HISTOIU
UMMf
OF CALtfOWttA
RIVERSIDE
Untv. of California
Withdrawn
ENGLAND AND
THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Z/siitippe, Jung of t/ie
ENGLAND AND THE
ORLEANS MONARCHY
MAJOR JOHN HALL
AUTHOR OF "THE BOURBON RESTORATION"
" The history of the day before yesterday is the
least known, it may be said, the most forgotten,
by the public of to-day."
GUIZOT, Memoires, viii. p. 5 1 5
WITH A PORTRAIT
LONDON
SMITH, ELDER & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE
1912
All rights reserved
PRINTED BY
WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED
LONDON AND BECCLES
TO
S. H.
'/'
PEEFACE
IN this volume the story is told of the first entente
cordiale and of the circumstances which led to its
disruption. The questions which occupied the attention
of the French and the British governments at that
period have now passed into the domain of history.
The resentment evoked by the Egyptian crisis of 1840
and the controversies raised by the Spanish marriages
has died away. The attitude towards the Liberal
and national movements in Europe, adopted, on the
one side, by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot and, on
the other, by Lord Palmerston, can, at this distance
of time, be reviewed dispassionately. In the light of
the knowledge of to-day, the difficulties which beset
the " Citizen King " may be estimated, and the in-
justice of many of the attacks made upon the policy
of Palmerston can be demonstrated.
Kesearches in the diplomatic correspondence of the
period, both in London and in Paris, have enabled
me to place in print, for the first time, many docu-
ments bearing upon the part played by Talleyrand in
the Belgian question and upon the secret policy of
Louis Philippe in the same affair. In these pages
some new light has, I venture to think, been thrown
upon the situation in Spain during the regencies of
Christina and Espartero, and during the early years
of the rule of Isabella. In connection, also, with
Palmerston's Eastern policy, certain facts, hitherto
unpublished, are now presented for consideration.
vii
PREFACE
During the eighteen years covered by this volume
the Whigs were, for the greater part of the time,
in office. Amidst the Russells, the Greys, the
Spencers and the other powerful Whig families
Palmerston was an interloper. Nor was he ever a
Whig. In external affairs he remained always a
Canningite. Some of the worst miscalculations of
Louis Philippe and his ministers were due to their
inability to grasp the fact that the foreign policy
of the Whigs was in the hands of the most "un-
Whiggish " of statesmen. The period was one of
political unrest, the precursor of great wars and
revolutions. France was disenchanted and profoundly
dissatisfied with her " Citizen King." In Germany
and Italy Metternich still maintained his system, but
there were symptoms that the end of his long rule
was fast approaching. In Spain the transition from
autocracy to constitutionalism coincided with a fiercely
disputed succession to the throne. Turkey, in the
words of Nicholas, was " the sick man of Europe."
J. H.
Sept., 1912.
Vlll
CONTENTS
GHAPTEE I
LOUIS PHILIPPE
PAGES
The Revolution of July, 1830 Louis Philippe Louis Philippe and the
military democratic party First communications with the
Sovereigns 1-13
CHAPTEE II
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
Effect of the Revolution of July in England Character and system
of Metternich The chiffon de Carlsbad Metternich's policy
towards the Germanic Confederation and Prussia Hostility of Tsar
Nicholas to the new rigimc in France Revolution at Brussels
Talleyrand in London France proclaims the principle of non-
intervention The Duchesse de Dino and the Comte de Montrond
Great Britain proposes that the Belgian question be submitted
to a conference Mol6 and Talleyrand Change of government in
France and England 14-39
CHAPTEE III
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The Whigs in office Talleyrand insists upon the necessity of
establishing a good understanding with England Palmerston's
distrust of the French Liberals State of Europe Revolution at
Warsaw" The Frenchmen of the North " Belgium declared
independent and neutral Candidates for the Belgian throne
ix
CONTENTS
PAGES
should enter Spain Mendizabal dismissed Military revolution
in Spain Scene at the Palace of La Granja Resignation of
Thiers The "No mention." incident Why Don Carlos retreated
from before Madrid Dissensions among the Carlists fomented by
Villiers Palmerston's suspicions of Louis Philippe Muiiagori
Reasons which compelled Maroto to bring the war to an end
Soult The Convention of Bergara Don Carlos driven across the
frontier Cabrera andEspana The Municipal Bill Espartero
Christina and Espartero Abdication of Christina . . . 171-218
CHAPTER VII
SULTAN AND PASHA
Efforts to prevent a renewal of the struggle between' the Sultan and
the Pasha Strained relations between Great Britain and Russia
Wellington and the Dardanelles Ponsonby at Constantinople
Durham at St. Petersburg M. Thiers M. de Lesseps Secret
negotiations General Chrzanowski The Pasha's monopolies
Ponsonby negotiates a commercial treaty Indian government
occupies Aden Importance of the victories of Mehemet Ali over
the Wahabites The Pasha announces his intention of declaring
his independence Russia and the Court of Teheran The Shah
lays siege to Herat Palmerston protests Disavowal of
Simonitch and Witkewitch The general situation in the East
Mahmud resolves on war Policy of Lord Palmerston French
government obtains a credit of 10 millions of francs Harmony
of French and British relations Self-restraint of Mehemet Ali
Ibrahim defeats the Turks at Nezib Death of Mahmud and
suspension of hostilities The Turkish fleet treacherously
surrendered to Mehemet Ali Strange conduct of the French
admiral France seeks to isolate Russia The Collective Note of
July 27, 1839 Satisfaction of Palmerston and uneasiness of the
French government Conversation between Bulwer and Louis
Philippe Palmerston does not share in the general illusion
respecting the military strength of the Pasha Brunnow's mission
to London The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi France scouts the
Russian proposal The French party in the English Cabinet
Return of Brunnow Palmerston's letter to Sebastiani Guizot
in London Thiers, President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs Guizot's despatches Thiers mediates in the
sulphur dispute Remains of the Emperor to be removed to
France Proceedings of " Bear " Ellice Metternich alarmed
Palmerston accepts the Austrian proposal Attitude of M. Thiers
M. Coste and the French agents at Constantinople and Cairo
Princess Lieven in London Palmerston tenders his resignation
Insurrection in Syria The Quadrilateral Treaty of July 15,
1840 Palmerston informs Guizot of the treaty . . . 219-278
xii
CONTENTS
CHAPTER VIII
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
PAGE*
Language of M. Thiers and Louis Philippe on learning of the
conclusion of the treaty Warlike declamations of the French
press Attitude of different parties in England Thiers' instruc-
tions to Guizot The conference at the Chateau d'Eu Louis
Philippe seeks to alarm Queen Victoria Louis Napoleon at
Boulogne Guizot at Windsor Castle Leopold's proposals
Ibrahim suppresses the insurrection in Syria Palmerston's
despatch of August 31 The Sultan's ultimattim Movements
of the British fleet Theatening language of M. de Pontois
The French armaments Warlike language of Louis Philippe
and M. Thiers Mehemet Ali invokes the protection of France
Interview at Auteuil between Thiers and Bulwer Intrigues
against Palmerston in London A Cabinet crisis impending
Why Lord John Russell " disappointed " Greville Meeting of the
Cabinet of October 1 Bombardment of Beyr out Warlike excite-
ment in Paris Henry Reeve Lord John Russell calls a Cabinet
for October 10 Two despatches from Thiers A Cabinet crisis
averted French government reported to have designs upon
the Balearic Islands Melbourne writes to King Leopold Louis
Philippe and M. Thiers Resignation of M. Thiers Thiers'
proceedings reviewed M. Guizot's plans Palmerston's com-
munications with Guizot Successful progress of the operations
in Syria Proposals to Mehemet Ali Napier's convention and his
disavowal Mehemet Ali submits The firman of February 13,
1841 M. Guizot manoeuvres to bring back France into the Concert
of Europe Nicholas' proposal Palmerston's reply Policy of
M. Guizot Bourqueney and Palmerston The Convention of the
Straits drafted and initialed Mehemet Ali refuses to accept the
firman of heredity Ponsonby's advice to the Porte Procrastina-
tions of the Porte Mehemet Mi accepts the amended firman
Convention of the Straits signed Unsatisfactory character of the
criticisms passed upon Palmerston 279-330
CHAPTER IX
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Aberdeen and Palmerston contrasted Why Guizot would not conclude
the right of search treaty with Palmerston The Chamber refuses
to ratify the slave trade treaty of November 20, 1841
Conpiracies in Paris against Espartero The question of Isabella's
marriage Designs imputed to Louis Philippe by Bulwer
xiii
CONTENTS
PAGES
Insurrections in Spain Tho Spanish government demands the
expulsion of Christina from France The Salvandy affair
Pageot's mission Count Toreno and Lord Cowley Louis
Philippe connives at the Spanish plots Insurrection at Barcelona
Conduct of M. de Lesseps Military revolution in Spain
Fall of Espartero Aberdeen alarmed Queen Victoria at the
Chateau d'Eu "The cordial understanding " The Duo de
Bordeaux in Bclgrave Square Admiral Dupetit-Thouars in the
Pacific France proclaims a protectorate over Tahiti Mr. Pritchard
Queen Pomare deposed and Tahiti annexed Dupetit-Thouars
disavowed The Prince de Joinville's pamphlet The Tsar
Nicholas in London France quarrels with Morocco Imprison-
ment and expulsion of Mr. Pritchard Excitement in London
Guizot and Aberdeen Bombardment of Tangier Violence of the
press in both countries The Comte de Jarnac The Pritchard
affair settled France concludes peace with the Emperor of
Morocco Louis Philippe at Windsor Castle Condition of Spain
The descendants of Philip V. Bulwer and Bresson at Madrid
Montpensier to marry the Infanta Queen Victoria's second visit
to Eu The compact with Louis Philippe State of affairs at
Madrid The Memorandum of February 27, 1846 Christina and
Narvaez The Queen-Mother entrusts to Bulwer her proposal to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg Aberdeen reprimands Bulwer and
informs M. Guizot of the negotiation The Whigs once more in
office . 381-380
CHAPTER X
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
Lord Palmerston in Paris Louis Philippe and M. Guizot disconcerted
by Christina's proposal to the Coburgs Palmerston's despatch of
July 19, 1846 Bresson's letter to Guizot of July 12 Anger of
Louis Philippe Bulwer implores Palmerston to promote the
Coburg marriage Palmerston puts forward Don Enrique Effect
at Madrid of the despatch of July 19 The double marriage
announced Correspondence between the French Queen and
Queen Victoria Guizot's letter to Lord John Russell Louis
Philippe's letter to his daughter Queen Victoria's reply
Palmerston's protest founded upon the renunciations at Utrecht
Attitude of the Northern Courts Palmerston's despatches of
October 31, 1846, and January 8, 1847 Debates in the French
Chamber and the British Parliament Christina's conduct
reviewed Louis Philippe's Bourbon policy Why Louis Philippe
broke the compact of Eu Palmerston's Spanish policy from 1834
to 1846 Weakness of Aberdeen 381-405
xiv
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XI
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
PAGES
Annexation of Cracow Political unrest in Europe Charles Albert
and Pius IX. Enthusiasm in Italy Attitude of French govern-
ment Revival of French and British rivalry Guizot sends a
secret agent to Vienna Metternich realizes the danger in Italy
The Roman plot and occupation of Ferrara Palmerston's
despatch of September 11, 1847 Minto's mission Prince
Consort's Memorandum The situation in Switzerland Sym-
pathies of the absolute Courts with the Sonderbund Palmerston's
attitude Probable reason of Morier's recall Palmerston's
despatch of October 29, 1847 The French proposal Palmerston's
counter-proposal Palmerston master of the situation Battle
of Lucerne and dissolution of the Sonderbund Crafty designs
imputed to Palmerston Policy of the Swiss Radicals Stratford
Canning at Berne The absolute Courts and France present the
identic note Haughty reply of the Swiss Diet Alarm of the
absolute Courts Coloredo and Radowitz in Paris Revolution in
Paris, Berlin and Vienna Charles Albert in Lombardy Une
revolution de m&pris Why the rupture of V the cordial under-
standing" displeased the French middle-classes Effect of M.
Guizot's rapprochement with Austria Palmerston and Thiers
Palmerston's policy substantially the same as Aberdeen's Why
" the cordial understanding " failed to justify expectations . 406-444
INDEX 445-452
XV
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS
MONARCHY
CHAPTER I
LOUIS PHILIPPE
THE spontaneous rising of the French people to expel
their King, Charles X., who had ventured to infringe
the Constitution, aroused the enthusiasm of Liberals
all over Europe. But the real character of the move-
ment which brought about the downfall of the elder
branch of the Bourbons was, at the time, very imper-
fectly understood. It was not a determination to
preserve at all costs the parliamentary system which
animated the combatants in the " glorious days of
July." " Long live the Charter " was the watchword
of the peaceful bourgeois. " Down with the Bourbons "
was the war cry of the men of the barricades.
Outside the limited circle of the old Royalist
families the restored monarchy had never been popular.
Yet it was unquestionably the best and freest form of
government which the country had ever enjoyed. The
reason of the unpopularity of the Bourbons lay in the
circumstances which had attended their return to
France. By the large majority of Frenchmen their
restoration was deeply resented, as one of the humiliat-
ing conditions imposed upon their country by the allied
sovereigns, after Waterloo.
1 u
RNGLAiTE)-AHn-THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
In respect to her frontiers, France in 1815 had
been replaced in the position which she had occupied
in 1789. Seeing the expenditure of blood and treasure
which her wars had entailed upon Europe, these terms
cannot be regarded as onerous. Nevertheless, it is
not surprising that the treaties of 1815 should have
been extremely distasteful to her. They were con-
ceived in a spirit of suspicion and were directed mainly
towards securing Europe from a fresh outbreak of her
aggressiveness. Nor were the barriers, by which it
was hoped to confine her within her boundaries, the
only cause of her irritation. Her vanity and love of
military glory had been dangerously stimulated by the
Republican and Imperial wars, and it was a bitter blow
to find that, in the final settlement, France, alone of
all the great Powers, was to acquire no increase of
territory. Vexation at these conditions was not con-
fined to Republicans and Bonapartists. Hatred for the
treaties of 1815 was the one political sentiment which
Liberals and Royalists possessed in common.
In 1830, there was *no Bonapartist party, but a
strong Bonapartist spirit existed throughout the
country. Veneration for the memory of " the man " l
constituted the whole political philosophy of many
thousands of Frenchmen. It was to the Bonapartist
element that the Liberal party owed its chief strength
and influence. Notwithstanding that the Liberals had
opposed the Emperor during the Hundred Days, and
had insisted upon his abdication after Waterloo, their
alliance with the Bonapartists was cemented in the
early days of the second Restoration. A common hatred
of the Bourbons was the bond of union between them.
In the Masonic and Carbonari lodges the bolder spirits
of the two parties plotted together against the monarchy.
When the reigning dynasty should have been over-
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), I. pp. 62, 63,
66, 67, 68, and 854.
2
LOUIS PHILIPPE
thrown, the conspirators proposed to proclaim the
sovereignty of the people and to declare once more the
tricolour the national flag. Then, and not till then,
could France regain her " natural frontiers." 1 It was
the practice of these military democrats invariably to
assert that the Bourbons were responsible for all the
misfortunes of 1814 and 1815. They believed, or
professed to believe, that the loss of territory, which
France had sustained, was the price which the Bourbons
had agreed to pay for their restoration. So long as a
Bourbon was upon the throne Waterloo must go
unavenged and France must submit to be deprived
of her natural boundaries. It was this spirit which
had animated the combatants in the Revolution of
July. Men who understood and cared nothing for
constitutional questions took up arms, believing that a
victory over Charles' guards would be a first defeat
inflicted upon the allied sovereigns, and that a success-
ful invasion of the Tuileries would be followed by a
great national war upon the Rhine. 2
The enthronement of the Due d'Orleans was the
strange termination of a revolution, carried out mainly
by men who were animated by sentiments such as
these. Even on the evening of the third day's fight-
ing, when the Royal troops had been driven from
Paris and when the people were in possession of the
Tuileries, the Duke's name was still unmentioned.
Most of the Liberal deputies were disposed to make
their peace with their lawful king, and to be satisfied
with the withdrawal of the unconstitutional ordinances
aud with the dismissal of the Prince de j^olignac and
his colleagues in the government. The extreme party,
the old soldiers, the members of the former Carbonari
lodges, the students of the poly technique, the men who
1 The "pre carre," the sea, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees.
2 N. Senior, Conversations ivith Thiers, Guizot, etc. t I. pp. 288, 823,
and 334.
3
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
had borne the burden of the struggle, were not pre-
pared with an immediate solution of the question.
Beyond declaring that they would take up arms again,
rather than accept any concessions at the hands of
Charles X. or the Dauphin, they had no definite plan
to bring forward. Louis Philippe was to owe his
crown to a skilfully worded placard, the work of
Laffitte the Liberal banker, and of Thiers, a clever
young journalist, which on the following morning,
greeted the Parisians at every street corner. In this
proclamation the enthronement of the Due d'Orleans
was held up as the one solution which would restore
public order without further bloodshed. A republic,
it was declared, would entail both internal strife and
war abroad, whilst Charles X., the monarch who had
shed the blood of the people, must be adjudged un-
worthy to retain his crown. The Due d'Orleans, on
the other hand, was a prince devoted to the cause of
the Revolution, who had never borne arms against his
own countrymen, but who, on the contrary, had worn
the tricolour at Valmy and at Jemmappes. Let the
people call for him and the Duke would come forward,
content to accept the Charter and his crown from their
hands.
The prospect of concluding the revolution in this
fashion was eagerly adopted by the Liberal deputies
and by the middle classes generally. But the more
turbulent members of the so-called Hotel de Ville
party indignantly repudiated the notion of allowing
their glorious achievements to culminate in the en-
thronement of " another Bourbon." The allusions in
Laffitte's and Thiers' placard to the tricolour, to Valmy,
and to the crown as the free gift of the people, left
them cold. Nor were they to be mollified by a second
proclamation, in which it was boldly asserted that the
the Due d'Orleans was a Valois, not a Bourbon. 1 No
1 L. Blanc, Histoirc de dir ana., I. p. 883.
4
LOUIS PHILIPPE
sooner was the Duke put forward as a candidate for
the throne, than the demagogues began to exhort the
people to call upon La Fayette to assume the presi-
dency of the republic. The old man was, as he had
been forty years before, in command of the national
guards, and was once more the hero of the mob. He
was, however, little disposed to undertake the responsi-
bility which his ultra-democratic friends wished him
to assume. Under these circumstances, Kemusat and
other of his colleagues in the Chamber, assisted, it is
said, by Mr. Hives, the American minister, had little
difficulty in persuading him that, were he to play the
leading part in founding a Liberal monarchy, it would
be accounted, throughout the Old and the New World,
the most honourable act of his declining years. Accord-
ingly, on the following day, July 31, 1830, he agreed
to receive the Due d'Orleans, the Lieutenant- General
of the Kingdom, at the Hotel de Ville. Upon his
arrival he led him to the window and, placing the
tricolour in his hands, embraced him warmly before the
dense crowd upon the Place de Greve. When this
ceremony had been completed the elect of the people
rode back in triumph to the Palais Royal, exchanging
enthusiastic handgrips with citizens along the road.
For the moment, even the most truculent democrats
were willing to accept La Fayette's assurance that in
an Orleans monarchy they had found " the best of
republics." Ten days later, on August 9, 1830, the
Duke having sworn fidelity to the Charter was formally
invested with sovereign power in the Chamber of
Deputies, under the title of Louis Philippe, King of
the French.
At the time of the Revolution of July Louis
Philippe was in his fifty-third year. He was the son
of Ec/alite, and had been educated according to the
Liberal views of his father and of Madame de Genlis.
Although in 1794 he had deserted from the national
5
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
armies along with Dumouriez, his commander-in-chief,
he could assert truthfully that, throughout the long
years of his subsequent exile, he had never turned his
arms against his own country. During his wanderings
in America and upon the continent, he had mixed
with men of all sorts and all conditions. In Switzer-
land, indeed, he is said to have earned a livelihood by
teaching in a school. In 1814 the idea of conferring
the crown upon him, rather than upon Louis XVIII. ,
had found favour in some quarters. But although,
from this time forward, there had always existed some
kind of a party, to which the name of Orleanist might
have been applied, the Duke himself would appear to
have been innocent of any participation in the pro-
ceedings of his adherents.
After Waterloo the plan of substituting him for
Louis XVIII. had an increased number of supporters.
Louis, who had never liked him, began from this
moment to treat him with great suspicion. Both in
England, where he continued to reside in a kind of
disgrace till 1817, and at the Palais Royal, after his
return to France, he was beset constantly by the spies
of the police. 1 Charles X. had no share in his brother's
dislike and distrust of the Due d'Orleans, and one of
his first acts, after his accession, was to raise him to
the rank of a Royal Highness. But, notwithstanding
that, from the beginning of the new reign, more cordial
relations were established between the Tuileries and
the Palais Royal, there was never any real intimacy
between the King and his sagacious relative. Charles
was a man of limited intelligence and a bigot in re-
ligion. Politically he had not changed since the time
when, as the Comte d'Artois, he had emigrated to
Coblentz, and had called upon the Powers to assist him
with men and with money to re-establish the old
1 F. Daudet, Revue des deux mondes. l er decembre, 1909. " La
police politique sous la Bestauration."
6
LOUIS PHILIPPE
regime in France. The Due d'Orle'ans, on the other
hand, was a well-informed man of the world, a Liberal,
who was neither a friend nor an enemy of the clergy.
It is clear that during the whole period of the
Restoration the Due d'Orle'au.s was at pains to impress
upon the public how greatly he differed in all matters,
both great and small, from his cousins of the elder
branch. When the return of Bonaparte from Elba
compelled the Royal family to fly once more from
France, he had not joined Louis XVIII. at Ghent, but
had gone to England and had resided, throughout the
Hundred Days, in complete retirement at Twickenham.
Moreover, before quitting Lille he had addressed a
farewell letter to the general officers serving under him,
bidding them act, after his departure, in whatever
manner might appear to them the most calculated to
promote the highest interests of their country an in-
junction which aroused as much indignation among the
" pure Royalists " as it elicited commendation from the
majority of Frenchmen. As they grew up, his sons,
the young princes, were educated like ordinary citizens
at the Lycee, and at the Palais Royal a simplicity was
observed which contrasted strongly with the ceremony
maintained, on all occasions, at the Court and in the
apartments of the Dauphin. Nor could it fail to
attract remark that men whose fidelity to the reigning
dynasty was doubtful and prominent members of the
Opposition were his habitual guests.
But, although there may be some circumstances of
a suspicious nature in Louis Philippe's conduct under
the Restoration, it is improbable that he ever seriously
harboured any thoughts of usurping the crown. His
general behaviour is capable of a different explanation.
He had tasted the bitterness of poverty, and appears to
have been haunted constantly by the dread that his chil-
dren might, some day, be reduced to the straits under
which he had suffered in the early years of his exile. He
7
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
was too clear-sighted a man not to perceive that the
restored monarchy had no place in the affections of the
people, and that the first serious mistake on Charles'
part would be the signal for his overthrow. It became,
therefore, his policy to dissociate himself, as far as
possible, from the Court in the hope that, should the
Bourbons be expelled, he might escape from the neces-
sity of sharing in their misfortunes. It is scarcely
doubtful that the true motives of his somewhat equi-
vocal attitude, at this period, should be ascribed to a
keen desire to be allowed to remain in possession of
his great estates, whatever political changes might
take place, rather than to any deep-laid schemes of
personal aggrandizement. 1
At the time of the promulgation of the famous
ordinances of July the Duke was with his family at
Neuilly. For the past four months he had viewed
Charles' obstinate determination to retain his ministers,
in defiance of the Chamber, with alarm. Nevertheless,
the King's coup d'etat seems to have taken him com-
pletely by surprise. His chief endeavour, from the
moment that it became apparent that the execution of
the ordinances would lead to serious trouble, was to
avoid committing himself with either party. Between
Monday, July 26, the day on which the decrees
were published in the Moniteur, and Friday, July 30,
when the success of the revolution was assured, he
would not appear to have had any communication
with either the Court at Saint-Cloud or the Liberal
deputies in Paris. Indeed, on Wednesday, July 28,
when the fighting in the streets assumed a very serious
character, he secretly withdrew from Neuilly and went
into hiding at Le Raincy, another of his residences
near Paris. Thiers, in consequence, when he visited
Neuilly on Friday morning, was unable to see him,
and it was only at last, after repeated messages had
1 Guizot, Mcmoircs, II. pp. 12-16.
8
LOUIS PHILIPPE
been sent him by Laffitte and other supporters, that
he ventured to emerge from his retreat and to return
secretly, and in the dead of night, to the Palais Royal.
It is said that in arriving at this decision he was
greatly influenced by his sister, henceforward to be
generally known as Madame Adelaide, to whose opinion
in political matters he was accustomed to attach greater
weight than to that of his wife, the sweet-natured and
dignified Marie Amelie.
After a few hours in Paris any doubts and hesita-
tions with which he may have been beset vanished
completely. The old King was in full flight from Saint
Cloud, his guards even were demoralized and were
deserting him. From country towns came the news
that the tricolour had been hoisted, amidst the greatest
enthusiasm, and that the revolution was spreading
rapidly. When, on that Saturday afternoon, the Due
d'Orleans mounted his horse to meet La Fayette at the
Hotel de Ville, he was fully determined to seize the
crown, which his unfortunate kinsman had let fall into
the gutter.
Legitimist historians and others, professing to
write in a more impartial spirit, have commented most
adversely upon his conduct in this, the supreme crisis
of his eventful life. It must, however, be admitted
by everybody who studies the question with an open
mind that France was irrevocably resolved to expel
the Bourbons. It has, nevertheless, been contended
that, had the Due d'Orleans consented to undertake
the regency, no serious objections would have been
made to the enthronement of the Due de Bordeaux, 1
in whose favour Charles and the Dauphin had abdi-
1 The son of the Duchesse de Berri. The Due de Berri had been
murdered at the Opera House on February 13, 1820, and his son had
been born in the following September. The Due de Bordeaux was
therefore the grandson of Charles X. and the nephew of the Due
d'Angouleme, the Dauphin. He is better known by the title of the
Comte de Chambord.
9
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
cated on August 2. Unfortunately, however, it was
notorious that this young prince was the pupil of
the Jesuits, and the prejudice against him, on that
account, was unquestionably very strong. Without
doubt, had the plan been given a trial, it must have
speedily ended in disaster. In addition to the many
and great difficulties with which Louis Philippe was
confronted, during the whole course of his reign, he
must, as Regent, have been perpetually exposed to the
suspicion of acting under the inspiration of the young
King's family, and that suspicion would quickly have
proved fatal. There were, therefore, but two alterna-
tives, either a republic or an Orleans monarchy. Seeing
the dispositions of the continental sovereigns and the
condition of France in 1830, the proclamation of a
republic, if it had not entailed war, must certainly
have produced anarchy and brought untold misery
upon the people. On the other hand, the statutory
monarchy, at the time when it was set up, had the
support of the best elements of the nation, and Louis
Philippe, by accepting the crown, can justly claim to
have preserved France from the imminent danger of
civil and foreign war.
Louis Philippe was a man of more than usual
courage. In his early life he had displayed it at a
critical moment upon the battlefield. In his middle
age, in his famous progress to the Hotel de Ville, he
had never hesitated to ride, without a military escort,
through an armed and hostile mob. No liing has
probably been the object of attacks upon his life of so
determined a character as Louis Philippe. The ever-
present danger of assassination is said to have broken
down the nerves of some of the boldest of men. But,
throughout his reign, the " citizen king " always con-
fronted this particular peril, to which he was so con-
stantly exposed, with a serene and lofty courage. In
the face of political difficulties, however, he was as
10
LOUIS PHILLIPPE
timid as lie was brave when it was a question of
meeting physical danger. His attitude towards the
Jacobinical spirit, which the " glorious days of July "
had so greatly stimulated, is characteristic of his weak-
ness in this respect. It is not improbable that in his
heart he was secretly convinced of the ultimate triumph
of revolutionary principles. Be that as it may, he
appears to have shrunk from attacking Jacobinism
openly and boldly. He seems to have looked upon it
as a most dangerous monster which it was advisable
O
to coax and to humour, in the hope that, by careful
handling, it might be temporarily subjugated. 1
In the days which intervened between La Fayette's
acceptation of him and his actual enthronement, he
lost no opportunity of putting his theory into practice.
Youthful Eepublicans were admitted into his presence,
and he submitted to be questioned about his political
principles. 2 It is probable that in some of these dis-
cussions he was induced to promise far more than he
afterwards found it convenient, or even possible, to
perform. On many occasions afterwards he was, in
consequence, reminded of a more or less mythical
Hotel de Ville Programme, with the conditions of
which he was accused of having broken faith. But of
all the difficulties by which he was confronted in these
early days, the demand for a vigorous foreign policy
was by far the most serious to deal with. The con-
vinced democrats, who had been so bitterly opposed
to his enthronement, were now the most vehement in
insisting upon the adoption of a spirited course of
action abroad. Without doubt, these men represented
only a small minority of the nation, but, when they
talked of military glory and of " natural frontiers,"
they appealed to sentiments which a " king of the
1 L. Vitet, "La monarchic de" 1830, Bevue des deux moniles. l er
dtkembre, 1860.
2 L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans., I. pp. 384-388.
11
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
barricades " could not afford to disregard. It was a
matter of indifference to the demagogues of the party
that the flower of the army was in Algeria, that many
of the regiments at home were demoralized by their
recent collision with the people, and that France had
neither allies nor financial credit. The war for which
they clamoured was to be conducted upon strictly
revolutionary principles. " Peace with the nations,
war with the kings," the old cry was to be raised once
more under cover of which, in former days, France had
acquired her coveted boundaries.
Apart from the question as to whether the con-
ditions of France and of Europe, in 1830, were such as
to render it probable that a repetition of the methods
of 1793 would be attended with success, the fact that
the first shot fired on the frontiers would be the signal
for the opening of the floodgates of revolutionary pro-
pagaDdism, made it of vital moment to Louis Philippe
to avert the outbreak of hostilities. In a war, having
for its loudly proclaimed object the destruction of
kings, what hope could he have that his throne, resting
upon new and untried foundations, would escape the
general ruin ? But although he was resolved to use
every effort to maintain the peace, it was thoroughly
in accordance with his habitual practice to cajole and
flatter the faction which desired war. Accordingly,
in his replies to the numerous patriotic addresses which
were presented to him, he would dilate in fulsome
language upon the heroic conduct of the citizens in
the recent street fighting. All his speeches and his
public utterances teemed with references to Valmy and
Jemmappes. When the band struck up the Marseillaise,
he would beat time with his finger, " casting ecstatic
glances at the tricolor like one who has found a long-
lost mistress." 1 Yet, whilst he was thus appealing to
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leyland), I. pp.
141, 142.
12
LOUIS PHILIPPE
the revolutionary recollections and flattering the mili-
tary vanity of the people, all his thoughts were bent
upon obtaining his recognition by the great European
Courts. No sooner, therefore, was he enthroned, than
he sent oft' emissaries, upon whose discretion he could
depend, bearing letters to his brother monarchs an-
nouncing his accession. But in these communications,
intended only for the eyes of the sovereigns and their
confidential advisers, he was careful to speak of the
"glorious revolution" as a lamentable catastrophe which
he sincerely deplored. 1
1 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 26-28.
13
CHAPTER II
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
IN 1830 England was still suffering acutely from the
financial crisis of five years before. The losses of the
capitalists entailed distress upon the working classes
in the shape of unemployment and diminished wages.
The misery of the people led to the commission of acts
of violence and incendiarism upon a scale unparalleled
in the recent history of England. The advocates of
parliamentary reform drew their best arguments, in
support of their cause, from the wretched condition of
the country. The elections, rendered necessary by the
death of George IV., began in the very week which
saw France in the throes of her revolution. By the
Opposition the victory of the Parisians was acclaimed
enthusiastically as the triumph of a neighbouring
people over despotism and aristocratic privilege. The
downfall of Polignac was celebrated as a crushing blow
to Wellington. The belief that the Duke had connived
at, if not directly inspired, the French King's attempted
coup d'etat, was not confined to ignorant people, but
was professed by the leaders of the Whig party. 1
Whilst this supposed connection of Wellington with
Polignac increased the voting power of the Opposition,
Tory patrons of rotten boroughs, incensed at his
Catholic policy, withheld from him their support.
1 Affaires ^trangdres 681, Angleterre, Baudrand a Mote, aout 28,
1830. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, I. p. 330. Edinburgh Review,
October, 1830. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 131-134. C. Greville,
Journals, II. pp. 94, 95. Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl
Grey, II. Grey to Princess Lieven, July 29, 1830.
14
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
The Duke returned from the elections with a diminished
majority, and one, moreover, which, such as it was, in
no way represented the real opinion of the country.
Wellington had been chiefly instrumental in effect-
ing the restoration of the Bourbons after Waterloo.
The news of their expulsion could not, under these
circumstances, fail to cause him some personal regret.
But, in addition, he was too well acquainted with
French affairs not to be aware that the triumph of the
democratic party was a grave menace to the peace of
Europe. On the other hand, however, far from being,
as was supposed, upon confidential terms with Polignac,
the French expedition to Algiers had strained seriously
the official relations which alone subsisted between
them. But any reluctance, which he and his colleagues
might have entertained, to recognizing the new regime
in France, had to give way before the popular enthu-
siasm which the revolution called forth throughout
England. The Duke, accordingly, lost no time in
advising the King to acknowledge Louis Philippe. It
was a policy, he maintained, which not only offered
the best prospect of preserving peace, but which would
meet with the approval of all the great Powers. 1
Consequently, when on August 22 General Baud-
rand arrived in London, bringing with him a letter
from Louis Philippe to William IV., he was accorded
a good reception in ministerial circles. Although he
fancied he could detect a little coldness in Wellington's
manner, his mission achieved a complete success.
After a stay of about a week in London he returned
to Paris, taking back with him King William's answer
together with a box ornamented with a portrait of
that monarch set in diamonds. 2 Meanwhile, on
1 DespatcJies and Correspondence of Wellington, VII. Wellington
to Aberdeen, August 12th, 1830, pp. 162-169, Memorandum upon
Relations with France. C. Greville, Journal, II. p. 21.
2 Affaires e'trangeres 631, Angleterre : Baudrand a Mole, 23 aout,
1830 ; Vaudreuil a Mole, 28 aout, 1830.
15
August 18, Charles X. and the members of his family
had arrived at Spithead on board The Great Britain,
the American vessel chartered by the French govern-
ment to convey them to England. The state of public
feeling made it inadvisable that they should proceed to
London or even land at Portsmouth, and they were, in
consequence, taken, a few days later, by steamer to
Lullworth Castle, in Dorsetshire, which had been
prepared for their reception. The mob which had
cheered exultingly as Castlereagh's body was borne
through the streets to its last resting-place at West-
minster Abbey, which, two years later, was to threaten
Wellington with violence on the anniversary of
Waterloo, would have shown scant respect for the
misfortunes of the fallen King.
Ever since the days of her crowning disaster at
Wagram, Metternich had directed the foreign policy of
Austria. Clement Wenceslas von Metternich, Chan-
cellor of the Court and of the State, was descended
from a family of counts of the empire and was born
at Coblentz in 1773. His predecessors in office, old
Kaunitz, the minister of Maria Theresa, Thugut,
Cobenyl, and Stadion, had in vain attempted to cope
with republican and imperial France. Without doubt,
Metternich in the final struggle with Bonaparte was
assisted by circumstances not of his own creation,
nevertheless he unquestionably proved himself, on
many occasions, a crafty, wary adversary, who could
await his opportunity patiently. The flattery which
was lavished upon him at the peace and the prominent
part which he was enabled to play in the great terri-
torial settlement at Vienna stimulated greatly his
natural vanity and presumption. In addition, as he
grew older, he began to indulge more and more in
long philosophical disquisitions upon every kind of
political subject. But under his pedantic manner, he
retained always his alert resourcefulness and shrewd
1C
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
common sense. In the words of Sir Frederick Lamb,
who had transacted much business with him, " he was
far too practical a man to regulate his conduct by his
doctrines, and far too ingenious a one to be at a loss
for a doctrine to cover his conduct." x
Without doubt, Metternich was a man of aristo-
cratic and conservative instincts, but, had he been
differently disposed, the conditions of the Empire must
have rendered very difficult the adoption of a Liberal
policy. At the Congress of Vienna Austria had re-
nounced all claim to her former possessions in the
Low Countries and in Western Germany, and had
withdrawn to the south and south-east to exercise an
uneasy dominion over Slavs and Italians. Progress
on national lines was hardly possible in an empire
thus constituted, and circumstances contributed to
facilitate the imposition of a strictly conservative
system. The Liberal impulse, to which the War of
Liberation had given birth in Prussia, had no counter-
part in Austria, nor had Francis II., like Frederick
William III., even in his darkest days, promised
constitutional reforms. At the peace, accordingly,
Austria reverted uncomplainingly to her old absolutist
traditions.
In Italy Bonaparte had encouraged deliberately
a spirit of nationality. But the patriotic hopes, which
he had raised, were extinguished at the Congress of
Vienna. Italy, Metternich decreed, was to be hence-
forward merely " a geographical expression." By the
settlement of 1815 Austria acquired actually the
provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, but her influence
extended far beyond these districts. Austrian princes
ruled over the Duchies of Tuscany, Modena and
Parma. Treaties which provided that Piacenza,
Commachio and Ferrara should be garrisoned by
Austrian troops gave her military control of the
1 F. 0. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, 1833.
17 c
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
valley of the Po. Tuscany was forbidden to make
either peace or war without her consent, and the
King of Naples was pledged to introduce no consti-
tutional changes, other than those sanctioned in the
Austrian dominions.
In the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, as it was
termed, it was Metternich's policy to make the
Lombards "forget that they were Italians." The
Austrian code of laws was introduced without regard
to native customs and prejudices. The civil service
was composed almost exclusively of Germans, and
the most trifling administrative questions had to be
referred to Vienna. 1 The stagnation engendered by
this system could not fail to have a demoralizing
effect. At Venice two-fifths of the population were in
receipt of charitable relief, the middle classes were
without enterprise, the aristocracy fawned upon the
Austrians. On the other hand, in Lombardy and
Venetia there were few monks and a comparatively
good system of popular education existed. The people,
moreover, enjoyed equality before the law which,
except in political cases, was justly administered.
But as in all Italian States, the police were arbitrary
and interfering and the censorship of the press was
enforced rigidly.
The heterogeneous composition of the Austrian
Empire, which demanded a strictly conservative policy
at home, prescribed no less urgently the preservation
of peaceful relations abroad. Since the conclusion of
the great war Metternich's foreign policy had had no
other object than the maintenance of the status guo t
by the strict observation of existing treaties. The
revolutionary spirit was the most serious danger to
the settlement of 1815. Bonaparte might be dead or
a prisoner at St. Helena, but Metternich was under no
illusion that the peril had passed away for ever. The
1 Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, I. pp. 51-61.
18
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
revolutionary monster still survived and required
ceaseless watching. Only, lie conceived, by a Euro-
pean Confederation, ruled over by a council of the
Great Powers, could complete security be obtained
against the common enemy of all established govern-
ments. Metternich's combination of the Powers " for
the maintenance of everything lawfully existing," ]
which has been held up to execration under the name
of the Holy Alliance, was an adaptation to practical
politics of the fantastic scheme, which Alexander had
propounded, on September 26, 1815, after a review
of his army on the plain of Vertus. According to the
Tsar's manifesto the relations of all European sove-
reigns were in the future to be guided by the teachings
of Christ. They were to regard each other in the light
of brothers and to look upon their subjects as their
children. The policy of Metternich's Holy Alliance
was set forth in the famous preliminary protocol of the
conference of Troppau, signed, on November 19, 1820,
by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia.
" States," it was laid down, "which have undergone a
change of government due to a revolution, the results
of which affect other States, shall cease to be members
of the European Alliance. If owing to these altera-
tions immediate danger threaten neighbouring States,
the Powers bind themselves to bring back by force of
arms the erring State into the folds of the Alliance."
Acting upon this principle, Austria, in 1821,
invaded the Kingdom of Naples and abolished the
constitution which the Carbonari had compelled Ferdi-
nand to accept, whilst Bubna, the Austrian general
commanding at Milan, entered Piedmont and sup-
pressed the revolution which had broken out at Turin.
The Tsar, Alexander, during these operations, held an
army upon the Galician frontier ready to march into
1 Metternich, Memoires, IV. p. 222 : Metternich a Esterhazy, 7 aout,
1825.
19
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Italy, should his assistance be invoked. The same
policy, in 1823, dictated the French armed intervention
in Spain, when the constitution, which the Liberals had
proclaimed three years before, was abolished and the
absolute rule of King Ferdinand VII. was restored.
O
But the determination of England " to abstain rigidly
from interference in the affairs of other States"
deprived the alliance of that appearance of complete
unanimity which Metternich hoped would convince
the peoples of the futility of attempting revolutions.
The Greek insurrection, the quarrel between Russia and
the Porte and the conflict of national interests to
which the Eastern question gave rise, completed the
work of disruption which Castlereagh and Canning
had begun.
Metternich received the news of the revolution in
Paris and of the downfall of Charles X. at Koenigswart,
his country seat in Bohemia. Ever since the termina-
tion of the Russo-Turkish war he had been striving to
re-establish the concert of the Powers and, more
especially, to place the relations of Austria and Russia
upon their former friendly footing. Deeply as Austria
was interested in all developments affecting the
integrity of Turkey, greatly as Metternich mistrusted
Nicholas' designs upon the Porte, the spread of
Liberalism constituted in his eyes an even graver
danger. The Russian government was intensely con-
servative and the people were little likely to be affected
by the revolutionary spirit of Western Europe. Were
a serious crisis to arise it was essential that Austria
should be in a position to look to St. Petersburg for
support. A visit which Nesselrode, the Russian
Chancellor, paid to Carlsbad, in the summer of 1830,
afforded Metternich an opportunity of sounding him
as to the views of his Court, and it was upon his
return from a satisfactory interview with his old friend
that he found awaiting him at Koenigswart the first
20
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
intelligence of Charles X.'s violation of the constitution.
On August 6, when the complete triumph of the
revolutionists in Paris was known to him, Metternich
determined to return at once to Vienna, making
another short stay at Carlsbad upon the way. At this,
their second meeting, both statesmen affixed their
signatures to a short document, which was to acquire a
certain celebrity in the chanceries of Europe under the
name of the chiffon de Carlsbad. By this agreement
the basis was established of the policy which the
absolute Powers were to adopt towards France. No
attempt would be made to interfere with her, provided
that she should abstain from seeking to infringe
existing treaties and from disturbing the internal peace
of neighbouring States. 1
Soon after Metternich's return to Vienna, on August
26, General *Belliard arrived, bringing with him a
letter from Louis Philippe to the Emperor Francis.
Some days were allowed to elapse before he was ad-
mitted to an audience, but in the interval he had two
interviews with Metternich. The Chancellor accepted
his assurances that the King of the French would do
all in his power to maintain peace at home and abroad.
At the same time, however, he gave him plainly to
understand that he had no confidence in Louis Philippe's
ability to carry out his intentions. Both the private
and the official answers of the Emperor were coldly ex-
pressed, but they contained the definite assurance that
he had no wish to interfere with the domestic affairs of
France, in which country he sincerely desired to see
tranquillity restored. He was determined to abide by
treaties, and was gratified to learn that His Majesty,
the King of the French, was animated by the same
resolution. As Metternich, on September 8, placed
these documents in Belliard's hands he took the
opportunity of impressing upon him solemnly that his
1 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 10-17.
21
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Imperial master, although he had decided to acknow-
ledge the sovereignty of Louis Philippe, viewed the
events which had taken place in France with the utmost
abhorrence and was convinced that the new regime could
have only a brief existence. In truth Metternich was
full of apprehensions, and, in a private letter to Nessel-
rode, unburdened himself of the conviction that " the
end of old Europe was fast approaching."
The Germanic Confederation had been formed with
the object of protecting Germany from external and
internal dangers. The thirty-eight States and the
four free cities of which it was composed were debarred
from entering into any alliance with foreign govern-
ments against another member of the Confederation
and, in case of need, were pledged to furnish con-
tingents to the federal army. Austria and Prussia,
however, in order to preserve the independence of
their foreign policy, brought portions only of their
territories into the Confederation, which, in conse-
quence, was not committed to the defence of Hungary,
Gallicia, Lombardy and Venetia, on behalf of Austria,
or to the protection of the Polish provinces of Prussia.
Each State was represented at the federal Diet at
Frankfort, which assembly was in no sense a federal
parliament, but resembled rather a conference of
diplomatists, the ministers attending it being strictly
bound by the instructions furnished them by their
respective Courts. Austria and Prussia had only one
vote apiece, Austria, however, held the perpetual
presidency.
Prussia in 1815 had been regarded as the champion
of Liberalism. The Constitutionalists, however, soon
discovered that the hopes which they placed in her
were not destined to be realized. In the counsels of
Frederick William, the influence of Wittgenstein, the
leader of the reactionary party, and the friend of
1 Metternich, Memoir, V. pp. 17-30.
22
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
Metternich, soon superseded that of Stein, Hardenburg
and the heroes of the War of Liberation. The con-
ditions of the country, it must be admitted, were
hardly suitable to the immediate establishment of
representative institutions. The inhabitants of the
nine provinces which, it had been decreed at the
Congress of Vienna, were to constitute the Kingdom
of Prussia, were not agreed as to the form of govern-
ment under which they desired to live. Until they
had become Prussians, the Poles of the Duchy of
Posen, the Westphaliand, the Saxons, and the .Rhine-
landers had existed under different codes of law and
of administration. The imposition of a uniform
system upon the kingdom was a matter of urgent
necessity, and it was to administrative measures that
the Prussian government devoted its attention exclu-
sively in the years which followed Waterloo. It is
clear that there was no strong demand for a constitu-
tion among the mass of the people, and Frederick
William III. could listen, in consequence, without
much danger, to Metternich's warning that representa-
tive institutions must prove incompatible with military
strength.
Successful as he had been in persuading Frederick
William to withhold a constitution from Prussia,
Metternich could not prevent certain rulers of the
minor States from complying with Article xiii. of the
Federal Act, and from establishing representative
government within their dominions. In 1816, the
Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a constitution,
and his example was followed by the Kings of Bavaria
and of Wurtemburg and the Duke of Baden. A wave
of Liberalism swept over Northern Germany. The
universities were affected profoundly by the new ideas.
In their lecture-rooms, professors denounced existing
governments and harangued their pupils in the
language of demagogues. The agitation culminated,
23
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
on March 23, 1819, in the murder of the dramatist
and publicist Kotzebue, who was said to be in the pay
of Russia, by Karl Sand, a student of Jena University
and a lecturer to the Burschenschaft. This crime and
an attempt to assassinate Ibell, the minister of Nassau,
gave Metternich the opportunity for which he had
been waiting. In the month of July of this same year
he had an interview with Frederick William at Teplitz,
in the course of which the King promised never to give
Prussia a constitution, to place his confidence only in
ministers of the type of Bernstorff and Wittgenstein,
and to sanction such repressive measures as the Austrian
Chancellor might see fit to suggest. After a con-
ference of the ministers of the different States at
Carlsbad, Metternich's decrees were submitted to the
Frankfort Diet, on September 20, 1819, and adopted
forthwith.
Under the provisions of the celebrated Carlsbad
decrees, the ruler of every German State was bound to
appoint commissioners to regulate the universities and
to impose a censorship upon all newspapers and matter
printed within his dominions. Furthermore, a central
tribunal was established at Mainz to inquire into the
doings of the secret societies, and upon the members
of this court was conferred the power of arresting the
subjects of any German sovereign, and of demanding
from any law court the production of documents.
These decrees, however, did not constitute the sum
total of Metternich's measures of precaution. In
November, 1819, he convened a council of German
ministers at Vienna, when, under the pretext of defining
the functions of the Diet, sixty-five new articles of a
repressive character were introduced into the Federal
Act. The general effect of the Vienna resolutions,
as these measures were termed, was to impose upon
the Federation the duty of defending absolutism by
force of arms in small States in which the sovereigns
24
might prove incapable themselves of maintaining a
despotic form of government.
Metternich's manipulation of the Diet was the
great triumph of his home policy. By converting the
Federation from a combination of States into a league
of sovereigns against their own subjects, he averted
the danger that it might promote the cause of Liberal-
ism or of national unity. From this time forward
Metternich, to all appearance, dominated the Court
and the Cabinet of Berlin, and held in leading strings
the minor princes of the Confederation. Nevertheless,
the position of Austria as a German Power was weaken-
ing steadily. At the Congress of Vienna he had
craftily withdrawn the empire from the post of danger,
and had thrust upon Prussia the task of protecting the
western flank of Germany. To his secret satisfaction,
he saw her pour out her treasure to defend the frontier
from which Austria had recoiled. He believed that by
his Carlsbad decrees and his Vienna resolutions he had
rendered national unity impossible, and had condemned
Northern Germany to the political stagnation in which
the empire appeared contented to repose. But the en-
lightened bureaucratic system of Prussia was incompar-
ably superior to that of Austria. In educational matters
she was the foremost State in Europe, and already
she was drawing the minor States into her system of
internal free trade the famous Zollverein which was
to prove so important a factor in the struggle for
Prussian hegemony and national unity. Even in 1830,
acute observers could perceive that the people were
stifling within the narrow confines of their duchies,
and that, when the day of Germany's awakening should
come, it would be to the Power standing on guard
upon the Rhine that they would look for leadership. 1
But that hour had not yet struck, and, in the question
1 E. Quinet, De VAllemagne. Revue den deux mondex, V. Premier
semestre.
25
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of the attitude to be observed towards France, after
the Revolution of July, Prussia, as was her wont,
shaped her policy upon that of Austria. The Emperor's
acknowledgment of Louis Philippe carried with it,
accordingly, Frederick William's recognition of the
King of the French.
At St. Petersburg it was not until August 19 that
any mention of the Revolution of July was allowed
to appear in the newspapers. Two days earlier a
new levy of two men in five hundred had been called
up for service in the army, all Russians had been
ordered to leave France, Frenchmen had been refused
admission to Russia, and any display of the tricolour
had been forbidden. But Lord Heytesbury, 1 the
British ambassador, was informed that this increase
of military strength had no reference to French affairs,
and that the recall of Russian subjects from France
was a simple measure of precaution. 2 In the eyes of
Nicholas any rising of the people against their lawful
sovereign was necessarily a highly offensive proceeding,
and in this instance it had the additional disadvantage
of disturbing a condition of affairs, the continued dura-
tion of which was very favourable to the national
policy of Russia. Under the different governments of
the Restoration an excellent understanding had been
established between the Courts of the Tuileries and
of St. Petersburg. The Eastern question, which had
brought Russia to the verge of war with England
and which had interrupted the smooth course of her
relations with Vienna, had, on the contrary, drawn
France towards her. When, in the campaign of the
previous year, Constantinople had appeared to lie at
the mercy of General Diebitsch, politicians as opposed
as Chateaubriand and Polignac had been disposed to
look upon the situation complacently, in the hope that
1 William A'Court, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860).
2 F. O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, August 17, 18, 19, 1830.
26
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
the disruption of the Turkish Empire might lead to
a readjustment of the map of Europe, which might
enable France to rectify in her favour the treaties of
1815. Furthermore, since the intervention in Spain,
in 1823, there had been little cordiality between the
Cabinets of London and Paris. This estrangement
had been intensified by the French occupation of
Algiers, the one important measure of foreign policy
of the last government of the Restoration. These
circumstances rendered it very improbable that Russia
in the near future would have to confront a coalition
of the maritime Powers. But now that a new regime
had been set up in France, the possibility of that
dreaded contingency would have to be seriously
considered.
In spite of the Tsar's military preparations, Lord
Heytesbury had no fears that he proposed to attack
France. Nicholas informed him that he had directed
his ambassador " to remain in Paris, but to remove
immediately from the house furnished to the Russian
embassy by the government of France." He was
constantly to hold himself in readiness to quit Paris
at an hour's notice, and to leave at once, should the
English, the Prussian, the Austrian or the Dutch
ambassadors be compelled to depart. " En dme et en
conscience he never would consider the Due d' Orleans
in any light except that of a usurper." Nevertheless
he had no intention of intervening, unless France were
to attempt to disseminate revolutionary doctrines in
other countries or to carry her arms beyond her
frontiers. 1 In due course Baron Athalin arrived at
St. Petersburg, bringing with him a letter from Louis
Philippe to the Tsar, and, on September 8, was
received in private audience by Nicholas. On this
occasion the question of the acknowledgment of the
1 F. O. Eussia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen (most secret and
confidential), August 20, 1830.
27
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
King of the French was avoided, the Emperor being
resolved to reserve the matter for further consideration.
But at Tsarkoe Selo, a week later, Nicholas, whilst
regretting that the British government should have
so hastily decided to recognize Louis Philippe, gave
Lord Heytesbury to understand that his own acknow-
ledgment of the King of the French would not be
deferred much longer. 1
In the meantime, an event had occurred which
threatened seriously to aggravate the embarrassments
of the situation. The creation of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands occupied a most important place in
the territorial settlement following the overthrow of
Bonaparte. British statesmanship had been largely
responsible for the union of Belgium with Holland,
and for the formation of a strong State of secondary
rank which was to act as a barrier against France.
Under Wellington's advice the great Powers, at their
own expense, erected a line of fortresses, connected
with Prussian territory upon the left bank of the
Rhine, to protect the southern frontier of the new
kingdom. From a purely military point of view the
plan may have been sound, but to propose to mould
the Belgians and the Dutch into a nation was to treat
as of no account the differences of race and of religion
which divided the two peoples. The Belgians soon
began to complain that they were very inadequately
represented in all branches of the public service.
Questions relating to education, taxation, and the
freedom of the press increased their discontent. The
Dutch, who could look back proudly upon two
centuries of independence, despised them as having
been constantly under the dominion of a foreign
Power. In 1830 it was generally recognized that the
attempt to fuse the two peoples into one nationality
had failed. The Belgians, however, still remained loyal
1 F. O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 8, 14, 1830.
28
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
to the House of Nassau and desired only administrative
separation under the reigning dynasty.
The Revolution of July in Paris created an immense
excitement at Brussels. The town was the favourite
place of refuge for the political offenders of all countries.
Yet in spite of the prevailing unrest the authorities
neglected to take the most ordinary precautions against
a popular rising. A performance of Scribe's opera, La
Muette de Portici, which treats of the insurrection of
the Neapolitans against the Spaniards, furnished the
spark which was to cause the explosion. Serious
rioting began on the night of August 25, and con-
tinued throughout the following day. The military
commander appears to have acted with a strange
irresolution, and on the 28th, the insurgents being
complete masters of the town, a deputation of notables
carried a respectful address to the Hague praying for
the redress of their grievances. The next three weeks
were spent in fruitless attempts to arrange a com-
promise. The Prince of Orange, who was personally
popular, visited Brussels, but his efforts to solve the
question met with no success. After the failure of his
eldest son's mission the King consented to dismiss van
Maanen, the unpopular governor of Brussels. But
this concession was made too late. Encouraged by
emissaries of the revolutionary clubs in Paris, and
emboldened by the weakness of the government, the
advocates of complete separation pressed their demands
with increasing violence. At last the King ordered
Prince Frederick of Orange to advance from the camp
of Vilvorde against the town. On September 23 the
attack began. The troops penetrated into the park,
but failed to carry the barricades which obstructed
the streets beyond. After three days' fighting the
Prince abandoned the struggle and withdrew from the
neighbourhood of Brussels. The discomfiture of his
army left King William no alternative but to appeal
29
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
for assistance to the Powers, whilst at Brussels a pro-
visional government declared Belgium independent,
and convened a national congress.
This attempt on the part of a neighbouring people
to imitate ''the glorious days of July" was exceed-
ingly gratifying to the republicans and the military
democratic party in Paris. Their orators and journalists
loudly declared that the revolt of the Belgians was an
opportunity both for extending the French frontiers,
and for effecting a breach in the treaties of 1815.
Louis Philippe, however, was resolved not to be
drawn into an adventure of this kind. He knew that
the powers would never tolerate an invasion of the
Low Countries, and he realized that the French army
was in no condition to oppose a European coalition.
Accordingly, as it was not in his power to silence the
cries for intervention or to repress the noisy sympathy
for the Belgians indulged in by a large section of the
press, he determined to give to foreign governments a
practical proof of his pacific intentions by despatching
to London, as his ambassador, the aged statesman who,
sixteen years before, had figured so conspicuously at
the Congress of Vienna.
The Prince de Talleyrand was in his seventy- third
year. Notwithstanding the great services which, in
1814, he had rendered to the cause of Legitimate
Sovereignty, the Bourbons of the elder branch had
never been able to forget his conduct under the
Republic and the Empire. At the second Restoration he
had been appointed President of the Council, but had
retired before the Chambre introuvable and the Royalist
reaction, and neither Louis XVIII. nor Charles X.
had given him a second opportunity of returning to
office. Upon the triumph of the popular party in
July, he had promptly placed his services at the
disposal of Louis Philippe. But, in spite of his Liberal
opinions, Talleyrand retained the language, the habits,
30
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
and the appearance of a noble of the old regime. It
might have been expected that all the King's ingenuity
would have been required to impose so fine a gentle-
man upon a Cabinet, which counted among its members
the democratic M. Dupont and the elder M. Dupin,
famous for his hobnailed boots and his affectations
of middle-class simplicity. Louis Philippe's ministers,
however, were agreed upon the necessity of preserv-
ing the peace, and, when it was proposed at the Council
table that Talleyrand should be sent to London, no
opposition was made to the suggestion. Guizot, who
was Minister of the Interior at the time, supposes
that those who disliked the appointment must have
stated their objections to the King in private. 1
But if Louis Philippe and his ministers were
determined to abstain from any intervention in
Belgium, they were bound to insist that other Powers
should adopt the same attitude. It was, therefore,
notified to foreign governments that French policy, in
the future, would be based strictly upon the principle
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
nations. It was a system to which both the great
parties in England had declared their adherence, and
its adoption by France might, in consequence, be
expected to facilitate the establishment of cordial
relations between the two countries. But the declara-
tion of such a principle could not fail to be highly
displeasing to the absolute Courts. Already move-
ments of troops were in progress in the Rhine
provinces which suggested an intention on the part
of Frederick William of rendering military assistance
to his brother-in-law, the King of the Netherlands.
Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador, although
still without official credentials, had been instructed
to remain in Paris. Mpl, Louis Philippe's first
Minister for Foreign Affairs, accordingly arranged
1 Guizot, Memoires, II. pp. 86-87.
31
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to meet him at a private house, where he gave him
clearly to understand that the entry of a Prussian
army into the Low Countries would be regarded as
an act of war directed against France. This threat,
which evoked much indignation in Berlin and at
Vienna, was effectual in inducing King Frederick
William III. to renounce any thoughts, which he may
have entertained, of reducing the Belgians to sub-
mission by force of arms. 1
Talleyrand arrived in London on September 24,
and in a despatch, sent off the next day, expressed his
satisfaction at the reception accorded him. 2 He was
accompanied by the Duchesse de Dino, who officiated
as hostess at his table, and presided over his house-
hold. In 1807, at the conclusion of the campaign in
Poland, Talleyrand, then Napoleon's Minister for
Foreign Affairs, had obtained for his nephew, Edmond
de Perigord, the hand of Dorothee, the daughter of the
last reigning Duke of Courland. After a few years
of married life, however, husband and wife agreed to
live apart, and Madame Edmond from that time for-
ward took up her residence with Talleyrand. She
accompanied him to Vienna, in 1814, and brought
back from the Congress the title of Duchesse de Dino.
In return for the services he had rendered him, the
King of Naples had conferred this dukedom upon
Talleyrand, who had asked that the title might be
assumed by his nephew. The duchess' position in
Talleyrand's household was so generally recognized
that, upon their arrival in London, King William IV.,
at Wellington's request, allowed her to take rank
as an ambassadress. 3 The Comte Casimir de Montrond,
another frequent guest at Valenay, and at the house
1 Broglie, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 41-42.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 631 Angleterre. Talleyrand a Mole*, 25
septembre, 1830. Barante, Souvenirs, IV. p. 9.
3 C. Greville, Journals, II. p. 57.
32
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
in the Rue Saint-Florentin, followed the ambassador
to London. Talleyrand's friendship with this curious
individual appears to have begun under the Directory.
In the terrible days which preceded the downfall of
Robespierre, Montrond had been an inmate of the
prison of Saint-Lazare. The fortunate possession of
some ready money, a rare commodity at the time,
had, however, enabled him to effect his escape, and
that of the citizeness Franquetot, the heretofore Aimee
de Coigny, Duchesse de Fleury, the heroine of Andre
Chenier's poem. 1 After this miraculous deliverance,
Aimee de Coigny, who under the emigration laws had
divorced the Due de Fleury, married the man to whom
she owed her life. But, after a brief and most unsatis-
factory experience of matrimony with the gay incroy-
able, she again contrived to obtain her freedom.
Montrond's introduction to London society appears
to date from the year 1812, when, having incurred
the grave displeasure of Bonaparte, he succeeded in
eluding the French police and in reaching England.
He seems to have become very rapidly a well-known
and popular member of the fashionable world in
London. During all this period of his life he is
believed to have been totally without regular means
of subsistence, and to have existed solely by play,
assisted by an occasional windfall in the shape of
employment upon any secret political work which
Talleyrand, when in favour, was enabled to procure
for him. But from the earliest days of the Monarchy
of July his circumstances began, to improve. From
this time forward he appears to have drawn a
pension of about 1000 per annum from the secret
service funds of the French Foreign Office. 2 This
1 La Jeune Captive.
* There is an interesting article on the subject of Montrond, by H.
Welschinger, in the Revue de Paris of the 1" fevrier, 1895, entitled " Un
ami de Talleyrand." His name figures constantly in T. Kaikes' Journal,
33 D
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
allowance is said to have been granted him in order
that " he should speak well of Louis Philippe in the
London clubs." It was, moreover, strongly suspected
that he had obtained knowledge of certain of the
King's proceedings during the emigration which His
Majesty had good reasons for wishing to keep
secret. 1
The uneasiness aroused in London by the first
news of the insurrection in Brussels developed into
serious alarm, when the triumph of the revolutionists
over the Royal troops became known. Wellington
openly declared that it was a " devilish bad business,"
and many people began to fear that a great European
war was inevitable. 2 The British government, whilst
prepared to accept as an accomplished fact the
complete separation of Belgium from the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, held that no changes must
take place of a nature to interfere with the efficiency
of the barrier fortresses, these defences " being
necessary for the security of other States." After
drawing up instructions to this effect for Lord Stuart
de Rothesay, Aberdeen intimated that the government
was desirous of conferring upon the situation " in
friendly concert with France and the other Powers. " ;
Talleyrand was of opinion that it was a matter for
congratulation that the first offer of co-operation
should have come from England, and strongly
recommended that the proposal should be responded
to cordially. An entirely passive attitude, he wrote,
Chroniques de Madame de Dino, C. Greville's Journals, H. Greville's
Diary, Gronow's Recollections, etc.
1 T. Raikes, Journal, I. p. 268, and III. 1 pp. 158-154. Among the
papers discovered at the Tuileries, after the Revolution of 1848, and
published in the Revue Retrospective, p. 37,|Montrond's name appears
opposite a sum of 86,000 francs in the accounts of the secret service
funds of the Foreign Office for the year 1842.
2 Affaires e^rangeres, 631 Angleterre, Vaudreuil a Mole, 81 Aout,
1880. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 144-147.
3 F. O France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 3, 1830.
34
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
must deprive France "of that influence which they
are disposed to ascribe to her over here."
Meanwhile, in Paris, notices were appearing in the
papers calling upon men to enroll themselves to
assist their Belgian brothers. The Society of the
Friends of the People equipped a battalion which
actually set out for the northern frontier. La
Fayette was still the recognized leader of the ultra-
Liberals, and his house was a meeting-place for the
Carbonari and the revolutionists of every country.
But he was occupied chiefly in encouraging insur-
rectionary movements in Spain and Italy. The
union of Belgium with France was advocated mainly
in the ranks of the Bonapartist or military democratic
section of the party. The protestations of Louis
Philippe and Comte Mole were probably true that
the government in no way favoured their designs,
and that strict orders had been given to the prefects
to prevent the passage of arms into Belgium. On the
other hand, however, their assertions to Lord Stuart
were untrue that they were innocent of conniving at the
proceedings of the Spanish revolutionists. Broglie and
Guizot, both members of the Cabinet, admit that in
order to compel the King of Spain to acknowledge Louis
Philippe, facilities for assembling their followers upon
French territory were accorded to the Spanish insur-
rectionary leaders. This rather disingenuous policy ap-
pears, without question, to have contributed materially
to the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Paris and Madrid at the end of the month of October. 2
None of the Powers evinced any intention of
responding to the King of Holland's request for
1 Affaires etrangeres, 681 (bis) Angleterre Talleyrand a Mole, 3, 6,
8 octobre, 1830.
2 F. O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 12, 1830. F. 0.
France 414, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 1, 8, 11, 1830. Guizot,
Memoires, II. pp. 95-98. Broglie, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 28-29. L. Blanc,
Histoire de dix ans., II. pp. 103-il4.
35
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
military assistance to subdue the revolted Belgians.
The English proposal that a conference should be held
to consider the situation was generally regarded as
the best solution of the question. " Austria and
Prussia," wrote Talleyrand on October 11, "intend
to follow the lead of England with respect to
Belgium, and there can be little doubt that Russia
will adopt the same course." l The French govern-
ment at this time was greatly incensed at the conduct
of the Cabinet of the Hague. No official appeal for
help had been sent to Paris, but in a letter to Louis
Philippe the Prince of Orange openly accused the
French authorities of encouraging the disturbances
in Belgium, and suggested that the King should make
a public declaration of his intention not to meddle
with the affairs of the Low Countries. In return, the
Prince undertook to use all his influence with the Tsar
in favour of the acknowledgment of the sovereignty
of the King of the French. At a Council of Ministers
it was resolved that Talleyrand should be instructed
to bring the affair to the notice of the British Cabinet,
and that Mole should draw up a note for presentation
at the Hague, expressing surprise at the continued
silence observed towards the French government. Two
days later, however, the news was telegraphed from
Strasburg that General Athalin had passed through the
town, bringing with him the Tsar's recognition of
Louis Philippe. But, upon the general's arrival, the
satisfaction caused by this intelligence was diminished
by the cold and formal language of Nicholas's letter,
and by his pointed omission to address the King as
" his brother," the designation generally employed by
sovereigns in their communications with each other. 2 !
1 Affaires e"trangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand 4
11 octobre, 1830.
2 Affaires e^rangeres, 681 (Ma) Angleterre, Mole & Talleyrand,
18 octobre, 1880. F. O. France 414 & 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, 12, 15
October, 1830.
36
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
The proposal of the English government that a
conference should be held upon Belgian affairs having
been accepted by the Powers, it remained only to
decide upon the town in which the deliberations should
take place. London, where for some time past the
representatives of Russia, France, and Great Britain
had been engaged in settling the frontiers and discuss-
ing the future of Greece, appeared to be the capital in
which, by reason of its proximity to Brussels, the
plenipotentiaries could assemble with the least incon-
venience. France alone dissented from this view, and
urgently demanded that the conference should be held
in Paris. Aberdeen, when Talleyrand communicated
to him his instructions upon the subject, would appear
to have seen little to object to in the French proposal.
Wellington, however, refused to entertain the sugges-
tion for a moment. It was highly important, the
Duke contended, that matters should be settled
promptly, and he was confident that he could induce
the ministers attending the conference to agree to
the French and English proposals, provided they
were to meet in London. On the other hand, were
Paris to be the scene of their deliberations, they
would insist upon referring every question to their
respective Courts. Talleyrand, who considered that
there was much sound reason in the Duke's conten-
tion, was nevertheless directed to reiterate his demand.
But his further representations only evoked the reply
that the English Cabinet regarded Paris as un
terrain trop agite, and at a subsequent interview, on
October 25, in the presence of the ambassadors
of Austria and Prussia, the Duke assured him that
the Powers were unanimous in opposing the notion
of discussing the affairs of the Low Countries
amidst the tourbillon revolutionaire of the French
capital. 1
1 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Mole a Talleyrand, 9, 20
37
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
In his conversations with Lord Stuart de Rothesay
in Paris, Mole, in order to gain his ends, had recourse
to a singular argument. Talleyrand himself, he ex-
plained, constituted the true reason why the govern-
ment was desirous that the Belgian conference should
not take place in London. He never would have been
accredited to the Court of St. James' had ministers
foreseen how greatly the public would resent his
appointment. To allow him to represent France at a
very important conference would expose the Cabinet
to attacks which must prove fatal to its existence.
" This extraordinary reason for objecting to our proposi-
tion," wrote Aberdeen, "does not appear to His
Majesty's government to be entitled to serious con-
sideration." Mole nevertheless continued to press his
point with much warmth, and it was only after several
more interviews with Lord Stuart that he began to
talk of sending a second plenipotentiary to the London
conference to be associated with Talleyrand. 1 This
plan, which was probably not put forward seriously,
was certainly never carried in to execution. At the end
of October, the Cabinet was reconstructed, and Mole
resigned the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. After his
retirement no further allusion appears to have been
made to the alleged inconvenience of Talleyrand's
presence at the London conference. Mole' was perhaps
jealous of allowing him to conduct these important
negotiations, in which he probably desired himself to
play the chief part. He was a highly cultivated man,
with much charm of manner, and of an ancient family,
and in Imperial days had enjoyed the favour of the
Emperor, and had held important positions. Under
the Restoration he had been Minister of Marine in
Richelieu's first administration, and in this capacity
octobre, 1880; Talleyrand A Mote, 15, 23, 25 octobre, 1830; 1 novembre,
1830.
1 F. O. France 405, Aberdeen to Stuart, October 22, 1830. F. O.
France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 18, 22, 25, 81, 1830.
38
THE POWERS AND THE CITIZEN KING
had incurred Louis XVIII. 's displeasure by intriguing
against his favourite the Due De"cazes.
The Cabinet, known as that of August llth, had
never been a united body. Guizot, Broglie, Mole and
Casimir Perier constituted the Conservative element,
whilst Laffitte and Dupont were opposed to all
measures which savoured of resistance to progress
upon democratic lines. The riots of October 17 and
18, in Paris, the mob's protest against the apparent
intention of the government to abolish the death
penalty in political cases, in order to save the lives of
the imprisoned ex-ministers of Charles X., brought
matters to a crisis. Seeing that the King decidedly
inclined to the views of Laffitte and the so-called party
of laissez -oiler > the Conservatives, advising him to give
the policy of their dissenting colleagues a fair trial,
tendered their resignations. Laffitte was accordingly
charged with the task of reconstructing the Cabinet. 1
On November 2, the day on which the composi-
tion of the new French ministry was published in the
Moniteur, King William IV. formally opened the
British Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne,
the Belgians were described as "revolted subjects"
and the intention was expressed of repressing sternly
disturbances at home. In the House of Lords, Grey
deprecated the employment of such language, and,
in reply, Wellington made his declaration against
Reform. A fortnight later, upon a motion of Sir
Henry Parnell for referring the Civil List to a select
committee, the government was placed in a minority.
The Duke thereupon resigned and advised the King to
send for Grey. Lord Grey undertook to form a ministry
upon the understanding that he was to bring forward
a measure of Reform.
1 Broglie, Souvenir*, IV. pp. 87-91. Guizot, Mrmoirct, II. pp. 128
-135.
39
: THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
THE accession to power of Lord Grey was an event
justly calculated to raise the hopes of those who wished
to see more cordial relations established between France
and England. The Whigs had been out of office during
the whole period of the Imperial wars ; they had not
been concerned in the territorial settlement at the
peace, nor were they responsible for the measures
which had been taken to ensure the safe custody of
Bonaparte after Waterloo. Many prominent members
of the party had avowed their sympathy for France,
and, moreover, the revolution of July had, unquestion-
ably, contributed to the overthrow of the Tories.
Under the new rfyime in France political power was to
rest with the bourgeoisie. It was by the support of
the trading and commercial classes that the Whigs
purposed to carry out their scheme of Parliamentary
Reform. Nor were these the only circumstances
which seemed to indicate that the two countries would,
in the future, develop upon parallel lines. Although
William IV. had succeeded to the throne legitimately,
whilst a revolution had placed the crown upon the
head of Louis Philippe, and although no two men could
be more different in character, there were, upon the
surface, curious points of resemblance between them.
Both were, or were supposed to be, Liberals, both were
simple and unostentatious in their tastes and habits,
both had succeeded sovereigns of reactionary views
40
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
who had been rigid observers of courtly ceremony and
etiquette.
"England," wrote Talleyrand in a despatch in
which he reviewed the situation created by the change
of government, " is the country with which France
should cultivate the most friendly relations. Her
colonial losses have removed a source of rivalry be-
tween them. The Powers still believe in the divine
right of kings ; France and England alone no longer
subscribe to that doctrine. Both governments have
adopted the principle of non-intervention. Let both
declare loudly that they are resolved to maintain
peace, and their voices will not be raised in vain." l
Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
was in his forty-sixth year. From 1811 he had
continuously held the post of Secretary-at-War in
succeeding Tory administrations until the year 1828,
when, with other Canningites, he had seceded from
the Duke of Wellington. He was an excellent
linguist ; indeed, in the opinion of so competent a
critic as Victor Cousin, there were not twenty French-
men who could lay claim to his knowledge of their
language. 2 In the course of a visit which he had paid
to Paris, in the year 1829, Palmerston had made the
acquaintance of most of the prominent members of the
Liberal party under the Restoration. From his con-
versations with these men, who were now the masters
of France, he had carried away the conviction that they
chafed bitterly at the treaties of 1815 and were
determined, at the first opportunity, to extend the
French frontiers to the Rhine. General Sebastiani,
who, on November 15, had succeeded Marshal Maison
as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, whilst in opposition,
1 Affaires etrangrres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
novembre 27, 1380.
2 N. Senior, Conversations with Thiers, Guizot, etc., II. p. 280.
C. Greville, Journals, III. p. 210.
41
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
been one of the loudest advocates of a policy of ex-
pansion. 1 The recollection of his boastful language
and of the aggressive schemes which he had heard
him propound was always present in Palmerston's
memory, and was sensibly to influence his conduct of
his first negotiations with the French government.
The general outlook in Europe in the autumn of
1830 augured ill for the continued maintenance of
peace. Great military preparations were reported to
be in progress in Russia. Marshal Diebitsch, the hero
of the recent war with Turkey, was at Berlin upon a
mission which, although it was described as " wholly
extra official," 2 excited considerable apprehension in
Paris. Insurrectionary movements, the repercussion
of the Revolution of July, had taken place in Saxony
and other States of Northern Germany. Metternich
was said " to have proposed certain armaments to the
Diet, wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the
situation." The Kins: of Prussia, although he was
o o
universally credited with a sincere desire for peace,
was suspected, nevertheless, " of preparing quietly for
war." The alarm was not dispelled by the assurances
which, in London, Prince Lieven gave to both Palmers-
ton and Talleyrand that the Russian armament was
merely a measure of precaution necessitated by treaty
obligations with the King of the Netherlands, and
that, under no circumstances, would his Imperial
master take action except in combination with the
Powers. 3 On December 1 the French Chamber voted
supplies for a considerable increase of the army.
The suspicion that the three Northern Courts were
meditating an unprovoked attack upon France was
unfounded. As Lord Heytesbury pointed out, the
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmer tton, I. pp. 315-316, 322 ; II. p. 8
* F. O. Russia 186, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, September 4, 1830.
3 Affaires e^trangeres, 631 (bit) Angleterre, Maison A Talleyrand, 13,
15, 22 novembre, 1830. F. O. France 416, Stuart to Aberdeen and
Palmerston, November 22, 26, 29. 1830.
42
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
cholera, which had made its appearance in the Tsar's
dominions, threw an insuperable obstacle in the way of
recruiting upon a large scale. Russia indeed, he con-
sidered, might almost be looked upon as hors de combat. 1
Nor was Metternich proposing to begin hostilities
against France. " Austria's task," he instructed
Esterhazy, the ambassador in London, " consists in
suppressing any insurrectionary movement in Italy."
But should the French interpose in favour of the
revolutionists, their action must be resisted vigorously.
It was expedient, therefore, for the three great con-
tinental Powers to hold their armies in readiness.
" The British government must be brought to under-
stand that Austria cannot accept the principle of non-
intervention. England, as an insular State, can adhere
to it without danger, but when adopted by France it
imperils the existence of neighbouring Powers. The
proclamation of such a doctrine can be compared only
to the complaints of thieves about the interference of
the police." 1 But, although the absolute Courts were
certainly innocent of any desire to provoke a war
deliberately, there were serious elements of danger in
the situation. The King of the Netherlands, without
doubt, looked upon the outbreak of a great European
war as the only chance of regaining his Belgian
provinces. Charles X. was once more installed quietly
in his old quarters at Holyrood, but his adherents, the
Legitimists, or Carlists, [as they were more usually
termed, were convinced that a war must prove fatal to
the new regime in France. Talleyrand suspected that
they were in league with the military party in Paris,
and suggested that an agent should be sent over to
London to watch them. He had no complaints to
make about the assistance afforded him by the Home
1 F. O. Russia 187, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, October 12, 1830.
2 Metternich, Memoircs, V. pp. 43-48 and 51-57 ; Metternich a
Esterhazy, 21 octobre, 1830. Memoirc pour Orloff, 6 octobre, 1830.
43
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Secretary, who placed all the information he could
obtain about them at his disposal, but, " in a country
in which the police system was so bad, such reports had
little value."
At the Congress of Vienna nearly the whole of
those territories, known as the Grand Duchy of War-
saw, had been constituted into the Kingdom of Poland
and assigned to the Tsar. Under the terms of the
treaty, which was guaranteed by the Five Powers, the
crown of the Kingdom was to be hereditary in the
Imperial family of Russia. The Poles, however, were
to be granted a constitution, and were to be allowed
to maintain a national army. These stipulations were
duly carried out by Alexander. But, as the Tsar's
Liberalism waned, the first conditions were consider-
ably modified, and, after the accession of Nicholas,
the Poles appear to have suspected, with perhaps good
reason, that the Imperial Cabinet purposed to abolish
gradually all their special privileges. Suddenly, on
November 28, 1830, an insurrection broke out at
Warsaw. The Viceroy, the Grand Duke Constantine,
was driven from the town and several of his generals
were murdered. The revolution spread rapidly through
the country, and, after some vain attempts to negotiate
a compromise, the Grand Duke retreated across the
frontier with his Russian troops. On December 5,
Chlopicki, a popular Polish general, who had served
with distinction under Bonaparte, was proclaimed
Dictator. Nicholas, whilst collecting his troops to re-
conquer his revolted kingdom, declared that the French
revolutionary propaganda and the creation of Lancas-
trian schools 2 were responsible for the insurrection. 3
1 Affairs etrangeres, 601 (bis) et 632, Angleterre, Talleyrand A, Mole",
29 octobre, 1830; Talleyrand a Sebastian!, 20 novembre, 1830,
10, 21 novembre, 1831.
2 Schools upon the system advocated by Joseph Lancaster (1778-
1888), i.e. upon the. monitorial system. (Dictionary of National
Biography.)
3 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand 4 Sebastiani,
44
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The rebellion evoked the utmost enthusiasm in
Paris. The designation of " the Frenchmen of the
North," which it became the fashion to apply to the
Poles, tickled the national vanity. It was remembered
that they had remained true to Bonaparte in his mis-
fortunes, and that the unsympathetic treatment which
they had experienced at the hands of the sovereigns
at Vienna had been the penalty of their fidelity.
Moreover, it was a natural consequence of their hatred
of the treaties of 1815 that Frenchmen should feel
drawn towards those countries which, like Poland or
Italy, had cause for dissatisfaction with the conditions
settled at the Congress of Vienna. Unquestionably
this was the secret of much of that sympathy for
"oppressed nationalities" which, from 1830 onwards,
manifested itself so keenly in France. The war party
and other factions hostile to the monarchy encouraged
the popular ferment. Lord Stuart de Rothesay was dis-
posed to think that Louis Philippe and his ministers
regarded the excitement with secret approval, in the
hope that it would distract public attention from the
impending trial of the ex-ministers of Charles X. 1
In addition to Polignac himself three members of the
Cabinet, who had signed the ordinances of July, had
failed to escape abroad. The King, however, notwith-
standing that the populace called furiously for their
heads, was determined to save their lives. This
merciful intention he was enabled to carry out success-
fully. On December 21 the peers adjudged them
guilty of high treason but, in deference to Louis
Philippe's wishes, sentenced them only to perpetual
confinement. Meanwhile Montalivet, the Minister of
the Interior, had personally conducted the prisoners
back to Vincennes, where they were lodged in safety
28 decerabre, 1830. Metternich, Memoires, V. p. 79, Metternich a
Ficquelmont, 31 decembre, 1830.
1 F. 0. France 417, Stuart to Palmerston, December 10, 1830.
45
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
before the mob, which thronged all the approaches to
the Luxembourg, realized that it had been baulked of
its prey. The satisfactory conclusion of this momen-
tous trial was followed by an event of no less happy
augury for the future. Nettled by a resolution of the
Chamber affecting his position, La Fayette retired from
the command of the national guard. The government
accepted his resignation with grave misgivings, but,
to the general surprise, the fickle multitude saw their
hero replaced by Mouton de Lobau with comparative
indifference.
But of all the questions which threatened to dis-
turb the peace of Europe, that of Belgium, by reason
of the conflict of national interests to which it gave
rise, was by far the most delicate. It is not without
cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have been
the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is
supposed to have described the possession of Antwerp
as "a loaded pistol held at England's head." Un-
questionably, during the great war, England had had
experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline
of Belgium and Holland united to that of France.
The lesson had not been thrown away upon Lords
Grey and Palmerston, who were fully determined to
resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion of the
Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the
other hand France had excellent reasons for objecting
to the system under which the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands had been created, and the barrier fortresses
erected. In the words of General Lamarque, the chief
parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these de-
i'ences constituted, within four days' march of Paris, a
tete depont behind which the armies of a hostile coalition
might assemble at leisure. Moreover, France, in 1815,
had been deprived of the fortresses of Marienburg and
Phiiippeville, both of which had been incorporated into
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped
46
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
that in any scheme of re-arrangement these two places
would be restored to her. All supporters of the new
monarchy were keenly alive to the immense satisfaction
with which the smallest modification of the hated treaties
of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men
of moderate views, such as Charles de Remusat and
Guizot, looked upon " a brilliant diplomatic triumph "
or " some acquisition of territory towards Belgium "
as conditions essential to the stability of the Orleans
throne. 1 On the other hand, it was the policy of Austria,
Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain,
to preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815
and to resist the aggrandisement of France. But the
attitude of the Northern Courts was also greatly influ-
enced by the marriages which connected the King of
the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the
Royal family of Prussia and the Imperial House of
Russia. In addition to these considerations of relation-
ship the sympathies of the absolute sovereigns neces-
sarily went out to a monarch struggling with a rebellion
of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to
participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.
The first sitting of the conference of the five
Powers upon Belgian affairs took place at the Foreign
Office in London, on November 4, on which occasion
it was decided to impose an armistice upon the con-
tending parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch
and Belgian armies " were to retire behind the line
which, previous to the treaty of May 30, 1814,
separated the possessions of the sovereign prince of
the United Provinces from the territories which have
since been joined to them." : No further step of much
importance was taken until December 20, when
1 Baraute, Souvenirs, IV. pp. 174 and 187, Eemusat a Barante, 2
avril, 1831 ; Guizot a, Barante, 8 avril, 1831. Cf. also N. Senior,
Conversations with Thiers, Guisot, etc., Conversation with Victor
Cousin, May 20, 1856.
- State papers, XVIII. pp. 728, 729.
47
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Talleyrand proposed that the conference should proclaim
the independence of Belgium. 1 After a discussion of
seven hours' duration, the objections of the plenipo-
tentiaries of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and
the plan was acceded to unanimously. A month later,
on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of Holland and
Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared
neutral under the guarantee of the Powers. At the
sitting of January 27, the plenipotentiaries appor-
tioned the share of the general debt which each State
would be called upon to bear. 2
The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for
Belgium was not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation
of frontiers had been proceeding. As early as October
19, Mole informed Lord Stuart in confidence that
M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the pro-
visional government in Brussels for the enthronement
of one of Louis Philippe's younger sons. But he
assured the British ambassador that, as France was
about to confer upon the situation with the other
Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a
moment. 3 Again Talleyrand, on November 7,
reported that "a kind of agent of the provisional
government" was in London seeking to ascertain
whether the elevation to the Belgian throne of the
Due de Leuchtenberg, a son of Eugene de Beauharnais,
would be permitted. 4 At first the Powers, France
included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince
of Orange as the safest solution of the difficulty. But
after the bombardment of the town of Antwerp by the
Dutch, at the end of October, he became very unpopular,
and, on November 24, the national congress at
1 State papers, XVIII. pp. 749, 750. Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis)
Angleterre, Talleyrand, A Sebastiani, 20 decembre, 1880.
-' State papers, XVIII. pp. 759-773.
3 P.O. France 415, Stuart to Aberdeen, October 19, 1830.
4 Affaires Etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand 4 Maison, 7
novembre, 1880.
48
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
Brussels resolved that all members of the House of
Orange-Nassau should be excluded from the throiic. 1
In consequence, possibly, of this action by the Belgian
deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston appear to have
mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talley-
rand as a suitable candidate. But he objected, re-
minding them that his enthronement would constitute
a restoration, which the most famous of Whigs had
once described as "the worst of revolutions." More-
over, Metternich, who had no desire to extend the
influence of Austria in that direction, soon afterwards
declared that the Archduke would decline the crown,
both for himself and for his children, were it to be
offered to him. 2 Talleyrand himself appears to have
been the first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg
might with advantage be chosen to rule over the new
State. 3 In putting forward this plan he seems to have
been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the British
government, but, for reasons which will be explained
later, his proposal met with very little response.
Meanwhile, the language of Mauguin and Lamarque
in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the
military party to object to any settlement which
should not admit of the future union of Belgium
with France, were rapidly impelling Louis Philippe
to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain
and the other Powers. 4
At the first sitting of the conference it had been
decided that M. Bresson, the first secretary of the
French embassy in London, and Mr. Cartwright, who
held a similar position at the British embassy at the
1 State papers, XVII. p. 1242.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastian!,
27 novembre, 1830 ; Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 25 decernbre, 1830.
Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Sebastiani a Bresson, 25 de'c., 1830.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand,
2 decembre, 1830 ; Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 30 decembre, 1830.
4 F.O. France 416, Stuart to Palmerston, December 31, 1830;
January 3, 1831.
49 E
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers
at Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been
recalled in order that he might assume the duties of
British minister at Frankfort, and Lord Ponsonby had
been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby
was the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed
to be the handsomest man of his time. There was a
story that as a youth he had been set upon by the
mob in the Rue Saint-Honore, in the early days of the
revolution, and that it was only the protests of the
women, that he was too good-looking to be hanged,
which had saved him from " la lanterne" Canning
is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in
1826, upon his first diplomatic mission of import-
ance, in order to please George IV., whose peace of
mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham's too
evident admiration of him. 1 In Belgium, at this
time, the two chief political parties were the French
party, consisting of the advocates of a union with
France, and the Orange party, the members of which
favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange.
The first were unquestionably by far the most numerous,
but the Orangists, who were to be found chiefly in
business and commercial circles, were not without
power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment
of his arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified
himself closely with the aspirations of the French
party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less zealously the
cause of the Prince of Orange. 2 There was, thus,
keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike
between these two representatives of the conference.
Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have
1 Lord Lamington, In \tlie Days of the Dandies, pp. 127, 128.
Dictionary of National Biography, Ponsonby, John, Viscount (1770-
1855).
2 Affaires Stranger es, 187 Belgique, Bresson & Sebastian!, 19 de'cembre
1830 ; 190 Belgique, Bresson d. Sebastiani, 8, t 14, 18 Janvier, 1831
(particuliere et confidentielle).
50
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
entertained the notion of allowing one of his younger
sons to accept the crown of Belgium, or of consenting
to the union of Belgium with France. Lord Grey had
given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the
British government upon the subject, clearly to under-
stand that the enthronement of a French prince would
be regarded as a case for war a declaration, which, in
the words of Sebastiani, "had at least the merit of
frankness." Of all the possible candidates for the
Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the
Due de Leuchtenberg to be the most undesirable. To
have allowed any one connected with the Bonaparte
family to become King of Belgium would have been
exceedingly dangerous to the French monarchy.
" There are no personal objections to him," wrote
Sebastiani to Bresson, " but all considerations must
give way before the raison d'etat" ' The candidate
for whose success Louis Philippe was in reality most
anxious, and whose selection Sebastiani instructed
both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate cautiously,
was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was
a Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de
Berri and a nephew of the French queen, Marie Amelie,
and Louis Philippe was always as desirous as any king
of the old regime to promote the aggrandizement of
his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name
to Lord Grey he was told at once that his connection
with the reigning House in France constituted an
insuperable objection, 3 whilst from Brussels Bresson
reported that " the Prince of Naples had no following." *
1 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) and 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a
Talleyrand, 3, 10, 19 Janvier, 1831 ; Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 7 Janvier,
1831.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Sebastiani a Bresson, 19 Janvier,
1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 17
Janvier, 1831.
4 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson a Sebastiani, 6 Janvier,
1831.
51
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers
at Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been
recalled in order that he might assume the duties of
British minister at Frankfort, and Lord Ponsonby had
been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby
was the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed
to be the handsomest man of his time. There was a
story that as a youth he had been set upon by the
mob in the Rue Saint-Honore, in the early days of the
revolution, and that it was only the protests of the
women, that he was too good-looking to be hanged,
which had saved him from " la lanterne" Canning
is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in
1826, upon his first diplomatic mission of import-
ance, in order to please George IV., whose peace of
mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham's too
evident admiration of him. 1 In Belgium, at this
time, the two chief political parties were the French
party, consisting of the advocates of a union with
France, and the Orange party, the members of which
favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange.
