 
 Do not I treat them like slaves? Who, when he sees me, 
 does not think that he sees his king and master ? 
 
 This is the language of the Cynics, this their character, 
 this is their purpose. You say No : but their characteristic 
 is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws : the devouring 
 of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing un- 
 reasonably all whom they meet, or displaying their shoulder 
 as a fine thing. Do you see how you are going to undertake 
 so great a business? First take a mirror: look at your 
 shoulders : observe your loins, your thighs. You are going, 
 my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games, 
 no frigid and miserable contest. In the Olympic games a 
 man is not permitted to be conquered only and to take his de- 
 parture ; but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the 
 world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedae- 
 monians or of Nicopolitans ; next he must be whipped also 
 if he has entered into the contests rashly; and before being 
 whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much 
 dust. 
 
 Reflect more carefully, know thyself, 8 consult the divinity, 
 without God attempt nothing; for if he shall advise you (to 
 do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to be- 
 come great or to receive many blows. For this very amusing 
 quality is conjoined to a Cynic : he must be flogged like an 
 ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who flog him, 
 as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all. 9 
 You say No ; but if a man flogs you, stand in the public place 
 and call out, "Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace
 
 254 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 under thy protection?" Let us bring the offender before 
 the proconsul. But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is a 
 proconsul or what is any other except him who sent the 
 Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus? 
 Does he call upon any other than Zeus ? Is he not convinced 
 that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him? 
 Hercules when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think 
 that he was wretched, but without hesitation he attempted 
 to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is 
 trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out 
 and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the sceptre of 
 Diogenes ? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers by when 
 he is in a fever. "Miserable wretches, will you not stay ? but 
 are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the des- 
 truction or the fight of athletes ; and will you not choose 
 to see the combat between a fever and a man?" Would 
 such a man accuse God who sent him down as if God were 
 treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circum- 
 stances, and claimed to be an example to those who were 
 passing by? For what shall he accuse him of? because he 
 maintains a decency of behaviour, because he displays his 
 virtue more conspicuously? Well, and what does he say 
 of poverty, about death, about pain? How did he compare 
 his own happiness with that of the great king (the king of 
 Persia) ? or rather he thought that there was no comparison 
 between them. For where there are perturbations, and 
 griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of 
 things which you can not avoid, and envies and jealousies, 
 how is there a road to happiness there? But where there 
 are corrupt principles, there these things must of necessity 
 be. 
 
 When the young man asked, if when a Cynic has fallen 
 sick, and a friend asks him to come to his house and to be 
 taken care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invi- 
 tation, he replied, And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic's 
 friend ? For the man who invites ought to be such another 
 as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reckoned the 
 Cynic's friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic's 
 sceptre and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends
 
 DISCOURSES 255 
 
 to be considered worthy of a Cynic's friendship, as Diogenes 
 was a friend of Antisthenes, as Crates was a friend of Diog^ 
 enes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and 
 salutes him, that he is the Cynic's friend, and that the Cynic 
 will think him worthy of receiving a Cynic into his house? 
 So that if you please, reflect on this also : rather look round 
 for some convenient dunghill on which you shall bear your 
 fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that 
 you may not be chilled. But you seem to me to wish to go 
 into some man's house and to be well fed there for a time. 
 Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as 
 the life of a Cynic) ? 
 
 But, said the young man, shall marriage and the procrea- 
 tion of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic ? 10 
 If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies 
 perhaps no man will readily apply himself to the Cynic prac- 
 tice. For on whose account should he undertake this man- 
 ner of life? However if we suppose that he does, nothing 
 will prevent him from marrying and begetting children ; for 
 his wife will be another like himself, and his father-in-law 
 another like himself, and his children will be brought up 
 like himself. But in the present state of things which is like 
 that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the 
 Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on 
 the ministration of God, 11 able to go about among men, not 
 tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled 
 in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will 
 not maintain the character of an honourable and good man ? 
 and if he observes them he will lose the character of the 
 messenger, and spy and herald of God. For consider that 
 it is his duty to do something towards his father-in-law, 1 
 something to the other kinsfolks of his wife, something to 
 his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being 
 a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family, 
 and from providing for their support. And to say nothing 
 of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the 
 child that he may wash it in the bath ; wool for his wife when 
 she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a cup : so the furniture 
 of the house is increased. I say nothing of his other occupa-
 
 256 EPICTETUS 
 
 tions, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king; 
 he who devotes himself to the public interests, 
 
 " The people's guardian and so full of cares." 
 
 Homer, Iliad ii : 25 
 
 whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those 
 who have children ; to see who uses his wife well, who uses 
 her badly; who quarrels; what family is well administered, 
 what is not; going about as a physician does and feels 
 pulses? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you 
 have a head-ache, or the gout : he says to one, abstain from 
 food ; to another he says, eat ; or do not use the bath ; to an- 
 other, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he 
 have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life? 
 is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to 
 send them to the schoolmaster with writing tablets, and 
 styles (for writing). Besides must he not supply them with 
 beds ? for they can not be genuine Cynics as soon as they are 
 born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose 
 the children as soon as they are born than to kill them in 
 this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down 
 to, how we are taking his royalty from him. Yes, but 
 Crates took a wife. You are speaking of a circumstance 
 which arose from love and of a woman who was another 
 Crates. 12 But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages 
 and those which are free from distractions, and making this 
 inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in this state 
 of the world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic. 
 
 How then shall a man maintain the existence of society? 
 In the name of God, are those men greater benefactors to 
 society who introduce into the world to occupy their own 
 places two or three grunting children, or those who superin- 
 tend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do, 
 how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect con- 
 trary to their duty ? Did they who left little children to the 
 Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died 
 childless ? And did Pnamus who begat fifty worthless sons 
 or Danaus or ^olus contribute more to the community than 
 Homer ? Then shall the duty of a general or the business of 
 a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of
 
 DISCOURSES 257 
 
 children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted 
 the condition of childlessness for nothing; and shall not the 
 royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want 
 of children ? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we 
 not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes; and do 
 we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who 
 are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the 
 Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in noth- 
 ing else ? For such matters would not have moved us at all 
 nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or 
 beget children. Man, the Cynic is the father of all men; the 
 men are his sons, the women are his daughters : he so care- 
 fully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think 
 that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom 
 he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the 
 minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus. 
 
 If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the 
 administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater 
 form of administration than that in which he is engaged? 
 Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and 
 say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who 
 must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike with 
 Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies, nor yet 
 about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness 
 and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about 
 slavery and freedom? When a man has undertaken the 
 administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall en- 
 gage in the administration of a state ? ask me also if he shall 
 govern (hold a magisterial office) : again I will say to you, 
 Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that 
 which he exercises now? 
 
 It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a 
 certain habit of body : for if he appears to be consumptive, 
 thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight. 
 For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul 
 prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent of the 
 things which they admire to be a good man, but he must 
 also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of 
 living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, 
 he says, I am proof of this, and my own body also is. So 
 17
 
 258 EPICTETUS 
 
 Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking, 
 and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal ap- 
 pearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he 
 seems to be a beggar: all persons turn away from him, all 
 are offended with him; for neither ought he to appear 
 dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men > 
 but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive. 
 
 There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural 
 grace and sharpness ; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fel- 
 low, and nothing else : and he must have these qualities that 
 he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circum- 
 stances that may happen. So Diogenes replied to one who 
 said, "Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there 
 are gods?" 13 "And how," replied Diogenes, "can this be 
 when I think that you are odious to the gods ?" On another 
 occasion in reply to Alexander, who stood by him when he 
 was sleeping, and quoted Homer's line (Iliad, ii. 24) 
 
 " A' man a councillor should not sleep all night," 
 he answered, when he was half asleep, 
 
 " The people's guardian and so full of cares." 
 
 But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer 
 than the sun ; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cun- 
 ning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while he him- 
 self is entangled in some vice he will reprove others. 14 For 
 see how the matter stands : to these kings and tyrants their 
 guards and arms give the power of reproving some persons, 
 and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though 
 they are themselves bad ; but to a Cynic instead of arms and 
 guards it is conscience (TO dweidos) which gives this power. 
 When he knows that he has watched and laboured for man- 
 kind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer, 
 and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of 
 the gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power of 
 Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say 
 
 " Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny ; " 
 and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be; why should
 
 DISCOURSES 259 
 
 he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers, 
 to his children, in a word to his kinsmen? For this reason 
 he is neither over curious nor a busybody when he is in this 
 state of mind; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of 
 others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is 
 looking after his own affairs. If that is not so, you may also 
 say that the general is a busybody, when he inspects his sol- 
 diers, and examines them and watches them and punishes 
 the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your 
 arm, you rebuke others, I will say to you, "Will you not 
 rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have 
 stolen ; what have you to do with the affairs of others ? For 
 who are you ? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of 
 the bees? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as 
 they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the 
 sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fel- 
 low citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones?" 
 The Cynic also ought to have such power of endurance as 
 to seem insensible to the common sort, and a stone : no man 
 reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he 
 gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it 
 what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must 
 be overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior ; 
 and the body is inferior to the many, the weaker to the 
 stronger. He never then descends into such a contest in 
 which he can be overpowered ; but he immediately withdraws 
 from things which belong to others, he claims not the things 
 which are servile. But where there is will and the use of 
 appearances, there you will see how many eyes he has so that 
 you may say, " Argus was blind compared with him." Is his 
 assent ever hasty, his movement (towards an object) rash, 
 does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he 
 would avoid befall him, is his purpose unaccomplished, does 
 he ever find fault, is he ever humiliated, is he ever envious ? 
 To these he directs all his attention and energy; but as to 
 every thing else he snores supine. All is peace; there is no 
 robber who takes away his will, 15 no tyrant. But what say 
 you as to his body ? I say there is. And his possessions ? I 
 say there is. And as to magistracies and honours? What 
 does he care for them? When then any person would
 
 26O EPICTETUS 
 
 frighten him through them, he says to him, "Begone, look 
 for children; masks are formidable to them; but I know 
 that they are made of shell, and have nothing inside." 
 
 About such a matter as this you are deliberating. There- 
 fore, if you please, I urge you in God's name, defer the mat- 
 ter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what 
 Hector says to Andromache, "Retire rather," he says, "into 
 the house and weave : " 
 
 " 'War is the work of men 
 Of all indeed, but specially 'tis mine.' " 
 
 Iliad, vi. 490. 
 
 So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her 
 weakness. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See the description of Thersites in the Iliad, ii. 212. 
 1 The office which in our times corresponds to this description of the 
 Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion. 
 
 "Quod petis hie est, 
 Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus." 
 
 Horace, Ep. i. n, 30. 
 
 " Willst du immer weiter schweifen? 
 Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah. 
 Lerne nur das Gluck ergreifen, 
 Denn das Gluck ist immer da." 
 
 Goethe. 
 
 4 These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Croesus 
 the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian. 
 
 B Man then is supposed to consist of a soul and of a body. It may be 
 useful to remember this when we are examining other passages in 
 Epictetus. 
 
 8 "It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualifi- 
 cation in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to be 
 destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus 
 doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a 
 height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine 
 wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Gospel ; whose 
 great author had not where to lay his head; and which some in later 
 ages have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian 
 religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of 
 Diogenes in Epictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is 
 too obvious to need any enlargement." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 T Some of the ancients, who called themselves philosophers, did 
 blame God and his administration of the world ; and there^ are men 
 who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the 
 world, he has the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says;
 
 DISCOURSES 261 
 
 and if he knows, as he must know, that he can not alter the nature of 
 man and the conditions of human life, he may think it wise to withdraw 
 from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that 
 there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself; 
 and if he does believe that there is a God he may still think that his 
 power of quitting the world is a power which he may exercise when he 
 chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied 
 with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard 
 of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human 
 things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long 
 as they can, and some of them take care of themselves and of all that 
 they possess ; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom 
 they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer 
 living in this world to leaving it, that their complaints are idle talk ; 
 and that being men of weak minds, and great vanity they assume the 
 philosopher's name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as 
 they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after 
 their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have 
 the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human 
 life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as 
 dissatisfied as themselves those who have less means of making life 
 tolerable. These grumblers are not the men who give their money or 
 their labour or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and 
 diminishing the unavoidable sufferings of human life ; but they find it 
 easier to blame God, when they believe in him ; or to find fault with 
 things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in 
 God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the con- 
 ditions under which we live. 
 
 7 "E caelo descendit yv&Qi tieavTov" Juvenal xi. 27. The express- 
 sion, " Know thyself" is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates 
 among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of 
 knowledge ; and no man has it completely. Men either estimate their 
 powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self conceit or arrogance ; 
 or they think too meanly of their powers and do not accomplish what 
 they might accomplish, if they had reasonable self confidence. 
 
 8 Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love 
 to enemies, Matthew v. 39-44. The reader will observe that Christ 
 specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth ; and 
 requires of all his followers, what Epictetus describes only as the duty 
 of one or two extraordinary persons, as such." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 8 The Stoics recommended marriage, the procreation of children, the 
 discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally. 
 
 10 "It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (anepi- 
 ditddrcos ) with St. Paul, I Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same considera- 
 tion, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from mar- 
 riagC; His observation too that the state of things was then (a?? tv ita- 
 pard&t) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the 
 Apostle's (tvetfr&tia ov ay tcrf) present necessity. St. Paul says 2 Tim. 
 ii. 4 (ov6el$ drparevo^svo? kpitXe KETCH,, etc.) "no man that warreth 
 entangleth himself with the affairs of life." So Epictetus says here that 
 a Cynic must not be ( tyiteftA-eytievov) in relations, etc. From these 
 and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think 
 that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul's Epistles or that he had 
 heard something of the Christian doctrine." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the
 
 262 EPICTETUS 
 
 Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the 
 Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact. 
 Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul 
 says that " if they can not contain let them marry : for it is better to 
 marry than to burn." Accordingly his doctrine is "to avoid fornication 
 let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own 
 husband." He does not directly say what a man should do when he is 
 not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do 
 (i Cor. vii. 2). Paul's view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus, 
 who recommends marriage. Paul does not : he writes, " I say therefore 
 to the unmarried and widows, it is good for them if they abide even 
 as I." He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children 
 as a duty ; which Epicetus did. 
 
 In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the minister 
 of God should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract 
 him and make him unable to discharge his duties There is sound sense 
 in this. A minister of God should not be distracted by the cares of a 
 family, especially if he is poor. 
 
 11 The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all ad- 
 vice in marrying Crates and lived with him exactly as he lived. Dioge- 
 nes Laertius, vi. 96. Upton. 
 
 "Diogenes Laertius, vi : 42. 
 
 " The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must be pure, 
 for otherwise how can he reprove vice? This is a useful lesson to those 
 whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind. 
 
 "This is quoted by M. Antoninus, xi. 36.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS FOR THE SAKE OF 
 OSTENTATION 1 
 
 FIRST say to yourself who you wish to be: then do 
 accordingly what you are doing; for in nearly all 
 other things we see this to be so. Those who fol- 
 low athletic exercises first determine what they wish 
 to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is 
 a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of 
 walking, rubbing, and exercise : if a man is a runner in the 
 stadium, all these things are different ; if he is a Pentathlete, 
 they are still more different. So you will find it also in the 
 arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such, and such 
 things ; if a worker in metal, such things. For everything that 
 we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose ; 
 and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark. 
 Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular 
 purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is com- 
 prehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though 
 gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the par- 
 ticular end has reference to each person's mode of life and 
 his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter 
 as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rheto- 
 rician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear 
 me read to you : take care first of all that you are not doing 
 this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you 
 are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is 
 the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised ? 
 Immediately you hear him saying, To me what is the value of 
 praise from the many ? and he says well, for it is of no value 
 to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geome- 
 trician. Do you then wish to be useful? in what? tell us 
 that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man 
 do anything useful to others, who has not received some- 
 thing useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any 
 
 263
 
 264 EPICTETUS 
 
 thing useful in the carpenter's art, unless he is a carpenter; 
 nor in the shoemaker's art, unless he is a shoemaker. 
 
 Do you wish to know then if you have received any advan- 
 tage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the 
 thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object. 
 What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which 
 you would avoid. Well ; do we fulfill their promise ? Tell 
 me the truth; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when 
 your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give 
 you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when 
 you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What 
 did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all 
 that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular 
 matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan 
 and the nymphs? 2 Excellently. Then do you tell me that 
 in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature? 
 Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not 
 praise a certain person contrary to your opinion ? and did you 
 not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator? 
 Would you wish your own children to be such persons ? I 
 hope not Why then did you praise and flatter him? He 
 is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses How 
 is this? He admires me. You have stated your proof. 
 Then what do you think? do not these very people secretly 
 despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he 
 has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a phi- 
 losopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you 
 have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think 
 that he says except this, This man has some need of me ? Or 
 tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown? 
 Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has 
 listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading ; has he 
 become more modest ? has he been turned to reflect on him- 
 self ? has he perceived in what a bad state he is ? has he cast 
 away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him? 
 He does. A man who will teach him to live ? No, fool, but 
 how to talk ; for it is for this that he admires you also. Lis- 
 ten and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect 
 art, much better than Dion. 3 This is altogether another 
 thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from
 
 DISCOURSES 265 
 
 perturbations? and even if he did say it, I should say to him, 
 Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is. 
 And if he could not tell me, I should add this. First under- 
 stand what you say, and then speak. 
 
 You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after 
 applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be 
 useful to others? To-day many more attended my dis- 
 course. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is 
 nothing; suppose that there were a thousand Dion never 
 had so many hearers How could he? And they under- 
 stand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can 
 move even a stone See, these are the words of a philoso- 
 pher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to 
 others; here is a man who has listened to discourses, who 
 has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as 
 the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. "I have often 
 wondered by what arguments." 4 Not so, but "by what argu- 
 ment" : this is more exact than that What, have you read 
 the words at all in a different way from that in which you 
 read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you 
 would not have been attending to such matters, but you 
 would rather have been looking to these words: "Anytus 
 and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me:" 
 "and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to 
 nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry 
 seems to me the best." 5 Hence who ever heard Socrates 
 say, "I know something and I teach:" but he used to send 
 different people to different teachers. Therefore they used 
 to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by 
 him ; and he would take them and recommend them. Not 
 so ; but as he accompanied them he would say, Hear me to- 
 day discoursing in the house of Quadratus. 6 Why should 
 I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words 
 together cleverly ? You put them together, man ; and what 
 good will it do you? But only praise me. What do you 
 mean by praising? Say to me, admirable, wonderful. 
 Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which 
 philosophers mean by the name (K-ar^opia) 7 of good, what 
 have I to praise in you ? If it is good to speak well, teach 
 men, and I will praise you. What then ? ought a man to lis- 
 
 18
 
 266 EPICTETUS 
 
 ten to such thing's without pleasure? I hope not. For my 
 part I do not listen even to a lute-player without pleasure. 
 Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear 
 what Socrates says, "Nor would it be seemly for a man of my 
 age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before 
 you." 8 Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small 
 art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them to- 
 gether, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or 
 to speak, and while he is reading to say, "There are not many 
 who can do these things, I swear by all that you value." 
 
 Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the 
 sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not 
 the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive ben- 
 efit ? What physician invites a man to be treated by him ? 
 Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do in- 
 vite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were in- 
 vited. "I invite you to come and hear that things are in a 
 bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing 
 except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are 
 ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and 
 unhappy." A fine kind of invitation : and yet if the words 
 of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is 
 dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say : "If you 
 have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose." 9 
 Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of 
 us who were sitting there supposed that some one had ac- 
 cused him before Rufus : he so touched on what was doing, 
 he so placed before the eyes every man's faults. 
 
 The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : you ought 
 not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you 
 are not in sound health when you enter : one has dislocated 
 his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a 
 fourth a headache. Then do I sit and utter to you little 
 thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go 
 away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which 
 he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third 
 with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for 
 this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their 
 parents and their friends and kinsmen and property, that 
 they may say to you, Wonderful! when you are uttering
 
 DISCOURSES 267 
 
 your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or 
 Cleanthes ? 
 
 What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who de- 
 nies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic 
 style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these, 
 the style of display? What is the hortatory style? To be 
 able to show both to one person and to many the struggle 
 in which they are engaged, and that they think more about 
 any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish 
 the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them 
 in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thou- 
 sand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen, 
 and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and 
 describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the 
 gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can. 
 Nothing can have more power in exhortation than when the 
 speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But 
 tell me who when he hears you reading or discoursing is 
 anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or when 
 he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me well : I must 
 no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you 
 have a great reputation, say to some person? He spoke 
 finely about Xerxes; 10 and another says, No, but about the 
 battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists, 
 Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This 
 practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the 
 time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger 
 Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis cor- 
 ruptae eloquentiae. Upton. 
 
 Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day delighted in. 
 
 * Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden- 
 mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist, 
 as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as 
 Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and 
 some fragments of fifteen. 
 
 4 These words are the beginning of Xenophon's Memorabilia, i. I. 
 The small critics disputed whether the text should read ri6i Xoyois, or 
 nvi Xoyoo. 
 
 5 From the Crito of Plato, c. 6. 
 
 ' The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we 
 learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40. 
 
 " Si dulcedine famae 
 Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes."
 
 2 68 EPICTETUS 
 
 Quadraius is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between 
 Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do 
 so; but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the 
 road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don't find anything in the 
 notes on this passage; but it requires explanation. 
 
 T tcarTjyopia is one of Aristotle's common terms. 
 
 8 From Plato's Apology of Socrates. 
 
 * Aulus Gellius, v. I. Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton. 
 
 10 Cicero, de Officiis i. 18 : "Quae magno animo et fortiter excellen- 
 terque gesta sunt, ea pescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc 
 Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, 
 Leuctris,"
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE FOR THOSE 
 THINGS WHICH ARE NOT IN OUR POWER 
 
 LET not that which in another is contrary to nature be 
 an evil to you : for you are not formed by nature to 
 be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with 
 others, but to be happy with them. If a man is un- 
 happy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault : for 
 God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturba- 
 tions. For this purpose he has given means to them, some 
 things to each person as his own, and other things not as 
 his own : some things subject to hindrance and compulsion 
 and deprivation ; and these things are not a man's own : but 
 the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own; 
 and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by 
 him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he 
 has made our own. But you say, I have parted from a 
 certain person, and he is grieved. Why did he consider as 
 his own that which belongs to another ? why, when he looked 
 on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you 
 are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for 
 a foreign country? Therefore he suffers the consequences 
 of his own folly. But why do you or for what purpose be- 
 wail yourself ? Is it that you also have not thought of these 
 things ? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you 
 have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if 
 you would always enjoy them, both places and men and con- 
 versation; and now you sit and weep because you do not 
 see the same persons and do not live in the same places. 
 Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and 
 ravens who have the power of flying where they please and 
 changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas with- 
 out lamenting or regretting their former condition. Yes, 
 but this happens to them because they are irrational crea- 
 tures. Was reason then given to us by the gods for the 
 purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our 
 
 269
 
 270 EPICTETUS 
 
 lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons 
 be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we our- 
 selves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if 
 any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and 
 weep ; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance 
 and clap our hands like children? 
 
 Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we 
 have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to 
 them as if they were jugglers : they tell us that this world is 
 one city, 1 and the substance out of which it has been formed 
 is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that 
 some things must give way to others, that some must be dis- 
 solved, and others come in their place; some to remain in 
 the same place, and others to be moved : and that all things 
 are full of friendship, first of the gods, 2 and then of men 
 who by nature are made to be of one family ; and some must 
 be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing 
 in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who 
 are removed from them; and man in addition to being by 
 nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things 
 which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this 
 property not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to . the 
 earth, but to go at different times to different places, some- 
 times from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others 
 merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who 
 saw 
 
 "Of many men the states, and learned their ways." 8 
 
 And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all 
 the inhabited world 
 
 "Seeing men's lawless deeds and their good rules of law :"* 
 
 casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and intro- 
 ducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many 
 friends do you think that he had in Thebes, how many in 
 Argos, how many in Athens? and how many do you think 
 that he gained by going about? And he married also, when 
 it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and 
 left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them 
 as orphans ; for he knew that no man is an orphan ; but it is
 
 DISCOURSES 271 
 
 the father who takes care of all men always and continu- 
 ously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that 
 Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his 
 own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when 
 he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to 
 live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happi- 
 ness and desire of what is not present to come together. 
 For that which is happy must have all 5 that it desires, must 
 resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have 
 neither thirst nor hunger. But Ulysses felt a desire for 
 his wife and wept as he sat on a rock. Do you attend to 
 Homer and his stories in every thing ? Or if Ulysses really 
 wept, what was he else than an unhappy man? and what 
 good man is unhappy? In truth the whole is badly admin- 
 istered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that 
 they may be happy like himself. But these things are not 
 lawful or right to think of : and if Ulysses did weep and la- 
 ment, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows 
 not who he is? and who knows what he is, if he forgets 
 that things which have been made are perishable, and that 
 it is not possible for one human being to be with another 
 always? To desire then things which are impossible is to 
 have a slavish character, and is foolish : it is the part of 
 a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way 
 that he can, by his opinions. 
 
 But my mother laments when she does not see me. Why 
 has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this, 
 that we should not take care that she may not lament, but 
 I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not 
 our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow : 
 but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow 
 by every means, for it is in my power: and the sorrow of 
 another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can ; but I will 
 not attempt to do it by every means ; for if I do, I shall be 
 fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be 
 placing myself against him in the administration of the uni- 
 verse; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting 
 against God and of this disobedience not only will the chil- 
 dren of my children pay, but T also shall myself, both by day 
 and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at
 
 272 EPICTETUS 
 
 every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending 
 on the letters of others. Some person has arrived from 
 Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can 
 happen to you, where you are not? From Hellas (Greece) 
 some one is come: I hope that there is no harm. In this 
 way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is 
 it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are, 
 and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of 
 letters ? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state 
 of security? Well then suppose that my friends have died 
 in the places which are far from me. What else have they 
 suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or 
 how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and 
 at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you 
 love ? Know you not that in the course of a long time many 
 and various kinds of things must happen ; that a fever shall 
 overpower one, a robber another, and a third a tyrant ? Such 
 is the condition around us, such are those who live with us in 
 the world : cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and 
 journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various 
 circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and ban- 
 ish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into 
 an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, la- 
 menting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and 
 dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten 
 thousands. 
 
 Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers ? 
 did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a 
 warfare? that one man must keep watch, another must go 
 out as a spy, and a third must fight? and it is not possible 
 that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should 
 be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the gen- 
 eral complain when any thing more hard than usual is im- 
 posed on you, and you do not observe what you make the 
 army become as far as it is in your power; that if all imitate 
 you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart 
 round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but 
 will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, 
 in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick 
 to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if
 
 DISCOURSES 273 
 
 to run to the head of the ship, refuse ; and what master of a 
 ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard 
 as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to 
 the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man's life 
 is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You 
 must observe the duty of a soldier and do everything at the 
 nod of the general ; if it is possible, divining what his wishes 
 are: for there is no resemblance between that general and 
 this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You 
 are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean 
 place ; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that 
 such a man must give little time to the affairs of his house- 
 hold, but be often away from home, either as a governor 
 or one who is governed or discharging some office, or serv- 
 ing in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that 
 you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to 
 be rooted? Yes, for it is pleasant. Who says that it is 
 not ? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleas- 
 ant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end ? 
 Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language? 
 that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites? Next 
 while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions, 
 do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates? 
 Will you not throw away as far as you can the things be- 
 longing to others with which you decorate yourself, though 
 they do not fit you at all ? For what else do they desire than 
 to sleep without hindrance and free from compulsion, and 
 when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash 
 the face, then write and read what they choose, and then 
 talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends 
 whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and 
 having walked about a little to bathe, and then eat and sleep 
 such sleep as is the fashion of such men? why need we say 
 how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell 
 your own way of passing the time which you desire, you 
 who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diog- 
 enes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that 
 others do), or something else? Why then do you call your- 
 self a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves 
 Roman citizens, 6 are severely punished; and should those,
 
 274 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name, 
 get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law di- 
 vine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the se- 
 verest punishments from those who commit the greatest 
 crimes? For what does this law say? Let him who pre- 
 tends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a 
 vainglorious man; 7 let him who disobeys the divine ad- 
 ministration be base, and a slave; let him suffer grief, let 
 him be envious, let him pity; 8 and in a word let him be un- 
 happy and lament. 
 
 Well then ; do you wish me to pay court to a certain per- 
 son? to go to his doors? 9 If reason requires this to be done 
 for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the 
 sake of mankind, why should you not go? You are not 
 ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are 
 in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you 
 want lettuces ; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the 
 rich when you want any thing? Yes, for I have no awe of 
 a shoemaker Don't feel any awe of the rich Nor will I 
 flatter the gardener And do not flatter the rich How then 
 shall I get what I want? Do I say to you, go as if you were 
 certain to get what you want? And do not I only tell you, 
 that you may do what is becoming to yourself ? Why then 
 should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may 
 have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a 
 friend. And further remember that you have gone to the 
 shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power 
 in any thing great or noble, though he may sell dear. You 
 go to buy lettuces: they cost an obolus (penny), but not a 
 talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for 
 to the rich man's door Well, I will go It is worth talk- 
 ing about Let it be so ; I will talk with him But you must 
 also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise Away with 
 that, it is a talent's worth : it is not profitable to me, nor to 
 the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils 
 a good citizen and a friend. But you will seem not to have 
 been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you 
 again forgotten why you went ? Know you not that a good 
 man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake 
 of doing right? What advantage is it then to him to have
 
 DISCOURSES 275 
 
 done right ? And what advantage is it to a man who writes 
 the name of Dion to write it as he ought? The advantage 
 is to have written it. Is there no reward then 10 ? Do you 
 seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is 
 good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more, 
 but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games. 
 Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be 
 good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by 
 the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your 
 duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want 
 nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their 
 weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you 
 thus never cease to be a foolish child ? know you not that he 
 who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridic- 
 ulous he is ? 
 
 In Athens did you see no one by going to his house? 
 I visited any man that I pleased Here also be ready to 
 see, and you will see whom you please : only let it be with- 
 out meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and 
 your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not 
 depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it de- 
 pends on what is within, on your opinions. When you 
 have learned not to value things which are external and 
 not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of 
 them is your own, but that these things only are your own, 
 to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move 
 towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where 
 is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness? 
 why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and 
 for the places to which you are accustomed? Wait a little 
 and you will again find these places familiar: then, if you 
 are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also, 
 weep and lament. 
 
 How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By 
 being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not rea- 
 sonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to 
 depend on another, nor even to blame God or man. I en- 
 treat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by 
 observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you 
 name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no
 
 276 EPICTETUS 
 
 profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from 
 loving another as a person subject to mortality, as one who 
 may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own 
 children ? He did ; but it was as a free man, as one who re- 
 membered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For 
 this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a 
 good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a 
 penalty on himself, 11 nor even in the former part of his 
 life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we 
 are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble 
 temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and 
 others for brethren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be un- 
 happy on account of any person, but to be happy on ac- 
 count of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made 
 us for this end. Well, did Diogenes 12 love nobody, who was 
 so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in 
 general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily 
 sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became 
 a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and 
 being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth 
 was his country, and no particular place; and when he was 
 taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates 
 and friends there, but even he became familiar with the 
 pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold after- 
 wards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens ; and he would 
 have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of 
 the Perrhaebi. 13 Thus is freedom acquired. For this rea- 
 son he used to say, "Ever since Antisthenes made me free, 
 I have not been a slave." How did Antisthenes make him 
 free? Hear what he says: Antisthenes taught me what is 
 my own, and what is not my own ; possessions are not my 
 own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor 
 places familiar, nor mode of life; all these belong to others. 
 What then is your own? The use of appearances. This 
 he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and 
 from compulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way, 
 no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than 
 I wish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or 
 Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king? How have 
 they this power? For if a man is going to be overpowered
 
 DISCOURSES '277 
 
 by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If 
 then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor 
 fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit 
 out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life, 
 whose slave can he still be? But if he dwelt with pleasure 
 in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his 
 affairs would have been at every man's command ; the stron- 
 ger would have the power of grieving him. How do you 
 think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that 
 they might sell him to some Athenian, that sometime he 
 might see that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and 
 the Acropolis? In what condition would you see them? 
 As a captive, a slave and mean : and what would be the use of 
 it for you ? Not so : but I should see them as a free man 
 Show me, how you would be free. Observe, some person 
 has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed 
 place of abode and says, "You are my slave, for it is in my 
 power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my 
 power to treat you gently, and to humble you: when I 
 choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to 
 Athens." What do you say to him who treats you as a 
 slave? What means have you of finding one who will 
 rescue you from slavery ? Or can not you even look him in 
 the face, but without saying more do you intreat to be set 
 free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening, 
 going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you, 
 are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in 
 Hellas (Greece) ? And when you must die, will you then 
 also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see 
 Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion? Have you gone 
 abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to 
 find some person from whom you might receive benefit? 
 What benefit ? That you may solve syllogisms more readily, 
 or handle hypothetical arguments? and for this reason did 
 you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you 
 might return when you had learned these things? So you 
 did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor free- 
 dom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from 
 harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no 
 person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may
 
 278 EPICTETUS 
 
 maintain your relative position without impediment? This 
 is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms 
 and sophistical arguments and hypothetical : if you like, 
 take your place in the agora (market or public place) and 
 proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic. 14 Will you 
 not deny even all that you have learned that you may not 
 bring a bad name on your theorems as useless ? What harm 
 has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured 
 you that you should prove by your acts that his labours 
 are useless? Were the evils that you had there (at home) 
 not enough, those which were the cause of your pain and 
 lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad? Have you 
 added more to the list? And if you again have other ac- 
 quaintances and friends, you will have more causes for 
 lamentation; and the same also if you take an affection 
 for another country. Why then do you live to surround 
 yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which 
 you are unhappy? Then, I ask you, do you call this affec- 
 tion ? What affection, man ! If it is a good thing, it is the 
 cause of no evil : if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it. 
 I am formed by nature for my own good : I am not formed 
 for my own evil. 
 
 What then is the discipline for this purpose? First of all 
 the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it 
 were at the entrance, is this : when you are delighted with 
 anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not one of 
 those which can not be taken away, but as with something of 
 such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it 
 has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may 
 not be troubled. So in this matter also: if you kiss your 
 own child, or your brother or friend, never give full license 
 to the appearance ((pavratiiav), and allow not your pleasure 
 to go as far as it chooses ; but check it, and curb it as those 
 who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them 
 that they are mortal. 15 Do you also remind yourself in like 
 manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you 
 love is nothing of your own : it has been given to you for the 
 present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it 
 been given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or 
 a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if
 
 DISCOURSES 279 
 
 you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you 
 wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you 
 must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter. For such 
 as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from 
 the universe to the things which are taken away according to 
 its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted 
 with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances. 
 What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with 
 a lisping voice, "To-morrow you will die;" and to a friend 
 also, "To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never 
 shall we see one another again?" But these are words of 
 bad omen. And some incantations also are of bad omen; 
 but because they are useful, I don't care for this; only let 
 them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen ex- 
 cept those which are significant of some evil ? Cowardice is 
 a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and 
 grief and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen : and 
 yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect 
 ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name 
 which is significant of any natural thing is of bad omen ? say 
 that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for 
 it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of the world. 
 Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for 
 the dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins 
 to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes 
 from a former state into other states ; not a destruction, but 
 a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going 
 away from home and a small change : such is death, a greater 
 change, not from the state which now is to that which is not, 
 but to that which is not now. Shall I then no longer exist? 
 You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which 
 the world now has need : for you also came into existence 
 not when you chose, but when the world had need of you. 16 
 
 Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he 
 is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is 
 attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regu- 
 larity, and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to 
 exist (live) ? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in 
 nature, as thou hast wished me to exist : for thou hast made 
 me free from hindrance in that which is my own. But hast
 
 280 EPICTETUS 
 
 thou no further need of me? I thank thee; and so far I 
 have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other 
 person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost 
 thou depart? Again, I say, as thou hast pleased, as free, 
 as thy servant, as one who hast known thy commands and 
 thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service, 
 whom dost thou will me to be ? A prince or a private man, 
 a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a 
 teacher or a master of a family ? whatever place and position 
 thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten 
 thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost 
 thou will me to be ? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara. 
 Only remember me there where I am. If thou sendest me 
 to a place where there are no means for men living according 
 to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to 
 thee, but as if thou wast giving me the signal to retreat : I 
 do not leave thee, let this be far from my intention, but I per- 
 ceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living ac- 
 cording to nature be allowed to me, I will seek no other 
 place than that in which I am, or other men than those 
 among whom I am. 
 
 Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day : 
 these you should write, these you should read : about these 
 you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, Can 
 you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to an- 
 other and to another. Then if any thing that is said be con- 
 trary to your wish, this reflection first will immediately re- 
 lieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing 
 in all cases to say, I knew that I begot a son who is mortal. 17 
 For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew 
 that I may leave my home, I knew that I may be ejected from 
 it, I knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you turn 
 round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which 
 comes that which has happened, you will forthwith recollect 
 that it comes from the place of things which are out of the 
 power of the will, and of things which are not my own. 
 What then is it to me ? Then, you will ask, and this is the 
 chief thing: And who is it that sent it? The leader, or the 
 general, the state, the law of the state. Give it me then, for 
 I must always obey the law in every thing. Then, when the
 
 DISCOURSES 28l 
 
 appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your power 
 to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, con- 
 quer it : do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to 
 the consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as 
 it pleases. If you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of 
 living at Rome, and how many pleasures there were for him 
 who lived there and how many there would be for him who 
 returned to Rome : but fix your mind on this matter, how a 
 man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man of 
 courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the 
 life in Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome. 
 
 Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that 
 of being conscious that you are obeying God, than not in 
 word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and 
 good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say 
 to himself, Now whatever the rest may say in solemn man- 
 ner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way 
 contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way) this I am 
 doing; and they are sitting and discoursing of my vir- 
 tues and inquiring about me and praising me; and of this 
 Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstra- 
 tion, and shall myself know if he has a soldier such as he 
 ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he 
 has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness 
 of the things which are independent of the will: See that 
 you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire what you 
 do desire : seek not the good in things external ; seek it in 
 yourselves : if you do not, you will not find it. For this pur- 
 pose he leads me at one time hither, at another time sends 
 me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and 
 sick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because 
 he hates me, far from him be such a meaning, for who hates 
 the best of his servants ? nor yet because he cares not for me, 
 for he does not neglect any even of the smallest things; 18 
 but he does this for the purpose of exercising me and making 
 use of me as a witness to others. Being appointed to such a 
 service, do I still care about the place in which I am, or with 
 whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not en- 
 tirely direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and 
 commands ?
 
 282 EPICTETUS 
 
 Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and 
 exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness, 
 you will never be in want of one to comfort you and 
 strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be without some- 
 thing to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping 
 away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained ex- 
 emption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a 
 tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or attendants on 
 Caesar? Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause 
 you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the 
 occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to 
 you who have received so great authority from Zeus ? Only 
 do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it ; but shew 
 it by your acts ; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that 
 you are yourself in a healthy state and happy. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 * See ii. 5, 26. 
 
 * See iii. 13, IS- 
 
 * Homer, Odyssey i. 3. 
 
 * Odyssey, xvii. 487. 
 
 B a.TCex Elv - See iii. 2, 13. Paul to the Philippians, iv. 18. 
 
 "Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: "Peregrinse conditionis homines 
 vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Ro- 
 manam usurpantes in campo, Esquilino securi percussit." 
 
 T This is a denunciation of the hypocrite. 
 
 8 "Pity" perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity, 
 when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning. 
 
 8 "What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded ; 
 but belongs to the general subject of the chapter." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 "The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems 
 to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great 
 man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. i) and to visit his 
 house." Schweighauser. 
 
 10 The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught 
 that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this 
 in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few 
 people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward 
 they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common 
 sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that 
 will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer : " For what 
 more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou 
 not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, 
 and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a 
 recompense for seeing or the feet for walking." M. Antoninus, ix. 42. 
 Compare Seneca, de Vita Beata, c. 9. 
 
 " It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had de- 
 termined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask
 
 DISCOURSES 283 
 
 him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates 
 refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to 
 name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon, 
 Apologia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for 
 himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the 
 Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 54). 
 
 13 The character of Diogenes is described very differently by Epic- 
 tetus from that which we read in common books. 
 
 u A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olym- 
 pus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country. 
 
 14 This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people. 
 Cicero (Pro Cluentio, c. 14) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopeia), 
 who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen 
 a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a 
 bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were 
 deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way 
 for others who had other complaints. 
 
 " It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind 
 the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was 
 still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41. 
 
 18 1 am not sure if Epictetus ever uses Ko6fJLo$ in the sense of Uni- 
 verse, the " universum " of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it 
 in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epic- 
 tetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated. 
 The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these 
 elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doc- 
 trine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call rational 
 and intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organisation of his 
 brain which is superior to that of all other animals ; and that what we 
 name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old 
 Greek hypothesis that at_death the body returned to earth from which it 
 came, and the soul (itvev^a) returned to the regions above, from which 
 it came. I can not discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doc- 
 trine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body. 
 The opinions of Marcus Antoninus on this matter are contained in his 
 book, iv. 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere: but they are rather obscure. 
 A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of 
 departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either 
 in heaven or in hell ; for the modern scientific notion, as I suppose that 
 it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven or a 
 place hell (Strauss, Der Alte und der Neue Glaube, p. 129). 
 
 We may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epic- 
 tetus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during Nero's 
 reign (A. D. 54-68) ; and it is affirmed, whether correctly or not, I do 
 not undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to 
 the Corinthians (Cor. i. 16, 8) in the beginning of A. D. 56. Epictetus 
 it is said, lived in Rome, till the time of the expulsion of the philoso- 
 phers by Domitian, when he retired to Nicopolis an old man, and taught 
 there. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians (c. 15) contains his doctrine 
 of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if 
 there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith : but it is not 
 understood by all in the same way. 
 
 Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and 
 roe again on the third day: and that after his resurrection he was 
 seen by many persons. Then he afk, if Christ rose from the dead, how
 
 284 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead? "But if there 
 be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen" (v. 13) ; and 
 (v. 19), " if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men 
 most miserable." But he affirms again (v. 20) that "Christ is risen and 
 become the first fruits of them that slept." In v. 32, he asks what ad- 
 vantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, " if the dead rise not : 
 let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." He seems not to admit the 
 value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead; and he seems to 
 say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, be- 
 cause life is short, if we do not believe in a resurrection of the dead. 
 It may be added that there is not any direct assertion in this chapter 
 that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to 
 heaven in any way. He then says (v. 35), " But some man will say, 
 How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" He 
 answers his question (v. 36), "Thou fool, that which them sowest is 
 not quickened except it die ;" and he adds that " God givetb it (the seed) 
 a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." We all 
 know that the body which is produced from the seed, is not the body 
 " that shall be ; " and we also know that the seed which is sown does not 
 die, and that if the seed died, no body would be produced from such 
 seed. His conclusion is that the dead "is^sown a natural body; it is 
 raised a spiritual body" (d&jna itvevfiariKov) . I believe that the com- 
 mentators do not agree about this "spiritual body," but it seems plain 
 that Paul did not teach that the body which will rise will be the same 
 as the body which is buried. He says (v. 50) that "flesh and blood can 
 not inherit the kingdom of God." Yet in the Apostles' Creed we pro- 
 nounce our belief in the "resurrection of the body" ; but in the Nicene 
 Creed it is said we look " for the resurrection of the dead," which is a 
 different thing or may have a different meaning from " the resurrection 
 of the body." In the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper 
 years, the person to be baptized is asked " Dost thou believe in God the 
 Father Almighty," etc. in the terms of the Church Creeds, but in place 
 of the resurrection of the body or of the dead, he is asked if he believes 
 " in the resurrection of the flesh." 
 
 The various opinions of divines of the English church on the resur- 
 rection of the body are stated by A. Clissold in the Practical Na- 
 ture of the Theological Writings of E. Swedenborg in a letter to 
 Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, 1859, 2nd ed. 
 
 " Seneca de Consol. ad Pol. c. 30 ; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 13. 
 