The first were unquestionably by far the most numerous,
but the Orangists, who were to be found chiefly in
business and commercial circles, were not without
power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment
of his arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified
himself closely with the aspirations of the French
party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less zealously the
cause of the Prince of Orange. 2 There was, thus,
keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike
between these two representatives of the conference.
Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have
1 Lord Lamington, In <the Days of the Dandies, pp. 127, 128.
Dictionary of National Biography, Ponsonby, John, Viscount (1770-
1855).
2 Affaires etrangeres, 187 Belgique, Bresson & Sebastian!, 19 de'cembre
1830 ; 190 Belgique, Bresson d, Seljastiani, 8, L 14, 18 Janvier, 1831
(particuliere et confidentielle).
50
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
entertained the notion of allowing one of his younger
sons to accept the crown of Belgium, or of consenting
to the union of Belgium with France. Lord Grey had
given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the
British government upon the subject, clearly to under-
stand that the enthronement of a French prince would
be regarded as a case for war a declaration, which, in
the words of Sebastiani, "had at least the merit of
frankness." Of all the possible candidates for the
Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the
Due de Leuchtenberg to be the most undesirable. To
have allowed any one connected with the Bonaparte
family to become King of Belgium would have been
exceedingly dangerous to the French monarchy.
" There are no personal objections to him," wrote
Sebastiani to Bresson, "but all considerations must
give way before the raison d'etat." ' The candidate
for whose success Louis Philippe was in reality most
anxious, and whose selection Sebastiani instructed
both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate cautiously,
was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was
a Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de
Berri and a nephew of the French queen, Marie Ame'lie,
and Louis Philippe was always as desirous as any king
of the old regime to promote the aggrandizement of
his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name
to Lord Grey he was told at once that his connection
with the reigning House in France constituted an
insuperable objection, 3 whilst from Brussels Bresson
reported that " the Prince of Naples had no following." 4
1 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) and 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a
Talleyrand, 3, 10, 19 Janvier, 1831 ; Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 7 Janvier,
1831.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Sebastiani a Bresson, 19 Janvier,
1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 17
Janvier, 1831.
4 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson 11 Sebastiani, 6 Janvier,
1831.
51
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
unjustly, England would be found upon her side."
From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand
it may be inferred with certainty that some scheme
was on foot whereby France was to acquire a part of
Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan,
England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp,
which was to be declared a free port. 3 Talleyrand,
whilst favourable to the idea of converting Antwerp
into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the
notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon
the continent. It would be too high a price to pay,
he contended, even for so popular a measure as the
extension of the French frontiers into Belgium. 3
Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London,
Colonel the Marquis de Lawoestine, a former aide-de-
camp of Sebastiani and a Belgian of good family, had
been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the
precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It
is clear, however, that M. Juste 4 is mistaken in
supposing that he was sent to urge the national
congress to elect the Due de Nemours. " In general,"
wrote Sebastiani to Bresson, when announcing the
despatch of Lawoe'stine, " you must say as little as
possible about his mission, but you need make no
mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby," 5 a sentence which
precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels
can have been connected with the election of a son of
Louis Philippe. Without doubt Lawoestine was
primarily charged to combat the candidature of
Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 37-40 ; Palmerston to
Granville, February 8, 1831.
2 F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, January 14, 21, 22,
1831.
3 Affaires trangeres, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 25
Janvier, 1831.
4 T. Juste, Sylvain Van de Weyer, pp. 135-137 and notes.
6 Affaires ^trangeres, 190 Belgique, Sebastiani a Bresson, 19 Janvier,
1831.
54
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
quietly to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him.
" It will be difficult," answered Bresson upon receipt of
Sebastiani's despatch, " to keep secret the object of
Lawoestine's mission. The candidature of Prince
Charles of Naples has been talked about and the
factions in Paris are working against him. Even M.
de Merode x is threatening to abandon Prince Charles
and to vote in favour of the Due de Leuchtenberg." a
Lawoestine, after "seeing all the chief people,"
appears to have returned to Paris to lay before the
King the urgency of the situation, whilst the tone
of Bresson's despatches, during the next few days,
became yet more alarming. The bust of the Due
de Leuchtenberg, he reported, had been crowned at the
theatre amidst cries of " Vive August l er , JRoi des
Beiges" Only, he considered, by the nomination of
the Due de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated
effectually. 3 Bresson himself, probably on either
January 25 or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit
to Paris. On February 1 the national congress was
to proceed to elect a King for Belgium, and, presum-
ably, he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the
attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities
which might arise. By this time the llth protocol of
the London conference, that of January 20, 1831,
defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium, had
been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for
communication to the provisional government. The
conditions of separation, as laid down in that
document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians.
They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg,
but the Powers assigned these provinces to Holland.
The King of the Netherlands was also Grand Duke of
1 The leader of the Catholic party in Belgium.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson a Sebastiani, 21 Janvier,
1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson & Sebastiani, 22, 24
Janvier, 1831.
55
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic
Confederation. His position had been recognized by the
conference which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830,
had formally declared its incompetence to interfere with
territories forming part of the Confederation, a decision
which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris and in
Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself,
France hoped to see this province withdrawn from the
Germanic Confederation and handed over to Belgium.
On January 29 Bresson reported his return to
Brussels, having performed the journey from the
French capital in twenty-five hours. He would appear
to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to
assure the members of the national congress that, were
Nemours to be elected, he would be allowed to accept
the crown. It is probable, however, that he was
instructed only to resort to this step should he find it
impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by
other means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson
nor Lawoestine felt any enthusiasm about the election
of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were only too anxious to
bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French prince.
" Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to
the Prince of Orange," wrote Bresson on the day of his
return. 1 "The effect of Lord Ponsonby's communi-
cation to the congress of the protocol of January 20 has
been very great," reported Lawoestine, who also was
back in Brussels. " The only way of preventing the
election of the Due de Leuchtenberg is by bringing for-
ward the Due de Nemours. Even at the risk of a war
with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium
would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin
the campaign in possession of the 23 frontier fortresses,
all of which are provided with an immense materiel." 2
1 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson a Sebastian!, 29 Janvier,
1831.
1 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Lawoestine a Sebastiani, 29
Janvier, 1831.
56
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels
Se'bastiani, in order, presumably, to influence the
national congress in favour of the French candidate,
despatched a letter to Bresson the contents of which
were intended for communication to the Belgian
deputies. In this document, dated February 1,
Sebastiani stated that France could not give her
consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to the
apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the llth
and 12th protocols of the London conference, unless
these conditions should be deemed satisfactory by
both the States concerned. The French government,
holding that the conference had been convened for
purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to
assume a different character. 1 On February 3 the
Due de Nemours was elected King of the Belgians,
and a deputation started at once for Paris to com-
municate the news officially to Louis Philippe.
In the meantime Sebastiani, on February 2, had
informed Talleyrand that, were the Belgians to elect
a son of Louis Philippe for their King, he would
decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to
be utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples.
He was confident that, in order to escape from the
complications entailed by Nemour's election, the
Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince,
would look upon his enthronement as a happy
alternative. On February 4 he again affirmed the
King's intention of declining the crown for his son,
but his despatch of the following day was replete
with complaints of Ponsonby's efforts upon behalf
of the Prince of Orange, a course of conduct
which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil
war. Were serious disturbances to break out in
Belgium, France would be driven to intervene, and
it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and
1 F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 4, 1831.
57
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Palmerston to understand that the situation was
extremely critical. 1
Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to
convince his government of the disastrous effect which
the rumours from Brussels were having upon public
opinion in London. His declaration to the conference,
on February 7, that the King of the French would
refuse the crown of Belgium for his son had made a
very good impression, and it had induced the pleni-
potentiaries to guarantee that, were Leuchtenberg to
be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their
respective Courts. 2 But, on the same day, he reported
that the Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had
resolved to declare war upon France, should the crown
of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he begged
Sebastiani to reflect most seriously upon the
consequences of a naval conflict. Bresson's behaviour
at Brussels, he complained, had placed him in a very
difficult position, and if the King could not see his
way to follow his advice, his continued presence in
London could no longer serve any useful purpose.
Montrond, who by his desire was returning to Paris,
would tell the King and his ministers that in London,
at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war
with France were the chief topic of conversation. 3
Although Louis Philippe and Sebastiani repeatedly
assured Lord Granville that there was no intention
of accepting the crown for Nemours, 4 it was not until
February 17 that the King officially received the
members of the deputation and signified to them his
refusal. The interval, between their arrival in Paris
and their formal interview with Louis Philippe, appears
1 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani 4 Talleyrand, 2, 4,
C fevrier, 1881.
2 State Papers, XVIIL pp. 774-775.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 7, 9,
10 fevrier, 1831.
4 F.O. France 426, Granville to Palmerston, February 4, 9, 1831.
58
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
to have been employed in vain attempts to induce them
to pronounce themselves in favour of the Neapolitan
prince. "We have tried to make them see," wrote
Sebastiani to Talleyrand, "the advantages which
would accrue to all parties from the enthronement
of Prince Charles of Naples." l But, in the meantime,
his letter to Bresson of February 1, in which he
had declared that the French government could not
adhere to the llth and 12th protocols of the conference,
had been published in the Belgian newspapers and had
caused Palmerston to instruct Granville to demand
an explanation. The ambassador was to point out
that, " when a government sees fit to disavow the acts
of its plenipotentiary, it should acquaint the parties
with whom the engagement has been made of the
fact, not, as in this case, communicate its disavowal to
third parties." Palmerston's despatch concluded with
the intimation that "His Majesty's government had
only allowed the conference to continue because it
was convinced that satisfactory explanations would
be forthcoming." Instructions of a like nature were
received by the Russian, the Prussian and the
Austrian ambassadors." 2
Sebastiani, whilst pretending that Bresson had no
authority to make public his letter, maintained that
the London conference had no power to do more than
mediate between the contending parties, and that
France " could not be a member of a revised Holy
Alliance which was to decide arbitrarily upon the
affairs of nations." Furthermore he declined to recall
M. Bresson from Brussels, unless Lord Ponsonby were
removed at the same time. 3 Fresh instances were
soon forthcoming, however, of Bresson's opposition to
1 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand,
8 fevrier 1831.
2 F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 8, 1831.
3 F.O. France 426 and 427, Granville to Palruerston, February 11,
12, 1831.
59
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the decisions of the conference of which he was
nominally the agent. Since the conclusion of the
armistice between the Belgians and the Dutch,
disputes had been frequent as to the infractions of
its conditions. The Dutch, in violation of the terms
imposed by the Powers, held the citadel of Antwerp
and closed the navigation of the Scheldt, whilst, as a
reprisal, the Belgians set up a blockade of Maastricht.
The conference had, in consequence, instructed its I
representatives at Brussels to warn the provisional
government that, unless communications were opened
between Maastricht and the surrounding country, the
Federal Diet would be invited to raise the blockade
by force of arms. But M. Bresson, alleging as a
reason for his conduct des motifs a lui personnels,
declined to sign the note which Lord Ponsonby duly
presented to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1
Lord Granville was in consequence directed to inform
Sebastiani that the conference could no longer regard
M. Bresson as its agent. 2 When the contents of
Palmerston's despatch were read out to him Sebastiani
declared that he should retain him at Brussels as
French minister. 3 This was, however, but an empty
threat. Bresson, since Louis Philippe's refusal to
allow his son to be proclaimed King, was most
unpleasantly situated towards the members of the
national congress, to whom he had given the most
C3 * O
positive assurances that, were Nemours to be elected,
he would be permitted to accept the crown. It is
very probable that in order to overcome the hesitation
of his government he may deliberately have expressed
exaggerated fears about the prospects of Leuchtenberg's
enthronement. The complete subsidence* of the
1 F.O. Belgium 4, Ponsonby to Pal merston, February 11, 1831.
2 F.O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, February 25, 1831.
3 F.O, France 427, Granville to Palmerston, February 28, 1831.
4 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson i Sebastiani, 12 fevrier,
1831.
60
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
agitation on behalf of the Bonapartist candidate
certainly accords ill with the alarming reports about
the strength of the movement in his favour which he
had transmitted to Sebastiani. But it would appear
that when he paid his visit to Paris, at the end of
January, he was himself deceived by Louis Philippe,
and that his promises to the Belgian deputies, that
Nemours would accept the crown, were made under
the honest impression that the King's objection had
been withdrawn. " You know the august mouth
from which issued my last orders," he wrote to
Sebastiani on February 9. " You heard them. Do not
fear, they shall remain hidden at the bottom of my
heart. But I cannot go back upon my footsteps. I
cannot be the agent of another change of policy. I
must ask you to replace me. I can sacrifice my
interests, not my honour." "The painful and
difficult situation in which you are placed," answered
Sebastiani, " is well understood here, but the King
does full justice to your conduct and to your zeal for
his service." '
On March 6 Bresson formally transmitted to
London his resignation of the post of commissioner to
the conference and returned to Paris, being replaced
at Brussels, as the agent of the French government,
by General Belliard. The rapid advancement which
awaited him was to compensate him amply for the
loss of this appointment. But it was not alone from
foreign governments that Se'bastiani received com-
plaints about these proceedings at Brussels. Talley-
rand expressed the greatest indignation at the
ignorance in which he had been kept of the instruc-
tions sent to Bresson. The whole affair, he pointed
out, had placed him in a false position with Palmerston
1 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Bresson a Sebastiani, 9 fevrier,
1831.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 190 Belgique, Sebastiani ii Bresson, 12 fevrier,
1831.
61
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and the ministers of the Powers, and had laid him
open to the most injurious suspicions. It must
appear- either that he was unacquainted with the
intentions of his government, or that he was in league
o * o
with Bresson to deceive the conference. 1
In the meantime, Paris had been the scene of
disturbances which were to change completely the
course of French policy. On February 14, the
anniversary of the death of the Due de Berri, the
Carlists decided to hold a memorial service in the
church of Saint-Germain-TAuxerrois. But the cere-
mony was interrupted by a mob, which had collected
at the rumour that a portrait of the Due de Bordeaux 2
had been crowned. The church and the palace of the
archbishop were sacked, and much valuable and
beautiful property was destroyed. The authorities
made only the feeblest attempts to restrain the rioters,
and cast the whole blame for the disorder upon the
Carlists. 3 Moreover, as a concession to the rabble,
all crosses were removed from in front of churches, the
bust of Louis XVIII. was destroyed at the Louvre, and
Louis Philippe even sanctioned the erasure of the
lilies from his coat of arms. The indignation with
which these despicable signs of weakness were greeted,
soon convinced him, however, that he might
with safety abandon his policy of truckling to the
mob. For some time past, the hopes of all lovers
of order had been centred in Casimir P^rier, as the
one man capable of maintaining peace abroad, and
of combating anarchy at home. Negotiations were
accordingly begun, and, on March 14, the Moniteur
announced that Lafitte had been replaced as President
1 Affaires e"trangeres, 632 Angletcrre, Talleyrand a Sebastian!,
13 fevrier, 1831.
2 The Comte de Chambord, the posthumous son of the Due de Berri,
in whose favour Charles X. and the Due d'Angouleme had abdicated.
3 Affaires e*trangeres, 682 Angleterre, Se"bastiani a Talleyrand, 27
fSvrier, 1831.
62
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
of the Council by Casimir Perier, who had, besides,
assumed the duties of Minister of the Interior.
With two exceptions the members of the new Cabinet
had all held office in the Lafitte administration. But
so little were the rules of the party system observed,
that they were quite prepared to enter a government,
formed upon principles diametrically opposed to those
which had guided the policy of the former Cabinet.
Casimir Pe'rier was pledged to the stern repression
of internal disorder, and to the maintenance of
external peace. In addition, he had asked that the
King should be absent from meetings of the Cabinet
a request to which Louis Philippe had given a
grudging and a qualified assent. 1
The news that M. Casimir Perier had assumed
office was received with feelings of intense relief at
the Courts and in the Cabinets of Europe. 2 The new
President of the Council belonged to a family of high
repute in banking and commercial circles. Under the
Restoration he had been an eloquent and much
respected member of the Liberal party. Henrich
Heine, who disliked the French as keenly as he
admired the English statesman, has declared that
Casimir Perier strangely resembled George Canning
in personal appearance. In both he perceived the
same expression of " invalidity, over-excitement and
lassitude." 3 Sebastiani's continued retention of the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs was also a subject for
congratulation. In spite of his Corsican excitability,
he had, upon the whole, won the confidence of the
ministers with whom he had had business to transact.
" The Dips," wrote Lady Granville to her sister, " are
1 F. O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
2 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 128-130 ; Metternich u Apponyi,
21 mars, 1831. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 51-53,
Palmerston to Granville, March 15, 1831.
3 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. pp. 114,
115, 118.
63
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
all pleased that Sebastian! remains, he is decidedly
pacific."
The state of affairs in Europe, at the time of the
formation of Casimir Perier's government, still bore a
most disquieting appearance. At the beginning of
February, 1831, General Diebitsch entered Poland at
the head of a strong Russian army, and, on the 25th,
there was fought at Grochov one of the fiercest battles
of the century, with results rather favourable to the
Poles. At the same time the Italian States were in a
condition of acute discontent. The Duke of Modena
had been compelled to invoke Austrian assistance
against his revolted subjects, and, on February 5, the
Carbonari raised the standard of rebellion at Bologna.
The States of the Pope extended from the Latin coast
across the Campagna to the marches of Ancona, and,
spreading out into the plains of Romagna, were
bounded by the Po. In the opinion of Chateau-
briand, 3 who was ambassador at Rome in 1828, one of
the chief defects of the Papal government lay in
the fact that " old men appoint an old man, and he
in turn makes none but old men cardinals." This
feature of the Pontifical rule seems to have attracted
the attention of Charles Greville 3 when he visited
Rome, in 1830. " The cardinals," he records, " appear
a wretched set of old twaddlers, all but about three in
extreme decrepitude. On seeing them and knowing
that the sovereign is elected by and from them,
nobody can wonder that the country is so miserably
governed." But it was the doctrine that only
ecclesiastics could administer a government of divine
appointment which constituted the radical vice of the
Papal system. Cardinals ruled over the four
Legations of Romagna Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna
1 Letters of Harriet, Countess Granrnlle, II. p. 93, Lady Granville
to Lady Carlisle, March 14, 1841.
2 Chateaubriand, Memoires, IV. p. 451.
3 C. Greville, Journal, I. pp. 310-311.
64
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
and Forli. Generally speaking, their administration
was both bigoted and corrupt. The finances were
constantly in a condition of hopeless confusion a
circumstance hardly to be wondered at, seeing that a
prelate in charge of the Exchequer is said to have
refused to study political economy, because some of
the text books were upon the Index. The roads
were bad, few in number, and infested with brigands.
Taxation was light, but trade was hampered by
customs barriers. An arbitrary and interfering police
system was supplemented by the Holy Office of the
Inquisition, which still repressed heresy among
Roman subjects, although it did not venture to
meddle with foreigners. Lastly, it was estimated that
not more than two per cent, of the population attended
school.
Bologna was the most flourishing manufacturing
town in the dominions of His Holiness, and Ancona
the only port which could boast of a real trade.
Probably it was because of their comparative prosperity
that the people of Romagna were in a chronic state of
unrest. The Pontifical troops, sent to suppress the
insurrection, quickly proved their inability to carry
out the task, and His Holiness appealed to Vienna
for assistance. Sebastiani, so soon as he received
intelligence that this request had been made,
instructed Marshal Maison to warn Metternich that
France could not consent to the entry of Austrian
troops into the Papal States, and, on February 24, he
informed Apponyi in Paris that, in accordance with its
principle of non-intervention, the French government
would regard the passage of the Piedmontese or
Roman frontiers by an Imperial army as a declaration
of war. 1 But Metternich had already sent off the
Comte Athanase d'Otrante, a son of Fouche, the
famous regicide and Minister of Police, to Paris, with
1 F. 0. France 427, Granville to Palrnerston, February 21, 24, 1831.
65 F
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
documents to prove that the Italian insurrections
were fomented by the Bonapartists. It was always
in the power of Austria, he pointed out significantly,
to put an end to the republican agitation in Italy,
Spain, Germany or France, by simply allowing the Due
de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, to be
proclaimed Emperor of the French. 1 It was perfectly
true that the Bonapartes were concerned in the Italian
revolutionary movement. Both Prince Charles and
his brother Prince Louis Napoleon held commands in
the rebel army at Civita Castellana. Without doubt
this was a circumstance calculated to induce Louis
Philippe to exercise the greatest caution. It was
decided, accordingly, to despatch the Comte de Sainte-
Aulaire to Rome to urge upon the Papal government
the expediency of withdrawing from ecclesiastics the
administration of the provincial affairs of Romagna,
and of confiding the management of local business to
the nobility and middle classes. Maison was to press
the Cabinet of Vienna to join with France in persuad-
ing His Holiness to inaugurate these reforms, whilst
in London Talleyrand was to seek to obtain the co-
operation of the British government. Palmerston, who
looked upon the condition of Italy as a perpetual menace
to the peace of Europe, readily consented to instruct
Sir Brooke Taylor, the British Minister at Florence,
to proceed to Rome to take part in the conference. 2
Metternich agreed with equal alacrity to the French
proposals. But it was not his policy to allow reforms
of any kind to be introduced into Italy, and he was
fully resolved that the deliberations should lead to no
results of any consequence. " We risk nothing," he
1 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 157-161 ; Metternich a Apponyi,
16, 19 feVrier, 1831.
2 Affaires e"trangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand, I*
mars, 1831 ; Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 8, 24 mars, 1831. F. 0. France
427 and 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 7, 21, 1831.
66
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
wrote to Apponyi. ..." Count Liitzow * is a man of
character, he knows what is practicable." 3
But the good effect of Metternich's consent to
confer with the Powers, upon the condition of affairs,
in the Papal States, was dispelled by a false report
which reached Paris of the conclusion of a treaty
between Austria and His Holiness. This news was
followed, on March 18, by the intelligence that an
Imperial army had entered Bologna. War, Sebastiani
informed Granville, was now inevitable. Nevertheless,"
in the evening, when the ambassador read over to him
the account of their conversation which he proposed
to send to London, he suggested that the words " war
was very probable" should be substituted for his
statement that " war was inevitable." 3 For the next
fortnight the situation continued to wear a most
critical appearance. At a Cabinet Council, held on
March 28, it was resolved to demand the evacuation
of the Papal States, and to ask the Chambers for a
vote of credit, to enable the King to mobilize the
army. Casimir Perier, 4 however, reassured Lord
Granville by telling him that the Austrians would
assuredly have crushed the insurrection in Romagna
before Maison's instructions could reach Vienna, and
that the message to the Chambers, far from being a
measure calculated to bring about war, would, on the
contrary, assist the King to preserve peace. Were
the government to appear indifferent to the entry of
the Austrians into the Papal States, the military party
would at once raise the cry that ministers wanted
peace at any price. Louis Philippe himself expressed
to the British ambassador the greatest confidence that
1 The Austrian ambassador at Borne.
2 Metternich, Memoires, V. p. 125, Metternich a Apponyi, 12 mars,
1831.
3 F. O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 1831.
4 F. O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 28, 1831.
67
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
hostilities would be avoided. The preservation of the
temporal power of the Pope, he went on to tell him,
was a cardinal feature of French policy. Five or six
millions of his subjects professed the Roman Catholic
religion, 1 and he was determined to remain upon good
terms with the head of the Church. 2 The King of
Prussia, Lord Granville was satisfied, was resolved
to take no part in the struggle, should the Austrian
intervention in Italy lead to a collision with France. 3
Heytesbury, on the other hand, reported that Nicholas,
although the cholera was raging in Russia and not-
withstanding that he had still the Polish war upon his
hands, had announced his determination " to bring the
whole force of his Empire to the assistance of his
Austrian ally." 4 But Metternich, in the meanwhile,
had empowered Apponyi to declare that no treaty had
been concluded, and to support his statement by the
production of a copy of His Holiness' appeal for help
to the Emperor Francis. Moreover, he promised that
the Legations should be evacuated " as soon as they
should have been purged of the Carbonari vermin
with which they were infested." 5 In effect the
Austriaus experienced little difficulty in dispersing
the insurgents and in restoring a semblance of
tranquillity in the disturbed districts, whilst at Rome
His Holiness undertook to initiate certain reforms, in
accordance with the spirit of the proposals which the
western Powers urged him to adopt. By July 17 the
complete withdrawal of the Imperial troops from
the territories of the Pope had been carried out.
The effect of Casimir Perier's assumption of office
upon the course of the Belgian negotiations was soon
1 Louis Philippe evidently considered that the large majority of his
subjects had no religion at all.
* F. O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
3 F. O. France 427, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1831.
4 F. O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 21, 1831.
5 F. O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 4, 1831.
68
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
apparent. Nothing more was heard of the candidature
of Prince Charles of Naples. " As a member of the
elder branch of the Bourbons, France," wrote
Sebastiani, " would reject him with indignation." l
Under these circumstances the French government
decided to exert its influence in favour of Leopold of
Coburg, although his enthronement, Louis Philippe
assured Lord Granville, would not be well received in
France. He will be looked upon as an English vice-
roy, but, insinuated the King, the nation could be
reconciled to the choice of this prince, were it possible
to announce that those portions of her northern
territory, of which she had been deprived by the
treaties of 1815, were to be restored to France.*
Leopold, the youngest son of Francis Duke of
Coburg, was born in 1790. On May 2, 1816, he
married the only daughter of George IV., the Princess
Charlotte, who died the following year, five hours
after giving birth to a dead child. As a widower, the
Prince continued to live in England in enjoyment of
the pension of 50,000 a year which Parliament had
settled upon him for life. In 1829 he was chosen by
the Powers for the throne of Greece, but, after
signifying his acceptation of the crown, he saw fit to
change his mind, alleging that the frontiers, which the
conference purposed to impose upon the new State,
were regarded as unsatisfactory by the Greek nation.
There would appear to have been good reasons for his
withdrawal, but it, nevertheless, caused the greatest
annoyance to the Tories who were then in office. The
Whigs, although less bitter against the Marquis
Peu-d-Peu, as George IV. nicknamed him, had
certainly no very high opinion of his ability to fill
1 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand,
24 mars, 1831. F. O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, March 25,
1831.
- F. 0. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1831.
69
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
a difficult position. 1 It was clear, however, that all
hope must be abandoned of inducing the Belgians to
accept the Prince of Orange for their King. This
Prince had been spending the winter in London where,
according to Greville, " he made a great fool of
himself and destroyed any sympathy there might have
been for his political misfortunes." 2 In the words of
Talleyrand, Palmers ton was, in consequence, prepared
to accept " sans chaleur" 3 the candidature of Leopold
of Coburg, whilst maintaining that, before electing
their Sovereign, the Belgians must adhere to the 1 1 th
and 12th protocols, which laid down the conditions
under which their country was to be separated from
Holland. 4
On April 17 Talleyrand was in a position to
announce to the conference that France now gave her
unqualified assent to the proposed terms of separation.
On this occasion it was resolved, at the suggestion of
the French plenipotentiary, that, should Belgium
decline to adhere to the conditions in question, which
the King of the Netherlands had accepted, all relations
should be broken off between the five Powers and the
Belgian authorities. To prove the satisfaction which
this changed attitude on the part of the French
government afforded them the plenipotentiaries of
Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain met, and
recorded their agreement to the principle of the
destruction of the barrier fortresses, the protocol of
this conference of the four Powers being communicated
in confidence to Talleyrand. 5
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 80-127.
2 C. Greville, Journals (I), II. p. 183. Affaires etrangeres, 632
Angleterre, Talleyrand & Sebastiani, 4 avril, 1881.'
3 Affaires e'trange'res, 682 Angleterre, Talleyrand & Sebastiani,
23 mars, 1831.
4 F. O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, March 18, April 1, 1831.
F. O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 1, 1881.
6 State Papers, XVIII. pp. 798-796. Affaires etrangeres, 132
Angleterre, Talleyrand & Sebastiani, 17 avril, 1881. F. O. France 424,
70
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The question of the nature of the coercion which
should be applied to the Belgians, should they
persist in laying claim to Luxemburg, was not easy
of solution. The Grand Duchy formed part of the
Germanic Confederation, and therefore it should
have devolved upon the Federal Diet to take the
steps required for restoring the sovereignty of
the King of the Netherlands. Sebastiani, however,
deprecated the idea of employing German troops for
the purpose of enforcing the decisions of the conference.
But on the understanding that both the strength of
the contingent, which was to enter Belgium, and the
date on which the military operations were to begin
should be settled by the five Powers, the French
government withdrew its objections. 1 Prince Leopold,
at the same time, informed the members of the
deputation, who had come to London to offer him
the crown of Belgium, that he could not listen to
their proposals, until the national congress should
have accepted the conditions of the llth and 12th
protocols. No persuasion could move him from this
resolution which met with the full approval of the
British government. Talleyrand, however, as a com-
promise appears to have suggested the plan of pro-
posing to the King of the Netherlands the cession
of the province of Luxemburg, without the fortress,
in return for a pecuniary indemnity. 2 This solution
of the difficulty was considered so practicable by Lord
Ponsonby that, upon his own responsibility, he left
Brussels and journeyed to London to urge its adoption.
The conference, in consequence of his representations,
Palmerston to Granville, April 17, 1831. F. O. France 428, Granville
to Palmerston, April 22, 1831.
1 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand,
12 aout 1831. F.: O. France 428, Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 11,
1831.
2 Affaires dtrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 3 mai,
1831.
71
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
agreed to open negotiations with the King of the
Netherlands for the purchase of Luxemburg and for
"so much of the province of Limburg as would
connect Maastricht with North Brabant." * But when
June 1, the date which had been assigned as that
on which the Belgians must signify their agreement
to les bases de separation, went by without a favour-
able answer having been received from Brussels, the
conference withdrew Ponsonby and decided to resort
to measures of coercion. The action of the national
congress, in electing Prince Leopold King of the
Belgians on June 4, had no effect upon the decision of
the Powers. " It has been used," wrote Palmerston,
"as a fresh opportunity for putting forward pre-
tensions to portions of the territory of the King of
Holland and by implication, at least, of repeating
their determination to gain possession of them by
force." 2
But, as the moment approached for setting in
motion General Hiniiber's Federal corps d'annee, the
French government evinced symptoms of alarm.
Se'bastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in
his power to discover some less objectionable method
of terminating the difficulty. The King and his
ministers, he assured him, placed their entire trust in
his wisdom and vast experience. 3 Casimir Perier
impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be
powerless to restrain the army, were the Prussians and
the Dutch to attack the Belgians " ranged under the
tri-colour." " Sufficient allowance," he pleaded, " was
not made for the weakness of a government sprung
from a revolution." 4 Talleyrand, however, reported
that, in spite of his efforts and of those of Prince
1 F. O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, May 17, 1831.
- F. O. France 424, Palmerston to Granville, June 7, 1818.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 9 iuin,
1831.
4 F. 0. France 429, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1831.
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
Leopold to make the Belgians listen to reason, they
refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed
upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a
keen desire to bring on a general war, whilst the Tsar
Nicholas was not sorry that the attention of the
western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the
Low Countries. In England men's minds were con-
centrated exclusively upon the Reform Bill, and the
knowledge that France and Great Britain were con-
fronted by grave domestic problems undoubtedly
encouraged the Belgians to defy the conference.
Under these circumstances, his favourite scheme, the
partition of the country, appeared to him the only
practicable solution of the question. But on this
occasion the idea of acquiring some part of Belgium
offered no attractions to the French government.
' We are disposed to think," answered Se'bastiani,
" that any partition would recall that of Poland, and
would not be popular." l
The determination of the Powers to impose by
force of arms the terms of the protocols of January 20
and 27 was, however, growing weaker. In their desire
to avoid a general war they agreed to depart from a
decision, which they had once pronounced to be irrevoc-
able. The event was to prove that by this concession
they had sensibly increased the danger of that armed
conflict between the nations, which they were so
anxious to avert. At the sitting of the conference, on
June 26, the plenipotentiaries, " in the interests of the
general peace," affixed their signatures to a protocol of
eighteen articles for acceptance by Holland and
Belgium. 2 The altered conditions, although they did
not fulfil all their aspirations, were far more favourable
to the Belgians than the terms of the former bases de
1 Affaires etrangeres, 682 Angleterre, Talleyrand il Sebastian!, 13, 15,
and 22 juin, 1831 ; Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 25 juiu, 1831.
2 State Papers, XVIII. pp. 802-806.
73
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
separation. The most important modification consisted
in a provision for maintaining a status quo in Luxem-
burg, pending the negotiations which were to be
carried out between Belgium, on the one hand, and
Holland and the Germanic Confederation, on the other.
Prince Leopold, when the protocol of the eighteen
articles was laid before him, agreed to accept the crown
provided, always, that the national congress could be
brought to assent to the new conditions which it set
forth. After several stormy debates in the assembly
this stipulation was complied with, and on July 11, a
deputation arrived in London to conduct the King to
Belgium.
Leopold had been assured that, even should the
King of the Netherlands decline to accept the eighteen
articles, the Powers would none the less recognize him
as the Sovereign of Belgium. But, when the refusal of
King William was known in London, the plenipo-
tentiaries of Austria, Prussia and Russia declared that
their respective governments had decided to withhold
their recognition of him. Leopold, however, wisely de-
termined to adhere to his resolution and to be satisfied
with the acknowledgment of France and Great Britain.
Before finally leaving London he informed Lord Grey
of his intention to renounce his English pension.
Claremont was to be kept up and all his debts were to
be paid, but, when these conditions had been fulfilled,
his trustees would pay the balance of his annuity into
the English exchequer. His decision to act in this
manner was quickened, without doubt, by learning that
in the House of Lords, Londonderry, an Opposition
peer, purposed to raise the question of his retention of
his English pension. 1
During the month of July an affair of some
delicacy was amicably settled between the Cabinets of
London and Paris. For some time past the government
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 161-172.
74
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
of M. Pe'rier had been trying to obtain redress for
the indignities to which French subjects, especially
those suspected of affiliation to masonic lodges, were
exposed in Portugal. Palmerston admitted the justice
of the French complaints and raised no objections when
it was proposed to send a fleet to Lisbon to demand
satisfaction. 1 On July 8, accordingly, Admiral Roussin
forced the entrance to the Tagus and ranged his
squadron within gunshot of the quays of Lisbon.
The Portuguese government, under these circumstances,
was compelled to accede to the demands which the
admiral had been instructed to make, and the French
fleet, shortly afterwards, withdrew, carrying off with
it, however, several Portuguese vessels of war. But,
although the affair gave rise to no complications
between England and France, it was seized upon by an
embittered Opposition in London, as an opportunity for
denouncing the failure of the government to protect
England's " most ancient ally." 2
The refusal of the King of the Netherlands to
accept the new conditions of separation, as defined in the
protocol of the eighteen articles, was communicated to
the conference by the Dutch minister, Verstolk. The
despatch, dated July 12, 1831, concluded with the
menace that, " were any Prince to accept the crown of
Belgium without having acceded to les bases de
separation as laid down in the protocol of January 20,
he would be regarded as in a state of war with His
]\I ajesty and as his enemy." 3 The representatives of the
Powers appear to have treated these ominous words
very lightly. An intimation was conveyed to the
Hague that hostilities must not break out afresh, but
no active measures were taken to prevent a rupture of
1 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastian! a Talleyrand, 4 mars,
1831, 16 avril, 1831, 13 juin, 1831. Talleyrand a Sebastiani, June 16,
1831.
2 C. Greville, Journals, (I) II. p. 178.
3 State papers, XVIII. pp. 807-817.
75
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the peace. It was soon evident, however, that the
King was fully resolved to put his threat into execution.
On August 1, Chasse, the Dutch general commanding
the citadel of Antwerp, denounced the armistice and
gave notice that hostilities would begin on the 4th.
Leopold at once appealed for help to France and
England, and then placed himself at the head of a
wing of his army upon the Scheldt. But the retreat
of General Daine, commanding the Belgian division
upon the Meuse, who abandoned his positions without
firing a shot, compelled the King to fall back to
Louvain. Here he made his dispositions for with-
standing the Dutch inroad, but, in spite of the gallant
example which he set his men, his army, at the first
contact with the enemy, fled in wild confusion. In
the meantime, however, Marshall Gerard had entered
Belgium in command of 50,000 French troops, and,
when Leopold was upon the point of being surrounded,
Sir Robert Adair, the British minister at Brussels, pre-
vailed upon the Prince of Orange to suspend hostilities.
The Dutch, shortly afterwards, began their retreat
closely followed by the French, and, by August 20,
the last of the invaders had evacuated the territory of
Belgium.
It had been an easy matter to bring the actual
hostilities to a close, but the Dutch raid had none the
less created precisely that situation which British
diplomacy had always striven to avoid. The French
were now in complete possession of Belgium. Palmers-
ton, indeed, strongly suspected them of having insti-
gated the King of the Netherlands to break the peace.
Sir Richard Bagot, the British ambassador at the
Hague, inclined to the belief that a secret understand-
ing existed between the Dutch and French govern-
ments. " Talleyrand," wrote Palmerston in a private
letter to Granville, " proposed to me some time ago
that we should goad the Dutch on to break the armistice,
76
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
cry out shame upon them, fly to the aid of the Belgians,
cover Belgium with troops and settle everything as we
choose." " It would seem," reported Granville, " that
the King of Holland rather expected from the French
government approbation than opposition to his in-
vasion." ] It is not improbable that the Cabinet of the
Hague may have been led to believe that a rupture of
the armistice would meet with approval in Paris. But,
in order to have furthered French designs, it should
have taken place at an earlier date. Talleyrand's
proposal to Palmerston, it is clear, must have been
made in June, when he was telling Se'bastiani that he
could devise no other plan for settling the question of
Belgium but that of partition. Once Leopold had
been enthroned, however, he knew full well that no
British government could acquiesce in the appropriation
by France of any portion of his kingdom. The Dutch
invasion, which might have served French policy, had
it occurred whilst matters were still unsettled in
Belgium, became simply an embarrassment and a
certain cause of discord between France and England,
after Leopold's arrival at Brussels. 2 Talleyrand, there-
fore, \vho regarded the maintenance of cordial relations
between the two countries as an object of far higher
importance that any extension of French frontiers into
Belgium, strove by all means in his power to second the
efforts of the British government to bring the French
occupation to a close as speedily as possible. But,
whilst Palmerston attributed to French intrigues the
Dutch attack upon Belgium, he himself was suspected
by Stockmar 3 of having known of the King of Holland's
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 96-98, Palmerston to
Granville, August 5, 1831. F. O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston,
August 8, 1831.
2 Affaires e'trangeres, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
15 aotit, 1831.
3 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 177-179. F. 0. Belgium 6, Adair to
Palmerston, August 22, 1831.
77
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
plans and of having connived at the invasion. A few
weeks later, however, when in London upon a con-
fidential mission, Leopold's trusted counsellor satisfied
himself that Palmerston was wholly innocent of any
double dealing in the aftair.
Casimir Perier had been on the point of resigning, in
consequence of the defeat of the ministerial candidate
for the post of President of the Chamber, when the
news reached Paris of the Dutch inroad into Belgium.
This new development at once caused him to change
his plans and to decide to remain in office. Talleyrand
was instructed to explain in London that it was only
the necessity for immediate action which had induced
the French government to order a French corps to
enter Belgium, without previous consultation with the
Powers. Lord Granville, at the same time, was in-
formed that, upon the withdrawal of the Dutch, the
French troops would return to France. 1 The news of
the French intervention in Belgium aroused great
excitement in London. The funds fell, and Palmerston
was sharply questioned upon the matter in the House. 2
Ministers, however, reassured by the accounts of the
intentions of the French government transmitted by
Granville, took a cheerful view of the situation. 3 At a
sitting of the conference, on August 6, Talleyrand
announced that Marshal Gerard's occupation of Belgium
would cease directly the Dutch should evacuate the
country. On this same occasion it was agreed that
the scope of the French operations should be decided
by the conference and that, under no circumstances,
should they be extended to the right bank of the
Meuse. It was further resolved that siege should not
1 Affaires e'trangeres, 184 Angleterre, Se'bastiani a Talleyrand 4 aout,
1831. F. O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 4, 1831.
2 Affaires c'tnmgeres, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
1 7, 9 aout, 1831.
3 C. Greville, Journal* (I) II, pp. 178-179.
78
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
be laid to either Maastricht or Venloo, on account of
their proximity to the Prussian frontier. 1
But, when the Dutch withdrew and the French
showed no disposition to follow their example, the
affair began to assume a very different complexion.
Sebastiani, changing his ground completely, declared
that Marshal Ge'rard's occupation must continue until
the conclusion of a definite treaty of peace between
Holland and Belgium. In the Chamber, Soult, the
Minister of War, stated explicitly that the retreat of
the Dutch did not entail the evacuation of Belgium
by the French army. The unfavourable impression
created by these words was not removed by Casimir
Perier's promise to Lord Granville, that he would
say something from the tribune calculated to diminish
the importance of the Marshal's pronouncement.
Sebastiani's conversations with the British ambassador,
and the reports forwarded by Adair from Brussels
made it too clear that the French government purposed
to avail itself of the presence of its troops in Belgium
for coming to a separate agreement with King Leopold,
respecting the immediate destruction of the frontier
fortresses. This was an arrangement which the Cabinet
of Lord Grey was determined to oppose, even to the
point of war. 2
Talleyrand, as was his invariable practise in these
disputes between France and England, left no stone
unturned to dissuade his government from embarking
upon a course of conduct destined inevitably to revive
the old rivalry between the two countries. Were
France to break her word and to retain her troops in
Belgium, he was convinced that Lord Grey and his
colleagues would be driven from office and their suc-
cessors would be men far less well disposed towards
1 State Papers, XVIII. pp. 824-825.
2 F. O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 5, 7, 13, 14, 15,
1831. F. O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831.
79
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
France. Palmerston, he wrote, was assailed by
questions in the House and must before long make
some definite statement. Sebastiani, in reply, ex-
pressed regret for the difficulties by which Lord Grey
was beset, but maintained that the French government,
were it to allow the army to return home empty
handed, would be confronted by a still more unpleasant
situation. Talleyrand, however, might announce that,
in consequence of the retirement of the Dutch, 20,000
of Marshal Gerard's troops would be recalled and that
the remaining 30,000 would be concentrated at
Nivelle. 1 The news of this partial evacuation caused
much satisfaction in London, but none the less Palmer-
ston, on August 17, instructed Lord Granville formally
to demand the complete withdrawal of the French
army corps. He was directed to remind the French
government of its pledges and to point out that, by
the protocol of April 17, the four Powers had agreed
to the principle of the destruction of the frontier for-
tresses, " the satisfactory execution of which arrange-
ment could only be impeded by any measures having
the appearance of making the protracted occupation of
Belgium by the French army bear upon it. . . ." He
was to speak " in terms of friendship and goodwill,
enforcing at the same time the just expectations of
His Majesty with firmness and decision." 2
On August 23 the conference decided to impose
an armistice upon the Dutch and Belgians, to expire on
October 10. 3 The French government, however,
declared that a mere undertaking by the King of the
Netherlands, not to begin hostilities afresh, could not
provide a guarantee for the maintenance of peace of
sufficient weight to permit of the complete withdrawal
1 Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
11, 12, 15 aofit, 1831 ; S^bastiani a Talleyrand, 14, 15 aout, 1831.
2 F. O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 17, 1831.
8 State Papers, XVIII. pp. 830-831.
80
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
of the French army. General Baudrand, moreover,
was sent to London with a letter from Louis Philippe
to Talleyrand, in which the King expressed his dis-
pleasure with his action in signing a document of that
nature. Baudrand during his stay in England had
interviews both with Grey and Palmerston. 1 He
appears to have expatiated upon the outcry which
would be raised in the Chamber, were France to
gain neither moral nor material advantages, in return
for the expense to which she had been put by her
intervention in aid of the King of the Belgians.
Palmerston assured him that his colleagues and himself
were sincerely anxious that M. Casirnir Perier should
remain in office, but, he added pointedly, " when to keep
in a ministry of peace it became necessary to comply
with the demands of the party which was for war, it
was problematical what decree of advantage was
thereby to be acquired." 2 Talleyrand appears to have
been little moved by the censure passed upon him.
He contended that he had acted for the best, and that
no fears need be entertained that the Dutch would
again attack Belgium. At the same time he continued
to urge the necessity of bringing the occupation of
Belgium to a close. " There is more real anxiety over
here than I have yet seen," he wrote on August 27.
" People are all talking of an interview between the
Duke of Wellington and Lord Grey." A few days
later he again pleaded earnestly for evacuation,
suggesting that the withdrawal of the troops might be
carried out so slowly that some portion of them should
still be in Belgium, at the expiration of the armistice. 3
1 Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Louis Philippe a Talleyrand,
Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 27 aout, 1841.
2 F. O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, September
5, 1831. Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Baudrand a Sebastiani,
31 aout, 1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiaui,
27 aout, 1 septembre, 1831.
81 G
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
In the meantime General La Tour Maubourg had
arrived at Brussels, on August 18, furnished with the
draft of a treaty which he was to conclude with the
Belgian government for the destruction of the barrier
fortresses. In the first instance it was probably
intended to keep his mission a secret, but different
counsels seem to have prevailed, and, a few days after
his departure, Sebastiani informed Granville of the
reason of this officer's journey to Brussels. France,
he told the British ambassador, claimed the right to
negotiate with regard to the fortresses and it was hoped
that powers would be given to Sir Robert Adair to act
with La Tour Maubourg in the matter. This request,
when in due course Granville transmitted it to London,
was refused. Palmerston, in a long interview with
Talleyrand, had already declared, in the most uncom-
promising language, that the pretensions of the French
government to have a voice in determining the fate of
these fortresses, erected at the expense of Great Britain,
Russia, Austria and Prussia, could not be entertained. 1
Immediately on hearing of La Tour Maubourg' s arrival
at Brussels Sir Robert Adair, guessing the object of
his mission, sought an audience with Leopold. Both
to the King and to Meulinaer, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, he asserted emphatically that his government
could never admit that the withdrawal of Gerard's
troops could be made to depend upon the conclusion
of an arrangement between France and Belgium,
respecting the fortresses. 3
Leopold was in a most difficult situation. Although
1 F. O. France 430, Granville to Palmerston, August 22, 1881.
F. 0. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 31, 1831. Affaires
e"trangeres, 634 Angleterre, Talleyrand & Sebastiani, 19 aout, 1831;
S^bastiani & Talleyrand, 22 aout, 1831. Affaires etrangeres, 192 Belgique,
Se"bastiani a La Tour Maubourg, 15 aout, 1831.
8 F. O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 21, 1831. Aflkires
Etrangeres, 192 Belgique, La Tour Maubourg A Sebastiani, 20 aout,
1881.
82
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
he liad invoked the assistance of France and England
the moment the Dutch had announced their intention
of beginning hostilities, he had only invited Marshal
Gerard actually to cross the frontier when the mis-
conduct of General Daine had seriously compromised
his position. 1 He appears to have greatly distrusted
the intentions of the French and to have proposed that
England should occupy Antwerp in the name of the
five Powers. Three days later, however, he desired
Sir Robert Adair to consider this suggestion as with-
drawn, stating that he was satisfied with Belliard's
assurances that the French would withdraw, as soon as
the Dutch should have effected their retreat. 2 After
the retirement of the Prince of Orange he was pressed,
on the one side, by Sir Robert Adair to declare that
he no longer required the presence of the French for
his protection, whilst, on the other hand, General
Belliard urged him no less vigorously to invite
Marshal Gerard to remain in Belgium. Without
doubt he was in a most cruel dilemma. He had no
army worthy of the name, and was at the mercy of the
Dutch should they return to the attack. Moreover, he
had every reason to apprehend that the Republican and
Orangist factions would regard the disturbed condition,
to which the invasion had reduced the country, as a
favourable opportunity for putting their designs into
execution. Against the external and internal perils by
which he was threatened he could only look for active
assistance to the French. England was very jealous
of French intervention in the Low Countries, but he
had no grounds for supposing that Lord Grey would
stir a finger to defend him from a rebellion of his sub-
jects. The British government, indeed, had declined
to send the fleet to the mouth of the Scheldt. The
1 Affaires etrangeres, 192 Belgique, Belliard a Sebastiani, 7, 9 aoiat,
1831.
2 F. 0. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 11, 14, 1831.
83
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
desire to afford the French no pretext for remaining
in Belgium undoubtedly dictated this refusal, which
nevertheless increased Stockmar's distrust of Palmer-
ston's policy. Adair soon discovered that, in his
endeavours to obtain the speedy departure of the
French, he could expect no assistance from Leopold.
He could discern, he reported, no sense of shame nor
of humiliation in the attitude of ministers or of the
people generally. They appeared to regard the
presence of Marshal Gerard's troops simply as a means
of extorting better terms from the Dutch. 1
When Palmerston was informed of La Tour
Maubourg's mission he at once directed Adair to
remonstrate against any separate negotiation between
France and Belgium, on the question of the fortresses.
But his first interview with Meulinaer, after the
receipt of his instructions, convinced Adair that " this
delicate matter had already proceeded so far that no
choice was left to him except to object in toto to every
sort of communication on the subject." A solution of
the difficulty was discovered, however, in a suggestion,
brought forward by the British minister, that " the
King of the Belgians should declare to the King of
the French, through M. de La Tour Maubourg, that he
was taking measures, in concert with Great Britain,
Austria, Russia and Prussia, for the demolition of
some of the fortresses erected since 1815." A few
days later Adair was informed that General Goblet
would be despatched to London to negotiate a con-
vention, whilst Leopold, on September 8, affixed his
signature to a document, wherein he undertook to
instruct his plenipotentiary to act in accordance with
1 F. O. Belgium 6, Adair to Palmerston, August 19, 22, 1831.
Affaires etrangeres, 192 Belgique, Belliard a Sebastian!, 19, 21 aout ;
Meulinaer & Gerard, 22 aout, 1831. Leopold a Gerard (undated)
undertaking that troops lefc in Belgium will be the object of his minute
attention and will be retained no longer than necessary.
84
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
the wishes of the French government in the matter of
the selection of the fortresses to be dismantled. 1
But in Paris the ambassadors of the four Powers
had protested formally against the protracted occupa-
tion of Belgium by a French army. Palmerston, in
forwarding to Granville a memorandum of the points
he was to urge in his conference with Sebastiani,
directed that this document " was not to be handed
to that minister as a note, but that it was to be read
to him confidentially ... a course which has been
adopted out of delicacy, and under the conviction that
we shall hear in a few days that the French govern-
ment has, of its own accord, given orders for the
evacuation of Belgium." 2 These representations
obtained the desired effect. At Brussels Leopold
suddenly discovered that the presence of Marshal
Gerard's soldiers were no longer necessary for his
safety. 3 The announcement in the Moniteur, of
September 15, of the ministerial decision to recall the
army from Belgium was the signal for a violent out-
burst in the newspapers against the poltroonery of
the government, in yielding to the dictation of the
conference. 4 In London satisfaction at the French
withdrawal was marred by the publication of a long
list of officers, appointed by Marshal Soult, to inspect
and organize the Belgian army. This circumstance
was seized upon by the Opposition as an opportunity
for attacking the foreign policy of the government.
The Reform Bill was before the House of Lords a ad
party spirit was running high. " King Leopold's
intention to employ French officers in his army,"
declared Lord Londonderry, " was more prejudicial
1 F. 0. Belgium 6, Palmerston to Adair, August 27, 1831 ; Adair to
Palmerston, August 30, and September 6, 1831. Affaires etrangeres, 192
Belgique, Belliard a Sebastiani, 1, 3, 8 septembre, 1831.
2 P. O. France 425, Palmerston to Granville, September 5, 1831.
3 F. O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, September 11, 1831.
4 F. 0. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 10, 16, 1831.
85
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to his independence than the retention of 12,000
French troops in Belgium." His Lordship then
proceeded to review Talleyrand's career, and to asperse
his conduct, under the various 'regimes which he had
served, with a virulence of language which has never
since been used in that dignified assembly about the
ambassador of a friendly Power. " There was a
flirtation," he asserted amidst much laughter, " going
on between the government and France which he
thought most improper. ... To see ministers running
to consult with that individual (Talleyrand) was creat-
ing a disgust which he thought most natural." The
Duke of Wellington, however, spoke up strongly for
Talleyrand. In the many transactions upon which
they had been engaged together, he assured the House
that the Prince had always conducted himself with
honour and uprightness. "He believed that no man's
public and private character had been so much
maligned as that of that illustrious individual." ]
Talleyrand was deeply moved by the Duke's conduct
on this occasion. "He was especially grateful to
him," he told Lord Alvanley, who the next day found
him perusing an account of the debate, " because he
was the only public man in the world who had ever
said a good word for him." 2
Following closely upon the announcement that the
French government had agreed to evacuate Belgium
came the intelligence of the defeat of the Poles and of
the entry of the Russians into Warsaw. The news
was the signal for the outbreak of disturbances in
Paris. Sebastiani's famous statement to the Chamber
" Vordre regne, d Varsovie," was denounced with
indignation by the demagogues. Both he and Casimir
Perier were surrounded by a furious mob upon the
Place Vendome, and were for a time in no little
1 The Times, September 30, 1831.
2 T. Eaikes' Journal, I. p. 137.
86
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
clanger. The rioters interrupted the performances at
the theatres, crying out that all places of amusement
must be closed on a day of mourning. The marked
reluctance of the national guards to act against their
fellow- citizens imparted a serious aspect to the situa-
tion. But the regular troops retained their discipline
and dispersed the rabble. 1 At the first outbreak of
the rebellion 'in Poland the French government had
sought to induce England to join with it in a proposal
to mediate between the Emperor and his revolted
subjects. Talleyrand, however, who was always
disposed to create difficulties for Russia, was obliged
to report regretfully that British ministers were
extremely averse to embarking upon any diplomatic
action calculated to add to the Tsar's embarrassments. 2
In March, 1831, a false report had reached London
and Paris of the total defeat of the Poles, whereupon
Sebastiani again instructed Talleyrand to urge, in
the most pressing language, the British government
to unite with France in insisting upon the humane
treatment of the rebels. Palmerston, believing the
insurrection to be at an end, readily promised to
direct Lord Heytesbury to support the representations
upon their behalf which the Due de Mortem art had
been enjoined to make at St. Petersburg. 3 Heytesbury,
accordingly, intimated to Count Nesselrode that, were
any measures to be adopted towards Poland at
variance with existing engagements, both Great
Britain and France would be under the necessity of
remonstrating formally. The Kingdom of Poland, it
should be remembered, had been constituted in 1815
under the guarantee of the five Powers, and it was, in
1 F. O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, September 19, 21, 1881.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 631 (bis) Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
21 decembre, 1830; Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 25 decembre, 1830;
3 Janvier 1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 632 Angleterre, Sebastiani ;\ Talleyrand, 9 mars,
1831 ; Talleyrand a Sebastiani, 13, 25 mars, 1831.
87
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
consequence, possible to contend, with some show of
reason, that all of them were equally concerned in the
maintenance of the liberties conceded to the Poles,
under the terms of the Vienna treaty. Heytesbury's
conversations with Count Nesselrode convinced him,
however, that, although the letter of that agreement
might be observed, the Polish constitution would be
virtually abolished. But, in reporting the nature of
the intentions by which he conceived the Russian
government to be animated, the able and experienced
diplomatist who then represented Great Britain at St.
Petersburg was at pains to point out the difficulties of
the Tsar's position. In Russia there was a strong
public opinion which even the autocratic Nicholas
could not afford to disregard. Were former conditions
to be restored in Poland, and were the authors of the
cold-blooded assassinations at Warsaw to be permitted
to escape unpunished, great indignation would be
aroused throughout the Empire. His representations
had been well received, but he was plainly allowed to
see how deeply the St. Petersburg Cabinet regretted
the existence of the close understanding between
France and England, which his action had revealed.
He could perceive clearly from the demeanour of his
Austrian and Prussian colleagues that neither the
Court of Vienna nor of Berlin would be disposed to
interfere upon behalf of the Poles. France not Russia,
he pointed out, was now looked upon as an object
of common danger. 1
French sympathy for the Poles was so keen that,
in July, Talleyrand was again instructed to invite the
English government to join with France in proposing
" a mediation in the bloody struggle raging in Poland."
Palmerston, in reply, appears to have suggested that
the French government should set forth its views
upon the matter in writing. Talleyrand, accordingly,
1 F. O. Russia 191, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 13, 30, 1831.
88
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
transmitted this request and, at the same time, begged
Sebastiani to remember, when framing his proposals,
that " he was dealing with cold-blooded people and
that it would be well therefore to avoid the use of
emotional language." But, on July 22, Palmerston
informed him that the Cabinet could not entertain the
suggestion of addressing to Russia any demand for a
cessation of hostilities, nor was he able to report better
success when, in September, whilst the Belgian difficulty
was at its height, he was once more directed to approach
the British government upon the subject of Poland.
"No party in the Parliament," he wrote, "was in
favour of intervention, and the newspapers merely
spoke of the Poles in sympathetic language." l Heytes-
bury, who at St. Petersburg was in a position to judge
correctly of the national resentment which any attempt
at foreign interference in Polish affairs would create,
strove to convince his government of the unwisdom
of impairing the good relations of Russia and England
by raising a question in which no British interests
were involved. Remonstrances, he was prepared to
admit, might effect an improvement in the condition
of the people of the Kingdom of Poland. But, even
under these circumstances, the sum of human misery,
which the rebellion must entail, would not be lessened,
inasmuch as the revolted Russo-Polish provinces, not
included in the Kingdom, would be treated with
increased severity. 2
But, with the complete suppression of the insurrec-
tion, Lord Grey and his colleagues assumed a more
sympathetic attitude towards the vanquished Poles.
In a closely reasoned despatch Palmerston, on November
23, formulated the arguments which Heytesbury was
1 Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Sebastiani u Talleyrand,
7 juillet, 1831 ; Talleyrand a Sobastiani, 14, 20, 22 juillet, 4 septembre,
1831.
2 F. O. Russia 193, Heytesbury to Palmerston, October 8, 10,
1831 ; November 12, 18.
89
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
instructed to press upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.
The most important passage in this long document
was that in which the interpretation was set forth
which the English government placed upon the wording
of the treaty of Vienna. The futility of the plea that
no specific constitution had been guaranteed to Poland,
a contention which Heytesbury had warned his chief
the Russian government would certainly set up, was
clearly exposed. "Surely," wrote Palmerston, "it
was no forced construction of the meaning of the
treaty to consider the constitution, which the Emperor
had given, as existing under the sanction of the
treaty." The constitution contained no clause reserving
to the Sovereign the right of modifying its provisions.
The action of the Poles in declaring themselves
separated from Russia could not be held to absolve
the Emperor from adhering to his compact. ' Wrongs
committed by one side," he concluded, " were not to
be punished by the commission of wrongs on the
other." 1
Heytesbury, after prefacing his disagreeable task
of communicating these instructions by assurances
that his government was only desirous of tendering
friendly advice to a former ally, proceeded to read out
to Count Nesselrode Lord Palmerston's despatch.
" The Count," he reported, " listened with great
attention and in silence, but his silence was not the
silence of assent." The Russian Chancellor expressed
his regret that the British government should have
seen fit to make representations of this nature, not-
withstanding the intimation, conveyed to it by Prince
Lieven, that the Tsar could not admit of foreign inter-
ference in the Polish question. The official answer
of the Imperial Cabinet was in due course communi-
cated to Palmerston by the Russian ambassador. As
Heytesbury had foreseen, Nicholas, " strong in the
1 F. 0. Russia 190, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23, 1831.
90
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
support of Austria and Prussia and in the unanimous
approbation of the Russian nation," l refused to adopt
the interpretation of the treaty which it was desired
to place upon it in London and in Paris.
In the meantime, important progress had been
made towards a settlement of the Belgian question.
At the end of August, Baron Stockmar, Leopold's
confidential adviser, proceeded to London to watch
over his interests in conduction with Van de Weyer,
the Belgian minister at the Court of St. James'.
Stockmar realized speedily that the Belgians would
have to suffer for the defeat inflicted upon them by
the Dutch. In the treaty of peace and separation,
which the conference was resolved must be concluded
without delay, they could not hope to obtain the
favourable terms conceded to them in the convention
of the eighteen articles. Should they refuse to agree
to the necessary concessions, Palmerston warned him
that the conference would be broken up, and the King
of Holland would be left free to fight out his quarrel
with Leopold. Stockmar, however, continually im-
pressed upon his master that this was a threat which
he could safely afford to disregard. The French had
always considered the union of Holland and Belgium
and the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
as a diplomatic combination directed against them.
Public opinion in France might, therefore, be depended
upon to compel the government to resist any attempt
on the part of the Dutch to reconstitute the kingdom
by force of arms. But, although he admitted that
Leopold could only expect active assistance from
France, Stockmar strongly deprecated the idea of
usinp- French intervention as a means of intimidating
O O
the conference. Such a course, he was convinced,
1 F. 0. Russia 193 & 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, December 18,
1831, January 2, 1832. Affaires etrangc'rcs, 635 Angletcrre, Talleyrand
ft Sebastiani, 19 novembre, 1831.
91
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
would simply incline the four Powers to lean all the
more towards Holland. Lords Grey and Palmerston
were well disposed, but they had to reckon with
national sentiment, which was more favourable to
" England's ancient allies," the Dutch, than to the
Belgians. Nevertheless, although the British govern-
ment might be unable to render him practical assist-
ance, Leopold, Stockmar considered, should strive to
gain its moral support. The prolonged occupation of
Belgium by the French was to be deplored, because it
engendered the suspicion in London that the King
was over-anxious to place himself under the protection
of France. In order effectually to put a check upon
both Dutch and French intrigues Leopold, in
Stockmar's opinion, would be well advised to propose
for the hand of a daughter of Louis Philippe.
After the French evacuation Stockmar urged
unceasingly the necessity of a speedy conclusion of
a definite treaty of peace. Russia, he pointed out,
was no longer distracted by the Polish rebellion, and
the sympathies of the Tsar were entirely with the
King of the Netherlands. This was a circumstance
bound to have a considerable influence upon the policy
of the Courts of Berlin and of Vienna. It was of the
highest importance, therefore, that Leopold should
bring his ministers and the Chambers to recognize that
the conditions of separation, set forth in the protocol
of the eighteen articles, could no longer be obtained,
and that only those stipulations should be insisted
upon which were essential to the independent existence
of Belgium. As Stockmar had foreseen, the new treaty,
known as that of the twenty-four articles, which the
conference proceeded to frame, imposed harsher terms
upon Belgium than those contained in the protocol of
June 26. That part of the province of Limburg which
lay upon the right bank of the Meuse was now
assigned to Holland, and Belgium was called upon to
92
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
contribute an increased share of the public debt of the
two countries. In other respects also the Belgians
had to suffer for their military inferiority to the Dutch.
Nevertheless, when all efforts to induce the conference
to modify its terms had proved useless, Stockmar,
scouting the notion of abdication, counselled Leopold
to agree to them. " Let the King," he wrote, " cry
aloud against the injustice which has been done him
. . . Let him show that he went to Belgium under
perfectly different conditions . . . Let the Belgian
ministry cry out equally loud. But in the meantime
let everything be done to induce the Chambers to
accept the treaty."
Leopold having let it be known that, were the
deputies to refuse to agree to the terms imposed by
the conference, he would be driven to abdicate, the
Chambers, on November 3, authorized him to conclude
a formal treaty of peace and separation upon the basis
of the twenty-four articles. This document was accord-
ingly signed in London, on November 15, 1831, by the
plenipotentaries of Belgium and of the five great
Powers. The King of Holland refused to be a party
to the agreement, but, before the expiration of the
armistice, he had been warned that any act of hostility
against Belgium would be treated as a declaration of
war against the Powers. In addition, by a supple-
mentary article, the contracting parties guaranteed to
Belgium the execution of the treaty. ^Ratifications, it
was laid down, were to be exchanged within the space
of two months. 1 At various periods during these
negotiations Talleyrand had experienced considerable
difficulty in persuading the French government to
agree to the decisions of the conference. When at last
it had reluctantly given its assent to the conditions of
separation he was at pains to show the advantages
which France would derive from the treaty. The
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 179-209.
93
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Duchy of Bouillon, he pointed out, no longer formed
part of the Duchy of Luxemburg, whilst the incorpor-
ation of Arlon with Belgium increased the strength of
the French frontier towards Longwy. Furthermore,
the cession of half of the Duchy of Luxemburg to
Belgium placed the Germanic Confederation at a
greater distance from France and, inasmuch as the
fortress was no longer to form part of a military
system, 1 it would cease to have any importance. With
regard to the repartition of the debt, which the French
government had objected to as pressing unduly upon
Belgium, Talleyrand contended that the general
interests of Europe urgently demanded a settlement of
the whole question, and that the Belgians, after their
wretched display in the summer, had been treated
with more generosity than they had any right to
expect. 2
Whilst the conference had been framing the con-
ditions of separation between Holland and Belgium, the
French government had brought forward a scheme for
a general disarmament. Se'bastiani in the summer had
proposed a reduction of establishments to a normal
peace footing, but had found that the German Powers
were unwilling to revert to ordinary conditions of
military strength, until the Polish insurrection should
be at an end. After the Russian entry in Warsaw,
however, the French overtures met with a ready
response. The continental Powers agreed to begin
disarming on January 1, 1832, and to proceed until
their armies should be reduced to their peace
establishments. Inasmuch as England had not added
to her naval or land forces she could not enter into an
1 As the system of the barrier fortresses was to be abandoned.
2 Affaires eirangeres, 634 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand,
13 septembre, 1831; Talleyrand a I Se'bastiani, septembre 29, 1831;
635 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talleyrand, 4 octobre, 1831 ; Talleyrand a
Sebastiani, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20 octobre, 1831 ; Sebastiani a Talleyrand
22 octobre, 1831, Talleyrand ii Sebastiani, 16 novembre, 1831.
94
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
agreement to disarm, but Lord Grariville was
instructed to communicate to Sebastiani the satis-
faction which so practical a manifestation of peaceful
intentions afforded to the British government. 1
The question of the demolition of the barrier
fortresses had been proceeding side by side with the
settlement of the conditions under which Belgium was
to be separated from Holland. Talleyrand, however,
was not admitted to these negotiations which were
conducted between the plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia and those of
Belgium. The result of their deliberations was
embodied in a document, known as the Fortress Con-
vention, which was signed by the representatives of the
five Powers concerned on December 14, 1831. When
La Tour Maubourg had been sent to Brussels, during
the French occupation of Belgium, he had been
instructed to press for the demolition of the
fortifications of Ath, Mons, Menin, Charleroi and
Tournay. The Powers, however, elected to preserve
the defences of the two last-named towns and to
dismantle in their place the works of Philippeville and
Marienburg. Palmerston, without doubt, was mainly
responsible for this decision which was to create great
dissatisfaction in Paris. He was resolved, under no
circumstance, to admit the principle of allowing
France to have a voice in determining which of the
fortresses, erected at the expense of the four Powers,
should be destroyed. After her attempts to arrive at
a separate understanding with Belgium concerning
them, he may have thought that she required to be
reminded of the true state of the case. Yet it would
appear that the mere fact that her plenipotentiary had
not appended his signature to the convention must
have made her position in the matter sufficiently clear
1 F. O. France 425, Palinerston to Granville, October 28, 1831 ; 431,
Granville to Palmerston, September 26, 30, 1831.
95
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to the world. But, in persuading the members of the
conference to substitute Philippeville and Marienburg
for Charleroi and Tournay, Palmerstou was not
actuated by a desire wantonly to slight France. In
the question of the destruction of the Belgian
fortresses Grey's Cabinet was in a very delicate
position as regards the Parliament. 1 An embittered
opposition was bound to demand to know on what
grounds the government proposed to justify its policy
of sanctioning the demolition of fortifications, which
the greatest captain of the day had pronounced to be
necessary to the security of Europe. Now Wellington,
it would appear, considered Charleroi and Tournay as
of more importance to the defence of Belgium than
Philippeville and Marienburg, and Lord Grey and his
colleagues could not afford to disregard his opinion.
It must be remembered also that, on several occasions
during the course of the negotiations, France had
shown a strong desire to regain possession of these two
places of which she had been deprived after Waterloo,
and it was hoped that, were their fortifications to be
demolished, they would cease to offer the same
attractions to her. 2
Without doubt the decision of the Powers to
deprive France of any voice in the settlement of the
question of the fortresses placed her in a very anomalous
position. She was a party to the treaty which estab-
lished the independence, defined the frontiers and
guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, nevertheless
Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain had pro-
ceeded to conclude at once a separate convention with
Belgium against her. By her own action, however,
she was debarred from bringing forward this aspect
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 216-218, 225, 280. H. Bulwer, Life of
Palmeraton, II. pp. 116-120 ; Palmerston to Granville, August 25, 1831.
2 F. 0. Belgium 7, Palmerston to Adair (secret), November 16, 1831.
Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., I. p. 338, Grey
to Taylor, August 26, 1881.
96
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
of the case as an argument against her exclusion from
the fortress agreement. Far from raising any object-
tions to the conduct of the four Powers in drawing up
the protocol of April 17, without consultation with her,
she had expressed the greatest satisfaction with its
contents. At her request it was communicated to her
officially, in order that an allusion might be made to it
in the Speech from the Throne. Louis Philippe, in
opening the Parliament on July 23, 1831, accordingly
announced the early destruction of the barrier fortresses,
as a proof that the four Powers had abandoned the
system established against France in 1815. In point
of fact the apprehensions of her aggressive spirit had
been intensified by the Revolution of July and, in
deciding to demolish some of the frontier defences of
the Low Countries, the Powers had not been actuated
by any desire to propitiate the new regime. But once
the partition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had
been accomplished, it was recognized that the Belgians
alone could not keep in repair and efficiently defend
the twenty-three barrier fortresses. Ill-equipped and
insufficiently garrisoned they would not have con-
tributed to the protection of Belgium, but would have
offered a constant temptation to the French to lay
hands upon them. If France, however, chose to
imagine that in this matter the policy of the Powers
was dictated by a desire to please her, it was un-
necessary to inform her that she was labouring under a
delusion. It was probably the knowledge that the
fiction contained in the paragraph of the King's Speech,
referring to the fortresses, could not be maintained for
long, which had induced the French government to
attempt to negotiate a separate agreement with
Belgium. 1
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 212, 219-221. Correspondence of Earl
Grey with King William IV., I. pp. 341-342, Taylor to Grey, August
27, 1831.
97 H
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have
been convinced that Talleyrand had prompted his
government to protest against the fortress convention. 1
But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have
been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his
conversations with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound
to employ those arguments most calculated to induce
them to make some concessions to the wishes of his
Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved
strongly of the attitude he was directed to adopt.
On December 15, in forwarding a copy of the fortress
treaty, the contents of which he knew would be ex-
ceedingly displeasing to his government, he told
Se"bastiani plainly that La Tour Maubourg's mission
to Brussels was largely responsible for the determina-
tion of the four Powers to select the fortresses for
destruction, without regard to the wishes of France.
That affair, moreover, in his opinion, had been managed
in a very clumsy fashion. When the government
decided to try to arrange a separate understanding
with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations
in the strictest secrecy. 2
Sebastiani, for the reason which has already been
explained, was precluded from objecting openly to the
exclusion of France from the fortress convention, and
was compelled to confine his protests to remonstrances
against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg
for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend
that the fortifications of these two places, having been
erected before 1815, could not be held to fall within
the category of works constructed at the expense of
the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it was
incompatible with the complete independence of
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 222-225, and 231-232.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand A Sebastiani, 15
d&jembre, 1881. Affaires etrangeres, 635 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Talley-
rand, 16, 19 decembre, 1831.
98
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
Belgium, which France was anxious to see established,
that the Powers should specify which fortresses King
Leopold was to dismantle. 1 Talleyrand, however,
reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by
these arguments. The British minister gave him
clearly to understand that La Tour Maubourg's pro-
ceedings at Brussels had impressed him most unfavour-
ably. At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville
and Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity
to the frontier of France, he hinted that the French
government must have some secret reason for objecting
to their demolition. " Nevertheless," reported Talley-
rand, " I still believe that he is well disposed towards
us. He is, however, in a difficult position as regards
the Commons. . . . We must bring pressure to bear
upon the Belgians." Sebastiani's fears that the policy
of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of the
Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no
less emphatic than that used by Granville in Paris,
entirely without foundation. Far too much importance,
he urged, was attached to the fortress convention. The
King's government, in his opinion, would be well advised
to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions
were in harmony with the protocol of April 17.
Russia was no longer occupied with the rebellion of the
Poles, and the Northern Courts were evincing a strong
disposition to draw together closely. Under these con-
ditions, he regarded it as essential that France should
maintain friendly relations with England. " It was a
matter of far more real importance than the question
of the fortresses." 2 But his endeavours to soothe the
irritation of his government met with no success. He
was instructed to announce in London that France,
1 P. O. France 431, Granville to Palmerston, December 16, 1831.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 635 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebaatiani, 22, 24,
25, 27, 30 decembre, 1831.
3 F. 0. France 442, Granville to Palmerston, December 19, 1831.
99
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
seeing that satisfaction was denied her in the affair of
the fortress convention, would refuse to ratify the
treaty of separation of November 15, 1831. Further-
more, Casimir Perier, who, on account of Sebastiani's
state of health, had taken charge of the portfolio of
Foreign Affairs, declared that, " in view of the general
uncertainty respecting the course of events in Belgium
and Holland, the signature of the proposed convention
of disarmament must be postponed." l
The French agents in the meanwhile had not been
idle at Brussels. On December 12 General Tiburce
Sebastiani, the brother of the minister, arrived.
" Ostensibly," reported Ad air, " he has come to visit
this town and Antwerp, but his real purpose is to
prevent the accession of the Belgian government to
the fortress convention." This officer certainly brought
a letter for Belliard containing instructions which
justified the British minister's conclusions, but his
mission appears also to have been connected with some
unfounded rumour, which had reached the French
government, that the Orangists were about to put into
execution their designs against Leopold's throne. 2
That monarch now found himself once more, as he
himself described it, " between the hammer and the
anvil." 3 Louis Philippe 4 wrote indignantly com-
plaining that the agreement of September 8, entered
into with La Tour Maubourg, had not been complied
with. In vain Leopold produced the instructions,
with which Goblet and Van de Weyer, who had
negotiated the convention, had been furnished,
1 F.O. France 432, Granville to Palmerston, December 23, 30, 1831.
Affaires t ran gores, 685 Angleterre, Sebastian! a Talleyrand, C. Perier a
Talleyrand, 81 decembre, 1881.
2 F. O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December 16, 1831. Affaires
etrangeres, 194 Belgique, Tiburce Sebastiani a Sebastiani, 12 decembre,
1831 ; Belliard a Sebastiani, 13 decembre, 1831.
3 Affaires etrangeres, 194 Belgique, Belliard u Sebasticni, 23 decembre.
1831.
4 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 234.
100
THE CREATION oft* BELGIUM
and protested that the Belgian plenipotentiaries had
been forced to sign, under the threat that the
Powers would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation,
should they persist in opposing their wishes with
respect to the fortresses. General Belliard, at the
same time, intimated that, were the Dutch again to
attack Belgium, no assistance from France could be
expected. To Adair, who, on the other hand, begged
him to stand firm, Leopold had expressed his determi-
nation to disregard the French objections and to adhere
to the convention. But at the threat that, were his
Kingdom again to be overrun, France would leave
him to his fate, his resolution broke down and Goblet
was directed to announce in London that the Belgian
ratification of the fortress agreement would be with-
held. 1 Stockmar, writing from London, impressed
upon -King Leopold that his refusal to ratify the
convention of December 14 would be eagerly seized
upon by the absolute Powers as an excuse for with-
holding their adhesion to the treaty of separation.
Already the news that differences had arisen between
France and England, upon the subject of the fortresses,
had enabled Metternich to reply to Mr. Forbes, the
British charge d'affaires, who had been instructed
to urge him to transmit to London the necessary
authority for an exchange of ratifications, that Frar^"*
was holding back and that it was important th.\ all
the Powers should act together in the matter. Prince
Metternich was torn between his fears that the con-
tinued state of uncertainty as to the affairs of the
Low Countries might lead to a war, and his desire
to propitiate Russia. Nicholas was believed to
have counselled the King of the Netherlands to agree
to the treaty, but to be resolved, none the less, to
1 Affaires etrangeres, 194 Belgique, Belliard a Sebastian!, 13, 18, 19
decembre, 1831. F. O. Belgium 7, Adair to Palmerston, December 20,
1831. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 225-230.
101
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
withhold his own ratification until that sovereign's
reluctance to accept the conditions of separation should
have been overcome. 1 M. Casimir Perier, in the
meanwhile, however, was beginning to realize that
Palmerston was determined not to yield to the outcry
about the fortresses, and that were France, on that
account, to decline to ratify the treaty of separation
not only would the labours of the London conference
for the past year be rendered nugatory, but the good
relations which had been established with England
would be seriously impaired. Moreover, should the
negotiations break down, Lord Grey might be com-
pelled to resign, and he had good reason to apprehend,
that a change of government in England would be
followed quickly by his own downfall. An important
group of deputies in the Chamber gave him their votes,
only because they believed that his alliance with the
Whigs ensured the maintenance of peace. But this
reason for their support of him would disappear on the
day on which the Tories should return to office. 3 Under
these circumstances Talleyrand was directed to obtain
from the representatives of the four Powers " some
declaration calculated to reassure the King's government
as to the spirit in which the fortress convention had
been drawn up." This result was achieved by means
of a document in which it was affirmed that the
arrangements respecting the fortresses were consistent
with the independence, neutrality and sovereignty of
Belgium, and that that country stood upon an equal
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 226-229. Metternich, Memoires, V. pp.
217-224, Metternich a Apponyi, Metternich a Ficquelmont, 27 decembre,
1831. F. 0. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, January 7 and 20, 1832.
Affaires etrangeres, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand a C. Perier, 25 Janvier,
1832.
2 Despatches and Memoranda, of Jhike of Wellington, VIII. pp.
277-279 (State of parties in the French Chamber). Heinrich Heine,
Letters from Paris, translated by C. Leland, I. p. 125. " And should
Lord Grey fall with him will fall Casimir Perier. Both keep themselves
upright by their mutual tendency to tumble down, like two drunkards
who remain standing by leaning one against the other."
102
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
footing as regards the five guaranteeing Powers.
Casmir Perier declared himself well pleased to receive
this empty satisfaction and, forthwith, announced his
intention of adhering to the treaty of separation. 1
On January 31, accordingly, the two western Powers
exchanged ratifications with Belgium and, at the same
time, it was resolved to keep open the protocol, in the
hope that the Northern Courts would before long
confirm the signatures of their plenipotentiaries. 2
Scarcely had this difficulty been settled when
grave complications arose in another direction. The
promises of the Pope, that reforms would be introduced
into the administration of local affairs in Romagna, had
not been carried out. The intention manifested by
the Roman government to disregard its pledges was
followed by a recrudescence of unrest in the Legations.
M. Casimir Perier, accordingly, proposed that, were
foreign intervention to be required to maintain the
authority of His Holiness, a French corps should
occupy Ancona. But Metternich demurred, and, as an
alternative, suggested that a French naval force should
be sent to the Adriatic to act in combination with the
Austrian squadron. On February 1, however, the
news arrived that the Austrians had entered Bologna,
whereupon M. Casimir Perier at once ordered a
French regiment to be embarked at Toulon for
Ancona. Were that town to be occupied by the
Austrians before the French expedition could arrive,
the troops, Lord Granville was informed in confidence,
would be landed at Civita Vecchia. The action of
the French government would, M. Casimir Perier
declared to the British ambassador, hasten the
departure of the Austrians and induce Prince
1 Affaires etrangores, 635 and 636 Angleterre, C. Perier a Talleyrand,
9, 11 Janvier, 1832 ; Talleyrand a Perier, 23 Janvier, 1832. Stockmar,
Memoirs, I. pp. 231-233. F. O. France 444, Granville to Palmerston,
January 27, 1832.
2 State Papers. XIX. pp. 92-9".
103
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Metternich to press the Court of Rome to adopt
those reforms by which alone permanent tranquillity
could be established in the Legations. 1
The more detailed information as to the course
of events in Romagna, transmitted by Saint-Aulairc
and the British consul at Rome, suggested the
existence of a secret understanding between His
Holiness and the Cabinet of Vienna. At Forli the
Pontifical troops were reported to have shot down
in cold blood peaceful and unarmed inhabitants, and
their behaviour created the impression that they were
anxious to produce disorder, in order to furnish
Cardinal Albani, the Legate, with a pretext for invok-
ing the aid of Austria. 2 Suspicions on this score
were heightened by the fact that, although Marshal
Radetzky only received the application for assistance
on January 23, his orders, in which he styled himself
commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, were dated
on the 19th, four days before the arrival of the
cardinal's demand for intervention. 3 Upon learning
of these proceedings the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire at
once notified to Cardinal Bernetti, the State Secretary,
that the entry of an Imperial army into the Papal
States would be followed by the immediate occupa-
tion of Ancona by a French force. Bernetti appears
reluctantly to have acquiesced, but, after the expedi-
tion had sailed from Toulon, acting, without doubt, at
the dictation of the Austrian ambassador, he formally
protested against the disembarkation of any French
troops within the dominions of the Pope. 4 When
1 F. O. France 444, Granville to Palmerston, January 30, February
1, 18, March 2, 1832.
* F. O. Borne 25, Freeborn to Bidwell, January 29, 1832.
3 F. O. France 445, Freeborn (British consul at Rome) to Granville,
February 1, 1832 ; Granville to Palmerston, February 13, 1832. F. O.
Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 6, 1832.
4 F. O. France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 5, 1832. F. O.
Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 14, 1832. F. O. Rome
104
the news first reached Vienna that the French had
taken steps to occupy Ancona, Metternich, concealing
his annoyance, was at pains to impress upon the
public that this measure was the result of a previous
understanding with Austria. 1 On the other hand, at
St. Petersburg the intelligence that the French had
intervened in Italy was held to have rendered war in-
evitable, and Nicholas forthwith declared his intention
of giving armed assistance to Austria. 2 From London
Talleyrand reported that Palmerston spoke very
guardedly when he sought to ascertain the views of
the British government upon the matter. In his
own opinion, and this aspect of the case he on more
than one occasion brought to the notice of M. Casimir
Perier, it was much to be regretted that the demon-
strations in Italy had taken place before Austria
should have ratified the Belgian treaty. The accounts,
moreover, of the lawless proceedings of the French
commander at Ancona, which soon began to arrive,
created a very general alarm. Not only had the
troops forced their way into the citadel, but a
proclamation was issued by Captain Gallois, drawn up
in terms so hostile to Austria, as to amount practically
to a declaration of war. That individual, however,
who was either a member of, or in league with, the
French secret societies, the agents of which were
striving to stir up a revolution in Italy, was promptly
disavowed and the fact of his recall to France was
communicated to foreign governments. Neverthe-
less, wrote Talleyrand, the affair has created a most
painful impression. " The territory of an independent
sovereign has been violated at a time of profound
peace and the tricolour has been hoisted over a fortress
25, Freeborn to Bidwell, February 1, 1832; Freeborn to Palmerston,
February 18, 1832.
1 F. O. Austria 234, Forbes to Palmerston, February 11, 1832.
2 F. O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.
105
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
which does not belong to France." l In a conversation
which he had had with William IV. at a levee, His
Majesty spoke to him most strongly about the impro-
priety of these proceedings which, ministers also
informed him, had greatly increased their difficulties
in both Houses. They could have added with perfect
truth that their relations with their sovereign had
suffered considerably owing to this affair. 2
The Austrian policy of deliberately encouraging
misgovernment in the Italian States and of placing
every obstacle in the way of reforms was hateful to
Lord Palmerston. Apart from other considerations he
was convinced that a continuance of this state of affairs
must, sooner or later, drive France to intervene in such
a manner as to render a war inevitable with Austria. 3
Already, on February 20, before he had received the
news of the arrival of the French expedition 1 at Ancona,
he had directed Mr. Seymour, the British minister at
Florence, to proceed to Rome " to represent the
anxiety of His Majesty's government to see those
causes, which have produced so much difficulty,
effectually removed." He was to urge that no
measures would appear "to afford so good a hope of
success as a complete adoption of those reforms which
were pointed out in the memorandum of May 21,
1831." Lastly, he was to impress upon Cardinal
Bernetti that, " if the reports be true that the ranks
of the papal troops, which recently entered the
Legations, have been replenished by emptying the
prisons of criminals and by calling down the lawless
bands from the mountains, the Roman government
cannot divest itself of a deep responsibility for the
1 Affaires etrangeres, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastian!,
22, 23 mars, 1832.
2 Correspondence of Earl Orcy witliKing William IV., II. pp. 351-
855. The King to Grey, April 16, 1832, II. pp. 858-368. Grey to the
King, April 17, 1832 ; Grey to Sir H. Taylor, April 17, 1832.
3 F. O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, April 25, 1832.
106
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
melancholy events which marked the entry into Cesena
and Forli. The innocent blood which was wantonly
shed in the streets of those towns might well be
accepted as a full atonement for the political offences
of the people of Romagna." l When the story became
known of the manner in which the French entry into
Ancona had been carried out, Palmerston readily
agreed to do all in his power to soothe the irritation of
Austria and to assist to remove the bad impression
created by Captain Gallois' lawlessness. Seymour was
further instructed to inform Cardinal Bernetti that the
British government was fully satisfied that the French
occupation of Ancona was but a temporary measure,
which the condition of the Legations had occasioned.
He was to reiterate the necessity for the immediate
introduction of the promised reforms and " to draw the
serious attention of the Roman government to the
fact, that the course which it was pursuing with respect
to the Legations, had already had the effect of turning
the eyes of the population of those provinces towards
Austria. . . . The system of administration established
in Lombardy and Venetia, although not free from
defects, was looked upon with envy by the subjects of
the Pope. 2 At Vienna Sir Frederick Lamb was directed
to assure Prince Metternich that the occupation of
Ancona would cease as soon as His Holiness should
have carried out his engagements. 3
Metternich, reported Lamb, received the news of
the French proceedings at Ancona very calmly. He
expressed himself as confident that Gallois' actions
would be disavowed by his government. " The
Emperor," he declared, "would be justified in falling
upon the French at Ancona, but he was too great a
1 F. O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, February 20, 1832.
2 F. O. Tuscany 62, Palmerston to Seymour, March 7, 1832.
F. O. France 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 14, 1832.
3 Affaires otrangeres, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand si C. Perier, 6 mars,
1832.
107
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
sovereign to receive an insult from the captain of a
frigate or the colonel of a regiment." It was to
England that Austria looked for support at this crisis.
She ruled the seas and it rested with her to decide
whether, or not, France should hold the command of the
Mediterranean. About a week after this conversation
had taken place Metternich informed Lamb that he
was perfectly satisfied with the explanations which
Marshal Maison had been instructed to give, and that
no demand would be made to the French government
for the evacuation of Ancona, so long as the Austrians
continued to occupy the Legations. 1
This condition of affairs was allowed to prevail for
some years. Both Powers retained their troops in the
Papal States, and the embarrassing necessity under
which the French government was placed of making
the occupation of Ancona depend upon the presence of
an Austrian garrison at Bologna constituted Metter-
nich's revenge for M. Perier's intervention in Italy.
The attention of the corps diplomatique had not
been concentrated exclusively upon the complications
to which the French proceedings at Ancona might give
rise. Early in the month of February it was known
that Count Orloff had been despatched by the Tsar on
a special mission to the Hague. It was in deference to
the wishes of Nicholas that the Courts of Vienna and
of Berlin had decided to withhold their ratification of
the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831, and the
keenest curiosity prevailed as to the instructions with
which the Tsar's emissary had been furnished. In
respect to the condition of affaires in the Low Countries
Russia was in a somewhat peculiar situation as regards
England. During the Napoleonic war Russia had
borrowed at Amsterdam a sum of 25,000,000 florins.
1 F. O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 2, and 12, 1832.
Affaires etrangeres, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastian!, 27 mars,
1832.
108
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
At the peace the King of the Netherlands and the King
of Great Britain agreed respectively to bear one-half
of the charge of this debt. But it was provided that,
should at any time the King of the Netherlands be
deprived of his sovereignty over the Belgian provinces,
this charge should cease. The contingency referred to
in the treaty had come about, under circumstances
never contemplated by the statesmen by whom it had
been drawn up. They had hoped to give Russia a
direct interest in preserving the union, but it was now
the British government which desired to see it abolished
and the Tsar who wished it to be maintained. With-
out doubt, according to the letter of the treaty, England
was no longer bound to pay a share of the Russian-
Dutch loan. Judged by the spirit of it, however, she
could not honestly escape from the charge which she
had undertaken to bear. This last construction of the
agreement was adopted b) T Palmerston, who admitted
the British liability in a new convention, by the terms
of which the Tsar guaranteed that, should the stipula-
tions made for the independence and neutrality of
Belgium be endangered by the course of events, he
would contract no other engagements without a previous
agreement with his Britannic Majesty. Palmerston
had thus earned the gratitude of the Tsar and had, in
addition, made it difficult for him to intervene actively
on behalf of the King of Holland. 1 Ministers were
debarred, however from referring to this inner history
of the affair in Parliament, where their policy in the
matter of the Russian loan was severely attacked both
by the Tory Opposition and by the Radicals, who
deprecated the notion of voting pecuniary assistance to
the autocratic government of Russia.
The Count Alexis Orloff, whose journey to
1 F. O. Russia 190 & 199, Palmerston to Heytesbury, November 23,
1831 ; Heytesbury to Palmerston, January 3, 1832. Stockmar,
Memoirs, I. pp. 268-270. State Papers, XVIII. pp. 928-931.
109
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the Hague was the subject of so much speculation
in the chanceries of Europe, was the natural son
of a younger brother of Gregory OrlofF, the lover of
Catherine II. and a prominent actor in that palace
revolution of 1762, which cost the Emperor Peter III.
his throne, and very probably his life. After serving
in the Napoleonic wars, the Count Alexis had gained
the lasting gratitude of his imperial master by his
resolute behaviour, which had contributed not a
little to upset the designs of the Decembrists, as those
military conspirators were termed, who, in 1825,
had sought to prevent the accession of Nicholas.
Ever afterwards, in consequence, Alexis Orloff was
selected by the Tsar for the most delicate and
secret missions. No notice of his departure was
given to any member of the corps diplomatique
at St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode, after he had
started, merely informed Lord Heytesbury that he
had been sent to the Hague to extract a categorical
statement from the King of the Netherlands as
to whether he would accept the treaty of separation,
and, in the event of his declaring that he would
withhold his consent, to signify to him that he must
not look to Russia for support. 1 This was in
substance all that Mr. Chad, the British minister
at Berlin, could discover about the objects of OiiofFs
mission during the Count's stay in the Prussian
capital. But he noted that the general effect of
his visit to Berlin had been to incline the Prussian
government to espouse more warmly the cause
of the King of the Netherlands, a result which,
he pointed out, was inconsistent with the purpose
which the Tsar's emissary was alleged to have in
view. 2 Fuller information, however, on that score
1 F. 0. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 4, 1882.
Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II. p. 215; Grey
to Taylor, February 13, 1882.
* F. 0. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 13, 1832.
110
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
was soon forthcoming from Vienna. On February
25, Sir Frederick Lamb was able to transmit to
Lord Palmerston a copy of OrlofFs secret instructions.
These contained a clause to the effect that the
Emperor of Russia would not recognize the King
of the Belgians, until he should have been acknow-
ledged by the King of the Netherlands. Further-
more, the Count was directed to protest against
any measures of coercion, which France and England
might decide to adopt against Holland, and to declare
that the Tsar would regard all concessions, obtained
by such means, as null and void. Lastly, whilst
in London, whither he was to proceed when he
had completed his task at the Hague, Orloff was
"to assist by all means in his power the endeavours
which, for the past twelve months, Prince Lieven
and Count Matuszewic 1 had been making to prevent
a union of the British Cabinet with that of the Palais
Royal." 2
During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win
over the Prussian government to the Tsar's views
upon the Belgian question. But his attempts were
unsuccessful. Anillon, the chief minister, was
greatly alarmed at the disturbance of the European
Concert to which he feared the Russian policy
must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to
make their ratification of the separation treaty
depend upon the acceptation of its conditions by
the King of the Netherlands, the Powers must
necessarily fall into two opposing groups : France
and Great Britain on the one side, and the three
Northern Courts on the other. Rather than help
to create so perilous a situation, Prussia would,
with much regret be obliged to " alter en amnt
1 Russian plenipotentiary at the conference which was settling the
affairs of Greece.
2 F. O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, February 25, 1832.
Ill
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
et de ratifier." Ai^illon seems to have succeeded
in extracting from Orloff a promise that he would
for the present, at least, refrain from communicating
the secret clauses of his instructions to the King of
the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian
minister at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade
Nicholas to cancel them. Metternich, reported Lamb,
regarded the matter in the same light as An9illon, and
was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of
the Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the
purpose of thwarting the Russian plan that a copy of
Orloff 's secret instructions was placed in the hands
of the British ambassador. 1
When France and England had ratified the treaty
of separation, Palmerston at once instructed the
British representatives at Vienna and at Berlin
to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow
the example of the western Powers. Metternich,
wrote Lamb, eluded the question, and insisted upon
the necessity of waiting to hear the result of Orloff 's
mission. 2 At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined to
remind M., An9illon that the action of the Prussian
government in refusing to ratify was a violation of
its promises. 3 In M. Casimir Perier's opinion, the
policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by the
hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the
House of Lords might lead to a change of government
in England. 4 In the meanwhile, Count Orloff had
arrived at the Hague on February 20. At Berlin, he
had intimated that under no circumstances would his
stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days. 5
Nevertheless, the period which he had assigned for the
duration of his visit was greatly exceeded. There was
1 F. O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1882.
2 F. O. Austria 234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 1, 1882.
3 F. O. Prussia, 180, Palmerston to Chad, February 3, 1832.
4 F. 0. France, 445, Granville to Palmerston, March 2, 1832.
5 F. 0. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, February 12, 1832.
112
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
reason to believe, however, that communications had
reached him from his Court which, if they did not
absolutely annul, unquestionably modified his instruc-
tions and brought them more into harmony with the
views of the constitutional Powers. 1 Without doubt,
the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to
break with the London conference was largely
responsible for the changed disposition of Nicholas.
But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after Orloff had left,
of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation,
in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the
most absurd pretensions, would seem to have im-
pressed the Tsar most unfavourably. He appears
to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court,
acting under the inspiration of the French legitimists,
was striving to embroil the Great Powers in a war. 2
Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to
exercise an increased pressure upon the wavering
resolution of the Northern Courts. The sittings of the
conference, he announced, would be suspended until
the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation should
have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March
16, Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was
instructed to protest against Count Orloff's continued
stay at the Hague. 3 The threat that the London
conference would be dissolved appears to have excited
considerable alarm at Berlin. 4 Although the obstinacy
of the King of the Netherlands was proof against all
remonstrances, Palmerston's action, which had the
support of the French government, was probably suc-
cessful in bringing Orlotf's mission to an end. In any
case, on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for
Foreign Affairs, officially informed Nicholas' envoy
1 F. O. Prussia 181, Chad to Palmerston, March 4, 1832.
2 F. O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, February 11, 19, 27,
1832.
3 F. O. Netherlands 180, Palmerston to Bapot, March 16, 1832.
4 F. O. Prussia 180, Chad to Palmerston, March 25, 1832.
113 I
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
that the King could not accept the separation treaty of
the twenty-four articles as it existed. No sooner had he
made this statement than Count OrlofF at once handed
him the declaration which he had been instructed to
deliver. The note in question was to the effect that,
although His Imperial Majesty would not participate
himself in any measures of coercion to force the King
to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps
which his allies might resolve to take in order to impose
its conditions upon Holland. Directly they learnt that
Orloff had delivered his declaration, the Austrian and
Prussian ministers sent separate notes to M. Yerstolk,
notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to the
course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two
days later, took leave of the King and started for
London. 1
The failure of Orloffs mission deprived the
Austrian and Prussian Cabinets of all reasonable
excuse for withholding their assent to the treaty.
Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his de-
parture from the Hague, Metternich informed Sir
Frederick Lamb that the Austrian ratification would
be forwarded to London without further delay. The
presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the
course upon which the absolute Courts had embarked
would tend to promote a close alliance between
England and France were factors in the situation,
which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had
greatly influenced Metternich's decision. 2 Accordingly,
on April 18, at the London Foreign Office the Austrian
and Prussian plenipotentiaries exchanged ratifications
of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with the repre-
sentative of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Billow,
had been furnished with a discretionary power either
to proceed with the matter or to await the Russian
1 F. O. Netherlands 181, Bagot to Palmerston, March 23, 1832.
2 F. O. Austria '234, Lamb to Palmerston, March 12, 1832.
114
ratification, and he appears to have yielded to the
pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston
and Talleyrand. 1 Both the Prussian and Austrian
ratifications were accompanied by reservations with
respect to the rights of the Germanic Confederation
in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion
of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. 2
It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep
open the protocol in order that Russia might still
be enabled to become a party to the treaty. Lieven
and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries, had
authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting
three articles of the treaty which concerned the
navigation of the Scheldt, the construction of a road,
and the share of the debt to be borne by Belgium. But,
were a limited ratification of this description to be
accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a
different situation as regards Belgium to that occupied
by the other contracting parties. This was a develop-
ment to which Palmerston was altogether opposed.
On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to
avoid the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty.
The rift in the European Concert, which such a result
would disclose, must encourage the King of the
Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference
and might endanger the general peace. The repre-
sentatives of the Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven
and Matuszewic were, however, sincerely anxious to
discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels it
was contended with some reason that the limited
ratification of Russia might be held to invalidate the
treaty as a whole. But Stockmar, the counsellor of
Leopold, pointed out that the existing governments
in France and England considered that their acts of
1 Aflaires etrangeres, 636 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Sebastiani,
20 avril, 1832.
2 State Papers, XIX. pp. 95-97.
115
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The
struggle over the Reform Bill had, however, entered
upon its final stage, and it was doubtful whether Lord
Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it success-
fully. Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar,
it was well to remember that both Wellington and
Aberdeen had declared that they should not consider
the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding, until
it should have been ratified by all the signatory
Powers. Were Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet
to be formed, Russia very probably might altogether
refuse to ratify. 1
On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at
the Foreign Office were prolonged far into the night.
Talleyrand's powers of persuasion, Palmerston's deter-
mined will and skill in argument were alike directed
to the task of devising some solution of the problem,
which all parties might accept with dignity. The
desired result was at last attained by means of an
explanation of the purpose of the Russian reservation,
which was inserted into the protocol. According to
this declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted
that their Court had no other intention than to leave
open the matters contained in the three articles in
question for subsequent settlement by Holland and
Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer
agreed to accept the Russian ratification with the
proviso, which was also to be embodied into the
protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit
of the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the
five Powers. That same night Orloff departed from
England. 2 Nicholas had been very gratified by the
flattering welcome which had been accorded to his
favourite in London society. 3 His satisfaction on
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 252-257.
2 F. O. France 442, Palmerston to Hamilton, May 8, 1832. State
Papers, XIX. pp. 98-99.
3 F. O. Russia 199, Heytesbury to Palmerston, April 15, May 18, 1832.
116
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
this point contributed, doubtless, to the happy
termination of the negotiation. But the statesman-
like conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time,
little appreciated in political circles in Brussels,
where he was censured for accepting the limited
ratification of Russia, 1
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 258-259.
117
CHAPTER IV
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
THE Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir Perier
had always regarded the execution of the separation
treaty as a measure which must necessarily follow
its ratification by the five contracting Powers. But,
during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers,
both in France and in England, were confronted by an
internal situation of exceptional gravity. The Lords,
on April 14, had passed the second reading of the
third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7,
however, three days after Russia had ratified the
Belgian treaty, Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried
against the government a motion postponing the
clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet,
therefore, decided to advise the King " to advance to
the honour of the peerage such a number of persons
as might ensure the success of the Bill in all its
essential principles." l
In the early days of the struggle the King had
been a keen advocate of parliamentary reform. But
the violent opposition which the measure had excited
had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only
with respect to the Bill that His Majesty was begin-
ning to entertain misgivings. The conduct of foreign
affairs had, for some time past, caused him grave
anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a
dangerous tendency on the part of the government
1 Correspondence of Earl Grey itrith King William IV., II.
pp. 894-958.
118
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
to subscribe to all the democratic theories which found
favour in Paris. He realized the importance of good
relations with France, and he was prepared to admit
that it might be due to the existence of such an under-
standing that war had been avoided in the Belgian
question. But he mistrusted France and could not
believe that she had abandoned her schemes of con-
quest and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore,
that it was impolitic to " unite too closely with her in
the prosecution of measures tending to give umbrage
and alarm to other Powers." l
In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey
signified his willingness to resign. But a second letter
from the King and a conversation, in which His
Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full con-
fidence, induced him to remain in office. A fortnight
later, however, when the King declined to follow the
advice, contained in the Cabinet minute of May 8, to
create a sufficient number of peers to enable the Bill
to pass, the government resigned. But the excite-
ment throughout the country and the attitude of the
House of Commons compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the
Duke of Wellington to abandon all hope of forming
a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out the
task with which he had entrusted them, the King had
no alternative but to send for his late ministers and to
give them the guarantees, which they made an indis-
pensable condition to their acceptation of office. Lord
Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting
to the powers which the crown had placed at his
disposal. In deference to the King's wishes 2 Welling-
ton and the chief opponents of the measure agreed
to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their
absence, the Bill was passed into law.
1 Correspondence of Earl Grey with King William IV., II.
pp. 351-355 ; the King to Grey, April 16, 1832.
- Annual Register, 1832, p. 187.
119
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties
were only temporarily overcome after grave disorder
and much bloodshed. The cholera, brought back by
the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread westwards.
The disease, which made its first appearance in England
in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in
Paris during the spring and summer of 1832. M.
Casimir Perier, who had been in bad health for some
time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death,
on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst
of hostility on the part of the parliamentary opponents
of his system. At the same time the avowed enemies of
the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and Carlist,
actively prepared to take advantage of the situation.
The Society of the Friends of the People, in defiance
of the police, held meetings at which armed insurrec-
tion was preached openly. " I was present at one of
them," wrote Heinrich Heine, "the smell reminded
me of an old file of the Moniteur of 1793 grown dirty
from too much reading." l
The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the
most prominent advocate in the Chamber of the union
of Belgium with France, was chosen by the revolution-
ary leaders as a favourable occasion for striking their
blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and
both regular troops and national guards were quickly
upon the scene of action. Nevertheless, it was not
until artillery had been brought up that, on the
following day, June 6, the great barricade at the
Cloitre Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formid-
able insurrection was finally suppressed. Nor was it
only in the streets of Paris that the government had
to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse
de Berri, the mother of the Due de Bordeaux, the
lawful King of France in the eyes of the Carlists,
raised the standard of rebellion in La Vendee. But
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. p. 2.
120
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
her insurrection, which had been undertaken against
the advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old
Royalist leaders in the West, was, in a few days,
stamped out completely. The defence of the Chateau
de la Pennissiere, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen
made a brave stand against overwhelming odds,
imparted, however, a tinge of heroism to this, the last
and the least famous of the Royalist rebellions of La
Vendee.
Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans
in Paris and of the Carlists in the West, came the news
that the Due de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of
Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But
Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired
that Louis Philippe's attention should be especially
directed "to his successor in the eyes of the Bona-
partists." The young Louis Bonaparte, he begged
him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the
Emperor of Austria, but, on the contrary, " was deeply
involved in all the machinations of the revolutionary
societies." ] Few people, however, shared Metternich's
forebodings, and the death of the Due de Reichstadt,
which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally con-
sidered, even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed
effectually of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration. 2
But neither the successful suppression of two rebellions,
nor the decease of a dangerous pretender to the throne
could make up for the loss of the President of the
Council. The death of M. Casimir Perier had deprived
the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis
Philippe, whilst doing full justice to the courage and
abilities of his late minister, was perhaps not altogether
sorry that his masterful personality no longer presided
at the council table. The role of a constitutional
1 Metternich, Metnoires, V. p. 288 ; Metternich a Apponyi, 21 juin,
1832.
2 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by C. Leland), I. p. 355. '
121
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
monarch was never to his taste. He longed always
to take a direct part in the management of public
affairs, and rather liked his people to think that his
was the hand which guided the ship of State. He
was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new
President of the Council. He soon perceived, however,
that a prolongation of this state of affairs would be
prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy both
at home and abroad.
For the past two months the London conference
had been engaged upon fruitless efforts to induce the
King of the Netherlands to agree to the separation
treaty. Moreover, His Majesty's obstinacy was not
the only difficulty with which the representatives of
the Powers had to deal. The Belgians clamoured
loudly for the execution of the treaty, and declared
that, so long as the Dutch retained possession of
Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification
of its conditions. 1 Oblivious of their disasters of the
year before, they even began to talk of ejecting the
Dutch by force, and, as though to prove the seriousness
of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish officers in
their army, and to make other warlike preparations. 2
Although determined that the main conditions of
the treaty must be left untouched, the members of the
conference were anxious that the minor points in
dispute should form the subject of amicable discussions
between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It
was on this principle that all their proposals had been
made. But neither at the Hague nor at Brussels was
any disposition evinced to listen to reasonable sugges-
tions for a compromise.
At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided
to forward their final proposals to the Hague and to
announce, at the same time, that, if they were not
1 State Papers, XIX. pp. 102-105. Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 262.
2 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 243.
122
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
accepted, no further modifications of the original
treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was
entertained that the King's obduracy would be over-
come without a resort to force. But before proceeding
to adopt more active measures the British government
decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special
mission to St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently
compelled Lord Heytesbury to relinquish his post, and
his successor had not as yet been appointed. The
King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted
that the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should
France and England begin hostilities against him.
Lord Durham was therefore charged to endeavour to
persuade the Emperor Nicholas "to give immediate
instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the
conference to co-operate cordially and effectually in
whatever measures might appear best calculated to
effect an early execution of the treaty." He was to
state most positively that France and England, under
any circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engage-
ments which they had contracted towards Belgium.
Lastly, he was to explain the views of His Majesty's
government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs. 1
Seeing that it was the object of the British govern-
ment to concilitate the Tsar, in order to induce him to
take part in measures which could not be otherwise
than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that this
particular minister should have been selected for the
mission. As one of the most advanced politicians in
the Cabinet Lord Durham would hardly seem to have
been the person best qualified to propitiate the Emperor
Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps
only a secondary consideration. On the question of
the creation of peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass,
he had seriously differed from Lord Grey, his own
father-in-law, and it may have been the wish to avoid
1 F. 0. Russia 200, Palmerston to Durham, July 3, 1832.
123
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
a complete rupture between them that prompted his
despatch to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however,
whatever may have been the real nature of his feelings
with respect to Durham's appointment, evinced not
the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared
to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and,
during the whole period of his six weeks' stay in the
Russian capital, the ambassador was the object of his
most flattering attentions. Durham, who was highly
gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and
by the marked deference with which he was treated,
was, for his part, no less anxious to create a favourable
impression. When removed from the turmoil of party
politics he rarely failed to display those statesmanlike
qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in
spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in
so far as its immediate objects were concerned, proved
a complete failure. Under no circumstances would the
Tsar agree to join in any hostile action against Holland.
But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such was
his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was
equally resolved not to oppose those measures which
other Powers might see fit to adopt, in order to obtain
the execution of the separation treaty. 1 This cate-
gorical statement of Nicholas' intention not to interpose,
should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one
satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was
enabled to transmit. In all his conversations the Tsar
manifested his extreme dislike of Louis Philippe and
expressed his determination to render military assist-
ance to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt
to interfere in German affairs. 2 Lord Durham was not
long in discovering that no good purpose would be
served by adverting to Poland. The greatest indignation
prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the
1 F. O. Russia 200, Durham to Palmerston, July 18, 1832.
2 Ibid., July 18, 27, August 2, September 8, 12, 1832.
124
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that
the Tsar dared not disregard the national resentment
which their insurrection had provoked. Only force,
he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that other
Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of
his Polish subjects, and England most certainly had
no intention of making the question a case for war.
He conceived, therefore, that he might depart from
the letter of his instructions and confine his observa-
tions upon the subject to a mere informal expres-
sion to Count Nesselrode of the interest felt by
the British government in the general welfare of
Poland. 1
Before the end of July, it was known in London
that the King of the Netherlands was determined to
reject the proposals which the conference had declared
must be the last which could be submitted to him.
Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by
the language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch pleni-
potentiary, decided to make a further attempt to avert
the necessity of an appeal to force. 2 Accordingly,
he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of
the points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to
the Dutch representative. Van Zuylen professed to
be oh the whole well satisfied with Palmers ton's
proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they might
serve as the basis of a definite agreement between
Holland and Belgium. But, before any progress
could be made in the matter, it was necessary to
induce the Belgians to abandon their declared
intention of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch
should have evacuated the citadel of Antwerp. In
order to try to persuade the Belgian government
to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron
Stockmar, early in August, proceeded to Brussels as
1 F. 0. Eussia 200, Durham to Palmerston, August 22, 1832.
a Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. U77-278.
125
the semi-official representative of the conference.
King Leopold's confidential adviser saw clearly that
the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light
should the negotiations break down, owing to their
obstinate refusal to recede from the position they had
taken up. He had never approved of the policy
of the Meulinaer Cabinet, and had always deprecated
the warlike preparations upon which that minister
had ostentatiously embarked. As he constantly
pointed out to the King, the chances of success in
a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily
very doubtful. Moreover, under any circumstances,
the Great Powers were pledged to intervene to put
an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium,
if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very
harshly. One measure, however, which Stockmar had
constantly advocated, was now an accomplished fact.
In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a daughter
of the King of the French, had been affianced to
Leopold, and the marriage had been duly celebrated
on August 9, at the Chateau de Compiegne. But
the newly married king showed as little disposition
to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law l as he
had those of the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the
language of many leading Belgians at this period
suggested that they were encouraged to defy the
Powers, from the security which they considered was
assured to them by the family ties uniting their
sovereign to the reigning House in France. 2 Leopold,
without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an
illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to
the Chambers to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp
as a preliminary to any fresh negotiations, and
1 F. O. France 448, Granville to Palmerston, August 3, 6, 1832.
2 F. O. Belgium 13, Adair to Palmerston, September 7, 1832. F. O.
France 448 & 449, Granville to Palmerston, August 27, 29, September 3,
1832.
I'Jf.
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
he seems to have thought that it would be too
unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account.
Stockmar returned to London on August 18. His
visit to Brussels had failed in its object, but he still
continued to press his views upon King Leopold.
A prolongation of the status quo constituted, he
argued, no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it
was the case that the Dutch held the citadel of
Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty, should
have passed out of their possession, their retention of
it was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of
parts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, under
the conditions of separation, had been assigned
to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers
were prepared to admit that a continued refusal
on the part of the Court of the Hague to evacuate
Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining
to pay their share of the public debt, jointly
contracted by the two countries before their separa-
tion. Before long, the force of this reasoning began
to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and
La Tour Maubourg, the British and French ministers,
were using their best endeavours to persuade the
King to conform to the wishes of their respective
governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction
was gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands
was merely trifling with the Powers, and that he had
still no intention of bringing the negotiations to a
conclusion. 1 Should these suspicions prove correct,
Leopold probably realized that it must be to his
advantage to display a readiness to meet the wishes of
the conference, at a time when the members of it
would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the dilatory
and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the
Hague.
Under the influence of these various considerations
1 F. O. France 449, GranvUle to Palme rston, September 18, 1832.
127
his resolution rose to the required point. 1 The
Meulinaer government was dismissed, General Goblet
was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and powers
were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into
negotiations with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the
basis of the new proposals, Le theme de Lord Palmer-
ston, as they were called by the diplomatists.
Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer
officially informed the conference that he was
authorized to discuss with the Dutch plenipotentiaries
the points in dispute between the two countries. But
in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring
completely the theme de Lord Palmerston, claimed the
execution of the treaty on the terms set forth in the
Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The conference,
thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether
he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in
accordance with the proposals submitted by the
British plenipotentiary. To this demand he returned
an answer which was unanimously held to be highly
unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the
representatives of the five Powers met to consider the
steps which should now be taken to bring matters to a
conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was clear at once
that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were
hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion
must be confined to a declaration authorizing the
Belgians to withhold payment of their share of
the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Ant-
werp should be handed over to them. France and
England, on the other hand, deriding the notion that
pressure of this kind would suffice to overcome the
obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for
the application of sterner measures. To this demand
the plenipotentiaries of the northern Powers opposed
the irrevocable resolution of their respective Courts
1 Stockmar, Memoirs, I. pp. 278-285.
128
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
not to participate in any hostile acts against Holland.
In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion,
the conference broke up, the representatives of France
and England announcing the intention of their
governments to take steps to ensure the prompt
execution of the terms of the separation treaty. 1
But, although the concert of the Powers had thus
ceased to exist, there was still no distinct understand-
ing between France and England, as to the measures
by which the Dutch were to be compelled to evacuate
Antwerp. Louis Philippe's continued inability to
reconstruct his Cabinet necessarily increased the
reluctance of the British government to agree definitely
to combined action with France. When, towards the
end of June, the King had become convinced of the
necessity of strengthening the ministry his thoughts,
in the first place, had turned towards M. Dupin. His
oratorical powers, the considerable following which he
commanded in the Chamber, and the support which he
had given to M. Casimir Perier, furnished excellent
reasons for his inclusion in a government which was
to carry on the policy of the late President of the
Council. But insurmountable difficulties had arisen.
It is not clear whether M. Dupin's objections to
joining the Cabinet should be ascribed to con-
scientious doubts about the future policy of the
government, or merely to disappointed ambition,
because the King was not prepared to confer upon him
the Presidency of the Council. According to one
account, he is said to have pointed to his hob-nailed
boots and to have asked insolently whether they were
to debar him from transacting business with " Milord
Granville. " But, whatever may have been the true
cause of his misunderstanding with his royal master,
their discussion unquestionably grew very heated and
culminated in the King seizing him by the collar and
1 State Papers, XIX. pp. 150-190.
129 K
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
ejecting him from the room. 1 A strong sense of
personal dignity, however, was never a characteristic of
Louis Philippe, and, notwithstanding this scene, he
soon reopened negotiations with M. Dupin. But this
second attempt to arrange matters was attended with
no better success than the first. Baffled in this direc-
tion, Louis Philippe was compelled to make overtures
to the Doctrinaires. Under the Restoration this desig-
nation had been applied to a small but distinguished
group of politicians, of whom the best known were
Royer-Collard, Guizot, Broglie and Barante. All were
strong advocates of limited monarchy and, generally
speaking, fervent admirers of the British constitution.
Their system of government was based upon the
theory that, in the modern France which the Revolution
had created, no regime could endure which did not
depend for support upon the middle classes. The
political principles which found favour with the
bourgeoisie, constituting as they did & juste milieu be-
tween the reactionary sentiments of the old aristocracy
and the revolutionary tendencies of the labouring
classes, were precisely those to which, in the opinion of
the Doctrinaires, all future governments would have
to conform. Accordingly, they had accepted the
Monarchy of July and both Broglie and Guizot had sat
in Louis Philippe's first Cabinet. But, holding that
insurrection must be put down with a firm hand, they
had always supported Casimir Perier.
Louis Philippe had no great liking for the
Doctrinaires. As strict constitutionalists they were
necessarily opposed to the direct interference of the
sovereign with the business of the State. Moreover,
they were unquestionably unpopular in the country.
On this occasion, however, when compelled by circum-
stances to seek their assistance, he hoped to overcome
1 F. O. France 447, Granville to Palmerston, June 29, 1832 ; D. dc
Dino Chronique, I. pp. 73-74.
130
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
this last objection by nominating a popular soldier, in
the person of Marshal Soult, to the presidency of the
council. All through his reign Louis Philippe was in-
clined to place a military man at the head of the
government. Not only were appointments of this kind
invariably well received, but he soon discovered that
soldiers, brought up in the school of Bonaparte, were
seldom troubled with constitutional scruples about the
exact position of the sovereign in a limited monarchy.
But, at the same time, he was careful to assure Lord
Granville that the Marshal's duties, as President of
the Council, would be purely nominal. " Under any
circumstances," said Louis Philippe, " his appoint-
ment need excite no apprehensions abroad, his love of
peace is notorious, indeed, his description of himself as
I'apdtre de la paix has almost passed into a byword." 1
The Due de Broglie, the son-in-law of Madame de
Stael, into whose hands the King proposed to confide
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, was a cultivated man
but of reserved and somewhat displeasing manners.
He enjoyed, however, a high reputation for honourable
dealing and integrity of purpose and was, moreover, on
terms of friendship with Lord Lansdowne and other
prominent members of the Whig party. His selection,
therefore, might be expected to meet with the cordial
approval of the British government.
The Due de Broglie, however, was not prepared
to accept unconditionally the task which the King
proposed he should undertake. After one of his first
interviews with Louis Philippe he met Lord Granville
at Talleyrand's house in the Rue Saint-Florentin and
explained the situation to him. The French public, he
told the ambassador, were weary of the interminable
negotiations about Belgium, and it was only by a
military exploit, such as the capture of the citadel of
Antwerp, that the Cabinet would be able to obtain the
1 F. O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, September 28, 1832.
131
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
support of the Chamber. It was useless to attempt to
disguise the grave character of the situation. Where
the government to be overthrown by a parliamentary
majority, the King would be forced to depend upon
the Left, and be rendered powerless to control the
violence of extreme members of the party. The Duke
went on to assure him that he was not ignorant of the
suspicion with which the entry of a French army into
Belgium would be regarded. There was no pledge, no
guarantee, however, which he would not be prepared to
give that, eight days after the capture of the citadel,
every French soldier should be withdrawn from
Belgium. 1 This conversation had been regarded by
Lord Granville as quite unofficial, but, on the follow-
ing day, October 5, Sebastiani informed him that
" the King purposed to defer concluding his ministerial
arrangements until the British ambassador should be
enabled to state the opinion of his government, re-
specting the conditions under which alone the Due de
Broglie would undertake the direction of foreign affairs. 3
It is evident, however, that other counsels must have
prevailed seeing that, on the morning of October 11,
the Moniteur contained the names of the members
of the new Cabinet. The despatches of Mareuil, the
charge d'affaires in London, respecting the intentions
of the British government, were, it may be presumed,
considered so satisfactory as to render further assurances
unnecessary. The ministry presided over by Marshal
Soult, assisted by four such men as Broglie, Guizot,
Humann, and Thiers, could almost aspire to the name
of " a government of all the talents."
The British government was in a difficult situa-
tion. The elections were impending, and a Reformed
Parliament, bent upon retrenchment and the settle-
ment of domestic questions, was little likely to regard
1 F. 0. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 4, 1832.
2 Ibid., October 6, 1832.
132
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
with favour any policy which might conceivably lead
to serious complications with foreign Powers. The
very indifferent display of the Belgians, in their short
campaign of the year before, had deprived them of all
popular sympathy. In commercial circles, especially,
the idea of embarking upon hostilities against Eng-
land's old allies, the Dutch, was strongly deprecated. 1
Although the unreasonable attitude of the King of
the Netherlands, during the past twelve months, had
alienated from him the support of The Times 2 and of
many persons who derived their opinions from its
columns, there was unquestionably something to be
said upon his behalf. He had adhered to the pro-
tocols of January 20 and January 27, 1831, which the
plenipotentiaries had declared must form the basis
of any separation treaty. Nevertheless, in order to
conciliate the Belgians, they had gone back upon their
decision, and both the convention of the eighteen
articles and the separation treaty of November 14,
1831, had been framed upon different conditions.
The Tories had always supported the Dutch, and
during the stormy months which had preceded the
passing of the Reform Bill, had delivered some
damaging attacks upon the foreign policy of the
government. It was certain that they would
vehemently denounce any combined action with
France in the Dutch-Belgian question. Nor would
it be politic to disregard their attacks and merely to
treat them as the venomous outburst of party
animosity. Notwithstanding that the republicans
had been crushed in the streets of Paris and that the
Carlist rebellion in La Vendee had been stamped out,
the situation in France undoubtedly presented many
1 Affaires etrangeres, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil A Sebastian!, 8 octobre,
1882.
2 The Times, January 81, 1834. Leading article explaining its
changed attitude in the Dutch-Belgian question and why it had supported
the King of the Netherlands in 1830 and 1881.
133
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
disquieting symptoms. The hiding place of the
Duchesse de Berri was still undiscovered, and her
presence in the west prevented the complete restora-
tion of tranquillity. The great difficulty which Louis
Philippe was experiencing in forming a government
of moderate men afforded food for yet more serious
reflection. The possibility could not be ignored that,
in the near future, he might be compelled to select his
ministers from the Left from the party, the leading
members of which proclaimed unceasingly that the
treaties of 1815 must be abrogated and that Belgium
must be united to France.
King William IV., moreover, was strongly opposed
to hostile action against Holland. The " Jack Tar
animosity " 1 which he always entertained for the
French blazed up afresh at the notion of England
and France engaging upon joint operations in the
Low Countries. The King's dislike to the policy of
his ministers was encouraged by the Howes and the
Fitzclarences, 2 who used their best endeavours to
persuade him to refuse his consent to all measures of
coercion. In view of the little sympathy which the
cause of Belgium evoked in the country, and of the
many difficulties by which they were beset, Lords
Grey and Palmerston might not improbably have felt
disposed to adopt some middle course, more in
harmony with the views of the Court and of the
absolute Powers. But a refusal on their part to
resort to force, in order to obtain the execution of the
treaty, would not have restrained the French from
beginning hostilities. " I should deceive your Lord-
ship," wrote Granville on October 19, "were I to hold
out any expectation that the British government, by
withholding its concurrence, could prevent a French
army from entering Belgium." 3 It was to be
1 C. Greville, Journals, III. p. 83. - Stockmar, Memoirs, I. p. 273.
3 F. O. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 19, 1832.
134
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
apprehended, however, that a refusal of the English
Cabinet to join with France in the application of
coercion to Holland might lead to the resignation of
the Due de Broglie. In that case it was more than
probable that the direction of French policy, at a most
important moment, might pass from the hands of a
statesman of moderate views into those of some
politician of advanced opinions, in whom it would be
impossible to feel the same confidence. This was a
consideration which, without doubt, carried the
greatest weight with the English ministers and
exercised a deciding influence over their resolutions.
It was soon apparent that the withdrawal of their
plenipotentiaries from the conference would be the
extent of the support which the Northern Courts
purposed to give to the King of the Netherlands.
The neutral attitude, which the Tsar had promised
Lord Durham he should adopt, rendered it certain
that Austria would not move a man to the assistance
of Holland. Metternich was much concerned at the
recrudescence of a demand for more Liberal institutions
in Germany, a state of affairs which had called forth
from the Diet fresh decrees of a repressive character.
The prevailing unrest, however, made it the more
desirable that the Dutch-Belgian question, with all
the possibilities of danger attaching to it, should be
promptly settled. Furthermore, the burden of military
establishments was already grievously straining the
Imperial exchequer. 1 But, although Metternich had
no thought of opposing the action of the constitutional
Powers in the Low Countries, he chafed bitterly at
the undignified attitude which his Court was compelled
to adopt. At one time he would impute the whole
blame for the situation which had arisen to the
plenipotentiaries at the conference who, by manifest-
ing too plainly their dread of war, had allowed
1 F. 0. Austria 236, Lamb to Palmerston, November 24, 1832.
135
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Palmerston to see that he might, without danger,
conduct matters as he chose. 1 At other times the
Cabinet of Berlin was the object of his fretful com-
plaints. Had Prussia on the first outbreak of the
insurrection at Brussels marched an army into the
Low Countries, the revolution would have been
stamped out, and all the subsequent trouble would
have been avoided. France, in that case, he professed
to believe, might have threatened, but would never
have dared to intervene. 2
The break-up of the conference and the intention
avowed by the two constitutional Powers of expelling
the Dutch from Antwerp, although not unexpected,
caused considerable perturbation at Berlin. A^illon,
the chief minister, declared that Prussia would agree
to the weekly deduction of a million florins from
Belgium's share of the debt due to Holland, for so
long a period as the Dutch should retain possession of
the citadel of Antwerp. Nor would his Court be
prepared seriously to oppose a blockade of the Scheldt
by the two maritime Powers. The entry of a French
army into the Low. Countries, however, was a different
matter, andi one which would compel Prussia to take
steps to safeguard her interests. But, neither the
angry language of M. A^illon at Berlin nor the veiled
threats indulged in by Baron Werther in Paris, excited
any real apprehension. Nevertheless, as both the French
and English governments were sincerely desirous of
conciliating the absolute Powers, it was resolved to pro-
pose that, pending the settlement of the Dutch-Belgian
question, Prussia should occupy Venloo and that part
of Limburg which the treaty had assigned to Holland. 3
1 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 397-406 ; Metternich & Schwartzen-
berg, 18 novembre, 1882 ; Metternich :i Trauttmansdorf, 13 novembre,
1832.
2 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 411-413 ; Metternich i\ Clam, 18
novembre, 1832.
3 F. 0. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 8, 1832.
136
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
It was not until October 22 that the convention,
to regulate the conditions under which France and
England were to apply coercion to Holland, was signed
in London. The French government chafed im-
patiently at this delay, for which King William's
reluctance to agree to the measures advocated by his
ministers was chiefly responsible. Notwithstanding
Talleyrand's l explanations of the delicate situation in
which Lord Grey was placed, the Due de Broglie, on
October 21, informed Lord Granville that his govern-
ment could wait no longer. The very existence of the
Cabinet, he assured him, was at stake. Unless he
were to be in a position to announce to the Chambers,
which were about to reassemble, that definite steps were
to be taken in order to expel the Dutch from Antwerp,
he and his colleagues would assuredly be driven from
office. If no news were received from London within
the next twenty-four hours, the Cabinet, he had no
doubt, would resolve to march an army against
Antwerp, in the event of the King of the Netherlands
refusing to comply with a summons to evacuate the
citadel. This resolution would, however, be at once
transmitted to London, and would be kept entirely
secret until the British government should have had
time to reply to it. But, to the great joy of Louis
Philippe and his ministers, the arrival, on October 29,
of the convention signed in London relieved them from
the necessity of deciding upon their course of action,
without having previously obtained the concurrence of
the English government. 2
By the terms of the convention of October 22,
F. O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, September 29, October 7, 18,
1832. Affaires etrangeres, 639 Angleterre, Mareuil a Sebastiani,
11 octobre, 1832.
1 Affaires etrangeres, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand & Broglie,
18 octobre, 1832.
- F. 0. France 449, Granville to Palmerston, October 21, 22, 24,
1832.
137
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
1832, the King of the Netherlands was to be
summoned to enter into an engagement by November 2
to withdraw his troops, before the 12th of the same
month, from the territory which the separation
treaty had adjudged to Belgium. Should he refuse
to comply, France and England agreed to lay an
embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their
respective harbours, to order their cruisers to seize all
Dutch vessels at sea, and to blockade the coast of
Holland with their combined fleets. If, by November 15,
the required evacuation should not yet have taken
place, a French army would enter Belgium. But its
operations were to be limited strictly to the capture of the
citadel of Antwerp and the forts dependent upon it, and,
when this result should have been attained, it was to
withdraw immediately. At the same time, a note was
to be addressed to the government at Brussels calling
for the evacuation of Venloo and those places still
occupied by Belgium, which, under the provisions of
the separation treaty, had been assigned to Holland. 1
This demand, however, would be of a purely formal
character, and was to be made upon the understanding
that it need only be complied with, should the King
of the Netherlands agree to the concessions required
of him. 2
Immediately upon receipt of the convention in
Paris, the French fleet at Cherbourg was ordered to
unite with the British squadron at Spithead. This
junction was duly effected, and, on November 4, the
King of the Netherlands having declined to comply
with the demand which had been presented to him,
the combined fleets set sail for the mouth of the
Scheldt, whilst, two days later, both governments laid
an embargo upon the Dutch shipping within their
ports. The Due de Broglie, in the meanwhile, had
1 State Papert, XIX. pp. 258-263.
2 F. O. Belgium 18, Adair to Palmerston, October 30, 1832.
138
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
instructed La Tour Maubourg, the French minister at
Brussels, to negotiate a convention for the entry of a
French army into Belgium. The French government
had always insisted that the operations, for the reduc-
tion of the citadel of Antwerp, must be carried out
exclusively by its own troops. The Belgian army was
to be entirely separated from them, and was to do no
more than hold itself in readiness to repel an invasion,
should the Dutch make an incursion across their
frontiers. King Leopold reluctantly assented to
these conditions, which necessarily deprived his
people of an excellent opportunity of wiping out their
humiliations of the year before. It came, therefore, as
a disagreeable surprise when, on the occasion of the
exchange of the ratifications of the convention, La
Tour Maubourg handed in a statement reserving to
the French government the right of demanding pay-
ment for the expenses of the expedition. This claim,
it was afterwards explained, would not be enforced
immediately, but would be allowed to stand over until
some future occasion. In Palmerston's opinion, how-
ever, the fact that payment was to be deferred made
the demand no less objectionable. Were it to be
admitted, Belgium must necessarily be placed in a
position of dangerous dependence upon France. His
vigorous protests achieved the desired result. After
some discussion the French government agreed to
abandon its claim for the repayment of its expenses. 1
In all other respects matters proceeded with perfect
smoothness. In accordance with the terms of the
convention, on November 16th, a French force of
60,000 men, under the command of Marshal Gerard,
crossed the Belgian frontier and laid siege to the
citadel of Antwerp, the Due d'Orleans and the Due de
Nemours, the two eldest sons of Louis Philippe,
1 F. O. France 443 and 450, Palmerston to Granville, November 20,
30, 1832 ; Granville to Palmerston, November 9, 22, December 7, 1832.
139
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
accompanying the headquarters staff of the army of
operations.
In London the application of coercion of so
vigorous a nature was far from evoking the universal
applause which it called forth in Paris. Among the
general public the entry of Marshal Gerard's army into
Belgium was regarded with suspicion, and a meeting
of London merchants was held, and a petition was
forwarded to the King, praying that hostile measures
might not be taken against the Dutch. The Tories
openly declared that they placed all their hopes in
General Chasse, the commandant of the citadel of
Antwerp. If only that gallant officer could contrive
to repel the French, the Grey Cabinet, they conceived,
might be forced to resign. Possibly there were
sanguine members of the party who fancied that the
prowess of a Dutch general might pave the way to the
repeal of the Reform Act. In the meantime all their
sympathies went out to a drunken sailor who, from
the dock in the police-court, proclaimed the union
of the British flag with the tricolour to be a national
disgrace. 1
The proposal that Prussia should occupy Venloo
and parts of Limburg, and the limitations which the
convention of October 22 set upon the scope of the
French operations, somewhat reconciled the German
Powers to the forcible ejection of the Dutch from
Antwerp. 2 Nevertheless, after having in the first
instance declared its readiness to take temporary
possession of portions of the disputed territory, the
Court of Berlin, at the instigation, it was suspected, of
the Tsar, declined to entertain the suggestion.
Inasmuch as the acquisition of the citadel of Antwerp
1 T. Raikes, Journal, I. pp. 88, 92, 93, 102, and 112. C. Greville,
Journals, II. p. 829.
2 F. O. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, October 18, 1832. F. 0.
France 449, Grauville to Palmerston, October 29, 1832.
140
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
by the Belgians depended upon the success of the
French arms, they could not reasonably be expected to
yield up, even to a third party, any territory which
they actually occupied, before the operations under
Marshal Gerard should have achieved their desired
result. Accordingly, in the formal proposal of
Talleyrand and Palmerston, which was submitted to
Billow on October 30, it was provided that the
Prussian occupation of Venloo and parts of Limburg
and Luxemburg should begin, only when the French
expedition should have accomplished its object.
Angillon, however, declared that this suggestion was
altogether inadmissible. Prussia, it was true, had
signified her willingness to hold certain districts of
the Low Countries. But she had only consented to
take temporary possession of them for the security of
her own interests during the French operations against
Antwerp. To occupy any portion of Holland, after
the withdrawal of Marshal Gerard's army, would
amount, in effect, to the application of military
pressure to the King of the Netherlands to compel
him to accept the conditions of the separation treaty.
Such a proceeding would be wholly inconsistent with
the policy which the Court of Berlin had invariably
pursued, and to which it was resolved to adhere.
Prussia, therefore, would content herself with the
concentration of an army of observation upon the
Meuse, for so long a period as the French might see
fit to remain in Belgium. 1
In the meantime the siege of the citadel of
Antwerp had been proceeding steadily, although
hardly with the rapidity which the British govern-
ment, in its impatience to see the affair concluded,
could have wished. 2 At last, after having sustained a
1 F. 0. Prussia 184, Minto to Palmerston, November 5, 7, 21, 24,
28, 29, December 22, 1832.
2 Affaires etrangnres, 639 Angleterre, Talleyrand d Broglie, 1 de-
cembre, 1832.
141
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
very heavy bombardment and having done all that
honour required, General] Chasse", on December 22,
agreed to surrender. But the two detached forts of
Lillo and Liefkenshoeck, which, owing to the opening
of the dykes, could only have been reduced by a long
blockade, were not included in the capitulation. The
arrangements connected with the transference of the
fortress to the Belgian military authorities were
quickly carried out, and, on December 27, the French
army began its homeward march.
The operations of Marshal Gerard had placed the
Belgians in possession of the citadel of Antwerp, and
had infused vitality into the Soult government, but
they had not succeeded in overcoming the reluctance
of the King of the Netherlands to adhere to the
separation treaty. It remained to be seen whether
the embargo which France and England continued
to maintain, and the loss entailed by the non-payment
of the Belgian share of the Netherlands debt, would
suffice to break down his obstinacy. After this state
of affairs had continued for some four months distinct
symptoms began to manifest themselves in Dutch
commercial circles of discontent at the prolongation
of the crisis. About this same time also the Russian
and Prussian Cabinets became imbued with the notion
that the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian affair might
lead to a separation between France and England.
Their intimate union had grown up in the course of
the negotiations, the final settlement of the question,
it was hoped, might cause them to drift asunder.
The agents of the northern Courts at the Hague were,
accordingly, instructed to urge the King to terminate
definitely his troublesome quarrel with Belgium and the
maritime Powers. 1
1 F. O. France 465, Aston to Palmerson, May 3, 11, 1833. F. 0.
Netherlands 186, Jerningham to Palmerston, February 15, April 18,
May 24, 1833.
142
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
This combination of internal and external pressure
was more than the Dutch Cabinet could withstand.
On May 21, 1833 a convention was signed in London
by the plenipotentiaries of Holland, on the one side,
and those of Great Britain and France, on the other,
stipulating that, so long as the relations between
Holland and Belgium should not be settled by a
definite treaty, His Netherlands Majesty would never
begin hostilities against Belgium, and would leave the
navigation of the Scheldt entirely free. France and
England in return engaged to remove the embargo,
immediately upon the ratification of this convention. 1
The convention of May 21, 1833, was, in effect, an
agreement for the maintenance of the status quo. It
constituted, however, a condition of affairs very
favourable to the Belgians. The retention of the
districts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, according
to the twenty -four articles, should have formed part
of Holland, compensated them amply for the small
inconveniences imposed upon them by the refusal of
the Court of the Hague to acknowledge their
independence and the sovereignty of their King.
Five years later, in 1838, this fact was brought home
to them when, the King of the Netherlands having
announced his intention of adhering to the separation
treaty, the Powers insisted upon the surrender to him
of those territories. By that time, however, Leopold
had obtained the recognition of all the great European
Courts with the exception of that of Russia, whilst,
relieved from the fear of aggression on the part of the
Dutch, his kingdom had already begun to thrive and
to prosper greatly.
It was the firm and skilful hand of Palmerston
which had guided the conference through a sea of
dangers to the creation of a free and independent
Belgium. But if the chief credit for the successful
1 State Papers, XX. pp. 282-286.
143
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
termination of these protracted negotiations should
be given to the English statesman, second honours,
without doubt, should be assigned to Talleyrand.
The veteran diplomatist was no friend to Belgium,
but he was a consistent supporter of the British
alliance. The exceptional position, which his age
and his reputation permitted him to assume, enabled
him on many occasions to uphold successfully the
English policy against his own sovereign and his
government. In 1814, at the Congress of Vienna,
friendship with England had been the object of his
untiring efforts. But, if he looked upon a close under-
standing with that Power as highly advantageous to
the restored Bourbons, he regarded it as a matter
of vital necessity to the Monarchy of July. An
intimate union with England, he was convinced, was
Louis Philippe's best security against the malevolent
hostility of the Northern Courts.
The Belgian conference had shown that, in the
person of Lord Palmerston, a worthy successor to
Canning had entered the arena of European politics.
As was the case with that statesman, Palmerston soon
came to be regarded with the bitterest dislike in
the Courts and Cabinets of the absolute Powers.
Metternich hoped devoutly that the Tories might soon
be back in office, and, not without good reason,
expressed a pious wish that never again might a
conference take place in London. 1 The real weakness
of the absolute Courts had transpired all too clearly in
the course of the negotiations.
1 Metternich, Memoires, V. pp. 406-411 ; Metternich a Trauttmans-
dorff, 13 novembre, 1832.
144
CHAPTER V
MEHEMET ALI
SCARCELY had the withdrawal of the French troops
from Belgium been effected, than grave news was
received from the east. At Konieh, in Asia Minor,
on December 21, 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of
Mehemet Ali, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt, was
reported to have inflicted so signal a defeat upon the
Turkish army, as to place it beyond the Sultan's power
to resist his advance to the shores of the Bosphorus.
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, with all the
fearful complications which it would entail, appeared
to be upon the point of taking place.
The Sultan, Mahmud^IL, had always been keenly
alive to the necessity of remedying the decrepit condi-
tion of his Empire. But only a Peter the Great could
have eradicated effectually the many evils from which
Turkey was suffering, and Mahmud was merely an
Oriental despot. All through his reign, however, he
set himself resolutely to destroy the almost indepen-
dent power which some of his Pashas had begun to
assume over the provinces which they governed. He
imposed the European dress upon his ministers and
officials, he introduced the French system of drill
into his army, and he exterminated the janissaries,
when they rebelled against his innovations. Even at
a time of profound peace reforms of this superficial
character could have effected little real improvement.
Under the actual conditions under which they were
145 L
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
carried out they proved a cause of anarchy and a
further source of weakness to the State.
In 1821 the Sublime Porte was called upon to deal
at the same time with the rebellion of Ali, the cele-
brated " Lion of Janina," and with the more serious
national rising of the Greeks. After the struggle in
the Morea had been carried on for three years, with
ruthless barbarity on both sides, the Sultan was reluc-
tantly compelled to invoke the aid of his too powerful
vassal, the Pasha of Egypt. The intervention of the
well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali deprived the Greeks
of the sea power, which had been the secret of their
success. Nevertheless, Ibrahim's invasion of the Moreu
in 1825, by compelling the Powers to interfere, gave
Greece her independence. The romantic episodes of
the struggle, the classic memories with which the
theatre of war was associated, had gained for the
insurgents the popular sympathies of the western
nations. The Phil-hellenism of the French and
English people gradually drove Villele * and Canning
to concert measures for terminating the conflict with
Nicholas, whose subjects were eager to strike a blow
on behalf of their co-religionists.
Negotiations proceeded slowly, but, on July G,
1827, Great Britain, France and Russia bound them-
selves by treaty to obtain the autonomy of the Korea.
Moreover, in a secret article, it was provided that
an armistice was to be proposed to both sides to be
enforced by such means as might " suggest themselves
to the prudence of the High Contracting Parties."
Three months later, on October 20, the allied fleets
of the three Christian Powers, under the command of
Codrington, the senior admiral, were face to face with
the Mussulman armada in the Bay of Navarino. Im-
mediate hostilities were probably not intended, but
a dispute about the position of a fireship led to an
1 Minister to Louis XVIII. and Charles X.
146
MEHEMET ALI
exchange of shots. Before nightfall the " untoward
event " had come to pass the Turkish and Egyptian
fleets had been destroyed completely.
Mahniud in his fury proclaimed a holy war, and
declared null and void the convention of Akkerman,
which he had recently concluded with Russia for the
settlement of certain points, long in dispute between
the two Powers. Canning was dead and Wellington
was determined to abstain rigidly from anything in
the nature of hostile action against Turkey. Neverthe-
less, under the conditions which had been created by
Canning's departure from the traditional policy of his
party, he could do nothing to prevent Nicholas from
appealing to the last argument of princes. On May 6,
1828, the Russians crossed the Pruth and the war
began, which British and Austrian diplomacy had
always striven to avert. The Turks, however, in a
struggle with their hereditary foes displayed unex-
pected powers of resistance, and it was not until
September 14, 1829, when Constantinople appeared
to lie at the mercy of the invaders, that peace was
concluded at Adrianople.
In accordance with his promises to the Powers,
Nicholas had exacted no cession of territory in Europe.
But Turkey had been compelled to grant a practical
independence to the Danubian principalities, to pay
a heavy war indemnity and to surrender to Russia
Anapi and Poti on the eastern shore of the Black Sea.
Moreover, the Sultan was forced to acknowledge the
complete independence of Greece, which was placed
under the guarantee of Great Britain, France and
Russia. The loss of the Morea was a serious blow to
the Porte. Not only was the Turkish navy deprived
of its finest recruiting ground, but the countenance
given by the Powers to the rising of the Greeks
necessarily had a most disturbing etfect upon all the
Christian subjects of the Sultan.
147
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Whilst the power of the Sultan was thus sensibly
diminished, Mehemet Ali, who had taken no part in
the Russian war, was preparing to avail himself of the
embarrassed condition of the Empire for the prosecu-
tion of his own designs. This remarkable man was
born at Cawala, a small seaport town in Roumelia, in
1769, the year which gave birth to Napoleon Bonaparte
and to Wellington. His father was a yeoman farmer
and he himself, in early life, was a small trader in
tobacco. In 1798, however, Bonaparte's descent upon
Egypt gave him his opportunity. Young Ali sailed
for the country in which he was so rapidly to acquire
fame, in the rank of second-in-command to a regiment
of Bashi-Bazouks. In the troublous times which
followed, his military talents and his statesmanlike
qualities soon brought him into prominence. In 1804,
the sheikhs of Cairo elected him Pasha, and, two years
later, ajirman of the Sultan confirmed their selection.
The last obstacle to his complete ascendency over
Egypt was removed, on March 1, 1811, by the terrible
aft'air known as the massacre of the Mamelukes. The
Beys and chiefs, to the number of 470, were invited to
witness the ceremony of investing his second son with
the command of the army destined for operations
against the Wahabites. These men versed in all the
wiles and stratagems of eastern politics complied, and
walked blindly into the trap set for them by one who,
they must have known, was their deadly enemy. On
leaving the citadel of Cairo they were relentlessly shot
down by a picked body of the Pasha's Albanian troops,
at a point where the road becomes a narrow winding
pathway cut out of the rock. Alone Emin Bey, by
blindfolding his horse and by forcing him through a
gap and down a high, precipitous bank, succeeded in
escaping from the scene of slaughter. 1
During the next few years Mehemet Ali won a
1 C. A. Murray, Memoir of Mohammed Ali, pp. 31-35.
148
MEHEMET ALI
high reputation in the Moslem world by his wars
against the Wahabites, and by his deliverance of the
Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca from these enemies
of the true faith. He had always entertained a great
liking and admiration for Europeans, and his
experience of French and English troops had
impressed him with the superiority of western over
eastern methods. As early as 1803 he had begun to
build up a fleet, and with the assistance of Colonel
Seves, known in Egypt as Suleyman Pasha, a former
aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, he hoped to obtain an
army trained and disciplined on a European model.
His efforts had been so far crowned with success, that,
but for the intervention of the Powers, his son
Ibrahim would, unquestionably, have crushed the
Greek rebellion.
Mehemet All's curious experiment in state
socialism can be discussed more conveniently later on.
Suffice it to say that, unsound as was his economic
system, and destined as it was largely to contribute
to his ultimate undoing, it, for a time, furnished him
with ample funds for the prosecution of his ambitious
schemes. By nature he appears to have been rather a
kind-hearted than a cruel man. To some extent,
without doubt, he was an oppressor of the people, yet
at the same time he constantly protected them from
the ill-treatment and exactions of his officials. But,
although he was too large-minded to find any
satisfaction in useless tyranny, when he conceived that
reasons of state called for their application, he would
resort unhesitatingly to the most ruthless measures. 1
In passing judgment on Mehemet Ali, however, it
must always be remembered that he was an
altogether illiterate man, who had only taught
himself to read in middle life by dint of great
1 N. Senior, Convn-aations and Journals in Egypt and Malta, I.
p. 27.
149
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
perseverance. Nor should it be forgotten that Egypt,
when he assumed the supreme control, was in a
state of confusion and anarchy almost impossible
to realize.
It was not loyalty which had prompted Mehemet
AH to assist the Porte to crush the Greek insurrection.
In 1822 he had obtained the island of Crete from the
Sultan, and the Morea and the pashaliks of Syria and
Damascus were to have been his rewards in 1825.
The intervention of the Powers had deprived him of
the Morea, which he had always regarded as one of
the gates of Constantinople. After the Russo-Turkish
war, however, he felt confident of his ability to take
forcible possession of Syria, the eastern avenue of
approach to the Imperial city. A quarrel with
Abdullah Pasha of Acre furnished him with an excuse
for setting his army and his fleet in motion. On
November 1, 1831, a force of about 10,000 Egyptians,
under Ibrahim, entered Syria and laid siege to the
fortress of Saint-Jean d'Acre.
To the commissioner of the Porte sent to re-
monstrate with him for thus invading a neighbour-
ing pashalik, without the permission of the Sultan,
Mehemet Ali loudly protested the loyalty of his
intentions. The presumptuous Abdullah, he swore,
had " insulted his beard whitened in the service of his
sovereign," and, in the interests of the Porte, he now
proposed to chastise his arrogance. These assurances
were, however, estimated at their true value, and
neither the Sultan nor his ministers had had any
doubts that the Pasha was now launched upon a career
of conquest. 1 The destruction of his powerful vassal
had, for many years past, been an object very near to
Mahmud's heart. To accomplish this purpose, he was
prepared to strain to their uttermost the exhausted
resources of the empire. His favourite, Hosrew, the
1 F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palraerston, January 26, 1832.
150
MEHEMET ALT
Seraskier, 1 was the sworn enemy of Mehemet Ali, and
both the Grand Vizier and the Capudan Pasha 2 were
the creatures of this minister. 3 On the other hand,
however, the Ulemas and the Mullahs argued in
favour of an arrangement with the rebellious viceroy,
even at the price of large concessions. The three
guaranteeing Powers had settled upon the boundaries
of the new Kingdom of Greece, and Sir Stratford
Canning was about to arrive at Constantinople to
arrange the final conditions of separation with the
Porte. But, were peace to be maintained with the
Pasha of Egypt, contended the true Mussulman
party, a united front could be turned to Europe, and
the concessions demanded, in respect of Greece, might
be scornfully rejected. 4
Notwithstanding his wrath, this consideration
appears to have carried some weight with the Sultan.
But his hesitation was not of long duration. Hussein
Pasha, a former janissary, and Mahmud's chief
instrument in the destruction of his comrades, was
appointed to the command of the troops in Syria. No
pains were spared to render the army of operations as
efficient and as numerous as possible, and, early in
May, both Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were declared
outlaws. Meanwhile, the siege of Acre had been
proceeding, but the defence was stubborn, and it was
not until May 27, 1832, that Ibrahim carried the
fortress by storm. The victorious general now set his
face northwards. On June 15, Damascus opened its
gates, and, on July 9, he defeated the advanced
Turkish troops at Horns. A week later, he entered
Aleppo, and, on July 29, routed Hussein Pasha
himself, who had taken up a strong position near
1 Commander-in-chief and Minister of War.
2 High Admiral.
3 F. O. Turkey 210, S. Canning to Palmerston, March 7, 1832.
4 F. O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.
151
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Alexandretta. This victory left him free to pass the
Taurus mountains and to enter Asia Minor.
It was to the politic attitude which he had
observed towards the people of the country through
which he had passed, rather than to any superiority of
his Arab troops over the Turks, that the success of
Ibrahim's invasion should be ascribed. In those wild
and mountainous districts any resistance on the part
of the inhabitants must have greatly impeded the
advance of an army. Ibrahim, however, maintained
the strictest discipline, and paid promptly for all the
requirements of his troops. The people, contrasting
his behaviour with the treatment they had been
accustomed to experience at the hands of the
Turks, were strongly impressed in favour of the
Egyptians. 1 The Emir Beshir, the powerful chief of
the Lebanon, threw in his lot with the invaders. The
warlike Druses and the Maronites tendered Ibrahim
their services. Christians were won over by promises
of equal rights, and Moslems by the prospect of
escaping from Ottoman oppression. Ibrahim's troops
were equipped in European fashion, but there was
nothing about their uniform which could offend the
most rigid Mussulman. He himself was dressed in
the same simple manner as his soldiers, and he
affected always to be a strict observer of Turkish
customs. Although in private, in the company of the
Christian officers of his staff, he would often indulge
freely in French wine, in public he was never seen to
drink anything stronger than water. 1
Ibrahim's rapid succession of victories and his
continued advance filled the Sultan with consternation.
Having resolved to throw all the resources of the
1 F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 27, 1832
(Report of Captain Maunsell, R.N., of H.M.S. Alfred).
2 F. O. Turkey 223 & 224, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 11, 1833
(Report of Mr. A. Pisani) ; Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 24, 1833
(Memorandum of Mr. Kennedy).
152
MEHEMET ALI
Empire into the struggle with Mehemet Ali he could
not afford to quarrel with the Christian Powers.
Stratford Canning, accordingly, experienced little
difficulty in bringing the Porte to agree to the condi-
tions under which it was proposed that Greece should
be separated from Turkey. Soon after his arrival,
however, on May 17, in the course of a confidential
talk, Mustafa-Etfendi, the Sultan's private secretary,
let fall certain expressions indicative of a desire on the
part of his master to enter into a close and intimate
connection with England. 1 On August 7, 1832, on
the occasion of Sir Stratford's audience for the purpose
of taking leave, the Sultan " honoured him with the
gift of his portrait suspended by a gold chain and
set in brilliants/' a mark of His Highness' considera-
tion which, the ambassador reported,* " was -without
precedent." 2 Direct proposals for the conclusion of
an alliance between England and Turkey were im-
mediately afterwards made to him both by the Reis-
E/endi 3 and by the Sultan himself. 4 Furthermore, M.
Maurojeni, the Turkish charge d'affaires at Vienna,
was sent to London to sound the British government
upon the subject, and, on October 18, Namic Pasha, a
major-general of the Imperial Guard, set out for
England with a letter from His Highness to King
William IV. praying for naval assistance on the coast
of Syria. 5
Had the decision rested with Palmerston alone it
is possible that aid of some kind might have been
furnished to the Porte. But the majority of the
members of the Cabinet were strongly averse to
embarking upon any fresh adventure, while the Belgian
1 F. O. Turkey 211, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1832.
2 F. O. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, August 7, 1832.
3 Minister for Foreign Affairs.
4 F. 0. Turkey 212, S. Canning to Palmerston (cipher, separate an d
secret), August 9, 1832.
f> F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, October 18, 1832.
153
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
question was still unsettled. Moreover, since the
conclusion of the great war, the naval establishments
had been cut down to so low a point that it would
have been highly inconvenient to reinforce the
Mediterranean squadron. The British charge d'affaires
at Constantinople was, therefore, instructed to inform
the Porte that " naval assistance was a matter of greater
difficulty than at first sight it would appear to be."
Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking
proof of the Sultan's confidence in British friendship,
and His Majesty's government would at once convey
to Mehemet Ali " an expression of regret that he
should so far have forgotten what was due to his
Sovereign." l This was all the comfort which
Mandeville was able to give to the distracted Turkish
ministers, at the moment when the news reached
Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had been
completely defeated at Konieh, that he himself was a
prisoner in Ibrahim's hands and that, in the words of
the Reift-Effendi, " the Turkish army existed no
longer." 2
A few days before the arrival of the news of the
disaster at Konieh, the Russian general, MuraviefF,
suddenly appeared at Constantinople. On December 23
both he and Boutenieff, the Russian ambassador, had
a conference with the Reis-Effendi and the Seraskicr,
and, on the 27th, the general was received in private
audience by the Sultan, to whom he presented a letter
from the Tsar. No mystery was made of the fact that
Muravieif had been charged to proceed to Cairo, to
warn Mehemet Ali that, should he persist in refusing
to make his submission to the Sultan, he would bring
down upon himself the wrath of the Emperor Nicholas.
But both Mandeville and Varennes, the French charge-
d' affaires, were soon satisfied, notwithstanding the
1 F. O. Turkey 218, Palraerston to Mandeville, December 5, 1832.
2 F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 28, 1832.
154
MEHEMET ALT
secrecy with which the Russian proceedings were
surrounded, that an offer of military assistance had
been tendered to the Porte. Their information was
correct. 1 Boutenieff had offered to place a squadron
of the Black Sea fleet at the Sultan's disposal, but his
Highness, with profuse expressions of gratitude, had
declined the proffered assistance. Rather than accept
help from Russia, he was prepared to humble his pride
and to send Halil Pasha to attempt to arrange a set-
tlement with his rebellious vassal. On January 5, 1833,
this decision was conveyed to Boutenieff, whereupon
Muravieff at once set out upon his mission to Mehemet
Ali, the Sultan's envoy, Halil Pasha, having already
started upon his way to Alexandria.
There had, for a long time past, been a disposition
in England to regard French relations with Egypt
with suspicion. Ever since Bonaparte's descent upon
the country, Egypt was believed to have a sentimental
attraction for the French. Now that by their acquisi-
tion of Algiers, they had gained a footing upon the
African shore of the Mediterranean, this feeling of
distrust had increased. It was remembered that
Polignac had seriously entertained the notion of sub- /
sidizing Mehemet Ali and of employing a corps of'
Egyptian troops in the Algerian expedition. During
the course of Ibrahim's campaign in Syria, both
Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked with sour
disapproval upon Varennes' efforts to persuade the
Porte to allow France to mediate between the Sultan
and the Pasha, 2 But both the French and English
governments were agreed as to the necessity of
1 F. O. Turkey 212, Mandeville to Palmerston, December 31, 1832.
S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 30-31. F. O. Turkey
222, Mandeville to Palmerston (cipher), January 8, 1833. F. O. France
463, Granville to Palmerston, January 21, 28, 1833.
2 F. O. Turkey 211 and 212, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 22,
1832. F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, September 26,
October 26, 1832 (cipher).
155
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
preserving the Ottoman Empire and were resolved to
prevent, if possible, the Porte from falling completely
under the influence of Russia. The Due de Broglie,
when he learnt that offers of assistance had
been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, at once
suggested the joint mediation of France and England
in the Turco-Egyptian dispute, and was greatly
disappointed to find that his proposal met with no
response in London. Palmerston, for the present, was
content to direct Lord Ponsonby to proceed from
Naples to Constantinople, as ambassador to the Porte,
and to despatch Colonel Campbell to Egypt, in the
capacity of British agent and consul-general, with
instructions to communicate " freely and confiden-
tially " with the French and Austrian representatives
at Alexandria. 1
It was one of the ironies of the situation that, at
this time, when Russia was suspected of intending to
put into execution long-matured schemes against the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her traditional
policy towards Turkey had in fact been completely
reversed. As far back as the year 1802 the minister,
Kotchuby, taking as his text Montesquieu's doctrine
that no Power can have a better neighbour than a
weak State, had drawn up a memorandum to prove
that the preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey
should be the object of Russian policy. More recently,
in 1829, when the terms of the peace of Adrianople
were under consideration, the members of the eastern
committee had endorsed Kotchuby's views, and the
Tsar Nicholas had reluctantly adopted their conclu-
sions. 2 Muravieffs instructions had been drawn
strictly in this spirit. Mehemet Ali, Nesselrode laid
1 F. O. Franco 463, Grauville to Palmerston, January 21, 28,
February 7, 1883. F. O. Turkey 227, Palmerston to Campbell,
February 4, 1838.
2 S. Goriainow, Le Boaphore et lex Dardanelles, pp. ix. 27, 48, 49,
CO.
156
MEHEMET ALI
down, must not be allowed to reach Constantinople
and to overthrow the existing regime. Such a develop-
ment would be opposed to the Imperial policy, which
aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present " stationary
condition." Should the Pasha succeed in establishing
himself at Constantinople, Russia would be placed " in
contact with a strong and victorious Power instead of
a weak and defeated neighbour." l
Meanwhile, Ibrahim who was still at Konieh was
believed to be on the point of moving forward to
Brusa. 2 Both to Colonel Duhamel, Muravieff's aide-
de-camp, and to a messenger despatched to him by
M. de Varennes, he returned the same answer. He
was a soldier and must obey his orders, his father
alone could decide upon his movements. He should
be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he
must abide by his instructions. 3 Ibrahim's uncom-
promising attitude overcame the Sultan's hesitation.
Boutenieff was informed that the promised naval
assistance would be thankfully accepted and that, in
addition, His Highness craved for the despatch of
30,000 Russian troops for the defence of his capital.
The Sultan knew well that to invoke the military
protection of the Tsar must lower him in the eyes of
his subjects and of every true Mussulman. But, upon
the whole, he regarded it as less dangerous than to
allow Ibrahim to advance to the shores of the
Bosphorus. It was in vain, therefore, that Varennes
and Mandeville exerted themselves to induce the
Porte to withdraw the demand for Russian help. 4
"A drowning man," said the Reis-E/endi, "will
clutch at a serpent." 6
1 S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 29-30.
2 On the Sea of Marmora.
3 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 18, 26, 1833.
4 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, January 28, February
3, 4, 1833. S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 31.
5 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 15, 1833.
157
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Early in February Muravieff was back at Con-
stantinople. The terms which Halil Pasha had been
empowered to offer had not been accepted, but
Mehemet AH had promised Muravieff that, for the
present, the Egyptian army should not advance
beyond Kiutayeh. 1 Upon the news that no immediate
forward movement on the part of Ibrahim was to be
apprehended, both the French and British ministers
again endeavoured to persuade the Porte to ask that
the despatch of the Russian succour might be delayed.
According to the Reis-Effendi such a request was
actually made to Boutenieff, who replied that he had
no ship at his disposal to send to Sevastopol, although
a Russian brig of war was at the time at anchor in
front of the embassy. 2 On the other hand, accounts
of these proceedings, derived from Russian sources,
state that the question of postponing the departure of
the fleet was never seriously raised. 3 Be that as it
may, on February 20, 1833, the Russian squadron,
consisting of four sail of the line, three large frigates,
a corvette and a brig, entered the Bosphorus and
anchored at Buyukdere.
Three days earlier, on February 17, Admiral
Roussin, the newly appointed French ambassador to
the Sublime Porte, arrived at Constantinople. Upon
the appearance of the Russian fleet he at once in-
structed his dragoman to warn the Porte that, unless the
admiral in command were requested to depart within
twenty-four hours, he should consider his mission at
an end. At the same time he tried to induce the
British minister to make a similar representation.
Mandeville, however, could only reply that he had no
authority " to hold language of so high and energetic
a character." Roussin appears to have seen very soon
1 About 150 miles beyond Konieh, and 80 miles from Brusa.
2 F. 0. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 11, 23, 1833.
3 S. Qoriainow, Le Bosphore et lea Dardanelles, p. 32.
158
that he had acted with undue precipitation, and that
his own withdrawal would not hasten by an hour the
departure of the Russian ships. But his next step
was scarcely more judicious. On the 21st, he affixed
his signature to a document guaranteeing that
Mehemet AH would make peace with the Sultan, upon
the terms proposed by Halil Pasha and which had
already been rejected. In return the Sublime Porte
was to undertake to refuse *' foreign succour " of any
kind in the future. 1
It was hoped to satisfy Mehemet Ali by conferring
upon him the government of the districts of Acre,
Naplous, Jerusalem and Tripoli. He, however, was
resolved to extend his rule over the whole of Syria,
and to acquire, in addition, the pashalik of Adana
and the seaports of Selefkeh and Alaia. Adana
possessed an especial value in his eyes, by reason of its
forests from which he proposed to obtain the timber
necessary for the building of his ships. He under-
stood the difficulties of the Sultan's position and he
was well informed about the rivalries of the Powers. 2
He perceived clearly that he was never likely again to
have so favourable an opportunity for pressing his
demands upon the Porte. On March 23, accordingly,
Reshid Bey arrived at Constantinople bringing a letter
in which Mehemet Ali rejected scornfully Admiral
Roussin's proposals. He would rather, he declared,
meet with an honourable death than submit to be
deprived of territories which were his by right of
conquest. At the same time, Ibrahim was directed to
march on Constantinople if, within five days of
Reshid's arrival, the Sultan should not have agreed to
the required concessions. 3
Terrible consternation prevailed in the Seraglio,
1 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, February 23, 1833.
2 F. 0. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, March 31, 1833.
3 F. 0. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmarston, March 26, 27, 1833.
159
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and great was the perplexity at the French and
British embassies. Roussin counselled a complete
surrender to Mehemet Ali, and Mandeville had no
alternative to propose. It was decided, finally, that a
Turkish plenipotentiary should proceed, accompanied
by M. de Varennes, to Ibrahim's headquarters at
Kiutayeh with authority to offer the pashaliks of
Damascus and Aleppo. 1 Ibrahim, however, would not
entertain the idea of a compromise, and Varenues
could only report the failure of his mission and advise
the cession of Adana. In opposition to the recom-
mendations of Mandeville, but with the approbation of
Admiral Roussin, the Sultan consented to yield up to
his vassal this valuable district. 3 The preliminaries of
this agreement, known as the Convention of Kiutayeh
were signed on April 8, 1833, and Ibrahim forthwith
began his preparations for retiring into Syria.
In the meantime, however, on April 6, a second
division of the Russian fleet had arrived in the
Bosphorus and 5000 troops had been disembarked
on the Asiatic shore opposite to the British embassy
at Therapia. The Tsar Nicholas was greatly incensed
at Admiral Roussin's attempts to induce the Porte to
ask for the withdrawal of his squadron. Pozzo di
Borgo was, in consequence, charged to protest
vigorously in Paris against the admiral's conduct,
and the complaints of the Russian ambassador were
warmly supported by his colleagues of Austria and
Prussia. Broglie, although he might allow Lord
Granville to perceive that he was not altogether
convinced of the wisdom of Roussin's actions,
invariably met the representations of the agents of
the Northern Courts with the reply that the admiral's
conduct was fully approved of by his government. 3
1 F. O. Turkey 228, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 81, 1833.
2 Ibid., April 14, 1833.
3 F. 0. France 464, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 22, 29, 1833.
160
MEHEMET ALI
At Constantinople Boutenieff declared emphatically
that nothing short of the complete evacuation of Asia
Minor by the Egyptians would induce his Imperial
master to recall either his fleet or his troops to
Sevastopol. 1
When the list of the pashaliks to which Mehemet
Ali had been appointed was officially made public, it
was seen that no mention had been made of the
province of Adana. Upon hearing of this breach of
the Convention of Kiutayeh, Ibrahim promptly
arrested the homeward march of his army. 2 A few
days later, however, on April 22, a third division of
the Russian fleet and a second detachment of troops
entered the Bosphorus. These reinforcements, which
should have added to the Sultan's powers of resistance,
became, in effect, the determining cause of his decision
finally to give way about Adana. Ever since the
entry of Ibrahim into Asia Minor, the people of
Constantinople had been deprived of their usual
sources of supply. The necessity of provisioning the
Russian fleet and corps cTarmee had greatly
aggravated the difficulties of the situation. Con-
fronted by the prospect of a famine and a rising of the
populace, Mahmud elected to humble his pride and to
obtain the withdrawal of the Egyptians at the price of
the surrender of Adana. 3 Yet he could not bring
himself openly to nominate his rebellious vassal to
the governorship of this important province. Ibrahim
was, in consequence, officially appointed collector of
the crown revenues of the district. Mehemet Ali,
provided he could exercise an effective dominion over
Adana, was content, in this instance, to waive his claim
to be styled its Pasha. In point of fact he was
delighted that matters had been so satisfactorily
1 F. O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 11, 1833.
2 Ibid., April 23, 1833.
3 Ibid., May 4, 1833.
161 M
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
arranged. Under Campbell's threat that, should he
persist in claiming Adana, the coast of Egypt would
be blockaded by the British fleet, he had actually
announced his intention of withdrawing his demand,
when the news arrived that the Sultan had invested
his son with the administration of the territory in
dispute. 1 Relations of amity were thus once more
officially established between the Sublime Porte and
the Pasha.
On May 1 Lord Ponsonby, the newly appointed
British ambassador, arrived at Constantinople, pre-
ceding by three days Count Orloff, the general-
issimo of the Russian military and naval forces in the
Black Sea and the Bosphorus, and Ambassador-
Extraordinary to the Sublime Porte. His appoint-
ment was due to the Tsar's desire to be represented at
Constantinople by some one who could be depended
upon resolutely to oppose Admiral Roussin.
Boutenieff appears to have been considered as some-
what deficient both in energy and strength of
character. Orloff had been furnished with very wide
powers, but he was charged to regard the task of
convincing the Sultan and his ministers that their
safety entirely depended upon the degree of support
which, in the future, the Tsar might be disposed to
afford them, as the primary object of his mission. He
must be admitted to have carried out his instructions
most faithfully. From the day of his arrival Russian
influence was supreme at the Porte and in the Divan.
Roussin's request that French war ships should be
allowed to pass through the Dardanelles was
peremptorily refused. Ponsonby saw clearly that,
for the time being, he must submit to be over-
shadowed completely by the Russian ambassador.
For the present he could only gaze moodily from
1 F. O. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15,
1833.
162
MEHEMET ALI
his windows at the Russian encampment in the
valley of Unkiar-Skelessi and endeavour to restrain
his French colleague from affording Orloff any
excuse for delaying the departure of his troops. At last,
on July 9 and 10, the Egyptian withdrawal behind the
Taurus mountains having been completely carried out,
the Tsar's soldiers were embarked and his ships sailed
out of the Bosphorus. 1
For some weeks prior to the departure of the
Russian expedition, it had been reported that an
offensive and defensive treaty was on the point of
being concluded between the Tsar and the Sultan. 2
The truth of this rumour was confirmed after Orloff
had quitted Constantinople. It would appear that
it was the Sultan himself who first suggested an
alliance, at an audience accorded to Orloff shortly
after his arrival, and that Ahmed Pasha acted as
the intermediary between the palace and the Russian
embassy in the very secret negotiations which
followed. The diplomatic instrument, known as
the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, concluded between
the Porte and Russia on July 8, 1833, for a
duration of eight years, consisted of six public
and one secret article. The public articles merely
proclaimed the existence of peace and friendship
between the two Empires and provided for their
mutual succour in case of need. The whole
importance of the treaty lay in the secret clause
in which it was stipulated that, inasmuch as
Russia had no intention of exercising her right to
ask for military assistance, the Porte, in return,
would, " upon demand and in accordance with the
1 S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 83-37. F. O.
Turkey, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 22, June 7, July 7, 1833.
2 F. 0. France 466, Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1833. F. O.
Turkey 224, Pisani to Ponsonby (secret and confidential), June 17,
1833 ; Ponsouby to Palmerston, June 22, 1833.
163
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
principle of reciprocity," * close the Dardanelles to
the warships of all nations.
It appears that, when it became necessary to inform
the Turkish ministers of the projected treaty, they one
and all evinced the greatest repugnance to the idea of
an alliance with their hereditary enemies. But, at the
news that the British fleet was approaching the
Dardanelles, they withdrew their objections. They
had besought the British government for naval assist-
ance in the struggle with Mehemet Ali, and their
request had been refused. The arrival, on June 25,
in the Bay of Tenedos of Sir Pulteney Malcolm's
squadron, which, a few months earlier, could have
intercepted the communications with Egypt and
changed the course of the campaign, now only served
to revive painful recollections of Admiral Duckworth's
proceedings in 1807. 3
The question of access to the sea, which bathes the
coasts of the richest provinces of the Empire, must
necessarily be a matter of the highest importance to
Russia. The principle of regarding the Black Sea as a
mare clausum found a place in the treaty concluded
between the Porte and Russia, on December 23, 1798.
It was again inserted into the treaty of September 23,
1805, but with this important addition that to the
Russian fleet was granted a right of passage to the
Mediterranean through the straits. These conditions,
however, had been terminated by the outbreak of
hostilities in 1806, and in the subsequent treaty of
peace, signed at Bucharest on May 10, 1812, no men-
tion was made of the special privilege which Russia
had obtained seven years before. Again in the treaty
of peace concluded between Great Britain and Turkey,
on January 5, 1809, England undertook to observe
"the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," which
1 " Au besoin et d'apres le principe de reciprocite."
2 S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et lea Dardanelles, p. 41.
164
MEHEMET ALI
declared the straits of Constantinople closed to the
warships of the Powers. But this arrangement, which
had ever since been regarded as a law of nations, was
suddenly terminated by the act, signed at the palace
of Unkiar-Skelessi, restoring Russia to the favoured
position which she had enjoyed for a brief space of
time in 1805. No specific mention, it was true,
had been made of her right of passage to and
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Neverthe-
less, although for obvious reasons both Russian and
Turkish ministers might prefer to elude a direct state-
ment on the subject, they unquestionably placed this
interpretation upon Orloffs treaty. 1 It was in this
light also that it was looked upon by Lord Palmerston
and the Due de Broglie.
At the suggestion of Broglie, 2 as it would appear,
the French and English governments resolved to
instruct their representatives at Constantinople to
advise the Porte not to ratify the treaty. But, should
the Sultan confirm the signatures of his plenipo-
tentiaries, they were to hand in a note, pointing out
that by the treaty the relations of Turkey with Russia
seemed to have been placed upon an entirely new
footing. In the event of this changed situation leading
to the armed interference of Russia in the internal
affairs of Turkey, France and Great Britain were
resolved to act as the circumstances might appear
to require, " equally as if the treaty above mentioned
were not in existence." 3 Directly it had been reported
that this note had been presented to the Porte, a copy
of it was transmitted to the French and British
ministers at St. Petersburg, for communication to the
Imperial Cabinet. Nesselrode in reply contended that
the treaty was purely defensive and aimed solely at
1 S. Goriainow, Le BoxpJiore et les Dardanelles, pp. 42-44.
2 F. O. France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 2, 1833.
3 F. O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 27, 1833.
165
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the preservation of Turkey. It had, it was true,
changed the relations of the two Empires towards each
other. It had converted a state of hostility and sus-
picion into one of friendship and confidence. His
Majesty the Emperor was determined, should circum-
stances demand it, faithfully to carry out the obliga-
tions which he had contracted, " as though the declara-
tion contained in the French and British notes did
not exist." In return Lord Palmerston reiterated the
dissatisfaction with which the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
was regarded in England. This despatch was in due
course communicated to Count Nesselrode by Mr.
Bligh, the British charge d'affaires, who, as he placed
it in the hands of the Russian chancellor, added that
his government " was resolved not to be drawn into a
controversy upon a question in which it differed so
widely from the Imperial Cabinet." 3
In the meantime, a meeting had taken place, in
September, at Munchengratz, between the Tsar of
Russia, the Emperor of Austria and the Crown Prince
of Prussia. The object of this interview had been
officially ascribed solely to a desire upon the part
of Nicholas to become better acquainted with the
Emperor Francis. 3 This explanation, which was
received with contemptuous derision by Palmerston, 4
and which Bligh " could scarcely read with becoming
gravity," deceived nobody. In point of fact weighty
political matters were the subject of the deliberations
of these potentates and their confidential advisers.
The formation of a league of the three Northern Courts
to resist the doctrine of non-intervention had, ever
since the Revolution of July, been the favourite scheme
of Nicholas and Metternich. Frederick William III.,
1 F. 0. Russia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, October 24, 1833.
2 Ibid., December 28, 1833.
3 F. O. Russia 207, Bligh to Palmerston, August 24, 1833. F. O.
France 466, Aston to Palmerston, August 30, 1838.
4 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmernton, II. pp. 165-166.
166
MEHEMET ALT
however, was doubtful of the wisdom of openly resusci-
tating the Holy Alliance. He was strongly impressed
with the dangers of a policy, which must necessarily
draw a sharp dividing line between the absolute and
the constitutional Powers. For this reason neither
the King of Prussia nor his chief minister travelled
to the little town on the Bohemian frontier to assist
at the deliberations. But, after the two Emperors had
set out on their return to their respective capitals,
Nesselrode journeyed to Berlin and succeeded in in-
ducing the King of Prussia to become a party to
the convention to which Nicholas and Francis had
given their adherence. By this treaty, signed
at Berlin, on October 15, 1833, the right of every
independent sovereign to call to his aid another sove-
reign was proclaimed. Should one of the three Courts
see fit to render material assistance to any sovereign,
and should such action be opposed by another Power,
the three Courts would consider any interference of
this kind in the light of an act of hostility directed
against them all.
In consequence of the objections of the King of
Prussia, the plan of transmitting this convention to
the French government was abandoned. But the
principle, which it involved, formed the subject of
separate despatches, couched in more or less threaten-
ing language, which the agents of the three Northern
Courts in Paris duly communicated to the Due de
Broglie. The Duke, however, declared emphatically
that, whatever her attitude might be as regards more
distant States, France would assuredly resist by force
of arms any intervention in Switzerland, Belgium or
Piedmont. Moreover, he caused a circular to be sent
to all French representatives at foreign Courts clearly
defining the line of action which would be adopted in
cases of intervention. The boldness of his language
came as a disagreeable surprise to Metternich. The
167
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Northern Courts, when they made their communica-
tions to the French government, had not intended to
provoke a defiant rejoinder of this kind.
At their meeting at Munchengratz, however, the
two Emperors had not been concerned exclusively
with the question of intervention, and with their
policy towards France. On September 18, 1833,
Nesselrode and Metternich signed a convention,
pledging Russia and Austria to combine for the
preservation of the Ottoman empire. The contract-
ing parties specifically undertook to oppose any
extension of the authority of Mehemet Ali over the
European provinces of Turkey. Lastly, should the
existing regime at Constantinople be overturned,
Russia and Austria agreed to act in concert on every
point relating to the establishment of a new order of
affairs. 1
Unfortunately, Nicholas saw fit to insist that
absolute secrecy should be observed with regard to
this convention, which might, with so much advan-
tage, have been communicated to the western Powers.
He probably feared that Russia's changed policy
towards Turkey would be ascribed to alarm, engendered
by Admiral Roussin's hostile attitude at Constanti-
nople. Sincerely desirous as he was to conciliate the
English government, he would not consent to admit,
so long as France and Great Britain were intimately
united, that Russia had renounced her old ambition of
establishing her power upon the Bosphorus. But,
although his pride would not allow him frankly to
explain his eastern policy to the British government,
he was at pains to convince Mr. Bligh of the purity of
his intentions. He was a " chevalier anglais" he
reminded him at the conclusion of a long talk about
the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and, pointing to his
star of the Garter, twice repeated the words " Iloni -wit
1 S. Goriainow, Le BospJiore et les Dardanelles, pp. 51-52.
1G8
MEHEMET ALI
qui mat y pense" 1 But assurances of this kind
carried no weight with the English government.
Russia was universally believed to be moving steadily
towards Constantinople. The chief organs of the
press accused her daily of secretly preparing to
conquer or to absorb the Ottoman empire. The most
extreme Radicals in the reformed Parliament, and
Tory gentlemen, the hunting friends of Matuszewic, 3
at Melton, were alike convinced of the duplicity and
of the aggressive character of Russian policy.
It was necessarily a matter of the deepest interest
to both Palmerston and Broglie to ascertain the spirit
in which Metternich would regard the Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelessi. The despatches from Vienna, how-
ever, speedily dispelled the hope that the dominant
position which Russia had acquired at Constantinople
would meet with the disapproval of Austria. Metter-
nich's lips were sealed on the subject of the Austro-
Russian convention respecting Turkey, and he could,
in consequence, only declare emphatically that he felt
no distrust of Russia, and was satisfied that she
harboured no hostile designs against Turkey. If
England, he reminded Lamb, 3 had not refused the
Sultan the assistance for which he had asked, he
would not have been driven to look to Russia as his
sole protector against Mehemet Ali. Neither Palmer-
ston nor Broglie believed that these expressions of
confidence in the honest intentions of Russia re-
presented Metternich's real convictions. Both attri-
buted his attitude to his intense fear of revolution,
which made him wilfully blind to the schemes which
Russia was maturing so craftily. But, so long as he
1 F. 0. Eussia 208, Bligh to Palmerston, December 21, 1833 (con-
fidential).
2 Matuszewic figures in the well-known picture, " The Melton Break-
fast."
3 F. O. Austria 243, Lamb to Palmerston, September 3, October 1,
December 26, 1833.
169
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
should continue in this frame of mind, they were
agreed that it would be " imprudent for Great Britain
and France to found upon the treaty any measures
of decided hostility." l For the present, therefore,
they were content to exercise the greatest vigilance,
and to be prepared for fresh developments. Every
endeavour, however, was to be made to open the eyes
of the Sultan to the real nature of his position, and to
induce him to withdraw from the fatal alliance into
which he had been inveigled. At the same time it
was greatly to be desired that Russia should be
afforded no excuse for intervening under the stipula-
tions of Orloff's treaty. Afresh quarrel between the
Porte and Mehemet All was the only circumstance
which could possibly justify such action on her part.
The whole influence of Great Britain and France
must, accordingly, be exerted to prevent the Pasha
from committing any renewed act of aggression. 3
1 F. O. France 481, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1834.
2 F. O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833.
170
CHAPTER VI
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
THE growing power of Mehemet Ali, and the increas-
ing decrepitude of the Ottoman Empire were not the
only subjects which, in the year 1833, engaged the
serious attention of the European Cabinets. A civil
war was in progress in Portugal, and Spain was
threatened with the same calamity. Dom Pedro, the
Emperor of Brazil, had, on the death of his father,
abdicated the crown of Portugal in favour of his seven
year old daughter, Donna Maria de Gloria. At the
same time he had appointed his brother, Dom Miguel,
to the Regency, on the understanding that he would //
agree to observe the Charter, and to marry his niece,
the young Queen. Dom Miguel gave the required
assurances, but upon his arrival at Lisbon, early in
the year 1828, he proceeded to abrogate the constitu-
tion, and shortly afterwards to usurp the throne. His
unlawful assumption of the crown was followed by
harsh and reactionary measures against Liberals and
Freemasons, which culminated in the establishment
of a veritable reign of terror. It was in consequence
of this state of affairs, that, in July, 1831, a French
fleet had, with the full approval of the British
government, been dispatched to the Tagus to exact
reparation for outrages committed on French subjects. 1
Meanwhile, a successful revolution in Brazil had
compelled Dom Pedro to seek refuge in England,
1 Vide p. 75.
171
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
where he arrived with his daughter at the very
moment when Admiral Roussin's squadron was before
Lisbon. The fallen Emperor threw himself heart and
soul into the task of reconquering his daughter's
kingdom. Lord Grey's Cabinet regarded his warlike
preparations with tacit approval, whilst the French
government openly encouraged him, and allowed his
followers to assemble at Belle- Isle. The constitu-
tional fleet, commanded by Sartorius, a British naval
officer, set sail from that port on February 10, 1832,
and, by the following month of July, Dom Pedro was
master of Oporto. But, though he constantly suc-
ceeded in defeating the Miguelite forces sent to
re-take the city, his cause made little or no progress
in other parts of the country.
Whilst these events were taking place in Portugal
the health of the King of Spain had been visibly
declining. Under ordinary circumstances it would
have been a matter for congratulation, rather than for
regret, that any country should be relieved from the
rule of such a man as Ferdinand VII. In this
particular instance, however, it was too probable that
a fiercely disputed succession would be the legacy
which he would bequeath to his unfortunate subjects.
His third wife, Maria Amalia of Saxony, had died on
May 17, 1829, and he, thereupon, announced his
intention of re-marrying. His choice fell upon an
intelligent and attractive woman in the person of his
niece, Maria Christina of Naples. His first three
marriages had been childless, but his fourth wife,
Christina, presented him with a daughter on October 1 0,
1830. By the ancient law of Spain females could
succeed to the throne, in the event of there being no
direct male heirs. But in 1713, Philip V., in order to
prevent the union of the Spanish and French crowns,
had been forced to issue a Pragmatic Sanction, which
gave the preference of succession always to the male
172
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
line. This act, however, was repealed in 1789 by
Charles IV., who restored the ancient law.