 "Compare i., 12. 2, ii. 14. n, iii. 26. 28. "Compare this with the de- 
 scription of the universal care of Providence, Matthew, x. 29, 30, and 
 the occasion on which it was produced." Mrs. Carter.
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (DESIST) FROM THEIR 
 PURPOSE 
 
 CONSIDER as to the things which you proposed to 
 yourself at first, which you have secured, and 
 which you have not; and how you are pleased 
 when you recall to memory the one, and are pained 
 about the other; and if it is possible, recover the things 
 wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we are 
 engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows. 
 For the combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancra- 
 tion, in which both the successful and the unsuccessful may 
 have the greatest merit, or may have little, and in truth may 
 be very fortunate or very unfortunate ; but the combat is for 
 good fortune and happiness themselves. Well then, even if 
 we have renounced the contest in this matter (for good for- 
 tune and happiness), no man hinders us from renewing the 
 combat again, and we are not compelled to wait for another 
 four years that the games at Olympia may come again ; l but 
 as soon as you have recovered and restored yourself, and 
 employ the same zeal, you may renew the combat again ; and 
 if again you renounce it, you may again renew it ; and if you 
 once gain the victory, you are like him who has never re- 
 nounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing 
 the same thing (renouncing the combat) begin to do it with 
 pleasure, and then like a bad athlete go about after being 
 conquered in all the circuit of the games like quails who have 
 run away. 2 
 
 The sight of a beautiful young girl overpowers me. Well, 
 have I not been overpowered before? An inclination arises 
 in me to find fault with a person ; for have I not found fault 
 with him before? You speak to us as if you had come off 
 (from these things) free from harm, just as if a man should 
 say to his physician who forbids him to bathe, "Have I not 
 bathed before?" If then the physician can say to him, "Well, 
 and what then happened to you after the bath? Had you 
 
 285
 
 2g6 EPICTETUS 
 
 not a fever, had you not a headache ?" And when you found 
 fault with a person lately, did you not do the act of a malig- 
 nant person, of a trifling babbler; did you not cherish this 
 habit in you by adding to it the corresponding acts ? And 
 when you were overpowered by the young girl, did you 
 come off unharmed? Why then do you talk of what you 
 did before? You ought, I think, remembering what you 
 did, as slaves remember the blows which they have received, 
 to abstain from the same faults. But the one case, is not like 
 the other; for in the case of slaves the pain causes the re- 
 membrance : but in the case of your faults, what is the pain, 
 what is the punishment ; for when have you been accustomed 
 to fly from evil acts? 3 Sufferings then of the trying char- 
 acter are useful to us, whether we choose or not. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 These games were celebrated once in four years. 
 
 * "All the circuit of the games " means the circuit of the Pythian, 
 Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympic games. A man who had contended 
 in these four games victoriously was named Periodonices, or Perio- 
 deutes. Upton. 
 
 The Greeks used to put quails in a cockpit, as those who are old 
 enough may remember that we used to put game cocks to fight with one 
 another. Schweighauser describes a way of trying the courage of 
 these quails from Pollux (ix. 109) ; but I suppose that the birds fought 
 also with one another. 
 
 Upton supposed that the words M/U.' ovx ofiotov .... to KCCK&S 
 tvEpyf}6at, in the translation, "But the one case is not" ... to "fly 
 from evil acts," are said by the adversary of Epictetus, and Mrs. Carter 
 has followed Upton in the translation. But then there is no sense in 
 the last sentence Oi itovoi apa, etc., in the translation, "Sufferings 
 then," etc. The reader may consult Schweighauser' s note. I suppose 
 that Epictetus is speaking the words " But the one case," etc. to the 
 end of the chapter. The adversary, who is not punished like a slave, 
 and has no pains to remind him of his faults, is supposed so far not 
 to have felt the consequences of his bad acts; but Epictetus concludes 
 that sufferings of a painful character would be useful to him, as they 
 are to all persons who do what they ought not to do. There is perhaps 
 some difficulty in the word itetparrfpiGov. But I think that Schweig. 
 has correctly explained the passage.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT 1 
 
 ARE you not ashamed at being more cowardly and more 
 mean than fugitive slaves ? How do they when they 
 run away leave their masters? on what estates do 
 they depend, and what domestics do they rely on? 
 Do they not after stealing a little which is enough for the first 
 days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea, 
 contriving one method after another for maintaining their 
 lives ? And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger ? 2 But 
 you are afraid lest necessary things should fail you, and are 
 sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don't you 
 see the road to which the want of necessaries leads ? Well, 
 where does it lead? To the same place to which a fever 
 leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not 
 often said this yourself to your companions? have you not 
 read much of this kind, and written much? and how often 
 have you boasted that you were easy as to death ? 
 
 Yes : but my wife and children also suffer hunger. 3 Well 
 then, does their hunger lead to any other place? Is there 
 not the same descent to some place for them also? Is not 
 there the same state below for them? Do you not choose 
 then to look to that place full of boldness ag'ainst every want 
 and deficiency, to that place to which both the richest and 
 those who have held the highest offices, and kings themselves 
 and tyrants must descend? or to which you will descend 
 hungry, if it should so happen, but they burst by indigestion 
 and drunkenness. What beggar did you hardly ever see 
 who was not an old man, and even of extreme old age ? But 
 chilled with cold day and night, and lying on the ground, and 
 eating only what is absolutely necessary they approach near 
 to the impossibility of dying. 4 Can not you write ? Cannot 
 you teach (take care of) children? Can not you be a watch- 
 man at another person's door? But it is shameful to come 
 to such a necessity. Learn then first what are the things 
 which are shameful, and then tell us that you are a philoso-
 
 2 gg EPICTETUS 
 
 pher : but at present do not, even if any other man call you 
 so, allow it. 
 
 Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that 
 of which you are not the cause, that which has come to you 
 by accident, as a headache, as a fever ? If your parents were 
 poor, and left their property to others, and if while they live, 
 they do not help you at all, is this shameful to you? Is this 
 what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never 
 hear that the thing which is shameful ought to be blamed, 
 and that which is blameable is worthy of blame ? Whom do 
 you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not 
 do himself ? Did you then make your father such as he is, 
 or is it in your power to improve him ? Is this power given 
 to you ? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are 
 not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them ? 
 And have you also been accustomed while you were studying 
 philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from 
 yourself? Lament then and groan and eat with fear that 
 you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your 
 poor slaves lest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die. 
 So live, and continue to live, you who in name only have ap- 
 proached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far 
 as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable 
 to those who take them up ; you who have never sought con- 
 stancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions : you 
 who have not sought any person for the sake of this object, 
 but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who have never 
 thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself, 
 Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear? What remains 
 for me to do? But as if all your affairs were well and se- 
 cure, you have been resting on the third topic, 5 that of things 
 being unchanged, in order that you may possess unchanged 
 what? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich, 
 desire without attaining any end, and avoidance (EKK\I<SIV) 
 which fails in the attempt? About security in these things 
 you have been anxious. 
 
 Ought you not to have gained something in addition from 
 reason, and then to have protected this with security? And 
 whom did you ever see building a battlement all round and 
 not encircling it with a wall? 6 And what door-keeper is
 
 DISCOURSES 289 
 
 placed with no door to watch? But you practise in order 
 to be able to prove what ? You practise that you may not 
 be tossed as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about 
 from what ? Shew me first what you hold, what you meas- 
 ure, or what you weigh ; and shew me the scales or the me- 
 dimnus (the measure) ; or how long will you go on measur- 
 ing the dust ? 7 Ought you not to demonstrate those things 
 which make men happy, which make things go on for them 
 in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man, 
 accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the 
 universe? Shew me these. "See, I shew them: I will re- 
 solve syllogisms for you." This is the measure, slave ; but 
 it is not the thing measured. Therefore you are now paying 
 the penalty for what you neglected, philosophy : you tremble, 
 you lie awake, you advise with all persons; and if your 
 deliberations are not likely to please all, you think that you 
 have deliberated ill. Then you fear hunger, as you suppose : 
 but it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you 
 will not have a cook, that you will not have another to pur- 
 chase provisions for the table, a third to take off your shoes, 
 a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, and to follow you, 
 in order that in the bath, when you have taken off your 
 clothes and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified 
 you may be rubbed on this side and on that, and then the 
 aliptes( rubber) may say (to the slave), "Change his position, 
 present the side, take hold of his head, shew the shoulder ;" 
 And then when you have left the bath and gone home, you 
 may call out, "Does no one bring me something to eat ?" And 
 then, "Take away the tables, sponge them :" You are afraid 
 of this, that you may not be able to lead the life of a sick man. 
 But learn the life of those who are in health, how slaves live, 
 how labourers, how those live who are genuine philosophers ; 
 how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children ; how Diog- 
 enes lived, and how Cleanthes 8 who attended to the school 
 and drew water. If you choose to have these things, you 
 will have them every where, and you will live in full confi- 
 dence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man 
 can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not sub- 
 ject to hindrance, in that which can not be taken away, that 
 is in your own will. And why have you made yourself so use- 
 19
 
 290 EPICTETUS 
 
 less and good for nothing that no man will choose to receive 
 you into his house, no man to take careof you ? but if a utensil 
 entire and useful were cast abroad, every man who found it, 
 would take it up and think it a gain; but no man will take 
 you up, and every man will consider you a loss. So can not 
 you discharge the office even of a dog, or of a cock ? Why 
 then do you choose to live any longer, when you are what 
 you are ? 
 
 Does any good man fear that he shall fail to have food? 
 To the blind it does not fail, to the lame it does not : shall 
 it fail to a good man ? And to a good soldier there does not 
 fail to be one who gives him pay, nor to a labourer, nor to 
 a shoemaker: and to the good man shall there be wanting 
 such a person? 9 Does God thus neglect the things that he 
 has established, his ministers, his witnesses, whom alone he 
 employs as examples to the uninstructed, both that he exists, 
 and administers well the whole, and does not neglect human 
 affairs, and that to a good man there is no evil either when he 
 is living or when he is dead ? What then when he does not 
 supply him with food? What else does he do than like a 
 good general he has given me the signal to retreat ? I obey, 
 I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising 
 his acts : for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go 
 away when it pleases him; and while I lived, it was my 
 duty to praise God both by myself, and to each person sever- 
 ally and to many. He does not supply me with many things, 
 nor with abundance, he does not will me to live luxuriously ; 
 for neither did he supply Hercules who was his own son ; but 
 another (Eurystheus) was king of Argos and Mycenae, and 
 Hercules obeyed orders, and laboured, and was exercised. 
 And Eurystheus was what he was, neither king of Argos nor 
 of Mycenae, for he was not even king of himself ; but Her- 
 cules was ruler and leader of the whole earth and sea, who 
 purged away lawlessness, and introduced justice and holi- 
 ness; 10 and he did these things both naked and alone. And 
 when Ulysses was cast out shipwrecked, did want humiliate 
 him, did it break his spirit ? but how did he go off to the vir- 
 gins to ask for necessaries, to beg which is considered most 
 shameful? 11 
 
 "As a lion bred in the mountains trusting in his strength.""
 
 DISCOURSES 291 
 
 Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor 
 on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that 
 is, on his opinions about the things which are in our power 
 and those which are not. For these are the only things 
 which make men free, which make them escape from hin- 
 drance, which raise the head (neck) of those who are de- 
 pressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich 
 and on tyrants. And this was (is) the gift given to the phi- 
 losopher. But you will not come forth bold, but trembling 
 about your trifling garments and silver vessels. Unhappy 
 man, have you thus wasted your time till now ? 
 
 What then, if I shall be sick? You will be sick in such 
 a way as you ought to be. Who will take care of me? 
 God; your friends. I shall lie down on a hard bed. But 
 you will lie down like a man. I shall not have a convenient 
 chamber. You will be sick in an inconvenient chamber. 
 Who will provide for me the necessary food? Those who 
 provide for others also. You will be sick like Manes. 13 
 And what also will be the end of the sickness? Any other 
 than death ? Do you then consider that this the chief of all 
 evils to man and the chief mark of mean spirit and of cow- 
 ardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Against 
 this fear then I advise you to exercise yourself : to this let all 
 your reasoning tend, your exercises, and reading; and you 
 will know that thus only are men made free. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of 
 our Saviour on the same subject, Matthew vi. 25-34; Luke xii. 22-30." 
 Mrs. Carter. The first verse of Matthew begins, "Take no thought for 
 your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink," etc. No Christian 
 literally follows the advice of this and the following verses, and he would 
 be condemned by the judgment of all men if he did. 
 
 * It is very absurd to suppose that no fugitive slave ever died of hunger. 
 How could Epictetus know that? 
 
 * He supposes that the man who is dying of hunger has also wife and 
 children, who will suffer the same dreadful end. The consolation, if it 
 is any, is that the rich and luxurious and kings will also die. The fact is 
 true. Death is the lot of all. But a painful death by hunger can not be 
 alleviated by a man knowing that all must die in some way. It seems as 
 if the philosopher expected that even women and children should be phi- 
 losophers, and that the husband in his philosophy should calmly contem- 
 plate the death of wife and children by starvation. This is an example of 
 the absurdity to which even a wise man carried his philosophy ; and it is 
 unworthy of the teacher's general good sense.
 
 292 EPICTETUS 
 
 4 We see many old beggars who endure what others could not endure ; 
 but they all die at last, and would have died earlier if their beggar life 
 had begun sooner. The living in the open air and wandering about 
 help them to last longer; but the exposure to cold and wet and to the 
 want of food hastens their end. The life of a poor old beggar is neither 
 so long nor so comfortable as that of a man, who has a good home and 
 sufficient food, and lives with moderation. 
 
 8 See iii. c. 2. 
 
 8 "Plato using the same simile teaches that last of all disciplines dia- 
 lectic ought to be learned." Schweighauser. 
 
 7 This is good advice. When you propose to measure, to estimate 
 things, you should first tell us what the things are before you attempt to 
 fix their value; and what is the measure or scales that you use. 
 
 * Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno in his school, was a great example 
 of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties : during the night he used 
 to draw water from the wells for the use of the gardens : during the day 
 he employed himself in his studies. He was the author of a noble hymn 
 to Zeus, which is extant. 
 
 9 It seems strange that Epictetus should make such assertions when we 
 know that they are not true. Shortly afterward he himself speaks even 
 of the good man not being supplied with food by God. 
 
 10 Compare Hebrews xi. and xii., in which the Apostle and Philoso- 
 pher reason in nearly the same manner and even use the same terms; 
 but how superior is the example urged by the Apostle to Hercules and 
 Ulysses !" Mrs. Carter. 
 
 u The story of Ulysses asking Nausicaa and her maids for help when 
 he was cast naked on the land is in the Odyssey vi. 127. 
 
 12 Odyssey, vi. 130. 
 
 18 Manes is a slave's name. Diogenes had a slave named Manes, his 
 only slave, who ran away, and though Diogenes was informed where the 
 slave was, he did not think it worth while to have him brought back. 
 He said, it would be a shame if Manes could live without Diogenes, and 
 Diogenes could not live without Manes.
 
 BOOK IV 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 ABOUT FREEDOM 
 
 HE is free who lives as he wishes to live j 1 who is neither 
 subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force ; 
 whose movements to action (opttai) are not impeded, 
 whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not 
 fall into that which he would avoid (iKKM<5Ei$ dTtepijtrcprot)- 
 Who then chooses to live in error ? No man. Who chooses to 
 live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discon- 
 tented, mean? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as 
 he wishes ; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in 
 sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, 
 attempting to avoid something and falling into it ? Not one. 
 Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from 
 fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and 
 does not obtain that which he wishes ? Not one ; nor then 
 do we find any bad man free. 2 
 
 If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this, 
 if you add, "But you are a wise man; this is nothing to 
 you ;" he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and 
 say, "You differ not at all from those who have been thrice 
 sold as to being yourself not a slave," what else ought you to 
 expect than blows ? For he says, "What, I a slave, I whose 
 father was free, whose mother was free, I whom no man can 
 purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of 
 Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves." 
 In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your 
 father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and 
 your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in 
 an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is 
 
 293
 
 294 EPICTETUS 
 
 possible, what is this to you ? What if they were of a noble 
 nature, and you of a mean nature ; if they were fearless, and 
 you a coward; if they had the power of self-restraint, and 
 you are not able to exercise it. 
 
 And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave ? 
 Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly, 
 with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with 
 being a slave ? It is something, you say : but who is able to 
 compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you 
 yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that 
 he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this con- 
 sole you at all : but know that you are a slave in a great fam- 
 ily. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim, 
 "By the fortune of Caesar, 3 we are free." 
 
 However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at pres- 
 ent. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a 
 young girl, or slave, or free ? What then is this with respect 
 to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by 
 the person beloved to do something which you did not wish 
 to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you 
 never kissed her feet ? And yet if any man compelled you to 
 kiss Caesar's feet, you would think it an insult and excessive 
 tyranny. What else then is slavery ? Did you never go out 
 by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did 
 you not expend what you did not wish to expend, did you not 
 utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to 
 abuse and to be excluded ? 4 But if you are ashamed to con- 
 fess your own acts, see what Thrasonides 5 says and does, who 
 having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you 
 have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does 
 not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would 
 have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his 
 bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? "A 
 worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did. 
 Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worth- 
 less girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why 
 do you talk of your service in the army ?" Then he calls for 
 a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses 
 it ; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats 
 and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success
 
 DISCOURSES 295 
 
 he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough 
 neither to desire nor to fear? 
 
 Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the 
 notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed 
 them, and some take them about ; and who will say that this 
 lion is free ? 6 Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his 
 ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition ? and who 
 if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these 
 lions ? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept 
 shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to es- 
 cape ? 7 and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to 
 such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly 
 live and with suffering pine away ; and if they ever find any 
 opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire 
 their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from 
 hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this ? What 
 do you say ? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, 
 to live in the open air, to sing when I choose : you deprive me 
 of all this, and say, what harm is it to you ? For this reason 
 we shall say that those animals only are free, which can not 
 endure capture, but as soon as they are caught, escape from 
 captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that 
 there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content : 
 and he writes to the Persian king, "You can not enslave 
 the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes." 
 How is that ? can not I catch them ? If you catch them, says 
 Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do; for 
 if you catch a fish, it dies ; and if these men that are caught 
 shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war? 
 These are the words of a free man who had carefully ex- 
 amined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it. 
 But if you look for it in a different place from where it is, 
 what wonder if you never find it? 
 
 The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why ? Do 
 you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of 
 twentieths? 8 No; but because he imagines that hitherto 
 through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfor- 
 tunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness, 
 I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them, 
 I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go
 
 296 EPICTETUS 
 
 where I choose. Then he is set free ; and forthwith having 
 no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter, 
 some one with whom he shall sup : then he either works with 
 his body or endures the most dreadful things; 9 and if he 
 can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than 
 his former slavery ; or even if he is become rich, being a man 
 without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little 
 girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave 
 again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery ? 
 Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, an- 
 other fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I 
 did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man, 
 what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one. 
 But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings, 10 then I shall 
 live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to ac- 
 quire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of ; 
 then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same. 
 Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am 
 free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers 
 as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a 
 second service and a third. After this, when he has put the 
 finishing stroke (the colophon) 11 to his career, and is become 
 a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the as- 
 sembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery 
 not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is 
 the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should 
 not rashly adapt preconceptions (TtpoA.r}ii>Ei$) to the several 
 things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their 
 evils, they not being able to adapt the general preconceptions 
 to the several things. But we have different opinions (about 
 the cause of our evils) . One man thinks that he is sick : not 
 so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his precon- 
 ceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor ; another that 
 he has a severe father or mother; and another again that 
 Cassar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only 
 one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions. 
 For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it 
 is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every 
 way to be guarded against? One preconception is not re- 
 pugnant to another, only where it comes to the matter of ad-
 
 DISCOURSES 297 
 
 aptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and 
 a thing to be avoided ? He answers not to be Caesar's friend, 
 He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adapta- 
 tion, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at 
 all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in 
 being Caesar's friend, nevertheless he has failed in finding 
 what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks? 
 To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes, 
 not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become 
 the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from 
 compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy ? Of whom shall we 
 inquire ? What more trustworthy witness have we than this 
 very man who is become Caesar's friend? Come forward 
 and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before 
 you became Caesar's friend? Immediately you hear the an- 
 swer, "Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me : you know 
 not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me; 
 but one comes and says, 'Caesar is already awake, he is now 
 going forth;' then come troubles and cares." Well, when 
 did you sup with more pleasure, now or before ? Hear what 
 he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is 
 pained : and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his mas- 
 ter, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any 
 thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid 
 of ; lest he should be lashed like a slave ? How can he expect 
 any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man, 
 Caesar's friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And 
 when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your 
 gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of 
 life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I 
 can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as 
 not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friend- 
 ship to Caesar. 
 
 Since then neither those who are called kings live as they 
 choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who 
 are free ? Seek, and you will find ; for you have aids from 
 nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able 
 yourself by going along these ways only to discover that 
 which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry. 
 What do they say? Does freedom seem to you a good thing? 
 
 20
 
 298 EPICTETUS 
 
 The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains 
 the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No. 
 Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, la- 
 menting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do 
 declare it. We have now then got away from buying and 
 selling and from such arrangements about matters of prop- 
 erty : for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the 
 great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he can not be free, 
 nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who 
 has been twice consul. Be it so. 
 
 Further then answer me this question also, does freedom 
 seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable? 
 How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a 
 man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be 
 mean ? It is not possible. When then you see any man sub- 
 ject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion, 
 confidently affirm that this man also is not free ; and not only 
 if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a 
 government (province) or a consulship : and call these men 
 little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things, 
 and those who do so for the sake of great things call great 
 slaves, as they deserve to be. This is admitted also. Do you 
 think that freedom is a thing independent and self govern- 
 ing? Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of 
 another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. 
 And do not look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and 
 great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or 
 sold ; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feel- 
 ing, "Master," even if the twelve fasces precede him (as con- 
 sul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, "Wretch 
 that I am, how much I suffer," call him a slave. If finally 
 you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a 
 slave though he wears a prsetexta. If then he is doing 
 nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn 
 his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may 
 produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him 
 such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia : 12 
 say that his master is from home : he will return soon, and 
 you will know what he suffers. Who will return ? Whoever 
 has in himself the power over anything which is desired by
 
 DISCOURSES 1299 
 
 the man, either to give it to him or to take it away? Thus 
 then have we many masters? We have: for we have cir- 
 cumstances as masters prior to our present masters ; and these 
 circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be 
 that those who have the power over any of these circum- 
 stances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar him- 
 self, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his prop- 
 erty, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar, 
 unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth, 
 the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love, 
 and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who 
 have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore 
 we adore them even as gods; for we think that what pos- 
 sesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us 
 is divine. Then we wrongly assume (vxorddtiotiev) that a cer- 
 tain person has the power of conferring the greatest advan- 
 tages ; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly 
 assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the 
 greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the 
 conclusion from these premises must be false. 
 
 What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance 
 and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do 
 it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal 
 power ; but something else must be discovered. What then 
 is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance 
 and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. 
 What then is it in playing the lute ? The science of playing 
 the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You 
 have then heard in a general way : but examine the thing also 
 in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of 
 the things which depend on others can be free from hin- 
 drance ? No Is it possible for him to be unimpeded ? No 
 Therefore he can not be free. Consider then ; whether we 
 have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether 
 we have all things, or whether some things are in our own 
 power, and others in the power of others. What do you 
 mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it 
 in your power or not? It is not in my power When you 
 wish it to be healthy ? Neither is this in my power. When 
 you wish it to be handsome ? Nor is this Life or death ?
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 Neither is this in my power. 13 Your body then is another's, 
 subject to every man who is stronger than yourself? It is. 
 But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you 
 please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? 
 No. And your slaves? No. And your clothes? No. 
 And your house? No. And your horses? Not one of 
 these things. And if you wish by all means your children to 
 live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in 
 your power? This also is not in my power. 
 
 Whether then have you nothing which is in your own 
 power, which depends on yourself only and can not be taken 
 from you, or have you any thing of the kind ? I know not. 
 Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man 
 able to make you assent to that which is false ? 14 No man. 
 In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and 
 obstruction ? Granted. Well ; and can a man force you to 
 desire to move towards that to which you do not choose ? 
 He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he 
 compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you de- 
 spise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him ? 
 No. Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is 
 it not yours ? It is my act. Is it your own act then also to 
 desire to move towards a thing: or is it not so? It is my 
 own act. But to desire to move away from a thing, whose 
 act is that ? This also is your act. What then if I have at- 
 tempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me ? What 
 part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of 
 assent ? No : but my poor body. Yes, as he would do with 
 a stone. Granted; but I no longer walk. And who told 
 you that walking is your own act free from hindrance ? for I 
 said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to 
 move : but where there is need of body and its co-operation, 
 you have heard long ago that nothing is your own. Granted 
 this also. And who can compel you to desire what you do 
 not wish ? No man. And to propose or intend, or in short 
 to make use of the appearances which present themselves, 
 can any man compel you ? He can not do this : but he will 
 hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire. If 
 you desire any thing which is your own, and one of these 
 things which can not be hindered, how will he hinder you ?
 
 DISCOURSES 3OI 
 
 He can not in any way. Who then tells you that he who 
 desires the things that belong to another is free from hin- 
 drance ? 
 
 Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any 
 thing else that belongs to another : for what is not in your 
 power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to 
 another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but 
 more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have 
 surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your 
 neck, if you admire 16 any thing not your own, to every thing 
 that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to 
 which you have conceived a liking. Is not my hand myown? 
 It is a part of your own body ; but it is by nature earth, 
 subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing 
 which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You 
 ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as 
 long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there 
 be a press, 16 and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do 
 not resist, nor murmur ; if you do, you will receive blows, and 
 never the less you will lose the ass. But when you ought to 
 feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to 
 be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of 
 the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are 
 bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, 17 barley, fod- 
 der. Let these also go : get rid of them quicker and more 
 readily than of the ass. 
 
 When you have made this preparation, and have practised 
 this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another 
 from that which is your own, the things which are subject to 
 hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things 
 free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are 
 not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily 
 fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned 
 from the things which do not concern yourself ; do you still 
 fear any man ? No one. For about what will you be afraid ? 
 about the things which are your own, in which consists the 
 nature of good and evil? and who has power over these 
 things? who can take them away? who can impede them? 
 No man can, no more that he can impede God. But will you 
 be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things
 
 302 EPICTETUS 
 
 which are not yours, about things which in no way concern 
 you ? and what else have you been studying from the begin- 
 ning than to distinguish between your own and not your 
 own, the things which are in your power and not in your 
 power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and 
 why have you come to the philosophers ? was it that you may 
 never the less be unfortunate and unhappy ? You will then in 
 this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without 
 fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear 
 comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is 
 present. But what further will you desire ? For of the things 
 which are within the power of the will, as being good and 
 present, you have a proper and regulated desire : but of the 
 things which are not in the power of the will you do not 
 desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that 
 which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty. 
 When then you are thus affected towards things, what man 
 can any longer be formidable to you? For what has a man 
 which is formidable to another, either when you see 
 him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him ? Not 
 more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog 
 to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are 
 formidable to every man ; and when any man is able to con- 
 fer these things on another or to take them away, then he too 
 becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold 
 or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the 
 sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the 
 acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fe- 
 ver, and that of beautiful women ? Can we in a word abolish 
 the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within 
 us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants, 
 at other times different tyrants ? But with this we must be- 
 gin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject 
 the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the facul- 
 ties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices, 
 honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these 
 things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been 
 ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall 
 of circumvallation, 18 at least on my account; for if it still 
 stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the ty-
 
 DISCOURSES 303 
 
 rant's) guards? For where do I perceive them? against oth- 
 ers they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords. 
 But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled 
 when I did not will. And how is this possible ? I have placed 
 my movements towards action (op/u-rfv) in obedience to 
 God. 19 Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will 
 also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing? 
 It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any 
 thing? It is my wish also. 20 Does he not will? I do not 
 wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the 
 rack ? It is my will then to die : it is my will then to be put to 
 the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my 
 own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hin- 
 der or compel Zeus. 
 
 Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller 
 has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not 
 venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companion- 
 ship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor, 
 or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such 
 persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world 21 the 
 wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, ty- 
 rants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest. 
 Where is there any place of refuge ? how shall he pass along 
 without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he 
 wait for that he may pass along in safety ? to whom shall he 
 attach himself ? To what person generally ? to the rich man, 
 to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to 
 me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments. 
 But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me 
 and becomes my robber, what shall I do ? I will be a friend of 
 Caesar: when I am Caesar's companion no man will wrong 
 me. In the first place, that I may become illustrious, what 
 things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how 
 many must I be robbed ? Then, if I become Caesar's friend, 
 he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance be- 
 comes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a 
 desert ? Well, does fever not come there ? What shall be done 
 then ? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faith- 
 ful one, strong, secure against all surprises ? Thus he consid-
 
 304 EPICTETUS 
 
 ers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will 
 make his journey in safety. 
 
 How do you understand, "attaching yourself to God?" In 
 this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will ; and 
 what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then 
 shall this be done ? In what other way than by examining the 
 movements ( op/*a, the acts) of God 22 and his administra- 
 tion ? What has he given to me as my own and in my own 
 power ? what has he reserved to himself ? He has given to me 
 the things which are in the power of the will (TO. jcpoaiperuca :) 
 he has put them in my power free from impediment and 
 hindrance. How was he able to make the earthly body free 
 from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has 
 subjected to the revolution of the whole ( rrj T&Y bXoov icep- 
 ojzoS) 23 possessions, household things, house, children, 
 wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what 
 does not depend on the will ? why do I will to have absolutely 
 what is not granted to me ? But how ought I to will to have 
 things? In the way in which they are given and as long as 
 they are given. But he who has given takes away. 24 Why 
 then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use 
 force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For 
 whence had I things when I came into the world? My 
 father gave them to me. And who gave them to him ? and 
 who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? 
 and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men 
 with one another and their fellowship ? 
 
 Then after receiving everything from another and even 
 yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he 
 takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what pur- 
 pose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) intro- 
 duce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give 
 you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as 
 whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce 
 you as subject to death, and as one to live on earth 
 with a little flesh, and to observe his administra- 
 tion, and to join with him in the spectacle and the 
 festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long 
 as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle 
 and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration
 
 DISCOURSES 305 
 
 of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen ? No ; 
 but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too would 
 wish to be longer in the initiation : 25 and perhaps also those 
 at Olympia to see other athletes ; but the solemnity is ended : 
 go away like a grateful and modest man ; make room for oth- 
 ers : others also must be born, as you were, and being born 
 they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And 
 if the first do not retire, what remains? Why are you insatia- 
 ble? Why are you not content? why do you contract the 
 world? Yes, but I would have my little children with me 
 and my wife. What, are they yours ? do they not belong to 
 the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not 
 give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to 
 him who is superior? Why then did he introduce me into 
 the world on these conditions? And if the conditions do not 
 suit you, depart. 26 He has no need of a spectator who is not 
 satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who 
 take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, adr 
 mire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who 
 can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly 
 see absent from the great assembly (itavriyvpts} ; for they 
 did not when they were present behave as they ought to do 
 at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented, 
 found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not 
 seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they 
 received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, 
 of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now in- 
 quiring about, freedom. For what purpose then have I re- 
 ceived these things? To use them. How long? So long 
 as he who has lent them chooses. What if they are neces- 
 sary to me? Do not attach yourself to them and they will 
 not be necessary : do not say to yourself that they are neces- 
 sary, and then they are not necessary. 
 
 This study you ought to practise from morning to even- 
 ing, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable 
 to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in 
 this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small es- 
 tate in land : then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of 
 your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers. 
 Look all round and throw these things from you (which are
 
 306 EPICTETUS 
 
 not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to 
 you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow 
 to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you ; 
 and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do 
 there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for 
 this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are 
 presenting an asserter of freedom : for this is really freedom. 
 To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he 
 said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For 
 this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave 
 to the pirates ? Did he call any of them master ? and I do not 
 speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of 
 the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did 
 he reprove them for feeding badly their captives ? How was 
 he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when 
 he was sold how did he behave to his master ? 27 Immediately 
 he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought 
 not to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner ; and 
 about the children he told them how he ought to bring them 
 up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had 
 bought an exercise master, would he have employed him in 
 the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master ? and 
 so if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in ev- 
 ery matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill 
 must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then gen- 
 erally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than 
 master ? For who is master in a ship ? The man who governs 
 the helm ? Why ? Because he who will not obey him suffers 
 for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then 
 without suffering for it ? So I also used to think. But because 
 he can not do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is 
 not in his power : and no man can do what is unjust without 
 suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his 
 own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact 
 of putting the slave in chains : and you also will admit this, 
 if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild 
 beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? 
 When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a 
 cock ? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then 
 is a man's nature ? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison
 
 DISCOURSES 307 
 
 and to behead ? No ; but to do good, to co-operate with oth- 
 ers, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condi- 
 tion, whether you choose to admit it or not, when he is acting 
 foolishly. 
 
 Socrates then did not fare badly? No ; but his judges and 
 his accusers did. Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly ? 
 No; but his murderer did. How do you mean? The same 
 as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when 
 he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but 
 that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and 
 is unhurt : nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pur- 
 sues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating, 28 
 when you see him in pain and panting violently after run- 
 ning. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say 
 that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the na- 
 ture of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say 
 this in the case of all other things ? Why then in the case of 
 man only do you think differently ? But because we say that 
 the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, 
 you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not. What 
 then, is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is 
 whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded ? does he not, if he suf- 
 fers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and 
 profit ? But is he not hurt who suffers in a most pitiful and 
 disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or 
 viper, or wasp ? 
 
 Well then, let us recapitulate the things which have been 
 agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to 
 whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes 
 them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or 
 hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will, 
 is a slave. But who is free from restraint ? He who desires 
 nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And 
 what are the things which belong to others ? Those which 
 are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have 
 of a certain kind or in a certain manner. 29 Therefore the 
 body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to an- 
 other, possession (property) belongs to another. If then 
 you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will 
 pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires
 
 308 EPICTETUS 
 
 what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is 
 the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at 
 last with all your soul 
 
 "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O destiny, 
 The way that I am bid by you to go." 
 
 But what do you say, philosopher ? The tyrant summons you 
 to say something which does not become you. Do you say it 
 or do you not? Answer me. Let me consider. Will you 
 consider now ? But when you were in the school, what was it 
 which you used to consider ? Did you not study what are the 
 things that are good and what are bad, and what things are 
 neither one nor the other ? I did. What then was our opin- 
 ion ? That just and honourable acts were good ; and that un- 
 just and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad. Is life a good 
 thing? No. Is death a bad thing? No. Is prison? 
 No. But what did we think about mean and faith- 
 less words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant? 
 That they are bad. Well then, you are not considering, 
 nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the 
 matter for consideration ; is it whether it is becoming for me, 
 when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest 
 of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to 
 avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and nec- 
 essary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why 
 do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you 
 really imagined that base things were bad and honourable 
 things were good, and that all other things were nefther good 
 nor bad, you would not even have 'approached this inquiry 
 nor have come near it : but immediately you would have been 
 able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would 
 do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire 
 if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not 
 comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses ? How then 
 do you now say that you are considering whether things 
 which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more 
 than things which are bad? But you do not possess these 
 opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be 
 neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the great- 
 est evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and
 
 DISCOURSES 309 
 
 faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not 
 concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have 
 accustomed yourself. Where am 1 ? In the schools : and are 
 any listening to me ? I am discoursing among philosophers. 
 But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of 
 scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the 
 testimony of a philosopher : 30 thus a philosopher becomes a 
 parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the 
 senate a man does not say what he thinks: in private (in the 
 school) he proclaims his opinions. 31 You are a cold and mis- 
 erable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a 
 hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and 
 initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the 
 report) ? I do not say, that your child is dead for how 
 could you bear that ? but that your oil is spilled, your wine 
 drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by 
 you while you are making a great noise, may say this only, 
 "Philosopher, you say something different in the school. 
 Why do you deceive us ? Why, when you are only a worm, 
 do you say that you are a man ? I should like to be present 
 when one of the philosophers is with a woman, that I might 
 see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is utter- 
 ing, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and 
 the words which he hears or says or reads." 
 
 And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this, 
 whether you who are rich choose or not. And who is your 
 evidence for this? who else than yourselves? who have a 
 powerful master (Caesar), and who live in obedience to his 
 nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a 
 scowling countenance; you who court old women 32 and old 
 men, and say, "I can not do this: it is not in my power." 
 Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend 
 with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla 33 has hin- 
 dered me? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away 
 from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one 
 to assert your freedom ( Kapmarriv ) , when you have so many 
 evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is com- 
 pelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judg- 
 ment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the 
 strength to follow it, one might consider him still more
 
 310 EPICTETUS 
 
 worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a 
 manner a divine power. 34 But who could endure you who 
 are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old 
 women's noses, and wash them and give them presents, and 
 also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the 
 same time wish them dead, and question the physicians 
 whether they are sick unto death ? And again, when in order 
 to obtain these great and much-admired magistracies and 
 honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so 
 you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about 
 before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not 
 know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your 
 consulship, who gave it to you ? I would not even choose to 
 live, if I must live by help of Felicion, 36 and endure his arro- 
 gance and servile insolence : for I know what a slave is, who 
 is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride. 
 
 You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the 
 Gods, and pray to be free; but I am not yet able to face my 
 masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preser- 
 vation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. 36 But I 
 can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek 
 an example. Diogenes was free. How was he free ? not be- 
 cause he was born of free parents, but because he was himself 
 free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it 
 was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any 
 man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had 
 everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. 
 If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it 
 go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it : if 
 you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if 
 of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, 
 country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had 
 them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true 
 parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never 
 have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obe- 
 dience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have 
 died for his country more readily. For he was not used to in- 
 quire when he should be considered to have done anything 
 on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the 
 world), but he remembered that every thing which is done
 
 DISCOURSES 3 1 1 
 
 comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and 
 is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see 
 what Diogenes himself says and writes : "For this reason," 
 he says, "Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the 
 King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the 
 Lacedaemonians, as you please." Was it because he was 
 born of free parents ? I suppose all the Athenians and all the 
 Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not 
 talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and 
 paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his 
 power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my 
 own, because I want nothing, because law 37 is every thing to 
 me, and nothing else is. These were the things which per- 
 mitted him to be free. 
 
 And that you may not think that I show you the example 
 of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor 
 children, nor country, nor friends, nor kinsmen, by whom he 
 could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates 
 and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not 
 consider them as his own ; that he had a country, so long as it 
 was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit ; friends 
 and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to 
 the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go 
 out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he ex- 
 posed himself to danger most unsparingly; 38 and when he 
 was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliber- 
 ate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base 
 action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal) , if it so 
 happened. 39 And what difference did that make to him? for 
 he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, 
 but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things 
 which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then 
 when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he 
 behave like a man who had children, who had a wife ? No, but 
 he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do 
 when he was (ordered) to drink the poison, 40 and when he 
 had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said 
 to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socra- 
 tes say? 41 did he consider the power of escape as an unex- 
 pected gain ? By no means : he considered what was fit and
 
 312 EPICTETUS 
 
 proper ; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the 
 reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor 
 body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing 
 what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what 
 is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act ; he who 
 would not put the Athenians to the vote -when they clam- 
 oured that he should do so, 42 he who refused to obey the ty- 
 rants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and 
 right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man's life 
 by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away. 
 For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping 
 when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting be- 
 yond the proper time. What then shall the children of Soc- 
 rates do? "If," said Socrates, "I had gone off to Thessaly, 
 would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the 
 world below, will there be no man to take care of them?" See 
 how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you 
 and I had been in his place, we should have immediately an- 
 swered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be 
 repaid in the same way, and we should have added, "I shall 
 be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be 
 useful to no man." For, if it had been necessary, we should 
 have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And 
 how in that case should we have been useful to any man ? for 
 where would they have been then staying? 43 or if we were 
 useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been 
 much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die, 
 and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less 
 useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of 
 that which he did or said when he was alive. 44 
 
 Think of these things, these opinions, these words : look to 
 these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing 
 according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy 
 so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great? 
 For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang them- 
 selves, others throw themselves down precipices, and some- 
 times even whole cities have perished : and will you not for 
 the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give 
 back to God when he demands them the things which he has 
 given ? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but
 
 DISCOURSES 3 1 3 
 
 also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word 
 to give up all which is not your own ? If you will not, you will 
 be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a 
 consul ; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar's 
 residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that 
 perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to com- 
 mon opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not 
 words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience 
 that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the 
 things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who 
 have obtained them ; and to those who have not yet obtained 
 them there is an imagination ( ^avra^ia) , that when these 
 things are come, all that is good will come with them ; then, 
 when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the 
 tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things 
 which are not present ; for freedom is acquired not by the full 
 possession of the things which are desired, but by removing 
 the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you 
 have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to 
 these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion 
 which will make you free ; pay court to a philosopher instead 
 of to a rich old man: be seen about a philosopher's doors: 
 you will not disgrace yourself by being seen ; you will not go 
 away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher 
 as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least : 
 the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Cicero, Paradox, v. "Quid enim libertas ? Potestas vivendi ut velis. 
 Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur," etc 
 
 2 "Whoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin," John viii. 34. Mrs. 
 Carter. 
 
 'A usual form of oath. See ii. 20, 29. Upton compares the Roman ex- 
 pression "Per Genium," as in Horace, Epp. i. 7, 94 
 
 "Quod te per Genium, dextramque, Deosque Penates 
 Obsecro et obtestor." 
 
 4 A lover's exclusion by his mistress was a common topic, and a serious 
 cause of complaint (Lucretius, iv. 1172) : 
 
 "At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe 
 Floribus et sertis operit." 
 
 See also Horace, Odes, i. 25.
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 Thrasonides was a character in one of Menander's plays, entitled 
 Mi<rovjievos or the Hated. 
 
 * It must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion ; but we read 
 of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epp. 41. 
 
 I The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common 
 among the Romans. Ovid (Amor. ii. 6) has written a beautiful elegy on 
 the death of a favourite parrot. 
 
 * See ii. I, 26. The eiKotiroovai were the Publicani, men who farmed 
 this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when 
 manumitted was established at an early time (Livy vii. 16). It appears 
 from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his sav- 
 ings (peculium). See ii. I, note 7. 
 
 " The reader may guess the meaning. 
 
 10 A gold ring was worn by the Equites ; and accordingly to desire the 
 gold ring is the same as to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class. 
 
 II The colophon. See ii. 14, note 5. After the words "most splendid 
 slavery" it is probable that some words have accidentally been omitted in 
 the manuscript 
 
 " Saturnalia. See i. 25, note 3. 
 
 At this season the slaves had liberty to enjoy themselves and to talk 
 freely with their masters. Hence Horace says Sat. ii. 74 
 
 "Age, libertate Decembri, 
 Quando ita majores voluerunt utere." 
 
 u Schweighauser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics 
 taught ; and Epictetus often tells us that the door is open. He suggests 
 that the true reading may be *al OVK ditoQaveiv. I think that the text 
 is right. Epictetus asks is "Life or Death" in our power. He means no 
 more than if he had said Life only. 
 
 14 He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42. 
 
 "In the matter of assent then" : this is the third ronoe, or "locus" or 
 division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1-5). As to the will, compare i. 17, note 
 10. Epictetus affirms that a man can not be compelled to assent, that is 
 to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which 
 seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in 
 that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two 
 creeds, which begin with the words, "I believe, etc.," he knows or he 
 ought to know, that he can not compel an unbeliever to accept the same 
 belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some 
 persons to profess or to express the same belief; but as no pains or 
 penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose 
 that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this 
 belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever 
 however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his 
 belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God. if he 
 denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same 
 motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does 
 not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with 
 respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not 
 believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble 
 him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except 
 the opinion of those who know that he does ^ not believe, or his own re- 
 flections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe ; or 
 in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm 
 to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough,
 
 DISCOURSES 3 1 5 
 
 under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing 
 which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this 
 under all circumstances. 
 
 To return to the matter under consideration, a man can not be com- 
 pelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when he 
 believes that it is not true ; and this act of his is quite independent of the 
 matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe 
 because he can not believe. Yet it is said ( Mark xvi. 16) in the received 
 text, as it now stands, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; 
 but he that believeth not, shall be damned" (condemned). The cause, as 
 it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians ; but all men 
 do not admit the explanation to be sufficient ; and it does not concern the 
 present subject. 
 
 18 The word "admire" is Qavjj.d6-ys in the original. The word is often 
 used by Epictetus, and Horace uses "admirari" in this Stoical sense. See 
 i. 29. 2, note. 
 
 "The word is ayyapsia, a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, viii. 
 p8). It means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it 
 is necessary. Upton refers to Matthew 5, v. 41, Mark 15, c. 21 for similar 
 uses of the verb ayyapevao. 
 
 17 Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the 
 word ( vitofyiitaria ) in Epictetus is "ferreae calces." I suppose they 
 could use nothing^but iron. 
 
 u The word is aitoretxiZoo, which means what I have translated. The 
 purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a 
 fortress. Schweig. translates the word by "destruam," and that is per- 
 haps not contrary to the meaning of the text; but it is not the exact 
 meaning of the word. 
 