This return to the old order of succession was not,
however, made public until May 19, 1830, when
Christina succeeded in persuading Ferdinand to allow
the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated. Conse-
quently, when some five months later her daughter
was born, she was promptly proclaimed Princess of
the Asturias, a title only conferred upon an heiress to
the throne. A fierce struggle then began between
Christina and Don Carlos, who had hitherto been
looked upon as his brother's successor. This prince
was the champion of the ultra clerical the so-called
Apostolical party whereas Christina, who, during
her passage through France, had promised to use her
influence on behalf of the Spanish political exiles,
represented the hopes of the Liberals. Thus, in
September, 1832, when Ferdinand was supposed to
be at the point of death, the Apostolical minister,
Calomarde, succeeded in procuring the abrogation of
the law of 1789. But the King most unexpectedly
recovered, and, under the influence of Christina, caused
the decree of Charles IV. to be promulgated a second
time. Calomarde, moreover, was disgraced and dis-
missed and a comparatively Liberal Cabinet was
formed.
From the moment of Dom Pedro's return to
Europe, the French Cabinet had endeavoured to
persuade the British government to join with France
in expelling Dom Miguel from Portugal. Palmerston,
however, had declined to interfere actively. 1 He was
very unwilling that France should be afforded an
opportunity of extending her influence in Portugal,
and he, moreover, suspected Louis Philippe of schem-
ing to marry one of his sons to Donna Maria. But,
1 F. O. France 430, Grauville to Palmerston, July 28, 1881. F. O.
France 425, Palmerston to Granville, August 10, 1831.
173
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
provided it could be brought about without a French
intervention, he was sincerely anxious that the usurper
should be overthrown and that a Liberal regime should
be set up at Lisbon. The dismissal of Calomarde
appears to have suggested to him that the King of
Spain might not be found unwilling to render assist-
ance to the constitutional cause in Portugal. Under
ordinary circumstances Ferdinand could scarcely have
been expected to regard with a friendly eye the
establishment of a limited monarchy in a country
bordering upon Spain. But the birth of his daughter
had introduced a new element into the situation.
Dom Miguel derived his strength from the support of
the Apostolical party, which in Spain looked upon
Don Carlos as its champion. There were some
grounds, therefore, for hoping that Ferdinand's
paternal anxiety to see his daughter Isabella's
succession to the throne assured might prove stronger
than his natural aversion to the growth of Liberal
institutions in a neighbouring State.
The task of inducing Ferdinand to intervene on
behalf of Donna Maria was entrusted to Sir Stratford
Canning, who was generally selected for the most
difficult negotiations. Canning arrived in Madrid,
upon his special mission, at the beginning of January,
1833. His first conferences with the Spanish Minister
for Foreign Affairs convinced him that he had little
prospect of bringing his task to a successful conclusion.
Compared to a man of the type of Calomarde, Cea,
Bermudez, his successor, might seem to be a Liberal.
In point of fact, however, although he was strongly
opposed to Don Carlos and the clerical party, he was
even more hostile to representative institutions in any
shape. An enlightened despotism, in his opinion,
constituted the best form of government for Spain.
Accordingly, he made it very clear that the change of
ministry had in no way modified the views of the
174
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
Court as to the situation in Portugal. It would be,
he declared, altogether inconsistent with honour and
good faith for the King to participate in any measures
directed against the sovereignty of Dom Miguel. 1
Stratford Canning, notwithstanding that his task
seemed almost hopeless, remained some four months in
the Spanish capital. So long as Cea Bermudez was in
power it was plainly useless to expect that Ferdinand
could be induced to enter into the views of the British
government. Canning, accordingly, set himself to
work to undermine the position of that minister. For
a brief moment he seems to have been sanguine that,
by means of " a difference of opinion in the Cabinet,"
he might be able to effect his purpose. But his hopes
were speedily dispelled. The three ministers opposed
to Cea Bermudez with whom he had established
communication were suddenly dismissed by the King. 2
Nor was he more fortunate with Queen Christina, with
whom he contrived *' to open a direct and confidential
intercourse." 3 She appeared to agree with him that
the triumph of Dom Miguel in Portugal could not
fail to react disastrously upon the fortunes of her
daughter, but she either could not, or would not
influence the King to regard matters in the same
light.
Sir Stratford's difficulties had been aggravated by
the news that Dom Pedro's resources were exhausted,
and that his position at Oporto was desperate. But a
few weeks after Canning's departure from Madrid the
situation in Portugal assumed a very different com-
plexion. Sartorius, the admiral of the constitutional
fleet, had been replaced by Charles Napier, who from
the first appears to have judged the political and
strategical situation correctly. The mere possession of
1 F. O. Spain 408, Canning to Pahnerston, January 22, 1833.
2 Ibid., March 20, 29, 1833.
3 Ibid., February 7, 1833 (most secret).
175
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Oporto and victorious sallies against the Miguelitc
lines would never, he saw clearly, win the crown for
Donna Maria. A bold move on Lisbon itself could
alone give the victory to the constitutionalists. The
capital, in his opinion, might be captured, provided
he could obtain the command of the sea. Having
succeeded in persuading Dom Pedro and his advisers
to adopt his views, he sought out the Miguelite fleet,
and, on July 5, 1833, despite the inferiority of his
ships, completely destroyed it off Cape St. Vincent. 1
Three weeks later, Lisbon was occupied by Terceira,
the constitutional general, in the name of Donna Maria.
The capture of Lisbon compelled the Miguelites
to raise the siege of Oporto. The civil war continued,
nevertheless, in other parts of the country. No
sooner, however, was Dom Pedro, the Regent,
installed in the capital than the British government
recognized the sovereignty of Queen Maria, and under-
took to protect her from aggression on the part of the
King of Spain. 2 But the fear that Ferdinand might
send military assistance to Dom Miguel was speedily
set at rest. On September 29, 1833, he died, and
Christina, thereupon, assumed the government in the
name of her daughter Isabella, who was at once
acknowledged as Queen of Spain by France and Great
Britain. The partisans of her uncle Don Carlos were,
however, upon the alert. The Basque provinces rose
in arms to the cry of " Long live Carlos V. Long
live the Inquisition," and Don Carlos was proclaimed
King, on October 7, at Vittoria. 3
Don Carlos himself was fortunately absent from
Madrid at the time of his brother's death. Some
few months earlier he had been practically exiled
from Spain and had joined Dom Miguel in Portugal.
1 C. Napier, War in Portugal, I. pp. 160-161 and 176-206.
2 F. O. Portugal 398, Palmerston to Russell, August 7, 1833.
3 F. O. France 469, Granville to Palmerston, October 10, 1833.
176
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
The presence of the Spanish Pretender at the head-
quarters of the Portuguese Usurper appears at last
to have brought home to Christina and her minister,
Cea Bermudez, that the fortunes of Isabella must
largely depend upon the success of the constitutional
cause in Portugal. Mr. Villiers, the British minister
newly accredited to the Court of Madrid, experienced,
in consequence, none of those difficulties which had
baffled Stratford Canning's ingenuity, whilst Ferdinand
was alive. The Queen Regent's government consented,
after some little hesitation, to propose to the contend-
ing parties in Portugal the joint mediation of Great
Britain and Spain, and, when Dom Miguel declined to
consider this offer, Cea Bermudez announced that his
refusal had released Spain from all engagements which
she had contracted towards him. 1
At the news that Ferdinand was dead and that
serious disturbances had broken out, the French
government proceeded to concentrate troops in
proximity to the Spanish frontier. These military
movements excited considerable alarm in London,
where it was feared that they were a prelude to an
active intervention. Palmerston, however, was soon
satisfied that neither Louis Philippe nor the chief
members of his government wished to despatch an
army across the Pyrenees. 2 In the opinion of Due de
Broglie, the expulsion of Dom Miguel from Portugal
was a necessary preliminary to any attempt to settle
Spanish affairs. Both he and his colleagues, he
declared, were prepared to respect England's tradi-
tional dislike to any foreign intrusion in Portugal.
But, under these circumstances, they had a right to
expect, he contended, that great Britain should herself
1 F. 0. Spain 412, Villiers to Palmerston, October 7, 15, 19, 24, 31,
November 8, 23, December 8, 1833.
2 Ibid,, October 27, 1833 (cypher). F. 0. France 465, Granville to
Palmerston, November 1, 15, 29, 1833.
177 N
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
take the necessary measures for terminating a situa-
tion, which threatened to disturb the tranquillity of
neighbouring States. 1
Although very anxious to see peace restored, the
British government wished to escape from the
necessity of landing a military force in Portugal. It
hoped to attain the desired result by concerting
measures with Spain for the expulsion of both
Pretenders. Seeing that Don Carlos was levying war
from Portuguese territory against the government of
the Queen Regent, the right of Spain to intervene was
beyond question. In January, 1834, Cea Bermudez
had been succeeded by Martinez de la Rosa. The new
minister entered readily into the plans of the British
government and agreed to despatch an ambassador
to London, provided with full powers to conclude a
convention. Strict secrecy was observed about the
negotiations, and it was only, on April 13, 1834, when
all the details had been settled, that Palmers ton
showed Talleyrand a draft of the proposed treaty.
Spain was to send an army against Dom Miguel,
whilst England was to furnish Dom Pedro with naval
assistance. It was not intended to invite France to
be a party to this agreement ; she would merely be
asked to adhere to it. 2
Talleyrand's account of this transaction was sent
to Admiral de Rigny, not to the Due de Broglie. The
refusal of the Chamber to ratify his proposals for
settling a long-standing dispute with the United
States, respecting the indemnity to be paid for the
seizure of certain ships between the years 1806 and
1812, had driven the Duke to resign. The conditions
of the projected treaty caused the greatest irritation in
1 F. O. France 468 & 480, Granville to Palmerston, December 16,
1883, January 17, March 14, 1834. Affaires etrangeres, 643 Angleterre,
Talleyrand a Broglie, 10 mars, 1834.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 643 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Rigny, 13,
14 arril, 1834. Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 86-92.
178
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
Paris. " The effect would be disastrous," wrote Rigny,
" were it to appear that France had entered into
the agreement under the protection of England." '
Talleyrand was, accordingly, directed to insist that
France should be made a party to the treaty. After
a lengfchy and, at times, a heated discussion,
Palmerston gave way and, on April 22, 1834, the
instrument, known as the Quadruple Treaty, was
signed by the representatives of Great Britain, France,
Spain and Portugal. An article had been inserted
into it stipulating that, " should the co-operation of
France be deemed necessary by the High Contracting
Parties the King of the French would engage to do,
in this respect, whatever might be settled by common
consent between himself and his august allies."
The immediate object of the alliance was rapidly
achieved. The junction of a Spanish army under
General Rodil with the constitutional forces,
operating in Tras-os-Montes, was followed, on May 16,
by a decisive victory over Dom Miguel at Asserceira.
A week later both Pretenders capitulated at Evora
Monte. Dom Miguel agreed to accept a small
pension 2 and to retire to Italy, whilst Don Carlos, at
his own request, was conveyed to England on board
H.M.S. Donegal. But the elation of the allies at the
rapid success which had crowned their operations was
of brief duration. After a stay of little more than a
week in London Don Carlos departed secretly, and,
contriving to cross France undetected, reached Spain,
where he appeared at the head of his followers in
Biscay on July 9. This new development, both the
French and British governments agreed, must be met
by an extension of the scope of the Quadruple Treaty.
Certain additional articles were, accordingly, formally
1 Affaires etrangeres, 643 Angleterre, Rigny a Talleyrand, 17 avril,
1834.
2 About 1500 per annum.
179
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
annexed to it, on August 18, 1834. By the first of
these, the King of the French undertook to hinder
supplies and arms from reaching the Carlists from his
southern provinces. By the second, His Britannic
Majesty pledged himself to furnish Her Most Catholic
Majesty with arms and ammunition and, in case of
need, to supply naval succour ; whilst by the third,
the Regent of Portugal promised to render whatever
military assistance it might be in his power to
give.
In thus deciding to afford Queen Isabella material
assistance, the French and English governments
appear to have been strangely oblivious of their loudly
proclaimed principle of "abstention from interference
in the affairs of other States." It was, doubtless,
the inconsistency of their conduct in this respect
which elicited from Talleyrand his cynical definition
of the word non-intervention as " un mot metaphysique
et politique qui signifie d pen pres la meme chose qu 1
intervention" Both governments had, unquestion-
ably, excellent reasons for desiring to put an end to a
state of civil war and anarchy, which interfered with
^English trade, and had a disturbing effect upon the
internal condition of France. In addition, there Wcis
the consideration, to which Palmerston attached much
weight, that the Quadruple Treaty, by proclaiming
the intimate union of the Liberal Powers, would
counterbalance the league which the absolute Courts
had, in the previous autumn, concluded at
Miinchengratz. 3 Martinez de la Rosa, Christina's
chief minister, had been engaged in framing a con-
stitutional Charter and the Estatuto Real, the
result of his labours was about to be made public.
Spain might, therefore, claim to be numbered among
the Liberal Powers of Europe. But there would
1 T. Raikes, Journal, I. p. 106.
* H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 166-174 and 180-185.
180
seem to have been another, and a more exclusively
national reason, for the support which the English
government decided to extend to the cause of con-
stitutionalism in Spain. For the past century Spain
had constantly followed the impulse of France and
that state of affairs had, on many occasions, proved
detrimental to British interests. " Foreign influence,
however," wrote Lord Palmerston some years later,
" can best be exerted over the Court of a despotic
monarch and becomes much weaker, if not entirely
paralyzed, when it has to act upon the constitutional
representatives of a free people. The British govern-
ment, therefore, perceived that, by assisting the
Spanish people to establish a constitutional form of
government, they were assisting to secure the political
independence of Spain, and they had no doubt that the
maintenance of that independence would be conducive
to important British interests." 1
One of the chief reasons, therefore, which led
England to enter into the Quadruple Treaty was to
destroy that influence which, for more than a century,
France had been striving to establish over the Spanish
government. Her statesmen had constantly laid it
down as the first principle of their policy that her
ascendency must be supreme at the Court at Madrid.
It was essential, they argued, that France should have
no fears of an attack from beyond the Pyrenees,
should she be engaged in war with her powerful
eastern neighbours. On that account the Salic Law,
the Due de Broglie explained to Lord Granville, was
distinctly advantageous to France, inasmuch as it
debarred females from succeeding to the Spanish
throne. Now that it was abolished, he pointed out,
the French government had to contemplate the
possibility that an Austrian Archduke might some day
1 F. O. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846
(confidential).
181
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
aspire to the hand of the Queen of Spain. 1 Louis
Philippe not only endorsed the views of his minister
in this matter, but frankly confessed to the British
ambassador that the triumph of absolutism, in the
person of Don Carlos, would suit him infinitely better
than the establishment of a Liberal monarchy at
Madrid. In that case " he was greatly afraid that the
Peninsula would become the resort of all the re-
volutionists and republicans in Europe." 2
These being Louis Philippe's opinions, it seems
strange that he should not have attempted to dissuade
his ministers from committing him to the Quadruple
Treaty. The adoption of such a course, however, would
have been very dangerous. The " citizen King " might
in his heart greatly prefer les capuchons to les bonnets
rouges? but he dared not publicly proclaim these
sentiments. Moreover, had France abandoned the
English alliance she would not have been received into
the league of the absolute Courts. Louis Philippe,
consequently, if he wished to avoid complete isolation,
was compelled to appear to adopt the British policy.
But his secret leanings being what they were and
Palmerston's object being what it was, it is not
surprising that, from the moment of the conclusion
of the Quadruple Treaty, symptoms of serious dis-
agreement should have manifested themselves in the
relations of the two governments.
Before the close of the year 1834 the Carlists
were masters of the whole of Biscay and Navarre, with
the exception of some of the larger towns. It was not
1 F. O. France 467, Granville to Palnaerstou, September 13, 1833.
Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 57-74.
8 F. 0. France 468, Granville to Palmerston, November 1, 1833.
3 F. O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837
(most secret). Report of a conversation repeated to the British
minister by the Carlist agent, Saint-Sylvain (Baron de Los Valles), in
which Louis Philippe is supposed to have said, " Je prefere toujours les
capuchons aux bonnets rouges."
182
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
alone the influence of the priests and the monks which
induced the people of these provinces to espouse the
cause of the Pretender so enthusiastically. They
knew well that, were a representative form of govern-
ment to be established throughout Spain, the Fueros?
those special rights and privileges to which they were
devotedly attached, must either be abolished or greatly
curtailed. A leader arose in Zumalacarregui, who
quickly proved his superiority over the constitutional
generals sent against him. Henceforward the struggle
between the Carlists and the Christinas was carried on
with a barbarity unknown in Europe for centuries.
Neither side gave nor expected quarter. After every
engagement wounded and unwounded prisoners were
ruthlessly massacred. Such was the condition of
aS'airs when a change of government took place in
England.
Lord Grey had resigned, on July 9, 1834, on a
question of Irish policy and had been succeeded as
Prime Minister by Lord Melbourne. Signs were
plentiful that the Whigs were losing their popularity
in the country, and the King resolved to dismiss his
ministers at the first opportunity. The death of Lord
Spencer gave him the pretext for which he was seeking.
Althorp's removal to the Upper House, he told
Melbourne, had left the government so weakly
represented in the Commons that he should call upon
his ministers to resign. Sir Robert Peel, accordingly,
undertook to form a new government, and Wellington
accepted the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
The Duke had never approved of his predecessor's
policy of intervening in the disputed succession to the
Spanish throne. But, soon after he had taken up his
1 The Fueros of Biscay and Navarre overrode the general laws of
Spain. So long as the system remained in force in these provinces the
right of taxation, the levy of military forces, and all matters connected
with land tenure, were vested in local legislative bodies.
183
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
duties at the Foreign Office, an opportunity arose of
interposing in a manner more in accordance with his
views. In the course of a conference with Mr.
Villiers, Martinez de la Rosa had suggested that the
French and British governments should propose to both
parties some arrangement for the exchange of prisoners
and, generally, for mitigating the horrors of the war.
The opening of communications with Don Carlos on
these lines might with advantage be made to serve a
double purpose. The commissioners, selected to pro-
ceed to the headquarters of the Pretender, might be
instructed to impress upon him the hopelessness of his
position, and to explain to him that he could obtain no
assistance from the absolute Courts. An authoritative
statement to that effect would, in the opinion of
Martinez de la Rosa, be more useful than " six victories
by her Majesty's troops." It would furnish Don Carlos
with the excuse, for which he was believed to be seek-
ing, for abandoning the struggle. 1
Lord Eliot was, accordingly, dispatched to Spain.
Ostensibly, his mission had no other object than the
negotiation of some agreement for terminating the
inhuman methods of warfare, which both parties had
adopted. In reality, however, he carried with him
secret instructions based upon the suggestions of
Martinez de la Rosa. Whilst in Paris he was to
communicate these to the Due de Broglie, who was
once more at the head of the Foreign Office, in order
that the French commissioner might be furnished with
identical instructions. 3 Hitherto, there had been no
great cause for complaint as to the manner in which
France performed the duties imposed upon her by the
additional articles of the Quadruple Treaty. It was,
1 F. O. Spain 489 and 440, Villiers to Wellington, February 11, 1835 ;
Wellington to Villiers, February 17, 1835.
2 F. O. Spain 439, Wellington to Villiers, March 27, 1835. F. 0.
Spain 446, Wellington to Eliot, March 26, 1835 (secret).
184
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
therefore, with the utmost confidence that the request
would be promptly complied with, that Wellington had
decided to invite the French government to appoint
some person to repair with Eliot to the seat of war.
But Lord Cowley, who, upon the change of government,
had succeeded Lord Granville as British ambassador in
Paris, speedily ascertained that the Duke's proposal was
regarded with much disfavour. Nor was he long in
doubt as to the quarter from which the opposition to it
was inspired. Louis Philippe himself assured him, on
April 2, that he dared not allow communications to be
opened with Don Carlos, except in response to an official
invitation from the government of the Queen Regent.
But, although the Spanish ambassador shortly after-
wards made the desired request, the King still hesitated
to comply with it. He was greatly afraid, he told
Lord Cowley, that Don Carlos would refuse to enter-
tain the suggested proposals. Were the Pretender to
take such a course, popular indignation would be
aroused in France, and the government might be forced
to march an army into Spain to enforce its demands. 1
Eliot, in the meanwhile, had proceeded, unattended
by a French colleague, to the headquarters of Don
Carlos. He experienced little difficulty in inducing
both contending parties to conclude a convention for
the proper custody and exchange of prisoners of war.
But no success attended his efforts to carry out the
secret and more important part of his mission. Don
Carlos resolutely declared that he never would abandon
the struggle. Nor could Eliot flatter himself that any
of his arguments had in the smallest degree shaken the
Pretender's determination to assert his right to the
crown. Having exhausted all his powers of persuasion
1 F. O. France 501, Cowley to Wellington, April 3 (secret and
confidential), 17, 20, 24 (separate and confidential), 1835. F. O. France
497, Wellington to Cowley, April 2, 1836. F. 0. Spain 446, Eliot to
Wellington, March 30, 1835 (private).
' 185
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
he set out on his return journey. As a result of his
visit to the theatre of war he brought back to England
the conviction that, without foreign assistance, the
government of the Queen Regent would never contrive
to pacify Alava, Biscay and Navarre. 1 Some weeks
before he arrived in London Sir Robert Peel's brief
administration had come to an end. Melbourne had
been recalled and Palmerston was once more at the
Foreign Office.
Upon learning of the failure of Eliot's mission, the
government of the Queen Regent resolved to apply
to France for military assistance against Don Carlos.
Palmerston, who at this time regarded a French inter-
vention as the worst of evils, lost no time in directing
Villiers to protest. No more telling indictment of the
whole policy of the Quadruple Treaty exists than the
despatch which, on this occasion, Palmerston himself
sent off to Madrid. The British minister was to repre-
sent that to appeal for foreign aid, before all the re-
sources at the disposal of the Queen Regent had been
exhausted, " would little redound to the honour of the
Spanish government." A settlement, he was to remind
Queen Christina's advisers, brought about by French
or British bayonets, " could only be temporary and
would never be acquiesced in as legitimate and final
by the nation." 3 It was very far, however, from
Louis Philippe's desire to despatch troops to Spain in
support of the constitutional throne of Isabella. But,
as Palmerston was also strongly opposed to direct
French intervention, the King felt that he might with
safety consult the British government about the
propriety of acceding to the Spanish demand. Palmer-
ston, as he had foreseen, had numerous objections to
urge against the entry of a French army into Spain.
1 F. O. Spain 446, Eliot to Wellington, April 20, 28, 1835 ; Eliot to
Palmerston, May 6, 1835.
2 F. 0. Spain 439, Palmerston to Villiers, May 22, 1835.
186
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
The French ambassador at Madrid was, accordingly,
instructed to inform Martinez de la Rosa that his
appeal could not be complied with. 1 But, whilst
making it perfectly clear that direct intervention was
out of the question, M. de Rayneval was authorized
to suggest that the foreign legion at Algiers might be
transferred from the French to the Spanish service,
and to promise that facilities for enlisting soldiers in
France would be granted to the Spanish government.
The Cabinet of Madrid readily accepted this
limited form of assistance. Help of the same descrip-
tion, but upon a more extended scale, was also fur-
nished by Great Britain. The Foreign Enlistment
Act was suspended and officers and men were en-
couraged to enter the service of the Queen of Spain.
In England, where the war in the Peninsula was re-
membered with pride, volunteers were easily obtained.
In France, for obvious reasons the appeals of the
Spanish recruiting agents met with far less response.
Nevertheless, before the autumn of 1835 some 4000
men, chiefly from Algiers, were transported to Spain,
whilst rather more than double that number of British
volunteers, under the command of De Lacy Evans, the
Radical member for Westminster, were conveyed to
the seat of war. Don Carlos, however, retaliated
promptly. From his headquarters at Durango he
issued a proclamation announcing that the Eliot Con-
vention could not be permitted to apply to foreigners.
Any person not of Spanish nationality, caught in arms
against him, would be shot. The moment this decree
was brought to the notice of the British government
Colonel Wylde, the officer attached to the headquarters
of the Queen's armies, was directed to protest against
it. 2 Wylde obtained access to Don Carlos and read
out to him the declaration which Palmerston had
1 F. 0. France 502, Granville to Palmerston, June 8, 1835.
- F. 0. Spain 447, Palmerston to Wylde, July 13, 1835.
187
drawn up. But the threats contained in it had no
effect upon the Pretender, who replied that his procla-
mation was lawful, under the circumstances, and that
his officers had the strictest orders to conform to it. 1
The only reprisal to which the British government
could resort was to signify to its naval commanders
that, in the event of Don Carlos applying for protec-
tion on board any of His Majesty's ships, such protec-
tion was to be denied to him. 2
The French government altogether declined to
associate itself with Great Britain in protesting against
the Decree of Durango. Lord Granville, who upon
the return of the Whigs to office had resumed his post
in Paris, found Louis Philippe and his chief ministers,
with the exception of the Due de Broglie, strongly
opposed to any step of that kind. France, they
argued, was differently circumstanced to Great Britain,
inasmuch as she was not a party to the Eliot Con-
vention. Moreover, were she to use threatening
language to Don Carlos and were he to disregard her
menaces, she would be driven to send troops across
the frontier, and both the French and English govern-
ments had agreed that direct intervention was highly
inexpedient for the moment. In vain Lord Granville
protested that to remonstrate against the barbarity
of the decree was a duty which the government owed
to the men, who had been transferred from the French
to the Spanish service. Neither that argument, nor
the consideration that any appearance of lack of
harmony between the French and British Cabinets
must necessarily encourage the Pretender, had the
smallest effect upon Louis Philippe or upon the
majority of his ministers. 3
1 F. O Spain 447, Wylde to Palrnerston, August 2, 1835.
2 F. O. France 504, Granville to Palmerston, August 17, 1835.
3 F. O. France 503, Granville to Palmerston, July 17, August 10,
1835.
188
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
Lord Palmerston's indignation at Louis Philippe's
conduct was increased by the news which he was
receiving from Lisbon. Dom Pedro had died on
September 24, 1834, and the Cortes had, thereupon,
declared the Queen to be of age, although she was not
yet sixteen years of age. Shortly afterwards she had
married Augustus of Leuchtenberg, the young duke
whose candidature for the Belgian throne had so
alarmed Louis Philippe in 1830. Their married
life, however, was of brief duration. On March
25, 1835, Maria became a widow and the Cortes
at once urged her to lose no time in contracting
a second alliance. The young queen was quite
ready to comply and soon, afterwards, informed
her ministers, Marshal Saldanha and the Duke of
Palmella, that she purposed marrying either the Due
de Nemours or the Prince de Joinville, both sons of
Louis Philippe. Her selection of the French princes,
wrote Lord Howard de Walden, 1 was to be ascribed
to the influence of her aunt, the Marquise de Louie,
who was afterwards discovered to have been in the
pay of Louis Philippe. 2 The British minister, how-
ever, succeeded in obtaining from Saldanha a promise
in writing that he would resign, sooner than allow the
French marriage to take place. 3 In Paris, meanwhile,
Louis Philippe emphatically denied to the British
1 F. O. Portugal 436 & 439, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 13,
November 12, 21 (secret), December 13, 1835.
2 Revue Retrospective, p. 41. Marquise de Louie, Subvention
Accidentelle, 6000 francs.
3 F. O. Portugal 436, Howard de W. to Palmerston, June 23, 1835
(confidential), contains following enclosure :
" Lisbon, June 22, 1835.
" MY DEAR LORD,
" You may give Lord Palmerston the most positive assurance
that I should resign my position as a minister to the crown the moment
it is out of my power to prevent the marriage of the queen with any
prince that would put an end to the relations existing between France
and England.
" (Signed), SALDANHA."
189
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
ambassador that he had ever entertained the idea of
bringing forward one of his sons as a candidate for the
hand of the Queen of Portugal. 1 It seems certain,
nevertheless, that some intrigue with that purpose in
view had been in progress, and that it was not
persevered with on account of the opposition of the
British government. In the opinion of Lord Howard
de Walden, it was to be attributed to the machinations
of the French party at the Court of Lisbon that Queen
Maria, about this time, displayed the greatest reluct-
ance to sanction the despatch of a Portuguese division
to the assistance of the Christines? But before
long it was announced that she was betrothed
to Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a nephew
of the King of the Belgians. The marriage was
celebrated on April 9, 1836, and from that moment
the influence of the French party at the Court
diminished.
But the proceedings of the French agents at Lisbon
and Louis Philippe's sympathy for the Spanish
Carlists were secrets, as yet known only to certain
ministers and diplomatists. It was otherwise with
the increasing rivalry between the British envoy and
the French ambassador accredited to the Court of the
Queen Regent at Madrid. It was the subject of
comment in the newspapers that France openly
favoured the cause of one, whilst England no less
ostentatiously gave her support to the other, of the
two great political parties which Spanish constitu-
tionalism had called into existence. Most of the
leading men in the Cortes had been in exile, until the
death of Ferdinand, on account of their participation
in the revolutionary movement of 1820. Some, like
1 F. O. France 501, Cowley to Palmerston, May 8, 1835 (separate
and confidential).
* F. 0. Portugal 438, Howard de W. to Palmerston, October 23, 1835
(secret).
190
Martinez de la Rosa, had sought refuge in France,
whilst others, prominent among them being the
financier Mendizabal, had repaired to England. Their
political views had, in consequence, been greatly
influenced by the statesmen with whom they had come
into contact in the countiies in which they had resided.
Thus Martinez de la Rosa, whose literary abilities had
brought him to the notice of M. Guizot, had adopted the
theories of the Doctrinaires and in framing the Estatuto
Real the Spanish Constitution of 1834 he had taken
the French Charter of 1 8 14 for his model. His followers,
the Mod er ados as they were called, consisted mainly
of the nobility, military and civil officials, and,
generally, of persons who, although opposed to Don
Carlos, disliked democratic institutions. Their
opponents, the Exaltados, or Progressistas, as they were
more usually termed, were made up chiefly of members
of the trading and commercial classes in the large
towns. The extreme wing of this party advocated
the restoration of the Constitution of 1812, which
recognized the sovereignty of the people and provided
for government by a single chamber. It was this
code which, in 1820, Riego and his followers had
imposed upon King Ferdinand. But, although only
the more violent of the Progressistas may have desired
that the very defective Constitution of 1812 should
be re-established without amendments, the whole
party derided the Estatuto Real as too timid an
experiment in representative government.
A party, which aimed at imposing salutary checks
upon the development of democracy and the leaders
of which were in close personal relationship with some
of his ministers, was naturally regarded with a
friendly eye by Louis Philippe. From 1834 onwards
the Moderados derived an artificial strength, which to
some extent counterbalanced the numerical superiority
of their opponents, by reason of the support given
191
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
them by Louis Philippe and by Christina, the Queen
Regent. It was no less logical that the Progressistas
should develop rapidly into " the English party."
For reasons which have already been explained
Palmerston desired that Spain should be free and
independent. But, before Don Carlos could be crushed
and the civil war terminated, the cause of the Queen
must be made popular with the Spanish people.
From Palmerston's point of view, therefore, it was
essential that political power should rest with the
party which sought to place the government upon a
broad and national basis. Objectionable in many
respects as were the principles of the Progressistas,
they were, in the opinion of the British government,
unquestionably better adapted to the immediate
requirements of the situation than the narrow and
restricted views of the Moderados.
The strength of the democratic movement, which
had begun at the death of Ferdinand, drove Martinez
de la Rosa from office in June, 1835. But his successor,
Count Toreno, was not more successful in his efforts
to stem the rising tide of Liberalism, and, in the fol-
lowing month of September, Christina reluctantly
consented to allow Mendizabal to form a Progresaista
Cabinet. Louis Philippe and his ministers were
greatly annoyed and declared that Toreno's fall was
aue to English intrigue. 1 Villiers, it was perfectly
true, had taken part in the negotiations which had
preceded the change of government. He had discussed
the situation, not only with Toreno and Mendizabal,
but with the Queen Regent herself. To Christina he
explained that he had no authority to speak in the
name of the British government. She, however,
replied that she required no more than " the advice of
an Englishman in whom she had entire confidence."
Villiers, therefore, told her plainly that, inasmuch as
1 Guizot, Memoircs, IV. p. 146.
192
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
she had not the necessary force at her disposal for
arresting by violent means the advance of democracy,
she must submit to the formation of a more Liberal
government. The Queen's dread of Mendizabal
appears to have been overcome temporarily by
Villiers' assurance that that statesman had no
intention of restoring the Constitution of 1812. 1
After the downfall of the Moderados, the French
authorities no longer attempted to prevent supplies
from reaching the Carlists. Upon the road from
Bayonne to Irun, an uninterrupted stream of waggons
was to be seen openly conveying stores and provisions
of all kinds to the insurgents. 2 The Pretender, wrote
Villiers, had received assurances from Louis Philippe
that in the future he intended to remain absolutely
neutral. 3 To all representations upon this subject,
whether made by the British or the Spanish
ambassador, the French ministers returned evasive
replies. Although from time to time Lord Gmnville
succeeded in extracting a promise that greater
vigilance would be exercised upon the frontier, the
lucrative trade, which the inhabitants of southern
France were carrying on with the armies of the
Pretender, was never interfered with seriously.
Mendizabal, in the meantime, was devoting himself
assiduously to the task of prosecuting the war against
Don Carlos. But his efforts to carry on the opera-
tions vigorously were hampered by the penury of the
treasury, and by the impossibility of raising a loan
abroad. It was under these circumstances that he
made a proposal to Mr. Villiers which, when it was
divulged to the Due de Broglie, increased the ill-
feeliDg which was rapidly growing up between the
1 F. O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835.
2 F. 0. France 504, 505 and 517, Granville to Palmerston, August 21,
October 5, 9, 19, 1835 ; Palmerston to Aston, August 30, 1836.
3 F. O. Spain 444, Villiers to Palmerston, September 15, 1835
(secret and confidential).
193
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
French and the English governments. Modern views
about the advantages of unrestricted commercial
intercourse had not as yet penetrated into Spain.
The imposition of prohibitory duties upon almost all
articles made abroad was still regarded as essential
for the protection of Spanish trade. England neces-
sarily suffered greatly from this system, which
brought no revenue into the Spanish exchequer, and
benefited only the smuggler. The question had often
been the subject of discussion between the two
governments, but Spain had hitherto always evaded
her promises to reform her tariff. Mendizabal,
however, now undertook that, provided England
would guarantee the interest of a loan of a million
and a half sterling, Spain would admit the chief
articles of British manufacture upon a low scale of
duty. Villiers was without authority to conclude any
agreement of that kind. But, as Mendizabal assured
him that any delay would be most inconvenient, he
decided to draw up the necessary documents. The
moment the treaty had been signed by Mendizabal
and himself, he forwarded it to Palmerston, explain-
ing the reasons which had led him to act without
instructions. " The Queen," he wrote in conclusion,
" Mendizabal and his English private secretary,
Southern, 1 and himself, were the only persons who
had any knowledge of the transaction." :
When the projected agreement and Villiers' cover-
ing despatch reached Paris, whither they had been
transmitted, as was the custom, under flying seal,
Granville was so impressed with the necessity of keep-
ing the matter secret, that he did not even allow the
attaches of his embassy to know of the affair.
Furthermore, his own observations upon the subject
1 Secretary to the British Legation at Madrid.
2 F. O. Spain 445, Villiers to Palmerston, November 28, 1855
(most secret and confidential).
194
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
were conveyed to Lord Palmerston in a private letter.
" It will not be liked here," he warned his chief. " It
is already thought that Mendizabal is entirely under
English influence, and this admission of English
manufactures at a reduced duty, even though pur-
chased by the guarantee of a loan, will very much con-
firm the impression." ] But all these precautions were
of no avail. Within a few days, Broglie received intel-
ligence of the transaction both from the French
ambassador at Madrid, and from some Spanish agent
in Paris. It seems highly probable that the secret
was disclosed by Christina herself. Perhaps she
wished to ingratiate herself with Louis Philippe,
whilst by exposing Mendizabal to his wrath, she may
have hoped to facilitate the return to power of the
Moderados.
M. de Rayneval having obtained his information
'' under the seal of the most profound secrecy,"
Broglie could not make representations on the subject
of the proposed treaty to the British government.
Rayneval, however, was directed to protest against it
at Madrid, and to warn Mendizabal that, if the affair
were to be concluded, " the Quadruple Alliance would
certainly undergo modifications of a nature which
Spain would regret." But the British government,
in the meanwhile, " whilst fully appreciating the
motives which had prompted Villiers to sign the
treaty without instructions," had decided not to
advise the King to ratify it. " His Majesty's govern-
ment," wrote Palmerston, " does not consider that it
would be consistent with the spirit of the alliance that
two out of four should make separately, and without
previous communication with the others, an engage-
ment. . . . Great Britain would expose herself to the
1 F. O. France 506, Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1835
(private letter).
2 Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 147-149 and 421-425 ; Broglie a Ray-
neval, 12, 19 decembre, 1835.
195
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
charge of having severed herself from her allies in
order to grasp at an object conducive to her own
particular interests." At the same time, however,
he enclosed the project of a new commercial treaty,
which Villiers was to invite Mendizabal to consider.
England, according to its provisions, asked for no
exclusive advantages, the only stipulation being that
British goods should be placed upon a footing of
equality with those of the most favoured nation. The
Spanish minister, however, professed his inability to
proceed with the matter. Great Britain's guarantee
to a loan was a condition, he declared, essential to the
conclusion of any commercial treaty. The proposal
to admit English cotton goods would be deeply
resented by Spanish manufacturers, and he must, in
consequence, be in a position to show that, by
consenting to it, he had gained some great political
advantage. 2 Without doubt, also, he was not insensible
to Broglie's threats. He foresaw that, although there
was to be no concealment about Palmerston's treaty,
and notwithstanding that France was to be given full
information about the negotiations, her objections to
the " reciprocal equality," and " mutual facilities," for
which England stipulated, would not on that account
be diminished. Nor was he mistaken. When the
matter was revived under the ministry of Comte Mole,
that statesman summed up the French case with
perfect frankness. Equality of opportunity for
trading in Spain, he informed Lord Granville, would
act solely for the benefit of England, seeing that the
French merchants were possessed of less capital, and
were less industrious and enterprising than their
British rivals. Palmerston, as may be supposed,
entered with zest upon the task of denouncing the
1 F. O. Spain 489, Palmerston to Villiers, December 21, 1835
(secret).
2 F. O. Spain 457, Villiers to Palmerston, January 2, 1836.
196
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
selfishness of founding an objection to a reform of the
Spanish tariff upon so unworthy a reason. 1
Broglie's instructions to Rayneval respecting the
commercial treaty were among his last acts as Minister
for Foreign Affairs. Parliamentary and other diffi-
culties, in the creation of which Louis Philippe is
supposed to have taken a part, brought about the
resignation of the government. M. Thiers, there-
upon, notwithstanding that he had been a member of
Broglie's Cabinet, undertook to form a new ministry.
At the time of the Revolution of July, M. Thiers had
been known merely as one of the editors of the National
and as the author of a very popular and successful
History of the French Revolution. Louis Philippe's
enthronement, in which he had been so prominently
concerned, enabled him to abandon journalism and to
embark upon the career of a politician. Only two years
later, on October 11, 1832, he was appointed Minister
of the Interior in Marshal Soult's first government.
In that capacity, by means of a bribe judiciously
administered to the Jew Deutz, he succeeded in
discovering the hiding-place of the Duchesse de Berri
at Nantes a mystery which, until he took the matter
in hand, had baffled the ingenuity of the police.
Having accomplished this object and having no desire
to be remembered in history as " the Fouehe of the
Monarchy of July," he promptly exchanged the port-
folio of the Interior for that of Commerce and of Public
Works. 2
Ever since the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty,
Louis Philippe had been quietly endeavouring to
improve his relations with the absolute Powers, in
general, and with Austria, in particular. Early in the
year 1835 he appears to have embarked, without the
1 F. O. France 518 and 527, Granville to Palmerston, December 5,
1836; Palmerston to Granville, December 27, 1836.
2 Thureau Dangin, Monarchic de Juillet, II. p. 178 (note).
197
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
knowledge of his ministers or of Sainte-Aulaire, the
French ambassador at Vienna, upon a confidential
correspondence with Metternich. 1 Without doubt, his
flattering advances to the Chancellor were made with
the hope that a marriage might be arranged between
his eldest son, the Due d' Orleans, and an Austrian
Archduchess. Neither Broglie nor Sainte-Aulaire
shared the Bang's illusions on that subject. Broglie
was firmly convinced that there could be no intimacy
between the Monarchy of July and the Northern Courts,
and it was chiefly on that account that Louis Philippe
had been so anxious to drive him from office. But,
whilst Louis Philippe had frequently been annoyed by
the independence and uncompromising honesty of the
Doctrinaire Duke, he had always admired the resource-
fulness and political adroitness of M. Thiers. For some
time past M. Thiers had been desirous of obtaining the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and he appears to have
satisfied the King that, were it to be confided to him,
he would promote the dynastic object which was
constantly in His Majesty's mind. He was, it was
said, greatly attracted by the prospect of raising "the
matrimonial blockade " which the Legitimists exult-
ingly declared had been established round the
Orleans throne. 3
It has generally been supposed that Talleyrand was
largely responsible for the overtures made to the
Court of Vienna by Louis Philippe, and for the coolness
which set in, about the same time, in the relations of
France and England. This view of the case may be
correct, but it is difficult to believe that the reasons,
usually given to explain his changed attitude towards
England, can be true. At the end of the year 1834
Talleyrand had retired from his embassy in London,
His advanced age and his increasing infirmities were
1 Metternich, Memoires, VI. pp. 31-53 and 270.
- Thureau Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, III. pp. 74-75.
198
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
the reasons officially given for his resignation. It was
notorious, however, that he had been frequently
annoyed by Palmerston's unceremonious behaviour
towards him, and it has been suggested that the lack of
deference with which he had been treated had caused him
greatly to modify his opinions about the advantages of
a close friendship with England. 1 It is, however, most
improbable that Talleyrand, who, up to the time of
his departure from London, unceasingly endeavoured
to extend the scope of the alliance, 2 should have
changed his views completely, because Palmerston may]
have kept him waiting in an ante-room or may have
failed to treat him with that respect to which his age
and his long diplomatic career entitled him. Neverthe-
less, it is not to be denied that, notwithstanding the
marked attentions which had been paid him at Court
and in London society, he had returned to France in a
somewhat dissatisfied frame of mind. The recently
published memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino show
plainly that, in 1834, he no longer entertained his
former admiration for England and English institu-
tions. But it was to the new conditions created by
the Reform Act that his altered dispositions should be
ascribed. Although he had been in favour of that
measure, in his heart he, doubtless, loathed the idea of
government by the people. Like Lord Grey himself,
once the Bill had become an accomplished fact, he was
horrified at the ugly aspect of democracy. Believing, .
therefore, that Great Britain was advancing rapidly /
towards a revolution he would naturally counsel Louis
Philippe to draw as close as circumstances would
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 221-223. Correspondence
of Princess Lieven loith Earl Grey, II., Princess Lieven to Grey, August
26, 1835. T. Eaikes' Journal, III. pp. 265-266. C. Greville, Journals (1),
III. pp. 20, 314, 385, 386.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand a Bigny, 16, 26
juin, 1834.
199
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
permit to conservative Austria. 1 Nor was there any-
thing in this advice which should be regarded as
unfriendly towards England. At Vienna in 1814, be
it remembered, he had insisted upon the necessity of
an alliance between France, Great Britain and Austria,
as the only means of checking the insatiable ambition
of Russia.
Meanwhile, the civil war in Spain continued and
the prospects of the constitutional cause were gloomy.
During the summer of 1835, however, the Carlists
sustained a loss the magnitude of which was hardly
appreciated at the time. Whilst superintending the
operations against Bilbao Zumalacarregui sustained a
wound and died a few days later. The original injury
was of a trifling character and his death has generally
been ascribed to the unskilful treatment of the doctors.
But Colonel Wylde, as he was returning from his
interview with the Pretender on the subject of the
Decree of Durango, received some curious details about
the last hours of the famous Carlist chief from an
English surgeon who had dressed his wound. Accord-
ing to this person, a dose of laudanum, not a Christino
bullet, was the cause of death. Furthermore, Wylde's
informant asserted that the doctors had under various
pretexts refused to allow the body to be opened.
This story, taken in connection with the detestation
with which Zumalacarregui was regarded by the
Apostolical section of his party, led Wylde to sus-
pect that he might have been the victim of foul play. a
Be that as it may, his death had an effect upon the
cause of absolutism and bigotry which may be com-
pared with that of Dundee at Killikrankie.
1 Affaires etrangeres, 644 Angleterre, Talleyrand u Louis Philippe,
22 novembre, 1834.1 In this letter occurs the following sentence,
" possibly the honour may be reserved for Wellington of arresting
England on the path of decadence."
1 F. 0. Spain 447. Extract of a private letter from Colonel Wylde,
dated Puente de la Beyna, August 8, 1835.
200
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
The Christinas, however, appeared incapable of
taking advantage of the loss which their opponents
had sustained. Even Mendizabal was unable to
infuse the required energy into the counsels of the
Queen's generals. " Everything," wrote Wylde on
February 12, 1836, "seems to stagnate for want of
money." The British legion had suffered cruelly
during the winter. Sickness had thinned its ranks,
the pay of officers and men was in arrears, and the
whole force was in a state of acute discontent. 1
Under these circumstances the British government
decided to intervene more effectually. Hitherto,
Lord John Hay's squadron off the north coast of
Spain had only been allowed to transport troops and
stores, and to give indirect assistance to the
Christinas. But the admiral was now ordered to take
an active part in the operations of the Queen's armies.
At the same time, Lord Palmerston's objections to the
entry of a French army into Spain disappeared
completely. He asked that the French cordon of
observation should be advanced across the frontier
and that the valley of Bastan should be occupied.
The measure which he proposed " would not entail ex-
tensive military operations, but would enable General
Cordoba to enclose the Carlists in a small space and to
deprive them of all supplies." 2 The British govern-
ment, doubtless, hoped that M. Thiers, who had
always professed to be in favour of armed interven-
tion, would, now that he was President of the Council,
be able to induce Louis Philippe to consent to it.
But that illusion, if it was ever entertained, was soon
dispelled. The course proposed by Palmerston was
incompatible with that policy of conciliating the
absolute Courts, upon which M. Thiers had embarked.
1 F. O. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, February 12, 18, 1836
(confidential).
- F. O. France 516, Palmerston to Granville, March 14, 1836.
201
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
He was, consequently, compelled to explain to Lord
Granville that he had altogether changed his mind
about the expediency of intervention, owing to the
wide development of the Carlist insurrection, and to
the revolutionary character which the government at
Madrid had recently assumed. Louis Philippe
expressed himself in more emphatic language. Never,
he told the British ambassador, would he allow the
French flag to be carried beyond the frontier. 1
The unsatisfactory progress of the war necessarily
had a damaging effect upon the position of Mendi-
zabal's Cabinet. Dissensions broke out among his
followers, and Christina, who had only accepted him
with reluctance, most unwisely decided to dismiss
him. She had been prompted to take this disastrous
step, Palmerston suspected, by her French advisers. 2
The dissolution of the Cortes, which the change of
ministry entailed, was followed by a most suspicious
inaction on the part of the Queen's generals. The
Carlists, on the other hand, displayed unwonted
activity. Insurgent bands penetrated to within
twenty miles of La Granja, where the Queen Regent
was in residence. Ramon Cabrera, " the Tiger of the
Maestrargo," who, as a reprisal for the murder of his
mother, refused to recognize the Eliot Convention,
desolated Aragon, whilst de Lacy Evans, on July 11,
1836, suffered a reverse at Fuentarabia, on which
occasion all the British prisoners were shot, in
accordance with the Pretender's decree. 3 Meanwhile,
the Progressistas were carrying all before them at the
elections, and their victories were followed by grave
revolutionary outbreaks. But neither civil disorder
nor military disasters could rouse M. Isturiz, the new
1 F. O. France 520, Granville to Palrnerston, March 18, 1836.
8 F. O. Spain 456, Palrnerston to Villiers, June 1 (No. 44), August
22, 1886. F. O. France 59 and 525, Palmerston to Ashton, August
30, 1836 ; Granville to Palmerston, October 7, 1836.
3 F. 0. Spain 464, Wylde to Palmerston, July 13, 16, 1836.
202
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDEKS
President of the Council, or his colleagues to action.
In the words of Mr. Villiers, " they appeared to
consider that calmness in adversity constituted the
whole duty of the responsible advisers of the
crown." l
The condition of affairs rapidly assumed a most
alarming appearance. The Constitution of 1812, was
proclaimed in many of the chief towns. At Madrid,
Quesada, the Captain-General, disarmed the national
guards, and declared the city in a state of siege,
whilst at La Granja, the Queen Regent announced
her firm intention of resisting the demands of the
revolutionists. But, on the evening of August 12,
her guards mutinied, and, led by their sergeants,
invaded the palace. On two nights in succession, the
unfortunate Christina was compelled to receive
deputations of non-commissioned officers, many of
whom were under the influence of liquor. Circum-
stanced as she was, with no loyal troops at her
disposal, she had no alternative but to yield. After
promising to accept the Constitution of 1812, to raise
the state of siege, and to re-establish the national
guards, she was allowed to depart for the capital.
But when the news of these events reached Madrid,
the people rose, murdered Quesada, and carried his
head in triumph through the streets. Order was,
however, gradually restored by Calatrava, the
Progressista minister, whom the revolted sergeants
had imposed upon Christina. 3
Some weeks before these events took place M.
Thiers had had to abandon all hope of bringing his
matrimonial negotiations to a successful conclusion.
It was in vain that he had refused to join with
England in protesting against the Austrian occupation
1 P. O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, July 24, 1836.
2 F. O. Spain 460, Villiers to Palmerston, August 6, 9, 13, 14, 16,
17, 1836.
203
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of the free town of Cracow. It was to no purpose
that he had forced the Federal government to expel
all political refugees from Switzerland. The Due
d'Orleans' l proposal for the hand of an Austrian
Archduchess was declined. In order to hide his dis-
comfiture and to punish Metternich, M. Thiers re-
solved to take up the Spanish affair vigorously.
Direct intervention, however, he looked upon as out
of the question. Not only would the King oppose it,
but it would be very unpopular with the country.
Nevertheless, by a process to which he gave the name
of " armed co-operation " he proposed to attain the
desired result. He prepared, accordingly, largely to
reinforce the French legion in Spain, which he intended
should be commanded by some well-known general.
Louis Philippe reluctantly assented to these initial
proceedings, but, when the news arrived of the military
revolt at La Granja, he promptly placed his veto upon
all measures of that kind. Never, he declared, would
hei allow assistance to be supplied to the Jacobins
in power at Madrid. 2 Thiers and his fellow-ministers,
in consequence, resigned.
Under Mole, to whom the King confided the
portfolio of Foreign Affairs and the formation of a
new Cabinet, France for all practical purposes with-
drew from the Quadruple Treaty. The depots formed
by Thiers were broken up and three battalions, which
he had raised for the service of Queen Isabella, were
sent to Algiers. It would be highly dangerous, Mole"
informed the British ambassador, to expose French
soldiers to the influence of the revolutionary societies
in Spain. 3 In vain Lord Palmers ton protested that in
no way could the spirit of anarchy be combated so
1 The Due d'Orleans married 011 May 30, 1837, the Princess Helena of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin.
2 F. 0. France 524, Aston to Palmerston, August 26, 1836.
3 F. O. France 525, Granville to Palmerston, September 23, 1836.
204
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
effectually as by the expulsion of Don Carlos from the
Peninsula. 1 That argument and his contention that
the stability of the Orleans monarchy depended upon
the triumph of the constitutional cause in Spain were
alike unheeded. 2 In order to show their displeasure
at the manner in which the French government was
thus evading its engagements, Lord Melbourne and
his colleagues decided to omit the customary reference
to France from the King's Speech at the opening of
Parliament in 1837. But the " no mention " incident,
although it caused Louis Philippe the keenest annoyance
and created a great sensation in Paris, 3 had no effect
upon Mole's resolution to refuse assistance of any kind
to the government at Madrid. The only safe policy
for France, the King informed Granville a few months
later, was to look upon Spain as infected with the
plague and to have as little communication with her as
possible. 4
Although Calatrava, whom the sergeants at La
Granja had raised to the head of the Queen Regent's
government, was invariably spoken of by Louis
Philippe and Comte Mole as a dangerous revolutionist,
he was far from deserving that appellation. Not only
was he successful in infusing a certain vigour into the
conduct of the war, but he contrived, in addition, to
frame a constitution which, in spite of its imperfections,
effected a happy compromise between the Jacobinical
code of 1812 and the ultra-monarchical Estatuto-Real.
The year 1836 closed with a brilliant success for the
arms of the Queen Regent. Powerfully assisted by
1 F. O. France 518, Palmerston to Granville, September 29, 1836.
2 F. O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, October 26, 1836.
3 F. O. France 539, Granville to Palmerston, February 3, 1837
(confidential). H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 243. H. Greville,
Diary, I. p. 113. Malmesbury, Memoirs of an Ex-minister, I. p. 272.
C. Greville, Journals (1), III. pp. 385-386.
4 F. O. France 542, Granville to Palmerston, July 3, 1837
(confidential).
205
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the bluejackets and marines of Lord John Hay's
squadron, the Christinas stormed the formidable lines
of Luchana and relieved the city of Bilbao. Hence-
forward the name of Baldomero Espartero, the
victorious general, was to figure very prominently in
Spanish politics. Nevertheless, during the campaign
of the ensuing year, complete success appeared to be
within the grasp of the Pretender. Eluding Espartero,
who was preparing to attack him in the Basque
provinces, Don Carlos, who had been liberally supplied
with money by the Tsar and the Kings of the Nether-
lands l and of Sardinia, marched southwards on Madrid.
But, when the capital lay at their mercy, his generals
were ordered to retrace their footsteps, recross the
Ebro and re-enter the northern provinces.
Various reasons have been given for the sudden
retreat of the Carlists from before Madrid. 2 The most
probable explanation appears to be that Don Carlos
had secretly arranged with Christina that, upon the
arrival of his army in the vicinity of the capital, the
gates were to be thrown open, and that the marriage
of his son with Isabella was to be announced and
peace proclaimed. 3 It would seem, however, that at
the last moment Christina decided that this scheme
was impracticable and the Pretender, finding, in
consequence, that no movement in his favour was
likely to break out in Madrid, gave the order to
retreat. The remainder of the year 1837 was spent
by the Carlist leaders in fierce quarrels and bitter
recriminations. But the condition of the Queen's
armies was still more pitiable. Officers and men were
unpaid and wholly without confidence in their generals.
Horrible excesses were committed by the mutinous
1 F. O. Netherlands 206, Disbrowe to Palmerston, October 6,
December 8, 1837 (most secret and confidential).
2 F. O. Netherlands. Disbrowe to Palmerston, December 8, 1837
(most secret).
3 A. S. Hume, Modern Spain, pp. 345-346.
206
[TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
regiments. Generals Escalera and Sarsfield were
murdered by their men, and, although Espartero upon
his arrival from Madrid, succeeded in restoring some
semblance of discipline, he dared not undertake offen-
sive operations with troops so completely demoralized.
The Pretender's advance upon Madrid proved fatal
to the Calatrava Cabinet. That government, which
had been created by the action of the sergeants at La
Granja, was destroyed by a pronunciamento on the part
of the officers of a brigade which had been hurried
south, when Don Carlos was threatening the capital. 1
The downfall of the Progressista Cabinet was, doubt-
less, one of the reasons which led the Queen Regent to
break her compact with the Pretender. A transition
ministry was formed, whilst Christina cautiously pre-
pared to recall the Moderados. Throughout the
country party differences were submerged in the
general desire for peace, and the opinion was rapidly
gaining ground that, without French assistance, the
Pretender could never be expelled. This idea was
sedulously encouraged by the Court party, and, as was
suspected, by agents of the French government. These
conditions at the elections, at the close of the year
1837, produced an overwhelming majority for the
Moderados. It was soon evident, however, that the
electors had been completely deluded in imagining
that the triumph of the Conservative party would be
followed by French intervention. The political
effacement of the Progressistas had not altered the
determination of Louis Philippe and Comte Mole to
withhold all assistance from the government of the
Queen Regent. 2
Yilliers, the British minister at Madrid, was now
1 Hubbard, Histoire de I'Espagne, IV. pp. 92-93.
2 F. O. Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 30, 1837. F. O.
France 544, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 30, 1837 (secret and
confidential).
207
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
convinced that in the dissensions of the Carlists lay
the only hope of preserving the crown for Isabella.
The animosity was extreme between the Provinciates,
whose chief object in supporting the Pretender was to
ensure the maintenance of their highly prized Fueros,
and the Castillanos, as that section of the party was
called which followed the lead of the fanatical Bishop
of Leon. 1 In order to widen this breach Villiers
instructed Lieutenant Turner, a British officer attached
to the division of the Queen's army at Pampeluna,
to open up a secret communication with the dis-
contented Navarrese chiefs. Turner experienced little
difficulty in executing his mission, and was soon able
to report that the men of Biscay and Navarre would
be prepared to discuss terms of peace upon the basis
of the recognition of their local rights and privileges.
But all the leaders with whom he had conferred had
stipulated that any compromise which, might be
arrived at, must have the guarantee of Great Britain. 2
The news of these proceedings was most agreeable
to Lord Palmerston, who forthwith drew up precise
instructions for the future conduct of the negotiations.
Whilst suggesting that on the subject of the Fueros
the Queen Regent's government would be well advised
to make concessions, he laid it down distinctly that
Great Britain could not guarantee the conditions of
peace. 3 A copy of this despatch was sent to Lord
Granville in Paris, who was directed to invite the
French government to act with England in the affair.
In Palmerston's opinion it was most important to
draw France " into an open and avowed mediation for
the purpose of reuniting the northern provinces to the
rest of the Spanish dominions." 4 He was convinced
1 F. 0. Spain 486, Wylde to Palmerston, December 10, 1837. F. O.
Spain 485, Villiers to Palmerston, December 24, 1837.
2 F. O. Spain 508, Villiers to Palmerston, April 21, 1838 (secret).
3 F. O. Spain 499, Palmerston to Villiers, May 7, 1838.
4 F. O. France 356, Palmerston to Granville, May 7, 1838.
208
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
that Louis Philippe cherished secret hopes that the
civil war might lead to the secession of Biscay and
Navarre and their incorporation into France. There
can be little doubt that he was entirely mistaken in
imagining that either the King of the French or his
ministers entertained any views of this kind. It is
possible, however, that the separatist movement,
which unquestionably existed in Catalonia, may have
been encouraged by French agents, with the object
of preventing the conclusion of a commercial treaty
with England. The threat of the manufacturers of
Barcelona that the Catalans would proclaim their
independence, should the duty upon English cotton
goods be lowered, was one of the chief reasons which
deterred the Cabinet of Madrid from accepting
Palmerston's commercial proposals. 1
Louis Philippe, however, would not hear of allow-
ing the French ambassador to be the organ of any
communications with the discontented Carlist chieftains.
He had been accused most unfairly, he told Lord
Granville, of sympathizing with Don Carlos, and to
accede to the British request would expose him to
further suspicion. 2 A new French ambassador was at
this moment about to proceed to Madrid, who appears
to have been admirably adapted for the part which
the King desired that his envoy should play at
Christina's Court, whilst the issue of the struggle
between constitutionalism and absolutism was so
extremely uncertain. "A more inoffensive person,"
wrote the British charge d'affaires about a year later,
" than the Due de Fezensac does not exist. He has
no political principles and has never taken the
slightest interest in the questions which agitate the
1 F. O. Spain 526 and 527, Clarendon to Palmerston, February 2,
1839 ; Southern to Palmerston, March 30, June 1, 1839.
2 F. 0. France 561, Granville to Palmerston, May 14, 1838 (secret
and confidential).
209 P
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
country. I have observed that, as a soldier, he would
now and then demonstrate some curiosity about the
movements of the armies and seem glad when the
advantage had been on the side of the Queen's
troops." *
In the meantime Mr. Turner's secret relations with
the Navarrese chiefs had been betrayed. The sudden
imprisonment of the disaffected officers and the
murder of one of his emissaries compelled him to
suspend his proceedings. 2 A counter-insurrection,
however, broke out against Don Carlos to the cry of
" Peace and the Fueros" under the leadership of an
individual named Munagorri. From Bayonne, where
" the French authorities coldly permitted him to
remain," he endeavoured to foment disaffection in,
and to encourage desertion from, the Pretender's
armies. 3 Villiers at one time expected great results
from this new development, but, before long, he was
forced to realize that Munagorri, a Basque lawyer, had
not the influence required for bringing the enterprise
to a successful conclusion. 4
Never, in the opinion of both Villiers and of
Wylde, had the constitutional cause presented so
gloomy an appearance as in the closing months of the
year 1838. The Queen's generals had suffered heavy
defeats in the open field and Espartero had been
compelled to abandon his operations against Morella,
Cabrera's stronghold. Political rather than strategical
considerations appear to have dictated the conduct
of the campaign. Fearing that Espartero might grow
too powerful, the Cabinet was suspected of having
deliberately neglected to reinforce him, whilst keeping
1 F. O. Spain 580, Southern to Palmerston, June 22, 1839.
2 F. O. Spain 504, Villiers to Palmerston, May 26, 1838 (cypher).
3 F. 0. Spain 505, Villiers to Palmerston, June 16, 23, 80, July 7,
1888.
4 F. O. Spain 505 and 506, Villiers to Palmerston, June 9, 1838 ;
Hervey to Palmerston, July 14, 1838.
210
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
his rival and enemy, Narvaez, who commanded the
army of reserve, liberally supplied with troops. 1 In
England no minister would have ventured to propose
that any further assistance, either in men or money,
should be sent to the Christinas, who had greatly
fallen in the public estimation. The commercial
classes were indignant that, notwithstanding the help
which the Queen's cause had received, prohibitory
duties upon British manufactures should still be main-
tained. The newspapers were full of the complaints
of the soldiers of the legion, who had returned home
with their claims upon the Spanish treasury unsatisfied.
The policy of encouraging these men to enter Isabella's
services was now universally condemned. The good
name of the British army had, it was feared, suffered
from their misconduct at the seat of war. The action
of the government, in conferring a knighthood of the
Bath upon De Lacy Evans, in no way lessened this
impression. 2
But, in the early spring of 1839, the news arrived
of strange proceedings in the Pretender's camp.
Maroto, the Carlist commander-in-chief, having dis-
covered the existence of a plot to overthrow him, had
caused four general officers to be shot at Estella, on
February 18. Don Carlos, who was in secret sym-
pathy with the conspirators, thereupon deprived Maroto
of his command and proclaimed him a traitor. That
officer, however, knew that he could count upon the
devotion of his men, and he, accordingly, boldly marched
upon Tolosa, where the wretched Don Carlos was
residing, and compelled him both to revoke his
decree and to dismiss his Apostolical advisers. But
Maroto, although he had on this occasion triumphed
so completely, was well aware that at any moment
his troops might turn against him, and that his life
1 Hubbard, Histoire de VEspagne, IV. pp. 111-118.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 65.
211
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
depended upon a speedy termination of the war. Not-
withstanding that Turner's attempts to incite the
Navarrese chieftains to rebellion had failed, and that
Munagorri's insurrection had practically collapsed, the
longing for peace had not diminished among the men
of Biscay and Navarre. After the executions at Estella
and his coercion of Don Carlos, Maroto had no alter-
native but to adopt the popular cry of " Paz y
Fueros." Instead of an obscure lawyer, the com-
mander-in-chief of the Pretender's armies was now at
the head of the counter-insurrection against him. 1
Whilst the Carlist general had thus the strongest
possible inducement for coming to terms with the
Christinas, other circumstances had arisen which con-
tributed to the undoing of the Pretender. Espartero
was now all powerful and in a position to carry on the
war, untrammelled by the intrigues of the Court and
of the Cabinet. 2 In France Mole had fallen and Soult
was once more at the head of the government. The
Marshal, in the previous year, had represented Louis
Philippe at the coronation of Queen Victoria, and had
returned to France delighted with the welcome
accorded him in London by all classes of the popula-
tion. 3 He was, consequently, very well disposed
towards England and far more inclined than any of
his predecessors to act up to the spirit of the Quad-
ruple Treaty. No sooner was he in power than orders
were sent to the French ships, stationed off the north
coast of Spain, identical in every respect with those
with which the British admiral was furnished. At
the same time, the authorities upon the frontier
were strictly enjoined both to prevent supplies from
reaching the Carlists and to embarrass the movements
1 F. O. Spain 526, Clarendon to Palmeraton, February 27, March 7,
1839. Hubbard, Histoire de I'Espagne, IV. pp. 141-148.
- Hubbard, Histoire de VEspagne, IV. p. 151.
3 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 104-108.
212
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
of the Pretender's armies by all means in their
power. 1
Maroto's first definite proposals of peace seem to
have been made to Lord John Hay, either on July 27
or 28. It is probable, however, that for some
time past he had been in more or less direct com-
munication with Espartero, with whom he had served
in South America. The negotiations, once formally
begun, continued for the next month. Espartero,
however, wisely refused to grant any suspension of
hostilities, and, whilst showing himself always ready to
listen to reasonable proposals, pushed on his military
operations vigorously. The question which proved the
most difficult of settlement was that of the Fueros,
which the Biscayans and Navarrese stipulated must be
maintained in their integrity. The Queen Regent's
government, in accordance with Palmers ton's advice,
was only prepared to make such concessions with
regard to them, as might be compatible with the repre-
sentative form of government which Spain had adopted.
The recognition of the sovereignty of Isabella, the
regency of Christina and the Constitution of 1837 were
also insisted upon. Colonel Wylde was present at
most of the conferences which took place. He was
authorized to explain to any Carlist officers, with whom
he might be enabled to converse, that, " although it
would not be consistent with the dignity of the
Spanish nation that Her Majesty's government should
guarantee any arrangement, they could rely upon the
good offices of the British government should, at any
time, the government of Madrid depart from its
agreements.' 2
Espartero's skilful conduct of the negotiations,
1 F. O. France 583, Granville to Palmerston, June 10, 1839. F. 0.
Spain 530, Southern to Palmerston, June 15, 1839.
2 F. O. Spain 579 (supplementary), Palmerston to Wylde, August 10,
1839.
213
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
combined with the personal reasons which made it
imperative for Maroto to conclude a peace, triumphed
at last over all obstacles. On August 29, a convention
was signed at Vergara settling the points in dispute
and providing for the capitulation of Maroto's army.
Two days later the 21 battalions specified in the treaty
marched into the camp of the Christinos and, having
been harangued by Espartero, proceeded to fraternize
joyfully with the Queen's troops. 1 Don Carlos, never-
theless, was still able to command the fidelity of a certain
number of his regiments. But Espartero, the moment
the capitulation of Maroto's people had been completed,
pressed these remnants of the insurgent army with the
utmost vigour. Their resistance was soon overcome,
and, on September 15, 1839, Don Carlos with a few
thousand followers was driven across the frontier.
On reaching French territory they were at once dis-
armed, the Pretender and the members of his family
being conveyed to Bourges, where they were detained
under strict supervision. It was not without difficulty
that Louis Philippe's ministers had obtained his
consent to that measure of precaution.
Although Don Carlos had abandoned the struggle,
Cabrera in the Maestrargo, and the no less bloodthirsty
Count of Espana in Catalonia, still carried on the war
with ruthless barbarity. In November, however,
Espana, having incurred the displeasure of the Carlist
junta, was removed from his command. His body
shortly afterwards was taken out of the river Segre
" tied neck and heels." 2 Without doubt he had been
murdered by the escort which was supposed to con-
vey him to a place of confinement. But it was not
till the month of July, 1840, that Espartero succeeded
1 F. O. Spain 679 (supplementary), Wylde to Palmerston, August 26,
29, September 1, 1889.
2 F. O. Spain 584 and 535, Southern to Palmerston, October 19,
1839 ; Jerningham to Palmerston, November 25, 1839.
214
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
in driving Cabrera and his lieutenant, Balmaceda, into
France and in breaking up the last of the Carlist
bauds.
Spain, however, was not destined to enjoy the
blessings of internal peace and tranquillity. Christina
had never really accepted the principles of constitu-
tional government, and most of the leading Moderados
shared her dislike to democratic institutions. With
the object, accordingly, of rendering nugatory certain
of the Liberal provisions of the constitution the
party, during the session of 1840, introduced a bill
abolishing the election of municipal officers, and
establishing a system under which they were, in the
future, to be appointed by the central government.
The Spaniards, however, have always been tenacious
of their municipal rights and privileges, and the pro-
posed law was, in consequence, greatly disliked by the
people. The Queen Regent and her Moderado advisers
would have cared little for popular opposition, pro-
vided always that they could have obtained the
support of one man. " Espartero," in the words of
Mr. Southern, the British charge d'affaires, "now
formed one of the bodies of the State." l The general
who had succeeded in terminating the civil war was,
for the time being, the idol of the nation.
Espartero, however, was deaf to the blandishments
of the Moderados, and publicly declared that he
regarded the municipal bill as unconstitutional. 2
Christina, nevertheless, was confident that he would
never resist her personal appeal. She had always
recognized the importance of winning his gratitude.
For his services he had been created Count of
Luchana, Duke de la Victoria, and a Spanish grandee
of the first class. After his capture of Cabrera's
1 F. O. Spain 531, Southern to Palmerston, July 27, 1889.
F. O. Spain 535, Jerningham to Palmerston, December 7, 1839,
January 4, 1840.
215
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
stronghold, in 1840, she had conferred upon him the
additional title of Duke of Morel! a. When the
municipal law was under discussion in the Chamber,
she suddenly announced her intention of proceeding
to Caldes, near Barcelona, with Isabella, who was
alleged to have been ordered sea bathing. But the
significance of her journey to the coast lay in the fact
that it would enable her to meet, and to confer with,
Espartero, who was directing the final operations in
Cabrera's country. 1 Her interview with the all-
powerful general took place, in due course, at Lerida,
but it disappointed her expectations. Espartero
advised her strongly to refuse her assent to the bill,
although it had been passed by both Chambers. It
was notorious that the Moderado majority had been
obtained by means of corruption and intimidation at
the elections of the previous year, and that it in no
way represented the will of the nation. Christina
wavered. At one time she decided to follow the
counsels of Espartero, at another she resolved to
adhere firmly to her Moderado policy. Meanwhile,
the country was growing dangerously excited, and
Barcelona was the scene of serious rioting. Christina,
in consequence, decided to move the Court to
Valencia, where O'Donnel, on whom she could depend,
commanded the troops. Upon her arrival, she boldly
announced that she purposed to commission Modesto
Cortazar, a former minister of Joseph Bonaparte, to
form an ultin-Moderado Cabinet. At the news, the
country rose, juntas sprang into existence in the
principal towns, and a provisional government was
established at Madrid. 2
Villiers was no longer at Madrid. On succeeding
to the earldom of Clarendon, he had returned home,
1 F. O. Spain 552, Aston to Palmerston, May 23, 30, June 8, 1840.
2 F. O. Spain 553, Aston to Palmerston, July 21, August 22,
September 3, 1840. Hubbard, Histairc dc I'Espagne, IV. pp. 228-229.
216
TWO QUEENS AND TWO PRETENDERS
where a seat in the Cabinet had been found for him.
When he learnt of the critical state of affairs in Spain,
Palmerston at once directed Mr. Aston, Clarendon's
successor, to seek out Christina, wherever she might
be, and to attempt to convince her of the imprudence
of the course upon which she had embarked. 1 But
before he could reach Valencia, she had abandoned the
struggle, and had sullenly surrendered the direction of
affairs to Espartero. She fully intended, she informed
Aston at his first audience, to resign the regency, and
no words of his could turn her from her resolution. 2
It was not alone the desire to avoid the disagreeable
necessity of having to accept a Progressista govern-
ment which had prompted her to arrive at this
decision. Gonzalez Bravo and the Radicals possessed
the proof of her marriage to Nunoz, the guardsman,
by whom she had already had several children. In
order to retain the regency, and especially the emolu-
ments appertaining to it, she had allowed it to be
generally believed that she was the mistress of the
handsome and low-born soldier. But now that her
secret had been betrayed, her marriage might be
adduced at any moment as a reason for declaring her
incompetent to hold the post of Regent. 3 Only by
a voluntary abdication could she escape from this
further humiliation. Accordingly, on October 12,
1840, she signed the act whereby she resigned the
regency, and left it to the Cortes to appoint her
successor. A few days later she parted from her
daughters, and set out for France. On May 18 of the
following year, Espartero was duly elected Regent,
1 F. O. Spain 547, Palmerston to Aston, September 3, 1840 (con-
fidential).
2 F. O. Spain 554 and 555, Aston to Palmerston, September 22, 1840 ;
Scott to Palmerston, October 1, 1840 ; Aston to Palmerston, October
11, 1840.
3 Hubbard, Histoire de VExpagne, IV. pp. 233-235.
217
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
whilst Argiielles, a veteran Progressista, was nomi-
nated guardian of Queen Isabella.
Christina's abdication passed almost unnoticed
outside Spain. The quarrel between the Sultan
and the Pasha had broken out afresh, and England
and France were upon the verge of war.
CHAPTER VII
SULTAN AND PASHA
IT will be remembered that, in the autumn of
1833, both France and Great Britain ineffectually
protested against the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. But
so long as Russia and Austria were closely united,
neither Palmerston nor Broglie were prepared to
enforce their demands by actual measures of hostility.
Both, however, were resolved vigilantly to watch the
course of events at Constantinople, and to interpose
should the Russian fleet return to the Bosphorus.
Being thus anxious to avoid a collision with Russia, it
became their policy to prevent a fresh outbreak
of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet AH, in
order that the Tsar should be furnished with no
excuse for intervention. It was soon apparent,
however, that the preservation of peace between
Mahmud and his powerful vassal would prove a
difficult matter. Already, in the summer of 1834,
only a little more than a year after the conclusion of
the Convention of Kiutayeh, there was once more
grave danger of an armed conflict between the Sultan
and the Pasha of Egypt.
In 1832, the Syrians had welcomed Ibrahim
as their deliverer from Turkish misrule. But no
sooner had they become the subjects of the Pasha,
than their disenchantment began. The introduction
of the conscription into Syria was fiercely resented.
In the spring of 1834, the whole country was in a
219
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
state of rebellion, and it required sixteen months of
arduous operations, attended with much bloodshed,
before Ibrahim could disarm the tribes, and restore the
authority of his father over the revolted districts. 1
But in the eyes of the Sultan, the insurrection was an
opportunity for attacking Ibrahim under favourable
conditions, and for wiping out the humiliations of the
former campaign. Accordingly, he prepared to
renew the struggle, and it was only in deference to
the protests of the Powers that he refrained from
carrying out his intention. 3 At the same time
the consuls at Alexandria insisted that Mehemet Ali
must strictly comply with the conditions of the
Convention of Kiutayeh, and afford Mahmud no
pretext for beginning hostilities. Nevertheless, on
September 4, 1834, the Pasha officially informed
the agents of the Powers that he was resolved to
proclaim his complete independence. 3 He soon,
however, perceived the necessity of postponing the
execution of this design, in face of the unanimous
declaration of the different Cabinets that he must
abandon "a project which the policy of Europe could
not allow him to realize." *
But, although the five Powers thus combined to
check the ambitious schemes of Mehemet Ali, the
suspicion with which the policy of Russia towards
Turkey was regarded by France and England was in
no way diminished. So strained were the relations of
Great Britain and Russia, at the beginning of 1834,
that Nicholas, notwithstanding his inveterate dislike
of Louis Philippe, allowed Nesselrode to make certain
1 F. O. Turkey 288, Campbell to Palmerston, August 23, 1836.
2 F. O. France 485 and 487, Granville to Palmerston, June 23, 1834 ;
Aston to Palmerston, August 13, 1884, September 15, 1834. F. O.
Turkey 284, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 23, 1834.
3 F. O. Turkey 246, Campbell to Palmerston, September 4, 5, 1834
(secret and confidential).
4 F. O. Turkey 244, Palmerston to Campbell, October 26, 1834.
F. O. France 488, Granville to Palmerston, October 27, 1834.
220
SULTAN AND PASHA
discreet advances towards France. These half-hearted
overtures, however, led to no results. Although
Broglie indulged in less provocative language than the
British minister, and deprecated the idea of another
naval demonstration in Levantine waters, he was in
complete agreement with Palmerston in the eastern
question. 1 A personal dispute served to increase the
tension which existed between the Imperial Cabinet
and the English government. Notwithstanding
Prince Lieven's intimation that the Tsar would greatly
dislike the appointment, 2 Palmerston had allowed Sir
Stratford Canning to be gazetted as ambassador to the
Russian Court. Nesselrode, thereupon, informed Mr.
Bligh, the British charge d'affaires, that Sir Stratford
would not be received. His " suspicious, overbearing
and irritable disposition " appears to have been the
reason assigned for the objections which were made
to his appointment. Palmerston, however, absolutely
refused to send any one else in his place. " The whole
thing," he believed or affected to believe, " was a mere
remnant of the Apostolical and Holy Alliance abomin-
ation of the name of Canning." 3 But Nesselrode was
equally unyielding and no British ambassador was, in
consequence, accredited to the Russian Court. Matters
continued upon this footing until Nicholas, in the
spring of 1834, decided to recall Prince Lieven from
London and merely to appoint a charge d'affaires to
replace him. The departure of the Lievens created a
1 F. 0. France 480 and 483, Granville to Palmerston, January 24,
March 14, April 18, 1834.
2 Sir Stratford Canning, who had been created Lord Stratford de
Bedcliffe, was ambassador to the Porte at the time of the Crimean War.
The negotiations are said to have been influenced by Nicholas' dislike of
him.
3 F. O. Russia 201 and 207, Palmerston to Bligh, October 27, 1832 ;
Bligh to Palmerston, November 17, 1832 ; Palmerston to Bligh,
December 14, 1832 ; Bligh to Palmerston, January 9, May 29, June
19, 1833 (the whole of this correspondence is in the form of private
letters).
221
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
great sensation, and was by many people regarded as a
prelude to a complete rupture between Russia and
Great Britain. The ambassador was a commonplace
person, but his wife 1 was a conspicuous figure in the
fashionable and political world. Besides being well
acquainted with most of the prominent diplomatists in
Europe, she had, during her long stay in England,
enjoyed the confidence of Grey, Aberdeen and other
statesmen. It may be imagined how bitterly she
deplored the necessity of exchanging a life, replete with
political interest in London, for an existence at the
Court of St. Petersburg, bereft of all the excitement in
which she delighted. It was to her influence, she
considered, that Palmerston owed his appointment as
Foreign Secretary, and she never forgave him for his
share in the events which led up to her husband's
recall. 2
Whilst the Duke of Wellington was at the Foreign
Office, during Sir Robert Peel's "Hundred Days,"
Anglo-Russian relations perceptibly improved. The
Duke's views upon the question of the Dardanelles
differed from those which Broglie and Palmerston
had hitherto entertained. In his opinion England
and France should endeavour to effect the closure of
the straits to the warships of all nations. The evil
arising from the passage of Russian ships from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean would not, he main-
tained, be diminished by the opening of the Dardanelles
to the fleets of the Powers. Accordingly, he cancelled
1 The following article appeared in The Times of May 28, 1834:
" The recall of Prince Lieven, or rather of Madame la Princesse, is an
event. We cannot say of Her Serene Highness that the petit nez
retrousse has occasioned much mischief, whatever her organs of speech
or her implements of writing may have done. . . . There never figured
on the courtly stage a female intriguer more restless, more arrogant,
more (politically and therefore we mean it not offensively) odious and
insufferable than this supercilious ambassadress. She fancied herself a
'power,' she was, however, more frequently a dupe," etc., etc.
2 E. Daudet, Dne Vic d'Ambassadrice, pp. 170, 180-183.
222
SULTAN AND PASHA
Palmerston's secret instructions of March 10, 1834, 1
authorizing Ponsonby, should the Porte ask for assist-
ance against Kussia, to call upon the Mediterranean
squadron to enter the Dardanelles. Moreover, apart
from this particular question, it was not fitting, in the
eyes of the Duke, that " the King's ambassador should
have the power of placing the country in a state of
war with another Power." 2 Wellington also proposed
to restore the diplomatic relations of the two countries
to their normal condition by the despatch of an
ambassador to St. Petersburg. But his selection of
Lord Londonderry for this post was disapproved of by
the House of Commons. Londonderry was an ultra-
Tory who was supposed to have used unsympathetic
language about the Polish insurrection, and, had he
not voluntarily declined the mission, the government
would certainly have suffered a defeat upon the ques-
tion of his appointment. 3
Palmerston, upon his return to the Foreign Office in
the spring of 1835, was struck by the soundness of the
Duke's opinion upon the subject of the Dardanelles. 4
Ponsonby was, in consequence, given no further
authority over the movements of the Mediterranean
squadron. No man at this time was more absolutely
persuaded of the Machiavellian character of Russian
policy than Lord Ponsonby. Neither words nor deeds
could shake his opinion upon that point. Although
the Russian envoy at Constantinople had co-operated
with his colleagues in preventing a renewal of the
struggle between the Sultan and the Pasha, the
British ambassador was none the less convinced that
Nicholas was secretly scheming to create a pretext for
intervention. Again, when M. de Boutenieff assisted
1 F. 0. Turkey 284, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 10, 1834
(secret).
2 F. 0. France 497, Wellington to Aston, March 17, 1835.
3 C. Greville, Journals (1), III. pp. 225-229.
4 F. 0. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 20, 1836.
223
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
him in obtaining redress for the ill-treatment of a
British subject at the hands of the Turkish police, he
explained his conduct by suggesting that " the Russian
minister was perhaps taken by surprise, and that those
honourable feelings, which are natural to him, operated
upon him." * Nor would he allow that the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg was actuated either by disinterested or
generous motives when, in 1836, it consented to remit
some of the indemnity due from Turkey and to
evacute Silistria. That fortress, he declared, was of no
value to Russia, and, by relinquishing it, she " would
obtain the advantage of making the world believe in
her moderation." 2 Being thus convinced that the
Tsar and his advisers entertained the most sinister
designs against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
he concluded that a secret understanding must exist
between Russia and Mehemet AH, the powerful and
disaffected vassal of the Sultan.
The effect of Lord Ponsonby's alarmist despatches
was to some extent counteracted by the more
statesmanlike reports of Lord Durham, his nephew
by marriage. The Duke of Wellington's intention
to send an ambassador of St. Petersburg had enabled
the Whigs, upon their return to power, to despatch
Lord Durham in that capacity to the Russian capital.
Durham, during the two years he was in Russia,
travelled through the southern provinces and made an
exhaustive study of the resources of the country. The
result of his observations and enquiries convinced him
that Russia's power for offensive war had been greatly
exaggerated. Furthermore, he was persuaded that
the Tsar Nicholas and almost all intelligent Russians
were sincerely desirous of establishing a good under-
standing with England, and had altogether abandoned
the idea of acquiring Constantinople. In short, he saw
1 F. 0. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 15, 1886.
* F. O. Turkey 273, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 14, 1836.
224
SULTAN AND PASHA
no reason why " a rival and an enemy should not be
converted into a friend and an ally." 1
Meanwhile, Palmerston and Broglie had been
quietly endeavouring to induce Austria to join with
France and Great Britain in guaranteeing the integrity
of Turkey. But Metternich, having contracted the
secret agreement with Russia 2 for the maintenance
of the Ottoman Empire, was not disposed to incur the
Tsar's displeasure by entering into a second compact.
Broglie, finding that his advances met with no
response, suggested that France and England should
separately conclude a treaty for the object which
both their governments had at heart and invite
Austria to adhere to it. Palmerston 3 acquiesced in
this plan, but was unable to obtain the assent of
his colleagues to its execution. Before any further
discussion of the subject could take place Broglie
fell, and the Presidency of the Council and the
direction of Foreign Affairs passed into the hands of
M. Thiers. The new minister professed to be as
anxious as his predecessor to preserve the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire, but it was apparent, at
once, that his first political object, to which all other
questions of European diplomacy would for the
present be subordinated, was the negotiation of a
marriage between the Due d'Orleans and an Austrian
Archduchess. 4
With the downfall of the Due de Broglie the
harmony, which had hitherto characterized French
and British relations, began to diminish. Both
Whigs and Tories had scrupulously abstained from
1 F. 0. Russia 223, Durham to Palmerston, February 6, 1836,
March 3, 1836 (confidential) ; cf. Barante,. Souvenirs, V. pp. 277-278,
299-300, 346.
- Vide p. 168.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 360, Palmerston to
Melbourne, July 5, 1840.
4 F. 0. France 520, Granville to Palmerston, February 26, 1836.
225 Q
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
raising the delicate question of the French occupation
of Algiers. 1 Broglie and the Doctrinaires were
opposed to the permanent retention of the colony,
and a considerable section of the Chamber looked
upon it as a useless and expensive encumbrance.
M. Thiers, however, thought otherwise. He was in
favour of " nationalizing the Arabs " an expression
which Mr. Aston 2 interpreted to mean that he was
contemplating their extermination. No sooner was
he in office than he began to prepare an expedition
against the Bey of Constantino, with whom the
French authorities had a long-standing dispute. At
the same time, whilst protesting that he had no
thought of extending French domination over either
Tunis or Tripoli, he refused to recognize the
sovereignty of the Sultan over those regencies. To
support this policy he sent Admiral Hugon to Tunis
to oppose, by force if necessary, the entry of the
Ottoman squadron into the bay. " I really believe,"
privately wrote the British ckargt d'affaires to Lord
Palmerston, " that * in order to gain popularity he
wishes for a war with Turkey, provided he could make
it appear that it was undertaken to protect French
interests." s
Whilst M. Thiers thus set himself to consolidate
the French rule over Algeria a secret negotiation was
initiated, at Constantinople and at Cairo, for the
purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the
French government, the relations of the Sultan and
the Pasha of Egypt upon a more secure foundation.
Campbell appears to have received the first
intelligence of what was taking place from his
Austrian colleague. The news caused him to pay a
1 F. O. France 489, Granville to Wellington, December 12, 1834.
2 British chargi d'affaires in Paris.
3 F. 0. France 523, Aston to Palmerston, July 25, 29, 1836 (private
letter).
226
SULTAN AND PASHA
visit to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, 1 who, in the
absence of M. Miniaut, was acting as French consul-
general. Lesseps was in a great state of indignation,
and in his wrath was inclined to be communicative. M.
Thiers, he confided to Campbell, before he left Paris,
had told him that an important negotiation was in
progress, but that he would not discuss it with him
as, upon his arrival at Alexandria, he could learn all
about it from a perusal of the documents at the
consulate. Mimaut, however, had carefully removed
every paper relating to the affair, and he was, in
consequence, in complete ignorance of all that had
passed. He had endeavoured, he added ingenuously,
to make Boghos Bey believe that he was ac-
quainted with the transaction, but the astute
secretary of the Pasha had discovered the true
state of the case and had promptly changed the
conversation. 2
Soon after Campbell's interview with Lesseps, on
December 11, 1836, Sarim Effendi, who was described
by Mehemet Ali as a confidential agent of the Sultan,
arrived at Alexandria. Ostensibly his mission was
concerned with questions of arrears of tribute. In
reality, however, he appears to have been empowered
to propose some repartition of territory. The state-
ments upon the subject which Campbell succeeded in
extracting from Mehemet Ali were conflicting. At one
time he told the British consul that the Sultan was
willing to invest him with the hereditary government
of Egypt and the Pashalik of Acre, whilst, on another
occasion, he asserted that the hereditary tenure of all
the territories which he actually occupied had been
offered to him, on condition that he would undertake
1 Lesseps, Ferdinand, Vicomte de, conceived in 1854 the great
scheme of cutting the Suez Canal.
2 F. 0. Turkey 284, Campbell to Palmerston, October 30,
November 18, 1836.
227
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to reduce his army. 1 In Paris Lord Granville was
unable to obtain any information about this affair.
In answer to his enquiries he was told that Roussin
had, " with the object of saving the dignity of the
Sultan, held out to the Pasha the prospect of obtaining
for his son the reversion of his Syrian possessions, in
return for the abandonment of the other territories
which he occupied." But he was assured that the
admiral had acted without instructions from his
government, which had, on the contrary, "dis-
countenanced his proceedings."
If Mahmud really empowered Sarim Effendi to
make substantial concessions to the Pasha, such
conduct on his part is altogether inconsistent with the
sentiments of implacable hostility which he had
constantly entertained towards his powerful vassal.
In the spring of 1836 he had shown a strong disposi-
tion to renew the struggle, and had sent a secret agent
to London to solicit help. His appeal was rejected,
but Palmerston intimated that the British government
was constrained to urge him to keep the peace from
fear that his military resources would be unequal to
the contest, rather than from any desire to see the
status quo in Syria maintained. 3 Finding that no
assistance would be forthcoming from England,
Mahmud may have listened to the advice of the
French government to make further concessions to
Mehemet Ali, in order to put an end to the armed
peace which was draining his depleted treasury. But
the conditions, whatever they may have been, which
1 F. O. Turkey 284 and 819, Campbell to Palmerston, December 20,
1836, January 21, 24, April 7, 11, 1837.
a P. O. France 562, Granville to Palmerston, June 25, 1838.
3 F. O. Turkey 271 and 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 8, 1836
(secret) ; Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 7, 1836 (secret). " His Majesty's
government do not expect that any communication which he (the
Sultan's agent) is to make will induce them to consider an attack upon
Mehemet Ali, in the present relative strength of the two parties, as
anything but an act of the most extreme impolicy."
228
SULTAN AND PASHA
were proposed to the Pasha were not accepted. Never-
theless, the negotiation, although it led to no direct
results, had an important influence upon the march of
events. It disclosed to Mehemet Ali that France and
England were pursuing different objects in the East,
and gave him grounds for hoping that he need no
longer fear a combination of the two naval Powers
against him.