 " In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation 
 of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man's will to the will 
 of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus 
 that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or 
 to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever 
 proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God's will. The Christian martyr 
 indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and 
 death : the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we can 
 not therefore say that he would have been able to bear it. 
 
 8 In this passage the distinction must be observed between 6eA.oo and 
 which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Mrs. Car- 
 
 ter. See Schweig.' s note on s. 90. 
 
 11 iv roS Kotfjuep : he means "on earth." 
 
 M Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word 
 (opfid<i) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it "Dei appetitio- 
 nem," and Upton "impetum." He says that he has translated it "con- 
 silium." 
 
 It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words In which 
 they speak of man. 
 
 " See ii. i, 18. Schweig. expected that Epictetus would have said 
 "body and possessions, etc." I assume that Epictetus did say "body and 
 possessions, etc.," and that his pupil or some copyist of manuscripts has 
 omitted the word "body." 
 
 " "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away. Job i. 21." Mrs. 
 Carter. 
 
 "The initiated ( jivdrai) are those who were introduced with solemn 
 ceremonies into some great religious body. These ceremonies are de- 
 scribed by Dion Prus. Orat. xii., quoted by Upton.
 
 316 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 * "And this is all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say, 
 which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can 
 give to the good man under severe distress? 'Either tell yourself that 
 present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your exist- 
 ence and mingle with the elements of the Universe' ! Unspeakably more 
 rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master's ex- 
 hortation to the persecuted Christian: 'Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, 
 for great is your reward in heaven.' " Mrs. Carter. 
 
 I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching 
 of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were, 
 as he assumes, believers in God or in the gods, and his argument is that 
 a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are 
 from God. If he can not be contented with things as they are, and make 
 the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells 
 him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a be- 
 liever in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to 
 him also. The case is past help or advice. 
 
 The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is 
 very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to 
 Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right. 
 
 " See the same story in Aulus Gellius (ii. c. 18), who says that Xeni- 
 ade?, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the 
 master of his children. 
 
 M I do not know if dogs sweat : at least in a state of health I have 
 never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science. 
 
 * As Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of 
 the Stoics. 
 
 80 "Stoicus occidit Baream, delator amicum, 
 Discipulumque senex." 
 
 Juvenal, iii. 116. 
 
 Epictetus is supposed to allude to the crime of Egnatius Celer who ac- 
 cused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 
 32). 
 
 " Mrs. Carter says that "there is much obscurity and some variety of 
 reading in the lines of the original." But see Schweig.'s notes. Epic- 
 tetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless : philosophy should 
 be practical. 
 
 82 Horace Sat. ii. 5. 
 
 **Aprulla is a Roman woman's name. It means some old woman who 
 is courted for her money. 
 
 ** Compare Plato ( Symposium, p. 206) : " All men conceive both as to 
 the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age, 
 our nature desires to procreate. But it can not procreate in that which is 
 ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and 
 woman is generation ; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which 
 is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting." See what is said in ii. 23, 
 note 5 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a 
 duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the 
 fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth ; and 
 therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man's duty is to labour in 
 some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which 
 he has received ; and this is also a divine act. Paul's opinion of marriage 
 is contained in Cor. i. 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been 
 justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriage ;
 
 DISCOURSES 317 
 
 at least he does not show that he has in this chapter. His teaching is im- 
 practicable, contrary to that of Epictetus, and to the nature and consti- 
 tution of man; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who 
 affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body 
 of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and 
 unmarried life. 
 
 84 Felicion. See i. 19. 
 
 ** Epictetus alludes to his lameness : compare i. 8. 14, i. 16. 20, and other 
 passages. Upton. 
 
 37 The sense of "law" ( OXO/MOS), can be collected from what follows. 
 Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton, c. 
 II, etc.) 
 
 58 Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium. He is said to 
 have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as 
 well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common. (Plato's Apol- 
 ogy.) 
 
 " Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, who at that 
 time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island of Salamis and to 
 bring him to be put to death. But Socrates refused to obey the order. Few 
 men would have done what he did under the circumstances. (Plato's 
 Apology; M. Antoninus, yii. 66.) 
 
 40 Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. i. 29. 
 
 41 The Dialogue of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which 
 were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and 
 the reply of Socrates. 
 
 " This alludes to the behaviour of Socrates when he refused to put to 
 the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and their behaviour after 
 the naval battle of Arginusae. The violence of the weather prevented the 
 commanders from collecting and honourably burying those who fell in 
 the battle; and the Athenians after their hasty fashjon, wished all the 
 commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this 
 time resisted the unjust clamour of the people. Xenophon Hellenica, 
 i. c. 7, 15 ; Plato, Apologia ; Xenophon, Memorab. i. i, 18. 
 
 41 The original isitovyap av enejierov kKsivoi; this seems to mean, 
 if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have been to 
 whom we might have been useful? They would have been left behind, 
 and we could have done nothing for them. 
 
 44 This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued : 
 the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than 
 his life. "The life of the dead," says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the 
 great Roman jurist and Cicero's friend, "rests in the remembrance of the 
 living." Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which 
 prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here 
 what Socrates said, which means what he taught ; but he knew what it 
 was. Modern writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form 
 which Epictetus would not or could not have used. Socrates left to oth- 
 ers the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught, 
 as we are told, the things which concern man's daily life and his inter- 
 course with other men: in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of 
 morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in 
 his social state will : and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy 
 of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was, as he said, to know 
 himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle "Know thyself 
 (yvooQt dsavrov) : and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend 
 the nature of man as a moral being in all relations ; and among these the
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as 
 Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the 
 end of man; death is only the road to another life. "The death of Soc- 
 rates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not 
 only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we 
 are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by 
 going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself 
 consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophpn, Apol. 
 2 22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both 
 (Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution 
 for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death 
 that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind." 
 (Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates and Christus, by F. C. 
 Baur.) 
 
 This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers 
 who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of 
 Socrates and Christ. However the essay is well worth the trouble of 
 reading. 
 
 The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is 
 in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the 
 Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German. 
 "What prejudices, what blindness must a man have," says Rousseau, 
 "when he dares to compare the son of Sophronicus with the son of 
 Mary ! the death of Socrates philosophising tranquil with his friends is 
 the most gentle that a man could desire : that of Jesus expiring in tor- 
 ments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible 
 that a man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him 
 who presents it and weeps ; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for 
 his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are 
 those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God." 
 (Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765.)
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY 
 
 TO this matter before all you must attend, that you be 
 never so closely connected with any of your former 
 intimates or friends as to come down to the same 
 acts as he does. 1 If you do not observe this 
 rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises 
 in your mind, "I shall seem disobliging to him and he 
 will not have the same feeling towards me," remem- 
 ber that nothing is done without cost, nor is it possi- 
 ble for a man if he does not do the same things to be 
 the same man that he was. Choose then which of the 
 two you will have, to be equally loved by those by 
 whom you were formerly loved, being the same with your 
 former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from your 
 friends the same that you did before. For if this is better, im- 
 mediately turn away to it, and let no other considerations 
 draw you in a different direction. For no man is able to make 
 progress (improvement), when he is wavering between op- 
 posite things; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to 
 all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out 
 this only, give up every thing else. But if you will not do 
 this, your wavering will produce both these results : you will 
 neither improve as you ought, nor will you obtain what you 
 formerly obtained. For before by plainly desiring the things 
 which were worth nothing, you pleased your associates. But 
 you can not excel in both kinds, and it is necessary that so far 
 as you share in the one, you must fall short in the other. You 
 can not, when you do not drink with those with whom you 
 used to drink, be agreeable to them as you were before. 
 Choose then whether you will be a hard drinker and pleasant 
 to your former associates or a sober man and disagreeable to 
 them. You can Yiot, when you do not sing with those with 
 whom you used to sing, be equally loved by them. Choose 
 then in this matter also which of the two you will have. For 
 if it is better to be modest and orderly than for a man to say 
 
 319
 
 320 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 he is a jolly fellow, give up the rest, renounce it, turn away 
 from it, have nothing to do with such men. But if this be- 
 haviour shall not please you, turn altogether to the opposite : 
 become a catamite, an adulterer, and act accordingly, and you 
 will get what you wish. And jump up in the theatre and bawl 
 out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different can 
 not be mingled: you can not act both Thersites and Aga- 
 memnon. If you intend to be Thersites, 2 you must be 
 hump-backed and bald : if Agamemnon, you must be tall and 
 handsome, and love those who are placed in obedience to you. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 He means that you must not do as he does, because he does this or 
 that act. The advice is in substance, Do not do as your friend does 
 simply because he is your friend. 
 
 1 See Iliad, ii. 216 ; and for the description of Agamemnon, Iliad, iii. 
 167.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS 
 
 KEEP this thought in readiness, when you lose any 
 thing external, what you acquire in place of it ; and 
 if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss; 
 neither if you have got a horse in place of an ass, or 
 an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit 
 of money, nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits 
 a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you have acquired mod- 
 esty. If you remember this, you will always maintain your 
 character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider 
 that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that what- 
 ever pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste 
 them all and overturn them. And it needs only a few things 
 for the loss and overturning of all, namely a small deviation 
 from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no 
 need of the same means as he has need of for saving it : but 
 if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost ; and if he does not 
 do this purposely, but has been neglecting his duty a little, 
 the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case 
 also : if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have up 
 to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the ap- 
 pearances of things, and watch over them; for that which 
 you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modesty and 
 fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of 
 mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a 
 word liberty. For what will you sell these things ? See what 
 is the value of the things which you will obtain in exchange 
 for these. But shall I not obtain any such thing for it? 
 See, and if you do in return get that, see what you receive in 
 place of it. I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : he 
 possesses a prsetorship, I possess modesty. But I do not 
 make acclamations where it is not becoming : I will not stand 
 up where I ought not j 1 for I am free, and a friend of God, 
 and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) any 
 thing else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor 
 
 21 321
 
 322 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 good report, nor in fact any thing. For he (God) does not al- 
 low me to claim (seek) them : for if he had chosen, he would 
 have made them good for me; but he has not done so, and 
 for this reason I can not transgress his commands. Preserve 
 that which is your own good in every thing ; and as to every 
 other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave con- 
 sistently with reason in respect to them, content with this 
 only. If you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in 
 all things, you will be hindered, you will be impeded. These 
 are the laws which have been sent from thence (from God) ; 
 these are the orders. Of these laws a man ought to be an ex- 
 positor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius 
 and Cassius. 2 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 He alludes to the factions in the theatres, iii. 4, 4 ; iv. 2-9. Upton. 
 
 1 Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of 
 Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Per- 
 sius, v. 90). C. Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a de- 
 scendant of the Cassius, who was one of the murderers of the dictator 
 Caius Caesar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Vespasian.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN 
 TRANQUILLITY 
 
 REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and 
 of riches makes us mean and subject to others, 
 but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, 
 and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For 
 to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the 
 value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others. 
 What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator 
 or not desiring to be one ; what is the difference between de- 
 siring power or being content with a private station ; what is 
 the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing 
 to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; or saying, I 
 am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as saluta- 
 tions and power are things external and independent of the 
 will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read ? 
 Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused 
 or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of 
 enduring labour. 1 But if you refer reading to the proper end, 
 what else is this than a tranquil and happy life (evtioia)? 
 But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil 
 life, what is the use of it? But it does secure this, the man re- 
 plies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it. 
 And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man 
 can impede, I do not say Caesar or Caesar's friend, but a 
 crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But 
 a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as conti- 
 nuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do 
 something : I will go then with the purpose of observing the 
 measures (rules) which I must keep, 2 of acting with mod- 
 esty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things ex- 
 ternal, 3 and then that I may attend to men, what they say, 
 how they are moved ; 4 and this not with any bad disposition, 
 or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule ; but I 
 turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults. 
 
 323
 
 324 EPICTETUS 
 
 How then shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also 
 acted wrong, but now I do not ; thanks to God. 
 
 Come, when you have done these things and have attended 
 to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read 
 a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat, 
 are you grieved because you are not reading? are you not 
 satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by 
 reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why then 
 do you not act consistently in all things, both when you ap- 
 proach Caesar, and when you approach any person? If you 
 maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, 
 and steady; if you look rather at the things which are done 
 and happen than are looked at yourself ; if you do not envy 
 those who are preferred before you ; if surrounding circum- 
 stances (vX.at) do not strike you with fear or admiration, 
 what do you want ? Books ? How or for what purpose ? for 
 is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and 
 is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than 
 this ? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters 
 the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it. 
 It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise ; for 
 this purpose were used the halteres (weights), 6 the dust, the 
 young men as antagonists ; and do you seek for those things 
 now when it is the time of action? This is just as if in the 
 topic (matter) of assent when appearances present them- 
 selves, some of which can be comprehended, and some can 
 not be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish 
 them but should choose to read what has been written about 
 comprehension (x-araA.^?). 
 
 What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we 
 have never read for this purpose, we have never written for 
 this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in a way con- 
 formable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we 
 terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able 
 to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, 6 and in 
 handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where 
 our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would 
 you have by all means the things which are not in your 
 power ? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose. 
 But if we read what is written about action (efforts,
 
 DISCOURSES 325 
 
 not that we may see what is said about action, but that we 
 may act well : if we read what is said about desire and aver- 
 sion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in 
 our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we 
 read what is said about duty (officium), in order that re- 
 membering the relations (of things to one another) we may 
 do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we 
 should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but 
 we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conform- 
 able (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what 
 so far we have been accustomed to reckon : To-day I have 
 read so many verses, I have written so many ; but (we should 
 say) , To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the 
 philosophers; I have not employed my desire; I have used 
 avoidance (iKxMtisi) only with respect to things which are 
 within the power of my will ; I have not been afraid of such a 
 person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of 
 another; I have exercised my patience, 7 my abstinence, my 
 co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for 
 what we ought to thank him. 
 
 But now we do not know that we also in another way are 
 like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have 
 power : you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man ; 
 but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have 
 power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference 
 whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have 
 a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you 
 still be able to say as Socrates did, "If so it pleases God, so 
 let it be?" Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager 
 to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to 
 discourse daily with the young men, would have readily 
 served in military expeditions so often as he did, and would 
 he not have lamented and groaned, ''Wretch that I am; I 
 must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning my- 
 self in the Lyceum ?" Why, was this your business, to sun 
 yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be 
 free from hindrance, free from impediment ? And could he 
 still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way : how 
 would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison? 8 
 
 In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is
 
 326 EPICTETUS 
 
 beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But 
 these things are out of the power of the will, not only power 
 (authority), but also a private condition: not only occupa- 
 tion (business), but also leisure. Now then must I live in 
 this tumult? Why do you say tumult? I mean among 
 many men. Well what is the hardship? Suppose that 
 you are at Olympia: imagine it to be a panegyris (pub- 
 lic assembly), where one is calling out one thing, an- 
 other is doing another thing, and a third is pushing 
 another person: in the baths there is a crowd: and who 
 of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it 
 unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious 
 about what happens. Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is 
 sharp; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit 
 of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like 
 leisure ; it is a desert : I do not like a crowd ; it is confusion. 
 But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone 
 or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought : 
 'talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to 
 you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd, 
 call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival : try to 
 enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleas- 
 ant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men ? 
 We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen : we are de- 
 lighted when we see many ships : who is pained when he sees 
 many men? But they deafen me with their cries. Then 
 your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you ? Is then 
 the power of making use of appearances hindered ? And who 
 prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a 
 thing and aversion from it ; and movement towards a thing 
 and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to 
 do this? 
 
 , Do you only bear in mind the general rules : what is mine, 
 what is not mine; what is given (permitted) to me; what 
 does God will that I should do now ? what does he not will ? 
 A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with 
 yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to pre- 
 pare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says 
 to you : "Come now to the contest, show us what you have 
 learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long
 
 DISCOURSES 327 
 
 will you be exercised alone? Now is the opportunity for you 
 to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one 
 of those who go about the world and are defeated." Why 
 then are you vexed ? No contest is without confusion. There 
 must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many 
 who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters, 
 many spectators. But my wish is to live quietly. Lament 
 then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a 
 greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him 
 who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament, 
 to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy? 
 Would you not release yourself from these things? And 
 how shall I release myself ? Have you not often heard, that 
 you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turn- 
 ing away) to those things only which are within your power, 
 that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame, 
 books, tumult, power, private station ? for whatever way you 
 turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you 
 are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But 
 keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness. 
 
 " Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity." * 
 
 Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to 
 Rome. To Gyara ? I will go to Gyara. To Athens ? I will go 
 to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should 
 once say, "When shall a man go to Athens?" you are un- 
 done. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is 
 not accomplished, must make you unhappy ; and if it is ac- 
 complished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at 
 things at which you ought not to be elated ; and on the other 
 hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched be- 
 cause you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give 
 up then all these things. Athens is a good place. But hap- 
 piness is much better ; and to be free from passions, free from 
 disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There 
 is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation. 10 But happiness 
 is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time 
 comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish 
 to avoid them ? what necessity is there to carry a burden like
 
 328 EPICTETUS 
 
 an ass, and to be beaten with a stick ? But if you do not so, 
 consider that you must always be a slave to him who has 
 it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you, 
 and you must serve him as an evil genius. 
 
 There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be 
 ready both in the morning and during the day and by night : 
 the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the 
 power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give 
 up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune ; to make them the 
 superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made 
 so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that 
 which can not be hindered; and when we read, to refer our 
 reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For 
 this reason I can not call the man industrious, if I hear this 
 only, that he reads and writes ; and even if a man adds that he 
 reads all night, I can not say so, if he knows not to what he 
 should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man 
 is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl ; nor do I. But if 
 he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is 
 a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that 
 he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour ; and if he does 
 it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learn- 
 ing. But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power 
 (riyEtiovtKov), that he may keep it in a state conforma- 
 ble to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say 
 that he is industrious. For never commend a man on ac- 
 count of these things which are common to all, but on account 
 of his opinions (principles) ; for these are the things which 
 belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Re- 
 membering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and 
 be content with the things which come in season. 11 If you 
 see any thing which you have learned and inquired about oc- 
 curring to you in your course of life (or 'opportunely applied 
 by you to the acts of life) , be delighted at it. If you have laid 
 aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling ; 
 if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hasti- 
 ness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you 
 formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were, 
 you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have be- 
 haved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have be-
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 329 
 
 haved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for 
 making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a 
 province ? These things come to you from yourself and from 
 the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to 
 whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these 
 thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference 
 where you shall be happy, where you shall please God ? Are 
 not the gods equally distant from all places ? Do they not see 
 from all places alike that which is going on ? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See Bishop Butler's remarks in the Preface to his Sermons vol. ii. 
 He speaks of the "idle way of reading and considering things ; by this 
 means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of without the pain of at- 
 tention : neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one 
 can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought than great part of 
 that which is spent in reading." 
 
 2 "Sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae." Hor. Epp. ii. 2, 
 144. M. Antoninus, iii. I. 
 
 * "The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what 
 they will find it very difficult to believe, That because externals are not 
 in our power, they are nothing to us. But in excuse for this frequent 
 repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves 
 to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by 
 rejecting stronger aids. One can not indeed avoid highly admiring the 
 very few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this founda- 
 tion. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no 
 one ever spoke so well in support of the argument as Epictetus. Yet, not- 
 withstanding his great abilities and the force of his example, one finds 
 him strongly complaining of the want of success ; and one sees from this 
 circumstance as well as from others in the Stoic writings, That virtue can 
 not be maintained in the world without the hope of a future reward." 
 Mrs. Carter. 
 
 4 Compare Horace, Sat. i. 4, 133 ; "Noque enim cum lectulus," etc. 
 
 5 See i. 4, note 5, iii. 15, 4 ; and i. 24, i, i. 29, 34. The athletes were 
 oiled, but they used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay 
 hold of one another. 
 
 * M. Antoninus, i. 17, thanks the Gods that he did not waste his time 
 in the resolution of syllogisms. 
 
 7 See Aulus Gellius xvii. 19, where he quotes Epictetus on what Gellius 
 expresses by "intolerantia" and "incontinentia." Compare M. Antoninus 
 (v. 33) on the precept 'Avexov and 'Aitsxov. 
 
 8 Plato in the Phsedon (c. 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a 
 hymn to Apollo. 
 
 * Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, who also wrote some poetry. 
 
 10 He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the 
 morning at the houses of the great and powerful at Rome. Upton refers 
 to Virgil, Gecrgics, ii. 461. 
 
 11 See Antoninus, vi. 2 ; and ix. 6. "Thy present opinion founded on un- 
 derstanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy 
 present disposition of contentment with everything which happens that 
 is enough."
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS 
 
 THE wise and good man neither himself fights with any 
 person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can 
 prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all 
 other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, 
 who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quar- 
 rels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in 
 Xenophon's "Symposium" how many quarrels he settled, 
 how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Calli- 
 cles ; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son 
 who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he 
 remembered well that no man has in his power another man's 
 ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than 
 that which was his own. And what is this ? Not that this or 
 that man may act according to nature; for that is a thing 
 which belongs to another; but that while others are doing 
 their own acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a 
 condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing 
 what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state 
 conformable to nature. For this is the object always set be- 
 fore him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a 
 praetor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his ob- 
 ject is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is 
 it to marry ? No ; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this 
 matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition con- 
 formable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do 
 wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another 
 not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learn 
 what things are a man's own and what belongs to another. 
 
 How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) 
 to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have) ? Is 
 he surprised at any thing which happens, and does it appear 
 new to him ? Does he not expect that which comes from the 
 bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually be- 
 falls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they 
 
 330
 
 DISCOURSES 331 
 
 (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? 
 Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not 
 having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks 
 that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also. Great 
 thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in 
 what school that man is a tame 1 animal, that men love one 
 another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who 
 does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not con- 
 vinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be 
 for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones. 
 Have you then done any thing wrong ? But the things in the 
 house have been broken. Are you then a utensil ? No ; but a 
 free power of will. 2 What then is given to you (to do) in 
 answer to this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in re- 
 turn, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is 
 proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what 
 faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition 
 of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an in- 
 jury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of 
 his natural faculties, not when he can not crow like a cock, 
 but when he can not run. When is a dog wretched ? Not 
 when he can not fly, but when he can not track his game. Is 
 then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he can not 
 strangle lions or embrace statues, 3 for he did not come into 
 the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for 
 this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidel- 
 ity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the 
 misfortunes into which he has fallen ; not indeed to lament 
 because a man has been born or has died, 4 but because it has 
 happened to him in his life time to have lost the things which 
 are his own, not that which he received from his father, not 
 his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves; for not one 
 of these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are 
 service, and subject to account ( vitevQvya ) . at different 
 times given to different persons by those who have them in 
 their power : but I mean the things which belong to him as 
 a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came 
 into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find 
 them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the 
 marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this sestertius ?
 
 332 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. 
 Throw it away : it can not be accepted, it is counterfeit. 5 So 
 also in this case : What is the stamp of his opinions ? It is 
 gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposi- 
 tion to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept 
 them : I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neigh- 
 bour, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he has not 
 Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he 
 fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the 
 heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did 
 you say that he is a man? Is every thing judged (deter- 
 mined) by the bare form ? If that is so, say that the form in 
 wax 6 is an apple and has the smell and taste of an apple. But 
 the external figure is not enough: neither then is the nose 
 enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the 
 opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to 
 reason, who does not know when he is refuted : he is an ass : 
 in another man the sense of shame is become dead : he is good 
 for nothing, he is any thing rather than a man. This man 
 seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not 
 even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast. 
 
 What then? would you have me to be despised? By 
 whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who 
 know you despise a man who is gentle and modest ? Perhaps 
 you mean by those who do not know you ? What is that to 
 you ? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who 
 know not his art. But they will be more hostile to me for 
 this reason. Why do you say "me" ? Can any man injure 
 your will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the ap- 
 pearances which are presented to you? In no way can he. 
 Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to 
 show yourself afraid ? And why do you not come forth and 
 proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they 
 may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can 
 harm you ? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I 
 am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no 
 access to the things which are mine. 
 
 In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the 
 besiegers, (and say) : "What trouble these men are now tak- 
 ing for nothing : our wall is secure, we have food for a very
 
 DISCOURSES 333 
 
 long time, and all other resources." These are the things 
 which make a city strong and impregnable : but nothing else 
 than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For what 
 wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession 
 is so safe, or what honour (rank, character) so free from as- 
 sault (as a man's opinions) ? All (other) things every where 
 are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any 
 way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is 
 bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and 
 fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not 
 choose to make secure the only means of safety which are 
 offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves 
 from that which is perishable and servile, and to labour at 
 the things which are imperishable and by nature free; and 
 do we not remember that no man either hurts another or 
 does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each 
 thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him ; 
 this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war ? That which 
 made Eteocles and Polynices 7 enemies was nothing else than 
 this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion 
 about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, the other the 
 greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek 
 the good, to avoid the bad ; 8 to consider him who deprives 
 us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and 
 treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. 
 For nothing is more akin to us than the good : therefore if 
 these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a 
 father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but 
 all the world is every where full of enemies, treacherous 
 men, and sycophants. But if the will (itpoatpcdis, the pur- 
 pose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only 
 good ; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the 
 only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? 
 about what ? about the things which do not concern us ? and 
 strife with whom ? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those 
 who are deceived about the chief things ? 
 
 Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and 
 endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) 
 son. 9 For in what did she show her bad temper? In pouring 
 water on his head as much as she liked, and in trampling on
 
 334 
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 the cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if I 
 think that these things are nothing to me? But this is my 
 business ; and neither tyrant shall check my will nor a master ; 
 nor shall the many check me who am only one, nor shall the 
 stronger check me who am the weaker; for this power of 
 being free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every 
 man. For these opinions make love in a house (family) , con- 
 cord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to God; 
 they make a man in all things cheerful (confident) in ex- 
 ternals as about things which belong to others, as about 
 things which are of no value. 10 We indeed are able to write 
 and to read these things, and to praise them when they are 
 read, but we do not even come near to being convinced of 
 them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedaemonians, "Lions 
 at home, but in Ephesus foxes,'' ' will fit in our case also, 
 "Lions in the school, but out of it foxes." 11 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See ii. 10, 14, iv. i. So Plato says (Legg. vi.), that a man who 
 has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of 
 animals. Upton. 
 
 On the doing wrong to another, see Plato's Crito and Epictetus iv. I. 
 
 2 See iii. I. 
 
 1 Like Hercules and Diogenes. See iii. 12. 2. 
 
 4 The allusion is to a passage (a fragment) in the Cresphontes of Eu- 
 ripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (Tusc. Disp i. 48) 
 
 eSet yap rfjuas ovA.A.oyov itaiovfj.evov$ 
 TOV (pyvra Bptfvsiv etg od* epx^rat Katca. 
 TOV d'av Qavovra Kai itovaov xsitavjuevov 
 ev<pr}ftovrrai; kKiteintetv Softtsov. 
 
 Herodotus (v. 4) -ays of the Trausi, a Thracian tribe : "when a child is 
 born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it 
 must suffer on coming into the world and enumerate all the calamities 
 of mankind : but when one dies, they hide him in the earth with rejoicing 
 and pleasure, reckoning all the evils from which he is now released and 
 in possession of all happiness." 
 
 8 This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for 
 there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the 
 purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise, 
 fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, in a letter to Upton, says that he can 
 discover no reason for Nero's coins being rejected in commercial deal- 
 ings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by 
 the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth. (Suetonius, Nero. c. 
 49-) When Domitian was murdered, the Senate ordered his busts to be 
 taken down, as the French now do after a revolution and all memorials 
 of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 23). Dion also reports
 
 DISCOURSES 335 
 
 (LX) that when Caligula was murdered, it was ordered that all the Brass 
 coin which bore his image should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again. 
 There is more on this subject in Wise's letter. 
 
 I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial 
 dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts 
 distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would 
 not touch the^coins of the detestable Nero. 
 
 8 He says TO tcrfptvov, which Mrs. Carter translates "a piece of wax." 
 Perhaps it means "a piece of wax in the form of an apple." 
 
 7 Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate CEdipus, who 
 quarrelled about the kingship of Thebes and killed one another. This 
 quarrel is the subject of the Seven against Thebes of ^Eschylus and the 
 Phoenistsae of Euripides. See ii. 22, note 3. 
 
 8 "Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the fore- 
 thought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good." Bp. But- 
 ler, Analogy, Chap. 2. The bishop's "naturally" is the <pvcris of Epicte- 
 tus. 
 
 9 Socrates' wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son LamprocleS 
 with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endurance (Xenophon, 
 Memorab. ii. 2, 7). Xenophon in this chapter has reported the conversa- 
 tion of Socrates with his son on this matter. 
 
 Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring water on 
 the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca says (De Constantia, 
 c. 18). .<Elian (xi. 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and 
 good cake, which Xanthippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only 
 laughed and said, "Well then, you will not have your share of it." The 
 philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the 
 torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the greatest calamities that 
 can happen to a man, and the trouble of an undutiful son. 
 
 10 This is one of the wisest and noblest expressions of Epictetus. 
 "See Aristophanes, the "Peace," v. 1188: 
 
 ito\\a yap 
 oi'ifot
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED 
 
 I AM grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then 
 is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns 
 you, or those who pity you ? Well, is it in your power to 
 stop this pity ? It is in my power, if I show them that I 
 do not require pity. And whether then are you in the condi- 
 'tion of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that 
 condition ? I think that I am not : but these persons do not 
 pity me, for the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it 
 would be proper, I mean, for my faults ; but they pity me for 
 my poverty, for not possessing honourable offices, for dis- 
 eases and deaths and other such things. Whether then are 
 you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these 
 things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor 
 and has no office ( ardpxovrt ) and enjoys no honour to be 
 happy ; or to shew yourself to them as rich and in power ? 
 For the second of these things belongs to a man who is boast- 
 ful, silly and good for nothing. And consider by what means 
 the pretence must be supported. It will be necessary for you 
 to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to ex- 
 hibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often 
 the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the 
 same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for 
 display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the 
 great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to 
 sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, 
 that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than 
 you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to 
 go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first 
 way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing 
 which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what 
 things are good and bad. 1 Is this power given to you? 
 This only is given to you, to convince yourself ; and you have 
 not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to 
 persuade other men ? and who has lived so long with you as 
 
 336
 
 DISCOURSES 337 
 
 you with yourself ? and who has so much power of convinc- 
 ing you as you have of convincing yourself ; and who is bet- 
 ter disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? 
 How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to 
 learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this 
 what you have been earnest about doing, 2 to learn to be free 
 from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled 
 (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that 
 there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up 
 (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to 
 withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to 
 others? For another man then to have an opinion about 
 you, of what kind is it? It is a thing independent of the 
 will. Then is it nothing to you? It is nothing. When 
 then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think 
 that you are convinced about good and evil? 
 
 Will you not then, letting others alone, be to yourself both 
 scholar and teacher? The rest of mankind will look after 
 this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives 
 in a state contrary to nature : but to me no man is nearer than 
 myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I have lis- 
 tened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, 
 but in fact I am no way made easier (more content) ? Am I 
 so stupid ? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen, 
 I have not been found very stupid; but I learned letters 
 quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllo- 
 gisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no 
 other things have I found from the beginning so approved 
 and chosen (as the things which are rational) : and now I 
 read about these things, hear about them, write about them ; 
 I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living 
 according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have 
 the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have 
 the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor 
 used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and 
 rusted and can not fit me? And yet neither in the exercises 
 of the palaestra, nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with 
 learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are 
 proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also. 
 But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man 
 
 22
 
 338 EPICTETUS 
 
 can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hin- 
 drance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor 
 do I practise in these the proper practice (study). Then I 
 care about what others will say of me, whether 1 shall appear 
 to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy. 
 
 Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about 
 yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your 
 opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things ( kv 
 rep kKK\iveiv), in your movements (purposes, kv bpn^f) in your 
 preparation (for anything), in your designs (plans), 'and in 
 other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself 
 about this, whether others pity you? Yes, but I am pitied 
 not as I ought to be. Are you then pained at this ? and is he 
 who is pained, an object of pity? Yes. How then are you 
 pitied not as you ought to be ? For by the very act that you 
 feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving 
 of pity. What then says Antisthenes ? Have you not heard ? 
 "It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be 
 ill spoken of." My head is sound, and all think that I have 
 the headache. What do I care for that? I am free from 
 fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever, 
 (and say), "Poor man, for so long a time you have not 
 ceased to have fever." I also say with a sorrowful counte- 
 nance, "In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill." 
 What will happen then? As God may please: and at the 
 same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. 
 What then hinders the same thing being done in this case 
 also ? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about pov- 
 erty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my pov- 
 erty? I am not in power (not a magistrate) : but 
 others are: and I have the opinion which I ought to 
 have about having and not having power. Let them look 
 to it who pity me : but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor 
 do I suffer cold; but because they are hungry or thirsty 
 they think that I too am. What then shall I do for them? 
 Shall I go about and proclaim and say, "Be not mistaken, 
 men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty, 
 nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than 
 right opinions. These I have free from restraint. I care 
 for nothing at all." What foolish talk is this? How
 
 DISCOURSES 339 
 
 do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being 
 what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be ? 
 
 But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me. 
 What then is more reasonable than for those who have la- 
 boured about any thing to have more in that thing in which 
 they have laboured ? They have laboured for power, you 
 have laboured about opinions; and they have laboured for 
 wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they 
 have more than you in this about which you have laboured, 
 and which they neglect ; if they assent better than you with 
 respect to the natural rules (measures) of things ; if they are 
 less disappointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less 
 into things which they would avoid than you do ; if in their 
 intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, 
 if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they 
 take a better aim ; if they better observe a proper behaviour, 
 as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names 
 by which we express the relations of life. But if they exer- 
 cise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell your- 
 self the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this 
 (power), and they do all ? And it is most unreasonable that 
 he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who 
 does not look after it. 
 
 Not so : but since I care about right opinions, it is more 
 reasonable for me to have power. Yes in the matter about 
 which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which 
 they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case 
 is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you 
 thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better 
 than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed 
 better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about 
 opinions and employ yourself about the things which you 
 wish to acquire ; and then lament, if you do not succeed ; for 
 you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occu- 
 pied with other things, that you are looking after other 
 things ; but the many say this truly, that one act has no com- 
 munity with another. 3 He who has risen in the morning 
 seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to 
 whom he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall 
 send a present, how he shall please the dancing man, how by
 
 340 EPICTETUS 
 
 bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays, 
 he prays about these things ; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices 
 for these things : the saying of Pythagoras 
 
 "Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes"* 
 
 he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the mat- 
 ters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any thing 
 like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man ? And if 
 he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses him- 
 self : "Why did you say this ? Was it not in your power to 
 lie ? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from 
 telling a lie." But do you, if indeed you have cared about 
 nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon 
 as you have risen in the morning reflect, "What do I want in 
 order to be free from passion (affects), and free from per- 
 turbation ? What am I ? Am I a poor body, a piece of prop- 
 erty, a thing of which something is said? I am none of 
 these. But what am I ? I am a rational animal. What then is 
 required of me?" Reflect on your acts. Where have I 
 omitted the things which conduce to happiness ( evpmav ) ? 
 What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? 
 what have I not done as to these things which I ought to 
 have done ? 
 
 So great then being the difference in desires, actions, 
 wishes, would you still have the same share with others in 
 those things about which you have not laboured, and they 
 have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and 
 are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. 
 Why ? Because they are convinced that they have that which 
 is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are 
 not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they 
 have : but they are satisfied with their own, and do not de- 
 sire what you have : since if you were really convinced, that 
 with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor 
 of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have 
 thought of what they say about you. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Here it is implied that there are things which God can not do. Per- 
 haps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and
 
 DISCOURSES 341 
 
 therefore of action, he can not at the same time exercise the contradic- 
 tory powers of forcing man's will and action ; for this would be at the 
 same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (Analogy, 
 chap. 5) "the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of vir- 
 tue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a 
 discipline of vice." In fact all men are not convinced and can not be 
 convinced in the present constitution of things "what things are good 
 and bad." 
 
 1 Something is perhaps wrong in the text here. 
 
 ' Schweig. says that he has not observed that this proverb is men- 
 tioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of 
 it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10, 24), "al- 
 terum opus cum altero nihil commune habet." I think that the context 
 explains it : if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper 
 means, and not the means which do not make for that end. 
 
 4 Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See 
 Schweig.'s remarks on the words "He who has risen, etc." I have of 
 necessity translated KaKarfiicrduEYos in an active sense; but if this is 
 right, I do not understand how the word is used so.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR 
 
 WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, 
 you say, and their swords, and the men of the bed- 
 chamber, and those who exclude them who would 
 enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the 
 tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or 
 is it because the child does not understand these things? 
 If then any man does understand what guards are and 
 that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very 
 purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circum- 
 stance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he 
 afraid of the guards ? No, for he wishes for the thing which 
 makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wish- 
 ing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be per- 
 mitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from ap- 
 proaching the tyrant without fear ? Nothing. If then a man 
 has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I 
 have instanced has about his body ; and also about his chil- 
 dren and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some mad- 
 ness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them 
 or not, but like children who are playing with shells care 
 (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about 
 the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials 
 (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and 
 the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him, or 
 what guards, or what swords ? 
 
 Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so 
 disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through 
 habit, 1 and is it possible that no man can learn from reason 
 and from demonstration that God has made all the things in 
 the universe and the universe itself completely free from 
 hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the 
 whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of compre- 
 hending the administration of it; but the rational animal 
 man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, 
 
 342
 
 DISCOURSES 343' 
 
 and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a 
 part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate 
 to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, mag- 
 nanimous and free, man sees that of the things which sur- 
 round him some are free from hindrance and in his power, 
 and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the 
 power of others ; that the things which are free from hind- 
 rance are in the power of the will ; and those which are sub- 
 ject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power 
 of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good 
 and his interest be in these things only which are free from 
 hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, 
 happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to 
 God 2 for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of 
 the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming 
 any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest 
 are in externals and in things which are not in the power of 
 his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a 
 slave to those who have the power over the things which he 
 admires (desires) and fears ; and he must of necessity be im- 
 pious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he 
 must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs 
 to him ; and he must of necessity be abject and mean. 
 
 What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (compre- 
 hended), these things, from living with a light heart and 
 bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which 
 can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? 
 Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will 
 know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well 
 the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess 
 power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, 
 banishment ? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with 
 me ; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place 
 that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I 
 shall carry off with me : for neither can any man deprive me 
 of them ; but my opinions alone are mine and they can not be 
 taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wher- 
 ever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time 
 to die. Why do you say, to die? Make no tragedy show of 
 the thing, but speak of it as it is : it is now time for the matter
 
 344 EPICTETUS 
 
 (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it 
 was composed. And what is the formidable thing here ? what 
 is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? 3 
 what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for 
 this reason that a tyrant is formidable ? Is it for this reason 
 that the guards appear to have swords which are large and 
 sharp ? Say this to others : but I have considered about all 
 these things ; no man has power over me. I have been made 
 free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a 
 slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom ; I have 
 proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? 
 What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my 
 property ? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master 
 of my exile or of my chains ? Well, from all these things and 
 all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you 
 please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far 
 it reaches. 
 
 Whom then can I still fear ? Those who are over the bed- 
 chamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they 
 find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do 
 you go to the doors ? Because I think it befits me, while the 
 play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut 
 out ? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not 
 choose to go in, but am always content with that which hap- 
 pens ; for I think that what God chooses is better than what 
 I choose. 4 I will attach myself as a minister and follower to 
 him ; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have 
 the same desires ; in a word, I have the same will (crw$e\Qo\ 
 There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would 
 force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in ? Be- 
 cause I know that nothing good is distributed within to those 
 who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate be- 
 cause he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen 
 to get? A province (the government of a province). Does 
 he also obtain an opinion such as he ought ? The office of a 
 Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office 
 well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar's chamber) ? A 
 man scatters dried figs and nuts : the children seize them, and 
 fight with one another ; men do not, for they think them to be 
 a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even
 
 DISCOURSES 345 
 
 the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed : let 
 children look to that. Money is distributed : let children look 
 to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed : let chil- 
 dren scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the 
 hands of the giver, of the slaves : but to me these are only 
 dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, 
 while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled : if 
 a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it ; for so far 
 you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn 
 another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter 
 those who have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a 
 dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things 
 which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded 
 me not to think good. 
 
 Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, 
 and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords 
 do ? They kill. And what does a fever do ? Nothing else. 
 And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you 
 then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, 
 and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this 
 will not happen : but when I have once learned that every 
 thing which has come into existence must also go out of 
 it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no 
 longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it 
 or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison 
 between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with 
 less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear 
 any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing 
 which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (ad- 
 miration) ? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the 
 guards ? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly 
 way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke 
 to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise 
 should be a proof of what I am ? Have I been eager to imi- 
 tate his morals ? But I keep up the play and go to him, and 
 serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing 
 foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, "Go and bring 
 Leon of Salamis," I say to him, "Seek another, for I am no 
 longer playing." (The tyrant says) : "Lead him away (to 
 prison)." I follow; that is part of the play. But your
 
 346 EPICTETUS 
 
 head will be taken off. Does the tyrant's head always re- 
 main where it is, and the heads of you who obey him ? But 
 you will be cast out unburied. If the corpse is I, I shall be 
 cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more 
 properly according as the fact is, and do not think of fright- 
 ening me. These things are formidable to children and 
 fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's 
 school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of 
 fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter ; 
 (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones 
 nor sinews (vsvpa'), but he is that which makes use of these 
 parts of the body and governs them and follows (under- 
 stands) the appearances of things. 6 
 
 Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws. And what 
 kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws that em- 
 ploy such talk ? And the things which are in the power of a 
 fool are not law. 6 And yet see how this talk makes us dis- 
 posed as we ought to be even to these men (fools) ; since it 
 teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things 
 in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as 
 to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, 
 as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give 
 up all ; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even 
 Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What 
 transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where 
 you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you : on 
 the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me ; for 
 I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your 
 study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, 7 
 how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you 
 shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute play- 
 ers, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you 
 made any study of opinions, and of your own rational fac- 
 ulty ? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they 
 are brought together, how they are connected, what powers 
 it has, and of what kind ? Why then are you vexed, if another 
 who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in 
 these things? But these things are the greatest. And who 
 hinders you from being employed about these things and 
 looking after them ? And who has a better stock of books, of
 
 DISCOURSES 347 
 
 leisure, of persons to aid you ? Only turn your mind at last 
 to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your 
 own ruling faculty 8 ( riyenoviKov ) : consider what this is 
 that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all 
 other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But 
 so long as you employ yourself about externals you will pos- 
 sess them (externals) as no man else does ; but you will have 
 this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid 
 and neglected. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See Schweig.'s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that 
 Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions 
 (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the 
 Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence 
 to the new faith and the fanatical behaviour of some of the converts. 
 That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on 
 undoubted authority; and also that there always have been such, and 
 now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed 
 no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions; and it is a 
 fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be 
 perverted, misunderstood, and misused. 
 
 1 "This agrees with Eph. v. 20 : 'Give thanks always for all things 
 to God.' " Mrs. Carter. The words are the same in both except that the 
 Apostle has &vxapi6rovvTZ$ and Epictetus has X<*P lv X OV - 
 
 He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is 
 composed : none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere, 
 will go to him who gave it (iii. 13). But I do not suppose that he 
 means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness. 
 
 4 "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt." Matthew xxvi. 39. 
 Mrs. Carter. "Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be 
 perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his ; when we rest in 
 his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good." Bp. 
 Butler, Sermon on the Love of God. 
 
 * Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses 
 the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor 
 what he supposes it to be. "Upon the whole then our organs of sense 
 and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, our- 
 selves, make use of to perceive and move with." Butler's Analogy, 
 chap. i. 
 
 * The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does, 
 if we use the word law in the strict sense of law: for law is a general 
 command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power 
 to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed, or if not to 
 enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word 
 "law" is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise 
 or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word "law" in 
 the strict sense. 
 
 'The word is A.t8ocrr/oa>roi$ which means what we name Mosaic 
 floors or pavements. The word Atfldor/oojrov is used by John xix. 13, 
 and rendered in our version by "pavement."
 
 348 EPICTETUS 
 
 *This term (TbrfyejLiovtK6r)has been often used by Epictetus (i. 26. 
 15, etc.), and by Antoninus. Here Epictetus gives a definition or de- 
 scription of it: it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and de- 
 termine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many 
 men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected; but still it ought to 
 be what its constitution forms it to be, a faculty which "plainly bears 
 upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute di- 
 rection of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification" (Bp. Butler, 
 Preface to his Sermons).
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 AGAINST THOSE WHO HASTILY RUSH INTO THE USE OF THE 
 PHILOSOPHIC DRESS 
 
 NEVER praise nor blame a man because of the things 
 which are common (to all, or to most), and do not 
 ascribe to him any skill or want of skill; and thus 
 you will be free from rashness and from malevo- 
 lence. This man bathes very quickly. Does he then do 
 wrong? Certainly not. But what does he do? He bathes 
 very quickly. Are all things then done well ? By no means : 
 but the acts which proceed from right opinions are done 
 well; and those which proceed from bad opinions are done 
 ill. But do you, until you know the opinion from which a 
 man does each thing, neither praise nor blame the act. But 
 the opinion is not easily discovered from the external things 
 (acts). This man is a carpenter. Why? Because he uses an 
 axe. What then is this to the matter? This man is a musi- 
 cian because he sings. And what does that signify? This 
 man is a philosopher. Because he wears a cloak and long 
 hair. And what does a juggler wear? For this reason if a 
 man sees any philosopher acting indecently, immediately he 
 says, "See what the philosopher is doing." But he ought 
 because of the man's indecent behaviour rather to say that 
 he is not a philosopher. For if this is the preconceived 
 notion ( itpo^ifn^ ) of a philosopher and what he professes, to 
 wear a cloak and long hair, men would say well ; but if what 
 he professes is this rather, to keep himself free from faults, 
 why do we not rather, because he does not make good his 
 professions, take from him the name of philosopher ? For so 
 we do in the case of all other arts. When a man sees an- 
 other handling an axe badly, he does not say, "What is the 
 use of the carpenter's art? See how badly carpenters do 
 their work." But he says just the contrary, " This man is 
 not a carpenter, for he uses an axe badly." In the same way 
 if a man hears another singing badly, he does not say, "See 
 how musicians sing." But rather, "this man is not a musi- 
 
 349
 
 350 EPICTETUS 
 
 cian." But it is in the matter of philosophy only that people 
 do this. When they see a man acting contrary to the pro- 
 fession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title, but 
 they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts deriv- 
 ing the fact that he is behaving indecently they conclude that 
 there is no use in philosophy. 
 
 What then is the reason of this ? Because we attach value 
 to the notion (ifp6A.rfi(nv) of a carpenter, and to that of a 
 musician, and to the notion of other artisans in like manner, 
 but not to that of a philosopher, and we judge from ex- 
 ternals only that it is a thing confused and ill defined. And 
 what other kind of art has a name from the dress and the 
 hair ; and has not both theorems and a material and an end ? 
 What then is the material (matter) of the philosopher? Is 
 it a cloak ? No, but reason. What is his end ? Is it to wear 
 a cloak ? No, but to possess the reason in a right state. Of 
 what kind are his theorems ? Are they those about the way 
 in which the beard becomes great or the hair long? No, but 
 rather what Zeno says, to know the elements of reason, what 
 kind of a thing each of them is, and how they are fitted to 
 one another, and what things are consequent upon them? 
 Will you not then see first if he does what he professes when 
 he acts in an unbecoming manner, and then blame his study 
 (pursuit) ? But now when you yourself are acting in a so- 
 ber way, you say in consequence of what he seems to you to 
 be doing wrong, "Look at the philosopher," as if it were 
 proper to call by the name of philosopher one who does 
 these things; and further, "This is the conduct of a phi- 
 losopher." But you do not say, "Look at the carpenter," 
 when you know that a carpenter is an adulterer or you see 
 him to be a glutton; nor do you say, "See the musician." 
 Thus to a certain degree even you perceive (understand) the 
 profession of a philosopher, but you fall away from the 
 notion, and you are confused through want of care. 
 
 But even the philosophers themselves as they are called 
 pursue the thing (philosophy) by beginning with things 
 which are common to them and others : as soon as they have 
 . assumed a cloak and grown a beard, they say, "I am a phi- 
 losopher." 1 But no man will say, "I am a musician." if he 
 has bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute : nor will he
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 351 
 
 say, "I am a smith," if he has put .on "a cap and apron. But 
 the dress is fitted to the art ; and they take their name from 
 the art, and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates 
 used to say well, "A long time I strove to be a philosopher 
 without people knowing it ; and this," he said, "was useful 
 to me: for first I knew that when I did any thing well, I 
 did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but for the sake 
 of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself: I had my 
 countenance well composed and my walk: all for myself 
 and for God. Then, as I struggled alone, so I alone also 
 was in danger: in no respect through me, if I did any- 
 thing base or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered : 
 nor did I injure the many by doing any thing wrong as a 
 philosopher. P'or this reason those who did not know my 
 purpose used to wonder how it was that while I conversed 
 and lived altogether with all philosophers, I was not a 
 philosopher myself. And what was the harm for me to 
 be known to be a philosopher by my acts and not by out- 
 ward marks? 2 See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, 
 how I bear and forbear, how I co-operate, how I employ de- 
 sire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), how I 
 maintain the relations (to things) those which are natural 
 or those which are acquired, how free from confusion, how 
 free from hindrance. Judge of me from this, if you can. But 
 if you are so deaf and blind that you can not conceive even 
 Hephaestus to be a good smith, unless you see the cap on his 
 head, what is the harm in not being recognized by so foolish 
 a judge?" 
 
 So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most 
 persons ; and they used to come to him and ask to be intro- 
 duced to philosophers. Was he vexed then as we are, and did 
 he say, "And do you not think that I am a philosopher?" 
 No, but he would take them and introduce them, being satis- 
 fied with one thing, with being a philosopher, and being 
 pleased also with not being thought to be a philosopher, he 
 was not annoyed: for he thought of his own occupation. 
 What is the work of an honourable and good man? To 
 have many pupils? By no means. They will look to this 
 matter who are earnest about it. But was it his business to 
 examine carefully difficult theorems? Others will look
 
 352, EPICTETUS 
 
 after" these matters also. In what then was he, 8 and 
 who was he and whom did he wish to be? He was 
 in that (employed in that) wherein there was hurt (dam- 
 age) and advantage. "If any man can damage me," he 
 says, "I am doing nothing: if I am waiting for another 
 man to do me good, I am nothing. If I wish for any thing, 
 and it does not happen, I am unfortunate." To such a 
 contest he invited every man, and I do not think that he 
 would have declined the contest with any one. What do you 
 suppose ? was it by proclaiming and saying, " I am such a 
 man ?" Far from it, but by being such a man. For further, 
 this is the character of a fool and a boaster to say, "I am 
 free from passions and disturbance : do not be ignorant, my 
 friends, that while you are uneasy and disturbed about things 
 of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation." So is it 
 not enough for you to feel no pain, unless you make this 
 proclamation: "Come together all who are suffering gout, 
 pains in the head, fever, ye who are lame, blind, and observe 
 that I am sound (free) from every ailment." This is empty 
 and disagreeable to hear, unless like yEsculapius you are able 
 to show immediately by what kind of treatment they also 
 shall be immediately free from disease, and unless you show 
 your own health as an example. 
 
 For such is the Cynic who is honoured with the sceptre 
 and the diadem by Zeus, and says, "That you may see, O 
 men, that you seek happiness and tranquillity not where it is, 
 but where it is not, behold I am sent to you by God as an ex- 
 ample, I who have neither property nor house, nor wife nor 
 children, not even a bed, nor coat nor household utensil ; and 
 see how healthy I am : try me, and if you see that I am free 
 from perturbations, hear the remedies and how I have been 
 cured (treated)." This is both philanthropic and noble. 
 But see whose work it is, the work of Zeus, or of him whom 
 he may judge worthy of this service, that he may never ex- 
 hibit any thing to the many, by which he shall make of no 
 effect his own testimony, whereby he gives testimony to vir- 
 tue, and bears evidence against external things: 
 
 "His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks 
 He wipes a tear."* 
 
 And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks any
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 353 
 
 thing, nor man, nor place, nor amusement, as children seek 
 the vintage or holidays; always fortified by modesty as 
 others are fortified by walls and doors and doorkeepers. 
 
 But now (these men) being only moved to philosophy, 
 as those who have a bad stomach are moved to some kinds 
 of food which they soon loathe, straightway (rush) towards 
 the sceptre and to the royal power. They let the hair grow, 
 they assume the cloak, they show the shoulder bare, they 
 quarrel with those whom they meet ; and if they see a man in 
 a thick winter coat, they quarrel with him. Man, first ex- 
 ercise yourself in winter weather : see your movements (in- 
 clinations) that they are not those of a man with a bad 
 stomach or those of a longing woman. First strive that it be 
 not known what you are: be a philosopher to yourself (or, 
 philosophize to yourself) a short time. Fruit grows thus: 
 the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in 
 order that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the 
 ear before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a produce of the 
 garden of Adonis. 5 Such a poor plant are you also : you 
 have blossomed too soon; the cold weather will scorch you 
 up. See what the husbandmen say about seeds when there 
 is warm weather too early. They are afraid lest the seeds 
 should be too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay 
 hold of them and show that they are too forward. Do you 
 also consider, my man : you have shot out too soon, you 
 have hurried towards a little fame before the proper season : 
 you think that you are something, a fool among fools : you 
 will be caught by the frost, and rather you have been frost- 
 bitten in the root below, but your upper parts still blossom 
 a little, and for this reason you think that you are still alive 
 and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the natural way: 
 why do you bare (expose) us? why do you force us? we 
 are not yet able to bear the air. Let the root grow, then 
 acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third; 
 in this way then the fruit will naturally force itself out, even 
 if I do not choose. For who that is pregnant and filled with 
 such great principles does not also perceive his own powers 
 and move towards the corresponding acts? A bull is not 
 ignorant of his own nature and his powers, when a wild 
 beast shows itself, nor does he wait for one to urge him on ; 
 nor a dog when he sees a wild animal. But if I have the 
 
 23
 
 354 EPICTETUS 
 
 powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to prepare me for 
 my own (proper) acts? At present I have them not, Re- 
 lieve me. Why then do you wish me to be withered up 
 before the time, as you have been withered up? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Compare Horace, Ep. i. 19, 12, etc. 
 
 "Quid, si quis vultu torvo ferus et pede nudo 
 Exiguaeque togse simulet textore Catonem, 
 Virtutemne reprsesentet moresque Catonis?" 
 
 1 "Yea a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works : shew me 
 thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works," 
 Epistle of James, ii. 18. So a moral philosopher may say, I show my prin- 
 ciples, not by what I profess, but by that which I do. 
 
 8 "In what then was he" seems to mean in what did he employ him- 
 self? 
 
 * Odyssey, xi. 528. 
 
 5 "The gardens of Adonis" are things growing in earthen vessels, car- 
 ried about for show only, not for use. "The gardens of Adonis" is a 
 proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for in- 
 stance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Such 
 things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonis. 
 Schweighauser's note.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER OF 
 
 SHAMELESSNESS 1 
 
 WHEN you see another man in the possession of 
 power (magistracy), set against this the fact that 
 you have not the want (desire) of power; when 
 you see another rich, see what you possess in place 
 of riches : for if you possess nothing in place of them, you 
 are miserable ; but if you have not the want of riches, know 
 that you possess more than this man possesses and what is 
 worth much more. Another man possesses a handsome 
 woman (wife) : you have the satisfaction of not desiring a 
 handsome wife. Do these things appear to you to be small ? 
 And how much would these persons give, these very men 
 who are rich, and in possession of power, and live with hand- 
 some women, to be able to despise riches, and power and 
 these very women whom they love and enjoy? Do you not 
 know then what is the thirst of a man who has a fever ? He 
 possesses that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man 
 who is in health : for the man who is in health ceases to be 
 thirsty after he has drunk ; but the sick man being pleased for 
 a short time has a nausea, he converts the drink into bile, 
 vomits, is griped, and more thirsty. It is such a thing to have 
 desire of riches and to possess riches, desire of power and to 
 possess power, desire of a beautiful woman and to sleep with 
 her : to this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the 
 thing which you love, indecent words, indecent thoughts, 
 unseemly acts. 
 
 And what do I lose? you will say. My man, you were 
 modest, and you are so no longer. Have you lost nothing? 
 In place of Chrysippus and Zeno you read Aristides and 
 Evenus; 2 have you lost nothing? In place of Socrates and 
 Diogenes, you admire him who is able to corrupt and seduce 
 most women. You wish to appear handsome and try to make 
 yourself so, though you are not. You like to display splendid 
 clothes that you may attract women ; and if you find any fine 
 
 355
 
 356 EPICTETUS 
 
 oil (for the hair), you imagine that you are happy. But 
 formerly you did not think of any such thing, but only where 
 there should be decent talk, a worthy man, and a generous 
 conception. Therefore you slept like a man, walked forth like 
 a man, wore a manly dress, and used to talk in a way becom- 
 ing a good man ; then do you say to me, I have lost nothing ? 
 So do men lose nothing more than coin ? Is not modesty lost? 
 Is not decent behaviour lost ? is it that he who has lost these 
 things has sustained no loss ? Perhaps you think that not one 
 of these things is a loss. But there was a time when you 
 reckoned this the only loss and damage, and you were anx- 
 ious that no man should disturb you from these (good) 
 words and actions. 
 
 Observe, you are disturbed from these good words and 
 actions by nobody, but by yourself. Fight with yourself, 
 restore yourself to decency, to modesty, to liberty. If any 
 man ever told you this about me, that a person forces me to 
 be an adulterer, to wear such a dress as yours, to perfume 
 myself with oils, would you not have gone and with 
 your own hand have killed the man who thus calumniated 
 me ? Now will you not help yourself ? and how much easier 
 is this help ? There is no need to kill any man, nor to put 
 him in chains, nor to treat him with contumely, nor to enter 
 the Forum (go to the courts of law), but it is only necessary 
 for you to speak to yourself who will be most easily per- 
 suaded, with whom no man has more power of persuasion 
 than yourself. First of all, condemn what you are doing, and 
 then when you have condemned it, do not despair of yourself, 
 and be not in the condition of those men of mean spirit, who, 
 when they have once given in, surrender themselves com- 
 pletely and are carried away as if by a torrent. But see what 
 the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen ? Rise, they say, 
 wrestle again till you are made strong. Do you also do 
 something of the same kind : for be well assured that nothing 
 is more tractable than the human soul. You must exercise 
 the will, 3 and the thing is done, it is set right: as on the 
 other hand, only fall a nodding (be careless), and the thing 
 is lost : for from within comes ruin and from within comes 
 help. Then (you say) what good do I gain? And what 
 greater good do you seek than this ? 4 From a shameless man
 
 DISCOURSES 357 
 
 you will become a modest man, from a disorderly you will 
 become an orderly man, from a faithless you will become a 
 faithful man, from a man of unbridled habits a sober man. 
 If you seek any thing more than this, go on doing what you 
 are doing : not even a God can now help you. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 "They, who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the 
 strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in read- 
 ing this chapter of Epictetus." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the au- 
 thor of a work named Milesiaca or Milesian stories. All that we know 
 of the work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious. 
 It was translated into Latin by L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of 
 the Dictator Sulla; and it is mentioned by Plutarch (Life of Crassus, c, 
 32), and several times by Ovid (Tristia ii. 413 etc.). Evenus was per- 
 haps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture 
 from being here associated with Aristides what his character was. 
 
 * The power of the will is a fundamental principle with Epictetus. The 
 will is strong in some, but very feeble in others ; and sometimes, as expe- 
 rience seems to show, it is incapable of resisting the power of old habits 
 
 4 Virtue is its own reward, said the Stoics. This is the meaning of 
 Epictetus, and it is consistent with his principles that a man should live 
 conformably to his nature, and so he will have all the happiness of which 
 human nature is capable. Mrs. Carter has a note here, which I do not 
 copy, and I hardly understand. It seems to refer to the Christian doc- 
 trine of a man being rewarded in a future life according to his works : 
 but we have no evidence that Epictetus believed in a future life, and he 
 therefore could not go further than to maintain that virtuous behaviour 
 is the best thing in this short life, and will give a man the happiness 
 which he can obtain in no other way.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE, AND WHAT THINGS WE 
 OUGHT TO VALUE 
 
 THE difficulties of all men are about external things, 
 their helplessness is about externals. What shall I 
 do, how will it be, how will it turn out, will this hap- 
 pen, will that ? All these are the words of those who 
 are turning themselves to things which are not within the 
 power of the will. For who says, "How shall I not assent to 
 that which is false? how shall I not turn away from the 
 truth ?" If a man be of such a good disposition as to be anx- 
 ious about these things, I will remind him of this. Why are 
 you anxious ? The thing is in your own power : be assured : 
 do not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the nat- 
 ural rule. On the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy) 
 about desire, lest it fail in its purpose and miss its end, and 
 with respect to the avoidance of things, lest he should fall 
 into that which he would avoid, I will first kiss (love) him, 
 because he throws away the things about which others are in 
 a flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs his 
 thoughts about his own affairs and his own condition. Then 
 I shall say to him, if you do not choose to desire that which 
 you will fail to obtain nor to attempt to avoid that into which 
 you will fall, desire nothing which belongs to (which is in 
 the power of) others, nor try to avoid any of the things 
 which are not in your power. If you do not observe this rule, 
 you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall into that 
 which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here? where 
 is there room for the words, How will it be ? and How will 
 it turn out ? and will this happen or that ? 
 
 Now is not that which will happen independent of the 
 will ? Yes. And the nature of good and of evil is it not in the 
 things which are within the power of the will ? Yes. Is it in 
 your power then to treat according to nature every thing 
 which happens ? Can any person hinder you ? No man. No 
 longer then say to me, How will it be ? For however it may 
 
 358
 
 DISCOURSES 359 
 
 be, you will dispose of it well, 1 and the result to you will be 
 a fortunate one. What would Hercules have been if he said, 
 "How shall a great lion not appear to me, or a great boar, or 
 savage men ?" And what do you care for that ? If a great 
 boar appear, you will fight a greater fight : if bad men appear, 
 you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I lose 
 my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble 
 act. For since we must certainly die, of necessity a man must 
 be found doing something either following the employment 
 of a husbandman, or digging, or trading, or serving in a 
 consulship, or suffering from indigestion or from diarrhoea. 
 What then do you wish to be doing when you are found by 
 death ? I for my part would wish to be found doing some- 
 thing which belongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the gen- 
 eral interest, noble. But if I can not be found doing things 
 so great, I would be found doing at least that which I can not 
 be hindered from doing, that which is permitted me to do, 
 correcting myself , cultivating the faculty which makes use of 
 appearances, labouring at freedom from the affects (labour- 
 ing at tranquillity of mind), rendering to the relations of life 
 their due; if I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touch- 
 ing on (advancing to) the third topic (or head), safety in 
 the forming judgments about things. 2 If death surprises me 
 when I am busy about these things, it is enough for me if I 
 can stretch out my hands to God and say : "The means which 
 I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of 
 the world) and following it, I have not neglected : I have not 
 dishonoured thee by my acts : see how I have used my per- 
 ceptions, see how I have used my preconceptions : have I ever 
 blamed thee? have I been discontented with any thing that 
 happens, or wished it to be otherwise? have I wished to 
 transgress the (established) relations (of things) ? That 
 thou hast given me life, I thank thee for what thou hast 
 given : so long as I have used the things which are thine I 
 am content; take them back and place them wherever thou 
 mayest choose ; for thine were all things, thou gavest them to 
 me." 3 Is it not enough to depart in this state of mind, and 
 what life is better and more becoming than that of a man 
 who is in this state of mind? and what end is more happy? 4 
 But that this may be done (that such a declaration may be
 
 360 EPICTETUS 
 
 made), a man must receive (bear) no small things, nor are 
 the things small which he must lose (go without). You can 
 not both wish to be a consul and to have these things (the 
 power of making such a dying speech), and to be eager to 
 have lands, and these things also ; and to be solicitous about 
 slaves and about yourself. But if you wish for any thing 
 which belongs to another, that which is your own is lost. 
 This is the nature of the thing : nothing is given or had for 
 nothing. 5 And where is the wonder? If you wish to be a 
 consul, you must keep awake, run about, kiss hands, waste 
 yourself with exhaustion at other men's doors, say and do 
 many things unworthy of a free man, send gifts to many, 
 daily presents to some. And what is the thing that is got? 
 Twelve bundles of rods (the consular fasces), to sit three or 
 four times on the tribunal, to exhibit the games in the Circus 
 and to give suppers in small baskets. 6 Or, if you do not 
 agree about this, let some one show me what there is besides 
 these things. In order then to secure freedom from pas- 
 sions (cbroSe/as), tranquillity, to sleep well when you do sleep, 
 to be really awake when you are awake, to fear nothing, to 
 be anxious about nothing, will you spend nothing and give 
 no labour ? But if any thing belonging to you be lost while 
 you are thus busied, or be wasted badly, or another obtains 
 what you ought to have obtained, will you immediately be 
 vexed at what has happened ? Will you not take into the ac- 
 count on the other side what you receive and for what, how 
 much for how much? Do you expect to have for nothing 
 things so great? And how can you? One work (thing) has 
 no community with another. You can not have both exter- 
 nal things after bestowing care on them and your own ruling 
 faculty : 7 but if you would have those, give up this. If you 
 do not, you will have neither this nor that, while you are 
 drawn in different ways to both. 8 The oil will be spilled, the 
 household vessels will perish: (that may be), but I shall be 
 free from passions (tranquil). There will be a fire when I 
 am not present, and the books will be destroyed : but I shall 
 treat appearances according to nature. Well; but I shall 
 have nothing to eat. If I am so unlucky, death is a harbour; 
 and death is the harbour for all; this is the place of refuge; 
 and for this reason not one of the things in life is difficult; as
 
 DISCOURSES 361 
 
 soon as you choose, you are out of the house, and are smoked 
 no more. 9 Why then are you anxious, why do you lose your 
 sleep, why do you not straightway, after considering wherein 
 your good is and your evil, say, "Both of them are in my 
 power? Neither can any man deprive me of the good, nor 
 involve me in the bad against my will. Why do I not throw 
 myself down and snore ? for all that I have is safe. As to the 
 things which belong to others, he will look to them who gets 
 them, as they may be given by him who has the power. Who 
 am I who wish to have them in this way or in that? is a 
 power of selecting them given to me ? has any person made 
 me the dispenser of them ? Those things are enough for me 
 over which I have power : I ought to manage them as well 
 as I can : and all the rest, as the master of them (God) may 
 choose." 
 
 When a man has these things before his eyes, does he keep 
 awake and turn hither and thither ? What would he have, or 
 what does he regret, Patroclus or Antilochus or Menelaus ? 10 
 For when did he suppose that any of his friends was im- 
 mortal, and when had he not before his eyes that on the mor- 
 row or the day after he or his friend must die ? Yes, he says, 
 but I thought that he would survive me and bring up my son. 
 You were a fool for that reason, and you were thinking of 
 what was uncertain. Why then do you not blame yourself, 
 and sit crying like girls ? But he used to set my food before 
 me. Because he was alive, you fool, but now he can not; 
 but Automedon 11 will set it before you, and if Automedon 
 also dies, you will find another. But if the pot, in which 
 your meat was cooked, should be broken, must you die of 
 hunger, because you have not the pot which you are accus- 
 tomed to ? Do you not send and buy a new pot ? He says : 
 
 "No greater ill than this could fall on me." u 
 
 Why is this your ill? Do you then instead of removing it 
 blame your mother (Thetis) for not foretelling it to you that 
 you might continue grieving. from that time? What do you 
 think? do you not suppose that Homer wrote this that we 
 may learn that those of noblest birth, the strongest and the 
 richest, the most handsome, when they have not the opinions
 
 362 EPICTETUS 
 
 which they ought to have, are not prevented from being most 
 wretched and unfortunate? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 See a passage in Plutarch on Tranquillity from Euripides, the great 
 storehouse of noble thoughts, from which ancient writers drew much 
 good matter ; and perhaps it was one of the reasons why so many of his 
 plays and fragments have been preserved. 
 
 " We must not quarrel with the things that are, 
 For they care not for us : but he who feels them 
 If he disposes well of things, fares well." 
 
 * See iii. c. 2. 
 
 * "Thine they were, and thou gavest them to me." John xvii. 6. 
 Mrs. Carter. 
 
 * "I wish it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by 
 applying it to the ideal perfect character ; but it is in a general way that 
 Epictetus hath proposed such a dying speech, as can not without shocking 
 arrogance be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixed as it is with any 
 acknowledgment of faults or imperfections, at present, or with any sense 
 of guilt on account of the past, it must give every sober reader a very 
 disadvantageous opinion of some principles of the philosophy on which 
 it is founded, as contradictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on 
 absolute ignorance or neglect of the condition and circumstances of such 
 a creature as man." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 I am inclined to think that Epictetus does refer to the "ideal perfect 
 character" : but others may not understand him in this way. When 
 Mrs. Carter says "but it is in a general . . . dying speech," she can hardly 
 suppose, as her words seem to mean, that Epictetus proposed such a 
 dying speech, for every man or even for many men, for he knew and has 
 told us how bad many men are, and how few are good according to his 
 measure and rule : in fact his meaning is plainly expressed. The dying 
 speech may even be stronger in the sense in which Mrs. Carter under- 
 stands it, in my translation, where I have rendered one passage in the 
 text by the words "I have not dishonoured thee by my acts," which she 
 translates, "as far as in me lay, I have not dishonoured thee ;" which ap- 
 parently means, "as far as I could, I have not dishonoured thee." The 
 Latin translation "quantum in me fuit," seems rather ambiguous to me. 
 
 There is a general confession of sins in the prayer book of the Church 
 of England, part of which Epictetus would not have rejected, I think. 
 Of course the words which form the peculiar Christian character of the 
 confession would have been unintelligible to him. It is a confession 
 which all persons of all conditions are supposed to make. If all persons 
 made the confession with sincerity, it ought to produce a corresponding 
 behaviour and make men more ready to be kind to one another, for all 
 who use it confess that they fail in their duty, and it ought to lower 
 pride and banish arrogance from the behaviour of those who in wealth 
 and condition are elevated above the multitude. But I have seen it 
 somewhere said, I can net remember where, but said in no friendly spirit 
 to Christian prayer, that some men both priests and laymen prostrate 
 themselves in humility before God and indemnify themselves by arro- 
 gance to man. 
 
 * See iv. 2, 2.
 
 DISCOURSES 363 
 
 * These were what the Romans named "sportulae," in which the rich 
 used to give some eatables to poor dependents who called to pay their 
 respects to the great at an early hour. 
 
 "Nunc sportula primo 
 Limine parva sedet turbae rapienda togatae." 
 
 Juvenal, Sat. i. 95. 
 
 T "You can not serve God and Mammon." Matthew vi. 24. Mrs. 
 Carter. 
 8 See iv. 2, 5. 
 
 * Compare i. 25, 18, and i. 9, 20. 
 
 10 Epictetus refers to the passage in the Iliad xxiv. 5, where Achilles 
 is lamenting the death of Patroclus and can not sleep. 
 
 11 "This is a wretched idea of friendship ; but a necessary consequence 
 of the Stoic system. What a fine contrast to this gloomy consolation 
 are the noble sentiments of an Apostle? Value your deceased friend, 
 says Epictetus, as a broken pipkin ; forget him, as a thing worthless, 
 lost and destroyed. St. Paul, on the contrary, comforts the mourning 
 survivors; bidding them not sorrow, as those who have no hope: but 
 remember that the death of good persons is only a sleep; from which 
 they will soon arise to a happy immortality." Mrs. Carter. 
 
 Epictetus does not say, "value your deceased friend as a broken pipkin." 
 Achilles laments that he has lost the services of his friend at table, a 
 vulgar kind of complaint ; he is thinking of his own loss, instead of his 
 friend. The answer is such a loss as he laments is easily repaired ; the 
 loss of such a friend is as easily repaired as the loss of a cooking vessel. 
 Mrs. Carter in her zeal to contrast the teaching of the Apostle with that 
 of Epictetus seems to forget for the time that Epictetus, so far as we 
 know, did not accept or did not teach the doctrine of a future life. As 
 to what he thought of friendship, if it was a real friendship, such as we 
 can conceive, I am sure that he did not think of it, as Mrs. Carter says 
 that he did ; for true friendship implies many of the virtues which Epic- 
 tetus taught and practised. He has a chapter on Friendship, ii. 22, which 
 I suppose that Mrs. Carter did not think of, when she wrote this note. 
 
 " Iliad xix. 321.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 ABOUT PURITY ( CLEANLINESS) 
 
 SOME persons raise a question whether the social feel- 
 ing is contained in the nature of man ; and yet I think 
 that these same persons would have no doubt that 
 love of purity is certainly contained in it, and that if 
 man is distinguished from other animals by any thing, he is 
 distinguished by this. When then we see any other animal 
 cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with 
 surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man : and 
 on the other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty, 
 straightway as if we were making an excuse for it, we say 
 that of course the animal is not a human creature. So we 
 suppose that there is something superior in man, and that 
 we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by their 
 nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men ap- 
 proach them by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to 
 a love (habit) of purity. But since it is impossible that man's 
 nature (ovcsia) can be altogether pure being mixed (com- 
 posed) of such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is pos- 
 sible, and reason endeavours to make human nature love 
 purity. 
 
 The first then and highest purity is that which is in the 
 soul ; and we say the same of impurity. Now you could not 
 discover the impurity of the soul as you could discover that 
 of the body : but as to the soul, what else could you find in 
 it than that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which 
 are her own? Now the acts of the soul are movement to- % 
 wards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, prep- 
 aration, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in 
 these acts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing else 
 than her own bad judgments ( Kpinara). Consequently the 
 impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the puri- 
 fication of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions; 
 and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the soul 
 
 364
 
 DISCOURSES 365 
 
 alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollu- 
 tion. 
 
 Now we ought to work at something like this in the body 
 also, as far as we can. It was impossible for the defluxions 
 of the nose not to run when man has such a mixture in his 
 body. For this reason nature has made hands and the nostrils 
 themselves as channels for carrying off the humours. If then 
 a man sucks up the defluxions, I say that he is not doing the 
 act of a man. It was impossible for a man's feet not to be 
 made muddy and not be soiled at all when he passes through 
 dirty places. For this reason nature (God) has made water 
 and hands. It was impossible that some impurity should not 
 remain in the teeth from eating: for this reason, she says, 
 wash the teeth. Why ? In order that you may be a man and 
 not a wild beast or a hog. It was impossible that from the 
 sweat and the pressing of the clothes there should not re- 
 main some impurity about the body which requires to be 
 cleaned away. For this reason water, oil, hands, towels, 
 scrapers (strigils), 1 nitre, sometimes all other kinds of 
 means are necessary for cleaning the body. You do not act 
 so : but the smith will take off the rust from the iron (instru- 
 ments), and he will have tools prepared for this purpose, and 
 you yourself wash the platter when you are going to eat, if 
 you are not completely impure and dirty : but will you not 
 wash the body nor make it clean ? Why ? he replies. I will 
 tell you again ; in the first place, that you may do the acts of 
 a man ; then, that you may not be disagreeable to those with 
 whom you associate. You do something of this kind even in 
 this matter, and you do not perceive it : you think that you 
 deserve to stink. Let it be so : deserve to stink. Do you think 
 that also those who sit by you, those who recline at table with 
 you, that those who kiss you deserve the same? Either go 
 into a desert, where you deserve to go, or live by yourself, 
 and smell yourself. For it is just that you alone should en- 
 joy your own impurity. But when you are in a city, to behave 
 so inconsiderately and foolishly, to what character do you 
 think that it belongs? If nature had entrusted to you a horse, 
 would you have overlooked and neglected him? And now 
 think that you have been entrusted with your own body as 
 with a horse; wash it, wipe it, take care that no man turns
 
 366 EPICTETUS 
 
 away from it, that no one gets out of the way for it. But who 
 does not get out of the way of a dirty man, of a stinking man, 
 of a man whose skin is foul, more than he does out of the 
 way of a man who is daubed with muck ? That smell is from 
 without, it is put upon him ; but the pther smell is from want 
 of care, from within, and in a manner from a body in putre- 
 faction. 
 
 But Socrates washed himself seldom. Yes, but his body 
 was clean and fair : and it was so agreeable and sweet that 
 the most beautiful and the most noble loved him, and desired 
 to sit by him rather than by the side of those who had the 
 handsomest forms. It was in his power neither to use the 
 bath nor to wash himself, if he chose; and yet the rare use of 
 water had an effect. [If you do not choose to wash with 
 warm water, wash with cold. 2 ] But Aristophanes says 
 
 "Those who are pale, unshod, 'tis those I mean." 1 
 
 For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the 
 air and stole clothes from the palaestra. 4 But all who have 
 written about Socrates bear exactly the contrary evidence in 
 his favour ; they say that he was pleasant not only to hear, 
 but also to see. 5 On the other hand they write the same about 
 Diogenes. 6 For we ought not even by the appearance of 
 the body to deter the multitude from philosophy ; but as in 
 other things a philosopher should show himself cheerful and 
 tranquil, so also he should in the things that relate to the 
 body ; "See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want noth- 
 ing : see how I am without a house, and without a city, and 
 an exile, if it happens to be so, 7 and without a hearth I live 
 more free from trouble and more happily than all of noble 
 birth and than the rich. But look at my poor body also and 
 observe that it is not injured by my hard way of living." But 
 if a man says this to me, who has the appearance (dress) and 
 face of a condemned man, what God shall persuade me to ap- 
 proach philosophy, if it makes men such persons ? Far from 
 it ; I would not choose to do so, even if I were going to be- 
 come a wise man. I indeed would rather that a young man, 
 who is making his first movements towards philosophy, 
 should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed than
 
 DISCOURSES 367 
 
 with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain 
 notion (appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt 
 at) that which is becoming; and where he supposes it 
 to be, there also he strives that it shall be. It is only nec- 
 essary to show him (what it is) and to say: "Young man, 
 you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then 
 that it (is produced) grows in that part of you where 
 you have the rational faculty; seek it there where you 
 have the movements towards and the movements from 
 things, where you have the desires towards, and the 
 aversion from things ; for this is what you have in yourself 
 of a superior kind ; but the poor body is naturally only earth : 
 why do you labour about it to no purpose ? if you shall learn 
 nothing else, you will learn from time that the body is noth- 
 ing." But if a man comes to me daubed with filth, dirty, with 
 a moustache down to his knees, what can I say to him, by 
 what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For about 
 what has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I 
 may be able to change him and say, Beauty is not in this, 
 but in that? Would you have me to tell him, that beauty 
 consists not in being daubed with muck, but that it Kes in the 
 rational part? Has he any desire of beauty? has he any 
 form of it in his mind ? Go and talk to a hog, and tell him 
 not to roll in the mud. 
 
 For this reason the words of Xenocrates touched Polemon 
 also, since he was a lover of beauty, for he entered (the 
 room) having in him certain incitements (ivavfyara) to love 
 of beauty, but he looked for it in the wrong place. 8 For 
 nature has not made even the animals dirty which live with 
 man. Does a horse ever wallow in the mud, or a well bred 
 dog? But the hog, the dirty geese, and worms and spi- 
 ders do, which are banished furthest from human inter- 
 course. Do you then being a man choose to be not as one of 
 the animals which live with man, but rather a worm, or a 
 spider? Will you not wash yourself somewhere some time 
 in such manner as you choose? 9 Will you not wash off the 
 dirt from your body? Will you not come clean that those 
 with whom you keep company may have pleasure in being 
 with you ? But do you go with us even into the temples in
 
 368 EPICTETUS 
 
 such a state, where it is not permitted to spit or blow the 
 nose, being a heap of spittle and of snot? 
 
 What then? does any man (that is, do I) require you to 
 ornament yourself ? Far from it ; except to ornament that 
 which we really are by nature, the rational faculty, the opin- 
 ions, the actions; but as to the body only so far as purity, 
 only so far as not to give offence. But if you are told that 
 you ought not to wear garments dyed with purple, go and 
 daub your cloak with muck or tear it. 10 But how shall I 
 have a neat cloak ? Man, you have water ; wash it. Here is 
 a youth worthy of being loved, 11 here is an old man worthy 
 of loving and being loved in return, a fit person for a man to 
 intrust to him a son's instruction, to whom daughters and 
 young men shall come, if opportunity shall so happen, that 
 the teacher shall deliver his lessons to them on a dunghill. 
 Let this not be so : every deviation comes from something 
 which is in man's nature; but this (deviation) is near being 
 something not in man's nature. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The Zvtirpa, as Epictetus names it, was the Roman "strigilis," 
 which was used for the scraping and cleaning of the body in bathing. 
 Persius (v. 126) writes 
 
 "I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer." 
 
 The strigiles "were of bronze or iron of various forms. They were 
 applied to the body much in the same way as we see a piece of hoop 
 applied to a sweating horse." Pompeii, edited by Dr. Dyer. 
 
 See what is said of this passage in the latter part of this chapter. 
 
 * Nubes, v. 102. 
 
 4 Aristophanes, Nubes, v. 225, and v. 179. 
 
 5 Zenophon, Memorab. iii. 12. 
 8 See iii. 22. 
 
 7 Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town Sinope in Asia 
 on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage. Upton. 
 It is probable that this is false. 
 
 8 As to Polemon see iii. I, 14. 
 
 * It has been suggested that the words "if you do not choose to wash 
 with warm water, wash with cold," p. 366, belong to this place. 
 
 10 This is the literal translation : but it means "will you go, etc., tear 
 it?" 
 
 "The youth, probably, means the scholar, who neglects neatness; 
 and the old man, the tutor, that gives him no precept or example of it." 
 Mrs. Carter.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 ON ATTENTION 
 
 WHEN you have remitted your attention for a short 
 time, do not imagine this, that you will recover 
 it when you choose ; but let this thought be pres- 
 ent to you, that in consequence of the fault com- 
 mitted to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for 
 all that follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a 
 habit of not attending is formed in you ; then a habit of de- 
 ferring your attention. And continually from time to time 
 you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper 
 behaviour, the being and living conformably to nature. If 
 then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the com- 
 plete omission of attention is more profitable ; but if it is not 
 profitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant? 
 To-day I choose to play. Well then, ought you not to 
 play with attention ? I choose to sing. What then hinders 
 you from doing so with attention ? Is there any part of life 
 excepted, to which attention does not extend ? For will you 
 do it (any thing in life) worse by using attention, and better 
 by not attending at all ? And what else of the things in life 
 is done better by those who do not use attention ? Does he 
 who works in wood work better by not attending to it ? Does 
 the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending? and 
 is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention? Do 
 you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no 
 longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or to 
 modesty, or to moderation: but you do every thing that 
 comes into your mind in obedience to your inclinations. 
 
 To what things then ought I to attend? First to those 
 general (principles) and to have them in readiness, and with- 
 out them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to eat, not 
 to converse (associate) with men; that no man is master of 
 another man's will, but that in the will alone is the good and 
 the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for 
 me good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over 
 24 369
 
 EPICTETUS 
 
 myself have power in these things. When then these things 
 are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external 
 things ? What tyrant is formidable, what disease, what pov- 
 erty, what offence (from any man)? Well, I have not 
 pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him) 
 my work, my judgment? No. Why then should I trouble 
 myself about him? But he is supposed to be some one (of 
 importance). He will look to that himself; and those who 
 think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please, 
 to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey, 
 God and those who are next to him. He has placed me with 
 myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone, 
 and has given me rules for the right use of it ; and when I 
 follow these rules in syllogisms, I do not care for any man 
 who says any thing else (different) : in sophistical argu- 
 ment, I care for no man. Why then in greater matters do 
 those annoy me who blame me? What is the cause of this 
 perturbation? Nothing else than because in this matter 
 (topic) I am not disciplined. For all knowledge (science) 
 despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the 
 sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that 
 you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own 
 work (business). Produce any carpenter. 
 
 First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness, 
 and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the 
 soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and 
 nothing which belongs to others (or is in the power of 
 others), but to do as he has appointed who has the power; 
 we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the 
 power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted. 
 Next to this we ought to remember who we are, and what 
 is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties towards 
 the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in 
 this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the 
 season for play, and in whose presence ; what will be the con- 
 sequence of the act ; whether our associates will despise us, 
 whether we shall despise them; when to jeer (rf/r&^at), and 
 whom to ridicule ; and on what occasion to comply and with 
 whom ; and finally, in complying how to maintain our own 
 character. But wherever you have deviated from any of
 
 DISCOURSES 37 1 
 
 these rules, there is damage immediately, not from any thing 
 external, but from the action itself. 
 
 What then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you 
 do all this) ? It is not possible ; but this is possible, to direct 
 your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be 
 content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape 
 at least a few errors. But now when you have said, "To- 
 morrow I will begin to attend," you must be told that you 
 are saying this, "To-day I will be shameless, disregardful of 
 time .and place, mean ; it will be in the power of others to 
 give me pain ; to-day I will be passionate, and envious." See 
 how many evil things you are permitting yourself to do. If 
 it is good to use attention to-morrow, how much better is it 
 to do so to-day ? if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend, 
 much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to- 
 morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 AGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR AFFAIRS 
 
 WHEN a man has seemed to us to have talked with 
 simplicity (candour) about his own affairs, how 
 is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to 
 discover to him our own secrets and we think 
 this to be candid behaviour? In the first place because it 
 seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his 
 neighbour, and not to communicate to him also in turn our 
 own affairs ; next, because we think that we shall not present 
 to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent 
 about our own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to 
 say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing 
 of your own? where is this done? Besides, we have also 
 this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already 
 told us his own affairs ; for the notion rises in our mind that 
 this man could never divulge our affairs because he would 
 be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way 
 also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A 
 soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak 
 ill of Caesar; then you, as if you had received a pledge of 
 his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also 
 what you think, and then you are carried off in chains. 1 
 
 Something of this kind happens to us also generally. 
 Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to me, 
 shall I also do so to any man whom I meet? (No), for 
 when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a disposi- 
 tion ; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has heard. 
 Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I 
 resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I 
 both disturb others and am disturbed myself. But if I re- 
 member that one man does not injure another, and that every 
 man's acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not 
 any thing like him, but still I suffer what I do suffer through 
 my own silly talk. 
 
 True : but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of 
 
 372
 
 DISCOURSES 373 
 
 your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate nothing 
 to him. Did I ask you for your secrets, my man? did you 
 communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should 
 in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler and think 
 that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be 
 like you ? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs 
 to me, and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you 
 wish me to be so rash ? It is just the same as if I had a cask 
 which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, and you 
 should come and deposit with me your wine that I might put 
 it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not 
 intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. 
 How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your 
 affairs to a man who is faithful, and modest, to a man who 
 thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) use- 
 ful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me in- 
 trust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured his own fac- 
 ulty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money 
 or some office or promotion in the court (emperor's palace), 
 even if you should be going to murder your own children, 
 like Medea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness) ? 
 But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, and steady : 
 show me that you have friendly opinions; show that your 
 cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall not wait 
 for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come 
 to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose 
 to make use of a good vessel ? Who does not value a benevo- 
 lent and faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a 
 man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the diffi- 
 culty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the 
 burden, by taking a part of it. 
 
 True : but I trust you ; you do not trust me. In the first 
 place, not even do you trust me, but you are a babbler, and 
 for this reason you can not hold anything ; for indeed, if it 
 is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only ; but 
 now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by 
 him and say : "Brother, I have no friend more benevolent 
 than you nor dearer ; I request you to listen to my affairs." 
 And you do this even to those who are not known to you at
 
 374 EPICTETUS 
 
 all. But if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me 
 because I am faithful and modest, not because I have told 
 my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion 
 about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to 
 another, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if 
 this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every 
 man, if that would make me faithful and modest. But the 
 thing is not so, and it requires no common opinions (princi- 
 ples). If then you see a man who is busy about things not 
 dependent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you 
 must know that this man has ten thousand persons to compel 
 and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to 
 compel him to declare what he knows : 2 but a little girl's nod, 
 if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of 
 one who belongs to Caesar's court, desire of a magistracy or 
 of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You 
 must remember then among general principles that secret 
 discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity 
 and corresponding opinions. But where can we now find 
 these easily? Or if you can not answer that question, let 
 some one point out to me a man who can say : I care only 
 about the things which are my own, the things which are not 
 subject to hindrance, the things which are by nature free. 
 This I hold to be the nature of the good : but let all other 
 things be as they are allowed; I do not concern myself. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those 
 vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He 
 was what Juvenal names a "delator." Upton, who refers to the life of 
 Hadrian by ^Elius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing 
 soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what was 
 said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke iii. 14) in 
 answer to the question of the soldiers, "And what shall we do?" said 
 unto them "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be 
 content with your wages." Upton. 
 