But, although the Sultan may have been dis-
appointed and annoyed at the refusal of Great Britain
to assist him actively, he could derive comfort from
the knowledge that the power of Mehemet Ali was
regarded with misgivings in England. Ponsonby's
influence at the Porte grew in proportion as it became
more and more evident that his government dis-
approved of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and
was prepared to uphold the sovereignty of Turkey
over Tunis and to resist French encroachments. On
the other hand, the Russian ambassador, who declared
unceasingly that under no circumstances must the
status quo, as established by the Convention of
Kiutayeh, be disturbed, found his authority diminish.
Early in 1836, shortly before the arrival in England
of the Sultan's secret agent, Palmerston had despatched
General Chrzanowski, an able and experienced Polish
officer, to Asia Minor. He had served in the Turkish
campaign of 1828-1829, and was, Palmerston con-
sidered, 1 "just the sort of man to be of the greatest
use to Reshid Pasha." 2 But as the Russians, by
whom he was looked upon as a deserter, would
greatly resent his employment, he was instructed
to avoid Constantinople, and to proceed direct
to Smyrna. He would never appear to have been
given a command or to have been employed officially
1 F. 0. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 7, 1836 (private
and confidential).
2 The Turkish Commander in Asia Minor.
229
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
by the Sultan, who probably scarcely ventured to defy
his powerful neighbour so openly. He was allowed,
however, to travel about Asia Minor, and to study the
strategical situation. He was thus enabled to furnish
Palmerston with excellent military advice, in return for
the salary which Lord Ponsonby was instructed to pay
him, from the moment of his arrival in the East. 1
Several Prussian officers, among them a certain Major
von Moltke, destined to become very famous, were at
this time serving with the Turkish army, to the
re-organization of which, in preparation for the coming
struggle, Palmerston unceasingly urged the Sultan to
devote his whole attention.
Whilst instructing Ponsonby to impress upon the
Turkish ministers the necessity of increasing the
efficiency of the army, Palmerston was intent on
creating embarrassments for Mehemet Ali. The
economic system, which he had established in Egypt,
and which he was imposing upon Syria, presented an
excellent field for hostile criticism. By often very
equivocal methods the Pasha had gradually expro-
priated the former freeholders, and had converted
them into his own tenants. He would then buy at a
fixed rate their produce, and thus, before long, the
sale of almost all articles of prime necessity became a
monopoly of the State. At first his system appeared
to work well, but, when he began to pile up his
armaments, he met the increased expenditure which
they entailed by reducing the price, which he had
hitherto paid to the unfortunate occupiers of the soil.
In order to compensate themselves these people were
necessarily compelled to raise the price of all articles
which the government did not take from them. In
1838 Colonel Campbell computed that, as the result
of the Pasha's administration, articles of ordinary
1 F. 0. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 29, 1836
(secret and confidential).
230
SULTAN AND PASHA
consumption in Egypt were from six to ten times
dearer than they had been under the rule of the
Mamelukes. Moreover, Mehemet AH, ever since the
year 1816, had been busily endeavouring to convert
Egypt into a manufacturing country. With this
object he had imported at great expense skilled work-
men and machinery from France and England. The
native labour required was obtained in the same
manner as the army was recruited. Men, women and
children were impressed and compelled to work in the
factories. But by their unskilfulness they injured the
machinery, nor did the articles which they turned out
pay the cost of manufacture. The result of this
experiment was that some 30,000 peasants, who might
with advantage have been engaged in agriculture,
were forced to labour unprofitably in the factories
of the government. The Pasha, however, was too
ignorant of the most elementary principles of political
economy to understand the folly of these proceedings,
in which he was encouraged to persevere by the
foreign merchants, who sold him machinery or who
bought his cotton and his indigo upon very advanta-
geous terms. 1
The British government had always been desirous
to put an end to the old system of capitulations? and
to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the Porte.
But as many influential persons in Turkey were
interested in the preservation of existing abuses, the
proposals of successive ambassadors had constantly
been eluded. At the beginning of 1838, however,
Palmerston directed Ponsonby to bring the matter
forward again, and to lay great stress upon the
prejudicial effect which the abolition of monopolies
throughout the Ottoman Empire would not fail to
1 F. O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, January, 22, 1838.
2 The name given to the immunities and privileges granted in the
sixteenth century to France, and gradually extended to other Powers.
231
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
have upon the personal position of Mehemet Ali. 1
This argument attained the desired result. Mahmud
quickly resolved that no vested interests should be
allowed to interfere with a commercial arrangement,
which must either seriously embarrass Mehemet Ali
or, should he refuse to adhere to it, bring him into
conflict with Great Britain. The Sultan's consent
having been obtained, Ponsonby entrusted to Henry
Bulwer the negotiation which was brought to a
satisfactory conclusion on August 19, 1838. 2
In the meantime, it had not escaped the vigilance
of the Indian government that the protracted resistance
of the Wahabites was weakening, and that Mehemet
Ali was upon the point of making himself master of
the whole of Arabia. The importance of Aden as an
intermediate coaling station between Bombay and
Suez had been realized, and it happened, most oppor-
tunely, that a quarrel 3 between the ruler of that port
and the East India Company enabled the Governor-
General to take action at the very moment when the
absorption of the Yemen by the Pasha was imminent. 4
The management of the affair was confided to Captain
Haines of the Bombay navy, who, early in 1838, was
able to inform Ibrahim that the Sultan of Aden had
ceded the port to the East India Company " par simple
motif damitie et de son consentement." 5 Nevertheless,
the expedition sent from India to take possession of the
place encountered, on January 16, 1839, a fierce resist-
ance which was only overcome after a sharp engagement.
Palmerston, upon receipt of the news of its cession, at
once directed Campbell to warn Mehemet Ali that any
movement of his troops against Aden would be treated
1 F. O. Turkey 328, Palmerston to Ponsonby, February 6, 1838.
2 F. O. Turkey 832, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 19, 1838.
3 On the subject of the alleged ill-treatment of the crew of a ship-
wrecked vessel sailing under British colours.
4 F. O. Turkey 842, Campbell to Palmerston, January 16, 1838.
5 Ibid., March 27, 1838.
232
SULTAN AND PASHA
as an attack upon a British possession. The Pasha,
although unable wholly to conceal his chagrin, accepted
the situation with a good grace. 1
Ever since the beginning of the year 1838, great
military preparations had been in progress both in
Egypt and Syria. The consuls, had in consequence,
been instructed to inquire of Mehemet AH the reason
of his armaments. It was whilst they were engaged
in warning him that any aggression upon the Sultan
would bring down upon him the vengeance of the
Powers that the news arrived of the submission of
Nejd, the great central district of Arabia, extending
from Medina and Mecca to the Persian Gulf. 2 It was
impossible to calculate what might result from the
enhanced prestige which he had thus acquired in the
eyes of the faithful. The immediate effect was seen, a
few days later, when he sent for the consuls and
announced to each of them separately his unalterable
resolution to proclaim his independence. " The
interests of his family," he declared to Campbell,
" imperiously called upon him to^fix their future state,
and it was les larmes aux yeux et le coeur serre that he
had taken his present resolution." Nevertheless, he
would wait a reasonable time in the full persuasion
that the British government would take such steps as
would permit of an amicable and satisfactory settle-
ment. 3
The Cabinets of the Powers were not greatly
disturbed by the Pasha's threats. Palmerston alone
showed any anxiety to arrange the military measures
which might be put into force against Mehemet Ali,
should he proceed to carry out his declared intentions.*
1 F. O. Turkey 343, Palmerston to Campbell, June 8, 1838 ; Camp-
bell to Palmerston, June 9, September 1, 1838.
- F. O. Turkey 342, Palmerston to Campbell, February 6, March 16,
1838 ; Campbell to Palmerston, April 3, 5, May 19, 21, 1838.
3 F. O. Turkey 342, Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838.
4 F. O. France 557, Palmerston to Granville, July 3, 1838.
233
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
But it was soon evident that the Pasha had no desire
to bring on a crisis. Although he continued to
impress upon the consuls that he was fully as deter-
mined as ever to obtain for his children the succession
of the countries which he governed, he at the same
time announced his intention of proceeding to Upper
Egypt to inspect his gold mines. Furthermore, he
duly transmitted his yearly tribute to the Sultan.
Nevertheless, his military preparations were not re-
laxed and reinforcements were continuously despatched
to Ibrahim in Syria. It was clear that he had no
intention of affording the Powers a pretext for taking
active measures against him, but hoped, by keeping
them and the Porte in a constant state of apprehen-
sion, to weary them into conceding him some of his
demands. 1 In pursuance of this astute policy he
accepted the British commercial treaty with the
utmost unconcern. He was confident, he assured
Campbell, that he could derive a larger revenue from
duties on exports and imports than he had ever
obtained under his system of monopolies. 2 M. Mole,
on the other hand, testified his surprise and annoyance
at the success which had attended Lord Ponsonbys
negotiations. He was greatly afraid, he told
Granville, that Mehemet Ali would now be pro-
voked into an immediate declaration of independence.
But, upon learning that the Pasha had announced his
intention of adhering to the terms of the British
treaty, he promptly instructed Roussin to conclude,
on behalf of France, a similar arrangement with the
Porte. 3
Whilst the aims and! ambitions of Mehemet Ali
1 P. 0. Turkey 343, Campbell to Palmerston, August 16, 24, Septem-
ber 5, 8, 1838.
3 F. O. Turkey 848, Campbell to Palmerston, September 28, 1838.
3 F. O. France 564, Granville to Palmerston, September 21, 28,
October 5, 1838. F. O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October
29, 1838.
234
SULTAN AND PASHA
were once more attracting the attention of the Powers,
Anglo-Russian relations again assumed a threatening
aspect. Both the British and Indian governments
had, for some time past, been disturbed by the ascend-
ency which Russia was acquiring over the Court of
Teheran, and by the intrigues of her agents in Afghan-
istan. Encouraged by Count Simonitch, the Russian
envoy, the Shah, who entertained pretensions to the
sovereignty of Afghanistan, at the close of the year
1837, marched against Herat. Before the siege had
been long in progress both the British and Russian
ministers arrived upon the scene the one to en-
deavour to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and
the other to direct the operations of the Persian
army. Whilst Macneil and Simonitch thus strove
for supremacy in the camp of Mohammad, Eldred
Pottinger, a subaltern of the Indian army, who had
reached Herat disguised as a horse-dealer, stimulated
by his example the courage of the garrison. At the
same time Captain Witkewitch, a secret agent of Count
Simonitch, arrived at t Cabul, for the purpose of drawing
Dost Mohammad into the Russo-Persian alliance and of
counteracting the influence of Alexander Burnes, who,
like his Russian rival, was in Afghanistan upon a
mission which was described as commercial. The idea
of a Russian agent established at Cabul, free to intrigue
with Ranjit Singh, the Maharajah of Lahore, and sup-
ported by the whole weight of Mohammedan Persia,
seriously alarmed Lord Auckland, the Governor-
General. 1 To combat this danger he conceived the
fatal plan of sending an Anglo-Indian army into
Afghanistan to overthrow the Barakzai dynasty, and
to set up in the place of Dost Mohammad an exiled
Sadozai prince, a pensioner of the Indian government.
The conduct of the Russian agents in Persia and
Afghanistan was made the subject of a note which, on
1 H. Rawlinson, Russia and England in the East, pp. 139-151.
235
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
October 26, 1838, Clanricarde, the British ambassador
at St. Petersburg, was directed to deliver to Count
Nesselrode. The Russian Chancellor, whilst deprecat-
ing the construction placed by Palmerston on some of
Count Simonitch's actions, admitted that he had
exceeded his instructions and undertook to recall him. 1
This promise was duly carried out. Consequently,
when Witkewitch arrived at St. Petersburg he was
coldly informed that he must forthwith return to his
post at Orenburg. In despair at finding that the
negotiations, which he had conducted so skilfully, were
to be disavowed, the unfortunate man blew out his
brains. 2 Only a little more than two years later
Burnes, his rival, perished at Cabul at the hands of an
infuriated mob.
The assurances and explanations of Count Nesselrode
were accepted as satisfactory by Lord Palmerston.
The visit of the Tsarewitch, the future Alexander II.,
to London, in the spring of 1839, contributed still
further to restore harmonious relations. Nevertheless,
the general situation which confronted Palmerston was
disquieting. Russia, which by means of the Treaty
of Unkiar-Skelessi had assumed the exclusive pro-
tectorship of Turkey, now appeared to exercise a
dangerous ascendency over the Court of Persia.
Although the Shah had been compelled to raise the
siege of Herat, and although the proceedings of
Simonitch and Witkewitch had been disavowed, there
was room for grave anxiety. Distant as was the
frontier line of the Sutlej from the most advanced
Cossack posts, the presence of Russian agents in the
intervening States foreboded trouble. At Lahore,
Hyderabad and Cabul, the appearance of a new
1 Correspondence, relating to Persia and AfgJianistan, Palmerston
to Clanricarde, October 26, 1828; Nesselrode a Pozzo, 20 octobre,
1838 ; Palmerston to Pozzo, December 20, 1838 ; Nesselrode ii Pozzo,
20 Janvier, 1889.
2 F. O. Russia 252, Clanricarde to Palmerston, May 25, 1839.
236
SULTAN AND PASHA
power in Central Asia could not fail to be eagerly
discussed.
But it was not alone the advance of Russia beyond
the Caspian which gave those responsible for the
safety of British India cause for uneasy reflection. At
this time, when the introduction of steam as a means
of transport was making the question of rapid
communication a matter of the first importance,
Mehemet Ali was building up an Arab Empire which
already extended from Khartum to the Taurus
mountains and the Persian Gulf. Whether in the
future the Indian mail would be carried over the
Isthmus of Suez, or whether Colonel Chesney should
succeed in establishing steam communication by way
of the Euphrates, the ruler of Egypt was master of
either route. Nor did he stand alone. Whilst busily
engaged in strengthening her own position as a
Mediterranean power, England's most formidable naval
rival was showing a marked disposition to befriend
him. In Syria France was the acknowledged protector
of the Catholics, and her influence was reported to
have increased of late years. 1 From Algiers she was
extending her grasp over the whole north coast of
Africa, whilst in Spain she was striving to re-establish
that predominating influence which she had formerly
exercised. It seemed possible that France, in alliance
with Spain and Mehemet Ali, might yet be enabled
to realize Napoleon's dream of converting the Medi-
terranean into a " French lake."
When Mehemet Ali had announced his intention
of shaking off his allegiance, Mahmud had seemed to
defer to the pacific counsels of the Powers, and had
refrained from ordering his troops in Asia Minor to
invade Syria. But, before the spring of 1839, it was
clear that he was resolved to appeal to arms, and that
all the efforts of diplomacy to prevent a renewal of
1 F. 0. Turkey 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 7, 1836.
237
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the conflict would be fruitless. It was not alone his
bitter hatred of his rebellious vassal which prompted
the Sultan to disregard the advice of the ambassadors
at Constantinople. His sole claim to the Khalifate
rested upon the protection of Mecca, and, inasmuch as
Mehemet Ali was in possession of the Holy Cities,
were he to declare himself independent, Mahmud
must forfeit his right to command the temporal
obedience of Mohammedans. Already Constantinople
was seething with disaffection, and he is said to have
been aware that a plot had been formed to depose
him and to enthrone his son, under the guardianship
of Mehemet Ali. 1
Mahmud was dying from a complication of dis-
orders, but he gave his whole expiring strength to his
military preparations. Men, horses and guns were
hurried across the Bosphorus and forwarded to Hafiz
Pasha in Asia Minor. Moltke with his plane-table was
busily engaged in exploring the country up to Nezib,
" a small town hidden among the olive trees close against
the Syrian frontier."' At the news that the Porte
was bent upon war, Mehemet Ali, curtailing his visit
to Khartum, hastily returned to Cairo, whilst at
Constantinople the ambassadors made a last endeavour
to dissuade the Sultan from disturbing the peace. 3
But Mahmud was not to be diverted from his object,
and in Paris, on May 23, 1839, it was known that
Hafiz Pasha had crossed the Euphrates and that
hostilities were about to begin.
French historians have generally imputed duplicity
to the British government in this affair. Palmerston,
they say, whilst pretending that he was anxious to
dissuade the Sultan from war, was in point of fact
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 291-294.
2 Lettrea du Marechal Molike sur I'Orient, II. pp. 310-811.
3 Levant Correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 12, 1839.
F. O. Turkey 355, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 20, 23, 1839
(confidential).
238
SULTAN AND PASHA
allowing Lord Ponsonby, his agent at Constantinople,
to encourage the Turkish ministers to break the peace.
Ponsonby was unquestionably opposed to the policy of
maintaining the status quo in Syria. In his opinion
Mehemet Ali was the sore which was sapping the
strength of the Ottoman Empire, and, seeing that it
was a British interest that Turkey should be in a
condition to resist Russia, he held that England
should assist the Sultan to crush his too -powerful
vassal. 1 It is undeniable that Palmerston allowed
him a liberty of action and of language which he
would not have tolerated in any other ambassador.
There can be no doubt, moreover, that he regarded
the Egyptian question in very much the same light as
Ponsonby. But he differed from him in one very
important particular, inasmuch as he considered that
the moment had not yet come when Mahmud could,
with a reasonable chance of success, try conclusions
with the Pasha. France, he was well aware, would
never join in an attack upon Mehemet Ali. Indeed,
it was rather a question whether she would not openly
espouse his cause. The possibility of a combination
between Russia and France could not be dismissed as
a development outside the range of practical politics. 2
Hitherto, Nicholas' dislike of Louis Philippe had
rendered the chance of such a contingency very
remote. But, were England to adopt a separate
policy in the east, it was improbable that the Tsar
would allow his personal animosity to stand in the
way of an alliance, which he might consider would
serve the best interests of his Empire. Accordingly,
when, at the close of the year 1838, Eeshid Pasha,
the Seis-Effendi, arrived upon a special mission to
1 F. O. Turkey 332, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 5 (secret),
October 3, 13, November 9, December 31, 1838.
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Pahnerston, II. pp. 267-269; Palmerston to
Granville, June 8, 1838.
239
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
London, he discovered, to his disappointment, that
Palmerston was not prepared to hold out any
hopes that the British government would join in an
attack upon Mehemet AH. Only, Palmerston
explained, in the event of the Pasha beginning
hostilities, could England furnish the Sultan with
naval assistance. Mahmud being intent upon war, a
purely defensive alliance could be of no service to him,
and was declined. 1 If the bellicose policy of the
Sultan had received any encouragement from Lord
Ponsonby, Reshid's conferences at the Foreign Office
in London must have made it clear that the
ambassador had been using language which he had no
authority to employ. When, therefore, the Sultan
ordered Hafiz Pasha to advance, he was perfectly
aware that he was acting in opposition to the wishes
of the British government, which did not believe
that he had an army capable of defeating Ibrahim's
Arab and Egyptian troops.
Directly it was known that the Turkish army had
been set in motion and that all hope of maintaining
the peace must be abandoned, the Soult Cabinet asked
the Chamber for a credit of ten million francs. The
sum demanded was accorded by an overwhelming
majority and, in the debates which followed, the
deputies were enabled to declare their views upon the
eastern question. The sympathies of the majority
were plainly on the side of Mehemet Ali, and ministers
were given clearly to understand, by the long
succession of orators who in turn ascended the tribune,
that with the large sum which had been placed at their
disposal they must do something both great and
glorious. 2 Soult, in the meanwhile, had despatched
1 Levant correspondence, Reshid a Palmerston, 26 avril, 1889 ;
Palmerston to Eeshid, May 6, 1839 ; Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6,
1839. F. O. Turkey 855, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 22, 1839.
8 Thureau Dangin, Monarchic de Juillet, IV. p. 48.
240
SULTAN AND PASHA
two officers, the one to Constantinople and the other
to Alexandria, with instructions to proceed, after
conferring with Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet,
to the headquarters of the two armies, in order to
endeavour to bring about a suspension of hostilities.
The friendly feelings towards England entertained by
Marshal Soult, and the better understanding with
regard to Spanish affairs between the French and
English governments, which followed his assumption
of office, have already been mentioned. Their co-oper-
ation in the eastern question was no less cordial.
" We are in complete accord," said Palmerston to
Bourqueney, the French c/iarge d'affaires in London ;
"our communications are not those of one govern-
ment with another but of two colleagues in the
same Cabinet." ! It was decided that both the French
and British fleets should proceed to the Levant, and
that the admirals should be instructed to do all in
their power to induce the opposing generals to sus-
pend hostilities. Both Soult and Palmerston, however,
were agreed that the great danger in the situation
lay in the possibility that Nicholas might avail himself
of the outbreak of war for invading Turkey, under
the plea that Constantinople must be protected against
Ibrahim. They, accordingly, resolved to intimate to
the Porte that, in the event of Russian aid being
invoked, or of a Russian fleet entering the Bosphorus,
permission should be given to the French and British
squadrons to pass through the Dardanelles into the
Sea of Marmora. 2
Mehemet Ali, when the news arrived that the Turks
had crossed the Euphrates, displayed the greatest self-
restraint. In his heart he was, doubtless, eager for the
1 Guizot, Memoires, IV. Pieces Historiques, Bourqueney a Soult,
20 juin, 1839.
2 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 18, 1839 ;
Palraerston to Beauvale, July 23, 1839.
241 R
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
fray, but he was determined that the responsibility for
the outbreak of the war should rest with the Sultan.
Accordingly, he delivered a written communication to
the representatives of the Powers, in which he under-
took to withdraw his troops to Damascus, provided
the Turkish army would recross the river. 1 It was
only on June 10, upon receipt of a report from
Ibrahim that his cavalry had been attacked within the
Egyptian frontier, that he directed him to assume the
offensive. 2 But three days after these orders had been
despatched Captain Caillier, the officer sent off by
Marshal Soult, arrived at Alexandria. He was the
bearer of despatches from the Marshal to M. Cochelet,
instructing him to declare to Mehemet Ali that the
Powers were taking steps to settle the eastern question,
and that they must insist upon the immediate with-
drawal of the Egyptian army within the boundaries of
Syria. The Pasha, after some little hesitation, con-
sented to write to his son enjoining him not to pursue
the Turks beyond the frontiers of Syria and to halt
wherever Caillier might come up with him. 3 But
before Marshal Soult's emissary could reach Ibrahim's
headquarters that general had completely defeated the
Turks, on June 24, 1839, in a great battle near Nezib.
Before the news of this disaster could reach Con-
stantinople Mahmud was dead, and when, shortly
afterwards, the intelligence of the complete defeat of
Hafiz Pasha was brought to the Turkish ministers,
they kept the matter strictly secret. AboVul-Mejid,
the sixteen-year-old son of the deceased Mahmud, was
proclaimed Sultan, and the ambassadors of the Powers
were invited to a conference on July 3. On this
occasion Nourri-Effendi, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, announced that the Porte had no reason to
1 Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, May 19, 1839.
2 Ibid., June 14, 1839.
3 Ibid., June 16, 1839.
242
SULTAN AND PASHA
suppose that any engagement had yet taken place
between the two armies. Nevertheless, the Sultan
purposed to send "one of the eminent men of his
Court " to offer Mehemet Ali a full pardon for the
past and to assure him of his favour in the future.
Furthermore, he was prepared to confer upon him
the hereditary government of Egypt, provided he
would abandon Syria and the other territories over
which he now exercised his dominion. Pending the
result of this negotiation orders had been sent to Hafiz
Pasha to suspend hostilities. 1
It was not until July 8 that the true facts were
generally known in Constantinople, and, on the
evening of that day, Lord Ponsonby was informed
by the French ambassador of a fresh disaster.
Admiral Lalande, who with a small French squadron
was lying at the entrance to the Dardanelles, reported
that the Capudan Pasha had sailed away with, he
believed, the intention of delivering up his fleet to
Mehemet Ali. Osman Bey, the second in command
of the Turkish squadron, had had an interview with
the French admiral, 2 and had declared that the
Sultan had been murdered by Halil and Hosrew
Pasha, both of whom were in league with the
Russians. Under these circumstances the Capudan
Pasha determined to place his ships in safety. On
this pretext he proceeded with all speed to Alexandria,
where he delivered up to the Pasha his whole fleet,
consisting of twenty-one sail, of which eight were of
the line.
The indifference with which Admiral Lalande had
heard of the treacherous intentions of the Capudan
Pasha, and the apathy which had characterized his
proceedings, could not fail to attract attention.
Marshal Soult himself, in discussing the surrender
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839.
2 Ibid., July 8, 1839.
243
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, was forced
to admit that Lalande's conduct appeared to him
inexplicable. 1 In the course of the next few months,
however, further light was thrown upon the matter.
An Armenian, a certain Avedick, the confidential
dragoman of the Capudan Pasha, was smuggled out of
Alexandria on board a British ship. This man, when
he arrived at Constantinople, agreed to disclose all he
knew to Reshid Pasha. According to his statement,
Admiral Lalande, accompained by the Prince de
Joinville, came on board the Turkish flagship, and
held a consultation with Osman, the Reala Bey? who
seems to have been the evil genius of the Capudan
Pasha. On learning of his intention to proceed to
Alexandria, the French officers, far from attempting to
detain him, applauded his resolution, bidding him only
to be careful to avoid H.M.S. Vanguard, which was in
Besika Bay. Ponsonby, in forwarding the papers
connected with this affair, emitted the opinion that,
although many circumstances appeared to confirm the
truth of the dragoman's story, " he could not feel it to
be true of an honourable man like Admiral Lalande."
Palmerston either adopted this view, or more probably,
deemed it impossible to base a formal representation
to the French government upon Avedick's unsupported
statement. But after the abdication and death of his
father, the Prince de Joinville saw fit to publish,
under an assumed name in the Revue des deux
Mondes;' an account of these transactions which
confirmed the dragoman's allegations in every partic-
ular. Throughout the French fleet there was, says
1 F. O. France 584, Granville to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
8 Vice-Admiral.
3 F. O. Turkey 860, Ponsonby to Palmerston, November 27, 28, 30,
December 3, 1839.
4 Revue des deux Mondcs, 1" aout, 1852, L'Escadre de la Mediter-
ranee. See also curious remarks of M. Thureau-Dangin, Monarchic de
Juillet, IV. pp. 53-56.
244
SULTAN AND PASHA
His Eoyal Highness, a bitter hatred of England and
an intense desire to avenge former defeats. The
Pasha of Egypt was regarded as the ally of France in
a struggle, which every man hoped and believed, would
take place in the near future. Admiral Lalande was,
therefore, clearly justified in encouraging the Capudan
Pasha to surrender his fleet to Mehemet Ali. Although
thirteen years had elapsed since the events referred to
in this article had taken place, the Prince evidently
experienced the greatest satisfaction in remembering
that Captain Walker, and the other British naval
instructors of the Ottoman fleet, had been carried off
to Alexandria on ships which were to be handed over
to England's enemy, the Pasha of Egypt.
These successive disasters, Lord Palmerston main-
tained, should make no difference in the policy of the
Powers. On the contrary, the battle of Nezib had
made it the more imperative that steps should be
taken to check the progress of the victorious Ibrahim. 1
Metternich held the same opinion. Russia, however,
appeared disposed to adopt a different view of the
situation. In 1838, when Mehemet Ali was threaten-
ing to proclaim his independence, she had refused to
acquiesce in Palmerston's proposal that the Turco-
Egyptian question should be submitted to a conference
of the Powers. 2 But in the following spring, when it
was plain that the Sultan was resolved to embark
upon war, she had not appeared disinclined to enter-
tain Metternich's suggestion that the seat of the
negotiations should be established at Vienna. " Each
Cabinet," Metternich proposed, " might send its opinion
to its representatives at Vienna, leaving a certain
latitude for discussion, and from a comparison of
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839 ;
Palmerston to Beauvale, August 1, 1839; Guizot, Memoircs, Pieces
historiques, Bourqueney tl Soult, 23 juillet, 1839.
2 F. O. Russia 243, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 10, 1338.
245
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the five opinions, one should be sought in which all
might coincide." 1 By this arrangement much delay
would be obviated, and the same advantages could be
obtained as by the summoning of the conference, to
which Nicholas had objected. But at the news that,
as a consequence of the death of 'Mahmud and of the
defeat sustained by the Turkish arms at Nezib, the
Porte purposed to open a direct negotiation with
the Pasha, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg once more
evinced a strong disinclination to assent to the plan of
establishing a European concert for the settlement of
the eastern question. 2 The disposition which Nicholas
thus manifested to diverge from the policy advocated
by Great Britain and Austria, was hastily seized by
France as an opportunity for isolating Russia. The
Soult Cabinet, accordingly, insisted upon the necessity
of counselling the Porte to avoid any precipitate action,
and only to treat with Mehemet Ali through the
intermediary of the Powers. 3 Palmerston, as may be
supposed, lost no time in expressing to the Marshal
the satisfaction which he derived from seeing that he
was animated by sentiments coinciding so completely
with his own. 4
In the meanwhile Akiff-Effendi, the Turkish envoy,
sent to treat with Mehemet Ali, had returned to Con-
stantinople, after a fruitless mission to Cairo. The
Pasha had protested his loyalty to the young Sultan,
but he had none the less received the Capudan Pasha
and his officers with open arms and clearly meant to
i 1 Levant correspondence, Dalmatic a Bourqueney, 17 juin, 1839;
Beauvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1889 ; Palmerston to Beauvale,
June 28, 1839 ; Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839 ; Beauvale to
Palmerston, June 30, 1838 ; W. Russell to Palmerston, July 6, 1839 ;
Beauvale to Palmerston, July 10, 1889.
2 Ibid., Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1889; Nesselrode a
Kisseleff, 15-27 juillet, 1839.
3 Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, July 30, 1839 ; Soult a Bour-
queney, 28 juillet, 1839.
4 Ibid., Palmerston to Granville, July 30, 1839.
246
SULTAN AND PASHA
retain the Ottoman fleet. Moreover, he had declared
emphatically that he must be invested with the
hereditary government of both Syria and Egypt, and
had expressed indignation that his old enemy Hosrew
Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had not been dismissed. He
had, however, undertaken that, for the present,
Ibrahim should not advance into Asia Minor. 1 It
was clear to the ambassadors at Constantinople that
the Porte, if left to itself, would consent to all the
Pasha's demands. " I consider the Ottoman Empire
to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali," wrote Ponsonby
on July 26. 2 But, on the following day, Baron
Stunner received despatches from Vienna. 3 Metter-
nich had either foreseen, or had obtained early informa-
tion, that the Turkish ministers would make further
concessions, and he, accordingly, informed the Inter-
niuicio that the five Powers were determined to resist
the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, and directed him to
urge his colleagues to unite with him in representing
to the Porte the necessity of allowing the conditions of
peace to be settled by the Powers. Lord Beauvale 4
and M. de Sainte-Aulaire had, it is said, at Metternich's
request, written in the same strain to Ponsonby and
to Roussin. 5 A meeting of the representatives of the
five Powers was immediately convened and a note was
drawn up, informing the Porte " that agreement among
the five Great Powers, on the question of the East,
was secured," and inviting it to suspend any definitive
resolution without their concurrence. M. de Boutenieff,
the Russian minister, appears to have made no difficulty
about affixing his signature to this document, which
was ;to be known as the collective note of July 27,
1839. When it was presented to them, the Turkish
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 21, 22, 1839.
2 Ibid., July 26, 1839.
3 Ibid., July 29, 1839.
4 Sir Frederick Lamb, created Baron Beauvale in 1839.
5 Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie de Juillet, IV. p. 58 (note).
247
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
ministers expressed the utmost gratitude, and promised
to suspend all negotiations and to inform Mehemet
Ali that the affair was now in the hands of the five
Powers. 1
The news that the collective note had been
delivered, and that it had been accepted by the Porte
in the desired spirit, afforded the keenest satisfaction
at Vienna and in London. Palmerston, agreeing with
Ponsonby, perceived that it had destroyed the Treaty
of Unkiar-Skelessi, and that the days of Russia's
exclusive protectorship over Turkey were at an
end. One of the chief objects of his eastern policy
had thus been attained, and he could devote his whole-
attention to the other the curtailment of the power
of Mehemet Ali. In Paris, on the other hand,
the situation created by the collective note awoke
serious misgivings. Since the battle of Nezib, French
enthusiasm for Mehemet Ali had increased alarmingly.
" Men," wrote Veron, a " defended the claims of
the Pasha with the same fervour as, in 1828, they
had espoused the cause of Greek independence."
Ministers, under these circumstances, could only
reflect ruefully that, now that France was a party
to the collective note, they must join with the
Powers in devising measures for depriving Mehemet
Ali of the fruits of his victories. Nor could they
escape from the dilemma by disavowing Admiral
Roussin, seeing that he had only acted in strict
accordance with the policy which Soult himself
had advocated, in the secret hope of isolating
Russia. But it was evident that the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg was reconciled to the necessity of
allowing the eastern question to be settled by the
Powers, and it was to be apprehended that both
Russia and Austria would adopt the hostile attitude
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
- L. Veron, Memoires d'un bourgeois de Paris, V. pp. 17, 19.
248
SULTAN AND PASHA
towards Mehemet AH which Palmerston had already
assumed.
Palmerston had invariably proclaimed the opinion
that the whole of Syria must be restored to the
Sultan, before a permanent peace could be established
in the East. The Egyptian desert, he had always
insisted, must be interposed between the Pasha
and the territories under the direct rule of the
Porte. 1 Soult had hitherto contrived to elude a
discussion upon this point by declaring that France
and England must, in the first place, concert
measures for checkmating the designs of Russia
upon the integrity of Turkey. 2 Palmerston, so
long as he was doubtful about the Tsar's intentions,
had been content to leave in abeyance the question
of the future position of Mehemet Ali. But his tone
changed from the moment that he became aware that
Russia had adhered to the collective note. The French
government on various pleas had declined to entertain
his proposal that the French and English squadrons
should combine for the purpose of obtaining from
Mehemet Ali the surrender of the Turkish fleet. 3 On
August 20, however, in a dispatch which Mr. Bulwer,
the British charge d'affaires was directed to communi-
cate to Marshal Soult, he insisted that the restitution
of the Turkish ships must be regarded as an in-
dispensable preliminary to any negotiations between
the five Powers and the Pasha. Furthermore, he
declared that the decision as to the measures, which
should be taken to obtain this result, " should emanate
from Vienna, which was to be the central point of the
negotiations instead of London or Paris," and that Sir
Robert Stopford would be instructed to comply with
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839.
2 Guizot, Memoires, Pieces historiques, Soult a Bourqueney, 17 juin,
1839.
3 Levant correspondence, Granville to Palmerston, August 8, 9, 19,
1839.
249
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
whatever directions he might receive from Lord
Beauvale, " either with or without the co-operation
of anyone of the other squadrons." 1
The French government, however, displayed a
marked reluctance to enter into any general discus-
sion of the Egyptian question. Notwithstanding that
Soult had himself suggested Vienna as the seat
of the negotiation, when he was under the impres-
sion that Russia would object to confer with the
Powers on the affairs of the East, he now deprecated
the selection of that capital. 2 The French govern-
ment, reported Bulwer, on August 30, will refuse
to consent to any measures of coercion against
the Pasha, " until the whole question that portion
of it relative to the Dardanelles and Russia as
well as that relating to Egypt and Mehemet Ali is
decided." 3 About a fortnight later, Bulwer was
enabled to ascertain Louis Philippe's opinions upon
the situation. It was advisable, the King considered,
to discover what would satisfy the Pasha, and
then to insist upon the Porte making the required
concessions. When Bulwer objected that such a
course was hardly consistent with the collective
note of July 27, His Majesty gave him to under-
stand that "in affairs of this kind, all notions
of honour and dignity among States need not
be greatly considered. I want peace," said he,
" nothing but peace, and I see no way of preserving
it but by soldering up this affair as soon as
possible." The discussion then turned upon the
military means which were available for the coercion
of the Pasha. "Naval measures," Louis Philippe
declared, " would prove insufficient ; bayonets were
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 20, 1839 ;
Palmerston to Admiralty, August 24, 1839 ; Palmerston to Beauvale,
August 25, 1889.
2 Ibid., Bulwer to Palmerston, August 26, 1839.
3 Ibid., August 30, 1839.
250
SULTAN AND PASHA
needed, and we (England ?) had no bayonets to cm-
ploy." '
The very high estimate which had been formed
in France of the power of Mehemet Ali was
the chief reason of the attitude which her govern-
ment now proceeded to adopt. Palmerston, on
the other hand, had no share in the illusions which
were very generally entertained as to the strength
of the Pasha. Nor had the battle of Nezib caused
him to alter his views. Yet neither Sir Robert
Stopford, 2 the admiral of the Mediterranean squadron,
nor Colonel Campbell, the British consul-general
at Alexandria, agreed with him. Both were con-
vinced that the expulsion of Ibrahim from Syria
would prove a most difficult undertaking, and Camp-
bell was to owe his recall to his strongly expressed
opinion upon this point. 3 Palmerston appears to
have placed the greatest faith in General Chrzanow-
ski, the Pole, who for the past three years had been
attached to the British embassy at Constantinople.
This officer had made a careful study of the brief
campaign which had terminated at Nezib, and was
not prepared to admit that Ibrahim's victory was due
to the superiority of the Egyptian army over that
of the Turks. 4 The result, he considered, would have
been very different had Hafiz Pasha elected to follow
the advice of Moltke, instead of listening to the
foolish talk of the Mullahs, who ranked as lieutenant-
generals, and were present in large numbers at his
headquarters. 5 On the morning of June 24, when the
1 F. O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 16, 1839
(secret and confidential).
2 F. O. Turkey 1 1 358, Stopford to Ponsonby, August 21, 1839.
3 F. O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, August 13, and Sep-
tember 11, 1839 (separate).
4 F. O. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, September 10, 1839
(report of General Chrzanowski on battle of Nezib) ; also Ponsonby
to Palmerston, July 29, 1839.
5 Lettres du Marechal de Molfke sur V orient, p. 340.
251
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
battle had only lasted an hour, no less than twelve
Egyptian battalions fled from the field, whilst three
others deserted in a body to the Turks. The
panic, which set in shortly afterwards among the
troops of Hafiz Pasha, was caused by a change of
position on the part of a brigade of their own cavalry.
It was significant that, although the battle had
consisted only of an artillery duel, and although the
Egyptian infantry had never been really engaged,
Ibrahim had not ventured to pursue. The report of
General Jochmus, 1 a Hanoverian who had served
upon the staff of the British legion in Spain, and who
was now in the pay of the Foreign Office, pointed
to the same conclusions. Chrzanowski, moreover, was
convinced that Ibrahim would be unable to keep up
his communications with Egypt, were he to be
deprived of the command of the sea. A corps of
15,000 Turkish troops acting in combination with
the disaffected tribes, and supported by the British
fleet, would, he believed, suffice to compel him to
evacuate Syria. 2
Whilst symptoms of disagreement between the
French and English governments were beginning to
appear, Russia made an unexpected move. Shortly
after the arrival at St. Petersburg of a despatch from
Count Medem, in which he reported that Marshal
Soult had declared to him that France would never
consent to apply coercion to the Pasha, Baron
Brunnow, the Russian minister at Stuttgart, was sent
upon a special mission to London. " It would not be
possible," Nesselrode informed Clanricarde, " for the
Emperor to have chosen any person more thoroughly
acquainted with the foreign affairs and policy of Russia
1 F. 0. Turkey 358, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 12, 1839
(report of General Jochmus on battle of Nezib).
2 F. O. Turkey 857, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 7, 1839
(enclosing Chrzanowski's plan for bringing Mehemet AH to reason).
252
SULTAN AND PASHA
than the Baron." * The proposals, which upon his
arrival in London, on September 15, Brunnow was
empowered to make, filled Lord Palmers ton with
astonishment. The Imperial Cabinet, he was in-
structed to declare, agreed with the English government
in thinking that alone the hereditary pashalik of Egypt
should be conferred upon Mehemet Ali, who must be
made to restore to the Sultan Arabia, Syria and Crete.
The Emperor was ready to enter into a treaty to
enforce these measures upon the Pasha, and he, there-
fore, suggested that such military operations as might
be necessary in Syria or in Egypt should be undertaken
by Great Britain, France and Austria, whilst, in the
event of Ibrahim advancing to the Bosphorus, the
defence of Constantinople should devolve upon Russia.
It was, however, to be clearly understood that any
assistance which Russia might afford would be given,
not by reason of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, but in
virtue of engagements about to be contracted between
the Powers of Europe and the Sultan. Furthermore,
the Emperor was ready to adopt the view of the
British government and to consider " as a permanent
principle and standing rule," that the Bosphorus and > tl
the Dardanelles should be closed to the war ships of all
nations. Lastly, Baron Brunnow was authorized to
promise that, if Russia and England should come to an
understanding on these matters, the Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi would not be renewed. 2
The Tsar's sudden determination to abandon those
advantages, which hew as supposed to have acquired
by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, has always been
ascribed to his desire to separate France and England.
Without doubt, this consideration entered largely into
his calculations. But he was also annoyed with
1 Levant correspondence, Clanricarde to Palrnerston, August 27, 28,
1839.
2 Ibid., Palrnerston to Clanricarde, October 25, 1839.
253
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Metternich and was anxious to thwart his plan of
establishing the seat of the negotiations at Vienna.
Moreover, it was now realized that Orloffs treaty was
a document of no practical value. Russia, by reason
alone of her geographical position, could never be
prevented from exercising her influence over the
counsels of the Porte. Nor could the stipulation that
the Sultan must close the Dardanelles at the demand
of Russia be of any real utility, seeing that the
maritime Powers had refused to accept this condition,
and that Turkey would be unable to carry out her
engagements in the face of their opposition. In a
general way the doctrine that a weak State makes an
excellent neighbour might be sound, but it was plainly
inapplicable to Turkey the custodian of straits so
vitally important to Russia as the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. Under these circumstances, there was
much to be gained by waiving the purely illusory
advantage to be derived from the Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi, and by agreeing that the closure of the straits
to the warships of the Powers should be declared a law
of nations. 1 Brunnow made no secret of the fact that
his Imperial master would be only too pleased, were
France to refuse to accede to his proposals. His desire
was soon gratified. When the project was communi-
cated to it by Lord Palmerston, the French government
flatly declined to entertain it. The Russian overture,
wrote Marshal Soult, was clearly a device for separating
France and England, and it was with " feelings of
painful astonishment" that he perceived "a man of
such enlightened judgment as Lord Palmerston enter-
tain it with so much complacency." Russia, he
proceeded, had betrayed her real intentions by insisting
that she alone should undertake the defence of
Constantinople. If her motives were such as she
S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et lea Dardanelles, pp. 52-82.
254
SULTAN AND PASHA
pretended, why this repugnance to the idea of " the
flags of the allied Courts floating side by side with her
own " in the Bosphorus ? " Never," he concluded,
" with our consent shall a foreign squadron of war
appear before Constantinople, unless ours appears there
also." Whilst he thus declined absolutely to con-
sider Baron Brunnow's propositions, Marshal Soult put
forward a plan for the settlement of the questions in
dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. But
the solution of the difficulty, suggested by the French
government, when it came to be examined, was found
to amount to little more than an arrangement whereby
the Pasha was to obtain the hereditary tenure of
Arabia, Syria and Egypt, in return for which he was
to restore to the Sultan the district of Adana. 2
In Palmerston's opinion the entry of a Russian
fleet into the Bosphorus, or of a Russian army into
Asia Minor, at the demand of the Powers, was a very
different proceeding to an intervention in virtue of a
separate engagement between the Porte and the Cabinet
of St. Petersburg. Had the decision rested with him
alone he would gladly have accepted the Russian
proposal. But both it and Marshal Soult's despatch
had to be considered by the Cabinet, some of the
members of which held opinions very opposed to his
own. Lord Holland and several of his colleagues
" our Whig friends " 3 as Lord Palmerston called them
were either completely indifferent to the Imperial
aspect of the question, or regarded it as a minor
consideration. In their eyes the point at issue was
simply whether England should break with Liberal
France, in order to enter into a compact with auto-
cratic Russia. The French party in the Cabinet
gained the upper hand and Palmerston had to agree to
1 Levant correspondence, Dalmatie a Sebastian!, 26 septembre, 1839.
- Ibid., Palmerston to Bulwer, September 28, 1839.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 348.
255
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
certain concessions. He had already consented, in
deference to the wishes of France and Austria, to allow
his demand for the restoration by Mehemet Ali of the
Turkish fleet to be merged in the larger question of the
territorial settlement, and he was now obliged to
inform Sebastiani that the English government would
be prepared to see, in addition to that of Egypt, the
hereditary tenure of the province of Acre, exclusive of
the fortress, conferred upon the Pasha. At the same
time Baron Brunnow was to be told that Her Majesty's
government was ready to adopt the whole arrangement
which he had proposed, with the exception of one single
point should it be necessary for a Russian force to
enter the Bosphorus, a British force must enter the
Dardanelles. 1
Brunnow had no instructions to. discuss the
question raised by the English Cabinet, and he was,
in consequence, obliged to bring his mission to an
unsuccessful conclusion. But he and Palmerston
parted from each other upon most excellent terms
and with little doubt that their negotiations were
suspended, rather than finally broken off. The
French government heard of the Baron's departure
with intense satisfaction, and, a few days later, on
October 15, Sebastiani communicated to Lord Palmer-
ston a despatch, in which Marshal Soult emphatically
declared that the proposal to cede to Mehemet Ali the
Pashalik of Acre was inadmissible. So trifling a conces-
sion, he averred, would merely drive the Pasha to seek to
obtain by the sword the frontiers to which he considered
himself entitled. Palmerston listened to the words of
the ambassador in silence, and when he had concluded
his statement, informed him that the offer regarding
Acre must now be considered as definitely withdrawn. 2
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25,
1839.
2 Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 365-367.
256
SULTAN AND PASHA
It was significant of the divergent courses upon
which the two governments were embarked that,
almost at the same time, Admiral Roussin was
recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell
from Alexandria the Frenchman because of his
hostility to, 1 and the Englishman because of his
sympathy with, Mehemet Ali. 2 For several weeks
after Brunnow's departure from London, the situation
remained unchanged. Palmerston was content to
wait in the confident expectation that Nicholas
would not refuse to accede to the British proposal.
The Soult Cabinet, convinced that no agreement
between England and Russia on the question of the
Dardanelles was to be apprehended, was equally
satisfied to remain inactive. " In the French
councils," reported Bulwer, " there is a mixture of
positiveness and of vagueness positiveness as to
what will not be done, vagueness as to what may
be done." 3
Early in December Se'bastiani transmitted to his
government the information, which he had received
from Palmerston, that the Emperor had agreed
to the English conditions, and that Brunnow would
shortly return to London to negotiate a convention.
This news came as an unpleasant surprise to the
French Cabinet. Under the circumstances, however,
Soult could only express satisfaction at this most
unexpected concession, which, he admitted, completely
altered the character of the Russian proposals. But,
at the same time, he cast the gravest doubts upon the
good faith of the Imperial Cabinet, and reiterated his
conviction that its real object was to effect a breach
in French and English relations. 4 In due course
1 F. O. France 586, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 13, 1839.
2 F. O. Turkey 372, Palmerston to Campbell, September 11, 1839
(separate).
3 F. O. France 587, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 4, 1839.
4 Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 367-370.
257 s
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Brunnow arrived in London, and in a note written
at Holland House, on January 5, 1840, Palmerston
made Se'bastiani acquainted with the result of his
first deliberations with the Russian envoy. " Brun-
now," he informed him, "is empowered to negotiate
with the object of bringing about a permanent
and definite solution of the Turkish and Egyptian
question, in order to ensure the independence and
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann
has arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us
that Austria is entirely with us and Russia in this
important affair. I think I can say for certain
that Prussia will look at matters in the same light.
It only remains for us, therefore, to secure a European
accord on a question which is incontestably the
most important that we have had to deal with these
last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation
of France will not be refused. . . ." l
Louis Philippe and his ministers were convinced,
however, that, when the Powers came to consider
the measures which would be required for expelling
the Pasha from the territories which he occupied,
they would soon discover the magnitude of the
task upon which they purposed to embark. Harsh
conditions, they were confident, would never be
imposed upon him, once it was realized that their
enforcement would entail the invasion of Syria by a
large Russian army. They were, in consequence, not
apprehensive, although fully informed that negotia-
tions were in progress, that any definite arrangement
would be concluded without their participation.
Nevertheless, on January 27, 1840, Se"bastiani 2
reported that Palmerston had replied in the affirmative
to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether, in the
1 Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Sebastiani a Soult, 5 Janvier,
1840.
2 Ibid., 27 Janvier, 1840.:
258
SULTAN AND PASHA
event of the four Powers arriving at an agree-
ment, and France withholding her consent, the clauses
of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of her
abstention. But, on the following day, the ambas-
sador informed his government that the English
Cabinet had decided that the Porte must be a party
to any convention which might be concluded, and
that the negotiations would, in consequence, be
suspended until the arrival of the Turkish plenipoten-
tiary. This was the last news of any importance
transmitted by Sebastiani. Soult and his colleagues,
in order to propitiate the Doctrinaires, whose support
was essential to their parliamentary existence, had
insisted upon his recall and upon the appointment
of M. Guizot to the embassy in London. 1
Although he had studied English constitutional
history so deeply, Guizot had never visited England,
and, moreover, he had not before been engaged upon
a diplomatic mission. He had, however, formed a
friendship with Princess Lieven, who was well
acquainted with most of the chief statesmen and
members of the corps diplomatique of the time, and
who, besides, had been a leader of English society.
After her husband's recall from London, 2 the Princess
quickly tired of St. Petersburg, and, upon the plea
of ill-health, took up her abode in Paris. At Talley-
rand's death in 1838, she moved into an apartment
in his famous house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, where
her salon soon acquired a European celebrity. Her
friendship with Guizot, which was to endure to the
day of her death, is said to have begun, in 1837, at
Chatenay, Madame de Boigne's house, near Paris.
The Princess was at the time fifty-three years of age,
whilst the grave Doctrinaire was three years her
junior. 1
1 Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 369-375. 2 Vide p. 221.
1 F. Daudet, Une Vic d'Ambassadrice, pp. 236-239. The liaison of
259
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Guizot arrived in London on February 28, and, on
the following day in Paris, the Soult Cabinet
was defeated and resigned. The King was, in
consequence, reluctantly compelled to commission
M. Thiers to form a government. Thiers, who
himself assumed the direction of Foreign Atfairs,
was probably honestly desirous of maintaining a
good understanding with England. But he was a
convinced believer in the military strength of
Mehemet Ali, and was determined to uphold his claim
to the hereditary tenure of Syria. In his opinion, the
collective note of July 27, 1839, was the cause of all
the difficulty; it was " the rut in which the coach had
stuck." 1 But, although he was secretly resolved
to escape from the obligations which his predecessors
had contracted, he was not prepared openly to
repudiate them. On the contrary, he admitted
readily that he was bound to refrain from attempting
to arrange matters between the Porte and Mehemet
Ali, except in co-operation with the other signatory
Powers. Should, however, the Sultan spontaneously
agree to terms acceptable to the Pasha, the Powers
could hardly interfere to prevent a settlement which
the Porte 'itself pronounced satisfactory. 2 If such a
result could be brought about, the collective note
would become a dead letter, and France would regain
her full liberty of action. Moreover, Mehemet Ali
would attain the object of his ambition in a large
measure owing to the goodwill of the French govern-
ment.
Soult had instructed Guizot to declare that France
was sincerely anxious to establish a permanent and
lasting peace in the East. But to attain the desired
Princess Lieven with Guizot is the origin of Balzac's story, Les Secrets
de la Princesse de Cadignan. Guizot figures in the character of
d'Arthez.
1 Guizot, Memoires, V. p. 63. 2 Ibid., V. p. 64.
260
SULTAN AND PASHA
result, she was convinced that Mehemet AH must, at
least, be given the hereditary tenure of Syria and
Egypt. He was to impress upon Palmerston that the
real object of the " trifling concessions," which Brunnow
had been empowered to make, was to obtain the signa-
ture of England to some agreement to which France
would refuse to adhere. 1 Thiers, in his first despatch,
expressed his approval of these instructions, and of the
language which M. Guizot had employed in carry-
ing them out. He directed him to persevere with his
arguments and constantly to impress upon the British
government that France had no "parti pris" no
" sy 'Sterne irrevocable" nor was she bound by either
promises or engagements to the Pasha. Her sole
desire was to contribute to the establishment of peace
upon a firm and durable foundation. The coercion of
Mehemet Ali would demand a vast expenditure o,.
military strength, and Lord Palmerston would, doubt
less, agree that the armed intervention of Russia would
greatly menace the independent existence of the
Ottoman Empire. 2 Thiers, whose judgment on this,
as on many other occasions, was greatly influenced by
his hopes, was persuaded that the decision to call in a
Turkish plenipotentiary, and the delay which it entailed,
signified that the plans of Palmerston and Brunnow
had encountered some serious obstacle. But the
longer the negotiations could be drawn out, the better
he would be pleased. Whilst matters were drifting to
a deadlock in London, his agents, he trusted, would be
enabled quietly to effect some definite arrangement at
Constantinople or at Cairo. 3
Guizot in his Memoires has described at length his
1 Guizot, Memoires, V. Pieces Jiistoriques, Soult a Guizot, 19
fevrier, 1840.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 634 Angleterre, Thiers a Guizot, 12 mars,
1840.
3 Guizot, Memoires, V. p. 207.
261
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
proceedings in London. As he himself admits, he
entertained an exaggerated belief in the strength of
Mehemet Ali. 1 But, on the other hand, he had not
Thiers' serene confidence that England would never
conclude an agreement for the settlement of the Turco-
Egyptian question without the co-operation of France.
On March 12, when relating a conversation he had had
with Lord Palmerston in one of the drawing-rooms at
Stafford House, he expressed the opinion " that the
British government regarded the present moment as a
favourable opportunity for settling affairs in the East,
and that a sudden resolve might be taken to act with-
out us." Again, a few days later, he sent M. Thiers a
warning couched in more emphatic language. Full
powers to conclude a convention, Lord Palmerston
informed him, had been transmitted to Nourri-Effendi,
the Turkish ambassador in Paris, who would shortly
arrive in London. "It is possible, therefore, that we
may be on the eve of important decisions. . . . The
British government has two interests at stake in the
eastern question the wish to keep Russia from Con-
stantinople and the fear of French influence in Egypt.
. . . The present moment is looked upon as favourable
for the attainment of these objects. By a singular
combination of circumstances, Russia is both prepared
to abandon her pretensions to exercise an exclusive
protectorship over the Ottoman Empire, and to assist
England to weaken the Pasha of Egypt. . . . Great
Britain, consequently, is far from regarding the present
situation as embarrassing, but on the contrary deems
it a most fortunate development which she must make
use of to the best advantage. . . . She is aware, how-
ever, that in prosecuting this policy she may impair
her good understanding with France. To retain our
friendship she will make some concessions, but I am
disposed to think that she has no intention of allowing
1 Guizot, Mcmoiret, V. p. 65.
262
SULTAN AND PASHA
the present opportunity of attaining her ends in the
East to escape." 1
Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. Nor
was the situation altered by the arrival, early in
April, of Nourri-Effendi. The Porte in sending him to
London only desired to make manifest its intention of
conferring with its allies. When the deliberations
should begin in earnest, it purposed to be represented
by Chekib-Effendi, who had been appointed Ottoman
ambassador at the Court of St. James', and another
month must elapse before he could reach England.
Guizot, however, reported that he perceived a strong
tendency upon the part of both Austria and Prussia to
draw closer to France. Billow had asked him in
confidence whether the concession to Mehemet Ali of
the governorship of Syria for his life would meet with
the approval of his government. Neumann had also
talked to him in the same strain. But Thiers was
little disposed to accept any compromise. These over-
tures, in his opinion, were symptoms that the Powers
were beginning to realize that they were in a false
position. Before long, he was certain, they would
adopt the French view of the question in its entirety.
Until some agreement should be arrived at with
England, he recommended that Guizot should abstain,
as far as possible, from any discussions with the
ministers of the Northern Courts. 2 Nor was Palmer-
ston's suggestion admissible that the Turco-Egyptian
difficulty should be submitted to a conference of the
Powers. Under existing conditions, " the differences
between France and her allies were too marked to
permit of any general deliberation conducing to a
satisfactory result."
1 Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Guizot a Thierg, 12, 16 mars,
1840.
2 Affaires Etrangeres, 654, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thierg, 13, 16
avril, 1840 ; Thierg & Guizot, 14, 20 avril, 1840.
263
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
In the month of March, Palmerston's brother, Sir
William Temple, the British minister at Naples, had
been instructed to insist upon the immediate execution
of the King's promise to abolish the sulphur monopoly
and to ask for an indemnity on behalf of the English
merchants who had suffered by its imposition. Upon
King Ferdinand's refusal to comply with this demand,
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford was directed to blockade
the coast and to seize and send to Malta such Neapolitan
merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, having
ascertained that his offer would be acceptable to both
parties, proposed to mediate in the dispute. He was
glad of the opportunity, which was thus afforded him,
of displaying both that France and England were still
upon excellent terms and of extending French influence
in Italy. Thiers' mediation was successful. The
Neapolitan Court conceded the British demands, and,
early in July in consequence, the blockading squadron
was free to carry out Palmerston's policy in another
direction. Soon after it had accepted his offer to settle
the sulphur dispute, Thiers made a second proposal to
the English government. In this instance he was
probably desirous simply of acquiring popularity at
home. 1 On May 10, Guizot formally asked that the
remains of Napoleon might be handed over to a deputa-
tion of officers and conveyed back to France, on board
a French warship, for interment in Paris. Palmerston
made no difficulty about immediately complying with
this request.
The extraordinary confidence of both Louis
Philippe and of M. Thiers that, under no circum-
stances, would Great Britain separate herself from
France in the eastern question 2 reposed upon their
joint conviction that Palmerston's colleagues in the
government would never allow him to disturb the
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot 11 Thiers, 10 mai, 1840.
2 Guizot, Memoires, V. pp. 61, 62.
264
SULTAN AND PASHA
harmony of French and English relations. Mr.
Ellice, 1 the brother-in-law of Lord Grey, and a former
Cabinet minister, was largely responsible for
encouraging this erroneous belief, which was to bring
the two countries to the verge of war. Since about
the year 1835, "Bear Ellice," as he was generally
known, by reason of his connection with the Canadian
fur trade, had been much in Paris. Although he
appears to have disliked the responsibilities of office,
he was keenly interested in public affairs and was an
inveterate political gossip. Grey, who was well
aware of his brother-in-law's vanity and peculiarities,
nicknamed him le grand faiseur. In Paris he
frequented Princess Lieven's salon, where he was
consulted and listened to with a deference which he
enjoyed exceedingly. 2 Not only was he very intimate
with M. Thiers, but, according to Creevey, 3 " Louis
Philippe could scarcely bear to have him out of his
sight." " I hear," wrote Palmerston at a most critical
time, " that Thiers says he has three agents upon
whom he can rely Guizot, Flahault 4 and Ellice." 5
Guizot had quickly discovered that the Cabinet
was not united upon the eastern question. At
Holland House, where he was a constant guest,
neither his host nor hostess concealed from him their
antagonism to Palmerston. Clarendon, notwithstand-
ing the insight into Louis Philippe's diplomacy which
he had acquired at Madrid, was a declared opponent of
any solution of the Turco-Egyptian difficulty which
might endanger the French alliance. Charles Greville,
1 Ellice, Edward (1781-1863) had been a member of Lord Grey's
government from 1880 to 1834.
2 Correspondence of Princess Lieven with Earl Grey, III. ; P. Lieven
to Grey, April 13, 1836 ; Grey to P. Lieven, May 6, and October 22,
1836.
3 Creevey Papers, II. p. 309.
4 Vide p. 53.
r> F. O. France 600, Palmerston to Granville, October, 1840
(private letter, part of which is given in Bulwer'a Life of Palmerston).
265
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
with whom Guizot appears to have become very
friendly, had no scruples about informing him of any
dissensions in ministerial circles. The vindictive clerk
of the council detested Palmerston and distrusted his
policy. Dedel, the Dutch minister, in talking over
these events a year or two later with the Duchesse de
Dino, 1 expressed the opinion that Guizot's great mistake
lay in imagining that intrigue played as large a part in
public affairs in London as in Paris. Palmerston, he
told her, had proofs of his proceedings, which would
have justified him in demanding his recall. This last
statement is probably somewhat exaggerated. Guizot,
however, whatever he may have done, appears to
have judged the situation with great discernment.
" Not to mention Lords Holland and Clarendon,"
he wrote to Thiers on June 1, "Melbourne and
Lansdowne would be very loath to see the French
alliance dissolved. . . Yet Palmerston, I believe, is as
firm as ever, and I am far from certain whether
those of his colleagues who disagree with him would
stand up to him very firmly, when it comes to the
point." 3
The overtures which Billow and Neumann had
made to Guizot were followed by a definite proposal
from Austria. Metternich was alarmed. He believed
that Palmerston had formed a totally erroneous
opinion of the military situation. He was certain
that naval assistance alone would not enable the
Turks to regain possession of Syria. He had no
intention of allowing Austrian troops to be employed
in the East, and Russia had recently sustained reverses
in the Caucasus which might make it difficult for her
to send an imposing force into Asia Minor. Great
Britain was engaged upon warlike operations in
Afghanistan, and was, besides, threatened with trouble
1 Duchesse de Dino, Chronique, III. p. 228.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Anglefcerre, Guizot a Thiers, 1 juin, 1840.
266
SULTAN AND PASHA
in China and Canada. It would be, therefore, an
arduous undertaking to attempt to coerce the Pasha
without the co-operation of France. To obtain her
assistance, he suggested that Syria should be divided
into two portions. The southern half, including the
fortress of Acre, might, he proposed, be given to
Mehemet Ali. But, should the French government be
not satisfied with this concession, Austria would agree
to enforce these conditions upon the Pasha in com-
bination with England and Russia and without the
participation of France. 1
Palmerston reluctantly decided to agree to the
Austrian proposal and, on May 8, officially informed
Guizot that the British government adhered to it.
But this concession only served to strengthen Thiers'
belief that the Powers would before long adopt his
views completely. Chekib-Effendi had not yet arrived,
and there was, therefore, no necessity for returning an
immediate answer. Even when the Turkish plenipo-
tentiary reached London, Palmerston appeared to be
in no hurry to resume the negotiations. On the other
hand, Guizot was inclined to think that the repre-
sentatives of the other Powers were growing restless.
Even Brunnow seemed disposed to adopt a more
conciliatory attitude, and there appeared to be a
growing feeling that no settlement could be concluded
without the assent of France. Thiers' answer to the
Austrian plan of partitioning Syria could not, however,
be indefinitely postponed, and, on June 16, he directed
Guizot to tell Lord Palmerston that he could not
entertain it. " We could not," he wrote, " suggest it
to Mehemet Ali ; he would refuse it, and we could not
refute his arguments which we should ourselves
consider to be sound and well founded." He was
greatly struck by the account which Guizot had sent
him of Bruuuow's attitude, " which could only be
1 Metternich, Memoirea, VI. pp. 430-432, and 454-464.
267
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
ascribed to disasters in Circassia. It was clear that
Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations
elsewhere." l
When Thiers thus declined to consider the
Austrian proposal, he believed that his hopes of
bringing about secretly a direct arrangement between
the Sultan and the Pasha were about to be realized.
Mehemet Ali had been unable wholly to conceal his
disappointment on learning of the collective note of
July 27, 1839. When it was officially communi-
cated to him by the consuls of the Powers, he declared
firmly that there could be no peace until the hereditary
tenure of Syria should be conferred upon him and
until his enemy Hosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier,
should be dismissed from office. 2 Since then, he had
sometimes angrily asserted that he would wait no
longer and that he should order Ibrahim to march
upon Constantinople, whilst, on other occasions, he
had shown a disposition to adopt a more conciliatory
attitude. Throughout the winter and the spring he
pressed on his military preparations. Some of these,
however, proved very unsuccessful an attempt to
form a national guard in Egypt itself breaking down
completely. 3 At the same time he appears to have
experienced great difficulty in keeping Ibrahim's army
in Syria supplied with money, food, and clothing, 4
whilst, to add to his embarrassments, in the spring, the
Druses and other tribes began to display renewed
symptoms of disaffection. 6 Palmerston, now that he
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thiers, 8 mai, 1, 9, 13
juin, 1840 ; Thiers a Guizot, 16 juin, 1840.
2 Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, August 7, 1839.
3 Levant correspondence, Campbell to Palmerston, September 2,
26, 1839 ; Campbell to Ponsonby, October 19, 1839 ; Young to Palmerston,
October 16, 1889; Hodges to Palmerston, January 4, 13, 14, 16, 23,
February 12, 1840.
4 Levant correspondence, Wagner to Koenigsmark, November 26,
1839.
6 F. O. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840 (secret).
268
SULTAN AND PASHA
no longer feared the separate intervention of Russia,
would probably have been well pleased could the
Pasha have been provoked into some act of aggression
against the Sultan. But he was too sagacious to be
moved from his attitude of prudent inaction by the
threatening language of Campbell's successor, Colonel
Hodges, which, however, caused some alarm at Vienna
and at St. Petersburg, where neither Metternich nor
Nesselrode entertained Palmerston's contemptuous
disbelief in the military power of Mehemet Ali. 1 M.
Thiers seems to have been wilfully blind to the diffi-
culties of the Pasha's position, and to have persuaded
himself that it was from respect to the wishes of the
French government that Ibrahim abstained from
advancing into Asia Minor.
M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was
probably instructed 2 to urge Mehemet Ali to refrain
from hostilities, to limit his demands to the hereditary
tenure of Syria and Egypt and, generally, to depend
upon the good offices of France for the attainment of his
wishes. M. Thiers, however, was well aware that his
plan of bringing about a direct arrangement between
the Sultan and the Pasha would encounter far more
serious difficulties at Constantinople than at Cairo.
Ever since the arrival of M. de Pontois, the successor
of Admiral Koussin, Ponsonby had constantly reported
that the French minister was endeavouring to persuade
the Porte to conclude a peace with Mehemet Ali, with-
out reference to the Powers. 3 But the advice of M. de
Pontois had hitherto been disregarded. Hosrew,
Reshid, and Halil Pasha, the most influential of the
1 F. O. Russia 260, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February 24,
May 23, 1840.
- The despatches of the French consuls at this period are not
available for inspection.
3 F. O. Turkey 359, 360, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 30,
November 24, December 18, 1839 ; F. 0. Turkey 392, Ponsonby to
Palmerston, January 28, 29, 1840. Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to
Palmerston, November 13, 1839.
2G9
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Turkish ministers, were very hostile to Mehemet AH
and firm supporters of the British policy. Soon after
his accession to office, Thiers appears to have decided to
supplement the efforts of the recognized representative
of the French government by those of an unofficial
agent. At the beginning of May, a correspondence was
opened between M. Jacques Coste * and Fethi Ahmed
Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and brother-in-law to
the young Sultan. Under ordinary circumstances
there would be nothing to excite attention in the fact
that a prominent French journalist should write on
political matters to a Turkish statesman, whom he
had known as Ottoman ambassador in Paris. But
the close intimacy which notoriously existed between
M. Coste and M. Thiers gives importance to this
particular correspondence. Certainly both Palmerston
and Ponsonby and, indeed, Ahmed Pasha himself, who
delivered the original letters into the hands of the
British ambassador, appear to have been satisfied that
the sentiments and advice contained in them emanated
from M. Thiers. 2
The primary object which M. Coste had in view
was to persuade Fethi Ahmed Pasha that it was essen-
tial for the Porte promptly to conclude a peace with
Mehemet Ali. All the powers, he contended, were
pursuing selfish ends with the sole exception of France,
and she was both resolved not to intervene herself and
not to allow any other Power to interfere actively in
1 Coste (Jacques), 1798-1859, founder and manager of the Temps,
the organ of the tiers parti. This venture proved a disastrous failure,
and M. Coste in 1840 was in pecuniary difficulties. There are frequent
allusions to his embarrassments in his correspondence with Fethi
Ahmed Pasha.
2 F. O. Turkey 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 29, 1840 (sepa-
rate and confidential) " Your Lordship knows the intimacy which
exists between M. Coste and M. Thiers, and he (Coste) undoubtedly
does speak (as he asserts) the sentiments of the President of the French
ministry." Lord Ponsonby goes on to state that the original letters
have been in his hands. The copies transmitted contain many notes in
Palmerston's handwriting.
270
SULTAN AND PASHA
the Turco-Egyptian dispute. Her hands were free and
she was strong enough to enforce her will upon Europe.
The perfidy of England's policy was manifest. As in
1839, Great Britain now proposed to incite the Porte
to make war upon the Pasha. If she could achieve
this object she would, of a surety, encourage Kussia to
intervene in order to crush the Egyptians, whilst at
the same time she would insist at Vienna and in Paris
upon the necessity of preventing the occupation of
Constantinople by the armies of the Tsar. Should she
be enabled to carry out her Machiavellian plan of
bringing about a general war she purposed, in the con-
fusion, quietly to, lay hands upon Egypt, which she
had long coveted for herself. He was sorry to hear
that Chekib-Effendi, when passing through Paris, had
declared to M. Thiers that it would be better that
England should take Egypt, than that it should con-
tinue in the possession of a rebellious vassal of the
Sultan. Such reasoning was deplorably unsound.
" That which England takes she keeps," whereas, in
the future, it should be an easy task for the Sultan to
compel the descendants of Mehemet Ali to give back
the territories which must now be surrendered tempo-
rarily. Writing on June 8, M. Coste suggested, as a
compromise, that Syria might be given to Ibrahim and
Adana to another son of the Pasha. They would
certainly quarrel among themselves, and the Porte
might avail itself of their dissensions for expelling
them altogether. Let the Sultan be assured of the
wisdom of the old saying, " diviser pour regner." 1
This curious correspondence continued intermittently
until the fall of M. Thiers in September. But after
the end of June, Coste's communications became less
frequent and were less cordially expressed. On July 8
he explained that the silence with which his well-meant
1 F. 0. Turkey 395, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 13, 1840 (sepa-
rate and confidential).
271
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
advice had been received " had placed him in an
awkward position with M. Thiers," whilst to Prince
Vogorides, a son of the Prince of Samos, another of his
correspondents, he conveyed his surprise and annoy-
ance that his letters, written " en quelque sorte sous la
dictee d'un tres haut personnage" should have elicited
no response. 1
Whilst the French agents at Constantinople were
thus striving to render nugatory the provisions of the
collective note, another attempt to achieve the desired
result was being made in a different quarter. The
Sultana Mother was believed to have been concerned
in the secret negotiation conducted by Sarim-Effendi, 2
under the patronage of Admiral Roussin and M.
Mimaut, during M. Thiers' first administration, and
her support was now obtained to the plan of a direct
arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha. The
sudden dismissal, on May 19, of Hosrew, the Grand-
Vizier, was the result of her intrigues. 3 The first news
of this event was conveyed to Mehemet Ali by M.
Cochelet. The Pasha at once declared that the fall of
his old enemy had removed the last obstacle to a
satisfactory conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan.
He should, he announced, forthwith send back the
Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential secretary,
should proceed without delay to Constantinople to
make the necessary arrangements. 4 Nevertheless, some
three weeks elapsed before the Pasha's emissary started
upon his journey, and it was only on June 13, on the
eve of his departure, that the object of his mission was
disclosed to Colonel Hodges and the other agents of
the Powers. 6 But Cochelet, on May 26, duly reported
1 F. O. Turkey 895, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1840
(separate and confidential).
2 Vide p. 227.
3 F. O. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840.
4 Guizot, Memoires, V. pp. 205, 206.
6 Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palmerston, June 16, 1840.
272
SULTAN AND PASHA
this new development to his government in a despatch,
a copy of which M. Thiers transmitted to M. Guizot
with instructions that its contents must, for the present,
be kept strictly secret. In spite of these precautions,
however, Cochelet's confidential communication appears
to have been divulged to Apponyi, the Austrian ambas-
sador in Paris, who, on June 16, was enabled to inform
Neumann in London of the negotiation which had
been initiated between Mehemet AH and the Sultan. 1
Meanwhile, at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby had
discovered that a potent influence was at work to
induce the young Sultan to surrender Syria in exchange
for his fleet. But, encouraged by the British ambas-
sador, both Reshid and Fethi Ahmed Pasha declared
that they should resign, were any compact of that
kind to be concluded, and their firm attitude defeated
the insidious schemes of the Sultana Mother, and
rendered abortive the mission of Sami Bey. 2
M. Thiers, however, was confident that the news
of Hosrew's dismissal would be followed quickly by
the intelligence that the Sultan and the Pasha had
settled their differences amicably. This unexpected
development would, he was convinced, place a totally
new complexion upon the Turco-Egyptian question.
But in point of fact, Palmerston had been informed by
Neumann of the negotiation which was to be opened
between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Thus, when
the news reached London of the mission of Sami Bey
to Constantinople, he was fully prepared for it. Far
from being suddenly confronted by the embarrassing
prospect that the settlement of the affair was about to
pass out of his control, he was, on the contrary, enabled
to adduce the proceedings of the French agents at
Constantinople and at Cairo, as a reason for promptly
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thiers, 11 juillet,
1840.
2 F. 0. Turkey 894, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840.
273 T
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
concluding a treaty for the protection of the young
Sultan from the machinations of his enemies.
Thiers' illusions were by no means shared by
Guizot. The ambassador divined correctly that the
crisis of the affair was approaching. Since the rejection
of the Austrian proposals Palmerston, he reported, had
pointedly avoided all discussion of the eastern question
with him. But from the moment that the news
arrived that a direct negotiation was in progress be-
tween Cairo and Constantinople he had been very busy.
This last development, moreover, had made a great
impression upon the representatives of the Powers,
and those of them, who had lately been inclined to
adopt the French view of the question, were now, it
was evident, less favourably disposed. Cabinet councils
had been held, dissensions had arisen, and Palmerston,
he believed, had threatened to resign. It was probable,
he considered, that Great Britain, Kussia, Austria, and
Prussia would agree to some form of joint action in
the East, and that France would be formally asked
whether or not she would participate in whatever
measures they might resolve to adopt. 1 This idea
that no treaty would be actually concluded until
France should have been invited to adhere to it, was
the one point upon which M. Guizot may be held to
have misled M. Thiers. Princess Lieven, who was
staying at Stafford House, is said to have encouraged
his delusion. She appears to have tried to extract
from Biilow, the Prussian minister, some information
about the progress of the negotiations. Her enquiries,
however, only elicited from him the fact that he was
still without the new letters of credence which the
recent death of Frederick William III. had rendered
necessary. From this circumstance Guizot seems to
have inferred that there was no immediate danger of
the conclusion of a treaty between the four Powers,
1 Guizot, Memoires, V. pp. 218-220.
274
SULTAN AND PASHA
inasmuch as Billow had not yet been officially accredited
to the Court of St. James'. 1
As Guizot had correctly surmised, Palmerston ex-
perienced the greatest difficulty in inducing his
colleagues to adopt his views. Both Holland and
Clarendon strongly deprecated the conclusion of any
treaty to which France would not be a party, and
Melbourne and Lansdowne seemed disposed to agree
with them. Palmerston, thereupon, placed his resigna-
tion in the hands of the Prime Minister. 2 In a long
letter, on July 5, in which he recapitulated the whole
history of the Turco-Egyptian question, he explained
the reasons which made it impossible for him to remain
at his post. Were Great Britain to elude the engage-
ments which she had contracted towards the Sultan,
because France was not prepared to co-operate with
the other signatory Powers, Russia would resume once
more "her separate and isolated position" towards
Turkey. England, he contended, would thus by her
own deliberate act, re-establish that protectorship of
Russia over Turkey, which had for so long been a
cause of apprehension to other Powers. " The ultimate
results of such a decision would be the practical division
of the Ottoman Empire into two separate and in-
dependent States, whereof one would be a dependency
of France and the other a satellite of Russia." Never
would he consent to be an instrument for the execution
of a policy which, he believed, must entail disastrous
consequences upon his country. Unless, therefore, his
colleagues were prepared to pursue the course which
he advocated he must retire, even though his resigna-
tion should lead to a break up of the government. 3
1 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, IV. p. 221. H. Bulwer,
Life of Palmerston, III. p. 432 ; Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27,
1843.
2 0. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 308-309.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 356-363 ; Palmerston to
Melbourne, July 5, 6, 1840.
275
ENGLAND AND THE OKLEANS MONARCHY
The most recent intelligence from the East had, more-
over, supplied Palmerston with an argument which
had a great effect in overcoming the resistance of his
opponents in the Cabinet. A formidable insurrection
was reported to have broken out in Syria, where the
tribes were in open rebellion against Mehemet Ali.
He could, therefore, contend that the treaty, which he
urged his colleagues to conclude with Russia, Austria
and Prussia, was a Liberal measure, inasmuch as it
meant the delivery of an oppressed people from a
tyrannical ruler. This last consideration, combined
with the desire to avoid the crisis which must result
from the resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
induced the dissenting members of the Cabinet re-
luctantly to assent to Palmerston's proposals. 1 Accord-
ingly, on July 15, "a convention for the pacification
of the Levant " was signed by the plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the one
side, and that of the Sublime Porte on the other. In
view of the expediency of speedily affording military
succour to the Syrians, it appears to have been agreed
that Billow should be considered as empowered to act
on behalf of his Court.
By the convention which was thus concluded the
four Powers undertook actively to assist the Sultan
to reduce the Pasha to submission Austria and Great
Britain engaging to intercept all communication by
sea between Egypt and Syria. To this instrument
was annexed a Separate Act in which were laid down
the terms which the Porte purposed to offer to
Mehemet Ali. The hereditary tenure of Egypt was
to be conferred upon him together with the governor-
ship for life of the greater part of the pashalik of
Acre. But, if he should not accede to these conditions
1 To the Cabinet minute submitting to the Queen the expediency of
making the treaty, the dissent of Holland and Clarendon was appended.
C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 304.
276
SULTAN AND PASHA
within a space of ten days, the offer of Acre would be
withdrawn. A further delay of ten days would,
however, be accorded him in which to consider the
second proposal which would be limited to the
hereditary pashalik of Egypt. If, after the specified
term had elapsed,- he should still refuse to accept the
proffered conditions, the Sultan would be free to bring
the negotiations to a conclusion and " to follow such
ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels
of his allies might suggest to him." In a third
document, known as The Reserved Protocol, it was laid
down that, inasmuch as " the state of affairs in Syria,
the interests of humanity and grave considerations
of European policy " made it desirable that active
operations should begin with as little delay as possible,
the naval measures to which Austria and Great Britain
were pledged would be initiated at once, without wait-
ing for the ratification of the convention. 1
The decision of the four Powers to conclude this
treaty had not been communicated to M. Guizot.
French historians have adduced the secrecy which was
observed as a proof of Palmerston's malevolent inten-
tions towards France. But no other course could
have been pursued with safety. It was certain that
France would not take part in coercing the Pasha, 2
and it was no less certain that she would warn him
of the measures which the allies were proposing to
adopt against him. 3 Inasmuch, therefore, as it was
advisable that the naval commander in the Mediter-
ranean should receive his orders before Mehemet Ali
could be aware of the nature of the pressure which was
to be brought to bear upon him, it was impossible to
acquaint M. Guizot with the resolution of the Powers.
1 Levant correspondence, Part I. pp. 689-700.
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 426-433 ; Palmerston to
Hobhouse, July 27, 1843.
3 Metternich, Memoires, IV. p. 436 ; Metternich a Apponyi, 4 aoiit,
1840.
277
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Nor was the expediency of enabling the British fleet
to forestall any hostile move on the part of the
Pasha the only reason which made secrecy desirable.
Although Palmerston was not apprehensive that the
French government would proceed to extremities, it
was possible that M. Thiers might decide actively to
support the Pasha. In that case war could not be
avoided and it was very necessary that Sir Robert
Stopford should receive the earliest information of
the intentions of his government. No communication,
accordingly, was made to the French ambassador until
the couriers from London had obtained a start of forty-
eight hours. But, on July 17, Palmerston invited
M. Guizot to call at the Foreign Office, where he read
out to him a memorandum acquainting him with the
convention which had been concluded. The numerous
efforts which had been made to induce France to
co-operate with the other Powers were insisted upon,
and great regret was expressed that she had not seen
fit to comply with the several proposals which had
been communicated to her. Palmerston then pro-
ceeded to explain the general nature of the measures
of coercion which it was intended to apply to Mehemet
Ali, without, however, supplying the ambassador with
a copy of the treaty. Guizot, after disputing the
accuracy of certain statements contained in the
memorandum, took his departure. The situation was
so grave that he must receive instructions from his
government before he could discuss it. 1
1 Aflaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thiers, 17 juillet, 1840.
Guizot, Mfrnoircs, V. pp. 220-228.
278
CHAPTER VIII
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
HENRY BULWER, X who during the absence of Lord
Granville from Paris was in charge of the embassy,
was agreeably surprised at the calmness with which
M. Thiers received the news of the conclusion of the
treaty. At their first interview, after the arrival of
Guizot's despatch, he contented himself with express-
ing a pained astonishment that England should have
treated her ally with so little consideration. The
affair would, he feared, arouse the greatest indignation
throughout the country and, for the present, he must
beg him to observe the strictest secrecy about it. 2 A
few days later, in the course of a long and confidential
conversation with Louis Philippe, Bulwer was enabled
to judge of the King's opinion of the situation.
Adopting the contention, which Thiers was instructing
Guizot to urge in his conferences with Palmerston,
that no definite proposals for settling the eastern
question had ever been made to the French govern-
ment, Louis Philippe complained of the secret manner
in which the treaty had been negotiated. "Ah, Mr.
Bulwer," said he, " I know you wished to read me
a lesson, I know it, but it may be a perilous one for
all parties." Assuming a more confidential tone, the
King then proceeded to explain the difficulties by
1 He had been transferred from Constantinople to Paris as secretary
of embassy in 1839.
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 815. Levant correspondence,
Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840.
279
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
which he might be confronted. It would not be easy,
he feared or affected to fear, to maintain peace.
Thiers, he had reason to believe, would wish him to go
to war, and in that case he might be placed in a very
delicate position. " How do you think I should
stand," he asked plaintively, "were Thiers at the
head of a large parliamentary party to announce that
he had resigned, sooner than submit to the dishonour
of France ? " It was to be hoped that the coercion
which the four Powers proposed to apply to Mehemet
AH would either at once prove effectual, or fail
completely and be promptly abandoned. The sooner
the affair could be settled the better. For his part,
only this was a circumstance which Bulwer must never
disclose to M. Thiers, he had taken steps to induce the
Pasha to refrain from ordering Ibrahim to pass the
Taurus mountains. 1 On August 3, before leaving
Paris for the Chateau d'Eu, Louis Philippe dis-
cussed the situation in the same spirit with Lord
Granville. 2
The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was
announced in London on the 25th, and two days later,
the news was published in the Paris papers. The
expectation of the King and of M. Thiers that it
would arouse a dangerous excitement was fully
realized. The bourse was panic-stricken and securities
fell heavily. The Chambers were not sitting, but the
press with one accord gave voice to the popular
indignation. The decision of the four Powers to adopt,
without consultation with France, hostile measures
against her protege Mehemet Ali, was denounced as a
national insult which must be wiped out in blood.
The tone of the Constitutionel, which was notoriously
inspired by the President of the Council, was nearly
1 F. 0. France 604, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840 (most
confidential).
2 Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, August 8, 1840 (confidential).
280
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
as bellicose as that of the National, the organ of the
republican and military party. M. Thiers, if he did
not actually encourage, certainly did nothing to allay,
the excitement, which was increased, on August 1, by
the publication of a Royal ordinance decreeing sub-
stantial additions to both the army and the navy.
In London the affair only began to attract much
public interest, when the extent of the resentment
which it had aroused in Paris became known. The
High Tories, who had always disliked the French
alliance, were delighted to think that that combina-
tion was at an end. The more moderate members of
the party, however, who followed the leadership of
Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, whilst agreeing as to
the necessity of driving Mehemet Ali from Syria,
regretted that means had not been found of inducing
France to adhere to the treaty. The Times, 1 which
was very antagonistic to Palmerston, supplied its
readers, on August 3, with an article by Henry Reeve
in which he expressed a sincere hope that relations
with France " would not be imperilled for the sake of
a desperado like Mehemet Ali," and, at the same time,
suggested that throughout the negotiations the Foreign
Office had not improbably been the dupe of Russia.
The Radicals adopted this view, and furthermore,
deprecated any intervention in Turkish affairs. It
was only in their quarter of the House that the policy
of the government encountered any real hostility.
But even their attack was not pressed with much
spirit, and Palmerston, on August 6, a few days
before the prorogation of Parliament, had no difficulty
in repelling Joseph Hume's allegation that the insurrec-
tion in the Lebanon had been fomented by British
agents. 2
Guizot, in the meanwhile, had had several
1 The Times, July 27, August 1, 3, 1840.
2 Jbid,, August 7, 1840.
281
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
conferences at the Foreign Office, and had discussed
the situation with both Melbourne and John Russell.
The position which the French government intended
to assume was set forth in a memorandum which he
was instructed to read to Lord Palmerston. No
formal proposals for a treaty, M. Thiers contended, had
ever been made to France. Various suggestions, it
was true, for settling the Turco-Egyptian question
had been put forward, with none of which she had
been able to agree. She had always looked upon
Mehemet Ali as an integral part of the Ottoman
Empire, and considered his strength as necessary to
the preservation of Turkey. Hence she had constantly
opposed the idea of wresting Syria from him by force,
and she was now disposed to think that the four
Powers had scarcely realized the magnitude of the
task upon which they had embarked so light-heartedly.
" Treat Lord Palmerston," wrote M. Thiers, " as he
treated you. Read out to him this written declara-
tion. Question him boldly. Ask him whether he
has any plans for helping the rising in Syria, and
what measures he proposes to adopt should the Pasha
return a flat- refusal to the Sultan's demands ? Press
him hard. Place him in the position of having to
confess that he has acted in a very foolhardy fashion.
... Be careful, however, to frame your questions in
such a way that, should he decline to answer them, you
are not compelled to announce a rupture of relations.
For the moment France must restrain herself."
There is no reason to suppose that Guizot dis-
played any lack of skill in the performance of his
prescribed task. He was, however, unable to report
that he had achieved the smallest measure of success.
Palmerston, whilst expressing his deep regret that a
divergence of opinion should have alienated the two
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Thiers a Guizot (undated,
probably, 21 juillet, 1840). Guizot, Memoir cs, V. pp. 230-235.
282
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Cabinets, and admitting the hope, which Guizot him-
self was convinced was sincere, that their separation
would be of brief duration, was clearly determined to
carry out the treaty to the letter. As regards the
military situation in Syria the point upon which M.
Thiers laid the greatest stress he was full of con-
fidence. Ibrahim, surrounded by a hostile population
and deprived of communication by sea with Egypt,
would, he felt certain, be reduced to impotence.
Melbourne, however, displayed far less confidence,
and the Austrian and the Prussian ministers, with
whom Guizot also conversed, adopted an almost
apologetic tone. Indeed, throughout this affair, it
would seem that the appellation of "time-serving
dog " applied by Charles Greville to Neumann might
with equal justice have been applied to Billow, his
Prussian colleague. 1
Whilst news from the East was eagerly awaited
Guizot was summoned to the Chateau d'Eu, where he
would be enabled to confer with both the King and
M. Thiers. From the subsequent proceedings of the
chief actors in these transactions, as well as from the
somewhat meagre account of his visit which M. Guizot
has given in his Me moires, it is not difficult to surmise
the nature of the plan which it was resolved to adopt.
France was to arm upon an imposing scale, and her
representatives at the different Courts were to assume
an attitude of dignified resentment. Such a course
possessed a twofold advantage. Abroad, it could not
fail to have a great effect upon the timid Cabinets of
Vienna and Berlin, and might even incline them to
withhold their ratification of the treaty. At home,
warlike preparations would be popular, and might
prevent people from enquiring too closely into the
policy which had resulted in the isolation of France.
Moreover, M. Thiers was glad of the opportunity,
1 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 329.
283
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
which the crisis afforded him, of strengthening the
army and of repairing the effect of many years of
military neglect.
But, although the King and his minister were thus
resolved to show a menacing front to Europe, Guizot
was supplied with confidential instructions of a most
pacific character. Palmerston, they were convinced,
had grossly miscalculated the strength of Mehemet
Ali, and it was to be hoped that the unexpected
difficulties which the execution of the treaty could not
fail to encounter would produce a great revulsion of
feeling, not only at the continental Courts, but among
the majority of the members of the British Cabinet.
Should, therefore, M. Guizot perceive signs of a
disposition to adopt a less uncompromising attitude
towards Mehemet Ali and to draw nearer to France,
he was to encourage it by all means in his power.
Provided the Treaty of July 1 5 could be declared to
be at an end, the French government would gladly
join with the Powers in guaranteeing the integrity of
Turkey, on the basis of the maintenance of the con-
ditions of the Convention of Kiutayeh. M. Thiers,
it will be seen, was thus ready to consent to restrict
Mehemet Ali to the life government of both Syria
and Egypt, a state of affairs to which he had always
declared that it was useless to expect him to submit.
As an alternative to this solution of the difficulty,
France might be invited to mediate on behalf of the
Pasha with the allied Powers. In that case the
hereditary tenure of Egypt and the life government
of Syria for Mehemet Ali would be the basis of the
negotiation. 1 This was another arrangement which
a few weeks before M. Thiers had rejected as
altogether inadmissible. The Comte Walewski, a
natural son of Napoleon, who had been sent upon a
special mission to Egypt, on August 2, for the purpose
1 Guizot, Memoires, V. p. 271-272.
284
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
of counselling the Pasha to refrain from beginning
hostilities, was, accordingly, instructed to suggest to
Mehemet AH that he should defer his dispute with the
four Powers and the Porte to the mediation of France.
But in addition to these instructions Guizot carried
back with him to London a letter from Louis Philippe
to his son-in-law, the King of the Belgians. Leopold
was at Windsor Castle, consumed with anxiety at the
thought of the dangers to which a European war
must expose his newly established Kingdom. Louis
Philippe's letter of August 13 was plainly intended
to be read by Queen Victoria, and was drawn up with
the object of seriously alarming her, and of prejudic-
ing her against Palmerston. "The situation in which
France finds herself," wrote the King, "is neither of
her choice nor of her creation. It was said of the
death of the Due d'Enghien that it was worse than a
crime, it was a blunder. I say now of the Treaty of
July 15, that it is worse than a blunder, it is a
misfortune of which the consequences are incalculable.
The situation is particularly painful for me who have
always scouted the notion that England could ever
enter into an alliance without France. I find I am
wrong. For the present we can only wait and see.
But there is one thing we must do and that is to
arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our role must
be one of expectation. We must see what England
means to do, before deciding what France shall do,
either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance
of power." *
A few hours before M. Guizot departed from
England to visit the King at Eu, a steamer left the
Thames having on board Louis Napoleon, who, with
some fifty followers, a tame eagle and a bundle of
proclamations, purposed to overthrow the Orleans
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Louis Philippe au Eoi dea
Beiges, 13 aout, 1840.
285
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Monarchy. His destination was Boulogne, where a
subaltern officer of the garrison had been drawn into
the plot. On the morning of August 6, the Imperial
Pretender disembarked at Vimereux and presented him-
self before the 42nd regiment upon the barrack square.
But his appearance aroused no enthusiasm. Finding
that their plans had miscarried, the conspirators
attempted to regain their ship. Their flight was,
however, intercepted by the police and the national
guards, who captured the whole party and lodged
them in the gaol. Four years before Louis Napoleon
had made a similar attempt at Strasburg. On that
occasion he had not been brought to trial, but had
simply been placed on board a ship and sent off to
America. This second offence, however, could not be
treated with the same leniency. On September 28,
he was arraigned before the peers and sentenced to
perpetual imprisonment in the fortress of Ham. The
affair excited little public interest and was generally
treated with contemptuous indifference. Certain
French newspapers, however, published accounts of
meetings between the Pretender and Palmerston, and
declared that his attempt must have been connived at
by the British government. But at his first interview
with Baron Bourqueney, who had come over to
London to take charge of the embassy during the
absence of Guizot, Palmerston was enabled to pledge
his word of honour that, for " the past two years,
neither he nor Lord Melbourne had set eyes upon
Louis Bonaparte or upon any of the adventurers by
whom he was surrounded. " : His assurance was
readily accepted and the matter was quickly forgotten.
Upon his return to London, Guizot found awaiting
him an invitation to Windsor. Among the party at
the Castle were the King of the Belgians, Melbourne,
1 Affaires dtrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Bourqueney a Thiers, 8 aout,
1840.
286
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Palmers ton, and Wellington. Leopold, to whom
Guizot at once delivered Louis Philippe's letter,
applied himself diligently to the task of extricating his
father-in-law from his difficulties. With the view of
terminating the isolation in which France was placed,
he proposed that the convention of the four Powers for
the pacification of the Levant should be merged in a
larger instrument, to which she might be a party.
But Palmerston, with whom he had a long conference,
whilst acknowledging the advantages to be derived
from a general agreement to uphold the integrity of
Turkey, declared emphatically that no plan of that
kind could be considered, until the Treaty of July 15
should have been executed in all its details. On
August 20, at the termination of his visit, Guizot
carried back with him to London the conviction that
Leopold's efforts had in no way modified the situation.
He had, however, been able to derive some small con-
solation from the evident desire of the Queen and of
Prince Albert to treat him with unusual consideration,
whilst he had noted with satisfaction that Melbourne
had appeared depressed and even Palmerston seemed
out of spirits. 1
From the French point of view the news from
Syria was of a distinctly reassuring character. The
insurrection in the Lebanon, upon the wide develop-
ment of which Palmerston was supposed to have
confidently depended for the realization of his
plans, had been suppressed without difficulty by
Ibrahim Pasha. This circumstance, combined with
the efforts of King Leopold, revived the active
opposition of those of Palmerston's colleagues who
disapproved of his eastern policy. They urged,
accordingly, the expediency of making some friendly
advances towards France. Palmerston consented with
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thiers, 21, 22
aout, 1840. Guizot, Memoirea, V. 278-290.
287
an unexpected alacrity to meet their wishes. He had
not answered Thiers' memorandum of July 21, and he
now proposed that he should reply to it and thus
re-open communications with the French government.
But his long despatch of August 31, was scarcely so
conciliatory as some of his fellow-ministers would have
desired. It was in effect an amplification of the
memorandum which, on July 17, he had read out and
handed to M. Guizot. It gave a luminous account of
the negotiations and set forth the British case with
admirable clearness, but only in the concluding
paragraphs was a vague hope expressed that, after the
complete execution of the Treaty of July 15, France
would once more resume her place in " the union of
the five Powers." l The document was intended for
publication and, in drawing it up, Palmerston had
been more concerned to convince his countrymen of
the justice of his cause than to conciliate the French
government. As the event was to prove, he had
judged correctly in supposing that a lucid exposition of
his policy would greatly strengthen his hand, and
enable him to counteract the intrigues of the French
party, in the Cabinet. When, about a month later,
his despatch was communicated to the press, it silenced
the opposition of all fair-minded persons. 2 Guizot,
suspecting at once the real object which Palmerston
had in view, lost no time in urging upon Thiers the
necessity of presenting, no less skilfully, the French
case to the public. 3
The conclusion of the Treaty of July 15 was
known at Constantinople on August 3. The Porte,
acting under the advice of the ambassadors of the
four Powers, proceeded without loss of time to carry
out its conditions. Eifaat Bey, accompanied by Mr.
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 31, 1840.
2 The Times, October 7, 1840.
3 Guizot, Metnoires, V. pp. 290-296.
288
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Alison of the British embassy, was despatched to
Egypt with the Sultan's ultimatum, and measures
were promptly taken for rendering effective aid to
the Syrian insurgents. 1 At the same time as the
documents relating to the treaty were sent to Con-
stantinople, the instructions of the Admiralty were
forwarded to Sir Robert Stopford, commanding the
British Mediterranean Squadron. All communication
by sea was to be cut off between Egypt and Syria. If
the Pasha's fleet should be discovered within the
harbour of Alexandria, it was not to be allowed to
leave. Should an Egyptian squadron be cruising off
the Syrian coast, the admiral was to use his own
discretion as to the means to be employed for carry-
ing out the intentions of his government. Peaceful
persuasion was to be tried in the first instance, but,
should it prove ineffectual, force must be resorted
to without hesitation. Five thousand stands of arms
from the stores at Malta were placed at his disposal,
for distribution among the insurgent mountaineers.
Lastly, Stopford was warned to be on his guard
against " any sudden movement of the French
squadron, in consequence of orders which might be
sent from Paris, under the first impulse of irritation
which the French government would naturally feel
at finding itself placed in a separate and isolated
position." 2
The French naval force in the Mediterranean was
at this time extremely efficient 3 and, in point of
numbers, slightly superior to the British. Ever since
the beginning of the year, Palmerston had made
the strength of the Toulon fleet the subject of
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 5, 8,
1840.
3 Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July
16, 17, 23, 1840 (secret).
3 C. Napier, War in Syria, I. p. 10.
289 U
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
numerous representations to the French government. 1
Should, therefore, warlike counsels prevail in Paris
the initial advantages of the naval situation would
be on the side of France. But, as early as July 25,
Palmerston was so satisfied that no danger of that
kind was to be apprehended, that he desired that
Stopford should be informed that the French govern-
ment had clearly " no intention of opposing by force
the measures which the allies had resolved to execute." ;
That officer, on receipt of his instructions, had pro-
ceeded to Alexandria, both to support by his presence
the demands which Rifaat Bey was pressing upon the
Pasha and to prevent the egress of the Egyptian fleet.
A few days before his arrival, the squadron, which
Mehemet Ali had recently sent to the coast of Syria, 3
had hastily returned to Alexandria, upon the advice, as
it was believed, of the French admiral.
Whilst he was in these waters, Stopford was joined
by Admiral Bandiera with two Austrian frigates, one
of which was commanded by the Archduke Charles
Frederick. Commodore Charles Napier, famous for
his destruction of the Miguelite fleet, had at the same
time been detached to the coast of Syria with five sail
of the line and some smaller vessels. Arriving off
Beyrout, on August 12, Napier found that the
insurrection, which he had been informed was in full
progress, had been suppressed. Nevertheless, two
days later, he took up a position "abreast of the
town" and sent an officer on shore to notify to the
governor that the four Powers had decided to restore
Syria to the Sultan, and to demand that the arms
taken from the inhabitants of the Lebanon should be
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, December 10, 13,
1839, January 3, February 14, March 5, 17, 1840.
2 Admiralty (in letters), 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July
25, 1840 (secret).
3 Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palrueraton, July 23, 1840.
290
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
restored to them. Furthermore, he issued a proclama-
tion calling upon the Syrians to return to their
allegiance to the Sultan, and proceeded to detain a
number of small vessels carrying provisions and
military stores for the use of Ibrahim's army. But, as
the twenty days allowed Mehemet AH for considering
the demands of the Porte had not yet expired, he did
not consider himself justified in beginning actual
hostilities. Finding, therefore, that Suleyman Pasha l
was not disposed to comply with his summons and
that his proclamation produced no effect, he withdrew
his squadron to a better anchorage and employed his
time in reconnoitring the coast. 2
M. de Pontois, the French ambassador to the
Sublime Porte, had, in the meanwhile, not been idle.
On August 16, on receipt presumably of instructions
from M. Thiers, he sent his dragoman to Keshid Pasha,
the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The
message, of which M. Cor was the bearer, was to the
effect that France was deeply offended at the action of
the Ottoman plenipotentiary in signing the Treaty of
July 15, and that she was resolved to support Mehemet
Ali and actively to oppose the measures of coercion
which the allies were proposing to apply to him. 3 M.
de Pontois himself further declared to the Russian
minister that he regarded war between France and
England as inevitable. This threatening language was
at once reported by the representatives of the Powers
to their respective Courts and Lord Ponsonby, at the
same time, sent to warn the British admirals that an
outbreak of hostilities with France was to be seriously
apprehended. 4 A few days later, however, the French
1 Colonel Seves.
2 C. Napier, War in Syria, I. pp. 29-49. Admiralty (in letters),
5503 Syria, Napier to Stopford, August 21, 1840.
3 Levant correspondence, Ponsouby to Paknerston, August 17,
1840.
4 F. O. Turkey 396, Ponsonby to Paknerston, August 19, 1840.
291
ambassador, whether in consequence of fresh instruc-
tions from Paris, or whether because on considering
the matter he was afraid he had said too much, saw
fit to disavow the language imputed to him. 1 This
was the attitude adopted by M. Thiers when, in due
course, representations on the subject of M. de Pontois'
menaces were made to him by the Powers. The full
brunt of his ill-humour fell, as was usual, upon the
Austrian ambassador, who met with a very warm and
disagreeable reception. " Vous pouvez dire d Reshid
Pasha qu'il en a menti" 3 was the only statement which
Apponyi could extract from him. Guizot, but in more
courteous terms, conveyed the same explanation to
Lord Palmerston. No written communication having
passed between M. de Pontois and Keshid Pasha, the
matter was allowed to drop. 3 It was evident that
whatever might have been the precise words used
by M. Cor, the message of the French ambassador to
the Reis-Effendi was a rather clumsy attempt to
frighten the Sultan into withholding his ratification of
the treaty.
France meanwhile was arming in most ostentatious
fashion. On September 13 the fortification of Paris
was decreed by a Royal ordinance. This was a measure
which had been under consideration for some time past,
but which had always been set aside on account of the
difficulty of inducing the Chambers to consent to the
required expenditure. Thiers, as a student of the
campaign of 1814, had constantly advocated it, whilst
Louis Philippe was also in favour of it because, as was
generally believed, he hoped that a circle of forts round
the capital would greatly facilitate the suppression of
any revolutionary movement. M. Thiers gave his
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 22,
1840.
a F. 0. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 7, 1840.
3 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Guizot, September 9,
1840.
292
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
closest personal attention to the military preparations.
With the journalists and stockjobbers, by whom he
was surrounded, 1 his conversation turned on war un-
ceasingly. In the early days of August he had hinted
at a campaign upon the Rhine, whilst the papers which
he inspired denounced the treaties of 1815 and talked
of " natural frontiers." But his thoughts soon
assumed a new direction. The debor dement, 2 when it
came, would be in Italy, where Austria was to be
assailed at her most vulnerable point. Lying on the
floor, with his maps spread out before him, like the
great man about whom he had written so much, he
planned vast military and diplomatic combinations. 3
Nor was Louis Philippe less warlike than his
minister. All Paris heard of the indignant and
threatening language which he had used to the
Prussian and Austrian ambassadors. Taking them
aside at the Tuileries, he had bitterly reproached them
for the ingratitude which their Courts had displayed
towards him. For ten years he had held the revolution
in check and his reward had been the Quadrilateral
Treaty of Julj T . But, and at this point his voice could
be heard far beyond the confines of the room in which the
interview took place, " they had better not provoke
him too far. He had discarded the red cap. Some
day, perhaps, they might be disagreeably surprised to
find that he had resumed it." 4 This threat, which was
uttered as though it had escaped him in the heat of
passion, was well calculated to give Metternich much
cause for uneasy reflection. At the same time the
King's eldest son, the Due d'Orleans, a keen and
ambitious soldier, loudly proclaimed that France had
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 160.
2 T. Raikes' Journal, IV. p. 43.
3 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 160.
4 F. O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 31, 1840.
Thureau Dangin, Monarchic de Juillet, IV. pp. 242-243. The Times,
September 1, 1840.
293
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
been insulted. With perfect sincerity he declared his
belief in the necessity of war. " If the worst came to
the worst," he told his friends, " he had rather be
killed in action upon the Rhine, than be shot in a
street fight and die in the gutter."
Under the influence of the revolutionary recollec-
tions evoked by the anti-dynastic press, and of the
threats of war to be waged upon Jacobinical
principles, 2 indulged in by the organs of M. Thiers,
public excitement in Paris rose to an alarming pitch.
The situation was complicated by a series of strikes in
different trades. Bands of men deprived of their
employment marched through the streets singing the
Marseillaise. The secret republican societies fomented
the discontent of the working classes and fanned the
flame of war. Disturbances took place, and the autho-
rities were apprehensive of an attack by the mob upon
the British embassy.
Towards the middle of September the news reached
Paris that, in consequence of the Sultan's demands,
conveyed to him by Rifaat Bey, Mehemet Ali had
invoked the protection and mediation of France. 3
Furthermore, at the instance of the Comte Walewski,
he had declared his readiness to restore to the Sultan
the island of Crete, the Holy Cities and the province
of Adana. Although maintaining his claim to the
hereditary tenure of Egypt, he had announced that lie
would be satisfied, as regards Syria, were the govern-
ment of Tripoli, Damascus and Aleppo to be conferred
upon his son Ibrahim for his life. Thiers perceived,
at once, that in these proposals lay his last chance of
preventing without war the full execution of the Treaty
of July 15. Notwithstanding that he still derided the
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 39.
Letters of Queen Victoria, October 2, 1840 (I. K. Leopold to Queen
Victoria).
2 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 141.
3 Levant correspondence, Hodges to Palmerston, August 24, 1840.
294
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
notion that a blockade of the coast would suffice to
make Mehemet All relax his hold upon Syria, in his
heart he was, doubtless, beginning to suspect that he
had overestimated the military power of the Pasha.
Napier's proceedings at Beyrout and his detention of
the Egyptian store ships and transports had not been
followed by that vigorous offensive, which, he had
always predicted, Ibrahim would assume the moment
any act of war was committed against him.
Hitherto M. Thiers, in his intercourse with the
British charge d'affaires, with whom he was in private
life on very friendly terms, had never made use of
those asperities of language and warlike threats which
he had sometimes indulged in with Werther and
Apponyi. But, on the morning of September 18,
when Mr. Bulwer called upon him, he resolved to adopt
new tactics. As they paced up and down a long
gallery in his house at Auteuil, M. Thiers declared
emphatically that he considered the Pasha's last
proposals both just and reasonable. If England would
agree to join with France in pressing their acceptance
upon the Porte and the Powers, there would once
more be established the intimate relations between the
two governments which the Quadrilateral Treaty had
interrupted. But if not, then seeing that Mehemet
Ali had made these concessions at the instance of
France, she would " be bound to support him." As he
concluded he looked Bulwer full in the face and asked
him whether he realized the full import of these words.
" Perfectly," replied he impcrturbably, " you mean to!
declare for the Pasha and go to war with us in his
favour." Before they parted, however, M. Thiers
somewhat modified the gravity of his statement, by
saying that he had spoken as a private individual, not
as the President of the Council.
A few hours later Bulwer returned to Auteuil.
Before leaving M. Thiers he had told him that he
295
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
would like him to see the account of their conversation
which he proposed to send to London. The despatch
which he, accordingly, placed in his hands began by
stating that, in the writer's opinion, the moment had
come when M. Thiers purposed saying to the King,
" You must follow me even to war, or 1 will leave you
exposed to public opinion as expressed by the news-
papers." It was certain, however, that the King
would not accept such a programme, and that, were M.
Thiers to place his resignation on those grounds, it
would be unhesitatingly accepted. This was very far
from the kind of message which Thiers wished con-
veyed to Lord Palmerston. " My dear Bulwer," he
said, "you are greatly mistaken, you will ruin your
promising career. The King is far more warlike than
I am." 1 Bulwer saw no occasion to argue that point,
and, having produced the desired effect, he readily
agreed merely to relate to his chief the substance of
their morning's conversation. In a private and confi-
dential despatch, however, he stated that this interview
had left a strong impression upon his mind that M.
Thiers had, in reality, an earnest desire to maintain
peace. 2
These so-called concessions of Mehemet Ali were,
Lord Palmerston declared, unworthy of serious consi-
deration. Whether Syria were governed by Ibrahim or
by Mehemet Ali was a matter of very little importance.
The object with which the treaty had been concluded
must be relentlessly pursued. Syria must be replaced
under the direct rule of the Porte. Until the Egyptian
desert should intervene between the territories of the
Sultan and those administered by his too-powerful
vassal, there could be no permanent peace in the East.
No arguments of M. Guizot could induce him to adopt
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 324-327.
2 F. O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 18, 1840
(private and confidential).
296
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
a less uncompromising attitude. The Pasha's proposals
indicated, he maintained, that he already perceived
the necessity of bowing to the inevitable, and that he
would, before long, yield to all the demands of the
Powers. 1 Certain of his colleagues, however, alto-
gether dissented from this view of the case. Mehemet
Ali's concessions, they contended, had created an
opportunity for terminating the differences with France
and for drawing her into the negotiations.
The French party in the Cabinet had recently
received a great accession of strength. Lord John
Russell, the Colonial Secretary and the leader of the
House of Commons, had cordially approved of the
Treaty of July 15. Nevertheless, early in September, he
appears to have been seized with grave misgivings as
to the wisdom of carrying out its provisions. A letter
from Lord Spencer to his brother the Duke of Bedford,
expressing the fear that Palmerston's policy would
lead to a war with France, seems to have made a great
impression upon him. 2 Moreover, " Bear " Ellice 3 was
actively engaged in propagating alarmist rumours and
in discoursing upon the indignation which the Anglo-
Russian alliance had aroused in France. There are
grounds for believing that the intrigue, of which he was
the soul, aimed at driving Palmerston to resign, in order
that Clarendon might replace him at the Foreign
Office. 4 Be that as it may, the inspiration of M.
Thiers can plainly be discerned in the correspondence
of Mr. Ellice with both Russell and with Melbourne. 5
Charles Greville also appears to have spent much time
with Guizot in inveighing against the presumptuous
1 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Guizot a Thiers, 20 septembre,
1840. Guizot, Memoires, V. pp. 317-323.
2 S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp. 347-348. C. Greville,
Journals (2), I. p. 304.
3 Vide p. 265.
4 C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 106.
5 Melbourne Papers, pp. 472-473.
297
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
recklessness of Palmerston and in discussing the votes
and opinions of different members of the Cabinet. 1
But the French ambassador could listen to even more
congenial sentiments in the social circle presided over
by Lord and Lady Holland. M. Thiers, a few weeks
after Holland's death, openly declared in the Chamber
that, throughout this crisis, he had always been able
to depend upon the support of that statesman. 2 It is
impossible to say how far he was justified in making
such a statement. It is undeniable, however, that
matters, which should have been treated as Cabinet
secrets, were known in Paris. In commenting upon
M. Thiers' amazing indiscretion, The Times, 3 which
cannot be charged with partiality to Palmerston,
positively asserted, as a notorious fact, that " every
transaction within the doors of the British council-
chamber were as well known upon the bourse as in the
deepest recesses of Downing Street or Whitehall." This
statement is to a great extent confirmed by Bulwer,
who relates that, in consequence of certain information
which he had acquired in Paris, he was enabled to warn
Palmerston of an attack which was to be made upon
him in the Cabinet. 4 " The talking at Holland
House," wrote Lord Melbourne, " is irremediable.
They cannot help it, and they are not themselves aware
how much they talk." 1 It was always a subject of
complaint against Palmerston that he would come to
important decisions and would embark upon grave
j measures of policy, without reference to his colleagues.
The conduct of certain of his " Whig friends and
grandees " 6 upon this occasion was, it must be admitted,
1 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 310-311, in particular, and Chapters
VIII. and IX. in general.
2 The Times, December 1, 1840.
3 Tlie Times, December 7, 1840.
4 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 343-844.
" Melbourne Papers, II. p. 479.
6 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. p. 848.
298
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
calculated to dispose him to confide in them as seldom
as possible.
Negotiations, John Russell insisted, must be opened
with France on the basis of the Pasha's last proposals.
If this course were not adopted, he announced his
intention of retiring from office. His resolution was
not to be shaken either by the remonstrances of
Melbourne that his resignation must destroy the
government, or by Palmers ton's representations that
his present conduct was inconsistent with his former
approval of the treaty. 1 The French party seemed to
be on the point of triumphing. Palmerston appeared
to be placed between two alternatives he must
either retire, or consent to suspend coercive measures
against Mehemet Ali and make conciliatory advances
to France. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, a
crisis was averted. Lord John agreed greatly to
modify his demands and Palmerston consented to a
slight compromise. " Russell," records Greville, " has
disappointed me. He is not the man I took him for." a
But in point of fact an influence, unsuspected by
Greville, had been brought to bear upon him. Mel-
bourne had conveyed to him a message from the Queen
that she was not in a condition 3 to bear, without
danger, the anxiety to which she must be subjected by
the course he threatened to pursue. But Her Majesty
placed her chief objection to anything in the nature of
a Cabinet crisis, at this particular moment, on other
grounds than those of her own state of health. She de-
sired Lord John to reflect most seriously upon the injury,
which the country must suffer in the eyes of foreign
Powers, from so public an exhibition of ministerial weak-
ness and vacillation at a time of national emergency. 4
1 Melbourne Papers, pp. 467-480. C. Greville, Journal* (2), I.
pp. 312-318.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 331.
3 The Princess Royal was born November 21, 1840.
4 S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp, 352-353.
299
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Metternich had been greatly alarmed by the
threatening aspect of affairs, and had, some weeks
before, submitted a paper to King Leopold, for trans-
mission to Louis Philippe, defining the attitude which,
in his opinion, the French government should adopt.
Whilst signifying her dissent from the policy of
coercing Mehemet AH, she might, he suggested, declare
her adherence to the main principle of the treaty the
necessity of preserving the integrity of Turkey. Should
the event prove that the Pasha was not to be subdued
by force, she might announce her readiness to discuss
with the Powers the means by which, in the future,
the security of the Ottoman Empire might be main-
tained. 1 Palmerston, who was in possession of a copy
of this document, expressed himself as willing to make
an overture to the French government on the basis of
Metternich's suggestions. At a Cabinet Council, on
October 1, this solution of the difficulty was agreed
to unanimously. 2 It was a small concession which
Palmerston could well afford to make. Before the
French government could be approached on the
subject, the consent of the Powers, which were parties
to the Quadrilateral Treaty, would have to be obtained.
Brunnow, without doubt, would at once declare that
he must refer the matter to his Court, and long before
an answer could be received from St. Petersburg, the
guns would have spoken in the East and the whole
situation would be altered. Nor was this expectation
falsified. The representatives of the Powers, following
the lead of Brunnow, announced that they were with-
out instructions and must submit the proposal to their
Courts. But already the news had arrived of the suc-
cess with which hostilities had been opened in Syria. 3
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 6, 1840.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 324-327. S. Walpole, Life of Lord
John Russell, p. 354. Melbourne Papers, pp. 483-484.
3 Levant correspondence, Schlemnitz to Palmerston, October 9,
300
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
At Constantinople Mehemet All's reply to the
demands made to him by Rifaat Bey was held to be
unsatisfactory, and, with the full approval of the
ambassadors of the allied Powers, the Porte decided to
treat his counter-proposals in the light of a rejection
of the Sultan's ultimatum. He was, accordingly,
declared deposed from the governorship of Egypt and
of the other territories which he ruled, and a blockade
was proclaimed both of the Syrian and Egyptian
coasts. The representatives of the Powers at the
same time recalled the consuls from Alexandria, and
every effort was made to carry out promptly the
stipulations of the Treaty of July 15. 1 Sir Robert
Stopford, leaving a portion of his command to watch
the Egyptian fleet, sailed with the remainder of his
force and the Austrian squadron to join Napier off
Beyrout, where Captain Walker, who had been placed
in command of the Turkish fleet, had already arrived.
On September 11, the governor of Beyrout having
been ineffectually summoned to surrender, fire was
opened upon the forts. After sustaining a heavy
bombardment, Suleyman Pasha withdrew the garrison
into the hills. Two days before, a Turkish division
and detachments of British and Austrian marines had
landed at Jounie Bay. Commodore Napier, under
whose direction these operations were carried out,
entrenched his force securely and proceeded to dis-
tribute arms and ammunition to the mountaineers, /
who flocked into his camp in large numbers. Mean-
while, Ibrahim, who with the main Egyptian army
was not far distant, looked on helplessly, and appeared
to be incapable of offering any serious resistance to
the operations of the allies. 2
1840; Brunuow to Palmerston, October 12, 1840; Neumann to
Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsouby to Palmerston, September 10,
14, 1840 ; Hodges to Palmerston, September 22, 1840.
2 C. Napier, War in Syria, I. pp. 47-68.
301
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
The news from the East created a profound sensa-
tion in Paris. " The cannon of Beyrout," wrote
Heine, 1 "re-echoes painfully in the heart of every
Frenchman." Young men eagerly proffered their ser-
vices at the recruiting offices. At the opera and at
the theatres excited audiences insisted on singing the
Marseillaise. On the question of peace or war the
Cabinet was supposed to be nearly equally divided.
M. Thiers was reported to have urged the necessity of
energetic action, but it was notorious that General
Cubieres, the Minister of War, and Roussin, the
Minister of Marine and the former ambassador at Con-
stantinople, were in favour of pacific measures. Henry
Reeve, the friend of Greville and the future editor of
his famous journals, was at this time in Paris.
Politically he was in complete accord with Lord
Holland and the French party, and, during his stay
in Paris, was in regular correspondence with Lord
Lansdowne, a member of the Melbourne Cabinet, who,
although not actively opposed to Palmerston, only
gave him a half-hearted support. Reeve was well
acquainted with most of the French ministers, and
was on very friendly terms with Le"on Faucher and
several other prominent journalists and politicians.
In fact, during these critical days, he may be said, in
his own words, " to have had his board and lodging
in the Cabinet." He was in constant communication
with M. Thiers, " who was everything that he could
wish." Consequently, he would ingenuously convey
to his patron 3 those opinions, which the crafty Frencli
minister considered might with advantage be dis-
seminated in governmental circles in London.
Amidst all this excitement, whilst in Paris the
bourse was panic stricken and in London the funds
were falling, Palmerston remained perfectly calm. He
1 H. Heine, Letters from Paris (translated by Leland), II. p. 49.
' 2 Memoirs of H. Reeve, I. p. 180. 3 Ibid., pp. 122-129.
302
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
had never believed in the danger of a conflict with
France, and, in his opinion, the progress of events in
the East had rendered still more remote the chances
of war. 1 He could not admit that the French people
or the French King would ever allow any government
to embark upon hostilities with the whole of Europe,
in order to preserve Syria for Mehemet Ali. He
wrote reassuringly to the Queen 2 to this effect, and
strove to calm the apprehensions of his colleagues and
to instil into them some of his robust common sense.
But the edict of the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali had
been deprived of the government of Egypt, had once
more stirred his opponents to action. According to
Lord John Russell, it was a measure which had never
been contemplated by the treaty and had clearly been
adopted in consequence of the violent counsels of Lord
Ponsonby. Palmerston, although he personally ap-
proved of the deposition of the Pasha, had, nevertheless,
immediately instructed Granville to inform M. Thiers
that it was merely a measure of coercion, and was not
intended to prejudge any arrangement which the
Sultan might, hereafter, be disposed to make in
favour of Mehemet Ali, should he, " at an early
moment, accept the conditions of the treaty." : Lord
John, however, was not to be pacified. War, he
asserted, appeared to be imminent, and he insisted
upon the necessity of holding a meeting of the
Cabinet. 4 Grave consequences, wrote Melbourne to
the Queen, were to be apprehended from the Council
which he had called for October 10. 5
But once again a crisis was averted. On the
1 H. Buhver, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 333-834.
2 Letters of Queen Victoria, Palmerston to the Queen, October 11,
1840.
3 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 2, 1840.
4 S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I. pp. 354-357.
Letters of Queen Victoria, Melbourne to the Queen, October 9,
1840.
303
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
morning of the day on which the meeting of the
Cabinet was to take place, Guizot presented himself
at the Foreign Office with two despatches from M.
Thiers. The first, dated October 3, purported to be
an answer to Lord Palmerston's despatch of August 31.
It was a long and rambling statement of the French
case. The chief argument consisted in an attempt to
show that France, throughout the negotiations, had
never departed from the principle embodied in the
collective note of July 27, 1839. Then, as now, France
considered that that instrument had been drawn up
for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence and
integrity of Turkey. She had always believed that
the object which it had in view was to enable the
Sultan to escape from the exclusive protection of a
certain great Power. She had never understood that
the policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire was
bound up with any question of "territorial limita-
tions, more or less advantageous, between the Sultan
and the Viceroy." ' The second, and more important,
despatch bore the date of October 8, and dealt with
the firman of the Sultan deposing Mehemet AH from
the government of Egypt. France, declared M. Thiers,
was prepared to leave the question of Syria to the
chances of the war, which had actually begun. But
the edict expelling the Pasha from Egypt was a
different matter. It threatened to disturb the balance
of power in the East, and France could, therefore, not
consent to see it carried into execution. 2 Certain
writers have pompously asserted that, on this occasion,
M. Thiers "formulated the casus belli." It must be
borne in mind, however, that he had already been
informed by Lord Granville of the light in which the
British government regarded the Porte's decree of
deposition. Hence many of his contemporaries treat his
1 Levant correspondence, Thiers i Guizot, 3 octobre, 1840.
* Ibid., 8 octobre, 1840.
304
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
despatch of October 8 with derision. That famous
document, they contend, merely "forced an open
door." l
The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had
expressed himself came as a great surprise to the
British government. M. Guizot, sincerely as he desired
to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that
so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely
inconsistent with the warlike attitude which his govern-
ment had adopted, since the beginning of the crisis.
He contented himself, in consequence, with placing
M. Thiers' despatches in Lord Palmerston's hands, and
made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions
expressed in them. 2 Their contents, when communi-
cated to the assembled British ministers, removed at
once the danger that acute differences of opinion
might lead to a disruption of the government. At
the Cabinet Council of October 10, it was simply
decided that Lord Ponsonby should be directed to
urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the
governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment
hereditary in his family, provided he would consent to
make an early submission to the Sultan. At the same
time, it was agreed that a copy of these instructions
should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to
the French government. 3
But, in spite of the pacific language used by
M. Thiers in his despatches, the situation still gave
cause for anxiety. The lower classes in Paris had
been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical declamations
of the Eadical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe
was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the
bullet of an assassin. The would-be regicide, an
1 L. Vernon, Memoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris, V. p. 27.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 337. Letters of Queen Victoria,
Melbourne to the Queen, October 11, 1840.
3 Levant correspondence, Pahnerston to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840 ;
Palmerston to Granville, October 17, 1840.
305 x
ENGLAND AND THE OKLEANS MONARCHY
individual named Darmes, when arrested and ques-
tioned, declared that he was by profession "a con-
spirator and an exterminator of tyrants." This outrage
and other anarchical symptoms were not without
effect upon the bourgeoisie. 1 The signs of the times
pointed clearly to the probability that war abroad
would be followed by a revolution at home. Mean-
while, rumours were current that the government
was preparing some sudden act of aggression an
"Anconade " a as it was called. It was said that the
military occupation of some position in Turkey was
contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon
of the French fleet, which had been cruising in Greek
waters, seemed to prove, not only that the government
could have no such intention, but that it was desirous
of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with
the British squadron operating off the Syrian coast.
Nevertheless, after the return home of Admiral
Hugon's fleet, reports about the warlike plans of
M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Gran-
ville, on October 12, received information from a
person, who stipulated for a special remuneration
should his intelligence prove accurate, that the French
government had decided to seize one of the Balearic
Islands. 3
The strategic importance of these Spanish islands
had been enhanced by the French occupation of Algiers.
Situated about midway between Toulon and the
African coast, they would, in the hands of France,
enable her to control the western Mediterranean.
The British Foreign Office and the Admiralty had, in
consequence, been always on the alert, lest she should
by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port
1 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, IV. p. 343.
2 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, October 8, 1840.
8 F. O. France 606, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
Levant correspondence, Granville to Palmerston, October 12, 1840.
306
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Mahon. It had been ascertained that many of the
inhabitants were not at all averse to the idea of a
French annexation of Minorca. 1 But, in addition to
the military advantages to be derived from the occu-
pation of the Balearic Islands, there were political
reasons which made both Palmerston and Bulwer
suspect that M. Thiers might regard a coup d' eclat in
Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of
July 15. 2 The struggle between Christina 3 and the
Progressistas had been raging for some weeks past,
and now appeared certain to terminate in the complete
defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject of
Spanish affairs the British government held views
which were diametrically opposed to those entertained
at the absolute Courts. Any stroke directed against
Espartero and the Radicals could not fail to be ap-
plauded at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A
French intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the
means of sowing discord between Great Britain and
her continental allies.
Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger
to Madrid to warn the British minister of the blow
which was impending, and Palmerston also wrote to
Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero, 4 when the
news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen
the garrison of Port Mahon, and promised to resist
manfully any French aggression. Melbourne, at the
same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating
strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the
Belgians. 5 England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst
1 Admiralty (in letters) 5495, Martin to Stopford, April 26, 1840.
2 F. O. France 605, Bulwer to Palmerston, September 14, 1840 (con-1
fidential).
3 Vide p. 217.
4 F. O. Spain 555, Scott to Palmerston, October 23, 1840 (secret) ;
Aston to Palmerston, November 7, 1840. Levant correspondence,
Palmerston to Aston, October 15, 1840. H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston,
II. pp. 341-343.
5 Melbourne Papers, p. 487.
307
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
France continued to arm and to threaten. She must,
if the present situation were prolonged, take measures
to safeguard her interests. This communication pro-
bably reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long
as he had believed that Mehemet AH was capable of
offering a serious resistance to the allied Powers, he
had approved of the menacing attitude of his govern-
ment. But, when the Pasha's impotence was made
manifest, he realized the expediency of adopting
different tactics. He understood the difficulties of
M. Thiers' position. Already the more extreme of the
various groups composing his parliamentary majority
were beginning to testify their displeasure at the
pacific tone of his despatch of October 8, which had
been published in the English papers. At the ap-
proaching meeting of the Chambers heated and violent
recriminations were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe,
however, had also perceived that, notwithstanding the
clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current of public
opinion was running in the direction of peace. People
were beginning to realize that, under existing con-
ditions, war and revolution were synonymous terms.
Some of M. Thiers' colleagues had, moreover, it is said,
privately intimated that, if peace were to be main-
tained, the King must take upon himself to dismiss his
present ministers. 1 But the adoption of this dis-
interested advice was fraught with certain unpleasant
consequences. For the past fortnight the Constitu-
tionnel, M. Thiers' chief organ, had been insinuating
that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity
of France were frustrated by the Sovereign. The
King was, therefore, under no illusions as to the
manner in which his minister purposed to cover his
retreat.
The Chambers were to assemble on October 28.
1 Guizot, Memoires, IV. pp. 400-402. Thureau-Dangin, La-
Monarchic de Juillet, IV. pp. 344-436.
308
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
M. Thiers, about a week before, submitted to Louis
Philippe a draft of the proposed Speech from the
Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph,
and announced that 150,000 more men would be
called up for service with the colours. The King
objected, and whilst the matter was under discussion,
he received Lord Melbourne's letter. It is very pos-
sible that a perusal of its contents may have served to
overcome his last hesitations. He refused to employ
the language which his minister proposed to place
in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his
resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal
Soult agreed to form a new government, of which the
real head was to be M. Guizot, the French ambas-
sador in London, into whose charge the King had
confided the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.
M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the posi-
tion in which France found herself at the time of his
downfall. When he took office, the mistakes of his
predecessor had already carried the country a great
distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless,
the brief period of his second administration affords an
instructive example of the many mistakes which a
very able man may commit. The two principal
objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly
incompatible. He sincerely desired to retain the
friendship of Great Britain and, at the same time, he
proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an
independent State, which was to owe its separate
existence to French patronage. But, inasmuch as
Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the Pasha out
of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was
obliged to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods.
Thus, whilst he strove to prolong and to embarrass the
negotiations in London, he endeavoured secretly, and
in flagrant violation of the collective note of July 27,
1839, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands
309
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of the Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that
the young Sultan and his ministers, rather than follow
the congenial advice of the Powers which desired to
curb the ambition of Mehemet AH, would listen to the
unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their
arch-enemy the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded
upon so erroneous a conception of human nature was
fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the French
agents at Alexandria and Constantinople 1 were ex-
posed, the correspondence of M. Coste found its way
into Lord Palmerston's drawer at the Foreign Office,
and the treaty between the four Powers and the Porte
was concluded on July 15.
But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the
student of war, the Napoleon civil, as Metternich named
him, altogether failed to understand the strategic situ-
ation in the East. Unlike Lord Palmerston, who fore-
saw that the Pasha's position in Syria would be
untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of
the command of the sea, Thiers conceived it possible
that Ibrahim could assume the offensive in Asia Minor,
and at the same time maintain, in the midst of a
hostile population and through a most difficult coun-
try, his communications with Egypt. His plans were,
accordingly, based upon the supposition that the
Powers would experience serious difficulty in expelling
the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha's resistance, he
was confident, would not be overcome before the winter,
and would, doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a
Russian army. But, were the Tsar to despatch a large
force to Asia Minor, national jealousies and suspicion
would be aroused. Then France, having completed
her military preparations, could enter upon the scene
and impose her will upon a disunited and disheartened
coalition. In pursuance of this plan, M. Thiers made
divers attempts to draw the chief Italian States into
1 Vide pp. 269-273.
310
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
an alliance with France. But his proposals were un-
heeded both at Turin and at Naples. 1 In one direction
only would his overtures appear to have met with any
response. King Otho, the young Bavarian prince
whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the
throne of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtain-
ing Crete, seems to have promised to invade Thessaly,
whenever France should give the signal for a general
outbreak of hostilities. 2
But all these schemes were rendered abortive by
the state of impotence to which Ibrahim was reduced
by the arrival of the British fleet in Syrian waters.
After the success of Stopford's operations at Beyrout,
M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge
France, with King Otho for her only ally, into a war
with the whole of Europe. It is impossible to believe
that he can ever have thought seriously of adopting
this last alternative. But Louis Philippe's unalterable
resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him
to advocate a bellicose policy, seeing that he would
never be called upon to carry it out. By proposing
certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of the
Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he
intended to compel the King to dismiss him. Thus
he would be enabled to escape from the difficulties
in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis Philippe
would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted
to the dictation of Lord Palmerston.
The injury done to the House of Orleans was not,
however, the only consequence of M. Thiers' proceed-
ings in 1840. His warlike declamations and the fre-
quent allusions in his newspapers to the left bank of
the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had
1 F. O. Sardinia 112, Abercromby to Palmerston, November 28,
December 30, 1840. F. O. Sicily 169, Temple to Palmerston, September 16,
1840. Thureau-Dangin, Monarchie et Juillet, IV. pp. 274-275.
2 F. O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, February 2, 5, 1841.
F. 0. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, February 3, 1841.
311
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
slumbered for a generation. The amazing popularity
of Becker's Song of the Rhine l testifies to the strength
of the national sentiment which the French threats had
aroused. The significance of this, and other mani-
festations of German feeling, did not escape Prince
Metternich. "M. Thiers," he wrote bitterly, "likes
to be compared to Napoleon. With respect to Ger-
many he resembles him closely, indeed, he may justly
be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accom-
plished as much in that country as the Emperor
during ten years of war and oppression."
The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon
the basis of the maintenance of peace. But innumer-
able difficulties confronted it. Whilst pursuing a
strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford to
disregard the national susceptibilities which the events
of the past few months had aroused. Guizot, accord-
ingly, before leaving London, and after his return to
France, declared constantly that the fate of the new
ministry was in the hands of the British government.
If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers
were prepared to make concessions to M. Thiers' suc-
cessors, which they would not have made to M. Thiers
himself, he was confident that he could defeat his
opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to
execute the treaty against Mehemet AH, he and his
colleagues would surely be overwhelmed and the King
would be forced to call the war party into his counsels.
Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved
most useful in propagating this opinion. 3 Palmerston,
however, was quite unmoved. He scouted the notion
that France would resort to extreme measures in
defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the
1 " Sie soil i- 11 ihn nicht haben, den frien deutscheu Rhein."
2 Metternich, Memoires, VI. p. 447.
3 Memoirs of H. Eeeve, pp. 134-135. Melbourne Papers, p. 492.
C. Greville, Journals (2), I. pp. 347-349.
312
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
British interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet
Ali from Syria, should not be sacrificed in order to
strengthen the parliamentary position of a foreign
government.
At the time of M. Thiers' resignation, his despatch
of October 8 was still unanswered. But, before M.
Guizot had been long installed at the Foreign Office,
he received Lord Palmerston's reply to it. The con-
tents of this document caused him the greatest irrita-
tion. After exposing with remorseless logic the
fallacies of M. Thiers' arguments, Palmerston laid
down the principle that the future government of
Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally
been blamed for not employing a more conciliatory
tone in this, his first important communication with
M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions
of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had
two distinct objects in view, and it is open to question
whether he would have attained his ends, had he
employed less uncompromising language. His de-
spatches, both of November 2 and November 20, were
clearly written with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot
of the necessity of regarding Syria as altogether
lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end to
the efforts which were being made to preserve for him
the southern portion of Palestine. Secondly, by inti-
mating that the Pasha's reinstatement in the govern-
ment of Egypt would depend upon his prompt compli-
ance with the Sultan's demands, Palmerston evidently
intended to force M. Guizot to exert all his influence
over Mehemet Ali in favour of a complete surrender. 1
Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in
Syria. Before the middle of October the Turkish flag
waved once more over Beyrout and Saida, the ancient
Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish division
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Granville, November 2, 20,
1840 ; Granville to Palmerston, November 5, 1840.
313
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and some detachments of British and Austrian marines,
completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable
Ibrahim. As early as October 5, Palmers ton had
desired the Lords of the Admiralty to advise Sir Robert
Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring the
fortress of Acre to the Sultan. 1 The allied commanders
appear to have been somewhat undecided as to the
propriety of attacking this famous stronghold, the key
of Syria. In view of the lateness of the season, Stop-
ford himself was very reluctant to embark upon opera-
tions against it. 2 But Palmerston's despatch overcame
his irresolution and induced him to listen to the bolder
counsels of Napier, Walker, and Jochmus. Acre, which
had successfully . resisted Bonaparte and which had
held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on
November 3, to the British admiral after an engage-
ment of a few hours' duration. The moment the news
reached London, Stopford was directed to send " a com-
petent officer" to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that,
provided he would restore the Turkish fleet and give
an undertaking in writing to evacuate Syria, Adana,
Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers would
recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governor-
ship of Egypt. 3 But, before these instructions could
take effect, Napier, who had arrived off" Alexandria with
his squadron, had seen fit to conclude, upon his own
responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali. In
this unauthorized convention, which was signed on
November 27, it was stipulated that the Pasha should
surrender the Turkish fleet and evacuate Syria, on the
understanding that the four Powers in return would
1 Admiralty (in letters) 5503, Syria, Palraerston to Admiralty,
October 5, 1840 (secret) .
2 F. 0. Turkey 897, Ponsonby to Palmerston, October 7, 1840 (confi-
dential).
3 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Admiralty, November 14,
1840.
314
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic
of Egypt. 1
Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have
been privately urged by certain members of the
Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of concluding a
peace with Mehemet Ali. 2 But, whatever his reasons
may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the
main provisions of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded
with the instructions sent to Stopford on November 14.
Palmerston, in consequence, decided to signify his
approval of the arrangement, with one important
reservation. 3 Under no circumstances "could Great
Britain singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee
to a subject a grant of administrative authority made
to him by his Sovereign, within the dominions of that
Sovereign." But at Constantinople Napier's proceedings
aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime
Porte, with the full concurrence of the ambassadors
of the Powers, pronounced the convention null and
void.* The same course was adopted by Stopford, who
sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria
to declare that the convention of November 27 could
not be ratified, and that Mehemet Ali must submit
unconditionally to the terms which the Powers were
prepared to offer to him. 5
Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield.
The fall of Acre had decided the fate of Syria. Fan-
shawe's task was thus easy of execution, and, on
December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing
1 Levant correspondence, Barrow to Leverson, December 15, 1840.
2 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16, 1840 (enclosure I.) ;
Napier to Ponsonby, December 14, 1840, " I was led to believe by letters
which I had received from different members of the Government that
they were most anxious to settle the Eastern question speedily."
3 Ibid., Palmerston to Admiralty, December 15, 1840 ; Palmerston
to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.
4 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 8, 1840.
5 Admiralty (in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Stopford to Admiralty,
December 10, 1840.
315
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
with him a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand
Vizier, in which the Pasha conceded every demand and,
with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon the gene-
rosity of the Sultan. 1 The Turkish ministers, however,
were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy
who, in the days of his strength, had caused them so
much anxiety. Nor were the British ambassador and
the Austrian internuncio in favour of treating Mehemet
Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly
alarmed by the French armaments, and had sent strict
instructions to his agent at Constantinople to terminate
the eastern question with as little delay as possible.
Baron Stunner was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged
to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the
hereditary tenure of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was
more tenacious of his opinions, and, although Palmer-
ston, after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had
directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant
the heredity to Mehemet Ali, a he declined to join with
his colleagues in pressing the Porte to adopt
this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether
the Pasha's letter to the Grand Vizier should be
regarded as an act of complete submission. Before
pronouncing a decided opinion upon that point, he
must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his
actions intended to prove the sincerity of his promises. 3
But, on January 10, 1841, he received Palmerston's
despatch on the subject of Napier's convention, wherein
it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain approved
of the principle of conferring the heredity upon
Mehemet Ali. 4 This second intimation of the views
of his government was too clear for even Ponsonby
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 16,
23, 1840.
2 Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840.
3 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston December 23, 1840.
4 Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840.
316
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
to venture upon disregarding it. He was, in conse-
quence, obliged to advise the Porte to make the
required concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner
perceived that the Powers were unanimously in favour
of it, than they promised to take the necessary steps
for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary govern-
ment of Egypt. 1
Two days before this concession was extorted from
the Porte, Mehemet Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet
to the commissioners sent to receive it. Furthermore,
he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of
Crete and the other territories which he had promised
to restore to the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the
remnants of the army of Syria, had by this time
arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had
himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had
suffered cruelly in their retreat. 2 But their losses
would have been far heavier, had it not been for the
Napier Convention. The British officers employed in
Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to
observe the armistice, which was one of the conditions
of that irregular agreement. 3
Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it
remained only to determine the conditions under
which the hereditary governorship of Egypt should be
conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally
desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the
powers which it had reluctantly consented to delegate.
Some weeks, accordingly, were spent in discussing the
affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on February
13, 1841, the Porte issued a jirman of investiture,
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, January 10, 13,
1841.
2 Ibid., Barrow to Backhouse, February 1, 28, 1841.
3 F. O. Turkey 399, Ponsonby to Palmerston, December 13, 1840.
F. O. Austria 208, Beauvale to Palmerston, March 5, 1841. Levant
correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 21, 1841. Admiralty
(in letters) 5504, Syria, II., Backhouse to Admiralty, April 17, 1841.
317
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to
Mehemet AIL 1
The French government, meanwhile, rigidly
abstained from any kind of interference. M. Guizot
from the tribune of the Chamber declared his
intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same
time maintaining the armaments which, by reason of
her isolation, France could not afford to reduce. The
Opposition inveighed fiercely against the attitude
which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers
gave his version of the negotiations and protested
that, had he been able to remain in office, he would
have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only in order to
prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in
order to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement
of 1815. To support their statements, he and his
former colleagues recklessly divulged the contents
of confidential documents, and disclosed military
secrets. 2 Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority
in both Chambers on the question of their foreign
policy. The attention of the assembly, during the
remainder of the session, was chiefly directed to
matters connected with the fortification of Paris.
The enormous expenditure entailed by that measure,
and by the other military preparations of M. Thiers
had a very sobering effect upon the popular Chamber.
The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country
not less than one hundred and fifty millions of
francs. 3
No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully
from the initial stages of the parliamentary struggle,
than he applied himself diligently to the task of
bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers.
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palrnerston, February 14, 15,
1841 ; Chekib Effendi to Palmerston, March 11, 1841.
2 Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, December 4, 1840.
3 F. O. France 607, Granville to Palmerston, November 27, 1840.
318
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
The German Courts, he was well aware, were most
anxious to terminate a situation pregnant with
dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of Metternich
and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister,
the isolation of France threatened the peace of
Europe, and, in order to put an end to it, they were
prepared to settle " tant bein que mal" l the eastern
question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar
Nicholas might have been expected to oppose the
resumption by France of her place in the Concert of
the Powers. But he had now strong reasons of his
own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He
had instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty
of Unkiar-Skelessi should not be renewed, because
experience had proved that it was of no practical
value. 2 The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at
the conclusion that, for the better protection of the
southern provinces of Russia, the question of the
Dardanelles should be regulated by some European
agreement. But no compact of that nature would be
likely to endure, unless France were to be made a
party to it. 3
Although it suited Nicholas that France should
re-enter the European Concert, his dislike of Louis
Philippe, and of the regime of July was as strong as
ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question
with some "final transaction to which France might
be invited to adhere," * he also suggested that the
treaty for the pacification of the Levant should be
converted into a quadruple alliance, "providing
against the contingency of an attack by France
upon the liberties of Europe." His main reason, he
informed Lord Clanricarde, for making this proposal,
1 Guizot, Memoires, VI. p. 78.
2 Vide p. 253.
3 S. Gorianow, Le Bospliore et lea Dardanelles, p. 83.
4 Levant correspondence, Nesselrode to Brunnow, December 10,
22, 1840.
319
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
was to establish a close understanding with Great
Britain. 1 Metternich had not " the spirit of a
gentleman," and neither England nor Russia ought to
place any confidence in him. 2 The British govern-
ment, however, was unable to entertain the suggestion.
" All formal engagements of the Crown," Lord
Clanricarde was instructed to explain, " must be
submitted to Parliament, and Parliament might not
approve of an engagement which should bind England
prospectively." Nor was there any way in which this
difficulty could be overcome. It would not be
removed by the verbal agreement into which the
Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter,
should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion
of a more formal compact prove insuperable. " A
verbal engagement would bind the ministers who
made it, but might be disavowed by their successors,
and thus the Russian government might be led
to count upon a system of policy which might
not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these circum-
stances," concluded Lord Palmerston, "it seems to
Her Majesty's government that the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg should be satisfied to trust to the general
tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which leads
her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of
power." 3
Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of
the Tsar's proposals, he appears to have ascertained
quickly that the three absolute Courts wished to close
the eastern question in order that France should resume
her place in the Concert. But he was very far from
certain whether Lord Palmerston's views coincided
with those of his continental allies. He was not with-
out fear that it might be the secret intention of Great
1 F. O. Russia 271, Clanricarde to Palmerston, January 18, 1841
(confidential).
2 Ibid., March 9, 1841 (confidential).
3 F. O. Russia 269, Palmerston to Clanricarde, Januarj* 11, 1841.
320
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of Egypt From the
moment he had taken office, he had declared that the
fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but
that no French government could acquiesce in the
expulsion of the Pasha from his Egyptian governorship.
So long, however, as France maintained her armaments
Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any
further measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali.
Thus by playing upon the fears of the German Courts,
he could bring considerable pressure to bear upon
Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he
proposed to counteract the schemes which he suspected
the British minister of harbouring. Lord Holland was
dead, and the French party was greatly discredited,
but he could still depend upon the assistance of
" Bear " Ellice, 1 Greville and his other English friends,
whenever an opportunity of thwarting Palmerston
should arise. For the purpose of organizing as much
opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he had,
in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron
Mounier upon a special mission to London. 2 At the
same time Baron Bourqueney, the French charge
d'affaires, was instructed confidentially to discuss the
situation with his colleagues, but, under no circum-
stances, was he to make any direct proposals to Lord
Palmerston. He was constantly to declare that the
isolation of France must continue, so long as the treaty
of July should be in existence.
M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that
Palmerston would rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed
1 Among the despatches in vol. 653 Angleterre, is an extract from a
letter from M. to M. Guizot, dated November 28, 1840 ; the writer
gives the views of Melbourne, Russell and Lansdowne. He also speaks
of a conversation with Esterhazy, and talks of an interview of two hours'
duration with Palmerston. The author of this communication was
perhaps Ellice. The evidence of Greville's Journal seems to make it
very improbable that he was responsible for it. Nor can the authorship
of it be imputed to Eeeve.
2 Guizot, Memoires, VI. pp. 49-50.
321 Y
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
than invested with the hereditary tenure of Egypt.
But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman ambassador, it
was his rule in all affairs "to be content with wheat
was practical," J and Lord Beau vale's despatches from
Vienna made it clear that Metternich would never
consent to take part in expelling the Pasha from
Egypt. 2 Palmerston, therefore, accepted the situation
and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement
which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his
Egyptian Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan,
which had been proposed at one time, of inviting
France to participate in the final settling between the
Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of
Mehemet Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring
a dangerous element of discord into the conference. 3
Nevertheless, at the beginning of January, 1841, Baron
Bourqueney, after havingjbeen his guest for a few days
at Broadlands, felt convinced that "he wae really
anxious .to discover some way of bringing back France
into the concert, although he was still undecided as to
the manner in which it should be effected."' The
correctness of this surmise was before long confirmed
by the event. After the decision of the four Powers
to press the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet
Ali had been embodied in the collective note of January
30, 1841, Palmerston himself took the initiative and
invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the
Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.
The conferences which were thus begun on February
18 continued until March 5, and resulted in the fram-
ing of two diplomatic instruments. The first, termed
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 29,
1841.
2 F. O. Austria 208, Beauvalo to Palmerston, January 17, 1841.
3 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Bloomfield, December 2,
1840.
4 Affaires (Strangeres, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney a Guizot, 7 Janvier,
1841 (confidentielle et rcservee).
322
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
the protocol, was only to be signed by the representa-
tives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty
of July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced
the Porte to invoke the assistance of the four Courts
being now at an end, the wish was recorded " of ex-
pressing in the most formal manner the respect due to
the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of
which it has, at all times, been prohibited for ships of
war of foreign Powers to enter the straits of the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." With this principle,
which was of general and permanent application,
France was to be formally invited to concur. The
second document consisted of a treaty, known as
The Convention^ of the _ Straits, according to which
the Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus to the warships of all foreign nations, and
the Sovereigns of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria
and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this ancient
rule of the Ottoman Empire. 1
M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to
certain small verbal alterations, pronounced himself
satisfied with both documents. Nevertheless, the full
powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was expecting
to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he
was merely authorized to initial the convention. 2 The
news had reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly
displeased with the conditions attached to his firman
of investiture, and that he had, in consequence, refused
to accept it. The decree in question had never been
submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at
Constantinople, and it now appeared that the heredity,
which it professed to confer, was of an entirely fictitious
nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it was provided
that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from
among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the
1 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 16, 1841.
2 Ibid., Granville to Palmerston, March 12, 15, 1841.
323
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
appointment of all officers of the Egyptian army, above
the rank of captain, was to be regulated by the Porte.
Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount of the
tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather
than submit to conditions so humiliating he would once
more appeal to arms. 1
Three months elapsed before the points in dispute
could be settled. Meanwhile, the French government
resumed its attitude of complete aloofness, and M.
Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be sent
to London, so long as the possibility existed that
coercion might once more be applied to the Pasha
under the terms of the Treaty of July. To the great
annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston was
resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects
of that treaty had been attained. A premature dissolu-
tion of the alliance, he maintained, would only en-
courage Mehemet AH to adopt a more defiant attitude,
and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his
relations with the Sultan. 2 " A question," he insisted,
" could not be really finished merely by saying that it
was so." 3 Metternich was compelled reluctantly to
admit the force of this argument. 4 But, whilst he
acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance,
his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to
embarrass the negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet
Ali to commit some act of violence.
The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be
admitted, suggested that his chief had no great wish
to discover a peaceful solution of the Egyptian
question. When the news arrived at Constantinople
that Mehemet Ali had refused to accept ihejirman, he at
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 6, 9, 17,
27, 1841. Guizot, Memoir es, VI. pp. 95-98.
2 Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.
3 Ibid., Palmerston to W. Russell, April 21, 1841.
4 Ibid., Beauvale to Ponsonby, April 19, 1841 ; Beauvale to Palmer-
ston, April 22, 1841.
324
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
once advised the Porte to hold no further communica-
tion with him. The Sublime Porte, he declared, need no
longer fear the military power of Mehemet Ali. " His
destruction might be the consequence 1 of his again
venturing to defy the Sultan." The patience with
which Lord Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby's devia-
tions from his instructions is undeniably suspicious.
It is practically certain, however, that no secret under-
standing existed between them. Palmerston's personal
views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so com-
pletely with those of his agent, that he was induced to
regard with a lenient eye his reluctance to carry out a
distasteful task. But, whilst treating him with great
forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to
impose his opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841,
in a despatch endorsed by Queen Victoria with the
significant words "highly approved," 2 he told him
plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in
harmony with his instructions. Again, on March 16,
he prescribed the necessity of overcoming the obstacles
to a settlement so emphatically, that Ponsonby wrote
in reply, that he perceived that " the end which he
was expected to attain was the arrangement of this
aifair with Mehemet Ali at any rate " (sic). 3 Nor can
it reasonably be contended that his tone changed after
the Pasha's refusal to accept the conditions of the
firman of investiture. On the contrary, in his
instructions of April 10, he laid stress upon the
necessity of adjusting the points in dispute with
as little delay as possible, and absolutely dissented
from Ponsonby's view that the Sultan should hold no
direct communication with Mehemet Ali. 4
Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his
1 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 27, 1841
(enclosures).
2 F. O. Turkey 427, Palmerston to Ponsonby, January 26, 1841.
3 Ibid., 433, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1841 (confidential).
4 Levant correspondence, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, 1841.
325
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
colleagues in advising the Porte to modify the firman
of February 13. Their representations, combined with
an intimation from Baron Stunner that Austria l would
withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were dis-
regarded, soon produced the desired effect. On April
14, Ponsonby was able to report that the Divan had
decided that the succession of Mehemet AH should
be regulated in accordance with the principle of
primogeniture, that he should have the power of
dealing with the promotion of all officers below the
rank of brigadier-general, and that the amount of his
tribute should be reduced. 2 Nevertheless, some weeks
elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody
these concessions in a new firman. For this delay
Ponsonby was in no way responsible. On the
contrary, he appears to have entered a vigorous
protest against the procrastinating policy of the
Turkish ministers. 8 Greatly to Metternich's annoy-
ance, however, Palmerston persisted in refusing to
declare that the objects of the Treaty of July had
been fully achieved. The French government, there-
fore, continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney
the authority to sign the Convention of the Straits.
But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety to conclude
the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston's attitude
he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt
to urge Mehemet Ali to accept the amended firman,
which they were to declare was no longer open to any
reasonable objections. 4
Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further
resistance. On July 8, 1841, Ponsonby 's singularly
laconic despatch reached London, announcing "the
satisfactory intelligence " 5 that the Pasha had accepted
1 Levant correspondence, Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9, 14, 1841.
2 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14, 1841.
3 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12,26, 1841.
4 Guizot, Memoires, VI. pp. 111-112.
6 Levant correspondence, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841.
326
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
the newyjrwkwi, and had made a complete submission
to the Sultan. The representatives of the Powers
which were parties to the Treaty of July, thereupon,
affixed their signatures to the protocol, which they
had initialed four months before, announcing that the
objects of their alliance had been fully attained.
Three days later the isolation of France was formally
terminated. On July 13, the plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France
signed the Convention of the Straits by which their
respective Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold
the principle of the closure of the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.
The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits
was the last important act of the Melbourne govern-
ment. After sustaining a defeat on the sugar question,
on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of
want of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert
Peel, found themselves in a minority of one. At the
general elections which followed, the Conservatives
obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in con-
sequence, retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was
replaced at the Foreign Office by Lord Aberdeen.
Palmerston's conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair
has been the subject of much adverse criticism. M.
Thureau-Dangin and other French writers have asserted
that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based upon the
desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of
July, they contend, was simply a retaliation upon
Louis Philippe, because he had declined to interfere
more actively in the civil war in Spain. Nor does
Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief
English historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole, 1
re-echoing the views of Lord Holland and the French
party, charges him with having sacrificed the greater
to the lesser object. The good understanding with
1 S. Walpole, History of England from 1815, IV. pp. 334-838.
327
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly,
was a matter, he argues, of far more importance to
England than any question connected with the rule of
the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and Arabia.
Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His
alliance with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a com-
plete negation of the policy which, in 1834, had led
him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty with Liberal
France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in
Spain and Portugal.
To these different charges there are certain obvious
answers. It has been shown that Palmerston, far
from maliciously desiring to exclude France from the
treaty for the pacification of the Levant, honestly
endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great
Britain, and the other Powers in the affair. It was
only when he perceived that M. Thiers was secretly
working to establish conditions in the Mediterranean,
which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon
his country's highest interests, that he decided to act
without her. He by no means undervalued the
importance of good relations with France, but, in
order to preserve them, he was not prepared to shut
his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil
the safety of British India. The public statements of
M. Thiers and of certain of his colleagues are alone
sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston's policy in 1840.
Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia
should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan,
which Sir Spencer Walpole dismisses as a secondary
consideration, lay the question as to whether a great
naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of
the Persian Gulf.
The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to
justify his accusation of inconsistency is still more
unconvincing. The Treaty of July was concluded
for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation
328
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
of the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of
1834. Yet Sir Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards
it as a betrayal of Liberalism that England, in a
question of eastern policy, should have separated her-
self from a constitutional Power and have allied
herself with the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and
Prussia. Under any circumstances such a contention
would be difficult to uphold, but when applied to
France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible.
Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers
were Liberals in the proper sense of the word.
Treaty engagements notwithstanding, their attitude
towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not
so openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as
that of the Cabinets of the autocratic monarchies.
Louis Philippe, Mole, Guizot and even Thiers, when
they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist
the development of popular government in Europe.
But whatever verdict may be passed upon
Palmerston's Egyptian policy, his rare skill and
determination in carrying it out must command
universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and
perhaps impeachment must have been the penalty of
failure, he never wavered in his resolution to execute
his treaty in all its details. His indomitable spirit
stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and
triumphed over the opposition of his fellow-ministers
at home. When he quitted the Foreign Office British
prestige stood at a height which it had not reached
since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent
detractors had been forced to admit the correctness
of his military judgment and his prescience in treating
as of no account the warlike threats of Louis Philippe
and of M. Thiers.
" Palmerston," wrote Reeve regretfully, "has
bowled out every one." l Charles Greville was
1 Memoirs of Henry Reeve, p. 141.
329
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
moved to enthusiasm. " The elder Pitt," he records,
" could not have manifested more decision and resource.
Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than
to our naval and military commanders, and, probably,
solely to him." l
1 C. Greville's Journals (2), I. p. 856.
330
CHAPTER IX
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
LORD ABERDEEN, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs
in Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet, had held the same office
in the government of the Duke of Wellington. He
had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the
question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with
the attitude which England was to observe towards
the revolution in Belgium. His first experience of
diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great
war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been
sent upon a special mission to Vienna, and had been
concerned in the negotiations which had resulted in
the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the
campaign in Germany he had accompanied the head-
quarters of the allied armies and had been profoundly
impressed by the scenes of which he had been a
witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed
widely that, should complications arise, the spectacle of
Leipsic after " the battle of the nations " would be ever
present before the eyes of England's Foreign Secretary. 1
With regard to the more important questions
which the Foreign Office had in hand, or with which
it had recently been called upon to deal, Aberdeen
was in substantial agreement with Palmerstoii. He
approved of his policy in the Egyptian affair and
endorsed his views as to the necessity of encouraging
Spain to shake off the influence of France. But he
was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing
1 Jarnac, Lord Aberdeen, Bevue des deux mondes, 15 juillet, 1860.
331
Franco-British relations upon their former intimate
footing, and of allaying the irritation which the
Treaty of July had aroused. To attain this end he
was prepared to make far greater concessions than
any to which Palmerston would have consented. No
one was so convinced as he of the truth of the
saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington, that the
peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as
France and England were united. It was not in
their policies, but in their personal characters, that lay
the real difference between Aberdeen and Palmerston.
Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was
instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself
the pleasure of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of
an opponent's arguments. Aberdeen, although in
some respects more of a Liberal than his predecessor,
had a scholar's abhorrence, which had been intensified
by his former relations with Metternich and other
continental statesmen, of all movements of a re-
volutionary character. Palmerston was a man of
coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave
and studious successor.
Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord
Aberdeen and of M. Guizot to bring matters to a
successful conclusion, the first important transaction
between the new British government and the French
Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831,
and again in 1833, France and England had con-
tracted certain engagements towards each other for
the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. They
had agreed that their cruisers should stop and over-
haul any suspected vessel, whether flying the French
or the British flag. Palmerston, however, had not
been content with an arrangement, which limited the
right of search to ships purporting to be of French or
English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination
with France, made representations on the subject to
332
THF CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
the other Powers and succeeded in inducing them to
agree to the principle which the French and English
governments had adopted. The new convention, to
which all the chief Euorpean Powers were to be
parties, was ready for signature at the time when it
became evident that a change of government in
England was about to take place. Palmerston, who
had always been keenly interested in suppressing the
slave trade, was particularly anxious that his name
should be affixed to an international agreement which,
he hoped, would prove the means of abolishing a
traffic which he abhorred. M. Guizot, however, saw
fit purposely to delay matters in order to deprive him
of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of
his reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston's
attitude towards him, he complained to Henry Bulwer,
had been unfriendly. In his dispatch of November 2,
1840, 1 he had shown a total lack of consideration for
the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech
to his constituents at Tiverton he had made some
highly offensive remarks about the manner in which
the French military authorities in Algeria were carry-
ing on their war with the Arab tribes. 2
But. once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing
O
Street, M. Guizot's objections to proceeding with the
slave trade convention disappeared. The necessary
powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French
ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty,
regulating the right of search, was signed in London.
It was soon clear, however, that M. Guizot had been
1 Vide p. 313.
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II. pp. 376-383. Guizot, Memoires,
VI. pp. 130-145 and 412-417. In the speech complained of,
Palmerston, besides denouncing the alleged cruelties committed by the
French army, was so ill-advised as to draw a comparison between the
tranquil condition of Afghanistan under a British military occupation
and the disturbed state of Algeria. How spurious was the peace of
which he boasted was proved, six months later, by the overwhelming
disaster which overtook Elphinstone's army.
333
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
mistaken in supposing that the Chamber would agree
to ratify the agreement into which he had entered.
The opposition to slavery had never been so pro-
nounced in France as in England, and the Treaty
of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling of
jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason
of England's naval preponderance, the duty of
stopping suspected vessels must necessarily devolve
chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French
Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended
that the new treaty was but a device, by means of
which England purposed to arrogate to herself the
right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling
that M. Guizot was forced to inform the British
government that France would be unable to ratify.
Popular opposition, it was thought, would diminish
with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open,
in the hope that France might still become a party to
the treaty. But this expectation was not fulfilled,
and on November 9, 1842, the definite withdrawal
of France was officially communicated to Lord
Aberdeen. The affair caused no little resentment and
disappointment in England. Three years later, how-
ever, M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the question.
By that time the relations of the two countries were
upon a more friendly footing, and the Due de Broglie
and Dr. Lushington, the commissioners of their
respective governments, succeeded, in consequence, in
arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on
May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of
previous conventions, but provided that, in future, the
right of search in African waters should be exercised
by a joint Franco-British squadron. 1
Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the
question which was to occupy the chief attention of
the two governments. It has been related how, in the
1 Guizot, Memoircs, VI. pp. 220-241.
334
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to quit
Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year,
the Cortes had elected Espartero sole Regent of the
kingdom. This solution of the difficulty was by no
means acquiesced in as satisfactory by all parties.
The elevation of the popular general to the head of
the government was necessarily regarded as a victory
for the Progressistas and, consequently, as a triumph
for English diplomacy. Indeed, since the abdication of
the Queen-Mother, the Moderados, as a parliamentary
party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders
still continued to correspond with Christina, whose
house in the Rue de Courcelles in Paris soon became
the centre of a vast conspiracy against the new
Regent.
Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety
that the Moderado chiefs, together with General
Narvaez and other military rivals of Espartero, were
plotting in Paris 1 to overthrow the new order of
affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen's
marriage suddenly sprang into prominence. Isabella
was not yet twelve years of age, but already the
selection of her husband was the subject of grave
deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had
always considered it to be vitally important that her
daughter should marry a member of one of the
great reigning families. As far back as the year
1838, at a most critical period of the civil war, when
it was evident that no assistance was to be expected
from Louis Philippe, she had suggested to the British
minister that Isabella might be affianced to an
English prince. If the difficulties arising from the
difference of religion should prove insurmountable, she
would be satisfied with the betrothal of her daughter
to a member of the House of Coburg, " on account of
the excellent education which the princes of that
1 F. 0. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 26, 1841.
335
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
family had received, and on account of their near
connection with Her Britannic Majesty." l Villiers
was without instructions upon the point, but he took
upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the
English match could never be effected. Christina,
thereupon, announced her intention of marrying her
daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of
Austria. It was a combination which, " she was now
convinced, afforded the best means of pacifying the
country." The negotiations at Vienna, she informed
him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermudez and
their success would largely depend upon the amount
of support given them by the British government. 2
Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers' despatch,
immediately conveyed to him " Her Majesty's gracious
approbation of the course which he had pursued." 3 At
the same time, he informed him that the British
government could not possibly take part in M. de
Cea's negotiations at Vienna, " without in the first
instance communicating thereupon with the govern-
ment of France and, as the King of the French
would be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was
not probable that such a communication would con-
tribute much to the accomplishment of the object."
Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the
Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This
view of the case was soon borne out by the event.
Metternich at once disclaimed any intention of
listening to Christina's proposals, whilst M. Mole, who,
notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed,
was aware of the reasons of M. de Cea's presence at
Vienna, declared to Lord Granville that " the armed
intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be t the
1 P. O. Spain 509, Villiers to Palmerston, November 17, 1838
(secret).
2 Ibid., 510, Villiers to Palmerston, December 1, 1838 (secret).
2 Ibid., 500, Palmerston to Villiers, November 30, 1838 (secret).
336
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian
prince upon the throne of Spain." l
The triumph of the constitutionalists and the
termination of the civil war necessarily invested
Isabella with an importance which she had not
possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was
uncertain. Once the stability of her throne seemed
assured, she appeared to Louis Philippe in the light of
a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the month of
November, 1839, Christina's former minister, Count
Toreno, was understood to be engaged in negotiating
a marriage between a son of the King of the French
and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme, reported
the British charge d'affaires, had numerous supporters.
But the Queen Regent had informed him privately
that "she was hostile to the match and had other
views for her daughter." 2 It is probable that
Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her
intentions to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason
to suppose that, after her abdication, her objections to
the French marriage diminished. But, inasmuch as
she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the
assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for over-
turning Espartero, she was necessarily compelled to
conceal her real sentiments. The re- establishment of
French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied a
foremost place in the policy both of the King and of
M. Guizot. So long, however, as Espartero and the
Progressistas were in power there was little prospect
that they would be enabled to bring their plans to
a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances,
therefore, they were disposed to regard with a friendly
eye the proceedings of the military and Moderado
malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly suspected that
1 F. France 580, Granville to Palmerston, March 1, 1839.
2 F. O. Spain 534, Southern to Palmerston, November 9, 1839
(cypher).
337 z
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe
promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and
Christina, in return, undertook to employ her parental
influence over Isabella in favour of her marriage with
the Prince de Joinville or the Due d'Aumale. 1
The insurrection against Espartero broke out early
in October, 1841. The standard of rebellion was
raised by O'Donnell at Pampeluna and by the generals
commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa.
But their plans, which had been so carefully matured
in Paris, miscarried, and the loyal troops experienced
little difficulty in dispersing their followers and in
restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile, had
been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in
recent history. On the night of October 7, Generals
Concha and Diego Leon, at the head of a band of
military conspirators, penetrated into the palace with
the object of carrying off the young Queen. But
when they attempted to ascend the grand staircase
they encountered a determined party of halberdiers.
A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of musketry
reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the
walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had
sought refuge with her attendants. But help was
soon forthcoming. The resistance of the halberdiers
had enabled the national militia, which was animated
by strong Liberal and Progressista sentiments, to
assemble. At the appearance of the citizen soldiers
the conspirators either fled or laid down their arms.
Some of their leaders escaped to France, but Leon was
captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of his
treason, his youth, his good looks and his former dis-
tinguished services earning for him a sympathy which
the circumstances of his case in no way justified.
1 F. O. France 623, Bulwer to Palmerston, April 23 (private
and confidential), 26, 1841. F. O. France 629, Bulwer to Aberdeen,
October 18, 25, 1841 (confidential).
338
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
" With respect to the share of the French govern-
ment in organizing and promoting this enterprise,"
wrote Lord Aberdeen, " I do not think it necessary to
enter into an enquiry at present. We have received
the most positive assurances that they have been
entirely strangers to the undertaking. Whatever may
be the value of these assurances, the attempt having
happily failed, there appears to be no advantage in
testifying suspicion and distrust." 1 He, accordingly,
directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade
Olozaga, the Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a
tone as possible in his communications with M. Guizot.
The Spanish government was naturally deeply in-
censed at the encouragement which the conspirators
had received in Paris, and their representations on the
subject included a demand for the expulsion of Christina
from France. This was peremptorily refused and the
relations of the two countries began to assume a very
disquieting appearance. In Bulwer's opinion, were
Louis Philippe to receive any encouragement from
Austria or Prussia, he might not improbably embark
upon a war with Spain. " Should hostilities break
out," he warned Lord Aberdeen, " Barcelona would be
the French objective, on account of the effect which its
capture would have on those Courts which are fearful
of the democratic opinions prevailing there." 2
Aberdeen's instructions to Mr. Aston, the British
minister at Madrid, were of the same nature as those
transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He was to warn the
Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture
with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure
Espartero that "the policy of Great Britain would
continue to be directed towards the maintenance of
the real independence of Spain and to her protection
1 F. 0. France 621, Aberdeen to Bulwer, October 22, 1841.
2 Ibid., 630, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 9, 1841 (private
and confidential).
339
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
from whatever quarter she might be threatened." l
Meanwhile, the British government would make every
effort to induce the Northern Courts formally to ac-
knowledge the sovereignty of Isabella. 2 Whether
designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord
Aberdeen in this direction were frustrated by France.
Owing in a great measure to his good offices, the
Spanish government withdrew its demand for
Christina's expulsion. 3 Louis Philippe, thereupon,
directed M. de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had
been appointed ambassador at Madrid, to proceed to
his post. But this measure, which seemed to fore-
shadow the establishment of more harmonious relations
between the two countries, led to a most unfortunate
complication. Salvandy, upon his arrival at Madrid,
insisted upon being allowed to place his credentials in
the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely declined to
present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides
invoked precedents in support of their attitude and
pressed their arguments with the greatest warmth.
Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid taking with
him all the members of his embassy, with the exception
of his second secretary, the Due de Gliicksberg, a son
of Louis XVIII. 's favourite minister, the Due Decazes.
It is unnecessary to discuss the various questions
of diplomatic etiquette raised in this controversy.
Whilst, upon the whole, inclining to the French point
of view, Lord Aberdeen was of opinion that the dispute
could have been amicably adjusted without great
difficulty. The attitude of Mr. Aston, he considered,
had not been altogether satisfactory, and he was
disposed to impute blame to him for not having
discovered some basis for a compromise. Not content
1 F. 0. Spain 671, Aberdeen to Aston, November 18, 1841.
2 F. O. Austria 297, Aberdeen to Gordon, December 4, 1841.
3 F. O. France 680, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 19, 1841 ;
Cowley to Aberdeen, November 26, 1841.
340
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
with censuring him, he allowed M. Guizot to be
furnished with a copy of the letter in which his dis-
approval was expressed. 1 When Salvandy was
appointed to the Court of Madrid Bulwer had de-
scribed him as " a man of letters, but pompous and
ridiculous in manner and unlikely to acquire an
influence over the young Queen of Spain." 2 But, if
it was the secret desire of Louis Philippe to provoke
a quarrel with Espartero, he was perhaps the most
suitable person he could have selected for the purpose.
The dispute involving, as it was supposed to have done,
the monarchical principle had effectually dispelled all
hope that the absolute Powers would agree to renew
diplomatic relations with the Court of Madrid a cir-
cumstance which Louis Philippe, in conversation with
the British ambassador, affected "to deplore most
deeply." 3 So far as France was concerned, however,
the Due de G-liicksberg was left at Madrid without
official title, in order merely to carry on the ordinary
business between the two countries.
But in all matters relating to Spanish affairs the
question of Isabella's marriage occupied the foremost
place. Louis Philippe now protested that he had
never for a moment entertained the idea of putting
forward one of his sons as a candidate for her hand.
But, after making this assertion, he invariably added
that he should object to her marrying any prince who
did not belong to either the Spanish or Neapolitan
branch of the House of Bourbon. 4 Accordingly, in
February, 1842, he sent M. Pageot, who had been for
several years first secretary of the French embassy at
1 Guizot, Memoires, pp. 316, 334. C. Greville, Journals (2), II.
pp. 73-75.
2 F. O. France 628, Bulwer to Aberdeen, September 17, 1841.
3 Ibid., 631 and 647, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 29, 1841,
January 21, 1842 (secret and confidential).
4 Ibid.,* 630 and 631, Bulwer to Aberdeen, November 8, 1841
(private and confidential) ; Cowley to Aberdeen, December 3, 1841
(secret and confidential), December 6 and 24 (confidential),
341
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Madrid, to London, for the purpose of obtaining the
accession of the British government to the principle
that the husband of the Queen of Spain must be a
descendant of Philip V. After leaving London Pageot
was to proceed to Vienna, where he was to hold the
same language to Prince Metternich.
Neither in London nor at Vienna, however, was
M. Pageot able to bring his mission to a successful
conclusion. Lord Aberdeen declared emphatically
that England could not recognize the right of France
to dispose of the hand of Isabella. The British
fovernment looked upon the matter " as an exclusively
panish affair, which ought to be regulated solely by
considerations affecting the happiness of the Queen
and the welfare of her people." At these words
M. Pageot, at once, interposed with the remark that
he presumed that he was now at liberty to inform his
government that England would not object to her
marriage with a French prince. But Aberdeen, with
equal promptitude, added an important amendment to
his first statement. The marriage of the Queen of
Spain with a son of Louis Philippe would, he asserted,
upset the balance of power, and England would
always oppose any combination calculated to produce
political consequences of that nature. 1 Metternich
was no less emphatic in protesting against the pre-
tensions of the King of the French to dictate on such
a subject to an independent State. Nor was he less
decided in declaring that the general interests of
Europe would be endangered by Isabella's marriage
with a son of Louis Philippe. In his opinion the
whole Spanish question might be amicably settled by
the betrothal of the Queen to a son of Don Carlos,
without any sacrifice of their respective rights, as in
the case of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fifteenth
1 F. O. Austria 804, Aberdeen to Gordon, March 16, 1842. Gui/ot,
Memoires, VIII. pp. 115-116.
342
THE COKDIAL UNDERSTANDING
century. This was a view of the case, however, with
which the British government was unable to concur.
" Prince Metternich," wrote Aberdeen, 1 " has been
misled by a fancied historical analogy. The solution,
he suggests, might have been productive of good
whilst the civil war was in progress and whilst Don
Carlos was in possession of the northern provinces.
But, now that he and his adherents have been driven
from Spain as fugitives, it would be regarded with the
utmost repugnance by the majority of Spaniards.
A marriage of the Queen with a son of Don Carlos,
although it might reconcile the personal claims of
each, would inevitably bring into fierce and hostile
contact the passions and opinions of their adherents."
Pageot's mission, therefore, had done little to
advance the question of Isabella's marriage. Mean-
while, Count Toreno, Christina's confidential adviser
in Paris, had, on several occasions, sought out Lord
Cowley, the British ambassador, for the express pur-
pose of informing him that the Queen-Mother would
prefer to see her daughter married to a Coburg rather
than to a Bourbon prince. 2 At the same time
Espartero was known to be engaged in attempting to
negotiate her marriage with the third son of the King
of Bavaria. Louis Philippe, for his part, was more
than ever determined to restrict her choice of a
husband to the Bourbon candidates, and, in Lord
Cowley 's opinion, had serious thoughts " of supporting
his pretensions by an armament." 3 It was, however,
by more indirect methods that he proposed to attain
his ends. All through the spring and summer of 1842
the Spanish malcontents, both in Paris and upon the
frontiers, displayed renewed activity. The Carlists and
1 F. O. Austria 304, Aberdeen to Gordon, April 26, 1842. Guizot,
Me'moires, VIII. pp. 118-122.
2 F. O. France 631 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 6, 1841
(confidential) ; May 6, 1842 (confidential).
3 Ibid., 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 4, May 6, 1842 (confidential).
343
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the Christinos, having concluded an alliance based
upon the marriage of Isabella with a son of the
Pretender, openly prepared for united action against
their common enemy, the Regent Espartero. 1 This
compact was, doubtless, the reason of the seeming
approval, given by Louis Philippe, to Metternich's
utterly impracticable plan for settling the Spanish
difficulty. 2 Neither the representations of the Spanish
government nor a strong protest from Lord Aberdeen 3
had any effect in inducing the French authorities to place
any check upon the proceedings of the conspirators.
In November, 1842, a formidable insurrection
broke out at Barcelona. The rising assumed from the
outset a republican character, and, in their first con-
flicts with the troops, the insurgents were uniformly
successful. The arrival of reinforcements, however,
soon altered the aspect of affairs and enabled General
Van Halen to re-establish the authority of the Regent.
Once more Louis Philippe and Christina were loudly
accused of having promoted the outbreak. The
Queen-Mother, reported Lord Cowley, undoubtedly
supplied the revolutionists with money, and General
Athalin, a close personal friend of the King and an
officer of his household, had been in secret com-
munication with the organizers of the movement.
" The Spanish government," wrote Mr. Aston, " con-
siders that the insurrection at Barcelona has been
promoted by France with the twofold object of pre-
venting the conclusion of a commercial treaty with
Great Britain and of causing the downfall of the
Regent. 4 The complaints, which the Spanish charge
1 F. O. France 648 and 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 4,
February 14, March 4, April 15, 1842.
2 Ibid,, 649, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 18, 1842.
3 Ibid., 645, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 18, 1842.
4 Ibid., 653, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2, 1842 (secret and
confidential). General Athalin's intimacy with Mdme. Adelaide,
Louis Philippe's sister and political confidant, was notorious. Madame
Atlialin was one of the least offensive of the names applied to her by
344
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
d'affaires was instructed to make in Paris, bore
especially upon the proceedings of M. Ferdinand de
Lesseps, 1 the French consul at Barcelona, who was
accused of having actively assisted the insurgents.
M. Guizot, however, who, according to Lord Cowley,
had taken no part in these intrigues, defended the
conduct of Lesseps and directed the Due de Gliicksberg
to obtain a retractation of the charges brought against
him from the Cabinet of Madrid. 3 The situation
thus assumed a very dangerous appearance, and Lord
Aberdeen intervened once more in the interests of
peace. Let the Spanish government, he urged, in-
stitute a calm and dispassionate inquiry into all the
facts alleged against the French consul and let no
reparation be demanded of the French government,
unless there be evidence of his culpability sufficient to
satisfy all impartial persons. 3 This advice was
accepted, and, after a thorough examination of all the
circumstances of the case, a disavowal of certain of
the more serious charges was inserted in the Gazette
at Madrid. Nevertheless, as Lord Aberdeen pointed
out, " few people could read with impartial attention
the various documents without coming to the con-
clusion that M. de Lesseps did very considerably
exceed the limits of his consular duties," and he,
therefore, ventured to express the hope that the
French government "would no longer retain him in
the place where his undue activity had been dis-
played. 4
the legitimists. The story that she was secretly married to General
Athalin appears to be unfounded. F. 0. Spain 604, Aston to Aberdeen,
November 21, 1842.
1 Vide p. 227.
2 F. O. France 653 and 665, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 2
(secret and confidential), December 13 and 19, 1842 (secret and con-
fidential), January 20 and 22 (secret and confidential), January 2
and 6 (confidential), January 30, 1843.
3 F. O. Spain 597, Aberdeen to Aston, December 27, 1842.
* F. 0. France 663, Aberdeen to Cowley, February 14, 1843.
345
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Under ordinary circumstances, Louis Philippe
would not have hesitated to dispense with the services
of a consul, who had shown sympathy with a re-
publican insurrection. But it being his secret policy
to create every kind of embarrassment for Espartero
he declined to recall M. de Lesseps. 1 The refusal of the
French government aroused great indignation in Spain
and materially contributed to increase the difficulties
which were threatening to overwhelm the Regent. 3
The popular general, the idol of the nation, was now
an object of execration with all parties. His stern
repression of anarchy had gained for him the hatred of
the extreme democrats, whilst his ignorance of the
principles of representative government had involved
him in innumerable disputes with the Cortes. The only
remedy which he could apply to the situation was to
prorogue the Chambers and assume the powers of a
military dicta tor. But the army was no longer his willing
instrument. The senior officers, with few exceptions,
held Moderado opinions, and, for the past two years,
General Narvaez and other agents of Christina had been
busily engaged in undermining their loyalty. In the
month of June, 1843, Brigadier Prim raised the cry of
" Down with Espartero," to which his troops responded
eagerly. The revolution spread rapidly. Whilst regi-
ment after regiment deserted the cause of the Regent,
Narvaez appeared before Madrid at the head of a
division. After a feeble resistance on the part of
the national militia the capital opened its gates. In
the south meanwhile, on July 29, Espartero, having
been abandoned by his troops, embarked at Cadiz on a
British ship, and sought refuge in England, where he
was feasted by the City of London and acclaimed by
the populace.
For some weeks prior to these events the threatening
1 F. O. France 666, Cowley to Aberdeen, March 6, 13, 31, 1843.
2 F. O. Spain 624, Aston to Aberdeen, March 6, 1843.
346
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
aspect of affairs had been a frequent subject of dis-
cussion between Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and Lord
Cowley. Both the King and his minister had but one
remedy to suggest for the many ills from which Spain
was suffering. Espartero, they declared, would speedily
find that all his difficulties would disappear, were
he to devote his whole attention to effecting the
marriage of Isabella with a Bourbon. If England
desired to see the dangers now threatening the Regent
averted, let her join with France in urging him to
adopt this policy. 1 Aberdeen, however, declined to
entertain this request. The matter, he maintained,
was one in which no Foreign Power had a right to
interfere, whilst, " as to whether the proposed marriage
would be likely to answer the expectations of those
who counselled it, Her Majesty's government did not
feel called upon to express an opinion." 2 But as the
situation in Spain daily increased in gravity, Lord
Cowley became persuaded that a fresh complication
was to be apprehended. Should Espartero be over-
thrown, he warned his chief, it was greatly to be feared
that the victorious party would demand the marriage
of Isabella with a son of Louis Philippe. If such an
alliance were to be proposed, the French nation would
be flattered and might not improbably insist upon the
offer being accepted, " even at the risk of war." 3
The downfall of Espartero and the new danger to
which Cowley had drawn his attention caused Lord
Aberdeen's resolution to waver. He now proposed
that France and England should unite their efforts for
the purpose of restoring order in Spain. Under the
circumstances this was practically an intimation that
1 F. O. France 667, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 29 (secret and
confidential), June 2, 1843 (confidential).
2 F. O. Spain 622, Aberdeen to Aston, June 7, 1843 (confidential).
3 F. O. France 668, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 3, 1843 (secret and
confidential).
347
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
he was prepared to reconsider his often-repeated decla-
ration that the marriage of Isabella was an exclusively
Spanish affair. It was certainly interpreted in this
sense by Louis Philippe and M. Guizot, who accepted
the offer with the utmost alacrity. It was their policy
to affect the greatest confidence that, in their hour of
triumph, Christina and her friends would defer to the
advice of France in all matters. But in their hearts
they had doubtless grave misgivings upon the subject,
and they were, consequently, only too delighted to
obtain the support of England to their schemes.
Marshal Sebastiani was at once despatched to London
to confer upon the situation. 1 He was to assure Lord
Aberdeen that Louis Philippe would never allow one of
his sons to marry the Queen of Spain. Personally the
King would prefer that she should marry a son of Don
Carlos, but he would not oppose her union with any
member of either the Spanish or Neapolitan branch of
the House of Bourbon. Scarcely, however, had the
marshal arrived in England than it was announced that
Queen Victoria purposed to pay the king of the French
a visit at the Chateau d'Eu, near le Treport. Her
Majesty was to be accompanied by her Foreign Secre-
tary, who would thus be enabled personally to discuss
matters with M. Guizot.