 * The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract con- 
 fessions. See ii. 6, 18, and Schweighauser's note there. 
 
 END OF THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
 
 MEDITATIONS OF 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS
 
 Meditations of Aurelius 
 George Long 
 
 Eantmtavhs of CMt^atton
 
 '_< 
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 From a bust in Rome
 
 Meditations of 
 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus 
 
 Translated by 
 
 George Long 
 
 With a Critical and Biographical Introduction 
 
 * 
 
 by John Lancaster Spalding 
 Illustrated 
 
 New York 
 
 D. Appleton and Company 
 1904
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1900, 
 BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 THE intimate thoughts of a wise and noble man con- 
 cerning whatever touches the human heart most 
 nearly are necessarily interesting, and when he who 
 utters them has stood for years at the head of a vast and 
 powerful empire his words receive a new significance, 
 which is still further heightened by the fact that he writes 
 not for the public, but simply to render to himself an ac- 
 count of himself. This is what we have in the " Medita- 
 tions " of Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, a man 
 so modest, so sincere, so kindly, so magnanimous, that to 
 know him is to conceive a higher opinion of the race which 
 in him attains to such dignity and virtue. He was born 
 at Rome in the year 121 of the Christian era, and died in 
 1 80, a few weeks before his fifty-ninth birthday. He was 
 the nephew and adopted son of Antoninus Pius, whom from 
 early manhood he assisted in administering public affairs. 
 He became emperor at the age of forty, and reigned nine- 
 teen years, twelve of which he passed in Asia Minor, Syria, 
 Greece, Egypt, and the countries on the Danube, putting 
 down rebellion or defending the empire against the at- 
 tacks of the barbarians, having at the same time to face 
 various public misfortunes inundations, famines, earth- 
 quakes, fires, and pestilence which caused widespread 
 misery and dismay. But though constantly surrounded by 
 grave difficulties and dangers, and compelled to travel to 
 
 iii
 
 iv MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 almost every part of the empire, he not only found time 
 to devote himself, as a wise and careful ruler, to even the 
 minor interests and details of government, but also to 
 occupy himself with the study of philosophy and his own 
 improvement. It is the history of his inner life, as re- 
 corded in his journal, which has made him immortal, and 
 placed him in the company of the few in whom the lovers 
 of wisdom and perfection find it possible to take genuine 
 delight. The book has small literary merit. The lan- 
 guage is without elegance or distinction. He tells us that 
 he had learned to abstain from rhetoric and poetry and 
 fine writing. He studied simplicity and plainness in all 
 things. He jots down detached thoughts, often merely 
 gives us notes or indications, and his views are seldom 
 profound or original. He is a Stoic, but does not develop 
 or follow consistently any system of philosophy. He 
 wavers and is uncertain precisely in those things in which 
 a firm-rooted faith is most inspiring and invigorating. 
 Running all through his " Meditations " there is an under- 
 current of sadness and despondency. Is it because he is 
 compelled to labour in a vocation for which Nature did not 
 intend him, or is it due to the sight of the corruption and 
 worthlessness of those by whom he was surrounded, indi- 
 cating plainly to him that the fabric of Roman civilization 
 was falling to ruin, or is it to be attributed to the fatalism 
 which determines and controls his world-view? There was 
 little either in the condition of society or in his own re- 
 ligious faith to cheer and strengthen; and yet it is impos- 
 sible to live with him in his book without feeling that we 
 are in the company of one of the best, wisest, and bravest 
 of men, of one who, placed on the summit of power and 
 splendour, was never for a moment blinded by the glitter 
 and the show, but, looking steadfastly at the heart of things, 
 remained simple, sincere, modest, self-controlled, and lov- 
 ing. We forget that he was an emperor; we care not in
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS V 
 
 what style he utters himself; we are not curious about his 
 metaphysical theories, or disposed to argue and dispute; 
 it is enough that we are in his presence, that we hear his 
 words of wisdom and Stoic piety, with the reverence, 
 candour, and devoutness with which he speaks them. 
 
 He is a born teacher of morals, a born preacher of the 
 surpassing worth of the inner life; and this natural bent 
 was confirmed by his education, of which he has given an 
 account in the first book of the " Meditations," where he 
 mentions with gratitude that he was not sent to a public 
 school, and that his tutors were men of character and learn- 
 ing. " To the gods," he says, " I am indebted for having 
 good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
 teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends 
 nearly everything good." He began his studies, as was 
 the custom of the time, with rhetoric and poetry, but at 
 the age of twelve he became a pupil of the Stoics, and 
 adopted their austere practices as well as their dress, lead- 
 ing a life so abstemious and laborious as to injure his health, 
 which remained delicate. Much of his youth was passed 
 in the country, at the villa of Lorium, where, while con- 
 tinuing to read, he engaged in the pleasures of the chase, 
 mingled with the vintagers, and occupied himself with ath- 
 letic sports. Here, too, he enjoyed more exclusively the 
 society and conversation of his mother, from whom, he 
 tells us, he learned piety and beneficence, and abstinence 
 not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts, and 
 simplicity in his way of living far removed from the habits 
 of the rich. By her influence also he was strengthened to 
 preserve intact the virginal flower of his youth. Nor does 
 he forget to mention the admirable precepts given by his 
 tutors, who taught him to love work, to deny himself, 
 to endure misfortunes without complaint, not to deviate 
 from his purpose, to be considerate of others, not to listen 
 to evil speech, to be grave without affectation, and not
 
 Vi MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 to seek excuses for neglecting duty. Rusticus, whom he 
 thanks for having made him acquainted with the " Dis- 
 courses of Epictetus," warned him against the study of 
 what is merely speculative or ornamental. The example 
 of his masters made a greater impression even than their 
 words; and what touched him most was their patience, 
 firmness, equanimity, mildness, beneficence, uprightness, 
 and sincerity. In these " Meditations " there is not the 
 faintest trace of vanity. He is lowly minded and the most 
 modest of men. His candour and truthfulness are per- 
 fect. A lie seems to him to be an outrage upon his nature, 
 upon the divinity that dwells in him. He strives not only 
 to think and feel, but to love what he speaks. He is present 
 in these thoughts, and we almost seem to have bodily sight 
 of him as he lived and bore himself nearly eighteen hun- 
 dred years ago. 
 
 The habit of recollection, of self-examination was recom- 
 mended and practised by the Stoics before the time of 
 Marcus Aurelius. " Each day," says Seneca, " we should 
 call our soul to account. This was the custom of Sextius, 
 who, before taking his nightly rest, invariably passed his 
 conduct in review: Of what fault hast thou cured thyself 
 to-day? What passion hast thou combated? In what hast 
 thou become better? " And the philosopher goes on to 
 tell us how each evening, when the light was taken from 
 his room, and his wife, from respect for his pious practice, 
 became silent, he also was accustomed to recall whatever 
 he had done or spoken during the day, without dissimulat- 
 ing or omitting anything whatever; and that when he found 
 aught blameworthy, he pardoned himself only on condi- 
 tion that the fault should not again be committed. All 
 that concerns a good life was brought into this inquiry 
 the right use of time, the avoidance of the occasions of 
 wrongdoing, human respect, the keeping guard over one's 
 thoughts and words, mindfulness of the presence of God,
 
 MARCOS AURELIUS yii 
 
 of the certainty of death, and of the necessity of being pre- 
 pared to meet it with courage and dignity. We do not 
 know that Marcus Aurelius practised this daily and me- 
 thodical examination of conscience, but he certainly habit- 
 ually meditated the great moral truths, living in ideas, 
 not in material interests; in principles, not in passions. In 
 his youth even, as we learn from one of his letters to 
 Fronto, he was accustomed to make extracts from the 
 books he read, and to these little volumes, into which he 
 had gathered the fine essence of the best writers, he doubt- 
 less often recurred. In this way he cultivated a taste for 
 the brief and pregnant sayings of the Stoic and other phi- 
 losophers, and found in them new incentives to lead a 
 worthy life. A great thought, a winged word may have 
 power not only to rouse the conscience and the will, but 
 it may remain with us as a permanent stimulus to virtuous 
 conduct. A phrase may fasten itself in the mind as though 
 rivetted with bolts of steel, or it may insinuate itself into 
 the current of our opinions and beliefs, and, blending with 
 it, make the waters of life purer and sweeter. He loved 
 thoughts of this kind, and he has written many which will 
 continue to be a source of joy and strength as long as gen- 
 erous minds and hearts shall be found on earth. What he 
 says has additional charm and power because he says it, 
 because it is the utterance of a genuine man, the purity 
 and nobleness of whose character can not be called in ques- 
 tion, the testimony which his contemporaries bore to his 
 wisdom, magnanimity, and goodness being confirmed by 
 the consenting voice of succeeding generations. How 
 pleasant and invigorating it is to read considerations like 
 these: " Such as thy habitual thoughts, such also will be 
 the character of thy mind, for the soul is dyed by the 
 thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous series of such 
 thoughts as these; for instance, that where a man can live, 
 there he can also live well. Live with the gods. Hold
 
 yiii MARCUS AURfcLIUS 
 
 good to consist in the disposition to justice and the prac- 
 tice of it, and in this let thy desire terminate. The greatest 
 part of what we say or do being unnecessary, if a man 
 takes this away, he will have more leisure and less uneasi- 
 ness. We ought to check in the series of our thoughts 
 everything that is without a purpose and useless. What 
 more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? 
 Art thou not content that thou hast done something con- 
 formable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for 
 it, just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or 
 the feet for walking? Have I done something" for the gen- 
 eral good? Well, then, I have had my reward. Let it 
 not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou 
 art not simple or that thou art not good, but let him be 
 a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about thee. 
 Let men see, let them know a real man who lives accord- 
 ing to Nature. If they can not endure him, let them kill 
 him. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and 
 it will ever bubble up if thou wilt ever dig." 
 
 Epictetus and Seneca had taught much of what is best 
 in the " Thoughts " of Marcus Aurelius, but in his com- 
 pany we seem to breathe the air of a higher and serener 
 world. He is meek and patient, affectionate and helpful. 
 In his words there is nothing to recall the hard and haughty 
 spirit of stoicism. He lives with his soul, but he finds 
 the good of life in doing good. He is a worker, not a 
 dreamer. He strives always to behave like a Roman, like 
 a man; he never thinks of himself apart from his fellow- 
 men. What is not useful for the swarm is not useful for 
 the bee. His purpose is to keep himself holy, and to labour 
 for the salvation of men, for the welfare of society. He 
 seeks inner perfection in the midst of courts and camps, 
 but neglects no duty which his high office imposes. In his 
 tent, surrounded by barbarous hordes, he directs his armies, 
 and still has time to write his tender and lofty thoughts.
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS ix 
 
 In these he finds the strength to bear the awful burden 
 'which is laid upon him. Each morning he reminds him- 
 self that he awakens to do a man's work. Philosophy is 
 his mother, while the court is but a stepmother. " Return 
 to philosophy frequently, and repose in her, through whom 
 what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee toler- 
 able, and thou appearest tolerable in the court." He is 
 conscious of the temptations and dangers of his exalted 
 position, and frequently makes them the subject of his 
 " Meditations." " Take care that thou art not made into a 
 Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye, for such 
 things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, seri- 
 ous, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper 
 of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. 
 Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make 
 thee. Reverence the gods, and help men." He encour- 
 ages himself in this noble purpose by recalling the exam- 
 ple of Antoninus, his adoptive father his constancy, his 
 evenness in all things, his piety, the serenity of his counte- 
 nance, his sweetness, his disregard of empty fame, and his 
 efforts to understand things. He remembers how he bore 
 with those who blamed him unjustly; how he did nothing 
 in a hurry; how he refused to listen to calumnies; how he 
 was content with little; how laborious, patient, and firm 
 he was; how tolerant of those who opposed his opinions; 
 how eager to learn. 
 
 Men must have a chief, as the world a ruler, the herd 
 a leader; but this chief is not above the laws. His ideal 
 is that " of a polity in which there is the same law for all, 
 a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal 
 freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government 
 which respects most of all the freedom of the governed." 
 He abhors whatever is arbitrary or unjust, and finds noth- 
 ing so odious as the character of a tyrant, which. he couples 
 with such epithets as black, bestial, animal, stupid, coun-
 
 x MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 terfeit, scurrilous, and fraudulent. He admires the martyrs 
 of patriotism who have been the victims of tyrannical em- 
 perors. His knowledge of the incredible cruelties of some 
 of his predecessors on the imperial throne seemed to drive 
 him almost to excessive leniency. When he heard of the 
 assassination of Avidius Cassius, who at the head of 
 the armies of Asia had revolted, and against whom he was 
 marching, he said he was sorry to be deprived of the pleas- 
 ure of pardoning him. He does not think with the elder 
 Stoics that to be virtuous one must be harsh and unbend- 
 ing. " In mildness and goodness," he says, " there is a 
 higher quality of manliness." His constant aim is to unite 
 benignity with firmness. He does not wish to be too 
 severe even with himself. "It is not right that I should 
 afflict myself, I who have never willingly given pain to any 
 one." He has the tenderness and delicacy of soul of a 
 noble woman. There is a large benevolence and sympathy 
 in his judgment of men, even when they are perverse. He 
 is ever ready to be of help ; he is full of affection and clem- 
 ency. The temple he built he dedicated to Goodness, a 
 divinity hitherto unknown in Rome. " Love men," he 
 says, " but with a genuine love." " Thou dost not yet love 
 men with all thy heart." " It is not enough to forgive; 
 thou must love those who do thee wrong." The only 
 revenge he permits is to make one's self unlike the evil- 
 doer. Correct, if thou canst, the wicked; if not, suffer 
 them: for this good-will has been given thee. Be like the 
 vine, which bears its fruit and asks no reward. For the 
 rest, to be a blessing to others is to be a friend to one's 
 self. When there is question of doing good, one should 
 be of those who know not what they do a benefactor 
 without thinking that any one is his debtor. What may 
 be called his great precept is: Love mankind; follow God. 
 He has no weak thoughts about his own happiness. It is 
 well enough with him when he lives in accord with uni-
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS xi 
 
 versal law, when he fulfils his duties as a child of God and 
 a member of the whole human family. Besides, has he not 
 a sure refuge within his own heart, where at every mo- 
 ment he may live with the thoughts which give peace to 
 the soul? It is not necessary for him to seek the seashore 
 or the mountains to avoid distractions, for it is always in 
 his power to retire into himself, and to find there the things 
 which induce the tranquil mind those brief and funda- 
 mental principles which, whenever he recurs to them, make 
 him calm and strong, and send him back free from all dis- 
 content to his appointed work. Thus he lives in intimate 
 communion with the divinity present within him, and 
 seeks in the contemplation of the laws of reason protec- 
 tion from temptation, discouragement, and weakness. His 
 favourite virtues are justice and truth; but he is in tune 
 with whatever makes for magnanimity, freedom, strength, 
 and holiness of life. He cares not for fame, or wealth, or 
 power, or pleasure. Things are largely what we think 
 they are, and if we but understand that virtue is the only 
 essential good, we shall not deem poverty, or ill health, or 
 pain, or death an evil. One may be a divine man and be 
 unknown, while they who are praised are praised, for the 
 most part, ignorantly or by the false and the fickle. What, 
 after all, is man? The earth is but a point, and the present 
 in which alone we can live but a moment lost between 
 two infinities. Fame is good when it increases the will 
 and the power to do good, else it is naught, mere sound, 
 and emptiness. The clapping of hands and the clapping 
 of tongues are vanities in which none but the childish take 
 delight. The emotion with which he touches on the favour- 
 ite theme of dull and gloomy declaimers the hollowness 
 and evanescence of human life and grandeur imparts a 
 certain charm and freshness to his words: " Consider the 
 times of Vespasian! Thou wilt see all these things peo- 
 ple marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring,
 
 x ji MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, ob- 
 stinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some- 
 body to die, grumbling about the present, loving, heaping 
 up treasure, desiring to be consuls or kings. We see, then, 
 that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, 
 go to the times of Trajan. All is again the same. Their 
 life, too, is gone." He is full of commonplaces on this and 
 kindred subjects. He does not weary of them, but hunts 
 for arguments and comparisons to express his sense of the 
 worthlessness of fame, of the shortness of life, and the van- 
 ity of all things, especially of those which attract with the 
 bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by 
 the voices of men. What belongs to the body is a stream, 
 and what belongs to the soul is a dream and a vapour. All 
 pass quickly and are buried in oblivion, both they who 
 remember and they who are remembered. As he grows 
 older his sense of the hopeless sadness of life grows keener. 
 He is still resigned, still obedient to the eternal laws, but 
 he advances into ever-deepening gloom, where no ray of 
 light falls. His health was broken, and the evils which 
 he had worn himself out in trying to overcome were break- 
 ing forth again on every side. In the midst of his own 
 family he was unhappy. His wife, though she has doubt- 
 less been the victim of calumny, had ceased to sympathize 
 with him, and hated his friends. She had grown weary 
 of his philosophy and of the society of philosophers. His 
 austerity, his melancholy, his aversion to gaiety and splen- 
 dour, his grave maxims, were offensive to her pleasure- 
 craving nature. Though he gave no heed to the malicious 
 rumours about her, though he continued to love her as 
 " his good and faithful spouse," he was depressed by the 
 knowledge of her lack of heart for him. Commodus, his 
 son and successor, was a cause of still more poignant sor- 
 row than Faustina. He was a mere animal, without intel- 
 ligence or feeling, and though but seventeen years old at
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS xiii 
 
 the time of his father's death, he had already manifested 
 something of the dispositions which made him later one 
 of the most brutal tyrants by whom the world has been 
 cursed. 
 
 The emperor has been blamed for not disinheriting him 
 and adopting some one worthy to rule; but he had been 
 proclaimed Caesar while yet a boy, and by the time his 
 evil nature had revealed itself Marcus was too infirm to 
 take so decisive a step. In fact, it would have been neces- 
 sary to murder him, for had he been left alive the military 
 party, already disgusted with the rule of the philosophers, 
 as shown in the revolt of Avidius, would have placed him 
 at the head of the army, and plunged the empire into the 
 horrors of civil war. And then what is more natural than 
 that a father should believe that time and responsibility 
 would correct the faults of his youthful son? Neverthe- 
 less, Commodus filled him with forebodings and increased 
 his weight of care and pain, which already was too heavy 
 for his declining strength. His friends are dead, the bar- 
 barians are in arms, the corruption of morals is spreading, 
 faith in the gods has degenerated into gross superstition, 
 the reforms which he had laboured to bring about are 
 superficial and ineffectual, the laws had been made better, 
 but the life of the people continued to become more false 
 and brutal, the army was losing its old-time loyalty and 
 discipline on all sides the signs of decadence were mani- 
 fest. 
 
 In the midst of a falling world, in the presence of the 
 northern hordes, menacing destruction and ruin, the em- 
 peror still meditates, still studies how he may fortify his 
 soul. He does not despise death, but waits for it, content 
 to see it come. It will deliver him from the sight of the 
 corruption by which he is surrounded. His departure will 
 not be from men who have the same principles as himself. 
 " Come quick, O Death! lest perchance I, too, should for-
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 get myself." There will not be lacking those who are 
 glad to see him go, whose lives his very presence con- 
 demns: " Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from 
 this schoolmaster." In dying he will go away from those 
 for whom he strove, prayed, and cared so much, but who 
 nevertheless wish to see him depart, hoping thereby to get 
 some little advantage. " Why, then, should he desire to 
 stay longer? " It is better to be dead than to live as they. 
 Thou art in the grasp of fatal laws; be not like a pig that 
 squeals and struggles when it is sacrificed, but accept with 
 resignation what destiny decrees. Men are but leaves 
 which the wind seizes and scatters on the ground. Thus 
 weariness of life grows upon him, until he seems to be 
 without God and without hope in the world. In fact, he 
 had neither a philosophy nor a religion which can satisfy 
 the human heart. He was never able to settle for himself 
 the ultimate problems, the foundations of all ethical prin- 
 ciples God, immortality, and the freedom of the will. 
 He speaks as a polytheist, or a deist, or a pantheist, ac- 
 cording to his mood. At Athens he founded chairs of phi- 
 losophy for the Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean 
 schools, giving the same honour to the atheist as to the 
 believer in the gods. At times he seems to doubt even 
 that to which he holds most firmly. His grasp of specula- 
 tive truth is feeble; he is strong and helpful only as a 
 teacher of the conduct of life. Outside of this we find in 
 him little but uncertainty and confusion. His moral prin- 
 ciples even rest on no foundation of dogma, or, if on any, 
 it is that of cosmic pantheism. His theology is as vague 
 and variable as his philosophy. He has no settled con- 
 victions concerning the soul and its immortality. When 
 our little boat comes to shore and we get out, he leaves it 
 undecided whether it is to enter on another life or simply 
 to lose all sensation, to cease to be. His thought moves 
 between alternatives. " To go from among men, if there
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS XV 
 
 are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will 
 not involve thee in evil; but if, indeed, they do not exist, 
 or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it 
 to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of 
 providence? " Then he reassures himself and declares that 
 the gods do exist, and that they do care for human things; 
 at least they place the avoidance of real evils in a man's 
 power. But death and life, honour and dishonour, pain 
 and pleasure, are neither good nor evil, and therefore they 
 happen alike to all. God is for him the universal reason, 
 the immutable law which governs all things. He is the 
 whole, he is nature itself; the indwelling force which 
 gives order and beauty to the universe. How this divin- 
 ity, this inexorable fate, is to be reconciled with Providence 
 and with the freedom of the will, or be made an object of 
 prayer and adoration, he does not attempt to explain. 
 " Out of the universe from the beginning everything which 
 happens has been apportioned and spun out to thee." 
 " Accept everything which happens, even if it seem dis- 
 agreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the 
 universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus." Here 
 he joins theism and pantheism, but by Zeus he really means 
 the universe, the universal substance of which the individ- 
 ual has but a very small portion. As this universal sub- 
 stance exists necessarily, from it by fatal laws the thread 
 of each one's destiny is spun. " Whatever may happen 
 to thee was prepared for thee from all eternity, and the 
 implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread 
 of thy being." At times he seems to regard the universe 
 as an immense animal, " one living being, having one sub- 
 stance and one soul." But it is perhaps wrong to insist 
 on the theoretical views of a man who had little intellectual 
 curiosity, and cared hardly at all for what is speculative. 
 Still it is impossible not to recognise that he himself felt 
 that the help which pantheism can offer the soul is inef- 
 25
 
 xvi MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 factual. Even a philosopher can derive small comfort from 
 the thought that his absorption into the mass of matter is 
 for the interest of the All, which contains nothing that is 
 not for its advantage. For the multitude such a belief is 
 without worth or meaning. Stoic morality is interesting 
 chiefly on account of its influence upon men like Epictetus 
 and Marcus Aurelius, who found in it a source of strength 
 in the midst of the universal corruption in which Greco- 
 Roman civilization was disappearing. It could never have 
 become a principle of social regeneration. The fatalism 
 on which it rests makes enthusiasm impossible. Its resig- 
 nation is despondency; its indifference, hopelessness. It 
 lacks vitality and joyousness. There is in it no love of 
 life, no belief in progress. The Stoic sage stands alone, 
 conscious of his own virtue, in the midst of a world of liars 
 and hypocrites. He is not angry with men; he is kind 
 even, and glad to be of help; but, in truth, he has little 
 sympathy with them. They are blind and perverse, an 
 infinite number of fools, who are deprived of that which 
 alone can make life bearable. Hence stoicism necessarily 
 fails. It can neither interest nor influence the mass of man- 
 kind. It is dry and hard. It inspires no glad emotion, 
 no immortal hope. It does not thrill the soul with the con- 
 sciousness that Life is lord of Death, that truth and love lie 
 at the heart of being, that whether we live or whether we die 
 we are borne in the arms of the eternal Father, who knows 
 and cares for each, even the least of his children. It can 
 not make us feel that the loving spirit of God leads us 
 forth into the land of righteousness, that we are reborn 
 into a kingdom of peace and joy and blessedness. It can 
 not give the faith which overcomes all things, and guides 
 us through the portals of death into everlasting life. It 
 has no words of pardon and comfort for sinners who re- 
 pent. The power that was to regenerate the world was 
 already active under the eyes of Marcus Aurelius, but was
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS xvii 
 
 wholly misunderstood by him. He alludes to the Christian 
 religion once only. " What a soul," he writes, " that is 
 which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated from 
 the body, and ready either to be extinguished, or dispersed, 
 or to continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes 
 from a man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as 
 with the Christians! " From his point of view the mar- 
 tyrs were obdurate fanatics and enemies of the empire. 
 Of his humanity and tolerance there can be no doubt, but, 
 unfortunately, there can be just as little doubt that he per- 
 secuted the Christians, or at the least permitted them to be 
 persecuted. Intensely moral natures are apt to be narrow 
 and rigid, and though several apologies for the new faith 
 were addressed to him, he either never read them or was 
 incapable of taking a world -view so utterly opposed to 
 that of the Stoic philosophy. They who are placed in high 
 stations are often the last to see the real trend of things, 
 for the possession of power, like the possession of wealth 
 or the indulgence of appetite, seems to impede insight; 
 and this kind-hearted and spiritual-minded man had not a 
 suspicion of the true nature of the teaching of Christ. It 
 did not appeal to him as a philosophy, and as a religion 
 it seemed to him atheistic, for it denied the existence of 
 the gods whom he revered and whose worship he thought 
 inseparable from loyalty to the empire. He felt, as all 
 the thoughtful minds of the time felt, that here was a new 
 spirit, which, if it should prevail, would lead to the over- 
 throw of the old civilization. He may not have held with 
 Tacitus that the Christians were convicted of hatred of the 
 human race, but he believed that they were the enemies 
 of the Roman state. The ancients looked upon religion 
 as essentially a national affair. They had no conception 
 of what we mean by liberty of conscience. The appeal 
 from Caesar to God was for them meaningless, if not im- 
 pious. When the Christians declared that they were ready
 
 xviii MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 to obey all civil and military laws, but reserved to them- 
 selves freedom to worship God according to the principles 
 of their faith, which forbade them to offer sacrifice to idols, 
 they uttered words which their enemies could not under- 
 stand, words which Christians themselves in later ages 
 have often been unable or unwilling to understand. 
 
 It was but two or three years before the death of Marcus 
 Aurelius that the persecution broke forth at Lyons. The 
 emperor, who became prematurely old, was in feeble health 
 and surrounded by dangers and difficulties. The populace, 
 eager to believe the Christians guilty of the most atrocious 
 crimes, attributed whatever evils befell the state to the 
 anger of the gods against their contemners, and clamoured 
 for their punishment. The emperor yielded to the popular 
 fury, and the church of Lyons gave to the world an ex- 
 ample of heroism which, if ever equalled, has never been 
 surpassed. It is the very irony of fate that Marcus Aurelius 
 should be counted among the persecutors of the Christians, 
 that his name should be coupled with those of Nero and 
 Domitian. It is doubtful whether he himself issued a new 
 edict or simply permitted those of his predecessors to be 
 enforced. Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who addressed a letter 
 to the emperor, leads us to suppose that he had sent forth 
 decrees which resulted in the martyrdom of St. Polycarp, 
 Bishop of Smyrna, ten years before the persecution at 
 Lyons. 
 
 On the other hand, Tertullian, writing twenty years after 
 the death of Marcus Aurelius, affirms in the most positive 
 manner that he protected the Christians; that if he did not 
 expressly revoke the edicts of former emperors against 
 them, he at least rendered them ineffective by establishing 
 penalties against their accusers. It seems probable that 
 he was not an active persecutor; but he certainly lived and 
 died with an utter misconception of the religion which 
 even then was the only vital force left to a perishing world.
 
 MARCUS AURELIUS xix 
 
 He was, nevertheless, one of the most just and clement 
 of men. There is little genuine wisdom and goodness any- 
 where, and what there is is rarely found in the palaces of 
 kings and emperors. Let us try to imagine a European 
 ruler or an American President of our day who should 
 be busy with the thoughts and aspirations of Marcus Aure- 
 lius. The mere idea seems to be grotesque. He is one in 
 whom the wise have recognised the genuine goodness 
 which has the mark of universality, which, like the best 
 culture, lifts its possessor above party and country, and 
 makes him a blessing for mankind and for all time. 
 
 In reading his " Meditations " we are always in the 
 presence of a magnanimous man, of a great soul whose 
 kindliness and good faith we can not doubt unless we our- 
 selves lack love and truth. He will remain in literature 
 as one of its great spiritual forces. He has the vital touch 
 which gives immortality, because it reveals a noble and 
 interesting personality. There is in him the indefinable 
 something which makes writing literature. It is doubtless 
 largely sincerity, the perfect truthfulness which makes the 
 word the mirror of the man. Much of what he says is said 
 by Seneca and Epictetus, but in it there is an accent of 
 his own which gives it a fresh meaning, a new quality. In 
 these disconnected " Thoughts," in spite of repetitions, of 
 incorrectness, and obscurity, there breathes a soul that can 
 not die, there stands forth a character which all men must 
 deem it a privilege to know. The book is alive with the 
 high and rare qualities which go to the making of a true 
 and noble man. In the little casket found in the tent on 
 the Danube where he died there was stored a life which 
 death could not extinguish. The " Meditations " with 
 which he fortified his own spirit in the struggle for better 
 and higher life have consoled and will continue to console 
 kindred spirits in every age; for whatever his doubts and 
 misgivings, his faith in duty and affection, in the supreme
 
 xx MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 worth of righteousness, was never shaken. His victories 
 are forgotten; his efforts to improve the laws, to spread 
 enlightenment, to help the orphans, are hardly remembered; 
 but fame, for which he cared not at all, is his forever, and 
 of our many vanities perhaps the least vain is the fame 
 which rests on words that never lose their power to inspire, 
 to illumine, and to strengthen. The whole earth is the 
 sepulchre of illustrious men, but it is so only when the 
 greatness of soul which shone forth in their lives is kept in 
 imperishable vigojur in some immortal book. 
 
 JOHN LANCASTER SPALDING.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 BOOK I i 
 
 BOOK II 10 
 
 BOOK III 16 
 
 BOOK IV 24 
 
 BOOK V 36 
 
 BOOK VI 47 
 
 BOOK VII 59 
 
 BOOK VIII 72 
 
 BOOK IX 84 
 
 BOOK X 95 
 
 BOOK XI 107 
 
 BOOK XII 118 
 
 zxi
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 FACING 
 PAGE 
 
 THE FATES Frontispiece 
 
 From a painting by Paul Thumann. 
 
 DIOGENES 66 
 
 From a painting by Jean Le"on Ge>6me. 
 
 THE AUGURS 202 
 
 From a painting by Jean Le'on GeY6me. 
 
 MEDITATIONS 
 MARCUS AURELIUS Frontispiece 
 
 From a bust in Rome. 
 
 HADRIAN'S TOMB 78 
 
 26
 
 MEDITATIONS 
 
 BOOK I 
 
 FROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I learned] good morals 
 and the government of my temper. 
 From the reputation and remembrance of my 
 father, 2 modesty and manly character. 
 
 From my mother, 3 piety and beneficence, and abstinence, 
 not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and 
 further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the 
 habits of the rich. 
 
 From my great-grand father, 4 not to have frequented public 
 schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to know 
 that on such things a man should spend liberally. 
 
 From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the 
 blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either 
 of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ; 
 from him too I learned endurance of labour, and to want 
 little, and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle 
 with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to 
 slander. 
 
 From Diognetus, 6 not to busy myself about trifling things, 
 and not to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers 
 and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of 
 daemons and such things; and not to breed quails [for fight- 
 ing] , nor to give myself up passionately to such things ; and 
 to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become intimate 
 with philosophy ; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,
 
 2 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dia- 
 logues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and 
 a skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian 
 discipline. 
 
 From Rusticus 8 I received the impression that my char- 
 acter required improvement and discipline; and from him I 
 learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to 
 writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering little horta- 
 tory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who prac- 
 tises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to 
 make a display ; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and 
 fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my out- 
 door dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to 
 write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rus- 
 ticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect 
 to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, 
 to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as 
 they have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read 
 carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial under- 
 standing of a book; nor hastily to give my assent to those 
 who talk overmuch ; and I am indebted to him for being ac- 
 quainted with the discourses of Epictetus, 7 which he com- 
 municated to me out of his own collection. 
 
 From Apollonius 8 I learned freedom of will and undevia- 
 ting steadiness of purpose ; and to look to nothing else, not 
 even for a moment, except to reason ; and to be always the 
 same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, 
 and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living example that 
 the same man can be both most resolute and yielding, and 
 not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had be- 
 fore my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience 
 and his skill in expounding philosophical principles as the 
 smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned how to receive 
 from friends what are esteemed favours, without being either 
 humbled by them or letting them pass unnoticed. 
 
 From Sextus, 9 a benevolent disposition, and the example 
 of a family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of 
 living conformably to nature; and gravity without affecta- 
 tion, and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and 
 to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions
 
 MEDITATIONS 3 
 
 without consideration :* 10 he had the power of readily accom- 
 modating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was 
 more agreeable than any flattery ; and at the same time he was 
 most highly venerated by those who associated with him: 
 and he had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in 
 an intelligent and methodical way, the principles necessary 
 for Irfe ; and he never showed anger or any other passion, but 
 was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate; 
 and he could express approbation without noisy display, and 
 he possessed much knowledge without ostentation. 
 
 From Alexander 11 the grammarian, to refrain from fault- 
 finding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those who 
 uttered any barbarous or solecistic or strange-sounding ex- 
 pression; but dexterously to introduce the very expression 
 which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or 
 giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing 
 itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion. 
 
 From Fronto 12 I learned to observe what envy, and 
 duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally 
 those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient 
 in paternal affection. 
 
 From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without 
 necessity to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have 
 no leisure; nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties 
 required by our relation to those with whom we live, by 
 alleging urgent occupations. 
 
 From Catulus, 13 not to be indifferent when a friend finds 
 fault, even if he should find fault without reason, but to try 
 to restore him to his usual disposition; and to be ready to 
 speak well of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
 Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 
 
 From my brother 14 Severus, to love my kin, and to 
 love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to 
 know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus; 15 and from 
 him I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same 
 law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights 
 and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly govern- 
 ment which respects most of all the freedom of the governed ; 
 I learned from him also * consistency and undeviating stead- 
 iness in my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do
 
 4 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 good, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good 
 hopes, and to believe that I am loved by my friends ; and in 
 him I observed no concealment of his opinions with respect 
 to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no 
 need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was 
 quite plain. 
 
 From Maximus 16 I learned self-government, and not to 
 be led aside by anything; and cheerfulness in all circum- 
 stances, as well as in illness; and a just admixture in the 
 moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what 
 was set before me without complaining. I observed that 
 everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in 
 all that he did he never had any bad intention ; and he never 
 showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, 
 and never put off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor de- 
 jected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on 
 the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. He 
 was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to 
 forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented 
 the appearance of a man who could not be diverted from 
 right rather than of a man who had been improved. I ob- 
 served, too, that no man could ever think that he was de- 
 spised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better 
 man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agree- 
 able way.* 
 
 In my father 17 I observed mildness of temper, and un- 
 changeable resolution in the things which he had determined 
 lafter due deliberation; and no vain glory in those things 
 which men call honours; and a love of labour and perseverance; 
 and a readiness to listen to those who had anything to pro- 
 pose for the common weal ; and undeviating firmness in giv- 
 ing to every man according to his deserts ; and a knowledge 
 derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action 
 and for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all 
 passion for boys; and he considered himself no more than 
 any other citizen ; and he released his friends from all obliga- 
 tion to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he 
 went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by 
 reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the 
 same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all mat-
 
 MEDITATIONS . 5 
 
 ters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never 
 stopped his investigation through being satisfied with ap- 
 pearances which first present themselves; and that his dis- 
 position was to keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of 
 them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection ; and to be 
 satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; and to foresee things 
 a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without dis- 
 play ; and to check immediately popular applause and all flat- 
 tery; and to be ever watchful over the things which were 
 necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a 
 good manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure 
 the blame which he got for such conduct ; and he was neither 
 superstitious with respect to the gods, nor did he court men 
 by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the popu- 
 lace; but he showed sobriety and firmness in all things and 
 never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. 
 And the things which conduce in any way to the commodity 
 of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he 
 used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so 
 that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, 
 and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one 
 could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a 
 [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant; but every one ac- 
 knowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able 
 to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, he 
 honoured those who were true philosophers, and he did not 
 reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet 
 was he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversa- 
 tion, and he made himself agreeable without any offensive 
 affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body's health, 
 not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of re- 
 gard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but 
 so that, through his own attention, he very seldom stood in 
 need of the physician's art, or of medicine or external appli- 
 cations. He was most ready to give way without envy to 
 those who possessed any particular faculty, such as that of 
 eloquence, or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of any- 
 thing else ; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy 
 reputation according to his deserts ; and he always acted con- 
 formably to the institutions of his country, without showing
 
 6 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of 
 change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same places, 
 and to employ himself about the same things; and after his 
 paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and 
 vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not 
 many, but very few and very rare, and these only about pub- 
 lic matters; and he showed prudence and economy in the 
 exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction of 
 public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such 
 things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be 
 done, not to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He 
 did not take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not fond 
 of building houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about 
 the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the beauty 
 of his slaves. 18 His dress came from Lorium, his villa on 
 the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. 19 We know how 
 he behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his 
 pardon ; and such was all his behaviour. There was in him 
 nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may 
 say, anything carried to the sweating point ; but he examined 
 all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- 
 out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consist- 
 ently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded 
 of Socrates, 20 that he was able both to abstain from, and to 
 en joy, those things which many are too weak to abstain from, 
 and can not enjoy without excess. But to be strong enough 
 both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the mark 
 of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he 
 showed in the illness of Maximus. 
 
 To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, 
 good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, 
 good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. Further, 
 I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence 
 against any of them, though I had a disposition which, if 
 opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something 
 of this kind ; but, through their favour, there never was such 
 a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, 
 I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up 
 with my grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the 
 flower of my youth, and that I did not make proof of my
 
 MEDITATIONS 7 
 
 virility before the proper season, but even deferred the time ; 
 that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to 
 take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowl- 
 edge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without 
 wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and 
 statues, and similar show; but that it is in such a man's 
 power to bring himself very near to the fashion of a private 
 person, without being for this reason either meaner in 
 thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to the things 
 which must be done for the public interest in a manner that 
 befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a 
 brother, 21 who was able by his moral character to rouse me 
 to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased 
 me by his respect and affection; that my children have not 
 been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did not make more 
 proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which 
 I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen 
 that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to 
 place those who brought me up in the station of honour, 
 which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with 
 hope of my doing it some time afterward, because 
 they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, 
 Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and fre- 
 quent impressions about living according to nature, 
 and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far 
 as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and 
 inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living ac- 
 cording to nature, though I still fall short of it through my 
 own fault, and through not observing the admonitions of the 
 gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that 
 my body has held out so long in such a kind of life; that I 
 never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after 
 having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured; and, 
 though I was often out of humour with Rusticus, I never did 
 anything of which I had occasion to repent ; that, though it 
 was my mother's fate to die young, she spent the last years of 
 her life with me ; that, whenever I wished to help any man in 
 his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I 
 had not the means of doing it ; and that to myself the same 
 necessity never happened, to receive anything from another ;
 
 3 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so affection- 
 ate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good 
 masters for my children ; and that remedies have been shown 
 to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting and 
 giddiness 22 ****** ; and that, when I had an inclina- 
 tion to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any 
 sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of his- 
 tories], or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself 
 about the investigation of appearances in the heavens ; for all 
 these things require the help of the gods and fortune. 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua. 23 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Annius Vents was his grandfather's name. There is no verb in this 
 section connected with the word "from," nor in the following sections 
 of this book; and it is not quite certain what verb should be supplied. 
 What I have added may express the meaning here, though there are 
 sections which it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that he learned 
 all these good things from the several persons whom he mentions, he 
 means that he observed certain good qualities in them, or received 
 certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better for 
 it, or at least might have been; for it would be a mistake to understand 
 Marcus as saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed in 
 his kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 3 His father's name was Annius Verus. 
 
 ' His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla. 
 
 * Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
 * In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one Diognetus, 
 whom the writer names "most excellent." He was a Gentile, but he 
 wished very much to know what the religion of the Christians was, 
 what God they worshipped, and how this worship made them despise 
 the world and death, and neither believe in the gods of the Greeks nor 
 observe the superstition of the Jews ; and what was this love to one 
 another which they had, and why this new kind of religion was intro- 
 duced now and not before. My friend Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge 
 in Kent, has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the 
 tutor of M. Antoninus. 
 
 ' Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus valued 
 highly, and often took his advice. 
 
 'Antoninus says, roic, 'EictKrrjreiois vxojuvfyiadiv, which must not 
 be translated, "the writings of Epictetus," for Epictetus wrote nothing. 
 His pupil Arrian has preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus. 
 
 8 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to be Mar- 
 cus's preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 
 
 " Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as some 
 say; but more probably a grandson. 
 
 "I have placed in some passages an *, which indicates corruption in 
 the text or great uncertainty in the meaning." Long's Preface.
 
 MEDITATIONS 9 
 
 u Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He wrote a 
 commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician Aristides wrote a panegyric 
 on Alexander in a funeral oration. 
 
 11 M. Cornelius Pronto was a rhetorician, and in great favour with 
 Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus and Fronto. 
 
 " Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
 " The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no brother. 
 It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin. Schultz in his 
 translation omits "brother," and says that this Severus is probably 
 Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. 
 
 15 We know from Tacitus (Annal. xm; xvi, 21; and other passages), 
 who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written the lives of the 
 two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to 
 Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. 
 
 18 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly es- 
 teemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. The character 
 of Maximus is that of a perfect man. 
 
 17 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor An- 
 toninus Pius. 
 
 18 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain. 
 
 " Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there An- 
 toninus was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt. 
 
 80 Xenophon, Memorab. I, 3, 15. 
 
 * The emperor had no brother, except L. Verus, his brother by adop- 
 tion. 
 
 ** This is corrupt. 
 
 ** The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia ; 
 and Antoninus made a campaign against them. Granua is probably 
 the river Graan, which flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written this first 
 book during the war with the Quadi. In the first edition of Antoninus, 
 and in the older editions, the first three sections of the second book 
 make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker placed them at the 
 beginning of the second book.
 
 BOOK II, 
 
 BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet 
 with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, 
 envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by 
 reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. 
 But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, 
 and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does 
 wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or 
 seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and 
 [the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured 
 by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor 
 can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are 
 made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
 the rows of the upper and lower teeth. 1 To act against one 
 another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against 
 one another to be vexed and to turn away. 
 
 Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, 
 and the ruling part. Throw away thy books ; no longer dis- 
 tract thyself: it is not allowed; but as if thou wast now 
 dying, despise the flesh ; it is blood and bones and a network, 
 a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath 
 also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and not Always the same, 
 but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The third 
 then is the ruling part : consider thus : Thou art an old man ; 
 no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings 
 like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dis- 
 satisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from the future. 
 
 All that is from the gods is full of providence. That 
 which is from fortune is not separated from nature or with- 
 out an interweaving and involution with the things which 
 are ordered by providence. From thence all things flow ; and 
 there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage 
 of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 1 
 
 good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole 
 brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the 
 universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so 
 by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let 
 these principles be enough for thee, let them always be fixed 
 opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou 
 mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from 
 thy heart thankful to the gods. 
 
 Remember how long thou hast been putting off these 
 things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity 
 from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at 
 last perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what 
 administrator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and 
 that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not 
 use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go 
 and thou wilt go, and it will never return. 
 
 Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to 
 do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, 
 and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to 
 give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
 give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it 
 were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aver- 
 sion from the commands of reason, ajid all hypocrisy, and 
 self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been 
 given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which 
 if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in 
 quiet, and is like the existence of the gods ; for the gods on 
 their part will require nothing more from him who observes 
 these things. 
 
 Do wrong 2 to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul ; but 
 thou wilt no longer have the opportunity of honouring thy- 
 self. Every man's life is sufficient.* But thine is nearly 
 finished, though thy soul reverences not itself, but places thy 
 felicity in the souls of others. 
 
 Do the things external which fall upon thee, distract thee? 
 Give thyself time to learn something new and good, and 
 cease to be whirled around. But then thou must also avoid 
 being carried about the other way. For those too are triflers 
 who have wearied themselves in life by their activity, and
 
 12 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 yet have no object to which to direct every movement, and, 
 in a word, all their thoughts. 
 
 Through not observing what is in the mind of another a 
 man has seldom been seen to be unhappy ; but those who do 
 not observe the movements of their own minds must of 
 necessity be unhappy. 
 
 This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of 
 the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to 
 that, and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole ; 
 and that there is no one who hinders thee from always doing 
 and saying the things which are according to the nature of 
 which thou art a part. 
 
 Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts such a com- 
 parison as one would make in accordance with the common 
 notions of mankind says, like a true philosopher, that the 
 offences which are committed through desire are more 
 blameable than those which are committed through anger. 
 For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from 
 reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction ; but 
 he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleas- 
 ure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more 
 womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way 
 worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is com- 
 mitted with pleasure is more blameable than that which is 
 committed with pain ; and on the whole the one is more like 
 a person who has been first wronged and through pain is 
 compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own 
 impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something 
 by desire. 
 
 Since it is possible 3 that thou rnayest depart from life 
 this very moment, regulate every act and thought accord- 
 ingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, 
 is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve 
 thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no 
 concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a uni- 
 verse devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth 
 they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they 
 have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to 
 fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything 
 evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 3 
 
 altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. Now that 
 which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's 
 life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the 
 knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct 
 these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has 
 overlooked them ; nor is it possible that it has made so great 
 a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that 
 good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good 
 and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour and dis- 
 honour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to 
 good men and bad, being things which make us neither better 
 nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil. 
 
 How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies 
 themselves, and in time the remembrance of them; what is 
 the nature of all sensible things, and particularly those which 
 attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are 
 noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless, and con- 
 temptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are all 
 this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To 
 observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give 
 reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks 
 at it in itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection re- 
 solves into their parts all the things which present themselves 
 to the imagination in it, he will then consider it to be nothing 
 else than an operation of nature ; and if any one is afraid of 
 an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, is not 
 only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which con- 
 duces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man 
 comes near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when 
 this part of man is so disposed.* 
 
 Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses 
 everything in a round, and pries into the things beneath the 
 earth, as the poet 4 says, and seeks by conjecture what is in 
 the minds of his neighbours, without perceiving that it is 
 sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and to rever- 
 ence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in 
 keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dis- 
 satisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the 
 things from the gods merit veneration for their excellence; 
 and the things from men should be dear to us by reason of
 
 14 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move our 
 pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this 
 defect being not less than that which deprives us of the 
 power of distinguishing things that are white and black. 
 
 Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand 
 years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember 
 that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives, 
 nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The 
 longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the 
 present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not 
 the same ;* and so that which is lost appears to be a mere mo- 
 ment. For a man can not lose either the past or the future : 
 for what a man has not, how can any one take this from 
 him? These two things then thou must bear in mind; the 
 one, that all things from eternity are of like forms and come 
 round in a circle, and that it makes no difference whether 
 a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or 
 two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the 
 longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same. 
 For the present is the only thing of which a man can be de- 
 prived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, 
 and that a man can not lose a thing if he has it not. 
 
 Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the 
 Cynic Monimus is manifest : and manifest too is the use of 
 what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it 
 as far as it is true. 
 
 The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when 
 it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the uni- 
 verse, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which 
 happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some 
 part of which the natures of all other things are contained. 
 In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it 
 turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with 
 the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who 
 are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself 
 when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, 
 when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and 
 untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any 
 movement to be without an aim and does anything thought- 
 lessly and without considering what it is, it being right that
 
 MEDITATIONS 15 
 
 even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; 
 and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and 
 the law of the most ancient city and polity. 
 
 Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in 
 a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the 
 whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and 
 fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judg- 
 ment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs 
 to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a 
 dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's so- 
 journ, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which 
 is able to conduct a man ? One thing and only one, philoso- 
 phy. But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man 
 free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
 pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely 
 and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's 
 doing or not doing anything ; and besides, accepting all that 
 happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, 
 wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, 
 waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else 
 than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being 
 is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements 
 themselves in each continually changing into another, why 
 should a man have any apprehension about the change and 
 dissolution of all the elements ? For it is according to nature 
 and nothing is evil which is according to nature. 
 
 This in Carnuntum. 5 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Xenophon, Mem. n, 3, 18. 
 
 * Perhaps it should be "them art doing violence to thyself," v 
 not vftpit.t. 
 
 1 Or it may mean ''since it is in thy power to depart ;" which gives 
 a meaning somewhat different. 
 4 Pindar in the "Thestetus" of Plato. 
 
 * Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of the Dan- 
 ube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona (Vienna). Orosius (vn, 15) 
 and Eutropius (vin, 13) say that Antoninus remained three years at 
 Carnuntum during his *var with the Marcomanni.
 
 BOOK III 
 
 WE ought to consider not only that our life is daily 
 wasting away and a smaller part of it is left, but 
 another thing also should be taken into account, 
 that if a man should live longer, it is quite un- 
 certain whether the understanding will still continue suffi- 
 cient for the comprehension of things, and retain the power 
 of contemplation which strives to acquire the knowledge of 
 the divine and the human. For if he shall begin to fall into 
 dotage, perspiration, and nutrition, and imagination, and 
 appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail ; 
 but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the 
 measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, 
 and considering whether a man should now depart from life, 
 and whatever else of the kind absolutely requires a dis- 
 ciplined reason, all this is already extinguished. We must 
 make haste then, not only because we are daily nearer to 
 death, but also because the conception of things and the 
 understanding of them cease first. 
 
 We ought to observe also that even the things which 
 follow after the things which are produced according to 
 nature contain something pleasing and attractive. For in- 
 stance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the 
 surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain 
 fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beauti- 
 ful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for 
 eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape 
 open, and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their 
 being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. 
 And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows, 
 and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and 
 many other things though they are far from being beauti- 
 ful, if a man should examine them severally still, because 
 
 16
 
 MEDITATIONS 17 
 
 they are consequent upon the things which are formed by 
 nature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind ; so that 
 if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with re- 
 spect to the things which are produced in the universe, there 
 is hardly one of those which follow by way of conse- 
 quence which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed 
 so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real gap- 
 ing jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those 
 which painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an 
 old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain 
 maturity and comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of 
 young persons he will be able to look on with chaste eyes; 
 and many such things will present themselves, not pleasing 
 to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar 
 with nature and her works. 
 
 Hippocrates, after curing many diseases himself, fell sick 
 and died. The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and 
 then fate caught them too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and 
 Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole 
 cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of 
 cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from 
 life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the confla- 
 gration of the universe, was filled with water internally and 
 died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed De- 
 mocritus; and other lice killed Socrates. What means all 
 this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, 
 thou art come to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life, 
 there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state 
 without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and 
 pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much 
 inferior as that which serves it is superior :* for the one is 
 intelligence and deity ; the other is earth and corruption. 
 
 Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about 
 others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object 
 of common utility. For thou losest the opportunity of do- 
 ing something else when thou hast such thoughts as these, 
 What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he say- 
 ing, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving, 
 and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from 
 the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then
 
 1 8 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 to check in the series of our thoughts everything that is 
 without a purpose and useless, but most of all the over curi- 
 ous feeling and the malignant; and a man should use him- 
 self to think of those things only about which if one should 
 suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with 
 perfect openness thou mightest immediately answer, This or 
 That; so that from thy words it should be plain that every- 
 thing in thee is simple and benevolent, and such as befits a 
 social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about 
 pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry, or 
 envy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst 
 blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For 
 the man who is such and no longer delays being among the 
 number of the best, is like a priest and minister of the 
 gods, using too the [deity] which is planted within him, 
 which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, un- 
 harmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feel- 
 ing no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, one 
 who can not be overpowered by any passion, dyed 
 deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything 
 which happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and 
 not often, nor yet without great necessity and for the general 
 interest, imagining what another says, or does, or thinks. 
 For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes the mat- 
 ter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which 
 is allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he 
 makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own 
 portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man 
 is carried along with him and carries him along with it.* 
 And he remembers also that every rational animal is his kins- 
 man, and that to care for all men is according to man's na- 
 ture ; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but 
 of those only who confessedly live according to nature. But 
 as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what kind 
 of men they are both at home and from home, both by night 
 and by day, and what they are, and with what men they live 
 an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the 
 praise which comes from such men, since they are not even 
 satisfied with themselves. 
 
 Labour not unwillingly, nor without regard to the com-
 
 MEDITATIONS 19 
 
 mon interest, nor without due consideration, nor with dis- 
 traction; nor let studied ornament set off thy thoughts, and 
 be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many 
 things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be the 
 guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and en- 
 gaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has 
 taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which sum- 
 mons him from life, and ready to go, having need neither 
 of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful also, and 
 seek not external help nor the tranquillity which others give. 
 A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others. 
 
 If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, 
 truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better 
 than thy own mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it 
 enables thee to do according to right reason, and in the con- 
 dition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; if, I 
 say, thou seest anything better than this, turn to it with all 
 thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. 
 But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is 
 planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, 
 and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates 
 said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and 
 has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if 
 thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than 
 this, give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge 
 and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be 
 able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy 
 proper possession and thy own for it is not right that any- 
 thing of any other kind, such as praise from the many, or 
 power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competi- 
 tion with that which is rationally and politically [or, prac- 
 tically] good. All these things, even though they may seem 
 to adapt themselves [to the better things] in a small degree, 
 obtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But 
 do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the better, and hold 
 to it. But that which is useful is the better. Well then, if 
 it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is 
 only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy 
 judgment without arrogance: only take care that thou mak- 
 est the inquiry by a sure method.
 
 2O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall 
 compel thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to 
 hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to 
 desire anything which needs walls and curtains : for he who 
 has preferred to everything else his own intelligence, and 
 daemon, and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic 
 part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much 
 company ; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either 
 pursuing or flying from [death] ; but whether for a longer 
 or a shorter time he shall have the soul inclosed in the body, 
 he cares not at all : for even if he must depart immediately, 
 he will go as readily as if he were going to do anything else 
 which can be done with decency and order; taking care of 
 this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away 
 from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a 
 member of a civil community. 
 
 In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou 
 wilt find no corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore 
 skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete when fate over- 
 takes him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage 
 before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in 
 him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to 
 other things], nor yet detached [from other things], noth- 
 ing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this 
 faculty it entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy 
 ruling part any opinion inconsistent with nature and the con- 
 stitution of the rational animal. And this faculty promises 
 freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men, 
 and obedience to the gods. 
 
 Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which 
 are few ; and besides bear in mind that every man lives only 
 this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that all 
 the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short 
 then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of 
 the earth where he lives ; and short too the longest posthu- 
 mous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of 
 poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know 
 not even themselves, much less him who died long ago. 
 
 To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still
 
 MEDITATIONS 2 1 
 
 be added : Make for thyself a definition or description of 
 the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly 
 what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its 
 complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
 names of the things of which it has been compounded, and 
 into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive 
 of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically 
 and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and 
 always to look at things so as to see at the same time what 
 kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything 
 performs in it, and what value everything has with reference 
 to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citi- 
 zen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like fam- 
 ilies; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and 
 how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now 
 makes an impression on me, and what virtue I have need of 
 with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidel- 
 ity, simplicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on 
 every occasion a man should say : this comes from god ; and 
 this is according to the apportionment* and spinning of the 
 thread of destiny, or similar coincidence and chance; and 
 this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, 
 one who knows not however what is according to his nature. 
 But I know; for this reason I behave towards him, accord- 
 ing to the natural law of fellowship, with benevolence and 
 justice. At the same time however in things indifferent 1 I 
 attempt to ascertain the value of each. 
 
 If thou workest at that which is before thee, following 
 right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing 
 anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part 
 pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back immedi- 
 ately; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing 
 nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according to 
 nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which 
 thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man 
 who is able to prevent this. 
 
 As physicians have always their instruments and knives 
 ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou 
 have principles ready for the understanding of things divine 
 and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with
 
 22 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human 
 to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well 
 which pertains to man without at the same time having a ref- 
 erence to things divine; nor the contrary. 
 
 No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read 
 thy own memoirs, 2 nor the acts of the ancient Romans and 
 Hellenes, and the selections from books which' thou wast re- 
 serving for thy old age. 3 Hasten then to the end which 
 thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come 
 to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it is in 
 thy power. 
 
 They know not how many things are signified by the 
 words stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what 
 ought to be done ; for this is not effected by the eyes, but by 
 another kind of vision. 
 
 Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belongs sensations, 
 to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To re- 
 ceive the impressions of forms by means of appearances be- 
 longs even to animals; to be pulled by the strings of desire 
 belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made 
 themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to 
 have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear 
 suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, 
 and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds 
 when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is 
 common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that 
 which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content 
 with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for 
 him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his 
 breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it 
 tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying any- 
 thing contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to 
 justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a sim- 
 ple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any 
 of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the 
 end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, 
 ready to depart, and without any compulsion, perfectly re- 
 conciled to his lot.
 
 MEDITATIONS 23 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 "Est et horum quse media appellamus grande discrimen." Seneca 
 Ep. 82. 
 
 ^TTtonvrifiara: or memoranda, notes and the like. 
 
 8 Compare Pronto, n, 9; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who was then 
 consul : "Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex libris sexaginta in 
 quinque tomis." But he says some of them were small books.
 
 BOOK IV 
 
 THAT which rules within, when it is according to na- 
 ture, is so affected with respect to the events which 
 happen, that it always easily adapts itself to that 
 which is possible and is presented to it. For it re- 
 quires no definite material, but it moves toward its purpose, 
 under certain conditions however; and it makes a material 
 for itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of 
 what falls into it, by which a small light would have been 
 extinguished : but when the fire is strong, it soon appropri- 
 ates to itself the matter which is heaped upon it, and con- 
 sumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material. 
 
 Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than 
 according to the perfect principles of art. 
 
 Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, 
 sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire 
 such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the 
 most common sort of men, for it is in thy power, whenever 
 thou shalt choose, to retire into thyself. For nowhere either 
 with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man 
 retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within 
 him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immedi- 
 ately in perfect tranquillity ; and I affirm that tranquillity is 
 nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Con- 
 stantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; 
 and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as 
 soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse 
 the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all dis- 
 content with the things to which thou returnest. For with 
 what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? 
 Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist 
 for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and 
 that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many 
 
 24
 
 MEDITATIONS 25 
 
 already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, 
 have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes ; and be quiet at 
 last. But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is 
 assigned to thee out of the universe. Recall to thy recol- 
 lection this alternative; either there is providence or atoms 
 [fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or remember the argu- 
 ments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of 
 political community [and be quiet at last]. But perhaps 
 corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. Consider then 
 further that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether 
 moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself 
 apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all 
 that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure 
 i [and be quiet at last]. But perhaps the desire of the 
 thing called fame will torment thee. See how soon every- 
 thing is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on 
 each side of [the present], and the emptiness of applause, 
 and the changeableness and want of judgment in those who 
 pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space 
 within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For 
 the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this 
 thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of 
 people are they who will praise thee. 
 
 This then remains: Remember to retire into this little 
 territory of thy own, 1 and above all do not distract or strain 
 thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human 
 being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things read- 
 iest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, 
 which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, 
 for they are external and remain immovable; but our per- 
 turbations come only from the opinion which is within. 
 The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change 
 immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in 
 mind how many of these changes thou hast already wit- 
 nessed. The universe is transformation : life is opinion. 
 
 If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in re- 
 spect of which we are rational beings, is common : if this is 
 so, common also is the reason which commands us what to 
 do, and what not to do ; if this is so, there is a common law 
 also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we
 
 26 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 are members of some political community; if this is so, the 
 world is in a manner a state. 2 For of what other common 
 political community will any one say that the whole human 
 race are members? And from thence, from this common 
 political community comes also our very intellectual faculty 
 and reasoning faculty, and our capacity for law ; or whence 
 do they come ? For as my earthly part is a portion given to 
 me from certain earth, and that which is watery from an- 
 other element, and that which is hot and fiery from some 
 peculiar source ( for nothing comes out of that which is noth- 
 ing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the 
 intellectual part comes from some source. 
 
 Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature ; a 
 composition out of the same elements, and a decomposition 
 into the same ; and altogether not a thing of which any man 
 should be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature of] 
 a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason of our 
 constitution. 
 
 It is natural that these things should be done by such 
 persons, it is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not 
 have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But 
 by all means bear this in mind, that within a very short time 
 both thou and he will be dead ; and soon not even your names 
 will be left behind. 
 
 Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the 
 complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the com- 
 plaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm is taken away. 
 
 That which does not make a man worse than he was, 
 also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him 
 either from without or from within. 
 
 The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been 
 compelled to do this. 
 
 Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, 
 and if thou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. 
 I do not say only with respect to the continuity of the series 
 of things, but with respect to what is just, and as if it were 
 done by one who assigns to each thing its value. Observe 
 then as thou hast begun ; and whatever thou doest, do it in 
 conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense ir\
 
 MEDITATIONS 27 
 
 which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to 
 this in every action. 
 
 Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who 
 does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look 
 at them as they are in truth. 
 
 A man should always have these two rules in readiness; 
 the one, to do only whatever the reason of the ruling 
 and legislating faculty may suggest for the use of men ; the 
 other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who 
 sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this 
 change of opinion must proceed only from a certain per- 
 suasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the 
 like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation. 
 
 Hast thou reason? I have. Why then dost not thou 
 use it ? For if this does its own work, what else dost thou 
 wish? 
 
 Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that 
 which produced thee ; but rather thou shalt be received back 
 into its seminal principle by transmutation. 
 
 Many grains of frankincense on the same altar : one falls 
 before, another falls after ; but it makes no difference. 
 
 Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom 
 thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy 
 principles and the worship of reason. 
 
 Do not act as if thouwert going to live ten thousand years. 
 Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in 
 thy power, be good. 
 
 How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see 
 what his neighbour says or does or thinks, but only to what 
 he does himself, that it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon* 
 says, look not round at the depraved morals of others, but 
 run straight along the line without deviating from it. 
 
 He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does 
 not consider that every one of those who remember him will 
 himself die very soon; then again also they who have suc- 
 ceeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been 
 extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly 
 admire and perish. But even suppose that those who will 
 remember are immortal, and that the remembrance will be 
 immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what
 
 28 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 is it to the dead, but what is it to the living. What is praise, 
 except* indeed so far as it has* a certain utility ? For thou 
 now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, clinging to 
 something else . . . *. 
 
 Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in 
 itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of 
 itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by be- 
 ing praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called 
 beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and 
 works of art. That which is really beautiful has no need 
 of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not 
 more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things 
 is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed ? 
 Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it 
 is not praised ? or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a 
 flower, a shrub? 
 
 If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them 
 from eternity? But how does the earth contain the bodies 
 of those who have been buried from time so remote? For 
 as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain con- 
 tinuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make 
 room for other dead bodies ; so the souls which are removed 
 into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted 
 and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received 
 into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way 
 make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. 
 And this is the answer which a man might give on the 
 hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not 
 only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, 
 but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by 
 us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, 
 and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed 
 on them? And nevertheless this earth receives them by 
 reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
 transformations into the aerial or of the fiery element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? 
 The division into that which is material and that which is 
 the cause of form [the formal]. 
 
 Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have 
 respect to justice, and on the occasion of every impression
 
 MEDITATIONS 29 
 
 maintain the faculty of comprehension [or understanding]. 
 
 Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to 
 thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too 
 late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to 
 me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: from thee are all 
 things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The 
 poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not thou say, Dear 
 city of Zeus ? 
 
 Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if 
 thou wouldst be tranquil. But consider if it would not be 
 better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason 
 of the animal which is naturally social requires, and as it 
 requires. For this brings not only the tranquillity which 
 comes from doing well, but also that which comes from do- 
 ing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do 
 being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have 
 more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every 
 occasion a man should ask himself, Is this one of the un- 
 necessary things? Now a man should take away not only 
 unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus 
 superfluous acts will not follow after. 
 
 Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of 
 him who is satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and 
 satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition. 
 
 Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do 
 not disturb thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any 
 one do wrong? Is it to himself that he does the wrong. 
 Has anything happened to thee? Well ; out of the universe 
 from the beginning everything which happens has been ap- 
 portioned and spun out of thee. In a word, thy life is short. 
 Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason 
 and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation. 
 
 Either it is a well arranged universe 3 or a chaos huddled 
 together, but still a universe. But can a certain order sub- 
 sist in thee, and disorder in the All ? And this too when al! 
 things are so separated and diffused and sympathethic. 
 
 A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn char- 
 acter, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, 
 fraudulent, tyrannical ! 
 
 If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know
 
 3O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what 
 is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social rea- 
 son ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding ; he 
 is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself 
 all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the 
 universe who withdraws and separates himself from the 
 reason of our common nature through being displeased with 
 the things which happen, for the same nature produces this, 
 and has produced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from 
 the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable 
 animals. 
 
 The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other 
 without a book : here is another half naked : Bread I have 
 not, he says, and I abide by reason : And I do not get the 
 means of living, out of my learning,* and I abide [by my 
 reason] . 
 
 Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, 
 and be content with it; and pass through the rest of life 
 like one who has intrusted to the gods with his whole soul 
 all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the 
 slave of any man. 
 
 Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou 
 wilt see all these things, people marrying, bringing up chil- 
 dren, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating 
 the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot- 
 ting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, 
 loving, heaping up treasure, desiring consulship, kingly 
 power. Well then that life of these people no longer exists 
 at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all 
 is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view 
 also the other epochs of time and of whole nations, and see 
 how many after great efforts soon fell and were resolved into 
 the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom 
 thou hast thyself known distracting themselves about idle 
 things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their 
 proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be con- 
 tent with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that 
 the attention given to everything has its proper value and 
 proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou 
 appliest thyself to smaller matters no further than is fit.
 
 MEDITATIONS 31 
 
 The words which were formerly familiar are now anti- 
 quated : so also the names of those who were famed of old, 
 are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Cseso, Volesus, 
 Leonnatus, and a little afterward, also Scipio and Cato, then 
 Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all 
 things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete 
 oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have 
 shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have 
 breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks 
 of them. And, to conclude the matter, what is even an 
 eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is 
 that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? 
 This one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words 
 which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all 
 that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a prin- 
 ciple and source of the same kind. 
 
 Willingly give thyself up to Clotho, allowing her to spin 
 thy thread* into whatever things she pleases. 
 
 Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers 
 and that which is remembered. 
 
 Observe constantly that all things take place by change, 
 and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the Uni- 
 verse loves nothing so much as to change the things which 
 are and to make new things like them. For everything that 
 exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But 
 thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth 
 or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar notion. 
 
 Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free 
 from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by 
 external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost 
 thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
 Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, 
 what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue. 
 
 What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling prin- 
 ciple of another ; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy 
 corporeal covering. Where is it then ? It is in that part of 
 thee in which subsists the power of forming opinions about 
 evils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and 
 all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body, 
 
 is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, neverthe- 
 28
 
 32 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 less let the part which forms opinions about these things be 
 quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good 
 which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. 
 For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary 
 to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is neither 
 according to nature nor contrary to nature. 
 
 Constantly regard the universe as one living being, hav- 
 ing one substance and one soul ; and observe how all things 
 have reference to one perception, the perception of this one 
 living being ; and how all things act with one movement ; and 
 how all things are the co-operating causes of all things which 
 exist ; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and 
 the contexture of the web. 
 
 Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus 
 used to say. 
 
 It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for 
 things to subsist in consequence of change. 
 
 Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, 
 and a violent stream : for as soon as a thing has been seen, 
 it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this 
 will be carried away too. 
 
 Everything which happens is as familiar and well known 
 as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is 
 disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and what- 
 ever else delights fools or vexes them. 
 
 In the series of things those which follow are always aptly 
 fitted to those which have gone before ; for this series is not 
 like a mere enumeration of disjointed things, which has 
 only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational connection: 
 and as all existing things are arranged together harmoni- 
 ously, so the things which come into existence exhibit no 
 mere succession, but a wonderful relationship. 
 
 Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death 
 of earth is to become water, and the death of water is to 
 become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and re- 
 versely. And think too of him who forgets whither the 
 way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which they 
 are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs 
 the universe; and the things which they daily meet with 
 seem to them strange : and consider that we ought not to act
 
 MEDITATIONS 33 
 
 and speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to 
 act and speak; and that* we ought not, like children who 
 learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we have 
 been taught.* 
 
 If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or 
 certainly on the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care 
 much whether it was on the third day or on the morrow, 
 unless thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited, for 
 how small is the difference? so think it no great thing to 
 die after as many years as thou canst name rather than to- 
 morrow. 
 
 Think continually how many physicians are dead after 
 often contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how 
 many astrologers after predicting with great pretensions the 
 deaths of others; and how many philosophers after endless 
 discourses on death or immortality ; how many heroes after 
 killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used 
 their power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if they 
 were immortal ; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to 
 speak, Helice 4 and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others 
 innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast 
 known, one after another. One man after burying another 
 has been laid out dead, and another buries him ; and all this 
 in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephem- 
 eral and worthless human things are, and what was yester- 
 day a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. 
 Pass then through this little space of time conformably to 
 nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls 
 off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and 
 thanking the tree on which it grew. 
 
 Be like the promontory against which the waves contin- 
 ually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the 
 water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I, because this has happened to me Not so, 
 but happy am I, though this has happened to me, because I 
 continue free from pain, neither crushed by the present nor 
 fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have 
 happened to every man ; but every man would not have con- 
 tinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is 
 that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And
 
 34 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 dost thou in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is 
 not a deviation from man's nature? And does a thing.seem 
 to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not 
 contrary to the will of man's nature. Well, thou knowest 
 the will of nature. Will then this which has happened 
 prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, pru- 
 dent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; 
 will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and 
 everything else by the presence of which man's nature ob- 
 tains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion 
 which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle : not that 
 this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune. 
 
 It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of 
 death, to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to 
 life. What more then have they gained than those who 
 have died early? Certainly they lie in their tombs some- 
 where at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any 
 one else like them, who have carried out many to be buried, 
 and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the in- 
 terval is small [between birth and death] ; and consider with 
 how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people 
 and in what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. 
 Do not then consider life a thing of any value.* For look 
 to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time which 
 is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then 
 what is the difference between him who lives three days and 
 him who lives three generations? 5 
 
 Always run to the short way; and the short way is the 
 natural: accordingly say and do everything in conformity 
 with the soundest reason. For such a purpose frees a man 
 from trouble,* and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious 
 display. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. Persius, iv, 52. 
 
 * Compare Cicero, De Legibus, i. 7. 
 
 "Antoninus here uses the word Kdtffios both in the sense of the Uni- 
 verse and of Order ; and it is difficult to express his meaning. 
 
 * Ovid, Met. xv, 293 : 
 
 Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes, 
 Invenies sub aquis. 
 
 1 An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the war of Troy 
 among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred and fifty-
 
 MEDITATIONS 35 
 
 two years, and some others in modern times who have beaten Parr by 
 twenty or thirty years, if it is true; and yet they died at last. The 
 word is rpiyeprjviov in Antoninus. Nestor is named rptyepeov by some 
 writers ; but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's reprjvios iic- 
 itora NefSroop.
 
 BOOK V 
 
 IN the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this 
 thought be present I am rising to the work of a human 
 being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do 
 the things for which I exist and for which I was 
 brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to 
 lie in the bedclothes and keep myself warm? But this is 
 more pleasant Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, 
 and not at all for action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the 
 little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees 
 working together to put in order their several parts of the 
 universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a 
 human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which 
 is according to thy nature? But it is necessary to take rest 
 also It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to 
 this too : she has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, 
 and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is 
 sufficient ; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short 
 of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if 
 thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But 
 those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in 
 working at them unwashed and without food ; but thou val- 
 uest thy own nature less than the turner values the turning 
 art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money val- 
 ues his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And 
 such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, 
 choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the 
 things which they care for. But are the acts which concern 
 society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labour ? 
 
 How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression 
 which is troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in 
 all tranquillity. 
 
 Judge every word and deed which are according to na- 
 
 36
 
 MEDITATIONS 37 
 
 ture to be fit for thee; and be not diverted by the blame 
 which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a 
 thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy 
 of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading prin- 
 ciple and follow their peculiar movement; which things do 
 not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own na- 
 ture and the common nature ; and the way of both is one. 
 
 I go through the things which happen according to nature 
 until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that 
 element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon 
 that earth out of which my father collected the seed, and 
 my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; out of which 
 during so many years I have been supplied with food and 
 drink: which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for 
 so many purposes. 
 
 Thou sayest, Men can admire the sharpness of thy wits 
 Be it so: but there are many other things of which thou 
 canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show 
 those qualities then which are altogether in thy power : sin- 
 cerity, gravity, endurance of labour, aversion to pleasure, 
 contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevo- 
 lence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from tri- 
 fling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities 
 thou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no 
 excuse of natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still 
 remainest voluntarily below the mark? or art thou com- 
 pelled through being defectively furnished by nature to mur- 
 mur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with 
 thy poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great 
 display, and to be so restless in thy mind ? No by the gods : 
 but thou mightest have been delivered from these things long 
 ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being 
 rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must exert thy- 
 self about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure 
 in thy dulness. 
 
 One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready 
 to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. Another 
 is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks 
 of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. 
 A third in a manner does not even know what he has done,
 
 38 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks 
 for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. 
 As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the 
 game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he 
 has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and 
 see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to pro- 
 duce again the grapes in season Must a man then be one 
 of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it? 
 Yes But this very thing is necessary, the observation of 
 what a man is doing : for, it may be said, it is characteristic 
 of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social 
 manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also 
 should perceive it It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost 
 not rightly understand what is now said : and for this reason 
 thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for 
 even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if 
 thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, 
 do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act. 
 
 A prayer of the Athenians: "Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, 
 down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the 
 plains." In truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to 
 pray in this simple and noble fashion. 
 
 Just as we must understand when it is said, That JEscu- 
 lapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in 
 cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand 
 it when it is said, That the nature of the universe prescribed 
 to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of 
 the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something 
 like this : he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted 
 to procure health; and in the second case it means, That 
 which happens 1 to [or, suits] every man is fixed in a manner 
 for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean 
 when we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen 
 say of squared stones in walls .or the pyramids, that they are 
 suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of 
 connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony] . 
 And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a 
 body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] 
 is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who 
 are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for they
 
 MEDITATIONS 39 
 
 say, It [necessity, destiny] brought this to such a person. 
 This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let 
 us then receive these things, as well as those which JEscu- 
 lapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among 
 his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the 
 hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of 
 the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be 
 judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so 
 accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagree- 
 able, because it leads to this, to the health of the universe and 
 to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For 
 he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, 
 if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature 
 of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is 
 not suitable to that which is directed by it. For two reasons 
 then it is right to be content with that which happens to 
 thee ; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed for 
 thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from 
 the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and the other, 
 because even that which comes severally to every man is to 
 the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity 
 and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the 
 integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off any- 
 thing whatever from the conjunction and the continuity 
 either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, 
 as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in 
 a manner triest to put anything out of the way. 
 
 Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou 
 dost not succeed in doing everything according to right prin- 
 ciples but when thou hast failed, return back again, and be 
 content if the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
 with man's nature, and love this to which thou returnest ; and 
 do not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like 
 those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, 
 or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. 
 For thus thou wilt not fail to* obey reason, and thou wilt 
 repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only 
 the things which thy nature requires ; but thou wouldst have 
 something else which is not according to nature It may 
 be objected, Why what is more agreeable than this [which I
 
 40 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 am doing] ? But is not this the very reason why pleasure 
 deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, sim- 
 plicity, equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For 
 what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou think- 
 est of the security and the happy course of all things which 
 depend on the faculty of understanding and knowledge? 
 
 Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have 
 seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common philos- 
 ophers, altogether unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics 
 themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all our 
 assent is changeable; for where is the man who never 
 changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects them- 
 selves, and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, 
 and that they may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a 
 whore or a robber. Then turn to the morals of those who 
 live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
 most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being 
 hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and 
 dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, 
 and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth be- 
 ing highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can 
 not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's duty to com- 
 fort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution and not 
 to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only : 
 the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not con- 
 formable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that 
 it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and dae- 
 mon : for there is no man who will compel me to this. 
 
 About what am I now employing my own soul? On 
 every occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire, 
 what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling 
 principle ? and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of 
 a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a 
 domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 
 
 What kind of things those are which appear good to the 
 many we may learn even from this. For if any man should 
 conceive certain things as being really good, such as pru- 
 dence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after 
 having first conceived these endure to listen to anything* 
 which should not be in harmony with what is really good.*
 
 MEDITATIONS 41 
 
 But if a man has first conceived as good the things which 
 appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily re- 
 ceive as very applicable that which was said by the comic 
 writer.* Thus even the many perceive the difference.* For 
 were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be 
 rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said 
 of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, 
 as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should 
 value and think those things to be good, to which after their 
 first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer 
 might be aptly applied that he who has them, through pure 
 abundance has not a place to ease himself in. 
 
 I am composed of the formal and the material ; and neither 
 of them will perish into non-existence, as neither of them 
 came into existence out of non-existence. Every part of me 
 then will be reduced by change into some part of the uni- 
 verse, and that again will change into another part of the 
 universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a 
 change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for 
 ever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from 
 saying so, even if the universe is administered according to 
 definite periods [of revolution]. 
 
 Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers 
 which are sufficient for themselves and for their own works. 
 They move then from a first principle which is their own, 
 and they make their way to the end which is proposed to 
 them ; and this is the reason why such acts are named Cator- 
 thoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed 
 by the right road. 
 
 None of these things ought to be called a man's, which 
 do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a 
 man, nor does man's nature promise them, nor are they the 
 means of man's nature attaining its end. Neither then does 
 the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to 
 the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards 
 this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these 
 things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to 
 despise them and to set himself against them ; nor would a 
 man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want 
 these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of
 
 42 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now 
 the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of 
 other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any 
 of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the 
 same degree he is a better man. 
 
 Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the 
 character of thy mind ; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. 
 Dye it then with a continuous series of such thoughts as 
 these: for instance, that where a man can live, there he 
 can also live well. But he must live in a palace ; well then, 
 he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that 
 for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for 
 this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; 
 and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; and where 
 the end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each 
 thing. Now the good for the reasonable animal is society ; 
 for that we are made for society has been shown above. Is 
 it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the supe- 
 rior? but the things which have life are superior to those 
 which have not life, and of those which have life the supe- 
 rior are those which have reason. 
 
 To seek what is impossible is madness : and it is impossi- 
 ble that the bad should not do something of this kind. 
 
 Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by 
 nature to bear. The same things happen to another, and 
 either because he does not see that they have happened or be- 
 cause he would show a great spirit, he is firm and remains 
 unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit 
 should be stronger than wisdom. 
 
 Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least 
 degree; nor have they admission to the soul, nor can they 
 turn or move the soul : but the soul turns and moves itself 
 alone, and whatever judgments it may think proper to make, 
 such it makes for itself the things which present themselves 
 to it. 
 
 In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far 
 as I must do good to men and endure them. But so far as 
 some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man 
 becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no 
 less than the sun or wind or a wild beast Now it is true
 
 MEDITATIONS 43 
 
 that these may impede my action, but they are no impedi- 
 ments to my affects and disposition, which have the power 
 of acting conditionally and changing : for the mind converts 
 and changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and 
 so that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an act ; 
 and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this 
 road. 
 
 Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is 
 that which makes use of all things and directs all things. 
 And in like manner also reverence that which is best in thy- 
 self; and this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself 
 also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and 
 thy life is directed by this. 
 
 That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to 
 the citizen. In the case of every appearance of harm apply 
 this rule: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am I 
 harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry 
 with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his 
 error is. 
 
 Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and 
 disappear, both the things which are and the things which 
 are produced. For substance is like a river in a continual 
 flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, and 
 the causes work in infinite varieties ; and there is hardly any- 
 thing which stands still. And consider this which is near 
 to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the future 
 in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool 
 who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and 
 makes himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, 
 and a short time. 
 
 Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a 
 very small portion ; and of universal time, of which a short 
 and indivisible interval has been assigned to thee; and of 
 that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it 
 thou art. 
 
 Does another do me wrong ? Let him look to it. He has 
 his own disposition, his own activity. I now have what the 
 universal nature wills me to have ; and I do what my nature 
 now wills me to do. 
 
 Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be un-
 
 44 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 disturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleas- 
 ure or of pain ; and let it not unite with them, but let it cir- 
 cumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. But 
 when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other 
 sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, 
 then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is 
 natural : but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sen- 
 sation the opinion that it is either good or bad. 
 
 Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who 
 constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with 
 that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the 
 daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for 
 his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is 
 every man's understanding and reason. 
 
 Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits stink? art thou 
 angry with him whose mouth smells foul ? What good will 
 this anger do thee ? He has such a mouth, he has such arm- 
 pits : it is necessary that such an emanation must come from 
 such things but the man has reason, it will be said, and he 
 is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he offends I 
 wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast 
 reason : by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty ; 
 show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou 
 wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
 
 As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out .... so 
 it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit 
 thee, then get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffer- 
 ing no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why 
 dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as 
 nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and 
 no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I 
 choose to do what is according to the nature of the rational 
 and social animal. 
 
 The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly 
 it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, 
 and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest 
 how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- 
 thing its proper portion, and has brought together into con- 
 cord with one another the things which are the best. 
 
 How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents,
 
 MEDITATIONS 45 
 
 brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy in- 
 fancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if 
 thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may 
 be said of thee: 
 
 "Never has wronged a man in deed or word." 
 
 And call to recollection both how many things thou hast 
 passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to 
 endure : and that the history of thy life is now complete and 
 thy service is ended: and how many beautiful things thou 
 hast seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou hast de- 
 spised; and how many things called honourable thou hast 
 spurned ; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown 
 a kind disposition. 
 
 Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who 
 has skill and knowledge? What soul then has skill and 
 knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, and 
 knows the reason which pervades all substance and through 
 all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the uni- 
 verse. 
 
 Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and 
 either a name or not even a name; but name is sound and 
 echo. And the things which are much valued in life are 
 empty and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting 
 one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and 
 then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and 
 justice and truth are fled 
 
 "Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth." 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee here? if the ob- 
 jects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and 
 the organs of perception are dull and easily receive false im- 
 pressions; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from 
 blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this 
 is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tran- 
 quillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to 
 another state? And until that time comes, what is suffi- 
 cient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless 
 them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and
 
 46 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 self-restraint ; 2 but as to everything which is beyond the lim- 
 its of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is 
 neither thine nor in thy power. 
 
 Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, 
 if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the 
 right way. These two things are common both to the soul 
 of god and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every 
 rational being, not to be hindered by another; and to hold 
 good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice 
 of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination. 
 
 If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my 
 own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I 
 troubled about it? and what is the harm to the common 
 weal? 
 
 Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appear- 
 ance of things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability 
 and their fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in 
 matters which are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a 
 damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man, when 
 he went away, asked back his foster-child's top, remembering 
 that it was a top, so do thou in this case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou for- 
 gotten, man, what these things are? Yes; but they are 
 objects of great concern to these people wilt thou too then 
 be made a fool for these things? I was once a fortunate man, 
 but I lost it, I know not how. But fortunate means that a 
 man has assigned to himself a good fortune : and a good for- 
 tune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good 
 actions. 3 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of tivuftaivEiv. 
 
 *This is the Stoic precept arexov xal ditexov. The first part teaches 
 us to be content with men and things as they are. The second part 
 teaches us the virtue of self-restraint, or the government of our pas- 
 sions. 
 
 'This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be corrupt, 
 and the general purport of the section can not be discovered. Perhaps 
 several things have been improperly joined in one section. I have 
 translated it nearly literally. Different translators give the section a 
 different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they can not 
 understand.
 
 BOOK VI 
 
 THE substance of the universe is obedient and com- 
 pliant ; and the reason which governs it has in itself 
 no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor 
 does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed 
 by it. But all things are made and perfected according to 
 this reason. 
 
 Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold 
 or warm, if thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art 
 drowsy or satisfied with sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or 
 praised; and whether dying or doing something else. For 
 it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : it is 
 sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in 
 hand. 
 
 Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything 
 nor its value escape thee. 
 
 All existing things soon change, and they will either be 
 reduced to vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will 
 be dispersed. 
 
 The reason which governs knows what its own disposi- 
 tion is, and what it does, and on what material it works. 
 
 The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like 
 [the wrong doer] . 
 
 Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from 
 one social act to another social act, thinking of God. 
 
 The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, 
 and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills Jo 
 be, it also malces everything which happens appear to itself 
 to be such as it wills. 
 
 In conformity to the nature of the universe every single 
 thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity 
 to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a 
 nature which externally comprehends this, or a nature which 
 
 47
 
 48 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and 
 independent of this. 
 
 The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution 
 of things, and a dispersion; or it is unity, and order, and 
 providence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry 
 in a fortuitous combination of things and such a disorder? 
 and why do I care about anything else than how I shall at 
 last become earth ? and why am I disturbed, for the disper- 
 sion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the 
 other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I 
 trust in him who governs. 
 
 When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be 
 disturbed in a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not 
 continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts; for 
 thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by contin- 
 ually recurring to it. 
 
 If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same 
 time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still 
 thou wouldst constantly return to thy mother. Let the court 
 and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother : re- 
 turn to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through 
 whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee 
 tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 
 
 When we have meat before us and such eatables, we re- 
 ceive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and 
 this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig ; and again, that 
 this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe 
 some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish : such 
 then are these impressions, and they reach the things them- 
 selves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things 
 they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through 
 life, and where there are things which appear most worthy 
 of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at 
 their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which 
 they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful per- 
 verter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou 
 art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it 
 cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xeno- 
 crates himself. 
 
 Most of the things which the multitude admire are re-
 
 MEDITATIONS 49 
 
 f erred to objects of the most general kind, those which are 
 held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as 
 stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which are ad- 
 mired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are referred 
 to the things which are held together by a living principle, as 
 flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are 
 still more instructed are the things which are held together 
 by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational 
 so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some 
 other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number 
 of slaves. But he who values a rational soul, a soul uni- 
 versal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except 
 this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition 
 and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and 
 he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same 
 kind as himself. 
 
 Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are 
 hurrying out of it; and of that which is coming into exist- 
 ence part is already extinguished. Motions and changes are 
 continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted 
 course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of 
 ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no 
 abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which 
 a man would set a high price? It would be just as if a man 
 should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but 
 it has already past out of sight. Something of this kind is 
 the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood 
 and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once 
 drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every 
 moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power 
 which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day 
 before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst 
 first draw it. 
 
 Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, 
 nor respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, 
 nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, 
 nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor as- 
 sembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; for this is 
 just like the act of separating and parting with the useless 
 part of our food. What then is worth being valued? To
 
 5O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 be received with clapping of hands ? No. Neither must we 
 value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes 
 from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that 
 thou hast given up this worthless thing called fame, what 
 remains that is worth valuing ? This in my opinion, to move 
 thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper 
 constitution, to which end both all employments and arts 
 lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has 
 been made should be adapted to the work for which it has 
 been made; and both the vine-planter who looks after the 
 vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek 
 this end. But the education and the teaching of youth aim 
 at something. In this then is the value of the education and 
 the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek any- 
 thing else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things 
 too? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy 
 own happiness, nor without passion. For of necessity thou 
 must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can 
 take away those things, and plot against those who have that 
 which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be alto- 
 gether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these 
 things; and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. 
 But to reverence and honour thy own mind will make thee 
 content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in 
 agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give 
 and have ordered. 
 
 Above, below, all around are the movements of the 
 elements. But the motion of virtue is in none of these : it is 
 something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly ob- 
 served it goes happily on its road. 
 
 How strangely men act. They will not praise those who 
 are living at the same time and living with themselves ; but 
 to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they 
 have never seen or ever will see, this they set much value on. 
 But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved 
 because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee. 
 
 If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not 
 think that it is impossible for man : but if anything is possible 
 for man and conformable to his nature, think that this can be 
 attained by thyself too.
 
 MEDITATIONS 5 1 
 
 In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn 
 thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has 
 inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of 
 vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him after- 
 wards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
 against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with sus- 
 picion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like 
 this let thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life ; let us 
 overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in 
 the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out 
 of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 
 
 If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do 
 not think or act rightly, I will gladly change ; for I seek the 
 truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured 
 who abides in his error and ignorance. 
 
 I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are 
 either things without life, or things without reason, or things 
 that have rambled and know not the way. 
 
 As to the animals which have no reason and generally all 
 things and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they 
 have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal 
 spirit. But towards human beings, as they have reason, be- 
 have in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods, 
 and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which 
 thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are suffi- 
 cient. 
 
 Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were 
 brought to the same state; for either they were received 
 among the same seminal principles of the universe, or they 
 were alike dispersed among the atoms. 
 