The Queen duly arrived at Eu, on September 2,
and prolonged her stay until the 7th, as the guest of
the King. In every respect the visit proved an
immense success. 3 Her Majesty's affectionate regard
for Louis Philippe was destined, before long, to
diminish greatly, but she appears always to have
looked back with pleasure upon the days spent in
company with his family at Eu. 3 Although social
1 F. O. France 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 14, 1843 (secret and
confidential).
2 Ibid., 670, Cowley to Aberdeen, September 11, 1843 (confi-
dential). C. Greville, Journal* (2), II. p. 200.
3 Letters of Queen Victoria, Vols. I. and II.
348
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
amenities were the feature of the visit, Lord Aberdeen
and M. Guizot were enabled to discuss grave matters
of State. Both appear to have been equally satisfied
with the result of their informal conferences, 1 and their
agreement upon Spanish affairs was afterwards con-
firmed by Aberdeen in an official despatch. " All that
can at present be done," he wrote, " is that both govern-
ments should act cordially and unreservedly together,
taking for the principle of their conduct the real good
of Spain, without reference to the supposed separate
interests of either. . . . Her Majesty's government are
still of opinion that to the Queen and the nation
should be left the selection of the Royal Consort. But
they will not be found unwilling to offer such friendly
counsel to the Spanish government as may aid them in
coming to a sound decision. With this view, although
Her Majesty's government cannot admit that the
preferable claims of any prince or family are such as
to control the free choice of the Spanish government,
they would be fully disposed to concur in the pro-
position of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and to recom-
mend that the selection of the Queen's Consort should
be made from the descendants of Philip V. . . ." 2
Shortly after the conclusion of the Queen's visit to
Eu, M. de Jarnac, 3 the French charge d'affaires in
London, was the guest of Lord Aberdeen at Haddo.
On one occasion his host placed in his hands a letter
in which he referred to the " cordial understanding,"
which he now believed had been established between
France and England. 4 This designation struck M.
Guizot as singularly happy, and both he and Louis
1 Guizot, Memoires, VI. pp. 188-195.
2 F. O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, December 15, 1843.
Correspondence relating to the marriage of the Queen and Infanta of
Spain presented to Parliament, 1847.
3 Philippe de Eohan-Chabot, Comte de Jarnac, First Secretary of the
French embassy in London.
4 Jarnac, Lord Aberdeen, Revue des deux Mondes, 15 juillett, 1860.
349
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Philippe henceforward constantly employed it to
describe the complete accord existing between the
French and British governments.
An occasion quickly arose which enabled England
to show that " the cordial understanding " was, so far
as she was concerned, no diplomatic fiction. The Due
de Bordeaux, more commonly known by the title of
Comte de Chambord which he shortly afterwards
assumed, arrived in London, towards the end of
November. The prince was the posthumous son of
the Due de Berri and the sole surviving male represen-
tative of the elder branch of the Bourbons. No sooner
was he installed in the house, which had been taken
for him in Belgrave Square, than hundreds of French
legitimists flocked to London. They were for the
most part members of the old noble families, but
among the pilgrims was M. Berryer, the distinguished
advocate and parliamentary orator. Even old Chateau-
briand, who since the Revolution of July had taken no
part in politics, journeyed to London to testify his
devotion to the prince, whom he and his party acclaimed
as Henri V. King of France and Navan'e. 1 These
proceedings aroused considerable excitement in France
and caused Louis Philippe and his ministers some
uneasiness. The French ambassador had already been
instructed to urge that Queen Victoria should refuse to
receive the young prince, on the ground that it was
the evident intention of his adherents to give to his
visit the character of a political demonstration against
the House of Orleans. The Queen a had promptly
signified her readiness to comply with this demand.
It was not possible, however, to accede to a further
request, made after the arrival of the Due de Bordeaux
in London, that the proceedings in Belgrave Square
1 Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Queen Victoria, December 1,
1848.
2 Ibid., Prince Albert to Peel, October 21, 1843.
350
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
should be forcibly put a stop to, seeing that they in
no way infringed the law of England. An intimation
was, nevertheless, conveyed to His Royal Highness
that Her Majesty greatly disliked these demonstrations
and would, in consequence, be pleased to hear that he
had decided to curtail his stay in London. This
message produced the required effect. The Due de
Bordeaux, a few days later, departed from Belgrave
Square, and, during the remainder of the time which
he spent in England, his conduct was irreproachable. 1
The promptitude with which the Queen and her
government had responded to his wishes was very
gratifying to Louis Philippe. In their Speeches from
the Throne, both Sovereigns, at the opening of their
respective Parliaments, alluded to " the cordial under-
standing" which had been established between their
governments. Nevertheless, before the close of the
session of 1844, the two countries were once more
upon the brink of war. In the year 1839, a company
had been formed at Nantes for the purpose of founding
a French colony in New Zealand. The undertaking-
was supported by the government, which proposed
annexing both islands. But, before the arrival of the
French expedition, Captain Hobson proclaimed the
sovereignty of Her Britannic Majesty over New
Zealand, and its acquisition was duly notified in the
London Gazette of October 2, 1840. The French
government bowed before the accomplished fact, but
prepared to seek another outlet in the Pacific. The
following year, accordingly, a squadron, under the
command of Admiral Dupetit-Thouars, was dispatched
to take possession of the Marquesas Islands, where
it was proposed to establish a penal colony. Not
content, however, with carrying out his instructions
1 Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
December 12, 1843. Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 63-66. C. Greville,
Journals (2), pp. 211-214.
351
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
the admiral, upon his own responsibility, proceeded
to declare a French protectorate over Tahiti, the most
important of the islands of the Society group. More
than fifty years before, Tahiti had been visited by the
first English missionaries. Owing to their unremit-
ting efforts, the islanders had gradually been converted
to the Protestant religion and had acquired civilized
habits. On two occasions the Sovereign, Queen Pomare,
had offered to place herself under the protection of the
British flag, but both Canning and Palmerston had
declined to accede to her proposal. In August, 1842,
Admiral Dupetit-Thouars anchored off the island. He
came to exact reparation for the alleged ill-treatment
of two French priests. He demanded a large indemnity
and threatened a bombardment, unless payment were
made within twenty-four hours. It was altogether
out of the power of Queen Pomare to comply with
these conditions. Resistance was, however, out of the
question. By the advice of the French consul, M.
Meerenhout, she begged to be allowed to place herself
under the protection of France. It was M. Meerenhout
who was supposed to have counselled the French
admiral to make his descent upon the island. 1
The admiral's report of his proceedings at Tahiti
afforded little satisfaction either to the King or to M.
Guizot. a But to have disavowed him would have ex-
posed them to the charge of truckling to England an
accusation which would probably have proved fatal to
the existence of the government. The establishment
of a French protectorate over the islands was, accord-
ingly, published in the Moniteur of March 20, 1843.
The announcement was much resented in England. It
was not possible, however, for England to object to
France assuming a responsibility which she herself
had twice declined to undertake. Lord Aberdeen's
1 F. O. Pacific Islands 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.
8 Guizot, Memoires, VII. p. 56.
352
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
communications with M. Guizot on the subject were,
consequently, confined to the expression of a hope that
the British missionaries would not be interfered with,
and that the sovereign rights of Queen Pomare would
be respected. With both these requests the French
government readily promised to comply. 1 But, in the
meantime, affairs at Tahiti had not been progressing
smoothly.
When the Queen was induced to invoke the pro-
tection of France, Mr. Pritchard, the British consul,
was absent from the island on a visit to Australia.
Pritchard had, for a long time past, been engaged in
missionary work and in trading in the South Seas.
According to his own statement, however, upon his
appointment to the post of consul at Tahiti, he had
severed his connection with the Methodist missionary
society of which he had been a member. 2 Meerenhout,
the French consul, on the other hand, was an ardent
Roman Catholic, but, like his British colleague, he too
combined the businsss of trading with his official
duties. 3 Racial prejudice, sectarian zeal and trade
rivalry account sufficiently for the bitter enmity which
existed between the two men. The news of Admiral
Dupetit-Thouars' proceedings reached Pritchard at
Sidney, and his own correspondence shows that he
started upon his return journey with the intention of
doing everything in his power to induce the British
government "to interfere" and with the expectation
of finding " many difficulties to encounter." 4 His first
act upon his arrival at Tahiti was to instigate Queen
Pomare, over whom he appears to have had great
1 F. 0. France 666 and 669, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 7, August 30,
1843. F. 0. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 25, October 3,
1843.
* F. O. Pacific Islands 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, August 17, 1844.
3 Ibid., 26, Miller to Bidwell, September 17, 1844.
4 Ibid., 20, extract from a letter from Consul Pritchard, dated
Sidney, January 3, 1843.
353 2 A
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
influence, to write to Her Britannic Majesty. In this
curious document Queen Pomare, after inviting her
"sister friend" to commiserate with her in the difficulties
in which she was involved with the French, begged
her " to send a large ship of war " to her assistance.
The circumstances under which the demand for French
protection had been extorted from her were narrated,
much space being devoted to the part played in the
transaction by M. Meerenhout, "a very bad and
troublesome man." l
It was evident to Lord Aberdeen that the attitude
adopted by Mr. Pritchard might at any moment
produce some disagreeable incident, the danger of a
chance collision being enhanced by the ill-feeling which
prevailed between the French and British naval
officers. He decided, therefore, to appoint Major-
General Miller, upon whose prudence and judgment he
could depend, consul-general of the Pacific Islands,
and to place under his orders all the British consuls
in the South Seas. At the same time, he sent off
instructions to Mr. Pritchard enjoining him to recom-
mend a prudent line of conduct to Queen Pomare and
carefully " to avoid any expression calculated to en-
courage her or her chiefs to expect assistance from
England." Her Majesty's government, whilst strongly
disapproving the action of the French authorities at
Tahiti and deploring the humiliations inflicted upon
the Queen, " was precluded from interfering authorita-
tively on her behalf." But, before this despatch
could reach its destination, Admiral Dupetit-Thouars
reappeared at Tahiti. On this occasion he had re-
turned to complain of some incident connected with
the hoisting of a flag. After a few days spent in
investigating the matter, he pronounced the islanders
1 F. O. France 664, Aberdeen to Cowley, October 8, 1843 (enclosures).
2 F. O. Pacific Islands 20, Aberdeen to Pritchard. September 25,
1840. } ^
" \V 354
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
to be animated by a thoroughly bad spirit. On
November 6, 1843, Queen Pomare was declared
deposed, and Tahiti a French possession. Having
issued this proclamation the admiral proceeded to land
troops and to occupy the island. In his despatch to
his government, explaining the reasons which had
induced him to take this step, he imputed the chief
blame for the unrest of the natives to Mr. Pritchard. 1
The news of these events reached Europe in the
month of February, 1844, and evoked a great outburst
of indignation in England. Louis Philippe and M.
Guizot were again placed in a most embarrassing situa-
tion. Should they refuse to uphold the action of the
admiral, their conduct would be assailed on all sides as
a cowardly betrayal of French interests at the bidding
of England. On the other hand, the ratification of
his act, if it should not entail war, must certainly put
an end to " the cordial understanding," the maintenance
of which, for the present, was essential to the success-
ful execution of their Spanish policy. Of these two
alternatives, the second unquestionably presented the
greatest disadvantages. At a Cabinet Council, on
February 25, it was decided to adhere to the protec-
torate, but to disavow the last proceedings of Admiral
Thouars and to reinstate Queen Pomare in the sove-
reignty of which she had been deprived. 2 A few
weeks later, on April 10, Lord Aberdeen informed
Mr. Pritchard that he would be transferred to the
Navigator Islands. In deciding to remove him from
Tahiti, the government in no way desired to express
disapprobation of his past conduct, but, for the sake
both of his own comfort and of the maintenance of
good relations with France, it was felt to be advisable
to replace him by some person who had not been
1 F. 0. France 695, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 14, 1844. Guizot,
Memoires, VIII. pp. 64-69.
2 F. 0. France 693, Cowley to Aberdeen, February 19, 25, 1844.
355
connected with the transactions of the past two years. 1
This measure of precaution was, however, of no avail.
A month before the despatch of these instructions Mr.
Pritchard had departed from Tahiti, but under very
different circumstances from those contemplated by
Lord Aberdeen. The disavowal of Admiral Thouars
was made the subject of a fierce attack in the Chamber
upon the Soult-Guizot Cabinet. In the course of the
debates, certain deputies displayed great hostility to
England and indulged in much intemperate language.
This ebullition of temper was not treated very seriously
in England. But it was a different matter when the
Prince de Joinville, who was a strong supporter of
Admiral Thouars, saw fit to publish a pamphlet, in
which the question of a war with Great Britain was
discussed in all its bearings. Only the year before
His Royal Highness had been the guest of Queen
Victoria at Windsor, and the appearance of his work,
entitled Note sur Vetat des forces navales de la France,
created a most disagreeable impression at Court, upon
the government and upon all classes of the people.
Louis Philippe, who had never authorized the publica-
tion of his son's imprudent pamphlet, was genuinely
distressed and did all in his power to suppress it. 2
Public attention, however, was speedily diverted
from the Prince de Joinville to the Tsar. Suddenly,
on May 31, 1844, the Court was informed that
Nicholas would arrive on a visit to England within
the next twenty-four hours. At Ascot races and at
the various festivities which were hastily arranged in
his honour, his appearance excited universal curiosity.
On every occasion it was plainly his intention to im-
press, not only the Court and high society, but all
1 F. O. Pacific Islands 27, Aberdeen to Pritchard, April 10, 1844.
f F. O. France 696, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 20, 31, 1844 (secret
and confidential). Letters of Queen Victoria^ Queen Victoria to King
of the Belgians, May 24, October 17, 1844.
35G
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
classes of the people with the sincerity of his desire to
establish the most friendly relations between his empire
and Great Britain. 1 To Peel, Aberdeen and Wellington,
with whom he had some confidential conversations, he
was at pains to contrast his respect and affection for
England with the dislike and the contempt with which
he regarded Louis Philippe, M. Guizot, and the French
nation generally. Sir Robert Peel, however, appears
to have told him plainly that he and his col-
leagues were most desirous that, at the death of Louis
Philippe, his crown should pass to his next heir in the
Orleans line without disturbance or opposition. But
having given emphatic expression to his hatred of the
July Monarchy, Nicholas put forward a distinct pro-
posal. Turkey was sick, very sick, upon the point of
death. It would be a critical moment when the
Ottoman empire should break up completely. Never-
theless, he apprehended danger only from the ambitious
and aggressive spirit of the French. Let, therefore,
England, Austria and Russia agree to act in concert,
without reference to France, and all would be well. 2
The British ministers would not appear altogether to
have rejected this proposition. But it is difficult to
believe the story 3 that distinct pledges on the subject
were given, and that Nicholas, in consequence, was
tempted to embark upon those measures which were to
result in the Crimean war. It is unnecessary, however,
to discuss here whether the conferences of 1844 were
in any degree responsible for the war ten years later.
The Tsar's visit had no immediate effect upon the
European situation in general, or upon Franco-British
relations in particular. Nothing that he had said or
done during his nine days' stay in England had in any
1 Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
June 4, 11, 1844. C. Greville, Journals (2), II. pp. 243-246.
2 Stockmar, Memoirs, II. pp. 106-110. T. Martin, Life of Prince
Consort, I. pp. 215-219.
3 Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, I. p. 402.
357
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
way impaired " the cordial understanding." He had
probably a shrewd idea, however, that complications in
more than one direction would, before long, greatly
endanger its existence. An instinctive perception of
coming trouble may have been the secret of his sudden
determination to visit England.
On June 6, three days before the departure of the
Tsar, Aberdeen was informed officially that French
troops might not improbably be ordered to enter the
territory of the Emperor of Morocco. 1 The famous
Arab chieftain, Abd-el-Kader, with whom the French
had been at war for a long time past, had recently
sought refuge within the frontiers of the Moorish
empire. On former occasions, when hard pressed, he
had eluded capture in this manner. Representations
had frequently been made at Fez, on the subject of the
facilities which were alleged to have been afforded him
for renewing the struggle. These complaints, however,
had hitherto produced little or no effect, and Marshal
Bugeaud, the governor of Algiers, consequently urged
the adoption of stronger measures. Neither Louis
Philippe nor his ministers desired to begin hostilities,
but, on May 30, 1844, a French force, under General
de Lamoriciere, was attacked by a body of Moroccan
cavalry upon the Algerian side of the frontier. The
situation at once assumed a very grave character.
The French consul at Tangier was instructed to pro-
ceed to Fez to demand the punishment of the Moorish
commander, the expulsion of Abd-el-Kader, and the
withdrawal of the troops assembled close to the French
frontier. At the same time, a squadron under the
Prince de Joinville was despatched to Moroccan waters 3
and preparations were made for reinforcing Marshal
Bugeaud.
1 F. O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 3, 1844. Affaires
etrangeres, 663 Angleterre, Guizot & Sainte-Aulaire, 6 juin, 1844.
2 Affaires etrangers, 668 Angleterre, Guizot & Sainte-Aulaire, 13 juin,
1844. F. O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 14, 1844.
358
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
The news that hostilities were impending caused
great dissatisfaction in England. Ministers were
questioned upon the subject in both Houses and the
press commeuted upon the affair with much acrimony.
Under pretext of obtaining redress for some more or
less imaginary grievance, Morocco, it was predicted,
would be invaded and, without doubt, permanently
occupied. The fate which had befallen the Dey of
Algiers was assuredly reserved for the Emperor of
Morocco. This general feeling of uneasiness and sus-
picion was increased by the selection of the Prince de
Joinville, the author of the recent pamphlet, for the
command of the squadron sent to cruise off Tangier. 1
The two governments, nevertheless, maintained their
friendly communications. M. Guizot gave the most
positive assurances that every effort would be made to
settle the affair peacefully, and undertook that, should
hostilities break out, Tangier 2 would not be bom-
barded nor would any portion of Morocco be appro-
priated. Aberdeen was not prepared to deny that
the French government had grave cause for complaint.
Although it had been considered necessary for the
protection of British interests that a squadron should
be sent to the Moroccan coast, the British fleet in
those waters, he promised the French ambassador,
would be numerically inferior to that of the Prince de
Joinville. 3 Had he regarded it as in the smallest
degree probable that his proposal would be accepted,
he would, doubtless, have suggested that England
should act as mediator in the quarrel. But, in spite
of the fact that " the cordial understanding " had
been loudly proclaimed, the idea of allowing England
1 Guizot, Mcmoires, VII. pp. 52-59.
2 England asked that Tangier should be respected on the ground
that all the European consuls resided there.
3 F. O. France 697, Cowley to Aberdeen, June 10, July 12, 15, 1844.
Affaires etrangeres, 663 Angleterre, Guizot & Sainte Aulaire, 13 juin,
1844 ; Jarnac ;\ Guizot, 6 juillet, 1844.
359
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to interfere would have been so unpopular in France
that no government could have ventured to entertain
it. Under these circumstances Aberdeen could only
direct Mr. Drummond Hay, the British consul at Tan-
gier, to proceed to Fez and to endeavour to prevail
upon the Emperor to acquiesce in the French demands.
Notwithstanding that the Moors had a second time
attacked the column of General de Lamoriciere, strong
hopes were entertained, at the end of July, that actual
war might still be averted.
On July 30, 1844, The Times announced the start-
ling news that Mr. Pritchard, the British consul at
Tahiti, had arrived in England, after having been
arrested, cast into a dungeon and finally expelled from
the island by the French military authorities. In
answer to a question put to him, the following night,
by Sir Charles Napier in the House of Commons, Sir
Robert Peel declared that, if the reports which the
government had received were true, " a gross outrage "
had undoubtedly been perpetrated. But, when the
next day M. de Jarnac spoke to Lord Aberdeen on
the subject, he was authorized to inform M. Guizot
that the Prime Minister could not admit that his
words had been correctly reported in the morning
papers. 1 The first accounts of Mr. Pritchard's case
would seem to have been somewhat inaccurate. When
all the circumstances were brought to light, it was evi-
dent that the British government had just cause to
complain of the treatment which he had experienced,
but it was, at the same time, no less clear that his
own conduct had been most injudicious. Immediately
upon the proclamation of French sovereignty over
Tahiti, Mr. Pritchard struck his flag and sent a protest
to Admiral Thouars. From this moment he assumed so
anomalous a position that it is not surprising that the
French governor, Admiral Bruat, should have refused
1 Affaires ^trangeres, 664 Ansjleterre, Jarnac i Guizot, 1 aout, 1844.
^360
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
to recognize it. According to Pritchard's own statement,
he " continued to perform his functions as consul, except
in corresponding with the French authorities, and con-
tinued to act as the accredited agent of Great Britain
to Queen Pomare." Furthermore, he appears to have
invited the deposed Queen to take up her abode in his
house, where she stayed until, "considering it not safe
to remain on shore," she decided to go on board H.M.S.
Dublin, which was lying in the harbour of Papeite. 1
The natives meanwhile were growing restless and
evincing a determination to resist the imposition of
foreign rule. Their hostility, in the opinion of the
French officers, was to be ascribed mainly to the per-
nicious example set them by Mr. Pritchard. No event
of importance, however, occurred until March 2, 1844,
on which date, during the absence of the governor from
Papeite, a French sentry was alleged to have been
assaulted by a native. M. d'Aubigny, the senior officer
on the spot, thereupon proclaimed martial law through-
out the island and decreed the arrest of Mr. Pritchard,
who was forthwith imprisoned in an underground cham-
ber beneath the guard room of a block house. After he
had been in captivity for four days and had endured
much discomfort, Admiral Bruat returned to Papeite.
The governor, perceiving at once that his subordinate
had acted with undue precipitation, ordered the release
of Mr. Pritchard and his removal to a British vessel,
Tlie Cormorant, which, on March 13, quitted the island
and carried him to Valparaiso. 2
"Never since I have been in this country," wrote
M. de Jarnac, " have I seen anything to equal the
excitement which the news from Tahiti has aroused.
The religious party took up the case at once. Meet-
ings of the ' Saints ' have been convened, violent
1 F. 0. Pacific Islands! 20 and 27, Pritchard to Aberdeen, Novem-
ber 10, 23, 1843, January 26, 1844.
2 Guizot, Memoires, VII. pp. 74-82.
361
ENGLAND AND TH ORLEANS MONARCHY
speeches have been delivered all over the country, and
pictures representing certain of the events connected
with the affair have been exhibited. The papers are
very violent. Lord Aberdeen appears to be growing
more apprehensive daily. He is convinced that some
form of satisfaction must be given. He wishes, how-
ever, to leave the initiative of proposing it to Your
Excellency : but I happen to know that the plan of
sending Mr. Pritchard straight back to Tahiti has
been under discussion by the Cabinet." 1 In
France the excitement was scarcely less intense.
The newspapers, with one accord, called loudly
upon the government to stand by its officers,
and to deny Great Britain any kind of reparation,
even at the risk of war. The production of Charles
IV. at the Opera House evoked a furious manifes-
tation of hostility to England. Fortunately, how-
ever, the session was brought to a close on August 5,
and, in the meantime, M. Guizot resolutely refused
to make any statement about the affair in the
Chambers. 2
But although the prorogation afforded him some
relief, M. Guizot was, nevertheless, in a position of
extreme difficulty. His friends unceasingly warned
him that he must resist the demands of England, or
be prepared to succumb to the outburst of popular
indignation which any concessions would provoke. 3
Under these circumstances he decided that complete
inaction was, for the present, the safest course to adopt.
"The greater the excitement," he instructed Jarnac,
" the more necessary it becomes to allow it time to
cool down. For the moment we must abstain from all
discussion of the subject." Nevertheless, when inter-
1 Affaires e"trangeres, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac a Guizot, 4 aout, 1844.
* F. O. France 699, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 2, 5, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
3 Ibid., August 9, 1844 (secret and confidential).
362
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
viewing Aberdeen, he would do well to bring forward
those arguments which he himself was employing in
his conversations with Lord Cowley. Stress should
be laid upon the fact that Pritchard had ceased to
act as consul. As a private individual whose presence
was regarded as prejudicial to good order, the colonial
authorities had a universally acknowledged right to
expel him. At the same time, however, it could not
be denied that " some of the proceedings which had
attended his removal had been irregular. . . ." l
Hitherto Lord Aberdeen had studiously refrained
from formulating any precise demand. But, on
August 13, after a meeting of the Cabinet, he directed
Cowley to give M. Guizot clearly to understand that,
unless satisfaction in some shape were voluntarily
offered, he must transmit " a formal and detailed
statement of the grounds upon which Her Majesty's
government founded its expectations of redress." 2 Hi
England anger at the continued silence of the French
government was rising to a dangerous pitch. On
August 14, at a meeting at Exeter Hall, at which Mr.
Pritchard himself was present, men, who in most
international disputes would have advocated peace at
any price, gave utterance to the most warlike senti-
ments. Two days later came the news that the
answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the French i I
ultimatum having been considered unsatisfactory,
Tangier had been bombarded. " War," wrote M. de
Jarnac, "is now generally regarded as inevitable." 3
Lord Cowley was instructed to represent that "the
attack upon Tangier, after the repeated assurance of
M. Guizot that it would be respected under all circum-
stances, had greatly surprised the British government
1 Affaires etrangeres, 664 Angleterre, Guizot a Jarnac, 8 aout, 1844.
2 P. 0. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 13, 1844.
s Affaires etrangeres, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac a Guizot, 22 aout,
1844.
363
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
. . . any occupation of the coast of Morocco could not
fail to be viewed in a very serious light by Great
Britain, and must lead to evils of great magnitude. 1 '
M. Guizot, however, adhered resolutely to his plan
" of allowing time for the excitement to cool down "
in England, and he still forbore to offer any satisfac-
tion for the treatment to which Mr. Pritchard had
been subjected. Both he and the King appear to
have strangely underestimated the intensity of the
resentment to which the Tahiti affair had given rise.
" The two governments," he informed Jarnac, " were
not yet agreed in their appreciation of the facts
imputed to Mr. Pritchard," and it was, consequently,
impossible for the present to discuss the nature of the
reparation which might be due to him. Again, a few
days later, he directed him to inform Lord Aberdeen
that his despatch of the 13th would have to be
deliberated upon by the Council, "many of the
members of which were absent from Paris." 2 Mean-
while, the press of both countries was busily engaged
in embittering the quarrel. Some highly offensive
attacks upon the private life of Mr. Pritchard appeared
in the French papers, whilst The Times published
letters, purporting to have been written by naval
officers who had witnessed the bombardment of
Tangier, in which the most insulting doubts were
cast upon the seamanship of the Prince de Joinville
and upon the fighting qualities of the French sailors. 3
M. Guizot, however, continued to display a lofty
indifference to the popular excitement on both sides 1
of the Channel. He was content to enjoin M. de
Jarnac to impress upon Lord Aberdeen that it " would
be a disgrace, were the peace of the world to be
1 F. 0. France 691, Aberdeen to Cowley, August 23, 1844.
2 Affaires etrangeres, 664 Angleterre, Guizot a Jarnac, 15, 18 aout,
1844.
3 The Time*, August 21, 1844.
364
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
disturbed on account of Pritchard, Pomare and
d'Aubigny." 1
But the young diplomatist in charge of the French
embassy in London was, fortunately, alive to the
dangers of the situation. Ever since the first arrival
of the news from Tahiti, M. de Jarnac had sought to
convince his government that the affair was highly
serious. Nor was it only to M. Guizot that he
addressed his warnings. Having been charged to
deliver a letter from the King to Prince Albert, he
took the opportunity, thus afforded him, of com-
municating his fears to Louis Philippe himself. He
begged him to believe that at a recent Cabinet Council
Lord Aberdeen had been the only minister to oppose a
large increase of the navy. "Were it not for the
confidence reposed in the wisdom of Your Majesty,
the situation would resemble in many unfortunate
particulars that of 1840." 2 He daily adjured M.
Guizot to reflect most seriously upon the danger of
deferring any longer his reply to the British govern-
ment. ." People in England are discussing alliances
and talk of nothing but war. M. de Nesselrode is stay-
ing at Brighton. He affects to be unconcerned with
politics. But it is said that he remains here in order
that he may be upon the spot, should a serious dis-
agreement arise between France and England. If that
be his object, fortune may have favoured his designs
'in a remarkable manner." 3
The British Parliament was to be prorogued on
September 5, and, unless an announcement could be
made in the Queen's Speech that a settlement had
been arrived at, war, it was generally felt, could
scarcely be avoided. Even M. Guizot began to realize
1 Guizot, Memoires, VII. p. 97.
2 Aflaires etrangeres, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac a Louis Philippe,
14 aout, 1844.
3 Ibid., 664 Angleterre, Guizot a Jarnac, 28 aout, 1844.
365
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
that, if the peace was to be preserved, he must propose
some form of reparation. On several occasions Jarnac
had hinted that the British government might very
possibly be satisfied, were a pecuniary indemnity to be
offered to Mr. Pritchard. 1 Unquestionably, the pay-
ment of a sum of money would be regarded in France
as less objectionable than most other forms of repara-
tion. But, having proposed to the King and the
Cabinet that the affair should be settled on those lines,
and having obtained their assent, M. Guizot still
deferred transmitting an offer of pecuniary compensa-
tion to London. In a despatch, dated August 29, a
copy of which was to be given to Lord Aberdeen, he
stoutly maintained the right of the authorities at
Tahiti to expel Mr. Pritchard from the island. His
imprisonment, however, and certain other acts of
which M. d'Aubigny had been guilty, could not be
defended, and that officer would, in consequence,
receive in due course a notification of the censure
which the government had passed upon his conduct.
He could concede no more, he told Lord Cowley, and
he fully intended to retire from office, if further redress
were to be demanded. 2 Nevertheless, he appears
privately to have informed M. de Jarnac that he was
transmitting a second despatch, containing an offer of
a money payment to Mr. Pritchard, which he was to
communicate to Lord Aberdeen, should the British
government regard the reprimand, administered to
M. d'Aubigny, as an inadequate reparation. This, as he
doubtless expected, was the view taken of his first
despatch by the Cabinet in London. Jarnac, in con-
sequence, lost no time in assuring Lord Aberdeen that
an offer of a pecuniary indemnity would be made.
1 Affaires etrangeres, 664 Angleterre, Jarnac a Guizot, 10, 27 aout,
1844.
2 F. O. France 691, Cowley to Aberdeen, August 28, 30, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
366
THE COKDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Had he not taken this responsibility upon himself, he
was convinced that the customary announcement that
"friendly relations existed with other countries"
would have been omitted from the Queen's Speech, and
" the whole of Europe would have been thrown into
a state of perturbation." On the following day,
September 4, he placed in the hands of Lord Aberdeen
the official offer of the French government to in-
demnify Mr. Pritchard by the payment of a sum of
money, the amount of which was to be determined by
the admirals commanding the French and British fleets
in the Pacific. Aberdeen pronounced the proposed
satisfaction "rather slender," but assured him that he
might now consider the matter as settled. 1 Twenty-
four hours later Parliament was prorogued, and the
happy termination of the Pritchard affair was an-
nounced in the Speech from the Throne. "The
danger," wrote Queen Victoria to the King of the
Belgians, had been "imminent." 2
The settlement of the Tahiti dispute was quickly
followed by the welcome news that France had con-
cluded peace with the Emperor of Morocco. Marshal
Bugeaud, on August 14, had won a decisive victory
over the Moors on the river Isly, whilst at sea the
Prince de Joinville, after silencing the forts of Tangier,
had, on August 15, destroyed the defences of Mogador.
Neither the King nor M. Guizot desired to prosecute
the campaign any further. They had obtained all the
advantages which they could hope to derive from
active hostilities. They had proved that they were
not to be deterred, by the irritation which their action
had called forth in England, from inflicting a severe
punishment upon the Moors. The national thirst for
1 Affaires trangeres, 664 Angleterre, Guizot a Jarnac, 29 laout,
2 septernbre, 1844; Jarnac a Guizot, 4 septernbre, 1844. Guizot,
Memoires, VII. pp. 98-104.
2 Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen Victoria to King of the Belgians,
September 15, 1844.
367
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
military glory had been sufficiently appeased by the
successes which had already been achieved. Under
these circumstances, they were not disposed to be
exacting in their conditions. Provided the Emperor
would submit to the terms set forth in their original
ultimatum, they would not insist upon an indemnity,
but would recall their troops and forthwith suspend
hostilities. The Court of Fez promptly acceded to
these moderate demands, and, on September 10, 1844,
a treaty of peace was signed at Tangier.
The cessation of hostilities between France and
Morocco removed much of the resentment which recent
events in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific had
aroused in England. Notwithstanding that, at the end
of August, 1844, the two countries had been upon the
brink of war, Louis Philippe, early in October, was
enabled to return the visit which Queen Victoria, the
year before, had paid him at the Chateau d'Eu. Dur-
ing his stay in England the King was installed with
much magnificence as a Knight of the Garter at
Windsor, and, on every occasion on which he was seen
in public, was accorded a hearty welcome by the
people. Isabella's marriage still occupied the foremost
place in his thoughts. That question, however, had
made but little progress, in spite of the overthrow of
Espartero and of the triumph of Christina and the
Moderados.
After the flight of the Regent Spain had passed
under the rule of Ramon Maria Narvaez, the Captain-
General of Castile, an able and unscrupulous adven-
turer. The Liberals, who had joined with the Moderados
in encompassing the downfall of Espartero, were quickly
forced to realize the magnitude of their folly. Parlia-
mentary government was practically abolished, and
any attempts to resist the authority of the dictator
were mercilessly repressed. Over two hundred execu-
tions for political offences, during the space of one
368
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
year, broke the spirit of the democratic party, and
gave the country an outward appearance of tranquillity.
The difficulty of selecting a Regent in the place of
Espartero had, in the meantime, been overcome by
the unconstitutional declaration of the Cortes, on
November 8, 1843, that the Queen was of full age,
although she had only entered upon her fourteenth
year. The question having thus been settled, Christina,
in the spring of 1844, left Paris and returned to
Madrid, accompanied by her husband, Nunoz, hence-
forward to be known as the Duke of Rianzarez.
In 1844 the eldest son of Don Carlos, the two sons
of Don Francisco de Paula, and Count Trapani, the
brother of the King of Naples, and of Christina herself,
were, for all practical purposes, the only unmarried
male descendants of Philip V. If, therefore, the prin-
ciple proclaimed by Louis Philippe were to be adhered
to, Isabella's choice of a husband must be restricted to
these four princes. To each one, however, there were
serious objections. Although a suitable candidate in
other respects, the son of Don Carlos was ineligible on
political grounds. 1 The idea of her daughter's mar-
riage with either of the sons of Don Francisco de
Paula was most distasteful to Christina. Notwith-
standing that their mother, the Infanta Carlotta, was
her sister, she had for a long time past looked upon
her as her worst enemy. Nor had the death of this
princess, early in 1844, 2 greatly diminished the ani-
mosity with which she regarded this branch of the
family. But in addition to the feud which had existed
for so many years between Christina and their mother,
both young men for different reasons were objection-
able in themselves. The appearance of the elder, Don
1 F. O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 15, 1844 (con-
fidential). Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 197-198.
2 Ibid., 724, Cowley to Aberdeen, May 2, 1845 (secret and con-
fidential).
369 2 B
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Francisco de Asis, Duke of Cadiz, was ridiculous and
effeminate, and he, moreover, was generally believed
to be impotent. Christina, however, appears to have
regarded the loudly professed Liberalism of Don
Enrique, Duke of Seville, as a more serious objection
to his marriage with her daughter than the physical
unfitness of his elder brother. The fourth candidate,
Count Trapani, was an unattractive, backward youth
of sixteen, whose life had hitherto been spent within
the walls of a Jesuit College at Rome. The difficulties,
however, in the way of his marriage with Isabella
were mainly political. Metternich greatly disliked
the notion of a closer connection between the absolute
Court of Naples and the constitutional monarchy of
Spain. 1 Furthermore, the Spanish people despised
the Neapolitans, and could not fail to resent the idea
of selecting the Royal Consort from the Neapolitan
branch of the Bourbons. 2
Count Trapani, nevertheless, was chosen by Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot as the most suitable husband
for Isabella. In the summer of 1844, the French
agents, both at Naples and at Madrid, were instructed
to further his candidature by all means in their
power. 3 Christina's feelings on the subject cannot
be precisely determined. There can be little doubt,
however, that she never gave the project her hearty
support. Propably she realized that it was impracti-
cable by reason of the dislike with which it was
certain to be regarded by Spaniards of all classes.
It is significant that one of her first acts, after her
return to Madrid, was to assure Mr. Bulwer that she
had no intention of submitting to the dictation
of Louis Philippe, and that she still hoped to arrange
1 F. O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, November 22 (con-
fidential), December 13, 1844 (secret and confidential).
2 T. Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, I. pp. 849-350.
a Guizot, Memoir es, VIII. p. 199.
370
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
the marriage of Isabella with Leopold, the son of
Prince Ferdinand of Coburg. 1 Henry Bulwer had been,
appointed British minister at Madrid, soon after the
downfall of the Regent. Aberdeen appears to have
been anxious that a man, less wedded than Aston
to Palmerstonian traditions, should carry out the
new policy of cordially co-operating with France
for the general welfare of Spain. The French
government, once Espartero had been expelled, had
hastened to resume normal diplomatic relations with
the Court of Isabella. Accordingly, almost at the
same time as Bulwer was sent to Madrid, the Comte
Bresson, whose proceedings at Brussels in 1831 have
been related, was transferred from Berlin to the
Spanish capital as French ambassador. Far from
acting harmoniously together, however, they appear
to have cordially disliked each other. Bresson is
described by Bulwer, 2 in his Life of P aimer ston, as
a person sprung from the middle classes, and " con-
sequently vulgarly pre-occupied with his position as
ambassador." Bresson, 3 for his part, considered his
English colleague as "pas eleve," and as a man
against whom he must constantly be on his guard,
lest he should take some liberty with him.
At the close of the year of 1844, a further
complication was added to the many difficulties which
surrounded the question of the Queen's marriage.
" I believe," wrote Lord Cowley/ "that Louis Philippe
is thinking of the marriage of Montpensier 6 with the
sister of Isabella." The supposition was perfectly
correct. It is impossible, however, to say with
1 F. 0. Spain 651 and 652, Bulwer to Aberdeen, April 1, May 15,
1844 (private and confidential).
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 213.
3 Guizot, Me'moires, VIII. pp. 160-161.
4 F. O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 16, 1844 (secret
and confidential).
5 Youngest son of Louis Philippe.
371
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
certainty when the King first decided to put forward
his son as a candidate for the hand of the Infanta
Fernanda. According to Guizot, 1 the suggestion
was not made until the autumn of 1844, and it was
then propounded, he alleges, for the purpose of
reconciling Christina and the Spanish people to the
insignificance of the Neapolitan alliance. But it was
always, he asserts, made perfectly clear that the
Montpensier marriage could not take place until the
Queen had married and borne a child. Be that as
it may, it was not considered advisable to inform
Lord Aberdeen of this project. During the next few
months, however, the new matrimonial scheme was
the subject of many rumours, and, in the month of
July, 1845, a visit of the Duke of Rianzarez to Paris
was so generally believed to be connected with this
afiair, that it was felt that some explanation must
be given to the British government. 2 M. Guizot,
accordingly, informed Mr. Bulwer, who happened to be
in Paris on his way to London, that he wished Lord
Aberdeen to know that " King Louis Philippe and
Queen Christina were desirous to settle the marriage
for private and personal reasons into which the
Infanta's fortune entered." It would not take place
for some time, he assured him, and in any case not
until Isabella had had children. 8
On September 8, 1845, Queen Victoria paid a
second visit to Louis Philippe at the Chateau d'Eu.
Her Majesty, Prince Albert, Aberdeen and Peel had
been considerably disturbed by the news brought
by Bulwer from Paris. But on the very day of the
arrival of the Royal party at Eu, both the King
and M. Guizot declared to Lord Aberdeen, "in the
1 Guizot, Memoires, VITI. pp. 211, 223, 224.
2 F. O. France 726, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 25, 1845 (confiden-
tial).
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 215.
372
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
most positive and explicit manner, that until the
Queen was married and had children, they should
consider the Infanta precisely as her sister, and that
any marriage with a French prince would be entirely
out of the question. ... I distinctly understood,"
wrote Aberdeen to Peel a few hours after he had
received these assurances, "that it was not only
a marriage and a child, but children that were
necessary to secure the succession. I thought this
was as much as we could desire at present, and that
the question of a marriage with a French prince might
safely be left to be considered, whenever the con-
tingency contemplated should arrive. Many things
may happen in the course of a few years." l
On the very day that Queen Victoria arrived at
Eu, the Due and the Duchesse de Nemours and the
Duke d'Aumale left Pampeluna, where they had been
the guests of the Spanish Royal family. The real
object of their visit would never appear to have
transpired. 2 Bulwer, for reasons which in due course
he explained to Aberdeen, was not present at Pampe-
luna, and delayed returning to Spain until the French
princes had recrossed the frontier. The interview, he
understood, had been arranged for the purpose of
"pushing on the marriage with Count Trapani, a
marriage most unpopular in the country." He had,
therefore, decided to stay away. By absenting him-
self, his government would not incur " the odium
which must stigmatize all those by whom the
Neapolitan match may be conceived to have been
brought about." On the other hand, should the visit
of the French princes not achieve the desired result,
1 Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Peel, September 8, 1845.
T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 305. Guizot, Meinoires, VIII.
pp. 225-227. F. 0. France 728, Cowley to Aberdeen, October 6, 1845
(secret and confidential).
2 Guizot, in his detailed account of the Spanish marriages, ma^es no
mention of the visit.
373
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
they would be unable to impute its failure " to the
intrigues of the British minister." Upon his return
to Madrid, Bulwer experienced great difficulty in
obtaining any information about the state of affairs.
Bresson assured him that Isabella's health " was
declared to be such as to render her marriage for
the present inopportune." l Christina gave him to
understand that matters were still undecided. " But
her language was not that of entire confidence, and
she seemed divided between the wish to say nothing
and the desire to say enough to prevent any
subsequent charge of want of frankness." Upon the
whole, he was inclined to think that some plan was
contemplated, "which it was not yet judged expedient
to avow." 2 From divers sources he learnt that the
Queen-Mother, Bresson and Carini, the Neapolitan
ambassador, were suspected of an intention " privately
to betroth Isabella to Trapani, and to force his
acceptance upon the Cortes." Narvaez had been
induced to support their unconstitutional designs,
" in the belief that he would be more necessary with
an unpopular, than with a popular prince." :
Meanwhile, M. Bresson at Madrid and M. Guizot
in Paris were greatly dissatisfied with the aspect of
affairs. The King of Naples had always been reluctant
to allow his brother to be put forward as a suitor for
the hand of the Queen of Spain. He distrusted Louis
Philippe exceedingly, he was fearful of offending the
Court of Vienna, he was on bad terms with his sister
Christina, and, in point of fact, had not officially
acknowledged the sovereignty of Isabella. Never-
theless, under the vigorous pressure brought to bear
upon him from Paris, he agreed to renew diplomatic
relations with the Court of Madrid, and to empower
1 F. 0. Spain 678, Bulwer to Aberdeen, October 9, 1845.
2 Ibid., October 30, 1845.
3 Ibid., October 10, 30, 1845 (cipher, confidential).
374
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
his ambassador to discuss his brother's marriage. But,
having surmounted the difficulties at Naples, Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot were confronted by more
serious obstacles at Madrid. As time went on, the
unpopularity of the Neapolitan match tended rather to
increase than to diminish. So universal was the dislike
to this connection that Guizot judged it prudent to
warn Bresson to maintain friendly relations with Don
Francisco de Paula, 1 seeing that it might be necessary
before long to insist upon Isabella's marriage with one
of his sons. As the prospects of the Bourbon can-
didates grew less favourable the Coburg marriage,
greatly to the annoyance of Louis Philippe, began to
be discussed as a necessary alternative. The impend-
ing visit of Prince Leopold to his brother the King of
Portugal gave rise to many rumours. There was an
intrigue on foot, reported Bresson, to promote the
chances of that prince, and Bulwer, he was convinced,
was more or less concerned in it. 2
Under these circumstances M. Guizot decided to
direct M. de Jarnac to confer upon the situation with
Lord Aberdeen. He was to intimate to him that, in
fulfilment of the compact at Eu, he should now bestir
himself actively on behalf of the Bourbon candidates,
and make it perfectly clear to the Coburgs that no
member of their family could be allowed to marry
Isabella. This was more than Aberdeen was prepared
to undertake. He, however, assured M. de Jarnac
upon his honour that the Coburgs should receive no
encouragement either from the Court or from the
government, and promised him that they would be
advised to abandon their supposed intention of visiting
Madrid. 3 Aberdeen was at this time in receipt of
Bulwer's despatch of October 30, 1845, informing him
1 Revue retrospective, pp. 295, 296.
2 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 227-234.
3 Ibid., pp. 228-235.
375
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of his suspicion that Christina and Narvaez were pur-
posing to accomplish the Trapani marriage, in violation
of the article of the constitution which prescribed
that the sovereign must communicate his intention of
contracting a matrimonial alliance to the Cortes.
He at once replied by charging him to express to the
general the sincere hope of the British government that
no such plan was under consideration. " Say to him,"
he wrote in conclusion, " that you are instructed to
offer no opposition to the marriage of the Queen to
Trapani, provided it be openly accomplished according
to legal forms, still less are you authorized to espouse
the cause of any other candidate." *
Mere friendly neutrality, however, could be of
little service to Louis Philippe and M. Guizot. A
further disappointment, moreover, was in store for
them. At the end of January, 1846, General Narvaez,
who, as a supporter of the Neapolitan alliance, had
been growing very unpopular, resigned office after a
violent quarrel with his fellow-ministers. 2 When the
news reached Paris that the one man who might have
effected the Trapani marriage was no longer at the head
of affairs, it was decided to make another, and a more
direct, attempt to force the British government to take
action on behalf of the Bourbon candidate. Jarnac
was, accordingly, supplied with a document, which he
was to read to Lord Aberdeen. This extraordinary
paper, known as the Memorandum of February 27,
1846, set forth the following conclusions : "The Count
Trapani is greatly compromised : 1. By the demonstra-
tion which has been made against him ; 2. By the fall
of General Narvaez. The sons of Don Francisco de
Paula are greatly compromised : 1. By their mistaken
conduct ; 2. By their intimacy with the Radical
1 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Aberdeen to Bulwer, November 17, 1845.
2 F. 0. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, February 28, 1846.
376
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
party ; 3. By the dislike of the Queen-Mother and of
the young Queen herself to them. The sons of Don
Carlos are for the time out of the question. The
actual situation of the descendants of Philip V. is
consequently bad. Efforts are being made to marry
Prince Leopold of Coburg either to the Queen Isabella
or to the Infanta Fernanda. Lisbon is the chief seat
of these machinations. It is said that Prince Leopold,
who is to leave Lisbon on February 24, intends to
visit Madrid. Many circumstances appear to confirm
the truth of this rumour. If the present state of
affairs be prolonged we may find ourselves compelled,
in order that our policy in Spain may not receive a
check which we are determined not to suffer, to declare
ourselves liberated from all engagements with regard
to either marriage. Such a situation would arise, were
the marriage of the Queen or the Infanta with Prince
Leopold of Coburg or with any other prince, not a
descendant of Philip V., to appear probable or immi-
nent. In that case we should take immediate steps to
ward off the blow by demanding the hand of either the
Queen or the Infanta for the Due de Montpensier.
We are sincerely desirous of averting the necessity of
resorting to so extreme a measure. We see only one
way in which the crisis can be avoided. The English
Cabinet must co-operate actively with us in promoting
the claims of one of the descendants of Philip V., no
matter which, and in arranging his marriage with
Queen Isabella, and in preventing, in the meanwhile,
the marriage of the Infanta either with Prince
Leopold or with any other prince, not a descendant of
Philip V." l
Aberdeen appears to have listened in silence and
to have made no protest against the unwarrantable
assumptions contained in this document. No copy of
it was given to him, nor would he seem to have asked
1 Guizot, Metnoires, VIII. pp. 251-255.
377
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
for one. 1 Meanwhile, strange events were taking place
in Spain. The Miraflores Cabinet was quickly over-
thrown and, on March 17, 1846, Narvaez was once
more at the head of the government. His return to
power was quickly followed by the promulgation of
decrees restricting the liberty of the press and sus-
pending the sittings of the Cortes. 3 Bulwer was
convinced that it was decided forthwith to betroth
Isabella to Trapani, regardless of public opinion and of
legal forms. 3 But, if Narvaez ever contemplated a
coup d'etat of this nature, he soon relinquished the
idea. His tenure of office was of very brief duration.
On April 5 he was dismissed and ordered to quit
Madrid immediately. The mystery which surrounds
these sudden changes of government has never been
satisfactorily unravelled. It is certain that they were
connected, more or less directly, with Isabella's
marriage. At first sight it would seem as though
Christina had resolved to discard Narvaez, because she
perceived that he was powerless to effect the Trapani
marriage. Nevertheless, this apparently obvious ex-
planation is probably erroneous. The Queen-Mother
was never really desirous that her daughter should
marry her uncle, Trapani. But she wished to ruin
Narvaez, whose secret aim it was to diminish the
influence of the Court and of the Church. 4 It is
possible, therefore, that she may have insisted upon
his supporting the Neapolitan alliance in order simply
to discredit him. In this crafty fashion she may have
hoped to rid herself of the man who, she had once
declared, " was more arrogant than Espartero." '
1 C. Greville, Journal (2), III. pp. 9 and 54. T. Martin, Life of
Prince Contort, I. pp. 855-856.
2 F. O. Spain 696, Bulwer to Aberdeen, March 19, 1846.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 217.
* F. 0. Spain 698, Bulwer to Aberdeen, July 8, 1846.
5 Guizot, M&noires, VIII. pp. 248-249.
378
On April 8, 1846, the following message 1 was
received in Paris from M. Bresson, who, doubtless, had
some person in his employ in close attendance upon
Isabella. "La reine est nubile depuis deux heures."
Whether or not this news was communicated to Lord
Cowley by M. Guizot, it was certainly known at once
at the British embassy. Christina could no longer
invoke physical reasons for delaying her daughter's
marriage. But, meanwhile, the number of Bourbon
candidates was rapidly diminishing. Trapani was too
unpopular, and Don Enrique, Duke of Seville, the
younger son of Don Francisco de Paula, had recently
been concerned in an insurrection in Gallicia, and had
been ordered to leave Spain. The only available
husband for Isabella among the descendants of Philip
V. was, therefore, Don Enrique's elder brother, Don
Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, whom both she and her
mother disliked and despised. Christina, under these
circumstances, resolved to revert to the matrimonial
combination which she had constantly regarded as the
best. The moment was not unfavourable for openly
defying Louis Philippe. Narvaez, the minister who
had always been looked upon as the chief tool of the
French Court, was in disgrace, and Isturiz, his successor,
was her devoted servant. She accordingly determined
to propose to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg that Isabella
should marry his son, Prince Leopold. After inform-
ing him of its contents, she gave the letter containing
this offer to Mr. Bulwer, asking that it might be con-
veyed to Lisbon by his messenger. The British
minister complied with her request and reported the
affair to his chief.
Lord Aberdeen was seriously annoyed, and at once
1 It would be conveyed from the Spanish frontier by Chaptal's
system of telegraphy.
2 F.O. France 751, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 8, 1846 (private and
confidential).
379
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
informed M. de Sainte-Aulaire of what had passed,
assuring him that he should administer a severe rebuke
to Mr. Bulwer. Bulwer, he considered, had violated
his instructions, both in undertaking to transmit the
offer to Lisbon and in concealing Christina's proceed-
ings from M. Bresson. In consequence of the strictures
passed upon his conduct, Bulwer offered to resign.
Aberdeen, however, in a friendly letter insisted upon
his remaining at his post. 1 A few days later, on June
29, 1846, Sir Robert Peel announced that he and his
colleagues had retired from office, and that Lord John
Russell had undertaken to form a government. On
June 25, on the very day on which their Corn Bill had
been carried through the House of Lords, ministers
had been defeated in the Commons by a Radical and
Protectionist coalition. In the new administration the
seals of the Foreign Office passed into the keeping of
Lord Palmerston.
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 219-226. T. Martin, Life
of Prince Consort, I. pp. 350-352. Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 261-264.
380
CHAPTER X
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES *
AT the close of the year 1845, when Peel had resigned
office on account of the dissensions in his Cabinet on
the question of the Corn Laws, Lord John Russell had
in vain attempted to form a government. His failure
had been due to the objections urged by Lord Grey to
Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office. 2 Peel had,
in consequence, agreed to withdraw his resignation and
to carry on the government. But it was soon clear
that the Protectionists, if they could not prevent the
passage of his Corn Bill, would certainly encompass
his downfall at the first opportunity. Palmerston,
under these circumstances, judged it advisable to take
steps to remove the impression that his nomination as
Foreign Secretary would create alarm in France and
imperil " the cordial understanding." He, accordingly,
decided to visit Paris with the object of dispelling this
1 Practically the whole of the correspondence relating to this affair
has been removed from the archives des affaires etrangeres in Paris.
But in the volume marked " 828 Espagne " the following unsigned and
and undated note is to be found : " In the question of the Spanish
marriages there was a private correspondence between the King and
M. Bresson, and also between the latter and M. Guizot. After the death
of the ambassador the minutes of his letters and the original answers of
the King and of the minister (Guizot) were handed over to M. Guizot by
his widow, and were carried off by him in February, 1848. But it is
certain that Madame Bresson retained improperly a copy of this corre-
spondence which her husband had made, and .which it was her duty to
return to the Foreign Office." (M. Bresson committed suicide at
Naples in November, 1847.)
2 Letters of Queen Victoria, Memorandum by the Prince Albert,
December 20, 1845.
381
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
idea. His intimate knowledge of the French language
and his considerable powers of conversation, combined
with the personal charm 'of Lady Palmerston, soon
achieved the desired result. In the previous month
of December, the prospect that "ce terrible Lord
Palmerston " would be once again at the Foreign Office
had spread dismay in ministerial circles. But, in the
following spring, when he returned to England, after
a few weeks' stay in Paris, the amiable qualities and
the friendly dispositions of " ce clier Lord Palmerston "
were the chief topic of conversation in the political
salons. 1
Louis Philippe and his Foreign Minister had been
most disagreeably surprised by the disclosure of the
proposal made by Christina to the Duke of Saxe-
Coburg. Lord Aberdeen's straightforward conduct in
the affair could not undo the fact that the Queen-
Mother had deliberately, and without the knowledge
of the French ambassador, opened a negotiation for
the marriage of Isabella to a prince, who was not a
descendant of Philip V. In pursuance of this policy
the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in
London, had been instructed to inquire officially in
what light the British government would regard the
selection of a prince, who was not a Bourbon, as the
future husband of the Queen. To this question Lord
Aberdeen had replied that, " should it be found that
no descendant of Philip V. could safely be chosen,
consistently with the happiness of the Queen or with
a due regard to the tranquillity of the country, it could
be no cause of displeasure to Great Britain were a
prince from some other family to be selected." He
could not believe that in such a case " the enlightened
Court of the Tuileries " would interfere. " But, if
contrary to all reason and probability, an attempt
1 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 192-193. C. Greville,
Journals (2), II. p. 388. Guizot, Memoires, VIIL, pp. 279-282.
382
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
were made to control the wishes and feelings of the
Queen and the clearly understood will of her people,
Spain would not only receive the warmest sympathy
of Great Britain but of all Europe." *
M. Guizot appears to have been even more
annoyed than Louis Philippe at Christina's proposal
to the Coburgs. He is said, indeed, to have attempted
to persuade the King to counteract it, by demanding
the hand of Isabella for his son Montpensier. But
neither Louis Philippe nor the young Duke himself
were prepared to resort to so extreme a measure. The
King, for the present, was content to address acri-
monious complaints to Christina, 2 and to instruct
M. Bresson to make a strong representation to the
Spanish ministers. 3 At the same time, both he and
M. Guizot decided to take steps to effect a reconcilia-
tion between the Queen-Mother and General Narvaez,
whose return to power they regarded as essential to
the success of their plans. Meanwhile, Jarnac spoke
of Palmerston, with whom he had had his first inter-
view on July 14, as " fairly well intentioned and
rather timid." This description of his attitude,
M. Guizot admitted, was most satisfactory. " Never-
theless, between him and me," he pointed out to his
royal master, "there can be nothing more than a
marriage of reason." He purposed, therefore, so to
arrange matters that he might be enabled to com-
municate his views directly to Lord John Russell.
" It will require nice handling to speak to one about
foreign affairs without offending the other. But, on
occasions, we may have to do so." *
Bresson appears to have expressed himself strongly
1 Correspondence relating to the Queen and Infanta of Spain,
Aberdeen to Sotomayor, June 22, 1846.
2 Revue retrospective, pp. 52-53.
3 F. O. France 753, Cowley to Aberdeen, July 13, 1846 (private and
confidential) ; Revue retrospective, p. 171.
4 Revue retrospective, p. 171.
383
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
in favour of abandoning the Trapani marriage. In
his opinion the matter resolved itself simply into
choosing one of the sons of Don Francisco. Jarnac
was, accordingly, instructed to propose to Lord
Palmerston that these two princes should be the
objects of the joint support of France and England.
" London," wrote M. Guizot to Louis Philippe, " will
certainly favour Don Enrique, on account of his
intimate connection with the Progressistas. . . .
Evidently Cadiz would be the best selection for
the Queen, Spain, and ourselves. Nevertheless, I do
not think it advisable to propose him directly." 1
Although Christina's overture to the Duke of Saxe-
Coburg at Lisbon had been made early in June, no
answer had yet been returned to it. The prudent
Coburgs would seem to have regarded it as in-
expedient to incur the lasting enmity of Louis
Philippe, for the sake of seeing a member of their
family raised to the position of King-Consort of
Spain. Upon his arrival in England, at the end of
June, the Duke was strongly advised in this sense
both by King Leopold and by Prince Albert. He,
accordingly, resolved to reject Christina's offer, on the
ground of the injury which must result to Spain
from a marriage contracted in opposition to the wishes
of France. 2 This decision, however, would not appear
to have been communicated directly to Louis Philippe.
Nevertheless, the private letters, during the months of
July and August, both of Bresson and Guizot, show
plainly that they were aware that the Coburgs had no
intention of entertaining the Queen-Mother's proposal. 3
1 Eevue retrospective, pp. 170 and 181-182.
2 T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 352.
3 Revue retrospective, pp. 180-181, 196, 197 ; Guizot , Louis
Philippe, 8 aout, 1846:" You can be quite happy about Coburg. No
Coburg possible. Palmerston has had a long confidential talk on the
subject with the Queen, Prince Albert and King Leopold. This news
reaches me from an excellent quarter."
384
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
Palmerston, whilst in opposition, appears to have
known nothing of the details of the Spanish marriage
question. Until informed of it by Aberdeen, with
whom he had a long conversation in the first days of
July, he was completely ignorant of Christina's pro-
posal to the Coburgs. 1 From 1834 to 1841, however,
he had constantly been engaged in combating the
Moderados, and, upon his return to office in 1846, he
at once reverted to his former policy of favouring the
Progressistas. Under these circumstances, the candida-
ture of Don Enrique, whose connection with the extreme
wing of the Liberal party had been the cause of his exile
and disgrace, would naturally enlist his approval and
support. Nevertheless, in his first communication to
Mr. Bulwer, he expressed no preference for any par-
ticular candidate. Spanish affairs, he wrote in his
famous despatch of July 19, appeared to be divided
into two questions the marriage of the Queen and
the condition of the country. In respect to the first,
he had nothing to add to those instructions with
which Bulwer had been supplied by his predecessor in
office. There were three candidates in the field
Prince Leopold of Coburg and the two sons of Don
Francisco de Paula and " Her Majesty's government
could only hope that the choice might fall upon the
one most likely to secure the happiness of the Queen
and promote the welfare of the Spanish nation." The
greater part of the despatch, however, was concerned
with the second question the political condition of
the country. On that point, although Lord Palmer-
ston had no particular instructions to give, he had
some very severe criticisms to offer. " After a
struggle of now thirty-four years' duration for con-
stitutional freedom, Spain," he declared, " finds herself
under a system of government almost as arbitrary in
practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which
1 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 180-181.
385 2 C
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
has existed in any former period of her history. She
has indeed a Parliament, but all freedom for dis-
cussion has been overborne by force. . . . There is,
indeed, by law liberty of the press, but that liberty
has, by the arbitrary acts of the government, been
reduced to the liberty of publishing what may be
agreeable to the executive. . . . This system of
violence seems, in some degree, to have survived the
fall of its author l and not to have been as yet entirely
abandoned by the more moderate men who have suc-
ceeded him in the government. ... It was certainly
not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation
to a grinding tyranny that Great Britain entered into
the Quadruple Alliance and gave that active assistance,
which contributed so materially to the expulsion of
Don Carlos from Spain. . . . " 2
This despatch was not to be communicated to the
Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, but was intended
to enable Mr. Bulwer to express, " to those persons
who might have the power of remedying the existing
evils," the opinions of his government upon the state of
the country. But, having sent it to Madrid, Palmerston,
on July 20, confidentially informed M. de Jarnac of
its contents and allowed him to be supplied with a
copy of it. It is plain that he must have had some
reason for thus communicating to the French charge
d'affaires a despatch, replete with sentiments which
could not but be otherwise than very distasteful to his
government. Without doubt, he must have known
that Bulwer's instructions would be at once passed on
from Paris to Madrid, and it can only, therefore, be
supposed that he wished the Spanish ministers to
learn in this manner exactly what he thought about
them. Perhaps, also, he was not sorry that M. Guizot
1 General Narvaez.
2 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and
Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, July 19, 1846.
38G
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
should have an opportunity of realizing the very low
estimation in which he held his political friends, the
Moderados. To the marriage question he obviously
attached little importance, and his remarks upon that
subject were, doubtless, drawn up far less carefully
than those which had reference to the actual condition
of Spain.
Louis Philippe, at this time, was somewhat dis-
turbed by a letter from M. Bresson to M. Guizot, dated
July 12, in which the ambassador gave a lengthy
account of his recent proceedings at Madrid. The
Queen-Mother, he reported, urged various objections
to the Duke of Cadiz. " Isabella," she declared,
" had an insurmountable aversion to him and she
herself had grave doubts about his virility. This last
statement," wrote M. Bresson, " took us upon very
delicate ground. She adverted to his voice, his hips,
and his general bodily conformation, and I replied by
insisting that his rigid morality was to be ascribed
solely to his consuming passion for the Queen, her
daughter. Furthermore, I pointed out, that his desire
to marry was inconsistent with the idea that he was
incapable of fulfilling the conditions of matrimony."
Christina's opinion upon that point was probably little
influenced by arguments such as these. But, when
M. Bresson took upon himself to assure her that, " in
any Bourbon combination " the marriage of the Due de
Montpensier with the Infanta could be announced
simultaneously with that of the Queen, she received
the information with "every appearance of sincere
pleasure." Rianzarez also expressed to him his satis-
faction with this arrangement, which would remove the
great political objection to the Queen's marriage with
Cadiz or, even, with Trapani. Bresson, however, was
of opinion that her union with the former could be
effected more easily and expeditiously than with the
latter, and he, accordingly, suggested that his regiment
387
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
should be brought to Madrid, in order that, " by
constantly seeing him, Isabella might grow accustomed
to his voice and hips."
The Queens, Louis Philippe declared at once, must
be given to understand clearly that Bresson had no
right to promise that the two marriages would be
concluded simultaneously. He was not to be moved
from this decision by Guizot's insinuation that possibly
the ambassador had not gone quite so far as His
Majesty imagined. On the contrary, he replied, he
had very little doubt that he had committed himself
even more deeply than he admitted. It was while
he was in this mood that Jarnac's copy of Palmerston's
despatch of July 19 reached Paris. A perusal of its
contents caused the King a considerable amount of
annoyance, 2 yet it would not appear to have weakened
his determination to insist upon the disavowal of
M. Bresson. 3 But the question, as to how far the
despatch of July 19 was responsible for the final
decision of Louis Philippe, will be discussed later on.
Athough in his official instructions he had ex-
pressed no preference for any particular candidate,
Palmerston soon informed Bulwer, privately, that
Don Enrique was the British candidate. 4 The selection
of that prince called forth no objections from M. de
Jarnac. On the contrary, as late as August 16, he
gave Palmerston definitely to understand that, pro-
vided he would adhere to that arrangement, France
would join with him in pressing it upon the Court of
Madrid. 5 Bulwer, however, was filled with dismay on
learning that he was expected to support the suit of
1 Revue retrospective, pp. 180-181.
2 F. O. France 753, Cowley to Palmerston, July 27, 1846 (private and
confidential).
3 Revue retrospective, pp. 182-185, 402-403.
4 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 264-276.
5 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 16, 1846.
388
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
Don Enrique. He had little fault to find with him
personally. He considered him manly, enterprising
and ambitious, and described him as resembling in
many respects Prince Louis Napoleon. 1 There was
one objection to him, however, and that was an
insuperable one nothing short of a successful revolu-
tion would induce Christina to accept him. " Let me
caution your Lordship again and again," he wrote on
August 4, " against appearing to listen to the counsels
of the Progressistas and Don Enrique, if you wish to
retain the confidence of the palace." 2
No sooner was Palmerston installed at the Foreign
Office, than Bulwer, reverting to his former scheme,
began to plead earnestly in favour of the Coburg
marriage. France, he maintained, in order to carry
out successfully her plans of aggrandisement in
Algeria, Morocco, Tunis and Egypt must exercise
a paramount influence at Madrid. It followed,
therefore, that all her ambitious designs would be
checkmated by the Queen's marriage outside the
Bourbon line. " The policy of maintaining good
relations with France," he was not disposed to dispute
it, " was a great and wise policy. But what would
happen," he asked, " were Louis Philippe to die ?
In that event would not the power of a great military
nation fall into the hands of three or four enterprising
young men, burning for glory in their several careers ?
The policy of good relations with France depended,"
he much feared, " upon the life of a man of seventy-
four and upon the well or the ill -directed aim of an
assassin." : The Coburg marriage, Christina assured
him, could still be arranged. Let the management of
the affair be entrusted to him and he would undertake
1 F. O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
confidential).
* Ibid., August 4, 1846 (secret and confidential).
3 Ibid.
389
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to bring it to a successful conclusion. France would
oppose it vigorously, and it must, therefore, be pre-
pared in secrecy. Indeed, he acknowledged that his
plan must needs " wear the aspect of an intrigue, in
order to avoid the effects of an intrigue." *
Palmerston, however, was not to be diverted from
his intention by these arguments. The Court, the
government, and the Coburgs themselves were alike
agreed that Louis Philippe's hostility to it had
rendered the Spanish proposal unacceptable. On
August 22, therefore, he addressed a lengthy despatch
to Bulwer, in which he laid it down as the deliberate
opinion of the British government that Don Enrique
was the most suitable candidate. 2 But, before this
communication could reach Madrid, the affair to which
it referred had been definitely settled. The French
government had not failed to turn its knowledge
of Palmerston's dispatch of July 19 to account.
M. Bresson, in pursuance of M. Guizot's 3 instructions,
had been busily engaged in representing it as a declara-
tion of hostility against the Moderado government in
Madrid. Nunoz, the brother of the Duke of Rianzarez,
informed Mr. Bulwer that all hope of arranging the
Coburg marriage had been abandoned, that Palmer-
ston " would listen to no other alliance but that of
Don Enrique, who is looked upon by the Court as an
open adversary and a disguised rebel," and that a Pro-
gressista insurrection was being prepared in London. 4
Only a week after he had transmitted this news, the
British minister, on August 29, reported that the
Queen, the night before at 12 o'clock, had made up
1 F. O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Paknerston, July 19, 1846 (secret and
confidential).
2 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846.
3 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. p. 801.
4 F. O. Spain 698, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 22, 1846 (secret and
confidential).
390
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
her mind in favour of Don Francisco de Asis, Duke of
Cadiz. Furthermore, he had to inform Lord Palmer -
ston that the marriage of the Due de Montpensier
would take place at the same time. " I learn," he
wrote in conclusion, " that directly the Queen had
signified her intention of marrying her cousin, Count
Bresson formally asked the hand of the Infanta for
the Duke of Montpensier, stating that he had powers
to enter upon and conclude that affair." 1
M. Guizot, on September 1, communicated this
news to Lord Normanby, the new British ambassador
in Paris. 2 Palmerston, who was yachting with Her
Majesty on the south coast of England, received the
information of the conclusion of the double marriage in
a letter from the Comte de Jarnac. Louis Philippe
eluded the disagreeable task of apprising Queen Victoria
that he had broken his compact, by allowing his own
Queen, Marie Amelie, to convey the intelligence to her.
The reply which she received was short and cold.
1 'You will remember," wrote Queen Victoria, "what
passed between the King and myself at Eu. . . .
You will, doubtless, have heard that, in order to be
agreeable to your King, we declined to arrange the
marriage of our cousin, Prince Leopold, with the
Queen of Spain. . . . You will, therefore, easily
understand that the sudden announcement of this
double marriage could only cause us surprise and the
keenest regret . . ." 3
M. Guizot explained his conduct by referiing to
the Memorandum of February 27, 1846, of the exist-
ence of which Palmerston was now for the first time
1 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Bulwer to Palmerston, August 29, 1846.
2 Ibid., Normanby to Palmerston, September 1, 1846.
3 Letters of Queen Victoria, Queen of the French to Queen Victoria,
September 8, 1846 ; Queen Victoria to Queen of the French, September
10, 1846.
391
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
informed. In that document France had reserved to
herself the right of departing from the agreement at
Eu, should at any time a Coburg marriage appear
" imminent or probable." Palmerston's inclusion of
Prince Leopold among the available candidates in
his despatch of July 19, combined with Christina's
overture at Lisbon, in the previous month of May,
had created a situation, M. Guizot insisted, which
released France from all her engagements. But,
although he firmly maintained this contention and
instructed M. de Jarnac to hold the same language in
London, his conduct was not that of a man confident
in the justice of his cause. Besides attempting to
induce Lord Aberdeen to declare that, under the
circumstances, a departure from the compact at Eu
was permissible, he drew up a bitter attack upon Lord
Palmerston and sent it to Jarnac with instructions to
forward it to Lord John Russell. But in both cases he
met with disappointment. Aberdeen told him frankly
that he could not adopt his view of the case, and that
he had no fault to find with the language or the
conduct of his successor in office. 1 John Russell
showed his letter to Palmerston, and informed M.
de Jarnac that his colleague had his hearty
approval and support. 2 Louis Philippe, meanwhile,
had compiled a lengthy statement of his case and had
sent it to his daughter, the Queen of the Belgians, in
order that it might be placed before Queen Victoria.
But neither his laboured attempts to extenuate his
own conduct nor his insinuations about Lord Palmer-
ston produced the desired effect. After a careful con-
sideration of his letter, replied the Queen on September
27, she had failed to discover any reasons which could
justify him in breaking his promise. She had arrived
at this conclusion, she begged him to believe, " by the
1 Revue retrospective, pp. 324-326.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 10.
392
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
help of her own eyes," not, as he had suggested, by
the aid of those of Lord Palmers ton. 1
The protests of the Queen, however, were as
ineffectual as the official remonstrances of Bulwer at
Madrid and of Normanby in Paris. On October 10,
1846, the double marriage was duly solemnized at the
palace, in the hall called " de Embaj adores" The
British minister was not present at the ceremony,
which was witnessed by a great crowd of persons.
" One viva only was heard, and that not very loud,
when the Infante Don Francisco descended from his
carriage." 2 Louis Philippe and M. Guizot had attained
their object, but they had sacrificed " the cordial
understanding." In England, the authors of the
Spanish marriages stood condemned by the Court, by
the Cabinet, and by public opinion. There was no
thought of an appeal to arms, but it was felt that in
the future the relations of the two governments could
no longer be carried on in the same spirit of close and
friendly intimacy. Palmerston, founding his case
upon the renunciation made at the Peace of Utrecht 3
by the Due d'Orleans of that day, sought to induce
the Powers to declare that any children, which might
be born to the Due de Montpensier and the Infanta,
would be excluded from succeeding to the Spanish
throne. Throughout Europe, however, there were
ominous signs of a recrudescence of the revolutionary
spirit, ; and Metternich, in consequence, had strong
reasons for desiring to propitiate Louis Philippe and
M. Guizot. He, therefore, refused to pronounce him-
self and simply adopted an attitude of neutrality,
taking care to point out that the trouble could never
have arisen, had the legitimist principle been upheld
1 T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. pp. 503-516.
2 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Bulwer to Palmerston, October 11, 1846.
3 Ibid., Palmerston to Normanby, September 22, 1846 ; Palmerston
to Bulwer, September 28, 1846.
393
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and had Don Carlos been enthroned. Russia and
Prussia, which like Austria had never acknowledged the
sovereignty of Isabella, followed the example of the
Court of Vienna and declined to be drawn into the
controversy.
Palmerston's conduct was, unquestionably, ill-
advised in thus attempting to apply to Spain, in the
middle of the nineteenth century, the stipulations of
diplomatic instruments framed when the conditions of
Europe were very different. But, if his objections to
the Infanta's marriage, founded upon the Treaty of
Utrecht, were unsuccessful, he was afforded the satis-
faction of completely refuting the pleas set up by M.
Guizot in justification of his actions. The argument
which forms the main contention of his despatches,
both of October 31, 1846 and of January 8, 1847, is
unanswerable. The memorandum of February 27,
1846, to which the French government attached so
much importance was, he pointed out, unofficial and
verbal. No record of it was to be found at the
Foreign Office. M. de Jarnac had never mentioned
it to him, " until after the event had happened for
which it was now quoted as a justification." But,
"even admitting for the sake of argument that Her
Majesty's present government were to be held bound
by it, how could it justify a departure from the
engagement of Eu? The imminent danger, speci-
fied in that memorandum, was the likelihood that either
the Queen or the Infanta should be about immediately
to marry a foreign Prince, not being a descendant of
Philip V. But if that likelihood had ever existed, it
had at all events ceased to exist, when M. Bresson
demanded the hand of the Infanta for the Due de
Montpensier. Not only had it then ceased to exist,
but with respect to the Queen, whose marriage was
then the immediate and only subject of discussion, it
had been succeeded by an impossibility ; because when
394
THE SPANISH MAERIAGES
Count Bresson demanded the hand of the Infanta the
marriage of the Queen to the Infant Don Francisco
had actually been resolved upon and settled." 1
Both in the French Chambers and in the British
Parliament the Spanish marriages were the subject of
debate, at the opening of the session of 1847. The
publication of the English blue-book created a profound
sensation in France. 2 After reading the correspon-
dence, no one could any longer maintain that England
had encouraged the candidature of Prince Leopold of
Coburg, or that Louis Philippe had been justified in
breaking the agreement of Eu. Nevertheless, in spite
of the light which was thus thrown upon the proceed-
ings which led up to the marriages, the true history of
the case was only imperfectly revealed. Even to-day,
the real motives which actuated some of the principal
actors in the affair are still largely a matter of conjec-
ture. Palmerston 3 himself believed, and his opinion
has been adopted by the majority of English writers,
that a secret understanding existed between Christina
and Louis Philippe. The Queen-Mother's overture to
the Duke of Saxe-Coburg has been represented as a
trap craftily laid for the British government. England,
it was calculated, would never resist the temptation of
actively supporting the candidature of Prince Leopold,
and Louis Philippe would, in consequence, be fur-
nished with a pretext for repudiating his promises.*
But, plausible as this explanation of Christina's con-
duct may sound, it cannot stand the test of a close
examination.
Had the Queen-Mother never manifested any
1 Correspondence relating to the marriages of the Queen and the
Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Normanby, October 31, 1846, January
8, 1847.
2 C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 48.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. p. 320.
4 T. Martin, Life of Prince Consort, I. p. 351. Stockmar, Memoirs,
II. p. 156.
395
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
anxiety to marry her daughter to a Coburg, until she
requested Bulwer to transmit her proposal to Lisbon,
her proceedings, it must be admitted, would be open
to grave suspicion. But the facts of the case are
very different. On at least three previous occasions,
when she cannot possibly have been acting in collusion
with Louis Philippe, she had declared her predilection
for the Coburg match. In 1838, during the civil war,
she mentioned the matter to Lord Clarendon. 1 In
1841, after her abdication, when she was living in
Paris, she sent Count Toreno to Lord Cowley to inform
him that she regarded a Coburg Prince as the most
suitable husband for Isabella. 3 No sooner was she
back at Madrid, in 1844, than she expressed herself in
the same spirit to Mr. Bulwer. 3 To the very last she
appears to have struggled against the dictation of the
King of the French. Finding that the Coburgs were
fearful of incurring the wrath of the Court of the
Tuileries, she did all in her power to persuade Louis
Philippe not to insist upon her daughter's marriage
with a Bourbon, " who had none of the qualities calcu-
lated to make her happy." As late as the middle of
July, 1846, she sent the Marquis of Miraflores to Paris
to plead her cause with him. But the " Citizen King"
was inflexible. "Royal marriages," he reminded her,
" were not like of those of private individuals." '
Nevertheless, she still refused to yield, and when she
at last gave way and compelled the unfortunate
Isabella to marry the Duke of Cadiz, it was the ill-
judged intervention of Lord Palmerston which was the
cause of her surrender, not the expostulations and
threats of Louis Philippe.
In Spain, in 1846, the victory of one party over
1 Vide p. 835. a Vide p. 343. 3 Vide p. 370.
4 Revue retrospective, pp. 52-53. Correspondence relating to the
marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain, Palmerston to Bulwer,
October 31, 1846, January 8, 1847.
396
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
another meant something more than that a particular
set of politicians had been temporarily replaced in
office by their opponents. Disgrace, exile and even
loss of liberty were the fate which generally awaited
the leaders of a defeated party. Christina herself,
after the triumph of the Progressistas in 1836, had
had to submit to the insolent dictation of a band
of mutinous sergeants and had seen her Moderado
ministers forced to fly from the country. Four years
later the same party, in its hour of victory, had humi-
liated her as a woman and as a Queen and had driven
her to resign the regency. She was not by nature
vindictive, but she, doubtless, regarded a Progressista
with feelings very similar to those which her father or
her brother entertained for a Carbonaro. It may be
imagined, therefore, with what dismay she read Palmer-
ston's despatch of July 19. In every line of it the
intention of befriending her enemies was apparent.
Palmerston, it was clear to her, was declaring that
Don Enrique was the only suitable husband for
Isabella, simply in order to promote the fortunes of
the Progressistas.
Once convinced that the Moderado regime was
endangered by the hostility of Lord Palmerston,
Christina determined to comply with Louis Philippe's
demands and thus obtain his protection. The Duke
of Cadiz was hastily summoned to Madrid and Isabella
was compelled to accept him for a husband. It is not
absolutely certain whether the Queen-Mother insisted
upon the simultaneous announcement of Montpensier's
marriage with her second daughter, or whether the
proposal came from M. Bresson. It is highly probable,
however, that she made it an indispensable condition
to her acceptation of Cadiz. The fact that the Infanta
was betrothed to a sou of Louis Philippe would con-
ciliate the French party and would be looked upon by
people, generally, as some compensation for the
397
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
extreme insignificance of the King Consort. Moreover,
from her point of view there was another, and a far
stronger reason, in favour of the simultaneous con-
clusion of the two marriages. Once the elder brother
was the husband of the Queen, it would be very diffi-
cult to prevent the marriage of the younger, Don
Enrique, with the Infanta. 1 That danger could be
averted only by the announcement that she was
betrothed to, and was shortly to marry, Montpensier.
Notwithstanding that he owed his crown to a
popular revolution, Louis Philippe attached the
highest importance to the natural alliances of the
Bourbons. The maintenance of relations with Spain
on the footing of consanguinity was, in consequence,
the constant aim of his policy. In the pursuit of this
object he found a ready instrument in his Foreign
Minister. By upholding the principle that Isabella's
husband must be a descendant of Philip V., M. Guizot
purposed to disprove the reproach of his opponents
that this foreign policy was weak and subservient to
England. 2 His motives are perfectly comprehensible.
But the reasons which induced the King to break the
compact of Eu, by consenting to allow his son's
marriage to take place at the same time as that of the
Queen, have never been satisfactorily explained. Louis
Philippe was very angry upon learning, on July 20,
1846, that M. Bresson, in order to overcome Christina's
repugnance to the Duke of Cadiz, had held out to her
the inducement that Montpensier's marriage with the
Infanta might be concluded simultaneously. Turning
a deaf ear to the timid remonstrances of M. Guizot, he
insisted upon the necessity of acquainting the Queen-
Mother that his ambassador had greatly exceeded his
instructions. His private correspondence, discovered
1 This, in M. Thiers' opinion, was Christina's motive, vide L. Fagan,
Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. p. 228, Thiers to Panizzi, January 17, 1847.
2 Stockrnar, Memoirs, II. pp, 134 and 197.
398
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
at the Tuileries after the Revolution of '48, makes his
sentiments upon that point absolutely clear. 1 Never-
theless, in the course of the next three weeks all his
scruples vanished, and he allowed M. Bresson to be
furnished with the powers necessary for the conclusion
of the double marriage.
According to the official French version of the
affair, it was the despatch of July 1 9 which caused the
King to change his mind. Seeing that Palmerston had
placed Coburg at the head of the list of candidates, he,
rightly or wrongly, conceived that the danger, specified
in the memorandum of February 27, 1846, had become
" probable and imminent," and that he was, in conse-
quence, released from all his engagements to England.
But his secret correspondence with M. Guizot com-
pletely disproves this assertion. In forwarding, on
July 24, the despatch to the King, Guizot himself
made no suggestion of that nature. On the contrary,
he expressed the extremely judicious opinion that
Palmerston was very indifferent about Coburg and
was rather trying to regain his influence over the
Progressistas. Louis Philippe took the same view of
the case. He was greatly annoyed at the strictures
passed upon his friends, the Moderados, predicted that
Palmerston's proceedings would lead to the bouleverse-
ment of Spain, but " all that," he wrote, " makes it
the more necessary that our disavowal of the simul-
taneous marriage plan should reach Christina at once.
The more we suspect bad faith in others the more
must we be careful to keep our own hands clean." 2
The letters published in the Revue retrospective show
that he adhered to these admirable sentiments for
some ten days longer. There is no document, how-
ever, or trustworthy evidence to explain why, pro-
bably about August 13 or 14, he suddenly decided to
adopt a totally different view of the matter. Under
1 Revue retrospective, pp. 182-184. -' Ibid., pp. 184-185.
399
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
these circumstances it is only possible to suggest the
following explanation.
Louis Philippe in the question of the Spanish
marriages had a two-fold object in view. To his
Bourbon policy was subjoined the bourgeois policy of
the pdre de famille, who was desirous of obtaining for
his son the large fortune which was supposed to be the
portion of the Infanta. Palmerston, however, was
determined to prevent the accomplishment of this plan.
To the well-known instructions transmitted to Bulwer,
on August 22, was appended a despatch, marked
separate and confidential, in which he laid down the
principle that Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta
" would be as objectionable, and in some respects more
so, than his marriage with the Queen." ] It is true that
the contents of this despatch were unknown to Louis
Philippe and his agents, and moreover, that before it
reached Bulwer's hands the affair had been concluded.
But Guizot was, undoubtedly, aware of Palmerston's
opinions on the subject. Indeed, in a letter to the
King, on August 8, he expressed the fear that, although
Coburg might be abandoned so far as Isabella was
concerned, Palmerston would probably attempt to
marry him to the Infanta. " After our first battle,"
he wrote, " we shall have to fight another, and a very
sharp one." 2 Louis Philippe himself, a few days later,
appears to have been disturbed by a letter which his
Queen had received from Christina. The tone of it he
considered unpleasant, " and it contained no mention
of Montpensier's marriage." ..." Our situation," he
informed Guizot, "has, in consequence, much changed
for the worse." 3
It is evident, therefore, that on August 12, Louis
Philippe was aware that danger threatened his project
1 F. 0. Spain 694, Palmerston to Bulwer, August 22, 1846 (separate
and confidential).
2 Revue retrospective, p. 197. n Ibid., p. 198.
400
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
of marrying his son to the Infanta from two quarters.
Palmerston was resolved to oppose it, and the Queen-
Mother, if not actually hostile to it, was showing some
reluctance to support it. But in the course of the next
day or two, news would probably be received from
Madrid of the effect which the despatch of July 1 9 had
had upon Christina and her ministers. Under these
circumstances, a great effort was, doubtless, made to
persuade the King to give Bresson a free hand. Guizot,
Madame Adelaide, 1 and other members of his family
assuredly represented to him that the present oppor-
tunity must not be allowed to escape. Christina was
thoroughly frightened, and would be prepared to accept
both Cadiz and Montpensier, provided only that the two
marriages could take place simultaneously. Should
there be either hesitation or delay, however, Palmers-
ton would have time to mature his plans, and the
Infanta and her fortune would be lost to them.
If the theory, here put forward, be correct, that it
was Palmerston's hostility to Montpensier's projected
marriage which caused Louis Philippe to break his
promise to England, the question arises, whether, under
the circumstances, he was not justified in regarding
himself as released from his engagements. M. Thureau-
Dangin 2 contends that the King, having undertaken at
Eu to postpone his son's marriage with the Infanta
until the Queen should have children, had a right to
expect that, in the interval, England should do nothing
to facilitate her marriage with any other prince.
Aberdeen, unquestionably, did not regard the matter
in that light. He simply looked upon Montpensier's
marriage with the Infanta as delayed for several years,
until, by the birth of heirs to Isabella, it should
have lost its political significance. Even then, when
it should be less objectionable, he did not consider that
1 B. Arnaud, Adelaide d 1 Orleans, p. 348.
2 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, VI. pp. 220-221.
401 2 D
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
England was bound to consent to it, and, in the mean-
time, as he pointed out to Peel, " many things might
happen." ] Palmerston most certainly would have
repudiated the notion that the compact of Eu debarred
him from recommending the alliance of the Infanta
with Leopold of Coburg. " We can admit of no
parity of position," he told Jarnac, "between a son
of the King of the French and the third son of a
German nobleman as closely related to the French, as
to the British, Royal Family." 2 M. Guizot, in the
memorandum of February 27, undoubtedly declared
that the Bourbon principle applied equally to the Queen
and the Infanta, but he clearly had not much faith in
his ability to make good that contention. He was
perfectly aware of Palmerston's sentiments with respect
to Montpensier's marriage, but he never attempted to
argue that, because of them, the King was released
from his promise. Throughout the controversy he con-
fined himself to asserting, what he knew to be untrue,
that Palmerston's proceedings had rendered " probable
and imminent " the alliance of a Coburg prince with
Queen Isabella.
In most English accounts it is taken for granted
that Louis Philippe selected the Duke of Cadiz as a
husband for Isabella, in order to make certain that the
succession to the Spanish throne should pass to the
descendants of Montpensier. But the circumstances
do not warrant this assumption. Count Trapani,
whose physical fitness was never called into question,
was always his favourite candidate. It was only in
the last resort, when, owing to the unpopularity of
the Neapolitan connection, he was forced to bring
forward another Bourbon, that he fell back upon
1 Letters of Queen Victoria, Aberdeen to Peel, September 8, 1845.
2 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 268-276. Correspondence
relating to the marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain,
Palmeraton to Normanby, September 22, 1846.
402
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
Cadiz. The suspicions which existed about the virility
of this young prince did not deter the King
from seeking to impose him upon Isabella. He
cannot, however, be fairly charged with having
expressly chosen him, because he believed him to be
impotent. Don Enrique and the sons of Don Carlos
being for different political reasons out of the question,
he had no option but to renounce his Bourbon prin-
ciple, or to insist upon the Queen's marriage with the
Duke of Cadiz.
The experience of England during the eighteenth
century had taught her to look with dread upon the
prospect of having to struggle single-handed against
the two Bourbon Powers. The lesson of 1783 was
never forgotten by her statesmen. Under the Restora-
tion, when the absolute rule of Ferdinand VII. was
re-established by French bayonets, Mr. Canning, to
avert the dangers of a close alliance between the
Courts of Madrid and of the Tuileries, acknowledged
the revolted Spanish colonies and " called in the new
world to redress the balance of the old." Palmerston
was confronted by a different situation. Spain was
weaker, but France had acquired Algiers and was upon
terms of suspicious friendliness with Mehemet AH.
In alliance with the Pasha of Egypt in the east and
with Spain in the west, she might, it was to be feared,
obtain a complete control of the Mediterranean. It
was, therefore, Palmerston conceived, a matter of the
first importance that her influence over the Cabinet of
Madrid should be destroyed. This object, in his
opinion, could never be successfully attained until
Spain should be endowed with Liberal institutions,
and should adopt a national, not a dynastic, policy.
It was with this end in view that he entered into the
Quadruple Treaty, by which England engaged to
assist the Christinas to expel Don Carlos from the
Peninsula. Without doubt, the idea upon which his
403
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
policy was based was statesmanlike ; nevertheless, the
methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose
were deplorably unsound. The treaty of 1834 in-
volved interference in the domestic affairs of Spain,
and that in combination with the very Power the
ascendancy of which over the Spanish government it
was his secret object to diminish.
Any military advantages which the Christinas may
have derived from the Quadruple Treaty were more
than counterbalanced by the harm, which the jealous
interference of France and Great Britain in her
internal affairs, inflicted upon Spain. Long after the
Pretender had fled and outward peace had been
restored, the political settlement of the country was
retarded by the rivalry and intrigues of the am-
bassadors and ministers of the two Powers. The
marriages of 1846, and all the evils which they
brought in their train, were an outcome of the policy
which Palmerston had inaugurated twelve years before.
But he had not been in power during the whole of this
period, and, when he returned to the Foreign Office,
the marriage question was already far advanced.
Aberdeen was not responsible for the Quadruple
Treaty, and he was sincerely desirous of putting an
end to the practice of meddling with internal politics,
which both the French and British agents at Madrid
had adopted. Nevertheless, his weakness and irreso-
lution in dealing with M. Guizot were the cause of
much mischief. Had he adhered to his first pro-
nouncement that England would object to any
alliance which threatened to disturb the balance of
power, but that, with that exception, she looked upon
the Royal marriages as an exclusively Spanish affair,
none of the subsequent complications could have
arisen. Unfortunately, however, after the downfall
of Espartero, he undertook to observe a kind of
benevolent neutrality towards the principle of the
404
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES
French government that Isabella's husband must be
a Bourbon. The compact of Eu and the different
interpretations which were placed upon it, the pre-
tensions set up in the memorandum of February 27,
1846, were the consequences of the modifications
introduced into his original declaration.