 Consider how many things in the same indivisible time 
 take place in each of us, things which concern the body and 
 things which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder 
 if many more things, or rather all things which come into 
 existence in that which is the one and all, which we call 
 Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 
 
 If any man should propose to thee the question, how the 
 name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining 
 of the voice utter each letter? What then if they grow 
 angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with
 
 52 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 composure and number every letter? Just so then in this 
 life also remember that every duty is made up of certain 
 parts.. These it is thy duty to observe and without being 
 disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry 
 with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set be- 
 fore thee. 
 
 How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things 
 which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profit- 
 able ! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do 
 this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For they 
 are certainly moved towards things because they suppose 
 them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them 
 But it is not so Teach them then, and show them without 
 being angry. 
 
 Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, 
 and of the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, 
 and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the 
 service to the flesh. 
 
 It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this 
 life, when thy body does not give way. 
 
 Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou 
 art not dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep 
 thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affecta- 
 tion, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, af- 
 fectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue to 
 be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence the 
 gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit 
 of this earthly life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do 
 everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his con- 
 stancy in every act which was conformable to reason, and his 
 evenness in all things, and his piety, and the serenity of his 
 countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty 
 fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how he 
 would never let anything pass without having first most 
 carefully examined it and clearly understood it ; and how he 
 bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming 
 them in return ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he 
 listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of 
 manners and actions he was ; and not given to reproach peo- 
 ple, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist ; and with how
 
 MEDITATIONS 53 
 
 little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, ser- 
 vants ; and how laborious and patient ; and how he was able 
 on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not 
 even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except 
 at the usual hour; and his firmness and uniformity in his 
 friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those 
 who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that he had when 
 any man showed him anything better ; and how religious he 
 was without superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest 
 have as good a conscience, as he had, when thy last hour 
 comes. 
 
 Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and 
 when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived 
 that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy 
 waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou 
 didst look at those [the dreams]. 
 
 I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body 
 all things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differ- 
 ences. But to the understanding those things only are in- 
 different, which are not the works of its own activity. But 
 whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these 
 are in its power. And of these however only those which 
 are done with reference to the present; for as to the future 
 and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the 
 present indifferent. 
 
 Neither the labour which the hand does nor that of the 
 foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's 
 work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as 
 a man is his labour contrary to nature, so long as it does the 
 things of a man. But if the labour is not contrary to his 
 nature, neither is it an evil to him. 
 
 How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, 
 patricides, tyrants. 
 
 Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate 
 themselves up to a certain point to those who are not skilled 
 in their craft, nevertheless they cling to the reason [the 
 principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from it ? 
 Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have 
 more respect to the reason [the principles] of their own arts
 
 54 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 than man to his own reason, which is common to him and 
 the gods ? 
 
 Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : all the sea a drop 
 in the universe ; Athos a little clod of the universe : all the 
 present time is a point in eternity. All things are little, 
 changeable, perishable. All things come from thence, from 
 that universal ruling power either directly proceeding or by 
 way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's gaping jaws, 
 and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a 
 thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and the beau- 
 tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind 
 from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion 
 of the source of all. 
 
 He who has seen present things has seen all, both every- 
 thing which has taken place from all eternity and everything 
 which will be for time without end ; for all things are of one 
 kin and of one form. 
 
 Frequently consider the connection of all things in the 
 universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner 
 all things are implicated with one another, and all in this way 
 are friendly to one another; for one thing comes in order 
 after another, and this is by virtue of the* active movement 
 and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance. 
 
 Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been 
 cast : and the men among whom thou hast received thy por- 
 tion, love them, and do it truly [sincerely]. 
 
 Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which 
 it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. 
 But in the things which are held together by nature there is 
 within and there abides in them the power which made them ; 
 wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, and to 
 think, that, if thou dost live and act according to its will, 
 everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence. And 
 thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in 
 conformity to intelligence. 
 
 Whatever of the things which are not within thy power 
 thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of 
 necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of 
 such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men 
 too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or
 
 MEDITATIONS 55 
 
 those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause ; and 
 indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference 
 between these things [because we do not regard these things 
 as indifferent*]. But if we judge only those things which 
 are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason 
 either for finding fault with god or standing in a hostile at- 
 titude to man. 1 
 
 We are all working together to one end, some with knowl- 
 edge and design, and others without knowing what they do ; 
 as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, 
 I think, who says that they are labourers and co-operators in 
 the things which take place in the universe. But men co- 
 operate after different fashions; and even those co-operate 
 abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who 
 try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe has need 
 even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to un- 
 derstand among what kind of workmen thou placest thyself ; 
 for he who rules all things will certainly make a right use of 
 thee, and he will receive thee among some part of the co- 
 operators and of those whose labours conduce to one end. 
 But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse 
 in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of. 2 
 
 Does the sun undertake to do 'the work of the rain, or 
 ^sculapius the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth] ? And 
 how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not differ- 
 ent and yet they work together to the same end ? 
 
 If the gods have determined about me and about the things 
 which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is 
 not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; 
 and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that ? for what advantage would result to them from 
 this or to the whole, which is the special object of their pro- 
 vidence? But if they have not determined about me in- 
 dividually, they have certainly determined about the whole at 
 least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this 
 general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to 
 be content with them. But if they determine about nothing 
 which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us 
 neither sacrifice, nor pray, nor swear by them, nor do any- 
 thing else which we do as if the gods were present and 
 29
 
 56 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 lived with us but if however the gods determine about 
 none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine 
 about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful : 
 and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his 
 own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and 
 social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is 
 Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things 
 then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. 
 
 Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest 
 of the universal : this might be sufficient. But further thou 
 wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, 
 that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to 
 other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the 
 common sense as said of things of the middle kind [neither 
 good nor bad] . 
 
 As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, 
 that the continual sight of the same things and the uniform- 
 ity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; 
 for all things above, below, are the same and from the same. 
 How long then ? 
 
 Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds 
 of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts 
 come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. 
 Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To 
 that place then we must remove, where there are so many 
 great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, 
 Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and 
 so many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, 
 Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute 
 natural talents, great minds, lovers of labour, versatile, con- 
 fident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of 
 man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these 
 consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm 
 then is this to them; and what to those whose names are 
 altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth a great deal, 
 to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent dispo- 
 sition even to liars and unjust men. 
 
 When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues 
 of those who live with thee ; for instance, the activity of one, 
 and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and
 
 MEDITATIONS 5; 
 
 some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights 
 so much as the examples of the virtues, when they -are 'ex- 
 hibited in the morals of those who live with us and present 
 themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore 
 we must keep them before us. 
 
 Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest 
 only so many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatis- 
 fied then that thou must live only so many years and not 
 more ; for as thou are satisfied with the amount of substance 
 which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the 
 time. 
 
 Let us try to persuade them [men], but act even against 
 their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If 
 however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake 
 thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time 
 employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other 
 virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a reserva- 
 tion [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossi- 
 bilities. What then didst thou desire? Some such effort 
 as this But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which 
 thou wast moved are [not] accomplished.* 
 
 He who loves fame considers another man's activity to 
 be his own good ; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensa- 
 tions ; but he who has understanding, considers his own acts 
 to be his own good. 
 
 It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and 
 not to be disturbed in our soul ; for things themselves have 
 no natural power to form our judgments. 
 
 Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by 
 another, and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's 
 mind. 
 
 That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good 
 for the bee. 
 
 If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, 
 would they listen to anybody else; or how could the helms- 
 man secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the 
 health of those whom he attends ? 
 
 How many together with whom I came into the world are 
 already gone out of it. 
 
 To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by
 
 58 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 mad dogs water causes fear ; and to little children the ball is a 
 fine thing. Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a 
 false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced 
 or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog ? 
 
 No man will hinder thee from living according to the rea- 
 son of thy own nature : nothing will happen to thee contrary 
 to the reason of the universal nature. 
 
 What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, 
 and for what objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon 
 will time cover all things, and how many it has covered 
 already. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, in, 32. 
 1 Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14.
 
 BOOK VII 
 
 WHAT is badness ? It is that which thou hast often 
 seen. And on the occasion of everything which 
 happens, keep this in mind, that it is that which 
 thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down 
 thou wilt find the same things, with which the old histories 
 are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own day ; 
 with which cities and houses are filled now. There is noth- 
 ing new : all things are both familiar and short-lived. 
 
 How can our principles become dead, unless the impres- 
 sions [thoughts] which correspond to them are extin- 
 guished? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these 
 thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about any- 
 thing, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? 
 The things which are external to my mind have no relation 
 at all to my mind. Let this be the state of thy affects, and 
 thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. 
 Look at things again as thou didst use to look at them ; for 
 in this consists the recovery of thy life. 
 
 The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of 
 sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, 
 a bit of bread into fish-ponds, labourings of ants and burden- 
 carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets 
 pulled by strings [all alike]. It is thy duty then in the 
 midst of such things to show good humour and not a proud 
 air; to understand however that every man is worth just 
 so much as the things are worth about which he busies him- 
 self. 
 
 In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every 
 movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the 
 one thou shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, but 
 in the other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 
 
 Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is 
 
 59
 
 60 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 sufficient, I use it for the work as an instrument given by the 
 universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I 
 retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do 
 it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do 
 so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man 
 who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now 
 fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either 
 by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to 
 this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society. 
 
 How many after being celebrated by fame have been given 
 up to oblivion ; and how many who have celebrated the fame 
 of others have long been dead. 
 
 Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy business to do 
 thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, 
 if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battlements 
 alone, but with the help of another it is possible ? 
 
 Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come 
 to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same 
 reason which now thou usest for present things. 
 
 All things are implicated with one another, and the bond 
 is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any 
 other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they 
 combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is 
 one universe made up of all things, and one god who per- 
 vades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one] com- 
 mon reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth ; if 
 indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are 
 of the same stock and participate in the same reason. 
 
 Everything material soon disappears in the substance of 
 the whole; and everything formal [causal] is very soon 
 taken back into the universal reason; and the memory of 
 everything is very soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 To the rational animal the same act is according to nature 
 and according to reason. 
 
 Be thou erect, or be made erect. 
 
 Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are 
 united in one, so it is with rational beings which exist sep- 
 arately, for they have been constituted for one co-operation. 
 And the perception of this will be more apparent to thee, if 
 thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [ /'Ao$ ] of
 
 MEDITATIONS 6 1 
 
 the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r~\ 
 thou sayest that thou art a part [//>o$] , thou dost not yet love 
 men from thy heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for 
 its own sake; thou still doest it barely as a thing of pro- 
 priety-, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can 
 feel the effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt 
 will complain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that 
 what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in 
 my power not to think so. 
 
 Whatever any one does or says, I must be good, just 
 as if the gold, or the emerald, or the purple were always say- 
 ing this, Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald 
 and keep my colour. 
 
 The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does 
 not frighten itself or cause itself pain.* But if any one else 
 can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself 
 will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let 
 the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, and 
 let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is 
 subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power of 
 forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, 
 for it will never deviate* into such a judgment. The lead- 
 ing principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want 
 for itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation 
 and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself. 
 
 Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good 
 thing. What then art thou doing here, O imagination? go 
 away, I entreat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for I 
 want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old 
 fashion. I am not angry with thee : only go away. 
 
 Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take place 
 without change ? What then is more pleasing or more suit- 
 able to the universal nature? And canst thou take a bath 
 unless the wood undergoes a change ? and canst thou be nour- 
 ished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can any- 
 thing else that is useful be accomplished without change? 
 Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just 
 the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature ? 
 
 Through the universal substance as through a furious
 
 62 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united 
 with and co-operating with the whole, as the parts of our 
 body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how 
 many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already 
 swallowed up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with 
 reference to every man and thing. 
 
 One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something 
 which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the way 
 which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now. 
 
 Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; and near the for- 
 getfulness of thee by all. 
 
 It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. 
 And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee 
 that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through 
 ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
 die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no 
 harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it 
 was before. 
 
 The universal nature out of the universal substance, as 
 if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken 
 this up, it uses the material for a tree, then for a man, then 
 for something else; and each of these things subsists for a 
 very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be 
 broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened to- 
 gether. 
 
 A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; when it is often 
 assumed, 1 the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at 
 last is so completely extinguished that it can not be again 
 lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that 
 it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of doing 
 wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any 
 longer ? 
 
 Nature which governs the whole will soon change all 
 things which thou seest, and out of their substance will make 
 other things, and again other things from the substance of 
 them, in order that the world may be ever new. 
 
 When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately con- 
 sider with what opinion about good or evil he has done 
 wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, 
 and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thy-
 
 MEDITATIONS 63 
 
 self thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or 
 another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to par- 
 don him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good 
 or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is 
 in error. 
 
 Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what 
 thou hast : but of the things which thou hast select the best, 
 and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if 
 thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care 
 that thou dost not through being so pleased with them ac- 
 custom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if 
 ever thou shouldst not have them. 
 
 Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules 
 has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does 
 what is just, and so secures tranquillity. 
 
 Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. 
 Confine thyself to the present. Understand well what hap- 
 pens either to thee or to another. Divide and distribute 
 every object into the causal [formal] and the material. 
 Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a 
 man stay there where the wrong was done. 
 
 Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understand- 
 ing enter into the things that are doing and the things which 
 do them. 
 
 Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with in- 
 difference towards the things which lie between virtue and 
 vice. Love mankind. Follow God. The poet says that 
 Law rules all * And it is enough to remember that law 
 rules all. 2 * 
 
 About death : whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution 
 into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change. 
 
 About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; 
 but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind 
 maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself,* and the 
 ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts which are 
 harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion 
 about it. 
 
 About fame : look at the minds [of those who seek fame] , 
 observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, 
 
 and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as 
 30
 
 64 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former sands, 
 so in life the events which go before are soon covered by 
 those which come after. 
 
 From Plato : 3 the man who has an elevated mind and takes 
 a view of all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it 
 possible for him to think that human life is anything great ? 
 it is not possible, he said. Such a man then will think that 
 death also is no evil Certainly not. 
 
 From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good and to be abused. 
 
 It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and 
 to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for 
 the mind not to be regulated and composed by itself. 
 
 It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
 
 For they care nought about it. 4 
 
 To the immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn : 
 
 One man is born ; another dies. 
 
 If gods care not for me and for my children, 
 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 For the good is with me, and the just 8 
 
 No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion. 
 
 From Plato : 7 But I would make this man a sufficient 
 answer, which is this : Thou sayest not well, if thou think- 
 est that a man who is good for anything at all ought to com- 
 pute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look 
 to this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is 
 just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man. 
 
 For thus it is, men of Athens, 7 in truth : wherever a man 
 has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has 
 been placed by a commander, there in my opinion he ought 
 to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the reck- 
 oning, either death or anything else, before the baseness [of 
 deserting his post] . 
 
 But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble 
 and good is not something different from saving and being 
 saved; for* as to a man living such or such a time, at least 
 one who is really a man, consider if this is not a thing to be 
 dismissed from the thoughts :* and there must be no love of 
 life : but as to these matters a man must intrust them to the 
 deity and believe what the women say, that no man can
 
 MEDITATIONS 65 
 
 escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best 
 live the time that he has to live. 8 
 
 Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert 
 going along with them ; and constantly consider the changes 
 of the elements into one another; for such thoughts purge 
 away the filth of the earthly life. 
 
 This is a fine saying of Plato : 9 That he who is discours- 
 ing about men should look also at earthly things as if he 
 viewed them from some higher place; should look at them 
 in their assemblies, armies, agricultural labours, marriages, 
 treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert 
 places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, 
 markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination 
 of contraries. 
 
 Consider the past ; such great changes of political suprem- 
 acies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. 
 For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible 
 that they should deviate from the order of the things which 
 take place now : accordingly to have contemplated human life 
 for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten 
 thousand years. For what more wilt thou see ? 
 
 "That which has grown from the earth, to the earth; 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns." 10 
 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the 
 atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. , 
 
 "With food and drinks and cunning macric arts 
 Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death." 1 * 
 
 "The breeze which heaven has sent 
 We must endure, and toil without complaining." 
 
 Another may be more expert in casting his opponent ; but 
 he is not more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined 
 to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with respect to 
 the faults of his neighbours. 
 
 Where any work can be done conformably to the reason 
 which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to 
 fear: for where we are able to get profit by means of the
 
 66 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 activity which is successful and proceeds according to our 
 constitution, there no harm is to be suspected. 
 
 Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to 
 acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to 
 those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy 
 present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without 
 being well examined. 
 
 Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling 
 principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, 
 both the universal nature through the things which happen to 
 thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must be 
 done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is ac- 
 cording to its constitution; and all other things have been 
 constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among 
 irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but 
 the rational for the sake of one another. 
 
 The prime principle then in man's constitution is the 
 social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of 
 the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelli- 
 gent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be over- 
 powered either by the motion of the senses or of the appe- 
 tites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent motion claims 
 superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by 
 the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by 
 nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational 
 constitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let 
 then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go 
 straight on, and it has what is its own. 
 
 Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy 
 life up to the present time; and live according to nature the 
 remainder which is allowed thee. 
 
 Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the 
 thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable ? 
 
 In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those 
 to whom the same things happened, and how they were 
 vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault 
 with them: and now where are they? Nowhere. Why 
 then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? and why 
 dost thou not leave these agitations which -are foreign to 
 nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved
 
 MEDITATIONS 67 
 
 by them? and why art thou not altogether intent upon the 
 right way of making use of the things which happen to thee ? 
 for then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a material 
 for thee [to work on] . Only attend to thyself, and resolve 
 to be a good man in every act which thou doest: and re- 
 member 12 
 
 Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will 
 ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig. 
 
 The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregu- 
 larity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind 
 shows in the face by maintaining in it the expression of in- 
 telligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the 
 whole body. But all these things should be observed with- 
 out affectation. 
 
 The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the 
 dancer's, in respect of this, that it should stand ready and 
 firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected. 
 
 Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou 
 wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess. 
 For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involun- 
 tarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest 
 to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 
 
 Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived 
 of truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of jus- 
 tice and temperance and benevolence and everything of the 
 kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind, 
 for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all. 
 
 In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no 
 dishonour in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence 
 worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either so far 
 as the intelligence is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed 
 in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid 
 thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou 
 bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest noth- 
 ing to it in imagination : and remember this too, that we do 
 not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us 
 are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the 
 being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When 
 then thou art discontented about any of these things, say to 
 thyself, that thou art yielding to pain.
 
 68 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel 
 towards men. 
 
 How do we know that Telauges was not superior in char- 
 acter to Socrates? for it is not enough that Socrates died a 
 more noble death, and disputed more skilfully with the 
 sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more endur- 
 ance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, 
 he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked 
 in a swaggering way in the streets though as to this fact 
 one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to 
 inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, 
 and if he was able to be content with being just towards men 
 and pious towards the gods ; neither idly vexed on account of 
 men's villany, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's 
 ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his 
 share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor 
 allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of 
 the miserable flesh. 
 
 Nature has not so mingled* [the intelligence] with the 
 composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the 
 power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under sub- 
 jection to thyself all that is thy own; for it is very possible 
 to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one. 
 Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, that very 
 little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And be- 
 cause thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and 
 skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason re- 
 nounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and 
 obedient to God. 
 
 It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the 
 greatest tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out 
 against thee as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts 
 tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has 
 grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the 
 midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity, and 
 in a just judgment of all surrounding things, and in a ready 
 use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judg- 
 ment may say to the thing which falls under its observation : 
 This thou art in substance [reality], though in men's opinion 
 thou mayest appear to be of a different kind; and the use
 
 MEDITATIONS 69 
 
 shall say to that which falls under the hand : Thou art the 
 thing that I was seeking ; for to rtfe that which presents itself 
 is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and 
 in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man or 
 God. For everything which happens has a relationship 
 either to God or to man, and is neither new nor difficult to 
 handle, but usual and apt matter to work on. 
 
 The perfection of moral character consists in passing every 
 day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor 
 torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 
 
 The gods, who are immortal, are not vexed because during 
 so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as 
 they are and so many of them bad ; and besides this, they also 
 take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to 
 end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this 
 too when thou art one of them? 
 
 It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own 
 badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's 
 badness, which is impossible. 
 
 Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds 
 to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be 
 inferior to itself. 
 
 When thou hast done a good act and another has received 
 it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as 
 fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good 
 act or to obtain a return? 
 
 No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful 
 to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiv- 
 ing what is useful by doing it to others. 
 
 The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But 
 now either everything that takes place comes by way of con- 
 sequence or [continuity] ; or even the chief things towards 
 which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
 ment are governed by no rational principle. If this is re- 
 membered it will make thee more tranquil in many things. 18 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 This is corrupt. 
 
 1 The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
 1 Plato. Pol. vi, 486. 
 
 * From the Bellerophon of Euripides.
 
 7O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 * From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. in, 25.) has 
 translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are these two 
 lines, 
 
 "Reddenda terrae est terra: turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges: Sic jubet necessitas." 
 
 * See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661. 
 ' From the Apologia, c. 16. 
 
 * Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of Antoninus 
 has kareov which is perhaps right ; but there is a difficulty in the^ words 
 jj.ij yap TOVTO nsv, TO Ztfv oitoijovSrf xpovov Tovys. w$ aXrfl&s 
 avdpa kccreov l<5ri, Kal ov, etc. 
 
 * It is said that this is not in the extant writings of Plato. 
 
 10 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 11 The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, v, mo. 
 
 11 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt that it is 
 impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is better to leave it as 
 it is than to patch it up, as some critics and translators have done. 
 
 u It is not easy to understand this section. It has been suggested that 
 there is some error in r? akoytdra, etc. Some of the translators have 
 made nothing of the passage, and they have somewhat perverted the 
 words. The first proposition is, that the universe was made by some 
 sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power 
 which framed an order. The next question is, How are things produced 
 now; or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous 
 succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this : It is by 
 virtue of the original constitution of things that all change and succes- 
 sion have been effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a 
 sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and the same, a con- 
 tinuity of identity; as much one and the same as man is one and the 
 same, which he believes himself to be, though he also believes and can 
 not help believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there is 
 change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in the uni- 
 verse; and if we say that there was an order framed in the beginning 
 and that the things which are now produced are a consequence of a 
 previous arrangement, we speak of things as we are compelled to view 
 them, as forming a series or succession; just as we speak of the changes 
 in our own bodies and the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there 
 are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between any two 
 supposed states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even in- 
 finitely small, between what we call one thing and any other thing which 
 we speak of as immediately preceding or following it. What we call 
 time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession of things or 
 events, an idea which is a part of our constitution, but not an idea which 
 we can suppose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. The 
 conclusion then is certain that the present and the past, the production 
 of present things and the supposed original order, out of which we say 
 that present things now come, are one: and the present productive 
 power and the so-called past arrangement are only different names for 
 one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus wrote here as people some- 
 times talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed by 
 his words. There are certainly other passages from which, I think, that 
 we may collect that he had notions of production something like what 
 I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternative : "or even the chief things
 
 MEDITATIONS 7 1 
 
 principle." I do not exactly know what he means by ra Kvpitiorara. 
 "the chief," or, "the most excellent," or whatever it is. But as he 
 speaks elsewhere of inferior and superior things, and of the inferior 
 being for the .use of the superior, and of rational beings being the high- 
 est, he may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative as- 
 sumes a governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing 
 its power towards these chief objects, or making f its ^special, proper, 
 motion towards them. And here he uses the noun (opjurf) "movement, 1 ' 
 which contains the same motion as the verb (oopurjGz) "moved," which 
 he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking of 
 the making of the universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, 
 he says, we must take the conclusion of the second, that the "chief thing 
 towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
 ment are governed by no rational principle." The meaning then is, if 
 there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing power, which 
 strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude that there is no 
 rational direction of anything, if the power which first made the uni- 
 verse does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that 
 anything is now produced or now exists without the action of the su- 
 preme intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to act, 
 we obtain a conclusion which can not be reconciled with the nature of a 
 supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always assumes. The tran- 
 quillity that a man may gain from these reflections must result from his 
 rejecting the second hypothesis, and accepting the first; whatever may 
 be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he 
 says elsewhere, if there is no providence which governs the world, man 
 has at least the power of governing himself according to the constitu- 
 tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does the best that he 
 can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labour to discover 
 the writer's exact meaning; for I think that he had a meaning, though 
 people may not agree what it was. If I have rightly explained the em- 
 peror's meaning in this and other passages, he has touched the solution 
 of a great question.
 
 BOOK VIII 
 
 THIS reflection also tends to the removal of the desire 
 of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to 
 have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life 
 from thy youth upwards, like the philosopher; but 
 both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far 
 from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so 
 that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a 
 philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then 
 thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the 
 thought, How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if 
 thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature 
 wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else dis- 
 tract thee ; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings 
 without having found happiness anywhere ; not in syllogisms 
 nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor 
 anywhere. Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature 
 requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has prin- 
 ciples from which come his affects and his acts. What prin- 
 ciples ? Those which relate to good and bad : the belief that 
 there is nothing good for man, which does not make him 
 just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, 
 which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned. 
 On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with 
 respect to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I 
 am dead, and all is gone. What more do I seek, if what I 
 am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, and 
 a social being, and one who is under the same law with God ? 
 Alexander and Caius 1 and Pompeius, what are they in 
 comparison with Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? 
 For they were acquainted with things, and their causes 
 [forms], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these 
 men were conformable to their pursuits. But as to the 
 
 72
 
 MEDITATIONS 73 
 
 others, how many things had they to care for, and to how 
 many things were they slaves. 
 
 Consider that men will do the same things nevertheless, 
 even though thou shouldst burst. 
 
 This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, for all things are 
 according to the nature of the universal ; and in a little time 
 thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and 
 Augustus. In the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily 
 on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering 
 that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's nature 
 demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it 
 seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition 
 and with modesty and without hypocrisy. 
 
 The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove 
 to that place the things which are in this, to change them, 
 to take them away hence, and to carry them there. All 
 things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All 
 things are familiar to us; but the distribution of them still 
 remains the same. 
 
 Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its 
 way well ; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when 
 in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, and 
 when it directs its movements to social acts only, and 
 when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which 
 are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that 
 is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this common 
 nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the 
 leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the 
 plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not 
 perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the 
 nature of man is part of a nature which is not subject to 
 impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to 
 everything in equal portions and according to its worth, 
 times, substance, cause [form], activity and incident. But 
 examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with 
 any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking 
 all the parts together of one thing and comparing them with 
 all the parts together of another. 
 
 Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast 
 leisure [or ability] to check arrogance : thou hast leisure to
 
 74 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 be superior to pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be su- 
 perior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and un- 
 grateful people, nay even to care for them. 
 
 Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the 
 court life or with thy own. 
 
 Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected 
 something useful ; but that which is good must be something 
 useful, and the perfect good man should look after it. But 
 no such man would ever repent of having refused any sen- 
 sual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful. 
 
 This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? 
 What is its substance and material? And what its causal 
 nature [or form]? And what is it doing in the world? 
 And how long does it subsist ? 
 
 When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember 
 that it is according to thy constitution and according to 
 human nature to perform social acts, but sleeping is common 
 also to irrational animals. But that which is according to 
 each individual's nature is also more peculiarly its own, and 
 more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable. 
 
 Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every 
 impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physics, 
 of Ethics, and of Dialectics. 
 
 Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thy- 
 self: What opinions has this man about good and bad? 
 For if with respect to pleasure and pain and the causes of 
 each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and 
 life he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing won- 
 derful or strange to me, if he does such and such things ; and 
 I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so. 
 
 Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig- 
 tree produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world pro- 
 duces such and such things of which it is productive; and 
 for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be sur- 
 prised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavourable. 
 
 Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him 
 who corrects thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is 
 to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity which 
 is exerted according to thy own movement and judgment, 
 and indeed according to thy own understanding too.
 
 MEDITATIONS 75 
 
 If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? but 
 if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame? the 
 atoms [chance] or the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must 
 blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct that which is the 
 cause ; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing 
 itself; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it 
 to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done without a 
 purpose. 
 
 That which has died falls not out of the universe. If 
 it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its 
 proper parts, which are elements of the universe and of thy- 
 self. And these too change, and they murmur not. 
 
 Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why 
 dost thou wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some 
 purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For 
 what purpose then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if com- 
 mon sense allows this. 
 
 Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end 
 than to the beginning and the continuance, just like the man 
 who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to 
 be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have 
 fallen? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds 
 together, or what harm when it is burst ? The same may be 
 said of a light also. 
 
 Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of 
 thing it is ; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it 
 becomes ; and when it is diseased. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the 
 rememberer and the remembered: and all this in a nook of 
 this part of the world; and not even here do all agree, 
 no, not any one with himself; and the whole earth too is a 
 point. 
 
 Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is 
 an opinion or an act or a word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest rather to be- 
 come good to-morrow than to be good to-day. 
 
 Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good 
 of mankind. Does anything happen to me? I receive it 
 and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from 
 which all that happens is derived.
 
 76 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 Such as bathing appears to thee oil, sweat, dirt, filthy 
 water, all things disgusting : so is every part of life and 
 everything. 
 
 Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda 
 saw Maximus die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus 
 saw Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus 
 saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is every- 
 thing. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And 
 those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with 
 pride, where are they? for instance the sharpwitted men, 
 Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any 
 one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some 
 indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, and 
 others have become the heroes of fables, and again others 
 have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, 
 that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or 
 thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and 
 placed elsewhere. 
 
 It is a satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a 
 man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to 
 his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to form 
 a just judgment of plausible appearances, and to take a sur- 
 vey of the nature of the universe and of the things which 
 happen in it. 
 
 There are three relations [between thee and other things] : 
 the one to the body which surrounds thee ; the second to the 
 divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third 
 to those who live with thee. 
 
 Pain is either an evil to the body then let the body say 
 what it thinks of it or to the soul; but it is in the power 
 of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and 
 not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgment and 
 movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil 
 ascends so high. 
 
 Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: 
 now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor 
 desire nor any perturbation at all ; but looking at all things 
 I see what is their nature, and I use each according to its 
 value. Remember this power which thou hast from nature. 
 
 Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he
 
 MEDITATIONS 77 
 
 may be appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain 
 discourse. 
 
 Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, 
 sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, 2 Maece- 
 nas, physicians and sacrificing priests the whole court is 
 dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a 
 single man, but of a whole race, as of the Pompeii ; and that 
 which is inscribed on the tombs The last of his race. Then 
 consider what trouble those before them have had that 
 they might leave a successor ; and then, that of necessity some 
 one must be the last. Again here consider the death of a 
 whole race. 
 
 It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; 
 and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be con- 
 tent ; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall 
 not do its duty. 
 
 But something external will stand in the way Nothing 
 will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and 
 considerately But perhaps some other active power will be 
 hindered Well, but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by 
 being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, 
 another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee 
 in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt 
 itself to this ordering of which we are speaking. 
 
 Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be 
 ready to let it go. 
 
 If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, 
 lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does 
 a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content 
 with what happens, and separates himself from others, or 
 does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached 
 thyself from the natural unity for thou wast made by na- 
 ture a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off yet here there 
 is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again 
 to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after 
 it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together 
 again. But consider the kindness by which he has distin- 
 guished man, for he has put it in his power not to be sep- 
 arated at ail from the universal ; and when he has been sep-
 
 78 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 
 
 arated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to 
 resume his place as a part. 
 
 As the nature of the universal has given to every rational 
 being all the other powers that it has,* so we have received 
 from it this power also. For as the universal nature con- 
 verts and fixes in its predestined place everything which 
 stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such things a 
 part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to make every 
 hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purposes as 
 it may have designed. 
 
 Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy 
 life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various 
 troubles which thou mayest expect to befall thee: but on 
 every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is in- 
 tolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to 
 confess. In the next place remember that neither the future 
 nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is re- 
 duced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and 
 chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this. 
 
 Does Panthea orPergamusnowsit by the tomb of Verus? 3 
 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? 
 That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, 
 would the dead be conscious of it ? and if the dead were con- 
 scious, would they be pleased? and if they were pleased, 
 would that make them immortal ? Was it not in the order 
 of destiny that these persons too should first become old wo- 
 men and old men and then die? What then would those do 
 after these were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a 
 bag. 
 
 If thou canst see sharply, look and judge wisely,* says the 
 philosopher. 
 
 In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue 
 which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is op- 
 posed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance. 
 
 If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears 
 to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security 
 Who is this self ? The reason But I am not reason Be it 
 so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any 
 other part of thee suffers let it have its own opinion about 
 itself.
 
 MEDITATIONS 79 
 
 Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the 
 animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is 
 equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else 
 also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution 
 of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelli- 
 gence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these 
 things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure af- 
 fect thee? The senses will look to that. Has any obstacle 
 opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object? if indeed thou 
 wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or with- 
 out any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to 
 thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest into 
 consideration the usual course of things, thou hast not yet 
 been injured nor even impeded. The things however which 
 are proper to the understanding no other man is used to im- 
 pede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches 
 it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues 
 a sphere. 
 
 It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have 
 never intentionally given pain even to another. 
 
 Different things delight different people. But it is my 
 delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning 
 away either from any man or from any of the things which 
 happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome 
 eyes and using everything according to its value. 
 
 See that thou secure this present time to thyself : for those 
 who rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the 
 men of after time will be exactly such as these whom they 
 can not bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it in 
 any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that 
 sound, or have this or that opinion about thee? 
 
 Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall 
 keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel 
 and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this 
 change of place sufficient reason why my soul should be un- 
 happy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrink- 
 ing, affrighted? and what wilt thou find which is sufficient 
 reason for this ? 
 
 Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human 
 accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature
 
 8o MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature 
 of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If 
 then there happens to each thing both what is usual and 
 natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common 
 nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee. 
 
 If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing 
 that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it 
 is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if any- 
 thing in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders 
 thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if thou art 
 pained because thou art not doing some particular thing 
 which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather 
 act than complain ? But some insuperable obstacle is in the 
 way ? Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
 done depends not on thee But it is not worth while to live, 
 if this can not be done Take thy departure then from life 
 contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well 
 pleased too with the things which are obstacles. 
 
 Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self- 
 collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which 
 it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. 
 What then will it be when it forms a judgment about any- 
 thing aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the 
 mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has 
 nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for 
 the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this 
 is an ignorant man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly 
 to this refuge is unhappy. 
 
 Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appear- 
 ances report. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that 
 a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ; 
 but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported. 
 I see that my child is sick. I do see; but that he is in dan- 
 ger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first ap- 
 pearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then 
 nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a 
 man who knows everything that happens in the world. 
 
 A cucumber is bitter. Throw it away. There are briars 
 in the road. Turn aside from them. This is enough. Do 
 not add, And why were such things made in the world ? For
 
 MEDITATIONS 8 1 
 
 thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with na- 
 ture, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoe- 
 maker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their 
 workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they 
 make. And yet they have places into which they can throw 
 these shavings and cuttings, and the universal nature has no 
 external space; but the wondrous part of her art is that 
 though she has circumscribed herself, everything within her 
 which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she 
 changes into herself, and again makes other new things from 
 these very same, so that she requires neither substance from 
 without nor wants a place into which she may cast that 
 which decays. She is content then with her own space, and 
 her own matter and her own art. 
 
 Neither in thy actions be sluggish, nor in thy conversa- 
 tion without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor 
 let there be in thy soul inward contention nor external effu- 
 sion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. 
 What then can those things do to prevent thy mind from re- 
 maining pure, wise, sober, just? For instance, if a man 
 should stand by a limpid, pure spring, and curse it, the spring 
 never ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should cast 
 clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash 
 them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt thou 
 possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By 
 forming* thyself hourly, to freedom, conjoined with con- 
 tentment, simplicity, and modesty. 
 
 He who does not know what the world is, does not know 
 where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose 
 the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the 
 world is. And he who has failed in any one of these things 
 could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
 What then dost thou think of him who seeks the praise of 
 those who applaud, of men who know not either where they 
 are or who they are? 
 
 Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses him- 
 self thrice every hour? wouldst thou wish to please a man 
 who does not please himself? Does a man please himself 
 who repents of nearly everything that he does?
 
 82 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the 
 air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now 
 be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all 
 things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all 
 parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw 
 it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to re- 
 spire it. 
 
 Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the uni- 
 verse; and particularly, the wickedness of one man does no 
 harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in 
 his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose. 
 
 To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just 
 as indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we 
 are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ru- 
 ling power of each of us has its own office for otherwise my 
 neighbour's wickedness would be my harm, which God has 
 not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on 
 another. 
 
 The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions 
 indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffu- 
 sion is extension : Accordingly its rays are called Extensions 
 [aKTives] because they are extended [a7r6roKTVe<50ai]. 4 But 
 one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at 
 the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a 
 darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as it 
 were is divided when it meets with any solid body which 
 stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there 
 the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such 
 then ought to be the out-pouring and diffusion of the under- 
 standing, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an ex- 
 tension, and it should make no violent or impetuous colli- 
 sion with the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall 
 down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For 
 a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not 
 admit it. 
 
 He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a 
 different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sen- 
 sation, neither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt 
 acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different 
 kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live.
 
 MEDITATIONS 83 
 
 Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then 
 or bear with them. 
 
 In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. 
 The mind indeed both when it exercises caution and when it 
 is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the 
 less, and to its object. 
 
 Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and also let every 
 other man enter into thine. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Caius is Caius Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompeius is Cneius 
 Pompeius, named Magnus. 
 
 8 Areius was a philosopher, who was intimate with Augustus. 
 8 " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true reading. 
 4 A piece of bad etymology.
 
 BOOK IX 
 
 HE who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the 
 universal nature has made rational animals for the 
 sake of one another to help one another according 
 to their deserts, but in no way to injure one an- 
 other, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of im- 
 piety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is 
 guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal na- 
 ture is the nature of things that are ; and things that are have 
 a relation to all things that come into existence. 1 And 
 further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the 
 prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies 
 intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts un- 
 justly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, 
 inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and 
 inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the 
 nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is moved 
 of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had re- 
 ceived powers from nature through the neglect of which he 
 is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And 
 indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids 
 pain as evil is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a 
 man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging 
 that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to 
 their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoy- 
 ment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleas- 
 ure, but the good have pain for their share and the things 
 which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain 
 will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which 
 will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And 
 he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and 
 this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things to- 
 wards which the universal nature is equally affected for 
 
 84
 
 MEDITATIONS 85 
 
 it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected 
 towards both towards these they who wish to follow nature 
 should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. 
 With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or 
 honour and dishonour, which the universal nature employs 
 equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly act- 
 ing impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs 
 them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to 
 those who are produced in continuous series and to those 
 who come after them by virtue of a certain original move- 
 ment of Providence, according to which it moved from a 
 certain beginning to this ordering of things, having con- 
 ceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and 
 having determined powers productive of beings and of 
 changes and of such like successions. 
 
 It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind 
 without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and 
 luxury and pride. However to breathe out one's life when 
 a man has had enough of these things is the next best voy- 
 age, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with 
 vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this 
 pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a 
 pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and 
 change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this 
 corruption is a pestilence of animals so far as they are ani- 
 mals ; but the other is a pestilence of men so far as they are 
 men. 
 
 Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since 
 this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such 
 as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to 
 reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, 
 and to beget, and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all 
 the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life 
 bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with 
 the character of a reflecting man, to be neither careless nor 
 impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to 
 wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now 
 waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy 
 wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall 
 fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest also a vul-
 
 86 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 gar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt 
 be made best reconciled to death by observing the objects 
 from which thou art going to be removed, and the morals of 
 those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For 
 it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty 
 to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to 
 remember that thy departure will be not from men who have 
 the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, 
 if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and 
 attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have 
 the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how 
 great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those 
 who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O 
 death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself. 
 
 He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He 
 who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes 
 himself bad. 
 
 He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; 
 not only he who does a certain thing. 
 
 Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy 
 present conduct directed to social good, and thy present dis- 
 position of contentment with everything which happens* 
 that is enough. 
 
 Wipe out imagination : check desire : extinguish appetite : 
 keep the ruling faculty in its own power. 
 
 Among the animals which have not reason one life is dis- 
 tributed ; but among reasonable animals one intelligent soul 
 is distributed : just as there is one earth of all things which 
 are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe 
 one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that 
 have life. 
 
 All things which participate in anything which is com- 
 mon to them all move towards that which is of the same 
 kind with themselves. Everything which is earthly turns 
 towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together 
 and everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so 
 that they require something to keep them asunder, and the 
 application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account 
 of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together 
 with all the fire which is here, that even every substance
 
 MEDITATIONS 87 
 
 which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited because there is less 
 mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition. 
 Accordingly then everything also which participates in the 
 common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards 
 that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even 
 more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all 
 other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to 
 mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. 
 Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms 
 of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, 
 and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are souls, 
 and that power which brings them together is seen to exert 
 itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has 
 been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in 
 rational animals there are political communities and friend- 
 ships, and families and meetings of people; and in wars, 
 treaties and armistices. But in the things which are still 
 superior, even though they are separated from one another, 
 unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to 
 the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in 
 things which are separated. See, then, what now takes 
 place. For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this 
 mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone the property 
 of flowing together is not seen. But still though men 
 strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held 
 by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and thou wilt 
 see what I say if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will 
 one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no 
 earthy thing than a man altogether separated from other 
 men. 
 
 Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at 
 the proper seasons each produce it. But if usage has espe- 
 cially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this is 
 nothing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for itself, 
 and there are produced from it other things of the same kind 
 as reason itself. 
 
 If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong ; 
 
 but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to 
 
 thee for this purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to 
 
 such persons ; and for some purposes they even help them to 
 
 31
 
 88 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 get health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. And it is 
 in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee? 
 
 Labour not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who 
 would be pitied or admired : but direct thy will to one thing 
 only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the 
 social reason requires. 
 
 To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast 
 out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my 
 opinions. 
 
 All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephem- 
 eral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything 
 now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have 
 buried. 
 
 Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, 
 neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any 
 judgment. What is it, then, which does judge about them ? 
 The ruling faculty. 
 
 Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good 
 of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice 
 lie not in passivity, but in activity. 
 
 For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to 
 come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up. 
 
 Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou 
 wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of 
 judges they are of themselves. 
 
 All things are changing: and thou thyself art in contin- 
 uous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, 
 and the whole universe too. 
 
 It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there 
 where it is. 
 
 Termination of activity, cessation from movement and 
 opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy 
 thoughts now to the consideration of thy life, thy life as a 
 child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also 
 every change was a death. Is this anything to fear ? Turn 
 thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to 
 thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father ; 
 and as thou findest many other differences and changes and 
 terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like
 
 MEDITATIONS 89 
 
 manner, then, neither are the termination and cessation and 
 change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of. 
 
 Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of 
 the universe and that of thy neighbour : thy own that thou 
 mayst make it just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst 
 remember of what .thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbour, 
 that thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly or 
 with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that his 
 ruling faculty is akin to thine. 
 
 As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, 
 so let every act of thine be a component part of a social life. 
 Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immedi- 
 ately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life, 
 and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a 
 mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by 
 himself stands apart from the general agreement. 
 
 Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spir- 
 its carrying about dead bodies [such is everything] ; and so 
 what is exhibited in the representation of the mansions of 
 the dead strikes our eyes more clearly. 
 
 Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and 
 detach it altogether from its material part, and then contem- 
 plate it ; then determine the time, the longest which a thing 
 of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure. 
 
 Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being 
 contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does the things 
 which it is constituted by nature to do. But enough* [of 
 this]. 
 
 When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say 
 about thee anything injurious, approach their poor souls, 
 penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou 
 wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that 
 these men may have this or that opinion about thee. How- 
 ever thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature 
 they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by 
 dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on 
 which they set a value.* 
 
 The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up 
 and down from age to age. And either the universal intel- 
 ligence puts itself in motion for every separate effect, and
 
 9O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 if this is so, be thou content with that which is the result of 
 its activity; or it puts itself in motion once, and everything 
 else comes by way of sequence in a manner; or indivisible 
 elements are the origin of all things. In a word, if there is 
 a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be 
 governed by it. 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth, too, will 
 change, and the things also which result from change will 
 continue to change for ever, and these again for ever. For 
 if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which 
 follow one another like wave after wave, and their rapidity, 
 he will despise everything which is perishable. 
 
 The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries 
 everything along with it. But how worthless are all these 
 poor people who are engaged in matters political, and, as 
 they suppose, are playing the philosopher! All drivellers. 
 Well then, man : do what nature now requires. Set thyself 
 in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee 
 to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's Re- 
 public : but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and 
 consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can 
 change men's opinions? and without a change of opinions 
 what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while 
 they pretend to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexander 
 and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They them- 
 selves shall judge whether they discovered what the common 
 nature required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if 
 they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to 
 imitate them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. 
 Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. 
 
 Look down from above on the countless herds of men and 
 their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyag- 
 ings in storms and calms, and the differences among those 
 who are born, who live together, and die. And consider, 
 too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of 
 those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among 
 barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, 
 and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps 
 now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that
 
 MEDITATIONS 9! 
 
 neither a posthumous name is of any value, nor reputation, 
 nor anything- else. 
 
 Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to 
 the things which come from the external cause ; and let there 
 be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, 
 that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, 
 in social acts, for this is according to thy nature. 
 
 Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things 
 among those which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy 
 opinion ; and thou wilt then gain for thyself ample space by 
 comprehending the whole universe in thy mind, and by con- 
 templating the eternity of time, and observing the rapid 
 change of every several thing, how short is the time from 
 birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as 
 well as the equally boundless time after dissolution. 
 
 All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who 
 have been spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish 
 too. And he who dies at the extremest old age will be 
 brought into the same condition with him who died pre- 
 maturely. 
 
 What are these men's leading principles, and about what 
 kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons 
 do they love and honour? Imagine that thou seest their 
 poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm 
 by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 
 
 Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal na- 
 ture delights in change, and in obedience to her all things 
 are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like 
 form, and will be such to time without end. What, then, 
 dost thou say? That all things have been and all things al- 
 ways will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in 
 so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been 
 condemned to be bound in never ceasing evil ? 
 
 The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of 
 everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : or again, marble rocks, 
 the callosities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sedi- 
 ments; and garments, only bits of hair; and purple dye, 
 blood; and everything else is of the same kind. And that 
 which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the 
 same kind, changing from this to that.
 
 92 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish 
 tricks. Why art thou disturbed? What is there new in 
 this? What unsettles thee? Is it the form of the thing? 
 Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But besides 
 these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now be- 
 come at last more simple and better. It is the same whether 
 we examine these things for a hundred years or three. 
 
 If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But 
 perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and 
 come together as in one body, and the part ought not to find 
 fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole : or 
 there are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture and dis- 
 persion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling 
 faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing 
 the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and 
 feed with the rest? 2 
 
 Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, 
 then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them ? But 
 if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to give 
 thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou 
 fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou de- 
 sirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray 
 that any of these things should not happen or happen? for 
 certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate 
 for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods 
 have placed them in thy power. Well, then, is it not better 
 to use what is in thy power like a free man than to desire in 
 a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And 
 who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the 
 things which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for 
 such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus : How 
 shall I be able to lie with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : 
 How shall I desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: 
 How shall I be released from this ? Another prays : How 
 shall I not desire to be released ? Another thus : How shall 
 I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How shall I not be 
 afraid to lose him ? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and 
 see what comes. 
 
 Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not
 
 MEDITATIONS 
 
 93 
 
 about my bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such 
 subjects to those who visited me; but I continued to dis- 
 course on the nature of things as before, keeping to this 
 main point, how the mind, while participating in such move- 
 ments as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from perturba- 
 tions and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, 
 give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn 
 looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life 
 went on well and happily. Do, then, the same that he did 
 both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
 stances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that 
 may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an igno- 
 rant man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a princi- 
 ple of all schools of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that 
 which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which 
 thou doest it. 
 
 When thou art offended with any man's shameless con- 
 duct, immediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shame- 
 less men should not be in the world? It is not possible. 
 Do not, then, require what is impossible. For this man also 
 is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be in 
 the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy 
 mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of 
 every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same 
 time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that 
 such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become more 
 kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful 
 to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, 
 what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every 
 wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote 
 against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind 
 of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for 
 thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray : for 
 every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. 
 Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find 
 that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has 
 done anything by which thy mind could be made worse : but 
 that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only 
 in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there 
 strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the
 
 94 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou 
 shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not ex- 
 pect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means 
 given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he 
 would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art 
 amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blam- 
 est a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For 
 the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that 
 a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, 
 or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it ab- 
 solutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy 
 very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when 
 thou hast done a man a service? art thou not content that 
 thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and 
 dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded 
 a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as 
 these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by 
 working according to their several constitutions obtain what 
 is their own ; so also as man is formed by nature to acts of 
 benevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in 
 any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted 
 conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 " As there is not any action or natural event, which we are ac- 
 quainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to 
 some other actions and events, so, possibly each of them, when it has 
 not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other 
 actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world," 
 Again : "Things seemingly the most in significant imaginable, are per- 
 petually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the great- 
 est importance ; so that any one thing whatever, may, for aught we 
 know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other." Butler's 
 Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. 
 
 * There is some corruption at the end of this section : but I think 
 that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. Whether intelli- 
 gence rules all things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He 
 must use the power that he has, and be tranquil.
 
 BOOKX 
 
 WILT them, then, my soul, never be good and simple 
 and one and naked, more manifest than the body 
 which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy 
 an affectionate and contented disposition ? Wilt 
 thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing 
 for nothing more, nor desiring anything,, either animate or 
 inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures? nor yet desiring 
 time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or 
 pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst 
 live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present 
 condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt 
 thou convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it 
 comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee, and 
 will be well whatever shall please them, and whatever they 
 shall give for the conservation of the perfect living being, 1 
 the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds 
 together all things, and contains and embraces all things 
 which are dissolved for the production of other like things? 
 Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in com- 
 munity with gods and men as neither to find fault with them 
 at all, nor to be condemned by them? 
 
 Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art gov- 
 erned by nature only : then do it and accept it, if thy nature, 
 so far as thou art a living being, shall not be made worse by 
 it. And next thou must observe what thy nature requires 
 so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayst 
 allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational ani- 
 mal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal 
 is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these 
 rules, then, and trouble thyself about nothing else. 
 
 Everything which happens either happens in such wise as 
 thou art formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not 
 32 95
 
 96 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 formed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in 
 such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not 
 complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. 
 But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by 
 nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it 
 has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art 
 formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which 
 it depends on thy opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, 
 by thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this. 
 
 If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him 
 his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame 
 not even thyself. 
 
 Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee 
 from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from 
 eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which 
 is incident to it. 
 
 Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or na- 
 ture [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a 
 part of the whole which is governed by nature; next, I am 
 in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the 
 same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch 
 as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things 
 which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is 
 injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. 
 For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advan- 
 tage ; and all natures indeed have this common principle, but 
 the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it 
 can not be compelled even by an external cause to generate 
 anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am 
 a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything 
 that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner inti- 
 mately related to the parts which are of the same kind with 
 myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct 
 myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, 
 and I shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, and 
 divert them from the contrary. Now, if these things are 
 done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe 
 that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of 
 action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is 
 content with whatever the state may assign to him.
 
 MEDITATIONS 97 
 
 The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is nat- 
 urally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity per- 
 ish ; but let this be understood in this sense, that they must 
 undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and 
 a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to 
 exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change 
 and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For 
 whether did nature herself design to do evil to the things 
 which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil 
 and of necessity fall into evil, or have such results happened 
 without her knowing it? Both these suppositions, indeed, 
 are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term 
 Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these 
 things as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm 
 at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their na- 
 ture subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised 
 or vexed as if something were happening contrary to nature, 
 particularly as the dissolution of things is into those things 
 of which each thing is composed. For there is either a dis- 
 persion of the elements out of which everything has been 
 compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and 
 from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back 
 into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods is 
 consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do 
 not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee 
 from the time of generation. For all this received its accre- 
 tion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from 
 the food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which 
 has received [the accretion], changes, not that which thy 
 mother brought forth. But suppose that this [which thy 
 mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that 
 other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change], this 
 is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said. 2 
 
 When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, 
 rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care 
 that thou dost not change these names ; and if thou shouldst 
 lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the 
 term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating at- 
 tention to every several thing and freedom from negligence ; 
 and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the
 
 98 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 things which are assigned to thee by the common nature; 
 and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
 above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and 
 above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such 
 things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the possession 
 of these names, without desiring to be called by these names 
 by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on an- 
 other life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto 
 been, and to be torn in pieces and denied in such a life, is the 
 character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life, 
 and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 
 though covered with wounds and gore, still entreat to be 
 kept to the following day, though they will be exposed in 
 the same state to the same claws and bites. 3 Therefore fix 
 thyself in the possession of these few names : and if thou art 
 able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to cer- 
 tain islands of the Happy. 4 But if thou shalt perceive that 
 thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go 
 courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain 
 them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but 
 with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing this 
 one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of 
 it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these 
 names, it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the 
 gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, -but wish all rea- 
 sonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou re- 
 memberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, 
 and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what 
 does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work 
 of a man is a man. 
 
 Mimi, 5 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily 
 wipe out those holy principles of thine. *How many things 
 without studying nature dost thou imagine, and how many 
 dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to look on and so 
 to do every thing, that at the same time the power of dealing 
 with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative fac- 
 ulty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the 
 knowledge of each several thing is maintained without show- 
 ing it, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy 
 simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge of every
 
 MEDITATIONS 99 
 
 several thing, both what it is in substance, and what place 
 it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist and 
 of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, 
 and who are able to give it and take it away? 
 
 A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another 
 when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has 
 taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken 
 wild-boars, and another when he has taken bears, and an- 
 other when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these rob- 
 bers, if thou examinest their opinions? 8 
 
 Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things 
 change into one another, and constantly attend to it, and 
 exercise thyself about this part [of philosophy]. For noth- 
 ing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a 
 man has put off the body, and he sees that he must, no one 
 knows how soon, go away from among men and leave every- 
 thing here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all 
 his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns 
 himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man 
 shall say or think about him or do against him, he never 
 even thinks of it, being himself contented with these two 
 things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being 
 satisfied with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside 
 all distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else 
 than to accomplish the straight course through the law, 7 and 
 by accomplishing the straight course to follow God. 
 
 What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy 
 power to inquire what ought to be done ? And if thou seest 
 clear, go by this way content, without turning back : but if 
 thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. But 
 if any other things oppose thee, go on according to thy pow- 
 ers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears 
 to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou 
 dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who 
 follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the 
 same time, and also cheerful and collected. 
 
 Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep 
 whether it will make any difference to thee, if another does 
 what is just and right. It will make no difference. 
 
 Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume
 
 IOO MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, 
 are such as they are at bed and at board, and thou hast not 
 forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they 
 pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands 
 and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of 
 which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, mod- 
 esty, truth, law, a good daemon [happiness] ? 
 
 To her who gives and takes back all, to Nature, the man 
 who is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; 
 take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, 
 but obediently and well pleased with her. 
 
 Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as 
 on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man 
 lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in 
 a state [political community]. Let men see, let them know 
 a real man who lives according to nature. If they can not 
 endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to 
 live thus [as men do]. 
 
 No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good 
 man ought to be, but be such. 
 
 Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole 
 'of substance, and consider that all individual things as to 
 substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, the turning of 
 a gimlet. 
 
 Look at every thing that exists, and observe that it is al- 
 ready in dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefac- 
 tion or dispersion, or that everything is so constituted by 
 nature as to die. 
 
 Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, 
 generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then what 
 kind of men they are when they are imperious* and arrogant, 
 or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a 
 short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what 
 things; and after a little time consider in what a condition 
 they will be. 
 
 That is for the good of each thing, which the universal 
 nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time 
 when nature brings it. 
 
 "The earth loves the shower;" and "the solemn aether 
 loves;" and the universe loves to make whatever is about to
 
 MEDITATIONS IOI 
 
 be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. And 
 is not this too said, that "this or that loves [is wont] to be 
 produced ?" 8 
 
 Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thy- 
 self to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own will ; 
 or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty. But be- 
 sides these things there is nothing. Be of good cheer, then. 
 
 Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land 
 is like any other ; and that all things here are the same with 
 things on the top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or 
 wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what 
 Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as in a shep- 
 herd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are 
 omitted in the translation.] 9 
 
 What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what na- 
 ture am I now making it? and for what purpose am I now 
 using it? is it void of understanding? is it loosed and rent 
 asunder from social life? is it melted into and mixed with 
 the poor flesh so as to move together with it ? 
 
 He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law 
 is master, and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And 
 he also who is grieved or angry or afraid,* is dissatisfied 
 because something has been or is or shall be of the things 
 which are appointed by him who rules all things, and he is 
 Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who 
 fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway. 10 
 
 A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then 
 another cause takes it, and labours on it and makes a child. 
 What a thing from such a material ! Again, the child passes 
 food down through the throat, and then another cause takes 
 it and makes perception and motion, and in fine life and 
 strength and other things; how many and how strange! 
 Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden 
 way, and see the power just as we see the power which car- 
 ries things downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but 
 still no less plainly. 
 
 Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, 
 in time past also were; and consider that they will be the 
 same again. And place before thy eyes entire dramas and 
 stages of the same form, whatever thou hast learned from
 
 IO2 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 thy experience or from older history ; for example, the whole 
 court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, and 
 the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Crcesus; for all 
 those were such dramas as we see now, only with different 
 actors. 
 
 Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or dis- 
 contented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and 
 screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments 
 the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to 
 the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what 
 happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 
 
 Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, 
 pause and ask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it 
 deprives thee of this. 
 
 When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith 
 turn to thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err 
 thyself ; for example, in thinking that money is a good thing, 
 or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. For by 
 attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this 
 consideration also is added, that the man is compelled: for 
 what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away from 
 him the compulsion. 
 
 When thou hast seen Satyron 11 the Socratic,* think of 
 either Eutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Eu- 
 phrates, think of Eutychion or Silvanus, and when thou hast 
 seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast 
 seen Xenophon think of Crito 12 or Severus, and when thou 
 hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the 
 case of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought 
 be in thy mind, Where then are those men? Nowhere, or 
 nobody knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt look 
 at human things as smoke and nothing at all; especially if 
 thou reflectest at the same time that what has once changed 
 will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But 
 thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And 
 why art thou not content to pass through this short time in 
 an orderly way ? What matter and opportunity [ for thy ac- 
 tivity] art thou avoiding? For what else are all these 
 things, except exercises for the reason, when it has viewed
 
 MEDITATIONS 103 
 
 carefully and by examination into their nature the things 
 which happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have 
 made these things thy own, as the stomach which is strength- 
 ened makes all things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame 
 and brightness out of everything that is thrown into it. 
 
 Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that 
 thou art not simple or that thou art not good; but let him 
 be a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about 
 thee; and thi is altogether in thy power. For who is he 
 that shall hinder thee from being good and simple? Do 
 thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou shalt be 
 such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou 
 art not such. 
 
 What is that which as to this material [our life] can be 
 done or said in the way most conformable to reason. For 
 whatever this may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say 
 it, and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou 
 wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a condition 
 that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall 
 be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented 
 to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to 
 man's constitution; for a man ought to consider as an en- 
 joyment everything which it is in his power to do according 
 to his own nature. And it is in his power everywhere. 
 Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere by 
 its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything 
 else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, 
 for the things which check them and stand in the way are 
 many. But intelligence and reason are able to go through 
 everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they 
 are formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy 
 eyes this facility with which the reason will be carried 
 through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards, as 
 a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing 
 further. For all other obstacles either affect the body only 
 whichisa dead thing; or, except through opinion andtheyield- 
 ing of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm of 
 any kind ; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately 
 become bad. Now, in the case of all things which have 
 a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to any
 
 104 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently 
 worse ; but in the like case, a man becomes both better, if one 
 may say so, and more worthy of praise by making right 
 use of these accidents. And finally remember that nothing 
 harms him who is really a citizen, which does not harm the 
 state ; nor yet does anything harm the state, which does not 
 harm law [order] ; and of these things which are called mis- 
 fortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law 
 does not harm either state or citizen. 
 
 To him who is penetrated by true principles even the brief- 
 est precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind 
 him that he should be free from grief and fear. For ex- 
 ample 
 
 "Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground 
 So is the race of men." 1 * 
 
 Leaves, also, are thy children ; and leaves, too, are they who 
 cry out as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their 
 praise, or on the contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer ; 
 and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall receive and 
 transmit a man's fame to after times. For all such things 
 as these "are produced in the season of spring," as the poet 
 says; then the wind casts them down; then the forest pro- 
 duces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is 
 common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all 
 things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou 
 shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy 
 grave another soon will lament. 
 
 The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to 
 say, I wish for green things; for this is the condition of a 
 diseased eye. And the healthy hearing and smelling ought 
 to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and smelled. 
 And the healthy stomach ought to be with respect to all food 
 just as the mill with respect to all things which it is formed 
 to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding 
 ought to be prepared for everything which happens ; but that 
 which says, Let my dear children live, and let all men praise 
 whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green things, 
 or teeth which seek for soft things. 
 
 There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by 
 him when he is dying some who are pleased with what is
 
 MEDITATIONS IO5 
 
 going to happen. 14 Suppose that he was a good and wise 
 man, will there not be at last some one to say to himself, Let 
 us at last breathe freely being relieved from this schoolmas- 
 ter? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I per- 
 ceived that he tacitly condemns us. This is what is said of 
 a good man. But in our own case how many other things 
 are there for which there are many who wish to get rid of 
 us. Thou wilt consider this then when thou art dying, and 
 thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus : I am 
 going away from such a life, in which even my associates in 
 behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, 
 themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some 
 little advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a 
 longer stay here ? Do not however for this reason go away 
 less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own char- 
 acter, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the other 
 hand not as if thou wast torn away ; but as when a man dies 
 a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the 
 body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for 
 nature united thee to them and associated thee. But does 
 she now dissolve the union ? Well, I am separated as from 
 kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without com- 
 pulsion ; for this too is one of the things according to nature. 
 
 Accustom thyself as much as possible, on the occasion of 
 anything being done by any person, to inquire with thyself, 
 For what object is this man doing this? but begin with thy- 
 self, and examine thyself first. 
 
 Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing 
 which is hidden within : this is the power of persuasion, this 
 is life, this, if one may so say, is man. In contemplating 
 thyself never include the vessel which surrounds thee and 
 these instruments which are attached about it. For they are 
 like to an axe, differing only in this that they grow to the 
 body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without 
 the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver's 
 shuttle, and the writer's pen, and the driver's whip. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 That is. God, as he is defined by Zeno. But the confusion between 
 gods and God is strange. 
 1 The end of this section i3 perhaps corrupt. The meaning is very ob-
 
 106 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 scure. I have given that meaning which appears to be consistent with 
 the whole argument. The emperor here maintains that the essential part 
 of man is unchangeable, and that the other parts, if they change or 
 perish, do not affect that which really constitutes the man. 
 
 1 See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused the people 
 of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarii, some of whom may 
 have been criminals, but even if they were, the exhibition was equally 
 characteristic of the depraved habits of the spectators. 
 
 4 The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae are spoken of 
 by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode of Heroes, like 
 Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aris- 
 togiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors who 
 had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest from 
 his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus told 
 Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at 
 the boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt: (Odyssey, iv, 
 565.) 
 
 "For there in sooth man's life is easiest : 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man." 
 
 It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some old 
 legend without having any knowledge of any place which corresponds 
 to his description. The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be 
 Madeira and the ad jacent_ island. Compare Pindar, Ol. n, 129. 
 
 8 Corais conjectured ftitiot "hatred" in place of Mimi, Roman plays 
 in which action and gesticulation were all or nearly all. 
 
 * Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself 
 warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like the rest. 
 
 T By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will of God. 
 
 * These words are from Euripides. They are cited by Aristotle, Ethic. 
 Nicom. viii, I. Athenaeus (xin, 296.) and Stobasus quotes seven complete 
 lines beginning Ipq. nlv ojtfipov yaia. There is a similar fragment 
 of Aeschylus, Danaides, also quoted by Althenaeus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of words, 
 So Antoninus here takes the verb (fnXei, "loves," which has also the 
 sense of "is wont," "uses," and the like. He finds in the common lan- 
 guage of mankind a philosophical truth, and most great truths are ex- 
 pressed in the common language of life; some understand them, but 
 most people utter them without knowing how much they mean. 
 
 ' Plato Theaet. 174 D. E. But compare the original with the use that 
 Antoninus has made of it. 
 
 10 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of vo^oc,, law, assign- 
 ment, that which assigns (vcjust) to every man his portion. 
 
 "Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion; nor, I believe, of Euty- 
 ches or Hymen. Euphrates is honourably mentioned by Epictetus. Pliny 
 speaks very highly of him. He obtained the permission of the Emperor 
 Hadrian to drink poison, because he was old and in bad health. 
 
 " Crito is the friend of Socrates ; and he was, it appears, also a friend 
 of Xenophon. When the emperor says "seen" (tSdov) he does not mean 
 with the eyes. 
 
 18 Homer, II. vi, 146. 
 
 14 He says xaxov, but as he affirms in other places that death is no 
 evil, he must mean what others may call an evil, and he means only 
 '"'what is going to happen."
 
 BOOK XI 
 
 THESE are the properties of the rational soul : it sees 
 itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it 
 chooses; the fruit which it bears itself enjoys for 
 the fruits of plants and that in animals which corre- 
 sponds to fruits others enjoy it obtains its own end, where- 
 ever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and 
 in a play and in such like things, where the whole action 
 is incomplete, if anything cuts it short ; but in every part and 
 wherever it may be stopped, it makes what has been set be- 
 fore it full and complete, so that it can say, I have what is my 
 own. And further it traverses the whole universe, and the 
 surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends 
 itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and compre- 
 hends the periodical renovation of all things, and it compre- 
 hends that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor 
 have those before us seen anything more, but in a manner 
 he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, 
 has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things 
 which have been and all that will be. This too is a prop- 
 erty of the rational soul, love of one's neighbour, and truth 
 and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself, which is 
 also the property of Law. 1 Thus then right reason differs 
 not at all from the reason of justice. 
 
 Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing 
 and the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of 
 the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if 
 thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be prevented by 
 shame from confessing it : and in the matter of dancing, if 
 at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same; and 
 the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, 
 then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
 
 107
 
 108 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to 
 value them little : and apply this rule also to thy whole life. 
 
 What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it 
 must be separated from the body, and ready either to be 
 extinguished or dispersed or continue to exist; but so that 
 this readiness comes from a man's own judgment, not from 
 mere obstinacy, as with the Christians, 2 but considerately 
 and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without 
 tragic show. 
 
 Have I done something for the general interest? Well 
 then I have had my reward. Let this always be present to 
 thy mind, and never stop [doing such good]. 
 
 What is thy art? to be good. And how is this accom- 
 plished well except by general principles, some about the 
 nature of the universe, and others about the proper constitu- 
 tion of man? 
 
 At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of 
 reminding men of the things which happen to them, and that 
 it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that, if 
 you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you 
 should not be troubled with that which takes place on the 
 larger stage. For you see that these things must be accom- 
 plished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out 3 "O 
 Cithaeron." And, indeed, some things are said well by the 
 dramatic writers, of which kind is the following especially : 
 
 "Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
 This has its reason too." 
 
 And again 
 
 "We must not chafe and fret at that which happens." 
 
 And 
 
 "Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear." 
 
 And other things of the same kind. 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a 
 magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of 
 speaking was useful in reminding men to beware of inso- 
 lence ; and for this purpose too Diogenes used to take from 
 these writers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 09 
 
 what it was, and again, for what object the new comedy was 
 introduced, which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic 
 artifice. That some good things are said even by these 
 writers, everybody knows : but the whole plan of such poetry 
 and dramaturgy, to what end does it look ! 
 
 How plain does it appear that there is not another condi- 
 tion of life so well suited for philosophizing as this in which 
 thou now happenest to be. 
 
 A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of neces- 
 sity be cut off from the whole tree also. So too a man when 
 he is separated from another man has fallen off from the 
 whole social community. Now as to a branch, another cuts 
 it off, but a man by his own act separates himself from his 
 neighbour when he hates him and turns away from him, and 
 he does not know that he has at the same time cut himself 
 off from the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege 
 certainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is in our power 
 to grow again to that which is near to us, and again to be- 
 come a part which helps to make up the whole. However, 
 if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it diffi- 
 cult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and 
 to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, 
 which from the first grew together with the tree, and has 
 continued to have one life with it, is not like that which 
 after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is something 
 like what the gardeners mean when they say that it grows 
 with the rest of the tree, but* that it has not the same mind 
 with it. 
 
 As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art 
 proceeding according to right reason, will not be able to turn 
 thee aside from thy proper action, so neither let them drive 
 thee from thy benevolent feelings towards them, but be on 
 thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the matter of 
 steady judgment and action, but also in the matter of gentle- 
 ness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble 
 thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as 
 well as to be diverted from thy course of action and to give 
 way through fear ; for both are equally deserters from their 
 posts, the man who does it through fear, and the man who
 
 I IO MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a 
 friend. 
 
 There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts 
 imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature 
 which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all 
 natures, can not fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts 
 do the inferior things for the sake of the superior ; therefore 
 the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is the 
 origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have their 
 foundation : for justice will not be observed, if we either care 
 for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived 
 and careless and changeable. 
 
 If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoid- 
 ances of which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to 
 them. Let then thy judgment about them be at rest, and 
 they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursu- 
 ing or avoiding. 
 
 The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, when 
 it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted 
 inwards, nor dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by 
 light, by which it sees the truth, the truth of all things and 
 the truth that is in itself. 
 
 Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that 
 himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered 
 doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any 
 man hate me ? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and 
 benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him 
 his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display 
 of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Pho- 
 cion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior 
 [parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the 
 gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. 
 For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is 
 agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which 
 at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since 
 thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what 
 is for the common advantage may be done in some way ? 
 
 Men despise one another and flatter one another ; and men 
 wish to raise themselves above one another, and crouch be- 
 fore one another.
 
 MEDITATIONS I 1 1 
 
 How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have deter- 
 mined to deal with thee in a fair way. What art thou doing, 
 man ? There is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon 
 show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written 
 on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,* he imme- 
 diately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forth- 
 with reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who 
 is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells 
 strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him 
 must smell whether he choose or not. But the affectation of 
 simplicity is like a crooked stick. 4 Nothing is more dis- 
 graceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid 
 this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent 
 show all these things in the eyes, and there is no mis- 
 taking. 
 
 As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, 
 if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it 
 will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things sepa- 
 rately and all together, and if it remembers that not one of 
 them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us ; 
 but these things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves 
 who produce the judgments about them, and, as we may say, 
 write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write 
 them,and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments 
 have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them 
 out ; and if we remember also that such attention will only be 
 for a short time, and then life will be at an end. Besides, 
 what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if these 
 things are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they will 
 be easy to thee : but if contrary to nature, seek what is con- 
 formable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even 
 if it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek 
 his own good. 
 
 Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it con- 
 sists,* and into what it changes, and what kind of a thing 
 it will be when it has changed, and that it will sustain no 
 harm. 
 
 [If any have offended against thee, consider first] : What 
 is my relation to men, and that we are made for one another ; 
 and in another respect, I was made to be set over them, as a
 
 112 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the 
 matter from first principles, from this : If all things are not 
 mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things: if this is 
 so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the superior, and 
 these for the sake of one another. 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in 
 bed, and so forth : and particularly, under what compulsions 
 in respect of opinions they are ; and as to their acts, consider 
 with what pride they do what they do. 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not 
 to be displeased; but if they do not right, it is plain that 
 they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every 
 soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwill- 
 ingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man accord- 
 ing to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they 
 are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word 
 wrong-doers to their neighbours. 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, 
 and that thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost 
 abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to 
 commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern 
 about reputation or some such mean motive, thou dost ab- 
 stain from such faults. 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand 
 whether men are doing wrong, or not, for many things are 
 done with a certain reference to circumstances. And in short, 
 a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct 
 judgment on another man's acts. 
 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that 
 man's life is only a moment, and after a short time we are 
 all laid out dead. 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for 
 those acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, 
 but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away 
 these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment 
 about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger 
 is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By 
 reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on 
 thee : for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 1 3 
 
 must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a 
 robber and everything else. 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by 
 the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts 
 themselves, at which we are angry and vexed. 
 
 Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it 
 be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For 
 what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest 
 to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as oppor- 
 tunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly cor- 
 rectest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee 
 harm, saying, "Not so, my child : we are constituted by na- 
 ture for something else : I shall certainly not be injured, but 
 thou art injuring thyself, my child." And show him with 
 gentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that 
 even bees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are 
 formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this 
 neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, 
 but affectionately and without any rancour in thy soul ; and 
 not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander 
 may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are 
 present 6 
 
 Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them 
 as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while 
 thou livest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and 
 being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. 
 And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of 
 anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that 
 mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human 
 nature, so also are they more manly ; and he who possesses 
 these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and 
 not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. 
 For in the same degree in which a man's mind is nearer to 
 freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it 
 nearer to strength : and as the sense of pain is a characteris- 
 tic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain 
 and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both 
 submit. 
 
 But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the 
 leader of the [Muses, Apollo], and it is this that to expect
 
 1 14 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this 
 desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to 
 others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irra- 
 tional and tyrannical. 
 
 There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty 
 against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and 
 when thou hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out 
 and say on each occasion thus : this thought is not necessary : 
 this tends to destroy social union : this which thou art going 
 to say comes not from the real thoughts ; for thou shouldst 
 consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to 
 speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou 
 shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence 
 of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yield- 
 ing to the less honourable and to the perishable part, the 
 body, and to its gross pleasures. 
 
 Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled 
 in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still 
 in obedience to the disposition of the universe they are over- 
 powered here in the compound mass [the body]. And also 
 the whole of the earthly part in thee and the watery, though 
 their tendency is downward, still are raised up and occupy a 
 position which is not their natural one. In this manner then 
 the elemental parts obey the universal, for when they have 
 been fixed in any place perforce they remain there until again 
 the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it 
 not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be dis- 
 obedient and discontented with its own place? And yet no 
 force is imposed on it, but only those things which are con- 
 formable to its nature : still it does not submit, but is carried 
 in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injus- 
 tice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is 
 nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. 
 And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with any- 
 thing that happens, then too it deserts its post : for it is con- 
 stituted for piety and reverence towards the gods no less than 
 for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under 
 the generic term of contentment with the constitution of 
 things, and indeed they are prior 6 to acts of justice. 
 
 He who has not one and always the same object in life,
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 1 5 
 
 can not be one and the same all through his life. But what 
 I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this 
 object ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion 
 about all the things which in some way or other are consid- 
 ered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain 
 things, that is, things which concern the common interest ; so 
 also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall 
 be of a common kind [social] and political. For he who 
 directs all his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts 
 alike, and thus will always be the same. 
 
 Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of 
 the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse. 7 
 
 Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name 
 of Lamiae, bugbears to frighten children. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set 
 seats in the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down 
 anywhere. 
 
 Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas 8 for not going 
 to him, saying, It is because I would not perish by the worst 
 of all ends, that is, I would not receive a favour and then be 
 unable to return it. 
 
 In the writing of the [Ephesians] there was this precept, 
 constantly to think of some one of the men of former times 
 who practised virtue. 
 
 The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the 
 heavens that we may be reminded of those bodies which con- 
 tinually do the same things and in the same manner perform 
 their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity. 
 For there is no veil over a star. 
 
 Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed him- 
 self in a skin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone 
 out, and what Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed 
 of him and drew back from him when they saw him dressed 
 thus. 
 
 Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay 
 down rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to 
 obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life. 
 
 A slave thou art : free speech is not for thee. 
 
 And my heart laughed within. 9 
 
 And virtue they will curse speaking harsh words. 10
 
 Il6 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 To look for the fig in winter is a madman's act : such is he 
 who looks for his child when it is no longer allowed. 11 
 
 When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should 
 whisper to himself, "To-morrow perchance thou wilt die" 
 But those are words of bad omen "No word is a word of 
 bad omen," said Epictetus, "which expresses any work of 
 nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak 
 of the ears of corn being reaped." 
 
 The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are 
 changes, not into nothing, but into something which exists 
 not yet. 12 
 
 No man can rob us of our free will. 13 
 
 Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] 
 with respect to giving his assent ; and in respect to his move- 
 ments he must be careful that they be made with regard to 
 circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests, 
 that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to 
 sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it ; and 
 as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with re- 
 spect to any of the things which are not in our power. 
 
 The dispute then, he said, is not about any common mat- 
 ter, but about being mad or not. 
 
 Socrates used to say, What do you want? Souls of 
 rational men or irrational? Souls of rational men Of 
 what rational men? Sound or unsound? Sound Why 
 then do you not seek for them? Because we have them 
 Why then do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 Law is the order by which all things are governed. 
 
 *This is the only passage in which the emperor speaks of the 
 Christians. Epictetus (iv, 7,) names them Galilsei. 
 
 8 Sophocles, GEdipus Rex. 
 
 4 Instead of crKaXuij Saumaise reads (TKa^ftrj. There is a Greek pro- 
 verb, (TKafifibv vA.ov ovdEitor' opQov: "You cannot make a crooked 
 stick straight." 
 
 The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of the sheep and 
 the wolves. 
 
 5 It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 
 
 *The word rtpscrfivrspa, which is here translated "prior" may also 
 mean "superior;" but Antoninus seems to say that piety and reverence 
 of the gods precede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from 
 them, even justice, which in another passage (xi, 10) he makes the 
 foundation of all virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 1 7 
 
 to every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed, 
 but a moral rule which law can not in all cases enforce. Besides law 
 has its own rules, which are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral; 
 but it enforces them all simply because they are general rules, and if 
 it did not or could not enforce them, so far law would not be law. 
 Justice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience 
 to it; and as we all live under universal law, which commands both 
 our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, that is the 
 law of the whole constitution of man, we must endeavour to discover 
 what this supreme law is. It is the will of the power that rules all. 
 By acting in obedience to this will, we do justice, and by consequence 
 everything else that we ought to do. 
 
 7 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (n, 6), and by others 
 since, but not better. 
 
 8 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other writers say 
 that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to 
 Macedonia. 
 
 Od. ix. 413. 
 
 "Hesiod, Works and Days, 184. 
 "Epictetus, in, 24, 87. 
 "Epictetus, in, 24. 
 "Epictetus, m, 22, 105.
 
 BOOK XII 
 
 ALL those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a 
 circuitous road, thou canst have now, if thou dost not 
 refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt 
 take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to 
 providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety 
 and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayst be con- 
 tent with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature de- 
 signed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, 
 that thou mayst always speak the truth freely and without 
 disguise, and do things which are agreeable to law and ac- 
 cording to the worth of each. And let neither another man's 
 wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the 
 sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; 
 for the passive part will look to this. If then, whatever the 
 time may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neg- 
 lecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy ruling 
 faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be 
 afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if 
 thou shalt fear never to have begun to live according to 
 nature then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe 
 which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger 
 in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen 
 daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be de- 
 pendent on this or that. 
 
 God sees the minds (ruling principles) of all men bared 
 of the material vesture and rind and impurities. For with 
 his intellectual part alone he touches the intelligence only 
 which has flowed and been derived from himself into these 
 bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt 
 rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not 
 the poor flesh which envelopes him, surely will not trouble 
 
 118
 
 MEDITATIONS 1 19 
 
 himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and 
 such like externals and show. 
 
 The things are three of which thou art composed, a little 
 body, a little breath, [life], intelligence. Of these the first 
 two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them ; 
 but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou 
 shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, 
 whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done 
 or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee 
 because they may happen, and whatever in the body which 
 envelopes thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature as- 
 sociated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy 
 will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls 
 round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things 
 of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and 
 accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt 
 separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which 
 are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things 
 of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thy- 
 self like Empedocles' sphere, 
 
 "All round, and in its joyous rest reposing:" 1 
 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, 
 that is, the present then thou wilt be able to pass that por- 
 tion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy 
 death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy 
 own daemon [to the god that is within thee]. 
 
 I have often wondered how it is that every man loves 
 himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value 
 on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others. 
 If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to man 
 and bid him to think of nothing and to design nothing which 
 he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not 
 endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have 
 we to what our neighbours shall think of us than to what 
 we shall think of ourselves. 
 
 How can it be that the gods after having arranged all 
 things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked 
 this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, 
 as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, 
 
 33
 
 1 2O MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 and through pious acts and religious observances have been 
 most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died 
 should never exist again, but should be completely extin- 
 guished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been 
 otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, 
 it would also be possible ; and if it were according to nature, 
 nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in 
 fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
 been so : for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry 
 thou art disputing with the deity; and we should not thus 
 dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and 
 most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed 
 anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected un- 
 justly and irrationally. 
 
 Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest 
 of accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffec- 
 tual for all other things for want of practice, holds the bridle 
 more vigorously than the right hand ; for it has been practised 
 in this. 
 
 Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man 
 should be when he is overtaken by death; and consider the 
 shortness of life, the boundless abyss of time past and future, 
 the feebleness of all matter. 
 
 Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things 
 bare of their coverings; the purposes of actions; consider 
 what pain is, what pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is 
 to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is 
 hindered by another ; that everything is opinion. 
 
 In the application of thy principles thou must be like the 
 pancratiast, not like the gladiator ; for the gladiator lets fall 
 the sword which he uses and is killed ; but the other always 
 has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it. 
 
 See what things are in themselves, dividing them into 
 matter, form, and purpose. 
 
 What a power man has to do nothing except what god will 
 approve, and to accept all that god may give him. 
 
 With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, 
 we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong 
 either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do
 
 MEDITATIONS I 2 1 
 
 nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
 should blame nobody. 
 
 How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised 
 at anything which happens in life. 
 
 Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a 
 kind providence, or a confusion without a purpose and with- 
 out a director. If then there is an invincible necessity, why 
 dost thou resist? But if there is a providence which allows 
 itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the 
 divinity. But if there is a confusion without a governor, be 
 content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain 
 ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee 
 away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath, every- 
 thing else ; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away. 
 
 Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splen- 
 dour until it is extinguished ; and shall the truth which is in 
 thee and justice and temperance be extinguished [before thy 
 death] ? 
 
 When a man has presented the appearance of having done 
 wrong, [say,] How then do I know that this is a wrongful 
 act ? And if he has done wrong, how do I know that he has 
 not condemned himself? and so this is like tearing his own 
 face. Consider that he, who would not have the bad man 
 do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree 
 to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to 
 neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what 
 must a man do who has such a character ? If then thou art 
 irritable,* cure this man's disposition. 
 
 If it is not right, do not do it : if it is not true, do not say 
 it. [For let thy efforts be. ] 2 
 
 In everything always observe what the thing is which pro- 
 duces for thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it 
 into the formal, the material, the purpose, and the time 
 within which it must end. 
 
 Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and 
 more divine than the things which cause the various affects, 
 and as it were pull thee by the strings. What is there now 
 in my mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything of 
 the kind? 
 
 First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose.
 
 122 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social 
 end. 
 
 Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and no- 
 where, nor will any of the things exist which thou now seest, 
 nor any of those who are now living. For all things are 
 formed by nature to change and be turned and to perish in 
 order that other things in continuous succession may exist. 
 
 Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy 
 power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, 
 and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou 
 wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. 
 
 Any one activity whatever it may be, when it has ceased 
 at its proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased ; nor 
 he who has done this act, does he suffer any evil for this 
 reason that the act has ceased. In like manner then the 
 whole which consists of all the acts, which is our life, if 
 it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason that 
 it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series at the 
 proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper 
 time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the 
 peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by 
 the change of whose parts the whole universe continues ever 
 young and perfect. And everything which is useful to the 
 universal is always good and in season. Therefore the ter- 
 mination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it 
 shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not 
 opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is sea- 
 sonable and profitable to and congruent with the universal. 
 For thus too he is moved by the deity who is moved in the 
 same manner with the deity and moved towards the same 
 things in his mind. 
 
 These three principles thou must have in readiness. In 
 the things which thou doest do nothing either inconsiderately 
 or otherwise than as justice herself would act; but with re- 
 spect to what may happen to thee from without, consider that 
 it happens either by chance or according to providence, and 
 thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence. Sec- 
 ond, consider what every being is from the seed to the time 
 of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to 
 the giving back of the same, and of what things every being
 
 MEDITATIONS 123 
 
 is compounded and into what things it is resolved. Third, 
 if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and 
 shouldst look down on human things, and observe the variety 
 of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst 
 see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell 
 all around in the air and the aether, consider that as often as 
 thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, 
 sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these 
 things to be proud of ? 
 
 Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders 
 thee from casting it away ? 
 
 When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast for- 
 gotten this, that all things happen according to the universal 
 nature ; and forgotten this, that a man's wrongful act is noth- 
 ing to thee ; and further thou hast forgotten this, that every- 
 thing which happens, always happened so and will happen 
 so, and now happens so everywhere ; forgotten this too, how 
 close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, 
 for it is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of 
 intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that every 
 man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the deity ; and 
 forgotten this, that nothing is a man's own, but that his child 
 and his body and his very soul came from the deity; for- 
 gotten this, that everything is opinion ; and lastly thou hast 
 forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and 
 loses only this. 
 
 Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have com- 
 plained greatly about anything, those who have been most 
 conspicuous by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities 
 or fortunes of any kind : then think where are they all now ? 
 Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let there 
 be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, how 
 Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in 
 his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae 
 and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; and in fine think of 
 the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride ; and how 
 worthless everything is after which men violently strain; 
 and how much more philosophical it is for a man in the 
 opportunities presented to him to show himself just, tem- 
 perate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all sim-
 
 124 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 plicity : for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is 
 the most intolerable of all. 
 
 To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods or how 
 dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest 
 them, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with 
 the eyes; 3 in the second place neither have I seen even my 
 own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the 
 gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from 
 this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them. 
 
 The safety of life is this, to examine everything all 
 through, what it is itself, what is its material, what the 
 formal part; with all thy soul to do justice and to say the 
 truth. What remains except to enjoy life by joining one 
 good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest 
 intervals between ? 
 
 There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by 
 walls, mountains, and other things infinite. There is one 
 common substance, though it is distributed among countless 
 bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul, 
 though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual 
 circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent 
 soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things 
 which have been mentioned all the other parts, such as those 
 which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no 
 fellowship : and yet even these parts the intelligent principle 
 holds together and the gravitation towards the same. But 
 intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which is of the 
 same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for com- 
 munion is not interrupted. 
 
 What dost thou wish? to continue to exist? Well, dost 
 thou wish to have sensation ? movement ? growth ? and then 
 again to cease to grow ? to use thy speech ? to think ? What 
 is there of all these things which seems to thee worth desir- 
 ing? But if it is easy to set little value on all these things, 
 turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and 
 god. But it is inconsistent with honouring reason and god 
 to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived of the 
 other things. 
 
 How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time 
 is assigned to every man? for it is very soon swallowed up
 
 MEDITATIONS 125 
 
 in the eternal. And how small a part of the whole sub- 
 stance ? and how small a part of the universal soul ? and on 
 what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest ? Reflect- 
 ing on all this consider nothing to be great, except to act as 
 thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common 
 nature brings. 
 
 How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all 
 lies in this. But everything else, whether it is in the power 
 of thy will or not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 This reflection is rnost adapted to move us to contempt 
 of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and 
 pain an evil still have despised it. 
 
 The man to whom that only is good which comes in 
 due season, and to whom it is the same thing whether he has 
 done more or fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to 
 whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the 
 world for a longer or a shorter time for this man neither is 
 death a terrible thing. 
 
 Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the 
 world] : what difference does it make to thee whether for 
 five years [or three] ? for that which is conformable to the 
 laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant 
 nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but 
 nature who brought thee into it ? the same as if a praetor who 
 has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage "But 
 I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them" 
 Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
 drama ; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by 
 him who was once the cause of its composition, and now of 
 its dissolution: but thou art the cause of neither. Depart 
 then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied. 
 
 NOTES 
 
 1 The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has been re- 
 stored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus : 
 
 2<pcnpos KVK'k.oTEpris noviy itepiyTfWi yaioov. 
 
 1 There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
 * " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be ex- 
 plained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living being 
 (rv, 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (vm, 19). But the em-
 
 126 MARCUS AURELIUS 
 
 peror may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he afterwards 
 states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man has intel- 
 lectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other way do 
 we know it. This passage then will agree with the passage in the Epistle 
 to the Romans (i v. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i v. 
 15), in which Jesus Christ is named "the image of the invisible god;" 
 and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv v. 9). 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning, and all 
 of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which is founded on 
 St. Paul's language (Rom. i v. 20) : "God by creating the universe [or 
 world, mundum], being Himself invisible, has presented Himself to our 
 eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca 
 (De Benef. iv c. 8) : "Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis oc- 
 currentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare 
 also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (vm, 7), 
 and Mem. rv, 3 ; also Epictetus, i, 6, de Providentia. I think that my 
 interpretation of Antoninus is right 
 
 CO 
 
 THE END.
 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 A 000769227