405
CHAPTER XI
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48.
WHILST France and England had been quarrelling
over the Spanish marriages, events of greater im-
portance had been taking place in Central Europe.
The Polish nationalists had planned an insurrection
which was to break out simultaneously in Prussian
and Austrian Poland. At Posen, the authorities
obtained early intelligence of the projected rising, and
were enabled to suppress it without difficulty. But
in Gallicia, in February, 1846, the Austrian military
commander was suddenly called upon to deal with a
formidable rebellion. Colonel Benedek, 1 however, by
allowing the Polish peasants to wreak their hatred
upon their landlords, succeeded in dividing the forces
opposed to him and in subduing one revolution by
another. The free town of Cracow was the scene of
severe fighting, and, after the defeat of the insurgents,
was occupied by Russian troops. The measure was to
be merely temporary, and the town, it was announced,
would be evacuated, directly order should be restored.
But, when it was evident that the Spanish marriage
question had hopelessly divided France and England,
the Northern Courts adopted a different attitude. On
November 15, 1846, the Austrian, the Prussian and
the Russian ministers in London informed Palmerston
1 Afterwards Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army in Bohemia
in the war with Prussia in 1866.
406
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
that the independent existence of Cracow was in-
compatible with the public tranquillity of Europe, and
that, in consequence, it had been decided that the
Republic should, in the future, form part of the
Austrian Empire. 1 A similar communication was, at
the same time, made to the French government. The
Republic of Cracow having been constituted by a
treaty between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on May 3,
1815, these three Powers maintained that they had a
right to undo what they had done, without consulta-
tion with the other Powers which were parties to the
general settlement of 1 8 1 5. 2 Both France and England
at once entered a formal protest. M. Guizot, having
attained his object in Spain, was now bent upon re-
establishing " the cordial understanding," and would
gladly have made a joint representation to the three
Powers with great Britain. 3 But his hope that the
annexation of Cracow would prove the means of re-
uniting France and England was not realized. Palmer-
ston contented himself with directing Normanby to
furnish the French government with a copy of the
remonstrance which he addressed to the Court of
Vienna. 4
Metternich was not disturbed by these representa-
tions. It was out of the power of England to enforce
her views, and Louis Philippe and M. Guizot were
careful at once to reassure him about their veritable
intentions. Public indignation had been aroused in
France by the extinction of the little republic and,
under the circumstances, it had been necessary to
protest officially. But let the Chancellor understand,
Louis Philippe informed the Austrian ambassador,
that the remonstrance which M. de Flahaut had been
1 State Papers, XXXV. pp. 1069-1071.
2 Metternich, Memoires, VII. p. 282.
3 F. O. France 757, Normanby to Palmerston, November 20, 1846.
4 State Papers, XXXV. pp. 1082-1095.
407
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
instructed to make at Vienna was " merely talk which
could hurt no one." l Metternich, however, although
he was thus speedily relieved from all anxiety as to
the attitude which the western Powers purposed to
adopt towards his proceedings in Gallicia, had much
cause for uneasiness in other directions. Germany was
seething with discontent, and the King of Prussia, by
deciding to summon the combined Estates, was evincing
a regrettable disposition to acquiesce in the popular
demand for a greater measure of political rights. In
Italy affairs presented a yet more alarming appearance.
For the past fourteen years the Peninsula had been
outwardly at peace. But Metternich's vigilance had
not been lulled to sleep by this seeming acquiescence
in existing conditions. A movement, he was well
aware, was in progress infinitely more dangerous than
the local insurrections planned in the secrecy of the
Carbonari lodges. Mazzini, by means of his society of
Young Italy, and Gioberti, d'Azeglio and Balbo, by
their writings, were teaching the people to dream of
independence and of national unity. Hitherto Metter-
nich, in his policy of repression, had always been able
to count upon the whole-hearted support of the different
Italian governments. But now the Sovereign of the
most important State in the Peninsula was strongly
suspected of encouraging the propagation of these new
doctrines.
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, had, as the Prince
of Carignano, displayed Liberal tendencies. In the
Piedmontese rebellion of 1821 his conduct had been
equivocal, but, since his accession, in 1831, he had
shown a firm determination to uphold the absolutist
traditions of his House. Nevertheless, he now per-
mitted both d'Azeglio and Balbo to reside unmolested
within his dominions and, in spite of Metternich's
remonstrances, his police scarcely interfered with the
1 Thureau-Dangin, Monarchic de Juillet, VII. p. 276.
408
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
free circulation of their subversive writings. In the
summer of 1846, it was already apparent that the rela-
tions between the Courts of Turin and of Vienna were
no longer upon their former friendly footing. Osten-
sibly a question of tariff was the only cause of dispute.
In reality, however, it was Charles Albert's increasing
sympathy with the Italian national movement which
was the reason of the prohibitive duty, placed by
Metternich, upon the wines of Piedmont. 1 Matters
were in this state when, on June 1, 1846, the Pope,
Gregory XVL, died. Fifteen days later, Cardinal
Mastai-Ferretti, Archbishop of Imola, was elected to
succeed him, and assumed the title of Pius IX.
The condition of the Papal States was deplorable.
The finances were in disorder, and the government
depended for its existence upon the protection of
Austria and upon the presence of its Swiss auxiliary
troops. The new Pope, it was hoped, would consent
to the introduction of certain necessary measures of
reform. The expectation that Pius IX. would not
pursue the reactionary policy of his predecessor proved
well founded. 2 On July 16, 1846, a month after his
election, His Holiness proclaimed a general annesty
for political offences. The educated classes had eagerly
absorbed the doctrines of Balbo, d'Azeglio, and Gioberti,
and the Liberal tendencies manifested by the new Pope
aroused an immense enthusiasm. Nor was his popu-
larity confined to his own dominions. The quiet and
unpretending priest suddenly found himself magnified
into a national hero. Patriots, who had begun to look
to Charles Albert as the future liberator of Italy, now
placed all their hopes in Pius IX. It was not pos-
sible for him to withstand the enthusiasm which his
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
Palmerston, January 12, 1847. Metternich, Memoires, VII. pp. 228-245.
2 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Scarlett to Aber-
deen, June 18, 1846 ; Hamilton to Aberdeen, June 30, 1846.
409
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
concessions had called forth. In the spring of 1847, a
modified liberty was granted to the press, and the for-
mation of a Council of State, to be chosen by the Pope
from elected provincial delegates, was decreed. Lastly,
on July 5, the establishment of a civic guard was
announced. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, fearful that
invidious comparisons would be drawn between his
methods of government and those of His Holiness,
made haste to initiate similar reforms at Florence. 1
In the opinion of Louis Philippe, the death of
Gregory XVI. amounted to a public misfortune. A
Liberal Pope could not but add materially to the
political unrest which had suddenly affected the whole
of Europe. 2 Nevertheless, neither he nor M. Guizot
were as yet prepared to join with Austria in counselling
the Papal government to resist the popular demand
for reforms. France was at the time represented at
Rome by a man of considerable ability and learning,
Count Rossi, an Italian political exile and a naturalized
Frenchman. In the first instance he was instructed
to counsel the adoption of a strictly juste milieu policy. 3
The new Papal government should be based upon the
principles of an enlightened conservatism. His Holi-
ness would be well advised promptly to introduce certain
much-needed reforms into his system of administration.
Let him beware, however, of listening to those who
would propose violent and ill-considered changes.
Above all, let him avoid giving unnecessary offence to
Austria. 4 But, after his quarrel with England over
the Spanish marriages, M. Guizot decided to revise his
Italian policy.
In every part of the world France and England
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Scarlett to Palmer-
ston, April 17, 1847.
2 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, VII. pp. 230-231.
3 Correspondence relating to affairs of Italy, Cowley to Palmerston,
July 17, 81, 1846.
4 Guizot, Memoirca, VIII. pp. 342-356.
410
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
were opposed to each other. M. Guizot's own rela-
tions with Lord Normanby were very far from friendly.
The public denial of the French minister that he had
used certain words, imputed to him by the British
ambassador, had been followed by a personal quarrel,
which had only been arranged by the intervention of
Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador. 1 At Madrid,
the consequences of the distasteful marriage forced
upon the young Queen were already apparent. Isabella
was practically separated from her husband, and her
relations with General Serrano were a cause of scandal.
French and British rivalry was actively maintained by
Bresson and by Bulwer, who, with the full knowledge
of Palmerston, was deeply involved in all the intrigues
of the palace. 2 At Athens, where King Otho had
been compelled to grant a constitution, Lyons and
Piscatory, the British and French ministers, were
closely identified with different political parties. In
South America, a dispute between Lord Howden and
Comte Walewski threatened to put an end to the
mediation of France and England in the war, which
for some time past had been in progress between
Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. 3
M. Guizot, under these circumstances, resolved to
make approaches to Austria. The British government
alone was disposed to sympathize sincerely with the
Liberal movement which was causing so much anxiety
to the absolute Courts. If only he could arrive at an
agreement with Metternich as to the policy to be
adopted towards German, Swiss and Italian affairs,
England would be isolated completely. But the
negotiation of such an understanding was a delicate
matter. An alliance between the government of the
1 F. 0. France 778, Normanby to Palmerston, February 26, 1847
(private and confidential).
2 The despatches contained in F. O. Spain 720-727 afford abundant
evidence of this.
3 H. Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, III. pp. 199-200.
411
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
" Citizen King " and the Cabinet of Vienna, for the
maintenance of despotism and of the settlement of
1815, was an unnatural combination which might
prove fatal to its promoter. Public opinion in France
was on the side of the peoples struggling for political
freedom. M. Thiers, the leader of the Opposition, had
loudly declared that this was only the principle upon
which French policy could be based. M. Guizot,
therefore, considered it advisable, in his intercourse
with Metternich, not to make use of the ordinary
channels of communication, but to employ a secret
agent. In the spring of 1847, accordingly, he sent to
Vienna, a certain Klindworth, 1 who on several former
occasions appears to have been entrusted with
confidential missions by the French Foreign Office.
He was to assure Prince Metternich that the French
government was determined to uphold the territorial
status quo, and was prepared to co-operate with
Austria in opposing the introduction of any funda-
mental changes in the system of government of the
different Italian States. 2
M. Guizot, furthermore, entered into a direct
correspondence with Prince Metternich. But no
precise agreement as to their respective policies was
concluded.3 Guizot appears to have been mainly
concerned to assure the Austrian Chancellor of the
high esteem which he entertained for his perpicacity
and judgment. Nor did he, on occasions, disdain to
employ language which can only be described as that
of fulsome adulation. 4 Metternich could not be
1 Revue Retrospective. His name frequently occurs among those in
receipt of secret service money. For his mission to Vienna, he appears
to have received 10,000 francs.
2 Metternich, Memoires, VIII. pp. 395-404 ; Thureau-Dangin, La
Monarchic de Juillet, VII. pp. 239-240.
3 Ibid., pp. 388-404.
4 Ibid., pp. 404-485 (note), Guizot a Metternich, 7 novembre, 1847,
ft J'ai appris avec grand plaisir que la santd de Votre Altesse etait
excellente ; J'en fais mon compliment a 1'Europe."
412
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
otherwise than pleased and flattered by the advances
thus made to him. He was not, however, disposed to
set an undue value upon the protestations of M.
Guizot. He had little doubt that, were Austria to
invade the Papal States, France would at once
dispatch an army to Italy, proclaiming that she had
taken His Holiness under her protection. But,
although no formal compact resulted from M. Guizot's
overtures at Vienna, his desire to propitiate Prince
Metternich was reflected in his instructions to his
agents at the different Italian Courts. By the spring
of 1847, it was evident that the Italian Liberal move-
ment was regarded with nearly as much disapproval
by the government of Louis Philippe as by the
Cabinet of Vienna.
Metternich was under no illusions as to the true
meaning of the events which were taking place in
Italy. Above the popular expressions of joy at the
reforms, conceded by the Pope or by the Grand Duke
of Tuscany, rose the threatening cry for the expul-
sion of the foreigner. Unless the Liberal movement
could be crushed, the Emperor, he perceived clearly,
would have to fight to retain his Italian possessions.
" Nationality," he bade Buol warn Charles Albert,
" was the new device which the revolutionists had
inscribed upon their banners." l Resolutely he pre-
pared for the struggle which he saw was impending.
Troops were poured into Lombardy and the Austrian
garrison at Ferrara was strengthened. Moreover, he
was strongly suspected of fomenting a counter-revolu-
tionary plot at Rome, with the object of forcibly
displacing the Liberal advisers of His Holiness, and
of surrounding him with members of the reactionary
party. The discovery of this conspiracy, in which the
governor of Rome was involved, caused an immense
1 Metternich, Memoires, VIII. pp. 228-229, Metternich a Buol,
29 mai, 1846.
413
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
excitement. No certain evidence could be procured
of the participation of Austrian agents in the affair.
It was significant, however, that the garrison of
Ferrara received a substantial accession of strength on
the very day fixed upon by the conspirators for the
execution of their plans. 1 But, if Metternich's connec-
tion with the Roman plot of July 1847 may be held
to be not proven, his intention to provoke the Liberal
and national party into some ill-considered act of
violence, which should furnish him with a pretext for
armed intervention, admits of no doubt. Hitherto,
as specified by the treaty, the garrison at Ferrara 2
had been confined to the citadel. But now the
Austrians proceeded to occupy the whole town, the
troops adopting a most insulting attitude towards the
population, and especially towards the civic guard.
But this clumsy device for bringing on a collision
failed in its object. In the words of the British
minister at Florence, the newly enrolled citizen
soldiers " observed the most extraordinary moderation
under the most contumelious treatment." 1 The
Austrian proceedings at Ferrara called forth a strong
protest from His Holiness, who, at the same time
requested Charles Albert to send a frigate to Civita
Vecchia for his personal protection. His Sardinian
Majesty promptly complied with this demand, where-
upon, the French ambassador tendered an offer of
assistance on the part of his government. This
proposal, however, was declined, no doubt being
entertained at Rome, that France and Austria were
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
Palmerston, June 10, 1847 ; Hamilton to Palrnerston July 20, 1847 ;
Clinton Dawkins to Palmerston, July 17, 1847, Hamilton to Palmer-
ston, July 25, 1847 ; Palmerston to Ponsonby, September 27, 1847.
2 Ferrara was in the Papal States, but Austria had the right of
garrisoning la place de Ferrare.
3 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Hamilton to Palmer-
ston, August 14, 1847.
414
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
acting together in Italian affairs. 1 Thus Metternich,
by his aggressive attitude, had only succeeded in
creating a bond of union between the Papal govern-
ment and the Court of Turin. 2
At the end of July, 1847, Metternich resolved to
inquire of the different Powers, which were parties to
the treaties of 1815, whether they, as "the principal
guardians of the political peace," 3 intended to maintain
the territorial divisions of the Italian peninsula as
settled by the Congress of Vienna. The revolution,
he told Lord Ponsonby, must now be considered as
complete in the Roman States and in Tuscany. A
revolution, he explained, was accomplished, once a
government had been deprived of all power. But the
real object of the party which had triumphed at Rome
was to create a united Italy. The Emperor, however,
while studiously respecting the independence of the
sovereign States of the Peninsula, was determined to
preserve his own Italian kingdom. 4 The British
government, wrote Palmerston in reply, holds that the
stipulations of treaties must everywhere be observed,
and that no changes in an agreement can properly be
effected, except with the concurrence of all the Powers
which are parties to it. But Her Majesty's government,
at the same time, is no less strongly of opinion that
the right to carry out internal reforms is a right in-
herent to independent sovereignty. 5 A month later,
on September 11, when the threatening communica-
tions made by Count Buol to the Court of Turin, and
the proceedings of the military commander at Ferrara
suggested that Austria might be contemplating some
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Abercromby to
Palmerston, August 19, 1847.
2 Ibid., Abercromby to Palmerston, August 24, 1847.
3 Ibid., Metternich to Diedrichstein, August 2, 1847. In this de-
spatch occurs the famous sentence, " Italy is a geographical expression."
4 Ibid., Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847.
5 Ibid., Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 12, 1847.
415
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
act of aggression against the Kingdom of Sardinia and
the Papal dominions, Palmerston reverted to this sub-
ject. "The crowns of Great Britain and of Sardinia," he
warned Metternich, " had long been bound together by
the ties of an intimate and faithful alliance, and Great
Britain could neither forget nor repudiate claims
founded upon such honourable grounds." The Papal
States were an essential element in the political inde-
pendence of the Italian Peninsula, and no invasion of
them could take place " without leading to con-
sequences of great gravity and importance."
At the time when Palmerston was holding this
language, the British government had decided upon a
measure, which was afterwards the subject of much
criticism. In the month of April, the Papal nuncio
in Paris had expressed to Lord Normanby a fear that
His Holiness would experience great difficulty in carry-
ing out his projected reforms. It was plain that no
assistance would be forthcoming from the French
government, and it was, in consequence, very neces-
sary that the cause of social improvement in Italy
should receive " a more active moral support from
England." If there were constitutional objections to
the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with
the Holy See, 2 might not some one, he suggested, in
the confidence of Her Majesty's government, be sent to
Rome for the purpose of communicating with the Pope
and his ministers ? 3 The Russell Cabinet was strongly
in favour of acceding to this request, but the manner
in which the British government should extend its
" moral support " was somewhat difficult to determine.
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Palmerston to
Ponsonby, September 11, 1847.
2 A secretary of the British legation at Florence resided at Rome,
and directed his reports to the minister at Florence.
3 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Normanby to
Palmerston, April 19, 1847 ; Palmerston to Normanby, April 27, 1847 :
Normanby to Palmerston, April 30, 1847.
416
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
Palmerston advocated that Lord Minto, the Lord
Privy Seal, should be sent upon a special mission to
Turin, Florence and Borne. The Queen, however,
raised certain objections to this plan. In an able
memorandum Prince Albert pointed out that to
despatch a member of the government to Italy, to
encourage the rulers of the different States to adopt
measures, which Austria regarded as highly dangerous
to her existence as an Italian power, was "a most
hostile step towards our old and natural ally." It
would be more friendly, he contended, and certainly
more honest, to let it be clearly understood at Vienna
that an attack upon any Italian Sovereign, who was
desirous of effecting administrative reforms, would be
looked upon as a violation of treaties to which England
was a party. But His Royal Highness was ready to
admit that, by adopting such a policy, England would
be morally bound to uphold the independence of the
Italian States, whereas the projected mission of Lord
Minto would not commit her actively to interfere on
their behalf. 1 After some further discussion and corre-
spondence Palmerston carried his point. On Septem-
ber 11, his already quoted despatch was sent off to
Vienna, and, a week later, Lord Minto was supplied
with his instructions and started upon his journey.
Moderate as was the language which Lord Minto
was directed to hold at the different Italian Courts,
his mission was necessarily regarded with extreme
disapproval at Vienna. Yet Minto had no mandate to
encourage the movement in favour of Italian unity,
nor was he instructed to counsel the adoption of any
measures which could be regarded as even an indirect
attempt to deprive the Emperor of his Italian posses-
sions. On the contrary, he was to insist upon the
necessity of maintaining the peace. At Turin, he was
1 T. Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, I. pp. 428-434. Prince
Albert's Memorandum is dated, Ardverikie, August 29, 1847.
417 2 E
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
to warn Charles Albert of the danger of allowing his
natural irritation at the interference of Austria in his
affairs to betray him into some act, which might
furnish the Court of Vienna with a pretext for attack-
ing him. But Metternich, being determined to place
an absolute check upon the development of Liberal
ideas, was naturally greatly annoyed that a British
minister should visit Florence, Rome and Turin for
the purpose of congratulating the Sovereigns upon the
reforms which they had already carried out, and of
urging them to persevere in the same course in the
future. 1
Another task, however, had been confided to Lord
Minto, besides that of counselling the Italian rulers to
advance with prudence and circumspection along the
path of reform. On his way to Turin he was instructed
to visit Switzerland, where a very grave condition of
affairs had arisen. By the Federal Pact of 1815
Switzerland consisted of twenty-two sovereign and
independent Cantons, each of which possessed one vote
in the Federal Diet. The repercussion of the revolu-
tion of 1830, in France, was acutely felt in Switzer-
land, and, about that time, the cantonal constitutions
were revised in a democratic spirit. Some nine years
later, however, the Conservatives, by raising the cry
that religion was in danger, succeeded in many of the
Cantons in regaining their lost power. The victorious
party made no attempt, even in those Cantons where
their ascendency was the most complete, to repeal the
Liberal legislation of the past few years. On the con-
trary, in the very Catholic cantons of Lucerne and of
the Valais, the popular veto and the referendum were
introduced. It was plainly the opinion of the clergy
that their influence over the people would enable them
to obtain, by means of these democratic institutions,
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Palinerston to
Minto, September 18, 1847.
418
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
the rejection of any measure of which they disap-
proved. In the Canton of Aargau, however, of which
the population was half Protestant and half Catholic,
the clerical party failed to establish its ascendency by
peaceful means. An attempt was, accordingly, made
to overturn the existing government by force. But
the insurrection proved unsuccessful and the eight
monasteries, the inmates of which were proved to have
been actively concerned in the plot, were suppressed.
The existence of these establishments had been guaran-
teed by an article of the Federal Pact, and the
action of the Grand Council of Aargau, in decreeing
their abolition, was, in consequence, brought before the
Federal Diet. The matter was not settled until the
year 1843, when the Canton of Aargau agreed to
restore four suppressed female convents ; a com-
promise which was accepted as satisfactory by the
majority of the Diet. But scarcely had this contro-
versy, which had evoked intense bitterness of feeling,
been settled, then disturbances broke out in the Valais.
The clerical party in that Canton contrived, after
severe fighting, to overturn the Radical government.
The success of this revolution, it was clear, was largely
due to the secret assistance which the reactionaries had
received from the Grand Council of Lucerne. Such
conduct was the more inexcusable seeing that, at the
time, Lucerne was the directing Canton and, therefore,
the more bound to observe an attitude of impartiality.
The Jesuits were generally regarded as the chief
instigators of the affair, and throughout the greater
part of Switzerland a feeling of extreme hostility arose
against them. But the men in power at Lucerne were
indifferent to the dislike with which the Order was
regarded by the majority of their countrymen, and
they, forthwith, proceeded to call in the Jesuits and to
give them the complete control of all the educational
establishments in their Canton. Meanwhile, with the
419
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
admitted connivance of the Radical governments of
Berne, Aargau and Soleure, volunteers were being
enrolled and, at the end of the year 1844, and again
in April, 1845, armed bands, known as the corps
francs, deliberately attacked Lucerne. But, having
concluded an alliance with Uri, Zug, and Unterwalden,
Lucerne successfully repelled these invaders. In this
same year the expulsion of the Jesuits from the whole
of Switzerland was moved in the Federal Diet.
As far back as the year 1832, the Cantons of Uri,
Schwyz and Unterwalden, had entered into a com-
bination, known as the League of Sarnen, with the
object of resisting the democratic tendencies of the
age. The association was, subsequently, strengthened
by the accession of Friburg, Zug, Lucerne, and, in
1844, of the Valais. Early in the year 1846, the
character of the league was transformed completely.
From a peaceful association it was converted into a
military alliance, for the purpose of upholding the
right of every independent Canton to live under such
laws as its legislature might enact. The Sonderbund,
as this alliance of the seven Catholic Cantons was
called, was at once denounced as an infraction of
Article VI. of the Federal Pact, prescribing that
" no alliance, prejudicial either to the general con-
federacy or to the rights of other Cantons, could be
formed by separate Cantons among themselves." A
motion to that effect was, accordingly, brought for-
ward in the Federal Diet, but no decision in its favour
was obtained. Before the next year, however, in some
cases by constitutional means, in others, as at Geneva,
by force and violence, the composition of the govern-
ments in several Cantons was changed and Radical
Grand Councils were installed in power. Under these
circumstances, a majority was easily obtained in favour
both of the expulsion of the Jesuits and of declaring
the illegality of the Soiiderbund. The allied Catholic
420
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
Cantons, however, refused to submit to this decision of
the Federal Diet and proclaimed their intention of
resisting, by arms if necessary, any attempt to inter-
fere with their independence. Thus, at the time
when Lord Minto departed for the continent, all the
signs pointed to the probability that Switzerland
would, before long, be the scene of a bloody civil war.
The rapid advance of democracy in Switzerland
had necessarily excited the alarm of the absolute
Courts. Moreover, between the years 1830 and 1840,
not only the Cabinet of Vienna but the French
government had had, on 'several occasions, good cause
to complain that, unchecked by the authorities,
political refugees were allowed to concert their
measures for disturbing the peace of neighbouring
States. After 1840, the internal disputes and the
increasing lawlessness of the country began to attract
the serious attention of all the Powers responsible for
the settlement of 1815. Both Lord Aberdeen and
M. Guizot were agreed that, could the question of the
Jesuits be arranged, the chief element of danger
in the situation would be removed. The French
minister consented readily to exert his influence to
induce the Pope to recall them. Let it be well under-
stood at Rome, he wrote to Rossi, on June 6, 1845,
that, should a Radical government be established at
Geneva, there would be a majority in favour of the
expulsion of the Order in the Federal Diet. Make it
perfectly clear to His Holiness that " the fate of the
disciples of Loyola is in the hands of the followers of
Calvin." 1 Prince Metternich was at this time instruct-
ing the Austrian ambassador at Rome to employ
similar arguments. But Gregory XVI. showed no
disposition to interfere, and all hope had soon to be
abandoned of obtaining his co-operation in the affair. 3
1 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 434-435.
2 Correspondence relating to affairs of Switzerland, Cowley to
421
In the following year, the overthrow of the Conserva-
tive governments at Geneva and in the Canton of
Vaud, and the prospect that, in the ensuing session,
the Radicals would be in a majority in the Federal
Diet, increased Metternich's uneasiness. Hitherto,
France had set her face resolutely against interven-
tion in any shape or form. But, in the autumn of
1846, Louis Philippe, being anxious to assure himself
of the neutrality of the Northern Courts in the question
of the Spanish marriages, the Austrian Chancellor took
the opportunity of proposing that the Powers should
seriously take in hand the affairs of Switzerland.
M. Guizot was rather disposed to accede to this sug-
gestion, but the King, being still hopeful of re-estab-
lishing " the cordial understanding," refused to
sanction any participation in measures which might
lead eventually to armed intervention. 1 In the spring
of 1847, however, when it was clear that England had
no intention of forgetting the affront which she had
received in the matter of the Spanish marriages, and
when, in consequence, M. Guizot was desirous of
effecting a close understanding with Austria, French
policy towards Switzerland was altered to suit the
exigencies of the situation.
The sympathies of Metternich and of all the
absolute Courts were necessarily on the side of the
Sonderbund? The continental Cabinets were agreed
that it would be highly dangerous, in the unsettled
state of Europe, to allow the league of the Catholic
and Conservative Cantons to be dissolved by their
Radical neighbours. Federal unity, Metternich main-
tained, was clearly the object for which the democrats
were striving, and it was on that account that they
Aberdeen, February 8, 21, 1845 ; Gordon to Aberdeen, February 19,
1845.
1 F. O. France 756, Normanby to Palmerston, October 23, 1846
(secret and confidential). Metternich, Memoiren, VII. pp. 178-180.
2 Metternich, Memoires, VII. pp. 451-466.
422
desired to undermine cantonal independence. But
any revision of the Federal Pact would, he argued,
release from their engagements the Powers which had
guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Switzer-
land, and would justify them in intervening. Louis
Philippe and M. Guizot, although fully disposed to
endorse his views, dared not venture to employ French
troops to fight the battle of the Jesuits. They, accord-
ingly, insinuated that, if Austria were to take the first
step, public opinion in France might be reconciled to
the notion of a French intervention. This ingenuous
proposal was promptly declined. Metternich had no
idea of incurring the odium of invading Switzerland
and of allowing France to declare that similar action
on her part had been rendered necessary by the aggres-
siveness of Austria. 1 Thus in Swiss, as in Italian
affairs, M. Guizot and Prince Metternich, notwith-
standing the harmony of their sentiments, found it
impossible to devise any practical plan for concerted
action.
England, as a party to the settlement of 1815, had
an unquestionable right to be consulted in any arrange-
ment tending to alter the political position of Switzer-
land in the European system. But, owing to her
geographical situation, she was less directly concerned
than France, Austria or Prussia in the internal condition
of the Confederation. The British government was,
consequently, in a position to regard the question from
a more detached and impartial standpoint. More-
over, the letters of Mr. Grote, 2 the historian of Greece,
to the Spectator, supplied the English public with far
better information about Swiss politics than was to
be obtained in the official press of continental States.
1 Metternich, Memoires, VII. pp. 335-336 ; Metternich t\ Apponyi,
20 juin, 1847.
2 G. Grote, Seven letters on the recent politics of Sivitzerland
(originally published in Spectator), London, 1847.
423
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
Palmerston had no intention of discussing the questions
as to whether the alliance of the Catholic Cantons
should be looked upon as an infraction of the Federal
Pact" and as to whether the action of the Radical
majority in the Diet, in decreeing the expulsion of
the Jesuits, constituted a violation of cantonal sove-
reignty and independence. It is clear that, from an
early date, he adopted the view, propounded by Mr.
Grote, that, whereas the so-called Radical Cantons repre-
sented the wealth, the intelligence, the industry, the
population and the progressive elements of Switzerland,
the Cantons of the Sonderbund were, in every respect,
the stationary and backward portions of the Republic.
From these premises it followed logically that, although
it might be possible for the allied Catholic Cantons to
break up the Confederation, it was not in their power
to guide it or to hold it together. 1 He, therefore,
proposed both to Prince Metternich and M. Guizot,
that they should endeavour to persuade the Catholic
leaders to dissolve their alliance. 2 This solution of
the difficulty, as may be supposed, was not adopted
by either of the statesmen to whom it was made.
On the contrary, Metternich at this time was arranging
to furnish the Sonderbund with arms, and was seriously
considering whether he should place the services of an
Austrian general at its disposal, while M. Guizot was
giving secret instructions for the despatch of warlike
stores to Lucerne from the arsenal at BesaDfon. 3
Lord Minto, in his conversations with M. Ochsen-
bein, the President of the Federal Diet, was charged
to counsel forbearance and moderation. "Her Majesty's
1 G. Grote, Seven letters on the recent politics of Switzerland, pp.
173 and 181.
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmer-
ston to Ponsonby, August 9, 17, 1847 ; Pabnerston to Normanby,
August 17, 1847.
3 Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847 ; Peel to Palmerston,
October 14, 1847.
424
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
government," wrote Palmers ton, " as the sincere and
disinterested friend of Switzerland, could not but
exhort all parties to abate pretensions, however just
they may be thought, and to yield somewhat of rights,
however valid they may be considered, rather than
begin an appeal to arms, the consequences of which
it would be easier to lament than to foresee." He was
not prepared to deny that the Federal Pact might
stand in need of revision. It was alleged, however,
that the Diet proposed " to sweep away the separate
sovereignty of the several Cantons in order to blend
the whole of Switzerland into one single Republic."
He must, therefore, remind the Swiss government that
"the fundamental principle upon which the arrange-
ments of the Treaty of Vienna, in regard to Switzer-
land, repose, is the separate sovereignty of the several
Cantons." Any attempt to alter the basis of the
political organization of the Republic would inevitably
entail civil war and foreign intervention. 1
Yet, notwithstanding the pacific spirit in which
Lord Minto's instructions were drawn up, Palmerston
has been freely accused of inciting the Radical Cantons
to begin hostilities. Animosity to Louis Philippe and
his principal minister, assert his detractors, was at
this period the mainspring of his policy. Thus, when
the French government evinced a disposition to favour
the cause of the Sonderbund, Palmerston, having satis-
fied himself of the military superiority of the Radical
Cantons, secretly urged them to attack their weaker
neighbours, in the hope that the forcible dissolution
of the Catholic alliance would entail the downfall of
M. Guizot. This charge has been reiterated in the
recently published letters of Sir Robert Morier. Mr.
David Morier, Sir Robert's father, had been for many
years British minister in Switzerland. In the summer
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Stvitzerland, Palmerston
to Minto, September 18, 1847.
425
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
of 1847, however, being in England on leave, he was
not allowed to return to his post, because, says his son,
he was instinctively a peacemaker and, therefore, no
longer a suitable instrument to execute the policy
upon which Lord Palmerston had decided to embark. 1
But a perusal of Mr. Morier's despatches suggests
another, and an infinitely more probable, explanation of
his recall. When affairs in Switzerland were beginning
to assume a dangerous aspect, he is to be found
expressing views with which Lord Palmerston would
have heartily agreed. Writing to Lord Aberdeen, in
June, 1844, on the subject of the Jesuits, Mr. Morier
points out that this intrusion of a powerful foreign
agency into all the concerns of the Confederation
raises the question whether, "self-preservation being
the first law of States, the claim of cantonal sovereignty
should not be made to yield to the exigencies of the
general welfare." Again, some months later, speaking
of the introduction of the Jesuits into Lucerne, he
warns his chief that Lucerne " must be inscribed upon
the list of Cantons with Friburg, Schwyz and the Yalais,
subjected, henceforward, through their Jesuit institu-
tions, to the influence of a foreign and anti-national
power of the most dangerous tendency to the peace of
the Confederation." 2 But, during the winter of 1846,
an unprovoked assault was committed upon one of
his sons, Burnet Morier, by an excited Radical of
Berne. The young man with commendable promptitude
felled his assailant to the ground, 3 and, under these
circumstances, Palmerston probably considered that
the affair need not be made the subject of an official
demand for reparation. Mr. Morier, however, thought
1 Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier, I.
p. 88.
* Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Morier to
Aberdeen, June 4, November 25, 1844.
n Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir fi. Morier,
p. 58.
426
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
otherwise, and his indignation appears to have trans-
formed him into a strong supporter of the Sonderbund.
The contrast between the sentiments, contained in his
memorandum on Swiss affairs, submitted to the Foreign
Office in February, 1847, 1 and those expressed in his
earlier despatches, must have given Lord Palmerston
food for serious reflection. Without doubt, he must
have come to the conclusion that a man burning with
resentment against the Radical leaders was hardly as
qualified, as his son seems to have supposed, to
exercise a moderating influence upon the passions of
contending parties.
Lord Minto, having arrived in Switzerland, lost no
time in placing himself in communication with M.
Ochsenbein. The election of this person, who two
years before had commanded the corps francs in
their raid upon Lucerne, to the post of President of
the Federal Diet, had greatly exasperated the Catholics.
Lord Minto, however, reported that he found him
most reasonable, and, to all appearances, sincerely
desirous of discovering some means of averting an
outbreak of hostilities. The Jesuits, he assured the
English minister, constituted the chief obstacle to a
peaceful settlement, and, could they be removed, all
danger of war would disappear. Palmerston, on receiv-
ing this information, at once instructed Minto, who by
that time had passed on to Italy, to use every en-
deavour, while at Rome, to persuade His Holiness to
intervene. 2 But, meanwhile, in Switzerland the
chances of maintaining the peace were hourly diminish-
ing. Both sides were now openly preparing for war,
and, on October 29, the deputies of the Catholic
Cantons formally quitted the Federal Diet. On that
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Sivitzerland, Morier to
Palmerston, February 18, 1847 (enclosure).
2 Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 4, 1847; Palmerston to
Minto, October 22, 1847.
427
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
same day Lord Palmerston made a last effort to avert
a rupture. He enjoined the British charge d'affaires
at Berne to seek out M. Ochsenbein and to endeavour
to prevail upon him to postpone the execution of any
irrevocable measure, until the result of Lord Minto's
mission to Rome should be known. M. Ochsenbein's
only reply to this communication was hastily to
convene the Diet, which forthwith decreed the dissolu-
tion of the Sonderbund by the armed forces of the
Federal executive. 1
Two days later, on November 6, the Due de Broglie,
who had recently succeeded Sainte-Aulaire, as ambas-
sador in London, submitted a project of intervention
to Lord Palmerston. Let the Powers, proposed M.
Guizot, offer to mediate on the basis that the question
of the Jesuits should be settled by the Pope, and that
the other points in dispute should form the subject of
a conference, at which each of the Cantons should be
represented. In the meantime, the contending parties
would be invited to suspend hostilities a refusal to
comply releasing the Powers from their engagements
to the Confederation and entitling them to enforce
their demands by whatever measures they might
subsequently agree to adopt. 2 Palmerston's official
answer was not sent off to Paris until November 16.
It was in the form of a counter-proposition. The
British government, he declared, " could not go the
length of thinking " that the outbreak of civil war
could release the Powers from those pledges into which
they had entered to maintain the neutrality of Switzer-
land. Furthermore, it considered that the presence of
the Jesuits upon the territory of the Confederation, in
opposition to the wishes of the majority of the Cantons,
constituted a real grievance. Her Majesty's govern-
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
to Peel, October 29, 1847 ; Peel to Palmerston, November 4, 6, 1847.
2 Ibid., Guizot a Broglie, 4 novembre, 1847.
428
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
ment, under the circumstances, before consenting to
join with France and the other Power in offering to
mediate, must make two conditions. In the first
place, the removal of the Jesuits, whether by a decision
to be obtained from the Pope, or by an act of sovereign
authority on the part of the Cantons in which the
Order was established, must be the basis of any arrange-
ment proposed by the Powers to the contending parties.
Secondly, it was to be distinctly understood that a
refusal by either side to accept mediation must not be
made the ground for armed interference in the internal
affairs of Switzerland. 1
In Paris, at Berlin, and at Vienna, it had been in-
tended to hold very different language to M. Ochsenbein
and his colleagues. Nevertheless, M. Guizot, although
stipulating for certain trifling modifications, accepted
the British proposal. The assent of Prussia and of
Austria was obtained, but it was given with the utmost
reluctance. 2 Palmerston was, in point of fact, com-
pletely master of the situation. The condition of
Germany was so unsettled, the appearance of affairs
in Italy was so alarming, that Metternich could not
attack the Radicals of Berne except in combination
with France and, in the Swiss question, Louis Philippe
and M. Guizot dared not act with the absolute Courts
in opposition to the constitutional government of
England. 3 Nicholas, having no direct interest in the
matter, was content to adopt .whatever course might
commend itself to the Cabinet of Vienna. The five
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
to Normanby, November 16, 1847.
2 Ibid., Normanby to Palmerston, November 18, 1847 ; Palmerston
to Normanby, November 19, 1847 ; Broglie a Guizot, 20 novembre,
1847 ; Guizot a Broglie, 19 novembre, 1847 ; Howard to Palmerston,
November 21, 1847 ; Palmerston to Broglie, November 26, 1847 ; Howard
to Palmerston, November 22, 1847 ; Metternich, Memoires, VII. pp.
493-502.
3 F. 0. France 783, Normanby to Palmerston, November 6 (cypher),
8, 1847 (private and confidential). Guizot, Memoir es, VIII. pp. 468-502.
429
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
governments being thus agreed, an identic note was, on
November 26, drawn up in London for presentation
to the President of the Diet, and to the official organ of
the Sonderbund by the representatives of the Powers
in Switzerland. But, while ministers and diplomatists
had been talking and writing, the Federal executive
had acted. No sooner had the Diet, on November 4,
decreed the forcible suppression of the Sonderbund
than the Genevese general, Dufour, who had at his
disposal an army of 100,000 men and 260 guns, was
ordered to begin operations. The isolated canton of
Fribourg having been easily overwhelmed, the Federal
commander advanced with his whole force against
Lucerne. Salis-Soglio, a Protestant of the Grisons,
whose army amounted to some 80,000 troops with
74 guns, awaited him in a selected position between
the Reuss and the Lake of Zug. The decisive battle
was fought on November 23, Dufour's victory was
complete. On the following day, the Jesuits and the
executive council having fled, Lucerne surrendered.
The Valais, the last of the seven Cantons to abandon
the struggle, capitulated on the 29th. Twenty-five
days after the Diet had formally resolved upon its
suppression, the Sonderbund ceased to exist.
In almost all accounts of these events Palmerston's
proceedings have been misrepresented. According to
his detractors, he cunningly inveigled the Powers into
an exchange of views with the pretended object of
averting civil war in Switzerland, while in reality he
was secretly urging the Federal executive to open the
campaign against the Sonderbund. 1 Even Liberals, in
sympathy with his policy, describe him as having
deliberately protracted the negotiations in London, in
order that the Radicals should be able to crush the
Catholic Cantons without fear of foreign interference. 2
j 1 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, VII. pp. 186-198.
2 Cambridge Modern History, XI. p. 250
430
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
Palmerston, it is perfectly clear, was strongly opposed
to direct intervention and, moreover, was disposed to
think that an unsolicited offer on the part of the
Powers to assist the Swiss to settle their internal dis-
putes would inflame their national pride, and rather
tend to aggravate, than to diminish, the gravity of the
situation. It is possible, therefore, that he may to
some extent have delayed the negotiations. But the
alleged waste of time cannot at the most have exceeded
a very few days, seeing that the French note was only
submitted to him on November 9, and that his counter-
proposal had been agreed to by the Powers and was
ready for transmission to Switzerland on the 26th. To
contend that Palmerston supposed that, by delaying
the negotiations for two or three days, he would enable
the Radicals to achieve their purpose, is to credit him
with a knowledge of the military weakness of the
Sonderbund which he most certainly did not possess.
If he in any way retarded the final drafting of the
proposed offer of mediation, it is infinitely more prob
able that he so acted in the hope that Minto's efforts at
Rome to induce the Pope to recall the Jesuits from
Lucerne might prove successful and that, in consequence,
the two parties might be able to settle their quarrel
without an appeal to arms and without foreign
interference.
Sir Robert Morier, however, asserts most positively
that Palmerston " instigated Peel to perform his
celebrated feat of precipitating the war of the So?ider-
lund." 1 In his Memoir es M. Guizot has reproduced a
letter from M. de Bois-le-Comte, the French ambassador
to the Confederation, in which it is stated that, upon
receipt of the news from London that the Powers
intended to propose mediation, Mr. Peel sent the
chaplain of the British legation to the headquarters of
1 Mrs. Rosslynn Wemyss, Memoirs and letters of Sir R. Morier, I.
p. 38.
431
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
General Dufour to apprise him of the state of affairs
and to urge him immediately to march upon Lucerne
and try conclusions with the army of the Sonderbund. 1
It is evident that, if there be any foundation of truth
in these stories, neither the instructions with which
Lord Minto, a member of the government, was
supplied, nor the oSicial despatch of October 29, which
was to be communicated to M. Ochsenbein, can have
been the expression of Lord Palmerston's real policy.
His veritable intentions must have been conveyed in
private letters 2 to the British charge d'affaires at Berne,
it never having been suggested that he employed any
secret agent in the affair. The question as to who
acted as British minister to the Confederation, at this
period, is, therefore, of extreme importance. It is in-
conceivable that Palmerston, if he really were engaged
in prosecuting the Machiavellian designs imputed to
him, should not have replaced Mr. Morier by an
Arthur Aston, a Henry Bulwer, or some other tried
and trusted agent. But in point of fact the business
of the legation, during the whole of this critical time,
was left in charge of a young secretary, Mr. Peel.
Now Peel was the eldest son of Sir Robert, who, to the
day of his death, never forgave Palmerston for his
desertion of the Tory party in 1828. 3 Is it credible
that Palmerston can have entrusted the conduct of an
affair of the kind, suggested by M. Guizot and Sir
Robert Morier, to a comparative stranger, a young man
1 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 506-508.
* One private letter was certainly written by Palmerston to Peel. It
is dated November 17, 1847, marked private, and begins " My dear
Sir." Peel is asked to ascertain privately, "throwing out the idea as
his own," in what light the Diet would regard the proposal of mediation
which Palmerston informs him, in confidence, he has just sent to Paris.
He then proceeds to warn him to be on his guard against M. de Bois-le-
Comte. " Keep well with him," he says, " but it is well that you should
know he is one of the most artful, cunning and intriguing of the French
diplomatists " (F. O. Switzerland 92).
3 C. Greville, Journals (2), I. p. 364 (note).
432
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
of twenty-five, the son of his political opponent and
personal enemy ?
Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Palmerston's
despatch of October 29, although written with a very
different object, did, in effect, precipitate the conflict
between the Radical Cantons and the Sonderbund.
As Mr. Peel, without doubt, rightly divined, M.
Ochsenbein, notwithstanding the pacific language which
he had held to Lord Minto, had no real desire to see
the dispute amicably settled. 1 Federal unity was the
end which he and his friends had set themselves to
attain, and they were convinced that nothing but
physical force would induce the Catholic and Con-
servative Cantons to renounce their sovereign rights.
By " blood and iron " alone could the success of their
policy be achieved. Hence the prospect that England
intended to exert herself at Rome, in favour of Papal
intervention, may have driven the Radicals of Berne to
immediate action. They may have argued that, should
His Holiness consent to recall the Jesuits and should
the Sonderbund, in consequence, be peacefully dis-
solved, an excellent opportunity would be lost of
reducing the Conservative Cantons to submission.
The identic note of November 26, 1847, was to
have been communicated to the contending parties,
on behalf of Great Britain, by Sir Stratford Canning.
His instructions, however, provided that he should
not present it if, upon his arrival in Switzerland, he
should find that the Sonderbund had capitulated and
that the war was at an end, 3 Canning, in consequence,
made no offer of mediation, but remained about three
weeks in Switzerland for the purpose of impressing
upon M. Ochsenbein and his colleagues the expediency
of treating the defeated Cantons with consideration,
1 F. O. Switzerland 94, Peel to Palmerston, November 6, 1847.
2 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Palmerston
to S. Canning, November 27, December 1, 1847.
433 2 F
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
and of refraining from any measures which might
furnish other Powers with a pretext for intervention.
France, Austria, and Prussia, however, adopted a
different procedure. M. de Bois-le-Comte received
the identic note on November 29, and, forthwith,
despatched a copy of it both to the Federal Diet and
to the leaders of the Sonderbund, notwithstanding that
Lucerne had already surrendered and that it was
evident that the Valais could not hold out much
longer. 1 His example was followed by the ministers
of Austria and Prussia. To these communications the
executive at Berne, the members of which had
expressed to Sir Stratford Canning their gratification
at the attitude adopted by Great Britain, sent an
answer couched in very decided language. The offer
of mediation was rejected, not only because hostilities
had ceased, but because it was impossible to recognize
the principle upon which the proposal was based. If
the Confederation were at war with another State, it
might, or might not, entertain an offer of mediation,
but it could not admit, under any circumstances, the
claim of the Powers to treat as belligerents the
Cantons of the Sonderbund. The treaties by which
the Confederation had been constituted provided only
for one Diet and for one Federal executive. The
alliance of the seven Cantons was simply an act of
rebellion which the central government had been
strong enough to deal with effectually. 2
The overthrow of the Sonderbund and the haughty
reply returned by the Diet to the French, the Austrian,
and the Prussian notes caused a profound sensation.
The inability of the absolute Courts and of the govern-
ment of M. Guizot to render assistance to the Cantons,
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Switzerland, Hervey to
Palmerston, December 3, 1847.
2 Ibid., Peel to Palmerston, December 7, 1847 ; Canning to Palmer-
ston, December 8, 11, 1847.
434
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
which had sought to resist the decrees of the majority
in the Swiss Diet, was made manifest to the world.
Italian nationalists, German Liberals, French re-
formers, acclaimed the victory of the Radical executive
as a triumph for their cause. In governmental circles,
at Vienna and at Berlin, there was no disposition to
under-rate the gravity of the situation. Largely
owing to the restraining influence of Lord Minto,
central Italy still presented a certain outward ap-
pearance of tranquillity. 1 But Sicily and Naples were
in open revolution, and King "Bomba," who had,
hitherto, set his face sternly against all reforms, was,
in January, 1848, compelled to concede a constitution.
Meanwhile, throughout the Peninsula the feeling of
hostility to Austria was growing in intensity. En-
couraged by Lord Minto, Sardinia, Tuscany, and the
Papal States agreed to abolish all internal lines of
customs and to form a commercial league, after the
manner of the German Zollverein? The significance
of this measure was clearly perceived by Metternich.
On December 14, he directed Diedrichstein to acquaint
Palmerston that the condition of Italy would neces-
sitate a large increase of the Austrian army in Lom-
bardy. 3 " You and I," he confided to his old friend,
Radetzky, " are not destined to end our days in peace.
... It has been reserved for the present age to
witness the spectacle of a Liberal Pope."'
The forcible dissolution of the alliance of the
Catholic Cantons made it the more necessary, the
German Cabinets declared, for the Powers vigilantly
to watch over the proceedings of the Federal Diet.
The conference, which it had been proposed to hold
upon Swiss affairs, must, they insisted, still take
1 Correspondence relating to the affairs of Italy, Minto to Palmer-
ston, October 29, 1847.
- Ibid., Minto to Palmerston, October 5, November 9, 1847.
3 Ibid., Metternich to Diedrichstein, December 14, 1847.
4 Metternich, Memoires, VII. p. 476.
435
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
place. 1 The British government, however, altogether
dissented from this view. The Sonderbund no longer
existed, the Jesuits had fled, and Palmerston, there-
fore, could see no occasion for any deliberations upon
the domestic affairs of the Confederation. England,
in any case, he announced, must now decline to take
part in a conference. M. Guizot adopted a different
attitude. If Palmerston were resolved to pose as the
patron of Radicals and revolutionists, why should not
he come forward as the champion of order and
stability ? The Austrian, Count Coloredo, and the
Prussian, General von Radowitz, who had been
despatched to Paris by their respective governments,
found him most favourably disposed. It was very
flattering to his vanity that at this crisis the Courts of
Vienna and of Berlin should be prepared to defer to
his opinions and should send their emissaries to Paris
to consult him. But from London he received a word
of warning which made a considerable impression upon
him. It would evoke, wrote his friend the Due de
Broglie, recollections of the Holy Alliance and savour
overmuch of the deliberations at Laybach and Verona, 3
were France to take part in a conference which Eng-
land had declined to attend. 3
In his conversations with Coloredo and Radowitz,
M. Guizot, consequently, deprecated the notion of
assembling a conference. Let them for the moment,
he urged, be content with formally declaring to the
Diet that the Powers were resolved not to suffer the
violation of the principle of cantonal sovereignty
and independence. Should their representations be
1 Metternich, Memoires, VII. pp. 613-630.
2 As a result of the conference at Laybach in 1821 Austria received
a mandate to intervene at Naples and to abolish the constitution wrung
from Ferdinand. The congress of Verona in 1822 preceded a French
intervention in Spain for the purpose of restoring the absolute rule of
Ferdinand VII.
3 Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchie de Juillet, VII. p. 210.
436
PALMERSTON AND THE DEVOLUTION OF '48
unheeded, the question of active intervention could be
more conveniently discussed at a later date. He had,
they must not forget, his parliamentary position to
consider. In the coming session, M. Thiers was pre-
paring to assail his foreign policy with the utmost
virulence. Metternich consented readily to adopt
these suggestions. Far from desiring to aggravate the
difficulties of M. Guizot, he considered it of supreme
importance that he should remain in office. 1 A joint
note, dated January 18, 1848, was, accordingly, drawn
up and presented to the Federal executive. Coloredo
and Radowitz, thereupon, quitted Paris. It was
clearly inexpedient that these agents of the absolute
Courts should be present in the French capital, during
the heated debates to which the reply to the Address
was expected to give rise. But their deliberations
were to be regarded as merely suspended, not as
definitely concluded. In the spring they were to
return and resume their discussions. But this plan
was not destined to be realized. Before the time
appointed for their second meeting with M. Guizot,
the storm burst and swept away the Orleans Monarchy.
The revolutionary contagion spread rapidly to Berlin
and to Vienna. Metternich, compelled to fly, sought
refuge in England, in company with Prince Wittgen-
stein, M. Guizot, and other ultra-conservative statesmen.
At the news of the downfall of the redoubtable Chan-
cellor the Milanese flew to arms. After a memorable
conflict of five days' duration, Radetzky retired upon
the Quadrilateral, to prepare for the struggle with
Charles Albert, who had thrown down the gauntlet to
Austria and marched to the assistance of the Lombards.
A history of Franco-British relations, during the
reign of Louis Philippe, is not concerned with the
internal reasons which contributed to his downfall. It
1 Guizot, Memoires, VIII. pp. 513-515. Metternich, Memoires, VII.
pp. 563, 564.
437
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
is sufficient to point out that the existence of the
Orleans Monarchy was necessarily precarious, seeing
that it was in the nature of a compromise which had
only been grudgingly acquiesced in by the nation.
The revolution by which it was overwhelmed was, in
the words of Lamartine, " une revolution de mepris"
All classes were thoroughly disgusted with the policy of
M. Guizot and indignant at the numerous public and
private scandals * brought to light, during the year
1847. In a constitutional State a change of govern-
ment is the remedy provided for such a condition of
affairs. Louis Philippe, however, was too attached to
his system of personal government willingly to part
with a minister, who never attempted to restrict him
to the role of a constitutional sovereign. 2 His last
Cabinet, he protested, to the day of his death, had the
support of the majority of the Chamber. But the
servile body of placemen, which formed the ministerial
party, in no way represented the opinion of the nation.
The people with one accord condemned the proceedings
of the government and identified the King with the
unpopular actions of his principal minister. On
February 23, 1848, a demonstration in favour of parlia-
mentary reform, followed by a tumult, in the streets,
sufficed the destroy the discredited regime.
The rupture of " the cordial understanding " with
England was followed so closely by the downfall of the
monarchy, as to suggest that there must have been a
connection between the two events. That the quarrel
with England was one of the contributory causes of
the revolution is almost universally admitted.
1 Notably the trial and conviction of MM. Teate and de Cubieres,
ex-ministers, for fraud in connection with a mining concession and the
murder of the Duchesse de Choiseuil-Praslin by her husband. The
Duke, a peer of France, took poison in prison. The Duchess was the
daughter of Marshal Se"bastiani.
2 F. O. France 781, Normanby to Palmers ton, July 30, 1847 (private
and confidential).
438
PALMEKSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
English writers have generally referred to the events of
'48 with some complacency, as the just retribution
which promptly overtook Louis Philippe. So shrewd
an observer as Baron Stockmar appears to have been
convinced that the revelations in connection with the
Spanish marriages did the " Citizen King " an incalcu-
lable amount of harm in the eyes of the French people
and precipitated his overthrow. 1 Now, it is clear that
the Spanish marriages had one effect which took those
who were responsible for them completely by surprise.
M. Guizot had confidently anticipated that, whatever
other consequences might flow from them, they would
be acclaimed as a great diplomatic triumph achieved at
the expense of England. But the event completely
falsified his expectations. The men, who in the ques-
tion of the right of search, in the Pritchard affair, and
in many other matters, had constantly accused him of
truckling to England, were the first to denounce him
for having sacrificed " the cordial understanding " to a
purely dynastic object. It is more than probable that
the indignation professed by M. Thiers and his friends
was not very sincere and was, to a large extent, assumed
for purposes of party politics. But their words, none
the less, made a deep impression upon the middle-
classes which had hitherto steadfastly supported the
regime of July. These people, says Lord Normanby,
were convinced that their material interests had
suffered owing to the rupture of the English alliance.
The construction of railways in France had led, as in
England, to a wild outburst of speculation. The
undue inflation of prices was followed by the inevit-
able reaction. This unexpected depreciation in the
value of the shares of the new companies was not, how-
ever, ascribed to its true causes. Disappointed specu-
lators persuaded themselves that their losses were due
to the disinclination of the British public to invest in
1 titockmar, Memoirs, II. p. 203.
439
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
French railways, owing to the change which the
Spanish marriages had wrought in the political relations
of the two countries. 1
But in so far as the revolution of '48 is concerned,
the true importance of the break-up of " the cordial
understanding " consists in the policy which M. Guizot,
in consequence, saw fit to adopt. It is undeniable that
his attitude towards the Italian national movement and
in the Swiss question was severely condemned by the
majority of his countrymen, and proved most injurious
to the monarchy. Men perceived clearly that the only
result of his unnatural alliance with the Cabinet of
Vienna had been enormously to diminish French
influence at Rome and at Turin. In Switzerland his
policy was seen to have been even more ineffectual. 2 All
his efforts had been directed to the preservation of the
Sonderbund. Nevertheless, the alliance of the re-
actionary cantons had been promptly and ignomini-
ously dissolved, whilst his proffered mediation had
been rejected with a haughty intimation that the
victorious party intended to settle its affairs without
his interference. It has been urged, however, in his
defence that his difficulties were greatly aggravated by
Lord Palmerston, whose deliberate purpose it was to
thwart him on every occasion. A secret alliance, it has
been said, existed between the British Foreign Minister
and M. Thiers. Gossip on this subject had been rife ever
since the close of the year 1844. It would seem that
about that time some friendly messages from Palmer-
ston were conveyed to M. Thiers by Sir John Easthope, 3
the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, which was
generally regarded as Palmerston's especial organ. In
1 F. O. France 781, Normanby to Palmerston, July 30, 1847 (private
and confidential).
a E. Eegnault, Hiatoire de liuit ans, III. pp. 808-309. Thureau-
Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, VII. pp. 232-294.
3 F. O. France 700, Cowley to Aberdeen, December 23, 1844 (private
and confidential). C. Greville, Journals (2), II. p. 267.
440
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
the following year, when M. Thiers visited London, Sir
Anthony Panizzi, an Italian political exile, and the
chief librarian of the British Museum, took great credit
to himself for having cemented a good understanding
between the two statesmen. 1 Palmerston afterwards
denied absolutely that their interviews were in any
way connected with a " conspiracy against M. Guizot. 2
Greville, however, accuses him of having, during the
controversy on the subject of the Spanish marriages,
permitted Lord Normanby to supply M. Thiers with
the diplomatic documents bearing upon the question.
Greville was so ready to believe anything discreditable
about Palmerston that he cannot, as a rule, be looked
upon as an altogether trustworthy witness. But, at
the time referred to, he was in a position to speak of
his own knowledge of what was taking place, inasmuch
as he was in Paris for the express purpose of trying to
re-establish " the cordial understanding " and was,
moreover, the guest of Lord Normanby at the British
embassy. 3 His testimony, therefore, coupled with the
corroborative evidence to be found in the published
letters of Panizzi, does suggest that certain of Thiers'
very damaging criticisms of M. Guizot may have been
inspired by Lord Palmerston. 4 But, had the policy of
M. Guizot been supported by public opinion, the
intrigues of a foreign minister with his chief political
opponent would have tended to strengthen, rather than
to weaken, his position. The whole affair, indeed, is
not of much importance. Some of Thiers' newspaper
articles may have been based upon information im-
properly supplied to him by the agents of Lord
Palmerston, but his great speech on the Spanish
1 L. Fagan, Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. pp. 253-254.
2 Letters of Queen Victoria, Palmerston to Melbourne, December
26, 1845.
3 C. Greville, Journals (2), III. p. 40, also pp. 16-49.
4 L. Fagau, Life of Sir A. Panizzi, I. pp. 208-248.
441
marriages was not delivered until February 4, 1847, 1
when the British blue book was at the disposal of any
one who might desire to purchase it.
But the more serious charge has been made that
Palmerston's whole policy, at this period, was sub-
ordinated to his desire to avenge the defeat he had
sustained in the Spanish marriages. 2 His attitude in
the Swiss and Italian questions has been fully explained.
It is difficult to see how any British minister could
have acted differently. Had Aberdeen been in office,
it may safely be surmised that, out of consideration
for Austria, he would not have advocated the despatch
of one of his colleagues upon such a mission, as was
confided to a member of Lord John Russell's govern-
ment. But, without doubt, he would have furnished
his agents at the Italian Courts with instructions sub-
stantially the same as those drawn up for the guidance
of Lord Minto. In the Swiss affair both Aberdeen and
Palmerston sought to avert civil war and foreign inter-
vention by inducing the Pope to recall the Jesuits
from Lucerne. There is, in short, a continuity in the
British policy, whether conducted by Aberdeen or by
Palmerston, not to be found in that of M. Guizot.
His rapprochement with the Cabinet of Vienna obliged
him to adopt towards the Liberal and national move-
ments in progress throughout Europe the views of
Prince Metternich. The precise reasons which induced
him to make overtures to Austria can only be con-
jectured. Having shattered " the cordial understand-
ing," he may have thought that he must be able to
show that he had substituted for the English, the
Austrian, alliance. Perhaps he may have had some
idea of isolating England, by means of the close
relations which he proposed to establish between the
government of the " Citizen King " and the absolute
1 E. Begnault, Histoire de Unit ans, III. pp. 190-198.
- Thureau-Dangin, La Monarchic de Juillet, VII. pp. 116-148.
442
PALMERSTON AND THE REVOLUTION OF '48
Courts. But, be his motives what they may, his deal-
ings with Metternich, in 1847, were unquestionably one
of the chief reasons of the revolution of '48. 1
For the first time, between the years 1830 and
1848, the attempt was seriously made by the French
and English governments to establish, as a primary
principle of policy, the necessity of maintaining close
and intimate relations between the two countries. The
result, on the whole, disappointed expectations. The
great work of Talleyrand's old age, the cementing of a
good understanding between the Whigs and the Orleans'
Monarchy, without doubt, deterred the absolute Courts
from intervening in French affairs after the Revolution
of July. Unquestionably, also, it averted a great war
in the question of the separation of Belgium from Hol-
land. But, on subsequent occasions, it did not prevent
grave differences of opinion from arising between the
two governments. The time had not yet come when
"the cordial understanding" could be placed upon a
firm and durable basis. The maintenance of the settle-
ment, agreed to after the great war, was still the founda-
tion of British policy in Europe. France, on the other
hand, chafed bitterly at the conditions imposed upon
her by the Congress of Vienna. Even among the peace-
loving middle-classes the hope was fondly entertained
that the man would arise .who, " a grands coups de
sabre," should destroy the treaties of 1815 and give
back to France her " natural frontiers." Bonapartism
was a living force by reason of the existence of this
feeling. Louis Philippe and his ministers sought to
allay the restlesness which it engendered by an active
policy in the Mediterranean and hi more distant waters.
Suspicions and jealousies, the consequences of more
than a hundred years of war and rivalry, were thus
kept alive. French and British officials, whether of high
rank or of low degree, continued to regard each other
1 E. Begnault, Histoire de huit am, III. p. 304.
443
ENGLAND AND THE ORLEANS MONARCHY
with instinctive hostility. Bulwer was no less anxious
to outwit his colleague, Bresson, than was Pritchard to
thwart his fellow-consul, Meerenhout. Nevertheless,
the policy which finally broke up the alliance was not
a policy which commended itself to the French people.
Palmerston's views upon European affairs, between
1846 and 1848, accorded far more with the sentiments
of the majority of Frenchmen than did those of M.
Guizot ; and his quarrel was not with the French
nation, but with the government of Louis Philippe.
444
INDEX
ABD-EL-KADER, Algerian chief, 358
Abdullah Pasha, 150
Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan of Turkey, 242
Aberdeen, Earl of, 34, 37, 38, 116,
222, 281, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334,
339, 340, 342, 343, 344. 345, 347,
348, 349, 352, 354, 355, 356, 357,
358, 359, 360, 362, 363, 364, 365,
366, 367, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376,
377, 379, 380, 382, 385, 392, 401,
404, 421, 426, 442
Adair, Sir Robert, 76, 79, 82, 83,
84, 100, 101, 127
Adelaide, Madame, sister of Louis
Philippe, 9, 401
Ahmed Pasha, 165
Akiff-Effendi, 246
Albani, Cardinal, 104
Albert, Prince Consort of Queen
Victoria, 287, 365, 372, 384, 417
Alexander I., Tsar of Russia, 19, 44
Alexander, Tsare witch, afterwards
Alexander II., 236
Ali Pasha, 146
Alison, Secretary of Embassy at
Constantinople, 289
Althorp, Viscount. See SPENCER,
EARL
Alvanley, Lord, 86
Ancillon, John Peter, 111, 112, 136,
141
Apponyi, Count, 65, 68, 273, 292,
295, 411
Argiielles, Augustin, 218
Aston, Arthur, 217, 226, 307, 339,
340, 344, 371, 432
Athalin, General, Baron, 27, 36, 344
Aubigny, Captain de, 361, 365, 366 i
Auckland, Earl of, 235
Aumale, Due d', son of Louis
Philippe, 338, 373
Avedick, Armenian dragoman, 244
Azeglio, Marquis de, 408, 409
BAGOT, Sir Charles, 76, 118
Balbo, Count Cesare, 408, 409
Balmaceda, Carlist chief, 215
Bandierra, Admiral, 290
Barante, Baron de, 130
Baudrand, General, 15, 81
Beauharnais, Eugene de, 48
Beauvale, Lord, 17, 107, 108, 111,
112, 114, 169, 247, 250, 322
Becker, German poet, 312
Bedford, Duke of, 297
Belliard, General, 21, 61, 83, 100,
101
Benedek, Colonel, 406
Berri, Due de, 62, 350
Berri, Duchesse de, 51, 120, 134,
197
Bernetti, Cardinal, 104, 106, 107
Bernstorff, Count, 24
Berryer, Pierre-Antoine, 350
Beshir, Emir, 152
Bligh, British charge d'affaires at
St. Petersburg, 166, 168, 221
Boghos Bey, 227
Boigne, Comtesse de, 259
Bois-le-Comte, French Ambassador
to the Swiss Confederation, 431,
434
Bordeaux, Due de, 9, 62, 120, 350,
351
Bourqueney, Baron, 241, 286, 321,
322, 323, 326
Boutenieff, Russian Minister at
Constantinople, 154, 155, 156,
157, 158, 161, 162, 223, 247
Bravo, Gonzalez, 217
Bresson, Comte, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 371,
445
INDEX
374, 375, 879, 880, 383, 384, 387,
388, 890, 891, 394, 395, 397, 398,
399, 401, 411, 444
Broglie, Due de, 35, 39, 130, 131,
132, 135, 137, 138, 156, 160, 165,
167, 169, 177, 178, 181, 184, 188,
193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 219, 221,
222, 225, 226, 834, 428, 436
Bruat, Admiral, 360, 361
Brunnow, Baron, 252, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 261, 267, 300, 319
Bubna. Field-Marshal, 19
Bugeaud, Marshal, Due d'Isly, 358,
367
Bulow, Baron, 114, 141, 263, 266,
274, 275, 276, 283
Bulwer, Henry, Lytton, afterwards
Lord Dalling, 232, 249, 250, 257,
279, 280, 295, 296, 298, 307, 833,
337, 339, 341, 370, 371, 372, 373,
374, 375, 378, 879, 380, 885, 386,
388, 390, 393, 896, 400, 411, 432,
444
Buol, Count, 413, 415
Burnes, Sir Alexander, 235, 236
CABRERA, Eamon, 202, 210,214,215,
216
Caillier, Captain, 242
Calatrava, Jose Maria, 203, 205, 207
Calomarde, Spanish statesman, 173,
174
Campbell, Colonel, 156, 162, 226,
227, 230, 282, 233, 234, 251, 257
Canning, George, 20, 50, 63, 144,
146, 147, 352, 403
Canning, Sir Stratford, afterwards
Lord Stratford de Bedcliffe, 161,
153, 155, 174, 175, 177, 221, 433,
434
Carini, Neapolitan Ambassador at
Madrid, 874
Carlos, Don, Pretender to the
Spanish throne, 173, 174, 176,
178, 179, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187,
188, 191, 192, 193, 205, 206, 207,
209, 210, 211, 214, 842, 343, 344,
348, 869, 377, 386, 894, 403
Carlotta, Infanta, 869
Cartwright, Thomas, 49, 50
Castlereagh, Viscount, afterwards
Second Marquis of Londonderry,
16,20
Cea, Bermudez, Spanish statesman,
174, 175, 177, 178, 336
Chad, British minister at Berlin.
110, 112
Charles X., King of France, 1, 4, 6,
8, 16, 20, 21, 30, 39, 43, 45
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia,
408, 409, 413, 414, 418, 437
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 49,
336
Charles Frederick, Archduke of
Austria, 290
Charles, of Naples, Prince, 51, 55,
57, 59, 69
Charlotte, Princess, daughter of
George IV., 69
Chasse, General, Baron, 76, 140,
142
Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, 26,
64, 350
Chekib-Effendi, 263, 267, 271
Chesney, Colonel Francis, 237
Chlopicki, General, 44
Chrzanowski, General Adalbert,
229, 251, 252
Clanricarde, Marquis of, 236, 252,
319, 320
Clarendon, Earl of, 177, 184, 186,
192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 203, 207,
208, 210, 216, 217, 265, 266, 275,
297, 336, 396
Cochelet, Adrien-Louis, 241, 242,
269, 272, 273
Codrington, Admiral, Sir Edward,
146
Coloredo, Count, 436, 437
Concha, General, 338
Constantino, Paulovitch, Grand
Duke, 144
Cor, dragoman to French Embassy
at Constantinople, 291, 292
Cordoba, General, 201
Cortazar, Modesto, 216
Coste, Jacques, 270, 310
Cousin, Victor, 41
Cowley, Earl, 185, 343, 345, 347,
363, 366, 371, 379, 896
Cubieres, General de, 302
Cunningham, Marchioness of, 50
DAINE, General, 76, 83
Darmes, regicide, 306
Decazes, Due, 39, 340
440
INDEX
Dedel, Dutch Envoy in London, 266
Deutz, Agent of Duchesse de Berri,
197
Diebitsch, Marshal, Count, 26, 42,
64
Diedrichstein, Baron von, 435
Dino, Duchesse de, 32, 199, 266
Dost Mohammad, Amir of Kabul,
235
Drununond-Hay, British Consul at
Tangier, 360
Duckworth, Admiral, 164
Dufour, General, 430, 432
Duhamel, Colonel, 157
Dupetit-Thouars, Admiral, 351, 352,
353, 354, 355, 356, 360
Dupin, Andre, Marie, Jean, Jacques,
31, 129
Dupont, Jacques, 31, 39
Durham, Earl of, 123, 124, 135, 224
EASTHOPE, Sir John, 440
Eliot, Lord, afterwards Earl of St.
Germans, 184, 185
Ellice, Edward, 265, 297, 321
Elphinstone, Miss Mercer, 53
Emin Bey, 148
Enrique, Don, Duke of Seville,
370, 379, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390,
397, 398, 403
Escalera, General, 207
Espana, Count of, 214
Espartero, General Baldomero, 206,
207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216,
217, 307, 335, 338, 339, 340, 341,
343, 344, 346, 347, 368, 369, 371,
378, 404
Esterhazy, Prince, 43
Evans, Sir George de Lacy, 187,
202, 211
Excelmans, General, aftenuards
Marshal, 52
FABVIEK, General, Baron, 52
Fanshawe, Captain, 315
Faucher, Leon, 302
Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 20,
172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 190,
191, 192, 403
Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the
Two Sicilies, 19
Ferdinand II. (" Bomba,") King of
the Two Sicilies, 264, 374, 435
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, King
Consort of Maria II., Queen of
Portugal, 190
Ferdinand, Duke of Saxe-Coburg,
371, 379, 382, 384, 395
Fernanda, Infanta, 372, 377, 391,
394, 395, 397, 398, 400, 401
Fethi Ahmed Pasha, 270, 273
Fezenzac, Due de, 209
Flahaut, General, Comte de, 53, 54,
265, 407
Forbes, British chargl d'affaires at
Vienna, 101
Francis II., Emperor of Austria, 17,
21, 26, 68, 166
Francis IV., Duke of Modena, 64
Francisco de Paula, Infante, 369,
375, 385, 393
Francisco de Asis, Don, Duke of
Cadiz, afterward* King Consort
of Isabella II., Queen of Spain,
370, 379, 384, 387, 391, 395, 396,
397, 398, 401, 402, 403
Frederick William III., King of
Prussia, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32,
68, 167, 274
Frederick William IV., King of
Prussia, 166, 408
Frederick William, Crown Prince
of Prussia. See FREDERICK
WILLIAM IV.
GALLOIS, Captain, 105, 107
Gendebien, Alexandre, Joseph, 48,
52
George IV., King of Great Britain,
14, 50, 69
Gerard, Marshal, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82,
83, 84, 85, 139, 140, 141, 142
Gioberti, Vincenzo, 408, 409
Gliicksberg, Duo de, 340, 341, 345
Goblet, General, 84, 100, 101, 128
Granville, Earl of, 53, 54, 58, 59,
60, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80,
82, 85, 95, 99, 103, 129, 131, 132,
134, 187, 160, 181, 185, 188, 193,
194, 196, 202, 205, 208, 209, 228,
234, 244, 279, 280, 303, 304, 305,
306, 307, 336
Granville, Countess of, 63
Gregory XVI., Pope, 409, 410, 421
Greville, Charles, 64, 70, 265, 283,
297, 299, 302, 312, 321, 329, 441
447
INDEX
Grey, 2nd Earl, 39, 40, 46, 49, 51,
57, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92, 96,
98, 102, 116, 118, 119, 123, 134,
137, 140, 172, 183, 199, 222, 265
Grey, 3rd Earl, 881
Grote, George, 423, 424
Guizot, Francois, 31, 35, 39, 47,
180, 182, 191, 259, 260, 261, 263,
264, 265, 266, 267, 273, 274, 275,
277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 285,
286, 288, 292, 296, 297, 304, 305,
309, 312, 313, 318, 320, 321, 323,
324, 326, 329, 332, 333, 334, 337,
839, 341, 345, 347, 348, 349, 352,
353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 362,
363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 372,
374, 375, 876, 379, 383, 384, 386,
387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394,
398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404, 407,
410, 411, 412, 413, 421, 422, 423,
424, 425, 428, 429, 431, 432, 484,
436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 444
HAINES, Captain, 232.
Hafiz Pasha, 228, 240, 242, 243,
251, 252
Halen, General Van, 344
Halil Pasha, 155, 158, 159, 243,
269
Hay, Admiral, Lord John, 201,
207, 213
Heine, Heinrich, 63, 120, 302
Heytesbury, Lord, 26, 27, 28, 42,
68, 87, 88, 89, 90, 110, 123, 125
Hiniiber, General, 72
Hobson, Captain William, 851
Hodges, Colonel, 269, 272
Holland, Lord, 255, 266, 275, 298,
302, 321, 327
Holland, Lady, 298
Hosrew Pasha, 150, 243, 247, 268,
269, 272, 273
Howard de Walden, Lord, 189, 190
Howden, Lord, 411
Hugon, Admiral, 226, 306
Humann, Jean-Georges, 182
Hume, Joseph, 281
Hussein Pasha, 151
IBELL, Charles, 24
Ibrahim Pasha, 145, 146, 149, 150,
151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159,
160, 161, 219, 220, 232, 234, 240,
241, 242, 245, 247, 251, 252, 253,
268, 269, 271, 280, 283, 287, 291,
294, 295, 296, 301, 310, 311, 314,
817
Isabella II., Queen of Spain, 174,
176, 180, 186, 204, 206, 208, 211,
213, 216, 335, 337, 338; 340, 341,
342, 343, 344, 347, 348, 368, 369,
870, 371, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379,
382, 383, 387, 388, 391, 394, 396,
397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 411
Isturiz, Francisco, Javier de, 202,
379
JARNAC, Philippe de Rohan-Chabot,
Comte de, 349, 360, 361, 362,
363, 364, 365, 866, 375, 376, 383,
384, 386, 388, 391, 392, 394, 402
Jochmus, General, 252, 314
Joinville, Prince de, son of Louis
Philippe, 189, 244, 338, 356, 358,
359, 364, 867
KLINDWORTH, secret diplomatic
agent, 412
Kotchuby, Russian minister, 156
Kotzebue, Augustus, 24
LA FAYETTE, Marquis de, 5, 9, 11,
35,46
Laffitte, Jacques, 4, 9, 39, 62, 63
Lalande, Admiral, 248, 244, 245
Lallemand, General, Baron, 52
Lamarque, General, Comte, 46, 120
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 438
Lamb, Sir Frederick. See BEAU-
VALE, LORD
Lamoriciere, General de, 358, 360
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 131, 266,
275, 802
La Tour Maubourg, General, Mar-
quis de, 82, 84, 95, 98, 99, 100,
127, 139
Lawocstine, Colonel, Marquis de,
54, 55, 56
Leon, General Diego, 338
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, after-
wards Leopold I., King of the
Belgians, 49, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
74, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 91, 92,
93, 99, 100, 101, 126, 127, 139,
143, 285, 287, 300, 307, 367, 384
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince,
448
INDEX
371, 375, 377, 379, 385, 391, 392,
395,402
Lesseps, Ferdinand, Viscomte de,
227, 345, 346
Lcuchtenberg, Auguste, Due de, 48,
51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 189
Lieven, Prince, 42, 90, 115, 221
Lieven, Princess, 222, 259, 265, 274
Lobau, Marshal Mouton de, 46
Londonderry, 3rd Marquis of, 74,
85, 223
Louis XVIII., King of France, 6,
7, 30, 39, 62, 340
Louis Philippe, King of the French,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 21,
22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 40, 45,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57,
58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 81,
92, 97, 100, 121, 124, 129, 130,
131, 134, 137, 144, 173, 177, 182,
185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192,
193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 220,
239, 250, 258, 264, 265, 279, 285,
287, 292, 293, 300, 305, 307, 308,
309, 311, 319, 327, 329, 331, 335,
337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343,
344, 347, 348, 350, 351, 355, 356,
357, 358, 365, 368, 369, 370, 371,
372, 374, 375, 376, 379, 382, 383,
384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392,
393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400,
401, 402, 407, 410, 413, 422, 423,
425, 429, 437, 438, 439, 443, 444
Louise, Princesse, daughter of
Louis Philippe, consort of Leo-
pold I., Kuig of the Belgians,
126, 392
Louie, Marquise de, 189
Lushington, Doctor, 334
Liitzow, Count, 67
Lyndhurst, Lord, 118, 119
Lyons, Sir Edmund, 411
MAANEN, Cornelius van, 29
Macneil, British minister at Te-
heran, 235
Mahmud II., Sultan of Turkey,
145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 157,
159, 161, 163, 165, 169, 219, 220,
227, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 239,
240, 242, 246
Maison, Marshal, Marquis, 41, 64,
66, 67, 108
Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, 164
]ilB.uA.eviile,Tlriti8h charged' affaires
at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157.
158, 160
Maria II., Queen of Portugal, 171,
173, 174, 176, 189, 190
Maria Amalia of Saxony, 3rd wife
of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain,
172
Maria Christina, 4th wife of Fer-
dinand VII. and Queen Regent of
Spain, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177,
186, 192, 194, 195, 202, 203, 206,
207, 209, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218,
307, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340,
343, 344, 346, 348, 368, 369, 370,
372, 374, 376, 378, 379, 382, 383,
384, 385, 387, 389, 392, 395, 397,
398, 399, 400, 401
Marie Amelie, Queen of the French,
Consort of Louis Philippe, 9, 51,
391
Mareuil, French charge d'affaires
in London, 132
Maroto, General Rafael, 211, 212,
213, 214
Martinez, de la Rosa, Francisco,
178, 180, 184, 187, 190, 192
Matuszewic, Count, 111, 115, 169
Mauguin, Francois, 49
NauxoieintTurkisb. charge d'affaires
at Vienna, 153
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 408
Medem, Count, 252
Meerenhout, French consul at Ta-
hiti, 352, 353, 354, 444
Mehemet Ali, 145, 146, 148, 149,
150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158,
159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 170, 171,
219, 220, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239,
240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247,
248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256,
260, 261, 262, 263, 266, 267, 268,
269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277,
278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 290,
291, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300,
301, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 812,
313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 321,
322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 403
Melbourne, Viscount, 183, 186, 205,
449
2G
INDEX
266, 275, 282, 288, 286, 287, 297,
298, 299, 808, 807, 309, 326
Menoizabal, Juan Alvarez, 191, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202
Merode, Comte Felix de, 55
Metternich, Clement Wenceslas,
Prince, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 42, 43, 49, 65, 67, 68,
101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 112,
114, 121, 136, 144, 166, 167, 168,
169, 198, 204, 225, 245, 247, 254,
266, 269, 293, 300, 310, 312, 316,
319, 320, 821, 322, 324, 326, 332,
336, 342, 348, 344, 370, 393, 407,
408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415,
416, 418, 421, 422, 423, 424, 429,
435, 437, 442, 443
Meulinaer, Dutch statesman, 82,
84, 126, 128
Miguel, Dom, usurping King of
Portugal, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177, 178, 179
Miller, Major-General, 854
Mimaut, French consul-general at
Alexandria, 227, 272
Minto, Earl of, 417, 418, 421, 424,
425, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 435,
442
Miraflores, Marquis of, 378, 896
Mohammad, Shah of Persia, 235,
236
Mol6, Louis, Comte, 31, 35, 36, 38,
39, 48, 196, 204, 205, 207, 212,
234,329,336
Moltke, Major Helmuth von, after-
wards Field-Marshal, 280, 288,
251
Montalivet, Comte de, 45
Montpensier, Due de, son of Louis
Philippe, 371, 372, 377, 383, 887,
391, 393, 894, 397, 398, 400, 401,
402
Montrond, Comte Casimir de, 32, 58
Morier, Burnet, 426
Morier, David, 425, 426, 432
Morny, Due de, 53
Mortemart, Due de, 87
Mounier, Baron, 321
Munagorri, Basque lawyer, 210,
212
Muraviefi; General, 154, 155, 156,
158
Mustafa-Effendi, 153
NAMIC Pasha, 153
Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles,
175, 290, 295, 301, 313, 314, 315,
316, 317, 360
Napoleon, Prince Charles, 66
Napoleon, Prince Louis, afterwards
Napoleon III., 53, 66, 121, 285, 286
Narvaez, General Bamon Maria,
211, 335, 346, 368, 374, 376, 378,
379, 383
Nemours, Due de, son of Louis
Philippe, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
60, 61, 189, 189, 873
Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count,
20, 22, 87, 88, 90, 110, 125, 156,
165, 166, 167, 168, 220, 221, 236,
252, 269, 365
Neumann, Baron, 258, 263, 266,
273, 283
Nicholas I., Tsar of Russia, 20, 26,
27, 28, 86, 44, 68, 73, 88, 90, 101,
105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 116, 123,
124, 135, 140, 146, 147, 154, 156,
157, 160, 168, 166, 168, 220, 223,
224, 239, 241, 246, 258, 257, 319,
356, 357, 429
Normanby, Marquis of, 391, 393,
407, 411, 416, 439, 441
Nourri-Effendi, 242, 262, 263
Nunoz. See RIANZARBZ, DUKB OF
Nuiioz, brother of Duke of Rian-
zarez, 390
OCHSENBEIN, Ulrich, 424, 427, 428,
429, 432, 433
O'Donnell, General, 216, 338
Olozaga, Salustiano de, 339
Orange, Prince Frederick of, 29
Orange, William, Prince of, 29, 36,
47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 70, 76, 88
Orleans, Due de. See Louis
PHILIPPE, King of the French
Orleans, Due de, eldest son of
Louis Philippe, 139, 198, 204,
225, 298
Orloff, General, Count Alexis, 108,
109, 110, 111, 112, 118, 114, 115,
116, 162, 163, 170, 254
Osman Bey, 243
Otho, King of Greece, 311, 411
Otrante, Comte Athanase de, 65
PAGEOT, French diplomatist, 341,
342, 343
450
INDEX
Palmella, Duke of, 189
Palmerston, Viscount, 41, 42, 46,
49, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 72,
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98,
99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 112,
113, 115, 116, 125, 128, 134, 136,
139, 141, 143, 144, 153, 156, 166,
169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181,
182, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 195,
196, 199, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209,
213, 217, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225,
226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233,
236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245,
246, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263, 264,
265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 273, 274,
275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282,
284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290,
292, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 303,
304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312,
313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 822, 324,
325, 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332,
333, 336, 352, 380, 381, 382, 383,
384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391,
392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 399,
400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407,
411, 415, 416, 417, 424, 425, 426,
427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433,
435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 444
Palmerston, Lady, 382
Panizzi, Sir Anthony, 441
Parnell, Sir Henrys 39
Pedro L, Emperor of Brazil, 171,
172, 173. 175, 176, 178, 189
Peel, Sir Robert, 183, 186, 222,
281, 327, 331, 357, 360, 372, 873,
380, 381, 401, 432
Peel, Robert, son of Sir Robert,
431, 432, 433
Perier, Casimir, 39, 62, 63, 64, 67,
68, 72, 75, 78, 79, 81, 86, 100,
102, 103, 105, 108, 112, 118, 120,
121, 129, 130
Perigord, Comte Edmond de, 32
Piscatory, French minister at
Athens, 411
Pius IX., Pope, 409, 414
Polignac, Prince Jules de, 3, 14, 15,
26, 45, 155
Pomare, Queen of Tahiti, 352, 353,
354, 361, 365
Ponsonby, Viscount, 50, 52, 54, 55,
56, 59, 60, 71, 72, 156, 162, 223,
224, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 239,
240, 248, 244, 247, 248, 269, 270,
273, 291, 303, 305, 316, 324, 325,
326, 415
Pontois, French ambassador at
Constantinople, 269, 291, 292
Pottinger, Eldred, 285
Pozzo di Borgo, Charles, Count,
160
Prim, Brigadier-General, after-
wards Marshal, 346
Pritchard, George, 353, 854, 355,
356, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365,
366, 367, 444
QUESADA, General, 203
RADETZKY, Field-Marshal, Count,
104, 485, 437
Radowitz, General von, 436, 437
Ranjit Singh, Maharajah of Lahore,
235
Rayneval, Alphonse Gerard de, 187,
195, 197
Reeve, Henry, 281, 302, 312, 329
Reichstadt, Due de, son of
Napoleon L, 67, 121
Remusat, Comte Charles de, 5, 47
Reshid Bey, 159
Reshid, Mustafa, Pasha, 229, 239,
240, 244, 269, 273, 291, 292
Riego, Rafael del, 179
Rifaat Bey, 288, 290, 294, 301
Rigny, Admiral, Comte de, 178,
179
Rives, American minister in Paris,
5
Rodil, General, 179
Rossi, Comte Pellegrino, 410, 421
Roussin, Admiral, Baron, 75, 158,
159, 160, 162, 168, 172, 228, 234,
241, 247, 248, 257, 272, 302
Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 130
Russell, Lord John, 282, 297, 299,
303, 380, 381, 383, 392, 416, 442
SAINTK-AULAIRE, Marquis de, 66,
104, 193, 247, 333, 380, 428
Saldanha, Marshal, Duke of, 189
Salis-Soglio, Ulnch von, 430
Salvandy, Comte de, 340, 341
Sami Bey, 272, 273
INDEX
Samoa, Prince of, 272
Sand, Karl, 24
Sarim-Effendi, 227, 228, 272
Sarsfield, General, 207
Sartorius, Sir George, 172, 175
Sebastiani, General, afterwards
Marshal, 41, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70,
72, 73, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86, 87,
89, 94, 98, 99, 100, 132, 256, 257,
258, 259, 348
Sebastiani, General Tiburce, 100
Serrano, General, 411
Seves, Colonel. See SULEYMAN
PASHA
Seymour, George, 106, 107
Simonitch, Count, 235, 236
Sotomayor, Duke of, 382
Soult, Marshal, Due de Dalmatic,
79, 85, 131, 132, 142, 197, 212,
240, 241, 242, 243, 246, 248, 249,
250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259,
260, 309, 356
Southern, secretary to British
legation and charge d'affaires at
Madrid, 194, 215, 837
Spencer, Earl, 183, 297
Stockmar, Baron, 77, 84, 91, 92,
93, 98, 101, 115, 116, 125, 126,
127, 439
Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert,
249, 251, 264, 278, 289, 290, 301,
311, 314, 315
Stuart de Bothesay, Lord, 34, 35,
38, 45, 48, 53
Stiirmer, Baron, 247, 316, 326
Suleyman Pasha, 149, 291, 801
TALLEYRAND-PERIGORD, Prince de,
30, 31, 32, 83, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41,
42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59,
61, 66, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79,
80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95,
98, 99, 102, 105, 115, 116, 137,
141, 144, 178, 179, 180, 198, 259,
443
Taylor, Sir Brooke, 66
Temple, Sir William, 264
Terceira, Duke of, 176
Thiers, Louis-Adolphe, 4, 8, 132,
197, 198, 201, 203, 204, 225, 226,
227, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265,
267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283,
284, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296,
297, 298, 302, 304, 305, 306, 308,
309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 328,
329, 412, 437, 439, 440, 441
Toreno, Count, 192, 337, 343, 396
Trapani, Count, 369, 370, 373, 374,
376, 878, 379, 384, 387, 402
Turner, Lieutenant, 208, 210, 212
VARENNES, French charge d'affaires
at Constantinople, 154, 155, 157,
160
Veron, Doctor, 248
Verstolk, Dutch statesman, 75, 113
Victoria, Queen of Great Britain,
212, 285, 299, 303, 325, 348, 350,
356, 367, 368, 372, 373, 391, 392,
417
Villele, Jean-Baptiste de, 146
Villiers, George. See CLARENDON,
EARL OF
Vogorides, Prince, 272
WALEWSKI, Comte, 284, 294, 411
Walker, Captain, 245, 301, 814
Wellington, Duke of, 14, 15, 28,
32, 34, 37, 41, 81, 86, 96, 116,
119, 147, 183, 185, 222, 223, 224,
281, 287, 331, 332, 357
Werther, Baron, 31, 186, 295, 319
Weyer, Silvain van de, 52, 91, 100,
116, 117, 128
William I., King of the Nether lands,.
29, 43, 47, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75,
76, 77, 80, 91, 93, 101, 109, 110,
112, 113, 115, 122, 123, 125, 127,
133, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143
William IV., King of Great Britain *
15, 32, 39, 40, 106, 118, 134, 137,
153, 183
Witkewitch, Captain, 235, 236
Wittgenstein, Prince, 22, 24, 437
Wylde, Colonel, 187, 200, 201, 210,
213
ZUMALACARREGUI, General, 183,.
200
Zuylen, Baron van, 125, 128
PUINTKD BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LOOTED, LONDON AND BECCLES.
DATE DUE
PRINTED IN US